[Senate Hearing 107-749] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 107-749 NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS ======================================================================= HEARINGS before the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION on NOMINATIONS OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD; PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ; DOV S. ZAKHEIM; CHARLES S. ABELL; VICTORIA CLARKE; EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE; WILLIAM J. HAYNES II; POWELL A. MOORE; DR. DAVID S.C. CHU; THOMAS E. WHITE; GORDON R. ENGLAND; DR. JAMES G. ROCHE; ALFRED V. RASCON; DOUGLAS JAY FEITH; DR. JACK DYER CROUCH II; PETER W. RODMAN; SUSAN MORRISEY LIVINGSTONE; JESSIE HILL ROBERSON; THOMAS P. CHRISTIE; ALBERTO J. MORA; DIANE K. MORALES; STEVEN J. MORELLO, SR.; WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.; MICHAEL W. WYNNE; DIONEL M. AVILES; REGINALD JUDE BROWN; STEVEN A. CAMBONE; MICHAEL MONTELONGO; JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.; JOHN B. STENBIT; DR. RONALD M. SEGA; MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ; MICHAEL PARKER; DR. MARIO P. FIORI; H.T. JOHNSON; NELSON F. GIBBS; GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF; GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF; GEN. PETER PACE, USMC; GEN. JOHN W. HANDY, USAF; ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN; LINTON F. BROOKS; MARVIN R. SAMBUR; WILLIAM WINKENWERDER, JR.; EVERT BECKNER; MARY L. WALKER; JOSEPH E. SCHMITZ; SANDRA L. PACK; R.L. BROWNLEE; DR. DALE KLEIN; PETER B. TEETS; AND GEN. CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., USAF ---------- JANUARY 11; FEBRUARY 27; APRIL 24, 26; MAY 1, 10; JUNE 5, 7, 22, 27; JULY 31; AUGUST 1; SEPTEMBER 13, 25; OCTOBER 11, 23; NOVEMBER 8; DECEMBER 4, 2001 ---------- Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS S. Hrg. 107-749 NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS ======================================================================= HEARINGS before the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION on NOMINATIONS OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD; PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ; DOV S. ZAKHEIM; CHARLES S. ABELL; VICTORIA CLARKE; EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE; WILLIAM J. HAYNES II; POWELL A. MOORE; DR. DAVID S.C. CHU; THOMAS E. WHITE; GORDON R. ENGLAND; DR. JAMES G. ROCHE; ALFRED V. RASCON; DOUGLAS JAY FEITH; DR. JACK DYER CROUCH II; PETER W. RODMAN; SUSAN MORRISEY LIVINGSTONE; JESSIE HILL ROBERSON; THOMAS P. CHRISTIE; ALBERTO J. MORA; DIANE K. MORALES; STEVEN J. MORELLO, SR.; WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.; MICHAEL W. WYNNE; DIONEL M. AVILES; REGINALD JUDE BROWN; STEVEN A. CAMBONE; MICHAEL MONTELONGO; JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.; JOHN B. STENBIT; DR. RONALD M. SEGA; MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ; MICHAEL PARKER; DR. MARIO P. FIORI; H.T. JOHNSON; NELSON F. GIBBS; GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF; GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF; GEN. PETER PACE, USMC; GEN. JOHN W. HANDY, USAF; ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN; LINTON F. BROOKS; MARVIN R. SAMBUR; WILLIAM WINKENWERDER, JR.; EVERT BECKNER; MARY L. WALKER; JOSEPH E. SCHMITZ; SANDRA L. PACK; R.L. BROWNLEE; DR. DALE KLEIN; PETER B. TEETS; AND GEN. CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., USAF __________ JANUARY 11; FEBRUARY 27; APRIL 24, 26; MAY 1, 10; JUNE 5, 7, 22, 27; JULY 31; AUGUST 1; SEPTEMBER 13, 25; OCTOBER 11, 23; NOVEMBER 8; DECEMBER 4, 2001 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 75-903 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Maine JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri MARK DAYTON, Minnesota Les Brownlee, Staff Director David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky David S. Lyles, Staff Director Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES Page January 11, 2001 Nomination of Donald H. Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense...... 1 Statements of: Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois....................................................... 9 Fitzgerald, Hon. Peter G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois....................................................... 10 Rumsfeld, Donald H., Nominee to be Secretary, Department of Defense........................................................ 13 February 27, 2001 Nomination of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense........................................................ 209 Statements of: Sarbanes, Hon. Paul R., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland 212 Wolfowitz, Dr. Paul D., Nominee to be Deputy Secretary of Defense 214 April 24, 2001 Nominations of Dr. Dov S. Zakheim to be Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Charles S. Abell to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy; and Victoria Clarke to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. 301 Statements of: Zakheim, Dr. Dov S., Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller.................................................... 306 Clarke, Victoria, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs............................................. 308 Abell, Charles S., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy.................................... 309 April 26, 2001 Nominations of Edward C. Aldridge to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology; William J. Haynes II to be General Counsel of the Department of Defense; and Powell A. Moore to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs........................................................ 371 Statements of: Thompson, Hon. Fred, a U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee.. 374 Aldridge, Edward C., Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology..................................... 376 Moore, Powell A., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs........................................ 381 Haynes, William J. II, Nominee to be General Counsel of the Department of Defense.......................................... 382 (iii) May 1, 2001 Pending Military Nominations..................................... 449 May 10, 2001 Nomination of Dr. David S.C. Chu to be Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Thomas E. White to be Secretary of the Army; Gordon R. England to be Secretary of the Navy; Dr. James G. Roche to be Secretary of the Air Force; and Alfred V. Rascon to be Director of Selective Service..................... 455 Statements of: Sarbanes, Hon. Paul, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland... 460 Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland 461 Gramm, Hon. Phil, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas......... 462 Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe, a Representative from the State of Maryland....................................................... 462 Chu, Dr. David S.C., Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness........................................ 464 Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas.......................................................... 464 White, Thomas E., Jr., Nominee to be Secretary of the Army....... 466 England, Gordon R., Nominee to be Secretary of the Navy.......... 458 Roche, Dr. James G., Nominee to be Secretary of the Air Force.... 469 Rascon, Alfred V., Nominee to be Director of Selective Service... 472 June 5, 2001 Nomination of Douglas Jay Feith to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Dr. Jack Dyer Crouch II to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; and Peter W. Rodman to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs............................................... 581 Statements of: Feith, Douglas Jay, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy......................................................... 582 Rodman, Peter W., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs............................. 582 Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania................................................... 584 Bond, Hon. Christopher ``Kit'', a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri....................................................... 586 June 7, 2001 Nominations of Susan Morrisey Livingstone to be Under Secretary of the Navy; Jessie Hill Roberson to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management; and Thomas P. Christie to be Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense........................................................ 867 Statements of: Livingstone, Susan Morrisey, Nominee to be Under Secretary of the Navy........................................................... 875 Roberson, Jessie Hill, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management............................ 877 Christie, Thomas P., Nominee to be Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense.......................... 878 June 22, 2001 Nominations of Alberto J. Mora to be General Counsel of the Navy; Diane K. Morales to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness; Steven J. Morello, Sr., to be General Counsel of the Army; William A. Navas, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and Michael W. Wynne to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology......................... 935 Statements of: Morello, Steven J., Sr., Nominee to be General Counsel of the Army........................................................... 941 Wynne, Michael W., Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology......................... 942 Morales, Diane K., Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness................... 942 Navas, William A., Jr., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.......................... 943 Mora, Alberto J., Nominee to be General Counsel of the Navy...... 944 June 27, 2001 Nominations of Dionel M. Aviles to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller; Reginald Jude Brown to be Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Dr. Steven A. Cambone to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Michael Montelongo to be Assistant Secretary for the Air Force, Financial Management and Comptroller; and John J. Young, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition............ 1031 Statements of: Inouye, Hon. Daniel, a U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii..... 1034 Stevens, Hon. Ted, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska....... 1035 Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a U.S. Representative from the State of Texas.......................................................... 1036 Montelongo, Michael, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary for the Air Force, Financial Management and Comptroller................ 1040 Brown, Reginald Jude, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs............................. 1041 Cambone, Dr. Steven A., Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy............................................. 1041 Aviles, Dionel M., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller........................... 1042 Young, John J., Jr., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition................... 1042 July 31, 2001 Nominations of John B. Stenbit to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence; Dr. Ronald M. Sega to be Director of Defense, Research and Engineering; Michael L. Dominguez to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Paul Michael Parker to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works; Dr. Mario P. Fiori to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment; H.T. Johnson to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; and Nelson F. Gibbs to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Environment.................................. 1139 Statements of: Dominguez, Michael L., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs..................... 1144 Stenbit, John B., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence.......... 1145 Sega, Dr. Ronald M., Nominee to be Director of Defense Research and Engineering................................................ 1146 Lott, Hon. Trent, a U.S. Senator from the State of Mississippi... 1159 Cochran, Hon. Thad, a U.S. Senator from the State of Mississippi. 1161 Parker, Paul Michael, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works........................................... 1165 Fiori, Dr. Mario P., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment......................... 1166 Johnson, H.T., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment.................................. 1167 Gibbs, Nelson F., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Environment........................ 1167 August 1, 2001 Nomination of Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff United States Air Force.......................................................... 1309 Statement of: Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Nominee to be Chief of Staff, United States Air Force............................................... 1313 September 13, 2001 Nomination of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF, to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................................... 1377 Statement of: Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Nominee to be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff................................................ 1383 September 25, 2001 Nominations of Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, for Reappointment in the Grade of General and for Appointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. John W. Handy, USAF, for Reappointment in the Grade of General and for Appointment as Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command and Commander Air Mobility Command; and Adm. James O. Ellis, Jr., USN, for Reappointment in the Grade of Admiral and for Appointment as Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command........................................................ 1445 Statements of: Handy, Gen. John W., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and for Appointment as Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command, and Commander, Air Mobility Command........................................................ 1451 Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and for Appointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................................................... 1451 Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and for Appointment as Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command....................................... 1451 October 11, 2001 Nominations of Linton F. Brooks to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration; Marvin R. Sambur to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; William Winkenwerder, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; Everet Beckner to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration; and Mary L. Walker to be General Counsel of the Air Force............................ 1529 Statements of: Domenici, Hon. Pete V., a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico......................................................... 1531 Beckner, Everet, Ph.D., Nominee to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration..... 1535 Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., Nominee to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration................................................. 1537 Winkenwerder, William, Jr., M.D., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs........................ 1538 Sambur, Marvin R., Ph.D., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.................................. 1539 Walker, Mary L., Nominee to be General Counsel of the Air Force.. 1539 October 23, 2001 Nominations of Joseph E. Schmitz to be Inspector General, Department of Defense; and Sandra L. Pack to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. 1623 Statements of: Schmitz, Joseph E., Nominee to be Inspector General, Department of Defense..................................................... 1627 Pack, Sandra L., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller....................... 1628 November 8, 2001 Nominations of R.L. Brownlee to be Under Secretary of the Army; Dr. Dale Klein to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; and Peter B. Teets to be Under Secretary of the Air Force................ 1693 Statements of: Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas.......................................................... 1700 Klein, Dr. Dale, Nominee to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs....................................................... 1706 Brownlee, R.L., Nominee to be Under Secretary of the Army........ 1707 Teets, Peter B., Nominee to be Under Secretary of the Air Force.. 1709 December 4, 2001 Nomination of Claude M. Bolton, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology............ 1789 Statement of: Bolton, Maj. Gen. Claude M., Jr., USAF, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology..................................................... 1792 APPENDIX......................................................... 1863 NOMINATION OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ---------- THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2001 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Lieberman, Cleland, Reed, Warner, Thurmond, McCain, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, and Sessions. Other Senators present: Senators Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Collins, and Bunning. Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff director. Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Charles S. Abell, professional staff member; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; John R. Barnes, professional staff member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Cord A. Sterling, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Eric H. Thoemmes, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Thomas C. Moore, and Michele A. Traficante. Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; David Klain, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Christopher J. Paul and Walter E. Fischer, assistants to Senator McCain; Gregory C. McCarthy, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Thomas A. Vecchiolla, assistant to Senator Snowe; Robert Alan McCurry and James Beauchamp, assistants to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael P. Ralsky, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Scott Douglass, assistant to Senator Sessions. Other Senate staff present: Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Pete Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Sheila Murphy, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Larry Smar, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Christopher Ford and Sam Patten, assistants to Senator Collins; and Jeff Freeman, assistant to Senator Cochran. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER Senator Warner. The history of this committee in the annals of the Senate reflect that we have achieved, through successive chairmen, a high degree of bipartisanship that our Nation is entitled from this committee. I have been privileged to serve 23 years on this committee with my distinguished colleague. We came together 23 years ago. It has been my privilege to serve as the Chairman for the past 2 years. If the high water does not rise and flood us out, I will return to that position in a week or so. But in the meantime, in the spirit of bipartisanship, I am privileged to pass the gavel to Senator Levin. Senator Levin and I and Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and other members of the House went down to visit with President-elect Bush on Monday and we had a very good, thorough, and searching examination of defense issues and that struck the note of bipartisanship that is so essential as we, the collective members of our committee, represent this Nation in national security. So, Mr. Chairman, it is with privilege I pass the gavel to you. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. I have been Chairman of this Committee for all of about a week. I cannot tell you how many people have noted to me just how you have thrived under my chairmanship already. [Laughter.] Before I proceed, I want to thank you for the many good years of friendship we have enjoyed over two decades now that we have been in the Senate. I will have some more comments about your chairmanship and that of Senator Thurmond and others in a moment. This is just a personal thank you to you. The committee meets today to consider the nomination of Donald Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense. As the first order of business, I want to welcome all of our Members back to the committee and extend a special welcome to our prospective new members. On our side, we are joined by Senator Akaka, Senator Bill Nelson, Senator Ben Nelson, Senator Carnahan, and Senator Dayton. On the Republican side, we are joined by Senators Collins and Bunning. This is a great committee to serve on. I know that Senator Warner and I and all the members of this committee look forward to our new members joining us. On behalf of the entire committee, I extend a warm welcome to Mr. Rumsfeld and his family. I understand that you are accompanied by your wife, Joyce Rumsfeld, your daughter Marcy Rumsfeld, and your granddaughter Kayley Rumsfeld. We know the sacrifices that your family will make while you are in this position and we want to thank them in advance for their support of you and the sacrifices which they will make. We also welcome Senators Durbin and Fitzgerald who have joined us today. Mr. Rumsfeld is well known to this committee from his recent service as Chairman of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States and his many other endeavors. A couple of the senior members of the committee may also admit to their age by remembering Mr. Rumsfeld's previous service as Secretary of Defense in the Ford administration. Don Rumsfeld was the youngest Secretary of Defense in our history. After a few years of service in the upcoming Bush administration, he will earn the distinction of being our oldest Secretary of Defense as well--at least until Senator Thurmond is sworn in as his successor sometime in the future. [Laughter.] We convene this hearing at a unique moment in the history of this country and in the history of the United States Senate. We have just concluded the closest presidential election in our history. For the first time ever at the beginning of Congress, the Senate is equally divided. A practical arrangement to accommodate that unusual situation was worked out by our leaders and approved by the Senate last week. Times like these call out for, and necessitate, bipartisanship and cooperation. Fortunately, this committee, as Senator Warner has said, has a long tradition of working in a bipartisan manner to address the national security challenges facing this country. Chairman Warner has consistently led the committee in this spirit, as have the chairmen before him. At times when the rest of Congress has suffered from gridlock, our committee's legislative achievements--like the Goldwater- Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--have been marked by bipartisanship. Even our disagreements on issues have rarely been along partisan lines. For instance, while debates on the withdrawal of troops from Kosovo and on additional rounds of base closures have divided this committee in recent years, the division has not been on partisan lines. It is my hope that the ease with which we hand the chairman's gavel back and forth in the course of this month will symbolize the close working relationships on this committee over the decades and help set the tone elsewhere. Our new Secretary of Defense will inherit the most dominant military force in the history of the world. Over the last two decades, our military has incorporated a series of technological improvements that have revolutionized their military capability--from precision guided munitions and stealth technology to satellite reconnaissance and electronic warfare capabilities. The members of this committee, the Appropriations Committee, and our counterparts in the House of Representatives have played a key role in those changes. Today, each of our military services is more lethal, more maneuverable, more versatile and has greater situational awareness on the battlefield than at any time in history. During the 1990s, Congress and the administration worked together to enhance our national security by achieving a balance between the needs of today's troops, including their current readiness, with the need to develop and field weapons that will enable us to retain our technological advantage in the future. This effort led to the enactment of comprehensive improvements to the military's health care system, military pay and retirement systems, and the substantially increased acquisition spending to recapitalize and modernize the force. We have also been engaged in a constant struggle to maintain funding for operations and maintenance accounts that support current readiness, given the high rates of deployment. The terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole last fall demonstrated once again that our enemies are most likely to use indirect, asymmetric means to attack us. They realize it would be suicide to confront the United States military directly. The most likely threats to our national interest will come from regional conflicts due to ethnic, religious, or cultural conflicts and from terrorists and terrorist states. If states are involved, they will seek to hide their involvement, because the retaliatory power of the United States is so massive and survivable as to guarantee the destruction of the principal goal of a totalitarian regime--its own survival. In the area of national missile defense, the outgoing administration chose to aggressively pursue research and development, while stating a determination to consider in any deployment decision not only the threat, but the system's operational effectiveness and affordability, and the impact that deployment would have on our overall national security. This approach gives appropriate weight not only to the effect that large expenditures on missile defense would have on resources available to meet other vital defense needs, but also to the negative impact that the unilateral deployment of a national missile defense could have on our allies and on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, given the likelihood that the Russian and Chinese response to such unilateral deployment would be to increase (or stop reducing) the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of nuclear material on their soil. As Senator Baker and Lloyd Cutler found in their report released yesterday, the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States is that weapons of mass destruction or weapons usable material located in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home. We need to analyze the extent to which we spend defense resources on threats that are the least likely to occur. A ballistic missile attack from a terrorist state against the United States is a threat, but it is one that we have successfully deterred and against which we have a continuing overwhelming deterrent. There are cheaper and easier means of attacking the United States than an ICBM--means such as truck bombs, poisoning of water systems, or infiltration of computer networks--which may not open the unknown attacker to massive destruction in return. Those are just a few of the issues that we will be grappling with as a committee and you will be grappling with as Secretary of Defense. We are blessed to live in a Nation whose political institutions and economy are respected throughout the world. With the end of the Cold War, our core values of freedom, democracy, and human rights appear to be stronger than ever with democratic revolutions changing the history of nation after nation. Our military, when used wisely, at once makes our Nation secure and enables us to play a unique role in influencing the course of events outside our borders in a peaceful and stable direction. But the ability to influence events does not necessarily mean, of course, the ability to control them. We live in such a complex world, where we must deal with many interests that are contrary to our own. We should be proud of all that we have achieved in the world, including the reversal of ethnic cleansing in Europe for the first time in history, which also enabled nearly a million refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes. At the same time, we must be prepared to deal with new threats--particularly the terrorist threat--with new technologies, more mobile forces, and improved intelligence capabilities. Chairman Warner, with my support, created a subcommittee that is specially aimed at addressing these new threats. In the most recent defense authorization bill that we have adopted, we have paid special attention to the need to address the new threats. The new administration will develop its own strategy for addressing these difficult issues and for maintaining the superiority of America's military force. Today's hearing provides an opportunity for all of us to begin the process of discussing that strategy. The nominee before us today has a strong commitment to the national defense. He is well-qualified to address the issues facing the Department of Defense and he is an extremely well-qualified nominee for this position. We congratulate him. We also congratulate the President-elect for this nomination. I now call upon Senator Warner for his opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin. I join you in welcoming our new members. Our new members put this committee at the highest level membership in history at 24. In years past, we recruited members. Now we have certainly an indication of strength among our entire membership as reflected by so many wishing to join us. We welcome you. To you, my dear friend for over 30 years, we have had a friendship and a personal relationship and indeed a professional one, having served together in the Ford administration, I as Secretary of the Navy and you as one of our troublemakers over in the White House. I join in welcoming your lovely wife and family. Anyone taking on particularly your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and that phone is always by your side. Indeed, your family fully shares the heavy responsibilities. You are so fortunate to have such a wonderful family to share that burden. If I may say, Mrs. Rumsfeld, you will be an integral part of reassuring the other families of the service persons throughout the world by your strong support of your husband and indeed them. So we welcome you as a team to the department. I look back over the hearing record of November 12, 1975. It was a very short hearing I note and perhaps not as well attended. But that reflects the importance of the Senate advice and consent today. This committee, as to other committees of the Senate, take that responsibility very seriously. So our hearing today will be lengthy and we will probe deeply into many areas of our security relationships and your responsibility and how you intend to fulfill it. First, I would like to say that based on my good fortune to have known you, I say without any reservation you are competent. You are experienced. You are trustworthy. You have the character, the honesty, to do this job second to none. I was so pleased, and indeed I think the country should be grateful that you are willing to come back again, sign on for a second hitch, as we say in the military, for this important post. I note behind you two old-timers who are not paying any attention to what we are saying, Mr. Schneider and Mr. Korologos. [Laughter.] I do not know why they are here, but we welcome them anyway. [Laughter.] We also commend you, Mr. Rumsfeld, for keeping active and informed on defense and security issues since your last Pentagon service. The committee is familiar with the excellent work you have done in both the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat which issued its report in 1998 and the ongoing Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization which coincidentally the report will be issued today. Now, Senator Levin and I and others have received a briefing on the work of this commission. It is a job well done. It is another serious wake-up call to America about the threats directed at us. Our committee played a central role in establishing both of these commissions and I commend its membership. We thank you again and the members of the committee for your work. We are familiar with the findings and recommendations of the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and the influence that that report had. It came at a critical time I say to you. In many ways, the Ballistic Missile Threat Report changed the entire debate over national missile defense by convincing many in Congress, and, respectfully, in the Clinton administration, that the potential threat is more serious and more imminent than previously understood throughout our Nation. I look forward to your comments on this subject and my dear friend and colleague here I think quite appropriately in his opening statement indicated some of his strong views. We have not always agreed on it, but it is a subject that is the centerpiece of the new Bush administration. No one is better qualified than yourself to advise the President on the directions to be taken. We still have, as you well know, you are a former sailor, former naval aviator the best-trained, best-equipped military force in the world today. There are certainly many areas in which we need to continue to make improvements. We are not pleased at all with the retention levels, difficulty of recruiting. When we recruit today, we recruit families. We recruit unlike when you and I went in many years ago into the service. It is families today. When that critical decision is made about retention the wives are usually co-equal partners. It was a family decision to stay or to go out and seek the lucrative opportunities that these well-trained individuals have in the private sector. Readiness and modernization have been the highest priority of this committee. We have achieved some gains, but not enough. Procurement. We have almost dropped to levels which are just totally unacceptable. We have to modernize and restore the best we can within the budget a much higher level of acquiring new and modern weapons. Just look at the truck inventory in the United States Army. No civilian, no private sector, would operate a truck force like we are operating in the military. That is just one thing people can understand all across America. So therefore, Mr. Secretary, we have to increase defense spending. When we, Senator Levin and I, had an opportunity to visit with President-elect Bush, Vice President-elect Cheney, on Monday, we did not talk about specific levels. But there was the clear consensus that we have to increase substantially defense spending. Now, this morning we cannot establish those levels with any precision. But I was heartened to see that the President-elect wants to first task you to examine how the current budget, those of past years, being expended, to determine whether or not you should redirect funding, to determine whether there are efficiencies within which you can gain some cash needed for other programs. Then after doing that, you can establish that level of increase in the context of not only the other budget factors, but most importantly the President-elect said the defense budget has to have a direct relevance if not in fact be driven by the threats poised against this Nation, threats quite different than our generation of active service in the military. Quite different. Senator Levin expounded on terrorism and the work of this committee, and I commend this committee for its work. We have constantly had to push the current administration for higher levels of funding in a wide range of areas to combat terrorism and the risks here in the United States which I will address momentarily. We call it homeland defense. President-elect Bush used that very phrase in his statement at the Citadel which is a foundation document of his thinking. Now, historically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had, of course, a vital role in the planning in the Department of Defense. But I commend them, especially for the past 2 years, and indeed the years before under my distinguished predecessor, Senator Thurmond, for coming before this committee and testifying about the need for additional funds over and above the recommendations and the submissions by the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States at that very table. The past 2 years we have taken that testimony which has been essential as this committee has gone to the floor of the United States Senate to get higher authorization levels for spending. We have gotten what I regard as modest sums, but nevertheless very important increases in the past 2 fiscal years. You will be faced early on with first the supplemental. We have talked about that together. We talked with Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye about it. Followed by a budget amendment to the current Clinton administration budget which is traditionally submitted to Congress by the outgoing President. Those are some of the key things that you will have to address immediately. Within both, you will have additional sums needed desperately for our defense. President-elect Bush has articulated a vision for the U.S. military and have set three broad goals for national defense. First, to strengthen the bond of trust between the President which is so essential, from the four star officer down to the private or the seaman, that bond of trust between the commander and chief and those in uniform and indeed their families. Second, to defend the American people against missiles and terror. Very few in the United States recognize we are virtually defenseless against missile attack. That, of course, is the subject that my colleague discussed and we will have further discussions on that. Third, to begin creating the military of the next century. How well you know from your own study the old slogan they are always preparing to fight the last battle. Well, that worked maybe in World War II when we had the time to catch up because of the protection of the oceans. But those protections are gone today. Warfare is instantaneous. It is the arsenal we have of weapons and trained people in place that will be used. Cyber warfare. No one envisioned that a decade ago. But today it is a threat which I and others think is just as lethal as anything. I commend your predecessor, Secretary Cohen. He has recognized would you not say, Mr. Chairman, the oncoming and the changing threats in just the 4 years that he has been present as Secretary of Defense? I want to say at this time, and I think the members of this committee would want to reflect, our respect for the work that Secretary Cohen and his team have done in his administration. You understand these goals. I want to go back to the President's speech at the Citadel. He said, and I quote, ``Those who want to lead America accept two obligations. One is to use our military power wisely remembering the cost of the war. The other is to honor our commitments to veterans who have paid those costs.'' People. Those who have served in the past, those who are serving today, and those we need to have come in and serve for tomorrow. I am proud of the way this committee, this last bill, began to reach back and take care of those veterans, particularly the career veterans, in terms of their medical needs. This committee is very conscious of the fact that they are the best recruiters in the world, those who have served once. We have in the past, I think, neglected them. That has come to an end with the work of this committee. The start point President-elect Bush has said that he will recommend a substantial pay raise, a billion. This committee has worked on two successive pay raises. We are ready to accept that challenge of that billion dollar mark. Perhaps it has to be adjusted maybe up or sideways or down a bit. But we will back him in working through that very important thing because that is key again to the retention and the care of the families. We all know that most of the retention decisions as I mentioned are made on a family basis. That is critical to care for those people. Homeland defense will be a high priority for President- elect Bush and yourself, if confirmed. President-elect Bush has said that he will deploy both theater and national ABM systems to guard the United States, our allies, and troops deployed overseas against missile attack or the threat of attack. Defense against domestic terrorism, including detecting and responding to such threats, will also be a priority for the next administration. You will be at the very forefront. We also need an immediate and comprehensive review as President-elect Bush advised us when we visited with him of our military today, its structure, it strategy, its capabilities, and its modernization priorities. President-elect Bush has promised such a review. In my conversations with you, you are fully prepared to undertake that the first day you arrive in the department. We must look beyond the modest improvements we have had to our current systems and find ways to enhance and strengthen our military in many areas. I want to include among that base closure. It has been a very contentious subject. In past years, I was privileged to join with my friend, the Chairman, in originating those bills. Senator McCain has been very active on that front. I urge you to take a look at that at the earliest opportunity. There is infrastructure out there that can be withdrawn and I think constructively and in many instances will help local communities to get that infrastructure back and put it to good use. There will be a cost savings to the military which those dollars can be applied elsewhere. In most instances, it will eventually help the local communities. These are some of the initiatives that you must undertake. So I support this nomination very enthusiastically. It is my intention to cast that vote for you subject to the work of this committee and I wish to commend President-elect Bush for putting together an absolutely outstanding team on the areas of national defense, national security, and international affairs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. Two of our friends and dear colleagues have joined us to introduce Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator Durbin, we will call on you first. Then we will call on Senator Fitzgerald. STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS Senator Durbin. Thank you, Chairman Levin, and the members of the committee. It is an honor to introduce to the committee today my distinguished colleague from the land of Lincoln. I know that presidents have often complained about the Senate confirmation process. Herbert Hoover, upon the birth of his granddaughter, said, ``Thank God she doesn't have to be confirmed by the Senate.'' Donald Rumsfeld has so much experience, I am sure he will have less trouble winning confirmation than President Hoover's granddaughter would have had if she had required the Senate's blessing. Don Rumsfeld's resume is impressive. Four-term Congressman from Illinois, Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, White House Chief of Staff, the youngest ever Secretary of Defense, CEO of several major corporations, and a special envoy for President under President Reagan. We have heard a lot about bipartisanship lately. When Don Rumsfeld came by my office to talk about this hearing, he told me that when he served in Congress before Baker versus Clark that Speaker Sam Rayburn had a congressional district of about 89,000. Is that what you remember, Don? His congressional district was the largest in the nation at 1.1 million. The Illinois district that Don Rumsfeld represented in the House of Representatives was split in two in Congress after he departed. One district represented by a conservative Republican and one by a liberal Democrat. His ability to serve such a diverse district speaks well of his ability to bridge a Congress and a country almost equally divided. While all Senators may not agree with Mr. Rumsfeld on every issue, he has certainly earned our respect. In fact, I want to warn my Senate colleagues to be reluctant to go to the mat with Don Rumsfeld. Not only was he Captain of Princeton University's wrestling team, and All Navy wrestling champion, he was also inducted in the National Wrestling Hall of Fame and Museum. He joined Speaker Hastert as another famous wrestler who hails from Illinois. I for one plan to keep in mind that wrestling depends on strategy and making the right move at the right time as much as it does on strength and power. Some of his critics have complained Mr. Rumsfeld's experience with defense is from a bygone, Cold War era. Those critics ignore the obvious. Mr. Rumsfeld's valuable contributions chairing several commissions, including the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, and the obvious experience that he has had in managing major corporations in a new economy. Mr. Rumsfeld has kept up and I would challenge his critics to try to keep up with him. In 1775, in our revolutionary era, Patrick Henry said, ``I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging the future but by the past.'' It is only because the United States was so steadfast in fighting for freedom and democracy that the world enjoys an unprecedented era of freedom and prosperity today. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rumsfeld carries the lamp of experience. I wish him for our country's sake every success as he travels by that light. It is with pride that I present to you one of Illinois' favorite and most distinguished sons. Chairman Levin. Senator Durbin, thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. STATEMENT OF HON. PETER G. FITZGERALD, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of this distinguished committee. It is a great honor and privilege for me to join with my colleague, Senator Durbin, to present to this committee one of Illinois' most distinguished residents, Donald Rumsfeld. The day after President-elect Bush announced his selection of Donald Rumsfeld, I noted that in the New York Times the reporter had asked Henry Kissinger his opinion of the Defense Secretary designate. Dr. Kissinger said, and I quote, ``I literally cannot think of a better person for the post.'' That was exactly my impression. I believe it was the impression of many of the members of this body and certainly of many of the newspaper editorial boards around the country. It is kind of an irony, Don. You were actually my Congressman when I was growing up. I was one of those 1.1 million constituents Senator Durbin referred to. Now, lest this committee conclude that either I am too young to be in the United States Senate or that he is too old to serve as Defense Secretary, I would point out that he was a very young Member of Congress, one of the youngest Members of Congress at the time, in his early 30s. I would note that in one of life's unfair ironies, he has more hair than I do today. As Senator Durbin said, I would not recommend that anybody try to wrestle with Don Rumsfeld. Shortly after I got sworn in, I was very familiar with Donald Rumsfeld's record in business and in government. I knew of his impressive resume. But what I would urge you to reflect upon is, this man is not simply a resume who has held all these impressive posts. He is someone who has collected a lot of wisdom from his years of experience. Shortly after I was sworn in, he shared with me a little pamphlet that he put together and compiled over the years known as ``Rumsfeld's Rules''. If any of you have not seen that, I would recommend that you get a copy of it. It has many of his words of wisdom and advice to Members of Congress or those in the administration. I read that carefully after I got sworn in. I remember certain pearls and chestnuts that you had, such as, ``no Member of Congress is here by accident, if you get to know your fellow colleagues in this body, you will see that there is some special reason each one of them is here. In getting to know that special reason, you will come to respect that member and you will also learn a lot about America.'' So I recommend ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' to all of you. It has a great deal of wisdom in it. As Senator Durbin said, Mr. Rumsfeld is a graduate of Princeton University, and captain of the wrestling team, and I believe, captain of the football team. He went on to be a naval aviator, was the Navy wrestling champion, served four terms in Congress, became the White House Chief of Staff, then was named Defense Secretary. He was regarded as having a wonderful record and having been an outstanding Secretary of Defense the first time around. I can only imagine him being better this time around. Now, there is a lot of talk about investment opportunities these days with the market having gone up so much the last few years and then coming down. A good investment strategy over the last 20 years would have been to invest in companies that were chaired or the CEO was Donald Rumsfeld. G.D. Searle Company, a major Illinois pharmaceutical company, was in dire straits back in 1977 when Don Rumsfeld took over. By the time he left in 1985 and the company was sold, the stock had quadrupled. There was a similar success story with General Instrument Corporation. Many of you are familiar and are friends with Ted Forstman who runs a fund that invests in corporations. Ted Forstman, of course, is known for his philanthropy and his generosity in creating scholarships for young children all over the country. That philanthropy might not have been possible had his fund not bought General Instruments, put Donald Rumsfeld in charge who within 3 years had tripled the stock of that corporation. They took it public. He has continued on in advisory roles to this body and to the executive branch. He has stayed engaged in defense issues. This is a rare individual who has literally succeeded at almost everything he has done in life. I think I can only say, I can only conclude, as some of you have already concluded, that we are simply fortunate to have a person of this caliber who is willing to re-enter public service and to assist our country. Mr. Chairman, I would ask leave to introduce into the record prepared remarks that I have. I want to thank you all for your consideration. I recommend Donald Rumsfeld with whole hearted enthusiasm and confidence. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Senator Fitzgerald follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am honored to be here today to introduce to you a man whom I have admired and respected throughout his distinguished career of public service. Introducing Don Rumsfeld to the Armed Services Committee is a little like introducing Sammy Sosa to the Chicago Cubs. Secretary Rumsfeld has hit home runs in literally everything he has done in his long and influential career. Don Rumsfeld was my congressman when I was growing up. I first met Don in 1988, when he ran for President, and my family has known him for nearly 40 years. I am proud to be before this committee today in support of this extraordinary individual. Don Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on a scholarship, and then was a Navy pilot and All Navy Wrestling Champion, before being elected four times to Congress from my home state of Illinois. Don was an energetic and effective congressman, a rising star, who quickly caught the eye of Gerald Ford, then a Representative from Michigan. In 1969, President Nixon appointed Don as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and later as U.S. Ambassador to NATO. In 1974, President Ford selected Don to be his chief of staff, and Don's sound management and political instincts helped President Ford heal the wounds of Watergate and the Vietnam War. In 1975, President Ford appointed Don as Secretary of Defense, the youngest ever to serve in the position. Once again, Don displayed his extraordinary talents as a tough, skillful manager, strategist, and advocate. Don helped restore the confidence and credibility of our Armed Forces, warned of the growing Soviet threat, and built bipartisan support in Congress for strengthening and modernizing our military. Don then applied his extraordinary energy and talent to the private sector, restoring profitability to two large, Illinois-based blue chip corporations. G.D. Searle, a major worldwide pharmaceutical company, was foundering when Don took over, but made a dramatic recovery under his leadership. Don then returned GI Corporation, a pioneer in telecommunications, to profitability--GI's market value tripled under Don's leadership. Throughout Don's years in business, he continued to serve Illinois and the Nation, on numerous non-profit philanthropic boards, as an adviser to the State and Defense Departments, as President Reagan's Special Envoy to the Middle East, and as Chairman of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, among other things. The President's most important job is Commander in Chief. President-elect Bush has demonstrated in selecting Don Rumsfeld as his Secretary of Defense that he will ensure that our Nation can face the security challenges of the 21st century. These challenges require that we create and maintain a flexible military force that is able to adapt quickly to changing threats. I know Don is committed to ensuring that America's Armed Forces are modernized to meet the challenges of the new century. He understands that today's procurement is tomorrow's readiness. He knows that the men and women of the Armed Forces must remain the best trained and best equipped in the world. President-elect Bush has committed himself to building an effective missile defense system to protect our country from ballistic missile attack and nuclear intimidation. Don, as Chairman of the bipartisan Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, warned the Nation that the missile threat to the U.S. is real and growing, and that the United States will have little or no warning before a rogue state deploys ballistic missiles with the capability to inflict major destruction on the United States. As Don put it so well, the surprise is not that there are surprises, but that we are surprised that there are surprises. We in Congress, by passing the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, made it the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as is technologically possible, an effective National Missile Defense system. Don Rumsfeld is the right individual to make the hard choices and the tough calls that must be made to select and deploy an effective and affordable system that meets the threat. Finally, providing the resources for the defense of this country is one of the greatest responsibilities we have as U.S. Senators. While we often get deeply involved in the pros and cons of this or that fighter plane or battleship, we can never forget what the defense of this country really rests on: our men and women in uniform. Don Rumsfeld knows this to his very core. Don's 3 years of service in the U.S. Navy as a jet pilot and flight instructor, and his work as Secretary of Defense in the post-Vietnam years rebuilding the morale and pride of our military, are legendary. Don clearly understands the sacrifice that has been made by our service members. I am confident Don will help provide our military with the best equipment and training America has to offer and will ensure that every service member and his or her family has the quality of life they were promised. The recently released report on the U.S.S. Cole tragedy underscores the need to beef up security for our troops stationed abroad against the threat of terrorism. In short, I cannot imagine anyone more capable of serving as Secretary of Defense than Don Rumsfeld, and I commend President-elect Bush for his bold choice. I am grateful that Don has agreed to return to what is, without doubt, one of the toughest jobs in the world. We are fortunate to have someone of Don's caliber willing to take on this difficult responsibility once again. It is therefore a great privilege to join my colleague, Senator Durbin, in introducing Don Rumsfeld, and urge the committee to give prompt and favorable consideration to his nomination. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record. We thank both of you for coming. It makes a real difference to the nominee I am sure and to this committee. Mr. Rumsfeld, now you have to live up to all of that and investment advice while you are at it. STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOMINEE Mr. Rumsfeld. Wow. Well, I must say I thank Senator Fitzgerald and Senator Durbin for those very generous words. I will try to live up to them. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as the nominee for the post of Secretary of Defense. I am certainly grateful to President-elect George W. Bush for his confidence that he's placed in me. I thank the committee and you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy in arranging this hearing so promptly. I would like, with your permission, to make some remarks off my prepared statement and have the statement made a part of the record. Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record in full. Mr. Rumsfeld. As has been said, it was 25 years ago that I had the privilege of appearing for the first time before this committee as President Ford's nominee for Secretary of Defense. Certainly, we lived in a very different world then. In the intervening quarter of a century, the world has changed in ways that we could really only have dreamed of. America was locked in a nuclear and ideological standoff with the Soviet Union. Today, the Soviet Union is no more. The world of superpower standoff has given way to a world of expanding freedom and, I would add, expanding opportunity. The last time I appeared here for a confirmation hearing, the Armed Forces and those of our NATO allies stood toe-to-toe facing the militaries of the Warsaw Pact--ready to clash at a moment's notice on a battlefield with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Today, the Warsaw Pact is no more; Berlin is again the capital of a unified Germany; and Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest are the capitals of our new NATO allies. As one who served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, I must say I find these changes breathtaking and fundamental. When I appeared previously, American industry was facing an industrial challenge from Japan. You will recall the productivity and competitiveness made American industry look fat in overhead, excessively layered in management, sluggish in confronting change and innovation. Today, U.S. industry has shaken off those handicaps and--in a process that I have had the privilege to witness first hand-- become a leader and a model for the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet military power have brought the twentieth century--possibly the most violent and destructive century in human history--to a remarkably peaceful close. U.S. and allied military power was the indispensable instrument that contained the Soviet Union, confronted Soviet power and its surrogates at the geographic extremities of its advance, and provided the shield within which democratic order and economic prosperity could evolve and develop. When the great struggle that was World War II had passed, this country found itself facing new challenges with the advent of the Cold War and the development of nuclear weapons. Today, with the Cold War Era history, we find ourselves facing a new era, often called the Post Cold War period or possibly more properly the Era of Globalization. It is an extraordinarily hopeful time, one that is full of promise, but also full of challenges. One of those challenges, one that, if confirmed, I look forward to working with President-elect Bush and this committee and Congress to meet, is the challenge of bringing the American military successfully into the 21st century, so that it can continue to play its truly vital role in preserving and extending peace as far into the future as possible. As President-elect Bush has said, ``After the hard but clear struggle against an evil empire,'' the challenge that we face today ``is not as obvious, but just as noble: To turn these years of influence into decades of peace.'' The ``foundation of our peace'' is a ``strong, capable and modern military.'' Let there be no doubt. The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed conflict, or the end to challenges and threats to U.S. interests. We know that. Indeed, the centrifugal forces in world politics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries whose aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force will produce challenges to important U.S. interests and to those of our friends and allies as Chairman Levin mentioned. President-elect Bush has outlined three overarching goals for bringing U.S. Armed Forces into the 21st century: First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. The brave and dedicated men and women who serve our country in uniform active, guard, and reserve--must get the best support their country can possibly provide them so that we can continue to call on the best people in the decades to come. Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism, the newer threats against our space assets and information systems as members of the committee have mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad, and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats with modern technology and its proliferation confront us. Third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing technological revolution offers to create the military of the next century. Meeting these challenges will require a cooperative effort between Congress and the Executive Branch, and with industry and with our allies as well. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close working relationship with this committee and with the counterpart committees in the House of Representatives to achieve these goals, and to fashion steps to help to transform our defense posture to address those new challenges. We must work together if we are to be able to address the problems of inadequate funding, which has been the case, unreliable funding, pertebations in funding and resistance to change. Change is hard and institutions are difficult to move. With cooperation and collaboration, we can make real progress. Without cooperation, we will surely fail. President-elect Bush is committed to a strong national defense. If confirmed, one of our first tasks will be to undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. defense policy that Senator Warner mentioned. This review will be aimed at making certain that we have a sound understanding of the state of U.S. forces and their readiness to meet the 21st century security environment. We need to ensure that we will be able to develop, deploy, operate, and support a highly effective force capable of deterring and defending against new threats. This will require a refashioning of deterrence and defense capabilities. The old deterrence of the Cold War era is imperfect for dissuading the threats of the new century and for maintaining stability in our new national security environment. If confirmed as Secretary, I plan to pursue five key objectives needed to support and make progress on the President's goal. First, we need to fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the new national security environment. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a fact of life that first must be acknowledged and recognized for what it is. They must be managed. While striving to slow proliferation remains essential, a determined state may, nonetheless, succeed in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and increasingly capable missiles. As a consequence, a decisive change in policy should be aimed at devaluing investment in weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by potential adversaries. Credible deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through retaliation. It must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities, working together to deny potential adversaries the opportunity and the benefits that come from the threat and the use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces, our homeland, as well as those of our allies. Second, the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces must be deferred. The price of inadequate readiness is paid in necessary risks to American interests and in unnecessary risks to the lives of American service men and women. But inadequate readiness exacts a further price in the future quality of the force. Our Armed Forces today are all volunteers. Whether Active Duty, Reserve or National Guard, they are men and women who have willingly answered the call to serve our country and accepted the burdens and dangers that go with that service. As President-elect Bush has said, ``even the highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and equipment, and declining readiness. . . . A volunteer military really has only two paths it can travel. One is to lower standards to fill the ranks. Or it can inspire the best and brightest to join and stay.'' If confirmed, I look forward to working with the President and this committee that has been so interested in this subject to make sure that our country's service is able to attract and retain the best of our country. Third, U.S. command-control-communication, intelligence and space capabilities must be modernized to support our 21st century needs. A modern command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure is the foundation upon which U.S. military power is employed. The development and deployment of a truly modern effective command, control, communication, and intelligence system is fundamental to the transformation of U.S. military forces, and it is indispensable to our ability to conduct effective diplomacy. I am committed to strengthening our intelligence to serve both our short-term and our long-term national security needs. I will personally make establishing a strong spirit of cooperation between the Department of Defense and the rest of the intelligence community, under the leadership of the DCI, one of my top priorities. We simply must strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our space capabilities, along with the ability to protect those assets against various forms of attack. Fourth, the U.S. defense establishment must be transformed to address our new circumstances. The need to swiftly introduce new weapons systems is clear. The transformation of U.S. military power to take full advantage of commercially created information-technology may require undertaking a near-term investment to acquire modern capabilities derived from U.S. scientific and industrial pre-eminence, rather than simply upgrading some existing systems. The present weapons system acquisition process was designed in an environment different from the one that exists today. In my view, it is not well-suited to meet the demands posed by an expansion of unconventional and asymmetrical threats in an era of rapid technological advances and a period of pervasive proliferation. The cycle time from program start to initial operational capability for major acquisition programs conducted over the past several decades has, I am told, generally been between 8 and 9 years. Some efforts obviously have taken far longer. But such processes are not capable of harnessing the remarkable genius and productivity of the modern, information- based commercial and industrial sectors that have done so much to revolutionize our civilian economy. Fifth, reform of DOD structures, processes, and organization. The legacy of obsolescent institutional structures, processes, and organizations does not merely create unnecessary costs--which, of course, it does--it also imposes an unacceptable burden on the national defense. In certain respects, it could be said that we are in a sense disarming or under arming by our failure to reform the acquisition process and to shed unneeded organizations and facilities. If confirmed, we will examine, in consultation with Congress, omnibus approaches to changing the statutory and regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to reform. This agenda for the new security environment is admittedly ambitious. It is an achievable one if the legislative and the executive branches work together. If confirmed, I will work closely with the committee and with the other appropriate committees of Congress to develop, fund, and implement an overall defense program that can achieve our goals for the future and for the future of our children. I again want to express my appreciation to the President- elect for his confidence and to you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the committee for inviting me here today. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement of Mr. Rumsfeld follows:] Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: It is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be the next U.S. Secretary of Defense. I am grateful to President-elect George W. Bush for nominating me to this important post and for the confidence he has placed in me. I thank you and this Committee for your courtesy in scheduling this confirmation hearing. With your permission, I will make a few opening remarks and request that my prepared statement be included in the record. Some 25 years ago, I had the privilege of appearing for the first time before this Committee as President Gerald R. Ford's nominee for Secretary of Defense. We lived in a very different world then. In the intervening quarter century the world has changed in ways that we could once only dream of. The last time I appeared before you in this capacity, America was locked in a nuclear and ideological standoff with the Soviet Union. Today, the Soviet Union is no more, and the world of superpower standoff has given way to a world of expanding freedom and, I would add, expanding opportunity. The last time I appeared here for a confirmation hearing, U.S. Armed Forces and those of our NATO allies stood toe to toe facing the militaries of the Warsaw Pact--ready at a moment's notice to clash on the battlefield with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Today, the Warsaw Pact is no more; Berlin is again the capital of a unified Germany; and Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest are the capitals of our new NATO allies. As one who once served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, I find these changes both breathtaking and fundamental. When I appeared previously, American industry was facing an industrial challenge from Japan, whose productivity and competitiveness made American industry look fat in overhead, excessively layered in management and sluggish in confronting change and innovation. Today, U.S. industry has shaken off those handicaps and--in a process that I have witnessed personally--has become a leader and a model for the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet military power have brought the 20th century--possibly the most violent and destructive century in human history--to a remarkably peaceful close. U.S. military power was the indispensable instrument that contained the Soviet Union, confronted Soviet power and its surrogates at the geographic extremities of its advance, and provided the shield within which democratic order and economic prosperity were able to develop. As part of this process, the peoples of Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union have, or are in the process of, throwing off communism and reaching for democratic order and market economy. The United States has emerged from the 20th century in a strong position in every measure of national strength--military, economic, scientific, industrial, diplomatic, political and, I believe, even spiritual. Even more important, the U.S. and our democratic allies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere enjoy a special position in the world that, if we can work together, offers the possibility to make the new century one of the most peaceful in history. When the great struggle that was World War II had passed, this country found itself facing new challenges with the advent of the Cold War and the development of nuclear weapons. Today, with the Cold War Era history, we find ourselves facing a new era, one that is often called the Post Cold War Era or the Era of Globalization. It is an extraordinarily hopeful time, one that is full of promise, but also full of challenges. One of those challenges, one that, if confirmed, I look forward to working with President-elect Bush and Congress to meet, is the challenge of bringing the American military successfully into the 21st century, so that it can continue to play its vital role in preserving and extending the peace as far into the future as possible. As President-elect Bush has said, ``After the hard but clear struggle against an evil empire,'' the challenge that we face today ``is not as obvious, but just as noble: To turn these years of influence into decades of peace.'' The ``foundation of our peace'' is a ``strong, capable and modern military.'' The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed conflict, or an end of challenges and threats to U.S. interests. Indeed, centrifugal forces in world politics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries whose aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force may well produce challenges to important U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies. President-elect Bush has outlined three overarching goals for bringing U.S. Armed Forces into the 21st century: First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. The brave and dedicated men and women who serve our country in uniform-active, guard and Reserve--must get the best support their country can possibly provide them, so that our country can continue to call on our best people to serve in the decades to come; Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism, and newer threats against our space assets and information systems. The American people, our forces abroad, and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats with which modern technology and its proliferation confront us; and Third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the ongoing technological revolution offers to create the military of the next century. Meeting these challenges will require a cooperative effort between Congress and the Executive Branch, and with industry and with our allies as well. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close working relationship with this Committee and your counter-parts in the House to achieve these goals, and to fashion steps to transform our national defense posture from its current form to one that will address the challenges of 21st century security. Bonds of trust need to exist not only between the President and the Armed Forces, but between the Department of Defense and Congress as well. We must work together if we are going to be able to address the real problems of inadequate funding, unreliable funding and resistance to change. Without cooperation and collaboration we will fail. President-elect Bush is committed to a strong national defense. Therefore, if confirmed, one of our first tasks will be to undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. defense policy. This review will be aimed at making certain that we have a sound understanding of the state of U.S. forces and their readiness to meet the requirements of the 21st century security environment. We must ensure that we will be able to develop, deploy, operate and support a highly effective force capable of deterring and defending against new threats, so that our country can contribute to peace and stability in the world. This will require a refashioning of deterrence and defense capabilities. The old deterrence of the Cold War era is imperfect for dissuading the threats of the 21st century and for maintaining stability our new security environment. primary objectives Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the explosive advance of modern technology, and the forces of globalization that are making the technology available to ally and adversary alike, make the transformation of U.S. military power essential. While much of the existing defense establishment can be adapted to 21st century needs, a good deal cannot. We must move forcefully to rationalize the costly burden of force structures and practices that do not contribute to current and future U.S. security needs. If confirmed as Secretary, I plan to pursue five key objectives and implement policies and allocate resources needed to achieve those objectives. First, we need to fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the contemporary security environment--a new national security environment. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are increasingly a fact of life that first must be acknowledged and then managed. While striving to prevent further proliferation remains essential, a determined state may, nonetheless, succeed in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and increasingly capable missiles. As a consequence, a decisive change in policy should be aimed at devaluing investment in weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by potential adversaries. In a world of smaller, but in some respects more deadly threats, the ability to defend ourselves and our friends against attacks by missiles and other terror weapons can strengthen deterrence and provide an important compliment purely to retaliatory capabilities. Moreover, the ability to protect our forces is essential to preserving our freedom to act in a crisis. To this end, effective missile defense--not only homeland defense, but also the ability to defend U.S. forces abroad and our allies and friends, must be achieved in the most cost- effective manner that modern technology offers. Nuclear deterrence remains an essential element of our defense policy. The credibility, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent must remain unquestioned. But it must be adapted to 21st century deterrence needs. Credible deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive retaliation. Instead, it must be based on a combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny potential adversaries the opportunity and benefits from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces and homeland, as well as those of our allies. Second, the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces must be assured. When U.S. forces are called upon, they must be ready to cope with any contingency they may face, and be able to sustain military operations over an extended period of time if necessary. The pace of modern military operations in the Kosovo campaign revealed the kinds of demands placed on the readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces. The price of inadequate readiness is paid in unnecessary risk to American interests and lives of American service men and women. But inadequate readiness exacts a further price in the future quality of the force. Our armed forces today are all volunteers. Whether Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard, they are men and women who have willingly answered the call to serve our country and accepted the burdens and dangers that go with that service. But, as President-elect Bush has said, ``even the highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and equipment, and declining readiness. . . . A volunteer military has only two paths. It can lower its standards to fill its ranks. Or it can inspire the best and brightest to join and stay.'' If confirmed, I look forward to working with the President and Congress to make sure that our country's service continues to attract and keep our very best. Third, U.S. command, control, communication, intelligence, and space capabilities must be modernized to support 21st century needs. In his speech at the Citadel, President-elect Bush talked about how the threats to our security are changing: ``We see the contagious spread of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. All the unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old hatreds.'' As the threats we face change, our defense capabilities must adapt and change with them. A modern command-control-communication and intelligence infrastructure is the foundation upon which U.S. military power is employed. The development and deployment of a truly modern and effective command-control-communication and intelligence system is fundamental to the transformation of U.S. military forces, and indispensable to our ability to conduct effective diplomacy. I am committed to strengthening our intelligence to serve both our short-term and long-term national security needs. I will make establishing a strong spirit of cooperation between the Department of Defense and the rest of the intelligence community, under the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, one of my top priorities. We must strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our space capabilities, along with the ability to protect those capabilities against various forms of attack. Fourth, the U.S. defense establishment must be transformed to address 21st century circumstances. The DOD has been unable to procure advanced weapon systems that can lower the cost and increase the performance of the Armed Forces. The need to swiftly introduce new weapons systems is paramount. The transformation of U.S. military power to take full advantage of commercially created information-technology may require undertaking a near-term investment to acquire modern capabilities derived from U.S. scientific and industrial pre-eminence, rather than simply upgrading existing systems. The present weapons system acquisition process was designed for a different environment than the one that exists today. It is ill suited to meet the demands posed by an expansion of unconventional and asymmetrical threats in an era of rapid technological advances and pervasive proliferation. The cycle time (from program start to initial operational capability) for major acquisition programs conducted over the past several decades has averaged between 8 and 9 years. Some efforts take far longer. Such processes are not responsive to urgent new challenges that involve considerable uncertainties. They are not capable of harnessing the remarkable genius and productivity of the modern, information-based commercial and industrial sectors that have done so much to revolutionize the U.S. civilian economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the time from initial concept to actual deployment was significantly shorter than it is today. In short, the pace of development has become slower while the pace of technological change has become far more rapid. These two opposite trends conspire to create a situation where it is difficult for the acquisition process to produce anything other than capabilities that are already a generation behind when deployed. This problem must be addressed. Simply tinkering with the present acquisition system will not provide the innovation and speed necessary to satisfy future military needs and take advantage of powerful new technologies. If confirmed, I will work with this committee to develop a new acquisition strategy-- one designed to take advantage of modern U.S. industrial practices-- that will enable us to develop and field weapon systems at a speed that reflects the needs and possibilities of the new century. Fifth, reform of DOD structures, processes and organization. The legacy of obsolescent institutional structures, processes and organizations does not merely create unnecessary costs, it imposes an unacceptable burden on the National defense. In certain respects, it could be said that we, in a sense, are disarming ourselves by our failure to reform the acquisition processes and to shed unneeded organizations and facilities. If confirmed I will examine, in consultation with Congress, omnibus approaches to changing the statutory and regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to reform. This agenda for the new security environment is admittedly an extraordinarily ambitious one. It is an achievable one if the Legislative and Executive branches of our government strengthen the bond of trust, and work together in a determined and collaborative fashion. If confirmed, I will work closely with this committee and the other appropriate Committees of Congress to develop, fund, and implement an overall defense program that can achieve our goals for the future and for the future of our children and grandchildren. Again, I want to express my appreciation to the President-elect for his confidence and trust. I thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. In accordance with the practice of the committee, without objection, your responses to our pre-hearing policy questions and your response to the committee questionnaire will be made part of the record of this hearing. We have not yet received all of the paperwork on Mr. Rumsfeld's nomination. That paperwork, which may be lengthy, will be reviewed by the committee and it could require additional discussion between the committee and the nominee. Before we begin our first round of questions, there are several standard questions which we ask every nominee who comes before the committee. In your response to advance policy questions, you agreed, Mr. Rumsfeld, to appear as a witness before congressional committees when called and to ensure that briefings, testimony and other communications are provided to Congress. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not know. First of all, the laws and regulations and rules are different for the various entities to which I have submitted this massive amount of information: the Pentagon, the Office of Government Ethics, the committee. I do not know that they all agree among themselves, but they are reviewing it. I think probably one of the reasons for the delay in getting the stack of hundreds of pages of materials to you is because it is still down in the Office of Government Ethics. I have a large number of investments and activities that would have to be characterized as conflicts were they to be maintained during my service as Secretary of Defense. I have, however, indicated in my response to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other organizations, that I am ready and able--I believe able, but certainly ready--to take whatever steps are appropriate to eliminate anything that anyone of the various entities might feel would be inappropriate, both with respect to investments and with respect to relationships and boards and associations and that type of thing. Chairman Levin. Then to rephrase the tense of the verb, will you adhere to applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Of that you can be certain. Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I have not. I have talked to two people about--on a contingency basis that in the event that I am confirmed, they are individuals I would like to have join me in the department. But it has been purely on a contingency basis. I might just say that because the outcome of the election was delayed so long, the process is delayed. I hope that when we do get to the point of my recommending to the President-elect names to join me in the Pentagon, that the committee will move as promptly as possible with consideration of those people. Because when I think of the massive review you have characterized in your opening remarks that is facing me at the Pentagon, it is not something I would look forward to doing alone. I will need all the help I can get. Chairman Levin. I am sure that our next Chairman will have the support of this full committee in trying to expedite the nominees for those positions. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that the Department complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including prepared testimony and questions for the record and hearings? Mr. Rumsfeld. I will certainly try to. I have been told that the number of requests for studies and responses to questions from various elements of the committees of interest to the Executive Branch to the Department of Defense is enormous. I would have to look at it and see how we can manage that process in a way that is satisfactory to both Congress and to the Executive Branch. But I certainly would make every effort in the world to do so. Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, if it is honest, certainly. If some witness came before a committee and said something that was inaccurate, I certainly would want to visit with them. Chairman Levin. I think we would, too. Mr. Rumsfeld. I do too. Chairman Levin. I think we would too. But other than that qualification, you will take steps to make sure that there is no reprisal against witnesses who intend to honestly present testimony and their opinions. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. I would certainly want to see that witnesses were honest and forthright with the committees of Congress. Chairman Levin. Now, we are going to proceed to a first round of questions which, because of the number of Members who are here, we are going to limit to 8 minutes for each Senator. First, we will do that on an alternating basis between the two sides. Then following the early bird rule, we will recognize current Members of the committee first, followed by our newly designated Members. That's a bit of an awkward way to go at this, but I hope that our designated Members who are not yet formally Members of the committee will understand that. If there is a difficulty with that, we can try to adjust among us to accommodate schedules. But I did not know any other way to proceed until our new Members are actually Members of the committee which will not occur apparently until next week. The second round and any subsequent rounds will be limited to 6 minutes for each Senator. It is my intent to recess the committee for lunch at about 1 o'clock and to resume the hearing at 2 o'clock. If necessary, we will schedule additional hearings. First, relative to missile defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, press reports have occasionally suggested that the Ballistic Threat Commission, which you chaired, advocated the deployment of a national missile defense system. Am I correct in stating that the mandate of the Commission was limited to examining the ballistic missile threat to the United States and that you and your commission did not take any position whether we should deploy a national missile defense system? Mr. Rumsfeld. That is correct. Chairman Levin. It has also been suggested that the incoming administration has already made decisions about the architecture of a national missile defense system should it seek to deploy such a system. It has been stated by, I believe, one of our colleagues that a decision presumably has been made already, a phased layered plan and a reconfigured plan for the ground-based program including land, sea, and space components. Do you know whether or not the incoming administration has made any decisions relative to the architecture of a national missile defense system, if in fact a decision is made to recommend such a system? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, we know that the President-elect--and I suppose in terms of trying to characterize an administration that does not exist yet and where there are prospective participants who have really not had opportunities to meet and discuss these things, the President-elect has indicated that it is his intention to deploy a missile defense system. I know of no decisions that have been made by him or by me with respect to exactly what form that might take. Chairman Levin. The National Missile Defense Act, which was adopted by Congress and signed by the President, contains two equal statements of U.S. policy. The first statement is that it is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense system to defend against limited ballistic missile attacks. The second statement is that it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear weapons. Do you believe that we should consider the possible negative impact that the deployment of a national missile defense system could have on our policy to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear weapons as indicated by that statute? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, you were kind enough to give me a copy of that statute. I have read it. It seems perfectly reasonable to me. The only thing I might have added to it, had I been a Member of Congress, I might not have included the word negotiated in the second phrase where it says seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. It seems to me you may or may not do it on a negotiated basis. There had been instances in relationships with countries where they had each taken actions that were not a result of a final negotiated agreement but rather were understood and were agreed to be in both parties' interests. But I find nothing in here that is surprising or unusual or with which I would disagree. Chairman Levin. You believe that both of those goals are legitimate goals with that qualification? Mr. Rumsfeld. There is no question but that I think that we should deploy a missile defense system when it is technologically possible and effective. I think that you obviously would want to be in discussions with Russia about the sizes and shapes of their capabilities and ours. Chairman Levin. Do you believe that it is a legitimate policy and an important policy to seek reductions in those nuclear weapons on Russian soil, as indicated by that statute? Do you agree with that as a goal? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do. I think that to the extent we can manage those capabilities down--I must say I think that the Russian stockpile or capabilities are going to go down anyway. Simply because of the circumstance of their economy. But I have no problem in talking with them about that. Although it is principally the responsibility of the Department of State. Chairman Levin. Is it in our interest that there be fewer nuclear weapons on Russian soil rather than more nuclear weapons on Russian soil? Mr. Rumsfeld. Sure. Chairman Levin. Is that something which would be in America's interest and the world's interest? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed. Chairman Levin. On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we have recently received a letter from former Secretary of Defense Laird, who now joins General Shalikashvili, in believing that there should be reconsideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with certain safeguards relative to verification. Given your previous position as having doubts about the question of verification, I am wondering whether you would be willing to take a look at the position of our Joint Chiefs which favors the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and believes that it is verifiable? Would you be willing to take a look at the recommendations of General Shalikashvili, and Secretary Laird, relative to that treaty? Mr. Rumsfeld. Former Secretary of Defense Mel Laird was kind enough to send me the material that he communicated with General Shalikashvili about. I have not had a chance to study it. But my concern on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--and I forget when it was before the Senate, but as I recall, I testified on the subject. My concerns were two-fold really. One was the number of issues that were raised by people whose judgment I respect in the scientific community about the risks to the reliability and safety of the stockpile. I think that is something that is terribly important. We simply must have confidence in the safety and reliability of our weapons. The second was the difficulty of verification. I am aware in the press of what General Shalikashvili has come forward with. Certainly, I would want to look at it and think about it as any reasonable person would. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Earlier this month, the Chicago Tribune reported on a taped conversation that you apparently had with President Nixon when you were serving as counselor to the President in 1971. On the tape, there are a number of statements which I would appreciate your commenting on. I think it is important that you do comment on them. First, there were some offensive racist comments by the President. I would like you to explain your recollection of that conversation and your response to his comments. Second, the Chicago Tribune reports that in the conversation you make the statement that the Republicans got us out of Democratic wars four times in this century, referring to the first World War, the second World War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. I am wondering whether you believed it at the time that those wars were Democratic wars? If not, why would you have made that statement? What are your thoughts about that? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I was--the Bush transition office was contacted by the reporter who had been listening to the tape. He provided the office with some notes. I would not call them a transcript. Because in many cases they did not even purport to be a transcript of the tape. There was lots of places where it was dot, dot, dot. They then somehow--the transition office got ahold of the tape. I was able to listen to a few seconds of it. I do not know how long, but not much. I could not understand much of it. It is very difficult to understand. The truth is I did not remember the meeting or the conversation at all when it was raised. It was 30 years ago, 29 years ago. Apparently, from what can be reconstructed, I was in an office somewhere in the White House complex with President Nixon as a--I guess I was an aide or a counselor or an assistant to him at the time. Apparently--and again, I am not certain of all of this--it appears that he was characterizing some remarks that were made by Vice President Agnew. He was characterizing--he was quoting them in a critical manner saying that Agnew should not have said that. He should not have been drinking with people who he did not know or whatever it was. Then later he quoted some other people and how they talked and he adopted a dialect according to this tape. The tape seems to indicate that I may have agreed with one or more things on that tape. To the extent I did agree with anything, I am certain I agreed only with the fact that some people talk like that and that Vice President Agnew should not have used or thought such derogatory and offensive and unfair and insensitive things about minorities. I did not then and I do not now agree with the offensive and wrong characterizations. I think it is unfortunate that it comes up because it is not fair and it can cause pain to people to read that type of thing. It is ironic that that newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, opposed the civil rights legislation during the 1960s when I was supporting it. That was the most powerful paper in my congressional district and I supported every single piece of civil rights legislation. I was Chairman of Tuskeegee Institute's 100th anniversary fundraising when Chappy James died and have an honorary degree from Tuskeegee Institute. On the Democratic war quote, I would say this. That was a time when the Vietnam War was raging. President Nixon was embattled and he was trying to end it. There were buses around the White House if you think back to that period. It is not-- when you think of the Hoover Depression or the Clinton economy today, there are shorthand ways of talking in private. It is a--a war is our country's war. It is not a Democratic war. It is not a Republican war. It is not a president's war. It is our Nation's war. I understand that. To the extent shorthand was used, it should not have been. Chairman Levin. Senator Warner. Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an important inquiry that the Chairman has brought up and I feel I should add some personal recollections. I was Secretary of the Navy at that very time under Nixon. I recall being in a similar position from time-to-time in his presence when--although I regard him as a great President on national security and foreign affairs, he did have his shortcomings. I have looked into that transcript very carefully with our nominee here this morning and I am personally satisfied that he conducted himself in a manner that reflects no discredit on him today. Second, I must say, Mr. Chairman, the morning after that article appeared, Senator Moynihan called me. Senator Moynihan also was a member of our team in those days and very much involved. He said that if this is a matter that requires explanation, he would be happy to appear before this committee as a witness and testify to the unqualified credentials of this distinguished nominee, particularly in the area of civil rights. So I thank you for your forthright responses on that issue. Let us turn to the critical question of defense spending. I am going to ask you three or four questions on it. We are not here today to establish a number, even a benchmark. I think the important thing is to receive from you your unqualified support to increase defense spending. The procedures by which you will in the first 90 days undertake to ascertain first the efficiencies that can be generated within the existing budgets and second the procedures by which the President, yourself, and other advisors will determine how to increase it and by what amount. Second, reiterate what the President has already said, to me and others, that, yes, other budget considerations, very important, will take into consideration, but threat, the threats facing the United States and the need for this modernization will be the controlling factor in reaching the determinations on increased funding. Can you elaborate on that, sir? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. I was asked by the President to consider becoming his nominee for this post I guess 8 or 10 days ago. I have spent most of my time visiting with members of this committee and preparing for this hearing. I have not taken the series of briefings at the Pentagon. Nor have I had an opportunity to wrap my head around the budget numbers. I have read a great deal about it. I mean, the CBO was using one number. I think it was something like $40 or $50 billion add on. I read an article by Jim Schlesinger and Harold Brown who came up with a number that was somewhat higher than that, $60 or $75 billion as I recall. I read a report from the CSIS, Georgetown Center, that was something in the neighborhood of $100 billion or $100 billion plus. Senator Warner. I heard you include the very conscientious evaluations of the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, yes. What the number is, I don't know. Is it clear that there needs to be an increase in the budget? There is no doubt in my mind. But I am not well enough along in my thinking on it. Nor have I had an opportunity to even begin to be briefed by Bill Cohen. Although he has told me they are-- he feels the same way. I have not had a chance to talk to the transition people who are thinking through the budget numbers and how whatever it is---- Senator Warner. But your commitment today is to work toward a significant increase. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Senator Warner. That is what I wanted to know. Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely. Senator Warner. That threat will be a consideration. Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely. Senator Warner. Second, that in your capacity as Secretary of Defense, the Chiefs can continue under your administration to come before Congress and give us their views. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed. Senator Warner. That is fine. Mr. Rumsfeld. I would prefer they give them to me first. Senator Warner. Well, that is all right. We will get them. Let us turn to another threat. It is interesting. I have done a lot of study on this. We know about the military threat, but there is another threat. That is the industrial base that America has been put to a tremendous task of trying to survive in the face of 12 to--a dozen years of decline in defense spending. They find very tempting avenues to go out into the private sector and do business and forget about all the regulations in the Department of Defense and the uncertainty of defense spending and take that on and simply worry about their bottom line. But fortunately, we have a lot of courageous people who are willing to continue to provide our industrial base. So you bring that business experience which is very valuable, not unlike Dave Packard with whom I served with. He really understood the need to strengthen the industrial base. Together with the competition from firms in Europe primarily where those firms have government support in some instances. So give us your thoughts on that. Then I address a quote by the President-elect here. They will want to get some clarifications. ``We will modernize some existing weapons and equipment necessary for current tasks. But our relative peace today allows us to do this selectively. The real goal is to move beyond marginal improvements, to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies to use this window of opportunity to skip a generation of technology.'' That is a bold challenge. I bring back your recollection--I left the Department in roughly 1974. You came in shortly thereafter. You remember the bones of TFX were all over the Department, billions of dollars lost in trying to manufacture an airplane to hang every trinket known to mankind on it until it sunk of its own weight. We then experienced the A-12 which I can show you that. Billions of dollars lost. Well, today we are working on, I think, some essential programs. I will not mention them here. One indeed needs to be scrutinized and that is the VSTOL and you know that craft, the Marines. It is important to the Marine mission. We have to give very serious consideration to that program. But I am not getting into programs. I want you to explain to me against that background your definition of skipping a generation of technology and the impact that could have on this industrial base. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. First, with respect to the study on the defense industrial base, let me say that I agree with you. I had the privilege of being briefed by General Tom Morman who served, I believe it was on the Defense Science Board that did the study. It is a very serious problem. I mean, the return on investment in the defense industry today is not sufficient to attract investment. The government does not make things. We purchase things. We acquire things. That industry has to be there. To be there, it has to be viable from an economic standpoint or people are not going to invest in it. It is a very serious problem. Second, with respect to the President-elect's remarks about skipping generations and that, clearly the review is going to have to address this. But it seems to me there is at least two ways that one can achieve advances in technology. I do not want to bring up ancient history, but as fate would have it, I was in the Secretary of Defense's office when the subject of the M1 tank came along. The argument was that it should continue to be another upgrade of a new diesel. Let us do another diesel and a couple more diesels. I decided no. I said let us go to a turbine engine. Now, that takes a major weapon system and moved it into an entirely new generation of technologies at that time. Senator Warner. I think that is helpful. Let me get in one last question here. You will have an opportunity to amplify that for the record. That is the doctrine of the use of force. General Powell, the Secretary of State designee, once stated that we should always execute the decisive results and be prepared to commit ``the force needed to achieve the political objective''. I was quite interested the other night in looking at the Lehrer news hour. Our Secretary of State, Mrs. Albright, I urge you to go back and look at that transcript. I will just pick out one of her quotes. I do that respectfully, but it says as follows. In answering that question about where she was with regard to the Powell doctrine, ``It does not have to be all or nothing. If you think about the fact that you have to employ every piece of force that you have and you have months to plan it and the earth is flat, you are never going to do anything.'' In other words, you need the full--I have time limit. Give us your parameters of thinking of how you are going to advise the President of the United States as to when to send into harm's way the men and women of the Armed Forces, and, frankly, when not to send them. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, that is an enormous question and an exceedingly important one and I would be happy to talk about it for a few seconds here. Could I go back to the tank first? I would not want to leave you with the idea that the only way to transform is to go from one generation of technology and leapfrog into a new one. There is another way. I am not as familiar with it. But with respect to the same tank, it is my understanding that it has gone from I think the M1 to the M1-- what is the second? Senator Warner. M1A2. Mr. Rumsfeld. A2, right. Senator Warner. This is the tank expert right here. Mr. Rumsfeld. But it has gone from analog to digital. Now, there you have taken a platform that exists and you have not done a leapfrog with the whole platform, but you have taken some electronics and leapfrogged. There are plenty of opportunities to do things where we can significantly improve capabilities, both with respect to the system itself, but also with respect to the pieces of the system or elements of the platform if you will. Now, with respect to your question. This is a subject that is important. It is sensitive. It is in my view a presidential issue and not a Secretary of Defense issue alone. It is a national security council term issue. We have not met. We have not deposited ourselves and worried this through. All of us in that team have opinions and all of us have opined on this subject, publicly and privately, from time-to- time, including the President-elect. The elements that come back from time-to-time are is what you think you want to do actually achievable? It may be meritorious. It may need to be done. But if you can't really do it, oughten you maybe not to try? That's a tough one to evaluate. In no case is it a cookie mold you can press down and say there is the answer. Each of these are subjective and difficult. The second that comes to mind is resources. Do you have the resources? You might be able to do it. But if you are spread all over the world, you simply do not have the capabilities at that given moment, then you have to face up to the truth. That is that you cannot do everything. A second thing that comes back from time-to-time is to what degree is this particular activity or recommendation truly a part of our national interest? That is something that is a consideration. It is one of the dimensions of the debate and discussion. Another I would say is are there artificial constraints as to how you can do this? I personally believe it is terribly important that we have a very clear understanding of what the command structure is and who is deciding what. That to the extent humanly possible you avoid a committee that has not pre- decided these things and ends up interminably debating as to what should be done with various aspects of an engagement. I think last, and there may be others I have forgotten, but I thought about this last night. How would you characterize what success is? When you have done something, how do you know when you have done it that you have done what you went in to do? What is success? What is your exit strategy? When does it end? Is there some point where it is over? Or is it interminable? Now, I do not know where that positions me across that spectrum because I tried to avoid characterizing where I happen to think in any given case because I do not know. It really is something I wanted to talk to the President-elect about and Secretary designate Powell and Condy Rice and the folks that are interested in this. It is an enormously important subject. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator Kennedy. Senator Kennedy. Thank you, very much, and congratulations. Mr. Rumsfeld, during the campaign President-elect Bush made some interesting arms control proposals, including the reduction of nuclear weapons well below the START II levels and removing them from hair trigger status. I have long been an advocate of arms control and was pleased to see the President- elect's interest in this area. I understand that when you were with President Ford as Secretary of Defense, you did not support the SALT II Treaty and are now opposed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Will you support the President-elect's arms control agenda? Mr. Rumsfeld. You can be sure I will support the President- elect's agenda. He is the President. I will, however, offer my views. I hope persuasively and thoughtfully in deliberation of the National Security Council as I did during that time. I mean, people, honorable people, can come to different views. I did with respect to SALT II. Senator Kennedy. You just had an exchange with Senator Levin on missile defense. As you know, the failure of the two most recent NMD flight tests has cast significant doubts on the viability of the current system. When the President-elect announced you as the nominee, you spoke of a need for the United States to develop a missile defense system that will work. I am interested in what your definition is of a system that will work. You have spoken recently about the successes you've had in your discussions with our allies. When will we know that it will work? Will you establish as a baseline which requires that it has to pass a field test? Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I would really like to avoid setting up hurdles on this subject. I was reading the book ``Eye In The Sky'' about the Corona Program and the first overhead satellite and recalling that it failed something like 11, 12, or 13 times during the Eisenhower administration or the Kennedy administration. They stuck with it and it worked and it ended up saving billions of dollars because of the better knowledge we achieved. In this case, if I could just elaborate for a moment, the principle of deterrence, it seems to me, goes to what is in the minds of people who might do you harm. How can you effect their behavior? The problem with ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction, even though there may be a low probability, as the chart that Senator Levin I believe mentioned suggests, the reality is they work without being fired. They alter behavior. If you think back to the Gulf War, if Saddam Hussein, a week before he invaded Kuwait, had demonstrated that he had a ballistic missile and a nuclear weapon, the task of trying to put together that coalition would have been impossible. There is no way you could have persuaded the European countries that they should put themselves at-risk to a nuclear weapon. People's behavior changes if they see those capabilities out there. I think we need missile defense because I think it devalues having that capability. It enables us to do a much better job with respect to our allies. Now, finally, I do not think many weapons systems arrive full blown. Senator Levin or somebody mentioned phased and layered. Those are phrases that I think people not improperly use to suggest that things do not start and then suddenly they are perfect. What they do is they get them out there and they evolve over time and they improve. So success, this is not the old Star Wars idea of a shield that will keep everything off of everyone in the world. It is something that in the beginning stages is designed to deal with handfuls of these things and persuade people that they are not going to be able to blackmail and intimidate the United States and its friends and allies. Senator Kennedy. Well, I think you've made a good response to that question. I hope this means that we have assurances that there will be a very careful review. Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely. Senator Kennedy. In terms of the effectiveness of this missile defense system; it is going to have to meet a criteria. I understand that you are not prepared to establish that criteria today, but I assume that it is going to be meaningful criteria in terms of actually being able to function and be able to work in the different phases. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Senator Kennedy. Let me move to the question of Colombia. What is your sense of the capacity of the military in these countries to address the challenge? How are we going to respond to reports about the conflict spilling over in the area and in the region? How are we really going to be able to determine the difference between the counter insurgency and the counter narcotics? Can you tell us what you are thinking? This is complicated. It is specialized. It is enormously important. We are going to have to address this, and I would be interested in knowing your thinking at this time. We will have more time later on to discuss this, but can you tell us now what your thoughts are? Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, it is not something that I have been able to get briefed into. It is my understanding that the Department of State has the lead on this. I understand that there is a cap that has been put on by Congress on the numbers of people, military people, that are engaged. It is complicated. I am one who believes that the drug problem is probably overwhelmingly a demand problem and that it is going to find--if the demand persists, it is going to find ways to get what it wants. If it is not from Colombia, it will be from somebody else. If I were the neighboring countries, I would be concerned about spillover as well. I think it is a very important problem and it is not something I have had a chance to screw my head into or talk to the National Security Council team about. Senator Kennedy. For the next 8 days, I am the Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee of this committee. Under Senator Snowe, we had extensive hearings about the decline of the shipbuilding budget and about what actions are going to be necessary in order to meet responsibility in terms of the Navy's budget. Have you had a chance to review that and can you give us any ideas of how you think that that issue is going to be addressed in the future? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I have not been briefed on it at all. I am by background and interest very interested in the Navy. I recognize the importance--Senator Snowe indicated to me that we are currently building ships at a level that if it continues will permit the U.S. Navy to decline down into very low numbers. That the only thing that can be done if we are to maintain the kind of capabilities in the world where we can project power and presence through the United States Navy, we are going to have to increase the shipbuilding budget. I will stop there. Senator Kennedy. Senator Roberts, who is Chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, has been a real leader in the whole area of bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism. Chairman Levin also referenced these issues in his opening comments. Could you give us some assessment of what your concerns would be in those areas? Senator Frist and I successfully completed legislation, last session, in the area of bio-terrorism. I would be interested in your own views regarding the nature of these threats as we look down the road. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I have been made aware of Senator Frist's and your interest and Senator Roberts'. I would rank bio-terrorism quite high in terms of threats. I think that it has the advantage that it does not take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful. They can be done in mobile facilities, in small facilities. I think it is something that merits very serious attention, not just by the Department of Defense, but by the country. I have an interest in it and certainly would intend to be attentive to it. Senator Kennedy. Thank you, very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join in welcoming Mr. Rumsfeld to the committee, and I congratulate him on his nomination to be Secretary of Defense. Mr. Rumsfeld has a very impressive record of service to the country, from his years as a Naval Aviator, as Congressman from Illinois, as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, as Ambassador to NATO and, of course, as Secretary of Defense under President Ford. The list is long and has continued to grow. He recently served as Chairman of the Ballistic Missile Threats Commission. He is currently chairman of the Commission to Assess National Security Space Management, and also chairman of the Congressional Leadership's National Security Advisor Group. This extraordinary background will be extremely valuable in dealing with the many issues that the Armed Forces of the United States currently face and that we will certainly face in the future. Many challenges are waiting for our answer, starting with national missile defense and nuclear arms control. They also include force protection, which is especially urgent after the recent tragic attack on the U.S.S. Cole. We're concerned about the heavy demands on our forces that strain both morale and readiness. We're concerned about training issues, such as how to maintain training areas and ensure adequate training budgets. We face challenges of recruitment and retention, when private sector competition remains strong. We must do more to ensure that military personnel and their families have good pay and good housing. They need modern equipment, modern weapon systems, and modern information technology. We have to be concerned about cyber-security and about chemical and biological terrorism. Significant changes have occurred in the military since Mr. Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense in the 1970s. Women now hold many military roles traditionally reserved for males, including service as combat pilots and on combat ships. There are more women generals and admirals than ever before, and the potential for further gains is large. The military still faces many problems in this area, including the need to prevent harassment and discrimination in all forms. I continue to believe that the current ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy has been a failure. As a world leader, our Armed Forces need to set the example on human rights issues and treat all men and women, regardless of their diversity, with the respect and equality that they deserve. Mr. Rumsfeld's many leadership experiences, in both public service and private life, will serve him well in dealing with all these challenges and I look forward to working with him in the years ahead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Senator Thurmond. Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Chairman Levin. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you on your leadership during this period of transition and appreciate your bipartisan approach in holding this hearing. Your chairmanship continues the committee's long tradition that the defense of our Nation is above politics. Before I address the issue at hand, I want to express my appreciation for our outgoing Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen. His tenure as Secretary of Defense will be marked by great advances in the quality of life for our military personnel and their families, the refocusing of the Department of Defense to the new threats of weapons of mass destruction and cyber- terrorism, and, more importantly, assuring this Nation's position as the world's only super power. I wish him and his lovely wife, Janet, the best in their future endeavors. Secretary Rumsfeld, congratulations on your nomination and welcome to this your second confirmation hearing as Secretary of Defense. I hope that the praise of Bill Cohen does not lead you to the conclusion that you will not have any challenges as you move into the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Our Nation is fortunate to have an individual such as you follow Bill Cohen. You have a distinguished career both in the public and private sector and have shown your willingness to take on the tough issues facing the Department of Defense. Those of us who served on the Armed Services Committee in the mid-70s can recall the problems you encountered then with the state of our Armed Forces--they were undermanned, morale was sagging, drugs were rampant, and most important they were underfunded. Fortunately, drugs in the Armed Forces are no longer a major issue. However, overworked and undermanned units and underfunded programs are problems that will again test your mettle. Mr. Secretary, you have been a proponent for a strong defense. I can assure you that this committee will provide you the support that will be critical as you work to strengthen our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the future. Our Nation's history is replete with examples of failing to anticipate the future challenges and degrading our military capability. Coincidentally, it was 50 years ago, at the beginning of the Korean War, when the United States sent the ill-equipped and under-trained troops of Task Force Smith into battle with tragic results because we failed to anticipate the threat. As we commemorate that War, we should make the pledge of never again will this Nation send another Task Force Smith to battle. Mr. Secretary, I wish you success and look forward to working with you in the coming years. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thurmond for those comments and we very personally appreciate it and the leadership that you have shown on this committee and in so many other places in this Senate over the years. Senator Lieberman, we all give you a special welcome back, some of us with greater enthusiasm perhaps than others. But welcome back. Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld, I was privileged to have a courtesy call yesterday from Don Evans, the Secretary of Commerce designate, and I open by thanking him for all he did to bring me back to the United States Senate. So it is good to be here with my colleagues, particularly on this committee. Mr. Rumsfeld, I welcome you and join my colleagues in expressing not only my admiration for your extraordinary record of public and private service, but for your willingness to take on this job at this time. I have not read ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' yet, but I will certainly--I remember there was a little red book in another country a distance from here. I do not know what color the ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' are going to be. But as your opening statement suggests, at this critical time, unusual time in our national security history, there is a surprising amount that we have to do. We are--when I think of the comparison that you made of the Cold War situation you found on the last occasion when you came in as Secretary of Defense and the remarkably difference circumstance you find today. We are not in ideological and strategic conflict with another major super power, the Soviet Union. We are it. But we are nonetheless challenged. Technology is expanding the threats as you have documented. We have tremendous demands on us to maintain our force, to keep our troops with the quality of life and training that we want them to have. This is going to require some very tough leadership from you and priorities, the setting of priorities, and a willingness to try to implement those. We have been, in the time I have been privileged to be on this committee and therefore have been involved more directly in national security questions, watching Congress and the military and the Executive Branch, we have generally reached beyond in authorization what we have ultimately--and conceptualization--of what we would ultimately be willing to pay for. I think we are at such a point now where legitimate claims can be made for resources. We have not yet put them together. I mean, in the mad cap experience to which Senator Levin refers that I went through last year, a glorious experience actually and one that I thoroughly enjoyed, the Bush-Cheney campaign had a document out suggesting a willingness to spend $45 billion more over the next 10 years for national security. Vice President Gore and I doubled that to $100 billion, big spenders that we are. But what is interesting, and, of course, focuses the tough choices you will have, is that the Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, who I believe Senator Warner referred to, have essentially told us that what we really need is at least $50 billion more a year. So let me first put in an appeal which you and I have spoken about which is that all of us who care about national security have to really reach out and try to build more of a public understanding for the need to spend more to keep our national security strong in this age. When you look at what people think we ought to spend more money on as we are deciding how to spend the surplus, national security comes out way down on the list. That is not good. As long as that exists, it is going to be hard for us here to make the decisions we should make. The second point is how do you begin to approach the excess of needs and the deficiency of resources and make the kind of priority decisions that we need you to make? Mr. Rumsfeld. I want you to know that I understand the task facing the Department of Defense is enormously complex. It is not a time to preside and tweak and calibrate what is going on. It is a time to take what has been done to start this transformation and see that it is continued in a way that hopefully has many, many more right decisions than wrong decisions. There is no one person who has a monopoly on how to do this or genius. It is going to take a collaborative relationship within the Executive Branch and with Congress. I just hope and pray that we are wise enough to do it well. But the one thing we know of certain knowledge is that it is not a peaceful world. It is a different world. It is more peaceful in the sense that the Soviet Union is gone. But it is nonetheless a more dangerous and untidy world. We also know that the power of weapons today is vastly greater than it was in earlier eras. We know that with the relaxation of tension at the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of these capabilities is pervasive. It is happening. We have to acknowledge that. If I know anything, I know that history shows that weakness is provocative. Weakness invites people into doing things they would not otherwise think of. What we have to do is better understand what will deter and what will defend against this new range of threats. I do not look at them in isolation. I do not think of long-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and terrorism as something that is disconnected. I think of it as a continuum. With the Gulf War, the world was taught to not try to take on western armies, navies, and air forces because you lose. Therefore, you should try something else. That means you are going to look at things like information system attacks and cyber war. You are going to look at bio-terrorism. You are going to look at other kinds of terrorism. The vulnerability of space assets has to be worrisome to people. As well as shorter range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in addition to long-range ballistic missiles. Senator Lieberman. Let me ask this question. I agree with you that we have to prepare to face this new range of threats to our security because no sensible antagonist will take us on as we were taken on in the Gulf War because we were too dominant. Does that not inevitably mean that we will have to cut some of the programs that we are now spending money on that may be more continuations of that earlier threat scenario than the new one? Mr. Rumsfeld. It is entirely possible that that kind of a recommendation could come out of this review. Whether it will or not, I do not know until I dig into it. I mentioned the need for collaboration with Congress. That is true. We also need to make darn sure that we are dealing with our allies in a way that they are brought along. We are not alone in this world. We have some enormously important allies in Asia and in Europe and friends in other parts of the world. I think that those relationships as well are terribly important. Senator Lieberman. Let me ask about the review that you have spoken of. Congress has authorized by law a quadrennial defense review. That was a way to try to encourage and mandate an incoming administration to look forward and to require that those in the military present some big thoughts over the horizon. You have also referred to, and the President-elect referred during the campaign and more recently, to a strategic review. Help me, if you would, to relate those two reviews to one another. Is the strategic review the incoming administration has in mind the quadrennial defense review authorized by law? Or, since that does not give you a final product until December, though it gives you some before, are you thinking about a separate review to help you make some of the budget priority decisions I have just referred to? Mr. Rumsfeld. The latter. My impression is that what the President-elect has in mind is that we will take a look at how we view the world and our circumstance in it and fashion some thoughts with respect to broader strategy and then get down into more of the details as to the defense establishment's capability or appropriateness of our current arrangements to deal with those kinds of threats and opportunities. The quadrennial review, I do not know--you say it is finished in December? Senator Lieberman. Well, you get earlier versions of it this spring. Then the final product will be in December. Mr. Rumsfeld. My impression was that when Bill Cohen came in, it came at him very fast. The timing seemed to me, looking from outside, to be unfortunate. Because I did not get the impression that Secretary Cohen had much of an opportunity to effect it or to calibrate it. I am a little apprehensive that that is going to be the case in my situation. The realistic thing is too--my whole life, I have benefitted from attracting enormously talented people to help me. I think when I took my first job in the Executive Branch, I hired Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney and Ron James and people all across the spectrum from--Bill Bradley worked there and Christy Todd Whitman worked there. Micky Kantor I noticed had some remarks to make the other day and he was there as a legal service lawyer. We had a wonderful group of people. Unless you are a Mozart or an Einstein who goes off in a closet who does something brilliant, the rest of us people, just people, we get other people to help us figure things out. They are something like 500,000 security clearances behind in the Pentagon today. Now, the process of getting confirmed is just unbelievable. I just hope each of you will have that opportunity someday. [Laughter.] It is an amazing process. I am going to recommend to the President that he think about getting some sort of an outside commission to look at this. Because the questions from the committee are one set. From the Ethics Office, there is another. The Pentagon has some others. You are supposed to fill them all out in 5 minutes. There is no way to do it. I am worried about getting people picked, recommended, which I cannot do, as we know, until I am the man. I am not. I have to have help. I am being practical as a manager. I know that we are going to have to figure out a way to flesh out this system a little bit. Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much. I would say from your performance here this morning that it is clear that you are the man. [Laughter.] Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman Thank you Mr. Rumsfeld for appearing before this committee today. You have a distinguished record of service to our Nation and you bring impressive credentials to the job for which you are being considered. You will need all the expertise you have acquired over your long career, for the job ahead of you is one of the most consequential positions that one can hold in our government. You will assume stewardship of our military at a time when it is at a crossroads between taking the path defined by the ideas and methods of the 20th century or the path defined by the needs and potential of the 21st century. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the NDP conducted in 1997 pretty well define these two roads for you, and define the choices you face. These panels produced two fundamentally and constructively different evaluations. The 1997 QDR's conclusion was that although future military challenges will likely be different, the ``two war'' construct, with some modifications, is and will continue to be the proper standard against which to gauge our capability and preparedness. By this standard, the QDR concluded, the current forces and weapons are satisfactory, and will continue to sustain our military dominance if modernized in kind. Much of the Pentagon effort since then has been toward increasing the budget to maintain and modernize this force. The members of the NDP disagreed. They asserted that ``we are at the cusp of a revolution in warfare'' and ``unless we are willing to pursue a new course,'' one different than that proposed by the QDR, ``we are likely to have forces that are ill-suited to protect our security twenty years from now.'' Indeed, the NDP questioned the advisability of continuing to use the ``two war'' standard and of continuing to procure some of our current core weapons. They concluded that transformation is the path we should follow, and therefore that spending better was more important than spending more. The good news is that the first steps along the path toward transformation are being taken. The defense establishment has come to accept transformation as a fundamental policy goal, which is evident from a growing number of important official speeches and documents. Secretary of Defense Cohen has said that our defense policy is transformation, and that the strategy to implement it is ``shape, respond, and prepare now.'' The QDR states ``we must meet our requirements to shape and respond in the near term, while at the same time we must transform U.S. combat capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the face of future challenges.'' And transformation as a goal is at the core of Joint Vision 2020--the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision that guides the continuing transformation of America's Armed Forces for the 21st century. The bad news is that while the services are, to their credit, beginning to ``talk the talk'' and even to take steps to transform themselves, our actions and resourcing are not really keeping pace with the pronouncements. While most see the need for future forces fundamentally different than those of today, they urge that change be cautious and deliberate. So we continue to place the highest priority on current readiness, keeping our organizations and weapons prepared to deal with the threats they were designed to deal with, while trusting that incremental and evolutionary improvements will allow them to adapt to deal with new and more dangerous threats as they emerge. Consequently, our resource allocation is still too much like it was during the Cold War. As a consequence, you are faced with funding a force that costs billions more than has been budgeted for it, and that requires more by far than President-elect Bush has said he is willing to spend. His stated intent to add significantly more money to missile defense programs will only add to that shortfall. We have heard that you intend to narrow the funding gap by cutting or terminating existing programs. You may have to make many of these decisions now before you are able to complete a strategic review. If you must do that, those decisions will impact the strategic review you will design and conduct as Secretary. The commitment of resources to execute the conclusions of that review will be substantial, and changing course will be exceedingly difficult and time consuming, and we will not likely have the money we would need to change course quickly. So if we choose the wrong road now we will not have the trained, ready military we will need to dominate on the battlefields of the future. I look forward to hearing what your approach will be to resolving these difficult conflicts, what philosophy you intend to follow to provide guidance to those who must decide about initial priorities among sea, land, air, and missile programs, and what guidance you intend to give the Pentagon to direct their design and execution of the upcoming strategic review. I look forward to working with you to build a dominant military for the 21st century. Chairman Levin. Senator McCain. Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate the President-elect for his outstanding selection of Don Rumsfeld to be the next Secretary of Defense. His reputation for intelligence, candor, and competency is well- deserved and we look forward to a rapid confirmation of his nomination so that he can get right to work. I guess there are very few benefits of old age, but every new administration we hear the same complaint that you just mentioned. It is a very legitimate complaint. Perhaps maybe we ought to do something about this process. I am not worried about the willingness of people like you to serve in all candor because you are a patriot first and last. But I am worried about at lower levels of government, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary. Those positions when highly qualified men and women look at it and then see what they have to go through, they decide not to do that. I think that is the compelling reason. I do not have a lot of sympathy for you, Mr. Secretary, but I certainly do for others that you need to attract on your team as you so well pointed out. I was interested in your comments to Senator Warner's questions about the use of force and when and when not the United States troops should be committed. Those of us who assailed the administration and NATO's conduct of gradual escalation during the Balkans campaign took heart in your comments at that time, particularly your reflections on CNN on April 4, 1999, with respect to comparisons of Kosovo to Vietnam which went as follows, and I quote: ``There's always a risk in gradualism. It pacifies the hesitant and the tentative. What it didn't do is shock and awe and alter the calculation of the people you're dealing with.'' During an interview with Chris Matthews, you noted that it was a mistake to say that we would not use ground forces because it simplifies the problem for Milosevic. It seems to me we ought to stop saying things to appease and placate our domestic political audiences. We ought to start behaving in a way that suggests to Milosevic that it is in his interest to end this and stop ethnic cleansing and come to the negotiating table. I appreciate those words very much. But my question is do you think we should have gotten involved in Kosovo to start with? Mr. Rumsfeld. There are pieces of that on both sides obviously. I think that NATO had historically been a defensive alliance and been thought of as that. Its image has altered as a result of that. My comments--and they sound pretty good to me too. I am kind of pleased I said those things--were obviously after the fact. It was we're there. By golly, I'm no fan of graduated response. If we're going to do something, let's do it. But I do not know that--the problem is that in our society people seem to watch how people manage a crisis or a conflict rather than what preceded it. Of course, the real kudos ought to go to people who manage things in a way that the conflict does not happen. Senator McCain. Or not manage them so that the conflict does happen. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. When I think back to the Balkans, I mean, goodness. Again, I do not want to bring up ancient history. But all of us for years did scenarios and war planning and war games with respect to Yugoslavia coming apart and problems in that part of the world. If we know anything, it is that the Europeans I think--by waiting for the Europeans to do something, things evolved in a way that are unfortunate. I think it requires a lot more effort up front. Senator McCain. I think that is certainly true of Bosnia. Mr. Rumsfeld. It is. Senator McCain. Kosovo is a little closer call. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, it is. Senator McCain. So you do not have an answer? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not. That is correct. Senator McCain. I would like to mention a couple more issues to you. I will again propose the question that you previously addressed in the advanced questions to the committee. Do you believe we still have excess military infrastructure that can and should be reduced? Mr. Rumsfeld. Instinctively I do, but knowledgeably I do not. Because I have not gone back in and reviewed it. But I would say this---- Senator McCain. Have you heard the comments of Colin Powell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense that you are succeeding, virtually every military expert in America? Mr. Rumsfeld. I have. I am kind of old-fashioned. I like to figure things out for myself. But I am a firm believer that base structure has to fit force structure. Senator McCain. But it does now? Mr. Rumsfeld. As I say, my impression is it does not. I have not been in there and--the next question after that would be, well, in what way? Of course, I do not know what way because I have not been over there getting briefed. But my brain tells me, my instincts tell me from the past that in fact not only should base structure fit force structure, it does not. That something should be done about it. Because we cannot afford to waste resources with the important tasks we have ahead of us. But I am not in a position to say this is how it ought to be done. Senator McCain. Recently, the United States made a very significant investment in problems in Colombia. Largely, but not totally, but largely unnoticed by Americans and their representatives. I take it from your answer that you have less than well-informed personal views which you prefer to discuss with the appropriate officials before taking a public position and that you have not paid as much attention to it as maybe other issues as well. Mr. Rumsfeld. That could be true. I have not. I have not been to the country in years. I know only basically what I know from the press. Senator McCain. Do you know that we just invested about $1.3 billion in the last appropriation cycle? Mr. Rumsfeld. That is my understanding. Senator McCain. We are upgrading a base in Ecuador which I found out--perhaps I should not admit this--by looking at a newspaper. Mr. Rumsfeld. I did not know that. Senator McCain. There are a lot of things going on in Colombia, Mr. Secretary. I hate to harken back to other conflicts, but I hope you will get very well aware of this situation, what we are doing, what the involvement of U.S. military personnel is in the area and what kind of investment and more importantly what goals we seek here. Because very frankly, I do not know the answer to those questions yet. I think that at least those of us who sit on this committee should be much better informed. I hope that the committee will start looking at the situation from an Armed Forces standpoint very quickly. Mr. Rumsfeld. I will certainly invest the time needed to do that. Chairman Levin. Senator McCain, if I could just interject. Senator Warner and I were just chatting. He raised that very same subject. I think both of us would agree with your comment that we should, indeed, as a committee, get more deeply involved and we will. Senator McCain. I thank you. I will take responsibility for not knowing about the upgrade in Ecuador, but very frankly I am not sure many Americans know about it either. Maybe that is perfectly fine. But I think we had better have a close and careful examination of exactly what we are committed to. I am not sure that the members of this committee or Americans, would agree with a proposed decision on the part of Colombia to give more areas of sanctuary to the so-called narco traffickers there. But anyway, finally, Mr. Secretary, I am sure that you are aware of my concerns about excess spending and the increase of pork barrel spending. It has risen--my time has expired. Senator Warner. We cut into your time. Go ahead and take that question. Senator McCain. Well, I will take about 5 or 10 more minutes, Mr. Rumsfeld. [Laughter.] It has gone up. It continues to go up. When you were Secretary of Defense, it was about $200 to $300 million a year of unrequested add-ons in the Defense appropriations process. It is now up around $6 or $7 billion at minimum--at minimum. New gimmicks have been invented since you were there. One of them is the so-called wish list that comes over from the Pentagon, that although not requested in the budget, would be really great to have. So they pick and choose from that very long list. I want to say this to you, Mr. Secretary, and I do not think you need any advice. But unless you get a handle on this spending, a billion and a half dollars for an aircraft helicopter carrier that the Navy and the Marine Corps said they neither want or need, continued acquisitions of C-130s which 10 years ago the United States Air Force said they did not need, we are going to have a C-130 in every schoolyard in America before this is over. You are going to have to get a handle on this and you may have to face down some very powerful interests, both on the Hill and off the Hill. So I see it lurch out of control. Why do I care? I was just down at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma. They are still living in World War II barracks. We are purchasing equipment that the military neither wants nor needs. We hope we have addressed the food stamp problem. Although, I am not sure we have satisfactorily. But while all this excess and unnecessary spending is going on, the men and women in the military have suffered. It is not an accident that Army captains are getting out at a greater rate than in the history of this country's armed services. I do not mind losing a few admirals and generals. I do mind losing the high quality captains that are the future leaders of this country. So I strongly urge you to look at this issue because the urgency of the Cold War situation has therefore allowed us a degree of license in unnecessary spending out of the defense budget, much of which has nothing to do with defense. You are never going to be able to meet our requirements of a new and modernized military, much less the men and women in the military being taken care of unless you address this issue. I thank the Chairman for the additional time. [The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain Mr. Chairman, the President-elect should be commended for his outstanding selection of Don Rumsfeld to be the next Secretary of Defense. Secretary Rumsfeld's reputation for intelligence, candor, and competency is well deserved, and I look forward to today's hearing with great interest. The decline in spending on national defense that we witnessed for 15 years coincided with dramatic global changes that, rightly or wrongly, resulted in a level of deployments that exceeded any previous period in memory. That protracted decline in defense spending did not come without a price. We can rightly point to the United States Armed Forces as the most capable in the world, but they are not omnipotent, and they do have their breaking point. Shallow analyses that point to the size of the U.S. defense budget relative to those of potential enemies combined and an overemphasis on the two-war strategy as a planning guide have impeded our ability to accurately gauge requirements. The myriad readiness problems that have been well documented occur not because of the two-war strategy, but despite it. The resources and attention needed to correct those problems are required irrespective of that strategy. The readiness problems we are witnessing today occur as a result of the operational tempo demanded of our military combined with a force structure ill-suited to the projected international environment of tomorrow. They occur because of the failure of the Clinton administration and of Congress to adequately provide for a strong defense. Not to be ignored is the considerable damage done to our national defense through the growing problem of pork-barrel spending and its related infrastructure issue, the closing of unneeded military bases. Defense spending bills have become a national disgrace, with increasing percentages of the budget wasted by earmarking many billions of dollars for solely parochial reasons. The problem, in fact, has gotten so bad that, increasingly, pork-barrel spending is not occurring on top of requested spending levels, but in place of it. In short, we are adding pork at the expense of vital programs. Should anybody doubt this statement, just wait for the uniformed services to request supplemental spending bills for the current fiscal year reflecting spending that should have already been appropriated. For the past several years, together with Senator Levin, I have cosponsored legislation authorizing additional base closing rounds. That legislation has been regularly and summarily rejected by the Senate. Yes, the Clinton administration politicized the 1995 round and, yes, it costs money to close bases. But the real reason for the rejection of these amendments has been to protect jobs, not promote national defense. The Clinton administration will be gone in a matter of days, and no rational person can possibly argue that a closed military base costs money once inevitable and programmed cleanup costs are completed. Additional base closings, together with contracting out of certain activities and the elimination of protectionist statutes, can account for as much as $20 billion per year in savings--clearly enough to make a sizable dent in the modernization shortfall we are facing. I am also interested in hearing Secretary Rumsfeld's approach to the use of force. Many of the most contentious debates that occur in this committee and on the floor of the Senate involve unforeseen and ongoing military contingencies. The question of when and how to use military force is central to our responsibilities as a government, the question of war powers central to our responsibilities as an institution. Secretary Rumsfeld's thoughts on these matters will be of immeasurable importance as we continue to wrestle with ongoing deployments in the Balkans and Southwest Asia and the unknown but certain deployments of the future. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to address this session of the committee and look forward to Secretary Rumsfeld's opening statement. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Do you have a quick comment on that before I call on Senator Cleland? Mr. Rumsfeld. I certainly agree that the question that has to be posed is whether or not something is going to contribute to our national security and whether or not it meets the priorities that are important for this country. That has to be our focus. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Cleland. Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, since the C-130s are built in Georgia, I would like to say that I am for schoolyards being able to move anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. [Laughter.] Let me just say that I am fascinated by the ``Rumsfeld's Rules''. I appreciate your appreciation for quotes and anecdotes. In listening to your incredible resume and your wonderful experience that you bring to this task--and you certainly have my support for this job. I think you are going to be an outstanding Secretary of Defense--I thought about the line by Jack Kennedy that the thing he appreciated most in the White House was a sense of history. The thing he feared most was human miscalculation. I think you bring something very special to this post and to this committee and to this country with your great sense of history, not only in service to this country yourself, but in the defense post. I think you can help us avoid a lot of human miscalculations. So congratulations to you. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Senator Cleland. In terms of deployment of American forces, I would just like to followup on my fellow combat veteran John McCain's comments and some of the comments that have been made here. I was privileged to visit General Powell when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Again, a fellow Vietnam veteran, someone like many of us that learned a lot of bitter lessons about deployment of forces in the Vietnam War. I once heard General Powell say something very powerful. He said, ``my job is to recommend to the President the best advice to the President on how to use the American military to stay out of war. But if we get in war, to win and win quickly.'' When he said that, it occurred to me that that was the best mission statement that I had ever really heard about the purpose of the American military. So he is going to be one of your great colleagues in the cabinet and I think that kind of thinking I heard from you today. I was appreciative of your comments about using force, using American military, using our posture to the extent to which we did not have to commit it. But obviously, if we commit it, then there are certain things we have to do to make it successful. In terms of success, I am glad to hear you say that we must ask the question how do we know when we are successful? I asked this question of several administration people in terms of the Balkan War. I said early on, make sure you define victory. Because one of these days you are going to have to declare it. It leads me to a Clausewitz line that I like very much that the leader must know the last step he is going to take before he takes the first step. So that steps in motion a whole set of thought processes. Senator Roberts and I took the floor all last year to argue out the question in a bipartisan way basically about when to commit American forces, about what is in the strategic national vital interest of the United States and what is not. That if you commit, then you have a definable objective. Then you do have an exit strategy. It has been a pleasure to work with my colleague across the aisle. I just wanted to share those thoughts with you that might be of help in fulfilling your task. Onto the question of our men and women in uniform. I appreciate your interest in your statement about working hard to make sure that we recruit the best and the brightest, that we do not just lower our standards, that we do not dummy up the military just to get numbers. That is fool's gold. That is false economy. Any way you cut it. I would rather have less numbers and keep quality people. So we do want to go after the best and the brightest, not only to join but to stay. Senator McCain pointed out senior captains, senior NCOs. I have tried to fight through this, work through this, over the last 4 years I have been on the Personnel Subcommittee. We have looked at various ways, various incentives, not only for recruitment, but for retention. It does seem to me that retention is a real special challenge. I have learned that you recruit a soldier, but you retain a family. You have a family military now. Those families are interested in the same things families outside the post are interested in. One of them is education. For the last 2 years, this body has put forward a notion that with my initiative that we ought to look at the GI bill and maybe see if we can use that to apply to family members to entice members to stay into the military for a full career. I would just like for you to take a look at that as we go along as just one of our tools that we use to retain quality personnel. I appreciate in your statement a focus on intelligence. I cannot help but feel that intelligence prevents many battles and wins many battles when you get in them. That the coordination of our intelligence capabilities is itself a challenge. I mentioned the deployments. Senator Roberts and I came to basically a point of view of realistic restraint. We just saw with the U.S.S. Cole. Now, if you project force or project power, you also make yourself in this terrorist world, in this terrorist environment, a target, so that power projection requires power protection. Therefore, I think we have to be very realistic about our power projection. I think one of the reviews that I would be grateful for you to do as you review the American military is to see where it is deployed around the world. We literally are out there everywhere in the world and I think it's a time for review. In terms of weapons systems, I noticed that a couple of years ago, you joined with seven other Secretaries of Defense to endorse full funding for the F22. That is something that I think that is important to our national security interest. Let me just say that one of the Rumsfeld's Rules is do not necessarily avoid sharp edges. Occasionally, they are necessary to leadership. So onto a sharp edge. National missile defense. I have been a big supporter of theater missile defense, but especially the Arrow system that we worked very closely with, with our Israeli friends. I am a big booster of research and further testing of an anti-missile system. I guess I feel right now that we are not ready for deployment of a system. I am not sure that the concept has been proven. But I am willing to work on it to prove it out, test it, and then make judgments on deployment later. But one of the wonderful briefings I have received in the last year or so is from your commission on missile systems. Of course, we were all concerned about the North Korean launch of the missile in the Pacific. I went to South Korea right up to the DMZ this past August. It was fascinating to get the briefing on North Korea and see where they were. We got a fascinating briefing. We had given to us by the Department of the Army a photo taken at night of lights on the Korean peninsula which also showed lights just into Southern China. It is interesting. You see lights in South Korea. You see lights in China. North Korea literally is a big, dark, black hole. It is amazing to me that 50 years after the Korean War, they still cannot turn the lights on. I just wonder--we do not want to overreact here. I think any missile defense system that is deployed should be well thought out and not just on the basis of one launch by a country that cannot even turn the lights on. So I point that out to you because I am willing to walk down this path with you to continue to prove the concept. But I think first things first. Let us prove the concept and then think about deployment. I would say too that in my analysis of threats, it is this terroristic threat that is maybe our biggest challenge. Particularly, in terms of missile systems one that Senator Sam Nunn and that great expert on nuclear warfare, Ted Turner, have recently articulated and that is that we might want to look at the whole question of the Soviets, former Soviets, or the Russians now and their de-alerting of their existing systems and any loose nukes that might be out there. That might be one of our biggest challenges in terms of missile threats. Now, I would like for you just to respond to maybe the last point that I raised. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I think the danger that has been suggested with respect to the disarray in the former Soviet Union and the large number of nuclear weapons is a very real concern. There is just no question but that it has to be looked at in two dimensions. First is the actual materials which there are a number of countries that have appetites for it. If your circumstance is that anything is for sale, there is a risk. The second dimension to it is the fact that you have a large number of very bright, talented, experienced weapons people in the Soviet Union that are not getting paid and not getting their pensions. Again, if everything is for sale, their brains and their knowledge is for sale. It results in a risk for accelerated proliferation that is serious and real and I am very much concerned about it. I recognize the fact that the United States needs to address it and play a role in trying to avoid that proliferation. I would like to add one word on missile defense if I might. We talk frequently about the risks of deploying missile defense. We are properly concerned about our allies in that regard. We are properly concerned about attitudes by Russia and China and other countries. I think it is useful from time-to-time to also ask ourselves what are the risks of not deploying missile defense. I would mention several. One is it seems to me if some countries that have significant technological capabilities, decide that they are vulnerable to ballistic missiles from their neighbors and that we lack the ability to assist them in defending against that capability. That we may contribute to proliferation by encouraging them to go forward and develop their own nuclear weapons and their own ballistic missiles. I think that is just a fact. Second, the other thing that worries me if we do not deploy ballistic missile capability is I have been in the White House as Chief of Staff and as Secretary of Defense on the National Security Council. I have seen the process that a President has to go through when there is a risk or a threat. If we know of certain knowledge that another country has a nuclear warhead that can effect us and we do not feel we have a good grip on their motivations, their behavior patterns, what could dissuade them, and we know that they are capable of using it, we are forced into one of two course of action. Either we acquiesce and change our behavior and change our interest and alter what we would otherwise have done or we have to preempt. I think putting a President of the United States and a country in the position where their choices, their options, are so minimal that they are forced into a position of--as Israel was--with respect to the radon and nuclear capability in Iraq so many years ago--where a President is forced to go in and take action of a preemptive nature because he lacks the defensive capability to persuade those people that it is not in their interest to do that. So that is a dimension to this missile defense thing that I do not think gets into the debate to the extent it ought to. I think we need to look at deterrence across the spectrum. I was in a meeting up in New York. Some person raised their hand and they said that my father was a good friend of Colonel House. I thought back, my goodness gracious, Colonel House. That was Woodrow Wilson's day. I was talking about missiles and missile defense and so forth. He said, one day my father asked Colonel House why he was so courteous. Why he was just the most gracious, courteous, person he had ever met. The answer was by Colonel House, well, young man, I grew up when gentleman carried revolvers. If you know everyone has a revolver, you tend to be courteous. Well, North Korea is selling, has been and is today to my knowledge, to my not today knowledge, but very recent knowledge, selling those capabilities and technologies and trading them around the world. They are an active world class proliferator. It is my understanding when the United States representatives met with them, their response was when we asked if they would change their behavior with respect to ballistic missiles, one of their responses was something to the effect that you are America. You have bombed in the Sudan. You have bombed in Afghanistan. You are bombing in Kosovo. You are bombing in Iraq. You are giving food aid to North Korea. Now, why? Why is the behavior so different? Well, they believe it is because they have those weapons. They believe that those capabilities they believe they have are sufficient to alter behavior of their neighbors. I do not think we as a country want to think that the old mutual assured destruction where the United States and the Soviet Union could kill each other several times over is necessarily a deterrent that is well- fashioned for the period we are moving into. Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Inhofe. Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can remember when I heard on TV--I did not have any indication that you would be nominated nor that you would accept if nominated to this position. I told my wife there is not a person in America today as qualified as Don Rumsfeld for this position. I also had two personal reasons that I am rejoicing in your nomination. One is that as Senator Durbin said when you are inducted into the National Wrestling Hall of Fame--of course, that is located in Stillwater, Oklahoma. So you are even more of a hero there than you are in some other areas. I remember also when I came from the House to the Senate in 1994, I went through some of these confirmation hearings on the different Chiefs. I can remember identifying with them because we had served at the same time. You know, myself and Elvis Presley and some of these guys. So now as of about 5 years ago, Mr. Chairman, there is not one person in the service who was serving when I was serving. So you and I are contemporaries. We served precisely the same years and now I have someone I can communicate with. I want to also complement you and your family and I look at your beautiful granddaughter over there. I think there is not one of my eight grandkids who would listen to me for 2 hours and be as patient as she is. I think when we assess this thing, I know there is this euphoric attitude after the Cold War is over that somehow the threat is not there. I really believe the threat is greater today. I think we are in the most threatened position that we have been in as a nation in our Nation's history. Incidentally, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, agrees with that. I think when you look at it, Senator Warner is right. We cannot try to pin you down as to what kind of a cost this is going to be. But I would say that when you have the Joint Chiefs all agreeing that the range is similar between $48 and $58 billion additional. Do you have any reason to believe that is unreasonable? Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no reason to believe any of those numbers are unreasonable. It takes--I really do like to get my brain engaged before my mouth. I need to get in there and pour over it and I need to get some people to help me. Senator Inhofe. Well, there is one thing that has not been brought up that I think you--I am going to ask that you look into immediately. That is what we are going to have to do in a supplemental before the current budget year. We have been talking about it in future years. But right now we have a list that has been provided us with $4.5 billion of near term readiness requirements. We are talking about spare parts and equipment maintenance and another $2.5 billion for emergency personnel or modernization programs. Now, we have been told that if we are unable to get that, we may have to cease training in the fourth quarter of this year. I am going to ask you to really pay attention to the current needs, those things that are having a deteriorating effect on our retention and those things that have to be done. Our RPM accounts, for example. I mean, you can go down to Fort Bragg in a rainstorm as I have been there and our kids are covering up their equipment with their bodies to keep them from rusting. So those are the things that have to be done immediately. I hope that you would look at those. Mr. Rumsfeld. I will indeed. Thank you, sir. Senator Inhofe. Just so there is clarification as to the responses that you made, when the Chairman first asked about the missile defense law that we passed, the Missile Defense Act of 1999, and he read the two parts of that bill that I think we have heard many, many times before, do you see that there is anything incompatible about those two statements? Mr. Rumsfeld. The first is deploying an effective system. Senator Inhofe. As soon as technologically possible. Mr. Rumsfeld. The second was negotiation. Senator Inhofe. Yes. Mr. Rumsfeld. Not that I can see. Senator Inhofe. Well, I do not either. But I just wanted to--because I think that the act is very specific. Let us keep in mind that was not just passed by a huge margin in the House. It was passed by a 97 to 3 margin in the Senate. Not one person who has been in here today voted against it. So I would only ask that you would recommend to the administration that you immediately start complying with Public Law 106-38 and start getting and deploying. By the way, I want to say that if there is one--one of the great recent services that you have provided for this country is the Rumsfeld Commission. I think if I were to single out one or two sentences in there when those who were opposed to our meeting what I think our requirements are on a national missile defense system. They often say, well, these countries, Iran, Iraq, and other countries are not going to be able to have this capability for another five to ten years. You pointed out that an indigenous system does not exist today. That these countries are trading technologies and trading systems. So I appreciate very much your making that statement and making it very clear to this committee. Third, there is one thing that we have not really talked about and I would ask that you address. It does not have a lot of sex appeal. Not many people talk about it. But it is our near-term readiness and modernization. Just as one example, and I could use many other examples, but this is a personal one. I chair the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee and have had a great deal of concern as to how these efforts over in Kosovo and Bosnia are draining our ability to defend America. Just one being the 21st TACOM. The 21st TACOM is responsible for ground logistics in that area of the Balkans, but also in the Middle East. They're at about 100 percent capacity right now. Some of the equipment they had over there in the M915 trucks that we are using, many of them with over a million miles on them. We determined that if we could just use the amount of money that we are going to have to use to maintain those for a 3-year period, we could replace them with new vehicles. Now, the problem there is an accounting problem that you are well aware of. I am not sure whether it was back in 1975 or not. But we cannot get anything done and prepare for the future when fiscally in a normal prudent business decision, you would say, no. We are not going to keep fixing those. We are going to have new ones. Do you have any thoughts about how you might address that? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, there is no difference that the government operates quite differently from business. There is also no question that at a certain point people do not maintain fleets of things that are antiquated because of the upkeep and maintenance cost of continuing them. Senator Inhofe. Yes, but, of course, we have been doing it. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Senator Inhofe. Because a question on base closure was asked, I would only make a request that the force structure that we have today is about one-half of what it was during 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. That can be quantified, half the Army divisions, half the tactical air wings, half the ships going out from 300 ships--600 ships to 300 ships. After the U.S.S. Cole, tragedy took place, I went over there. I talked to virtually every rear admiral and everyone who was around there. They said that if we had had--when we cut down the number of ships, we cut our refuellers or our oilers down from 32 to 21. If we had not done that, every one of them to the last one said we would not have gone into Yemen or the other ports. We would have refueled at sea. Now, when you go from the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea and turn left and go up the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. It is about 5,000 miles. You have to have some refueling capability. Virtually everything in there is in kind of a threatened area. I went back to the bone yards and found that we had two vehicles out there that were in very good shape and cost very little more money to put them back into service. Those were the Higgins and the Humphreys. I would hope that you would consider doing that and talk to your Navy people--and, of course, you draw on your own experience there--as to why it would not be prudent to pull some of those back into service and to get that refueling capability in that area. I just make that request that you would consider that. Mr. Rumsfeld. I will be happy to look at it. Thank you, sir. Senator Inhofe. Thank you, very much. Mr. Rumsfeld. Could I clean up two things that are a little embarrassing to me? The Senator mentioned I was in the Wrestling Hall of Fame. It is true. But I did not go in the front door with the great wrestlers. I came in the back door with the so-called distinguished Americans who had wrestled. It was Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Dennis Hastert, and Rumsfeld and a few others. [Laughter.] Second, I was described as the captain---- Senator Warner. We would add John Chafee is my recollection, our distinguished colleague. Mr. Rumsfeld. That is right, exactly. I was described as captain of the college football team and it is true. But I was a little guy. It was the 150-pound football, not the big guys. I would not want to let the record stay inaccurate. Chairman Levin. Well, we will keep the record open for a number of additional comments. [Laughter.] Senator Inhofe. One last thing just for the record. I would ask also in this setting and this environment today at this time, you cannot get into your F-22, joint strike fighters, crusader, global hawk, for example. I know you were a real supporter of unmanned vehicles sometime ago. But I hope for the record maybe later on you can have some time to think about this and address these platforms. We would like to believe, and many of the American people believe, that we have the very best of everything. But I was very proud of Gen. John Jumper not too long ago when he said in terms of air- to-air vehicles, we are not superior. In fact, the Russians have some things on the market right now, the SU-35, that are better than any air-to-air combat vehicle we have, including the F-15s. So I am hoping that you will be able to assess our modernization and get it as specific as you can as early in your term as possible. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Reed. Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld, not only for your willingness to serve, but for your lifetime of public service. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. Senator Reed. We had a chance this morning to chat briefly. I thank you for that also. I was listening to your response to Senator Warner about the conditions for committing American forces today. Frankly, and I think you would agree, that it is in a sense a work in progress that you are trying to understand the forces and the structure that we have and the threats we face. I might suggest that we are pretty good at the initial phases of these operations because they are essentially military operations, the forceful entry into contested territory. We are not very good at the back end which is the policing operation which is humanitarian operations. One of the reason we are not is that we do not have those resources. We have not been able to coordinate with our allies and with national organizations to have such resources. I wondered if you might comment upon this whole issue, not just in terms of America's role, but being able to parade an organization or mutual organizations that can do missions that you might feel needed to be done. We have the forces militarily to make the entry, but we are uncertain about whether or not we can extract ourselves in reasonable time. Would you comment on that? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I can comment briefly. We all know it is a lot easier to get into something than it is to get out of it. We all know that everyone is not capable of doing everything. In fact, the tasks as you properly point out are distinctly different. I have had an impression over the years that we have a significant role in helping to deter aggression in the world. The way you do that is to be arranged to defend in the event you need to which you know well as a West Point graduate. Having been at NATO and looking at different countries and what the different countries bring to that alliance, it is pretty obvious that the United States has some things that we bring to it that are notably different from some of the other countries. It is also true that the other countries can bring significant things. I do not think that it is necessarily true that the United States has to become a great peacekeeper if you will. I think we need to have capabilities, as you are suggesting, that are distinct from war fighting capabilities. But I also think other countries can participate in these activities that are needed in the world from time-to-time and bring--they can bring the same capabilities we can to that type of thing. Whereas, they cannot bring the same capabilities that we can, for example, with respect to air lift or sea lift or intelligence gathering or a variety of other things. There is one other aspect to being on the ground in an area. Someone mentioned with respect to the U.S.S. Cole. If you are a space asset or the Marines that were in Beirut Airport back when I was President Reagan's Middle East envoy, if you provide an attractive target, a lucrative target, somebody may want to try to test whether or not they can damage that target. That is a lot less true--the United States of America is an attractive target. So when we are on the ground, we tend to become a bit more attractive, a bit more ``lucrative'' as a target. It seems to me that it may very well be that other countries can do some of those things in a way that is less likely to create the kind of targeting that the United States tends to draw. Senator Reed. Thank you. You made reference to and anticipated my next question which as the former Ambassador to NATO, you have a great experience you are bringing to the task because there are issues, one of which is to what extent NATO will operate or European forces will operate independently of NATO. We have a current controversy about the depleted uranium being used in Kosovo. We have an ongoing debate and discussion about national missile defense. Most--many European governments are frankly opposed to it. Then we also have the issue not only of whether or not we are willing to essentially allow our allies to do some things, frankly because they might get the impression that they can do everything alone and they do not need us any longer. I wonder from your perspective and as you go in how do you propose to deal with some of these issues relative to NATO? Mr. Rumsfeld. I would begin with several principles. I think NATO is just an enormously important alliance. It has a record of amazing success. I believe in consultation with our NATO allies. I think that they have difficult political situations and close margins in their parliaments. They need time. They need discussion with us. They need leadership. They need an opportunity so that the solution can be fashioned in a way that makes sense. With respect to the European defense force, let me just put it this way. I think anything that damages the NATO cohesion would be unwise for Europe and for the United States and for our ability to contribute to peace and stability in that part of the world. Senator Reed. During the campaign, Mr. Rumsfeld, the Bush campaign made a great point about suggesting that China was a competitor. Frankly, in that type of dynamic, there is always the fear that competition will lead to conflict. How do you think you can use your resources at the Department of Defense to preempt conflict with China? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I think how China evolves in the 21st century into the world in Asia and elsewhere in the world is enormously important. I think our behavior and the behavior of other countries in the region and the world is going to make a difference as to how they evolve. I would characterize our relationship with the People's Republic of China as complicated and multi-dimensional. It is true, as the President-elect said, that we are competitors. They are seeking influence in the region and we are in the region. We have been in the region. I think it is important we have been in the region because we have contributed to peace and stability in that part of the world. We are trading partners simultaneously. So on the one hand, we are somewhat of a competitor. On the other hand, we are a trading partner. We watch what they say and they write. I am no more an expert than others, but I do read what some of their military colleges, writings are saying. We see their defense budget increasing by double digits every year. We see an awful lot of their military doctrine talking about leapfrogging generations of capabilities and moving toward asymmetrical threats to the United States, cyber warfare and these types of things. I do not think the history between the United States and the PRC is written. I think we are going to write it. I think we have to be wise and we have to be engaged and we have to be thoughtful. But we cannot engage in self-delusion. They are not strategic partners in my view. They are--it is a multi-faceted relationship. Senator Reed. Let me touch upon this. Many of my colleagues have national missile defense. But from the context of the overall theory of deterrence, you described from your vantage point in the White House the sort of two choices. If someone had a ballistic missile that could reach our shores, the choice is being acquiescence or preemption. Yet, for decades, Russia had exactly that capability, the Soviet Union. I would suggest we did not acquiesce and we did not conduct preemptive strikes. It seems to me that what is going on here in this deterrence theory is that it is as much about the psychology or one's perception of the psychology of the opponent as well as throw weight and defense mechanisms. Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely. Senator Reed. Inherent, it seems that what you are saying, is that you really distinguish some of these so-called rogue states as being irrational as different from the Soviet Union, unable to appreciate the fact that any type of unilateral attack on the United States, even if frankly--one would assume, even if it was successfully defeated by a missile defense, would result in almost inevitable retaliation. Is that at the core of your thinking, that we are dealing now with some irrational actors? Mr. Rumsfeld. No, sir. I must not have explained myself well. Two things. My comments about the behavior of the states that we are talking about--I am not terribly enamored of the phrase rogue state. It leaves the impression that the leadership there is kind of like a rogue elephant careening off a wall blindly and that is not the case. I mean, I have met with Saddam Hussein and I met with the elder Assad as Middle East envoy. These people are intelligent. They are survivors. They are tough. They do not think like we do. Goodness knows, they do not behave like we do with respect to their neighbors or their own people. But they are not erratic. You are correct. We absolutely must--that is why this intelligence gathering task we have as a country is so much more important today, not just because of proliferation but because the weapons are so powerful. It is not a matter of counting beans in Russia, how many missiles, how many ships, how many tanks? It is a matter of knowing a lot more about attitudes and behaviors and motivations and how you can alter their behavior to create a more peaceful world. The thing that I would want to clarify is that when I said what I said, I was distinguishing between the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. There the so-called mutual shared destruction indeed worked. The potential to be able to have massive retaliation I think created a more stable situation. To pretend that the fact that we had through massive retaliation a stable situation with Russia and that that necessarily would deter not only Russia, but others from making mischief is obviously historically wrong. We had a war in Korea. We had a war in Vietnam. Saddam Hussein went into Kuwait. Not withstanding the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union had a perfect ability to destroy each other several times over. So what you need is deterrence across the spectrum that addressed the evolving threats that are notably different as you well know. I just must not have made myself very clear. Senator Reed. Well, again, this is a topic that cannot be exhausted in 5 or 6 or 7 minutes. Mr. Rumsfeld. No, it is an interesting topic. Senator Reed. I appreciate your thoughtfulness and your comments. Thank you very much, Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. We are going to call on two more Senators before lunch. We are going to try to squeeze in both Senator Roberts and then Senator Bingaman. Then we will break for lunch. If we break right at 1:00, we will come back at 2:00. If we go 5 minutes after 1:00, we will come back at five after 2:00. Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say I think you are the right man for the right job. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Senator Roberts. This is a little different experience in regards to the usual nomination process at least for me and I think other members of the committee. We have all of our prepared questions that are prepared by staff in large type so that we can read them and go on from there. But I think in your case, you shine the light of experience and expertise into the nomination fog and I think it has been very helpful. I think it has been educational. I think you caused us to think a little bit and I think that is very appropriate. I feel compelled to use part of my time--I should not, but I am going to--to inform my colleagues and Mr. Rumsfeld that in terms of our vital national security interests, I think that Latin America, Central America, our involvement in Colombia in the Southern Command where there are 31 nations involved is just as important as the Balkans. I noted that there was some concern in regards to maybe Congress going in with a blindfold or not really fully aware of all the details. Let me point out that the subcommittee of which I am privileged to chair and Senator Bingaman was the ranking member, we had lengthy hearings and the full committee had hearings. We had General Wilhelm. We had the Assistant Secretary of Defense. We had the Assistant Secretary of State. We had two of those. We had two ambassadors. We went over in considerable detail what the pros and cons were in regards to our involvement. More especially since we left Panama and went to Miami and found thousands of miles in the Southern Command that we are at risk. We do have bases. We have them in El Salvador. We have them in Aruba. Then I think we have them in Ecuador as well to do a tough job. We took a lot of infrastructure away to go over to the Balkans. Well, why am I saying this? That is because there are 360 million people down there. The average age is 14 with a lot of problems. In regards to immigration, in regards to drugs, in regards to trade, in regards to possible revolution, and in regards to our energy supply, where we have about 22 percent of our energy coming from Venezuela and Mexico and in regards to what a fellow down there named Chavez is doing, I think we better pay attention to it. Now, I cannot say whether our policies in Colombia are going to work or not. But I do say that we have taken a considerable interest in this, had a subcommittee debate and in the full committee and in the Appropriations Committee where General Wilhelm had to stand tall and parade rest before the appropriators and in the Senate and in the House, this was not done without due consideration. I would urge your attention to that because I think it is very important. I want to talk about--I want to ask you if--in fact I am going to recommend a criteria in regard to the use of troops. This is in concert with what my dear friend Senator Cleland and I determine in our realistic restraint foreign policy dialogue that at least us two listened to. We had to listen to each other over on the Senate. We came up with the criterion before we would put the troops in. One was the stakes are vital to the United States. Second, public support is assured. Third, overwhelming force is used in regards to a clear definition of goals and purpose. Last, everybody agrees on an exit strategy. I think that is a pretty good list. The reason I mention that is on behalf of the warfighter. I was in Kosovo on exactly the same day that we mounted up and the 27th Marines went in. I took the advantage to get briefed. They probably did not want to brief me. That was the last thing they wanted to do was see a U.S. Senator there as they were getting ready to mount up. But I asked a lance corporal, I said, what are your goals here? Do you think you can do the job in regard to Kosovo? He said, sir, I'm a United States Marine. I can do the job. I said, but what is your personal goal? He said my personal goal is to take care of myself so that I can come home after 6 months to my wife and kids because I know just as soon as I leave, these guys are going to start shooting each other all over again. I think too many times it is not that we should not pay attention to the geo-political concerns and the strategic concerns. My concern is the warfighter, that person in uniform. I believe that as we go down this we remember that it is one thing to have a cause to fight for. It is another thing to have a cause to fight and die for. So I am in agreement with the Powell Doctrine. I pretty much said what I think we ought to do on down the road. I offer that up as a suggestion. The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of which I am privileged to chair and we have drugs and we have terrorism and we have weapons of mass destruction and we have the counter threat reduction programs. We have a whole bunch of things. Every staff member back here has to deal with me because of this subcommittee and the foresight of the distinguished Chairman. We asked witnesses in terms of things that really bother you, whether it is a cyber attack or a biological attack or whatever it is, what keeps you up at night? What is the one big thing that keeps you up at night? Now, other than you filling out all the paperwork you have to in regard to the ethics business, what keeps you up at night? What would you tell the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee right now that you think is an immediate concern in terms of our national security? What keeps you up at night? Now, I know you said that you cannot really single one out, that this is a continuum and a many faceted kind of thing here with missile development, terrorism, so on and so forth. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, two things I would say. I would repeat what I said about the importance of considerably improving our intelligence capabilities so that we know more about what people think and how they behave and how their behavior can be altered and what the capabilities are in this world. I think the goal ought not to be to win a war. The goal ought to be to be so strong and so powerful that you can dissuade people from doing things they otherwise would do. You do not have to even fight the war. That takes me to the second point. The second point is I do not know that I really understand what deters people today because I do not think one thing deters everybody. I think that we need to understand that there are different parts of the world. There are different types of leaders with different motivations. We have to do a lot better job of thinking through deterrence and assuring that we have done the best job possible. I mean, everyone is going to make mistakes. But today when mistakes are made with the power of weapons, they are not little mistakes, they are big mistakes. We need to do everything we can to fashion a set of deterrents, a nest, a fabric that does the best possible job for this country. Let me go to your first point just very briefly and add a thought for consideration. You mentioned overwhelming public support as a criteria. I am uncomfortable with that. I think that leaders have to lead and build support. I look back at history. I think there have been times when we have had to do things when the public was not there yet. I think that what needs to be done is to have leaders in office, presidents, who think these things through, who make the right decisions, who are sufficiently persuaded that overwhelming support, public support, follows. You cannot sustain anything without it. I quite agree. But I think that thinking that you are going to have it at the outset is optimistic. Second, on overwhelming force. I have watched presidents look at their situation in a pre-crisis period, a build-up period. They have very few tools to deal with. The military tends to come in and the choices are not--you do not have a lot of arrows in your quiver. It is a proper thing to say we do not want to do something unless we are going to put the force into it we need. But the concept of overwhelming force in isolation I would think needs to have another dimension. It is this. In the pre-crisis period, in the early period, you can do things to alter people's behavior that does not require 500,000 troops and 6 months to build up. If we are wise and think these things through, there are things that can be done in a build-up period that will persuade people they ought not to be doing what they are thinking about doing, that will persuade the people they need to support them in doing what they are thinking about doing, that those people ought not to support them. That does not require overwhelming force. That requires a lot better intelligence and a lot more tools to affect and alter thinking in those periods. I think we need to broaden that concept somewhat. Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. My time has expired. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Bingaman is next. We will then recess and Senator Allard will be first when we return. Senator Bingaman. Mr. Rumsfeld, thank you and congratulations on your stamina in considering all of these questions. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. Senator Bingaman. As well as congratulations on your nomination. I certainly intend to support you. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Senator Bingaman. One of the issues that we always hear a lot of talk about, but at least in my view has not been given adequate priority in defense budgeting, is science and technology. It seems like, at least for the last several years, every time we see a defense budget proposed by the administration, the percentage of the defense budget that is committed to science and technology is reduced. It always loses out compared to procurement, compared to readiness, compared to all these other things. I know that President-elect Bush gave a speech at the Citadel a year and a half ago where he talked about the importance of science and technology investment. He said he was committing an additional $20 billion--or he would if elected President--commit an additional $20 billion to defense research and development between now and 2006. I think that was the commitment he made in that speech or the statement he made. Let me add one other aspect of this. The reductions in growth in defense research and development in recent years has been justified at some of our hearings on the basis that the industrial companies will pick up the difference here, that U.S. industry is sufficiently strong that we do not need to do what we once did in science and technology. That to my mind is very much at odds with what I understand is happening to our defense industrial base. They do not have the luxury of putting substantial new resources into this area. So I would be interested in any comments you have about how we can increase research and development, defense related research and development and support for science and technology. Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree completely with everything you have said. When President-elect Bush announced that I was his choice for this post, I said that I had visited with him. I had read his pronouncements and plans for defense and that I supported them enthusiastically. Certainly with respect to science and technology, he is on the mark and you are on the mark and I agree. I came out of the pharmaceutical business where we invest in research and development that is not guaranteed to produce anything in the next 5 minutes. You have to be patient. You have to live with a lot of failures. I have been involved in the electronics business, quite the same. If you are not investing for the future, you are going to die. You simply run out of gas at a certain point. This wonderful country of ours has such fine leadership in science and technology. But the reality is an awful lot of the foreign students who used to come over here and stay and study are now going back to their countries. They are leaving with an enormous amount of knowledge and the country, this committee, this department, simply must be willing to make those investments. Senator Bingaman. Well, thank you for that answer. Let me ask about one other area that I also think tends to get short changed in the defense budgets that I have seen, and that relates to test and evaluation. Again, there does not seem to me at least to be a strong constituency for funding the necessary infrastructure to accomplish and maintain our ability in the test and evaluation area. I have a parochial interest in this. Because White Sands Missile Range is in my state. It's our largest, and I believe our most capable test and evaluation facility. But this is an area that I hope you will give some attention to. It seems to me to be one of those areas that falls between the stools when people start putting together defense budgets. It does not have the natural advocates behind it the way we are currently structured that would allow it to be given sufficient attention. I am glad to hear your comment. Or I will go onto another question. Mr. Rumsfeld. I am not knowledgeable about the state of that and will be happy to look into it. Senator Bingaman. One other area I wanted to ask about, and this has been asked about by some of the other Senators. There was a New York Times editorial that I am sure you saw expressing concern about what they anticipate would be a missile defense organization. The MDO recommendation to the new president that he needs to order construction of a radar system in Alaska to begin this March in order to meet the deadlines that you identified in the commission report that you came up with for actual deployment by 2005 I believe. I believe I have those dates right. I wondered if you have any insight into whether or not such a recommendation will be made, whether or not you would support such a recommendation to begin construction of a radar site in March or whether you believe that is premature. Mr. Rumsfeld. It would be premature for me to comment on it. There is no question we simply have to get some folks pass through this committee engaging that subject. I have to get myself up to speed. It clearly would be an issue that would end up with the President and the National Security Council. Senator Bingaman. Let me ask about one other thing, one other area, and that is export controls. My impression is that there are major problems in the system we have in place now to control defense related exports, that it has worked to the disadvantage of many of our companies that have defense related work, but also do a lot of commercial work. This is an issue that involves several departments, not just the Department of Defense, but the Department of Commerce, Department of State. I think we have probably added to the problem here in Congress by shifting responsibilities to the Department of State and not adequately funding them in this area. I do not know if this is an area that you are informed about. If so, I would be anxious to hear your views. If not, I would be anxious to just urge you to look at this and see if you could bring some constructive recommendations to this system. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I agree that it is something that has to be looked at. It is an enormously complicated set of problems of which I am only marginally informed. I have bumped into it through the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and watching that set of issues. I have bumped into it through business on a number of occasions. There has to be a balance between national security interest and our obvious desire to be able to encourage investment in this country to create advanced technologies. To the extent you inhibit that, you do not stop it. You simply drive it offshore. A businessman can sit down in a room in Chicago and decide if he wants to do research and development in France or in Asia, in Japan or in Skokie, Illinois. Just with a decision it gets changed one place or another. To the extent we are unwise and allow a system that needs to be very dynamic because there is so much happening to be static and prevent things that need not be prevented or delay things to the point where people are unwilling to accept the costs which delay imposes, then we damage ourselves, not just economically. We also damage ourselves from a national security standpoint because we force people to go offshore to develop these technologies. So we need to give that system a good look. Senator Bingaman. Thank you, very much. My time has expired. Chairman Levin. We are going to recess now for 1 hour. We will start with Senator Allard. The order of recognition for all my colleagues is on a sheet of paper here, so you can see where in that list you will come. We will stand recessed until 2:05. [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m. the hearing was recessed.] AFTERNOON SESSION The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Levin, Byrd, Cleland, Landrieu, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, and Sessions. Other Senators present: Senators Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Collins, and Bunning. Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff director. Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Charles S. Abell, professional staff member; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; John R. Barnes, professional staff member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel; Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Cord A. Sterling, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Eric H. Thoemmes, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Thomas C. Moore, and Michele A. Traficante. Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, Terrence E. Sauvain, Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; Jason Matthews and David Klain, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Gregory C. McCarthy, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Thomas A. Vecchiolla, assistant to Senator Snowe; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Charles Cogar, assistant to Senator Allard; and Scott Douglass, assistant to Senator Sessions. Other Senate staff present: Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Pete Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Sheila Murphy, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Larry Smar, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Christopher Ford and Sam Patten, assistants to Senator Collins; and Jeff Freeman, assistant to Senator Cochran. Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order. Senator Allard. Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would echo the comments that have been made by my colleagues on this committee, Mr. Rumsfeld, about your qualifications. I do not think anybody can legitimately question your qualifications, and I am absolutely delighted with the President's appointment in appointing you specifically as Secretary of Defense. I do not see how you are going to apply the Rumsfeld's Rules over there as Secretary of Defense when you testify before this committee, and I respect your administrative capabilities, and I think everybody here also recognizes those. When you visited my office we shared our experiences. I shared my experience on the NRO Commission. You shared your experience as Chairman of the Space Commission. Both reports are coming out with a recommendation. I guess the Space Commission's report is coming out today, and ours, the NRO Commission is already out that there needs to be, in fact it is critical that there is a dialogue between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I just would hope that you would just for a moment at least express to me how you feel about this and what you plan to do to improve communications. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I thank you, and I know of your service on the NRO Commission and, of course, have discussed it with you. The international community is really not a community. It is a set of organizations, the CIA and the NSA and the NRO and the DIA and the Air Force, Army, and Navy Intelligence, the State Department, the FBI, there are all kinds of pieces to it, and I think to use the word community is an overstatement, and because of the way the legislation, the way the funding works, it is something that I think takes a lot of senior level interaction so that things do not get bottlenecked. There are some very complicated issues in rearranging our intelligence-gathering to fit the new century, to fit the new circumstance with proliferation, and I think that bureaucracies do not like to change. They are terribly resistant to change, and the only way they are going to change is if the very senior people who meet regularly understand where each is going, and recognizes the fact that each has responsibilities that cannot be performed unless the two of them work together. I suppose you could have perfect organizations and people who are not too good and you are not going to have very good organization or operation, and vice versa. You could have organizations that are not perfect, but if you have people who really care about it and are willing to force those issues through the bureaucracies it could work pretty darned well, and I just think that that is a start. Senator Allard. With this election, there was a lot of discussion about voting by members of the military, and I do not know whether you have given this any thought or not, but I was disturbed, I think as many members of this committee were disturbed about credible attempts to disqualify certain military votes, and most of these were due to hypertechnical kinds of reasons, but in the legal community they are real reasons, and I am wondering if you are going to give any thought about how it is that we can make sure that that problem does not get repeated again on military votes. Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I have discussed this with the President-elect, and thought a bit about it. As you suggest, it is complicated because of the role the States play, and not one State but 50 States. I do think it is an enormously discouraging thing for people serving overseas in the United States Armed Forces to read in the paper that because there may not be a postmark or some other issue, that their vote might not be counted. It is just not fair, it is not right, and we have to figure out ways to do it, and I quite agree with you that if confirmed that the Secretary of Defense should address the issue and put in place some people to think that through and figure out what kinds of recommendations might be made so that there is a high confidence that the men and women in the Armed Services in fact vote and have their votes counted. Senator Allard. I just do not know that anybody has ever really thought through just how those ballots may be handled, getting from the base or where there will not be a post office or maybe even a postmark getting them to their State where the individual is registered to vote, so I appreciate your answer on that. On emerging threats, I think your 1998 ballistic missile report threat, you indicate there is an emerging threat and it is maturing more rapidly, and do you still believe the threat is emerging and maturing more rapidly, and also what do you perceive as our greatest threats? Mr. Rumsfeld. Maturing more rapidly of course is relative. More rapidly than the international community at that time had anticipated, or had described. Our report, as you may recall, followed the 1995 NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate which Congress decided they wanted a second look at, so they empaneled the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission. We did take a look at it, and we came to a number of distinct disagreements with that National Intelligence Estimate. I do not think I would say it is currently evolving more rapidly than the intelligence community believes, because since our report we then followed it with an intelligence side letter to the international community, and Director Tenet empaneled the entire international community and we presented it, and they have been addressing the kinds of things that we suggested. My impression is that more recent NIEs have begun to take account of some of the suggestions made, and that I would think, if you dropped a plumb line through the international community today and asked where they are on this issue, I would think that they are probably a lot closer to where we were than they used to be. Senator Allard. I have not had a chance to completely review your Space Commission report, but from my briefings I am going to be, I think, pleased with its findings. One of the areas you talked about is vulnerability of our space assets, and I am wondering if you can comment about the vulnerability of our space assets and how you would manage that. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I have not had a chance to see the final report, either. I was asked to become the nominee and I had to resign from the commission, and the following days they have completed it and printed it and they are now in the process of briefing Members of the House and Senate and the executive branch on that report. Senator Warner. If I can interrupt, we are going to release it at 2:30, and I am going to absent myself to go over for a few minutes. Mr. Rumsfeld. Adm. Dave Jeremiah, Steve Cambone, the staff director, other members of the commission are going to be doing that, but one of the things that became fairly clear is that we have seen a significant growth in the use of space assets for all kinds of things, clearly from a military standpoint but also from a civil governmental standpoint as well as a civilian private sector standpoint, and as you end up with this greater degree of dependence on these assets you obviously become more vulnerable to interruptions of those capabilities. I forget what the number is, but something like 70 or 80 or 90 percent of the pagers in the country were out for a period because of an interruption on a Galaxy satellite. We know that Russia or former Russian republics are selling, in effect, hand-held jammers that can jam satellite signals. We know that. There is an organization in England that makes and puts in space microsatellites that have a variety of capabilities for lots of countries. They do it for--China has a relationship with them, and many other countries do as well, and if you are as dependent as our country is on space, you are, by definition, vulnerable, more vulnerable than others, and it seemed to the commission, unanimously, I might say, that that calls for attention on the part of our country to see that we have the ability to preserve those assets and defend the assets in a way that we could have reasonable assurance that we are going to not be dramatically inhibited, for example, in presidential leadership during a pre-crisis buildup, that we are going to be able to communicate with our military forces in a way that is appropriate in a conflict, to say nothing of the fact that our economy is so dependent today that significant economic disruptions could occur, and I am not just referring to space assets and space systems. I mean, ground stations as well as these systems. Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard Thank, you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld, good morning and welcome to the committee. I enjoyed our meeting last week and during the course of today's hearing, I will broach a few of the issues we discussed. I again look forward to hearing your views on the many important subjects facing America and the military, but I hope the presence of the media means that all of America will be introduced to you and your achievements for the country. Further, I always look forward to any opportunity when we have a chance to publicly discuss the many crucial issues facing America's national security and military service members. Mr. Secretary, as we all know, for the last several years you have been involved with numerous commissions and studies, most notably your work on the ``Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States'', and most recently the Space Commission. I carefully studied the missile threat report, found it detailed, thoughtful, well researched, and credible. I have been operating with it in my mind whenever this committee deals with the missile defense issue. A new administration is seen by many as our only chance for fixing a critical flaw in our defense--a lack of NMD. Many of us are breathing a sigh of relief that we might finally be entering a phase of concrete actions. Better yet--actions with concrete. Your other recent project, the Space Commission, is also of great interest to myself and many others in Colorado. Colorado has a close connection to military and civilian satellite launch and control. We are aware of the competing needs of civilian, military and intelligence. I don't want to get into the report too much for it is to be released today. While I do not have all the details of the report but from the briefing I received earlier, I am encouraged by the findings and the forward thinking recommendations. I hope we can continue to work together on these issues. Finally, I note that at the press conference announcing your nomination, President Elect Bush mentioned that one of his defense goals was to ``strengthen the bond of trust between the American president and those who wear our Nation's uniform.'' There has been a real degradation in that area. I hope to see this rapidly addressed. I will bring up this issue later in my questions. Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your second tenure in the Pentagon. I hope we have a productive hearing today and have already concluded you run a tight ship. I am looking forward to hearing what your ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' might be. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. Senator Landrieu is next. Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Congratulations on your nomination. I look forward to working with you through these hearings, and I just want to say that Senator Durbin's and Senator Fitzgerald's comments go a long way with me. They are a ringing endorsement, and my own personal knowledge of your good work. I just have a few questions. The first two have to deal with the nuclear policies of our Nation. In your opening statement, you made an excellent point about our need to invest more money and more resources in our defense. I could not agree with you more, and have a voting record to support that. We need to make sure our money is spent wisely and well, but the need to make new investments, to shore up our defenses and to modernize them I think are crucial, and so I want to commend you for that, and one of the ways that we will be able to do that, there are really only two ways to identify new moneys, or to redirect some of the moneys we are spending now in new ways to make that goal that you have stated actually come to pass, and of course one of the big cost drivers is our nuclear strategic defenses. Given that, and you are aware, because you served in this position before, that we are prohibited by law from falling below our START II levels, but we are coming upon several crucial and costly, and our underlying costly decision points, particularly regarding our Peacekeeper missile system, which the Defense Department has recommended that we move past, if you will. I believe that it would make sense for our Nation to establish a cost-effective and appropriate deterrent, independent of anything Russia may do, because they have already provisionally ratified the levels indicated by START II, but it does not comport with our law, and so my question is, do you believe that we need to hold to some artificially mandated level of nuclear weapons, or in light of our great need to find resources within our budget as well as add to them, that there is some potential here for not only strategic thinking but some good cost savings could be applied in other ways, and would you be willing to explore or to comment today about some of your thoughts regarding that? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I certainly agree with you, we are going to have to do both. We are going to have to find new dollars in nontrivial amounts, and we also have to see that the defense establishment functions in as cost-effective a way as is humanly possible, and that we find savings, and third, we are going to have to undoubtedly not do some things we have been doing, because the nature of our world has changed, and we are going to do some other things, and it certainly is at least logical, although I cannot tell you what that is, it is logical that we ought to be able to not keep on doing some of the things we have been doing. With respect to the numbers of weapons, it is not a subject that I have engaged since the announcement a week or so ago. The President-elect has commented on the subject of numbers of weapons. We know that the Russian systems are very likely to be declining in some numbers, apart from negotiations, apart from agreements, simply because of their economic circumstance. We also know that Russia is not the only nation in the world that one needs to be attentive to. The Chinese are increasing their--they have a very modest nuclear capability at the present time, but they are increasing their budget in double digits. They do have at least a publicly pronounced desire to be a factor in strategic nuclear weaponry. I do not know whether we can reduce or not. I suspect that that will be part of the review, and in what numbers. I am afraid that the likelihood is that any reduction--there is a minimum below which you can go and maintain the kind of target list that rational people think is appropriate. My guess is that there are very likely not a lot of savings in that, but I do not know that. Senator Landrieu. Well, I look forward to working with you on that, I think to be open to evaluate these questions from the bottom up, because it brings me actually to my next point, which is our targeting plan, which is our single integrated operational plan, our SIOP plan which actually lays out the nuclear targets and is one of the, for obvious reasons one of the most carefully guarded secrets of our Nation. I raise this issue to you today because one of our most distinguished departing Members, Senator Bob Kerrey, who served for many years on the Intelligence Committee, has been very frustrated publicly and privately. Many times publicly on the floor of the Senate and other places he has expressed his great concern, and I wanted to express it for him as if he were here today. This particular plan of targeting our nuclear weapons has been unavailable to be reviewed by the leadership of our committee, either Republican or Democrat, or even to the highest level of congressional Intelligence Committee members. While it is claimed under our law or rules that he has to have reason to know, he, as the highest ranking member, was not given the information in order to make rational decisions, exactly what you said about not only what can we afford, but what is an effective deterrent, what do we need to do to maintain the safety of our citizens. So my question would be, if you wanted to make a comment about it today, but at least could you assure this committee that you would be willing to work with the appropriate Members of Congress, and not all Members would be on an equal footing here, but the leadership of our committee and the Intelligence Committee members particularly, to jointly review that, because it has a direct bearing on the strategic posture that we either take or not take, and is driven by the target. So could you make a comment, please, for the record? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes. For the record, those are decisions that I think are the President's, and it is not for me to opine as to what extent, if at all, the current procedures ought to be changed. I do know that the U.S. plans are reviewed, admittedly by a very small number of people in the executive branch, the National command authorities. They are reviewed regularly. They are changed as circumstances change in the world. As you suggested, they are highly classified, and that is about all I can say. Senator Landrieu. My third question is, again commenting on your opening statement, on your phrase that you would like to try to help us develop weapons systems, I think--I do not know the exact term you used, but taken off the shelf as opposed to the more traditional ways we have developed, to try to get weapons systems more quickly and more cost-effectively. I would like to commend our current Under Secretary, Rudy de Leon, for suggesting that we apply that same principle to the Reserve units in trying to combat terrorism in cyber space, to actually be able to access the brain power of the American people by developing more strategic smart Reserve units instead of developing that intelligence within the Defense Department to actually, if you would, Mr. Secretary, be able to pull it off the shelf. So have you given any thought to perhaps strengthening our Reserves in this way, that we could get the best and the brightest minds in the United States to apply their great ability and intellect to help us to fight this new front in a smart, cost-effective way for the American people, and one that I think would tend to be more successful, perhaps, than the old ways that we are used to doing? Have you been briefed much about this, or know much about what I am suggesting? Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not been briefed on it, and it is not a subject I have engaged personally. There is no question but that cyber attacks and information warfare are an exceedingly important subject for the country. They are important for the private sector. They are important for the Government. They are certainly important for the military. I had not addressed the subject as to what role the Reserves and the Guard might play in that, but it certainly is worth exploring. Senator Landrieu. My time has expired. I would just urge you to think about the strategy to solicit service from a core of very talented, well-skilled individuals to bring to bear the new abilities or talents we are going to need to fight the threats of the future. Thank you very much. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Landrieu. Senator Sessions. Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask a question, I wonder where we are on the possibility of moving this nomination? I think it would be well if we have as much support as it appears we have today for this extraordinary nominee I think the world would well receive the fact that we could promptly confirm him. Do you have any thoughts about how we could move this nomination, if there are no objections, as there appear to be? I think it would help the President-elect and his team to get started as early as possible. Chairman Levin. Technically, I think the nomination has to be submitted by the new President. I think the first thing he usually does after being sworn in is to sign a number of nomination sheets and nominate his Cabinet officers. The nomination then has to be received technically by the Senate. Then, I believe it will be Chairman Warner's plan at that time, probably the same day, but I do not want to speak for him, that we try to meet even on Inauguration Day, if possible, to act on and confirm, if we are ready at that point to act on and confirm. There is significant paperwork which we must go through. The nominee is working very hard on it with all of us. It has to be finished, too. I hope we can complete the hearing today, but there is no guarantee of that. It depends upon how many questions need to be asked that we have not had a chance to ask. That is our goal. I agree with your point, in any event even though it is not technically possible to even receive a nomination until Inauguration Day, or act on it. We will act promptly after we are legally able to act on this nomination, because it does have, indeed, broad bipartisan support. Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really believe we should move on that, and there might be some uncertainty in the world among those who--we had a prolonged election process, and I think it might be good for stability if we could move as promptly as possible. I remember, when I was back in college, at Huntington College where I attended, they introduced the old president as a president proven and the new one as a president challenged, and you are both a proven Secretary of Defense and a challenged Secretary of Defense, so we are delighted to have you here. I think your testimony has been superb. It is wise and thoughtful and strong, and I know you know there are some real challenges out there that have to be met. One thing I would say is that Senator Lieberman's comments really went to the heart of where we are, in my opinion. I think this Nation has a serious problem with our defense funding and structure, that in the past decade we have failed to maintain adequate funding streams. We are paying salaries and the like and that kind of thing, but really, recapitalizing the military has not occurred as it should, and I asked Secretary Cohen, your predecessor--who by the way was extraordinarily cooperative with this Senate. I was a new member of this committee and he just did a great job of being forthcoming and helpful, and I would ask you to do the same, and want to compliment him on the work that he did, but he said this in answer to a question of mine. He said, as I indicated before, Senator Sessions, ever since the height of the Cold War we have seen a tremendous decline in defense spending. This was last year, and many on this committee and throughout this body were urging a peace dividend, and we have been enjoying the fruits of that peace dividend, but it has come at the cost of relying on what President Reagan did in the 1980s as far as the buildup. We have been living off that, and now we are at the point where we have to replace it. Do you understand what he is saying, and would you tend to agree with that? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do, indeed. It is a surprise to me, when you think about it, but when I was Secretary of Defense I went to the roll-out for the F-16 and made the decision on the M-1 tank and the B-1 bomber, and that was a long time ago. Senator Sessions. What we have is the question of how much needs to be spent. It is my understanding that the number of $45 billion that President Bush was reported to have estimated that he would have to spend in addition was based on several programs he intended to initiate, did not represent his full commitment to spending more for defense, but I think Senator Lieberman rightly suggests it is going to take a lot more than that and a lot more than the $100 billion over 10 years that was--and I think, Mr. Rumsfeld, that it--and I will ask you to respond to it, it is going to be your duty, and I think you have the credibility and the competence to evaluate this Defense Department to analyze the threats we are facing in the world, to comprehend what can be done technologically and how much money can be saved wherever it can be saved, and then I think it will be your duty to come back to this committee and use all the credibility that you have to sell this committee and this Nation on the amount of funding we are going to need to maintain the strength of the United States in the 21st century. How would you respond to that? Mr. Rumsfeld. First, your understanding of President-elect Bush's comments about budget are exactly mine, that he identified some particular things he wanted to see funded. He priced them, and he mentioned the price tag. I do not believe that he suggested that that was the totality of what he had in mind, because he was asked for a defense review and promised that as well, and that is something that of course has not been done, and until that has been done, it is clearly not possible to come up with the numbers. I think second, with respect to the numbers, I do not know what the number is, but I have an impression that goes not to the total number over the 5-year period, but the impression is that we need some money up-front, and we may very well have to come back with a supplemental or something that would indicate the needs that exist now so that--because there have been things that have been pushed off, as has been mentioned here, for example, the shipbuilding budget and some other things, science and technology and others that have been mentioned. Senator Sessions. There has been a lot put off and, in fact, we had testimony from one official, one General on research and development. He used the phrase, we are eating our seed corn. I am now looking at a National Association for the Advancement of Science survey, historical table on the amount of money spent for research and development. Since 1989 in real dollars, not inflated dollars, in actual dollars, the amount of DOD research has dropped 20 percent, while other research in nondefense departments and agencies are up 50 percent. Senator Bingaman raised that point. I really do believe that we got squeezed to pay for lights, to pay for salaries. We were cutting, eating our seed corn. We were cutting back on things that are going to come back to haunt us and are going to cost us more money today than it would have if we had started on a 6 or 8-year program of research and development. One more thing and I will give up this questioning. One expert has said that the post-Cold War, the references to the post-Cold War foreign policy are really a statement, an admission that we have not developed a post-Cold War foreign policy. Is it your opinion, briefly, that we do need to develop a more comprehensive foreign policy in this post-Cold War environment that the American people and this Congress can rally behind? Mr. Rumsfeld. I certainly agree, but by agreeing I do not want to suggest that it is easy. There are some who look at our current period and characterize it as a transition out of the Cold War into something that is still ahead. There are others who suggest that possibly history might indicate that this is it, that we are not transitioning to something else, but what we are in now is what we will be in for a period, and that if that is true, and I am certainly not one who can suggest that I know the answer, but if it is true, it puts a much greater urgency on fashioning policies and standards and some flags we can plant down ahead so that we as a country can point directionally and know how to arrange ourselves to function and live with a maximum degree of safety and stability during that period. Senator Sessions. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Byrd. Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you have been around this track before, and I appreciate your presence here today, and I compliment the President-elect on nominating you. Certainly it is my present intention to support you. My time is brief, and so I will get right into a question. The Department of Defense continues to confront pervasive and complex management problems due to its inadequate financial management systems. This can greatly diminish the efficiency of the military services operations. Since 1995, the DOD's financial management has been on the General Accounting Office's list of high-risk areas vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. While the Department has made progress in a number of areas of its financial management operations, no major part of DOD's operations has yet been able to pass the test of an independent financial audit. The Chief Financial Officers' Act of 1990, as amended by the Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 requires the Department of Defense to prepare annual audited financial statements. Nevertheless, 10 years after the enactment of the CFO Act of 1990, the Department of Defense has yet to receive a clean audit opinion on its financial statements. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times, written by a retired vice admiral and a civilian employee in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, accused the Secretary of Defense of being unable to account for the funds that Congress appropriates to it. The authors wrote, and I quote in part, quote, the Pentagon's books are in such utter disarray that no one knows what America's military actually owns or spends. That is the close of my extract. The thrust of this Los Angeles Times article is backed up by the DOD's own Inspector General's financial audit for fiscal year 1999. I have a copy of that here in my hand. I assume you have seen it. Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not. I cannot even say I look forward to seeing it. [Laughter.] Senator Byrd. Well, I will look forward to hearing what you have to say about it after you have seen it. [Laughter.] That audit report found that out of $7.6 trillion in Department-level accounting interest, $2.3 trillion in entries either did not contain adequate documentation or were improperly reconciled, or were made to force buyer and seller data to agree. This DOD IG report is very disturbing. Last year, according to the General Accounting Office, the Pentagon reported that it did not expect to have the necessary assistance in place to be able to prepare financial statements for 3 more years. That was last year. We are now advised that the Pentagon is currently telling the Office of Management and Budget that it will take them until the year 2005 or 2006. Now, I also note in the Washington Post of January 9, 2001, this sentence, which I extract from an article titled, ``Bush Talks Defense with Key Members of Congress.'' Here is the sentence: The chiefs of the Armed Services have said that they need a budget increase of more than $50 billion a year to modernize their forces. That figure dwarfs the $4.5 billion in added defense spending proposed by Bush during the campaign. Now, if the Pentagon cannot account for what it is doing this year, how can it hope to improve its operations next year? As Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, thank God, now for 17 days----[Laughter.] I seriously question an increase in the Pentagon budget, and in the face of the Department's recent Inspector General's report how can we seriously consider a $50 billion increase in the defense budget when DOD's own auditors say the Department cannot account for $2.3 trillion in transactions in 1 year alone? Now, $2.3 trillion I would readily assume is a large amount of money. According to my old style math, there have been 1 billion minutes, give or take a little, it will not make much difference, since Jesus Christ was born, 1 billion minutes, and according to that same old math, $2.3 trillion, which the Department cannot account for in 1 year alone, would amount to $2,300 per minute for every minute since Jesus Christ was born. Now perhaps we can begin to understand the magnitude of $2.3 trillion. So why is this happening? Of course, I would not expect you to be able to answer that question. The state of affairs did not occur on your watch, but you are inheriting it. Now, my question to you is, Mr. Secretary, what do you plan to do about this? Mr. Rumsfeld. Decline the nomination. [Laughter.] Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned in that case. [Laughter.] Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I have heard some of that and read some of that, that the Department is not capable of auditing its books. It is--I was going to say, terrifying. It is such a monumental task. I have met with two former officials of the Pentagon who served in the budget and control areas, and I have mused over the fact that I have read some of these things and asked what they thought. One insight that I got was that to a certain extent the financial systems have been fashioned and designed to report on requirements that they receive from various organizations and they have not been fashioned and designed for financial management the way you would in a corporation. I do not know whether that is a useful insight or not, but it is something that is rattling around in my head, and certainly something that I think--I doubt, to be honest, that people inside the Department are going to be capable of sorting this out. I have a feeling it is going to take some folks from outside to come in and look at this and put in place a process that over a period--and I regret to say, but I have seen how long things take. I think it is going to take a period of years to sort it out, and it will probably take the cooperation of Congress to try to get the system so that you can actually manage the financial aspects of that institution, rather than simply report on things that have happened imperfectly. That is not a satisfactory answer, but I hear you. I recognize the problem and, if it is not solved, I hope at least that when I leave, if I am confirmed, that it will be better than it was when I came in. Senator Byrd. My time is up, but Mr. Secretary, I have every confidence in you. I think I have the duty to request and to urge, and I am sure that my colleagues on both sides here join me, and I am sure as well that you do, because you have indicated the enormity of the task, and I think this may have come, perhaps, not as a surprise to you, but you have not seen it. Will you pledge to make balancing the Pentagon's books a topmost priority? The simple answer is yes, but I would like to hear your answer. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I do not know that I can assure you it will be the topmost priority, but it will certainly be among the top priorities. It simply must be done for the National security interests of the country, as well as from the standpoint of the taxpayers of the country. Senator Byrd. Absolutely, and let me close by saying that, as an appropriator, I cannot have much confidence in the budget request when we have such a track record as we see here, and the Joint Chiefs come up here and ask for $50 billion, even $4.5 billion more, whatever it is. I, as an appropriator, and I would think every member of the Appropriations Committee, would have to look with a jaundiced eye, perhaps not on some specific items, with which they are perhaps more acquainted, but with the overall--it is a terrible record, and it is preposterous that the Defense Department does not know what has happened to this money. But I thank you for your testimony, and I hope you will do everything you can to set this thing in order and put the Pentagon's house in order in this regard. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld, I want to start by echoing the praise of my colleagues in congratulating you on your appointment, which I hope very much that you will not decline, and to also commend the President- elect for making such an outstanding choice. I want to start with a comment before going to a couple of other issues, and I want to follow up with the exchange you had with Senator Kennedy, in that I share both yours and Senator Kennedy's concerns about the current shipbuilding rates. They do not support the goal of a 300-ship naval fleet, as identified by the last QDR and the Clinton administration's defense budgets have been gradually taking the Navy not toward a 300-ship Navy but ultimately toward a considerably smaller fleet. To make the challenge confronting the new administration and the new Congress even more stark, even a 300-ship Navy has been increasingly recognized as inadequate to meet the increased operational and deployment requirements that we face. In addition, recent press reports indicate that the DD-21, the Navy's revolutionary new destroyer program, may be among the Pentagon programs most at risk of procurement budget cuts. Now, I know from our brief conversation that you have not yet had an opportunity to review specific procurement programs, but I do want to express my concern about the direction that shipbuilding is heading, or has been heading in, and seek your commitment to reverse that direction, and to look to increasing our shipbuilding budget. I believe you gave that kind of commitment to Senator Kennedy in your earlier exchange, is that correct? Mr. Rumsfeld. Indeed, I share your interest and concern, and if we are each year building fewer ships than are necessary to maintain the kind of Navy that this country needs, then we are damaging ourselves, and we are damaging our national security. Senator Collins. Thank you. I look forward to working with you closely in that area. Last month, Mr. Rumsfeld, I accompanied Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen on a holiday trip to visit our servicemen and women in Kosovo and Bosnia. We brought with us entertainers such as the Dallas Cowboy cheerleaders, which I will readily concede the servicemen were far more interested in talking to than they were in talking to United States Senators and Members of Congress. Nevertheless, I did have the opportunity to speak with members of our active duty components, as well as reservists and members of the National Guard who were stationed in Bosnia and Kosovo, and while morale generally appeared to be high, I nevertheless heard many accounts of the effects of the increased operational tempo on the lives of those who are serving, their families and, in the case of reservists and guardsmen, their employers. I was concerned about what I heard, because of the implications for retaining and recruiting men and women to serve in the military. For example, I spoke to one young Reservist from my home State who had returned to his family after an assignment in the Middle East, only to be called on again to be sent to the Balkans. In addition, a young naval officer from my home State recently resigned after 12 years in the Navy because continuous 9-month periods of sea duty proved too great a burden on his growing family. I am told that the Army is currently considering reducing its overseas assignments to periods of 120-days, and that other services, including the Guard and the Reserves, may adopt similar models. I realize that this issue really ties to the underlying issue of peacekeeping forces and these daunting and protracted missions we have undertaken, but I wonder if you support looking at ways that we can ease the burden on our young men and women who are serving so far from home for such protracted periods. Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed. In any organization that does not use conscription or force to have people work there you have to fashion the sort of incentives that will enable you to attract and retain the people you need to run that activity in an efficient and cost-effective way. I do not know what the number is, but I think it was Senator McCain who mentioned the attrition rates with respect to our young captains. I think it is something like 12, 13, 14 percent. My goodness. That has to tell anybody that we are doing something wrong. We simply cannot have that kind of churning when you train and develop and have this fine talent and then lose it. It costs so much to bring people through the intake, bring them along, get them experience, train them, and then you lose them, and so we have to arrange ourselves so that we have a high confidence that we can attract and retain the people we need, and that is a mixture of things. It is a mixture of how they feel about their Government, and how they feel about the defense establishment. It is partly how their families are functioning and whether or not they feel that they are able to do what they need to do for their families. As you suggested, the operations tempo can be a difficult thing, time away from families. It is pay, it is health, it is education, it is a whole host of things, opportunity, and it is also feeling that the country cares and appreciates what they have done and what they are doing. Senator Collins. You are absolutely right about that, and I did in my discussions with the young men and women whom I met-- I was so impressed with their pride and their professionalism, their dedication to their jobs, and many of them want to stay in the service, or they want to continue in the Guard, and we need to figure out ways to deal with the very real family concerns they have, and I appreciate the fact that you obviously acknowledge that and are committed to looking at that. I want to raise quickly just one final issue. The Defense Department has for years tried to take steps to reduce the physical and electronic security, or the vulnerability of its communications satellites, but in recent conflicts such as Kosovo, and even in peacetime, it is my understanding that the military has come to depend more and more heavily upon commercial communications satellites. It seems to me the Defense Department needs a stronger effort to work with the private sector and other appropriate parties to improve the safety, not just of our military satellite communication links, but of civilian ones as well, and I would be interested in knowing whether this is a priority area for you and whether you have any plans in this regard. Mr. Rumsfeld. It is an area of interest to me. I am certainly not an expert. We do know that commercial capabilities in this area have for the most part no hardening or no ability to survive mischief and attacks. We also know that properly, in my view, the United States Government, including the military, are using more and more and should use more and more civilian capabilities for communications, for imagery, for a variety of things. It is efficient. They are good at it. On the other hand, we have to be certain that we have secure systems so that we are not blinded at critical times. It is an area that I do intend to interest myself in, and I thank you for bringing it up. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Senator Collins, thank you. Senator Akaka. Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, before the Senator responds, may I ask consent that the audit report to which I referred in my questions be included in the record, report number D-2000- 179, dated August 18, 2000? Chairman Levin. It will be made a part of the record. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I ask my opening statement be placed in the record. Chairman Levin. It will be. [The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to join the committee for today's hearing. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing me with the opportunity to participate today. I look forward to working with you and Senator Warner and the other distinguished members on this committee to address issues involving our National Security and our Armed Forces, beginning with the confirmation hearing for the Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense has a substantial impact on my home State of Hawaii. We proudly have military installations from every Armed Service branch in the State of Hawaii. We have traditionally had a very good relationship with the United States military, and I look forward to continuing to work with the Department of Defense in fostering these relationships. I am familiar with Mr. Rumsfeld's experience, accomplishments and impressive record, including his service as the chair of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Threat Commission. I look forward to hearing more from Mr. Rumsfeld on his vision for our Nation's security and military preparedness, and again, I thank my colleagues on the committee for welcoming me to participate today. Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, we are sitting in this hearing with a man who has had tremendous experience, and has had lots of confidence given by others, and is now being considered for Defense Secretary. After reading your bio, I think that this is the kind of person we would expect much from because of your experience. I think, talking about deals, I think we have a good deal in hand with you. In the Pacific and in other areas, we have had some issues, and besides issues of appropriate funding, issues of the criteria for the deployment of U.S. troops, and necessary situations. There have been issues in the community regarding encroachment, including the importance of dealing with communities surrounding military installations and training ranges, and the environmental constraints on training ranges. I must tell you that in Hawaii we have had over the years, as long as I can remember, very, very good relationships with the military. We work well together. We live well together. We respect the leadership of the military, and they have helped us out in many ways. Now, they have really tried to deal with our communities as well, so encroachment is an issue. I understand you intend to deal with these issues in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion, and that you are open to work with all parties involved, so my question to you is, how do you intend to implement a more comprehensive approach to these issues? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I wish I had an answer that represented a solution to the problems. As you properly point out, not just in the United States, including Puerto Rico, and Japan, and in other parts of the world where the United States Armed Forces has a presence there are pressures and difficulties that run to this issue that is characterized as encroachment. I do not know the way the encroachment goes, whether the base is encroaching or the community is encroaching on the base, which happens to be historically the case in most instances, but it is a problem that is real, it is serious. The United States needs bases, it needs ranges, it needs test ranges, and it cannot provide the training and the testing that people need before they go into battle unless those kinds of facilities are available, and each year that goes by there are greater and greater pressures on them. Admittedly, I suspect, and I do not know enough to say, but I suspect that, as with many things, there are ways that technology can assist us in these areas that will enable the military to do things that they need to do that they used to do physically that they will be able to do with computers and various other types of technologies. Certainly that is true with all kinds of simulations and what-have-you, but you cannot do everything, and you do need to do live fire for people before they go into battle to have some sense of what that is like. I am afraid it is not so much a problem as a fact of our times that, not to be solved, but to be coped with over a period of time. I think it is going to be a constant pressure on the defense establishment, and all we can do is our best. Senator Akaka. I was glad to hear your commitment to research and development, and how you feel about not standing still, or static, but in order to move ahead we must move into areas like that. You also mentioned in your response to Senator Kennedy the book on the Corona satellite program. I feel that space and the military, of course, can work so much together. What role, if any, do you see for the new commercial satellite imaging industry to supplement our classified systems? Mr. Rumsfeld. My impression is that the United States Government, including the military, will and should be increasingly using commercially available capabilities, satellite capabilities. Whether it is communications or imagery, there are a great many instances when you could take available off-the-shelf products and services of the type and use them to great effect. Senator Akaka. I know you are well-versed in missile defense. In your response to the committee's advance policy questions you state, before deploying a national defense, missile defense, a factor to be considered is, and I quote, ``the urgency of the ballistic missile threat to the United States.'' How do you assess the urgency of that threat now, and has it changed since the Rumsfeld Commission report? Mr. Rumsfeld. The Ballistic Missile Threat Commission I think have the subject right, and I think that has been agreed to by both Secretary Cohen and by others. What has happened in the intervening 2 years is that time has passed. Proliferation has continued. People have advanced in their development programs of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. I do not believe it possible to stop the proliferation of things we do not want proliferated. I think we ought to try, and we ought to work hard at it, but the reality is today that in this relaxed environment, and so much available on the Internet, and so many people willing to sell almost anything for a price, that we have to learn to live in that world, and we are capable of living in that world. There is no question but that we can do it, and so I think that time passes, and capabilities grow. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time is up. I just want you to know that you have my support. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Senator Bunning. Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to say that I am honored to serve with all of the other people on this committee, this esteemed Senate Armed Services Committee. It has been a promise I made to my constituents, and a desire of mine since coming to the Senate 2 years ago, to serve on this great committee, and I am very happy to be here. Second, Secretary Rumsfeld, welcome. It is good to see you. Assuming you are confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense, I am looking forward to working with you and your Department of Defense. Of course, the United States has the strongest military in the world. There is no arguing that fact. However, our biggest challenge may be to keep it strong, and to redefine it in this new century. It has been said that our military is stressed, overdeployed, and underfunded. Many talk of the last 10 years as the decade of decline for our military. I hope you find it not to be true. I look forward to this committee and Congress working with you to take on the tough issues regarding missile defense, the readiness of our military, particularly recruitment and retention, and the overall wellbeing and safety of our citizens, soldiers, and Nation. Over the past 8 years, I have watched generals and officers come before this committee and testify about the readiness and overall strength of the military. Time and facts have proven that they were either ill-informed or not giving Congress the full picture as to what really was happening, for whatever reasons, with our military. I simply ask you that you urge those under your watch to tell us the truth, the good, the bad, and sometimes the ugly, for only with the truth can we help to shape a military through policy and funding that is strong and ready to protect this Nation with peace through strength throughout the world. Now, I am looking forward to working with you. As I stated, over the last 8 years many generals have testified before this committee regarding the overall readiness, strength, and quality of our military. Time and facts have proven the generals were either ill-informed or not fully up-front with the committee, and things turned out worse than they had testified. Therefore, we in Congress made decisions about funding and policy based on the words of those generals. What will you do to make sure that this does not happen again under your watch? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I suppose for one thing, if I find that people are telling Congress something that is not so, you will not find them back up here telling Congress anything. Senator Bunning. We can count on that? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Senator Bunning. Senator Allard talked about this, but I think it needs to be reiterated, about the military ballots, particularly voting by our soldiers on bases. We know that there was a proposal to not allow our military to vote on bases, and Congress stopped that and allowed it to happen for one more year. I would like to ask you the question if you think that is the right or wrong thing to do, that we continue to extend the privilege to our military to vote on base? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not know enough about it to answer. I am not an attorney. I do not know the extent to which State law governs, and I am simply not current, and I should be, and I will get current. Senator Bunning. Can you give me a general idea about your thinking about military people voting on bases, if it is legal? Mr. Rumsfeld. If it is legal, sure. I just do not know enough about the legalities, but I think that in our country we like to have people participate in the elections of our country, and certainly people who are serving in the Armed Services ought to be treated at least equally in terms of having an opportunity to vote. To the extent the defense establishment can find ways to facilitate the ease of that voting, I think we ought to try to do that, and to the extent we cannot because of legalities, I think it is perfectly proper to recommend to other entities, whether it is the White House or State and local governments, that this is our view and we would hope that they would take steps to provide so that men and women of the Armed Forces can, in fact, vote. Senator Bunning. This is a more localized question. This is about Fort Knox, which is a training and doctrine post, and the U.S. Army Recruiting Command is located there as well. When initial entry trainees come to Recruiting Command at Fort Knox they see 50-year-old barracks that are run down and literally patched together. Fort Knox has the oldest entry training barracks in the Army, with no barracks being built since before the Korean War. Despite that fact, Knox has been absent on TRADOC's list of recommended posts to receive new training barracks or a Starbase complex which integrates barracks, classrooms, and dining facilities and other soldier components. How will you go about assessing the condition of trainee barracks in recommending new construction of training barracks complexes for the Army? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I suppose the first thing to do would be to try and see if we can find the best possible people to serve in the posts of leadership in the Army that share the concern you have expressed about the circumstances of these barracks. That is a part of the broader question we were talking about earlier. This establishment will not function if we do not have talented people, and talented people are simply not going to accept an environment for themselves and their families and a circumstance that drives them away from the military. We need people who we can attract and retain, and who are proud to be there and available to be there. Senator Bunning. My last question, I read in your answers to the committee policy questions that you cannot fully give your opinion on whether you do or do not support another round of base closures because you are awaiting the DOD's next defense review. I have been seeking answers as to whether or not the last round of BRAC has saved money, or whether or not we have reduced our strength and readiness. I have never received any real answers with numbers either way. We all know the policies of BRAC, but I hope in your tenure as Secretary of Defense you can illustrate to us the realities and simple facts as to how past base closures and possible future ones have and will affect the taxpayers and the military, because no one has ever shown me actual numbers on the actual savings of the last BRAC, so before I ever look at anything new I want to see the old. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I am sure that there must be data. My general impression on the subject is that there is no question but that savings result from adjusting base structures to fit force structures. There is also no question but that they tend not to occur in the first or second year. They tend to come out over a period of time, so there is a cost factor. There is also a factor of military efficiency, and both benefit, the former being somewhat more easy to quantify than the latter. Senator Bunning. Thank you very much. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bunning. Senator Nelson. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to appear at today's confirmation hearing, even though my membership on the committee is not fully official, and should I serve on the committee I would be honored to be a part, and I look forward to it. I have been tremendously impressed, Mr. Rumsfeld, with your knowledge of the whole subject of national defense, your concern about readiness, your concern about budget realities, the external and internal security risks, and those unpredictable circumstances which are always there, and at this point in time virtually every question that could be asked seems as though it has been asked, and I do not want to be redundant, but there are a couple of questions that I would like to ask you. First of all, I think it was Senator Cleland who mentioned that defense does not poll very high among the public. Maybe that is because the public seems to be falsely secure when we are not. There are different kinds of threats today, as you have indicated, and there are limited resources to deal with those threats, so my first question is, do you have some plans that would engage and raise the public awareness and interest in the importance of the kind of defense we need to provide for today's world to get more resources and more money to be supported for national defense? It is always a challenge when there are limited resources and seem to be unlimited demands in all kinds of areas, and I wonder if you do have some specific plans to make the public far more aware of the need for these increased resources. The second question is, it has been often said that someone who takes on a new challenge can bring to it one big idea, and while you have been very generous with your thoughts about all of the realities that we are dealing with and what you propose to do, to the extent that you know at the present time, I would like to ask, do you have one big idea, and if you do, what is it? You can choose which order you prefer to respond. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, let me just make a comment on the first point you have posed while I think about the second. With respect to the first, I do not think there is any one person who is going to help our country and, indeed, our allies as well fully understand what needs to be done and why. It is a task that takes a lot of people, multiple centers of leadership in Europe and Asia and in this Congress, in the executive branch. I give President-elect Bush high marks on the pronouncements he has made with respect to national defense, and I think that that is a good start. That bully pulpit of the White House is an important place, and we need leadership there that is sensitive to these issues and concerned about them. We all know that history is filled with instances where people were surprised. There were plenty of signals, plenty of warnings, plenty of cautions, but they were not taken aboard. They did not register. They were not sufficient to cause a person to act on those concerns. It was not that the information was not there. It just did not register. It happens to people in businesses. They go along, and pretty soon they do not see all those warning signs out there and they do not act on it. We see it in families when a youngster goes wrong, and when do you step in and do something, or try to do something? We know that the thing that tends to register on people is fear, and we know that that tends to happen after there is a Pearl Harbor. It tends to happen after there is a crisis, and that is too late for us. We have to be smarter than that. We have to be wiser than that. We have to be more forward-looking. So I would throw that back and say, it is going to take you, and it is going to take every member of this committee, and it is going to take Presidents, and it is going to take our friends in other countries to make sure that we understand that it is a world full of hope and opportunity, but it is also a world filled with dangers, and there are different kinds, and we need to be attentive to them, and I think we can be wise enough to do that. There is a wonderful book on Pearl Harbor by Roberta Wohlstetter, and a forward by Dr. Schelling, that talks about this problem of seeing things happen and not integrating them in your mind and saying, yes, we need to be doing something about that now, that I reread periodically because it is so important. As to a single big idea, I do not know, but it may be this. It may be that one of the biggest things we have to do is what I mentioned earlier, and that is, recognize that the deterrence of the Cold War worked. Those deterrents very likely will not work as well or as broadly as we will need during the period of this era of globalization, or post-Cold War period, or whatever we are going to end up calling it, that the problems are different, and the demands will be different, and that we as a people have an obligation to be smart enough to think about those things and to see that we get arranged as a defense establishment with our allies so that in fact we dissuade people from doing things. We do not want to win wars, we want to prevent them. We want to be so powerful and so forward-looking that it is clear to others that they ought not to be damaging their neighbors when it affects our interests, and they ought not to be doing things that are imposing threats and dangers to us, and I think we can do that, but I think it is going to take some fresh thinking. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Next, under our early bird rule, is Senator Dayton. Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you very much for your support in my obtaining a spot on this esteemed committee. I understand Senator Warner's dismay about the expansion of the membership after seeing how long it takes to move once around the cycle here. Senator Warner. I did not express dismay, I expressed appreciation to so many Senators wanting to come on. In years past we used to be like the old Navy. We went out and pressed them out of the bars and dragged them in. [Laughter.] Chairman Levin. He was not referring to Senators in bars, by the way. Senator Dayton. As you can see, if you were to cut it any finer, I would be the one who would be cut off, but feeling my lofty 100th position in seniority I can see I am going to be sitting at the end of a lot of tables for the next couple of years. But Mr. Rumsfeld, I join with the others in congratulating you for your willingness to take on this huge responsibility. Your career in both the public sector and the private sector is certainly admirable, and as a citizen and a public servant I think to combine those careers with the longevity of years is extraordinary, and I wish you well, and I do not presume to have the expertise that my colleagues here or you have, so my questions are inquisitory, not meant to be presumptive. I know that you said in your opening statement, you talked about the timetable, the cycle time for the development of new major projects, now 8, 9 years, and how that pace has slowed while technology has accelerated. To what do you attribute that lengthening delay, and what would you think might be some of the approaches to improving it? Mr. Rumsfeld. It is interesting to me that this is the case. We have seen in the sixties things could go from concept to deployment in a very short period of time. They had much more flexibility with respect to acquisition. There was much greater secrecy, and there was much greater urgency, quote-unquote, perceived urgency which allowed much more flexibility in acquisition rules and much greater secrecy, so at a time when those numbers have gone from a year or 2 to 8 or 9, and in a period when technologies--in those days took 5, 10, 8 years to change. Today they are changing in a year, so you have those two things conspiring to produce equipment that when it is there is not the most advanced possible. There has to be a way to shorten that process. Business is finding ways to do it. Silicon Valley has dozens of ways to do it. I do not know, beyond what I have said, that in some cases I think you leapfrog systems, but in other cases I think you probably keep platforms and leapfrog elements of that and provide flexibility as advanced technologies come along. We are going to have to do it. We cannot simply be spending money to produce things that are going to be behind the curve. We have to find ways to do it. It sure will not be Don Rumsfeld that will figure it out, but if I am lucky we will find people who are smart enough and a lot smarter than I am to put down and screw their head into it and then come up to Congress and talk about how we can adjust these systems so that they will work in the environment we are in, which is much more rapidly paced. Senator Dayton. It has certainly done a lot for Minnesota business. The difficulty and the length of time and the cumbersome procurement requirements, bidding contracts, procedures, anything that can be done it seems to me to reduce by two-thirds or more the amount of paperwork requirements and therefore the timetables involved will benefit the private sector as well as the Government. Perhaps related to that, you talked also about the need to try to have the technological systems of the various services better coordinated. You talked about, I think your phrase was, borne jointly, where they would start again, given the disparity of the services and the contracting procedures, like, how realistically are you going to effectuate it. I cannot get my Washington office computers and my Minnesota office computers joint at this point yet, so when you talk about the complexity of what you are doing, isn't that problem going to get worse? Mr. Rumsfeld. I am having the same problem with my computers, but it could. I mean, we have to see that the services can talk to each other. They simply must be able to do that, and the effort that occurred really well after my watch on, quote, jointness, has I think made strides in that direction. But I mean, your point about the private sector, the Government of the United States has not been a good customer. We have not been a good interactor with the defense industry. It is not an accident. The last time I looked the three top defense contractors in size, Boeing and Raytheon and Lockheed, had a market cap that was less than Wal-Mart. Now, why is that? Because doing business with the Government is not a great deal. Senator Dayton. I might prefer that you stick with the analogy of Target, but I would not quarrel with you. [Laughter.] In your response to the questions you were asked about the international criminal court, and particularly the Rome Accord. You said you opposed it. Is it that you oppose that concept in the entirety, or oppose the particular framework of the Rome Accord? What is your position, sir? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not have the letter I signed along with George Shultz and a host of Republicans and Democrats expressing our concern about that, but if I am not mistaken President Clinton has recently signed that and announced he was not going to send it to the Senate, is that correct? I think that is right. Again, I am not an international lawyer, but my view of it was that it posed a risk to the men and women in the Armed Services that they could be doing the bidding of the United States Government and the United States Senate and be hauled before an international court for war crimes, and it concerned me, and it concerned a whole series of former Secretaries of State and Secretaries of Defense, which is the reason we signed the letter. The current status of the situation as I understand it is that the President has signed it and said that he had concerns about it and was not going to send it to the Senate for ratification. I am further advised that a signed agreement like that, even though not ratified, has standing, standing in the sense that if you sign it and it is not ratified, you take unto yourself the obligation not to undermine it and to support it and to behave reasonably in accordance with it. That concerns me, so I am uncomfortable with the position that President Clinton has taken. I am not the nominee for Secretary of State, nor am I the President-elect. It is up to them to take--in the National Security Council context to consider this, and my understanding is that President-elect Bush has indicated that is what will happen, that he will not send it up either, but whether or not he wants to leave it stand I think is an issue that the National Security Council would engage at some point in the future, and I would need to know a lot more than I currently know. Senator Dayton. My time has expired. Just quickly, we are sending you up there with all of the responsibilities, all this good advice. We talked just before this afternoon about your going there essentially by yourself. What can this committee do to help you get underway most productively over the next couple of months? Mr. Rumsfeld. If I get through this process and it looks like I am going to be confirmed, then the next order of business is twofold. One is to get briefed up by the fine people who have been serving there and understand what the circumstance is, and the second is to come to some judgments as to who I think ought to be recommended to President-elect Bush for nominees, and there are an enormous number of critical jobs that need to be filled. With a backlog in clearances and a backlog in FBI approvals, and the amount of time it takes to get through the Office of Government Ethics, and the amount of time it takes to process a human being through this thing, the odds are, if I get there, I will be there alone, without another soul that has been brought in to help, and you have to be very careful about bringing people in on a temporary basis to help you, because of the assumptions and presumptions, and because they have not been confirmed by the Senate they are really not in a position to make decisions. So we have a strange complication here, where we are kind of tangled up on ourselves. On the 20th we are going to have a President of the United States in office, and who knows how many of his Cabinet will be there. He cannot even nominate until he is sworn in, as the chairman said. I do not know what the answer is. As I said earlier, I know that I am just one human being, and there is no way I can do that job down there. The only way I can ever do anything in my life is to find the best talent around. Chairman Levin. Senator Nelson. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, this is a pleasure for me to be a member of your committee, one in which you and the next chairman operate in such a bipartisan manner, and I am privileged and honored to be a part of the committee. Mr. Secretary--I will call you that ahead of time--welcome. Clearly, the issue of terrorism is going to be one that is going to be facing us quite a bit in the future. As we look back in the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is questionable whether the United States moved quickly enough to do what it could, as in the resulting chaos, where people utilizing money perhaps spirited away nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, the command and control system, all of the temptations that came into the system at that time, I would like to have your comments on that, and what you think we should be thinking about in this committee, assisting you as we try to confront this issue of containing this proliferation. Mr. Rumsfeld. The problem of terrorism is an exceedingly serious one. It is a problem for us in our homeland. It is a problem for deployed forces. It is a problem for our friends and allies, and I think it was Lenin who said that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, and that is what it does. It changes people's behavior, and the wonderful advantage is, a terrorist can attack at any time in any place using any technique, and it is physically impossible to defend at every time and every place against every technique. In Beirut, I watched a process where they first used trucks with explosives to drive into a barracks and kill 241 American Marines. The next thing, people started putting barricades up like we have around the White House, and what do they do then? Well, you change your method. What you do is, you start using rocket-propelled grenades and lobbing them over, so the next thing, you look at the embassy, the British Embassy in Beirut, and they have wire nets hanging off the building to reject rocket-propelled grenades. Fine. It did not happen again. The next thing, they go after targets. They go after people, families, going to and from their place of work. So it is not something that ends. It is something you need to be attentive to. It is something we need to have vastly better intelligence than we do today, and it is something that needs to not simply be a Defense Department problem, or a homeland defense problem, but it is also a diplomatic problem. We have to find ways to function in this world where we work with people and try to create an environment that is less hospitable to terrorists and to terrorism. I do not know the number, but I have something rattling in my head that we are spending today something like $11 billion on this problem, and I do not have any idea if that is the right number or the wrong number, but it is a lot, and it is a lot more, for example, than is being proposed to spend on some other defense techniques, but it is a problem. Senator Bill Nelson. Well, we are looking forward to working with you on this. Down in Florida we had an interesting election this year. Mr. Rumsfeld. I noticed that. Senator Bill Nelson. Part of the problem was military overseas ballots, and I want to work with the committee particularly in devising a way that--in Florida, for example, 42 percent of the ballots were not counted, of the military overseas ballots were not counted because they did not qualify under Florida law, even though the Attorney General issued a ruling in the midst of all the controversy actually changing the effect of the law so that it did not have to be just a postmark, that it could be a signature, a date, and a witness, and what we need is some uniform procedures, and I am going to propose to the committee that we have voting by military overseas personnel by the Internet. It is interesting that just today a consortium of companies, both software and hardware companies, are proposing to do software for Internet voting for the entire country. Well, that is on down the road, but I think we ought to look at the Internet for our military overseas personnel. We can discuss that later. Finally, I have some knowledge of launch vehicles and the competition of American launch vehicles with foreign launch vehicles, and we are getting into a situation, as you have responded to other questions on space-based assets, of, we have to have the assurance that we can get those assets to space and now it is not necessarily the DOD payloads that we have to have on expendable booster rockets, which are Government vehicles, but we have a great reliance now of getting our commercial satellites on orbit, many of whom perform a function that is absolutely essential to the functioning of the free world, and we are relying on foreign competitors getting over half of those payloads to orbit. So I am going to look forward to working with you and your staff on this, and this committee as well on that. I would love to have any comments you have. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, you are of course exactly correct. There is no question but that the launch capability of the United States has been diminishing relative to the rest of the world, and there have been three or four studies that have analyzed in some depth the nature of the problem with respect to U.S. launch capabilities, and I think it is important you have raised it, and certainly I am aware of those studies. Our Commission on Space Management and Organization did not go into detail on it because it had been addressed by so many previous organizations, and I think the problems are fundamentally rather well-known. They are not being attended to, but they are rather well-known. Senator Bill Nelson. Did your report get into the transfer of technology by putting American spacecraft on the top of foreign vehicles, particularly the Chinese? Mr. Rumsfeld. It did not. There have been others who have looked at that, and there is no question but that if you are going to marry a payload with a launch vehicle, that it requires inevitably a certain amount of technology transfer. Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Carnahan. Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld, you have certainly shown this committee impeccable credentials, and you have shown a great deal of candor and forthrightness in answering all of the questions that have been presented to you today, and I thank you for that and for your patience. Because of the length of the day and the brevity of my seniority I will confine myself to just one question. Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri is a major part of the Army training system, with a chemical school, an engineering school, and an MP school and I have been told that, from Congressman Ike Skelton, that the readiness level at this TRADOC post is not all that it should be, as it is not in other posts as well. I was wondering what your thoughts might be on how we would address the readiness level at TRADOC posts. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I am certainly not knowledgeable about that particular situation, but people are aware of their circumstance, and to the extent readiness levels in an institution like that, an organization like that are not what they ought to be, the people there know they are not what they ought to be, and it affects their attitude, it affects their morale, it affects their feeling about their jobs, and whether or not they want to stay in the service, so it seems to me it is part of a much broader problem that we must address, and certainly if it is true there, as I understand that it is, then it is very likely true in other locations. I would say one other thing about readiness. It is one thing to say, here are our readiness categories and here are the levels of readiness that we need to meet, and that is well and good, but the first thing to do is say, ready for what? We need to make sure what we are getting ready for, and that they are not simply categories that existed in the prior period that are not well-adapted to the future, because people understand that, too, the people who have the responsibility for that. It is not good for morale if you know you are breaking your neck trying to get your readiness level up for something that in fact made a lot of sense yesterday but may not make as much sense tomorrow. Senator Carnahan. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan. Mr. Rumsfeld, let me go back to national missile defense. I want to press that issue with you. I want to follow up on a number of questions which I, Senator Cleland, Senator Reed, and others have asked here. First, you said this morning that your experience led you to the view that in a crisis, that a President should not be presented with just two options, either capitulation or a preemptive strike. I could not agree with you more. But there is a third option that is missing from your response, which is to pursue the policy of the United States and not be deflected by any threat with a real level of confidence that it would be a totally irrational act for anybody to carry out that threat. You this morning said those dictators you enumerated are rational folks. We do not like them. We do not like what they do, but that they act rationally. Mr. Rumsfeld. Maybe not rational in our context, but by their standards. Chairman Levin. We have been told over and over again by our intelligence sources and otherwise that the first goal of these regimes is survival and self-perpetuation. This third option, which you did not address this morning, which is to pursue the course we are on and not be deflected by that threat, seems to me to be a very important and most likely option. We should not signal in any way to any of these folks that one possibility of their having such a weapon of mass destruction would be that we might acquiesce. I think Senator Reed made reference to that point. It seems to me it is absolutely critical, number 1. Number 2, you indicated that we should consider certain adverse effects if we fail to deploy a national missile defense, and I agree with that. I think the pros and cons of deployment at a time when we have a technologically feasible missile defense, when that time comes, if it comes, that the pros and cons should all be on the table. Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree. Chairman Levin. What is essential is to consider the effects you made reference to. It seems to me those are important effects, that we also have to consider the negative effects of a deployment if it is unilateral--if it requires us to pull out of the ABM Treaty that we have with Russia--and if it results in a larger number of weapons on Russian soil and Chinese soil. We had a report yesterday referred to in this morning's paper by the writers, Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. I referred to it this morning, but I just want to read one thing to you, that the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is that weapons of mass destruction, or weapons-usable material located in Russia, could be stolen or sold to terrorists or hostile nation-States and used against American troops abroad, or citizens at home. Now, whether that is the most urgent unmet national security threat or not, and I happen to think it certainly ranks near or at the top, I think you would agree that it is a serious concern. I qualify this. I say, if the effect of our deployment of a national missile defense would be to increase the proliferation threat of a weapon of mass destruction, or material that is involved in a weapon of mass destruction by Russia responding to our unilateral withdrawal from this treaty by no longer reducing the number of weapons she has, or increasing the number of weapons she has, that is a factor which I hope you would consider. Would you agree it is a legitimate factor to consider, however you come out in the end? Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree completely that in this process the advantages and disadvantages of deployment should be considered and the advantages and disadvantages of not deploying should be considered. Chairman Levin. I welcome that. It seems to me that is important. But there are some other disadvantages I just want to throw in there, and I happen to agree with you that we should look at all the advantages and disadvantages. But I want to mention a couple of others. Our allies have urged us not to unilaterally deploy this system, not to leave them out of any system. They have not urged us, as far as I know of, in any case to unilaterally deploy. I use the word unilateral to mean that we would pull out of the treaty with Russia and proceed on our own, without being able to modify it. Now, you have said in your answers to the questions to the committee that you would seek modification of that treaty with Russia. I believe that was in your answers. It seems to me that is the course which should be followed. If it was not in your answers, then it was the President-elect that made reference to an effort to modify the treaty. Mr. Rumsfeld. It may have been the President-elect. Chairman Levin. Now, there is one other factor which I think should be placed on the table. Mr. Rumsfeld. Am I going to get a chance to comment? Chairman Levin. Absolutely, and if you cannot remember all of these points, then I will remind you of them. But there is another consideration here which seems to me that should be put on the table. Even if we are willing to take those adverse effects because we think that the positives outweigh the negatives, we are still left with the fact that there are other means of delivery besides missiles, trucks, and ships, which are cheaper, more reliable, have no return address. In the case of a truck, we could be threatened by one of these dictators with the kind of ultimatum like, I just invaded Kuwait. If you try to throw me out of Kuwait, there is a truck going around the interstate of the United States that has a biological or chemical weapon on it. You are going to lose part of your major cities, or you are going to see your air poisoned, for example. We are going to face potential threats even if we successfully create a national defense technologically, and even if we decide to take the risk of proliferation, which might result, if Russia's response is what she said that it will be, which is, forget the reductions, forget START II, forget START III. Rather than building down she is going to build up, creating the threat which Baker and Cutler talked about in their report. I would urge you to read the President's signing statement when he signed the Missile Defense Act, by the way. I think it is really important that you read that statement. I made reference this morning to the Missile Defense Act. Those factors which I have tried to enumerate in the last couple of minutes are all on the table before a deployment decision would be made by the current administration. Of course, it later on decided to delay it because of the failure of the tests. But I would urge you to read that statement before he signed the act, relative to the meaning of those two clauses, before you reach any final conclusion on the meaning of those two clauses yourself. I will stop there. I will help you to remember all of these factors if you were not able to write them all down, but I surely want to give you a chance to respond. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. I think I have them all down. My question is, can I read my handwriting, I was writing so rapidly here. I think we have to begin with the fact that the President- elect has indicated that he intends to deploy a missile defense capability. I do not want to get ahead of myself and argue in any way that suggests that I know what the outcome of the review will be or what he means by that, or what the National Security Council will end up recommending, and I understand that Congress has a role in this. The authorization and appropriation process is there. First, with respect to the concept of unilateral, I may overstate for emphasis a little bit, but I have the impression that for at least a period of 4, 5, or 6 years the argument has been made by the United States Government that missile defense would be destabilizing, that missile defense would be a bad thing, and that it could be, and the feedback we got was yes, that is right. The Russians say, we do not like it, and the allies say, we do not want the Russians to be unhappy and we do not want the agreements between the United States and Russia to be ruptured by the United States doing something unilaterally. There is no way I can prove what I am going to say, but I have a feeling that once the Russians understand that the United States is serious about this and intends to deploy, as opposed to the reverse of that, that they will in fact find a way in the negotiations--I do not know quite how, or when, or in what way--in the discussions that take place to accept that reality, recognize that there are threats from States with capabilities that not only threaten us and our allies and our friends, but over time will threaten the Russians as well. They are worried about terrorism. They are worried about military capabilities. Second, the implication has been set forth that we would do something precipitous or unilateral with respect to our allies. That is just not going to happen. We understand how important that alliance is. We understand that our allies need to be consulted. We also understand that to some extent the allies' concern is twofold. One is that--and I am meandering off into the Secretary of State-designate's area of responsibility and not mine, but--and I will tighten this up a little bit, but the allies are concerned, and I have talked with a number of them, about being disconnected. Our program, as it is currently on path, could conceivably have the effect of providing States with protection, but leaving our allies with less protection, and that kind of decoupling would be unwise by us. It would be unhelpful to the alliance, and I do not think you will see things happen--I think you will see a much closer consultation take place. Next, you mentioned the Baker-Cutler thing and connected it to this in some way. I do not see the connection. My impression is that--and I did not read the article. I was so busy getting ready for today that I did not read it carefully, but I was under the impression, at least, that they were talking about the loose-nuke problem, the risk that in fact nuclear materials and nuclear weapons and nuclear competence in terms of people, could and are and may to a greater degree lead to proliferation. I agree with that completely. The Russians have been telling us they have not been doing it, and they have been doing it. They have been helping Iran. They have been helping other countries. Certainly they have been helping India, and we know it and they know it, and they know we know it. Is it because they are actively trying to make mischief? Is it because they're making money, or is it because they do not have the kinds of controls over what is taking place in that country and there is a demand for that kind of assistance, or is it some combination of those? I do not know for sure, but I know that they in fact are active proliferators. The Baker issue is, I think, a somewhat different one, is my impression. You are right, there are other means of delivery, we know that. We know anything other than fighting armies, navies, and air forces is attractive because they are all cheaper. They are all more readily available, and they all offer the prospect that even without doing it you can affect people's behavior because you can threaten the use of a terror weapon and terrorize others and alter their behavior. My view of that is simply because you cannot do everything does not mean you should not do anything. I mean, I agree to the extent it is unattractive to work one end of that spectrum or some place along the spectrum. It inevitably will lead people to look for the weak link, to look for another part of that asymmetrical spectrum to assert their influence. I agree with that. That is a fact, and yet that does not say to me that it makes sense for us to remain vulnerable to ballistic missile attack if we do not have to. Chairman Levin. Thank you. I am sure my time is up. Senator Warner. Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think everyone realizes our second round is 6 minutes. Chairman Levin. Yes. I should have announced that. Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to compliment you and others. This has been an excellent hearing, and I have moved about a little bit in the course of this hearing and wanted to go over and welcome your Space Council and they are carrying on, as you might expect, quite well, and others, and throughout the whole way this compliment is being paid to this committee as a whole for undertaking a very thorough and in-depth hearing. I shall proceed quickly, under my 6 minutes. Did you want a seventh-inning stretch here? Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I am fine. Senator Warner. As you can clearly see, there is a diversity of views on this very important subject. For the 23 years my good friend and I have been here in this Senate together, we have from time to time been on opposite sides on this question of missile defense, but listening to this very important colloquy between the two of you, let us also include the following category, and that is accidental. Military men and women training all over the world on all types of systems, accidents happen. No treaty is going to stop that. No form of deterrence is going to stop that, and I have often said that every President better have a draft statement on his desk to explain to a half-million American people who lost their lives and their families and survivors why we were not prepared to stop an accident, so that is a factor we had better figure in. Now, I want to cover some very important subjects that we touched on, and our very valued ally, Israel. As we have had a strategic relationship with them for many, many years. Unfortunately that area of the world is embroiled in conflict, one which you, as a former negotiator and troubleshooter, have a clear understanding of the origins. Regrettably, many of those origins are still there. I would like to have your views on that, and in the gulf region we have done our best. We have formed a magnificent coalition under President Bush. Some 13 nations came together to stop the aggression of Saddam Hussein, and send his forces back in-country, and we are in there alone today, except for some help from Great Britain in the air campaign and from some other nations in the sea campaign, to contain him. I would like to have your views on how we approach that. As I stated this morning, President-elect Bush has put together an extraordinary and superbly well-qualified national security team. These questions are going to be on their desk on the day of arrival. I would like to also explore with you the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Again, we have had a longstanding relationship with the people of Taiwan. We have in place certain agreements, and lastly I think we should cover the policy that you would hope to recommend to the President with regard to the withdrawal of our peacekeepers and our timetable, maybe not specifically, but the general discussion of the withdrawal from Bosnia and Kosovo. This is a subject I have been active in. Last year, I and other colleagues--Senator Byrd joined with me and I joined with him on separate pieces of legislation to try and bring to the attention of our allies the commitments they made, the fact that we were trying to fulfill our commitment, and somehow if they did not continue to live up to those commitments we would have to address a withdrawal policy. Well, guess what happened. Very quickly the allies came in and fulfilled their commitments in terms of money in Kosovo and troops and likewise, and that situation righted itself. I think it is important that the United States keep some presence in both the Kosovo and Bosnian military forces so long as our allies are there, perhaps not to the level that we have today, but we do not want to give the perception that we are not a reliable partner in all of these, so if you would sort of kick off, and we will take the first one. Mr. Rumsfeld. OK. Most of what you have posed, well, falls over in the area of the Department of State and the National Security Council as much or more than it does the defense establishment. Senator Warner. But you are a team, and you are at that table. Mr. Rumsfeld. I understand, and I am going to reach out and comment, but I want to preface it by saying that we are not in office. We have not had meetings. We have not talked about these things. Senator Warner. I understand that. Mr. Rumsfeld. It would be wrong for me to try to think I could sketch out policy, so whatever I am saying is coming from Rumsfeld. Senator Warner. That is clear, but we have an obligation under advise and consent to get your views, because you are one of the most experienced, if not the most experienced person on that team. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, with respect to Israel, the situation is very difficult. The hostilities are obvious. People die in that region regularly. Israel is a very small country. They cannot make many mistakes about what they give up. There is a feeling I have had, watching that process, that to the extent someone leans forward, someone leans back, to the extent someone leans back, someone leans forward, and it goes that way. I do not think it is possible for the United States of America to go in and grab people by the scruff of the neck and think they could put them together and have something stick. It has to make sense on the ground. I have questions about Mr. Arafat's ability to manage his affairs, his circumstances, and I think to be dealing with him as though he were a State in control of his circumstance may not--may be somewhat unrealistic. I am hopeful. I think that it is an important issue that I am sure Secretary of State- designate Colin Powell and Condy Rice and the President will engage, and certainly I will be happy to be a participant. The gulf coalition is in fact unraveling and there is no question but that Saddam Hussein's appetite for weapons of mass destruction has not disappeared. Under the agreement, he was allowed to continue working on ballistic missiles below a certain range and, of course, the weight of the warhead affects range, so he has his team together, and he is working aggressively to make better relationships with Syria under the new Assad, and I suspect that we will not have heard the last of him by a darned sight. The control over assets and funding I think is rather important and fundamental, and ought not to be let go. There is a lot of pressure from various coalition partners to ease up, but I think that central principle is one we ought to think about. Senator Warner. We have over 20,000 U.S. troops in that region containing these policies. Mr. Rumsfeld. They are risking their lives in the north and south with flights. It is a dangerous situation. The PRC and Taiwan, so much has been said I think there is not much I can add. Clearly, we have laws, we have obligations, we have hopes, and that situation also seems to ebb and flow in terms of the volume of the words coming out of the PRC on that subject, and at the moment they seem to have ebbed rather than flowed. Senator Warner. But the one thing certain is a steady buildup in the PRC military capabilities. Mr. Rumsfeld. Not just generally, but in that area. Senator Warner. That is correct. Mr. Rumsfeld. Third, peacekeepers in Bosnia. The first thing I would say is that we have forces on the ground. We have troops there, and we ought to be supporting them, and I worry about forums like this where we talk about altering what we have, the Government, the President, Congress. We have to decide what we want to do on these things, but discussions that lead to uncertainty harm the people on the ground who are trying to do things, and I went into Bosnia sometime back and visited with people from various factions, and they are either leaning forward or they are leaning back, and you can be sure the more there is talk about departure, the more they wait you out. It is true across the globe. I have never been a fan of deadlines. I mean, the original deadline that we would be out by Christmas was not wise, not good policy in my judgment. We ought not to do that. It tells everybody, wait for a year, go on. I think what we ought to do--and I know the President has said he will review it. He will. When he has a view--you can be certain he will not do anything precipitous. He understands the importance of the relationships with our allies. What he will decide, I have no idea. He will certainly consult with Congress as well as allies, and we will all know when that process has completed. Senator Warner. I think that term, consult with Congress, is a very reassuring one, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and I thank the distinguished witness for those replies. Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman. Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I had to leave for a while. I apologize for that. I must say, coming back, I thought I would find you weary, mentally worn, but I am discouraged to find that you are as sharp as you were when I left this morning. [Laughter.] I want to thank you particularly for some of the straight talk. As another member of the committee was fond of saying earlier last year, you have been on the straight talk express here for part of today, and I appreciate it. Chris Williams, sitting behind you, worked with Senator Lott, and Senator Lott and I have sponsored some legislation on our concern about proliferation to Iran, and you were dead right that the Russians have just continued to do that. Sometimes we do not like to deal with that reality, but it is real, and I appreciate the straight talk that you gave, and I hope that we will continue to work on that, because it threatens our security and the security of our allies. The same is true of your answer just now on the question of our forces in the Balkans, and I thank you for it. We made a serious mistake here some years ago, under political pressure, where we did set a deadline, and it created a real credibility gap that we are still fighting to overcome. Believe it or not, I want to come back to national missile defense in a slightly different way and make this statement and ask you for your reaction. I accept the reality of the threat. I think it is a serious one. I was an original or early cosponsor of the National Missile Defense Act. I was pleased when it went through Congress and pleased when the President signed it, and I was up in my office for meetings, listening to your earlier testimony, and if I understood correctly, in response to a question from Senator Akaka you indicated logic would tell us that in the time since your commission's report the threat has just naturally become more serious because proliferation goes on. My concern is about the timeliness of a response, and just to say that I am concerned, as the new administration comes in and thinks about the layered approach to national missile defense, that if you think about the 2005 date, or whatever date, even earlier by some estimates, which some of these folks who have hostile intent toward us could get capacity to do our homeland damage, I think that one of the reasons--not all, but one of the reasons the Clinton administration chose the land- based alternative for national missile defense because it was possible, assuming technological abilities, to get, if you will, online earlier. Sea-based is essentially a concept now, and estimates I have seen say that it will not come online any earlier than 2010, space-based probably later than that. So my concern is, as you think about the alternatives you have as you come into office, that you take a look at the fact that while the land-based system missile defense may not be the best, it may be the one that we can get operating earliest. Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not disagree with that. I do not know enough to know, of certain knowledge, that that is right, but I have a set of impressions, and they are these, that the current program may very well have been something that could be done sooner than some of the other alternatives such as sea-based or space-based capabilities. On the other hand, my further impression is that the current system was designed to fit within the treaty. I have never believed--I mean, that treaty is ancient history. It is almost--it dates even back farther than when I was last in the Pentagon. That is a long time. Think what has happened to technology in the intervening period. I mean, to try to fashion something that fits within the constraints of that, and expect you are going to get the most effective program, the earliest to deploy, and the most cost-effective, it is just--it boggles the mind. That is not how people do advance technologies, is to sit down with those kinds of constraints and try to fit it in that straitjacket. I do not disagree that at this stage it may be something that could be done earlier than other alternatives, but I would say it may very well be that pieces of it might very well fit in what one might ultimately want to do. Now, this is all sheer speculation on my part. I mean, the press has kind of played me up as an expert in missile defense, and I am not. I know a lot about the threat, and I spent a lot of time on it, but I have spent much less time on the ways of dealing with it, and that is something I have simply got to wrap my head around. Senator Lieberman. I have one more question. Incidentally, enjoy whenever the press plays you up as an expert on anything, because it will not last long. [Laughter.] I want to come to the fifth of your priorities in the opening statement you made, reform of DOD structures, processes, and organization. One of the things that struck me in my years on the committee is the extent to which the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have not yet been realized. That is one of them, which is one of the central ones, which is based on the conclusion, I think correctly, that warfighting would be joint, that therefore more of the operation of our military should be joint, and there has been a natural institutional resistance to that, and look, the four services have extraordinary histories of capability and unique functions to play, but I was thinking, in terms of your background, in this case in the private sector, that too often probably I found myself saying, I do not think any CEO of a big company--and there is no company as big as the Pentagon. You are about to become the CEO of the largest company in the world, but would tolerate that kind of overlap. We have made some progress lately, particularly through the establishment of the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, and I really commend it to you and hope you can get to know it well, but ideally we should be having more joint experimentation, joint acquisition, joint training, so that when we come to warfighting we will not only have avoided redundancy and saved some money along the way to do some of the many things that we have all said today we want you to do, but we will be better able to fight jointly. Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not disagree at all. I think warfighting is inevitably going to involve all of the services, and to the extent they have not trained and exercised and equipped for interoperability in that kind of an environment they are not going to do what they could do had they done that. Senator Lieberman. My time is more than up. Thank you very much. Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions. Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that the chairman has been a skillful questioner, let us say on national missile defense. Now, we went through a long battle on it. Senator Lieberman and Senator Cochran formed an opinion, as did a number of us, that we needed to move forward. We accepted your bipartisan unanimous report that by the year 2005 we did have a threat that we needed to be prepared to defend against, and in the Senate I think Senator Roberts had over 90 votes, maybe 3 dissents, to deploy and follow through on this. The President did, in fact, drag his feet. We did not do the Alaska radar work that we hoped to have done this summer, so we have already missed the 2005 year that your commission, your report suggested we should try to meet, and so we are now at 2006, and I believe this summer we will have another date that we will need to make a decision soon to get started with the Alaska base or we will be at 2007. I just wanted to say, to follow up on Senator Roberts, I believe this Congress is for this. I believe we voted overwhelmingly for this, and with determined leadership, the technological problems will be overcome, and I think we need to move forward. Most Americans have no idea we have no defense to incoming missiles, absolutely none. They saw in Israel, in the Gulf War, some Patriot and Scuds, and think maybe we have that here. We really have none of that here, and I believe we need to move forward on that. I salute you for coming to it with the background you do, and I salute you for the report that you issued, and your fellow members, which we acted on, and the President did sign. I would like to pursue a little bit--and by the way, on national missile defense, we are talking about a $3 billion a year expenditure, maybe $4. That is hardly 1 percent of the total defense budget. It is not going to drain our defense resources to deploy national missile defense. Colombia has 38 million people. It is a significant trading partner of the United States, but 40 to 50 percent of that country is now being held by Marxist guerrillas who are working with the narcotraffickers. Venezuela is showing some strange activity. At best, I do believe we need to give more attention to our hemisphere, and when you compare that to Kosovo, there are 2 million people we have no trading relationships with, and it is clearly in the backyard of the Europeans. Would you share with us your view about the importance of our involvement in this hemisphere in general? Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, in general is about what I can do. Again, I am reluctant to be continuously infringing on my friend Colin Powell's areas of prospective responsibility. We live here. It is important to us, there is no question that this hemisphere is, and I think that successive administrations in both parties have recognized that and addressed that over my adult lifetime. That is a very complicated problem down there, and I need to get steeped in it. We have talked a bit about what is going on. I understand there are a limited number of U.S. military forces, that the State Department has the lead, that a lot of what is being done there is being done by contract personnel, that there is fear around the periphery that whatever is done in Colombia is not going to end the problem but move the problem geographically. I have read the same speculation you have about the Venezuelan involvement. I do not know much about it beyond that. It is going to take a lot of very careful thought, and a combination probably of the kinds of things that are being done as well as diplomacy, to see if we cannot have that situation begin to get better rather than worse, thus far. I have seen the maps that show the minimal control that the Government is currently exerting in the country, and it tends to be urban areas, as I understand it. Senator Sessions. It is a disturbing situation, and I do not know the answer to it. I do not believe it requires troops, but I do believe we need to say, which Ambassador Pickering would not say in one of these hearings when I asked him, that we endorse--perhaps they have sense, but we need to endorse unequivocally the oldest democracy in the hemisphere, except ours, Colombia, in their struggles with the Marxist guerrillas, in my view, and we need to encourage them to be aggressive, and if they are not going to defend their country, I do not see how we can defend it for them. But I believe they are going to be reaching a point soon where they are going to decide they have to fight to preserve their democracy, and if they do not fight they are going to lose it. At that point I think we are going to have to help them. I wish we did not, I wish it was not a problem, but I am afraid it is. Finally, I would say I agree with you totally that this treaty with Russia and the missile defense question is ancient history. It was with a dead empire that no longer exists. Surely we will deploy the best system and work and just deal with the Russians in a fair and objective way, tell them we love them, we want to be partners and friends with them, but we are going to do what is in our interests to protect our American citizens, and I think they will accept that if we will quit waffling and be clear, and I hope that you will do that. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland. Senator Cleland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for the committee's information, I do understand that under the voting of military ballots and the counting of military ballots overseas, with your help, Mr. Chairman, and myself and Senator Hutchison and Senator Warner, we have asked for the GAO to do an independent investigation on this whole issue of military ballots being counted, and how military votes overseas, and that that report will be to us in a matter of months. Mr. Secretary, let me just say, thank you very much for waiting us out and for being so patient. A couple of years ago you signed a letter along with Dick Cheney supporting full funding for the F-22, which is advanced technology for our tactical aircraft. I would like to, Mr. Chairman, submit that letter for the record, if there is no objection. Chairman Levin. It will be made a part of the record. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your support of the F-22 in the past. I hope we can count on your continued support for the F-22. Any remarks you would like to make on that? Mr. Rumsfeld. No, sir, other than that I said what I said, I believed it when I said it, I am now in a circumstance where I have to take a review and look at that and other things and try to come to some rational conclusions, and I shall do so. Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. In terms of airlift capability, it is interesting that the fiscal year 2000 defense authorization bill did direct the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to this Congress no later than February. The airlift requirement report is in. The current requirement for airlift in the Pentagon is almost 50 million ton-miles, and a mobility requirement study estimates the requirement may rise to around 54 or 55 million ton-miles. With the move away from more forward-deployed forces, an airlift and air mobility more and more important, the C-130J is integral to our rapid deployment operations. The last administration proposed some 24 new C-130Js over the next 4 or 5 years. I have a special interest in this program, Mr. Secretary, and would hope that you would continue to look hard at the C-130J program, particularly in terms of its critical role in moving our forces abroad. Finally, Warner-Robbins is one of three remaining Air Force depots. There used to be five. Now there are three. Part of the challenge here, it seems to me, is to determine if the Pentagon is going to continue to keep core capability in its maintenance and depot facilities, and in determining that core capability I just hope you would work with all of us so that our military commanders will have the ability in a crisis to ramp up and work 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, to meet the needs of our servicemen and women overseas. So I will just have those thoughts, and any response from you would be welcome. Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not engaged this subject of depots. I understand that among all the caucuses in Congress these days the depot caucus may take the cake as being the largest one. It is a subject that--let me phrase it this way. There is no question but that the United States military needs to have what they need to have, and the question is, in what way can they assure that they have that so that their capabilities, and our capabilities as a country to contribute to peace and stability are assured? I have not looked at it. I understand it is there and will certainly address it. Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. We talked about one big idea, and when I heard that I thought about maybe a question on deterrence in this new globalized era, and defining what could maybe deter the terrorist or the biochemical attack and so forth, and I appreciate your views on that and look forward to that continued discussion. But one of the big ideas I would just like for you to think about in the challenge of dealing with an all-volunteer force, and now a married all-volunteer force in terms of a big idea, in the last few years, in looking at the GI bill and its power to attract young men and women to the military, maybe one of the big ideas we ought to explore together is in the American military being the greatest university in the world. In other words, we are going to have to train constantly, and there probably already is the greatest university, certainly the biggest university in the world, but education begets education. If the American military can become known not just as a good place to get a couple or 3 or 4 years of education and then get out, but some place to educate yourself and your family over the long haul, then maybe we can work in a wonderful way on our retention problem as well. Because people who get out that contact me, get out basically with tears in their eyes. They love the military, they love the service, but they get out because they have pressures on their families. One of the pressures on their families is their kids' education. So I would just like to throw that out as an interesting big idea that we can explore as we walk down this road together, because it does seem to me that the power of the GI bill, or the power of education and the military can be a powerful tool to keep people--I mean, to attract people and to keep people in that otherwise would get out, but we have to broaden it so that it includes their families as well. I might say one of your colleagues in the Cabinet will be Tony Principi, who was the author a couple of years ago of the Principi Commission report, which actually recommended the concept that a serviceman or woman can take their unused GI bill assets and transfer them to their spouse or to their kids, thereby creating a college fund for them. Tony Principi was the author of that idea, and he will be in the Cabinet with you as head of the Veterans Administration, so I wanted to throw that out as a big idea that you might consider. Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you very much. Senator Cleland. Thank you very much for your patience, Mr. Chairman. No further questions. Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland. Let me also add our thanks for your continuing leadership on the broadening of the GI bill. It is a very important initiative. You have had a little success. You deserve a lot more success, and hopefully will achieve a lot more success in that area. Senator Nelson. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, in Nebraska we have the Joint Command and Strategic Command. The military for the last several years and the civilian leadership have worked toward finding ways to marry the military establishment in a way that certainly will work better for cooperation and collaboration, and obviously under a Joint Command you tend to get that. It surprises people in Nebraska to see the Strategic Command under the control of an admiral from the Navy, because Nebraska may be nearly landlocked, except for the Missouri River. I have a question that really relates to how you develop an exit strategy without showing your hand. We have a civilian military. We have a citizen Government, and yet we know that the right of the public to know is there, and this body provides oversight so that when you come with an idea that you would like to provide some knowledge about, the first question is, what is your exit strategy? Once you have tipped your hand, there is no going back. The genie does not go back in the bottle, whether you say we are not going to use any land forces, we are going to be out by December--are we somewhat relegated to going back to 1968? When nominee President Nixon was running and said, ``I have a plan to end the war,'' he would not tip his hand. I think when you have this challenge it is very easy for people to put you in the box, where they want to know that you have a plan, they want to know what it is, but once you have told them, it is like the coach giving his playbook to the other team, the other coach. Mr. Rumsfeld. You have put your finger on an enormously difficult problem. I was chief of staff in the White House when Vietnam ended, and you had all of these fine people who had supported that effort, and at some point you pulled the plug, and when you do, people are killed, people are hurt, people are damaged, and the reputation of our country for following through and for consistency and for being a reliable partner is damaged for a period. I was the one who had to go tell President Jamail of Lebanon that the United States and the President and Security Council had decided to withdraw support, and walked into his office, and it was a heartbreaker, just an absolute heartbreaker. There were a whole host of people who had stepped forward and relied on us to help him try to get the Syrians out of his country, and at a certain moment it is gone. You are right, if you talk and if you telegraph something more people get killed, more people are damaged, and the hardship is much greater. What is the answer? Well, I do not know what the answer is. I think part of the answer is, let us try not to get into things we cannot get out of. Let us try not to get into things we cannot finish well. We are still going to have this happen. We are not always going to be right. We are going to end up trying to do things because we are concerned and we care, and it will not work because we miscalculated. We thought there was a greater possibility that there could be an institutional capability to sustain itself and create a nation that could build and go forward, but that is hard. We are not geniuses at nation-building, institutional capabilities. There has to be something where people say, my gosh, the Marshall Plan, goodness gracious, those countries there, they were capable, they were competent, we gave them money. They did what they did, and the analogy of the Marshall Plan to some of the kinds of continents that we have been dealing with and problems that we have been dealing with I think is a mismatch. You are right, I think that about all you can do is if you have been wrong, do it fast, confess, and get out. That is all you can do, and try not to get yourself in a situation where you cause other people to support you and then you leave them in the lurch, which is just a heartbreaker. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Dayton. Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, I believe that a member of President Kennedy's Cabinet said that as Secretary you have one boss and 535 advisors, and I think you have received enough advice for one day. I wish you well, and I would cede the rest of my time unless there is anything you would like to say, sir. Mr. Rumsfeld. I would like to say something, Senator, and I thank you for that opportunity. Chairman Levin. By the way, there will be another round of questions. Mr. Rumsfeld. Maybe I will save it, then. [Laughter.] Well, I will say it right now. I must say, if I know anything I know that you do not tackle Defense Department problems and issues and challenges by political party. You do it on a bipartisan basis, and I respect the way you and Senator Warner have handled your back-and-forth chairmanships, and I admire it, and I assure you that I approach these issues in a nonpartisan way, and I intend to work with the committee in that way and look forward to it. Chairman Levin. We are going to have a third round for those who might be interested in asking additional questions. First, on the space policy question. There was a report in Defense Daily recently--it quoted--I do not know who was saying these words, but here are the words: ``Rumsfeld understands the need for militarization of space.'' My question is, do you see the need for the ``militarization of space''? Mr. Rumsfeld. I did not say it, and I do not know who wrote it, and I do not know quite what it means. Let me see if I can put some words around my thoughts on the subject. We know what has been done on land by way of military conflict, we know what has been done on the sea, and we know what has been done in the air. I think it would be a stretch to suggest that space will not at some point in the future find itself receiving similar attention. Why do I say that? Well, if, for example, we have an interest on the sea to maintain the sea lanes open and to create an environment that is hospitable to sea traffic for international intercourse, and we have a lot of assets in space, one would think we would feel or share a similar view about having the assets in space free to provide these services and the capabilities that they do, and to the extent we do, as we do, both civilian and military space assets, and to the extent they conceivably, as with ships and tanks and planes, become a target at some point, there is no question in my mind but that it is in our interest to create the kinds of deterrence and capability so that it is not attractive to disable the United States and our enormous dependence on space assets. I do not know quite what that means in answer to that article, but those are my views, and I should say these were my views as a member of the commission. They are not the views of the administration, since I have not had a chance to even discuss these things with President-elect Bush or the National Security Council. Chairman Levin. Thank you. You made, I think, brief reference to this today. That the United States and North Korea signed an agreement in 1994 which provides that North Korea will end and disband its plutonium production capacity. By the way, I actually went up to see with my own eyes that that was being done. It also called for the United States to lead a coalition with South Korea and Japan to provide North Korea with proliferation-resistant light water reactors if it complies with every step of the agreement, and it also provides for some fuel, I believe, to substitute for the loss of that capacity. Assuming that both sides comply with this agreement, in your judgment does this agreed framework serve our national security interest? Mr. Rumsfeld. I will offer some personal views, but I have to again begin with the beginning, and that is, this is quite a distance off my turf, and certainly the National Security Council and President and Secretary-designate Colin Powell will be addressing it. My view on North Korea is that they have been as active a proliferator of technologies across the globe as any country that I know of. It is hard to believe that a country that cannot feed its people, that has a dictatorship that is as repressive and damaging to its country as anything on the face of the earth, could be developing and marketing and benefiting financially from the proliferation of these technologies, but it is a fact. I was very impressed with the Senator's photograph of the Korean peninsula earlier today, where it showed lights in the south, and lights in China, and black, and it is a wonderful metaphor for the problem. I think talking is fine. I am glad they are talking. I think there has not been, to my knowledge, changes in their military posture with respect to South Korea or with respect to their activities of proliferation. It is good to be hopeful. It is good to talk. I am not an expert on the agreed framework. I have not been there, as you have. I am not sure I would be welcome. Chairman Levin. As far as you know, have they dismantled their plutonium production capacity? Mr. Rumsfeld. I know that--I know what I know and I know what I do not know, and I do not know what I do not know. Specifically, they are world-class tunnelers. They have gone underground across that country in a way that few other nations have done. They have underground emplacements that have enormous numbers of weapons. For me to sit here, having never been there, and not being a sufficient expert to know anyway, and say that I have high confidence that they are doing what the agreed framework suggested would be foolhardy. They do not have a record of behaving well, and we know they are a secretive, closed society, and it is perfectly possible for Americans to go milling around there, think they see something, and it is over there. It is a shell game with those folks. Chairman Levin. Let me try a different question. Is it in our interests to try to find a way to eliminate North Korea's plutonium production capacity so they cannot build nuclear weapons? Is it in our interest to do that? Mr. Rumsfeld. I would broaden it. I think it is in our interest, and our Asian allies' interests, and our antiproliferation interest across the globe that North Korea stop proliferating, stop threatening South Korea, and begin to behave rationally to its people and stop having them die of starvation. So I guess the answer is, sure it is in our interest, but there are a lot of things that are in our interest with respect to North Korea, and I do not know that I would stick one ahead of the other. Chairman Levin. I would agree with you there are a lot of things that are in our interest, but it is in our interest to end the plutonium production? Mr. Rumsfeld. You bet. Chairman Levin. There are a lot of other things in our interest as well, but at least you would agree that it is in our interest? Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes. Chairman Levin. Senator Warner. Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just to put on our old Navy hats for a moment, and that is the shipbuilding program in the Navy. Any reasonable analysis of the curves in the outyears, the current projection? We are going to be moving down precipitously close to the 300 level, and I just think at the moment the most you can say is, again climbing back into our purple suits so we are fair to all, we have to address the level of naval ship construction, and we have to do it early on. Do you not agree with me? Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree. I think that the pressures we face around the world with respect to bases suggest that we do need to be able to have capabilities that are afloat. Senator Warner. My follow-on for that, of course, is that-- and these are true stories--Presidents, when they are awakened at night by that phone, either you on the other end or someone else, the Secretary of State advising them of a crisis somewhere in the world, as Senator John Stennis, the very valued and wonderful chairman of this committee used to say, the Presidents would always say to me, well, the first thing that comes to mind, where is the nearest U.S. aircraft carrier? Do you recall that? Mr. Rumsfeld. I do indeed. Mr. Stennis was chairman when I was last Secretary. Senator Warner. I testified before him, as did you, many times. We have to keep that carrier level up. We have 12 now, one in training capacity, several in upkeep, some in transit, four to five at max on station throughout the world, and I would hope that you would indicate to me now that your preliminary thinking is, we have to maintain that minimal level, in my judgment, of that key asset of our arsenal of deterrence. Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, as an ex-Navy pilot I am not unaware of the value of aircraft carriers, but the last thing I am going to do is start speculating about one weapons system. I have an enormous task to gather some folks and look at the whole picture and see that they come into a coherent whole, and I am reluctant to start piecing things out. Senator Warner. That is all right, my good friend. You maintain your reluctance, and I will not have any reluctance to continue to bring that subject up with you repeatedly from time to time. [Laughter.] South Korea. It is so interesting, my modest experience in the U.S. military, and I have said this before, it did a lot more for me than I was able to return to them on Active Duty, but anyway, with South Korea, in the Marines in 1951. We are still there, 50-plus years, and we have a very significant number of our troops there. Now, you have covered the North. Let us talk a little bit about the South and its importance as our strong ally, and its importance for the forward-deployment of our troops to be in that region. I think this record should reflect some of your views on that. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I think the U.S. presence in Asia since, essentially since the Korean War and World War II, has been a superb investment in the sense that we have, without question, contributed to a more stable region. Their presence there is still useful in that regard, and I think that--I am trying to think where I heard it or read it, but there have been comments to the effect that in conversations between the North and the South, both have indicated that the U.S. presence is a useful thing, and I find that very interesting. The rhetoric sometimes from the North is a little different, but my impression is that realistically we are wanted and it is a good thing for us to be there. I also think it has been helpful from the standpoint of Japan. Senator Warner. I do, too, and indeed they are very valuable allies for the security of that region out there, and we should really touch a little bit on our valuable allies, Australia and New Zealand, and you will undoubtedly be visiting that region of the world, where we have had to dispense some of our troops not long ago for a contingency situation, but they are valued allies. Mr. Rumsfeld. As you look at what is happening in that part of the globe, and the periodic difficulties that the People's Republic of China has had with its neighbors, whether it is the Spratly Islands, or difficulties with India, difficulties with Russia, difficulties with Vietnam, there is no question but that Australia is a truly important nation, and it is important to that region, it is important to us, and it seems to me that it merits a priority from the standpoint of the United States of America. Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, again, an excellent hearing. I would yield back the balance of my time. I think our witness has more than fulfilled our expectations, and the endurance test he has withstood indicates he can handle that department pretty well. Chairman Levin. Just a few more questions. Senator Sessions, would you like to go first? Senator Sessions. You go ahead. Chairman Levin. The Army has been in the process of transforming itself into a lighter and more agile force that can deal with the challenges posed by threats in the uncertain future. In response to the pre-hearing questions, you stated you would not be in a position to evaluate the Army's plans until you have conducted a complete review of all the services' investment programs. That review is expected to take several months, and therefore I have the following questions. Does your answer mean that we should not expect any changes to the Army's transformation plans in this budget cycle? Mr. Rumsfeld. I just do not know. Chairman Levin. Are you open to the possibility of reallocation of resources among the military departments, if your review points in that direction? Mr. Rumsfeld. It would be foolish for me to say that I was not open to anything at this stage, because I really am coming out of civilian life into an institution that is not easily understood. Senator Warner. Or managed. [Laughter.] Chairman Levin. You have been asked a number of questions about the U.S. and China, and I have one additional one in that area. What approach would you take with respect to military-to- military contacts between the United States and China? Do you have any feelings? Mr. Rumsfeld. We have had some, and I have been there myself. Chairman Levin. Do you have any feelings about continuing or expanding those contacts? Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not thought about it. Off the top of my head, I have no reason to believe that they are undesirable. Chairman Levin. Just a couple of questions to follow up Senator Sessions' questions on the missile defense issue. I want to read just a portion of the statement of the President when he signed the Missile Defense Act. I think it is important. Mr. Rumsfeld. I would like a copy of it, if you have it. Chairman Levin. We will provide that to you. Before I do that, though, I want to ask you a question again. I think you answered it clearly this morning, but given something which was said just a little while ago, did your report on the North Korean or on the missile threat in general suggest anything relative to the deployment of missile defenses? Mr. Rumsfeld. Not that I can recall. Chairman Levin. Now, this is just a part of the President's statement. I am going to give you the whole thing to read after the hearing. I am going to be putting the whole thing in the record. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] We have been talking about two sections. One is the ``policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense system with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for NMD. By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, the legislation makes no clear decision on the deployment has been made.'' We call that the first point. Mr. Rumsfeld. This is reading from his statement? Chairman Levin. I am. This is part of what the President said relative to the second policy that was in that National Missile Defense Act. Section 3 puts Congress on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, and he also said our missile defense policy must take into account our arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. At the end he said: ``Any NMD system we deploy must be operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance our security. In making our determination, we will also review progress in achieving our arms control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the ABM treaty that may be required to accommodate a possible NMD deployment.'' I offer you an opportunity to react as to whether you disagree with any of that. It is kind of hard, because maybe I read too many excerpts for you to follow. In any event, do you wish to comment now or not as to whether you have any disagreement with that. I really would urge that you read the President's statement after this hearing so that you are familiar with the thinking of both the administration in signing that act, but also the thinking of many of us--I will not say a majority, necessarily--but many of us in supporting that act after section 3 was added in the Senate. It is a very important part of the history of that National Missile Defense Act. Now, let me give you an opportunity to comment if you want. Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will read it. As you went through it I was trying to parse it in my mind, and clearly, while President Clinton is President that is his view. We have a President-elect coming in who has expressed some views that are somewhat different from that. Chairman Levin. I am talking about the view of the President about the act he was signing. I do not know if the President-elect has any different view about this act. He has not spoken, as far as I know, on that issue. Maybe he has. But I am talking about just what the President who signed the act said when he signed it. Senator Sessions, do you have anything more? Senator Sessions. I do not. Chairman Levin. Let me just make a very quick final statement. First, we will include any statements in the record by committee Members who either were not able to be here today or who were here today but would want to expand on any statements they made. There were a number of Members who had other commitments. This hearing came up quickly and a number of our Members were unable to make it, although they are occupied in a number of instances on business that relate to this committee's work. Second, several Senators have indicated that they have some questions that they would like to submit to you for the record. We will ask for those questions, if possible, by the end of this week. You have many things to do. I do not expect there will be a lot, but there could be some, and I want to keep that record open. I know Senator Thurmond asked me to keep the record open for questions he wanted to ask. There may be others that want to ask questions. The record will be kept open for that purpose. We will keep the record open at least through tomorrow. We urge everybody to get their questions in by tomorrow, and then urge you to respond by the end of the day next Wednesday. If any questions come in after that, we will just give you additional time. We do not expect there will be a lot. We look forward to getting all of that paperwork you made reference to. Mr. Rumsfeld. We have it over at the other places. Before they want to release it they want to try and massage it. Chairman Levin. As always, there is an FBI report which we will receive and we will review. We again want to recognize your family for your attendance and your patience. You may not have noticed, but the audience has significantly dwindled. What has not dwindled is the love, affection, and support of your family, and we thank them for that. We will now stand in recess subject to the call of the chair. We do not expect we are going to need another hearing, but I do not want to preclude that possibility because we do not know what events may transpire. We will, therefore, stand in recess subject to the call of the chair. We want to thank you for your testimony today. Again I think you feel that there is broad support to move this nomination quickly out of this committee as soon as that can legally happen, after receipt of all the materials and after the President-elect formally sends in your nomination after he is inaugurated. Senator Warner, I do not think you were here at that moment, but I am sure that you, as our chairman-to-be, will move expeditiously, within moments after receipt of that official nomination on the 20th, to convene this committee. That is going to be his call because it will be his gavel. Senator Warner. Let us elaborate, because a lot of people are quite interested in that. What we did last time was, President Clinton came off the dais after the inaugural ceremonies and went up and signed a series of documents. Among them were the nominations of several Cabinet members. The committees voted, and then the Senate voice-voted that day, and in discussion with our distinguished Majority and, indeed, Minority Leaders, I think that is their intention to do just that, so I think we will follow the protocols that we have had through the years, and the Good Lord willing, and your endurance and that of your family, things should be in place Monday afternoon. It is important we do that, that the security team, particularly of the President of the United States, irrespective of the President, be in place. I remember our old boss one time, President Nixon, I happened to be with him one day and he said that the order of the succession of the presidency should never be in doubt for a minute. I remember that very well, and the same way with the team in the National security. So I congratulate you, I join my colleagues in congratulating you for a very, very good hearing. Both of us have been through hearings now for 23 years, and we put this one at the very top. Again, you and your family have stood the test side by side. Chairman Levin. If this ideal process works as outlined, the Inaugural Ball you will be going to a week from next Saturday night will be at the Pentagon. [Laughter.] Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, thank you. Chairman Levin. We stand in recess. [The prepared statements of Senators Smith, Santorum, and Hutchinson follow:] Prepared Statement by Senator Bob Smith Secretary Rumsfeld, I thank you and your family for coming before the Senate Armed Services Committee today. I am very pleased with your nomination. President-elect Bush has made an excellent choice to bring you onto his national security team. I can think of no one more qualified. You bring to the office your great experience, having held the position of Secretary of Defense previously in the Ford Administration. As a former White House Chief of Staff, you bring to the office your knowledge of the challenges faced by our President. As a former Congressman, you bring to the office a knowledge of the Hill. You also bring to the office your experience as a highly successful businessman. When confirmed, you will be running an organization larger than any business in the world, an organization chartered to defend the United States of America. Most of all, you bring to the office a great appreciation for the two major threats this Nation will face in this new century which I have long fought to address on this Committee and in the Senate, namely the threat to our Nation's growing reliance on space and the threat from missile attack. Coincidentally, today also marks the release of the report from the Commission to Assess United States National Security and Space Management and Organization, more commonly known today as the Space Commission, which I worked to create in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Act. You chaired that bipartisan group composed of the Nation's leading military space experts. The Space Commission's findings confirmed my long-held view of the growing importance of space to the nation and my belief that space management and organization reforms are urgently needed as America's commercial, civil, and military reliance on space assets expands. The Commission's recommendations lay the foundations for what I have said may be necessary--the eventual creation of a separate Space Force. These near- term management and organization reforms will begin to put in place the leadership and advocacy for space programs that have long been lacking. The United States has shown the world the value of space in providing information superiority on the modern battlefield. As we move into the new century, we need to defend our space-based information superiority, be able to deny our adversaries that same capability, and leverage the uniqueness of space to be able to rapidly project military force around the world. We need a strong advocate for space to fight for and justify new space programs needed for the 21st century in competition with many other pressing military investment requirements. I salute your leadership on the Space Commission, and I am grateful for the knowledge and appreciation of the issue you will bring to your new office. Another of your many recent activities serving the nation was your chairing the 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. The unanimous finding by that Commission served as a wake-up call to the nation and set us on a course that I hope will lead to a robust multilayered national missile defense capability in the near term. I thank you for your service to the nation and your willingness to take on the daunting task of Secretary of Defense again. I look forward to your testimony. ______ Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum Senator Levin and Senator Warner, thank you for scheduling this hearing today. I believe it is important that this committee do all that it can to assist the new administration on helping to address pressing issues facing our military forces. This confirmation hearing will help begin that process. Members of this committee are familiar with Secretary Rumsfeld from his service in the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and as a private citizen. Based on Secretary Rumsfeld's past record of service to this country, President-elect Bush has made a wise choice in nominating him to be our next Secretary of Defense. There are significant issues that the next secretary will be forced to confront. For example, there is the issue of military readiness. Five times, under the leadership of both Senator Thurmond and Senator Warner, this committee has examined the status of U.S. military readiness. To fully examine reports concerning the decline of military readiness, the committee received the testimony of the Service Chiefs and asked for their views on these reports. As you are probably aware, the Department of Defense's most recent Quarterly Readiness Report indicates that risk factors for executing ongoing operations and responding to a Major Theater War (MTW) are moderate, while risk for a second MTW is high. The committee also learned that of the Army's 20 schools for critical military skills such as field artillery, land combat and helicopter aviation, 12 have received C-4 ratings. The most recent readiness hearing confirmed what members of this committee suspected--that non-forward deployed forces are being ``raided'' for resources needed to maintain the readiness levels of our forward deployed forces. One of the biggest challenges facing the next secretary concerns the need to adequately fund not only our readiness accounts but also our modernization accounts. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Airland, I pay close attention to the modernization needs of the Services. I am troubled by a recent CBO report which notes, at a minimum, a $50.0 billion disparity between the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2000 and the level of funding needed to sustain our defense forces in a steady state. The largest gap identified by CBO concerns the funds needed to modernize our military. Under a worst case scenario, CBO identifies a gap as large as $62 billion between current funding and the funding needed to modernize at a ``steady state.'' It will also be necessary to review and scrutinize those programs and weapons systems currently under development. This will be particularly important with respect to the development and procurement costs associated with three tactical aviation programs being pursued by the military Services. The total costs associated with developing and procuring the F-22 Raptor, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and Joint Strike Fighter will total upwards of $350 billion. It will be important to view the affordability of these programs against the full range of requirements facing the Department of Defense. In addition to the financial burden associated with our TACAIR programs, the Army has recently unveiled a new transformation initiative. In late 1999, General Eric Shinseki announced that the Army intended to embark on an effort to transform the Army to better respond to today's conflicts. The transformation process includes three elements: modernization of the current legacy force, establishment of rapidly deployable Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), and research and development investments in the Objective Force. The Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $637 million for the fielding of the first IBCT, $300 million to begin fielding the second IBCT and another $200 million for related equipment. The fiscal year 2001 NDAA also required an acceptable form of side-by-side test against the current inventory of armor vehicles as well as additional field trials to examine the IAV's conventional warfare capabilities against a conventional force. One of the concerns expressed by this committee has been a perceived reluctance on the part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to support the Army's transformation effort with sufficient resources. In order to fund the effort for fiscal year 2001, the Army was required to terminate or restructure a number of important programs. Congress subsequently restored many of these cuts. It is unclear to this committee whether there are sufficient funds to support modernization of the legacy force, fielding IBCTs and R&D efforts on the Objective Force. It is essential that you review all aspects of the Army's plan--fielding schedule, resourcing, testing plan, threat assessment, acquisition plan and lift requirements--if you are confirmed by the Senate. An area of keen interest to this committee has been the need to protect our critical infrastructure from being attacked or compromised by enemies, terrorist organization or individuals. The committee has also been interested in seeing improved coordination between the public sector and private sector with respect to identifying threats to our critical infrastructure and in efforts to safeguard these important networks. As part of the fiscal year 2001 NDAA, the committee authorized funding for two important programs which will help address our current weakness in addressing ``cyber threats.'' First, the committee authorized $10.0 million for the creation of an Institute for Defense Computer Security and Information Protection to conduct research and technology development in the area of information assurance and to facilitate the exchange of information regarding cyber threats, technology, tools, and other relevant issues. Second, the committee authorized $15.0 million to support the establishment of a Information Security Scholarship Program. The program would authorize the Secretary of Defense to award grants to institutions of higher learning to establish or improve programs in information security and to provide financial assistance to persons pursuing a baccalaureate or advanced degree in information assurance. The Department's support for both these efforts is vital to address this critical problem. The Clinton administration elected to approach this problem with a government-sponsored entity, the Institute for Infrastructure Information Protection. Such an approach fails to capitalize on the abilities of our Nation's federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) to disseminate information on cyber threats, promote best practices to industry, and provide a safe meeting place for discussions about cyber threats. I hope that you will do all you can to tap the resources of these FFRDCs in helping to counter cyber threats. Again, Senators Levin and Warner, thank you for convening this hearing and I look forward to the testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld. ______ Prepared Statement by Senator Tim Hutchinson Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, Mr. Secretary, I regret that I could not attend today's hearing. President-elect Bush's decision to designate an individual as experienced and as capable as Don Rumsfeld to serve as our Nation's 21st Secretary of Defense sends an unmistakable signal that this Administration is committed to tackling the tremendous challenge of transforming our military from the force that defended our Nation during the Cold War to a force capable of deterring and winning the wars of the 21st century. While I look forward to working with the Secretary on all of the national security-related challenges facing this great nation of ours, I am particularly anxious to begin addressing a number of critical personnel issues. Implementation of the Warner/Hutchinson ``TRICARE- for-Life'' plan must proceed carefully and expeditiously. Equitable compensation for senior enlisted members of our Armed Forces must be restored. New programs must be developed so that the men and women who choose to make a career of the military are able to provide college educations to their dependents. I am equally committed to working with the Secretary on a number of Arkansas-specific matters. Enhancing the continuing missions of Little Rock Air Force Base and the Pine Bluff Arsenal are two of the main reasons that my constituents sent me to Washington, DC, and I intend to continue to work every day to exceed their expectations. Mr. Secretary, I have every confidence that you will be able to satisfactorily answer all of the questions put to you by my colleagues, and I look forward to casting my vote in favor of your nomination. Good luck, and thank you for your continued dedication to public service. [Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.] [Prepared questions submitted to Donald H. Rumsfeld by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] January 9, 2001 The Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith are the answers to the policy questions the Senate Armed Services Committee asked me to complete. Sincerely, Donald H. Rumsfeld. cc: Hon. John Warner ______ Questions and Responses defense reforms Question. More than 10 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. From your close association with defense issues, you have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms? Answer. The establishment of the unified and specified combatant commands, the delineation of responsibilities, and most importantly the focus on ``jointness'' outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has enhanced the readiness and warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces. Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented? Answer. I have had no personal experience with these reforms, but it is my understanding that these reforms have changed the way the Department of Defense works by strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, and significantly improving the ability of the Department to protect America's security and further its vital interests. It apparently has helped improve the interaction among the services in conducting military operations by making joint operations the norm. Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms? Answer. The goals of Congress in enacting these reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing a clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense. Question. Do you agree with these goals? Answer. Yes, I support the goals of Congress in enacting the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. But it must be said that they represent a tall order. Question. Do you anticipate submitting legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols? Answer. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will review the extent to which the reforms have been implemented to assess the extent to which they have achieved the stated goals. I would consult with Congress on any changes that might be appropriate. Question. If so, what areas do you plan to address in these proposals? Answer. It would be premature to offer any thoughts at this time. duties Question. Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President, and the law, he has authority, direction and control over the Department of Defense. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense? Answer. I suspect there are, but I am not in a position to comment today. If I determine that additional authorities are needed in this regard, I will propose such changes. Question. Do you believe that you can provide advice to the President, or the NSC, in disagreement with or in addition to the advice of the Chairman without jeopardizing your relationship with General Shelton? Answer. Yes without question. The relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is important. I have had highly constructive relationships in the past and, if confirmed, I believe we both will be able to effectively fulfill our responsibilities in support of the President. chain of command Question. Section 162(b) of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of Title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and Secretary in performing their command function. Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command? Answer. I do not know. I assume it does. I will be interested to see how it works in practice. Question. Do these provisions enhance or degrade civilian control of the military? Answer. I would have to work with them to know. priorities Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Department of Defense? Answer. Our responsibility will be to take the lead in fulfilling President-elect Bush's commitments as set forth in my opening statement to the committee. I will insist that the Department cooperate with Congress and with the defense oversight committees. To the American people, I pledge every effort to foster special concern for those who have volunteered to serve in uniform--including the guard and reserve as well as the active forces--and to achieve careful management of their tax dollars. For America's Armed Forces, I will do all in my power to give our military men and women every advantage in fulfilling their difficult missions. Regarding more specific priorities or objectives, I will work to: 1. Fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the new national security environment; 2. Ensure the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces; 3. Transform U.S. military forces from a Cold War-oriented force to a 21st century force capable of deterring and defeating new threats; 4. Modernize the intelligence and command-control- communications-infrastructure and secure our space assets given the growing dependence on those assets and their vulnerabilities; and 5. Reform DOD structures, processes, and organizations. u.s. defense strategy Question. The essence of present U.S. defense strategy, as articulated in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, is defined as consisting of three elements-- shaping, responding, and preparing. Do you agree with that defense strategy? Answer. See response below. Question. If not, what defense strategy would you substitute for it? Answer. Determining what an appropriate defense strategy should be is one of the most important issues that will need to be addressed by the Department. From defense strategy flows policies, programs, and resource requirements. The U.S. must have a national security strategy that seeks to advance U.S. national interests and to have a positive impact on world events without the need to resort to armed force. It is important that we shape and prepare the Armed Forces to respond to whatever national security challenges may confront us--this is the essence of deterrence. External events sometimes are outside our control. Therefore, we must ensure that the military has the tools it needs to fight and win, should that be necessary. If confirmed, the defense strategy would recognize that peace is best preserved when the U.S. remains strong. By providing for a military that is second-to-none and equipped to meet the newer challenges of the 21st century, I believe we can best ensure a peaceful strategic environment that advances U.S. national security interests and those of our friends and allies. quadrennial defense review Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review is required to be submitted to Congress by September 30, 2001. Will that deadline provide sufficient time for the new administration to develop required changes to national security strategy on which the Quadrennial Defense Review will be based? Answer. No I do not believe it will. We intend to undertake a comprehensive review of strategy, forces, and capabilities as prescribed by law and will consult with Congress should the deadline prove to be overly burdensome. Question. How will you keep the committees of jurisdiction informed during the conduct of the QDR? Answer. I do not know precisely but I will consult with congressional leadership and request staff to keep the committees appropriately informed as the review progresses. Question. During the past decade, the military departments have been reduced significantly, both in terms of force structure and resources, in response to the perceived post-Cold War security environment. During the same period, the various Defense Agencies have grown considerably--a prudent investment in some eyes, but a questionable investment to others. How will you include the Defense Agencies in the overall QDR process? Answer. If confirmed, the Department will undertake a comprehensive review of our strategy, forces, and capabilities that addresses all elements of the Department. Question. Do you envision a separate process to review the Defense Agencies, apart from the review of the military departments? Answer. I have not considered the shape of the review process. hart-rudman commission. the 21st century national security study group Question. The Hart-Rudman Commission, the 21st Century National Security Study Group Phase 3 report is scheduled to be completed by February 2001 to recommend alternatives to the current national security apparatus and suggest ways to implement the proposed national security strategy. What process and organization do you intend to use to review the report and do you intend to use the results to influence the Quadrennial Defense Review? Answer. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, is composed of a group of prominent Americans drawn from all sectors of society, well suited to examine American national security in the 21st century. I fully expect the commission's phase 3 report to stimulate significant thought and discussion inside and outside of government and contribute to the ongoing national security debate and the new administration's defense review. two major theater wars requirement Question. The present requirement to have the capability to fight and win two major theater wars in overlapping time frames is extremely demanding. Some argue that as long as that requirement exists, our Armed Forces will have to be sized in such a way as to address the least likely contingency with short shrift given to any preparation for other lesser contingencies and for emerging threats. Do you believe the two major theater wars requirement should be maintained? Answer. Modern history suggests that the U.S. has often faced more than one security contingency at a time. With that history in mind, preparations are appropriate. The manner in which the U.S. responds to two near-simultaneous contingencies is an issue of military strategy and operations and the adequacy of available resources at the time. This issue should be examined in the upcoming strategy review. Question. If so, how do you respond to the above argument? Answer. The consequences of not being prepared to fulfill the military's primary mission of deterring war and winning war if deterrence fails would be devastating. The U.S. military must also be able to deal with emerging threats. If confirmed, I will work to restructure our military to meet 21st century threats. strategic pause Question. Some have argued for taking a strategic pause now in modernization programs, accepting some modest risk in the near-term when we have no peer competitor, while making more fundamental shifts for dealing with challenges we will face in the future. During the campaign, President-elect Bush endorsed skipping procurement of a generation of weapons systems. What is your view on this issue and, if confirmed, how would you proceed in implementing your view? Answer. We cannot allow the effectiveness of our military forces to degrade while we are modernizing and transforming. The U.S. military needs to get on a new path that will permit the rapid introduction of advanced technology that can materially increase military effectiveness and decrease the cost of operating and maintaining those forces. The cost of maintaining Cold War era equipment and its associated infrastructure and the steep reduction in modernization funding since the end of the Cold War has produced long-term modernization problems that must be addressed. If confirmed, I will conduct a comprehensive review of our military structure, strategy and procurement priorities, as promised by President-elect Bush. This review should help to determine how best to modernize the U.S. military to deal with future challenges. when to use military force Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should participate in potentially dangerous situations, including peace enforcement operations, is one of the most important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decision making for such situations. What is your criteria for such situations? Answer. The use of military force is one of the most important decisions a President can take. If confirmed, I would work closely with the President and his senior advisors to develop appropriate policies to guide the use of our military forces in peacetime, crisis, and war. Question. If you have not developed such criteria, what are the factors that you believe are most important with regard to such decisions? Answer. My general views are these: A decision to use military force, whether unilaterally or in coalition with other nations, should reflect important U.S. national security interests. The U.S. structure of alliances and its diplomatic ability to build informal, but effective regional coalitions provides the President with a variety of options to bring military power to bear in a specific situation where U.S. interests are involved. U.S. military forces can best be used when the military mission is clear and achievable and when there is a reasonable exit strategy. I look forward to working the President and his national security team on the details of this important question in the weeks ahead. participation in peacekeeping Question. Some have taken the position that the United States should not generally participate in peacekeeping in view of the negative impact that such activities have on certain warfighting skills, and the fact that the U.S. Armed Forces' primary mission is fighting and winning our Nation's wars. Others have taken the position that participation in peacekeeping operations is in our Nation's interest and strengthens U.S. leadership and that such actually improves certain warfighting skills, such as leadership skills. What is your view on the participation of U.S. forces in peacekeeping operations? Answer. Clear criteria for the use of U.S. military forces should be established prior to U.S. participation in specific peacekeeping operations. There should be clear objectives, a coherent strategy to achieve them, a reasonable chance of success, acceptable command and control arrangements, and an exit strategy. When the main burden of the U.S. presence shifts to infrastructure and nation-building, however, we are into missions that are not appropriate for the U.S. military. jointness Question. It became apparent during this year's debate on defense needs that our military deployments have increased dramatically in the past decade at the same time our force structure and resources have declined, increasing the tempo on our military personnel and equipment. To the consternation of many, including members of this committee, we seem to encounter the same significant problems with meaningful joint operations and interoperability of our Armed Forces during each significant military operation. Most notably, the armed services continue to be hampered by communications systems, information management systems, and other capabilities that are often not interoperable and sometimes redundant. This committee has expended considerable time on these issues, but continues to observe problems in the development and fielding of interoperable systems and concepts. How do you propose to remedy these recurring shortcomings? Answer. Interoperability among our forces is an issue which I believe demands immediate attention. Interoperability should be addressed as new systems are conceived, not simply after they are fielded. I believe we should devote significant efforts to solving the warfighter's problems in the field as identified by the CINCs, including from experiences in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Desert Storm. Question. In your opinion, do our experimentation, requirements generation, and acquisition processes need significant reform? If so, how would you propose to reform these processes? Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake a review of these processes, with a special emphasis on innovation and streamlining, and will report the results of that review to Congress. My current impression is that the process is mired in unrealistic requirements that unnecessarily delay the time from concept to deployment at a time when technology is leaping ahead. Because of the lengthy acquisition process and the rapid advances in technology, we may have driven ourselves into a position that is guaranteed to produce technologically obsolete equipment the day it is deployed. national security Question. Most agree the most significant near-term threat to our national security is not from a military peer competitor, but from transnational, ideological groups that may attempt to employ some type of weapon of mass destruction within the United States. How would you assess our preparedness to respond to such a situation? Answer. I am advised that the U.S. government is spending more than $11 billion to deal with terrorist threats that might be posed by transnational or ideological terrorists, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. While some impressive results have been achieved from this considerable effort, my preliminary impression is that more remains to be done, particularly with respect to the role of the Department in providing for homeland defense as well as for defense of U.S. facilities overseas. Question. What adjustments would you recommend, if confirmed, to our national security mechanisms to ensure the collective, accountable cooperation of all appropriate agencies? Answer. I am not prepared at this time to recommend adjustments. While the response to the transnational terrorist threat to the U.S. has been well supported the distribution of resources, programs, and leadership over numerous Federal agencies has posed significant coordination problems. Greater coordination and interagency leadership is needed to assure an effective U.S. government response to this threat. Two areas of particular interest to me are space and intelligence. Each would benefit from more senior level leadership and closer coordination between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. transformation Question. The December 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel, titled ``Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,'' contained the following statements: ``The Defense Department should accord the highest priority to executing a transformation strategy. Taking the wrong transformation course (or failing to transform) opens the nation to both strategic and technological surprise. Transformation will take dedication and commitment--and a willingness to put talented people, money, resources, and structure behind a process designed to foster change. Greater emphasis should be placed on experimenting with a variety of military systems, operational concepts, and force structures. The goal is to identify the means to meet the emerging challenges, exploit the opportunities, and terminate those approaches that do not succeed.'' And: ``At the core of the effort should be a much greater emphasis on jointness, building upon the legacy of Goldwater-Nichols.'' Do you agree that there is a need to transform the U.S. Armed Forces into a very different kind of military from that which exists today? Answer. Yes. Our current force structure will be sorely challenged by asymmetric threats and the growing ability of both state and non- state actors to deny access to critical forward bases and lines of communication. We have the opportunity now to critically evaluate both our force structure as well as how we organize and employ our forces. Lessons learned from previous operations suggest the need for improvement in the areas of intelligence, rapid deployment and employment, decisive operations across the spectrum of conflict, streamlining of logistics, and improvements in the C\4\ISR capabilities and architectures. Question. Do you agree that experimentation, particularly joint experimentation, is essential to successfully achieving such a transformation? Answer. Yes. Joint experimentation is essential in ensuring that operations, doctrine-related activities, and acquisition are more fully explored from inception to delivery/implementation. Our concept should be to field systems and develop capabilities that are ``born joint.'' An essential step in helping to ensure that new capabilities are ``born joint'' and work is through experimentation. We must avoid radios usable by only one service, service-specific software, and procedures that are peculiar to one community or service. Transformation involves more than merely new weapons systems. Rather, it is a process of reorganization and reform that can best be validated through joint experimentation. Question. Over the last year, we have seen the Army begin a process to transform the service into a force that will be able to deal with a wide range of anticipated 21st century national security challenges. The Navy and Air Force have also begun to explore opportunities to initiate transformation processes to keep current with evolving defense challenges. These efforts demonstrate a recognition that fundamental change is necessary if they are to remain viable over the next 20-30 years. Are you at all concerned that these initiatives appear to be ``self defined'' by the services without direct participation of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff? Answer. I am told that a structure is in place in which JFCOM was designated the lead for joint force integration and for joint force training. While I am not familiar with it, I intend to assess the effectiveness of the current arrangement. Question. Should the Department of Defense play a role in steering or guiding individual service efforts? If so, how? Answer. Yes. Service initiative is invaluable. However, if forces are to fight jointly in the field, transformation must be conducted as a joint endeavor. Only then can the Services' specific cultures and capabilities likely to be forged into a joint cooperative endeavor. army transformation Question. The Army has begun a process for transforming itself into a lighter, more agile force that will be able to deal with the challenges posed by threats in an uncertain future. Do you believe that the Department should support the Army's current transformation plan even if it means diverting resources from other Services' investment programs to pay for it? Answer. I cannot answer this without an analysis of all the Services' investment programs. But I can say this: I believe that the Secretary of Defense should seek an allocation of resources that is best for the overall defense posture--that gives priority to funding the most pressing requirements. The transformation of our Armed Forces will be a high priority. But before recommending major changes in the allocation of investment funding--which Congress has recently approved--I intend to assess what new capabilities are being sought and the soundness of programs advancing those capabilities and their impact on deterrence and warfighting capabilities. Question. What is your view of the appropriate role that experimentation, including joint experimentation, should play in directing the Army's efforts in modernizing the legacy force, fielding an interim force, and developing the objective force? Answer. Army Transformation must be coherent with evolving joint operational doctrine, and that doctrine will only emerge through joint experimentation. I see experimentation playing an important role. But let me be clear: experimentation will yield changes in course, exhibit failures of expectations, or even reveal past mistakes. We must be careful to learn from experimentation, and acknowledge the risks it reveals. Question. Do you believe that the current Air Force and Navy strategic mobility programs will support the Army's transformation goals for strategic agility? If not, what changes do you believe should be made in those programs? Answer. My preliminary impression is that we need to make improvements in our strategic mobility capability. As we transform the forces, we will need an appropriate strategic sea/airlift fleet. budget priorities Question. During the 106th Congress, both Congress and the administration placed the highest priority on increasing pay and compensation for military personnel and health care benefits for retirees, and on improving housing for military families. If you are confirmed, what will be your highest priorities for increased funding over and above financing the unfunded cost of these previously enacted benefit increases? Answer. First, preserving the high quality of our military personnel and restoring their morale. We need to spend what is needed to compensate military people fairly and ensure a competitive quality of life for them and their families. In this tight U.S. labor market for highly-skilled professionals, we must spend enough to attract and retain people with the skills required for the technically sophisticated Armed Forces. Also important is good military health care, housing, and other quality of life contributors. I would review the progress made in recent years and decide if further improvements are needed. President-elect Bush has signaled that taking care of our military people is a top priority with his pledge to increase pay for the Armed Forces. Second, readiness. I would look for areas where increased funding is needed for training, maintenance, and other readiness essentials--there are also important quality of life considerations. I also would consider actions to prevent indirect threats to readiness--that is, to prevent funding shortfalls that could result in funds being diverted from readiness accounts. Third, future capabilities--focused on ballistic missile defense and modernization of air, sea, land, intelligence, and space capabilities. These areas are complex, and I will likely not complete an assessment of where best to put added funding until the defense review is completed. I hope to have identified some immediate funding needs in time to include in the fiscal year 2002 budget submission, and possibly in a fiscal year 2001 supplemental. Question. As Secretary you would be called on to make tough decisions in many areas, one of which would be funding priorities. What areas in the defense budget represent your highest priorities for additional resources? Answer. Again, the highest priorities would be people, readiness, and future capabilities. It is important to ensure that we are taking good care of our people, both now and for the future; and to seek the proper balance between current readiness and investment in the high- tech capabilities to ensure our future superiority in all security realms--with special attention to the threats of this post-Cold War period. Over the past few years I have been focused on the issues of ballistic missile defense, America's security posture in space, and intelligence. If confirmed, these would certainly be high priorities. Question. There are an increasing number of studies from outside the administration, in addition to the Joint Chiefs, which indicate that current and projected levels of defense spending will be inadequate to meet U.S. national security requirements as they are currently stated. What is your view of these and other studies, and will you seek additional funding for defense? Answer. I agree with the conclusion that projected defense spending levels are inadequate to meet U.S. national security requirements as they are currently stated. President-elect Bush has expressed the same conclusion. If confirmed I would direct a study to specify exactly where inadequacies lie, where savings could be achieved to help address those inadequacies, and what additional funding may be required. readiness for most likely military operations Question. The Army has been exploring changes to the way readiness is measured due in part to confusion in some recent deployments where units were assessing themselves and reporting against one set of requirements while they were undertaking a different mission at the time. Do you believe the readiness reporting system should be made more comprehensive so that it measures our units not only against the most demanding requirements contained in the national military strategy but also assesses the performance of those units in the real world missions directed by the national command authorities? Answer. The question ``ready to do what?'' is a good one. The current system centers on our readiness for high intensity combat operations, such as a major theater war, and provides broad indicators of readiness status ranging from personnel to equipment. I understand that planning is underway for a number of improvements to the existing reporting system, in both the near and longer term. Question. Over the last few years many have agreed that we have seen increasing evidence that the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces has begun to deteriorate as a result of the over-commitment of an under-resourced Department of Defense. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Bush administration, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues? Answer. There are a number of readiness challenges that must be addressed. These include the classic ``unit readiness'' concerns of robust manning, functioning equipment, and realistic training. Warfighting commanders have to have the assets to synchronize and use their units in effective joint and coalition forces. National Guard and Reserves have a number of unique challenges in meeting their mission requirements upon deployment that require immediate address. Some of the more pressing concerns lie in the condition of equipment, or more broadly, the materiel readiness of the forces. Problems include higher-than-planned use, inadequate spare parts inventories, and recruiting and retaining highly skilled personnel. Joint readiness requires effective command, control, communications, and computer (C\4\) systems; robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; sufficient lift to mobilize forces and equipment; and healthy logistics practices and sustainment stocks. The U.S. needs to be better prepared for the growing threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), threats to critical information and other infrastructure systems, and vulnerable space assets. As we review our National Military Strategy in the Quadrennial Defense Review, these concerns must be addressed. encroachment Question. Some of the most significant issues that will impact the readiness of the Armed Forces as we enter the 21st century could be categorized as outside encroachment upon military resources. This encroachment includes environmental constraints on military training ranges, local community efforts to obtain military property, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, transfer of radio frequency spectrum from the Department of Defense to the wireless communications industry, and many others. Unless these issues are effectively addressed our military forces will find it increasingly difficult to train and operate at home and abroad. In your opinion, how serious are these problems? Answer. This is an important issue. The myriad forms of encroachment ranges face threaten to complicate and in some cases severely restrict the ability to conduct critical training. The number of external pressures is increasing and the readiness impacts are growing. We need to address these issues in a more comprehensive and systematic fashion. It will be important to work with regulators, special interests, other federal agencies, and communities to more clearly define the issues from all viewpoints. We must anticipate pressures and reach acceptable, timely solutions, whenever possible. We will also need to address the issues raised by the transfer of radio frequency spectrum from DOD to the wireless communications industry. Question. If confirmed, what efforts will you take to ensure that military access to these specific, and other required resources, will be preserved? Answer. The Department's approach should be comprehensive and balanced, supporting test and training and operational requirements, while seeking to protect the natural environment and operating within a balanced regulatory framework. Modernizing instrumentation is central to efforts to make DOD ranges sustainable. Live training is expensive. Improved range instrumentation can increase the return on investment by: expanding the battle space and creating a more realistic warfare environment; providing improved learning by better feedback; and reducing the impact on the environment by substituting simulated engagements. All Services are experiencing deterioration of training range infrastructure, which will require recapitalization. I am advised that the Senior Readiness Oversight Council recently directed a broad- based effort to counter encroachment and protect the future capability of ranges to support required training and testing. The goal is to maintain fully sustainable ranges. A comprehensive approach is needed to satisfy both readiness needs and the legal and moral responsibilities as stewards of public lands. outsourcing of commercial activities Question. Over the past several years the Department of Defense has increased its reliance upon the private sector to perform certain activities including equipment maintenance and facility operations. Some have supported this effort while others have expressed concern that core activities are being jeopardized by reducing our reliance upon military personnel and civilian employees of the Federal Government. What approach would you recommend to balance maintaining military necessary capabilities and outsourcing? Answer. The size and composition of DOD's facilities to perform equipment maintenance is an important aspect of the overall readiness of the Armed Forces. The appropriate balance between government and private sector facilities must be struck in a manner that assures the equipment employed by the Armed Forces will be ready for use when needed. This balance in turn will be affected over time by the nature of the technology used in military equipment. A balance will be reviewed to assure that capabilities essential to national defense that cannot reliably be provided by the private sector will be provided by the government sector. Moreover, critical capabilities will be maintained in the government sector. counter-narcotics Question. The U.S. Government has initiated a massive assistance program to the Government of Colombia to regain control of its territory in an effort to stem the production of cocaine and other narcotics that are sent to the United States. The Department of Defense is playing a particularly significant role in this program by training and providing resources to the Colombian Armed Forces. This program, Plan Colombia, has come under criticism as expensive and misdirected and, some allege, will contribute to the abuse of human rights and lead the U.S. military into ``another Vietnam.'' What is your view with regard to Plan Colombia--its potential for success and the appropriate role of the U.S. Armed Forces? Answer. I have less than well-informed personal views which I prefer to discuss with the appropriate officials before taking a public position. combating terrorism Question. The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (sec. 901) requires the Secretary of Defense to designate an Assistant Secretary as the individual responsible for providing ``overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism.'' If confirmed, what are your plans for implementing this legislation and any other plans you have for streamlining and providing more focus on the Department's combating terrorism programs? Answer. I am aware of the Section 901 language requiring the designation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Department's combating terrorism activities. I share the committee's concerns with providing an appropriate focus for combating terrorism. If confirmed, I would hope to review the current organizational structure. I would of course inform Congress as implementing decisions are made. Question. In recent years, there have been numerous congressional proposals to establish a National Coordinator for Combating Domestic Terrorism. The proposals have ranged from establishing a position similar to the current ``Drug Czar'' to creating a Deputy Attorney General for Combating Domestic Terrorism. Would you have concerns with such an individual having budgetary and policy responsibilities over certain Department of Defense combating terrorism programs? Answer. The many activities associated with combating terrorism, domestically and internationally, need to be coordinated. Combating terrorism is a complex issue involving the expertise and statutory authorities of many departments and agencies. I would be concerned with proposals that could limit the Department's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. I would need to know more than I do now to have conclusions about such proposals and provide the committee with my appraisal. Question. Do you have any suggestions as to what type of a position, and its responsibilities, should be established to better coordinate our Nation's combating domestic terrorism efforts? Answer. I would need some time to be prepared to make a recommendation. tactical fighter programs Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize our tactical aviation forces, including the F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that these three programs will consume over $300 billion of our investment resources over the next 20 years. Some have said that we need to cancel or truncate one or more of these programs in order to afford other high priority modernization efforts, such as Army transformation, or recapitalizing the Navy's fleet. What are your views on the requirements for and timing of these three programs? Answer. The modernization of U.S. tactical fighter programs is of immense importance to the maintenance of U.S. military superiority. It is costly, and deserves a careful review. The requirements and timing of the tactical fighter programs will be a subject in the defense review. b-2 bombers Question. Do you favor restarting production of B-2 bombers? Answer. Long-range bombers are a crucial national military capability providing timely worldwide reach to American military power. As is the case with tactical fighters, the bomber modernization requirement needs to be reviewed in the forthcoming defense review. Before such a decision could be made, one would have to look at the overall cost and the impact on other programs, and how that cost would compare to fielding other weapon delivery systems, including stand-off missiles that could perform or contribute to the same or similar missions. One would also likely look at whether more B-2s would be more effective than additional upgrades and improvements to the current bomber force structure of B-2, B-1, and B-52 aircraft. v-22 program Question. Do you believe that the V-22 program should move to full rate production now, should substantial additional operational testing be conducted, or is the Department pursuing a flawed program for which another alternative should be adopted? Answer. The two recent crashes of the V-22 which have resulted in loss of life are disturbing. I have read that the Department is reviewing the program in light of these incidents. I have no conclusions at this time. strateic lift Question. One of the shortfalls most consistently identified by Commanders-in-Chief in written and oral testimony has been in the area of the required strategic lift to support the National Military Strategy. Study after study has confirmed this shortfall, yet the shortfall remains. What steps would you propose to address this deficiency? Answer. Strategic lift is a key element of U.S. military power because of our dependence on the ability to conduct expeditionary campaigns to defend U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies. Depending on the airlift requirement established, there are several options to be considered. The question of strategic lift will need to be addressed in the defense review. nato expansion Question. The United States will face a decision on the addition of new members to the NATO Alliance by the 2002 NATO summit meeting. What are your views on continued NATO expansion? Answer. As former Ambassador to NATO, I have great respect for the value of the NATO Alliance. It has been the key instrument in keeping the peace in Europe for over 50 years. The key factor in considering future NATO expansion is whether or not expansion will enhance U.S. and NATO security. I believe it is important that the broadening of NATO membership preserve the alliance's capacity for effective collective action. This suggests that new members should share the democratic values of the alliance and be prepared to make the necessary investments in the creation and maintenance of effective and interoperable military forces. It is my understanding that Allied leaders agreed to ``review'' the issue of enlargement at their next summit, to be held no later than 2002. This is an issue that will need to be addressed by the President and his national security team. review of overseas military deployments Question. In an address to the Citadel in September 1999, then- Governor Bush said that he would order an immediate review of U.S. overseas military deployments worldwide. According to the Governor, ``the problem comes with open-ended deployments and unclear military missions.'' In conducting this review, what factors will you use to determine continued U.S. military participation in on going overseas deployments? Answer. A decision to employ U.S. military forces in support of our national interests is one that should never be taken lightly. Likewise the decision to sustain, reduce, or end the commitment of U.S. forces to on-going operations must be informed by careful assessment and deliberation. If confirmed, I will assist the President and his senior advisors in reviewing these matters, preferably in a way that does not create unnecessary uncertainties and difficulties for those responsible for managing such operations. european security and defense policy Question. The European Union (EU) is working to implement its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to enable the EU to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. Secretary Cohen recently warned our European allies that NATO could become ``a relic of the past'' if ESDP is not implemented in a way that will strengthen the NATO Alliance. Members of Congress have expressed similar concerns. What are your views on the EU's ESDP? Answer. I share these concerns. A free and democratic Europe is a vital security interest for the United States. The transatlantic alliance has proven to be the most effective instrument of collective military action in history. Coming at a time of historically low levels of investment and public interest in defense matters in Europe, the ESDP could pose a resource-diversion risk to NATO, and in doing so, undermine the ability of NATO to undertake effective collective defense. The U.S. and our NATO allies need to assure that any ESDP would not diminish the effectiveness of the NATO alliance. Question. What actions do you believe the EU should take in implementing ESDP to address the concerns expressed by Secretary Cohen and others? Answer. The task is to preserve the integrity of NATO as the primary instrument of transatlantic security. It will take active U.S. leadership at both the bilateral and multilateral levels to ensure that any ESDP does not diminish the effectiveness of the NATO alliance. Question. Do you believe that ESDP is, or could be, a threat to the NATO Alliance? Answer. It could, potentially. But we need to work with our allies to make sure that it does not. international criminal court Question. The United States signed the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court on December 31, 2000, the deadline established in the Treaty. The decision to sign, despite concerns about significant flaws in the Treaty, was to put the United States in a position to influence the evolution of the Court. What are your views on the Rome Treaty? Answer. I oppose the Treaty. The Rome Statute has deficiencies that expose U.S. personnel to certain risks. We must be concerned about the exposure of U.S. personnel to politically motivated prosecution. I favor rejecting the assertion of the ICC's purported jurisdiction over non-party states. Question. The Pentagon has been very concerned that the court could claim jurisdiction over American service members and officials, even if the U.S. has not ratified the treaty. Do you share those concerns with regards to the ICC? Answer. Yes. See my comments above. national missile defense Question. President-elect Bush has stated his support for deploying a robust National Missile Defense (NMD) system ``at the earliest possible date'' to protect the United States and its allies. Will you only consider deploying the NMD system currently under development, or will you consider alternative systems and architectures for deployment? Answer. I believe it would be good to examine alternative and complementary architectures to the NMD system currently under development. In doing so, a number of factors would need to be considered, including the urgency of the ballistic missile threat to the United States, U.S. forces deployed overseas, and our friends and allies, as well as the technical feasibility, cost, and deployment schedule for potential alternatives. Question. If you consider alternatives, they are likely to take longer to develop, test, and deploy than the system currently under development, perhaps considerably longer. Are you willing to wait until after 2010 to deploy a system if its development takes that long, or will you only consider systems that can be deployed during this decade? Answer. President-elect Bush is committed to deployment of an effective NMD at the earliest possible date. This commitment is based on the need to protect the American people against long-range missile threats that can evolve rapidly and with little or no warning. I agree. However, this does not mean we will foreclose alternatives that could be deployed after 2010, particularly if they can provide increased effectiveness or would address uncertainties in the evolution of the long range missile threat Question. The Bush administration and the Clinton administration both pursued development of a limited NMD system to defend against limited attacks. Then-Governor Bush wrote in May 2000, of the need for missile defense against ``missile attacks by rogue nations or accidental launches.'' Will you pursue an NMD system designed to defend against such limited attacks, or will you pursue an NMD system designed to defend against all Russian and Chinese ballistic missile systems? Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to review the various alternatives to defend us and our allies against ballistic missile attacks by rogue nations as well as accidental or unauthorized launches. Question. The Clinton administration adopted four criteria for determining whether to deploy an NMD system: (1) the existence of a threat that warrants deployment; (2) an NMD system that is operationally effective; (3) an NMD system that is affordable and cost- effective; and (4) an assessment of the impact of deployment on our relations with other nations and on nuclear arms control and non- proliferation efforts. The overall focus of these criteria was to determine whether deployment would make the United States more or less secure. What will be your criteria for determining whether deploying an NMD system will make us more or less secure? Answer. The incoming administration has not issued a specific set of criteria. However, the President-elect has stated his support of the deployment of an NMD system as soon as possible. This is founded in a belief that an effective NMD systems will make us more secure. Question. Since you chaired the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States in 1998, have your judgments changed regarding the nature and scope of the ballistic missile threat? Answer. No. The threat to the U.S. posed by emerging ballistic missile capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than had been previously estimated. Question. The current NMD program being developed by DOD is focused on the deployment of a single ground-based site in Alaska in the 2005- 2007 timeframe. Some have advocated either substituting a sea-based NMD system for the ground-based program or adding sea-based systems as adjuncts to the ground-based system. What role do you believe sea-based systems might have in a future NMD architecture? Answer. I am aware that sea-based systems could play an important role in defending against ballistic missile threats. I further understand that the Department has prepared a classified study of the possible contributions of sea-based systems to National Missile Defense. If confirmed I will review that study and make recommendations to the President, as appropriate. theater missile defense Question. Theater ballistic missile threats exist today and are growing. There are currently five U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) systems under development for deployment against these existing and growing threats. What priority will you give to theater missile defense and how will it compare to National Missile Defense? Answer. In light of the widespread deployment of ballistic missiles today, I believe it is imperative that the Department develop, test, procure, and deploy TMD systems. Given the simultaneous emergence of the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States, it is essential that the Department give equal priority to developing and procuring an effective NMD as well. Question. Will you continue the ``family of systems'' approach of layered and complementary TMD systems currently being developed, or will you change the approach to TMD? If you would change the approach, what manner of change would you propose? Answer. It is my understanding that the concept of layered defense has been adopted because a single TMD system cannot defeat the range of theater ballistic missiles U.S. forces could face. It also provides greater confidence in the overall effectiveness of the system. I currently know of no reason to move away from the ``family-of-systems'' approach currently under development. Question. Several of DOD's theater missile defense programs are currently funding-constrained, resulting in either inefficient production rates or development delays. What sort of priority would you attach to ensuring that we develop and field TMD systems in a timely and efficient manner? Answer. Given the widespread deployment of theater-range ballistic missiles and the threat those missiles pose to deployed U.S. forces as well as our friends and allies, I would attach a high priority to the development and deployment of effective TMD systems in a timely and efficient manner. missile defense technology Question. Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns over the declining level of funding available for ballistic missile defense science and technology and follow-on technology development. Do you believe that it should be a priority to reinvigorate the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's support technology efforts? Answer. Yes. Effective ballistic missile defense relies on the application of some of the most advanced technologies available. In assessing the scope of science and technology work in this area, it is also important to look beyond the specific dedicated investments in BMDO programs. anti-ballistic missile (abm) treaty Question. Then-Governor Bush stated in September 1999, that his administration would ``offer Russia the necessary amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty'' to make possible the deployment of a U.S. NMD system. ``If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the Treaty, that we can no longer be a party to it.'' What amendments to the ABM Treaty would you propose to the Russians? Answer. The issue of how to handle the ABM Treaty will be part of the overall review of NMD to be directed by the President. Question. The ABM Treaty gives each party the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.'' If the U.S. makes a unilateral decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy an NMD system, what possible negative consequences do you foresee from the reaction of our allies, from Russia, or from China? Answer. I am aware that concerns have been expressed by some of our allies about NMD and the prospect of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I believe these concerns can be addressed through close consultations. In the longer run, I believe that deployment of an effective NMD system can strengthen U.S. and allied security. For example, the failure to deploy appropriate defensive systems could also have adverse effects, including:Paralyzing our ability to act in a crisis or deterring other countries from assisting us; Providing incentives to U.S. friends and allies to develop nuclear capabilities; Putting the U.S. in a position where its only option may be preemption; and Moving the U.S. to a more isolationist position because of an inability to defend against ballistic missiles. To date, the Russians have rejected amendments to the treaty to permit deployment of any U.S. NMD system, and have raised the possibility of withdrawing from existing arms control regimes and on- going efforts to reduce strategic offensive arms. The task is to persuade the world of the truth that deployment of a NMD system will strengthen global security and stability. As President-elect Bush has stated, ``America's development of missile defenses is a search for security, not a search for advantage.'' Question. Could these consequences, possibly including Russia ending its nuclear weapon reductions, have the effect of reducing our security or increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation? Answer. I don't believe that is the case. These are issues the President-elect and his senior officials will need to address. nuclear force levels and posture Question. Then-Governor Bush wrote in May 2000 of the need for a new approach to nuclear security, saying that ``the premises of Cold War targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal.'' Concerning the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, Governor Bush wrote that he would ``pursue the lowest possible number consistent with our national security.'' He also stated that, ``It should be possible to reduce the number of American nuclear warheads significantly beyond what has already been agreed to under START II, without compromising our security in any way.'' Under what circumstances do you believe it would be possible to achieve such reductions? Answer. President-elect Bush has stated that he will direct his Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the nuclear force posture and determine how best to meet U.S. security needs. At the same time, he has stated he will pursue the lowest possible number of weapons consistent with our national security. I prefer to wait until that review is completed before speculating on the circumstances under which reductions might be advisable. Question. Do you believe we should pursue such reductions through negotiated agreement with Russia (and possibly other nations)? Answer. The President's advisers plan to undertake a review of how best to pursue President-elect Bush's goal of further reductions. Logically, this could involve traditional arms control tools, innovative unilateral initiatives, or some combination. In any case, an approach to any nuclear reductions would need to be developed in the context of a number of interrelated factors. These include decisions on the ABM Treaty and National Missile Defense, as well as measures relating to tactical nuclear weapons, the evolution in Russia's unilateral strategic force posture, and the outcome of the planned Nuclear Posture Review. Question. Governor Bush also wrote that ``the United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status,'' because ``keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.'' Do you intend to carry out an assessment of ``what we can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces?'' Answer. This is one of the questions that would be considered as part of the nuclear posture review. u.s.-north korean nuclear agreed framework Question. The United States and North Korea signed an agreement in 1994 that calls for North Korea to end and dismantle its plutonium production capacity, and for the United States to lead a coalition with South Korea and Japan to provide North Korea with proliferation- resistant light water reactors if it complies with each step of the agreement. To date, both sides have complied with the Agreed Framework, which has prevented North Korea from producing enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons. Assuming both sides continue to comply with its terms, do you believe this Agreed Framework serves our national security interests? Answer. It is in U.S. interest to ensure that the North Korean nuclear weapons program is terminated. I assume that the new administration will pursue that objective through means it deems most effective. Those precise means would likely be determined following a review of U.S. policy towards North Korea and U.S. nonproliferation policies. comprehensive test ban treaty (ctbt) and nuclear testing Question. You have expressed opposition to a permanent, zero-yield CTBT. If U.S. ratification were conditioned on a robust Stockpile Stewardship Program; a firm commitment to preserve the option to test a nuclear weapon (by withdrawing from the treaty) if necessary to fix a critical problem with the stockpile; and there were a review of the treaty after 10 years, would that address some of your concerns about the treaty? Answer. I am not convinced that that approach would adequately protect U.S. national security. The President-elect has opposed CTBT, but has stated that he would continue the current testing moratorium. That being said, I believe the new administration is likely to undertake a review of this matter. Question. Do you agree that we should maintain our current moratorium on nuclear testing? Answer. The President-elect has stated that he will continue the current moratorium on nuclear testing. The President will review annually the size, composition, and status of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This will include a detailed assessment of the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the weapons in the stockpile. Developments in this area need to be monitored closely. Question. Do you believe that a CTBT would make it more difficult for such nations to develop and stockpile advanced thermonuclear nuclear weapons? Answer. Not necessarily. History teaches that nations that are determined to cheat do so and I do not see how the CTBT can be effectively verified. Question. As Secretary of Defense, what measures do you believe must be taken to ensure that the U.S. stockpile is reliable and safe? Answer. I am not an expert, but one point is important. The U.S. cannot afford to lose too many of its key design and manufacturing personnel who have had senior-level experience in the nuclear weapons program when testing was undertaken. The DOD will work closely with the new Secretary of Energy and the Director of the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure a safe, effective, and reliable U.S. nuclear stockpile and complex. cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program Question. The U.S. Defense Department has a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar that is designed to reduce the threat of insecure nuclear stockpiles and excess weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Do you agree that this Cooperative Threat Reduction program serves U.S. national security interests by reducing the threat from former Soviet weapons of mass destruction? Answer. Certainly, the elimination of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that the CTR program has funded has benefited U.S. national security. But, we need to be aware of the fact that Russia, in particular, claims to lack the financial resources to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, but continues to invest scarce resources in the development of newer, more sophisticated ICBMs and other weapons. We would not want the U.S. investment in the CTR program to become the means by which Russia frees up resources to finance its military modernization programs. A review of ongoing CTR projects and their respective national security benefits would be appropriate. Question. Are you concerned about continuing this $1 billion program at the same time that Russia is increasing its military spending and arms exports? Answer. Yes. See answer above. space policy Question. You have recently served as chairman of a commission to examine U.S. space policy. Do you believe that protecting our space assets requires the United States to develop and deploy offensive means of disabling or destroying other nations' space assets, either from the ground or from space? Answer. The United States is increasingly dependent on its civil, commercial, and defense and intelligence space assets. With that dependence comes vulnerability to hostile acts. The Nation needs a capability to deter attack on space assets, and systems to defend satellites in orbit, the ground stations that control them, and the electronic links between them. Question. If the United States were to develop and deploy offensive means of disabling or destroying foreign satellites, do you believe it could lead other nations to acquire such means to threaten U.S. space systems? If so, do you believe that would be contrary to our security interests? Answer. The U.S. and other nations that make use of space face real threats to the operation of their satellites. We know that other nations have jammed telecommunications from on-orbit satellites, that Russian entities market devices that can jam GPS signals, and that foreign satellite manufacturers market so-called ``micro satellites'' to other foreign countries that can be used for offensive actions against satellites. In light of U.S. dependence on space assets, the vulnerability of the assets to attack or disruption and the fact that others have the means of doing harm to U.S. interests in space, it would be contrary to U.S. security interests not to develop, test, and deploy the means of deterring attack on and defending space systems. Question. In light of this experience, what types of management and organizational changes do you believe are needed in DOD to improve space management? Answer. If confirmed, I will give careful attention to the recommendations of the several recent studies and commissions on space systems and other matters. There are three areas of particular interest. First is the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, who together have the greatest responsibility for the operation of national security space systems. Second, is to assess whether the existing organizational structure is adequate for developing space policy, working with the military commanders in chief (CINCs), and overseeing the development and acquisition of capabilities by the Services. Third, is to assess whether changes are necessary within the Air Force so as to facilitate more efficient acquisition and operation of space systems and to create a dedicated cadre of space professionals. Question. The Department of Defense is currently reevaluating the military requirement for a space-based infrared system to support ballistic missile defense. Do you believe that the SBIRS-Low Program is a necessary element in an overall space and missile defense architecture? Answer. I am informed that a number of DOD reviews have concluded that a SBIRS Low capability is a necessary element of an effective missile defense architecture. space programs Question. The Department of Defense has sought to establish a space-based radar program for surveillance and moving target tracking. How do you rank such a program in terms of the various new technologies being developed by the DOD? Answer. We use space extensively today to support military operations. A radar in space to provide tracking of moving targets is an attractive concept. Demonstrating the feasibility of that concept is important. I understand there are concerns about the cost associated with space demonstration projects. However, without such demonstrations it is not possible to know if those systems will help to transform our military and provide the means for deterring adversaries and defending the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies. the balkans Question. U.S. troops are deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo as part of NATO-led peacekeeping forces. Do you support the continued participation of U.S. forces in the NATO-led peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo? Answer. President-elect Bush has indicated that a review will be conducted of U.S. peacekeeping deployments. His national security team will participate in this review. In the meantime, the deployed forces have an important job to do and should not be distracted by the fact of a new administration. Question. If so, under what circumstances and for what timeframe? Answer. See previous response. Question. Do you believe that our European allies should eventually assume full responsibility for these missions? Answer. See previous response. iraq Question. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the United States has been working to ensure Iraqi compliance with the obligations Iraq accepted at the end of the war--particularly those obligations related to disarmament. Unfortunately, since 1991 we have witnessed the fragmentation of the coalition that liberated Kuwait; the end of UN weapons inspections in Iraq; disagreement in the UN Security Council on how to proceed; and the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iraq by many nations in the Gulf region. At the same time, the United States continues to deploy thousands of troops to the Gulf region and spends approximately $1 billion per year for military operations to contain Iraq. What are your views on the current U.S. policy toward Iraq? Answer. See response below. Question. Are you concerned about the weakening in support for United Nations economic sanctions? Answer. See response below. Question. Do you believe that the benefits relating to enforcement of the no-fly zones justify the risk to U.S. and British airmen? Answer. See response below. Question. What additional or different steps, if any, do you believe the United States and its allies should take to ensure that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the means of their delivery are permanently ended? Answer. Saddam Hussein it still in power. The UN weapons inspection program established to ensure Iraqi fulfillment of its commitment to destroy all of its WMD programs has been suspended for more than 2 years. Baghdad continues to pose a military threat to its neighbors as well as its own people, and Iraqi planes continue to challenge U.S. pilots enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones. In addition, political support for Iraq's position seems to be solidifying among some Arab states, the economic embargo seems to be collapsing, and the coalition that successfully prosecuted the war with Iraq seems to be coming undone. The United States continues to maintain a presence in the region to deter Iraqi aggression, and daily no-fly zone patrols expose U.S. pilots to continuous risk. If confirmed, I will work closely with the national security team to help craft a policy that is effective and merits the support of Congress and the American people. iraqi opposition Question. There is a continuing debate about the implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides authority to provide up to $97 million worth of defense articles and services to support the Iraqi opposition. What is your view as to how the Iraq Liberation Act should be implemented? Answer. In the past I have favored it. However, this is an issue that the President-elect and his new administration's national security team will need to address. The Iraq Liberation Act established a policy of regime-change for Iraq and provides the authority for the Department of Defense to draw down $97 million worth of goods and services to support the efforts of the Iraqi opposition to bring about a change in the regime. I understand that the Department of Defense to date has utilized this authority only sparingly, primarily with the provision of training and other forms of non-lethal assistance aimed at improving the opposition's effectiveness as a political force. Helping the Iraqi opposition become a more credible alternative voice for the Iraqi people is useful, but may not, in itself, bring about a regime change in Baghdad. It could, however, make a useful contribution toward achieving that aim. north korea Question. Please outline your views with regard to the situation on the Korean peninsula, in particular the talks between North and South Korea and ongoing missile proliferation talks between the U.S. and North Korea. Answer. This is a matter the new administration will need to address. My personal impression, which is not well-informed, is that the on-going political discussions between North and South Korea are encouraging. The summit meeting between the Presidents of North and South Korea was a dramatic development. Obviously, tensions on the Peninsula cannot be reduced unless the two principal parties involved are committed to that effort. For over 2 years, the Clinton administration has sought to convince the North Koreans to limit their missile and missile export programs. In September 1999 the DPRK stated that it would refrain from testing long-range ballistic missiles (No Dong or greater) while talks to improve U.S.-DPRK relations were underway. That decision could be reversed at any time. At the same time, I believe that North Korean missile exports have continued apace. Question. In light of developments on the peninsula, what are your views on U.S. troop levels in South Korea? Answer. Neither the North Korean military threat nor its forces and posture along the DMZ have changed. Thus, although the in-coming administration will undertake a review of our overall military deployments, I have seen nothing thus far that persuades me that a change in U.S. troop levels in South Korea should be considered. russia and iran Question. In early December Secretary Cohen met with Russian defense minister Igor Sergeyev to discuss U.S. concern over Moscow's continued arms sales and proliferation activities with Iran. While this meeting and subsequent State Department meetings later in December were considered upbeat, the United States did not receive concrete assurances from Russia that these activities would cease. As Secretary of Defense, what policy options would you propose to President-elect Bush to address and minimize the continued proliferation activities of Russia with Iran? Answer. This is a matter for the President-elect and his national security team. However I would recommend to the President that senior officials of the new administration who meet with Russian counterparts bring up the serious U.S. concern on proliferation activities that strengthen Iran militarily. We must remind Russian policy makers that they are dealing with a new administration and they have the opportunity to start the relationship in a productive direction if they take concrete steps to address our concerns in this area. vieques Question. Last fall, Congress enacted legislation that essentially followed the agreement reached between President Clinton and the outgoing Governor of Puerto Rico, in particular by calling for a referendum to decide on whether training will continue there. That referendum is currently scheduled for November 2001, but recent comments by the incoming Governor of Puerto Rico suggest that she may attempt to reopen this deal. Do you believe there is a requirement to continue live fire training at Vieques? Answer. While simulation and non-live fire training certainly have value and are integral to the Navy and Marine Corps basic training programs, they do not provide an adequate substitute for live-fire training. Live-fire training contains an element of realism that is absent from simulators and non-live fire training. If U.S. forces cannot train under this realism, Sailors and Marines, when placed in a combat situation, will not only face the certain chaos that comes with combat but also the uncertainty which comes from handling and expending live ordnance for the first time in a highly complex, time synchronized combat operation. Failing to provide for adequate live-fire training prior to combat will place our Nation in the position of risking needless casualties through unpreparedness. Question. Do you agree with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps that Vieques is essential to the readiness of East Coast naval forces? Answer. I am advised that Vieques is a superior site for rehearsing amphibious operations, the only site currently used for aerial mine warfare training, and is the only location currently available on the east coast where aircraft, naval surface ships, and ground forces can employ combined arms training with live ammunition under realistic conditions. It is the only range currently available on the east coast that allows sailors and marines to conduct naval gunfire training. So it is a very important site. Question. Do you intend to look for alternative sites? Answer. I understand that to date no alternative sites, providing the ability to conduct combined arms training with live ammunition under realistic conditions, have been located. Question. Do you believe the existing agreement should be adhered to, or is there some alternative solution you believe would be more agreeable to all the parties involved that you intend to propose? Answer. I have not had an opportunity to study it. base closure Question. Secretary Cohen requested two additional rounds of base closures in each of his budget proposals to Congress, but so far Congress has not agreed to authorize any additional base closures. Do you believe we still have excess military infrastructure that can and should be reduced? Answer. See response below. Question. Do you believe it is in the best interest of the Defense Department to authorize additional military base closures and realignments and that such closures and realignments could better align our military base structure to meet the requirements of the new century and free up resources for higher priority military needs, while still protecting key training areas for which we have enduring requirements? Answer. See response below. Question. Should any future base closures follow the same basic procedures as the past four rounds? Answer. I will withhold an assessment of this issue until after the completion of the defense review. crisis in the military Question. Recent articles and op-eds by James Schlesinger and Harold Brown forecast that one of the first ``nightmares'' the new president will inherit is the threat of a ``defense train wreck'' looming in the next 5 to 10 years as the result of a decade of massive under-funding of the true costs of maintaining the current size and structure of the U.S. military. What are your views regarding these assessments of the future of our Armed Forces? Answer. Given President-elect Bush's commitment to rebuilding and reforming the U.S. military, and the commitment of many members of Congress, I believe we can ensure a strong future for U.S. Armed Forces. We do face major funding and technological challenges. Overcoming these challenges is necessarily a multi-year undertaking. The American people clearly support keeping our Nation secure, and our economy certainly makes that affordable. I believe my predecessors, Jim Schlesinger and Harold Brown, are correct in noting that many years of carefully targeted investment will be needed to guarantee the future superiority of those forces. recruiting and retention Question. The Armed Forces are experiencing significant problems in retaining company- and field-grade officers (O-3, O-4) who would, if retained, be contenders for intermediate service schools and command. The Armed Forces are experiencing similar problems in retaining mid- grade noncommissioned officers (E-5, E-6). These personnel are the backbone of the enlisted force, both as workers and as trainers and role models for younger enlisted personnel. In your view what are the primary factors associated with this attrition? Answer. See response below. Question. What would you propose to mitigate this attrition? Answer. It is my understanding that a number of factors have contributed to recruiting and retention challenges. A robust domestic economy has made it more difficult for recruiters to compete with the private sector job market; a heavy operations tempo has placed significant burdens on family life; and perceptions about a changing mission for the military have all contributed to stresses on military recruiting and retention efforts. President-elect Bush has spoken often about this issue during the campaign. As he stated, ``the military should be a magnet for the best and brightest in America.'' I share this view. We will examine a range of measures to try to make this goal a reality, including an increase in military pay, improved military housing, and a review of overseas deployments. force structure Question. Force structure has been reduced about 35 percent since 1989. Evidence, both anecdotal and analytical, increasingly indicates that the force structure of the Armed Forces may not be adequate to carry out the national security strategy of the United States including the current range of contingency operations. If this is so, the alternatives would seem to be a less ambitious strategy, a bolstering of force structure, or some combination of those alternatives. In your opinion, is the existing force structure of the Armed Forces adequate? Answer. See response below. Question. If not, what measures would you recommend, if confirmed, to deal with the problem? Answer. U.S. forces are stretched thin. This committee has heard testimony from the service chiefs to that effect. In accordance with law, the incoming administration will work to develop a national security strategy within 150 days after inauguration. That is a very short period. Also in accordance with law, the Department of Defense will review the overall defense strategy and produce a report to Congress in the fall. If confirmed, I expect to be fully engaged in those efforts. Once we have a new national security strategy, and we have had the opportunity to review our defense strategy, we can make decisions about the appropriate size and nature of the force. homosexual conduct policy Question. The current Department of Defense Homosexual Conduct Policy went into effect in February 1994 after months of congressional hearings and debate resulting in the enactment of a Federal statute. Although there have been some changes in how this policy has been implemented, the basic policy has not been changed. Do you believe that the current policy is effective? If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the basic policy or its implementation? If so, what changes will you propose? Answer. I am not yet knowledgeable as to how the current policy is working. Consistent with what President-elect Bush said during the campaign, and if confirmed, I have no plans to recommend changes either to current law or policy. gender integrated training Question. Basic training for new recruits is structured and defined differently by each Service. Men training for direct ground combat positions in the Army and Marine Corps train in all-male units. Men and women training to serve in positions that are open to women in the Army, Navy, and Air Force train in gender-integrated units. Men and women in the Marine Corps are segregated at boot camp, then integrated during subsequent training. Do you believe the current DOD policy of allowing each of the Services to establish its own policy for gender integration in Basic Training is effective? If confirmed, will you propose changes to the DOD or Service policies? If so, what changes will you propose? Answer. Basic training should have one purpose: to transform the recruit from civilian into a disciplined, physically fit soldier, sailor, airmen/women, and marine. If and when that goal is not being met, then changes should be made. Each service has the responsibility to design and implement the system of basic training that best accomplishes the goal for that service, and it should do just that. At present the services have varying policies with regard to gender integration in basic training. I do not have sufficient information as yet to comment further. army corps of engineers Question. The Army Inspector General recently released a report criticizing the Army Corps of Engineers for ``institutional bias'' and ``an atmosphere where objectivity in its analyses [has been] placed in jeopardy.'' Do you agree that the Army Corps of Engineers should institute a system of independent peer review of studies supporting major projects by experts from outside the agency before such projects are approved? Why or why not? Answer. I am not aware of this matter. I am advised that the Secretary of the Army and the new Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers recently developed working arrangements aimed at ensuring open lines of communication, necessary oversight, and, at the same time, the application of independent technical judgment by the Corps. Additionally, the Chief of the Corps has been directed to respond to the Army Inspector General's findings regarding the objectivity of its analyses and bring forward improvements aimed at ensuring sound, unbiased decision making. Those responses will have to be reviewed before making any recommendations. u.s.s. cole investigations Question. When Secretary Cohen took office, one of his first actions was to review the multiple Defense Department and Air Force inquiries into the terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. These investigations were initiated under his predecessor, then-Secretary William Perry. The attack on Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, killed 19 military personnel and left hundreds injured. Following his review, Secretary Cohen directed actions that were opposed by many in the Air Force and that resulted in the voluntary retirement of the then-Air Force Chief of Staff. You will begin your term as Defense Secretary under strikingly similar circumstances. Several investigations into the October 12, 2000, bombing of the U.S.S. Cole are being concluded. Will you make one of your first priorities in office to review the findings of the multiple Defense Department and Navy investigations into the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole? Answer. Yes. Question. Will you transmit to the President and to Congress your assessment of the findings and recommendations of the U.S.S. Cole- related investigations as soon as possible? Answer. I will transit any findings and recommendations that may result from the investigations. Question. If you find that the investigation initiated by your predecessor or the Navy were deficient in any areas, will you direct additional inquiries? Answer. It is important that the findings of the current investigations be reviewed without prejudgment. modernization Question. For the last several years, the Department of Defense modernization budget has fallen short of critical requirements identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the military services while the operational tempo of our forces is extremely high. As a result, near term readiness requirements have often been met at the expense of the long-term readiness, or modernization arena. We recognize that President-elect Bush has called for an overall review of military modernization programs and that this will be an area of great interest to you as the Secretary of Defense. How will you establish this modernization review process, what will be considered, and how will you incorporate the conclusions of this process into Department of Defense modernization budget requests? Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake congressionally-mandated review of the U.S. national security strategy and examine the modernization plans to carry it out in the conduct of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Considering which weapons to modernize and which to replace with new technology should be a major part of the QDR process. exports of sensitive technologies Question. In his October 1999 speech on high tech issues, then- Governor Bush stated that, as President, he would safeguard sensitive high technology exports, while letting Americans sell what is already widely available elsewhere. He stated that wherever there is no security interest at stake, exports would be permitted. Wherever security is truly at stake, exports would be barred, with serious penalties for violations. Governor Bush stated further that his administration would work to renew the cooperation of U.S. allies in this effort. As Secretary of Defense, what policies and procedures would you consider changing to reflect these criteria as the basis for determining the exports of sensitive high technology? Answer. Exports of sensitive high technology affect U.S. national security interests in many ways. First, we must protect our military personnel and our security interests by ensuring that sensitive technologies are not exported to potential adversaries or to foreign entities that represent a significant diversion risk. Second, we must have sensible and effective policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate transfers of military and commercial systems and technologies that support our coalition warfighting objectives through greater interoperability with our allies and friends are permitted. Finally, we must be mindful that the U.S. is not the only country with advanced military and commercial technology. Thus, we need to work aggressively with our allies and friends to ensure that our policies and approaches toward the export of such technologies meet our mutual security interests. The Department of Defense has an essential role to play in implementing these principles, and I will ensure that appropriate resources and senior level attention are devoted to this area. information security Question. Information superiority is widely recognized as an enabler of U.S. military superiority, and information security is a key to achieving information superiority. How do you plan on ensuring the security and integrity of the defense information infrastructure in the face of ever-expanding cyber threats? Answer. Information security poses important challenges and opportunities for Defense. We must prevent unauthorized access to information and information systems. We must work with other government organizations--the FBI, Department of Justice, and the Intelligence Community--in a collaborative environment to anticipate and counter such threats. I will ensure that the department devotes considerable time and attention to information security and information superiority. intelligence Question. What would be your top intelligence priority if you are confirmed as Secretary of Defense? Answer. We are in a new national security environment. Characteristics of this new environment include: - A relaxed attitude with the end of the Cold War. - The proliferation of powerful weapons and technologies throughout the world. - As a result of the Gulf War, a set of threats less likely to be deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation. - Considerably more complex intelligence challenges given the larger number of targets, and the proliferation of deception and denial capabilities. - Increasing dependence on space assets and therefore increased vulnerability. The intelligence community, just as the Department of Defense, needs to be rearranged to deal with the new security environment. The national command authorities need information more than simply numbers of things--ships, missiles, tanks, and planes--they need better information on intentions and motives as well. Certainly the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them pose a threat to the security of the United States, its allies, and friends. We must ensure that we are devoting the appropriate resources to identify these newer threats, including cyber attack. Question. What organizational and management changes do you believe are necessary in the Department of Defense to ensure that the best possible intelligence support is provided to the warfighter? Answer. This is an area that I intend to review if confirmed. Most important is senior level leadership, and a close working relationship between the SECDEF and the DCI is critical to the challenges ahead. Question. What specific actions would you pursue to ensure that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are able to cooperate and coordinate on national and military intelligence matters? Answer. One of the highest priorities should be to establish a real partnership with the DCI to ensure cooperation and coordination on intelligence matters. Reform of the Intelligence Community will require close collaboration. science and technology Question. The Department of Defense Science and Technology program is at a 20-year low. The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1999 established the goal of increasing the budget for the defense science and technology program by at least 2 percent over inflation for each of the fiscal years 2000 to 2008. This goal has not been met in the fiscal year 2000 nor the fiscal year 2001 budget request. Do you believe that a substantial increase in science and technology funding is needed? Answer. Determining a sufficient level of science and technology (S&T) investment is not a precise science. A downsized military needs a technological edge more now than ever. President-elect Bush has committed to increasing defense R&D by at least $20 billion between fiscal year 2002-2006. The S&T accounts should receive a substantial share of this increase. major challenges Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Secretary of Defense? Answer. The new administration will need to consider all of these aspects in evaluating the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The goal is to assure that our country has the new capabilities necessary to deter and defend in our new national security environment so we are able to contribute to the peace and stability. This will entail transforming U.S. military forces to a 21st century force, modernizing the intelligence and command, control and communications infrastructure, and reforming DOD structures, processes, and organizations. Further, the new capabilities and readiness must be sustainable. Balancing limited resources--even in an atmosphere of projected budget surpluses--is always a challenge. Properly outfitting our forces today, while at the same time ensuring we sustain robust modernization for the future, will be a key challenge for the new administration. Specific issues--such as morale, recruiting and retention, health care and benefits--will also be important. Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? Answer. These issues and others should be components of the upcoming defense review and Quadrennial Defense Review. Through those reviews, the new administration can examine priorities and weigh the fiscal implications associated with those priorities. most serious problems Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Secretary of Defense? Answer. Institutional resistance to change across the board-- executive branch, legislative branch, the private sector, as well as our allies. Change is difficult for institutions, but change we must. Question. What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? Answer. It is too soon to establish time lines. If confirmed I would need to know a lot more than I do now to respond. It will require close consultation with Congress and this committee. congressional oversight Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress? Answer. Yes. I consider that to be one of the most important parts of the job. Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of Defense? Answer. Yes. Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? Answer. Yes. ______ [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy 1. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, while the F-18E/F has significantly modernized our carrier aircraft fleet, many Navy and Marine Corps aircraft still need to be modernized. The AV-8B Harrier and EA-6B Prowler are some of the oldest aircraft in our inventory. Do you see the Joint Strike Fighter as a possible solution to these aircraft modernization needs? Secretary Rumsfeld. The Joint Strike Fighter, along with other tactical aircraft programs, will be assessed as part of the planned review of defense policy and programs. 2a. Senator Kennedy. The risk in being ready to fight the first war is ``moderate'' and that of the second is ``high.'' As the Department of Defense prepares to conduct the next Quadrennial Defense Review, will you consider alternative strategies to the two war scenario as you prepare to conduct the next review? Secretary Rumsfeld. I anticipate that a wide range of strategy options will be considered as part of the upcoming QDR. 2b. Senator Kennedy. If the two war scenario continues to be our strategy, how can we reduce the risk of each? President-elect Bush has said that he wants to increase defense spending by $20 billion. How much of this amount will be dedicated to non-national missile defense related research and development programs? Secretary Rumsfeld. No decision has been made on the appropriate level of resources for defense or how any additional funds would be distributed. 3a. Senator Kennedy. The Defense Science Board released ``The Technology Capabilities of Non-DOD Providers'' report in June 2000. In this report the Board recommends substantially increasing the defense science and technology base and, in particular, a 30 percent increase in defense basic research over 3 years. The concern over the eroding defense science and technology program was addressed by Congress in the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, which stated it should be an objective of the Secretary of Defense to increase the budget for the science and technology program by at least 2 percent a year over inflation each year through 2008. How do you propose to address this urgent national priority? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the defense science and technology program needs to be strengthened. However, until I have had an opportunity to review the program in detail, I am not in a position to comment on the appropriate funding level for the program. 3b. Senator Kennedy. Many believe that stability will never be restored in the Balkans as long as indicted war criminals remain at large. Do you believe that the military should be involved in the arrest of war criminals? Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to review the recent history and discuss this with my associates in the new administration before commenting. 4a. Senator Kennedy. For years now, Iraq has refused to accept an independent monitoring team to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not rebuilding his arsenal of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the economic and diplomat sanctions placed on his regime have been weakened by our allies in the region and in Europe. Some nations are even setting up offices in Iraq, in hopes of contracting Iraqi oil fields in the future in anticipation of these weakened sanctions collapsing. Regarding Iraq and Hussein, the President-elect's choice to be Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has said, ``I think it is possible to re-energize those sanctions and to continue to contain him and then confront him, should that become necessary again.'' Under what circumstances could you envision such a confrontation? Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. policy towards Iraq will no doubt be the subject of review by the new national security team. If confirmed, I will look forward to participating in that review. That being said, it is important to keep in mind that Saddam Hussein has miscalculated before and therefore any confrontation that takes place might be as a result of his actions. 4b. Senator Kennedy. What do you think sanctions on Iraq should accomplish? Are they accomplishing this goal? Are we targeting the right behavior? Are the objectives of halting chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons production attainable in your view? Secretary Rumsfeld. Because of the erosion of the sanctions regime, it is reasonable to assume that weapons of mass destruction and missile programs are continuing in Iraq. How best to deal with the threat posed by Saddam will be the subject of review by the new administration. 5. Senator Kennedy. In September 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order severing all U.S. military ties with Indonesia following the violence perpetrated against the East Timorese people in the aftermath of their vote for independence. Will you support a continuation of the current military cut-off? What signs or indications within the Indonesian military and government will you be watching for before you consider re-establishing full military relations? Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I am aware of the general state of U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relations, I have not had an opportunity to review this matter in detail. If confirmed, I will undertake to review those relations. 6. Senator Kennedy. There have been substantial changes in the role of women in our Nation's Armed Forces in the years since you were Secretary of Defense. Women now serve in a wide range of military occupations and there are more women generals and admirals than ever before. Women serve on combat ships and fly combat aircraft; women and men train together in all services at advanced levels--and in three of the services at the basic training level. What is your view of the role of women in today's military? Specifically, do you have any objection to the ways in which women and men train together today, or to opening any particular military occupational specialties to women? Secretary Rumsfeld. As I stated in answer to one of the committee's questions, basic training should have one purpose: to transform the recruit from civilian into a disciplined, physically fit soldier, sailor, airman/woman, or marine. If and when that goal is not being met, then changes should be made. Each service has the responsibility to design and implement the system of basic and other training that best accomplishes the goal for that service. At present the services have varying policies with regard to gender integration in basic training. I do not have sufficient information as yet to comment further. 7. Senator Kennedy. The Pentagon Inspector General conducted a survey of 75,000 service members last year and found that 80 percent reported hearing, witnessing, or experiencing anti-gay harassment. Based on those findings, Secretary of Defense Cohen asked a Department working group to review the current rules and training to prevent such harassment. The working group produced a 13-point action plan for a new regulations by the Department on this issue. Will you ensure that these new regulations are fully implemented and enforced? Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not had an opportunity to review the current rules or the working group's findings and recommendations. 8. Senator Kennedy. The lack of good housing for our service members and their families is an area where I think we really need improvement. At Hanscom AFB, there is currently a 6-month wait for on- base housing. The number of families on this list today stands at 106. I venture that the wait is similar at bases across the country. What can be done to limit or eliminate this wait? How can we ease the burden on a service member and his or her family when they've been assigned to a new base, but have to find short-term living arrangements while waiting for affordable base housing? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that military housing can and should be improved. Substandard housing and long delays undermine morale and ultimately affect job performance. If the Department can effectively tap into the prodigious resources and methodologies of the private sector to improve this situation, then we should do so. If confirmed, improving the quality and availability of military housing will be a priority. 9. Senator Kennedy. You noted in your answers to the advance policy questions that, ``(t)he Department's approach should be comprehensive and balanced, supporting test and training and operational requirements, while seeking to protect the natural environment and operating within a balanced regulatory framework'' and that ``(t)he goal is to maintain fully sustainable ranges.'' Last week, three of my colleagues on this committee and I wrote to Secretary Cohen urging that he consider establishing a Defense Environmental Restoration Account to begin to deal with the large amount of unexploded ordnance left at many of our military facilities. Would you please take a look at this idea? The more quickly the Department can get a handle on this issue, the more sustainable training will be at many military bases. Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will task a review of this suggestion and report back on the results. 10. Senator Kennedy. Several years ago, President Clinton, the Joint Chiefs, and Congress agreed that the United States would search aggressively for alternatives to land mines, and that if suitable alternatives are fielded the United States will join the Ottawa Convention. The Pentagon has made progress, but more needs to be done. Later this year we will also have the benefit of recommendations on mine alternatives by the Los Alamos/Livermore Laboratories and the National Academy of Sciences. There is bipartisan support in Congress for the United States to join our NATO allies and others, and set an example to rid the world of land mines. We also want to ensure the safety of our Armed Forces, which includes improving their counter-mine capabilities. Will you, as Secretary of Defense, strongly support the effort to field alternatives to land mines, so we can join the Ottawa Convention? Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not familiar with the obligations imposed under the Ottawa Convention and have not yet been briefed on the efforts to develop alternatives to land mines. If confirmed, I will review this issue, keeping foremost in mind the need to protect American servicemen and women. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd 11. Senator Byrd. I am very concerned about the threat of homeland terrorism. I believe that Senator Levin mentioned in his opening remarks how easy it would be for a terrorist to poison our public water systems. As best I can tell, all it would take is a single vial of some type of chemical or biological agent and you could wipe out the water supply for an entire city. Frankly, I believe that this threat is a more likely scenario under current world circumstances than that of the conventional ballistic missile threat posed by rogue nations. Do you believe that the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, as well as the threat posed by simple suitcase or truck bombs, deserve the same emphasis as a national missile defense system? Secretary Rumsfeld. Defending the American people against all types of unconventional or terrorist attacks must be a top priority of the new administration. If confirmed, I will devote time and attention to strategies and programs that can address this growing threat. In addition, because of the sometimes overlapping or conflicting obligations of the various federal and state governmental departments and agencies, inter-agency coordination is important. If confirmed, I will do my best to ensure proper coordination is achieved. 12. Senator Byrd. Turning to terrorism overseas--a Pentagon Commission reviewing the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole released its report earlier this week. The Commission determined that the military lacks coordination with other government agencies to fight terrorist threats. It recommended that training against terrorism be made as high a priority as training for combat. Do you agree with that conclusion? Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will review the Crouch-Gehman report carefully, along with the other reports commissioned on aspects of the U.S.S. Cole terrorist incident. That being said, I agree that realistic training against a wide range of terrorist and other threats, including operating in a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological environment, is imperative. 13. Senator Byrd. I understand that there was a good deal of discussion about Colombia at the morning session of this hearing. I commend Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for recommending that this committee get more involved in future decisions surrounding our involvement in Colombia. This is a dangerous mission, and I am deeply concerned that the United States should not be drawn into Colombia's civil war. As you and I discussed earlier, it was my proposal that capped the number of military and civilian personnel who could be involved in Plan Colombia in country. The reason that I proposed these caps was to ensure that mission creep would not inflate the number of American citizens in Colombia on what is a potentially deadly mission. Mr. Secretary, you've seen the results of American troops being drawn into civil conflicts overseas with no exit strategy. I understand that you want to wait until you can have a full briefing on the situation in Colombia before recommending a specific course of future action. However, this is not the first time that the U.S. has run up against the possibility of being drawn into another nation's civil war. How do we guard against that happening with this mission? Will you re- evaluate our presence in Colombia? Secretary Rumsfeld. As I stated during the hearing, I am not sufficiently informed about the situation in Colombia. I understand the nature of your concern, however, and if confirmed will review the U.S. military involvement carefully. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Max Cleland 14a. Senator Cleland. As you may know, language was included in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization bill directing the Secretary of Defense to submit a report no later than February 2000 describing the airlift requirements necessary to carry out the various missions of our Armed Forces. It is my understanding that this report is finally complete and is awaiting release by the Secretary of Defense. Preliminary information contained in this report outlines our current mobility challenges. Our current requirement is 49.7 million ton miles. The Mobility Requirements Study estimates that the requirement may rise to around 54.4 million ton miles. This indicates we are woefully short on meeting the future requirements. With the move away from more forward-deployed forces, airlift and air mobility will continue to be the key ingredient in our responding to future military missions and crises. However, there is uncertainty on how best to address this challenge. Certainly, the C-130J is integral in our rapid deployment within the theater of operations. However, the Air Force has been reluctant to put C-130s in their budget or in placing the aircraft on their unfunded requirements list--instead relying on congressional add-ons during the budget process. How would you rectify the inconsistencies of the C-130J program over the past several years? Secretary Rumsfeld. I am aware of and appreciate the keen interest in the C-130J program shown by you and several of your colleagues. However, I have not had an opportunity to review the program in detail, nor have I seen the results of the Mobility Requirements Study you mention. If confirmed, I will review the study and the program. 14b. Senator Cleland. Given your plans to review and revise our military strategy in the context of President-elect Bush's desire to review all military operations and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), would you consider submitting a new mobility requirements report? Secretary Rumsfeld. Until I have had the opportunity to review the above-mentioned study, it would be premature to suggest that an additional study is needed. 15. Senator Cleland. Military health care is a matter of great importance to our service members and to this committee. Last year, in response to concerns raised by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we enacted legislation that eliminates deductibles and copayments under TRICARE Prime for families of Active Duty service members; provides lifetime health care for military retirees and their families through the TRICARE program; and provides a comprehensive pharmacy benefit for military retirees. We still hear concerns from our constituents about lack of timely access to health care, portability of benefits as our service members move around, and poor claims processing. What are your priorities for maintaining a working, accessible, properly funded health care system? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the provision of effective, affordable health care to our servicemen and women and their families is a high-priority objective I have not had an opportunity to review the Defense Health Program, however, and therefore I am unable to comment on how best to ensure such coverage and treatment. If confirmed, I will devote time to this important program. 16. Senator Cleland. Almost all new service members enroll in and contribute to the Montgomery GI Bill. Only about half of these use their benefits, and many who use the benefit do not use all of their entitlement. Many of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines say they would like to stay in the service, but feel they have to leave so that they can provide for the education of their spouses and children. I believe that many of these service members would stay in the service if they could transfer all or a part of their unused entitlement to GI Bill benefits to family members in return for a service commitment. Service Secretaries could use this retention tool selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses. Will you give serious consideration to how the Department of Defense could use the transfer of GI Bill benefits to family members as a retention tool and give me your thoughts on how we best do this? Secretary Rumsfeld. I was interested in this suggestion when you mentioned it during the confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I will give consideration to this suggestion. 17. Senator Cleland. From what we have heard in today's session and from what has occurred on Capitol Hill in the past few years, it seems obvious that one of the most contentious national security issues-- which too often has broken down along party lines--is the subject of National Missile Defense. I would add, however, that I believe this important question cannot be viewed in isolation from our overall national strategic policy. For example, how will NMD be related by the new administration to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which unfortunately also broke down along partisan lines in the last Congress. I believe we must try to achieve a bipartisan consensus on this whole collection of issues and do so in a fashion which is comprehensive and coordinated. Therefore, I have proposed that we consider creating a bipartisan Commission on National Security Policy composed of respected leaders from both parties which seeks to develop such a consensus and encompasses both NMD and CTBT as well as related issues. I fear, Mr. Secretary, that absent a comprehensive, consensus approach that we may face more partisan wrangling and more internal division, which will serve our military, our country, and indeed the entire world. Would you care to react to any of these points? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that it is vital to consider issues such as NMD and CTBT in a broader context, and certainly bipartisan consensus is desirable. That being said, I am not persuaded that establishment of a commission, as you describe, is needed. The President-elect has stated that he does not favor ratification of the CTBT. He has indicated that he plans to continue the moratorium on underground nuclear testing so long as the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile can be certified. If confirmed, I will do what I can to contribute to the achievement of bipartisan support on topics such as these. 18. Senator Cleland. This committee has expressed its full support for upgrading and modernizing the C-5 fleet, both A and B models. Airlift is absolutely vital to America's ability to project military force. This will continue to be true for the foreseeable future. In last year's report accompanying S. 2549 (The Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act), this committee expressed concern that the Air Force appears to have budgeted for just modernizing the B-models first and yet has not provided any form of explanation for deviating from the committee's belief that the A and B models both need to be re-engined as soon as possible. In addition, the Air Force has not explained how it could arrive at this plan without doing the initial EMD testing on at least one A and one B model to factually determine the potential for improving the performance and reliability of the each model. The committee requested that the Air Force address these concerns by February 15, 2001. In the meantime, despite the support of this committee and the House defense committees, the contracting for the C-5 RERP has been inexplicably delayed. The contract was supposed to be let in November and yet still is not complete. For a program as vital to national security as the improvement of outsized/oversized airlift capability, this sort of unnecessary and unexplained delay is unacceptable. What commitment can you give this committee that the C-5 RERP will proceed as directed? What will you do to get the C-5 RERP back on schedule? Will you ensure that both A and B models are included in the initial testing so that any future program decisions are based on real facts? Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not yet had the opportunity to review the C-5 program. I expect that the C-5 program will be reviewed in the context of mobility requirements as part of the overall defense policy review I plan to undertake, if confirmed. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu 19. Senator Landrieu. Our nuclear posture is essentially frozen by a law that we not fall below Start I levels. Furthermore, we are coming upon several crucial and costly decision points with respect to some of our nuclear systems. I believe that this nation would be well-advised to establish an appropriate and cost-effective deterrent independent of anything Russia does. Do you believe that we need to hold to some artificially mandated level of nuclear weapons, or is it wise for the Pentagon to evaluate these questions from the bottom up? Secretary Rumsfeld. The President has stated that we want to go to the lowest level of nuclear weapons commensurate with the national security of the United States and our allies. Upon completion of the Nuclear Posture Review, we will review this requirement as well as which criteria to use in determining an appropriate strategic nuclear force level for the foreseeable future. I do hope that Congress would provide for the ability to get to the appropriate number of nuclear weapons, likely to be below today's level. 20. Senator Landrieu. We all understand that the Single Integrated Operation Plan or SIOP, is, of necessity, one of the most closely guarded secrets that our Nation possesses. However, one of our esteemed Senate colleagues, Bob Kerrey, the ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, shared with us the fact that he had been stone- walled by his every effort to have some opportunity to review these plans. While the SIOP is obviously one of our most import secrets, it is also one of our most fundamental defense policy decisions. Can you assure this committee that you will at least assist the committee leadership in gaining access to the SIOP for their review and consideration? Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand that there are certain procedures in place at this time whereby Congress has access to data regarding the nuclear war plan. I also understand that there are concerns that these procedures may not be sufficient. I will look into this matter and work with Congress to reach an acceptable balance between the requirement for security and the congressional need for information on this highly sensitive plan. 21. Senator Landrieu. You very cogently argued for the need to better integrate commercial off-the-shelf technology into our military force. It is important for us to do, and an important piece of that work is being done at our Navy Technology Center in New Orleans. However, I'd like you to consider a slightly different application of that same principle. I believe that we need to consider the utilization of commercial off-the-shelf personnel. What I mean by that term is this nation is creating a vast community of highly intelligent, highly skilled, and highly sought-after workers in the computer and communications fields. We also know that with the onset of NET-CENTRIC, and so-called ``cyber'' warfare, our Nation's military is going to desperately need more of these minds. Unfortunately, I believe that there is something of a disconnect between this need for talent, and an institutional culture that would attract this sort of talent. I have commended Rudy de Leon for taking the initiative of focusing the Reserve components on this question. Would you endorse a new strategy to solicit service from this core of talented individuals and introduce new standards which may be outside the box in order to employ them fight this new threat? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the Department can do a better job of recruiting and retaining individuals with skills in the computer and communications fields. If confirmed, I will seek to develop strategies for securing the availability of such individuals and look forward to working with Congress to implement appropriate strategies. 22. Senator Landrieu. Do you believe that adding funds to the defense budget alone will solve the problems we face? Do you have an estimate of an increase that you would desire? Secretary Rumsfeld. The challenges facing the Department are many. Certainly, a shortage of resources is evident, and priorities are needed. There are numerous other challenges as well, as I laid out in my testimony before the committee. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee and Congress as a whole to address these challenges. 23. Senator Landrieu. I would like to know your opinion with the approach of decreasing some of our existing infrastructure and transferring those assets to the operational forces in order to provide some relief to our deployed forces. Do you have any specific approaches you could provide us with today? Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not, as of today. 24. Senator Landrieu. One of the most exciting projects that we have underway in Louisiana is the Navy Information Technology Center in New Orleans. I would like to invite you to see this operation first- hand at your earliest opportunity. This center is really a model for the sort of innovation required by the Clinger-Cohen Act. Would you please comment on your views of this act, and what steps we might take to increase the pace of reform? Secretary Rumsfeld. First, thank you for the kind invitation. I have not reviewed the Clinger-Cohen Act, although I understand it allows for certain innovative ``pilot projects'' associated with acquisition reform. Given the fact that the existing acquisition system is in need of substantial reform, it may be that additional use of the authorities to conduct ``pilot projects'' aimed at that reform is warranted. 25. Senator Landrieu. As you may know, recent studies estimate that it will take $30 billion and more than 30 years just to fix the current backlog of military housing deficiencies. On the bright side, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 included a series of new authorities that allow the Department of Defense to work with the private sector to build and renovate military housing by obtaining private capital to leverage government dollars, and use a variety of private sector approaches to construct and refurbish military housing faster and at a lower cost to American taxpayers. This legislation was recently extended to December 2004. What is your opinion concerning this approach? Do you support a broader expansion of this initiative to include permanent authority? Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I have not been briefed on the law to which you refer, I support efforts to ensure that our servicemen and women have access to quality, affordable military housing. Measures to harness the productive potential of private industry are important to this end. ______ Questions submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond 26. Senator Thurmond. Due to the leaner Active Duty military and greater number of operational commitments, the DOD has increasingly called on the Reserves and National Guard. In 1989, Reservists and members of the Guard recorded one million days of duty. In each of the past 3 years, that figure has averaged 13 million days. This increased workload has had an impact on retention and recruiting. In extreme cases, the relationship between the reservist and his employer is adversely affected. What are your general views on the use of the Reserve components and, specifically, in peacekeeping operations? Secretary Rumsfeld. The Guard and Reserve perform admirably in the defense of our Nation, including deployments in peacekeeping operations. Although I have not had the opportunity to study this issue carefully, the quality of training, the status of equipment, and national support for the missions of the Guard and Reserve are keys to recruitment and retention of these essential forces. If confirmed, I will give priority consideration to this situation including the impact on civilian employment of deployed individuals. 27. Senator Thurmond. Since your last tour in the Department of Defense, there has been a concerted effort to privatize many of the services necessary to support our Armed Forces. Among the most recent are the efforts to privatize military family housing and the installation utility systems. What are your views in regard to the privatization of essential services within the Department of Defense? Secretary Rumsfeld. The size and composition of DOD's facilities to perform equipment maintenance is an important aspect of the overall readiness of the Armed Forces. An appropriate balance between government and private sector facilities must be struck in a manner that assures the equipment employed by the Armed Forces will be ready for use when needed. This balance in turn will be affected over time by the nature of the technology used in military equipment. A balance will be reviewed to assure that capabilities essential to national defense that cannot reliably be provided by the private sector will be provided by the government sector. Moreover, critical capabilities will be maintained in the government sector. As noted above, private sector support for military housing appears to have potential for accelerated improvement of that housing. 28. Senator Thurmond. With the end of the Cold War, some of the leading figures from the nuclear weapons programs and strategic policy advocated that the existing nuclear states dismantle their nuclear stockpile, which they considered as pointless and morally dubious arsenals. What are your views on the role of nuclear weapons in the future threat environment? Secretary Rumsfeld. Nuclear weapons remain an important element of U.S. and allied defense policy. That being said, President-elect Bush has stated that he will direct the next Secretary of Defense to undertake a review of the U.S. nuclear posture and associated force levels. If confirmed, I look forward to conducting that review. 29. Senator Thurmond. The Nation has made the decision not to produce new nuclear weapons. More importantly, we no longer have the capability to manufacture plutonium pits on a large scale to modernize the existing stockpile. Since you have historically advocated a strong nuclear TRIAD, what are your concerns regarding this lack of capability to modernize our nuclear stockpile? Secretary Rumsfeld. There are real challenges associated with maintaining a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons are capable of fulfilling the missions to which they have been assigned. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain base closures 30a. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, in your answers to the advance questions for today's hearing, I noticed your response with regard to additional base closure rounds. As you are aware, Secretary Cohen has requested two additional rounds of base closures in each of his budget proposals to Congress, but so far Congress has not agreed to authorize any additional closures--failing to authorize 40-60 and 36-63 in the last 2 years--an experience not dissimilar to your experience as the Secretary of Defense to President Ford. The National Defense Panel, Secretary Cohen, nearly all the Service Chiefs and other respected defense experts have been consistent in their plea that the Pentagon be permitted to divest themselves of excess infrastructure beyond what was eliminated during the prior four rounds of base closings. Through the end of 1998, the Pentagon had closed 97 major bases in the United States. Since then, it has closed none. Moreover, the savings attained would ostensibly be used for force modernization purposes. According to our senior military leaders, the facts are the Department of Defense still has nearly 23 percent more base facilities than necessary to support our Nation's military forces. I say this for my colleagues' benefit: the facts are--billions of dollars are at stake. Department of Defense figures suggest previous base closures will save, after one-time closing costs, $15 billion through fiscal year 2001, $25 billion through fiscal year 2003, and $6.1 billion a year thereafter. Additional needed closures can save $20 billion by 2015, and $3 billion a year thereafter. Sooner or later these surplus bases will be closed anyway. The sooner the issue is addressed, the greater will be the savings, that will ultimately go toward defense modernization and greater pay raises for servicemembers--two areas where President-elect Bush and I strongly agree. Previous base closure rounds have had many success stories. For example, after England Air Force Base closed in 1992, Alexandria, Louisiana, benefitted from the creation of over 1,400 jobs--nearly double the number of jobs lost. Across the U.S. about 60,000 new jobs have been created at closing military bases. At bases closed more than 2 years, nearly 75 percent of the civilian jobs have been replaced. In Charleston, South Carolina, where the number of defense job losses, as a percentage of the work force, was greater than at any other base closure location, 23 major entities are reusing the former Navy facilities and providing more than 3,300 jobs and another 13 more applications are pending--adding soon even more newly created jobs to that number. Additionally, roughly 75 percent of the 6 million square feet of leasable space on the base is occupied. This is comparable to the successes in my home State of Arizona with the closure of Williams Air Force Base in the Phoenix East Valley. Mr. Secretary, I will again propose the questions that you previously addressed in the advance questions to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Do you believe we still have excess military infrastructure that can and should be reduced? Secretary Rumsfeld. Our base structure should fit our force structure requirements. As the President has noted, it appears that we have 23 percent in estimated excess infrastructure. We are looking at the issue, and will make a decision on how best to address as soon as we can in the review process. 30b. Senator McCain. Do you believe it is in the best interest of the Defense Department to authorize additional military base closures and realignments could better align our military base structure to meet the requirements of the new century and free up resources for higher priority needs? Secretary Rumsfeld. As noted previously, our base structure should fit our force structure requirements. We are reviewing the current force structure, and will make a decision on how best to address mismatches as soon as we can in the review process. 30c. Senator McCain. Should any future base closures follow the same basic procedures as the past four rounds? Secretary Rumsfeld. It is too early to determine a process, but when we have had the chance to review the proper force structure- infrastructure alignment in greater detail, we will engage the committee and others in Congress as appropriate. 31a. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, congressional legislation authorizing the Pentagon to close bases expired in 1995. Since then, Defense Secretary Cohen has repeatedly asked for new authority to conduct two more rounds of base closures. Ostensibly because of a widespread belief that the 1995 round was politicized by the Clinton administration, Congress repeatedly rejected efforts to authorize additional rounds. Last year, for instance, the Senate voted against legislation mandating base closures by a vote of 36-63. Mr. Secretary, what actions will you take to ensure that there is no repetition of the politicization of the base closing process as was evident in the cases of Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases, recommended for closure in the 1995 BRAC? Secretary Rumsfeld. When we have established the proper relationship between the force structure needed to execute our national security strategy and the infrastructure needed to support that force, we will work closely with Congress to develop a process that is fair and true to that objective. 31b. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, from your previous experience as Secretary of Defense, will you recommend to the President additional base closing rounds and what advice can you lend to some of my more skeptical colleagues in the House and the Senate? Secretary Rumsfeld. Our base structure should fit our force structure requirements. We are reviewing the current force structure, and prefer to wait until the review is further along before we decide to go forward with a legislative proposal seeking authority to conduct future base closures. congressional add-ons 32a. Senator McCain. During the last major drawdown following the Vietnam War, there were instances of pork-barrel spending--a phenomenon no doubt as old as the Republic--totaling 0.1 to 0.3 percent of the President's budget request or roughly about $100 to $300 million, but it is miniscule compared with the rampant abuse of the process today. During the post-Cold War drawdown, in contrast to the 1970s, spending for parochial purposes expanded to 2.2 percent of the President's defense budget request--which doesn't seem like that much money but represents about $5.5 to $6.0 billion annually. Now that the budget is on an upswing, that expansion has grown even more. Last year, for example, Congress added over $4 billion to the President's budget request. Similarly, the Defense Appropriations Bill contained over $7 billion in unrequested and non-defense add-ons that is a net loss to national security of at least $3 billion. Moreover, each year during markup of the defense bill, this committee receives requests from Senators for parochial projects produced in their home state, last year those requests totaled $30 billion, a 25 percent increase over the prior year. Mr. Secretary, that is the state of the defense budget that you are inheriting, could you comment on your intended approach to dealing with the hundreds of member-adds that will most assuredly come your way? Secretary Rumsfeld. When presenting my budget plan, I will urge Congress to give it strong support. President Bush has emphasized that strategy should drive our resource decisions--I support his position. 32b. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, do you see this type of congressional behavior of congressional add-ons at cross purposes to President Bush's modernization plan, which I support, that skips a generation of weapon systems for ``programs that propel America generations ahead in military technology'' and what will you try to do to curb these excesses? Secretary Rumsfeld. Our on-going reviews across a wide array of matters will yield information that can be developed into operational concepts and, from these, program decisions. I will work closely with Congress to seek its support for these decisions. 33. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, a process evolved during the post-Cold War drawdown wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Secretaries were asked to produce so-called Unfunded Priority Lists or ``wish lists'' detailing where they would allocate additional funds if provided by Congress. These wish lists, over time, grew from several pages to lengthy binders. This was understandable given the degree to which the Armed Forces were under-funded by the Clinton administration. My concern, however, has to do with the degree to which the Department of Defense has been pressured by Members of Congress to include items too numerous to list here on the Unfunded Priority Lists. What will you do to resist such pressure and minimize pork-barrel spending when pressing modernization, long-term research and development, and readiness problems remain? Secretary Rumsfeld. I feel it is important that the Department speak with a unified voice, across the Services, in seeking to fund our Defense programs to achieve the President's objectives. That is the principle that will guide our interactions with Congress, in budgetary and other matters. use of force: kosovo and others 34. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, one of the fundamental unresolved questions that must be faced by every President and Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense is ``when to use military force.'' Beyond that is the equally important question of ``how to apply that force once the decision is made to use it.'' You are on the record, I believe, as having been reluctant to become militarily engaged in the Balkans, but once President Clinton initiated air strikes, as having opposed his announced decision not to use ground forces. Mr. Secretary, could you articulate for the committee your sense of the criteria that should guide the use of military force and, once force is used, how it would be employed? Secretary Rumsfeld. This is an issue for the President and his national security team, not the Secretary of Defense alone. Each case is unique. Some of the questions that should be discussed when considering the use of force include: Are the goals achievable? Do we have the resources? What interests are at stake? Are there constraints, such as the command structure, that will impact how we can carry out the operation? How would we characterize success? In the end, the President, following careful consultation with his national security team, must decide each case. 35a. Senator McCain. Those of us who assailed the administration and NATO's conduct of gradual escalation during the Balkans campaign took heart in your comments of that time, particularly your reflections on CNN on April 4, 1999, with respect to comparisons of Kosovo to Vietnam, which went as follows: ``There is always a risk in gradualism. It pacifies the hesitant and the tentative. What it didn't do is shock and awe, and alter the calculations of the people you're dealing with.'' Similarly, during an interview with Chris Matthews, you noted that ``. . . it was a mistake to say that we should not use ground forces, because it simplifies the problem for Milosevic. . . It seems to me we ought to stop saying things to appease and placate our domestic political audiences and we ought to start behaving in a way that suggests to Milosevic that it's . . . in his interest to end this and stop ethnic cleansing and come to the negotiating table. . .'' Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate adopting this approach as one of the key figures in the chain of command? Secretary Rumsfeld. We must approach each potential use of military force mindful of the unique circumstances at play. Our decisions must be made with an understanding of the goals we seek to achieve and our readiness to honestly evaluate the resources needed to achieve those goals. 35b. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, could you offer some insight on the philosophical approach you intend to bring to the job of Secretary of Defense when the question of military deployments arise? How do you approach the issue of moral imperative when no compelling national interest is involved? Secretary Rumsfeld. I fundamentally believe that America has compelling interests as a global leader and that our interests will continue to be challenged in ways that will threaten this Nation's security. Deciding when and where to employ military forces to protect our interests is a matter for the President in consultation with his national security team. We must be a reliable ally, but resist hasty decisions to use force. I also believe that, by remaining strong and capable, we can dissuade potential adversaries from taking actions that will ultimately lead to far more costly consequences for both of us. 36. Senator McCain. During the early phase of fighting in Bosnia- Herzegovina, there existed a decision-making process, chain of command, and rules of engagement that virtually guaranteed failure. Our pilots found themselves having to receive the personal okay of the U.N. Secretary General and his deputy for the Balkans prior to retaliating against Bosnian Serb forces. In Kosovo, during Operation Allied Force, we witnessed the spectacle of military commanders vetting their tactical targeting plans through a 19-nation alliance built on unanimity that also limited the effectiveness of the military operation. Mr. Secretary, what policies would you propose be implemented in order to avoid a recurrence of such situations? Secretary Rumsfeld. The key to avoiding such awkward command and control situations in the future is to carefully review our procedures and come to agreements with our allies before we ever have to put those procedures into practice. This would entail several steps. First, we need to refine and update our regional contingency plans where we are likely to engage in combined operations within established alliances. For different wartime scenarios, we must define what our mission would be, and what would constitute success. We must also define appropriate target sets that support the mission. Together with our allies, we should define what military targets would contribute to the success of operations described under the various scenarios, and define rules of engagement for each type of target under each scenario. We must establish operational guidelines within the framework of each alliance. In addition, it is essential that we wargame each scenario, using realistic command and control procedures, at the highest staff levels. Finally, it is important to review agreements within the alliance on a periodic basis to ensure currency. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith 37. Senator Smith. You understandably resigned from the Space Commission which you chaired to focus on your nomination. However, you left before signing onto the report and the unanimous conclusions of the remaining 12 Commissioners. Do you in fact agree with the findings and recommendations of the Space Commission? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the United States is increasingly dependent on its civil, commercial, and defense and intelligence space assets. With that dependence comes vulnerability to hostile acts. The Nation needs a capability to deter and defend against attack on space assets and systems. 38. Senator Smith. The Space Commission report recommends several actions for the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, will you implement those changes? Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will give careful attention to these recommendations and the recommendations of several other recent studies and commissions on space systems. 39. Senator Smith. There are several recommendations for the President and other agencies of the administration. Some are even suggestions for Congress. If confirmed, will you encourage the President, other agencies of the administration, and Congress to implement the changes recommended by the Space Commission? Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer above. 40. Senator Smith. The Commission's report stated that we have not adequately funded a number of space activities. In particular, it noted that we need space control and satellite negation capability. Do you believe the U.S. should have an anti-satellite capability? Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. and other nations that make use of space face threats to the operation of their satellites. We know that other nations have jammed telecommunications from on-orbit satellites, that Russian entities market devices that can jam GPS signals, and that foreign satellite manufacturers market so-called ``micro satellites'' to other foreign countries that can be used for offensive actions against satellites. In light of U.S. dependence on space assets, the vulnerability of these assets to attack or disruption and the fact that others have the means of doing harm to U.S. interests in space, it would be contrary to U.S. security interests not to develop, test, and deploy the appropriate means of deterring attack on and defending space systems. 41a. Senator Smith. The Commission had concerns about the Air Force not doing a good job of growing space experts from within the space community for senior leadership positions. Rather, they tend to bring in rated officers with little or no space experience to fill key space leadership positions. If confirmed, will you encourage the Air Force to promote more career space experts to senior leadership positions rather than drawing so heavily from the pilot community while space officers stagnate? Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. 41b. Senator Smith. Based on what you know of the emerging missile threat and the current administration's planned National Missile Defense concept, do you believe the planned concept by itself is sufficiently robust and capable of providing the defense you and the President-elect have described to the nation? When do you anticipate completing your review of the critical missile defense mission and bringing forward to Congress the robust missile defense architecture to protect America and our friends and allies? Secretary Rumsfeld. I believe it would be good to examine alternate and complementary architectures to the NMD system currently under development. I cannot now predict when that review will be completed or the architectures that will be found to be appropriate. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Olympia J. Snowe 42. Senator Snowe. In its review of the fiscal year 2001 budget request, the Seapower Subcommittee took testimony from Congressional Research Service that indicated a $10 to $12 billion annual investment, depending on the actual ship mix, and an average build rate of 8.7 ships per year is required to maintain 308 ships. However, in its budget request for fiscal year 2001, the administration in its Future Years Defense Program included only 7.5 ships per year and over the last 8 years of the Clinton administration requested only 4.75 ships per year. Congress helped raise that average to 5.5 ships per year. Given that the CNO has testified that 34 percent of the Navy is deployed at any given time and that he is hard-pressed to meet that requirement with the current fleet, are you committed to review the shipbuilding account for adequacy? Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. 43. Senator Snowe. In a New York Times article dated January 8, 2001, the authors questioned the DOD's ability to pursue leap-ahead technologies while modernizing the military. The article specifically mentioned three programs that might be candidates for cancellation or postponement to pay for pursuit of leap-ahead technologies: the F-22, the MV-22, and the DD-21. Witnesses testified before the Seapower Subcommittee that the Marines have been at considerable risk in naval surface fire support since the retirement of the Iowa-class battleship and will remain so until the DD-21 joins the fleet in strength. Slippage of the DD-21 would increase risk to the Navy team's capability for forced entry operations and its ability to conduct Operational Maneuver From The Sea. Do you plan to review the resources necessary to meet naval surface fire support requirements of the United States Marine Corps to perform the missions we expect of them? Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. 44. Senator Snowe. The safety and efficacy of the Department of Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP) continues to be of great concern to our men and women in uniform and their families. In light of the divisive nature of the DOD anthrax policy, do you plan to review this policy, and what actions might you plan to take to regain the trust of our service members and their families lost due to AVIP? Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not familiar with the details of the AVIP program. However, the trust of our service members and their families is essential to the effectiveness, morale, and welfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. If confirmed, I will get briefed on the program. In the interim, it would not be appropriate for me to comment in detail. 45. Senator Snowe. In your 1998 commission report you highlighted the missile threat faced by not only our own forces, but America's allies like Israel as well. U.S.-Israeli cooperation on the Arrow missile system has been a critical component to Israel's defensive capabilities as well as a centerpiece for our strategic relationship. Also, during your service in the Ford administration you were supportive of Israeli security requirements. As Secretary, do you foresee this joint initiative continuing? Will you continue to facilitate Israel's qualitative military edge, including the provision of advanced U.S. defense technologies? Secretary Rumsfeld. I support continued cooperative efforts in the area of ballistic missile defense. I have not been briefed on the ARROW program in detail, however, and therefore do not believe it appropriate to comment on possible future directions or funding for that program. 46. Senator Snowe. The Taiwan Relations Act declares America's intention to provide for the defensive capabilities of Taiwan with no veto by China. The Taiwan Relations Act also states that ``the President and Congress'' shall determine Taiwan's defense requirements. What recommendations to the President will you make based on the needs of Taiwan in order to defend itself as required by the Taiwan Relations Act? Secretary Rumsfeld. Any recommendations regarding arms sales to Taiwan will be made to the President. However, I understand the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act and support a strong relationship between Taiwan and the United States, in support of Taiwan's need for effective self-defense capability against the threats posed to it. 47. Senator Snowe. In addition to U.S. military aid to present recipients, as Secretary would you recommend to President Bush that there is a need to expand this aid? If so, do you have any regions or countries that you foresee need this assistance? Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not had an opportunity to review U.S. arms sales policy. If confirmed, I will assess U.S. arms sales policy, in conjunction with the other members of the President's national security team. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard 48. Senator Allard. As a member of the NRO Commission, we found that there is a valuable role to be played by commercial space systems in order to allow our defense and intelligence assets to be available for critical tasks. Do you see a role for commercial systems and will you advocate a clear national strategy and a commitment of funding for acquisition of imagery in order to take full advantage of commercial satellite capabilities? Secretary Rumsfeld. As I stated in the confirmation hearing, my impression is that the United States government, including the military, will and should increase the use of commercially available satellite capabilities, especially in the area of communications and imagery. There are a number of instances where the government might take advantage of commercial off-the-shelf type products and services, and use those products and services to good effect. 49. Senator Allard. A concern for me is the adequate funding for our long lead space research and development programs--such as the space based radar. What key areas and needs do you see as a focus for technological development in order to move our systems to the next generation? Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that there needs to be considerable investment in ``leading edge'' technologies. The United States cannot afford to lose its preeminence in science and technology. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Hutchinson 50. Senator Hutchinson. I am concerned that the military's basic pay table has become compressed over the last decade--that senior enlisted members of our Armed Forces are no longer receiving compensation commensurate with the great responsibilities placed upon their shoulders. If confirmed, will you thoroughly examine the area of compensation for senior enlisted members of our Armed Forces before President Bush sends an amended fiscal year 2002 budget request to Congress? Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. 51. Senator Hutchinson. Nearly every soldier, sailor, airman, or marine that I have spoken to has told me that the need to provide a college education for a spouse or child has become a major factor in most re-enlistment decisions. While I have, in the past, supported efforts to make Montgomery G.I. Bill benefits portable, I am not convinced that this would provide the best solution. If confirmed, will you commit yourself to working with Congress to explore new methods by which those who make a career of the Armed Forces will be able to provide college educations for their dependents? Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will be pleased to work with you and your colleagues in the Senate and the House of Representatives to identify options for improving the overall morale and welfare of our servicemen and women, including the dependent's education option you have suggested. 52. Senator Hutchinson. One of the many programmatic challenges facing the Department of Defense is the modernization of our Nation's fleet of C-130 transport aircraft. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure a modern and viable mission-ready C-130 force for today and for the future? Secretary Rumsfeld. I am aware of and appreciate the keen interest in the C-130J program shown by you and several of your colleagues. However, I have not had an opportunity to review the program, nor have I seen the results of the mobility requirements study you mention. If confirmed, I will review the study and the program. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions 53. Senator Sessions. The U.S. government is faced with the enormous task of destroying unexploded ordnance at munitions sites that have been found across the United States, most notably recently at Massachusetts Military Range on Cape Cod, in Massachusetts and Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver, Colorado. There are hundreds of U.S. sites with similar problems. These munitions and their toxic explosives can pose serious environmental problems both in terms of their storage or if they are destroyed by open burn or open detonation. What plans would your Department have to destroy munitions found in current and former U.S. bases? Will you focus on closed disposal technologies rather than continuation of open burn/open detonations as a solution to this problem? What priority would you give to the funding of new methods of destroying these hazardous materials, including finding private sector solutions to this problem that would not require the hazardous transport of conventional unexploded ordnance? Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate your concern about unexploded ordnance. However, I have not been briefed on the Department's plans and programs in this area, and am unable to comment at this time. If confirmed, these activities will be reviewed and assessed. 54. Senator Sessions. Areas of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia have numerous outdated and hazardous munitions sites that could pose a proliferation problem if those munitions and explosives are not properly destroyed. The U.S. government currently funds this program in the former Soviet Union. Would you support the continuation of this non-proliferation program and an increase in budgetary allocations to help stem this proliferation concern? Would you support the extension of this program to include Central and Eastern Europe and Asia? Which areas pose a particular concern? Would your administration support the extension of non-proliferation programs to China that would help American companies enter this market, destroying munitions that pose an environmental hazard? Would you support the use of Foreign Ministry Financing Funds for the destruction of unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons if requested by an eligible country? Secretary Rumsfeld. I am unaware of the program to which you refer. If confirmed, I will undertake to have this program reviewed in light of your questions. ______ [The nomination reference of Donald H. Rumsfeld follows:] Nomination Reference [On January 20, 2001, the Senate received the Donald H. Rumsfeld nomination. It was not referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, but was signed by the President, placed on the Senate Executive Calendar, and then confirmed by the full Senate by voice vote all on the same day. A confirmation hearing was held by the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 11, 2001.] ------ [The biographical sketch of Donald H. Rumsfeld follows:] Biographical Sketch of Donald H. Rumsfeld Donald Rumsfeld was born in 1932 in Chicago, Illinois, attended Princeton University on scholarship, served in the U.S. Navy (1954-1957) as an aviator, and was All Navy Wrestling Champion. Married in 1954, he and his wife Joyce have three children and five grandchildren. Mr. Rumsfeld is in private business and is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gilead Sciences, Inc. He serves as a member of the boards of directors of ABB (Asea Brown Boveri) Ltd. (Zurich, Switzerland), Amylin Pharmaceuticals, and Tribune Company. He is also Chairman of the Salomon Smith Barney International Advisory Board and an advisor to a number of companies, including Investor AB of Sweden. He is currently Chairman of the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization. In 1962, at the age of 30, he was elected to his first of four terms in the U.S. Congress. In 1969, he resigned from Congress to join the President's Cabinet. He served as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity and Assistant to the President, and later as Director of the Economic Stabilization Program and Counselor to the President. In January 1973 he was posted to Brussels, Belgium, as U.S. Ambassador to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In August 1974, Mr. Rumsfeld was called back to Washington, DC, to serve as Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. He served as Chief of Staff of the White House and as a member of the President's Cabinet, 1974-1975, and as the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1975-1977, the youngest in history. In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld left Washington, DC, after some 20 years of public service and lectured at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs and at Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management prior to entering business. In June 1977, he became Chief Executive Officer of G.D. Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company, where he served until 1985. The turnaround there earned him awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry in 1980 and 1981. He was in private business from 1985 to 1990. From 1990 to 1993, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation, a leader in broadband and digital high-definition television technology. After taking the company public, Mr. Rumsfeld returned to private business. During his years in business, he has continued public service in a variety of federal posts including service as President Reagan's Special Envoy for the Middle East, and as a Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, and the National Economic Commission. His current civic activities include service on the Boards of Trustees of the Chicago Historical Society, Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Rand Corporation and the National Park Foundation. He is also a member of the U.S.-Russia Business Forum, and recently completed service as Chairman of the U.S. Government Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Honors include: Distinguished Eagle Scout Award (1975), George Catlett Marshall Award (1984), Woodrow Wilson Award (1985), Dwight Eisenhower Medal (1993), and eleven honorary degrees. In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom. ------ [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Donald H. Rumsfeld in connection with his nomination follows:] UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Room SR-228 Washington, DC 20510-6050 (202) 224-3871 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Part A--Biographical Information Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public. 1. Name: (Include any former names used.) Donald Henry Rumsfeld. 2. Position to which nominated: U.S. Secretary of Defense. 3. Date of nomination: Expected to be on January 20, 2001. Date of announcement by President-elect December 28, 2000. 4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.] 5. Date and place of birth: July 9, 1932; Chicago, Illinois. 6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.) Married to Marion Joyce Pierson; December 27, 1954. 7. Names and ages of children: Valerie Jeanne Rumsfeld, age 44 (born March 3, 1956) Marcy Kay Rumsfeld, age 40 (born March 28, 1960) Donald Nicholas Rumsfeld, age 33 (born June 26, 1967). 8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received and date degree granted. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From To Name of School Address Degree ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9/46............................ 6/50.............. New Trier High Winnetka, IL...... H.S. Diploma School. 9/50............................ 6/54.............. Princeton Princeton, NJ..... B.A. University. 10/54........................... 1/56.............. U.S. Naval Flight Pensacola, FL..... Naval Aviator School. 1956............................ 1956.............. Instructors Basic Pensacola, FL..... Naval Flight Training School Instructor (IBTU). 1959............................ 1959.............. Georgetown Law Washington, DC.... None Center. 1959............................ 1960.............. Western Reserve Cleveland, OH..... None Law School. 1963............................ 1963.............. National War Washington, DC.... N/A College. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dates Position Company ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 08/93-Present................... Private Business.. 400 N. Michigan, #405, Chicago, IL 60611 10/90-08/93..................... Chairman and Chief General Instrument Executive Officer. Corp., 181 W. Madison St., Chicago, IL 60602 10/85-10/90..................... Senior Advisor William Blair & (part time) and Co., 135 S. private business. LaSalle St., Chicago, IL 60603 08/85-09/30/85.................. Chairman of the G.D. Searle & Co., Board, President 4711 Golf Road, & CEO. Skokie, IL 60076 06/77-08/85..................... President, CEO & G.D. Searle & Co., Director. 4711 Golf Road, Skokie, IL 60076 11/3/83-04/84................... Presidential Envoy U.S. Government, for the Middle Washington, DC East (part-time, temporary W.O.C.-- on leave of absence from G.D. Searle & Co.). 10/82-02/83..................... Presidential Envoy U.S. Government, for the Law of Washington, DC the Sea (part time--on leave of absence from G.D. Searle & Co.). 01/77-06/77..................... Lecturer (part Northwestern time). Graduate School of Mgmt. and Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs 01/77-06/77..................... Consultant........ G.D. Searle Co 11/18/75-01/20/77............... Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Defense. Defense, Washington, DC 08/74........................... Chairman of Gerald The White House, R. Ford's Washington, DC Transition to the Presidency. 09/27/74-11/18/75............... White House Chief The White House, of Staff; Asst. Washington, DC to the President; Cabinet Member. 02/02/73-12/05/74............... U.S. Ambassador to U.S. Dept. of NATO. State, Washington, DC 1971-1973....................... Member of the The White House, Cabinet. Washington, DC 12/10/70-02/02/73............... Counsellor to the President. 10/07/71-02/02/73............... Director, Economic Stabilization Program (Cost of Living Council). 1969-1973....................... Member of the The White House, Cabinet. Washington, DC 05/26/69-2/2/73................. Asst. to the President. 05/26/69-12/10/70............... Director, Office of Economic Opportunity. 1963-1969....................... Member, U.S. House U.S. Congress, of Washington, DC Representatives (R-IL). 1960-1962....................... Registered A.G. Becker & Co. Representative. (investment banking) Chicago, IL 1959-1960....................... Campaign Manager.. Hon. David Dennison, Warren, Ohio 1959............................ Staff Assistant, Congressman Robert U.S. House of Griffin (R- Representatives. Michigan) Washington, DC 1957-1959....................... Administrative Honorable David Asst., U.S. House Dennison, Warren, of Ohio. Representatives. 1954-1957....................... Naval Aviator, U.S. Navy and then then Flight U.S.N.R. Instructor, then Instructor of Flight Instructors. 1950-1954....................... Midshipman........ N.R.O.T.C. (Regular). 1949 (Summer)................... Counselor......... Camp Owakanze, Ft. Williams, Canada 1949 (Xmas)..................... Mailman (part U.S. Post Office, time). Winnetka, IL 1948 (Summer)................... Counselor......... Philmont Scout Ranch. (Xmas)........................ Mailman (part U.S. Post Office, time). Winnetka, IL 1947 (Summer)................... Laborer, Skokie Country construction and Club. gardening. (Xmas)........................ Mailman (part U.S. Post Office, time). Winnetka, IL. OTHER: 1948............................ Janitor (part Dress shop, time). Winnetka, IL 1947............................ Rug Cleaner....... Lewis Mothproof, Northbrook, IL 1946............................ Gardening and snow Winnetka, IL. shoveling. 1945............................ Newsboy, gardening Coronado, CA. 1944............................ Newsboy, chopped Port Orchard, wood, delivered Washington; ice, dug clams. Seaside, Oregon. 1943............................ Newsboy, shop boy Elizabeth City, (fish market), NC. raised and sold watermelons, cantaloupe and chickens. 1942............................ Newsboy, magazine Winnetka, IL. salesman, delivery boy. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above. This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional omissions. APPOINTMENT DATES--DONALD RUMSFELD ------------------------------------------------------------------------ President Date Title ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Nixon.......................... 5/26/69 to 2/2/73 Assistant to the President Nixon.......................... 5/26/69 to 12/10/70 Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity Nixon.......................... 4/20/70 to 2/2/73 Property Review Board (member 4/ 20/70; chairman 9/ 11/71) Nixon.......................... 12/10/70 to 2/2/73 Counselor to the President Nixon.......................... 1/20/71 to 2/2/73 Member of Domestic Council Nixon.......................... 10/7/71 to 2/2/73 Director of the Cost of Living Council Nixon.......................... 2/2/73 to 12/5/74 U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the Rank and Status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ford........................... 9/27/74 to 11/18/75 Assistant to the President Ford........................... 11/18/75 to 1/20/77 Secretary of Defense Ford........................... 2/24/76 to 1/20/77 Governor of Board of Governors, American National Red Cross Reagan......................... 9/23/82 to 10/29/86 Member of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency Reagan......................... 5/17/83 to 9/17/84 Member of the Presidents Council on the Conduct of U.S.- Japan Relations Reagan......................... 11/3/83 (no end Personal date) Representative of the President of the U.S.A. in the Middle East ------------------------------------------------------------------------ U.S. GOVERNMENT RELATED--CURRENT: Director of Central Intelligence--Washington, DC--Consultant (WOC) (7/98-) Congressional Policy Advisory Board, Republican Policy Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC--Member, Advisory Board (1/98- ) Congressional Leadership National Security Advisory Group, Washington, DC--Chairman (6/22/00- ) Senator Peter Fitzgerald Business Advisory Committee, Chicago, IL-- Member (12/98- ) National Park Foundation, Washington, DC--Member, Board of Trustees (8/90-8/96) (1/93-7/94) (11/97- ); Selection Committee for Theodore Roosevelt Medal (3/95- ); Selection Committee for Board (6/95-4/96); Development Committee (1/98- ); Executive Committee (10/92-4/96)(1/98- ); Finance Committee (10/92-4/96); New Initiatives Task Force (1/93-7/ 94); Government Relations Committee (7/94-4/96); Governance Committee (1/98-9/98)(11/98- ); Chairman, Governance Committee (11/98-7/00). Lt. Governor Corinne Wood Business Advisory Committee, Chicago, IL--Member (3/99- ) FORMER ACTIVITIES (PARTIAL) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Approximate Dates Activity ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1967-1969................................. THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTER- PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL--Co- Founder, Washington, DC 1968-1968................................. COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS FOR THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, Washington, DC-- Member. 1968-?.................................... THE NAVAL ACADEMY ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Annapolis, Maryland--Honorary Member 1968-1969................................. NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION-- Member, Chicago, IL. 1968-1969................................. RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION--Member, Washington, DC 1977-?.................................... U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, Washington, DC--Advisor (W.O.C.) 02/81-1981................................ INTERIM FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORY BOARD FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN--Member 09/82-11/86............................... PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL (GAC), Washington, DC--Member 10/82-2/83................................ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY--(W.O.C.), Washington, DC 11/82-06/85............................... PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL YOUTH EXCHANGE, Washington, DC-- Member 12/82-09/85............................... PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COUNCIL FOR PHYSICAL FITNESS & SPORTS, Washington, DC-- Special Advisor 12/82-10/90............................... NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, Washington, DC-- Honorary Member, Board of Directors 01/83-1984................................ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PANEL ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS--(MX Panel)--(W.O.C.), Washington, DC--Senior Advisor. 06/83-10/84............................... U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE CONDUCT OF U.S./ JAPAN RELATIONS (U.S.), Washington, DC--Member; and THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMISSION ON U.S./JAPAN RELATIONS (Bi-National)-- (W.O.C.), Washington, DC-- Member 10/83-1/89(?)............................. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, DC--Advisor/ Expert (W.O.C.) (Dates are uncertain.) 11/83-4/84................................ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE EAST-- (W.O.C.), Washington, DC 03/87-06/88............................... ASSOCIATION OF NAVAL AVIATION, Washington, DC-- Member. 10/87-08/90............................... NATIONAL (Paul Volker) COMMISSION ON PUBLIC SERVICE, Washington, DC-- Member 02/88-03/89............................... NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION (Reagan Administration), Washington, DC--Member 02/88-08/92............................... NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, Washington, DC--Member, Board of Advisors 05/89-08/91............................... COMMISSION ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS (U.S.-Japan 2000)--Member 08/89-2/90................................ NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, Washington, DC--Member, Panel on the Future Design and Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls 1992-1994................................. INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, Washington, DC-- Member 03/92-10/93............................... U.S. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION--HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION ADVISORY COMMITTEE 12/97-7/98................................ COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, Washington, DC--Chairman 2/99-6/99................................. PANEL TO ASSESS THE CAPABILITIES FOR DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ACTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (RAND)-- Washington, DC 1/99-11/00................................ U.S. TRADE DEFICIT REVIEW COMMISSION--Washington, DC-- Commissioner 6/00-12/00................................ U.S. COMMISSION TO ASSESS NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION, Washington, DC--Chairman ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SELECTED U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Approx. Dates ----------------------------------------------------- Activity From To ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Sep-50.......................... Jun-54............ Midshipman, N.R.O.T.C. Jan-54.......................... Jan-57............ Naval Officer, Ensign/LTJG Nov-57.......................... Honorable discharge from the U.S. Navy Nov-57.......................... 1989.............. Naval Reserves, Captain/USNR- Retired Dec-57.......................... Jan-59............ Administrative Assistant to Congressman David Dennison (R-OH) 1959............................ 1959.............. Staff Assistant to Congressman Robert Griffin (R- MI) Jan-63.......................... Apr-69............ Member (R-IL), U.S.House of Representatives, 88th Congress Jan-63.......................... Apr-69............ Member, House Committee on Science & Astronautics Jan-63.......................... Jan-65............ Member, Subcommittee on Advanced Research & Technology Jan-63.......................... Jan-65............ Member, Subcommittee on Tracking & Data Acquisition Jan-65.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight 1965............................ 2000.............. Member, 88th Congressional Club Jan-65.......................... Jan-67............ Member, House Committee on Foreign Operations & Government Information Jan-65.......................... Jan-67............ Member, Government Operations Subcommittee on Legal & Monetary Affairs Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Government Operations Subcommittee on Military Operations Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint Economic Committee Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint Economic Committee Subcommittee on Economy in Government Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint Economic Committee Subcommittee on Economic Statistics Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint Economic Committee Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint Economic Committee Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships 1967............................ President of Republican Members, 88th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives 1968............................ 1969.............. Member, Presidential Transition Team for President- Elect Richard Nixon Apr-69.......................... Jan-73............ Member, President's Cabinet (Nixon) May-69.......................... Feb-73............ Assistant to the President (Nixon) May-69.......................... Dec-70............ Director, Office of Economic Opportunity Apr-70.......................... Feb-73............ Member, Property Review Board. Chairman (9/11/71- 2/73) Dec-70.......................... Feb-73............ Counselor to the President (Nixon) Jan-71.......................... Feb-73............ Member, Domestic Council Oct-71.......................... Feb-73............ Director, Economic Stabilization Program (Cost of Living Council) Feb-73.......................... Dec-74............ U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Brussels, Belgium 1974............................ ................ Chairman of the Presidential Transition Team for Gerald Ford 1974............................ 1975.............. Member, President's Cabinet (Ford) 1974............................ 1975.............. White House Chief of Staff Sep-74.......................... Nov-75............ Assistant to the President (Ford) Nov-75.......................... Jan-77............ U.S. Secretary of Defense Feb-76.......................... Jan-77............ Governor, American National Red Cross Board of Governors 1977............................ 1980.............. Consultant, U.S. Department of Defense (W.O.C) 1980............................ Member of Ronald Reagan's Foreign and Defense Policy Advisory Committee 1981............................ Member, Interim Foreign Policy Advisory Board for President Reagan 1982............................ 1983.............. Senior Advisor to Commission on Strategic Systems (Scowcroft MX Panel), (W.O.C) Sep-82.......................... (?)............... Member, U.S. General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (W.O.C.) Oct-82.......................... Feb-83............ Presidential Envoy for the Law of the Sea Treaty May-83.......................... Sep-84............ Member, U.S. Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations (W.O.C.) May-83.......................... Sep-84............ Member, U.S. the Joint Advisory Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations (W.O.C.) Nov-83.......................... Jan-89............ Consultant/Expert Advisor, U.S. Department of State (W.O.C.) (dates uncertain) Nov-83.......................... Apr-84............ President Reagan's Personal Representative to the Middle East Feb-88.......................... Mar-89............ Member, National Economic Commission, Washington, DC Aug-90.......................... Aug-96............ Member, Board of Trustees, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Nov-97.......................... Dec-00............ Member, Board of Trustees, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Oct-92.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Executive Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Oct-92.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Finance Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Mar-95.......................... Jan-01............ Member, Selection Committee for Theodore Roosevelt Medal, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Jan-93.......................... Ju1-94............ Member, New Initiatives Task Force, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Ju1-94.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Government Relations Committee National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Jun-95.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Selection Committee for Board, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Jan-98.......................... Sep-98............ Member, Governance Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Jan-98.......................... Jan-01............ Member, Development Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Jan-98.......................... Jan-01............ Member, Executive Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Ju1-98.......................... Jul-00............ Chairman, Governance Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Nov-98.......................... Jan-01 ........... Member, Governance Committee, National Park Foundation, Washington, DC Jan-98.......................... Jan-01............ Member, Congressional Policy Advisory Board, Republican Policy Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, DC Ju1-98.......................... Jan-01............ Consultant to the Director of Central Intelligence, Washington, DC Jan-99.......................... Nov-00............ Member, U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission, Washington, DC Jun-00.......................... Jan-01............ Chairman, Congressional Leadership National Security Advisory Group, Washington, DC Jun-00.......................... Dec-00............ Chairman, U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington, DC ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional omissions. current activities *Organizational affiliations which I might wish to continue during the term of my appointment **Investments in entities which I might wish to continue during the term of my appointment. BUSINESS: BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: PUBLIC COMPANIES ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd., Zurich, Switzerland--Member, Board of Directors (6/99- ); Nominating Committee (12/99- ) AMYLIN PHARMACEUTICALS, La Jolla, California--Member, Board of Directors (11/91-9/96), (9/99- ), Advisor (9/96-10/99) GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., Foster City, California--Chairman, Board of Directors (1/97- ); Member, Board of Directors (7/88- ); Audit Committee (4/89-97); Compensation Committee (4/91-97) TRIBUNE COMPANY, Chicago, Illinois--Member, Board of Directors (7/ 92- ); Executive Committee (5/96- ); Audit Committee (7/92-5/95); Governance and Compensation Committee (5/95- ); Incentive Compensation Subcommittee of the Governance and Compensation Committee (5/96-5/99); Finance Committee (7/92-5/95); Technical Advisory Committee (9/92-2/ 00)--Chairman (5/95-2/00); [Leave of Absence from 7/8/96 to 11/6/96]. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: PRIVATE COMPANIES OVERX, INC., Chicago, IL--Member, Board of Directors (7/99- ); Compensation Committee (10/99-12/99) *,**SHOTPUT HOLDINGS, INC. (Owned 100 percent by Donald Rumsfeld to hold fractional interest in aircraft that are operated and maintained by a third-party), Chicago, IL--Member, Board of Directors and President (11/95- ). ADVISORY RELATIONSHIPS: PUBLIC COMPANIES INVESTOR AB, Stockholm, Sweden--Advisor (1/94- ) METRICOM, INC., Los Gatos, California--Member, Advisory Board (1/ 94- ) NVIDIA, Sunnyvale, California--Business Advisor (2/98- ) SALOMON SMITH BARNEY, New York, New York--Chairman, International Advisory Board (11/98- ). ADVISORY BOARDS: PRIVATE COMPANIES THE HAMILTON GROUP, Washington, DC.--Member, Advisory Board (2/97- ) TRANSACTION INFORMATION SYSTEMS (TIS), New York. NY--Advisory Board (4/99- ) THESCIENCE.COM--Menlo Park, CA--Advisory Board (4/00- ). U.S. GOVERNMENT RELATED DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--Washington, DC--Consultant (WOC)(7/98- ). CONGRESSIONAL POLICY ADVISORY BOARD, Republican Policy Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC--Member, Advisory Board (1/98- ). CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP, Washington, DC--Chairman (6/22/00- ) SENATOR PETER FITZGERALD BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Chicago, IL-- Member (12/98- ) NATIONAL PARK FOUNDATION, Washington, DC--Member, Board of Trustees (8/90-8/96) (1/93-7/94) (11/97- ); Selection Committee for Theodore Roosevelt Medal (3/95- ); Selection Committee for Board (6/95-4/96); Development Committee (1/98- ); Executive Committee (10/92-4/96)(1/98- ); Finance Committee (10/92-4/96); New Initiatives Task Force (1/93-7/ 94); Government Relations Committee (7/94-4/96); Governance Committee (1/98-9/98)(11/98- ); Chairman, Governance Committee (11/98-7/00) U.S. COMMISSION TO ASSESS NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION, Washington, DC--Chairman (6/00-12/00). LT. GOVERNOR CORINNE WOOD BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Chicago, IL--Member (3/99- ). BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: NOT FOR PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS CHICAGO HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Chicago, Illinois--Member, Board of Trustees (7/97- ); Exhibitions Committee (10/97-11/99); Finance Committee (10/97-4/00) *DHR FOUNDATION, Chicago, Illinois--President (12/85- ). (Possibly without investment control) EISENHOWER EXCHANGE FELLOWSHIPS, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-- Chairman Emeritus (5/93- ); Chairman, Board of Trustees (5/86-5/93); Executive Committee (5/93-5/95) EMPOWER AMERICA, New York, New York--Member, Board of Directors (1/ 93- ) *GERALD R. FORD FOUNDATION, Grand Rapids, Michigan--Member, Board of Trustees (9/81- ); Awards and Grants Committee (3/82-7/90); Program Committee (7/90-7/92); Endowment/Development Committee (7/92- ) HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE, Stanford, California--Member, Board of Overseers (8/83-2/87, 7/88-6/94 & 7/97- ); Finance Committee (7/97-3/98); Nominating Committee (7/97- ); Executive Committee (4/98- ) JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE, Japan--Member, Board of Trustees (1990- ). RAND CORPORATION, Santa Monica, California--Chairman, Board of Trustees (4/81-4/86)(4/95-12/96); Member, Board of Trustees (4/77-4/ 87)(4/88-4/98)(4/99- ); Executive Committee (4/77-4/87) (4/88-4/98)(4/ 99- ); Member, Audit Committee (4/95-4/98)(4/99-4/00); Endowment Fund Subcommittee (4/95-12/96); Corporate Development Advisory Committee (7/ 904/98- ); Chairman, Nominating Committee (4/97-4/98); Member, Nominating Committee (4/78-4/87 & 4/95-4/98); and Ad Hoc Committee for the National Defense Research Institute (4/94-11/94); Member, Corporate Development Advisory Committee (7/90-4/98); President's Council (9/93- 4/98); RAND Graduate School Committee (4/95-4/98); Member, Advisory Committee of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy (5/96-4/98); Member, Long-Term Investment Fund Subcommittee (4/99- ); Member, Ad Hoc Venture Advisory Committee (7/99- ). RAND Transition 2001, Washington, DC-- Panel Member (1/00-12/00). [Took leave of absence as Chairman/Member of the Board of Trustees of RAND from 6/96-12/96.] RAND Russian-American Business Leaders Forum, Santa Monica, California--Member (11/97- ) SMITH RICHARDSON FOUNDATION, New York, New York--Member, Grant Advisory Committees--Domestic (6/98-12/99); Foreign Policy (6/98- ) THE NATIONAL SECURITY FUNDERS INSTITUTE, New York, New York-- Advisory Board (3/00- ). UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois--Member, Department of Economics Chairman's Council (6/97- ) *AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY, Washington, DC--Member (10/83- ) BRETTON WOODS COMMITTEE, Washington, DC--Member (7/96- ) CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Chicago, Illinois--Member (6/ 93- ). (Member, Board of Directors, 5/85-6/92) *COUNCIL OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS, Washington, DC--Member (8/83- ) FIRST FLIGHT CENTENNIAL FOUNDATION, Raleigh-Durham Airport, NC (6/ 99- ) *FORMER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, Washington, DC.--Member (1975- ) INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS), London, England--Member (6/78- ) THE MARSH INSTITUTE (former Congressman John Marsh; D-VA), Shenandoah University, Winchester, Virginia--Member, Honorary Committee (11/98- ) *NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (NAPA), Washington, DC.--Member (9/81- ) NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM, Chicago, Illinois--Member (9/83- ). ADVISORY: ALEXIS de TOCQUEVILLE INSTITUTION--NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, Arlington, VA--Member, Senior Advisory Board (9/93- ) CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES--The Global Organization on Crime, Washington, DC.--Member, Steering Committee (11/ 97- ) COMMITTEE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, Arlington, Virginia--Senior Advisory Board member (9/93- ) GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Washington, DC.--Member, Committee for Democracy in Russia (4/96- ) INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, New York, New York--Member, International Advisory Board (6/88- ); Member Board of Trustees (6/86- 6/88) THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, Washington, DC.--Member, Advisory Board (10/85- ) JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE, INC. (JCIE/USA), New York, New York--Board of Trustees (10/92- ) JOHN E. MOSS (former Congressman John Moss; D-CA) FOUNDATION CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Chicago, IL--Member (1/99- ) THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE STUDY GROUP ON U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY STEERING COMMITTEE, Washington, DC--Member (2/00- ). POLITICAL ACTIVITIES: 42ND WARD REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION, Chicago, Illinois--Member (9/85- ). OTHER: *ALFALFA CLUB, Washington, DC--Member (1976- ) *BOHEMIAN CLUB, San Francisco, California--Member (12/86- ); H.B. Camp (8/87- ) *CAPITOL HILL CLUB, Washington, DC--Member (5/85- ) *CASTLE PARK PLATFORM TENNIS ASSOCIATION, Castle Park, Michigan-- Member (1980- ) *COMMERCIAL CLUB, Chicago, IL--Member (3/79- ). Executive Committee (5/92-5/93) *88TH CONGRESSIONAL CLUB, Washington, DC--Member (1965- ) *THE FEBRUARY GROUP (President Nixon Administration Alumni), Alexandria, Virginia--Member (4/91- ) THE 410 CLUB, Chicago, Illinois--Member (12/93- ) *FOURTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, Chicago, Illinois--Member (9/90- ) *FRIENDS OF PRINCETON WATER POLO, Princeton, New Jersey--Member *FRIENDS OF PRINCETON WRESTLING COMMITTEE, Princeton, New Jersey-- Member (7/96- ) OUTSTANDING AMERICANS SELECTION COMMITTEE, National Wrestling Hall of Fame, Stillwater, Oklahoma--Member (10/97- ) *PRINCETON CLUB OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois--Member (10/91- ). Honorary member, Board of Directors. Awards Committee (06/93-06/94) *PRINCETON CLUB OF NEW YORK, New York, New York--Member (4/79-10/ 91, reinstated 4/93- ) *RACQUET CLUB OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois--Member (1/86- ) *REAGAN ALUMNI ASSOCIATION, Alexandria, Virginia--Member (1990- ) *SOS CLUB, Washington, DC.--Member (1964- ). FIDUCIARY: *DONALD H. RUMSFELD REVOCABLE TRUST u/a/d October 6, 1978, as amended (1978- ) *DONALD H. RUMSFELD 1998 GRANTOR RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST (1998- ). INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIPS: The entities listed under this heading overwhelmingly represent investments in which I have no active role. My participation is predominately that of a passive investor **BIOTECHNOLOGY VENTURE PARTNERS, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited Partner (1995- ) **BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES VII, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner (1995- ) **BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES VIII, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner (1997- ) **BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES IX, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner (1998- ) **CERBERUS INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS, L.P., New York, NY--Limited Partner (1999- ) **CHENGWEI VENTURES FUND I, L.P., Shanghai, China--Limited Partner (2000- ) **COMPASS I, L.P., Chicago, IL--Limited Partner (1997- ). **CONVERGENCE CAPITAL GROUP, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited Partner (2000- ) **DEERFIELD PARTNERS, L.P., New York, NY--Limited Partner (1994- ). **FLAG GROWTH CAPITAL, L.P., Stamford, CT--Limited Partner (2000- ) **FLAG VENTURE PARTNERS IV, L.P., Stamford, CT--Limited Partner (2000- ) **FLC XXX PARTNERSHIP, New York, NY--General Partner (1998- ) **HAMILTON TECHNOLOGY VENTURES, L.P., San Diego, CA--Limited Partner (2000- ). **JORD PARTNERSHIP, Schaumburg, IL--General Partner (1990- ) **KINGSBURY CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P. III, San Diego, CA--Limited Partner (1998- ) **LASALLE RECOVERY VENTURE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Chicago, IL-- Limited Partner (1994- ) **LAZY O RANCH LTD. PARTNERSHIP, Schaumburg, IL--Limited Partner (1988- ) **LCOR, INC., Schaumburg, IL--50 percent shareholder (1996- ) **LLANO HOT SPRINGS PARTNERSHIP, Taos, NM--General Partner (1992- ) **MAVERICK CAPITAL, Dallas, TX--Limited Partner (1997- ) **MUTUALFUNDS.COM, Boston, MA--Limited Liability Company Member (1999- ) **OCM OPPORTUNITIES FUND III, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner (1999- ) **OCM OPPORTUNITIES FUND, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner (1995- ) **OPTION ADVANTAGE PARTNERS, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited Partner (2000 ) **POLARIS VENTURE PARTNERS III, L.P., Waltham, MA--Limited Partner (2000- ) **R. CHANEY & PARTNERS III L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner (1997- ) **R. CHANEY & PARTNERS IV, L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner (1998- ) **ROBERTSON STEPHENS RESIDENTIAL FUND, L.P., San Francisco, CA-- Limited Partner (1994- ) **SCF PARTNERS III, L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner (1995- ) **SCF PARTNERS IV, L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner (1998- ) **SILVER LAKE SPECIAL TRUST, New York, NY--Limited Partner (1999- ) **STINSON CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited Partner (1998- ) **SUMMIT VENTURES IV, L.P., Boston, MA--Limited Partner (1995- ) **TECOLOTE LAND LLC, Schaumburg, IL--Limited Liability Company Member (2000- ) **THOMAS H. LEE FUND V, L.P., Boston, MA--Limited Partner (2000- ) **TIGER MANAGEMENT L.L.C., New York, NY--Limited Partner (1993- ) **TRANSPAC CAPITAL 1996 INVESTMENT TRUST, Tortola, British Virgin Islands--Limited Partner (1997- ) **TWP CEO FOUNDERS' CIRCLE (QP), L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited Partner (1999- ). **VECTOR LATER STAGE EQUITY FUND II, L.P., Deerfield, IL--Limited Partner (1997- ) **WASHINGTON CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.L.C., Washington, DC--Limited Liability Company Member (2000- ) **YBR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Chicago, IL--General Partner (1987- ) **YBR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP II, Chicago, IL--Limited Partner (1992- ) 12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. See Question 11. 13. Political affiliations and activities: (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years. See Attachment A-13(a) (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements. This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional omissions. AWARDS AND HONORS ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date Awards/Honors ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1947...................................... Eagle Scout Award 1948...................................... Elected Vice President of Junior Class, New Trier High School, Winnetka, Illinois 1949-50................................... Elected Vice President of the Tri-Ship Club, New Trier High School, Winnetka, Illinois 1949-50................................... Awarded the Fathers Club Award as the Outstanding Wrestler in 1949 and in 1950, New Trier High School, Winnetka, Illinois 1949-50................................... Elected Co-Captain of the New Trier High School Varsity Wrestling Team (State Champions), Winnetka, Illinois 1950...................................... Awarded scholarship to Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 1950-51................................... Awarded the Hooker Trophy as the Outstanding Freshman Wrestler, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 1951-54................................... Selected in a national competition for an NROTC Regular Scholarship, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 1953...................................... Elected Captain, Princeton University Varsity 150 lb. Football Team, Princeton, New Jersey 1953...................................... Elected Captain of the Princeton University Varsity Wrestling Team, Princeton, New Jersey 1953-54................................... Awarded the Triede Award as the Outstanding Varsity Wrestler in 1953 and in 1954, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 1/55...................................... Designated Naval Aviator 1956...................................... Won the All Navy Wrestling Championship title at 147 lbs 1956...................................... Won the Olympic District Wrestling Championship at 160 lbs 1956...................................... Selected as a Flight Instructor in the Instructor's Basic Training Group, U.S. Navy, Pensacola, Florida 1962...................................... Elected to the U.S. Congress, 13th District of Illinois 1964...................................... Re-elected to the U.S. Congress, 13th District of Illinois 1964-66................................... Awarded the Watchdog of the Treasury Award, by the National Association of Businessmen in 1964, 1966 and 1968 1965...................................... Selected as one of the ten Outstanding Young Men by the Chicago Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Chicago, Illinois 1966...................................... Re-elected to the U.S. Congress, 13th District of Illinois 1967-68................................... Elected President of the 88th Club (Republican Members of the U.S. Congress who were elected in 1962) 1968...................................... Re-elected to the U.S. Congress, 13th District of Illinois, by the highest percentage (76) of all Congressmen in the U.S 1975...................................... Awarded the Distinguished Eagle Scout Award 1975...................................... Awarded the Opportunity Industrial Centers (OIC) Executive Government Award, presented by Rev. Leon Sullivan 5/18/75................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree--Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois 5/25/75................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree--Park College, Kansas City, Missouri 6/7/75.................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree--Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Illinois 10/2/76................................... Awarded the Leadership Citation for Outstanding Public Service, presented by the American Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1/10/77................................... Awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom--with distinction--the Nation's highest civilian award, Washington, D.C 3/17/80................................... Awarded the Gold Medal as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry, presented by Wall Street Transcript 1981...................................... Received the Northwest Suburban 1981 ``Good Scout'' Award, presented by Northwest Suburban (Ill.) Boy Scouts 2/23/81................................... Awarded the Bronze Medal as the #3 Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry, presented by Wall Street Transcript 3/11/81................................... Presented the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer Award in the Pharmaceutical Industry, by Financial World 4/81...................................... Elected Chairman of the Board of Trustees of The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 4/12/81................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree--Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama 5/16/81................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor of Science in Business Administration Degree-- Bryant College, Smithfield, Rhode Island 9/81...................................... Elected to the National Academy of Public Administration 1/25/82................................... Awarded a Silver Medal as the #2 Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry, presented by Wall Street Transcript 1/31/83................................... Awarded the Sliver Medal as the #2 Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry, presented by Wall Street Transcript 4/1/83.................................... Awarded the Executive of the Year Award, by the University of Arizona Business Advisory Council, Tucson, Arizona 5/6/83.................................... Awarded the Invest-in- America Eagle Award for dedication to the country's enterprise system 5/26/83................................... Presented the City Club of Chicago 80th Anniversary Award honoring Outstanding Chicagoans 7/9/83.................................... Presented the Golden Plate Award, by American Academy of Achievement 10/17/84.................................. Awarded the George Catlett Marshall Medal, by the U.S. Army Association, Washington, DC 2/16/85................................... Awarded the Woodrow Wilson Medal, by Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 3/5/85.................................... Presented the Marketing Man of the Year Award, by the Commercial Development Association, Inc 9/27/85................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree, by the National College of Education, Evanston, Illinois 11/20/85.................................. Presented the Shelby Cullom Davis Award, by the Ethics & Public Policy Center, Washington, DC 4/28/86................................... Presented the Award of Merit for Entrepreneurship from the Wharton School of Business of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 7/86...................................... Awarded the George Washington Honor Medal for Excellence in Public Address, by the Freedoms Foundation, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania 7/86...................................... Presented the Outstanding Private Sector Leader Award, by The American Legislative Exchange Council 9/87...................................... Presented the Professional Manager of the Year Award, by the Society for the Advancement of Management, Chicago Chapter, Chicago, Illinois 5/88...................................... Awarded Honorary Doctor of Letters Degree, by Claremont University Center and Graduate School, Claremont, California 4/8/90.................................... To be inducted into the Illinois Wrestling Coaches and Officials Hall of Fame 6/10/90................................... Awarded Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree, DePaul University College of Commerce, Chicago, Illinois 11/22/91.................................. Awarded Certificate of Appreciation, Private Sector Council, Washington, DC 4/23/92................................... Presented the Henry Townley Heald Award by Lewis Collens, President, Institute of Technology at Ceremony honoring 10-year members of the President's Council, Chicago, Illinois 5/2/92.................................... Induction as a Distinguished American by the National Wrestling Hall of Fame & Museum, Stillwater, Oklahoma 5/22/93................................... Awarded Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree, Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Illinois 5/27/93................................... Presented the Dwight David Eisenhower Medal, Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 7/10/93................................... Awarded Honorary Degree of Doctor of Public Policy, The RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, California 6/19/97................................... Presented the Atlantic Legal Foundation Award for Free Enterprise, New York, New York 5/10/98................................... Presented the Doctor of Laws from Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden-Sydney, Virginia 10/7/98................................... The Center for Security Policy 10th Anniversary ``Keeper of the Flame'' Award, Four Seasons Hotel, Washington, DC 4/27/00................................... Presented the Distinguished Community Service Award, Princeton Club of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 9/21/00................................... Named 42nd Ward Republican of the Year 2000, Chicago, Illinois ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written. This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional omissions. DOCUMENTS WRITTEN BY DR 1/65...................................... ``Freedom of Information Law'' 1966...................................... ``Summary of Congressman Rumsfeld's Efforts on the Freedom of Information Bill'' 1967...................................... ``Account of Effort to Free Future Farmers of America (FFA) from Federal Control'' 10/68..................................... ``The Long Day''--written draft unpublished 1976...................................... ``Which Five Year Shipbuilding Program?'' written for the Naval Institute Proceedings 1/6/77.................................... ``The All Volunteer Force: Myths & Realities'' ``The Economics of Good Intentions: The Carter Guidelines'' for Wage and Price Guidelines/ Commonsense 2/13/79................................... ``Costly Education: History Gives a Lesson on Wage Price Controls,'' The San Diego Union 12/79..................................... ``Is the Regulatory Process Working?'' Pharmaceutical Technology 6/27/80................................... ``The U.S. in a Dangerous, Untidy World'' National Review 11/80..................................... ``A Presidency for the 1980s'' 12/10/80.................................. ``The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'' 12/80..................................... ``ORBIS: A Journal of World Affairs'' 1980...................................... ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' 1980...................................... ``America Must Respond,'' Comparative Strategy 1983...................................... ``The Gauntlet-In Search of a Bipartisan Foreign Policy, The Challenge to a Genuine Debate'' 1/14/83................................... ``The Nuclear Balance in Europe: Status, Trends, Implications'' (introduction by DR) for the United States Strategic Institute 2/83...................................... Defense Forum, Armed Forces Journal International 1984...................................... ``Beyond Containment? The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations'' 11/84..................................... ``Five Business Views of Deficits & Taxes,'' Commentary 3/13/85................................... ``Rumsfeld Recollects'' Wilson Award Winner, Princeton Alumni Weekly 10/18/85.................................. ``The Middle East & State Sponsored Terrorism'' The Commonwealth Winter, 1985.............................. ``Analysis of Capitalism,'' Keynote Address, Business Today 7/28/86................................... Statement by The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld as read to Duncan Sellars of Conservative Caucus 2/21/87................................... ``America's Competitive Position in the World, The Commonwealth 2/92...................................... Message from the Chairman 6/96...................................... ``Economic Freedom, Political Liberty, and Prosperity'' for Freedom House 6/96...................................... Statement for The Wall Street Journal on Missile Defense 7/30/96................................... Reprint of Freedom House article, ``Economic Freedom. . .'' published by the Christian Science Monitor 9/05/96................................... ``The Bob Dole Tax Plan Will Work'' Chicago Tribune-- Voice of the People 3/05/97................................... ``No to the Chemical Arms Treaty'' The Washington Post, written by James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld Fall 1998................................. The Ambassador's Review 1/65...................................... Freedom of Information Law 1966...................................... Freedom of Information, Summary 1967...................................... Account of Effort to Free Future Farmers of America (FFA) from Federal Control 10/68..................................... The Long Day--written draft unpublished 1977...................................... Which Five Year Shipbuilding Program? Naval Institute Proceedings 1/6/77.................................... The All Volunteer Force: Myths & Realities Date?..................................... The Economics of Good Intentions: The Carter Guidelines 12/79..................................... Is the Regulatory Process Working? Pharmaceutical Technology 6/27/80................................... The U.S. in a Dangerous World, National Report 12/10/80.................................. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1980...................................... Rumsfeld's Rules 1980...................................... American Must Respond, Comparative Strategy 1983...................................... The Gauntlet 1/14/83................................... The Nuclear Balance in Europe: Status, Trends, Implications (introduction by DR) 2/83...................................... Defense Forum, Armed Forces International Journal 5/19/85................................... Book foreword for Wadi Haddad 7/28/86................................... Statement by The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld read to Duncan Sellars of Conservative Caucus 12/86..................................... Book foreword for John Andrews' Collected Essays 12/2/86................................... The Arms to Iran and Money to the Contra's Issue (unpublished) 4/27/92................................... Book forward for Tom Curtis Congressional Intent 16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? Yes. ______ [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.] ------ Signature and Date I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete Donald H. Rumsfeld This 9th day of January, 2001. [The nomination of Donald H. Rumsfeld was reported to the Senate by Senator John Warner on January 20, 2001, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on January 20, 2001.] NOMINATION OF DR. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ---------- TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2001 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, Collins, Bunning, Levin, Cleland, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Carnahan. Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Anita H. Rouse, deputy chief clerk; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel. Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, John R. Barnes, Edward H. Edens IV, William C. Greenwalt, Gary M. Hall, George W. Lauffer, Patricia L. Lewis, Thomas L. MacKenzie, Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes. Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority staff director; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Jennifer Key, Thomas C. Moore, Jennifer L. Naccari, and Michele A. Traficante. Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael P. Ralsky, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; Menda Sue Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Sheila Murphy, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman Warner. Good morning. The committee meets today on a very important nomination by President George W. Bush for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. I have had the privilege of knowing Dr. Wolfowitz for many years, worked with him in various capacities, and I commend the President for his nomination of this outstanding public servant. You are a man of accomplishments in many venues. You have many years of service in government and academia. You served in the Department of Defense on two previous occasions, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs from 1977 to 1980 and as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the period 1989 through 1993. You were Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Persian Gulf War, a critical juncture in the history of our country. The tenth anniversary is now being observed by our Nation and the coalition partners who came together under the leadership of President George Bush to mount that most important offensive against the aggression of Saddam Hussein. You have served in various other government assignments, including Chief of the State Department Policy Planning Staff and as Ambassador to Indonesia under the Reagan administration. In addition, you have had a distinguished career in the academic world, having taught at Yale, Johns Hopkins, and the National War College. Most recently, you served as Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. You have also appeared before this committee many times, providing valuable testimony, throughout your public career. Your insights and expertise have assisted this committee, and indeed Congress as a whole, in our deliberations and responsibilities, and we are confident, at least this Senator is, that you will continue to give that valued counsel and advice to this committee and Congress as a whole. If confirmed, you will be returning to the Department of Defense at a very challenging time in our history. In the judgment of many, and certainly this Senator, the threats growing against our interests as a Nation and those of our allies are more diverse, more complicated, than any time in contemporary history. I agree wholeheartedly with the directions which President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld are taking towards their new leadership roles in national security affairs, and most particularly the Department of Defense. It is a wise decision for the President and the Secretary of Defense to determine that they would undertake a top-to-bottom study long-term of the issues, beginning with the threat, the need to realign the military in many ways to meet these changing threats, and to take a long and counseled course for deciding which programs should continue and those that should be terminated. I continue--and I am perhaps a lone voice in some respects on this--to believe that we have short-term interests that have to be addressed, hopefully eventually in a supplemental appropriation late this summer or perhaps even earlier--before the Fourth of July is the target date I have. We will work along on that issue. Secretary Rumsfeld has asked this committee, during his confirmation hearing and in subsequent consultations, to move as quickly as we can on key nominations. I think that we are doing that in every respect. I commend my distinguished colleague, the ranking member, Mr. Levin, in working to see that this nomination has been handled properly and promptly, and we will continue to do that. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me welcome our nominee. I see Senator Sarbanes is here to introduce him and we are delighted that he is present this morning. I am pleased to join you in welcoming Paul Wolfowitz and his family to the Armed Services Committee for today's hearing. Mr. Wolfowitz is familiar with the work of this committee from the many times that he has testified before us and the House in his role as Dean of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He surely is familiar with the job to which he has been nominated from his previous service as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves in a position of awesome responsibility. He is the alter ego of the Secretary. In this capacity, the new Deputy Secretary will play a key role in determining how our country will meet the national security challenges that face us today. For example: How do we need to transform our military forces to meet a new set of threats over the coming decades? What new weapons systems and technologies do we need to field? Do we need to skip a generation of technology to do so? Will the National Missile Defense make us more or less secure? Should we commit to deploy such a system? If so, what system should we deploy and under what circumstances? To what extent should the United States remain engaged around the world--for example in Kosovo, Bosnia, Colombia, and even on the Korean peninsula? What is the best approach to restrain Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction and from threatening his neighbors in the Persian Gulf? Over the years, the best approach to foreign policy and national security policy has always been a bipartisan one. The administration is properly conducting a strategic review to determine the direction of our national security strategy and what direction our defense programs should take in the years ahead. I have supported President Bush's and Secretary Rumsfeld's decision to conduct this review before determining the level of resources that we should apply to our national defense. I look forward to working with them on these issues over the next several years. In addition, the Deputy Secretary has traditionally served as the chief manager of the Defense Department. A wide array of management challenges, including financial management, information security, and human capital issues, cut across functional areas in the Department to such an extent that no official other than the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary has the authority needed to address them. To take just one example, DOD's financial systems remain in need of modernization, with hundreds of partially-linked, error-prone computer systems spread throughout the Department. As a result, the Department remains unable to account for billions of dollars of property, equipment, inventory, and supplies, and unable to reconcile billions of dollars in differences between checks issued by the Department of Defense and reported to the Treasury. So if Mr. Wolfowitz is confirmed, and I expect that he will be, he will have a very full plate indeed. I look forward to working with you, as I know all members of this committee do. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Sarbanes, we are very fortunate, and indeed the nominee, to have you appear before this committee this morning. In my 23 years in the Senate I have come to know you very well and respect your knowledge on foreign affairs and national security matters. Indeed, we have traveled abroad together many times in this context of our security responsibilities. It is a privilege for this committee to welcome you this morning and to have you speak on behalf of this distinguished nominee. STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the Armed Services Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to recommend this morning to you, very strongly recommend, a distinguished Maryland resident, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense. Now, Mr. Chairman, I hope you will not hold it against him that he chose to live on the Maryland side of the Potomac and not the Virginia side. Chairman Warner. We observed that, but we will let it go by. Senator Sarbanes. We will let it pass. Thank you very much. Chairman Warner. He will be working in Virginia, though. Senator Sarbanes. I understand. Chairman Warner. If confirmed. Senator Sarbanes. Paul Wolfowitz has had a long and impressive career in both government and academia. Actually, his involvement in public service dates back to 1966, when he was a management intern in the Bureau of the Budget. From 1973 to 1977 he held various positions at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That posting was followed by his service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs from 1977 to 1980, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department in 1981 and 1982, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1982 to 1986. President Reagan then sent him from 1986 to 1989 as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world. During his tenure there, his post was cited as one of the four best-managed embassies reviewed by the inspectors in 1988. His last government position was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993, when Dick Cheney was the Secretary of Defense. This is a very wide-ranging and balanced government service, involving both the State Department and the Pentagon, and I think a very impressive blend of responsibilities. Shortly after leaving government service in 1993, Paul was appointed Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University here in Washington, commonly known as SAIS. SAIS is one of the preeminent institutions of higher learning devoted to the study of international relations. It is no wonder, of course, that he was appointed dean at this prestigious school because, in addition to important government service, he has outstanding academic qualifications: a B.A. in mathematics and chemistry from Cornell University in 1965, followed by an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in political science and economics. He has taught at Yale, SAIS, and the National War College, where he was the George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy. In my view, in the post-Cold War environment in which we operate, Paul's extensive background and experience should serve him well in this very significant and important post of Deputy Secretary of Defense. He has a solid grasp of complex defense and security issues, the diplomatic skills to operate in the international arena, the intellectual strength to look ahead to the challenges facing us in the 21st century, and the administrative skills to be the number two person in our largest government agency. No doubt his mathematics degree and his experience on budget matters will also come in handy at the Pentagon from time to time. Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with a quote from a statement released by the President of the Johns Hopkins University, William Brody, an outstanding educational leader, issued at the time of President Bush's announcement of his intention to nominate Paul to this position. President Brody said: ``The bad news is that Johns Hopkins is losing a great dean. The good news is that the country is getting a very smart, very focused, clear-thinking leader as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Paul Wolfowitz will serve the Nation well.'' Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I strongly concur with this assessment. I believe you have a highly qualified nominee before you who will serve our country well as Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I strongly urge his favorable consideration by the committee. Chairman Warner. Senator, we thank you. I think those of us who had the opportunity to know this distinguished nominee concur in your observations and that of the distinguished President of Johns Hopkins. Thank you, Senator. Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. At this point, I submit for the record the statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, who could not be here in person due to other Senate responsibilities. I also submit for the record the statement of Senator Strom Thurmond. [The prepared statements of Senator Mikulski and Senator Thurmond follow:] Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski Mr. Chairman: I appreciate the opportunity to express my support for the nomination of Dr. Paul Wolfowitz to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. Dr. Wolfowitz is well known to members of the Armed Services Committee. For over 30 years, he has committed his life to public service. As the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, he was the principal civilian responsible for strategy, plans and policy. As the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and as our Ambassador to Indonesia, Dr. Wolfowitz understands foreign policy as well as defense policy--and how the two are linked. Most recently, Dr. Wolfowitz served as dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University. He repositioned the school from a Cold War orientation, which it had since its founding, to a focus on the impact and challenges of globalization in the post-Cold War era. He strengthened the faculty, increased the endowment, raised funds for student aid and enhanced the school's visibility among policymakers in Washington and around the world. At the Pentagon, Dr. Wolfowitz will face great challenges. We need to improve the quality of life for our men and women in uniform--so that we can continue to attract the best and the brightest to serve in our military. We also need to upgrade our weapons and technology. For example, the average Navy aircraft is 18 years old. We need to invest in new aircraft quickly--to give our pilots what they need to defend America. I am pleased that Dr. Wolfowitz will bring his keen intellect and wide ranging experience to the important position of Deputy Secretary of Defense. I look forward to working with him to ensure that our military remains strong in a world constantly challenged by ethnic conflict, civil and nationalist tensions, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry that other Senate responsibilities prevent me from being here in person, but I look forward to voting for Dr. Wolfowitz when his nomination is considered by the full Senate. ______ Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond Thank you, Mr. Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I join you and the members of the Committee in welcoming Dr. Wolfowitz. I also want to take this opportunity to thank Deputy Secretary of Defense DeLeon for his service to our Nation while on the House Armed Services Committee and during the past 8 years in the many challenging positions he held in the Department of Defense. We may not always have been on the same side, but we always had the same goal of providing the best for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. Secretary Wolfowitz, congratulations on your nomination and on your superb record of public service. Your willingness to serve a third tour in the Department of Defense speaks highly of your dedication to our country and to the men and women who wear the uniforms of our military services. It is also noteworthy because holding public office requires many sacrifices and the rewards are few. Mr. Secretary, once confirmed, you will be part of the team that will face the challenge of transforming our armed forces, and for that matter the Department of Defense, to meet the challenges and threats of a new century. I want you to know that you can count on me, and, I believe the entire Armed Services Committee, to provide, on a bipartisan basis, the support that will be so critical toward achieving that goal. I wish you success and hope you will not hesitate to speak out forcefully on behalf of the men and women of our Armed Forces and the civilian employees of the Department of Defense. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Dr. Wolfowitz, you now have the unlimited opportunity to express such views as you wish. Following that, we will have a 6-minute round of questions by our members. STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, NOMINATED TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that unlimited opportunities are best kept short and I will read just a part of my statement and submit the rest for the record. I want to thank Senator Sarbanes for being so gracious as to make time in a very busy schedule to come and introduce me. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of the Armed Services Committee, it is a great honor to appear again before this committee, one that has done so much over the years to make our Nation strong and the world more peaceful. I am grateful to the President and to Secretary Rumsfeld for the confidence that they have shown in me by nominating me for a position of such great responsibility. If confirmed by the Senate, this will be my third tour in the Pentagon. It is also the second time that I come before this distinguished committee to seek confirmation for a senior position in the Department of Defense. On the previous occasion in 1989, it was a very different world. The Cold War was still a reality. Even in the heyday of Mr. Gorbachev, the principal threat to our Nation still came from a Soviet Union that was armed to the teeth with nuclear and conventional weapons. We had well over two million men and women on active duty to deter and, if necessary, to defend against this constant threat. Twelve years ago many observers believed that the United States was in a period of permanent decline and many pointed to other nations as models for reforming our economy. Budget deficits were taken as a given, the personal computer was a toddler, and the Internet was a mere infant. In the intervening years, the Cold War has become truly a part of history and we've fought and won a major war in the Persian Gulf. America did not decline, it prospered. We remain a vibrant world power with a position that is in many respects unique in the history of the world. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that our Nation desired to reap a peace dividend. We reduced our defense budget by 40 percent. We cut the force by nearly the same amount. Our defense budget was drawn down to the lowest percentage of our gross domestic product since the late 1930s. But the world remains, in Secretary Rumsfeld's phrase, a dangerous and untidy place. The need, indeed the demand, for U.S. leadership has increased as well. So, despite declining defense budgets and a shrinking force structure, in the past decade we drastically increased the number of military deployments for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. This added greatly to the workload of an already busy force, one that was struggling to maintain its combat readiness, with dedicated but tired troops manning aging equipment. Today, as General Shelton has said, the force is frayed. We must begin a long overdue renovation and transformation of the armed forces, so that we can preserve and extend the peace well into the 21st century. President Bush has set this task as one of the highest priorities of his administration. The President has set three important goals for the Department of Defense. First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. As General Creighton Abrams said when the all-volunteer force was first created: ``People aren't in the Army; they are the Army.'' The same is true of all the military services. Building on the dedicated work of the Senate and the House, we must continue to improve military pay and quality of life. But good pay and fair allowances by themselves won't keep the best people in the service. Working with Congress and our allies, we must also re-examine the balance among force levels, commitments, and deployments. We will have to make sure that we are focused on the most important defense tasks and not placing unreasonable demands on our men and women in uniform. We will also have to acknowledge the relationship between morale and readiness. President Bush has said that even the highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortage of spare parts and equipment, and declining readiness. Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorists, and the complex set of threats to our information systems and our all-important assets in space. U.S. military strength in the field is unparalleled. Many of our enemies therefore have determined that in order to move against us they must be able to strike us at home. Some have chosen to develop long-range missile systems. Others have chosen to support or direct terrorist attacks with conventional devices, weapons of mass destruction, or cyber weapons against our Nation, our forces, or our diplomats abroad. We must do everything in our power to stop them. Third, the Department of Defense must take advantage of the technological revolution to help us create a military for the 21st century. To this end, at the direction of the President, Secretary Rumsfeld has already launched a review of our defense strategy and programs designed to provide a sound understanding of the state of our armed forces and their readiness for the 21st century security environment. This work must be done quickly and it must be done before we can know what our true defense resource requirements are. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld believe, as the Secretary puts it, that we need to engage our brains before we open the taxpayers' wallets. I strongly support that approach and will work hard to shape a prompt and effective review. In addition to that review, to support and make progress on the President's goals, the Secretary has set five key objectives for the Department of Defense: First, to fashion and sustain a new form of deterrence appropriate to the new strategic environment, a deterrence based less on massive levels of punishment or retaliation and more on the use of both defensive and offensive means to deny our adversaries the opportunity and benefits that come from the use of weapons of mass destruction. Second, to assure the readiness and sustainability of our armed forces now and into the future. This will require not only spending to bring up current readiness levels, but also investment in the modernization efforts that our forces need to avoid being caught in a trap of making ever-increasing expenditures to maintain aging equipment. Third, to modernize our command and control and space capabilities to support our 21st century needs. That infrastructure is the foundation of American military strength. Fourth, to begin reshaping the U.S. defense establishment to meet new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities, we must begin to move, as President Bush has said, beyond marginal improvements to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies. Building on the superb human capital of the current force, we must fashion a future force that is at once more agile, more lethal, and more rapidly deployable. It must be able to operate over increasingly longer ranges. It must integrate the capabilities of all of the services so that field commanders have the best possible combination of air, sea, and land weapons for each situation, and it must have the best technology that America can offer. Our dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen deserve no less. Finally, we must reform Department of Defense structures, processes, and organizations. We need to seek greater efficiencies, not only to safeguard the taxpayers' money, but also because that will allow us to create better weapon systems and invest more in the cutting edge of our Nation's defenses. There is no more solemn responsibility that the American people entrust to the Federal Government than to provide for the common defense. There is no group of Americans who deserve more respect and honor from their fellow citizens than the men and women of our armed forces who daily put themselves in harm's way for that constitutional purpose. It is both exciting and humbling to be asked once again to help lead them in their work for the common defense. Mr. Chairman, it is more than just an honor to be nominated by the President to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is also a great responsibility. I appreciate the trust that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have placed in me. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work closely with this committee to achieve our common goals. Indeed, I pledge to you that, if confirmed, I will work with the services, Congress, and the defense industry to help the President and the Secretary prepare our armed forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Dr. Wolfowitz follows:] Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul Wolfowitz Senator Warner, Senator Levin, Members of the Armed Services Committee: It is an honor to appear again before this great committee, one that has done so much over the years to make our Nation strong and the world more peaceful. I am grateful to the President and Secretary Rumsfeld for the confidence that they have shown in me by nominating me for a position of such great responsibility. When I think of the men and women who have sought confirmation here in the past, and the number of important laws--like the Goldwater-Nichols Act--that have originated with this committee, I feel truly humbled. If confirmed by the Senate, this will be my third tour in the Pentagon. It is also the second time that I have come before this distinguished committee to seek confirmation for a senior position in the Department of Defense. On the previous occasion, in 1989, it was a very different world. The Cold War was still a reality. Even in the heyday of Mr. Gorbachev, the principal threat to our Nation still came from a Soviet Union that was armed to the teeth with nuclear and conventional weapons. We had well over 2 million men and women on Active Duty to deter and, if necessary, defend against this constant threat. Twelve years ago, many observers believed that the United States was in a period of permanent decline, and many pointed to other nations as models for reforming the U.S. economy. Budget deficits were taken as a given, the personal computer was a toddler, and the Internet was a mere infant. In the intervening years, the Cold War has become part of history, and we have fought and won a major war in the Persian Gulf. America did not decline, it prospered. We remain a vibrant world power, with a position that is in many respects unique in the history of the world. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that our Nation desired to reap a peace dividend. We reduced our defense budget by 40 percent, and cut the force by nearly the same amount. Our defense budget was drawn down to the lowest percentage of our gross domestic product since the late 1930s. But the world remained, in Secretary Rumsfeld's phrase, a ``dangerous and untidy'' place. Amidst the peace that encompassed the developed world, ethnic conflict, regional thugs, failed states, terrorists, and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction presented new challenges. The need, indeed the demand, for U.S. leadership increased, as well. Despite declining defense budgets and a shrinking force structure, in the past decade we drastically increased the number of military deployments for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. This added greatly to the workload of an already busy force, one that was struggling to maintain its combat readiness with dedicated, but tired troops manning aging equipment. Today, as General Shelton has said, the force is ``frayed.'' We must begin a long overdue renovation and transformation of the Armed Forces in order to preserve and extend the peace well into the 21st century. President Bush has set this task as one of the highest priorities of his administration. As the President has reminded us, peace is not ordained, it is earned; and it must be earned, in particular, by the hard and often dangerous work of our men and women in uniform. The President has set three important goals for the Defense Department: First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military. As General Creighton Abrams said when the All-Volunteer Force was first created, ``people aren't in the Army, people are the Army''--and the same is true of all the military services. Building on the dedicated work of the House and the Senate, we must continue to improve military pay and quality of life. But good pay and fair allowances by themselves won't keep the best people in the service. Working with Congress and with our allies, we must also reexamine the balance among force levels, commitments, and deployments. We will have to make sure that we are focused on the most important defense tasks, and not placing unreasonable demands on our men and women in uniform. We will also have to acknowledge the relationship between morale and readiness. President Bush has said that ``even the highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortage of spare parts and equipment, and rapidly declining readiness.'' Our men and women in uniform must have first-class equipment, adequate materiel for training and maintenance, decent barracks, modern family quarters, and suitable working conditions. Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorists and the complex set of threats to our information systems and our all-important assets in space. U.S. power in the field is unparalleled. Many of our enemies have determined that in order to move against us, they must be able to strike us at home. Some have chosen to develop long-range missile systems. Others have chosen to support or direct terrorist attacks--with conventional devices, weapons of mass destruction, or cyber weapons--against our Nation, our forces, or our diplomats abroad. We must do everything in our power to stop them. Third, the Department of Defense must take advantage of the technological revolution to help us create a military for the 21st century. To this end, at the direction of the President, Secretary Rumsfeld has already launched a review of our defense strategy and programs designed to provide a sound understanding of the state of our Armed Forces and their readiness for the 21st century security environment. This work must be done quickly, and it must be done before we can know what our true defense resource requirements are. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld believe, as the Secretary puts it, that we need to ``engage our brains before we open the taxpayer's wallet.'' I strongly support that approach and will work hard to shape a prompt and effective review. In addition to that review, to support and make progress on the President's goals, the Secretary has set five key objectives for the Department of Defense: First, we must fashion and sustain a new form of deterrence appropriate to the new strategic environment. The proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a key element in the new strategic environment. We need new concepts and forms of deterrence to deal with it. We need a deterrence based less on massive levels of punishment or retaliation, and more on the use of both defensive and offensive means to deny our adversaries the opportunity and benefits that come from the use of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we must assure the readiness and sustainability of our Armed Forces, now and into the future. This will require not only spending to bring up current readiness levels, but also investment in the re-capitalization and modernization efforts that our forces need to avoid being caught in the trap of making ever-increasing expenditures to maintain aging equipment. Third, we must modernize our command and control, and space capabilities to support our 21st century needs. Our command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure is the foundation of American military strength. That infrastructure is essential for current operations and indispensable for adapting today's force to take advantage of new technology to meet 21st century challenges. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, we must significantly improve our intelligence and space capabilities, as well as our ability to protect them against various forms of attack. Fourth, we must begin reshaping the U.S. defense establishment to meet new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. We face the demanding task of preparing for an uncertain future where there are many individual, unpredictable threats but no single major adversary to focus our efforts. We will have to make a stronger effort to define the key tasks and begin to move, as President Bush has said, ``beyond marginal improvements to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies.'' Building on the superb human capital of the current force, we must fashion a future force that is at once more agile, more lethal, and more rapidly deployable. It must be able to operate over increasingly longer ranges. It must integrate the capabilities of all of the services so that field commanders have the best possible combination of air, sea, and land weapons for each situation; and it must have the best technology that America can offer. Our dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen deserve no less. Finally, we must reform Department of Defense structures, processes, and organizations. We need to seek greater efficiencies not only to safeguard the taxpayer's money, but also because that will allow us to create better weapons systems and invest more in the cutting edge of our Nation's defenses. There is no more solemn responsibility that the American people entrust to the Federal Government than--in the words of the Constitution--``to provide for the common defense.'' There is no group of Americans who deserve more respect and honor from their fellow citizens than the men and women of our Armed Forces, who daily put themselves in harm's way for that constitutional purpose. It is both exciting and humbling to be asked again to help lead them in their work for the common defense. Mr. Chairman, it is more than just an honor to be nominated by the President to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, it is also a great responsibility. I appreciate the trust that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have placed in me. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work closely with this committee to achieve our common goals. Indeed, I pledge to you that I will work with the Services, Congress, and the defense industry to help the President and the Secretary prepare our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Wolfowitz. By the long-standing tradition of this committee, the Chair now propounds to you questions that are given to each nominee. First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, I have, Senator. Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? Dr. Wolfowitz. No, I have not, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that you and your staff comply with the deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record, by this committee and other committees of Congress? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I consider that a high priority. I also will work with Secretary Rumsfeld, as he indicated in his testimony, to try and see if we can streamline some of those requirements, because they are quite substantial, I have observed already. Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? Dr. Wolfowitz. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from any reprisal for their testimony or briefings? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, they will. Chairman Warner. The Chair notes that you have responded to the questions propounded by this committee and that they will be made a part of the record today. Now we will proceed on a round of 6 minutes to each member. Dr. Wolfowitz, you were in the Department of Defense during the Gulf War, and I copied a note from your opening statement in which you said, ``We fought and won the war in the Persian Gulf.'' Unquestionably, the coalition of military forces did fight bravely and win that war. It is interesting, it was a war of about 100 hours. The decision was made not to pursue Saddam Hussein's forces back into Iraq and I have always defended that decision that was made by our then-President George Bush. But the aftermath is not necessarily one of victory. We have seen 10 consecutive years now in which, although early on there was some compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions by Iraq, there has been absolute defiance of the Security Council resolutions and the understandings that were agreed to by Saddam Hussein. This morning I looked at the headlines and it said the U.S. is prepared to revise the sanctions regime and the caption was that we would lessen the sanctions. My question to you is, what do we get in return from Saddam Hussein and what is the likelihood that he will now comply with the clear obligations he undertook at the end of the conflict and the clear mandates of the Security Council? Dr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, in compliance with the strictures on me as a not yet confirmed nominee, I have not been intimately involved in the policy process on Iraq. I saw the same article you saw in the paper this morning. I have not yet seen a complete transcript of what Secretary Powell said. Chairman Warner. I recognize that you have not been involved in that. I understand that. But you have devoted much of your career to these types of issues and questions. What counsel and advice would you share with the President and the Secretary of Defense? Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe that what one has to do in approaching this issue, and it is a very difficult issue and you are absolutely correct in saying that we may have won the war, but we still have a major problem there as long as Saddam Hussein is in power--one needs not just a single policy decision, for example one concerning sanctions, one needs an overall strategy. That strategy has to reflect the reality of where you are today and where you hope to be a year from now or 2 years from now. I do believe that part of the reality is that where we are today is that we have lost a lot of ground since the end of the Gulf War and he has gained a lot of ground. In particular, the coalition that the first President Bush assembled to confront Iraq is not anything like what it used to be. Part of that problem is that Saddam has succeeded to a disturbing degree in cultivating the notion that the sanctions are not punishing him, they are only punishing the Iraqi people. I believe that part of what we need to do is make clear that the sanctions that are in place are not intended and should not prevent humanitarian assistance or food or medical supplies from getting to the Iraqi people. But I would also emphasize sanctions are not a policy; they are at best a part of a policy. I think the overall policy has to focus on how one can prevent him from getting weapons of mass destruction or get rid of them if he has them, how to keep him from becoming a threat to his neighbors by conventional or unconventional means, and hopefully, if possible, to devise a strategy to assist the Iraqi people in freeing themselves from this tyrant. That is not going to be something that is going to happen overnight. Chairman Warner. I have just returned from a trip to that region. Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and I and several other Senators, visited in Egypt with President Mubarak. We visited in Israel with Prime Minister-designate Sharon. It seems that there is a feeling that we can reconstitute under U.S. leadership in some measure the coalition of nations that fought that battle 10 years ago. Speaking for myself, I think that is probably the key to such new policies as we have towards Iraq. Regrettably, the United States and Great Britain have been going it alone certainly in the containment of Saddam Hussein through the very courageous air operations in the north and the south. In the Gulf itself we have been joined by several other nations in the naval activities to curtail the smuggling and other trafficking to and from Iraq in the Gulf waterways. But largely it has been the United States and Great Britain alone. My question to you is what is the likelihood that we can reconstitute in some measure that some 20-plus nations, is my recollection, that participated in that Gulf action? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think it is going to depend on what we want them for, and in fact we may not need all of them, depending on what we want to do. But I do think the key to putting the coalition together the first time and the key to reassembling another coalition if we need it is to convince people that there is a long-term outcome that benefits them. I think one of the problems we face today is they see many short-term costs. Every time there is a military strike, Arab governments suffer criticism from their own people. That is just one of many short-term costs. They do not see the long- term gain or benefit. It is crucial, I think, as the American piece of putting this coalition together to convince people that there is an outcome that is worth enduring those obvious costs. Chairman Warner. During the course of the early comments by President George W. Bush and based on his campaign commitments to the American people was the commitment to say that we would not engage the U.S. forces in the many and diverse actions that were undertaken by President Clinton. We now recognize that the Department of Defense was underfunded and the troops overextended in that period and corrections have to be made. In your work with Secretary Rumsfeld and indeed with the extraordinary competent security team the President has put together, what is the general framework? What are the general guidelines that should be laid down, in your judgment, to guide future military commitments by the United States and to guide those situations in which we will simply say, no, we will not participate? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think clearly one of the most important criteria is that it has to be something that is important to our national interests. It also has to be something where military forces can achieve the objectives of our national interest, and I think it has to be something where we have a strategy for success, that we have a way of achieving our goals and completing the mission and not end up in something that is an unending commitment with no way out. It is also true, Mr. Chairman, that I believe we need to be more careful about how we engage our forces. But one also has to be very careful about how you disengage. One cannot rewrite history and it is very important as we try to reduce the requirements and burdens that we have imposed by many commitments all around the world that we not recreate the very situations that we went in to prevent. Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wolfowitz, applying those criteria, where are we currently deployed where we should not be? Dr. Wolfowitz. It is not so much that we are deployed somewhere that we should not be, but I think everywhere that we are deployed we should look at the question of whether we need as much as we have. We should look at the question of whether we are heading down a road where we may tragically pull out precipitously. I think one of the very important things we want to avoid is the precedent--and it has been a bipartisan failure--in Beirut where we lost Marines and then suddenly pulled out, and Somalia where we lost Rangers and suddenly pulled out. It is very dangerous to have a commitment where we are undertaking dangers that we have not fully appreciated and that the American people are not prepared to support. As a general principle, I think we need to look as much as possible at turning responsibilities over to other people. Sometimes that means turning responsibilities over to our allies, sometimes--and I would hope this might be true in some places like East Timor and the Balkans--turning more responsibility over to the indigenous people themselves. Sometimes, where it is a matter where our highly trained combat people are performing what is essentially a police function, I would hope we could find policemen, hopefully not Americans, who can perform those functions. So it is less a matter that there is a specific place that we should pull out of, but rather everywhere that we have this very precious resource engaged we should try to make sure that there are not better alternatives. Senator Levin. I think we always should do that on an on- going and continuing basis. But you are not prepared to tell us where, applying those criteria and asking those questions, we should now plan on withdrawing forces? Dr. Wolfowitz. No, I am not. I think that is part of what this defense review that the Secretary is undertaking has to look at, although it is not entirely a Defense Department responsibility. Senator Levin. On the Iraq questions that the Chairman asked, you have previously said that the no-fly zones do not matter. You have been highly critical of that policy. You have also advocated what you have called a serious policy aimed at liberating the Iraqi people by creating a liberated zone in southern Iraq that could be used as a base by the Iraqi opposition. You have stated that it will take American forces, to use your words, to create a protected area in which the opposition forces can organize. Now, General Zinni, who is our most recent CINC in that area of the world, has taken a very different approach, saying that that approach which you have proposed is a dangerous illusion that was likely to lead to what he called a ``Bay of Goats''--like a Bay of Pigs kind of an operation. Do you still advocate the commitment of U.S. forces to support opposition elements within Iraq in an effort to overthrow Saddam? Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, it would depend on what those opposition forces are actually capable of doing. Every statement one makes, thoughtful statement about Iraq policy, as I said to the Chairman before, has to look at the context. In 1991, a month after the end of the Gulf War, we actually did put ground forces back into northern Iraq to create a protected zone under which Kurdish opposition forces could operate, and to this day, although there was a significant failure in 1996, northern Iraq is a largely liberated area. I think some of the statements you are referring to go back to a time a few years ago when Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Adviser, was saying that the problem of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction was something worth fighting for, and my reaction was, if it is worth fighting for, then it is worth fighting with whatever capabilities we need and not simply limiting ourselves to air power. Senator Levin. Is it worth fighting for? Dr. Wolfowitz. It depends on what we are being asked to do. When we were asked in 1991 to get the Kurdish refugees back into northern Iraq, it was a plausible plan that made sense. I have not yet seen a plausible plan today, but I would be very interested in seeing one. Senator Levin. Is that goal worth seeking? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think there is no question that the whole region would be a safer place, Iraq would be a much more successful country, and American national interests would benefit greatly if there were a change of regime in Iraq. Senator Levin. That being the case, why then do you apparently now back away from your previous statement that it is worth achieving a base from which the Iraqi opposition can attack Saddam? Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, because I believe it depends on the context. It depends on what your real options are. If there is a real option to do that, I would certainly think it is still worthwhile. Senator Levin. But you are not then saying that as of today there is a real option? Dr. Wolfowitz. I have not seen it yet. Senator Levin. On North Korea, do you have evidence that North Korea has cheated on the Framework Agreement? Dr. Wolfowitz. No, I do not, Senator. But during the months I spent with now Secretary Rumsfeld on the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission that he chaired, we kept hearing statements that there is no evidence of this and no evidence of that, and the commission as a whole began to come up with the saying, which I think George Tenet adopted, that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. In the case of a country like North Korea, where it is so hard to know what is going on, it is very hard to get hard evidence. There are bits of information that suggest it might be possible, but there is certainly no proof. Senator Levin. Do you advocate abrogating the Framework Agreement at this time? Dr. Wolfowitz. Not if the North Koreans comply with it, no. Senator Levin. Based on what you know, do you favor abrogating it at this time? Dr. Wolfowitz. No. Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you very much. Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wolfowitz, I do not think I have ever seen someone come in for confirmation with a more glittering array of credentials than you have. I think we are very fortunate to be having you at this confirmation hearing. Your credentials, as I think outlined by the Chairman and others, are both in the world of academia as well as in the Pentagon. What do you in your mind feel particularly qualifies you for this job with your background? Dr. Wolfowitz. I appreciate the question, Senator, because you have been polite, but I think one of the questions is: You are taking on--I am asking to be confirmed for a job that is essentially the chief operating officer of the Pentagon and it is quite a management challenge. I have had quite a bit of management experience. I would say for the last, ever since I was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, so that makes it the last 18 years, I have been managing organizations of 100 or multiple hundreds of people, and I think I would say reasonably successfully. I think there are two things that I bring to it as a manager. One is I believe in managing for results, whether the result was a focused American policy that helped to remove Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines or the result when I was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy implementing, designing and implementing a strategy that helped to keep Israel out of the Gulf War, or designing and implementing a strategy that raised $50 billion, more than $50 billion, from our allies and friends to support the war effort, or, on a more modest scale, but I hope I had a real impact, as Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, managing an enterprise of, if you count our students, over a thousand people, tens of millions of dollars, which is just a rounding error at the Pentagon, but it's real money, and a very successful capital campaign that raised four times our original goal. So I believe results is the way you measure management, not how many jobs you've held, and I believe people are the way you get results. That is the other thing I hope I bring to the job. There is something I think that some private sector managers do not quite appreciate about managing in government. It is even more so in the academic world. Your flexibility to reward people or to penalize people tangibly is limited. You have to motivate them in other ways. I think I have had the experience of motivating very good people to work ungodly hours for the national interest, and I hope I can continue to do that. Senator Inhofe. I am sure you can. The Chairman talked about how it might become necessary to reconstitute the 20-plus nation alliance that we once had should it become necessary in the Middle East. My concern is, while I am concerned for that, I am also concerned equally about reconstituting our state of readiness. The CINCs have identified some 87 readiness-related deficiencies, of which 31 of these are listed as category one, and that is our ability to fight a war. Are you prepared to try to address these? We brought these up before and nothing has happened in the last few years. How do you look at these identified deficiencies? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think that is one of the most important issues that this defense review that Secretary Rumsfeld is undertaking has to address. It is really central to the first of the President's priorities, because readiness is both a matter of our ability to fight wars, but it is also a measure of our ability to keep competent, capable people in the military services. So it is a top priority. Senator Inhofe. Also, some of the readiness issues that are there today, where there are some $4.5 billion of near-term readiness requirements, some of these I have been out in the field and I have seen. I use the example of out at Fort Bragg during a rain storm just that there is no roof on the barracks and they are covering up their equipment with their bodies. Real Property Maintenance (RPM) accounts that are supposed to be done immediately, they are robbing one account for the other to get ammunition. What is your feeling about a supplemental covering some of these things that really have to be done? Dr. Wolfowitz. As the Secretary said, we really have to do this review and do it quickly and see what our total requirements are and see if everything we are doing we need to do. But clearly we cannot have a force that is suffering from the kinds of problems that you have identified and we have to cover those things. Senator Inhofe. They are immediate. In your statement, I appreciate the fact that you talked about the problems that are out there threatening us, not just being missiles but other types, the suitcase type. When you sit on the floor of the Senate, those who are opposed to a National Missile Defense system are saying the real threat is that in a truck or a suitcase. Certainly, being from Oklahoma and the Murrah Federal Office Building, which you are very familiar with, I guess the most significant domestic terrorist attack in the history of America, I am very sensitive to that. Yet, just one nuclear warhead has a thousand times that explosive power. So I hope that you would look at both of these tracks at the same time as the real threat that is out there. You performed very well in the Rumsfeld Commission concerning the necessity for a National Missile Defense system and I applaud you for that, and I look forward to working with you in this committee to achieve that goal. Thank you. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Senator Cleland. STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX CLELAND Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wolfowitz, welcome and we appreciate your commitment to public service. You talked earlier in your testimony today about the over-commitment of American men and women and the stress on families from our commitments, the need to review those commitments, which I certainly share. Senator Pat Roberts and I took the Senate floor a number of times last year to talk about the sense in which we were over-committed and under- funded as a Nation. Then, in terms of Iraq, I hear that the air campaign may not be enough, that certain things are worth fighting for. I just want to get it straight. Are you prepared to support an American ground invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein? Dr. Wolfowitz. No one has proposed that, Senator, and I do not believe that even the statement Senator Levin referred to has to do with how we might support efforts by the Iraqi people to overthrow their own government. Senator Cleland. I just wanted to say that that would be a dramatic increase in American commitment abroad and American forces are now stretched pretty thin. I just wanted to make that clear, since you have talked about over-commitment and then in effect indicated the air campaign may not be enough and that certain things were worth fighting for. I just wanted to clarify your position on that. You do not now support an American ground invasion with American forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein? Dr. Wolfowitz. I have never supported an American invasion to overthrow Saddam. Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. Dr. Wolfowitz. But Senator, I think it is also fair to say, to point out that the prolonged commitment to that region of our forces that Chairman Warner referred to earlier is in part because that war ended inconclusively. We can debate endlessly whether we should have fought longer, fought differently. But the fact is one of the things that produces protracted commitments is inconclusive conclusions. Senator Cleland. As a Vietnam veteran myself, I am familiar with inconclusive conclusions and situations that turn out badly if you do not pursue them in the right way. Enough said. May I just say that part of my concern about the overcommitment of American forces is the inability to get them there quickly. If we are to actually make sure that we are not overcommitted, but are able to respond to hot spots in the world, that means that we have to have global airlift strength. The Hart-Rudman Commission recently reviewed American airlift capability and found it basically inadequate. I would just like to call that to your attention, because great aircraft like the new C-130J, the C-5B, and its possible modernization, are all part of a global airlift strategy that I think fits into our strategic needs very well, and I would just call that to your attention, the deficit in the airlift capability. There is another deficit I would like to bring to your attention. The key to our defense is our defenders and I think we would all agree with that. Almost all new service members enroll and contribute to the GI Bill, the Montgomery GI Bill, yet only about half of these service men and women actually use these benefits. Many who use the benefits do not use all of their entitlement. The great historian Steven Ambrose has said that the creation of the GI Bill was the single most important law ever passed by the Federal Government. Yet many of these soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines are getting out of the service. Many would like to stay in the service, they tell me as I get around to bases, not only here in this country but around the world, but they feel they have to leave so that they can provide, especially for the education of their spouses and children. I believe many of these service members would stay in the military if they could transfer part of their unused entitlement to the GI Bill to family members in return for a service commitment. That is a win-win situation, it seems to me. It is an idea actually supported by the Hart-Rudman Commission report. Service secretaries could use this retention tool selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses selectively. I would deeply appreciate it if you would give serious consideration to how the Department of Defense can use the transfer of GI Bill benefits to family members, in other words making the GI Bill more family-friendly, as the military itself has become a more family institution, use it as a retention tool, and continue to give us your best thoughts on how we might pursue this idea. Is that something that might be of interest to you? Dr. Wolfowitz. It sounds very interesting and it certainly addresses probably our highest priority, which is how to keep good people, attract good people, and keep them in the service. I know there is nothing that a parent cares more about than the education of their children. I know that as a father. Senator Cleland. You put your finger right on it. The old saying is you recruit a soldier, but you retain a family. I was just in Osaka, Japan, and a Navy admiral mentioned to me that the decision to stay in the Navy is made at the dinner table. So these retention decisions of our aviators, of our top quality people, of our high tech people, of our senior captains and senior NCOs seem to be made around the dinner table. This question of the ability to care for the education of our spouses, the education of our kids, is something that is of growing importance. We thank you very much for your testimony today. Mr. Chairman, no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I wish to associate myself with your observations about that GI Bill. You know that I will work with you again to achieve those goals. Just yesterday in Virginia I had a constituent raise that very issue of transferability. Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would yield for 10 seconds so I could join in the Chairman's support of Senator Cleland's comment on the GI Bill transferability issue. This committee has been very supportive of that effort. So, if you are confirmed, maybe you can help us persuade some of our House colleagues on it. Dr. Wolfowitz. It will be high on my list to look at, Senator. Chairman Warner. Senator Hutchinson. STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wolfowitz, I join my colleagues in welcoming you and in expressing our belief that our Nation is very fortunate to have you. I also want to pick up on what Senator Cleland was saying. I chair the Personnel Subcommittee. Senator Cleland is our ranking member. We have worked closely on this whole issue of retaining our men and women in uniform. While at one time most of our service men and women were single, that is not the case any more. Most of them have families, and the issue of not just their education, but the education of dependents, is foremost in their minds. I have supported, and still support very strongly, Senator Cleland's efforts at portability on the Montgomery GI Bill. But I also believe that there may be other areas, other methods by which service men and women can ensure that their children are going to receive an education. I just ask for your commitment to work with our committee in exploring ways in which we can ensure that that opportunity is there for all of the dependents of our men and women in uniform. Dr. Wolfowitz. I will do so with enthusiasm. Senator Hutchinson. Thank you. I think when you speak of strengthening the bond of trust, that is a big part of the quality of life that we are all concerned about. Also, I want to raise an issue concerning the acquisition policy of the Department of Defense on vaccine production. In the early 1990s the Department made the mistake, I believe, of abandoning its plans to construct a GOCO vaccine production facility. The consequences of that erroneous decision are only now being made fully evident and fully demonstrated. Last summer, partly as a result of prodding from this committee and our subcommittee's hearings, the gentleman that you will replace if confirmed, wisely, I think, decided to throw in the towel on that existing vaccine acquisition strategy and signaled that the Department would return to the pre-1994 strategy, namely the construction of a GOCO. Now, during this time of transition there are grumblings that there are those who now want to abandon that or head in another direction, which concerns me. I have written Secretary Rumsfeld and have asked him personally to investigate that matter. If confirmed, will you assure me that you will personally look into this vaccine acquisition strategy to ensure that it is an open and fair process? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, I will. Senator Hutchinson. I also want to raise something I have been very concerned about, as well as Senator Reed and Senator Cleland, and that is the C-130 acquisition and beddown schedule for the future. The Little Rock Air Force Base, in my home State of Arkansas, is the schoolhouse for the training for the C-130s, and the Little Rock Air Force Base is scheduled to receive the C-130J flight simulator, it should be up and running by 2004. But Little Rock is not scheduled to receive the first C- 130J aircraft until 2006. That means there will be a 2-year gap between the availability of the simulator and the arrival of the aircraft. That is obviously a problem. It is a problem that Senator Reed faces in his State as well. That would be eased considerably if OSD and the Air Force provided $130 million in the budget, the 2002 budget, as was promised last year, for the purchase of two C-130J aircraft. I do not ask you to make a commitment on that, but I do ask you to make a commitment that you will examine this budget issue and get back to me on what the possibilities are, because obviously if you are going to have a schoolhouse to train the pilots and you have the simulators there you need the aircraft there. Dr. Wolfowitz. I will look into that. [The information referred to follows:] There are two C-130J aircraft in the President's budget request for fiscal year 2002, while a third aircraft is on the Air Force's unfunded priority list. For now, the Air Force will continue to conduct in- flight training at the students' ultimate operational training bases. Senator Hutchinson. That is a very brief answer, but we are going to hold you to that. Dr. Wolfowitz. I will do it. Senator Hutchinson. We look forward to working with you, and we are very pleased that the President has nominated you and I look forward to your confirmation and being able to have the next couple of years to really see that commitment to the quality of life, to health care, to housing, to pay, being fulfilled and the whole retention issue that has been such a severe problem eased. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. It is, I think, a unique time to both fix some old problems and move forward on some new ones, and I really look forward to working with you and this committee to do that. Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. Senator Nelson. STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much. Dr. Wolfowitz, there is a report coming out from the Pentagon that questions the policy in ``Plan Colombia'' as it relates to strengthening the efforts at controlling the growth in coca and therefore the growth of cocaine to the United States. It is questioning whether the policy ought to be on controlling the area of supply or whether our efforts in ``Plan Colombia'' ought to be more in the nature of working with sub- south countries as well as within Colombia to build those economies and to work with those countries. I wonder if you can give us your distinction between what you would consider to be an appropriate role for the United States in Colombia with ``Plan Colombia'' and what might border on nation-building. My concern is that there is a lot of discussion and things are categorized as nation-building when we disagree with the efforts, but also it seems to be sanitized language when we say we need to work with these countries to help them with their infrastructure and with their democracy. Can you give us a distinction? I note that in the answers to the questions about Colombia that you have reserved the right to make statements later, given the fact that you are only being considered for approval here at the present time, and I can appreciate that. But I wonder if you could share with us a distinction that you would have between, let us say, what we are doing in Colombia and what might be considered by others as nation-building. Dr. Wolfowitz. I have a lot to learn about Colombia, Senator, I think, including from you. I think you were just down there, I understand. I know the other Senator Nelson was and I met with him yesterday. It does seem to me that one of the essential things that has everyone concerned, including myself, is that we not find ourselves in a situation as we were 35 years ago where we are fighting someone else's civil war. I think that is the essential thing to stay out of, and that that means I would draw the line, I think, less at--I try to understand what we mean by the exact terms, but I think most importantly we know when they are doing the job as opposed to us taking over the job. I think helping the Colombians to help themselves is something that probably does serve American interests. But I would be very leery of something that looked like we were starting to get our troops involved in another war down there. Senator Ben Nelson. Is it a question of an internal struggle or is our policy and our national interest to stem the flow of drugs north to the United States, which may be a completely different mission than strengthening Colombia, although it may have some connection, but it may be a different mission? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think that is ultimately a major part of our interest, although I would think also it is not in our interest from either point of view to see a so far rather democratic government in Latin America taken over by drug lords. So yes, I think there is a difference, and I think the primary purpose of our efforts to date has been to stem the flow of narcotics. One of the things I need to learn is whether you can really disentangle those two as much as we say we are doing. Senator Ben Nelson. At some point you might be in a position to help us understand which is the primary role and which is the secondary role. Dr. Wolfowitz. I will work very hard on that, and I look forward to actually learning from those of you who have just been down there. I think there is nothing like being on the spot. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you. That is a very important subject before this committee and I commend you and our distinguished ranking member for undertaking a trip down there. Senator Sessions. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wolfowitz, we are delighted to have you here. You have an extraordinary background, the kind of background I think is most valuable in public service. You have had three tours in the Pentagon, the State Department, SALT talks, but have also been in the private sector and in a university, where you have had the opportunity to study, maybe more objectively, the events that go on around the world, and now back in the leadership. I think it is tremendous that you have agreed to take on this challenge, which I think is very great. When I first came here about 4 years ago, George Gilder gave a little talk and told us that the 19th Century was a century of progress, the 20th Century was the century of the devil, with wars and oppressions and death, the likes of which we had never seen before, in a time when it really should not have happened, and that the 21st century has the potential to be the greatest in the history of mankind. I guess I want to ask you, do you feel that the United States has an interest, a responsibility, and an ability to help shape this new century in a way that promotes peace and prosperity around the world, and if so, would you comment in general about how that might be done? Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe very strongly, Senator, and I think the reference you made to past history is unfortunately all too true. The 20th Century started on an extremely optimistic note. People thought technology and economic progress was going to bring untold benefits and even outlaw war, that people would see war was not worth pursuing any longer. Then World War I came and it was all downhill from there. Once that terrible genie is out of the bottle, the consequences ripple on for decades. The consequences of World War I were felt well into the end of the last century. I think one of the greatest things to be concerned about is that we come to take for granted the structures that have produced a relatively peaceful world today. I say relatively. It is peaceful for us. It is peaceful for the big countries of Europe. Obviously, there are a lot of parts of the world that do not look peaceful at all. But the big wars do not threaten us now. I think it is very important to have an active strategy that is not just a military strategy--in fact, I think diplomacy and even economic policy may be just as important or more important--a policy that tries to protect those large zones of peace that we have created in the world and to try to extend them. I do believe a strong American military is part of that. I think it is an indispensable part of that. I think the goal is to keep wars as small and as far away as possible, and hopefully smaller and further away, until eventually the whole world benefits from that. Senator Sessions. So I take it that you are committed to creating the kind of defense force that would be relevant to this new world we are in for the purpose of promoting peace and prosperity? Dr. Wolfowitz. Exactly, and I also think that is a significant part of what Secretary Rumsfeld means when he talks about the need for rethinking the concept of deterrence for this new world. Senator Sessions. That is going to take a challenge, because we have constructed a defense establishment designed for a different kind of threat. Institutions, I think maybe even government institutions most of all, are reluctant to change. Do you think and believe at this point that you will have to confront some outmoded thinking and to recreate some strategies and equipment that would meet these new challenges? Dr. Wolfowitz. I am sure we will, and I know there is resistance to change. I would say that I also think there is particularly high resistance to change when you have a situation, as I think we have today, where we are trying to do too much with the force that we have and when people are stretched thin, when you are losing people because of excessive deployments, when they are afraid that if they identify some function they do not need that money will get taken away and they will suffer in their operational readiness accounts. I think all of that puts a pressure on the force that makes it much harder to be innovative. So I think on the one hand we have to fix some of these immediate needs, but if you want to create the head room for people to think in an innovative fashion, I think you have to give them some confidence that when they do try to do things differently there will be rewards for that, rather than people saying, oh, well, you have just demonstrated we can do without that division because you are experimenting with it. Senator Sessions. I agree. I have been to Kosovo a couple of times and I do believe that our men and women are basically doing police work. In fact, the UN was under an obligation and agreed to produce police forces that would allow our military to leave and they have not done so. So I think generating a system that actually produces police force in those kind of circumstances, so that our military do not have to be deployed, is the correct policy. Let me mention one other thing. I am on the Seapower Subcommittee and I chair it now. We have learned that we had, perhaps when you were last in the Department or in the early 1990s, we had over 500 ships; we are now at 315. We have seen, as you note in your opening remarks, a 40 percent reduction in funding and personnel pretty much across the board. I believe that there will be no way to transform this military, to maintain it at the right level, without some increasing expenditures to accomplish those goals. I hope and believe you will find every possible efficiency. I hope and believe you will find programs that you do not have to continue to fund, that could free up money for the things that we do have to fund. But how are you feeling about this review that is going to take place, and how are you feeling about how much additional funding the Defense Department is going to need? Dr. Wolfowitz. I would not, even in the security of a closed hearing, feel comfortable taking a guess at a number like that. I do share Secretary Rumsfeld's general feeling that we probably need more, but if we are going to ask for more we had better be very sure that everything we are asking for is something we need. I suspect there are things we are doing now that we could either stop doing or do much more efficiently. I think it was President Bush during the campaign said that we need to spend more, but we need to spend smarter. Part of this review is going to be focused very much on spending smarter, so that if we come and ask you for more you can be convinced that it is needed. Senator Sessions. I support your idea that you need to conduct a review before we just continue to continue programs. But I do believe that you will need some additional support. We will need to increase this budget, not beyond reason. A solid increase for a number of years to compensate for a long period now of neglect is going to be necessary if we are going to maintain our ability to defend our just national interests around the world. I look forward to working with you. I am absolutely convinced that you and Secretary Rumsfeld are about to lead a tremendous revitalization of our Defense Department, and we thank you for it. Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator. Senator Akaka. STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add my welcome to Dr. Wolfowitz this morning. I am familiar with you, as others who have been in Congress for a while, and I am familiar with your experience, accomplishments, and of course as has been said already, familiar with your impressive record here of service to our country. I am also familiar with your prior service as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993. I'm particularly pleased to know that you have given service as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, since policies in the Pacific have the most direct impact in my home State. I should tell you, in case you were not aware, that my friend who worked at East-West Center, Mike Oxenberg, just recently passed on. I know you have known him and have worked with him on China. Dr. Wolfowitz. It is a great loss to our country, Senator. Senator Akaka. News reports indicate that China has been helping develop a fiber optics communication system for Iraq's military. This is the same system that British and American forces just attacked, I understand. How important do you think it is that we should prevent this system from becoming operational and how persistent should we be in attacking it? Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I have not had the benefit yet of classified briefings on the details of that. It does seem to me the principle is very clear. If they are building something that threatens the safety of our air crews, we should do what we have to do to eliminate it or otherwise assure their safety. We should also, I think, make it very clear to the Chinese that this is behavior that has a real cost in our relations. Senator Akaka. I know, as I said, you have been in policy. Do you support a policy which would permit the Chinese to resume the launching of commercial satellites which the U.S. licenses? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think it depends crucially on whether we can have the kind of adequate safeguards that make sure that our missile guidance technology does not end up in the hands of the Chinese. As a commercial matter, it is probably good all around, but I think there is evidence that suggests the practices in the past were not sufficiently rigorous. Senator Akaka. As I have indicated, I regard you as a person who has had such a broad view of our country and our security. So let me ask you this one. There have been discrepancies in the readiness reports of operational forces. It is my understanding that some of the discrepancies have been attributed to a reporting system which is designed to provide a view of the current state of readiness, rather than a projection of the future. If confirmed, how will you address the issues surrounding the accuracy of determining the readiness of operational forces? Dr. Wolfowitz. The first thing I would do, if it has not been done already, is to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to make sure that we have a really first class person in that Under Secretary job, Manpower and Readiness, because this is a huge task. I would work with that individual to try to consider carefully whether the kinds of measures we are using for readiness are, number one, measuring what we want them to measure; and number two, to make sure they are not--every time you set up a way of measurement, whether it is military readiness or academic excellence, people start to game the system and they start to design to the measurement instead of to something else. So you have to be very careful. I suppose this is a Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. When you start to measure and you put out a certain measurement, you change how people behave. You want to make sure that you are changing it in the way you want to change it and not in an unintended way. But it is a very big issue that you raise and a very legitimate one. Senator Akaka. I am also aware of your work out in the Pacific Rim and in the Philippines and what you have done there. Again, I want to say that I am glad to see you here and seeking, I think, the position here with this administration. We all know that the future of our country and the security of our country leans in the Pacific and that area, so it is important to have a person like you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Senator Bunning. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, welcome to the committee. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. Senator Bunning. I want to explore just three different areas with you, Doctor. First, base realignment and closures. I notice in your answers that Senator Warner has shared with all the members that you took what we call a powder. You did not answer the question. You said: ``As Secretary Rumsfeld noted in his response to advance policy questions from this committee, we withhold an assessment of this issue until after the completion of the defense review.'' At least that is what is written down here. Do you have any idea what the President's feelings are on base realignment and closure, because I am deeply concerned until I have seen the savings that occurred from the first and the second round of base closures and had them proven to me, not just put down on paper and here is what we saved, but a much more thorough examination. If we proceed in another round you are going to have a terrible time up here on the Hill trying to convince anyone that this is in the best interests of this country. So do you have anything to add to your statement here? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think I would say what I believe Secretary Rumsfeld said when he was up here, that he believes, and I agree with him, that the base structure should correspond to the force structure. We are only now looking at what the force structure ought to be as a product of this review. There is a general feeling that we have more base structure than our present force structure requires. But until the review is done, it is a little early to state that as a firm conclusion. You bring up another issue which I discussed with you in your office yesterday, and I concur very strongly that we need to make sure that the savings that are attributed to past BRACs have actually been realized and if we end up in another process of that kind, that we get real savings out of it. That is certainly something I will look into very hard if I am confirmed. Senator Bunning. Second, there is a statement that you just made this morning and I wonder how that fits into this statement. I will read from the statement: ``Finally, we must reform the Department of Defense structures, processes, and organizations. We need to seek greater efficiencies, not only to safeguard the taxpayers' money, but also because that will allow us to create better weapons systems and invest more in the cutting edge of our national defense.'' I want to make sure that if we are going to do something here in closing down a base or removing structures that it is not just to save money, but that it does not force us to try to do more with less. If I have heard it once in the last 14 years, I have heard it an awful lot of times, that the Defense Department can do more with less. It can like heck, and it has been proven that it cannot do more with less and ask for more deployments. So does that fit into that statement that you made? Dr. Wolfowitz. I certainly agree with you we have been trying to do more with less and the consequences are that frayed force that General Shelton referred to. I do believe-- when I wrote those words in that statement, I am thinking much more of the kinds of efficiencies that people say we could achieve in things like the way we do our pay and accounts system, the way we purchase electricity for our bases. There seem to be a lot of places where we are much less efficient than the private sector and there is no obvious reason why we ought to be. But I certainly agree with you the purpose is not simply to save money. We need that money. There are a lot of needs, both immediate needs and long-term needs, it has to be applied to. Senator Bunning. Last but not least, Britain's Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, recently was before this committee. He told us about the effort of the European allies to form a 60,000-member force which would perform humanitarian action and perform military police type duties, such as overtaking security checkpoint duties in the Kosovo region and those things. Are you familiar with this effort of our European allies? Dr. Wolfowitz. I am in general terms and in some detail. Senator Bunning. Let me give you an experience that I had that shows that maybe we should encourage our European allies. I just spent a day or 2 at Fort Campbell in Kentucky, and 3,000 of our finest young men and women are about on June 1st to go off and replace 3,000 people that are in Kosovo. I went out to the training site on site, and those men and women were being trained to be MPs. I asked the general, how is that in the best national interest of our country, national security, to be MPs in Kosovo? He disagreed that it was not in our best interest, but they were being trained to secure their own safety when they were there. Would you like to expand on that a little bit? Dr. Wolfowitz. I repeat I think what I said earlier, which is I believe it is in our interest, where possible, to get our allies to take over jobs that they can do and that we do not need to do. It is in our interest to get local forces to take over tasks that they can do that we do not need to do. Where we are talking about police work, we really ought to be looking for policemen or their equivalent to do it and not sending highly trained combat troops, in fact, as you correctly point out, untraining them, retraining them for a whole new task, and then having to retrain them for their combat missions when they come home. There is a lot in that that does not make sense and we ought to be looking for alternatives. Senator Bunning. I wish you good luck. Thank you. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Carnahan. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome you to the committee today. I also want to congratulate you on your nomination and for your years of national service. Although we live in a time of peace and prosperity, these are certainly challenging times for the Department of Defense. Once the threat to our national security was formidable and apparent. Now the overall threat has been reduced, but we do not always know where the enemy is or where he is located or who he is or what weapons are at his disposal. We live in a time of unprecedented budget surpluses, but the pressure on the defense budget remains quite heavy. If we are to continue to have the best and the most highly trained and most effective military in the world, we have to invest in our military personnel. That means higher salaries and better health care and improved quality of life for those who wear the uniform. I think we also owe it to our troops that when they are placed in harm's way that they are properly equipped and that they are trained to perform the tasks for which they have been sent. The military services continue to demand newer and sophisticated weapons systems, but these demands must be evaluated against the type of threats we expect to face and balanced against competing defense and domestic spending priorities. There are discussions of transforming our entire armed forces structure, but we face a bureaucracy that is set in its ways and very resistant to change. So I expect that you will have a difficult time, but hopefully a very rewarding job. I look forward to working with you in those efforts. I have a few questions I would like to ask today. Senator Bond and Congressman Gephardt have been very involved in urging the South Korean government to purchase F-15s. I am very supportive of those efforts as well. The new purchase of F-15s is necessary to keep the F-15 production line running. Given the uncertainty of whether we will be relying on the Super Hornet or the F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter, do you agree that it is in our national interest to continue the production of the F-15? Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I certainly think it is very much in our national interest to maintain a strong industrial base. Clearly, aircraft production is a big part of that. You asked me when I met with you yesterday about this forthcoming Korean decision. It seems to me that there are two strong principles here which we should emphasize to our Korean allies in their consideration of what kind of aircraft to buy. One is that it will be far more effective if we are both flying the same kind of aircraft. It is not just a matter of interoperability, but the ability to repair one another's systems. Second, given that their budgets are tight as well as ours, I hope they will buy the best value for the dollar or for the won, and I suspect very much that is going to be the American plane. Senator Carnahan. I also mentioned to Secretary Rumsfeld when he was here a concern that had been expressed to me a number of times. That has to do with the readiness of our TRADOC posts, especially the one at Fort Leonard Wood. I would like for you to, if you would, check on that for me and get back to me with more information about that. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] The question I will ask today is one that is a little bit more general. I understand the Department is doing a comprehensive review, but I would like to hear what your views are on what measures the Department should take to address the short-term readiness of our troops. Dr. Wolfowitz. Clearly, one of the most serious readiness deficiencies that I have been briefed on is shortages in training facilities and lack of training time and lack of resources to do training properly. There is no, I think, more important contributor to the readiness of forces than the fact that they are well-trained. I remember going right after the Gulf War with Secretary Cheney to visit the Second Armored Division inside Iraq, and Secretary Cheney talked to a tough-looking senior master sergeant who I think had spent 26 years in the Army and asked him, was it tough? He said it wasn't anywhere near as tough as the National Training Center. That is the kind of training you want to have. It is an essential part of readiness and it is certainly something we will be looking hard at in this review. Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Collins. STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wolfowitz, I first want to echo the comments of my colleagues in thanking you for accepting this considerable challenge and for bringing your considerable expertise and talents to bear in this exciting new position. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator. Senator Collins. As a new member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have had a parade of service chiefs and senior officers come to my office to brief me and those meetings have been very helpful. I have, however, been concerned by what I have heard. Over and over again, senior officers have told me that there has been a pattern in the last administration of robbing our modernization accounts to pay for pressing readiness problems. Indeed, one senior officer told me that he was actually instructed to prepare a budget in the last administration that he knew would not possibly meet the readiness needs of his service. In fact, there was a reliance on supplementals in the last administration that caused there to be lots of concerns about the training moneys available for our troops and other readiness issues. It seems to me we need a new approach and that is a lousy way to go about budgeting. Are you going to commit today to a truth-in-budgeting process so that we really know what the numbers are and can make sure that we are not essentially gaming the system? Dr. Wolfowitz. I think it is essential not only for Congress to know, but for the President and the Secretary of Defense to know. I certainly agree with you it is a misuse of the budgeting process to have expenditures that you fully know you are going to need submitted as an emergency supplement to your budget. We have to figure out how we work our way out of that process that you correctly identify we have gotten into. Senator Collins. On a related issue, I have also heard from these senior officers about inefficiencies within the Defense Department's acquisition and procurement process. For example, one senior officer told me that the Defense Logistics Agency adds a markup of 22 percent to each uniform that it buys. He was saying that if he could eliminate the middleman within DOD that he could save a great deal of money. Are you planning to take a thorough look at the internal acquisition and procurement systems of DOD to see whether there are ways to improve efficiencies and perhaps save substantial sums of money? Dr. Wolfowitz. Absolutely. One of the things that has struck me a lot in briefings I have had over the last 6 weeks or so is there just are shelves full of studies going back at least to David Packard's commission in the early 1980s that identify all kinds of reforms. I keep asking the question: We do not need more studies; we need to implement these things; why is it not happening? It is not that people have not tried, and it is not as though it is going to be simple to do so. But I certainly think, with this unusual man we have as Secretary of Defense, we have a real opportunity now to get some things done that everyone agrees are long overdue. Senator Collins. I agree. I think everyone knows what the problems are, but there has been too much internal resistance to solving them that has prevented needed reforms from being implemented, so I appreciate that commitment. Finally, I want to echo Senator Sessions' concerns about our current shipbuilding rates. The current rates of shipbuilding do not support the goal of a 300-ship naval fleet as identified by the last QDR. The Clinton administration's defense budgets have been gradually taking the Navy, not toward a 300-ship Navy, but rather toward a considerably smaller fleet. Adding to the challenges are the facts that many defense experts believe that even a 300-ship Navy is inadequate for our current operational and deployment requirements. I hope as part of the top-to-bottom review that you and the Secretary are conducting that you will take a very hard look at what we can do to make sure that our shipbuilding budgets are adequate to make up for the deficiencies of the past 8 years. Dr. Wolfowitz. That will be a very important part of what we look at, yes. Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much. Senator Nelson. STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say to the ranking member, thank you again for that trip to Colombia over the last few days. It was extraordinary, it was informative, it was personally enjoyable to be with you and the other members, and I thank you very much. Senator Levin. Thank you. Your contribution to that very quick trip was really crucial. Our learning was mutually at a high level. You and Senator Ben Nelson, Senator Jack Reed, and I travelled and again, thank you for participating. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Wolfowitz, it was a pleasure to visit with you yesterday. I want to encourage you on the seeming new policy of the administration to break the mold, to think outside the lines. It is, I think, refreshing that you approach it this way, and with the changing nature of the threat to the United States I think it is essential. I thank you about that. Now, what I would like to get from you is some of your ideas about what are going to be the appropriations needs over the course of the next decade. Chairman Warner and a group of other Senators from this committee had recently written a letter asking for necessary appropriations having to do with a supplemental for this year. Senator Warner, if I recall, it totaled some perhaps $7 billion additional moneys in this particular year. This is for the 2001 budget, even before we get to the 2002 budget. If I recall also, that had to do with pay and benefits, health benefits. It had to do with spare parts. It had to do with the cost of fuel and a number of things like that. That is $7 billion before we even get to the decade that we are talking about. Can you give me some clue as to what you think are going to be the needs of increased defense spending over the course of the next decade? Dr. Wolfowitz. I suppose the real answer is without the review I cannot say very much. But I guess if you want a clue, it seems to me there is a general feeling, unless we are going to radically change what we try to do in the world--and I say radically because I think we probably do have to change what we try to do in the world, and we may want to do more. But unless we are going to do radically less, we probably need more resources. But we also have to find savings within what we do, because we cannot simply add to the defense budget. That is why even the short-term question of what do we need to make it through 2001 is something that requires a thorough look at what we are already spending our money on. Senator Bill Nelson. I know that that is the answer that you have to give at this point and I respect that. So let me suggest what I think the truth is on the answer. The fact is, as we change the nature of our defense posture we can save money, but at the same time, since the reason for a Federal Government in large part is to provide for the national defense, we cannot be penny wise and pound foolish, particularly with research and development and particularly with regard to the provision of our forces in the field, the supplies, the material, and the quality of the troops by virtue of what it is going to cost in competition with the private sector in order to be able to retain them. I think the bottom line is that there is going to be a considerable demand for increased spending over the course of the next decade. I think we are fooling ourselves if we do not plan for that. We have some choices to make very shortly in formulating a budget and how much are we going to allocate for defense and how much for education and for prescription drug benefit, and balance all that against the need to protect social security and the surplus in the Medicare trust fund, and then balance all of that on the question of how large is going to be the tax cut. So I think there are, as we approach the subject matter of this committee, people that are fooling themselves if they think that we are not going to need substantial defense increases over the next 10 years and do so at the peril of providing for the common defense if you use it up in other areas so that we do not have it, or so that the only choice that is left to us is the choice of going back into deficit financing, which was one of the reasons of a poorly performing economy in the decade of the 1980s. So you see where I am coming from, Dr. Wolfowitz. I congratulate you on your nomination. I congratulate you ahead of time. I am going to be visiting with you about these budgetary matters in the future. Dr. Wolfowitz. I look forward to it, Senator. Thank you. Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. We will now have a second round of questions. I will initiate those questions and my distinguished colleague, Mr. Levin, will follow up. I was quite interested in your selection of a quote in your opening statement, that General Creighton Abrams said when the all-volunteer force was first created that, ``People are not in the Army; people are the Army.'' I was privileged to serve in the Pentagon at that time when he was Chief of Staff and I have the greatest respect for that military leader. He was exactly right. As you said, you will become the chief operating officer and people will be at the very top of your agenda. This committee, indeed Congress as a whole, are very concerned about the inability of the Department of Defense, all services, some with varying degrees, but all services, having difficulty retaining particularly that critical group of younger officers, captains, so to speak, lieutenants in the Navy, who are making that pivotal decision as to whether to go on and perhaps commit for a career of at least 20 years. Similarly, the enlisted ranks, the middle grade and senior petty officers, sergeants and the like, are likewise not staying in the numbers that we need. Now, there has been some modest improvement here recently, possibly as a consequence of the initiatives taken by the past administration and Congress. This committee took the initiative to increase the pay raises, took the initiative to increase the quality of health care. What are your initiatives that you are going to assert, if confirmed and you take on this responsibility, to stem the flow of these young people out of the military, somewhat induced by very lucrative opportunities for their trained skills in the private sector? Dr. Wolfowitz. Pay and allowances are one of the first things one looks at. You are absolutely correct, this committee has taken very important decisions, including just at the end of the last year, that I think should help us. Some of I suppose the kinds of tangible benefits that Senator Cleland referred to earlier that can help service people think that by staying in they are ensuring their children's future, that is very important. I think, as I said earlier, it is equally important to make sure that people feel that they are getting the right kind of training and equipment to perform the missions, because at the end of the day I think what keeps people in the service will never be the pay and allowances. Pay and allowances have to be adequate, but they can almost always earn more money with less time away from home and less risk of life doing something else. It is the sense of mission. It is very hard to convince people of a sense of mission if they are not being given equipment for that mission or the training for the mission is not adequate. I also believe that, and I think hopefully this will be part of this review, we need as a country--and certainly this committee makes a big contribution in that respect--to convince the country that the mission these men and women are doing is important, because that I think is one of the greatest psychic rewards and therefore one of the greatest rewards that they get for service. So you have to look at it, I think, as a whole. It starts with pay and allowances, but it goes right up to what the President, Congress, and the country believe is the importance of what they are doing. Chairman Warner. It is also family separation, Dr. Wolfowitz. That is brought about by overdeployments in terms of the number of times that these young men and women are sent abroad. They will accept not only a reasonable level, but a high level, because that is what they joined to do. But I think we have in the past few years seen where we have crossed that invisible line to where they are now confronted with serious family situations because of their departure from family for prolonged periods, and they are all too often coming at a critical time when they are trying to raise some young children. How well all of us who have had that great privilege and challenge in life know the essential need for the two parents to be together as much as possible with those children in their formative years. Bear that in mind. Dr. Wolfowitz. You are absolutely right, Senator. Chairman Warner. Also, but for a spare part no bigger than that tip of that pencil, airplanes cannot fly. The mechanics are instructed to go over and take it out of another airplane which is operational and cannibalize it and put that airplane parked for a while. That is why I am urging consideration of this supplemental. We have to get into the spare parts replenishment and the distribution of those spare parts right away, because these young people working, whether it is on ships or on the line of airplanes on the tarmac working on it, they need to feel that we are supplying those parts such that they can keep those pieces of equipment up and ready. In my most recent visit to Kosovo a week or so ago, we visited a young captain who had several tanks and other motorized vehicles high on a hill in that sector that is becoming more and more destabilized, the valley. He said some of those units that he had up there were in a precarious situation because of spare parts. There is a trooper right out on the front line taking risks. Again, I know this question of the supplemental is not a cheerful one, but I take the brunt of criticism directed. I just think it has to be studied and studied very carefully. I am confident that Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, and others that are entrusted with the appropriations--therein is the primary responsibility--can manage that in a way that we can achieve it, hopefully for the military, and maybe restrict it and let the President indicate that he will veto if this thing becomes a giant snowball rolling down the hillside with everybody's need attached to it. So I will continue to work on that. The industrial base. We can really be no stronger as a Nation and a military if we do not have those companies who are willing to get out there and put at risk their capital and to have the ability to attract the talent that is necessary to do the research and development and the test and evaluation on these systems that are coming along. What are your views about assisting the industrial base, and particularly the question of across-the-ocean mergers? They are primarily in the Atlantic, trans-Atlantic, but they could well become also in the Pacific region a factor that concerns the industrial base here at home. That will be your responsibility. What are your views on that subject? Dr. Wolfowitz. First, Senator, Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about the health of our industrial base. It is crucial to our ability to support forces in the future. It is crucial to our ability to innovate. I think it is hurting badly. I think when one looks at this issue of trans-Atlantic or even possibly trans-Pacific mergers, I think the crucial question is do these mergers contribute to our ability to innovate, contribute to the long-term health of our industrial base, or conversely are they a kind of fire sale where we are transferring absolutely essential American capabilities abroad in a way that will hurt our long-term competitiveness. I think some degree of distributing production across defense establishments of our allies as well as ourselves may be a way to make the overall industrial base more efficient. But certainly one of the things we better look at is to make sure that if some of that is going eastward across the Atlantic that there is enough gain coming back the other direction that we are all better off in the long run. Chairman Warner. I thank you. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to Colombia first. Senator Bill Nelson indicated that four of us went down to Colombia last weekend. Let me just give you a quick impression, and then ask you for a response. First, our focus clearly has to be on the demand side of this equation. We are creating the demand which is creating the supply that Colombia currently is supplying in the area of cocaine. But stemming the flow of cocaine and the supply of it is an important goal as well. That is number one. Second, we should not send our forces there to try to go after the narco-terrorists and the narco-suppliers, but we should, as you put it, assist them to assist themselves, to go after those folks that are creating this problem. This is third--unlike many other countries in Latin America, the army in Colombia has been supportive of the democratic government in Colombia traditionally and is now. Strengthening that army is essential to the survival of that democracy against the onslaught of the narco-traffickers, number one. Those narco-traffickers are now funding the threats to that democracy both from the guerrillas and from the paramilitaries. So, when we strengthen the professionalism and the training and the protection of human rights by that army, we are in the process trying to accomplish two things. First, we are stemming the flow of narcotics to this country, attempting to reduce that coca crop. Second, we are in the process strengthening Colombian democracy. Both things are going on and they are inseparable. So when you talk about disentangling the two goals, the goal of supporting Colombian democracy or nation-building and the goal of stemming the flow of cocaine, both of those goals are dependent upon strengthening the professionalism, training of the army, and making sure that they protect human rights in order to reduce the power of the narco-traffickers. So the goals, it seems to me, are inseparable and talking about disentangling them may miss the point. I just want to give you that thought and give you a chance to respond if you want, or just to think about it, either way. Dr. Wolfowitz. I will respond. You are taking me in the direction I was heading already. I can see a clear difference between their doing the job and our doing the job, and that is the line I would like to keep clear and bright. I know people make a distinction between fighting narco-terrorists and fighting the civil war. I guess I have--you are saying it yourself. It is hard to disentangle because the instrument for doing both, especially if they are going to do it themselves, is their own military. When I was Ambassador in Jakarta, the Colombian Ambassador--and it may have been the first they ever sent to Indonesia--was not a foreign service officer. He was a judge who had sent some narco-terrorist to jail and he was in Indonesia essentially to protect his life. He told me with great bitterness that all that money from the United States that's sucking cocaine up from Latin America is destroying his country and destroying democracy in his country. It was very poignant and very moving. People like that judge-become- ambassador are very courageous people. It seems to me if they want our financial support, our material support, our training support, within limits we ought to provide it. If they want the lives of our service people, then we will say, it is your country, it is your lives that should be on the line. Senator Levin. They have not asked for that. Dr. Wolfowitz. I know they have not. Senator Levin. I do not think there is any support for that that I know of in this country. What there is, however, support for in ``Plan Colombia'' is what I just described and what you just described. I gather you, in general, are supportive of that goal; is that fair to say? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes. Senator Levin. Back to Iraq for a moment and what many thought, including myself, was an unclear signal to Saddam prior to his invasion of Kuwait. Would you comment on that? I think you have spoken on that issue before. Comment on the importance of clarity of our signals and the lack of clarity in terms of that signal to him as to what the impact would be should he move on Kuwait. Dr. Wolfowitz. Well, I believed at the time and I believe now that we sent ambiguous signals. I argued strongly at the time that we should send a clearer signal. In fairness to that administration, it also has to be said that one of the greatest ambiguities came in congressional testimony where an Assistant Secretary of State was pushed in my view a little bit too hard to say exactly what our commitments were. I liked Secretary Cheney's formulation at the time, which was: We have stood by our friends in the past and we will stand by them in the future, no further questions. I think if the administration had stuck to that line it would have been a better signal. But having said that, two things. Number one, given how Saddam behaved when he was faced with the threat of Desert Storm and his unwillingness to yield at that point, I think there is every reason to be skeptical that even a very clear signal would have deterred him. He was convinced that we were weak, that we had lost in Vietnam, we would lose again there. Number two, there is no question that once he invaded it was a great help in dealing with our Arab friends in the region that no one could accuse us of having provoked the attack. There is always a little bit of a tradeoff between sending clear signals on the one hand and being seen as being belligerent on the other. At the end of the day, I think history probably would have taken a similar course. Senator Levin. Just two last questions, and I thank our Chairman for yielding to me and so graciously allowing me to extend my questions so I can go to another hearing. When you were Under Secretary for Policy in President George Bush's administration, there was an employee in the Office of Nonproliferation Policy who became convinced that the administration was about to present false information to Congress in a classified briefing about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. The individual complained to his supervisor and the supervisor then became concerned that the employee might take it upon himself to correct the inaccurate information presented to Congress. I am not getting into the merits at all of that case, as to who was right or who was wrong. But there was a response by the supervisor there ordering him not to supply that information, and terminated the employment and apparently acted to ensure that security clearances be removed from that employee. I do not want to get involved in the specifics of that, either. That is the background. There is apparently litigation going on, so I am not asking you to comment in any way which could affect that litigation. The reason I am asking you this is because of the questions asked of you at this hearing about providing information to this committee and to our designated staff, who are cleared to receive classified information. It is important, I believe, to us that people who wish to come to give us classified information in no way be deterred from doing so or be threatened or be in any way deterred from providing that to, again, designated staff who are cleared to receive classified information. The Whistleblower Protection Act does not apply to this type of case because information is classified. But putting that aside, do you believe that it is appropriate in any way to retaliate against an employee who threatens to take accurate information to properly cleared congressional staffers, as a matter of policy? Dr. Wolfowitz. My answer is absolutely not. I do not believe that kind of retaliation is appropriate at all. I would go a bit further, too. I think it is terribly important, and on that specific issue of what Pakistan was doing with nuclear weapons there was a legal obligation to keep Congress appropriately informed. Senator, I was not even aware of that employee or the entire case until about 18 months ago when I was asked to give a deposition in a civil suit. Most of the events he alleged took place before I was confirmed as Under Secretary. Senator Levin. I did not want to get into your---- Dr. Wolfowitz. Well, OK, but you brought it up. So I believe---- Senator Levin. I assume you were aware of it one way or another. Dr. Wolfowitz. Only within the last---- Senator Levin. The issue. I do not mean back then. I mean you are aware of it. Dr. Wolfowitz. I have been aware of the issue. In fact, there have been times on that issue when I specifically sensed that people thought we could somehow construct a policy on the house of cards that Congress would not know what the Pakistanis were doing. I have always thought policies based on withholding information from Congress are going to fail in the long run. In that case, there was a clear legal obligation to keep Congress informed. Senator Levin. I appreciate that. My final question is the question of whether and how to deploy a National Missile Defense part of the strategic review or is it left out of the strategic review as far as you know? Dr. Wolfowitz. My understanding is it is a piece of the strategic review. There are many pieces. There is not a single--as Secretary Rumsfeld said when he was up here, surely one of the things that is going to come out of this strategic review is we can make some decisions now, we are going to have to review some more. I do not think this is a process that is going to end. But clearly you cannot make decisions about long- term resource requirements without factoring in what missile defense requirements are going to be. Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, let me just again thank you. I want to congratulate Dr. Wolfowitz and wish him the best of luck. I know there will be a lot of important efforts here to keep this committee on the bipartisan tack that it has always tried to follow and that we can look to you to assist us in that process. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. I think I have had courtesy calls with 18 members of this committee, and every one of them has been a strong bipartisan supporter of a strong national defense. So I am sure the other six are as well, and I really look forward to working with this committee if I am confirmed. Senator Levin. Thank you. Chairman Warner. I have several more questions I wish to ask. Speaking for myself and I think others, we were shocked about this recent series of allegations regarding a long and trusted member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the allegations of his sharing classified material with another nation. Also, regrettably, a person who preceded you in the office to which you aspire to serve this Nation was the subject of a pardon recently by the President with regard to allegations about his handling of classified materials. As the chief operating officer, it seems to me, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other persons in the administration, you should undertake a review of the Department of Defense with regard to the handling of classified material and the means by which to detect any violation of the regulations of the use of that material by employees at all levels of the Department. Therefore, my question to you is how do you view the importance of classification, the responsibility that those entrusted with documents that are classified and how they should deal, not only in the safeguarding of that, but the sharing of that information? How do you intend to deal with that issue and what are your views with regard to classified material? I feel very strongly that the most rigid rules should apply and that when an individual is found to have violated, and subject to the appropriate legal actions that have to be reviewed to verify that violation, whether it is a court case or whatever, that accountability of the strongest measures should be done. What are your views? Dr. Wolfowitz. I agree very strongly with you about that, Senator. It is kind of shocking, the extent to which classified information frequently and with great speed finds its way into public in one form or another. I do think we need to do everything we can to hold people accountable, to make it clear that we take this seriously. I know any one of us has come across a classified document that we may have thought was overclassified. But that does not give you an individual right to take it on yourself to declassify it or downgrade it. There are procedures for doing that and they should be stuck with. You are talking about two very different things and the second one--the first one is a matter of treason. We clearly have to look at what that whole Hansen case tells us about our counterintelligence capabilities, which clearly have missed two big ones in recent times, and think about how to protect ourselves from that kind of traitor. On the more almost mundane matter of the day-to-day handling of classified materials, I think we lead by example. We have to be careful ourselves. We have to take infractions seriously. If we think that things are overclassified, then we need in an orderly way to take care of that problem, but not let individuals take it on themselves. Chairman Warner. Are you prepared to commit to this committee that, if confirmed, you will undertake as one of your top priorities a review of that subject within your Department? Dr. Wolfowitz. I will do so, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you. The President, I think quite wisely, and the Secretary of Defense, in the course of his hearing before this committee, put increased emphasis on the subject of homeland defense. This committee has taken a number of initiatives to strengthen the ability of our communities to deal with a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical. We have really been out on the cutting edge. We have a Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities and it has been one of the most active subcommittees. I commend the chairman and ranking member for the past work and indeed what they propose to do in the coming year. But this is a subject of great concern to this Senator and I think many others. It is astonishing. I do not want to harp too much on my recollections, but I remember when we had blackouts in Washington, D.C., in the early stages of World War II. I was a youngster then. I remember it well. People would sit here and listen to me make that statement in astonishment. But that was the last time, really, that this Nation felt imperiled at the hands of an adversary. At that time it was primarily the Nazi submarine fleet, which was actively sinking shipping off of the shores. I will not go into further details, but it was the silhouetting of the shipping as a consequence of the lighting emanating from the shores. A drastic number of ships lost right off the Atlantic coast of the United States. There have been other incidents. But now we have come to the point where we are threatened by intercontinental ballistic missiles, we are defenseless. I commend the President for his strong initiatives to address the question of missile defense. We have covered it here today. But the terrorism that could strike here at home is a major concern. We have taken initiatives in the last authorization bill of this committee, to try and urge a reorganization of the lines of responsibility in our Federal Government. I do not have it with me, but I will see that you get it, a chart showing the voluminous number of crossed lines and crossed authority that exists today. I do not say that as a criticism of the past administration. It is just a statement of fact. I would hope that you would put this high on your list of priorities to address, because we have to have, I think, greater involvement by all departments and agencies of the Federal Government in this question of homeland defense. I just wondered what you thought about the missions for the Department which you will hopefully be responsible as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Right now the Department of Justice has primary authority, and we come up against the time-honored law of Posse Comitatus which limits the involvement of the U.S. military as it relates to the daily lives of our people in this country. I think that doctrine is well-founded in history and should be protected. But again, the assets and the knowledge of the Department of Defense need to be shared at every level of government and with the communities as to how best to protect themselves and, if an incident were to happen, how we can best assist those in the community that will come to the rescue of their fellow citizens. Dr. Wolfowitz. Actually, I know John Hamre, when he was Deputy Secretary, took a very strong interest in this issue, as will I if I am confirmed. Chairman Warner. I commend him. He did indeed. We talked many times on this subject. Dr. Wolfowitz. Actually, during, I guess it was the transition--it was actually the period of the recount of the Florida vote--he convened a very interesting 3-hour session over at CSIS of officials from the Clinton administration with a number of people prospectively on both the Gore and Bush group, to talk about this issue. What that discussion and many others reveals is there is a fundamental problem that you identify of how the U.S. Government organizes itself to deal with this problem, which has both a domestic and a foreign aspect, both a law enforcement and a security aspect. We need to do everything we can to prevent that kind of attack, everything we can, where possible, to defend against it. But also this question of how you respond is crucial. I was in Israel during the Gulf War with Deputy Secretary Larry Eagleburger, whom President Bush sent over to persuade the Israelis not to get in the war. So I have been in a country under missile attack. We knew the odds and the odds individually were not that dangerous, but the whole country is immobilized by it. The Israelis had a very substantial civil defense effort and they were quite clear that without that civil defense effort, without the little bit of warning that our satellites were able to provide so the people could go into shelters, they would have had a mass panic. So the ability to deal with an event if it happens I think is very important for the stability of society as a whole. It has to get a high priority. Chairman Warner. That is an interesting historical footnote that you mention about your visit with my old friend Dr. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State. I too was in Israel, on February 18th, 1991, with Senator Nunn--then Chairman of the Armed Services Committee--Senator Stevens, and Senator Inouye. We were in the headquarters of the Defense Ministry when the last Scud fell on Tel Aviv. We had to stop our meetings and put on our gas masks. The strike landed a mile or two away. I never felt--well, you are in the hands of the gods when that thing came in, because it did not have any particular target except to hit the population. It was used as a terrorist weapon, not as a military. The people of Israel and the government of Israel showed enormous courage at that time to withhold their ability, and they had it, to retaliate because they knew of how it could fracture and impede the progress of the coalition at that time engaged in repressing Saddam Hussein. So I share that. But I hope that you put this high on your agenda, this subject of homeland defense. Dr. Wolfowitz. I will, Mr. Chairman. I hope our whole government does. Chairman Warner. The National Missile Defense system, as I said, the President is taking a strong leadership role, together with other members of his cabinet. Secretary of State Powell, I think in a very forceful and successful way, based on the reports received, asserted the right of the United States to defend itself in the face of this threat. We stand, as I think we have to repeatedly say, defenseless against an incoming strategic intercontinental ballistic missile, and indeed other missiles for that matter, and we must marshall the resources of this country to determine whether or not we can devise a limited ability to interdict the accidentally fired or terrorist missile or whatever the case may be, up to a dozen or more of these missiles. As the President and Secretary Powell and others have pointed out, it is not a system that in any way should lessen the deterrence that Russia looks to its system to provide, or indeed other nations. It is simply an essential protection for our cities and communities here at home. Now, you have spent time on this. Have you ever sorted out the sea-based system and how that could be brought in a timely way to augment the current architecture that was employed by the last administration? Dr. Wolfowitz. If I may make one general point quickly and then get to your question. I think you said something which I think is missed too often, and that is we are not talking about missile defense as it emerged during the Cold War. We are not talking about SDI, we are not talking about how to compete with the Soviet Union. We are talking about a limited missile defense, of a kind that, frankly, I would think the Russians themselves would want to have. On the specific question of sea-based options or, I would say, other options more generally, I think one of the things we need to do, and hopefully the Russians will concur in this and we can do it cooperatively, is to relax a number of the restrictions of the ABM Treaty that I believe have prevented us from looking adequately at those kinds of options. I am just starting to get read into this on a classified basis, but it is quite clear to me from what I have seen already that our development would have looked very different over the last 10 years if the ABM Treaty had not been there or if it had been modified. What we want to do is find the most effective, least expensive, and least provocative way of proceeding in this direction. I think that is something that hopefully we can persuade the Russians and our allies and many other people is in their interest as well. Chairman Warner. I thank you for that observation and I share that. Actually, I was in the Department at the time the ABM Treaty was negotiated and happen to have been part of the delegation that attended the signing, that ceremony. I was there for other purposes. Dr. Wolfowitz. It was a different era, was it not, Mr. Chairman? Chairman Warner. It was a different era. It was May 1972, and at that time I was Secretary of the Navy and had finished negotiations of the Incidents at Sea agreement which was signed the day before the ABM Treaty. The point being that, yes, we do need to address modifications, amendments, to the ABM Treaty because the Treaty does serve, I think, an important role in the architecture, the world architecture of arms control agreements. But I think progress is being made with the Russians to come to the realization that this country has a right to defend itself and employ that technology which can be most efficiently and cost effectively used to achieve that system. Again, I commend the President for his very clear, forceful message to the entire world that he is going to protect the rights of this country to defend itself and that he will pursue, I think, in a diligent way, in consultation with our allies, amendments to the ABM Treaty. Dr. Wolfowitz. I think we are getting more of a bipartisan consensus in this country, which is progress. Chairman Warner. I think you are correct in that. But I do believe that we have to begin to put more focus on the sea-based option as a follow-on or an adjunct, whatever phraseology you wish, because that gives us in my judgment a greater protection of the instruments themselves on the high seas from interdiction of the defense system as a part of any attack, a limited attack. Now, moving on to Secretary Rumsfeld's very important point when he was before this committee, he said that this Nation needs ``a reasonable exit strategy'' as a precondition for the decision to make a military intervention. What definition would you apply to ``a reasonable exit strategy''? Dr. Wolfowitz. That we can define what our goals are, successfully achieve those goals, and then take our forces out. I suppose one might--at least that would be what I would generally strive to achieve. I suppose there might be a situation like the one we used to have in Europe or the one we still have in Korea, where ``exit'' is not the right word; it is a long-term commitment, but a stable one where you have a deterrent force in place. But certainly for most of the things we are talking about I would hope it is the kind of thing where you can finish the job and be done. Chairman Warner. Dr. Wolfowitz, that concludes the questions from the committee. I think that your responses have been very clear. I thank you for your what I perceive as total cooperation today. This committee will very shortly gather to determine the balance of the confirmation process, but at the moment I am optimistic we can conclude it in an expeditious manner. I thank you very much. Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned.] [Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz by Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:] February 23, 2001. Hon. John Warner, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith are the answers to the policy questions the Senate Armed Services Committee asked me to complete. Sincerely, Paul D. Wolfowitz. cc: Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member. ______ Questions and Responses defense reforms Question. More than 10 years have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. From your close association with defense issues, you have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms? Answer. The establishment of the unified and specified combatant commands, the delineation of responsibilities, and most importantly, the focus on ``jointness'' outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has enhanced the readiness and warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces. Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented? Answer. These reforms have changed the way the Department of Defense works by strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, and significantly improving the ability of the Department to protect America's security and further its vital interests. The reforms have helped improve the interaction among the services in conducting military operations by making joint operations the norm. Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms? Answer. I would consider each of the goals noted below to be an important aspect of these defense reforms. Each one has enhanced the ability of the Department of Defense to carry out its assigned responsibilities. Question. The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing a clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense. Do you agree with these goals? Answer. Yes, I support the goals of Congress in enacting the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Question. Do you anticipate submitting legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols? Answer. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will work with the Secretary to review the extent to which the reforms have been implemented and the extent to which they have achieved their stated goals. As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted, we would consult with Congress on any changes that might be appropriate. Question. If so, what areas do you plan to address in these proposals? Answer. It would be premature to offer any thoughts on the question at this time. relationships Question. What do you see as the relationship between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following? The Secretary of Defense Answer. If confirmed, it is the Secretary's intent that I act as the Department's chief operating officer under the Secretary's direction as chief executive officer. It will be my duty to execute the policies of the President and the Secretary within the department, and, when new direction or guidance is needed, to facilitate the timely, accurate, and reasoned presentation to the Secretary of issues that require his or the President's consideration. Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense Answer. My relationship with all other senior officials of the Department will, for the most part, be based on the chief operating officer role described above. If I am confirmed, I will seek to carry out the policies and guidance of the Secretary with respect to actions and initiatives of the respective Under Secretaries, and bring to the Secretary's attention facts, options, analyses, and recommendations from the Under Secretaries when such guidance or direction is needed. Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense Answer. My relationship with Assistant Secretaries of Defense and other senior officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would be similar to that described above in relation to the Under Secretaries of Defense. Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Chairman to assure his full participation in the leadership team of the Department of Defense. Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a vital role in developing and implementing joint plans, programs, and policies for the Services. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with the Vice Chairman. Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments carry out the policies of the President and the Secretary of Defense in their respective Military Departments and make recommendations to the Secretary and to Congress relating to their Military Departments and the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments. I will assure that they are aware of the President's and the Secretary's policies and priorities and assist them in contributing to the successful development and implementation of effective DOD policies and programs. This includes assuring that the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Military Departments are brought to the Secretary of Defense and that they understand his policies. Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services Answer. The Chiefs of Staff provide advice to the Secretaries of their respective Military Departments and other senior officials, and carry out the policies of the Secretaries of their respective Military Departments and the Secretary of Defense. My relationship with the Service Chiefs will follow the model outlined above, but with the extra dimension that my relationship will be in the context of my overarching relationship with the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Question. The Service Acquisition Executives Answer. The Service Acquisition Executives are most directly involved with their respective Service Secretaries and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In the role of chief operating officer of the Department, I will, if confirmed, promote the successful involvement of the Service Acquisition Executives in the development and execution of the policies and initiatives of the Secretary of Defense in the acquisition field. Question. The Inspector General Answer. As the Department's chief operating officer, I consider it my responsibility to support the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) in carrying out his or her duties as set forth in the Inspector General Act. qualifications Question. Section 132 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Rumsfeld will prescribe for you? Answer. In general, if confirmed, I expect to be the chief operating officer of the Department while the Secretary fulfills the role of the chief executive officer. It will be my duty to execute the policies of the President and the Secretary within the Department and, where necessary, to present well-reasoned advice when policy must be changed or modified. If confirmed, I will endeavor to establish close and effective relationships with Congress and to insist that responsible officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments do likewise. Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties? Answer. If confirmed, this will be my third senior position in the Department of Defense and the second one that requires confirmation by the Senate. I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs from 1977-1980 and as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1989-1993. This latter position covered a period of time that included the end of the Cold War, the revision of our national strategy, and the planning for and conduct of major military operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf region. In addition to these positions, I have held senior management positions as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and served as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, running one of the most important U.S. embassies in Asia. Finally, for the last 7 years I have managed a school of international affairs that entailed the development of fiscal and academic programs for 750 students on campuses in Washington, D.C.; Nanjing, China; and Bologna, Italy. The school is a $30 million per year operation. While in the job, I also supervised a team that more than doubled the school's endowment. Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Deputy Secretary of Defense? Answer. I believe that I have an excellent, general base of experience for this position. Without presuming confirmation, I have already begun to benefit from excellent information briefings from the SASC Staff, various offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. Courtesy calls with over a dozen members of this committee have been invaluable. I believe if confirmed, I am ready to assume the duties of the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense, which will remain a learning experience, as long as I hold the office. budgetary impact of contingency operations Question. Over the past several years, military units have been increasingly deployed to contingency operations around the world. While participation in these operations may improve discipline, unit cohesion and leadership skills that are not generally possible to develop during normal garrison activities, they disrupt operating budgets, cause lost training opportunities, and accelerate wear and tear on equipment. Additionally, increased OPTEMPO impacts quality of life and could jeopardize retention of high-quality people. Finally, unless funded through timely emergency supplemental appropriations, they divert funds from programs designed for needed readiness or modernization. Do you have any ideas as to how to reduce the impact of these operations on both near and long-term readiness and modernization programs? Answer. Near term, contingency operations--regardless of their intrinsic merits--can damage readiness by interrupting needed training for wartime operations, accelerating wear and tear on equipment, and eroding the quality of life of military personnel and their families. However, that damage can be minimized through careful management, and whatever damage is unavoidable can sometimes be offset by benefits to the units participating in these operations. Key to avoiding damage is robust funding for readiness accounts, so that readiness needs can be met before, during, and after contingency operations. Looking long- term, damage to modernization programs is best prevented by timely funding so that the Department does not have to disrupt procurement and RDT&E programs. Especially key is accurate DOD projections of operational costs and timely congressional approval of supplemental appropriations that are needed for unbudgeted contingency operations. preparation for future threats Question. We have heard a great deal recently about the fact that Russia no longer poses the threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact once did. Because of this, many argue that we can continue to cut back on defense spending and force structure beyond that which we have already achieved. Recognizing the need for a comprehensive examination of our national security requirements, Congress passed legislation last year that would make permanent the requirement for the Department of Defense to conduct the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). As a result of the last QDR, the Department recommended a reduction in military personnel levels despite the recognition that we will continue to engage in numerous peacekeeping activities. This, in part, led the National Defense Panel to state that ``there is insufficient connectivity between the strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other.'' Do you believe that the Two Major Theater War scenario continues to be the most appropriate basis for determining force structure, operational concepts and procurement decisions for U.S. armed forces? Answer. Modern history suggests that the United States has often faced more than one security contingency at a time. With that history in mind, preparations are appropriate. The increasing diversification of current and emerging threats requires that we build forces and operational concepts aimed at fashioning a new approach to deterrence. The manner in which the United States underwrites deterrence--for example, how we posture our military to be able to respond to multiple contingencies--is an issue of military strategy and operations and the adequacy of available resources at the time. This issue will be examined in the strategic review. Question. Do you believe that the force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions recommended by the QDR are sufficient to provide the capability to engage in overlapping Major Theater Wars today, and to prepare for the potential military threats of the future? Answer. It is important that we shape and prepare the armed forces to respond to whatever national security challenges may confront us. We must ensure that the military has the tools it needs to fight and win, should that be necessary. The technological revolution makes possible new forces and concepts of operations that can transform the way we fight in the future. These matters will be among those examined in the strategic review. Question. What are the principal threats to U.S. vital national security interests that you believe the Department should examine both in the near and long term? Answer. The centrifugal forces in world politics have created a more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries, whose aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use military force will produce challenges to important U.S. interests and to those of our friends and allies. Modern technology and its proliferation also confront us with an expansion of unconventional threats, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, missiles, terrorism, and the newer threats against space assets and information systems. At the same time, we have traditional responsibilities to existing allies in key strategic theaters that remain in our vital interests. Question. Would you agree that the uncertainty which we face in the future requires us to maintain a military which is both strong and flexible? Answer. In addition to fielding strong, flexible military forces for an uncertain future, the United States can help build a new national security environment by integrating the economic, technological, and diplomatic tools at our disposal, maintaining and strengthening our alliances, and promoting continued market and democratic reforms around the world. By providing for a military that is second-to-none and equipped to meet the newer challenges of the 21st century, I believe we can best ensure a peaceful strategic environment that advances U.S. national security interests and those of our friends and allies. The goal is to assure that our country has the new capabilities necessary to deter and defend in this new security environment so we are able to contribute to lasting peace and stability. readiness indicators Question. Over the past several years, the committee has observed discrepancies between the readiness reports we receive from the Pentagon and the information we receive from the operational forces. Many of these discrepancies are attributed to a readiness reporting system including the SORTS data which is designed to provide a snapshot of the current state of readiness rather than a projection of the future. If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, will you work with the Services to try to develop a better system of measuring and reporting readiness, including a way to predict future readiness, so that we have an adequate understanding of any readiness problems within the operational forces? Answer. At its core, our readiness reporting system centers on the readiness of our forces for high intensity combat operations. While the current system is useful, I know that it can be improved, and I support efforts to do so. The basic position as developed in this committee and others and as outlined by President Bush remains clear: we have an urgent need to address any decline in operational readiness. plan colombia Question. The United States is heavily involved in resourcing and training Colombian security forces that are fighting the growth and processing of coca leaves and the transport of refined cocaine. U.S. forces are specifically precluded, by policy, from taking a direct part in any such operations. Do you favor continuing U.S. support for Colombian security forces in this effort? Answer. The Department's counterdrug programs and policies are currently under review. This is a process in which I will participate if confirmed. At this point, however, it would be premature on my part to comment on this review until it is completed. Question. Are you committed to maintaining the policy that precludes U.S. forces from taking a direct part in these operations? Answer. As with all other Department policies, if confirmed I will reserve the right to review the existing policy and make my recommendations to the Secretary. However, in principle, I support the policy which prohibits DOD personnel from accompanying drug law enforcement and foreign military forces on counterdrug field operations. Question. Would you favor increasing U.S. assistance to the countries bordering Columbia to prevent a relocation of coca growth elsewhere? Answer. U.S. counterdrug policy relative to programs in the region is currently under review within the interagency, to include the Department of Defense. It would be premature on my part to speculate on the outcome of these reviews. maintaining our infrastructure Question. The Department of Defense maintains the world's largest infrastructure, with a physical plant value exceeding $500 million. It is widely acknowledged that much of this infrastructure is in poor condition and therefore impacts quality of life and readiness. What are the most critical infrastructure issues facing the Department of Defense? Answer. Our physical plant is too big, too old, and too often in poor condition. The Department faces the daunting task of rationalizing its infrastructure and finding the resources to properly sustain, restore and modernize the facilities and installations we will keep. Improving the quality of life and workplaces for our servicemembers and their families is critical to readiness and retention. The Department believes that it has excess facility capacity and infrastructure in the wrong locations. We will address these issues during our planned review and the months thereafter. Question. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative was enacted to provide a means for solving the military services' housing crisis. Has the initiative lived up to its expectations? If not, what actions would you advocate to assure the success of the program? Answer. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative was slow to start, but with nine projects now awarded, it has demonstrated that it is a powerful and important tool to solve our housing shortfall. Enthusiasm is high in the Military Services to do more, but the success of the program depends on capturing lessons learned at the initial projects and applying them as we move forward. defense health funding Question. As you are aware from your current position, the Department of Defense has identified a core program shortfall in the Defense Health Program of $6 billion from fiscal year 2002-2005. These figures do not include any expansion of the Department's capabilities or resources to meet the commitment to the over 65 military retiree population and their families. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, how do you plan to address this shortfall? Answer. Addressing this or any other major program funding shortfall will be our task once the DOD strategic review is completed and used to set guidelines for future spending. Additionally, however, we will be scrutinizing processes and management--including those in the Defense Health Program--to make improvements, increase efficiency, and save money. aviation modernization programs Question. In a recent presentation, the Air Force Chief of Staff stated that if all of our current aviation modernization programs execute as planned, in 15 years the average age of aircraft in the inventory will be 30 years. Specifically there has been much speculation that the current tactical aviation modernization plan is not affordable. Is this a viable program? Answer. The requirements and timing of the tactical fighter programs are subjects in the on-going review which Secretary Rumsfeld has initiated. Although a major investment, the modernization of U.S. tactical fighters is of immense importance and deserves careful review. Question. With the cost of individual platforms escalating, will we ever be able to rejuvenate our fleet of aircraft without a significant increase in our modernization budgets? Answer. Given the aging of the current fighter force structure, replacement aircraft must be procured. Once the review is complete, we will be in a position to address the budget necessary to satisfy the required future force structure. Question. How do you expect the development of unmanned aerial vehicles to impact our requirements for manned platforms over this period? Answer. Our unmanned aerial vehicles have demonstrated their value as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. As the quantity and capability of these unmanned systems increase, we expect them to pick up more of these roles, complementing our heavily tasked, manned intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance fleet. We also have technology programs to begin to develop combat roles for unmanned aerial vehicles. If the technologies prove successful, these unmanned systems will complement our manned combat fleet. readiness Question. Over the last few years we have seen increasing evidence that the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces has begun to deteriorate as a result of the over-commitment of an under-resourced Department of Defense. Whether you look at the comments of Army Training and Doctrine Command commanders, the testimony of the Service Chiefs, or reports of severe shortages aboard deployed naval vessels, all point to a pending readiness crisis. Many have argued that we are approaching a readiness death spiral where maintaining today's aging equipment and facilities is preventing the modernization necessary to maintain readiness in the future. What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Bush administration, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues? Answer. Our new administration faces a number of readiness challenges across the military. These include the classic ``unit readiness'' concerns of robust manning, functioning equipment, and realistic training so that our military is prepared to defend the vital national interests of the United States. Our war fighting commanders around the world must have the assets to synchronize and use their units in effective joint and coalition forces. This ``joint readiness'' requires effective command, control, communications, and computer (C\4\) systems; robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; sufficient lift to mobilize forces and equipment; interoperability; and healthy logistics practices and sustainment stocks. I believe that the U.S. also needs to be better prepared for the growing threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), threats to critical information and other infrastructure systems, and vulnerable space assets. Some of the more pressing concerns lie in the condition of equipment, or more broadly, the materiel readiness of the forces. Of particular concern is the readiness of our aviation forces. They continue to struggle to overcome the ill effects of higher-than-planned use and inadequate parts support that have accrued since the end of the Cold War. While increased funding in the past 2 years has had some positive effect on materiel readiness, there is more work to be done. DOD's equipment is growing older, and we will be continually challenged to keep our existing forces ready while preparing for the threats of the future. Our National Guard and Reserve Forces also have a number of unique challenges in meeting their mission requirements upon deployment that require our immediate attention. As we undertake a thorough review of the National Military Strategy, we will address these concerns. readiness supplemental funding requirement Question. The military services have provided this committee with a list of $4.5 billion in near-term readiness requirements, such as spare parts and equipment maintenance, and another $2.5 billion for emergency personnel and modernization programs, that they have identified for this fiscal year. Have you taken a look at the military services fiscal year 2001 emergency requirements and will the administration submit a supplemental budget request to fund these items? Answer. I have not studied in detail the service's unfunded fiscal year 2001 requirements. The administration's position is that DOD's strategic review must be completed before any decision on submitting an fiscal year 2001 supplemental appropriations request is made. vieques Question. Over the past 18 months Naval forces deploying from the east coast of the United States have been prevented from conducting live-fire training on the Navy's training range on Vieques, Puerto Rico, which has had a significant impact on the readiness of these forces to execute their wartime missions. An agreement was reached with the then-Governor of Puerto Rico, and legislation passed to implement that agreement, which will provide economic incentives to the people of Vieques in return for their cooperation in the restoration of live-fire training. Unfortunately, the current Governor has stated that she will not abide by the terms of this agreement and that she will insist the Navy cease operations immediately. If confirmed, what actions will you take to achieve the restoration of live-fire training on Vieques? Answer. It is my understanding that Vieques is a superior site for rehearsing amphibious operations, the only site currently used for aerial mine warfare training, and is the only location currently available on the east coast where aircraft, naval surface ships, and ground forces can employ combined arms training with live ammunition under realistic conditions. It is also the only range currently available on the east coast that allows the Navy and Marine Corps to conduct naval gunfire training. I understand that to date no alternative sites, providing the ability to conduct combined arms training with live ammunition under realistic conditions, have been located. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Rumsfeld and the Department of the Navy to explore all possible options for solutions that best meet the national interest. outsourcing of commercial activities Question. Do you believe that the military services need to retain a core capability to perform certain activities such as equipment maintenance, and what approach you take to allocate workloads between the public and private sector? Answer. The size and composition of DOD's facilities to perform equipment maintenance is an important aspect of the overall readiness of the Armed Forces. The appropriate balance between government and private sector facilities must be struck in a manner that assures the equipment employed by the Armed Forces will be ready for use when needed. This balance in turn will be affected over time by the nature of the technology used in military equipment. A balance will be reviewed to assure that capabilities essential to national defense that cannot reliably be provided by the private sector will be provided by the government sector. Moreover, critical capabilities will be maintained in the government sector. Question. Do you believe that significant savings can be achieved through outsourcing, and if so, do you have any data that would be applicable to those activities which you would outsource? Answer. I believe significant savings can be achieved by competing the Department's non-core activities with the private sector. While there has been some debate over the actual magnitude of the savings, recent studies have all agreed that savings are substantial. I believe specific functions should be identified for study where the most potential for savings and efficiency improvement exists. For example, past studies indicate base operating support functions achieve above average savings. I would review all functional areas to identify and target those commercial activities that offer the most promise for competition with the private sector. commercial vs. military requirements for frequency spectrum Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to review the Department's total spectrum requirements and ensure that new systems are designed to ensure efficient spectrum utilization by the Department of Defense? Answer. I understand the Department has reviewed its current and long-term electromagnetic spectrum needs, and will continue to re- assess these regularly. The Department has also revised its acquisition regulations to mandate more stringent procedures for determining and validating, prior to production decision, the requirements for and availability of spectrum for all equipment and systems to be utilized by the Department. If confirmed, I plan to support these efforts and ensure that the Department continues to investigate new technologies for the more efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum such as software programmable radio technology. Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take if the study currently being conducted within the Department of Defense determines that there will be a significant cost and operational impact if the military services surrender the 1755--1850 MHz band of frequencies? Answer. If confirmed, I will need to be thoroughly briefed on the study to fully appreciate its findings. The Department will continue to work closely with the National Telecommunication and Information Administration and the Federal Communications Commission in determining the best decision for the Nation, balancing national security and economic development, in identifying spectrum for the next generation of wireless systems while understanding that the Department's readiness must not be comprised. I know that Secretary Rumsfeld assigns a very high priority to this. I would also like to acknowledge the tremendous support the Department has received from this committee in supporting the Department's assured access to the electromagnetic spectrum. base realignment and closure Question. The previous administration insisted that another round of base closures was needed to streamline the defense budget and to shift resources into personnel programs and weapons procurement. However, when asked if in the absence of an additional base closure round they would provide, for congressional consideration, a list of those facilities that they consider excess and eligible for closure, they have been unable, or unwilling, to do so. Do you believe that we have excess defense facilities and, if so, where does this excess capacity exist? Answer. See response below. Question. Would you recommend additional rounds of base closures? Answer. See response below. Question. Would you provide a list of those facilities for congressional consideration absent the authorization of another round of base closure? Answer. See response below. Question. Would you support another round of BRAC but limited to where excess capacity exists? Answer. As Secretary Rumsfeld noted in his response to Advance Policy Questions from this committee, we will withhold an assessment of this issue until after the completion of the defense review. policy toward iraq Question. Ten years after the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, tens of thousands of U.S. troops remain in the Persian Gulf region--at a cost of $1 billion per year--to enforce the current U.S. policy of containing Saddam Hussein. Despite our efforts, Saddam remains in power in Iraq, his weapons programs unchecked; the international coalition that repelled him from Kuwait has virtually collapsed; and our friends and allies in Europe and the Gulf region are reestablishing diplomatic ties with Iraq. What steps do you think the United States should take to reinvigorate the international community's efforts to ensure Iraqi compliance with the obligations Iraq accepted at the end of the Gulf War--particularly those obligations related to disarmament? Answer. The administration is in the process of reviewing all the elements of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This review will have to address whether more can be done to secure Baghdad's compliance with the conditions laid down by the United Nations, particularly its obligation to foreswear the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. It will also have to address the complex task of rebuilding support for an effective policy in the region and in the international community. Question. What role do you believe the Iraqi opposition can play in these efforts? Answer. This is an issue that the Iraq policy review now underway will have to address. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on it at this time. Question. Do you believe that sanctions are an effective tool against Saddam Hussein? Answer. Sanctions can be a part of an effective policy, but they are not a substitute for a policy. The administration is reviewing whether any adjustments are needed in the U.S. approach to administering the sanctions. It is important to remember that the focus of the sanctions is not the Iraqi people but preventing Saddam Hussein from developing and using weapons of mass destruction against his own people or his neighbors, as he has done before. u.s. military presence in bosnia Question. Last December marked the 5-year anniversary of the NATO military presence in Bosnia. Although reduced from its early high of about 60,000 troops, the international community, under NATO leadership, today maintains a force of over 20,000 troops in Bosnia, almost 4,600 of whom are American. Despite over 5 years of an international military presence in Bosnia, we are far from achieving the goal of a unified, multi-ethnic nation, as envisioned in the Dayton Accords which ended the war. In fact, during the most recent nation- wide elections in Bosnia, the Nationalists--those who oppose the aims of Dayton--made surprising gains. What should the United States do to break the stalemate in Bosnia and help create the conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops? Answer. NATO is currently assessing options. It would be inappropriate for me to comment further. Question. Should we consider a renegotiation of the Dayton Accords? Answer. Dayton has served the central purpose of stopping the war. The Dayton Accords include procedures for making changes. Whether any changes are made is ultimately a matter for the Bosnians themselves to decide. north korea Question. What is your view of the agreed framework between the United States and North Korea? Answer. The Agreed Framework is one element of an overall effort by the U.S. and its democratic allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, to prevent war and reduce the level of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. It is important to remember that their overall problem is not only a nuclear one but also involves a large North Korean conventional military threat and a long record of North Korean hostility toward the South. The historic summit between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il is a significant positive step, but we need to proceed with caution. We also need to make sure that North Korea honors its commitments as we live up to ours. Question. What steps can the United States take to reduce the risks from North Korea's weapons proliferation activities? Answer. The risks posed by North Korea fall in three areas: the potential to build an ICBM capable of hitting U.S. territory; the continued domestic deployment of missiles that put our allies at risk; and the export of long-range missiles and missile technology to world trouble spots that heighten regional tensions. The administration is committed to the deployment of an effective national missile defense as soon as it is technologically feasible. Given the widespread deployment of North Korean derived theater range ballistic missiles and the threat those missiles pose to deployed U.S. forces as well as our friends and allies, the administration would attach a high priority to the development and deployment of effective theater missile defense systems in a timely and efficient manner. It is in the U.S. interest that the North Koreans terminate their programs and stop exporting missile technology to other countries. The administration will pursue that objective--the precise means would likely be determined following a review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and its proliferation policies. africa Question. The Defense Department is currently involved in a number of initiatives in Africa to help certain nations be better prepared to provide their own regional peacekeeping forces and humanitarian missions. The African Crisis Response Initiative and the ongoing training of several Nigerian army battalions for peacekeeping duty in Sierra Leone are two examples of this policy. Do you support such initiatives which are aimed at helping African nations be better prepared to respond to a regional crisis? Answer. Yes. The current strategy to develop peace operations and humanitarian response capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa includes two key objectives: to develop defense partnerships with important states, and to actively engage sub-regional organizations. One of these important states is Nigeria, with whom the U.S. is currently implementing peace operations training in support of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (Operation Focus Relief, or OFR). export controls Question. The domestic satellite industry has complained that it has lost a significant amount of market share, and billions of dollars, as a result of the satellite licensing provisions that were enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. What is your view of these complaints? Answer. Let me start by saying that the satellite industry is an important industry for national defense. We must ensure that government processes are not unnecessarily impeding legitimate exports of satellites that provide the critical revenues for the industry to continue to invest in advancing the state of the art. The satellite industry itself has released information suggesting that competitive pressures facing the industry are the result of a number of factors including launch failures, competition from land-based communications systems, and growing capabilities of foreign suppliers. All of these factors must be reviewed in the course of establishing an appropriate policy on the export of satellites. National security must always be of paramount consideration. Question. Do you believe that Congress should revisit the issue of how we license exports of satellite technology? Answer. I believe that the administration will be examining this issue carefully (including any statutory or regulatory changes that might be required), and will consult closely with Congress as this review proceeds. Any review must be undertaken in a manner that preserves fundamental national security interests. Question. Over the past 2 years, 16 ambassadors from NATO countries have written to the Secretary of State expressing their deep frustration with the U.S. export control system. Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre initiated an effort to streamline export control process without weakening controls. What is your view of Secretary Hamre's reforms? Do you believe that further streamlining is required? Answer. The administration will be reviewing this issue. Question. What policies and procedures do you believe need to be changed in the export license control process that would reflect the right balance between national security and commercial interests? Answer. Exports of sensitive high technology affect U.S. national security interests in many ways. First, we must protect our military personnel and our security interests by ensuring that sensitive technologies are not exported to potential adversaries or to foreign entities that represent a significant diversion risk. Second, we must have sensible and effective policies and procedures to ensure that appropriate transfers of military and commercial systems and technologies that support our coalition warfighting objectives are permitted. Finally, we must be mindful that the U.S. is not the only country with advanced military and commercial technology. Efforts to control exports can sometimes become counterproductive if they weaken American technical capacity without protecting truly critical technologies. Thus, we need to work aggressively with our allies and friends to ensure that our policies and approaches toward the export of such technologies meet our mutual security interests. The Department of Defense has an essential role to play in designing export control policies and implementing the principles I have outlined. We will be working closely with Congress and the other Executive Departments on these important matters. Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense should play a greater role in the export licensing process than it currently does in determining whether sensitive technologies should be exported overseas? Answer. The Defense Department must play a strong role in the export control policy process. Defense has a tremendous amount of technical expertise in the export control area and should have the ability to apply these assets to the overall export control process. I will be reviewing whether there are specific changes that should be proposed concerning DOD participation in these processes. Question. What critical military technologies do you believe the United States should not license for export overseas and why? Answer. There are obviously a number of critical military and dual- use systems and technologies that must be export controlled to preserve U.S. military technological advantages and to ensure that these items do not fall into the wrong hands. This is a changing picture as military capabilities advance and technology become diffuse worldwide. We must ensure that we have a system in place that regularly reviews the specifics to make sure that we are controlling the most important items and that we are not controlling items that cannot be effectively controlled because of widespread availability. Question. Senator Gramm recently reintroduced his bill to reauthorize the Export Administration Act. Senator Gramm has characterized his bill as an effort to build a higher fence around a smaller number of items, the export of which would have a detrimental impact on our national security. Others have expressed concern that the bill does not pay sufficient attention to national security concerns. What is your view of Senator Gramm's bill? Answer. I have not studied the bill but will do so as soon as possible. Question. Do you support the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act? Answer. It is my understanding that the administration is in the process of reviewing the bill and will have some comments soon. technological capabilities of terrorists Question. A key disadvantage of the proliferation of information technology is that potential and acknowledged adversaries can now gather data, imagery, and intelligence updates from many of the same sources and means that the U.S. military uses. Keeping a step ahead of these capabilities is a great concern for this committee. What would you propose the Department of Defense do to address this concern? Answer. While greater access to multiple sources of data has many advantages for the U.S., it is also true that our adversaries can use commercial imagery and other burgeoning information technologies to monitor and target U.S. interests. While we cannot prevent commercial capabilities from becoming more sophisticated and widespread, we do have the ability, with the proper blend of resources, personnel and processes, to enhance the likelihood that the U.S. will continue to maintain the information advantage it needs. Furthermore, the control of certain technologies remains an issue of significant concern to the Department. We will continue to review each export license request and appropriately apply conditions and provisos to those licenses to protect our national security interests. The Secretary has made it clear that information superiority is one of his top priorities. If confirmed, I intend to fully support these efforts. Question. According to the Department of Defense's most recent annual report to Congress entitled ``Worldwide NBC Weapons and Missile Threat'', ``technology to improve the delivery of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is becoming more advanced and in some cases more available. Some countries are focused on the production of better missile guidance and control mechanisms and countermeasures to defeat ballistic missile defense systems.'' What options should the Department of Defense pursue to address the threat posed by this growing capability? Answer. The Department of Defense needs to continue to support U.S. Government nonproliferation efforts intended to prevent or reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and associated technologies. It needs to press ahead with its counterproliferation programs to ensure that U.S. forces are prepared to fight and win in chemical and biological weapons environments. It must develop and deploy missile defenses that are effective against current and emerging ballistic missile threats. We also must strive to build stronger international non-proliferation regimes and simultaneously look for opportunities for cooperative programs with like-minded Defense Ministries. cooperative threat reduction (ctr) Question. Last month Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee that ``we need to be aware of the fact that Russia, in particular, claims to lack the financial resources to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, but continues to invest scarce resources in the development of newer, more sophisticated ICBMs and other weapons. We would not want the U.S. investment in the [DOD] CTR program to become the means by which Russia frees up resources to finance its military modernization programs. A review of ongoing [DOD] CTR projects and their respective national security benefits would be appropriate.'' What are the most important factors that should be considered during this review? Answer. The most important factor for this review should be the extent to which the assistance provided to the eligible states of the former Soviet Union enhances the security of the United States. Each eligible state is unique and that will also be an important consideration. Russia is the only eligible state that is permitted by international treaty to retain and modernize its nuclear forces. Therefore, an important factor for review should be whether the Department's CTR program is structured to prevent support for Russian military modernization programs. Question. Do you agree that the CTR program serves the U.S. national interests by reducing the threat from former Soviet weapons of mass destruction? Answer. Certainly the elimination of former Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that the CTR program has funded has benefited U.S. national security. As the previous answer indicates, we need to monitor the details of implementation to insure that those purposes continue to be achieved. reserve components Question. Although the Department of Defense is committed to the ``Total Force,'' as recently demonstrated by the deployment of the 49th Armored Division of the Texas Army National Guard to Bosnia, there is concern among the Reserve community that this commitment to the ``Total Force'' is only ``lip service.'' Those who question the Department's support of the Reserve components point out the Reserves do not receive an appropriate share of the defense budget for modernization and military construction. A specific issue was that the fiscal year 2000 military construction program. While the request for the National Guard amounted to about 3 percent of its critical needs, the active-component funding request covered nearly 20 percent of their critical needs. What role should our Reserve components have in the post-Cold War era? Answer. Over the last several years, the National Guard and Reserves have been transformed from a Cold War force held in Reserve to an essential force serving in the ``front lines'' daily. For example, during each of the past 5 years, Reserve component personnel have performed between 12.5 and 13.5 million workdays per year supporting the active force. The Total Force Policy is now a fundamental principle guiding the restructuring and reorientation of our Nation's military forces. At the same time, though, we must be careful not to place too much of the burden of our national security objectives on the Guard and Reserve. These are immensely capable forces that play a critical but well-defined role in our force structure. As such, the role of our Reserve components will be examined, along with our other Armed Forces, during the review of the overall defense strategy. Question. Do you believe the Reserve components are fully integrated into the ``Total Force?'' If not, what further steps should be taken to make the integration a reality? Answer. The integration of the Reserve components has improved steadily. Although barriers to full integration into the Total Force have been reduced or eliminated, work remains. For example, quality of life programs are needed to recruit and retain Reserve component forces. We need to work together to address employers' concerns and provide family support programs. Question. What should be the basis for level of funding in the administration's budget request for the Reserve components? Answer. Keeping the required force trained and ready remains our top priority. The basis for the level of funding for the Reserve components in the administration's budget request should be based on the readiness requirements placed on the Reserve components by the National Military Strategy, the ongoing strategic review being undertaken by Secretary Rumsfeld at the President's direction, the fiscal year 2001 QDR, and other missions assigned by the Services. The Reserve components should then be resourced to ensure interoperability to meet the requirements identified by those mandates. Question. Due to the leaner Active Duty military and greater number of operational commitments, the Department of Defense has increasingly called on the Reserves and National Guard. In 1989, reservists and members of the Guard recorded one million days of duty. In each of the past 3 years, that figure has averaged 13 million days. This increased workload has had an impact on the individual reservist and on his civilian employer. As a result, retention and recruiting are impacted and in extreme cases the relationship between the reservist and his employer. In your judgement, is it realistic to expect the Reserve components to assume an increasing role in operational deployments and in the ``Total Force'' without adverse impact on their civilian jobs? Answer. The Reserve Forces are a major and integral part of our National Defense team. The key to their effective use is maintaining the proper balance of utilizing their capabilities without overusing any specific segment of the force. We will endeavor to seek a level of participation for our reservists that maximizes the investments made in their training and equipping while mediating the potential for inadvertent harm done by their overuse. Question. What can the Department do to mitigate the impact of increasing Reserve deployments on the civilian employers? Answer. The key to mitigating the impact of Reserve component deployments on civilian employers is early notification, a predictable return of the Reserve component member, and not calling upon the same individual too often. We will continue to improve our ability to return reservists from deployments when they are scheduled to return. Work needs to be done to ensure that the force structure contains sufficient high demand units so the same reservists are not used too frequently. Question. The Reserve components represent a great asset to our Nation as they support the National military strategy while also serving to link our military forces to hometown populations where they serve. These forces also provide state governments with a critical ability to respond to natural disasters and are available to be the first responders to homeland defense mission requirements. Unfortunately, a significant portion of these forces appear to be improperly structured as there are a number of medium and heavy divisions in the Reserve components that have not been required or assigned to support warfighting requirements. These forces are similarly not equipped to properly support state missions. Tanks and mechanized infantry units are of little utility to governors who need these forces to respond to natural disasters. Modernizing these forces with combat support and combat service support equipment appears to be the most appropriate course to follow but would require Department of Defense oversight and a significant investment in resources. How do you believe this issue should be addressed and what will you do to restructure our Reserve components to be in a better position to support both Federal and state mission requirements? Answer. The National Guard and Reserve Forces play an essential role within today's force in supporting the day-to-day operations, at home and abroad. It is also my understanding that today's Guard and Reserve Force structure provides a significant portion of the Total Force's combat support/combat service support capability, which coincidentally, is also likely to be needed to help mitigate the consequences of a domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction event. While we anticipate that the Guard and Reserve will continue to play an important role in supporting our homeland security for the reasons you have articulated, it is important to note that the President and his key national security advisors are in the process of developing a new National Security Strategy. The President has already asked the Secretary of Defense to be prepared to undertake appropriate actions to reshape and restructure our force to meet that strategy. Therefore, it would be premature to predict with any precision what changes in structure are appropriate at this time. privatization of services Question. The Department is relying increasingly on the private sector to provide critical services. Among the most significant privatization efforts are the areas of military family housing and utility systems. What are your views on the ever-increasing reliance by the Department of Defense on the private sector to provide essential services to our military personnel? Answer. I believe the Department should seek out private sector performance for non-core functions where they are more cost effective and efficient. Question. If you support additional privatization of defense activities, what are they? Answer. Following the success of housing and utility privatization, other defense activities should be reviewed as possible privatization candidates. This is an issue that, if confirmed, I will have to study in further detail. Question. Although initial privatization efforts have resulted in near term savings, there is concern that over the long term there will be no savings. What are your expectations of the long term benefits from these privatization initiatives? Answer. All of our privatization efforts require analysis of life cycle savings to ensure they benefit the government over the long term. My understanding is that analysis of specific competitive sourcing competitions indicates that initial savings do, in fact, hold up over the life of the contract. In addition to savings, privatization supports the rapid infusion of best business practices, and attracts private sector capital to augment Department resources. management issues Question. During your tenure as Deputy Secretary, what key management performance goals do you want to accomplish, and how would this committee be able to judge whether you have accomplished them? Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to establish key management performance goals. At this point, it would be premature for me to offer specific performance initiatives, but in general, one of our primary goals should be to hire, support, and retain military and civilian personnel with the necessary skills to meet our mission needs. As we establish our goals, we must carefully consider the results of our ongoing strategic reviews as well as the QDR process, and look to closely tie DOD's strategic plans to our desired mission outcome. We also need to establish financial management operations that provide reliable information and foster accountability. Finally, we must look to reform our acquisition processes, establishing business practices that are more efficient and effective. I look forward to working with this committee and Congress as we strive to reduce or eliminate bureaucratic redundancies in the Department of Defense and streamline our management practices. Question. To successfully lead an organization, a leader must be able to create and share a vision that inspires people to follow. In your past experience, what specific steps have you taken to successfully create a vision for an organization, and how did you make sure that the entire organization had a common understanding of the mission and was aligned so that it could be accomplished? Answer. In previous questions and in many documents supplied to the committee, I have outlined my work history and the many organizations that I have run. I have always believed that the importance of leadership and management jobs is measured not by the title but by the results that the whole organization achieves. Perhaps most telling in the area of establishing a vision were my positions as Under Secretary for Policy, and my work as Dean at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), The Johns Hopkins University. In OSD Policy from 1989-1993, I redrew the organization, picked new people, and held numerous team building sessions to drive home my vision for how policy would operate. I don't want to say that my team did it all alone. Indeed, working closely with Congress, the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and our allies were integral parts of our standard operating procedures. I hope that the results--a new strategy and force structure, success in the Gulf War and in Panama, improved relations with our allies, highly successful arms control initiatives, and a whole set of new defense relationships with former adversaries-- validated my approach. At SAIS, I followed the same organizational strategies and was very pleased with the results--we doubled the goal for the school's 5-year capital campaign, focused it on the school's top priorities and then reached our goal in 2\1/2\ years (eventually reaching almost four times the original goal by the end of the campaign). Through a combined team effort, we were able to not only achieve significant increases in the school's endowment, but also created new and up-to-date programs, better faculty, improved facilities, and improved communications with the central university administration in Baltimore. In both cases, the keys to success were setting sensible objectives that could inspire support, clear communications, good people, and lots of hard work. I agree strongly with someone who once said that good government is a team sport. If confirmed by the Senate, that is the spirit I will bring to my duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Question. What steps do you intend to take to accomplish these objectives at the Department of Defense? Answer. As noted above, it would be premature for me to offer specific performance initiatives at this time. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Rumsfeld to establish key management performance goals. I look forward to working with this committee and Congress as we move ahead. Question. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is intended to provide managers with a disciplined approach--developing a strategic plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the results--for improving the performance and internal management of an organization. What are your views on this law and your experience with it, as well as your preliminary ideas on how this law might be implemented? Answer. Congress enacted GPRA in 1993 to strengthen performance management within the Federal Government. At the time GPRA was enacted, most Federal agencies did not routinely use strategic planning or performance management to shape resource decisions. DOD was a major exception, having relied for more than four decades on the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to guide program development and resource-allocation decisions. The PPBS is well aligned, in structure and intent, with the results-oriented mandate of GPRA. Instead of introducing a new data reporting or management system to implement GPRA, DOD has elected to use GPRA reporting to provide an executive-level overview of how the Secretary employs PPBS performance objectives to manage the Department's resources. Question. Are you familiar with the strategic plan, annual performance plans, annual accountability report, and financial statements of the Department of Defense? Answer. Yes, I'm familiar with these plans and reports, which are an important part of communicating the President's and the Secretary's priorities to the Department, Congress, and in a larger sense, to the American people. GPRA requires each Federal agency to produce a strategic plan every 3 years, to submit a performance plan with each budget, and to publish a performance report at the end of each budget year, summarizing progress in implementing the performance plan. In the case of DOD, Congress subsequently passed legislation establishing the Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review as DOD's strategic plan. DOD's annual performance plans and reports are structured to track progress in executing the defense strategy. In the next month or 2, the Department will forward its fiscal year 2000 performance report to Congress. If confirmed, I will give it close attention. Question. What do you consider to be the most important priorities and challenges facing DOD as it strives to achieve these management goals? Answer. Fundamentally, I believe the Department has effective processes in place for developing its strategic plan, establishing goals and measuring performance, and reporting the results. The challenge is to make sure that the substantive results of those processes reflect the true needs of U.S. national security in the 21st century and that goals are clearly articulated. Overall, the quality of the data we use to monitor performance has allowed us to measure and report our progress in meeting annual goals. In those cases where data is lacking, we are working to improve the underlying data support systems. Over the past several years, the Department has worked closely with Congress, the General Accounting Office, and the DOD Inspector General to enhance the performance of its internal management systems. In that process, several challenges have been identified, including the effective management of information technology investments and the need to streamline and improve the efficiency of financial management systems. The Secretary has made the modernization of these financial management systems one of his priorities, and I certainly support that objective. Question. What changes, if any, do you feel might be necessary in these plans? Answer. With the change of administration, the Department will revise its strategic plan and annual performance plans to reflect the priorities of President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld as informed in the ongoing strategic reviews. We will continue to work with Congress as we present future GPRA strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports to ensure that our GPRA activities reflect a full and effective implementation of the law. Question. What are your views on the importance and role of financial information in managing operations and holding managers accountable? Answer. These are immensely important. Accurate financial information is critical to evaluating outputs, services, costs, efficiency, productivity, and other essential management indicators. Such information is a vital tool for holding managers accountable. Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, useful, and timely financial information was not routinely available for these purposes? Answer. I would move decisively to improve the system or get a different one that works. It is my understanding that given the financial challenges we are facing, systems will need to be replaced over time. Question. What is your view of the importance and role of internal controls (i.e., management controls) in ensuring the reliability of financial information? Answer. Internal controls are very important. Their most critical role is to hold managers accountable for results and the wise use of resources. Also, these controls are essential to ensuring the proper allocation, disbursement, and accounting of funds and to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Question. How would you determine whether the Department has in place the key information management processes required by law, including a detailed architecture, an investment control process, and appropriate information security plans? Answer. If confirmed, I will look to the DOD Chief Information Officer to advise the Secretary and me on what information management initiatives are currently in place and what additional steps need to be taken to ensure that information technology investments are consistent with plans, process change requirements, architectures, and other information management guidance. I believe that the Department already has laid the foundation for a structured and systematic process for determining whether the key information management processes required by law are in place. Question. What role do you envision you would play in managing or providing oversight over these processes? Answer. As I indicated above, if confirmed I will look to the DOD Chief Information Officer to provide guidance for DOD information management and to spearhead the coordination of information technology activities across the Department. As such, I intend to fully support the DOD Chief Information Officer in these and other information technology management efforts. Question. How would you go about implementing or improving these processes? Answer. It would be premature for me to make any recommendations until I have had more time to study this area. However, if confirmed I intend to work closely with the DOD Chief Information Officer and other senior leaders in the Department to identify opportunities to improve existing information technology and management processes, and to achieve those improvements. Question. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) envisions that agencies will link their human capital planning with their strategic and annual plans. Can you describe your experience in building and maintaining the human capital needed to achieve results (getting the right employees for the job and providing the training, structure, incentives, and accountability to work effectively)? Answer. Attracting the right people, matching ``faces with spaces,'' ensuring professional development, and rewarding outstanding performance have been essential parts of every management job that I have ever held. Indeed, I believe that recruiting the right people for the right jobs and motivating them to perform are the most important keys to effective management. In government and in the academic world, where I have managed medium to large organizations, there are fewer tangible incentives to offer for performance and less flexibility to hire and fire. That means that one has to pay more attention, not less, to how you motivate people and provide as much intangible job satisfaction as possible, most importantly by empowering capable performers and entrusting them with meaningful responsibilities. Given our tight labor market, the Department of Defense's senior leadership and personnel managers will have to become more people-centric and rethink our incentive structure. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to make personnel issues--military and civilian--a central concern for senior departmental management. Question. The DOD workforce has undergone significant downsizing in the past several years, and with the current tight labor market, it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract and retain talent. How would you work to attract and retain individuals with the experience, education, and skills needed throughout the Department of Defense? Answer. The issues facing DOD in recruiting, developing, and retaining an excellent civilian workforce require a multi-faceted approach. I believe we begin by determining carefully what future workforce needs will be. Armed with that information, we need to strengthen or put into place the appropriate accession and retention strategies, including policies, legislation, and compensation. We also need to offer development opportunities, both as key accession and retention tools and as insurance that we are growing the cadre of leaders and managers necessary to implement our Defense strategy. Finally, we must continue to manage the workforce transition effectively. Question. To become a high-performance organization, an agency needs senior leaders who are drivers of continuous improvement. What is your approach to motivating career employees to achieve excellence? Answer. Career civil servants represent the core of operations, as they provide the continuity and institutional knowledge that support all of our military operations. Therefore, I believe in recognizing that value and rewarding excellence. One of the most important things is to communicate clearly the importance of the mission and an understanding of how their work contributes to the mission. Another way of doing so is to provide the education and training necessary to meet the increasingly complex mission. If confirmed, I will review existing education and training programs to ensure that they give current and prospective leaders the tools they need to manage effectively in the highly complex Defense environment. I will also make every effort to ensure that our career employees are appropriately compensated for all they do and would encourage public recognition of excellence. science and technology Question. The Department of Defense Science and Technology program is at a 20-year low. The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1999 established the goal of increasing the budget for the defense science and technology program by at least 2 percent over inflation for each of the fiscal years 2000 to 2008. This goal has not been met in the fiscal year 2000 nor the fiscal year 2001 budget request submitted by President Clinton. In President-elect Bush's speech at the Citadel he spoke of his support for a strong and stable technology base. If confirmed, how will you reflect this support in the defense budget? Answer. One of my goals will be to fund the Science and Technology (S&T) program at a level adequate to ensure the technological superiority of our armed forces. A downsized military needs a technological edge now more than ever. President Bush has committed to increasing defense R&D by at least $20 billion between fiscal years 2001-2006. The S&T accounts should receive a substantial share of this increase. Question. The defense laboratories are facing a future of continued reductions in research and support personnel. This trend, if unchecked, could result in a loss of ``critical mass'' in research efforts across a number of areas critical to future programs. This situation is further complicated by the fact that in the current economy the Department is vying with industry for the best and the brightest high tech personnel, but is unable to compete on salary and quality of work. Finally, the process for hiring can take up to 18 months as opposed to direct hiring in industry. If confirmed, how will you attract and retain scientists and engineers in the Department of Defense? Answer. This is an important issue, central to transformation. Unfortunately, I do not yet know enough about it to give you a complete answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that attracting and retaining scientists and engineers is a key priority of the Department of Defense. modernization Question. Last fall, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that if the Department were to execute just the current procurement plans, at the rates included in the approved acquisition strategy, that an additional $30 billion a year would be required in the procurement accounts alone. Do you agree that the procurement accounts are not executable unless there is an infusion of additional funds? Answer. The CBO estimate is based on the assumption that the currently approved plans are appropriate. The ongoing defense review directed by Secretary Rumsfeld will specify where shortfalls lie and what must be done to address those shortfalls. If confirmed, I will actively support that review. Question. Do you believe that significant changes are needed in the Department's current procurement plans? Answer. See previous answer. Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to address this shortfall, if it in fact exists? Answer. The aforementioned review of the U.S. national security strategy will result in consideration of which capabilities to modernize, upgrade or replace with new technology. Properly conducted, this process would address the Department's procurement plans. Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever- increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance costs, readiness levels continue to decline. How can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization efforts be affordable at anywhere near the current budget levels? Answer. I look at Secretary Rumsfeld's ongoing defense review as the first step to addressing these issues. That review should clarify the appropriate balance between legacy forces and modernization efforts. department of defense organization Question. In the 50 years of DOD's existence, there has grown up a substantial bureaucracy, much of which duplicates functions in the military departments. In your opinion, are there areas where functions should be centralized in DOD, at the expense of the military departments, or should functions be devolved from DOD to those departments? Please give examples. Answer. Without a more careful internal review, it would be premature for me at this point to offer any thoughts on administrative restructuring. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Rumsfeld and the Service Secretaries to identify redundancies in our bureaucratic infrastructure and to streamline our operations where possible. major challenges Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense? Answer. We will need to consider a number of issues in evaluating our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Our goal is to assure that our country has the new capabilities necessary to deter threats and defend our national security interests and contribute to peace and stability. This will involve transforming our U.S. military into a 21st century force, modernizing the intelligence and command, control, and communications infrastructure, and reforming DOD structures, processes, and organizations. In addition, our new capabilities and readiness must be sustainable. Balancing limited resources--even in an atmosphere of projected budget surpluses--is always a challenge. Properly outfitting our forces today, while at the same time ensuring we sustain robust modernization for the future, will be a key challenge for the new administration. Specific quality of life issues--such as morale, recruiting and retention, health care and benefits--will also be important. Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? Answer. These issues and others will be considered in the defense review and the QDR. Through these reviews, we will examine priorities and consider the fiscal implications associated with those priorities. most serious problems Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Department of Defense? Answer. As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted, institutional change across the board--in the executive branch, the legislative branch, the private sector, as well as our allies--will present a great challenge. If confirmed, I plan to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to establish key management performance goals and to reduce or eliminate bureaucratic redundancies in the Department of Defense and streamline our management practices. Question. What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems? Answer. It is too early to establish time lines. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and Congress as we address current problems in the Department of Defense. congressional oversight Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress? Answer. Yes. Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power? Answer. Yes. Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense? Answer. Yes. Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees? Answer. Yes. ______ [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond overseas presence 1. Senator Thurmond. The United States maintains a significant number of forces in forward deployed locations such as Europe and South Korea. With the end of the Cold War and ongoing peace initiatives on the Korean Peninsula, what is the justification for keeping the large number of forces forward deployed? Dr. Wolfowitz. Although the Cold War has ended and tensions on the Korean Peninsula have begun to lessen, forward-deployed U.S. forces in Europe, South Korea, and elsewhere continue to serve a number of vital national purposes. Our forces in Europe not only ensure the continuing security and stability of this critical region, they are also well postured to respond to crises both in Europe and in adjoining regions such as the Middle East. Despite some lessening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea remains a significant military threat to South Korea. U.S. forces in South Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia represent a powerful deterrent to North Korean aggression and, should deterrence fail, would constitute a critical element of the initial response to that aggression. Moreover, as with our forces in Europe, our forces in Northeast Asia provide broader benefits. They demonstrate our ongoing security commitment to the region, underwrite regional stability, and provide rapid response to crises throughout Asia. most significant challenge 2. Senator Thurmond. Unlike the period of the Cold War, the United States Armed Forces are facing the challenges of a world that is politically and economically unstable and unpredictable. In view of this uncertain future what in your personal views will be the most significant challenge facing the U.S. Armed Forces in the next 10 years? Dr. Wolfowitz. The most pressing challenge we face in the next 10 years will be ensuring our men and women in uniform have the wherewithal they need to address the threats of a new security environment, in which a more diverse, less predictable set of potential adversaries will seek to challenge the strategic interests of the United States and of our allies. Maintaining a capable and flexible force appropriate for this environment will require us to address issues ranging from recruitment and quality of life concerns to the expansion of unconventional threats brought by the proliferation of modern technology, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, missiles, terrorism and newer threats against space assets and information systems. junior rotc programs 3. Senator Thurmond. As you may be aware, I am very interested in the Junior ROTC program. While the primary purpose of the program is to develop good citizens, there are tangible benefits to our Nation's Armed Forces. Statistics show that more than 40 percent of the students who graduate from the Junior ROTC program choose some form of military service. Although I have expressed my goal to enhance the program to Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to make you aware of my interest in the program and would appreciate your views regarding Junior ROTC? Dr. Wolfowitz. In his February 21 letter to you, Secretary Rumsfeld underscored his support for the Junior ROTC program and reported the intent to look into expansion during the Department's forthcoming defense review. I agree that JROTC is a great way to improve the citizenship of America's high school youth, while helping students and faculty better understand and appreciate their armed forces. dod transformation 4. Senator Thurmond. Our services are undergoing or are planning major transformation to meet the challenges posed by threats of spreading technologies, increased nationalism, and weapons of mass destruction. In your personal view, why has it taken this long to begin the transformation and are these changes looking far enough into the future to be effective against emerging threats? Dr. Wolfowitz. Implementing rapid transformation of the world's premier fighting force is difficult absent a compelling case for how and why the future security environment demands such change. It is a difficult challenge to balance this transformation with our nearer-term readiness concerns. As a greater consensus emerges on future security challenges, the pace of transformation should accelerate. The means to measure progress toward transformation goals are also required in order to manage the allocation of resources appropriately. It is our goal to achieve a clearer articulation of emerging challenges in the context of the current strategy review. The metrics for measuring success should follow closely. We must carefully look at process changes that will bring new transformed capabilities to the field more rapidly. key issues 5. Senator Thurmond. Your experience and knowledge regarding the Department of Defense and Congress will serve you well during your tenure as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Based on that experience and on the needs of our Armed Forces, what is the one key issue that you would like to resolve before you leave office? Dr. Wolfowitz. I have no single issue that will animate my work in the Department. Rather, I will focus my efforts on helping Secretary Rumsfeld attain the President's three major goals for the Defense Department: First, to strengthen the bond of trust with the American military; Second, to develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorists and the complex set of threats to our information systems and our all-important assets in space; and Third, to take advantage of the technological revolution in order to help us create a military for the 21st century. At the end of my tour, if I have improved the well-being of the Department's people--military and civilian, Active and Reserve--and their ability to defend our Nation, I will consider my mission accomplished. multinational force and observers--sinai force deployment 6. Senator Thurmond. A significant concern with both the Bosnia and Kosovo deployments is that they appear to have no end. We only need to look at our deployments to the Sinai Peninsula that started in 1982. The 900 servicemembers year round commitment contributes to the high operations pace of our Armed Forces and is a drain on the Department of Defense's resources. In this era of peace between Egypt and Israel, what do these forces contribute to the peace in the region and when will this commitment end? Dr. Wolfowitz. MFO-Sinai has been a particularly successful peacekeeping operation and a highlight of the continued peace between Egypt and Israel. The presence of U.S. forces in the MFO has been a major contributor to mutual Egyptian-Israeli confidence in the Camp David Accords. This success now presents the opportunity to consider whether this commitment is still necessary. The Department is now reviewing options for the possible reduction of U.S. troop commitment in the Sinai. department of defense facilities 7. Senator Thurmond. The average age of the Department of Defense facilities is 41 years and is increasing. To support this infrastructure the Department is investing less than 2 percent of its replacement value while the accepted corporate standard is at least 3 percent. In simple terms, we are not investing sufficient resources to maintain our facilities to ensure the quality of life and readiness. As the next Deputy Secretary of Defense you will have a significant role in ensuring the readiness of our facilities. Other than providing the necessary fiscal resources to maintain our facilities, what other steps can the Department take to resolve this critical issue? Dr. Wolfowitz. You are right, Senator, our physical plant is aging. DOD has previously reported that it maintains excess infrastructure. We will continue to demolish and dispose of excess facilities individually. We plan to improve utilization of existing facilities through more joint use and through partnering with the private sector on leasing underutilized facilities. However, the Department is currently conducting a comprehensive defense review that will help guide decisions regarding our infrastructure strategy. Until that review is complete, I will defer judgment on whether further initiatives and additional funding are needed. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith u.s.-china military-to-military relations 8. Senator Smith. I believe China is a serious threat to U.S. national security and our allies in Asia. In 1999, Rep. Tom DeLay and I addressed the threat posed by the Clinton administration's policy of engagement with China with an amendment restricting military-to- military exchanges, a law which we believe the Clinton administration circumvented. We believe the military-to-military briefings given by DOD made available sensitive U.S. military information to the People's Liberation Army. Would you support ending this military-to-military exchange program? Or would you propose to overhaul it to convert it into a program that teaches code of conduct for soldiers, the role of a military in a democratic society, etc., information which would actually benefit the PLA and would promote our stated goals of encouraging China to democratize? Dr. Wolfowitz. Section 1201 of the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits ``inappropriate exposure'' of U.S. operational capabilities and technologies to Chinese visitors. The Department of Defense will continue to strictly comply with the requirements of this provision in our military-to-military engagement with the PRC. As the new administration settles in place, we are undertaking a serious review of the schedule of military-to-military events with the PLA planned for 2001. In this review, we will ensure that our military-to-military program with the PLA supports U.S. policy objectives and will emphasize that the program must have increased reciprocity and transparency on the part of the PLA. Secretary Rumsfeld conveyed this message clearly and directly to senior Chinese leaders during his March 22, 2001 meeting at the Pentagon with Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen. export controls 9. Senator Smith. I am very concerned over easing export control restrictions to China, which has allowed the Chinese Government to purchase powerful computers and garner sensitive aerospace technology assistance from the United States that can be employed for military purposes. How do you see the DOD working to prevent such dual-use transfers of technology from occurring under the Bush administration? Do you believe the DOD should have a heightened role in determining the sale of sensitive dual-use technologies to China? Dr. Wolfowitz. My objective is to ensure that we have a robust export control system that controls sensitive items and technologies that represent national security or proliferation risks. I am committed to ensuring that DOD plays a key role in the development and implementation of export control policy. In this regard, I will be paying close attention to the operation of existing interagency mechanisms and will work to revise them if it is necessary to protect our national security interests, particularly with regard to exports of sensitive dual-use technologies to high risk destinations. taiwan policy 10. Senator Smith. I support the sale of U.S. military hardware, including the Aegis system, to Taiwan in order for the island nation to defend its democracy against Chinese threats to reunify through military aggression. Furthermore, I support the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA). Do you agree that the U.S. should sell advanced military hardware such as the Aegis system and other types of military hardware to Taiwan to balance the military situation in the Taiwan Strait? Will you push for TSEA's passage in the Senate since President Bush endorsed the measure as a candidate? Do you believe the United States military has a role to play in the collective defense of Taiwan as a democratic friendly nation beyond military hardware sales should China initiate military aggression towards Taiwan? Dr. Wolfowitz. We support the provision of defense articles and services in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. We are currently evaluating this year's Taiwan's arms sales requests, to include the Aegis-derived Evolved Advanced Combat System. With regard to the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, we support the intent of the legislation-- ensuring the security of Taiwan. As has been stated publicly, the United States remains committed to maintaining regional peace and stability in this region, and we continue to stand firmly for the peaceful resolution of differences between the PRC and Taiwan. With regard to U.S. military support to Taiwan beyond arms sales, our forces are postured to safeguard U.S. interests and to react quickly to a range of possible contingencies in the region. ke-asat 11. Senator Smith. Over the last decade I have encountered considerable difficulty within the DOD and the previous administration to ensure the development and deployment of the Kinetic Energy Anti- Satellite (KE-ASAT) program. I believe we should finish the KE-ASAT program (which is 90 percent complete), which provides defensive measures against hostile space assets surveiling U.S. forces. Do you support programs such as KE-ASAT that will protect U.S. troops and ensure U.S. military dominance? I would like to ask you for your commitment to completing this vital program and providing the necessary oversight over SMDC to do so, including returning the team to the program and necessary funding for completion, as General Shinseki committed to me to do. Dr. Wolfowitz. I fully support protecting our U.S. troops and doing what is necessary to ensure U.S. military dominance. We will be looking at a new strategy for America's defense in our strategic review and subsequently in the Quadrennial Defense Review. As part of these reviews, we will look at how to programmatically and operationally support these very important goals. space commission report 12. Senator Smith. Last month, Secretary Rumsfeld released the findings of the Space Commission Report which made several recommendations to improve military space management and assets. What are your views on the need to reform military space management and the need to implement the recommendations made by Secretary Rumsfeld and the Commissioners? Dr. Wolfowitz. It is clear that the United States relies significantly on space for our national security. We need to ensure that the management and the organization of our national security space program reflect the importance of space to the Nation today. I believe that a more comprehensive approach is necessary to assign clear responsibilities and accountability for national security space programs. The Space Commission has presented a thorough, independent and objective assessment of our national space program. In our strategic review, we must seriously consider their recommended management and organizational changes if we are to meet the national security space needs of the 21st century. cooperative threat reduction 13. Senator Smith. I have serious concerns with the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program which I believe subsidizes the Russian Government's ability to improve their military at U.S. taxpayers expense--allowing the Russians to use our funds to replace obsolete weapons with more sophisticated ones. Meanwhile, the Russians continue to modernize their military and proliferate weapons of mass destruction to other hostile states. Do you believe the Cooperative Threat Reduction program could be reinvented to reach its original objectives--i.e. reducing the threat and conditioning funding to Russian compliance, particularly on proliferation issues? Dr. Wolfowitz. As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted to Congress, the elimination of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has benefited U.S. national security. I would note that the CTR program does not provide funds to the Russian Government. All assistance is in the form of contracts to either U.S. companies or to Russian enterprises and institutes. The weapon systems being eliminated are mainly operational systems while the pace of Russian strategic modernization remains slower than projected. Nevertheless, a review of ongoing CTR projects and their national security implications is appropriate and has now begun. chinese missiles 14. Senator Smith. Last year, I addressed in a floor amendment the sale of the Russian-made Moskit sea-skimming missiles purchased by China for use on Sovremenny Class destroyers, which China now possesses. How do you view this direct threat to U.S. naval forces in the Pacific and how do we aid Taiwan as required under the TRA to counter this escalated threat? Dr. Wolfowitz. Due to its high speed and maneuverability, the Moskit sea-skimming missile does present technical challenges to navies around the world. The Taiwan military has some limited capability against Moskit missile through U.S. supplied weapons systems. Perry- class and Knox-class frigates are equipped with the PHALANX Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), which is designed to intercept surface skimming, low-flying anti-ship missiles. In the event of a conflict, Taiwan's F- 16 aircraft, equipped with the air-launched Harpoon missiles, could be used to attack People's Republic of China ships equipped with the Moskit anti-ship cruise missile. phalcon sale 15. Senator Smith. I have recently read in defense industry publications that Israel is attempting to resurrect its Phalcon early warning radar sale with China. This sale will increase China's ability to project force in the Taiwan Strait and into the South China Sea. I believe this sale would also threaten the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet. What would you do as Deputy Secretary of Defense to deter this sale to China? Dr. Wolfowitz. The United States has consulted with the Israeli government closely on its proposal to sell the Phalcon early warning aircraft to China. We have made clear to the Israelis that we view the Phalcon as a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability in Asia, as well as a potential threat to any U.S. forces involved in a military conflict with China, and we have clearly stated our opposition to the sale. Then-Prime Minister Barak announced in July 2000 that the sale would not go forward, and we consider the matter closed. national missile defense 16. Senator Smith. I am an ardent supporter of the creation of a multi-tiered missile defense system. I believe the United States should move forward with developing and deploying this system. Furthermore, I am in full agreement with Secretary Rumsfeld's assessment that without a missile defense, hostile nations will be able to alter the actions and limit options available to the United States. Would the abrogation of the ABM Treaty help with the goal of pursuing missile defense? How should the United States approach providing Great Britain, Japan and Taiwan and other allies with missile defense capabilities? Dr. Wolfowitz. The issue of how to handle the ABM Treaty will be part of our overall strategic review. However, as senior administration officials have made clear, the ABM Treaty, in its current form, is no longer relevant. We will look at missile defense options unconstrained by the ABM Treaty, to see what makes the most sense. We hope to persuade the Russians of the need to permit deployment of effective missile defenses. But as Secretary Powell has noted, it may be necessary to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if the government of the Russian Federation will not agree to modifications necessary to accommodate our missile defense programs. The administration has made clear that our proposed missile defenses would protect our friends and allies as well as the United States. We have also made clear our commitment to close and substantive consultations with allies. These consultations have begun, and we will seek the views of our allies about specific missile defense responses to the growing ballistic missile threat. peacekeeping and humanitarian missions: impact on readiness 17. Senator Smith. I am disturbed at the dangerous decline of the U.S. military over the last decade. There is a long list of issues that concern me, but in particular, I see a pressing need to address military readiness. Furthermore, I believe peacekeeping and humanitarian missions correlate directly to our current readiness dilemma. What do you believe is the best way to work with the DOD to reverse our readiness deficiencies and to terminate U.S. peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that have no bearing on U.S. national security interests? Is anyone at DOD conceiving an exit strategy for the Balkans? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Secretary is actively reviewing U.S. military participation in the full range of ongoing peace operations, humanitarian operations, and routine engagement activities to ascertain ways for reducing tempo strains on our personnel while also continuing to advance U.S. interests. In this regard, it is worth noting that in some cases, such as communications, engineering, and civil affairs, the impact of ongoing operations on readiness is not entirely negative, as they can provide excellent training for certain military specialties. Our strategic goals in the Balkans are to maintain peace and security in South Eastern Europe, protect the strength of the NATO Alliance, and maintain U.S. credibility with our European Allies. With that in mind, we want to avoid precipitous withdrawals while continuously reviewing troop levels to tailor them properly to mission and environment. Changing conditions in Bosnia and Kosovo will allow adjustments with the intent of ``right-sizing'' our forces to the tasks at hand. defense review 18. Senator Smith. I am pleased that Andy Marshall has been selected to review the structure of the Defense Department. When will this review be completed and what kind of input will you or other appointees have in it? Will Senate Armed Services Committee members be briefed on Marshall's findings? Dr. Wolfowitz. To clarify the structure of our review, Andy Marshall has been asked to review the Department's overall strategy. Additional reviews will be conducted to look at other areas of concern. Later this spring, Secretary Rumsfeld will provide testimony in support of the fiscal year 2001 Supplemental Budget, at which time he will outline some broad aspects of the review for Congress. security clearance backlog 19. Senator Smith. Last year, I passed legislation that tightened the requirements for people seeking DOD security clearances for job- related purposes following revelations of clearances being granted to felons. But there is another problem, the clearance backlog. The Defense Security Service (DSS) is still a chaotic and demoralized agency and the security clearance backlog has not improved. What is being done to resolve this problem? Will new leadership be appointed at the DSS? Dr. Wolfowitz. I share your concern that this is a very serious issue that must be addressed quickly. As we assemble our senior leadership team, it will be a priority to consider any process changes that may be necessary to alleviate the current backlog in security clearances. base closures 20. Senator Smith. As I understand it, a BRAC round is being considered as a way to save money by the DOD. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, (PNSY), which is located in New Hampshire, represents the best performance shipyard for attack subs. PNSY successfully rolled out ``smartbase'' technologies to demonstrate to the DOD the cost saving improvements of the ``smartbase'' technology. Can you outline what you believe are the parameters of any BRAC Secretary Rumsfeld and you would like to see? Dr. Wolfowitz. Our base structure should fit our force structure requirements. We are looking at the issue of excess infrastructure, and will make a decision on how best to address this as soon as we can in the review process. When we have established the proper relationship between the force structure needed to execute our national security strategy and the infrastructure needed to support that force, we will work closely with Congress to develop a process that is fair and true to that objective. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum basic research funding 21. Senator Santorum. President Bush has emphasized the need to fund ``leap ahead'' technologies and has mentioned the possibility of ``skipping a generation of weapons to make them more lethal and mobile.'' The only way this policy will succeed is if President Bush commits to investing heavily in basic sciences in American universities. The Department of Defense has historically played a major Federal role in funding basic research and has been a significant sponsor of engineering research and technology development conducted in American universities. For over 50 years, Department of Defense investments in university research have been a dominant element of the Nation's research and development (R&D) infrastructure and an essential component of the U.S. capacity for technological innovation. Supporting university research benefits the Department of Defense in many ways. In addition to producing important advances in knowledge, support to university research helps keep top scientists and engineers involved in defense research. Also, students who get hands-on research training become the highly qualified scientists and engineers of the future who go to work in academia, industry, and Federal laboratories. In the 1990s, Basic Research funded through the Department of Defense peaked at $1.489 billion in fiscal year 1993 and declined to a level of $1.059 billion in fiscal year 1998. In fact, funding for Department of Defense Basic Research began to increase, beginning in fiscal year 1999, only after Congress took the lead in reversing this trend. Do you believe that there exists a mismatch between the goals of President Bush and levels of investment in our Department of Defense Basic Research accounts? If so, what do you believe is a more accurate figure that ought to be invested in Department of Defense Basic Research funding? Can you indicate any short-term goals that you feel are achievable with respect to Department of Defense Basic Research funding? Dr. Wolfowitz. First, it is important to review the funding history for the Department's Basic Research program. The funding numbers you have cited for fiscal years 1993 and 1998 are appropriated values in fiscal year 2001 constant dollars. The table below shows both the requested and appropriated amounts for the Department's Basic Research program in fiscal year 2001 constant dollars. BASIC RESEARCH DOLLARS IN MILLIONS/FISCAL YEAR 2001 CONSTANT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fiscal Year -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Requested...................... 1,277 1,398 1,337 1,300 1,220 1,215 1,148 1,133 1,217 Appropriated................... 1,489 1,312 1,282 1,176 1,090 1,059 1,098 1,157 1,314 Difference..................... +213 -86 -55 -124 -130 -156 -50 +24 +97 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As stated in ``A Blueprint for New Beginnings,'' outlining the President's Budget Request to Congress, ``the President believes that the Nation's defense strategy should drive decisions on defense resources.'' Such is the case with Basic Research. However, determining a sufficient level of investment for Basic Research is not a precise science, rather it is a strategic decision to invest in broad areas of research that have the potential of yielding revolutionary advances, as well as pursuing solutions to known operational problems. An investment in Basic Research pays dividends in many ways. Basic research is a long-term investment with an emphasis on opportunities for military application in the future, yet it also, as you note, contributes to our national academic and scientific knowledge base by providing approximately 40 percent of the research funding for the Nation's colleges of engineering. The Department will sustain an investment in Basic Research because of proven significant, long-term benefits. It has always been the Department's goal to fund Basic Research, and the remainder of the Science and Technology program, at a level adequate to ensure the technological superiority of our armed forces. However, we also need to ensure that the funding levels of the various components of the DOD budget are balanced based on our assessment of the most urgent requirements at any given time. The Department's compelling desire to increase the modernization budget, while sustaining readiness at a high level, must also be considered. The amount of funding the Department will request for Basic Research will, I believe, be adequate to maintain our technological superiority both near-term and in the future. defense industrial base 22. Senator Santorum. Last year, based on concerns articulated by the defense industry, the Department of Defense initiated a review of ways to improve not only the health of the defense industrial base but also competition among these companies. The review was carried out by a Defense Science Board (DSB) panel. The goal of the process was to see what kinds of actions in terms of acquisition practices, rules and regulations needed to be changed in order to help the Department get lower costs and more innovation. The DSB report, Preserving a Healthy and Competitive U.S. Defense Industry to Ensure our Future National Security, concluded that the Department of Defense must move aggressively to help American companies attract and retain top talent as well as improve overall profitability by continuing changes in profit policies boosting investment in defense research and development. The DSB panel issued a listing of 27 regulatory and policy changes designed to help ensure the financial health of the defense industry. Have you reviewed the DSB panel's report on improving the health of the defense industry? Are there other policy or regulatory changes that you would recommend to improve the health of the defense industry and improve innovation that were omitted by the report? Are there ways that the Department could do a better job at encouraging firms to increase their independent research and development (IR&D) efforts? Are there changes that can be made which will enable individuals who leave the private sector for public sector service the ability to return to private sector employment? Dr. Wolfowitz. We are continuing to address the recommendations of the DSB panel's report. As we assemble our management team, we will be examining recommendations made by a variety of groups, such as the Business Executives for National Security Tail-to-Tooth Commission, in order to establish the initiatives we intend to pursue. It is recognized that we must consider ways that the Department can encourage firms to increase their IR&D efforts. For example, the recommendation made by the DSB to revise the IR&D policy regarding fees could incentivize contractors to spend IR&D dollars. This is an area that certainly requires further analysis and careful consideration. At this point, it would be premature to offer more specific detail on changes that may be necessary. base closures 23. Senator Santorum. The military base closure process (BRAC) was first established in 1988. Since that time, 97 bases have been closed and about 400 have been realigned. The process of closure and community development after the base closes has suffered from problems in the past, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Accordingly, between 1992 and 1995, the Federal Government adopted policies to improve the reuse and redevelopment process governing these closed facilities. Congressional efforts to authorize additional base closing rounds have been unsuccessful due in large part to the belief that President Clinton interfered with the integrity of the process during the 1995 BRAC review. In an effort to re-start the base closing process, several Members of Congress have discussed the creation of a ``two-step'' BRAC process. Under this proposal, the military services would identify certain ``core'' bases that would not be considered for closure. Facilities like the Pentagon or Andrews Air Force Base would fall into this category. These core facilities, which might comprise up to 25 percent of all bases, would be exempt from further review by the base closure commission. A full assessment of ``non-core'' bases would follow this initial review period. Proponents of this approach believe that the two-step process would help eliminate community uncertainty and also help ``core base'' communities avoid the expense of hiring consultants and other experts to guide them through fighting the closure process. Do you believe that the Department of Defense should recommend to President Bush that he request authorization of additional BRAC rounds? If so, do you believe that the process must be changed to restore faith in the fairness of the process? What are your thoughts on the proposed ``two-step'' BRAC process that has been suggested? Dr. Wolfowitz. Our base structure should fit our force structure requirements. We are looking at the issue of excess infrastructure, and will make a decision on how best to address this as soon as we can in the review process. When we have established the proper relationship between the force structure needed to execute our national security strategy and the infrastructure needed to support that force, we will work closely with Congress to develop a process that is fair and true to that objective. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman strategic review 24. Senator Lieberman. What is your role in the current strategic review? Dr. Wolfowitz. As the Deputy Secretary of Defense I am part of a small group reviewing the work of each panel associated with our overall look at the Defense Department structure. I provide guidance regarding the particular areas each panel undertakes, as well as reviewing their results. I also make recommendations to Secretary Rumsfeld on various aspects of the overall review. transformation 25. Senator Lieberman. What do you think are the necessary actions to effect transformation? Dr. Wolfowitz. Successful military transformation will require several actions, the first of which is to generate organizational slack and free-up resources needed to develop future capabilities. Second, we need to create new, experimental forces dedicated to the development of new combat capabilities. These forces would conduct long-term experiments, develop operational concepts and even look at new ways of organizing forces. Finally, when the U.S. engages in conflict, these new units, should they prove effective, would be vanguard forces to test and refine our new methods. strategic review 26. Senator Lieberman. How do you intend to assure the strategic review puts the main focus on these actions? Dr. Wolfowitz. As discussed earlier, Andy Marshall is conducting one element of the strategy review. For the past 8 years, he has carefully reviewed past military transformation efforts and the conditions that allowed them to be successful. Also, there is a panel dedicated solely to the issue of transformation among the group of panels contributing to the Defense review. quadrennial defense review 27. Senator Lieberman. How do you see the review connecting to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Defense review is an iterative process that will be ongoing. The findings and recommendations of the various elements of the Defense review will serve as road maps for key issues that must be considered during the QDR process, and subsequently, in the development of future budget requests. defense review 28. Senator Lieberman. Please tell us the time lines for the review. Dr. Wolfowitz. Again, I want to emphasize that the Defense review is an iterative process that will be ongoing. Accordingly, specific completion dates have not been established. top priorities 29. Senator Lieberman. What do you see as the top priorities for the Defense Department and the Pentagon? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Department's top priorities, as outlined by Secretary Rumsfeld are: 1. Fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the new national security environment, aimed at devaluing investment made in weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. This must be based on a combination of nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny the opportunity and benefits associated with the threat or the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces, our homeland, and our allies. 2. Assure the readiness and sustainability of our forces, reducing unnecessary risks to American interests and to the lives of American service men and women. Inadequate readiness takes a larger toll on the future quality of our forces. Even the highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and equipment, and declining readiness. 3. Modernize U.S. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C\3\I) capabilities to support our 21st century needs. Modern C\3\I infrastructure is the foundation upon which military power rests, and is fundamental to the transformation of U.S. military forces. We must also strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our space capabilities and protect those assets against various forms of attack. 4. Transform the U.S. defense establishment to address our new circumstance by swiftly introducing new weapons systems. Undertake near-term investment to acquire modern capabilities derived from U.S. scientific and industrial preeminence. 5. Reform DOD structures, processes, and organization. The legacy of obsolete institutional structures, processes, and organizations creates unnecessary costs and imposes unacceptable burden on national defense. We will examine omnibus approaches to changing the statutory and regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to reform. the role of the deputy secretary of defense 30. Senator Lieberman. Will you adhere to the habitual role of the DEPSECDEF and manage the day-to-day operations of the Pentagon? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, it is fair to say that while the Secretary is the Chief Executive Officer, the Deputy functions mainly as the Chief Operating Officer (COO). This normal business relationship does not extend to the day-to-day supervision of military operations, but does cover most other areas of responsibility in the Department. 31. Senator Lieberman. Will your role be policy or management? Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe it is impossible to separate policy formulation and management. In general, I intend to be the COO of the Department. I realize that we will have an Under Secretary for Policy, as well as other senior officials in the Department with responsibility for various aspects of policy. My prior service as Under Secretary for Policy will in no way limit the traditional authority of those officials. 32. Senator Lieberman. Given your depth of policy expertise, how will you coordinate your role with the Under Secretary for Policy, once he/she is nominated? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Under Secretary for Policy will function in much the same way as they have in the past. I will assist and give guidance as necessary, but the fact that I once held this position will not limit the prerogatives of the incumbent. homeland defense 33. Senator Lieberman. What should be the Pentagon's role in the broader issue of homeland defense? Dr. Wolfowitz. Homeland defense is not a new mission area. The U.S. military has a long and proud tradition of protecting the American homeland from a wide variety of threats. Over time, the nature of the threat has changed--from traditional land and maritime invasion in the country's early years, to potential nuclear attack during the Cold War, to the present day potential of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile and information attacks from both state and non-state actors, such as terrorists. As part of our strategic review we will be addressing how the Department of Defense should be postured to ensure continued defense of the U.S. homeland from these evolving threats. military pay 34. Senator Lieberman. Do you believe there is a pay gap for military members? Dr. Wolfowitz. Much has been written about the existence of a military ``pay gap.'' Many argue that difficulty in recruiting and retaining high quality people in itself suggests the presence of a pay gap, but I believe the fundamental issue is the ability of pay to attract and retain a quality force. Recognizing that it has become increasing difficult to recruit and retain amidst today's economy, one can make a case that pay may not be adequate. One of my important responsibilities will be to ensure that great attention is paid to sustaining a level of military pay that is competitive, and supportive of consistent success in recruiting and retention. 35. Senator Lieberman. Do you support a military pay raise? Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes. The President recently announced an additional $1.4 billion to be directed to military pay. This will provide for a minimum pay raise of 4.6 percent on January 1, 2002, and $1 billion to be used to address specific recruiting and retention needs. 36. Senator Lieberman. Should the next pay raise be across the board or targeted, as in pay for skill? Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe all military members should receive a pay raise, and the President has proposed that all members will get a minimum of a 4.6 percent raise on January 1, 2002. Exactly how to use the President's additional billion dollars needs further review. defense health program 37. Senator Lieberman. What do you consider to be the most significant threats to the Defense Health Program (DHP) and the ongoing implementation of TRICARE? Dr. Wolfowitz. It is imperative that the Defense Health Program (DHP) maintains a fully funded budget that allows for a stable business environment. The absence of adequate funding directly impacts patient care in the Military Health System. With the implementation of expanded TRICARE benefits for our Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, funding continues to be a challenge. The Department has identified an approximate shortfall of $1.4 billion for fiscal year 2001 and will continue to assess DHP funding requirements as well as necessary solutions during the Secretary's strategic review. tempo for our armed forces 38. Senator Lieberman. Do you have any plans to reduce tempo for our armed forces? Dr. Wolfowitz. The use of military force is one of the most important decisions a President can make. We in the Department will work closely with the President and his senior advisors to develop appropriate policies to guide the use of our military forces in peacetime, crisis and war. A decision to employ U.S. military forces in support of our national interests is one that should never be taken lightly. Likewise, the decision to sustain, reduce, or end the commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations must be informed by careful assessment and deliberation. Working with Congress and our allies, we will reexamine the balance among force levels, commitments and deployments. We will ensure that we are focusing on the most important defense tasks and not placing unreasonable demands on our men and women in uniform. Still, we recognize that deployments will always be a part of military life, and we will continue to improve the ways we monitor and manage them. 39. Senator Lieberman. Given that the Services are different and even define tempo differently, how do you plan to measure tempo in a consistent manner? Dr. Wolfowitz. We recognize that deployments will always be a part of military life, and we continue to improve the ways we monitor and manage them. Last year, DOD implemented a department-wide tempo management system to allow us to identify the activities that have most affected the pace of operations and help us to better manage the demands on our people. Also adopted was a common definition for personnel tempo that allows us to measure it in a consistent manner across the Department. Personnel tempo is defined as the time an individual spends away from his or her home station. two major theater war (mtw) force structure 40. Senator Lieberman. Is the two MTW force structure the right planning tool to create a military prepared for the dangers of a new century? If not, what would you support using instead? Dr. Wolfowitz. Modern history suggests that the United States has often faced more than one security contingency at a time. With that history in mind, the Department's preparations to deal with multiple challenges have been appropriate. However, the increasing diversification of current and emerging threats requires that we build forces and operational concepts aimed at fashioning a new approach to deterrence. This issue will be examined in the strategic review. national missile defense 41. Senator Lieberman. What type of NMD system should the U.S. pursue? Dr. Wolfowitz. President Bush has said that the U.S. must build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date, and that missile defenses must be designed to protect all 50 states, our friends and allies, and our deployed forces overseas. The administration is currently undertaking a major review of missile defense as part of a broader strategic review examining our future offensive and defensive requirements. In this review, we are examining all available technologies and basing modes that could contribute to an effective and affordable missile defense. 42. Senator Lieberman. Given the limited funds available, what recommendations would you give regarding finding money for NMD? Dr. Wolfowitz. We are currently reviewing our policy with regard to missile defenses and how they can best contribute to deterrence in the current and emerging strategic environment. Given this, no decisions have yet been made with regard to possible deployments or funding requirements. 43. Senator Lieberman. What is your priority if forced to make choices among NMD and conventional forces? Dr. Wolfowitz. The top priorities of the Department include the deployment of effective missile defenses, the assured readiness and sustainability of our deployed conventional forces, the modernization of command, control, communications, intelligence and space capabilities, and the transformation of the means by which we acquire these forces. Additionally, the Secretary is currently conducting a comprehensive review of the defense strategy and program, which includes our missile defenses as well as our conventional forces. Given this, no decisions have yet been made with regard to making funding choices among different programs. 44. Senator Lieberman. How will the U.S.'s plans change if our European allies refuse to support U.S. NMD plans and Russia and China execute a nuclear force expansion as a result? Dr. Wolfowitz. As we move forward with missile defense, the administration is committed to consulting closely with our friends and allies to address their concerns and explore their possible participation in the program. The U.S. wants to deploy defenses that would protect our friends and allies as well as ourselves. We see missile defense as a necessary element of deterrence and an opportunity for a collective approach to enhancing security for all. We will also engage Russia and China on missile defense and seek to address their concerns about our defenses. Clearly, the missile defenses we are pursuing are so limited that they would not call into question Russia's nuclear deterrent. As for China, the Chinese have already embarked upon significant modernization of their nuclear forces that predates, and will take place regardless of, current U.S. NMD planning. 45. Senator Lieberman. What is your reaction to the Russian European Missile Defense proposal? Dr. Wolfowitz. We are currently examining the Russian proposal. The U.S. government welcomes the fact Russia recognizes that Europe also faces a serious threat from weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. While we welcome the prospect of cooperation in principle, the deployment of a ``Pan-European'' TMD system would not defend North America from ballistic missile attacks, and is therefore not a substitute for the deployment of a missile defense capable of defending North America. stockpile stewardship program (ssp) 46. Senator Lieberman. Will you support full funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)? Dr. Wolfowitz. As Secretary Rumsfeld made clear in his confirmation hearing, maintaining high confidence in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is critically important to the national security interests of the United States. I believe that the administration needs to review the Stockpile Stewardship Program and to evaluate how well it has done its job to date, and how well it will likely meet future stockpile issues. Following on that review and evaluation, it should be in a position to make informed decisions on the future of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, including appropriate levels of funding. nuclear weapons testing 47. Senator Lieberman. You have stated that continued nuclear weapons testing is not an impediment to arms reductions. That, on the contrary, our confidence in the reliability of our weapons has enabled us to take the lead in nuclear arms reductions since the end of the Cold War. Can you explain this? If the U.S. tests, what argument would you use with the nations who might then decide on their own limited test program? Dr. Wolfowitz. During the last 5 years that the United States was conducting nuclear tests (1987-1992), we concluded arms control agreements and announced unilateral initiatives to reduce the number of U.S. nuclear arms by many thousands of warheads. So clearly, nuclear weapons testing is not an impediment to nuclear arms reductions. Indeed, our decisions to make these reductions were in part based upon the fact that due to nuclear testing we believed that our residual stockpile of nuclear weapons was safe, secure, and highly reliable. balkans policy 48. Senator Lieberman. What policy do you expect to promote for U.S. forces in the Balkans? Dr. Wolfowitz. The presence of U.S. forces in the Balkans is key to the successful outcome of these missions with associated issues of regional stability, both U.S. and NATO credibility, and alliance cohesion. However, we do believe that conditions in Bosnia have changed so as to allow a restructuring of the force, and we are working with our allies through the normal NATO 6-Month Review process and associated Stabilization Force (SFOR) Restructuring Options Study to achieve this. In Kosovo, the situation remains unstable enough to require engagement at current levels. However, we will pursue a change in the capabilities of the existing force more appropriate to the current mission. 49. Senator Lieberman. Do you advocate a full or partial withdrawal of U.S. forces in the Balkans? Dr. Wolfowitz. Withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Balkans is a function of many things: the security situation, our position in NATO, regional stability. I am committed to withdrawing U.S. troops when the situation warrants. That will be done through the established NATO processes. I do feel that the situation in Bosnia should allow for restructuring of SFOR. Kosovo, however, is still unstable, and will require a more careful examination in consultation with our allies before any decisions are taken there. Within these factors, then, I am committed to withdrawing our soldiers as quickly as possible. 50. Senator Lieberman. What strategy would you recommend we undertake regarding the Balkans? Dr. Wolfowitz. With the fall of Milosevic, and the consequent rise of a democratic-oriented government in Belgrade, the dynamics of the region have changed. We should clearly be able to focus on things such as: promoting rule of law, respect for human rights and civil society; combating crime and corruption; assisting in economic reform and revitalization; and regional cooperation as basis for integration into European institutions. These are the means by which we may capitalize on the change in the strategic context. 51. Senator Lieberman. How do you intend to pursue that with our European allies and the Russians? Dr. Wolfowitz. The current engagement with our European allies continues to be effective. Increasingly, they are assuming more of the burden, and we will continue to press them on this. Ironically, our relations with Russia by way of the SFOR and International Security Force (KFOR) missions continue to be strong and cooperative. Our goal should be to build on these relationships through the NATO Permanent Joint Council and other bilateral means so as to gain their effective cooperation in dealing with the Balkan states. accelerating drawdown for iraqi opposition 52. Senator Lieberman. Will you act to accelerate the drawdown authority you have for the Iraqi opposition? Dr. Wolfowitz. It all depends on how the drawdown authority is to be used. The administration is in the process of reviewing all elements of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This review will address whether efforts to promote regime change are appropriately focused. Until that review is complete it would be premature to make a judgment as whether the use of the drawdown authority should be changed. upgrading support for the iraqi opposition 53. Senator Lieberman. Some speculate that the new administration's most promising option for putting Saddam ``back in the box'', in addition to bombing, is to support the Iraq National Congress (INC). How would you recommend the U.S. upgrade our political, economic, and military support of the opposition? What are the plans to do this? Dr. Wolfowitz. The administration is in the process of reviewing all elements of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This review will address whether our efforts to promote regime change are appropriately focused. Until that review is complete it would be premature to make a judgment on the exact nature of our future support to the Iraqi National Congress. support for the iraqi opposition 54. Senator Lieberman. How far should we be willing to go with regards to support for the INC-funds, weapons, equipment, sales, joint training, TMD, etc.? Dr. Wolfowitz. As part of our comprehensive policy review on Iraq, we are exploring how best to work with the Iraqi National Congress and other opposition groups to promote a regime transition in Iraq. Until the policy review is completed, it would be premature to speculate on the details of our support. inc charter 55. Senator Lieberman. What will the INC task force's charter include? When do you see it in place and functioning? Dr. Wolfowitz. The administration is reviewing its Iraq policy, including how it will work with the INC. regime change strategy 56. Senator Lieberman. You have talked about the current policy of containment regarding Iraq. You have stated that when this policy collapses, the U.S. will face a Saddam who has new nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and a renewed capacity to conduct conventional warfare and terrorism, and who is bent on avenging his 1991 defeat. Further, this policy would risk many more lives than trying to overthrow Saddam by force. What are your recommendations regarding this new Iraqi strategy? What do you see as the Pentagon role? How will this affect U.S. force posture and OPTEMPO? What would you do to deal with increased OPTEMPO? Dr. Wolfowitz. There can be do doubt that Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains a threat to the Gulf region and to U.S. interests and that this threat must be deterred and contained. Part of the administration's Iraq policy review must be to consider whether more can be done to secure Baghdad's compliance with the conditions laid down by the United Nations in a way that would satisfy us and the world community at large that Iraq is no longer a threat. We also are exploring whether more can be done to hasten the replacement of the present regime by one that is prepared to live at peace with its neighbors and with the people of Iraq. Clearly, our armed forces will have a prominent part to play in our national strategy toward Iraq. Until our review is completed, however, it is not possible to say what the effect will be on OPTEMPO. taiwan policy 57. Senator Lieberman. You suggested that Taiwan point the way of democracy to China. That is no doubt several years down the road. How should the U.S. plan to assist in this endeavor? Dr. Wolfowitz. Taiwan today is a full-fledged democracy, with a vibrant multiparty system, a popularly elected president and representatives at all levels of government, a free and spirited press, and the people's strong commitment to democratization. One of the most important measures the United States can take to foster the development of democracy in the PRC is to support Taiwan's fledgling democracy by acting in accordance with the principles outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act. 58. Senator Lieberman. You are known as a fierce defender of Taiwan, yet you have proposed a status quo in your writings. Can you elaborate on your approach? Dr. Wolfowitz. The status quo can best be maintained by ensuring a dynamic equilibrium of forces in the Taiwan Strait. Such a balance requires provision of necessary defense articles and services to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act to offset an increasingly capable PRC military. 59. Senator Lieberman. How far should we be willing to go with regards to support for Taiwan--funds, weapons, equipment, sales, joint training, TMD, etc.? What about a formal mutual defense pact? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Department of Defense is engaged with Taiwan in several ways to ensure the United States is appropriately prepared to implement relevant sections of the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States actively monitors the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, provides articles and services to Taiwan to ensure it can maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, works with Taiwan on a series of non-hardware related initiatives to address shortcomings in Taiwan's readiness, and maintains capabilities to assist in the defense of Taiwan if required. However, establishment of a formal defense pact would contradict the unofficial nature of our relationship with Taiwan. missile defense and china 60. Senator Lieberman. You support NMD. Is this contrary to your previous call for a status quo approach? Can you clarify this, since NMD might spur aggressive actions by China? Dr. Wolfowitz. Missile defense must be designed to protect all 50 states, our allies and friends, and deployed forces overseas from missile attacks by rogue states and from unauthorized or accidental launches. The missile defenses that will be deployed by the U.S. are intended for defense. Nevertheless, we understand that China has voiced its concerns about the potential implications for its deterrent posture of any future U.S. missile defense system. China has recently expressed a willingness to engage in substantive dialogue on missile defense issues. We welcome and encourage such dialogue. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Max Cleland u.s. airlift requirements 61. Senator Cleland. The recently released Hart-Rudman Commission report places a high priority on the development of expeditionary forces, much of which is dependent on our strategic and tactical airlift capabilities. The Mobility Requirements Study estimates we are woefully short on meeting the future requirement. With the move away from more forward-deployed forces, airlift and air mobility will continue to be the key ingredient in our responding to future military missions and crisis. Do you agree that we need to focus attention on our airlift needs? Dr. Wolfowitz. The recent Mobility Requirements Study 2005, required by the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, is the most exhaustive study on this subject to date. It provides a comprehensive assessment of our overall mobility requirements in the context of a two major theater war strategy and shows that, under certain extremely demanding conditions, we have insufficient airlift assets to meet the requirement. Clearly strategic and tactical airlift capability will remain a vital element of our national military strategy, and the results of the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 are a good point of departure for establishing airlift requirements in the context of the current strategy review. Options for meeting airlift requirements, however, need to be carefully considered in a manner that allows them to be balanced with other strategic risk and affordability decisions. military health care 62. Senator Cleland. Military health care is a matter of great importance to our service members and this committee. Last year, in response to concerns raised by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we enacted legislation that eliminates deductibles and co-payments under TRICARE Prime for families of Active Duty service members; provides lifetime health care for military retirees and their families through the TRICARE program; and provides a comprehensive pharmacy benefit for military retirees. We still hear concerns from our constituents about lack of timely access to health care, portability of benefits as our service members move around, and poor claims processing. What are your priorities for maintaining a working, accessible, properly funded health care system? Dr. Wolfowitz. As you point out, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 includes significant health care benefit enhancements for military beneficiaries, both for families of Active Duty members and for retirees and their families. The Department is working hard to implement these important new programs. In addition, we have made significant strides recently in improving our health care business practices, in areas such as providing a portable health care benefit, exceeding industry standards for claims processing timeliness, and enhancing appointment systems to ease access to care. Our number one priority is to assure medical readiness to support wartime missions; delivery of an excellent peacetime health care benefit on a cost-effective basis is a vital secondary mission. montgomery gi bill 63. Senator Cleland. Almost all new service members enroll in and contribute to the Montgomery GI Bill. Only about half of these use their benefits, and many who use the benefits do not use all of their entitlement. Many of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines say they would like to stay in the Service, but feel they have to leave so that they can provide for the education of their spouses and children. I believe that many of these service members would stay in the service if they could transfer all or a part of their unused entitlement to GI Bill benefits to family members in return for a service commitment--an idea supported by the Hart-Rudman Commission report. Service Secretaries could use this retention tool selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses. Will you give serious consideration to how the Department of Defense could use the transfer of GI Bill benefits to family members as a retention tool and give me your thoughts on how we best do this? Dr. Wolfowitz. I will certainly give this full consideration. I agree that we must be prepared to adapt our incentive systems to address the changing needs and aspirations of service members. hart-rudman commission 64. Senator Cleland. The Hart-Rudman Commission review suggested numerous initiatives to help prepare for the domestic threats that endanger the continental U.S. Several of these initiatives involve reform and restructuring at the Department of Defense in an effort to streamline and make DOD more efficient and effective to address the threats in this new world ``disorder.'' With your past experience at the Department of Defense, you know of the challenges that face the Department of Defense in this new century. Do you anticipate the need to review and implement any of the suggestions? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Hart-Rudman Commission made an important contribution to the debate about the challenges of the evolving security environment and how the U.S. government should be aligned in order to prepare for future threats, particularly to the U.S. homeland. I welcome the insights of the Commission, whose members represent a vast wealth of experience in the national security arena, in addition to recommendations from other experts both inside and outside the Department. problem accounting for appropriated funds 65. Senator Cleland. You noted in your response to an advance question that ``damage to modernization programs is best prevented by timely funding so that the Department does not have to disrupt procurement and RDT&E programs.'' However, my distinguished colleague Senator Byrd has recently reminded us that the Pentagon has a longstanding problem accounting for the funds appropriated for its use. As a two-time veteran of senior positions in the Department of Defense, what are your thoughts on the roots of this problem? Do you believe the solutions to this problem are internal to the Department, or is there something Congress can do to facilitate a solution? Dr. Wolfowitz. The Department's accounting problems are of a very specific nature. We have had no major problem tracking and accounting for appropriated funds in terms of ensuring that no more than the precise amount is spent on specifically the uses for which those funds were appropriated. Indeed, DOD accounting systems were designed exactly for this purpose, and that design is one of the root causes of the accounting problems referred to by Senator Byrd--that problem being that DOD accounting systems cannot yet produce annual financial statements that can receive an unqualified (most favorable) audit opinion. DOD accounting systems were not designed to produce such statements, and now that such statements are required the Department is moving expeditiously to transform its accounting systems to do so. This is an immense challenge, especially since much of the financial data needed for DOD financial statements originates outside the Department's accounting and finance systems. The massive effort to achieve acceptable financial statements is primarily internal to the Department, but as with all genuine reform the support of Congress remains essential. ______ [The nomination reference of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz follows:] Nomination Reference As In Executive Session, Senate of the United States, February 15, 2001. Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services: Paul D. Wolfowitz, of Maryland, to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, vice Rudy F. de Leon, resigned. ______ [The biographical sketch of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:] Biographical Sketch of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz On February 5, 2001, President Bush announced his intention to nominate Dr. Paul Wolfowitz to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. If confirmed by the Senate, this will be Dr. Wolfowitz's third tour of duty in the Pentagon. For the last 7 years, Dr. Wolfowitz has served as Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University. SAIS is widely regarded as one of the world's leading graduate schools of international relations with 750 students, studying on campuses in Washington, DC.; Nanjing, China; and Bologna, Italy. As Dean, he led a successful capital campaign that raised more than $75 million and doubled the school's endowment. Also under his leadership, the curriculum and facilities were modernized and new faculty and programs were added to shift the school's focus from the Cold War to the era of globalization. From 1989 to 1993, Dr. Wolfowitz served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in charge of the 700-person defense policy team that was responsible to Secretary Dick Cheney for matters concerning strategy, plans, and policy. During this period Secretary Wolfowitz and his staff had major responsibilities for the reshaping of strategy and force posture at the end of the Cold War. Key initiatives included the development of the Regional Defense Strategy, the Base Force, and two presidential nuclear initiatives that led to the elimination of tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Under his leadership, the Policy Staff also played a major role in reviewing war plans for the Gulf War, and developing and executing plans that successfully raised more than $50 billion in Allied financial support for the war and prevented Iraq from opening a second front with Israel. During the Reagan administration, Dr. Wolfowitz served for 3 years as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia--the fourth largest country in the world and the largest in the Moslem world. There he earned a reputation as a highly popular and effective Ambassador, a tough negotiator on behalf of American intellectual property owners, and a public advocate of political openness and democratic values. During his tenure, Embassy Jakarta was cited as one of the four best-managed embassies inspected in 1988. Prior to that posting, he served 3\1/2\ years as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he was in charge of U.S. relations with more than twenty countries. In addition to contributing to substantial improvements in U.S. relations with Japan and China, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz played a central role in coordinating the U.S. policy toward the Philippines that supported a peaceful transition from the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos to democracy. Dr. Wolfowitz's previous government service included: 2 years as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1981-82); an earlier Pentagon tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs (1977-80), where he helped create the force that later became the United States Central Command and initiated the Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, the backbone of the initial U.S. deployment 12 years later in Operation Desert Shield; and 4 years (1973-77) in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and a number of nuclear nonproliferation issues. His first government service was as a Management Intern at the Bureau of the Budget (1966-67). Dr. Wolfowitz taught previously at Yale (1970-73) and Johns Hopkins (1981). In 1993, he was the George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. He has written widely on the subject of national strategy and foreign policy and was a member of the advisory boards of the journals Foreign Affairs and National Interest. Among his many awards for public service are: the Presidential Citizen's Medal, the Department of Defense's Distinguished Public Service Medal, the Department of State's Distinguished Honor Award, the Department of Defense's Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Distinguished Honor Award. Dr. Wolfowitz received a bachelor's degree from Cornell University (1965) in mathematics, and a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago (1972). He is the father of Sara, David, and Rachel and lives in Chevy Chase, Maryland. ______ [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz in connection with his nomination follows:] UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Room SR-228 Washington, DC 20510-6050 (202) 224-3871 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Part A--Biographical Information Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public. 1. Name: (Include any former names used.) Paul Dundes Wolfowitz. 2. Position to which nominated: Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense. 3. Date of nomination: February 15, 2001. 4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.) [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.] 5. Date and place of birth: December 22, 1943; New York, NY. 6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.) Separated since January 1999; Frances Clare Selgin Wolfowitz. 7. Names and ages of children: Sara Elizabeth Wolfowitz, 22. David Samuel Wolfowitz, 19. Rachel Dahlia Wolfowitz, 13. 8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dates Degree Institution attended received Date granted ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ithaca High School, Ithaca, NY 9/58-6/61 ............ ............ Cornell University Ithaca, NY. 9/61-6/65 AB.......... 1965 University of Chicago, 10/65-6/70 Ph.D........ 1972 Chicago, IL. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Job title Employer Location Dates of employment ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dean................................. Johns Hopkins Washington, DC......... January 1994-present. University School of Advanced International Studies. Professor............................ National Defense Washington, DC......... January 1993-December University. 1993. Under Secretary for Policy........... Department of Defense.. Washington, DC......... May 1989-January 1993. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 13. Political affiliations and activities: (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate. None. (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years. Foreign policy advisor to Bush/Cheney Presidential Committee, 2000. Foreign policy advisor to Dole/Kemp Presidential Committee, 1996. (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date Amount Recipient ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 01-08-96........................... $250 Maggie Tinsman. 03-18-96........................... $1000 Bob Dole. 03-22-96........................... $250 John W. Warner. 09-16-96........................... $500 Republican Primary PAC. 10-07-97........................... $500 Dylan C. Glenn. 2000............................... $2000 George W. Bush-- (in kind) Primary Campaign. 2000............................... $1000 George W. Bush-- General Campaign. 2000............................... $500 George W. Bush-- Recount Effort. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements. President's Citizen's Medal; Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medal; Air Force Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service; Department of state Distinguished Honor Award; Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Distinguished Honor Award; Bangkok Embassy Refugee Coordinator's ``Pirate Buster'' Award; 1989 Lempad Prize from Indonesian Cultural Foundation; Embassy in Jakarta selected as one of four best-managed embassies in 1988; Phi Beta Kappa; National Science Foundation Fellow; Woodrow Wilson Fellow; General Motors Scholar; Telluride Scholar. 15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? Yes. ______ [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.] ------ Signature and Date I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. This 15th day of February, 2001. [The nomination of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz was reported to the Senate by Senator John Warner on February 28, 2001, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 28, 2001.] NOMINATIONS OF DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER; CHARLES S. ABELL TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT POLICY; AND VICTORIA CLARKE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ---------- TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 2001 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:40 p.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, Thurmond, McCain, Inhofe, Hutchinson, Bunning, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, and Dayton. Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel. Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, John R. Barnes, William C. Greenwalt, Gary M. Hall, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, George W. Lauffer, Patricia L. Lewis, Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes. Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director for the minority; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Thomas C. Moore, Suzanne K.L. Ross, and Michele A. Traficante. Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael P. Ralsky, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; David Young, assistant to Senator Bunning; Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Barry Gene Wright, assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; and Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator Levin. Chairman Warner has asked me to open up the hearing. He has been delayed just a few additional minutes, so we will get going. We meet today to consider the nominations of Dr. Dov Zakheim to be Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Charles Abell to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy; and Victoria Clarke to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. We want to first welcome all of our nominees, and the colleagues of ours who will be introducing them to the committee. I know that Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz want us to proceed expeditiously with these nominations. I think they are probably feeling a bit lonely in the Pentagon these days without the help that you all are going to be providing them, assuming you are confirmed. I know he has been looking forward to getting that assistance. The Department has a lot of important decisions to make. It needs senior civilian leadership in place to help make those decisions. Dr. Zakheim, we are all anxious to get the Department's fiscal year 2002 budget so that we can do our work here in Congress. The Comptroller, the chief financial officer for the largest department in the Federal Government, is a critical leadership position in the Department of Defense. It is an awesome responsibility. The financial management challenges facing the Department of Defense are enormous. As we've discussed, you are going to be in an important position to address those. It's always a pleasure to see Charles Abell. He is one of our own staff, who has been nominated for this important position in the administration. His service to this committee and to the Personnel Subcommittee for the last 8 years has been exceptional. Your committment to the well-being of our military members and their families is well known to us. We will miss your experience and expertise on this committee, but it will be put to good use in the department on behalf of our men and women in uniform and the civilians who serve in the Department of Defense. Ms. Clarke, you've been nominated to the very important position of public spokesperson for the Department of Defense. If confirmed, the American people will count on you to tell it like it is, like the man who sits to your right is famous for doing. [Laughter.] A lesser known, but just as important, aspect of the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, is the responsibility to keep the men and women in the military well-informed. So if you're confirmed, I am confident you will give this duty the attention that it rightfully deserves. So we have three well-qualified candidates for positions that the Secretary is anxious to fill. We all look forward to hearing from our nominees. I understand, Dr. Zakheim, your wife, Deborah, and your son, Roger, are here today. We welcome them. Mr. Abell, I understand that your wife, Kathy, is with you today, and we surely welcome her. I understand, Ms. Clarke, that your husband, Brian Graham, and children, Colin, Devon, and Charlie are here, as well as your parents, Charles and Cecilia Clarke, and your sister, Caitlin Clarke. We welcome all of them. Family support is essential in these positions. You will all be put under great time pressure. There will be too many times when you're not going to be able to get home as promised, and we ask your families for their service when we confirm you for your service. At this point, I think before I ask the questions that are traditionally asked, I'm going to call upon Senator Thurmond for his opening statement. Following that, I will ask the nominees the standard questions we ask all our nominees, and then we are going to call upon our colleagues to introduce our nominees. Senator Thurmond, please proceed. STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Dr. Zakheim, Mr. Abell, and Ms. Clarke. Each of them has had a long and distinguished career, either in the private sector or within the government, and I do not expect any surprises on their nominations. I am especially pleased by Charlie Abell's nomination to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. Charlie has been truly professional in carrying out his responsibilities as a staff member of the Armed Services Committee. He was instrumental in formulating many of the pay and benefit programs that have started to reverse the recruiting and retention programs in our military services. I only regret that the committee's retention program was not enticing enough to keep him here on the committee staff. To each nominee, I congratulate you on your nomination and on your superb record of public service. Your willingness to serve our Nation in the challenging positions for which you have been nominated speaks highly of you. I wish you all success. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator. We're going to move directly to the introductions. Let me call first on Senator McCain. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator Thurmond, members of the committee. I have known all three of the nominees. Dr. Zakheim and I had a professional relationship for many years. I am especially here on behalf of Victoria Clarke, who will, as you mentioned, be the voice of the Department of Defense. This doesn't mean Secretary Rumsfeld can't speak for himself, which he does very eloquently, but obviously, the job of spokesperson is one that requires talent and skills and a certain degree of sensitivity, particularly when we are faced with crises, as we have experienced just recently, some of which entailed the risk or even loss of American lives. I've known Victoria Clarke and have had the privilege of working with her since 1983. She has been able to balance the responsibilities of a true professional and wife and mother. She not only, I believe, will be an excellent member of the Bush team, but she will also be a role model to other women in America as she has moved up the ladder of success to this very important position. I recommend her highly. She's a very dear and beloved friend of mine, and I'm very proud of her at this moment that she will take over these very difficult and awesome responsibilities. I hope my colleagues will consider her positively and I look forward to working with her in the years ahead. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for allowing me to speak. Senator Levin. Senator McCain, thank you. Senator Hutchinson. STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman, I am very honored today to be able to appear before the committee and to introduce someone who doesn't need an introduction to this committee, President Bush's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, Charlie Abell, one that we all love dearly. I understand how lonely Secretary Rumsfeld is getting these days, but I seriously considered putting a hold on the nomination if it would have given us a chance of keeping Charlie around. I would ask unanimous consent that a more lengthy introduction be included in the record. Charlie served in the Army, in the enlisted ranks, in 1967, became an officer, served two tours in Vietnam, and is highly decorated. The distinguished medals he's received include the Legion of Merit, 4 Meritorious Service Medals, the Purple Heart, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 14 Air Medals, including 2 for valor, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor, and the Combat Infantry Badge. So he is highly decorated. But more than that is he joined our staff, and I've had the opportunity to serve with him for the last 2\1/2\ years. We all know him to be knowledgeable, professional, and totally dedicated. He is committed to the welfare of our men and women in uniform. Having had the opportunity to work with him as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, I am enthused about his new opportunities, and I know that he will do an outstanding job for those he loves and for the country he serves. [The prepared statement of Senator Hutchinson follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Tim Hutchinson Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before the committee. Today, I have the privilege of introducing President Bush's nominee to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, Mr. Charles S. Abell. In the 2\1/2\ years that I have worked with Charlie, I have learned what so many of our colleagues already knew--that Charlie is one of the most patriotic, dedicated, and hardworking public servants in the Nation's capital. For those who do not know Charlie personally, let me tell them something about his background. Charlie joined the enlisted ranks of the Army in 1967--it was not long before he became an officer. He served two tours in Vietnam as both a Cobra helicopter pilot and as an infantry platoon leader. After Vietnam, Charlie served in numerous command and staff positions within the Army, including Congressional Affairs Officer for the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel and as a member of the Army Legislative Liaison Office. The decorations he earned during his distinguished career as a soldier include the Legion of Merit, 4 Meritorious Service Medals, the Purple Heart, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 14 Air Medals including 2 for valor, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor, and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. After retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel, after 26 years in the Army, Charlie joined the staff of this committee. As the lead staffer on the Personnel Subcommittee, which I now have the privilege of chairing, he was responsible for issues concerning military readiness and quality of life. Included in that not- insignificant portfolio are the topics of manpower; pay and compensation; health care; personnel management issues affecting Active Duty, Reserve and civilian personnel; and nominations, both military and civilian. During his tenure here on the Hill, Charlie has worked with the present, and former, members of this committee to achieve great things for our men and women in uniform and for our Nation's military retirees. Those accomplishments include: Significant pay increases for Active Duty and Reserve service members; Improving recruiter access to our Nation's high schools; and, Enactment of the Warner/Hutchinson Tricare-For-Life plan, with which our Nation will finally fulfill the decade's- old promise of lifetime healthcare for those who choose to make a career of the Armed Forces. Now, Charlie is in the position, if confirmed, to take the next logical step in an already distinguished career of public service. From his new vantage point across the Potomac he will be able to build on the successes he helped over the last 9 years on behalf of millions of men and women in uniform, their families, and military retirees. If confirmed, Charlie will serve as Secretary Rumsfeld's senior policy advisor on matters concerning the management of military and civilian personnel and the welfare of their families. He will promulgate policies relating to recruiting, retention, career development, compensation, quality of life, equal opportunity and other force management concerns. By forwarding to us the nomination, President Bush has publically declared to the Nation that he has every confidence that Charlie is the best man for the job. For someone who's relatively new to this town, that decision marks our President as an excellent judge of character and a pretty fast learner. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, my fellow Americans, I present to you Mr. Charles S. Abell. Senator Levin. Senator Hutchinson, thank you very much. Senator Reed. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome all the nominees, but I'm particularly pleased and privileged to be able to introduce Dr. Dov Zakheim. One of the best ways to take a measure of a person is to debate that person on important issues of great consequence to the Nation, and I had that opportunity last fall at Duke. I became impressed, as we all will become impressed, with Dov's intelligence, his patriotism, and his dedication to this country. We don't agree on everything, but I believe this committee will agree that he is a superbly qualified and prepared nominee to become the next Comptroller of the Department of Defense. Dr. Zakheim has an extraordinary academic record--after graduating, summa cum laude, from Columbia University, he earned his doctorate in economics and politics from Oxford University. Dr. Zakheim's public career began at the Congressional Budget Office, where he was an analyst. In the 1980s, he served in a number of senior Defense Department positions. So he takes great experience to this task. He became, in 1985, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources. He knows the Department of Defense, and he will bring that experience and that intellect to bear on critical issues of financial management of the Department of Defense. His skill has been recognized by both Democratic and Republican administrations. The Clinton administration appointed him in 1997 to the Task Force on Defense Reform, and he has had numerous significant positions. Dr. Zakheim twice has been awarded the distinguished Public Service Medal from the Department of Defense. He received the CBO Director's Award for Outstanding Service, the Director's Award for Outstanding Service for his present firm, System Planning Corporation. He is eminently qualified and prepared for the difficult challenges of Comptroller. I know he will give his all, and he will be tireless in his efforts to improve the management of the Department of Defense. I would urge his rapid approval. Thank you. Senator Levin. Senator Reed, thank you very much. We will start with the opening statements now of our nominees, if they have opening statements. Why don't we call on you first, Dr. Zakheim? STATEMENT OF DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER Dr. Zakheim. Thank you, Senator Levin, and thank you so much, Senator Reed, for those very kind words. Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is an honor to come before you as President Bush's nominee to become the next Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. I thank President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld for their confidence in nominating me for this important position. Many people made this honor possible. I especially want to thank my wife, Deborah, and my sons and my parents for their love and support throughout my career. I will try to keep my remarks brief, and I ask that my full statement be included for the record. Senator Levin. It will be. Also, I forgot to mention Senator Hutchinson's statement will be made part of the record, too. Dr. Zakheim. Over the years, it's been my good fortune to have been guided by sage mentors and thoughtful colleagues. I especially appreciate the opportunities that were afford me by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger during their stewardship over America's security, and Secretary Weinberger's support ever since then. During my service at the Pentagon, I was also privileged to work for and with two especially talented and brilliant men, Fred Ikle and Richard Perle, who also afforded me wise counsel and support over the years. It was thanks to another good friend, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, that I first joined the Pentagon in 1981, and I'm delighted that he has returned to the Department of Defense as Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy. This is an important and challenging time for the Department of Defense. The Cold War may be over, but the international environment is hardly serene. As leader of the free world, the United States bears a special responsibility to protect, not only its interests, but to support those of its friends and allies. Those responsibilities bear most heavily on our military personnel, whose welfare must remain our highest priority, as well as on their civilian colleagues at the DOD. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, is especially critical to ensuring a robust national security posture. The Comptroller has to budget and manage funds to achieve the greatest payoff from every taxpayer dollar. The Department faces many tough choices in the area of strategy, military capabilities, as well as infrastructure and support activities. We have to allocate scarce budget dollars to give our fighting forces the greatest advantage on both current and future battlefields as they evolve. I assure you that, if I am confirmed, I will do everything possible to get our uniformed men and women the resources they need to excel in the difficult missions assigned to them. If confirmed as DOD Comptroller, I also intend to make financial management reform a top priority. We have to improve our management, including management information and accounting systems. Congress and the American people have to have full confidence that the Department maintains the very highest standards in managing and accounting for its funds. We also have to ensure that our planning, programming, and budgeting system remains relevant to the demands of the new century, and we have to rigorously pursue economies and efficiencies wherever we might find them. As one who has spent 6 years on Capitol Hill, I recognize and profoundly believe that the security of our country depends on wise decisions in both the legislative and executive branches of our government. If confirmed, a key goal of mine would be to foster a close cooperation between the Department of Defense and its oversight committees, in particular. My years in the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office taught me that, on matters of national security, bipartisan cooperation is essential. Let me close by saying again how honored I am to have been nominated by President Bush for a position of such immense importance for America's future security. I pledge to do my utmost to fulfill the trust placed in me. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim follows:] Prepared Statement by Dr. Dov S. Zakheim Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is an honor to come before you as President Bush's nominee to become the next Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). I thank President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld for their confidence in nominating me for this important position. Many people made this honor possible. I especially want to thank my wife, Deborah, my sons, and my parents for their unwavering love and support throughout my professional career. Over the years it has been my good fortune to have been guided by sage mentors and thoughtful colleagues. I particularly appreciate the opportunities afforded me by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger during their extraordinary stewardship over America's security. Secretary Weinberger has also been especially supportive to me since I left the Pentagon, and I will always be grateful to him for writing an exceedingly warm foreword to my book, The Flight of the Lavi. During my service at the Pentagon, I was privileged to work for, and with, two extraordinarily brilliant and talented men, Under Secretary Fred Ikle and Assistant Secretary Richard Perle. Both have afforded me wise counsel and support when I most needed it. It was thanks to another good friend, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, that I first joined the Pentagon in 1981, and I am delighted that he has returned to the Department as Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy. This is an important and challenging time for the Department of Defense. The Cold War may be over, but the international environment is hardly serene. As leader of the Free World, the United States bears special responsibility to protect not only its interests, but to support those of its allies and friends. These responsibilities bear most heavily on our military personnel, whose welfare must remain our highest priority, as well as on their civilian colleagues at the DOD. The Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is especially critical to ensuring a robust national security posture. The Comptroller must budget and manage funds to achieve the greatest payoff from every taxpayer dollar. The Department faces many tough choices in the areas of strategy, military capabilities, as well as infrastructure and support activities. Scarce budget dollars must be carefully allocated to give our fighting forces the greatest advantage on current and future battlefields as they evolve. I assure you that if confirmed I will do everything possible to get our uniformed men and women the resources they need to excel in the difficult missions assigned them. If confirmed as DOD Comptroller, I intend to make financial management reform a top priority. We must improve our management, including management information, and accounting systems. Congress and the American people must have full confidence that the Department maintains the very highest standards in managing and accounting for its funds. We also must ensure that our planning, programming, and budgeting system remains relevant to the demands of the new century. We must rigorously pursue economies and efficiencies wherever they are to be found. As one who spent 6 years on Capitol Hill, I recognize, and profoundly believe, that the security of America depends on wise decisions in both the legislative and executive branches of our government. If confirmed, a key goal of mine would be to foster a close cooperation between the Department of Defense and its oversight committees in particular. My years in the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office taught me that on matters of national security, bipartisan cooperation is essential. Let me close by saying again how honored I am to have been nominated by President Bush for a position of such immense importance for America's future security. I pledge to do my utmost to fulfill the trust placed in me. Thank you. Senator Levin. Thank you. Ms. Clarke. STATEMENT OF VICTORIA CLARKE, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, and members of the committee, thank you very much. It is a real honor for me to be here today. I am deeply grateful to President Bush for nominating me to this position, and to Secretary Rumsfeld for giving me the opportunity to serve. I am very grateful to Senator McCain for his remarks. They mean a great deal to me. As President Bush has said, the Department of Defense is in the business of protecting America's freedom, and the essence of that freedom demands that we join the American people in a discussion of and commitment to how we defend it. This, for me, is a matter of patriotism. It is also my professional philosophy. This committee knows far better than I that the portrait of international security and national defense is vastly different today from what it was even just a few years ago. As Secretary Rumsfeld has made clear, our challenge is building a military that fits in that portrait. We must attract and retain the very best people to serve. We must use public dollars effectively and efficiently, and we must explore the use of innovative technologies and policies that promote peace and stability. Our challenges change, changing an institution whose roots in our communities and our consciousness runs deeper than perhaps any other. That demands an aggressive program of outreach and education, a national conversation about the challenges, the risk, and the solutions. If confirmed, I will embrace that challenge in a spirit of openness and honesty with this committee, with our men and women in uniform, and with the people of the United States, on whose support this life-or-death challenge for our country ultimately depends. That is my professional philosophy. It is also my patriotic feeling. I thank the committee, the President, and the Secretary for giving me the opportunity to act on it. Thank you, Senator. Senator Levin. Ms. Clarke, thank you. Mr. Abell. STATEMENT OF CHARLES S. ABELL, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT POLICY Mr. Abell. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, I want to thank you and Senator Hutchinson and Senator Thurmond for the kind words this afternoon. I really appreciate them. I'm honored to have been nominated by the President. I'm honored to appear before this committee today. If confirmed, I will be privileged to serve in a position that provides for the personnel readiness of the force and for the quality of life for service members, retirees, and their families. It will be an awesome responsibility; however, I look forward to the challenge. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to personally and publicly thank you for your confidence in my abilities and for being a mentor and an inspiration to me during my time here on the staff. I've had the good fortune to serve with so many of my personal heros and those whom I have admired throughout my life. I plan to thrill my grandchildren with tales of working on important issues with many noted Americans. Being a part of this staff--of this great committee--has been a much greater experience than I could have ever imagined. I'm excited about the opportunity to serve in the Department of Defense and to continue to work for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. As a result of my position here as one of your professional staff members, I'm aware of some of the many critical issues and important challenges that I will face as the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. I also know that there are challenges that are not yet apparent to me. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will eagerly accept each of these challenges that I will face. I pledge to you and to the men and women who serve our nation that I will work hard to meet these challenges. I will conduct my dealings with the force, my colleagues in the Department of Defense and the administration and Congress in an open and direct manner. As the members of this committee know, I prefer to be forthright and open when dealing with any issue. If confirmed, I will be the professional this committee has come to know. As excited as I am for the opportunity that awaits me, leaving the committee staff will be difficult. I've worked on the staff of this committee for more than 8 years. I recall the pride and honor I felt when Senator Thurmond hired me. I fondly remember my first official trip as a member of the committee with you, Mr. Chairman. I've had extraordinary opportunities to be a part of history and to meet some of the most influential and important people in the world. I've been enriched beyond my greatest expectations. I will find another occasion to thank my fellow staff members, but I would be remiss if I did not publicly acknowledge the very positive impact that my staff director, Les Brownlee, has had on my life. As everyone knows, this gentleman is truly unique, and I owe much of what I am today to this friendship and his tutelage. If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will serve the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--active, Reserve, retired--and their families to the best of this ability. I will also miss this committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Abell. Senator Levin, thank you for initiating this hearing on time. I had to testify before another committee of the Senate. I might just start my opening remarks following your very thoughtful, very insightful statement to the committee. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman Warner. We are very proud of you, as we are of our professional staff. We take pride in this committee. Through the 23 years that I've been privileged to be a member--my colleague, Senator Levin, and I came to the Senate together these many years ago, almost a quarter of a century--this committee has enjoyed the finest of professionals on its staff throughout these years, and they have gone on to positions of great responsibility, not only in the public sector, but the private sector. You stand preeminent among those who have served this committee. I think it would be important for those in attendance today just to know a few facts. You started your career as an enlisted soldier, a private, and concluded with your retirement as a lieutenant colonel. You served as a Cobra attack helicopter pilot. You were decorated as an officer who led an infantry platoon, an infantry company, and attack helicopter units during two tours in Vietnam. I remember that war well because I was then Secretary of the United States Navy, and I know the personal sacrifice that all those who wore the uniform during that period made. Your decorations include the Legion of Merit, 4 Meritorious Service Medals, the Purple Heart, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 14 Air Medals, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. I think that says it all. After your 26-year Army career, you joined the committee in 1993, and you have been a most valuable member of our team. So we wish you well. I am confident that the Senate will give you the advice and consent the President has sought favorably on your nomination. Would you at this time kindly introduce your family who are present in the hearing room? Mr. Abell. Sir, I am accompanied by my wife, Cathy. Chairman Warner. We welcome you. Thank you, sir. Now, Dr. Zakheim, I've come to know you, through the years, with your distinguished career, and you served with the Congressional Budget Office--that's an experience, isn't it? [Laughter.] --and in the Department of Defense during the Reagan administration in a number of senior positions from 1981 to 1985. From 1985 to 1987, you served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources and played an active role in the planning, programming, and budget process. In that capacity, you successfully negotiated arms cooperation agreements with various U.S. allies. Subsequently, you served two terms as the President's appointee to the United States Commission for the Preservation of America's Heritage Abroad. In 1997, former Secretary of Defense Cohen named you to the Task Force on Defense Reform and later named you to the first Board of Visitors of the Department of Defense Overseas Regional Schools and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Impact of DOD Acquisition Policies and on the Health of the Defense Industry. You currently serve as Corporate Vice President of Systems Planning Corporation, a high-technology research analysis and manufacturing firm. Also, you're Chief Executive Officer of SPC International Corporation, which specializes in political, military, and economic consulting and international analysis-- again, a very distinguished public service career. Once again, you volunteered to go back to serve your country with a most exciting team. So I commend you. Would you introduce the members of your family, please? Dr. Zakheim. Yes, Mr. Chairman. My wife, Deborah, sitting right behind me and, next to her, one of my sons, Roger. Chairman Warner. We welcome you. As I've said many times in the course of these hearings, it is a family affair, serving in the Department of Defense. There are no hours. The clock knoweth no finality. Days go into nights and nights into day. But I must say it was one of the most exciting challenges of my life, the 5 years, 4 months, and 3 days I spent in that building. So when I speak to each of you, I speak to your families, because they are very much a part of the team. Now, Ms. Clarke served as Press Assistant to Vice President Bush's office early in the 1980s, and later served as Press Secretary to Senator McCain. That's a challenge. [Laughter.] I say that with respect to our colleague--working in both the House and Senate offices and then served as Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Public Affairs and the private-sector liaison under Ambassador Carla Hills in 1992, Press Secretary for President George Bush's re-election campaign in 1992. Ms. Clarke is currently the General Manager of the Washington Office of Hill and Knowlton, one of the most distinguished and venerable institutions of its type in the Nation's capital, and we welcome you. Would you kindly introduce those who have come to join you today? Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Charles Clarke; my sister, Caitlin; my husband, Brian Graham; my son, Colin, who is having his sixth birthday tomorrow; Devon, who is four; Charlie, who is a little over two; and my friend Lorraine Voles, who is graciously helping us out today. Chairman Warner. That's lovely. Those kids are beautifully well-behaved and turned out, as we say in the military, for parade dress. Well, we thank you for considering, again, public service and for undertaking it as an exemplary parent with the duties at home and the duties in the office, and all three of you are serving on, I think, what will be one of the most exciting teams--I don't say this, Republican and Democrat, because I've worked with all the teams in these 23 years we've been here-- but you're going to be on an exciting team and the cutting edge of history in our Department of Defense. So I wish you well. Now, the committee has standard questions which we propound to each of our nominees, and I will do so on behalf of the committee and ask each of you to respond. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflict of interest? Mr. Abell. Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Dr. Zakheim. Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Ms. Clarke. Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? Ms. Clarke. No, sir. Dr. Zakheim. No, sir. Mr. Abell. No, sir. Chairman Warner. Will you ensure your staff complies with the deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in the hearings? Charlie, I want you to answer that loud and clear. [Laughter.] Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir. Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Would those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir. Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, why don't you start the questioning period here on behalf of the membership? Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Zakheim, does the administration plan to file a detailed budget for defense for the year 2002? Dr. Zakheim. To the best of my knowledge, they plan to do so. I don't have those details myself, obviously. Senator Levin. Do you know when they plan to do that? Dr. Zakheim. I do not at this time. Senator Levin. Do you know whether the administration plans to request any supplemental funding for defense for fiscal year 2001? Dr. Zakheim. I believe that is under active consideration, but I don't know the final answer to that one, sir. Senator Levin. When will that decision be made, whether or not to do it? Do you know? Dr. Zakheim. I don't know the exact date. If confirmed, I suspect that I'll be part of that decision-making process. Senator Levin. Do you have any idea as to how much funding would be requested, if it's requested? Dr. Zakheim. Not at this time, sir, no. Senator Levin. You've written in the past, Dr. Zakheim, on the need for additional base closures. Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. Senator Levin. Do you believe there is excess infrastructure in the Defense Department today? If so, are there unfunded needs within the Department that could benefit by redirecting resources away from the excess infrastructure? Dr. Zakheim. I believe the infrastructure is in excess of the force structure, yes, sir. Senator Levin. Does that mean it's in excess, you believe, of what is needed? Dr. Zakheim. I believe that it is. I think we have to look closely at the details, of course. But yes, I believe that there is an excess. Senator Levin. Have previous rounds of base closures, in your opinion, resulted in significant reductions in DOD costs that have made resources available for higher priorities? Dr. Zakheim. As I understand it, GAO and CBO have said as much. They have never put a dollar figure on that, though. Senator Levin. Do you believe that it is true that there have been significant savings over time from previous rounds of base closures? Dr. Zakheim. I haven't done the analysis. I believe there are savings; but since I haven't done the numbers, I don't know how big they are. Senator Levin. Dr. Zakheim, you've also written that peacekeeping is a ``strategically marginal'' use of U.S. defense funds. You have advocated, ``withdrawing from much of the peacekeeping business,'' so that funds can be used for other needs. Do you believe we should withdraw our forces unilaterally from the following places: Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai? Dr. Zakheim. With regard to Bosnia and Kosovo, I think that it's a function of consultation with allies. The ``unilateral'' word is key here. We shouldn't do anything unilaterally. The events in the last few months, particularly in Macedonia, demonstrated that this is really a very sensitive region. I believe the same holds true for the Sinai. Clearly, both Israel and---- Senator Thurmond. Speak a little bit louder. I didn't hear you. Dr. Zakheim. I'm sorry, Senator. What I just, Senator--can you hear me now, sir? What I just said was that the word ``unilateral'' is key here, that on Kosovo and Bosnia, we can't just pull out without consultation with allies. The events in Macedonia have indicated how sensitive that region is. So these issues are a function of what is happening on the ground. I believe the same applies to the Sinai. The Israelis and the Egyptians both are deeply concerned about how we approach this process. So it will certainly have to involve consultation, Senator. Senator Levin. I'm glad to hear those answers. It is somewhat reassuring, both given prior positions, but, in any event, given current circumstances, I think those are reassuring answers, at least for me. Dr. Zakheim, when there are differences between the amounts that are authorized by us and the amounts that are appropriated by the appropriators for specific programs, will you work with the defense committees of Congress to identify and resolve such differences between authorization and appropriation reports prior to obligation? Dr. Zakheim. We have to, and I know it's been the Department's practice all along, to try to work with all the oversight committees and resolve these matters as amicably and as efficiently as possible, and I am committed to consultation with the committees on a case-by-case basis to resolve these matters to everyone's satisfaction. Senator Levin. Thank you. On the financial management end of your work, you and we all know the Department faces serious financial management problems. Because these problems are widespread, they can't be solved at one time, but require higher-level attention. I was pleased to read in your answers to the committee's advance questions that you are, in your words, fully committed to improve financial management in the Department of Defense. Could you give us just an idea, in your judgment, as to what needs to be done. What steps do you plan to take to improve financial management at the Department? Dr. Zakheim. Senator, there really are some very serious problems, whether it's a matter of clean audits, whether it's a matter of proper training, whether it's a matter of inventory management or management information. I'm coming out of the private sector, and when you're in the private sector, these sorts of matters are second nature. You can't run a business without having the kind of information that is being sought from the Department of Defense. If I were confirmed, it's a top priority for me to do a number of things--first, to reorganize the Comptroller's office to bring in some first-rate people as deputies to the Comptroller so that we can have focus on management reform and on management initiatives. Second, I would hope, if confirmed, to bring in outsiders, people with a financial management background, former CFOs and the like, who could provide what you might call mid-term--mid- course guidance on a regular basis to see how we're doing. Finally, I want to work with this committee and with other interested Members of Congress who have very valuable input and have made a very big difference over the years in passing a variety of financial management acts that have to be really fulfilled. Senator Levin. Just one last question for you and my time is up. Do you have any plans to reorganize the Office of the Comptroller; and if so, what types of changes would you make? Dr. Zakheim. If confirmed, Senator, I would very much like to do that. I believe that it would be in everyone's best interest to have at least one, and probably two, Deputy Under Secretaries who focus specifically on financial management issues, and then a third one who focuses on program budget issues. Financial management is simply not being dealt with as smoothly and as capably, in my view, as has the program budget side, and it really needs a lot of work. We need competent, excellent people to do this, and I'm committed to doing this, if confirmed. Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. For the record, the chair of this committee, together with the ranking member, has the responsibility to review the material that is forwarded on all nominees from the White House to the United States Senate through this committee. Senator Levin and I have reviewed that material. We took it upon ourselves to have a briefing in executive session on three nominees, and that has been completed. Do you have anything further to add--but we reviewed this material and it met our criteria. Am I correct in that? Senator Levin. There may be an additional executive session, if possible. Chairman Warner. I'm going to momentarily defer to my other senators, but I cannot let go saying that, one, a very valued staff member of this committee is to do a transfer from this committee to the Department of Defense to work under your aegis as your principal deputy. We wish to recommend him very highly. He is an extraordinary, able, well-trained professional, and it's been my experience--and I think my staff, who share these views--that the staff of the Pentagon and your department have served their country very well. While you certainly have the right to do certain reorganization, we would want you to do so knowing that this committee has very high respect for their performance in their respective duties. Senator Levin, do you have a statement? Then I'll yield to Senator Bunning, because I'm going to stay here for a period of time. Senator, do you have a statement you'd like to make? Just a brief announcement? Senator Thurmond. I will pass on the opportunity to ask questions of our nominees. I have complete confidence in their abilities and will support their nominations. Chairman Warner. I thank you. Now, Senator Bunning, you take my---- Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank all of you for coming. The most important thing I can convey to you today is the importance of providing, here in Congress to the members of this committee, timely, accurate information. If an administration official is asked a question, we need that official to provide us with accurate information or we cannot do our jobs. If confirmed, I look forward to working with all of you. Dr. Zakheim, there have been many reports of the deterioration of our readiness in the armed services. Do you believe that the proposed budget is sufficient to adequately resource our force at their current levels of commitment? Dr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, Secretary Rumsfeld is conducting the strategic review right now, and the budget submission for 2002 is going to reflect that review. So, in a sense, I can't really comment on the relationship other than to say that, clearly Secretary Rumsfeld is going to take into account exactly the concerns you've talked about. Senator Bunning. It's my understanding that there's going to be a request from the Department of Defense for a supplemental appropriation bill. Do you have that same understanding? Dr. Zakheim. I believe that it is under active consideration. I'm not aware yet of any timing or sizing of it. Senator Bunning. You're not aware of any sizing or timing. Dr. Zakheim. Not yet, no, sir. Senator Bunning. Gee, that's funny, because we are, and you're about to ask us to confirm you. You're not in any loop at all? Dr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, again, I'm briefed. People have tried to educate and get me up to speed, but on this particular decision loop, I am simply not aware of any final decision on either of those matters, Senator. Chairman Warner. The practice of the Department, Senator, is the nominee has to await the confirmation process before the Secretary of Defense can call on you to be an active participant in the decision making. Senator Bunning. I understand that. But, in other words, if he's had a briefing on the proposed budget and/or a possible supplemental, I thought maybe he might share some of that information. Today's Washington Times reports the Secretary of Defense is forming an executive committee of senior civilian leaders, including the Comptroller, to implement the transformation policy. What would be the specific function of that committee, and what would the Comptroller's role be? Dr. Zakheim. Again, I have not been given details as to exactly what the committee will do, except in the most general sense that you described. The Comptroller is also a chief financial officer and, in that respect, obviously has input into acquisition policy. I presume that that is what the article is alluding to. Senator Bunning. Senator Levin brought up BRAC and a possibility of another BRAC, and you were pretty firm in your statement that you didn't have a handle on any savings, if they occurred, from the first two rounds, other than to say that you thought that some savings might have occurred. Before I ever look at another BRAC, you're going to have to convince me that there were actual savings in the first two rounds. I don't think there's any question that the size of the force doesn't fit the facilities; but sometimes--as I just stopped on Midway Island on the way home from Taiwan--sometimes what is shut down is still operating. I say that only to point out that Midway had been BRAC-ed in 1996; and yet there is a big need on Midway for refueling and doing a lot of other things that the military needs to have done. So I want you to be prepared, if you are ready to recommend BRAC to us again, that you show us some substantial savings from the first two rounds. Let me ask a couple of other questions. Chairman Warner. Senator, you take such time as you need and then we'll turn to our other colleague momentarily. Senator Bunning. Yes, I want to ask our staff member--a number of years ago, General Mundy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, proposed to no longer enlist anyone who is already married. One of the objectives behind this was to reduce the pressure placed on newly-enlisted personnel, particularly given the high number of days per year they are deployed away from home--and I can speak from personal experience, with a son in the Air Force. Do you feel that this would be an effective way to reduce stress on our enlisted personnel during their initial enlistments? Mr. Abell. Senator, the short answer is no. I think it's a fact that more and more of our young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are enlisting with existing families. Even a greater number acquire a family shortly after enlistment. You're right, it is stressful. I have a great deal of confidence in the abilities of those young men and women to handle that stress, and I have a great deal of confidence in their chain of command to assist them in that endeavor. Senator Bunning. Then why are we falling short in every service on our enlistment goals? Mr. Abell. Sir, I think recruiting--recruiting especially, but retention, as well--is a very tough job. Currently, we enjoy a very robust economy. I think that probably contributes more. The opportunities available to young men and women today, especially the high quality young men and women we seek for the military, are probably unmatched. I think that is the difficulty, not so much family. Senator Bunning. Do you think our current force structure is large enough to assume the commitments that we have made presently? Mr. Abell. Senator, I think there's no doubt the current force structure is stressed and overtaxed by its missions. Whether it's the right size or not, I think, is going to be one of the outcomes that we will see from Secretary Rumsfeld's several studies, and I look forward to seeing the details of that--of those studies before I could give you a definitive answer on that. Senator Bunning. OK. Ms. Clarke, the Department of Defense usually uses individual Social Security numbers as their service-identification numbers. Recently, there have been some reports of identity theft from active duty military members. Given the Social Security numbers may be more accessible to outside parties, Privacy Act requirements notwithstanding, how do you plan to minimize the danger to service members from this crime? Ms. Clarke. Senator, I don't have enough information about that particular issue to address today, but I do think, when it comes to the Privacy Act, that one of the utmost priorities of my department is to respect and protect the privacy of individuals. I will do everything possible, if confirmed, to ensure that I and my staff are fully trained and sensitized to that protection and respect we should give to individual privacy. I would be happy to take the question for the record and get back to you with an answer. Senator Bunning. Well, the question I have is, why does the military continuously use the Social Security numbers as an ID number, when most of the banks, most of the driver's licenses, most other people are starting to phase that out since the access to the Social Security number and the maiden name of the mother allows access to your Social Security records? Ms. Clarke. I don't have an answer for you, Senator, but I would be happy to get you one. [The information follows:] The Department of Defense shares your concern about the potential misuse of social security numbers and the need to protect the privacy of the men and women of our Armed Forces. While Defense Department policies and practices do not appear to have contributed to misuse, we will continue to be vigilant in safeguarding such information. The issue of using the social security number (SSN) as the service identification number, a practice first begun in the 1960s, was recently studied by both the Defense Department and the General Accounting Office. In addition to identity theft, we studied the potential use of the SSN to obtain information that could be used against captured or detained personnel. However, given the ubiquitous access to personal information via the Internet, the senior officials who studied this issue determined that removal of the SSN and substitution of another number would not remove or even markedly reduce this threat. Further, any such attempts would likely waste hundreds of millions of dollars while not providing any significant protection for servicemembers. This issue poses a difficult challenge, but we remain committed to protecting the privacy of servicemembers and will vigilantly safeguard personal information. We take very seriously our responsibility to protect social security numbers and limit access to only those uses permitted by law. Senator Bunning. OK. During the recent incident with the U.S.S. Greeneville, the Navy was criticized for initially providing misleading and inaccurate information. How do you plan to address this in similar situations in the future? Ms. Clarke. Senator, if confirmed, I hope one of the mottos of my department will be ``maximum disclosure with minimal delay.'' I think one of the priorities for the Department is to disseminate news and information, the good and bad, as quickly and as accurately as possible. Senator Bunning. We are counting on you to do just that. Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir. Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator, and particularly for the question about Social Security. I think that this committee will follow your lead on that issue and look into that question with some thoroughness. Senator Bunning. Thank you, because, as Chairman of the Social Security Subcommittee in the other body, that was one of my primary concerns, and that now you can tell the bank to go you-know-where if they ask for your Social Security number. Chairman Warner. We will look into that. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am pleased to be participating in this hearing and want to welcome the families of the nominees here to the hearing, and to tell you I was impressed with introductions that were given by our Senators of each one of you, which tells me that the President made some good choices of well-qualified people, and I look forward to working with you as we move forward with this new administration. In advance questions that we received, Dr. Zakheim, you provided the committee--you indicated that you expect Secretary Rumsfeld to charge you--and I'd like to quote this loud and clear--``to do everything possible from every budget dollar.'' That is a high calling, and I agree with your assessment that accurate and timely financial management information is critical for managers across the Department to ensure accountability and the most effective use of taxpayers' dollars, and I then realize why you suggested reorganization of some of the top-level people under you. My question is a large one that has been around. I would just ask you one question, and then ask some of each of the others. My question to you, Dr. Zakheim is, how long do you think it will take before the Department can provide Congress with an accurate accounting of DOD expenditures? Dr. Zakheim. I can answer it the following way. I have been told that it will take many years to do that. Many years is not a good enough answer for me. I would hope that Congress will be in a position to receive cleaner audits, far more timely information, certainly within the next few years--in other words, hopefully, if confirmed, while I'm still around there. Senator Akaka. I do, too. I've enjoyed working with you, Mr. Abell, during the past few years, when I was not a member here on this committee, but we worked in other ways, and I really appreciate what you've done to help me in other ways. I'm sure that you will do your best to address the challenges facing the Assistant Secretary for Force Management and Policy. I agree with your assessment that, while recruitment is essential, retention is critical to force readiness. In your answers to questions by the committee, you referred to ``balancing deployments and military training requirements with the stability necessary for long-term health of military families.'' I took that off--a quote. So my question to you is, if confirmed, how would you address this issue? Mr. Abell. Well, Senator, this is a tough issue. It is one that the military services have talked to us about while I've served on the committee for many years. We--the committee and Congress--have put into effect some legislation requiring that the deployments now be tracked on an individual basis and that the individuals be apprised of how many days they have been deployed, and that those deployments be managed by senior officers. I think as this procedure gets implemented, just getting visibility on the subject will help a lot. But as we do get the visibility of how many days soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are actually deployed, we will get a good feel for the types of units, the types of military specialties and the types of missions that are consuming these service members' time. I think then we'll be able to make some judgments as to how to better balance the needs of the family, the needs of the individual, and the needs of the service. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Ms. Clarke, I liked your proposal that, if confirmed, your motto would be, and I quote, ``maximum disclosure exposure and minimum delay.'' I agree that accuracy is very important in dealing with the dissemination of information, as evidenced by recent events that have occurred in the past few months. In my case, many of these have occurred in the Pacific and Asian areas. How do you propose to engage and gain the support of the public as the Department of Defense addresses the threats of the 21st century? Ms. Clarke. I think there are two answers, Senator. The first part is to make sure, on a regular, consistent basis, in as timely and accurate a fashion as possible, you give them complete information, the good and the bad, about what is going on. I think that is an absolute priority. At the same time, I think it's critical that we do something that probably hasn't been done for quite some time. That is, on an ongoing basis, engage the American people, not just the men and women in uniform and their families, although I think they're absolutely critical as well, but engage the American people in a conversation and a dialogue, if you will, about the risks we face in the 21st century, about the kinds of changes that might be appropriate. The challenges are too great, and the issues too serious, not to engage all of them in that. So if the first motto of the Department, I hope, will be ``maximum disclosure and minimum delay,'' I hope another motto that people will come to think about is ``outreach, outreach, outreach.'' I think we should be talking to and responding to and educating and making aware everyone we can find. Talk to them about the risks, about the solutions, talk to them about the commitments these men and women make. It's very telling, you asked many questions about the people who are actually serving, and the stresses and the pressures on them. I think it's very important the American people see, up close and personal, the kind of commitment these men and women are willing to make, the kinds of challenges they face and the kinds of risks they face, as we've seen over the last few weeks. Increasingly, there are few people in society who have much real-life experience with the military. So I think it's really important that we focus on that outreach so they can see what's going on. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses, and I congratulate you on your nominations. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Senator Reed, I'm going to be the wrap up, so I'm going to let all members go ahead. You go right ahead. Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Then to Senator Dayton, and then we'll go into another round of questions if there are others. Senator Reed. Let me first address a question to Mr. Abell. But before I do that, let me associate myself with all the high praise that you richly deserve. You've been a key member of this committee's staff, and you've served every member with great diligence and professionalism, Charlie. It's a mixed blessing; we're glad for you, but sorry to see you go. Let me address a question. We often spend a great deal of time about the recruitment and retention within the uniformed services, but I think you're going to be facing a real challenge with respect to recruitment of civilian Department of Defense officials and retaining a very qualified workforce. I wonder if you've given any thought to what you might do. Mr. Abell. Yes, Senator, I have. I'm concerned about that. There are a number of senior civilians who will be retiring. I'm concerned about the developmental programs that enable folks to be developed professionally to fill those positions. I'm concerned about whether or not Federal civil service is attractive to men and women out in America, just like the military service is, and I look forward to getting into those issues. I'm not as familiar with those as I am with the military personnel policies, and so it is going to be a matter of some focus to me to roll up my sleeves and get involved in it. Senator Reed. Well, we have every confidence you will roll up your sleeves. Dr. Zakheim, again, welcome. One of the major initiatives that has been taking place over the last two decades has been an attempt to foster more ``jointness'' in the Department of Defense, and we have made some progress with uniformed officers serving in joint assignments with a requirement for promotion to have a joint assignment. But I think in the area of management systems and procurement systems, in the financial guts of DOD, we have made very little progress in ``jointness.'' Could you mention how you perceive the problem and what your instincts are at this moment? Dr. Zakheim. Certainly, Senator. First, again, thanks so much for the very kind words. I really do appreciate them. Certainly, one cannot say that on financial management we've received anything like a Goldwater-Nichols. Of course, it was this committee that was very much behind that. We have ``jointness'' in the military that was unprecedented when I came to the Pentagon in 1981. I believe that the only way one can achieve anything remotely like that in the financial management side of the Department is by conveying the sense of high-level attention. The Secretary of Defense is personally committed to making this happen. If I am confirmed, I'm personally committed to making this happen. I hope to work with the team of people who will focus on this full-time. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has made it clear that he wants the service secretaries to work as a team. One of the highest priorities in that team effort is getting coordinated financial management. So I believe with that degree of top-level involvement, we will make some progress. Senator Reed. I know it's very early. In fact, I presume you really have been barred from any significant discussions about planning as it goes on today in the Pentagon. That is a correct presumption, isn't it? Dr. Zakheim. Yes. Senator Reed. But do you anticipate, given your background, that legislation would be required to effectuate the kind of integration of financial measures and systems that you anticipate? Dr. Zakheim. It may well be, in certain respects, and I would hope to work with this committee and with other cognizant committees to identify those sorts of requirements. It's very important that the Department work very closely with Congress on these matters. Certainly, if I'm confirmed, I intend to make this not just an occasional practice, but a regular one. Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Zakheim. Ms. Clarke, best wishes. I'm sure you're going to do a fabulous job. Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Senator Reed. You also have a problem of ``jointness,'' which is you have three services that have their own public affairs operations. Do you have a plan at the moment to either do more integration or more decentralization, or less? Ms. Clarke. Sir, I've actually had the opportunity to meet with the heads of public affairs from the three services in my private-sector life, and---- Chairman Warner. Let me interrupt. There are four services---- Ms. Clarke. Yes. Chairman Warner. The United States Marine Corps, I say to my graduate of the West Point Academy here----[Laughter.] Excuse me for the interruption. Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I obviously stand corrected. I don't know what came over me. [Laughter.] Chairman Warner. All right. What came over Ms. Clarke? She picked right up on the same response. [Laughter.] Senator Reed. Well, she's in an awkward position. She has to be polite. I should be accurate. Forgive me. Senator Levin. Actually, you were really testing Ms. Clarke, and she came through. Senator Reed. She came through. She was wonderful. Senator Levin. It was a very conscious effort. I've seen him do that before. He really knew there were four services, but he wanted to see just how much you knew. [Laughter.] Senator Reed. Well, what I--I misspoke. There are three service secretaries. Chairman Warner is right--I misspoke. Chairman Warner is always right. That's a good rule on this committee, by the way. [Laughter.] Ms. Clarke. As I've been told many times by those in the Navy, there is no secretary of the Marines, is there--but there are four heads of Public Affairs, and they are all very talented, very professional people, and I have had the opportunity to meet with them. If confirmed, I look forward to working with them closely. I think the focus on ``jointness'' is absolutely appropriate and absolutely vital, so I look forward to working with them. I have not thought through--because I did not want to presume anything--I haven't thought through the structure, but I have thought, in general terms, about trying to find a process, trying to find a way to work more closely together. Senator Reed. Thank you. Just one final question. Dr. Zakheim, you have spent a lifetime studying strategic issues and bringing to that study, not just academic theoretical instincts, but also the knowledge of budgets and how they work, how they're put together. I'm just wondering about your view, as we look ahead, the budget you're seeing emerging, is that adequate to do modernization and then attempt, if feasible, to do some very expensive projects, like national missile defense? Dr. Zakheim. Well, the Secretary of Defense wants very much to have a top-down approach to this whole matter--that is to say, to lay out the strategy and then to coordinate the budgets with that strategy. So, in fact, right now, he has a strategic review that is ongoing; and hopefully, the budgets and the program would then reflect that review. If confirmed, I would hope very much to participate in that activity, but we're putting first things first. Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton. Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Clarke, I won't use any numbers in my questioning or comments, but I want to second what Senator Bunning said about--I'm new to this committee, and when I read your remarks there that there is a Principles of Information, I made a note to myself to get a copy of that, because I'm not aware that--what I imagine they must be, and what your remarks have suggested is followed in practice. The U.S.S. Greeneville incident, to me, was a classic case of providing as little information as absolutely necessary. Except for watching the television news, investigative reports, and the newspapers, I don't think a lot of it would have come to light. So I certainly support his comments and urge you to act accordingly. Similarly with the bombing of the Iraq radar installations, I remember my staff picking that up on CNN and trying to find somewhere to call and inquire as I was about to walk into a Minnesota defense establishment and not being able to even get a courtesy of reply. So I would say good luck to you. You have a long way to go. Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Senator. I will need the support. The Principles of Information, which I'd be happy to provide, do state clearly that it's the utmost responsibility to release news and information in as timely and accurate a fashion as possible. The only time you withhold information, according to the Principles, is if it would adversely affect national security or it would threaten the privacy or the safety of the men and women in uniform. I absolutely believe that, as many people say, bad news doesn't get better with age; so get it out there, and get it out there accurately. Senator Dayton. Well, I would like to receive a copy of the Principles. My solution would be to get a direct phone number for your office. But in either respect, I'm---- Ms. Clarke. You can have it. Senator Dayton.--encouraged by what you said. Mr. Abell, I note your comments about the importance of recruiting and retaining top-qualified military personnel, and I assume that applies to the Department, as well. Could you elaborate a bit on what you propose to do, or what you contemplate, in terms of--especially in making life better for the families of men and women in our service and improving the retention of them? Mr. Abell. Senator, I think, first, recruiting and retention are a matter of constant vigilance. It is my experience that anytime that a service takes its eye off of either of those two tasks, it is inevitable that they have suffered. So I will be, if confirmed, one who pushes for maintaining that constant vigilance. I also believe that the services are now--have responded well to some problems in the recent past and are being very innovative and visionary in their approaches to recruiting and to retention, and they are to be congratulated. I think the results, both last year and the projected results for this year--we just had a hearing this morning in the Personnel Subcommittee--are very encouraging, and they reflect well on the hard work of a lot of people. I think we need to keep looking for the fresh way to address these problems with a crisp delivery of a good message. As for the quality of life of our families--again, very important for retention--it is one of the focuses of Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review. I have not been briefed on their progress, and I look forward to receiving that brief, if confirmed. Senator Dayton. I would just note that, in the budget process, there were a couple of amendments, including the Chairman's, which was adopted, which provided additional funds which could be used for, among other purposes, those improvements. I was at the National Training Center in California during the recess and asked a couple of the commanding generals there what they thought were the greatest needs. They both--one said, ``I'm an armaments expert, but the quality of life for the pay benefits and standards of living for our families is what would be most valuable and supportive of my mission.'' So I look forward to your returning and to the administration coming forward, whether it's a supplemental appropriation or future requests, and really take advantage of the support of the members of this committee for those kinds of improvements. Mr. Abell. Thank you, sir. Senator Dayton. I would add, as part of that--and I noted with interest your referencing the health benefits dilemma that many reservists and National Guard members face. In Minnesota, we have reservists and members of the Guard who were called up for a period of 3 to 5 months, and the economic hardships which they and their families encountered, health being one of them-- again, I would hope and urge that they not be forgotten when it comes to these kinds of financial and other improvements. Mr. Abell. I assure you, Senator, I will look at the total force. Senator Dayton. Thank you. Dr. Zakheim, when Secretary Rumsfeld has met with us, he has cited his concern about the length of time and increasing length of time from the authorization and design of these weapons systems to their deployment now, some getting to be some 8 to 10 years. I wonder if you've had the chance to think about what kind of financial procedures--I know from the standpoint of military contractors in Minnesota, it's often very time consuming and contributes to these overall delays, getting swift billing and receipts and the like. Conversely, on the other side, according to Senator Byrd and others that have longer experience than I, it's almost astronomical amounts of money that can't be accounted for within the system. So we have this anomaly that, on the one hand, it seems that many of the procedures and requirements just extend delays, but they don't end up accounting for the money. Do you have a way to reconcile and solve those problems? Dr. Zakheim. Well, it's not an easy challenge, Senator. I understand that, in the matter of what Senator Byrd is very concerned about--and he mentions, I think, $4\1/2\ trillion-- there are technical answers to that question, but I think there is more than a germ of truth to his concern. If confirmed, one of my highest priorities would certainly be to, in particular, work to make sure that the various different sources of information are all congruent, because it is my impression--and I do have to study this more, Senator--but it is my impression that the various--what are called feeder systems and various sources of information simply don't speak to each other, and that is where a lot of this falls between the cracks. As to your first point, Senator, regarding the acquisition cycle, I am fully aware of Secretary Rumsfeld's concerns. There are some studies going on, as part of the overall strategic review, to look at this particular question. Obviously, how one deals with the funding of these programs is an integral part of it. So, if confirmed, I very much would hope to be involved in reconciling the financial side to the pure mechanics of the acquisition side so that the program can be speeded up. Senator Dayton. Thank you. I would appreciate your sharing those reports with me when they become available. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. Senator Bunning, do you have a question, too? Senator Levin? All right. You go, then I'll do wrap-up. Senator Levin. Thank you. I appreciate your yielding to me, Mr. Chairman, so I could leave in a few minutes. First, Ms. Clarke, last year, the editor of Stars and Stripes resigned because he was not allowed to publish a story even after the story was published in the Washington Post. I'm wondering whether or not you believe that Stars and Stripes should enjoy the same freedom to publish as other U.S. newspapers. Ms. Clarke. Absolutely, Senator. I think Stars and Stripes should be as independent and as credible as possible. It provides a very valuable service to the men and women in uniform and their families who serve overseas. It gives them news and information that they want, and they need and deserve to know that it is absolutely credible and independent. I think the safeguards are there. If confirmed, I would make sure the safeguards are enforced. Chairman Warner. That's encouraging to hear that. I concur in your response. Senator Levin. There is some real concern about that here, which you've just alleviated. Mr. Abell, what actions are you going to take to enhance recruiter access to secondary schools? This is a big part of our recruiting issue. Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. As you're aware, sir, as you recall, in last year's defense authorization bill, there was a provision that actually requires recruiter access unless the local school board takes some action. That provision is not effective until July 2002. This morning in the hearing, recruiters reported to us that their access was improving as a result of that, but they still sought more support. I think there are some things that we can do to encourage school systems to be more open to recruiters between now and 2002. Then in 2002, we'll follow the implementation of that provision. Senator Levin. What initiatives would you propose to improve the employment of spouses of our service members? That also is a big part of retention. Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. It's a difficult problem and one that, as I've traveled on the committee's staff, we find, at almost every location, is brought to our attention. There are a number of things that could be done, Senator--more education, tuition assistance for spouses. I, if confirmed, look forward to working with local civic organizations and chambers of commerce on initiatives like that to see what we can do. Senator Levin. There's been some evidence at least-- perhaps, anecdotal evidence--that we're beginning to lose the support of employers of our Reserve component personnel because of the deployments that we have seen. Any plans to address those concerns? Mr. Abell. Senator, I've heard the same anecdotes. I, if confirmed, would like to work very closely with the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs to examine this and try to determine the causal factors and actually determine--change it from anecdote to evidence to find out what the real problem is and then address that problem. It may be one of communication, it may be one of over-deploying certain units and not others. Senator Levin. If confirmed, will you recommend a medal for children who sit through these confirmation hearings? [Laughter.] Ms. Clarke, I must tell you, you have really extraordinary children. They have been wonderful. I can't take my eyes off them. We will call it the ``Clarke Medal,'' if Mr. Abell is able to produce that. I just want to thank all of you. I shouldn't single out family members. You're all really deserving of medals for many reasons, but your children have really been extraordinary. So please give them all of our thanks. Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Senator. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. The committee really enjoys its responsibilities in the confirmation process. It gives us an opportunity to share, not only views and elicit responses, but we really are appreciative of the overall family contribution to this public service. I thank you, Senator Levin. I will start with you, Ms. Clarke. Crisis management--it's just remarkable how your predecessors from time to time really are on the point at all hours of the day and night. Secretary Rumsfeld, I think, has a very good policy. He's been very careful in keeping Congress informed, certainly this committee--I can speak for the Senate side--in consultation with members of this committee and others about decisions that he's making. But then we have the tragic incident of the accident with the Chinese aircraft. I was called early in the morning, as were other members of this committee. I'm sure those responsibilities will fall on you. Tell us a bit about how you're going to go about this, because often you are the point person, particularly when the military families had their loved ones, at the end of the long voyage, or flight, whatever the case may be, at some remote part of the world and trouble is there--the anxiety in their hearts--you recognize that, being a family person, yourself. Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir. Chairman Warner. Tell us a bit about how you're going to approach that responsibility. Ms. Clarke. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. I hesitate to quote from somebody from just one service, but I think it was General MacArthur who said, ``The key to success and victory is preparation.'' I think that holds true across the board, including crisis management, including being prepared for the inevitable crises. If confirmed, one of the first things I want to do is to look into what is the planning, what processes do we have in place, and who is responsible for making sure the public affairs aspect of these incidents is addressed at the earliest possible position. I know there are some things in place, but I want to give it the utmost attention to ensure, when things do happen, the right people know, and the American people know as quickly as possible. So it's a matter of planning and process. Chairman Warner. Would you elaborate a little bit? By the way, I don't question General MacArthur's quote, but Admiral Jellico used to say, ``All preparation for naval battles starts in the engine room.'' In those days, they battened the hatches, and everybody in the engine room knew they were not going to come out and they had better stoke those old coal boilers and get full power for the captain to maneuver his ship. I've always enjoyed military history, and I hope that you share that curiosity and find a few moments to probe the magnificent contributions, certainly of those who have worn the uniform of this country for generations past. Congress--how do you propose to deal with Congress? Now, there's a long history about relationships with Congress and I would hope this Department sets a new high record for fairness and firmness, when necessary. Ms. Clarke. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will work closely with my legislative counterpart to make sure that you, this committee, the staff, and 535 Members of Congress get as much information as quickly as possible. Just by way of insight to how passionately I feel about this, I did work for John McCain for 6\1/2\ years, and every day was a delight; but I know how important it is to be kept informed by the agencies, so I'll make that a priority. Chairman Warner. Also, I must say, you had the privilege of working with our former president, George Bush. I know of no finer American. I really have the greatest admiration for him, and I envy you for your close relationship with him. Ms. Clarke. It was an honor to work for him. Chairman Warner. It was mentioned in the hearing today, the problems that we're having with recruiting and retention, and the stories you relate and how you relate them will have a direct impact. I'm sure the secretary-to-be Abell can work with you on that, because he has studied it from afar, and now he will be in the responsible position on that. Do you have any special insights into that problem? Ms. Clarke. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Two years ago, I was fortunate to work on a recruiting study. It started out as a very narrow look at the advertising that was being used by the recruiting commands, and then it became a broader look at the recruiting marketing. We spent 6 very intense months working with the services, working with everybody, from the Secretary on down, on how we could improve the marketing on recruiting efforts. One of the things that was so extraordinary to us--we came about it by chance, and we made part of the research--is we interviewed everybody from the Secretary on down to the rank and file to the general public. There was very little consistency expressed about the role of the U.S. military--very little consistency. It's very hard to go out there and recruit when people, including people in uniform, don't have a real clear picture of what they're about, about what their mission is. So I think it's absolutely critical, and part of my agenda will be, to make sure the American people do know what the role of the U.S. military is in the 21st century. I think that will help with recruiting and retention. Chairman Warner. Well, that's a good response, because that is a key thing that we're going to have to deal with. There's a tremendous investment the American taxpayers make in the training of our service persons. We're so fortunate, when numbers of them decide to repeat their tours of duty, in the case of enlisted or, indeed, in the case of the officers, to go ahead and accept another promotion with the obligation of active duty associated. So I wish you luck. The other--and I think I'd better speak and you just listen--but, again, having had some experience in the Department and watching it from this side now for these many years, there's a certain degree of independence that a Secretary of Defense should and does accord to the Service Secretaries and their respective chiefs, but from time to time, we see examples of how a military department will go out on an issue and then problems begin to arise. I'm not being critical, but recently the Army made decisions with regard to the simplest of things, the beret, and we were besieged on Capitol Hill. Then, of course, they could not have foreseen the tragic problem with China. That exacerbated it. Then had to go back through a reassessment. I would hope that the Secretary and yourself can work with these departments on certain decisions which have a high profile of public interest and do everything possible to go ahead and implement that decision and do it by laying a careful base of understanding before it is rolled out. Ms. Clarke. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I hope that one of the things I can do is inject the public affairs sensitivities, if you will, at the earliest stages to prevent just those sorts of problems. Chairman Warner. Well, that's wonderful. I'm very reassured by your responses. We haven't heard a peep from the back row yet, so I guess---- Ms. Clarke. Well, my colleagues are actually being very patient, because we're hearing lots of peeps back here. They're being very patient. [Laughter.] Chairman Warner. Dr. Zakheim, we had a marvelous conversation the other day--it's always enjoyable to have those calls from the nominees--and you reflected, and I would like to have the record reflect, your comments to me about one of your predecessors, Dr. John Hamre. He is just so respected by this committee. My parting comment was to you, call him up every now an then when things are going tough and say, ``How did you deal with this?'' Dr. Zakheim. Mr. Chairman, for the record then, I have known John Hamre since he left graduate school, and I know he served this committee with distinction. John Hamre is one of the finest people--not just public servants, but people who I have ever come across. The man has truly a heart of gold. He demonstrates that in very quiet