- NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS

[Senate Hearing 107-749]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 107-749

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

DONALD H. RUMSFELD; PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ; DOV S. ZAKHEIM; CHARLES S.
ABELL; VICTORIA CLARKE; EDWARD C. ALDRIDGE; WILLIAM J. HAYNES II;
POWELL A. MOORE; DR. DAVID S.C. CHU; THOMAS E. WHITE; GORDON R.
ENGLAND; DR. JAMES G. ROCHE; ALFRED V. RASCON; DOUGLAS JAY FEITH; DR.
JACK DYER CROUCH II; PETER W. RODMAN; SUSAN MORRISEY LIVINGSTONE;
JESSIE HILL ROBERSON; THOMAS P. CHRISTIE; ALBERTO J. MORA; DIANE K.
MORALES; STEVEN J. MORELLO, SR.; WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR.; MICHAEL W.
WYNNE; DIONEL M. AVILES; REGINALD JUDE BROWN; STEVEN A. CAMBONE;
MICHAEL MONTELONGO; JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.; JOHN B. STENBIT; DR. RONALD M.
SEGA; MICHAEL L. DOMINGUEZ; MICHAEL PARKER; DR. MARIO P. FIORI; H.T.
JOHNSON; NELSON F. GIBBS; GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF; GEN. RICHARD B.
MYERS, USAF; GEN. PETER PACE, USMC; GEN. JOHN W. HANDY, USAF; ADM.
JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN; LINTON F. BROOKS; MARVIN R. SAMBUR; WILLIAM
WINKENWERDER, JR.; EVERT BECKNER; MARY L. WALKER; JOSEPH E. SCHMITZ;
SANDRA L. PACK; R.L. BROWNLEE; DR. DALE KLEIN; PETER B. TEETS; AND GEN.
CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., USAF

----------

JANUARY 11; FEBRUARY 27; APRIL 24, 26; MAY 1, 10; JUNE 5, 7, 22, 27;
JULY 31; AUGUST 1; SEPTEMBER 13, 25; OCTOBER 11, 23; NOVEMBER 8;
DECEMBER 4, 2001

----------

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
107TH CONGRESS

S. Hrg. 107-749

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 107TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

__________

JANUARY 11; FEBRUARY 27; APRIL 24, 26; MAY 1, 10; JUNE 5, 7, 22, 27;
JULY 31; AUGUST 1; SEPTEMBER 13, 25; OCTOBER 11, 23; NOVEMBER 8;
DECEMBER 4, 2001

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

75-903 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Maine
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

Les Brownlee, Staff Director

David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

David S. Lyles, Staff Director

Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

----------

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Page

January 11, 2001

Nomination of Donald H. Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense...... 1

Statements of:

Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Illinois....................................................... 9
Fitzgerald, Hon. Peter G., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Illinois....................................................... 10
Rumsfeld, Donald H., Nominee to be Secretary, Department of
Defense........................................................ 13

February 27, 2001

Nomination of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz to be the Deputy Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 209

Statements of:

Sarbanes, Hon. Paul R., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland 212
Wolfowitz, Dr. Paul D., Nominee to be Deputy Secretary of Defense 214

April 24, 2001

Nominations of Dr. Dov S. Zakheim to be Under Secretary of
Defense, Comptroller; Charles S. Abell to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy; and Victoria
Clarke to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. 301

Statements of:

Zakheim, Dr. Dov S., Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense,
Comptroller.................................................... 306
Clarke, Victoria, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs............................................. 308
Abell, Charles S., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management Policy.................................... 309

April 26, 2001

Nominations of Edward C. Aldridge to be Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology; William J. Haynes II to
be General Counsel of the Department of Defense; and Powell A.
Moore to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative
Affairs........................................................ 371

Statements of:

Thompson, Hon. Fred, a U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee.. 374
Aldridge, Edward C., Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology..................................... 376
Moore, Powell A., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs........................................ 381
Haynes, William J. II, Nominee to be General Counsel of the
Department of Defense.......................................... 382

(iii)
May 1, 2001

Pending Military Nominations..................................... 449

May 10, 2001

Nomination of Dr. David S.C. Chu to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness; Thomas E. White to be Secretary of
the Army; Gordon R. England to be Secretary of the Navy; Dr.
James G. Roche to be Secretary of the Air Force; and Alfred V.
Rascon to be Director of Selective Service..................... 455

Statements of:

Sarbanes, Hon. Paul, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland... 460
Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland 461
Gramm, Hon. Phil, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas......... 462
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe, a Representative from the State of
Maryland....................................................... 462
Chu, Dr. David S.C., Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness........................................ 464
Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Texas.......................................................... 464
White, Thomas E., Jr., Nominee to be Secretary of the Army....... 466
England, Gordon R., Nominee to be Secretary of the Navy.......... 458
Roche, Dr. James G., Nominee to be Secretary of the Air Force.... 469
Rascon, Alfred V., Nominee to be Director of Selective Service... 472

June 5, 2001

Nomination of Douglas Jay Feith to be Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy; Dr. Jack Dyer Crouch II to be Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Policy; and Peter W.
Rodman to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs............................................... 581

Statements of:

Feith, Douglas Jay, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy......................................................... 582
Rodman, Peter W., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs............................. 582
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Pennsylvania................................................... 584
Bond, Hon. Christopher ``Kit'', a U.S. Senator from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 586

June 7, 2001

Nominations of Susan Morrisey Livingstone to be Under Secretary
of the Navy; Jessie Hill Roberson to be Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Environmental Management; and Thomas P. Christie to
be Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of
Defense........................................................ 867

Statements of:

Livingstone, Susan Morrisey, Nominee to be Under Secretary of the
Navy........................................................... 875
Roberson, Jessie Hill, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Environmental Management............................ 877
Christie, Thomas P., Nominee to be Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation, Department of Defense.......................... 878

June 22, 2001

Nominations of Alberto J. Mora to be General Counsel of the Navy;
Diane K. Morales to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Material Readiness; Steven J. Morello, Sr., to be
General Counsel of the Army; William A. Navas, Jr., to be
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs; and Michael W. Wynne to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology......................... 935

Statements of:

Morello, Steven J., Sr., Nominee to be General Counsel of the
Army........................................................... 941
Wynne, Michael W., Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology......................... 942
Morales, Diane K., Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness................... 942
Navas, William A., Jr., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.......................... 943
Mora, Alberto J., Nominee to be General Counsel of the Navy...... 944

June 27, 2001

Nominations of Dionel M. Aviles to be Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Financial Management and Comptroller; Reginald Jude Brown
to be Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs; Dr. Steven A. Cambone to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy; Michael Montelongo to be Assistant
Secretary for the Air Force, Financial Management and
Comptroller; and John J. Young, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition............ 1031

Statements of:

Inouye, Hon. Daniel, a U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii..... 1034
Stevens, Hon. Ted, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska....... 1035
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a U.S. Representative from the State of
Texas.......................................................... 1036
Montelongo, Michael, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary for the
Air Force, Financial Management and Comptroller................ 1040
Brown, Reginald Jude, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs............................. 1041
Cambone, Dr. Steven A., Nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 1041
Aviles, Dionel M., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Financial Management and Comptroller........................... 1042
Young, John J., Jr., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Research, Development, and Acquisition................... 1042

July 31, 2001

Nominations of John B. Stenbit to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence;
Dr. Ronald M. Sega to be Director of Defense, Research and
Engineering; Michael L. Dominguez to be Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Paul Michael
Parker to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works;
Dr. Mario P. Fiori to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Installations and Environment; H.T. Johnson to be Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; and
Nelson F. Gibbs to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Installations and Environment.................................. 1139

Statements of:

Dominguez, Michael L., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs..................... 1144
Stenbit, John B., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence.......... 1145
Sega, Dr. Ronald M., Nominee to be Director of Defense Research
and Engineering................................................ 1146
Lott, Hon. Trent, a U.S. Senator from the State of Mississippi... 1159
Cochran, Hon. Thad, a U.S. Senator from the State of Mississippi. 1161
Parker, Paul Michael, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Civil Works........................................... 1165
Fiori, Dr. Mario P., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations and Environment......................... 1166
Johnson, H.T., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Installations and Environment.................................. 1167
Gibbs, Nelson F., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Installations and Environment........................ 1167

August 1, 2001

Nomination of Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff United States Air
Force.......................................................... 1309

Statement of:

Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Nominee to be Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force............................................... 1313

September 13, 2001

Nomination of Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF, to be Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................................... 1377

Statement of:

Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Nominee to be Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff................................................ 1383

September 25, 2001

Nominations of Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, for Reappointment in the
Grade of General and for Appointment as the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. John W. Handy, USAF, for
Reappointment in the Grade of General and for Appointment as
Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command and
Commander Air Mobility Command; and Adm. James O. Ellis, Jr.,
USN, for Reappointment in the Grade of Admiral and for
Appointment as Commander in Chief, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 1445

Statements of:

Handy, Gen. John W., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and for Appointment as Commander in Chief, United
States Transportation Command, and Commander, Air Mobility
Command........................................................ 1451
Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade of General
and for Appointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 1451
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and for Appointment as Commander in Chief, United
States Strategic Command....................................... 1451

October 11, 2001

Nominations of Linton F. Brooks to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration; Marvin R. Sambur to be Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition; William Winkenwerder, Jr., to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; Everet
Beckner to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration; and Mary L. Walker to
be General Counsel of the Air Force............................ 1529

Statements of:

Domenici, Hon. Pete V., a U.S. Senator from the State of New
Mexico......................................................... 1531
Beckner, Everet, Ph.D., Nominee to be Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration..... 1535
Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., Nominee to be Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 1537
Winkenwerder, William, Jr., M.D., Nominee to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs........................ 1538
Sambur, Marvin R., Ph.D., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition.................................. 1539
Walker, Mary L., Nominee to be General Counsel of the Air Force.. 1539

October 23, 2001

Nominations of Joseph E. Schmitz to be Inspector General,
Department of Defense; and Sandra L. Pack to be Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. 1623

Statements of:

Schmitz, Joseph E., Nominee to be Inspector General, Department
of Defense..................................................... 1627
Pack, Sandra L., Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Financial Management and Comptroller....................... 1628

November 8, 2001

Nominations of R.L. Brownlee to be Under Secretary of the Army;
Dr. Dale Klein to be Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; and Peter
B. Teets to be Under Secretary of the Air Force................ 1693

Statements of:

Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Texas.......................................................... 1700
Klein, Dr. Dale, Nominee to be Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs....................................................... 1706
Brownlee, R.L., Nominee to be Under Secretary of the Army........ 1707
Teets, Peter B., Nominee to be Under Secretary of the Air Force.. 1709

December 4, 2001

Nomination of Claude M. Bolton, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology............ 1789

Statement of:

Bolton, Maj. Gen. Claude M., Jr., USAF, Nominee to be Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology..................................................... 1792

APPENDIX......................................................... 1863

NOMINATION OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

----------

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Bingaman, Lieberman, Cleland, Reed, Warner, Thurmond, McCain,
Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, and Sessions.
Other Senators present: Senators Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben
Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Collins, and Bunning.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, counsel; and Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Charles S.
Abell, professional staff member; Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; John R. Barnes, professional staff
member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; William
C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward,
professional staff member; Lawrence J. Lanzillotta,
professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel; Joseph T. Sixeas,
professional staff member; Cord A. Sterling, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Eric H. Thoemmes,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Thomas C.
Moore, and Michele A. Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator
Byrd; David Klain, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Christopher
J. Paul and Walter E. Fischer, assistants to Senator McCain;
Gregory C. McCarthy, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M.
Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Thomas A.
Vecchiolla, assistant to Senator Snowe; Robert Alan McCurry and
James Beauchamp, assistants to Senator Roberts; Douglas
Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael P. Ralsky,
assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Scott Douglass, assistant to
Senator Sessions.
Other Senate staff present: Richard Kessler, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Pete Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Sheila Murphy, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Larry
Smar, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Christopher Ford and Sam
Patten, assistants to Senator Collins; and Jeff Freeman,
assistant to Senator Cochran.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. The history of this committee in the annals
of the Senate reflect that we have achieved, through successive
chairmen, a high degree of bipartisanship that our Nation is
entitled from this committee. I have been privileged to serve
23 years on this committee with my distinguished colleague. We
came together 23 years ago. It has been my privilege to serve
as the Chairman for the past 2 years. If the high water does
not rise and flood us out, I will return to that position in a
week or so.
But in the meantime, in the spirit of bipartisanship, I am
privileged to pass the gavel to Senator Levin. Senator Levin
and I and Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and other members of
the House went down to visit with President-elect Bush on
Monday and we had a very good, thorough, and searching
examination of defense issues and that struck the note of
bipartisanship that is so essential as we, the collective
members of our committee, represent this Nation in national
security.
So, Mr. Chairman, it is with privilege I pass the gavel to
you.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. I have been
Chairman of this Committee for all of about a week. I cannot
tell you how many people have noted to me just how you have
thrived under my chairmanship already. [Laughter.]
Before I proceed, I want to thank you for the many good
years of friendship we have enjoyed over two decades now that
we have been in the Senate. I will have some more comments
about your chairmanship and that of Senator Thurmond and others
in a moment. This is just a personal thank you to you.
The committee meets today to consider the nomination of
Donald Rumsfeld to serve as Secretary of Defense.
As the first order of business, I want to welcome all of
our Members back to the committee and extend a special welcome
to our prospective new members. On our side, we are joined by
Senator Akaka, Senator Bill Nelson, Senator Ben Nelson, Senator
Carnahan, and Senator Dayton. On the Republican side, we are
joined by Senators Collins and Bunning. This is a great
committee to serve on. I know that Senator Warner and I and all
the members of this committee look forward to our new members
joining us.
On behalf of the entire committee, I extend a warm welcome
to Mr. Rumsfeld and his family. I understand that you are
accompanied by your wife, Joyce Rumsfeld, your daughter Marcy
Rumsfeld, and your granddaughter Kayley Rumsfeld. We know the
sacrifices that your family will make while you are in this
position and we want to thank them in advance for their support
of you and the sacrifices which they will make.
We also welcome Senators Durbin and Fitzgerald who have
joined us today.
Mr. Rumsfeld is well known to this committee from his
recent service as Chairman of the Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States and his many
other endeavors. A couple of the senior members of the
committee may also admit to their age by remembering Mr.
Rumsfeld's previous service as Secretary of Defense in the Ford
administration. Don Rumsfeld was the youngest Secretary of
Defense in our history. After a few years of service in the
upcoming Bush administration, he will earn the distinction of
being our oldest Secretary of Defense as well--at least until
Senator Thurmond is sworn in as his successor sometime in the
future. [Laughter.]
We convene this hearing at a unique moment in the history
of this country and in the history of the United States Senate.
We have just concluded the closest presidential election in our
history. For the first time ever at the beginning of Congress,
the Senate is equally divided. A practical arrangement to
accommodate that unusual situation was worked out by our
leaders and approved by the Senate last week.
Times like these call out for, and necessitate,
bipartisanship and cooperation. Fortunately, this committee, as
Senator Warner has said, has a long tradition of working in a
bipartisan manner to address the national security challenges
facing this country. Chairman Warner has consistently led the
committee in this spirit, as have the chairmen before him. At
times when the rest of Congress has suffered from gridlock, our
committee's legislative achievements--like the Goldwater-
Nichols DOD Reorganization Act, and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program--have been marked by bipartisanship.
Even our disagreements on issues have rarely been along
partisan lines. For instance, while debates on the withdrawal
of troops from Kosovo and on additional rounds of base closures
have divided this committee in recent years, the division has
not been on partisan lines.
It is my hope that the ease with which we hand the
chairman's gavel back and forth in the course of this month
will symbolize the close working relationships on this
committee over the decades and help set the tone elsewhere.
Our new Secretary of Defense will inherit the most dominant
military force in the history of the world. Over the last two
decades, our military has incorporated a series of
technological improvements that have revolutionized their
military capability--from precision guided munitions and
stealth technology to satellite reconnaissance and electronic
warfare capabilities. The members of this committee, the
Appropriations Committee, and our counterparts in the House of
Representatives have played a key role in those changes. Today,
each of our military services is more lethal, more
maneuverable, more versatile and has greater situational
awareness on the battlefield than at any time in history.
During the 1990s, Congress and the administration worked
together to enhance our national security by achieving a
balance between the needs of today's troops, including their
current readiness, with the need to develop and field weapons
that will enable us to retain our technological advantage in
the future. This effort led to the enactment of comprehensive
improvements to the military's health care system, military pay
and retirement systems, and the substantially increased
acquisition spending to recapitalize and modernize the force.
We have also been engaged in a constant struggle to
maintain funding for operations and maintenance accounts that
support current readiness, given the high rates of deployment.
The terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole last fall
demonstrated once again that our enemies are most likely to use
indirect, asymmetric means to attack us. They realize it would
be suicide to confront the United States military directly. The
most likely threats to our national interest will come from
regional conflicts due to ethnic, religious, or cultural
conflicts and from terrorists and terrorist states.
If states are involved, they will seek to hide their
involvement, because the retaliatory power of the United States
is so massive and survivable as to guarantee the destruction of
the principal goal of a totalitarian regime--its own survival.
In the area of national missile defense, the outgoing
administration chose to aggressively pursue research and
development, while stating a determination to consider in any
deployment decision not only the threat, but the system's
operational effectiveness and affordability, and the impact
that deployment would have on our overall national security.
This approach gives appropriate weight not only to the effect
that large expenditures on missile defense would have on
resources available to meet other vital defense needs, but also
to the negative impact that the unilateral deployment of a
national missile defense could have on our allies and on the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, given the likelihood that the
Russian and Chinese response to such unilateral deployment
would be to increase (or stop reducing) the number of nuclear
weapons and the amount of nuclear material on their soil. As
Senator Baker and Lloyd Cutler found in their report released
yesterday, the most urgent unmet national security threat to
the United States is that weapons of mass destruction or
weapons usable material located in Russia could be stolen and
sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against
American troops abroad or citizens at home.
We need to analyze the extent to which we spend defense
resources on threats that are the least likely to occur. A
ballistic missile attack from a terrorist state against the
United States is a threat, but it is one that we have
successfully deterred and against which we have a continuing
overwhelming deterrent. There are cheaper and easier means of
attacking the United States than an ICBM--means such as truck
bombs, poisoning of water systems, or infiltration of computer
networks--which may not open the unknown attacker to massive
destruction in return. Those are just a few of the issues that
we will be grappling with as a committee and you will be
grappling with as Secretary of Defense.
We are blessed to live in a Nation whose political
institutions and economy are respected throughout the world.
With the end of the Cold War, our core values of freedom,
democracy, and human rights appear to be stronger than ever
with democratic revolutions changing the history of nation
after nation. Our military, when used wisely, at once makes our
Nation secure and enables us to play a unique role in
influencing the course of events outside our borders in a
peaceful and stable direction.
But the ability to influence events does not necessarily
mean, of course, the ability to control them. We live in such a
complex world, where we must deal with many interests that are
contrary to our own. We should be proud of all that we have
achieved in the world, including the reversal of ethnic
cleansing in Europe for the first time in history, which also
enabled nearly a million refugees and displaced persons to
return to their homes. At the same time, we must be prepared to
deal with new threats--particularly the terrorist threat--with
new technologies, more mobile forces, and improved intelligence
capabilities. Chairman Warner, with my support, created a
subcommittee that is specially aimed at addressing these new
threats. In the most recent defense authorization bill that we
have adopted, we have paid special attention to the need to
address the new threats.
The new administration will develop its own strategy for
addressing these difficult issues and for maintaining the
superiority of America's military force. Today's hearing
provides an opportunity for all of us to begin the process of
discussing that strategy. The nominee before us today has a
strong commitment to the national defense. He is well-qualified
to address the issues facing the Department of Defense and he
is an extremely well-qualified nominee for this position. We
congratulate him. We also congratulate the President-elect for
this nomination. I now call upon Senator Warner for his opening
statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin. I join
you in welcoming our new members. Our new members put this
committee at the highest level membership in history at 24.
In years past, we recruited members. Now we have certainly
an indication of strength among our entire membership as
reflected by so many wishing to join us. We welcome you.
To you, my dear friend for over 30 years, we have had a
friendship and a personal relationship and indeed a
professional one, having served together in the Ford
administration, I as Secretary of the Navy and you as one of
our troublemakers over in the White House.
I join in welcoming your lovely wife and family. Anyone
taking on particularly your responsibilities as Secretary of
Defense 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and that phone is always
by your side. Indeed, your family fully shares the heavy
responsibilities. You are so fortunate to have such a wonderful
family to share that burden.
If I may say, Mrs. Rumsfeld, you will be an integral part
of reassuring the other families of the service persons
throughout the world by your strong support of your husband and
indeed them.
So we welcome you as a team to the department. I look back
over the hearing record of November 12, 1975. It was a very
short hearing I note and perhaps not as well attended. But that
reflects the importance of the Senate advice and consent today.
This committee, as to other committees of the Senate, take that
responsibility very seriously.
So our hearing today will be lengthy and we will probe
deeply into many areas of our security relationships and your
responsibility and how you intend to fulfill it.
First, I would like to say that based on my good fortune to
have known you, I say without any reservation you are
competent. You are experienced. You are trustworthy. You have
the character, the honesty, to do this job second to none.
I was so pleased, and indeed I think the country should be
grateful that you are willing to come back again, sign on for a
second hitch, as we say in the military, for this important
post. I note behind you two old-timers who are not paying any
attention to what we are saying, Mr. Schneider and Mr.
Korologos. [Laughter.] I do not know why they are here, but we
welcome them anyway. [Laughter.]
We also commend you, Mr. Rumsfeld, for keeping active and
informed on defense and security issues since your last
Pentagon service. The committee is familiar with the excellent
work you have done in both the Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat which issued its report in 1998 and
the ongoing Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization which coincidentally
the report will be issued today.
Now, Senator Levin and I and others have received a
briefing on the work of this commission. It is a job well done.
It is another serious wake-up call to America about the threats
directed at us.
Our committee played a central role in establishing both of
these commissions and I commend its membership. We thank you
again and the members of the committee for your work.
We are familiar with the findings and recommendations of
the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and the influence that
that report had. It came at a critical time I say to you. In
many ways, the Ballistic Missile Threat Report changed the
entire debate over national missile defense by convincing many
in Congress, and, respectfully, in the Clinton administration,
that the potential threat is more serious and more imminent
than previously understood throughout our Nation.
I look forward to your comments on this subject and my dear
friend and colleague here I think quite appropriately in his
opening statement indicated some of his strong views. We have
not always agreed on it, but it is a subject that is the
centerpiece of the new Bush administration. No one is better
qualified than yourself to advise the President on the
directions to be taken.
We still have, as you well know, you are a former sailor,
former naval aviator the best-trained, best-equipped military
force in the world today. There are certainly many areas in
which we need to continue to make improvements.
We are not pleased at all with the retention levels,
difficulty of recruiting. When we recruit today, we recruit
families. We recruit unlike when you and I went in many years
ago into the service. It is families today.
When that critical decision is made about retention the
wives are usually co-equal partners. It was a family decision
to stay or to go out and seek the lucrative opportunities that
these well-trained individuals have in the private sector.
Readiness and modernization have been the highest priority
of this committee. We have achieved some gains, but not enough.
Procurement. We have almost dropped to levels which are
just totally unacceptable. We have to modernize and restore the
best we can within the budget a much higher level of acquiring
new and modern weapons.
Just look at the truck inventory in the United States Army.
No civilian, no private sector, would operate a truck force
like we are operating in the military. That is just one thing
people can understand all across America.
So therefore, Mr. Secretary, we have to increase defense
spending. When we, Senator Levin and I, had an opportunity to
visit with President-elect Bush, Vice President-elect Cheney,
on Monday, we did not talk about specific levels. But there was
the clear consensus that we have to increase substantially
defense spending.
Now, this morning we cannot establish those levels with any
precision. But I was heartened to see that the President-elect
wants to first task you to examine how the current budget,
those of past years, being expended, to determine whether or
not you should redirect funding, to determine whether there are
efficiencies within which you can gain some cash needed for
other programs.
Then after doing that, you can establish that level of
increase in the context of not only the other budget factors,
but most importantly the President-elect said the defense
budget has to have a direct relevance if not in fact be driven
by the threats poised against this Nation, threats quite
different than our generation of active service in the
military. Quite different.
Senator Levin expounded on terrorism and the work of this
committee, and I commend this committee for its work. We have
constantly had to push the current administration for higher
levels of funding in a wide range of areas to combat terrorism
and the risks here in the United States which I will address
momentarily. We call it homeland defense.
President-elect Bush used that very phrase in his statement
at the Citadel which is a foundation document of his thinking.
Now, historically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had, of
course, a vital role in the planning in the Department of
Defense. But I commend them, especially for the past 2 years,
and indeed the years before under my distinguished predecessor,
Senator Thurmond, for coming before this committee and
testifying about the need for additional funds over and above
the recommendations and the submissions by the Commander in
Chief, the President of the United States at that very table.
The past 2 years we have taken that testimony which has
been essential as this committee has gone to the floor of the
United States Senate to get higher authorization levels for
spending. We have gotten what I regard as modest sums, but
nevertheless very important increases in the past 2 fiscal
years.
You will be faced early on with first the supplemental. We
have talked about that together. We talked with Senator Stevens
and Senator Inouye about it. Followed by a budget amendment to
the current Clinton administration budget which is
traditionally submitted to Congress by the outgoing President.
Those are some of the key things that you will have to address
immediately. Within both, you will have additional sums needed
desperately for our defense.
President-elect Bush has articulated a vision for the U.S.
military and have set three broad goals for national defense.
First, to strengthen the bond of trust between the
President which is so essential, from the four star officer
down to the private or the seaman, that bond of trust between
the commander and chief and those in uniform and indeed their
families.
Second, to defend the American people against missiles and
terror. Very few in the United States recognize we are
virtually defenseless against missile attack. That, of course,
is the subject that my colleague discussed and we will have
further discussions on that.
Third, to begin creating the military of the next century.
How well you know from your own study the old slogan they are
always preparing to fight the last battle. Well, that worked
maybe in World War II when we had the time to catch up because
of the protection of the oceans. But those protections are gone
today. Warfare is instantaneous. It is the arsenal we have of
weapons and trained people in place that will be used.
Cyber warfare. No one envisioned that a decade ago. But
today it is a threat which I and others think is just as lethal
as anything.
I commend your predecessor, Secretary Cohen. He has
recognized would you not say, Mr. Chairman, the oncoming and
the changing threats in just the 4 years that he has been
present as Secretary of Defense?
I want to say at this time, and I think the members of this
committee would want to reflect, our respect for the work that
Secretary Cohen and his team have done in his administration.
You understand these goals.
I want to go back to the President's speech at the Citadel.
He said, and I quote, ``Those who want to lead America accept
two obligations. One is to use our military power wisely
remembering the cost of the war. The other is to honor our
commitments to veterans who have paid those costs.''
People. Those who have served in the past, those who are
serving today, and those we need to have come in and serve for
tomorrow.
I am proud of the way this committee, this last bill, began
to reach back and take care of those veterans, particularly the
career veterans, in terms of their medical needs. This
committee is very conscious of the fact that they are the best
recruiters in the world, those who have served once. We have in
the past, I think, neglected them. That has come to an end with
the work of this committee.
The start point President-elect Bush has said that he will
recommend a substantial pay raise, a billion. This committee
has worked on two successive pay raises. We are ready to accept
that challenge of that billion dollar mark. Perhaps it has to
be adjusted maybe up or sideways or down a bit. But we will
back him in working through that very important thing because
that is key again to the retention and the care of the
families.
We all know that most of the retention decisions as I
mentioned are made on a family basis. That is critical to care
for those people.
Homeland defense will be a high priority for President-
elect Bush and yourself, if confirmed. President-elect Bush has
said that he will deploy both theater and national ABM systems
to guard the United States, our allies, and troops deployed
overseas against missile attack or the threat of attack.
Defense against domestic terrorism, including detecting and
responding to such threats, will also be a priority for the
next administration. You will be at the very forefront.
We also need an immediate and comprehensive review as
President-elect Bush advised us when we visited with him of our
military today, its structure, it strategy, its capabilities,
and its modernization priorities.
President-elect Bush has promised such a review. In my
conversations with you, you are fully prepared to undertake
that the first day you arrive in the department.
We must look beyond the modest improvements we have had to
our current systems and find ways to enhance and strengthen our
military in many areas.
I want to include among that base closure. It has been a
very contentious subject. In past years, I was privileged to
join with my friend, the Chairman, in originating those bills.
Senator McCain has been very active on that front. I urge you
to take a look at that at the earliest opportunity. There is
infrastructure out there that can be withdrawn and I think
constructively and in many instances will help local
communities to get that infrastructure back and put it to good
use. There will be a cost savings to the military which those
dollars can be applied elsewhere. In most instances, it will
eventually help the local communities. These are some of the
initiatives that you must undertake.
So I support this nomination very enthusiastically. It is
my intention to cast that vote for you subject to the work of
this committee and I wish to commend President-elect Bush for
putting together an absolutely outstanding team on the areas of
national defense, national security, and international affairs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. Two of our
friends and dear colleagues have joined us to introduce Mr.
Rumsfeld. Senator Durbin, we will call on you first. Then we
will call on Senator Fitzgerald.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Senator Durbin. Thank you, Chairman Levin, and the members
of the committee. It is an honor to introduce to the committee
today my distinguished colleague from the land of Lincoln. I
know that presidents have often complained about the Senate
confirmation process. Herbert Hoover, upon the birth of his
granddaughter, said, ``Thank God she doesn't have to be
confirmed by the Senate.''
Donald Rumsfeld has so much experience, I am sure he will
have less trouble winning confirmation than President Hoover's
granddaughter would have had if she had required the Senate's
blessing.
Don Rumsfeld's resume is impressive. Four-term Congressman
from Illinois, Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
U.S. Ambassador to NATO, White House Chief of Staff, the
youngest ever Secretary of Defense, CEO of several major
corporations, and a special envoy for President under President
Reagan.
We have heard a lot about bipartisanship lately. When Don
Rumsfeld came by my office to talk about this hearing, he told
me that when he served in Congress before Baker versus Clark
that Speaker Sam Rayburn had a congressional district of about
89,000. Is that what you remember, Don? His congressional
district was the largest in the nation at 1.1 million.
The Illinois district that Don Rumsfeld represented in the
House of Representatives was split in two in Congress after he
departed. One district represented by a conservative Republican
and one by a liberal Democrat. His ability to serve such a
diverse district speaks well of his ability to bridge a
Congress and a country almost equally divided.
While all Senators may not agree with Mr. Rumsfeld on every
issue, he has certainly earned our respect. In fact, I want to
warn my Senate colleagues to be reluctant to go to the mat with
Don Rumsfeld. Not only was he Captain of Princeton University's
wrestling team, and All Navy wrestling champion, he was also
inducted in the National Wrestling Hall of Fame and Museum. He
joined Speaker Hastert as another famous wrestler who hails
from Illinois.
I for one plan to keep in mind that wrestling depends on
strategy and making the right move at the right time as much as
it does on strength and power.
Some of his critics have complained Mr. Rumsfeld's
experience with defense is from a bygone, Cold War era. Those
critics ignore the obvious. Mr. Rumsfeld's valuable
contributions chairing several commissions, including the
Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, and the obvious experience
that he has had in managing major corporations in a new
economy. Mr. Rumsfeld has kept up and I would challenge his
critics to try to keep up with him.
In 1775, in our revolutionary era, Patrick Henry said, ``I
have but one lamp by which my feet are guided and that is the
lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging the future but
by the past.''
It is only because the United States was so steadfast in
fighting for freedom and democracy that the world enjoys an
unprecedented era of freedom and prosperity today.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rumsfeld carries the lamp of experience.
I wish him for our country's sake every success as he travels
by that light. It is with pride that I present to you one of
Illinois' favorite and most distinguished sons.
Chairman Levin. Senator Durbin, thank you.
Senator Fitzgerald.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER G. FITZGERALD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
ILLINOIS

Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of this distinguished committee. It is a great honor
and privilege for me to join with my colleague, Senator Durbin,
to present to this committee one of Illinois' most
distinguished residents, Donald Rumsfeld.
The day after President-elect Bush announced his selection
of Donald Rumsfeld, I noted that in the New York Times the
reporter had asked Henry Kissinger his opinion of the Defense
Secretary designate. Dr. Kissinger said, and I quote, ``I
literally cannot think of a better person for the post.''
That was exactly my impression. I believe it was the
impression of many of the members of this body and certainly of
many of the newspaper editorial boards around the country.
It is kind of an irony, Don. You were actually my
Congressman when I was growing up. I was one of those 1.1
million constituents Senator Durbin referred to.
Now, lest this committee conclude that either I am too
young to be in the United States Senate or that he is too old
to serve as Defense Secretary, I would point out that he was a
very young Member of Congress, one of the youngest Members of
Congress at the time, in his early 30s. I would note that in
one of life's unfair ironies, he has more hair than I do today.
As Senator Durbin said, I would not recommend that anybody try
to wrestle with Don Rumsfeld.
Shortly after I got sworn in, I was very familiar with
Donald Rumsfeld's record in business and in government. I knew
of his impressive resume. But what I would urge you to reflect
upon is, this man is not simply a resume who has held all these
impressive posts. He is someone who has collected a lot of
wisdom from his years of experience.
Shortly after I was sworn in, he shared with me a little
pamphlet that he put together and compiled over the years known
as ``Rumsfeld's Rules''. If any of you have not seen that, I
would recommend that you get a copy of it. It has many of his
words of wisdom and advice to Members of Congress or those in
the administration. I read that carefully after I got sworn in.
I remember certain pearls and chestnuts that you had, such as,
``no Member of Congress is here by accident, if you get to know
your fellow colleagues in this body, you will see that there is
some special reason each one of them is here. In getting to
know that special reason, you will come to respect that member
and you will also learn a lot about America.'' So I recommend
``Rumsfeld's Rules'' to all of you. It has a great deal of
wisdom in it.
As Senator Durbin said, Mr. Rumsfeld is a graduate of
Princeton University, and captain of the wrestling team, and I
believe, captain of the football team. He went on to be a naval
aviator, was the Navy wrestling champion, served four terms in
Congress, became the White House Chief of Staff, then was named
Defense Secretary. He was regarded as having a wonderful record
and having been an outstanding Secretary of Defense the first
time around. I can only imagine him being better this time
around.
Now, there is a lot of talk about investment opportunities
these days with the market having gone up so much the last few
years and then coming down. A good investment strategy over the
last 20 years would have been to invest in companies that were
chaired or the CEO was Donald Rumsfeld.
G.D. Searle Company, a major Illinois pharmaceutical
company, was in dire straits back in 1977 when Don Rumsfeld
took over. By the time he left in 1985 and the company was
sold, the stock had quadrupled.
There was a similar success story with General Instrument
Corporation. Many of you are familiar and are friends with Ted
Forstman who runs a fund that invests in corporations. Ted
Forstman, of course, is known for his philanthropy and his
generosity in creating scholarships for young children all over
the country. That philanthropy might not have been possible had
his fund not bought General Instruments, put Donald Rumsfeld in
charge who within 3 years had tripled the stock of that
corporation. They took it public.
He has continued on in advisory roles to this body and to
the executive branch. He has stayed engaged in defense issues.
This is a rare individual who has literally succeeded at almost
everything he has done in life. I think I can only say, I can
only conclude, as some of you have already concluded, that we
are simply fortunate to have a person of this caliber who is
willing to re-enter public service and to assist our country.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask leave to introduce into the
record prepared remarks that I have. I want to thank you all
for your consideration. I recommend Donald Rumsfeld with whole
hearted enthusiasm and confidence. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Fitzgerald follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.
I am honored to be here today to introduce to you a man whom I have
admired and respected throughout his distinguished career of public
service. Introducing Don Rumsfeld to the Armed Services Committee is a
little like introducing Sammy Sosa to the Chicago Cubs. Secretary
Rumsfeld has hit home runs in literally everything he has done in his
long and influential career.
Don Rumsfeld was my congressman when I was growing up. I first met
Don in 1988, when he ran for President, and my family has known him for
nearly 40 years. I am proud to be before this committee today in
support of this extraordinary individual.
Don Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on a scholarship, and
then was a Navy pilot and All Navy Wrestling Champion, before being
elected four times to Congress from my home state of Illinois.
Don was an energetic and effective congressman, a rising star, who
quickly caught the eye of Gerald Ford, then a Representative from
Michigan. In 1969, President Nixon appointed Don as Director of the
Office of Economic Opportunity, and later as U.S. Ambassador to NATO.
In 1974, President Ford selected Don to be his chief of staff, and
Don's sound management and political instincts helped President Ford
heal the wounds of Watergate and the Vietnam War. In 1975, President
Ford appointed Don as Secretary of Defense, the youngest ever to serve
in the position. Once again, Don displayed his extraordinary talents as
a tough, skillful manager, strategist, and advocate. Don helped restore
the confidence and credibility of our Armed Forces, warned of the
growing Soviet threat, and built bipartisan support in Congress for
strengthening and modernizing our military.
Don then applied his extraordinary energy and talent to the private
sector, restoring profitability to two large, Illinois-based blue chip
corporations. G.D. Searle, a major worldwide pharmaceutical company,
was foundering when Don took over, but made a dramatic recovery under
his leadership. Don then returned GI Corporation, a pioneer in
telecommunications, to profitability--GI's market value tripled under
Don's leadership.
Throughout Don's years in business, he continued to serve Illinois
and the Nation, on numerous non-profit philanthropic boards, as an
adviser to the State and Defense Departments, as President Reagan's
Special Envoy to the Middle East, and as Chairman of the U.S. Ballistic
Missile Threat Commission, among other things.
The President's most important job is Commander in Chief.
President-elect Bush has demonstrated in selecting Don Rumsfeld as his
Secretary of Defense that he will ensure that our Nation can face the
security challenges of the 21st century. These challenges require that
we create and maintain a flexible military force that is able to adapt
quickly to changing threats. I know Don is committed to ensuring that
America's Armed Forces are modernized to meet the challenges of the new
century. He understands that today's procurement is tomorrow's
readiness. He knows that the men and women of the Armed Forces must
remain the best trained and best equipped in the world.
President-elect Bush has committed himself to building an effective
missile defense system to protect our country from ballistic missile
attack and nuclear intimidation. Don, as Chairman of the bipartisan
Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, warned the Nation that the missile
threat to the U.S. is real and growing, and that the United States will
have little or no warning before a rogue state deploys ballistic
missiles with the capability to inflict major destruction on the United
States. As Don put it so well, the surprise is not that there are
surprises, but that we are surprised that there are surprises.
We in Congress, by passing the National Missile Defense Act of
1999, made it the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as is
technologically possible, an effective National Missile Defense system.
Don Rumsfeld is the right individual to make the hard choices and the
tough calls that must be made to select and deploy an effective and
affordable system that meets the threat.
Finally, providing the resources for the defense of this country is
one of the greatest responsibilities we have as U.S. Senators. While we
often get deeply involved in the pros and cons of this or that fighter
plane or battleship, we can never forget what the defense of this
country really rests on: our men and women in uniform. Don Rumsfeld
knows this to his very core.
Don's 3 years of service in the U.S. Navy as a jet pilot and flight
instructor, and his work as Secretary of Defense in the post-Vietnam
years rebuilding the morale and pride of our military, are legendary.
Don clearly understands the sacrifice that has been made by our service
members. I am confident Don will help provide our military with the
best equipment and training America has to offer and will ensure that
every service member and his or her family has the quality of life they
were promised. The recently released report on the U.S.S. Cole tragedy
underscores the need to beef up security for our troops stationed
abroad against the threat of terrorism.
In short, I cannot imagine anyone more capable of serving as
Secretary of Defense than Don Rumsfeld, and I commend President-elect
Bush for his bold choice. I am grateful that Don has agreed to return
to what is, without doubt, one of the toughest jobs in the world. We
are fortunate to have someone of Don's caliber willing to take on this
difficult responsibility once again. It is therefore a great privilege
to join my colleague, Senator Durbin, in introducing Don Rumsfeld, and
urge the committee to give prompt and favorable consideration to his
nomination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record. We
thank both of you for coming. It makes a real difference to the
nominee I am sure and to this committee. Mr. Rumsfeld, now you
have to live up to all of that and investment advice while you
are at it.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NOMINEE

Mr. Rumsfeld. Wow. Well, I must say I thank Senator
Fitzgerald and Senator Durbin for those very generous words. I
will try to live up to them.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: It
is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as the
nominee for the post of Secretary of Defense. I am certainly
grateful to President-elect George W. Bush for his confidence
that he's placed in me. I thank the committee and you, Mr.
Chairman, for your courtesy in arranging this hearing so
promptly.
I would like, with your permission, to make some remarks
off my prepared statement and have the statement made a part of
the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record in full.
Mr. Rumsfeld. As has been said, it was 25 years ago that I
had the privilege of appearing for the first time before this
committee as President Ford's nominee for Secretary of Defense.
Certainly, we lived in a very different world then. In the
intervening quarter of a century, the world has changed in ways
that we could really only have dreamed of.
America was locked in a nuclear and ideological standoff
with the Soviet Union. Today, the Soviet Union is no more. The
world of superpower standoff has given way to a world of
expanding freedom and, I would add, expanding opportunity.
The last time I appeared here for a confirmation hearing,
the Armed Forces and those of our NATO allies stood toe-to-toe
facing the militaries of the Warsaw Pact--ready to clash at a
moment's notice on a battlefield with Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.
Today, the Warsaw Pact is no more; Berlin is again the
capital of a unified Germany; and Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest
are the capitals of our new NATO allies. As one who served as
U.S. Ambassador to NATO, I must say I find these changes
breathtaking and fundamental.
When I appeared previously, American industry was facing an
industrial challenge from Japan. You will recall the
productivity and competitiveness made American industry look
fat in overhead, excessively layered in management, sluggish in
confronting change and innovation.
Today, U.S. industry has shaken off those handicaps and--in
a process that I have had the privilege to witness first hand--
become a leader and a model for the rest of the world. The end
of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet military power have
brought the twentieth century--possibly the most violent and
destructive century in human history--to a remarkably peaceful
close.
U.S. and allied military power was the indispensable
instrument that contained the Soviet Union, confronted Soviet
power and its surrogates at the geographic extremities of its
advance, and provided the shield within which democratic order
and economic prosperity could evolve and develop.
When the great struggle that was World War II had passed,
this country found itself facing new challenges with the advent
of the Cold War and the development of nuclear weapons. Today,
with the Cold War Era history, we find ourselves facing a new
era, often called the Post Cold War period or possibly more
properly the Era of Globalization.
It is an extraordinarily hopeful time, one that is full of
promise, but also full of challenges. One of those challenges,
one that, if confirmed, I look forward to working with
President-elect Bush and this committee and Congress to meet,
is the challenge of bringing the American military successfully
into the 21st century, so that it can continue to play its
truly vital role in preserving and extending peace as far into
the future as possible.
As President-elect Bush has said, ``After the hard but
clear struggle against an evil empire,'' the challenge that we
face today ``is not as obvious, but just as noble: To turn
these years of influence into decades of peace.'' The
``foundation of our peace'' is a ``strong, capable and modern
military.'' Let there be no doubt.
The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed
conflict, or the end to challenges and threats to U.S.
interests. We know that. Indeed, the centrifugal forces in
world politics have created a more diverse and less predictable
set of potential adversaries whose aspirations for regional
influence and whose willingness to use military force will
produce challenges to important U.S. interests and to those of
our friends and allies as Chairman Levin mentioned.
President-elect Bush has outlined three overarching goals
for bringing U.S. Armed Forces into the 21st century: First, we
must strengthen the bond of trust with the American military.
The brave and dedicated men and women who serve our country in
uniform active, guard, and reserve--must get the best support
their country can possibly provide them so that we can continue
to call on the best people in the decades to come.
Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against
missiles, terrorism, the newer threats against our space assets
and information systems as members of the committee have
mentioned. The American people, our forces abroad, and our
friends and allies must be protected against the threats with
modern technology and its proliferation confront us.
Third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that
the ongoing technological revolution offers to create the
military of the next century.
Meeting these challenges will require a cooperative effort
between Congress and the Executive Branch, and with industry
and with our allies as well. If confirmed, I look forward to
developing a close working relationship with this committee and
with the counterpart committees in the House of Representatives
to achieve these goals, and to fashion steps to help to
transform our defense posture to address those new challenges.
We must work together if we are to be able to address the
problems of inadequate funding, which has been the case,
unreliable funding, pertebations in funding and resistance to
change. Change is hard and institutions are difficult to move.
With cooperation and collaboration, we can make real progress.
Without cooperation, we will surely fail.
President-elect Bush is committed to a strong national
defense. If confirmed, one of our first tasks will be to
undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. defense policy that
Senator Warner mentioned. This review will be aimed at making
certain that we have a sound understanding of the state of U.S.
forces and their readiness to meet the 21st century security
environment.
We need to ensure that we will be able to develop, deploy,
operate, and support a highly effective force capable of
deterring and defending against new threats. This will require
a refashioning of deterrence and defense capabilities. The old
deterrence of the Cold War era is imperfect for dissuading the
threats of the new century and for maintaining stability in our
new national security environment.
If confirmed as Secretary, I plan to pursue five key
objectives needed to support and make progress on the
President's goal.
First, we need to fashion and sustain deterrence
appropriate to the new national security environment. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery are a fact of life that first must be acknowledged and
recognized for what it is. They must be managed. While striving
to slow proliferation remains essential, a determined state
may, nonetheless, succeed in acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and increasingly capable missiles.
As a consequence, a decisive change in policy should be
aimed at devaluing investment in weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems by potential adversaries. Credible
deterrence no longer can be based solely on the prospect of
punishment through retaliation. It must be based on a
combination of offensive nuclear and non-nuclear defensive
capabilities, working together to deny potential adversaries
the opportunity and the benefits that come from the threat and
the use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces, our
homeland, as well as those of our allies.
Second, the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces
must be deferred. The price of inadequate readiness is paid in
necessary risks to American interests and in unnecessary risks
to the lives of American service men and women.
But inadequate readiness exacts a further price in the
future quality of the force. Our Armed Forces today are all
volunteers. Whether Active Duty, Reserve or National Guard,
they are men and women who have willingly answered the call to
serve our country and accepted the burdens and dangers that go
with that service.
As President-elect Bush has said, ``even the highest morale
is eventually undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay,
shortages of spare parts and equipment, and declining
readiness. . . . A volunteer military really has only two paths
it can travel. One is to lower standards to fill the ranks. Or
it can inspire the best and brightest to join and stay.'' If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the President and
this committee that has been so interested in this subject to
make sure that our country's service is able to attract and
retain the best of our country.
Third, U.S. command-control-communication, intelligence and
space capabilities must be modernized to support our 21st
century needs. A modern command, control, communications, and
intelligence infrastructure is the foundation upon which U.S.
military power is employed. The development and deployment of a
truly modern effective command, control, communication, and
intelligence system is fundamental to the transformation of
U.S. military forces, and it is indispensable to our ability to
conduct effective diplomacy.
I am committed to strengthening our intelligence to serve
both our short-term and our long-term national security needs.
I will personally make establishing a strong spirit of
cooperation between the Department of Defense and the rest of
the intelligence community, under the leadership of the DCI,
one of my top priorities. We simply must strengthen our
intelligence capabilities and our space capabilities, along
with the ability to protect those assets against various forms
of attack.
Fourth, the U.S. defense establishment must be transformed
to address our new circumstances. The need to swiftly introduce
new weapons systems is clear. The transformation of U.S.
military power to take full advantage of commercially created
information-technology may require undertaking a near-term
investment to acquire modern capabilities derived from U.S.
scientific and industrial pre-eminence, rather than simply
upgrading some existing systems.
The present weapons system acquisition process was designed
in an environment different from the one that exists today. In
my view, it is not well-suited to meet the demands posed by an
expansion of unconventional and asymmetrical threats in an era
of rapid technological advances and a period of pervasive
proliferation.
The cycle time from program start to initial operational
capability for major acquisition programs conducted over the
past several decades has, I am told, generally been between 8
and 9 years. Some efforts obviously have taken far longer.
But such processes are not capable of harnessing the
remarkable genius and productivity of the modern, information-
based commercial and industrial sectors that have done so much
to revolutionize our civilian economy.
Fifth, reform of DOD structures, processes, and
organization. The legacy of obsolescent institutional
structures, processes, and organizations does not merely create
unnecessary costs--which, of course, it does--it also imposes
an unacceptable burden on the national defense. In certain
respects, it could be said that we are in a sense disarming or
under arming by our failure to reform the acquisition process
and to shed unneeded organizations and facilities.
If confirmed, we will examine, in consultation with
Congress, omnibus approaches to changing the statutory and
regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to reform.
This agenda for the new security environment is admittedly
ambitious. It is an achievable one if the legislative and the
executive branches work together.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the committee and
with the other appropriate committees of Congress to develop,
fund, and implement an overall defense program that can achieve
our goals for the future and for the future of our children.
I again want to express my appreciation to the President-
elect for his confidence and to you, Mr. Chairman, and the
members of the committee for inviting me here today. Thank you,
sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: It is a
privilege and an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to be
the next U.S. Secretary of Defense. I am grateful to President-elect
George W. Bush for nominating me to this important post and for the
confidence he has placed in me. I thank you and this Committee for your
courtesy in scheduling this confirmation hearing.
With your permission, I will make a few opening remarks and request
that my prepared statement be included in the record.
Some 25 years ago, I had the privilege of appearing for the first
time before this Committee as President Gerald R. Ford's nominee for
Secretary of Defense. We lived in a very different world then. In the
intervening quarter century the world has changed in ways that we could
once only dream of.
The last time I appeared before you in this capacity, America was
locked in a nuclear and ideological standoff with the Soviet Union.
Today, the Soviet Union is no more, and the world of superpower
standoff has given way to a world of expanding freedom and, I would
add, expanding opportunity.
The last time I appeared here for a confirmation hearing, U.S.
Armed Forces and those of our NATO allies stood toe to toe facing the
militaries of the Warsaw Pact--ready at a moment's notice to clash on
the battlefield with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
Today, the Warsaw Pact is no more; Berlin is again the capital of a
unified Germany; and Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest are the capitals of
our new NATO allies. As one who once served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO,
I find these changes both breathtaking and fundamental.
When I appeared previously, American industry was facing an
industrial challenge from Japan, whose productivity and competitiveness
made American industry look fat in overhead, excessively layered in
management and sluggish in confronting change and innovation. Today,
U.S. industry has shaken off those handicaps and--in a process that I
have witnessed personally--has become a leader and a model for the rest
of the world.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet military power
have brought the 20th century--possibly the most violent and
destructive century in human history--to a remarkably peaceful close.
U.S. military power was the indispensable instrument that contained the
Soviet Union, confronted Soviet power and its surrogates at the
geographic extremities of its advance, and provided the shield within
which democratic order and economic prosperity were able to develop. As
part of this process, the peoples of Russia and other states of the
former Soviet Union have, or are in the process of, throwing off
communism and reaching for democratic order and market economy. The
United States has emerged from the 20th century in a strong position in
every measure of national strength--military, economic, scientific,
industrial, diplomatic, political and, I believe, even spiritual. Even
more important, the U.S. and our democratic allies in Europe, Asia and
elsewhere enjoy a special position in the world that, if we can work
together, offers the possibility to make the new century one of the
most peaceful in history.
When the great struggle that was World War II had passed, this
country found itself facing new challenges with the advent of the Cold
War and the development of nuclear weapons. Today, with the Cold War
Era history, we find ourselves facing a new era, one that is often
called the Post Cold War Era or the Era of Globalization. It is an
extraordinarily hopeful time, one that is full of promise, but also
full of challenges. One of those challenges, one that, if confirmed, I
look forward to working with President-elect Bush and Congress to meet,
is the challenge of bringing the American military successfully into
the 21st century, so that it can continue to play its vital role in
preserving and extending the peace as far into the future as possible.
As President-elect Bush has said, ``After the hard but clear
struggle against an evil empire,'' the challenge that we face today
``is not as obvious, but just as noble: To turn these years of
influence into decades of peace.'' The ``foundation of our peace'' is a
``strong, capable and modern military.''
The end of the Cold War did not bring about an end to armed
conflict, or an end of challenges and threats to U.S. interests.
Indeed, centrifugal forces in world politics have created a more
diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries whose
aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use
military force may well produce challenges to important U.S. interests
and those of our friends and allies.
President-elect Bush has outlined three overarching goals for
bringing U.S. Armed Forces into the 21st century:
First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American
military. The brave and dedicated men and women who serve our country
in uniform-active, guard and Reserve--must get the best support their
country can possibly provide them, so that our country can continue to
call on our best people to serve in the decades to come;
Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against
missiles, terrorism, and newer threats against our space assets and
information systems. The American people, our forces abroad, and our
friends and allies must be protected against the threats with which
modern technology and its proliferation confront us; and
Third, we must take advantage of the new possibilities that the
ongoing technological revolution offers to create the military of the
next century.
Meeting these challenges will require a cooperative effort between
Congress and the Executive Branch, and with industry and with our
allies as well. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a close
working relationship with this Committee and your counter-parts in the
House to achieve these goals, and to fashion steps to transform our
national defense posture from its current form to one that will address
the challenges of 21st century security. Bonds of trust need to exist
not only between the President and the Armed Forces, but between the
Department of Defense and Congress as well. We must work together if we
are going to be able to address the real problems of inadequate
funding, unreliable funding and resistance to change. Without
cooperation and collaboration we will fail.
President-elect Bush is committed to a strong national defense.
Therefore, if confirmed, one of our first tasks will be to undertake a
comprehensive review of U.S. defense policy. This review will be aimed
at making certain that we have a sound understanding of the state of
U.S. forces and their readiness to meet the requirements of the 21st
century security environment.
We must ensure that we will be able to develop, deploy, operate and
support a highly effective force capable of deterring and defending
against new threats, so that our country can contribute to peace and
stability in the world. This will require a refashioning of deterrence
and defense capabilities. The old deterrence of the Cold War era is
imperfect for dissuading the threats of the 21st century and for
maintaining stability our new security environment.
primary objectives
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the explosive advance of
modern technology, and the forces of globalization that are making the
technology available to ally and adversary alike, make the
transformation of U.S. military power essential. While much of the
existing defense establishment can be adapted to 21st century needs, a
good deal cannot. We must move forcefully to rationalize the costly
burden of force structures and practices that do not contribute to
current and future U.S. security needs.
If confirmed as Secretary, I plan to pursue five key objectives and
implement policies and allocate resources needed to achieve those
objectives.
First, we need to fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the
contemporary security environment--a new national security environment.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery are increasingly a fact of life that first must be
acknowledged and then managed. While striving to prevent further
proliferation remains essential, a determined state may, nonetheless,
succeed in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and increasingly
capable missiles. As a consequence, a decisive change in policy should
be aimed at devaluing investment in weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems by potential adversaries.
In a world of smaller, but in some respects more deadly threats,
the ability to defend ourselves and our friends against attacks by
missiles and other terror weapons can strengthen deterrence and provide
an important compliment purely to retaliatory capabilities. Moreover,
the ability to protect our forces is essential to preserving our
freedom to act in a crisis. To this end, effective missile defense--not
only homeland defense, but also the ability to defend U.S. forces
abroad and our allies and friends, must be achieved in the most cost-
effective manner that modern technology offers.
Nuclear deterrence remains an essential element of our defense
policy. The credibility, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the
Nation's nuclear deterrent must remain unquestioned. But it must be
adapted to 21st century deterrence needs. Credible deterrence no longer
can be based solely on the prospect of punishment through massive
retaliation. Instead, it must be based on a combination of offensive
nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working together to deny
potential adversaries the opportunity and benefits from the threat or
use of weapons of mass destruction against our forces and homeland, as
well as those of our allies.
Second, the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces must be
assured.
When U.S. forces are called upon, they must be ready to cope with
any contingency they may face, and be able to sustain military
operations over an extended period of time if necessary. The pace of
modern military operations in the Kosovo campaign revealed the kinds of
demands placed on the readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces.
The price of inadequate readiness is paid in unnecessary risk to
American interests and lives of American service men and women. But
inadequate readiness exacts a further price in the future quality of
the force. Our armed forces today are all volunteers. Whether Active
Duty, Reserve, or National Guard, they are men and women who have
willingly answered the call to serve our country and accepted the
burdens and dangers that go with that service. But, as President-elect
Bush has said, ``even the highest morale is eventually undermined by
back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and
equipment, and declining readiness. . . . A volunteer military has only
two paths. It can lower its standards to fill its ranks. Or it can
inspire the best and brightest to join and stay.'' If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the President and Congress to make sure that
our country's service continues to attract and keep our very best.
Third, U.S. command, control, communication, intelligence, and
space capabilities must be modernized to support 21st century needs.
In his speech at the Citadel, President-elect Bush talked about how
the threats to our security are changing: ``We see the contagious
spread of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. All the
unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old
hatreds.''
As the threats we face change, our defense capabilities must adapt
and change with them. A modern command-control-communication and
intelligence infrastructure is the foundation upon which U.S. military
power is employed. The development and deployment of a truly modern and
effective command-control-communication and intelligence system is
fundamental to the transformation of U.S. military forces, and
indispensable to our ability to conduct effective diplomacy.
I am committed to strengthening our intelligence to serve both our
short-term and long-term national security needs. I will make
establishing a strong spirit of cooperation between the Department of
Defense and the rest of the intelligence community, under the
leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence, one of my top
priorities. We must strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our
space capabilities, along with the ability to protect those
capabilities against various forms of attack.
Fourth, the U.S. defense establishment must be transformed to
address 21st century circumstances.
The DOD has been unable to procure advanced weapon systems that can
lower the cost and increase the performance of the Armed Forces. The
need to swiftly introduce new weapons systems is paramount. The
transformation of U.S. military power to take full advantage of
commercially created information-technology may require undertaking a
near-term investment to acquire modern capabilities derived from U.S.
scientific and industrial pre-eminence, rather than simply upgrading
existing systems.
The present weapons system acquisition process was designed for a
different environment than the one that exists today. It is ill suited
to meet the demands posed by an expansion of unconventional and
asymmetrical threats in an era of rapid technological advances and
pervasive proliferation. The cycle time (from program start to initial
operational capability) for major acquisition programs conducted over
the past several decades has averaged between 8 and 9 years. Some
efforts take far longer. Such processes are not responsive to urgent
new challenges that involve considerable uncertainties. They are not
capable of harnessing the remarkable genius and productivity of the
modern, information-based commercial and industrial sectors that have
done so much to revolutionize the U.S. civilian economy.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the time from initial concept to actual
deployment was significantly shorter than it is today. In short, the
pace of development has become slower while the pace of technological
change has become far more rapid. These two opposite trends conspire to
create a situation where it is difficult for the acquisition process to
produce anything other than capabilities that are already a generation
behind when deployed. This problem must be addressed.
Simply tinkering with the present acquisition system will not
provide the innovation and speed necessary to satisfy future military
needs and take advantage of powerful new technologies. If confirmed, I
will work with this committee to develop a new acquisition strategy--
one designed to take advantage of modern U.S. industrial practices--
that will enable us to develop and field weapon systems at a speed that
reflects the needs and possibilities of the new century.
Fifth, reform of DOD structures, processes and organization.
The legacy of obsolescent institutional structures, processes and
organizations does not merely create unnecessary costs, it imposes an
unacceptable burden on the National defense. In certain respects, it
could be said that we, in a sense, are disarming ourselves by our
failure to reform the acquisition processes and to shed unneeded
organizations and facilities. If confirmed I will examine, in
consultation with Congress, omnibus approaches to changing the
statutory and regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to
reform.
This agenda for the new security environment is admittedly an
extraordinarily ambitious one. It is an achievable one if the
Legislative and Executive branches of our government strengthen the
bond of trust, and work together in a determined and collaborative
fashion. If confirmed, I will work closely with this committee and the
other appropriate Committees of Congress to develop, fund, and
implement an overall defense program that can achieve our goals for the
future and for the future of our children and grandchildren.
Again, I want to express my appreciation to the President-elect for
his confidence and trust. I thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. In accordance with
the practice of the committee, without objection, your
responses to our pre-hearing policy questions and your response
to the committee questionnaire will be made part of the record
of this hearing.
We have not yet received all of the paperwork on Mr.
Rumsfeld's nomination. That paperwork, which may be lengthy,
will be reviewed by the committee and it could require
additional discussion between the committee and the nominee.
Before we begin our first round of questions, there are
several standard questions which we ask every nominee who comes
before the committee. In your response to advance policy
questions, you agreed, Mr. Rumsfeld, to appear as a witness
before congressional committees when called and to ensure that
briefings, testimony and other communications are provided to
Congress.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflict of interest?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not know. First of all, the laws and
regulations and rules are different for the various entities to
which I have submitted this massive amount of information: the
Pentagon, the Office of Government Ethics, the committee. I do
not know that they all agree among themselves, but they are
reviewing it. I think probably one of the reasons for the delay
in getting the stack of hundreds of pages of materials to you
is because it is still down in the Office of Government Ethics.
I have a large number of investments and activities that
would have to be characterized as conflicts were they to be
maintained during my service as Secretary of Defense. I have,
however, indicated in my response to you, Mr. Chairman, and to
the other organizations, that I am ready and able--I believe
able, but certainly ready--to take whatever steps are
appropriate to eliminate anything that anyone of the various
entities might feel would be inappropriate, both with respect
to investments and with respect to relationships and boards and
associations and that type of thing.
Chairman Levin. Then to rephrase the tense of the verb,
will you adhere to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflict of interest?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. Of that you can be certain.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I have not. I have talked to two people
about--on a contingency basis that in the event that I am
confirmed, they are individuals I would like to have join me in
the department. But it has been purely on a contingency basis.
I might just say that because the outcome of the election was
delayed so long, the process is delayed. I hope that when we do
get to the point of my recommending to the President-elect
names to join me in the Pentagon, that the committee will move
as promptly as possible with consideration of those people.
Because when I think of the massive review you have
characterized in your opening remarks that is facing me at the
Pentagon, it is not something I would look forward to doing
alone. I will need all the help I can get.
Chairman Levin. I am sure that our next Chairman will have
the support of this full committee in trying to expedite the
nominees for those positions.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that the Department
complies with deadlines established for requested
communications, including prepared testimony and questions for
the record and hearings?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I will certainly try to. I have been told
that the number of requests for studies and responses to
questions from various elements of the committees of interest
to the Executive Branch to the Department of Defense is
enormous. I would have to look at it and see how we can manage
that process in a way that is satisfactory to both Congress and
to the Executive Branch. But I certainly would make every
effort in the world to do so.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, if it is honest, certainly. If some
witness came before a committee and said something that was
inaccurate, I certainly would want to visit with them.
Chairman Levin. I think we would, too.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do too.
Chairman Levin. I think we would too. But other than that
qualification, you will take steps to make sure that there is
no reprisal against witnesses who intend to honestly present
testimony and their opinions.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. I would certainly want to see that
witnesses were honest and forthright with the committees of
Congress.
Chairman Levin. Now, we are going to proceed to a first
round of questions which, because of the number of Members who
are here, we are going to limit to 8 minutes for each Senator.
First, we will do that on an alternating basis between the two
sides. Then following the early bird rule, we will recognize
current Members of the committee first, followed by our newly
designated Members. That's a bit of an awkward way to go at
this, but I hope that our designated Members who are not yet
formally Members of the committee will understand that. If
there is a difficulty with that, we can try to adjust among us
to accommodate schedules. But I did not know any other way to
proceed until our new Members are actually Members of the
committee which will not occur apparently until next week. The
second round and any subsequent rounds will be limited to 6
minutes for each Senator. It is my intent to recess the
committee for lunch at about 1 o'clock and to resume the
hearing at 2 o'clock. If necessary, we will schedule additional
hearings.
First, relative to missile defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, press
reports have occasionally suggested that the Ballistic Threat
Commission, which you chaired, advocated the deployment of a
national missile defense system.
Am I correct in stating that the mandate of the Commission
was limited to examining the ballistic missile threat to the
United States and that you and your commission did not take any
position whether we should deploy a national missile defense
system?
Mr. Rumsfeld. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. It has also been suggested that the
incoming administration has already made decisions about the
architecture of a national missile defense system should it
seek to deploy such a system. It has been stated by, I believe,
one of our colleagues that a decision presumably has been made
already, a phased layered plan and a reconfigured plan for the
ground-based program including land, sea, and space components.
Do you know whether or not the incoming administration has
made any decisions relative to the architecture of a national
missile defense system, if in fact a decision is made to
recommend such a system?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, we know that the President-elect--and I
suppose in terms of trying to characterize an administration
that does not exist yet and where there are prospective
participants who have really not had opportunities to meet and
discuss these things, the President-elect has indicated that it
is his intention to deploy a missile defense system. I know of
no decisions that have been made by him or by me with respect
to exactly what form that might take.
Chairman Levin. The National Missile Defense Act, which was
adopted by Congress and signed by the President, contains two
equal statements of U.S. policy. The first statement is that it
is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as
technologically possible an effective national missile defense
system to defend against limited ballistic missile attacks. The
second statement is that it is the policy of the United States
to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear
weapons.
Do you believe that we should consider the possible
negative impact that the deployment of a national missile
defense system could have on our policy to seek continued
negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear weapons as indicated
by that statute?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, you were kind enough to give me a copy
of that statute. I have read it. It seems perfectly reasonable
to me. The only thing I might have added to it, had I been a
Member of Congress, I might not have included the word
negotiated in the second phrase where it says seek continued
negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.
It seems to me you may or may not do it on a negotiated
basis. There had been instances in relationships with countries
where they had each taken actions that were not a result of a
final negotiated agreement but rather were understood and were
agreed to be in both parties' interests. But I find nothing in
here that is surprising or unusual or with which I would
disagree.
Chairman Levin. You believe that both of those goals are
legitimate goals with that qualification?
Mr. Rumsfeld. There is no question but that I think that we
should deploy a missile defense system when it is
technologically possible and effective. I think that you
obviously would want to be in discussions with Russia about the
sizes and shapes of their capabilities and ours.
Chairman Levin. Do you believe that it is a legitimate
policy and an important policy to seek reductions in those
nuclear weapons on Russian soil, as indicated by that statute?
Do you agree with that as a goal?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do. I think that to the extent we can
manage those capabilities down--I must say I think that the
Russian stockpile or capabilities are going to go down anyway.
Simply because of the circumstance of their economy. But I have
no problem in talking with them about that. Although it is
principally the responsibility of the Department of State.
Chairman Levin. Is it in our interest that there be fewer
nuclear weapons on Russian soil rather than more nuclear
weapons on Russian soil?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Sure.
Chairman Levin. Is that something which would be in
America's interest and the world's interest?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed.
Chairman Levin. On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we
have recently received a letter from former Secretary of
Defense Laird, who now joins General Shalikashvili, in
believing that there should be reconsideration of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with certain safeguards relative
to verification. Given your previous position as having doubts
about the question of verification, I am wondering whether you
would be willing to take a look at the position of our Joint
Chiefs which favors the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
believes that it is verifiable? Would you be willing to take a
look at the recommendations of General Shalikashvili, and
Secretary Laird, relative to that treaty?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Former Secretary of Defense Mel Laird was
kind enough to send me the material that he communicated with
General Shalikashvili about. I have not had a chance to study
it. But my concern on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--and I
forget when it was before the Senate, but as I recall, I
testified on the subject.
My concerns were two-fold really. One was the number of
issues that were raised by people whose judgment I respect in
the scientific community about the risks to the reliability and
safety of the stockpile. I think that is something that is
terribly important. We simply must have confidence in the
safety and reliability of our weapons.
The second was the difficulty of verification. I am aware
in the press of what General Shalikashvili has come forward
with. Certainly, I would want to look at it and think about it
as any reasonable person would.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Earlier this month, the Chicago
Tribune reported on a taped conversation that you apparently
had with President Nixon when you were serving as counselor to
the President in 1971. On the tape, there are a number of
statements which I would appreciate your commenting on. I think
it is important that you do comment on them.
First, there were some offensive racist comments by the
President. I would like you to explain your recollection of
that conversation and your response to his comments.
Second, the Chicago Tribune reports that in the
conversation you make the statement that the Republicans got us
out of Democratic wars four times in this century, referring to
the first World War, the second World War, the Korean War, and
the Vietnam War. I am wondering whether you believed it at the
time that those wars were Democratic wars? If not, why would
you have made that statement? What are your thoughts about
that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I was--the Bush transition office was
contacted by the reporter who had been listening to the tape.
He provided the office with some notes. I would not call them a
transcript. Because in many cases they did not even purport to
be a transcript of the tape. There was lots of places where it
was dot, dot, dot. They then somehow--the transition office got
ahold of the tape. I was able to listen to a few seconds of it.
I do not know how long, but not much. I could not understand
much of it. It is very difficult to understand.
The truth is I did not remember the meeting or the
conversation at all when it was raised. It was 30 years ago, 29
years ago.
Apparently, from what can be reconstructed, I was in an
office somewhere in the White House complex with President
Nixon as a--I guess I was an aide or a counselor or an
assistant to him at the time. Apparently--and again, I am not
certain of all of this--it appears that he was characterizing
some remarks that were made by Vice President Agnew. He was
characterizing--he was quoting them in a critical manner saying
that Agnew should not have said that. He should not have been
drinking with people who he did not know or whatever it was.
Then later he quoted some other people and how they talked
and he adopted a dialect according to this tape. The tape seems
to indicate that I may have agreed with one or more things on
that tape. To the extent I did agree with anything, I am
certain I agreed only with the fact that some people talk like
that and that Vice President Agnew should not have used or
thought such derogatory and offensive and unfair and
insensitive things about minorities.
I did not then and I do not now agree with the offensive
and wrong characterizations. I think it is unfortunate that it
comes up because it is not fair and it can cause pain to people
to read that type of thing.
It is ironic that that newspaper, the Chicago Tribune,
opposed the civil rights legislation during the 1960s when I
was supporting it. That was the most powerful paper in my
congressional district and I supported every single piece of
civil rights legislation. I was Chairman of Tuskeegee
Institute's 100th anniversary fundraising when Chappy James
died and have an honorary degree from Tuskeegee Institute.
On the Democratic war quote, I would say this. That was a
time when the Vietnam War was raging. President Nixon was
embattled and he was trying to end it. There were buses around
the White House if you think back to that period. It is not--
when you think of the Hoover Depression or the Clinton economy
today, there are shorthand ways of talking in private. It is
a--a war is our country's war. It is not a Democratic war. It
is not a Republican war. It is not a president's war. It is our
Nation's war. I understand that. To the extent shorthand was
used, it should not have been.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an
important inquiry that the Chairman has brought up and I feel I
should add some personal recollections. I was Secretary of the
Navy at that very time under Nixon. I recall being in a similar
position from time-to-time in his presence when--although I
regard him as a great President on national security and
foreign affairs, he did have his shortcomings. I have looked
into that transcript very carefully with our nominee here this
morning and I am personally satisfied that he conducted himself
in a manner that reflects no discredit on him today.
Second, I must say, Mr. Chairman, the morning after that
article appeared, Senator Moynihan called me. Senator Moynihan
also was a member of our team in those days and very much
involved. He said that if this is a matter that requires
explanation, he would be happy to appear before this committee
as a witness and testify to the unqualified credentials of this
distinguished nominee, particularly in the area of civil
rights. So I thank you for your forthright responses on that
issue.
Let us turn to the critical question of defense spending. I
am going to ask you three or four questions on it. We are not
here today to establish a number, even a benchmark.
I think the important thing is to receive from you your
unqualified support to increase defense spending. The
procedures by which you will in the first 90 days undertake to
ascertain first the efficiencies that can be generated within
the existing budgets and second the procedures by which the
President, yourself, and other advisors will determine how to
increase it and by what amount.
Second, reiterate what the President has already said, to
me and others, that, yes, other budget considerations, very
important, will take into consideration, but threat, the
threats facing the United States and the need for this
modernization will be the controlling factor in reaching the
determinations on increased funding. Can you elaborate on that,
sir?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. I was asked by the President to
consider becoming his nominee for this post I guess 8 or 10
days ago. I have spent most of my time visiting with members of
this committee and preparing for this hearing. I have not taken
the series of briefings at the Pentagon. Nor have I had an
opportunity to wrap my head around the budget numbers. I have
read a great deal about it. I mean, the CBO was using one
number. I think it was something like $40 or $50 billion add
on. I read an article by Jim Schlesinger and Harold Brown who
came up with a number that was somewhat higher than that, $60
or $75 billion as I recall. I read a report from the CSIS,
Georgetown Center, that was something in the neighborhood of
$100 billion or $100 billion plus.
Senator Warner. I heard you include the very conscientious
evaluations of the Joint Chiefs.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, yes. What the number is, I don't know.
Is it clear that there needs to be an increase in the budget?
There is no doubt in my mind. But I am not well enough along in
my thinking on it. Nor have I had an opportunity to even begin
to be briefed by Bill Cohen. Although he has told me they are--
he feels the same way. I have not had a chance to talk to the
transition people who are thinking through the budget numbers
and how whatever it is----
Senator Warner. But your commitment today is to work toward
a significant increase.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That is what I wanted to know.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Warner. That threat will be a consideration.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Warner. Second, that in your capacity as Secretary
of Defense, the Chiefs can continue under your administration
to come before Congress and give us their views.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed.
Senator Warner. That is fine.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I would prefer they give them to me first.
Senator Warner. Well, that is all right. We will get them.
Let us turn to another threat. It is interesting. I have done a
lot of study on this. We know about the military threat, but
there is another threat. That is the industrial base that
America has been put to a tremendous task of trying to survive
in the face of 12 to--a dozen years of decline in defense
spending. They find very tempting avenues to go out into the
private sector and do business and forget about all the
regulations in the Department of Defense and the uncertainty of
defense spending and take that on and simply worry about their
bottom line.
But fortunately, we have a lot of courageous people who are
willing to continue to provide our industrial base. So you
bring that business experience which is very valuable, not
unlike Dave Packard with whom I served with. He really
understood the need to strengthen the industrial base.
Together with the competition from firms in Europe
primarily where those firms have government support in some
instances. So give us your thoughts on that. Then I address a
quote by the President-elect here. They will want to get some
clarifications.
``We will modernize some existing weapons and equipment
necessary for current tasks. But our relative peace today
allows us to do this selectively. The real goal is to move
beyond marginal improvements, to replace existing programs with
new technologies and strategies to use this window of
opportunity to skip a generation of technology.''
That is a bold challenge. I bring back your recollection--I
left the Department in roughly 1974. You came in shortly
thereafter. You remember the bones of TFX were all over the
Department, billions of dollars lost in trying to manufacture
an airplane to hang every trinket known to mankind on it until
it sunk of its own weight. We then experienced the A-12 which I
can show you that. Billions of dollars lost.
Well, today we are working on, I think, some essential
programs. I will not mention them here. One indeed needs to be
scrutinized and that is the VSTOL and you know that craft, the
Marines. It is important to the Marine mission. We have to give
very serious consideration to that program.
But I am not getting into programs. I want you to explain
to me against that background your definition of skipping a
generation of technology and the impact that could have on this
industrial base.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. First, with respect to the study on
the defense industrial base, let me say that I agree with you.
I had the privilege of being briefed by General Tom Morman who
served, I believe it was on the Defense Science Board that did
the study. It is a very serious problem. I mean, the return on
investment in the defense industry today is not sufficient to
attract investment. The government does not make things. We
purchase things. We acquire things. That industry has to be
there. To be there, it has to be viable from an economic
standpoint or people are not going to invest in it. It is a
very serious problem.
Second, with respect to the President-elect's remarks about
skipping generations and that, clearly the review is going to
have to address this. But it seems to me there is at least two
ways that one can achieve advances in technology.
I do not want to bring up ancient history, but as fate
would have it, I was in the Secretary of Defense's office when
the subject of the M1 tank came along. The argument was that it
should continue to be another upgrade of a new diesel. Let us
do another diesel and a couple more diesels. I decided no. I
said let us go to a turbine engine.
Now, that takes a major weapon system and moved it into an
entirely new generation of technologies at that time.
Senator Warner. I think that is helpful. Let me get in one
last question here. You will have an opportunity to amplify
that for the record. That is the doctrine of the use of force.
General Powell, the Secretary of State designee, once stated
that we should always execute the decisive results and be
prepared to commit ``the force needed to achieve the political
objective''.
I was quite interested the other night in looking at the
Lehrer news hour. Our Secretary of State, Mrs. Albright, I urge
you to go back and look at that transcript. I will just pick
out one of her quotes. I do that respectfully, but it says as
follows. In answering that question about where she was with
regard to the Powell doctrine, ``It does not have to be all or
nothing. If you think about the fact that you have to employ
every piece of force that you have and you have months to plan
it and the earth is flat, you are never going to do anything.''
In other words, you need the full--I have time limit. Give us
your parameters of thinking of how you are going to advise the
President of the United States as to when to send into harm's
way the men and women of the Armed Forces, and, frankly, when
not to send them.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, that is an enormous question and an
exceedingly important one and I would be happy to talk about it
for a few seconds here. Could I go back to the tank first? I
would not want to leave you with the idea that the only way to
transform is to go from one generation of technology and
leapfrog into a new one. There is another way. I am not as
familiar with it. But with respect to the same tank, it is my
understanding that it has gone from I think the M1 to the M1--
what is the second?
Senator Warner. M1A2.
Mr. Rumsfeld. A2, right.
Senator Warner. This is the tank expert right here.
Mr. Rumsfeld. But it has gone from analog to digital. Now,
there you have taken a platform that exists and you have not
done a leapfrog with the whole platform, but you have taken
some electronics and leapfrogged. There are plenty of
opportunities to do things where we can significantly improve
capabilities, both with respect to the system itself, but also
with respect to the pieces of the system or elements of the
platform if you will.
Now, with respect to your question. This is a subject that
is important. It is sensitive. It is in my view a presidential
issue and not a Secretary of Defense issue alone. It is a
national security council term issue. We have not met. We have
not deposited ourselves and worried this through.
All of us in that team have opinions and all of us have
opined on this subject, publicly and privately, from time-to-
time, including the President-elect.
The elements that come back from time-to-time are is what
you think you want to do actually achievable? It may be
meritorious. It may need to be done. But if you can't really do
it, oughten you maybe not to try? That's a tough one to
evaluate. In no case is it a cookie mold you can press down and
say there is the answer. Each of these are subjective and
difficult.
The second that comes to mind is resources. Do you have the
resources? You might be able to do it. But if you are spread
all over the world, you simply do not have the capabilities at
that given moment, then you have to face up to the truth. That
is that you cannot do everything.
A second thing that comes back from time-to-time is to what
degree is this particular activity or recommendation truly a
part of our national interest? That is something that is a
consideration. It is one of the dimensions of the debate and
discussion.
Another I would say is are there artificial constraints as
to how you can do this? I personally believe it is terribly
important that we have a very clear understanding of what the
command structure is and who is deciding what. That to the
extent humanly possible you avoid a committee that has not pre-
decided these things and ends up interminably debating as to
what should be done with various aspects of an engagement.
I think last, and there may be others I have forgotten, but
I thought about this last night. How would you characterize
what success is? When you have done something, how do you know
when you have done it that you have done what you went in to
do? What is success? What is your exit strategy? When does it
end? Is there some point where it is over? Or is it
interminable?
Now, I do not know where that positions me across that
spectrum because I tried to avoid characterizing where I happen
to think in any given case because I do not know. It really is
something I wanted to talk to the President-elect about and
Secretary designate Powell and Condy Rice and the folks that
are interested in this. It is an enormously important subject.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, very much, and congratulations.
Mr. Rumsfeld, during the campaign President-elect Bush made
some interesting arms control proposals, including the
reduction of nuclear weapons well below the START II levels and
removing them from hair trigger status. I have long been an
advocate of arms control and was pleased to see the President-
elect's interest in this area.
I understand that when you were with President Ford as
Secretary of Defense, you did not support the SALT II Treaty
and are now opposed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Will
you support the President-elect's arms control agenda?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You can be sure I will support the President-
elect's agenda. He is the President. I will, however, offer my
views. I hope persuasively and thoughtfully in deliberation of
the National Security Council as I did during that time. I
mean, people, honorable people, can come to different views. I
did with respect to SALT II.
Senator Kennedy. You just had an exchange with Senator
Levin on missile defense. As you know, the failure of the two
most recent NMD flight tests has cast significant doubts on the
viability of the current system. When the President-elect
announced you as the nominee, you spoke of a need for the
United States to develop a missile defense system that will
work. I am interested in what your definition is of a system
that will work.
You have spoken recently about the successes you've had in
your discussions with our allies. When will we know that it
will work? Will you establish as a baseline which requires that
it has to pass a field test?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I would really like to avoid setting
up hurdles on this subject. I was reading the book ``Eye In The
Sky'' about the Corona Program and the first overhead satellite
and recalling that it failed something like 11, 12, or 13 times
during the Eisenhower administration or the Kennedy
administration. They stuck with it and it worked and it ended
up saving billions of dollars because of the better knowledge
we achieved.
In this case, if I could just elaborate for a moment, the
principle of deterrence, it seems to me, goes to what is in the
minds of people who might do you harm. How can you effect their
behavior?
The problem with ballistic missiles with weapons of mass
destruction, even though there may be a low probability, as the
chart that Senator Levin I believe mentioned suggests, the
reality is they work without being fired. They alter behavior.
If you think back to the Gulf War, if Saddam Hussein, a
week before he invaded Kuwait, had demonstrated that he had a
ballistic missile and a nuclear weapon, the task of trying to
put together that coalition would have been impossible. There
is no way you could have persuaded the European countries that
they should put themselves at-risk to a nuclear weapon.
People's behavior changes if they see those capabilities
out there. I think we need missile defense because I think it
devalues having that capability. It enables us to do a much
better job with respect to our allies.
Now, finally, I do not think many weapons systems arrive
full blown. Senator Levin or somebody mentioned phased and
layered. Those are phrases that I think people not improperly
use to suggest that things do not start and then suddenly they
are perfect. What they do is they get them out there and they
evolve over time and they improve.
So success, this is not the old Star Wars idea of a shield
that will keep everything off of everyone in the world. It is
something that in the beginning stages is designed to deal with
handfuls of these things and persuade people that they are not
going to be able to blackmail and intimidate the United States
and its friends and allies.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I think you've made a good response
to that question. I hope this means that we have assurances
that there will be a very careful review.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Kennedy. In terms of the effectiveness of this
missile defense system; it is going to have to meet a criteria.
I understand that you are not prepared to establish that
criteria today, but I assume that it is going to be meaningful
criteria in terms of actually being able to function and be
able to work in the different phases.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Let me move to the question of Colombia.
What is your sense of the capacity of the military in these
countries to address the challenge? How are we going to respond
to reports about the conflict spilling over in the area and in
the region? How are we really going to be able to determine the
difference between the counter insurgency and the counter
narcotics? Can you tell us what you are thinking?
This is complicated. It is specialized. It is enormously
important. We are going to have to address this, and I would be
interested in knowing your thinking at this time. We will have
more time later on to discuss this, but can you tell us now
what your thoughts are?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, it is not something that I have been
able to get briefed into. It is my understanding that the
Department of State has the lead on this. I understand that
there is a cap that has been put on by Congress on the numbers
of people, military people, that are engaged.
It is complicated. I am one who believes that the drug
problem is probably overwhelmingly a demand problem and that it
is going to find--if the demand persists, it is going to find
ways to get what it wants. If it is not from Colombia, it will
be from somebody else. If I were the neighboring countries, I
would be concerned about spillover as well.
I think it is a very important problem and it is not
something I have had a chance to screw my head into or talk to
the National Security Council team about.
Senator Kennedy. For the next 8 days, I am the Chairman of
the Seapower Subcommittee of this committee. Under Senator
Snowe, we had extensive hearings about the decline of the
shipbuilding budget and about what actions are going to be
necessary in order to meet responsibility in terms of the
Navy's budget. Have you had a chance to review that and can you
give us any ideas of how you think that that issue is going to
be addressed in the future?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I have not been briefed on it at all. I
am by background and interest very interested in the Navy. I
recognize the importance--Senator Snowe indicated to me that we
are currently building ships at a level that if it continues
will permit the U.S. Navy to decline down into very low
numbers. That the only thing that can be done if we are to
maintain the kind of capabilities in the world where we can
project power and presence through the United States Navy, we
are going to have to increase the shipbuilding budget. I will
stop there.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Roberts, who is Chairman of the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, has been a real
leader in the whole area of bio-terrorism and cyber-terrorism.
Chairman Levin also referenced these issues in his opening
comments. Could you give us some assessment of what your
concerns would be in those areas?
Senator Frist and I successfully completed legislation,
last session, in the area of bio-terrorism. I would be
interested in your own views regarding the nature of these
threats as we look down the road.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I have been made aware of Senator
Frist's and your interest and Senator Roberts'. I would rank
bio-terrorism quite high in terms of threats. I think that it
has the advantage that it does not take a genius to create
agents that are enormously powerful. They can be done in mobile
facilities, in small facilities. I think it is something that
merits very serious attention, not just by the Department of
Defense, but by the country. I have an interest in it and
certainly would intend to be attentive to it.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join in welcoming Mr. Rumsfeld to the
committee, and I congratulate him on his nomination to be Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. Rumsfeld has a very impressive record of service to the
country, from his years as a Naval Aviator, as Congressman from
Illinois, as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, as
Ambassador to NATO and, of course, as Secretary of Defense under
President Ford. The list is long and has continued to grow.
He recently served as Chairman of the Ballistic Missile Threats
Commission. He is currently chairman of the Commission to Assess
National Security Space Management, and also chairman of the
Congressional Leadership's National Security Advisor Group. This
extraordinary background will be extremely valuable in dealing with the
many issues that the Armed Forces of the United States currently face
and that we will certainly face in the future.
Many challenges are waiting for our answer, starting with national
missile defense and nuclear arms control. They also include force
protection, which is especially urgent after the recent tragic attack
on the U.S.S. Cole.
We're concerned about the heavy demands on our forces that strain
both morale and readiness. We're concerned about training issues, such
as how to maintain training areas and ensure adequate training budgets.
We face challenges of recruitment and retention, when private sector
competition remains strong. We must do more to ensure that military
personnel and their families have good pay and good housing. They need
modern equipment, modern weapon systems, and modern information
technology. We have to be concerned about cyber-security and about
chemical and biological terrorism.
Significant changes have occurred in the military since Mr.
Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense in the 1970s. Women now hold many
military roles traditionally reserved for males, including service as
combat pilots and on combat ships. There are more women generals and
admirals than ever before, and the potential for further gains is
large.
The military still faces many problems in this area, including the
need to prevent harassment and discrimination in all forms. I continue
to believe that the current ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' policy has been a
failure. As a world leader, our Armed Forces need to set the example on
human rights issues and treat all men and women, regardless of their
diversity, with the respect and equality that they deserve.
Mr. Rumsfeld's many leadership experiences, in both public service
and private life, will serve him well in dealing with all these
challenges and I look forward to working with him in the years ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Senator Thurmond.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Chairman Levin. Mr. Chairman,
I congratulate you on your leadership during this period of
transition and appreciate your bipartisan approach in holding
this hearing. Your chairmanship continues the committee's long
tradition that the defense of our Nation is above politics.
Before I address the issue at hand, I want to express my
appreciation for our outgoing Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen.
His tenure as Secretary of Defense will be marked by great
advances in the quality of life for our military personnel and
their families, the refocusing of the Department of Defense to
the new threats of weapons of mass destruction and cyber-
terrorism, and, more importantly, assuring this Nation's
position as the world's only super power. I wish him and his
lovely wife, Janet, the best in their future endeavors.
Secretary Rumsfeld, congratulations on your nomination and
welcome to this your second confirmation hearing as Secretary
of Defense. I hope that the praise of Bill Cohen does not lead
you to the conclusion that you will not have any challenges as
you move into the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Our Nation is fortunate to have an individual such as you
follow Bill Cohen. You have a distinguished career both in the
public and private sector and have shown your willingness to
take on the tough issues facing the Department of Defense.
Those of us who served on the Armed Services Committee in the
mid-70s can recall the problems you encountered then with the
state of our Armed Forces--they were undermanned, morale was
sagging, drugs were rampant, and most important they were
underfunded. Fortunately, drugs in the Armed Forces are no
longer a major issue. However, overworked and undermanned units
and underfunded programs are problems that will again test your
mettle.
Mr. Secretary, you have been a proponent for a strong
defense. I can assure you that this committee will provide you
the support that will be critical as you work to strengthen our
Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the future. Our Nation's
history is replete with examples of failing to anticipate the
future challenges and degrading our military capability.
Coincidentally, it was 50 years ago, at the beginning of
the Korean War, when the United States sent the ill-equipped
and under-trained troops of Task Force Smith into battle with
tragic results because we failed to anticipate the threat. As
we commemorate that War, we should make the pledge of never
again will this Nation send another Task Force Smith to battle.
Mr. Secretary, I wish you success and look forward to
working with you in the coming years.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thurmond for those
comments and we very personally appreciate it and the
leadership that you have shown on this committee and in so many
other places in this Senate over the years.
Senator Lieberman, we all give you a special welcome back,
some of us with greater enthusiasm perhaps than others. But
welcome back.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld, I
was privileged to have a courtesy call yesterday from Don
Evans, the Secretary of Commerce designate, and I open by
thanking him for all he did to bring me back to the United
States Senate. So it is good to be here with my colleagues,
particularly on this committee.
Mr. Rumsfeld, I welcome you and join my colleagues in
expressing not only my admiration for your extraordinary record
of public and private service, but for your willingness to take
on this job at this time.
I have not read ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' yet, but I will
certainly--I remember there was a little red book in another
country a distance from here. I do not know what color the
``Rumsfeld's Rules'' are going to be.
But as your opening statement suggests, at this critical
time, unusual time in our national security history, there is a
surprising amount that we have to do. We are--when I think of
the comparison that you made of the Cold War situation you
found on the last occasion when you came in as Secretary of
Defense and the remarkably difference circumstance you find
today.
We are not in ideological and strategic conflict with
another major super power, the Soviet Union. We are it. But we
are nonetheless challenged. Technology is expanding the threats
as you have documented. We have tremendous demands on us to
maintain our force, to keep our troops with the quality of life
and training that we want them to have.
This is going to require some very tough leadership from
you and priorities, the setting of priorities, and a
willingness to try to implement those.
We have been, in the time I have been privileged to be on
this committee and therefore have been involved more directly
in national security questions, watching Congress and the
military and the Executive Branch, we have generally reached
beyond in authorization what we have ultimately--and
conceptualization--of what we would ultimately be willing to
pay for.
I think we are at such a point now where legitimate claims
can be made for resources. We have not yet put them together. I
mean, in the mad cap experience to which Senator Levin refers
that I went through last year, a glorious experience actually
and one that I thoroughly enjoyed, the Bush-Cheney campaign had
a document out suggesting a willingness to spend $45 billion
more over the next 10 years for national security.
Vice President Gore and I doubled that to $100 billion, big
spenders that we are. But what is interesting, and, of course,
focuses the tough choices you will have, is that the Chiefs,
the Joint Chiefs, who I believe Senator Warner referred to,
have essentially told us that what we really need is at least
$50 billion more a year.
So let me first put in an appeal which you and I have
spoken about which is that all of us who care about national
security have to really reach out and try to build more of a
public understanding for the need to spend more to keep our
national security strong in this age.
When you look at what people think we ought to spend more
money on as we are deciding how to spend the surplus, national
security comes out way down on the list. That is not good. As
long as that exists, it is going to be hard for us here to make
the decisions we should make.
The second point is how do you begin to approach the excess
of needs and the deficiency of resources and make the kind of
priority decisions that we need you to make?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I want you to know that I understand the task
facing the Department of Defense is enormously complex. It is
not a time to preside and tweak and calibrate what is going on.
It is a time to take what has been done to start this
transformation and see that it is continued in a way that
hopefully has many, many more right decisions than wrong
decisions.
There is no one person who has a monopoly on how to do this
or genius. It is going to take a collaborative relationship
within the Executive Branch and with Congress. I just hope and
pray that we are wise enough to do it well.
But the one thing we know of certain knowledge is that it
is not a peaceful world. It is a different world. It is more
peaceful in the sense that the Soviet Union is gone. But it is
nonetheless a more dangerous and untidy world. We also know
that the power of weapons today is vastly greater than it was
in earlier eras. We know that with the relaxation of tension at
the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of these
capabilities is pervasive. It is happening. We have to
acknowledge that.
If I know anything, I know that history shows that weakness
is provocative. Weakness invites people into doing things they
would not otherwise think of. What we have to do is better
understand what will deter and what will defend against this
new range of threats. I do not look at them in isolation. I do
not think of long-range ballistic missiles and short-range
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and terrorism as
something that is disconnected.
I think of it as a continuum. With the Gulf War, the world
was taught to not try to take on western armies, navies, and
air forces because you lose. Therefore, you should try
something else. That means you are going to look at things like
information system attacks and cyber war. You are going to look
at bio-terrorism. You are going to look at other kinds of
terrorism. The vulnerability of space assets has to be
worrisome to people. As well as shorter range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles in addition to long-range
ballistic missiles.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask this question. I agree with
you that we have to prepare to face this new range of threats
to our security because no sensible antagonist will take us on
as we were taken on in the Gulf War because we were too
dominant. Does that not inevitably mean that we will have to
cut some of the programs that we are now spending money on that
may be more continuations of that earlier threat scenario than
the new one?
Mr. Rumsfeld. It is entirely possible that that kind of a
recommendation could come out of this review. Whether it will
or not, I do not know until I dig into it. I mentioned the need
for collaboration with Congress. That is true. We also need to
make darn sure that we are dealing with our allies in a way
that they are brought along. We are not alone in this world. We
have some enormously important allies in Asia and in Europe and
friends in other parts of the world. I think that those
relationships as well are terribly important.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask about the review that you
have spoken of. Congress has authorized by law a quadrennial
defense review. That was a way to try to encourage and mandate
an incoming administration to look forward and to require that
those in the military present some big thoughts over the
horizon.
You have also referred to, and the President-elect referred
during the campaign and more recently, to a strategic review.
Help me, if you would, to relate those two reviews to one
another. Is the strategic review the incoming administration
has in mind the quadrennial defense review authorized by law?
Or, since that does not give you a final product until
December, though it gives you some before, are you thinking
about a separate review to help you make some of the budget
priority decisions I have just referred to?
Mr. Rumsfeld. The latter. My impression is that what the
President-elect has in mind is that we will take a look at how
we view the world and our circumstance in it and fashion some
thoughts with respect to broader strategy and then get down
into more of the details as to the defense establishment's
capability or appropriateness of our current arrangements to
deal with those kinds of threats and opportunities.
The quadrennial review, I do not know--you say it is
finished in December?
Senator Lieberman. Well, you get earlier versions of it
this spring. Then the final product will be in December.
Mr. Rumsfeld. My impression was that when Bill Cohen came
in, it came at him very fast. The timing seemed to me, looking
from outside, to be unfortunate. Because I did not get the
impression that Secretary Cohen had much of an opportunity to
effect it or to calibrate it. I am a little apprehensive that
that is going to be the case in my situation.
The realistic thing is too--my whole life, I have
benefitted from attracting enormously talented people to help
me. I think when I took my first job in the Executive Branch, I
hired Frank Carlucci and Dick Cheney and Ron James and people
all across the spectrum from--Bill Bradley worked there and
Christy Todd Whitman worked there. Micky Kantor I noticed had
some remarks to make the other day and he was there as a legal
service lawyer.
We had a wonderful group of people. Unless you are a Mozart
or an Einstein who goes off in a closet who does something
brilliant, the rest of us people, just people, we get other
people to help us figure things out.
They are something like 500,000 security clearances behind
in the Pentagon today. Now, the process of getting confirmed is
just unbelievable. I just hope each of you will have that
opportunity someday. [Laughter.]
It is an amazing process. I am going to recommend to the
President that he think about getting some sort of an outside
commission to look at this. Because the questions from the
committee are one set. From the Ethics Office, there is
another. The Pentagon has some others. You are supposed to fill
them all out in 5 minutes. There is no way to do it.
I am worried about getting people picked, recommended,
which I cannot do, as we know, until I am the man. I am not. I
have to have help. I am being practical as a manager. I know
that we are going to have to figure out a way to flesh out this
system a little bit.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much. I would say from your
performance here this morning that it is clear that you are the
man. [Laughter.]
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
Thank you Mr. Rumsfeld for appearing before this committee today.
You have a distinguished record of service to our Nation and you bring
impressive credentials to the job for which you are being considered.
You will need all the expertise you have acquired over your long
career, for the job ahead of you is one of the most consequential
positions that one can hold in our government. You will assume
stewardship of our military at a time when it is at a crossroads
between taking the path defined by the ideas and methods of the 20th
century or the path defined by the needs and potential of the 21st
century. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the NDP conducted in
1997 pretty well define these two roads for you, and define the choices
you face. These panels produced two fundamentally and constructively
different evaluations. The 1997 QDR's conclusion was that although
future military challenges will likely be different, the ``two war''
construct, with some modifications, is and will continue to be the
proper standard against which to gauge our capability and preparedness.
By this standard, the QDR concluded, the current forces and weapons are
satisfactory, and will continue to sustain our military dominance if
modernized in kind. Much of the Pentagon effort since then has been
toward increasing the budget to maintain and modernize this force. The
members of the NDP disagreed. They asserted that ``we are at the cusp
of a revolution in warfare'' and ``unless we are willing to pursue a
new course,'' one different than that proposed by the QDR, ``we are
likely to have forces that are ill-suited to protect our security
twenty years from now.'' Indeed, the NDP questioned the advisability of
continuing to use the ``two war'' standard and of continuing to procure
some of our current core weapons. They concluded that transformation is
the path we should follow, and therefore that spending better was more
important than spending more.
The good news is that the first steps along the path toward
transformation are being taken. The defense establishment has come to
accept transformation as a fundamental policy goal, which is evident
from a growing number of important official speeches and documents.
Secretary of Defense Cohen has said that our defense policy is
transformation, and that the strategy to implement it is ``shape,
respond, and prepare now.'' The QDR states ``we must meet our
requirements to shape and respond in the near term, while at the same
time we must transform U.S. combat capabilities and support structures
to be able to shape and respond effectively in the face of future
challenges.'' And transformation as a goal is at the core of Joint
Vision 2020--the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision that guides the
continuing transformation of America's Armed Forces for the 21st
century.
The bad news is that while the services are, to their credit,
beginning to ``talk the talk'' and even to take steps to transform
themselves, our actions and resourcing are not really keeping pace with
the pronouncements. While most see the need for future forces
fundamentally different than those of today, they urge that change be
cautious and deliberate. So we continue to place the highest priority
on current readiness, keeping our organizations and weapons prepared to
deal with the threats they were designed to deal with, while trusting
that incremental and evolutionary improvements will allow them to adapt
to deal with new and more dangerous threats as they emerge.
Consequently, our resource allocation is still too much like it was
during the Cold War.
As a consequence, you are faced with funding a force that costs
billions more than has been budgeted for it, and that requires more by
far than President-elect Bush has said he is willing to spend. His
stated intent to add significantly more money to missile defense
programs will only add to that shortfall. We have heard that you intend
to narrow the funding gap by cutting or terminating existing programs.
You may have to make many of these decisions now before you are able to
complete a strategic review. If you must do that, those decisions will
impact the strategic review you will design and conduct as Secretary.
The commitment of resources to execute the conclusions of that review
will be substantial, and changing course will be exceedingly difficult
and time consuming, and we will not likely have the money we would need
to change course quickly. So if we choose the wrong road now we will
not have the trained, ready military we will need to dominate on the
battlefields of the future.
I look forward to hearing what your approach will be to resolving
these difficult conflicts, what philosophy you intend to follow to
provide guidance to those who must decide about initial priorities
among sea, land, air, and missile programs, and what guidance you
intend to give the Pentagon to direct their design and execution of the
upcoming strategic review. I look forward to working with you to build
a dominant military for the 21st century.

Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate the President-elect for his outstanding selection
of Don Rumsfeld to be the next Secretary of Defense. His
reputation for intelligence, candor, and competency is well-
deserved and we look forward to a rapid confirmation of his
nomination so that he can get right to work.
I guess there are very few benefits of old age, but every
new administration we hear the same complaint that you just
mentioned. It is a very legitimate complaint. Perhaps maybe we
ought to do something about this process.
I am not worried about the willingness of people like you
to serve in all candor because you are a patriot first and
last. But I am worried about at lower levels of government, the
Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary. Those positions when
highly qualified men and women look at it and then see what
they have to go through, they decide not to do that. I think
that is the compelling reason.
I do not have a lot of sympathy for you, Mr. Secretary, but
I certainly do for others that you need to attract on your team
as you so well pointed out.
I was interested in your comments to Senator Warner's
questions about the use of force and when and when not the
United States troops should be committed. Those of us who
assailed the administration and NATO's conduct of gradual
escalation during the Balkans campaign took heart in your
comments at that time, particularly your reflections on CNN on
April 4, 1999, with respect to comparisons of Kosovo to Vietnam
which went as follows, and I quote: ``There's always a risk in
gradualism. It pacifies the hesitant and the tentative. What it
didn't do is shock and awe and alter the calculation of the
people you're dealing with.''
During an interview with Chris Matthews, you noted that it
was a mistake to say that we would not use ground forces
because it simplifies the problem for Milosevic.
It seems to me we ought to stop saying things to appease
and placate our domestic political audiences. We ought to start
behaving in a way that suggests to Milosevic that it is in his
interest to end this and stop ethnic cleansing and come to the
negotiating table. I appreciate those words very much.
But my question is do you think we should have gotten
involved in Kosovo to start with?
Mr. Rumsfeld. There are pieces of that on both sides
obviously. I think that NATO had historically been a defensive
alliance and been thought of as that. Its image has altered as
a result of that.
My comments--and they sound pretty good to me too. I am
kind of pleased I said those things--were obviously after the
fact. It was we're there. By golly, I'm no fan of graduated
response. If we're going to do something, let's do it.
But I do not know that--the problem is that in our society
people seem to watch how people manage a crisis or a conflict
rather than what preceded it. Of course, the real kudos ought
to go to people who manage things in a way that the conflict
does not happen.
Senator McCain. Or not manage them so that the conflict
does happen.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. When I think back to the Balkans, I
mean, goodness. Again, I do not want to bring up ancient
history. But all of us for years did scenarios and war planning
and war games with respect to Yugoslavia coming apart and
problems in that part of the world. If we know anything, it is
that the Europeans I think--by waiting for the Europeans to do
something, things evolved in a way that are unfortunate. I
think it requires a lot more effort up front.
Senator McCain. I think that is certainly true of Bosnia.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It is.
Senator McCain. Kosovo is a little closer call.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, it is.
Senator McCain. So you do not have an answer?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not. That is correct.
Senator McCain. I would like to mention a couple more
issues to you. I will again propose the question that you
previously addressed in the advanced questions to the
committee. Do you believe we still have excess military
infrastructure that can and should be reduced?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Instinctively I do, but knowledgeably I do
not. Because I have not gone back in and reviewed it. But I
would say this----
Senator McCain. Have you heard the comments of Colin
Powell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense
that you are succeeding, virtually every military expert in
America?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have. I am kind of old-fashioned. I like to
figure things out for myself. But I am a firm believer that
base structure has to fit force structure.
Senator McCain. But it does now?
Mr. Rumsfeld. As I say, my impression is it does not. I
have not been in there and--the next question after that would
be, well, in what way? Of course, I do not know what way
because I have not been over there getting briefed. But my
brain tells me, my instincts tell me from the past that in fact
not only should base structure fit force structure, it does
not. That something should be done about it. Because we cannot
afford to waste resources with the important tasks we have
ahead of us. But I am not in a position to say this is how it
ought to be done.
Senator McCain. Recently, the United States made a very
significant investment in problems in Colombia. Largely, but
not totally, but largely unnoticed by Americans and their
representatives. I take it from your answer that you have less
than well-informed personal views which you prefer to discuss
with the appropriate officials before taking a public position
and that you have not paid as much attention to it as maybe
other issues as well.
Mr. Rumsfeld. That could be true. I have not. I have not
been to the country in years. I know only basically what I know
from the press.
Senator McCain. Do you know that we just invested about
$1.3 billion in the last appropriation cycle?
Mr. Rumsfeld. That is my understanding.
Senator McCain. We are upgrading a base in Ecuador which I
found out--perhaps I should not admit this--by looking at a
newspaper.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I did not know that.
Senator McCain. There are a lot of things going on in
Colombia, Mr. Secretary. I hate to harken back to other
conflicts, but I hope you will get very well aware of this
situation, what we are doing, what the involvement of U.S.
military personnel is in the area and what kind of investment
and more importantly what goals we seek here. Because very
frankly, I do not know the answer to those questions yet. I
think that at least those of us who sit on this committee
should be much better informed. I hope that the committee will
start looking at the situation from an Armed Forces standpoint
very quickly.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I will certainly invest the time needed to do
that.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain, if I could just interject.
Senator Warner and I were just chatting. He raised that very
same subject. I think both of us would agree with your comment
that we should, indeed, as a committee, get more deeply
involved and we will.
Senator McCain. I thank you. I will take responsibility for
not knowing about the upgrade in Ecuador, but very frankly I am
not sure many Americans know about it either. Maybe that is
perfectly fine. But I think we had better have a close and
careful examination of exactly what we are committed to. I am
not sure that the members of this committee or Americans, would
agree with a proposed decision on the part of Colombia to give
more areas of sanctuary to the so-called narco traffickers
there. But anyway, finally, Mr. Secretary, I am sure that you
are aware of my concerns about excess spending and the increase
of pork barrel spending. It has risen--my time has expired.
Senator Warner. We cut into your time. Go ahead and take
that question.
Senator McCain. Well, I will take about 5 or 10 more
minutes, Mr. Rumsfeld. [Laughter.] It has gone up. It continues
to go up. When you were Secretary of Defense, it was about $200
to $300 million a year of unrequested add-ons in the Defense
appropriations process.
It is now up around $6 or $7 billion at minimum--at
minimum. New gimmicks have been invented since you were there.
One of them is the so-called wish list that comes over from the
Pentagon, that although not requested in the budget, would be
really great to have. So they pick and choose from that very
long list.
I want to say this to you, Mr. Secretary, and I do not
think you need any advice. But unless you get a handle on this
spending, a billion and a half dollars for an aircraft
helicopter carrier that the Navy and the Marine Corps said they
neither want or need, continued acquisitions of C-130s which 10
years ago the United States Air Force said they did not need,
we are going to have a C-130 in every schoolyard in America
before this is over.
You are going to have to get a handle on this and you may
have to face down some very powerful interests, both on the
Hill and off the Hill. So I see it lurch out of control.
Why do I care? I was just down at Marine Corps Air Station
Yuma. They are still living in World War II barracks. We are
purchasing equipment that the military neither wants nor needs.
We hope we have addressed the food stamp problem. Although, I
am not sure we have satisfactorily.
But while all this excess and unnecessary spending is going
on, the men and women in the military have suffered. It is not
an accident that Army captains are getting out at a greater
rate than in the history of this country's armed services. I do
not mind losing a few admirals and generals. I do mind losing
the high quality captains that are the future leaders of this
country.
So I strongly urge you to look at this issue because the
urgency of the Cold War situation has therefore allowed us a
degree of license in unnecessary spending out of the defense
budget, much of which has nothing to do with defense. You are
never going to be able to meet our requirements of a new and
modernized military, much less the men and women in the
military being taken care of unless you address this issue. I
thank the Chairman for the additional time.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John McCain
Mr. Chairman, the President-elect should be commended for his
outstanding selection of Don Rumsfeld to be the next Secretary of
Defense. Secretary Rumsfeld's reputation for intelligence, candor, and
competency is well deserved, and I look forward to today's hearing with
great interest.
The decline in spending on national defense that we witnessed for
15 years coincided with dramatic global changes that, rightly or
wrongly, resulted in a level of deployments that exceeded any previous
period in memory. That protracted decline in defense spending did not
come without a price.
We can rightly point to the United States Armed Forces as the most
capable in the world, but they are not omnipotent, and they do have
their breaking point. Shallow analyses that point to the size of the
U.S. defense budget relative to those of potential enemies combined and
an overemphasis on the two-war strategy as a planning guide have
impeded our ability to accurately gauge requirements. The myriad
readiness problems that have been well documented occur not because of
the two-war strategy, but despite it. The resources and attention
needed to correct those problems are required irrespective of that
strategy. The readiness problems we are witnessing today occur as a
result of the operational tempo demanded of our military combined with
a force structure ill-suited to the projected international environment
of tomorrow. They occur because of the failure of the Clinton
administration and of Congress to adequately provide for a strong
defense.
Not to be ignored is the considerable damage done to our national
defense through the growing problem of pork-barrel spending and its
related infrastructure issue, the closing of unneeded military bases.
Defense spending bills have become a national disgrace, with increasing
percentages of the budget wasted by earmarking many billions of dollars
for solely parochial reasons. The problem, in fact, has gotten so bad
that, increasingly, pork-barrel spending is not occurring on top of
requested spending levels, but in place of it. In short, we are adding
pork at the expense of vital programs. Should anybody doubt this
statement, just wait for the uniformed services to request supplemental
spending bills for the current fiscal year reflecting spending that
should have already been appropriated.
For the past several years, together with Senator Levin, I have
cosponsored legislation authorizing additional base closing rounds.
That legislation has been regularly and summarily rejected by the
Senate. Yes, the Clinton administration politicized the 1995 round and,
yes, it costs money to close bases. But the real reason for the
rejection of these amendments has been to protect jobs, not promote
national defense. The Clinton administration will be gone in a matter
of days, and no rational person can possibly argue that a closed
military base costs money once inevitable and programmed cleanup costs
are completed. Additional base closings, together with contracting out
of certain activities and the elimination of protectionist statutes,
can account for as much as $20 billion per year in savings--clearly
enough to make a sizable dent in the modernization shortfall we are
facing.
I am also interested in hearing Secretary Rumsfeld's approach to
the use of force. Many of the most contentious debates that occur in
this committee and on the floor of the Senate involve unforeseen and
ongoing military contingencies. The question of when and how to use
military force is central to our responsibilities as a government, the
question of war powers central to our responsibilities as an
institution. Secretary Rumsfeld's thoughts on these matters will be of
immeasurable importance as we continue to wrestle with ongoing
deployments in the Balkans and Southwest Asia and the unknown but
certain deployments of the future.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to address this
session of the committee and look forward to Secretary Rumsfeld's
opening statement.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. Do you have a quick comment on
that before I call on Senator Cleland?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I certainly agree that the question that has
to be posed is whether or not something is going to contribute
to our national security and whether or not it meets the
priorities that are important for this country. That has to be
our focus.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, since the C-130s are built
in Georgia, I would like to say that I am for schoolyards being
able to move anywhere in the world at a moment's notice.
[Laughter.]
Let me just say that I am fascinated by the ``Rumsfeld's
Rules''. I appreciate your appreciation for quotes and
anecdotes.
In listening to your incredible resume and your wonderful
experience that you bring to this task--and you certainly have
my support for this job. I think you are going to be an
outstanding Secretary of Defense--I thought about the line by
Jack Kennedy that the thing he appreciated most in the White
House was a sense of history. The thing he feared most was
human miscalculation.
I think you bring something very special to this post and
to this committee and to this country with your great sense of
history, not only in service to this country yourself, but in
the defense post. I think you can help us avoid a lot of human
miscalculations. So congratulations to you.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cleland. In terms of deployment of American forces,
I would just like to followup on my fellow combat veteran John
McCain's comments and some of the comments that have been made
here. I was privileged to visit General Powell when he was
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Again, a fellow Vietnam
veteran, someone like many of us that learned a lot of bitter
lessons about deployment of forces in the Vietnam War.
I once heard General Powell say something very powerful. He
said, ``my job is to recommend to the President the best advice
to the President on how to use the American military to stay
out of war. But if we get in war, to win and win quickly.''
When he said that, it occurred to me that that was the best
mission statement that I had ever really heard about the
purpose of the American military.
So he is going to be one of your great colleagues in the
cabinet and I think that kind of thinking I heard from you
today. I was appreciative of your comments about using force,
using American military, using our posture to the extent to
which we did not have to commit it. But obviously, if we commit
it, then there are certain things we have to do to make it
successful.
In terms of success, I am glad to hear you say that we must
ask the question how do we know when we are successful? I asked
this question of several administration people in terms of the
Balkan War. I said early on, make sure you define victory.
Because one of these days you are going to have to declare it.
It leads me to a Clausewitz line that I like very much that
the leader must know the last step he is going to take before
he takes the first step. So that steps in motion a whole set of
thought processes.
Senator Roberts and I took the floor all last year to argue
out the question in a bipartisan way basically about when to
commit American forces, about what is in the strategic national
vital interest of the United States and what is not. That if
you commit, then you have a definable objective. Then you do
have an exit strategy. It has been a pleasure to work with my
colleague across the aisle.
I just wanted to share those thoughts with you that might
be of help in fulfilling your task.
Onto the question of our men and women in uniform. I
appreciate your interest in your statement about working hard
to make sure that we recruit the best and the brightest, that
we do not just lower our standards, that we do not dummy up the
military just to get numbers. That is fool's gold. That is
false economy. Any way you cut it. I would rather have less
numbers and keep quality people.
So we do want to go after the best and the brightest, not
only to join but to stay. Senator McCain pointed out senior
captains, senior NCOs. I have tried to fight through this, work
through this, over the last 4 years I have been on the
Personnel Subcommittee. We have looked at various ways, various
incentives, not only for recruitment, but for retention. It
does seem to me that retention is a real special challenge. I
have learned that you recruit a soldier, but you retain a
family. You have a family military now. Those families are
interested in the same things families outside the post are
interested in.
One of them is education. For the last 2 years, this body
has put forward a notion that with my initiative that we ought
to look at the GI bill and maybe see if we can use that to
apply to family members to entice members to stay into the
military for a full career. I would just like for you to take a
look at that as we go along as just one of our tools that we
use to retain quality personnel.
I appreciate in your statement a focus on intelligence. I
cannot help but feel that intelligence prevents many battles
and wins many battles when you get in them. That the
coordination of our intelligence capabilities is itself a
challenge.
I mentioned the deployments. Senator Roberts and I came to
basically a point of view of realistic restraint. We just saw
with the U.S.S. Cole. Now, if you project force or project
power, you also make yourself in this terrorist world, in this
terrorist environment, a target, so that power projection
requires power protection.
Therefore, I think we have to be very realistic about our
power projection. I think one of the reviews that I would be
grateful for you to do as you review the American military is
to see where it is deployed around the world. We literally are
out there everywhere in the world and I think it's a time for
review.
In terms of weapons systems, I noticed that a couple of
years ago, you joined with seven other Secretaries of Defense
to endorse full funding for the F22. That is something that I
think that is important to our national security interest.
Let me just say that one of the Rumsfeld's Rules is do not
necessarily avoid sharp edges. Occasionally, they are necessary
to leadership.
So onto a sharp edge. National missile defense. I have been
a big supporter of theater missile defense, but especially the
Arrow system that we worked very closely with, with our Israeli
friends. I am a big booster of research and further testing of
an anti-missile system.
I guess I feel right now that we are not ready for
deployment of a system. I am not sure that the concept has been
proven. But I am willing to work on it to prove it out, test
it, and then make judgments on deployment later.
But one of the wonderful briefings I have received in the
last year or so is from your commission on missile systems. Of
course, we were all concerned about the North Korean launch of
the missile in the Pacific.
I went to South Korea right up to the DMZ this past August.
It was fascinating to get the briefing on North Korea and see
where they were. We got a fascinating briefing. We had given to
us by the Department of the Army a photo taken at night of
lights on the Korean peninsula which also showed lights just
into Southern China.
It is interesting. You see lights in South Korea. You see
lights in China. North Korea literally is a big, dark, black
hole. It is amazing to me that 50 years after the Korean War,
they still cannot turn the lights on.
I just wonder--we do not want to overreact here. I think
any missile defense system that is deployed should be well
thought out and not just on the basis of one launch by a
country that cannot even turn the lights on.
So I point that out to you because I am willing to walk
down this path with you to continue to prove the concept. But I
think first things first. Let us prove the concept and then
think about deployment.
I would say too that in my analysis of threats, it is this
terroristic threat that is maybe our biggest challenge.
Particularly, in terms of missile systems one that Senator Sam
Nunn and that great expert on nuclear warfare, Ted Turner, have
recently articulated and that is that we might want to look at
the whole question of the Soviets, former Soviets, or the
Russians now and their de-alerting of their existing systems
and any loose nukes that might be out there. That might be one
of our biggest challenges in terms of missile threats.
Now, I would like for you just to respond to maybe the last
point that I raised.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I think the danger that has been
suggested with respect to the disarray in the former Soviet
Union and the large number of nuclear weapons is a very real
concern. There is just no question but that it has to be looked
at in two dimensions. First is the actual materials which there
are a number of countries that have appetites for it. If your
circumstance is that anything is for sale, there is a risk.
The second dimension to it is the fact that you have a
large number of very bright, talented, experienced weapons
people in the Soviet Union that are not getting paid and not
getting their pensions. Again, if everything is for sale, their
brains and their knowledge is for sale. It results in a risk
for accelerated proliferation that is serious and real and I am
very much concerned about it. I recognize the fact that the
United States needs to address it and play a role in trying to
avoid that proliferation.
I would like to add one word on missile defense if I might.
We talk frequently about the risks of deploying missile
defense. We are properly concerned about our allies in that
regard. We are properly concerned about attitudes by Russia and
China and other countries.
I think it is useful from time-to-time to also ask
ourselves what are the risks of not deploying missile defense.
I would mention several. One is it seems to me if some
countries that have significant technological capabilities,
decide that they are vulnerable to ballistic missiles from
their neighbors and that we lack the ability to assist them in
defending against that capability. That we may contribute to
proliferation by encouraging them to go forward and develop
their own nuclear weapons and their own ballistic missiles. I
think that is just a fact.
Second, the other thing that worries me if we do not deploy
ballistic missile capability is I have been in the White House
as Chief of Staff and as Secretary of Defense on the National
Security Council. I have seen the process that a President has
to go through when there is a risk or a threat.
If we know of certain knowledge that another country has a
nuclear warhead that can effect us and we do not feel we have a
good grip on their motivations, their behavior patterns, what
could dissuade them, and we know that they are capable of using
it, we are forced into one of two course of action.
Either we acquiesce and change our behavior and change our
interest and alter what we would otherwise have done or we have
to preempt. I think putting a President of the United States
and a country in the position where their choices, their
options, are so minimal that they are forced into a position
of--as Israel was--with respect to the radon and nuclear
capability in Iraq so many years ago--where a President is
forced to go in and take action of a preemptive nature because
he lacks the defensive capability to persuade those people that
it is not in their interest to do that.
So that is a dimension to this missile defense thing that I
do not think gets into the debate to the extent it ought to. I
think we need to look at deterrence across the spectrum.
I was in a meeting up in New York. Some person raised their
hand and they said that my father was a good friend of Colonel
House. I thought back, my goodness gracious, Colonel House.
That was Woodrow Wilson's day. I was talking about missiles and
missile defense and so forth. He said, one day my father asked
Colonel House why he was so courteous. Why he was just the most
gracious, courteous, person he had ever met. The answer was by
Colonel House, well, young man, I grew up when gentleman
carried revolvers. If you know everyone has a revolver, you
tend to be courteous.
Well, North Korea is selling, has been and is today to my
knowledge, to my not today knowledge, but very recent
knowledge, selling those capabilities and technologies and
trading them around the world. They are an active world class
proliferator. It is my understanding when the United States
representatives met with them, their response was when we asked
if they would change their behavior with respect to ballistic
missiles, one of their responses was something to the effect
that you are America. You have bombed in the Sudan. You have
bombed in Afghanistan. You are bombing in Kosovo. You are
bombing in Iraq. You are giving food aid to North Korea. Now,
why? Why is the behavior so different? Well, they believe it is
because they have those weapons. They believe that those
capabilities they believe they have are sufficient to alter
behavior of their neighbors. I do not think we as a country
want to think that the old mutual assured destruction where the
United States and the Soviet Union could kill each other
several times over is necessarily a deterrent that is well-
fashioned for the period we are moving into.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank
you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can remember
when I heard on TV--I did not have any indication that you
would be nominated nor that you would accept if nominated to
this position. I told my wife there is not a person in America
today as qualified as Don Rumsfeld for this position.
I also had two personal reasons that I am rejoicing in your
nomination. One is that as Senator Durbin said when you are
inducted into the National Wrestling Hall of Fame--of course,
that is located in Stillwater, Oklahoma. So you are even more
of a hero there than you are in some other areas. I remember
also when I came from the House to the Senate in 1994, I went
through some of these confirmation hearings on the different
Chiefs. I can remember identifying with them because we had
served at the same time. You know, myself and Elvis Presley and
some of these guys. So now as of about 5 years ago, Mr.
Chairman, there is not one person in the service who was
serving when I was serving. So you and I are contemporaries. We
served precisely the same years and now I have someone I can
communicate with.
I want to also complement you and your family and I look at
your beautiful granddaughter over there. I think there is not
one of my eight grandkids who would listen to me for 2 hours
and be as patient as she is.
I think when we assess this thing, I know there is this
euphoric attitude after the Cold War is over that somehow the
threat is not there. I really believe the threat is greater
today. I think we are in the most threatened position that we
have been in as a nation in our Nation's history. Incidentally,
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, agrees with
that.
I think when you look at it, Senator Warner is right. We
cannot try to pin you down as to what kind of a cost this is
going to be. But I would say that when you have the Joint
Chiefs all agreeing that the range is similar between $48 and
$58 billion additional. Do you have any reason to believe that
is unreasonable?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no reason to believe any of those
numbers are unreasonable. It takes--I really do like to get my
brain engaged before my mouth. I need to get in there and pour
over it and I need to get some people to help me.
Senator Inhofe. Well, there is one thing that has not been
brought up that I think you--I am going to ask that you look
into immediately. That is what we are going to have to do in a
supplemental before the current budget year. We have been
talking about it in future years. But right now we have a list
that has been provided us with $4.5 billion of near term
readiness requirements. We are talking about spare parts and
equipment maintenance and another $2.5 billion for emergency
personnel or modernization programs.
Now, we have been told that if we are unable to get that,
we may have to cease training in the fourth quarter of this
year. I am going to ask you to really pay attention to the
current needs, those things that are having a deteriorating
effect on our retention and those things that have to be done.
Our RPM accounts, for example. I mean, you can go down to
Fort Bragg in a rainstorm as I have been there and our kids are
covering up their equipment with their bodies to keep them from
rusting. So those are the things that have to be done
immediately. I hope that you would look at those.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I will indeed. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Just so there is clarification as to the
responses that you made, when the Chairman first asked about
the missile defense law that we passed, the Missile Defense Act
of 1999, and he read the two parts of that bill that I think we
have heard many, many times before, do you see that there is
anything incompatible about those two statements?
Mr. Rumsfeld. The first is deploying an effective system.
Senator Inhofe. As soon as technologically possible.
Mr. Rumsfeld. The second was negotiation.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Not that I can see.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I do not either. But I just wanted
to--because I think that the act is very specific. Let us keep
in mind that was not just passed by a huge margin in the House.
It was passed by a 97 to 3 margin in the Senate. Not one person
who has been in here today voted against it. So I would only
ask that you would recommend to the administration that you
immediately start complying with Public Law 106-38 and start
getting and deploying.
By the way, I want to say that if there is one--one of the
great recent services that you have provided for this country
is the Rumsfeld Commission. I think if I were to single out one
or two sentences in there when those who were opposed to our
meeting what I think our requirements are on a national missile
defense system. They often say, well, these countries, Iran,
Iraq, and other countries are not going to be able to have this
capability for another five to ten years. You pointed out that
an indigenous system does not exist today. That these countries
are trading technologies and trading systems. So I appreciate
very much your making that statement and making it very clear
to this committee.
Third, there is one thing that we have not really talked
about and I would ask that you address. It does not have a lot
of sex appeal. Not many people talk about it. But it is our
near-term readiness and modernization.
Just as one example, and I could use many other examples,
but this is a personal one. I chair the Readiness and
Management Support Subcommittee and have had a great deal of
concern as to how these efforts over in Kosovo and Bosnia are
draining our ability to defend America. Just one being the 21st
TACOM. The 21st TACOM is responsible for ground logistics in
that area of the Balkans, but also in the Middle East. They're
at about 100 percent capacity right now.
Some of the equipment they had over there in the M915
trucks that we are using, many of them with over a million
miles on them. We determined that if we could just use the
amount of money that we are going to have to use to maintain
those for a 3-year period, we could replace them with new
vehicles.
Now, the problem there is an accounting problem that you
are well aware of. I am not sure whether it was back in 1975 or
not. But we cannot get anything done and prepare for the future
when fiscally in a normal prudent business decision, you would
say, no. We are not going to keep fixing those. We are going to
have new ones.
Do you have any thoughts about how you might address that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, there is no difference that the
government operates quite differently from business. There is
also no question that at a certain point people do not maintain
fleets of things that are antiquated because of the upkeep and
maintenance cost of continuing them.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but, of course, we have been doing it.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Because a question on base closure was
asked, I would only make a request that the force structure
that we have today is about one-half of what it was during 1991
during the Persian Gulf War. That can be quantified, half the
Army divisions, half the tactical air wings, half the ships
going out from 300 ships--600 ships to 300 ships.
After the U.S.S. Cole, tragedy took place, I went over
there. I talked to virtually every rear admiral and everyone
who was around there. They said that if we had had--when we cut
down the number of ships, we cut our refuellers or our oilers
down from 32 to 21. If we had not done that, every one of them
to the last one said we would not have gone into Yemen or the
other ports. We would have refueled at sea.
Now, when you go from the Mediterranean through the Suez
Canal and the Red Sea and turn left and go up the Mediterranean
Sea to the Persian Gulf. It is about 5,000 miles. You have to
have some refueling capability. Virtually everything in there
is in kind of a threatened area.
I went back to the bone yards and found that we had two
vehicles out there that were in very good shape and cost very
little more money to put them back into service. Those were the
Higgins and the Humphreys. I would hope that you would consider
doing that and talk to your Navy people--and, of course, you
draw on your own experience there--as to why it would not be
prudent to pull some of those back into service and to get that
refueling capability in that area. I just make that request
that you would consider that.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I will be happy to look at it. Thank you,
sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Could I clean up two things that are a little
embarrassing to me? The Senator mentioned I was in the
Wrestling Hall of Fame. It is true. But I did not go in the
front door with the great wrestlers. I came in the back door
with the so-called distinguished Americans who had wrestled. It
was Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Dennis Hastert, and
Rumsfeld and a few others. [Laughter.]
Second, I was described as the captain----
Senator Warner. We would add John Chafee is my
recollection, our distinguished colleague.
Mr. Rumsfeld. That is right, exactly. I was described as
captain of the college football team and it is true. But I was
a little guy. It was the 150-pound football, not the big guys.
I would not want to let the record stay inaccurate.
Chairman Levin. Well, we will keep the record open for a
number of additional comments. [Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. One last thing just for the record. I would
ask also in this setting and this environment today at this
time, you cannot get into your F-22, joint strike fighters,
crusader, global hawk, for example. I know you were a real
supporter of unmanned vehicles sometime ago.
But I hope for the record maybe later on you can have some
time to think about this and address these platforms. We would
like to believe, and many of the American people believe, that
we have the very best of everything. But I was very proud of
Gen. John Jumper not too long ago when he said in terms of air-
to-air vehicles, we are not superior. In fact, the Russians
have some things on the market right now, the SU-35, that are
better than any air-to-air combat vehicle we have, including
the F-15s. So I am hoping that you will be able to assess our
modernization and get it as specific as you can as early in
your term as possible.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld, not only for your
willingness to serve, but for your lifetime of public service.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Senator Reed. We had a chance this morning to chat briefly.
I thank you for that also. I was listening to your response to
Senator Warner about the conditions for committing American
forces today. Frankly, and I think you would agree, that it is
in a sense a work in progress that you are trying to understand
the forces and the structure that we have and the threats we
face.
I might suggest that we are pretty good at the initial
phases of these operations because they are essentially
military operations, the forceful entry into contested
territory. We are not very good at the back end which is the
policing operation which is humanitarian operations. One of the
reason we are not is that we do not have those resources. We
have not been able to coordinate with our allies and with
national organizations to have such resources. I wondered if
you might comment upon this whole issue, not just in terms of
America's role, but being able to parade an organization or
mutual organizations that can do missions that you might feel
needed to be done. We have the forces militarily to make the
entry, but we are uncertain about whether or not we can extract
ourselves in reasonable time. Would you comment on that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I can comment briefly. We all know it
is a lot easier to get into something than it is to get out of
it. We all know that everyone is not capable of doing
everything. In fact, the tasks as you properly point out are
distinctly different. I have had an impression over the years
that we have a significant role in helping to deter aggression
in the world. The way you do that is to be arranged to defend
in the event you need to which you know well as a West Point
graduate.
Having been at NATO and looking at different countries and
what the different countries bring to that alliance, it is
pretty obvious that the United States has some things that we
bring to it that are notably different from some of the other
countries. It is also true that the other countries can bring
significant things.
I do not think that it is necessarily true that the United
States has to become a great peacekeeper if you will. I think
we need to have capabilities, as you are suggesting, that are
distinct from war fighting capabilities. But I also think other
countries can participate in these activities that are needed
in the world from time-to-time and bring--they can bring the
same capabilities we can to that type of thing. Whereas, they
cannot bring the same capabilities that we can, for example,
with respect to air lift or sea lift or intelligence gathering
or a variety of other things.
There is one other aspect to being on the ground in an
area. Someone mentioned with respect to the U.S.S. Cole. If you
are a space asset or the Marines that were in Beirut Airport
back when I was President Reagan's Middle East envoy, if you
provide an attractive target, a lucrative target, somebody may
want to try to test whether or not they can damage that target.
That is a lot less true--the United States of America is an
attractive target. So when we are on the ground, we tend to
become a bit more attractive, a bit more ``lucrative'' as a
target. It seems to me that it may very well be that other
countries can do some of those things in a way that is less
likely to create the kind of targeting that the United States
tends to draw.
Senator Reed. Thank you. You made reference to and
anticipated my next question which as the former Ambassador to
NATO, you have a great experience you are bringing to the task
because there are issues, one of which is to what extent NATO
will operate or European forces will operate independently of
NATO.
We have a current controversy about the depleted uranium
being used in Kosovo. We have an ongoing debate and discussion
about national missile defense. Most--many European governments
are frankly opposed to it.
Then we also have the issue not only of whether or not we
are willing to essentially allow our allies to do some things,
frankly because they might get the impression that they can do
everything alone and they do not need us any longer. I wonder
from your perspective and as you go in how do you propose to
deal with some of these issues relative to NATO?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I would begin with several principles. I
think NATO is just an enormously important alliance. It has a
record of amazing success. I believe in consultation with our
NATO allies. I think that they have difficult political
situations and close margins in their parliaments. They need
time. They need discussion with us. They need leadership. They
need an opportunity so that the solution can be fashioned in a
way that makes sense.
With respect to the European defense force, let me just put
it this way. I think anything that damages the NATO cohesion
would be unwise for Europe and for the United States and for
our ability to contribute to peace and stability in that part
of the world.
Senator Reed. During the campaign, Mr. Rumsfeld, the Bush
campaign made a great point about suggesting that China was a
competitor. Frankly, in that type of dynamic, there is always
the fear that competition will lead to conflict. How do you
think you can use your resources at the Department of Defense
to preempt conflict with China?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I think how China evolves in the 21st
century into the world in Asia and elsewhere in the world is
enormously important. I think our behavior and the behavior of
other countries in the region and the world is going to make a
difference as to how they evolve. I would characterize our
relationship with the People's Republic of China as complicated
and multi-dimensional.
It is true, as the President-elect said, that we are
competitors. They are seeking influence in the region and we
are in the region. We have been in the region. I think it is
important we have been in the region because we have
contributed to peace and stability in that part of the world.
We are trading partners simultaneously. So on the one hand,
we are somewhat of a competitor. On the other hand, we are a
trading partner.
We watch what they say and they write. I am no more an
expert than others, but I do read what some of their military
colleges, writings are saying. We see their defense budget
increasing by double digits every year. We see an awful lot of
their military doctrine talking about leapfrogging generations
of capabilities and moving toward asymmetrical threats to the
United States, cyber warfare and these types of things.
I do not think the history between the United States and
the PRC is written. I think we are going to write it. I think
we have to be wise and we have to be engaged and we have to be
thoughtful. But we cannot engage in self-delusion. They are not
strategic partners in my view. They are--it is a multi-faceted
relationship.
Senator Reed. Let me touch upon this. Many of my colleagues
have national missile defense. But from the context of the
overall theory of deterrence, you described from your vantage
point in the White House the sort of two choices. If someone
had a ballistic missile that could reach our shores, the choice
is being acquiescence or preemption.
Yet, for decades, Russia had exactly that capability, the
Soviet Union. I would suggest we did not acquiesce and we did
not conduct preemptive strikes.
It seems to me that what is going on here in this
deterrence theory is that it is as much about the psychology or
one's perception of the psychology of the opponent as well as
throw weight and defense mechanisms.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Senator Reed. Inherent, it seems that what you are saying,
is that you really distinguish some of these so-called rogue
states as being irrational as different from the Soviet Union,
unable to appreciate the fact that any type of unilateral
attack on the United States, even if frankly--one would assume,
even if it was successfully defeated by a missile defense,
would result in almost inevitable retaliation. Is that at the
core of your thinking, that we are dealing now with some
irrational actors?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, sir. I must not have explained myself
well. Two things. My comments about the behavior of the states
that we are talking about--I am not terribly enamored of the
phrase rogue state. It leaves the impression that the
leadership there is kind of like a rogue elephant careening off
a wall blindly and that is not the case. I mean, I have met
with Saddam Hussein and I met with the elder Assad as Middle
East envoy. These people are intelligent. They are survivors.
They are tough. They do not think like we do. Goodness knows,
they do not behave like we do with respect to their neighbors
or their own people. But they are not erratic.
You are correct. We absolutely must--that is why this
intelligence gathering task we have as a country is so much
more important today, not just because of proliferation but
because the weapons are so powerful.
It is not a matter of counting beans in Russia, how many
missiles, how many ships, how many tanks? It is a matter of
knowing a lot more about attitudes and behaviors and
motivations and how you can alter their behavior to create a
more peaceful world.
The thing that I would want to clarify is that when I said
what I said, I was distinguishing between the relationship of
the United States and the Soviet Union. There the so-called
mutual shared destruction indeed worked. The potential to be
able to have massive retaliation I think created a more stable
situation.
To pretend that the fact that we had through massive
retaliation a stable situation with Russia and that that
necessarily would deter not only Russia, but others from making
mischief is obviously historically wrong. We had a war in
Korea. We had a war in Vietnam. Saddam Hussein went into
Kuwait. Not withstanding the fact that the United States and
the Soviet Union had a perfect ability to destroy each other
several times over.
So what you need is deterrence across the spectrum that
addressed the evolving threats that are notably different as
you well know. I just must not have made myself very clear.
Senator Reed. Well, again, this is a topic that cannot be
exhausted in 5 or 6 or 7 minutes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, it is an interesting topic.
Senator Reed. I appreciate your thoughtfulness and your
comments. Thank you very much, Mr. Rumsfeld.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. We are
going to call on two more Senators before lunch. We are going
to try to squeeze in both Senator Roberts and then Senator
Bingaman. Then we will break for lunch. If we break right at
1:00, we will come back at 2:00. If we go 5 minutes after 1:00,
we will come back at five after 2:00.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say I
think you are the right man for the right job.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. This is a little different experience in
regards to the usual nomination process at least for me and I
think other members of the committee. We have all of our
prepared questions that are prepared by staff in large type so
that we can read them and go on from there.
But I think in your case, you shine the light of experience
and expertise into the nomination fog and I think it has been
very helpful. I think it has been educational. I think you
caused us to think a little bit and I think that is very
appropriate. I feel compelled to use part of my time--I should
not, but I am going to--to inform my colleagues and Mr.
Rumsfeld that in terms of our vital national security
interests, I think that Latin America, Central America, our
involvement in Colombia in the Southern Command where there are
31 nations involved is just as important as the Balkans. I
noted that there was some concern in regards to maybe Congress
going in with a blindfold or not really fully aware of all the
details.
Let me point out that the subcommittee of which I am
privileged to chair and Senator Bingaman was the ranking
member, we had lengthy hearings and the full committee had
hearings. We had General Wilhelm. We had the Assistant
Secretary of Defense. We had the Assistant Secretary of State.
We had two of those. We had two ambassadors. We went over in
considerable detail what the pros and cons were in regards to
our involvement.
More especially since we left Panama and went to Miami and
found thousands of miles in the Southern Command that we are at
risk. We do have bases. We have them in El Salvador. We have
them in Aruba. Then I think we have them in Ecuador as well to
do a tough job.
We took a lot of infrastructure away to go over to the
Balkans. Well, why am I saying this? That is because there are
360 million people down there. The average age is 14 with a lot
of problems.
In regards to immigration, in regards to drugs, in regards
to trade, in regards to possible revolution, and in regards to
our energy supply, where we have about 22 percent of our energy
coming from Venezuela and Mexico and in regards to what a
fellow down there named Chavez is doing, I think we better pay
attention to it.
Now, I cannot say whether our policies in Colombia are
going to work or not. But I do say that we have taken a
considerable interest in this, had a subcommittee debate and in
the full committee and in the Appropriations Committee where
General Wilhelm had to stand tall and parade rest before the
appropriators and in the Senate and in the House, this was not
done without due consideration. I would urge your attention to
that because I think it is very important.
I want to talk about--I want to ask you if--in fact I am
going to recommend a criteria in regard to the use of troops.
This is in concert with what my dear friend Senator Cleland and
I determine in our realistic restraint foreign policy dialogue
that at least us two listened to. We had to listen to each
other over on the Senate.
We came up with the criterion before we would put the
troops in. One was the stakes are vital to the United States.
Second, public support is assured. Third, overwhelming force is
used in regards to a clear definition of goals and purpose.
Last, everybody agrees on an exit strategy. I think that is a
pretty good list.
The reason I mention that is on behalf of the warfighter. I
was in Kosovo on exactly the same day that we mounted up and
the 27th Marines went in. I took the advantage to get briefed.
They probably did not want to brief me. That was the last thing
they wanted to do was see a U.S. Senator there as they were
getting ready to mount up.
But I asked a lance corporal, I said, what are your goals
here? Do you think you can do the job in regard to Kosovo? He
said, sir, I'm a United States Marine. I can do the job.
I said, but what is your personal goal? He said my personal
goal is to take care of myself so that I can come home after 6
months to my wife and kids because I know just as soon as I
leave, these guys are going to start shooting each other all
over again.
I think too many times it is not that we should not pay
attention to the geo-political concerns and the strategic
concerns. My concern is the warfighter, that person in uniform.
I believe that as we go down this we remember that it is
one thing to have a cause to fight for. It is another thing to
have a cause to fight and die for.
So I am in agreement with the Powell Doctrine. I pretty
much said what I think we ought to do on down the road. I offer
that up as a suggestion.
The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of which
I am privileged to chair and we have drugs and we have
terrorism and we have weapons of mass destruction and we have
the counter threat reduction programs. We have a whole bunch of
things. Every staff member back here has to deal with me
because of this subcommittee and the foresight of the
distinguished Chairman.
We asked witnesses in terms of things that really bother
you, whether it is a cyber attack or a biological attack or
whatever it is, what keeps you up at night? What is the one big
thing that keeps you up at night? Now, other than you filling
out all the paperwork you have to in regard to the ethics
business, what keeps you up at night?
What would you tell the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee right now that you think is an immediate concern
in terms of our national security? What keeps you up at night?
Now, I know you said that you cannot really single one out,
that this is a continuum and a many faceted kind of thing here
with missile development, terrorism, so on and so forth.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, two things I would say. I would repeat
what I said about the importance of considerably improving our
intelligence capabilities so that we know more about what
people think and how they behave and how their behavior can be
altered and what the capabilities are in this world.
I think the goal ought not to be to win a war. The goal
ought to be to be so strong and so powerful that you can
dissuade people from doing things they otherwise would do. You
do not have to even fight the war. That takes me to the second
point.
The second point is I do not know that I really understand
what deters people today because I do not think one thing
deters everybody. I think that we need to understand that there
are different parts of the world. There are different types of
leaders with different motivations. We have to do a lot better
job of thinking through deterrence and assuring that we have
done the best job possible.
I mean, everyone is going to make mistakes. But today when
mistakes are made with the power of weapons, they are not
little mistakes, they are big mistakes.
We need to do everything we can to fashion a set of
deterrents, a nest, a fabric that does the best possible job
for this country.
Let me go to your first point just very briefly and add a
thought for consideration. You mentioned overwhelming public
support as a criteria. I am uncomfortable with that. I think
that leaders have to lead and build support. I look back at
history. I think there have been times when we have had to do
things when the public was not there yet.
I think that what needs to be done is to have leaders in
office, presidents, who think these things through, who make
the right decisions, who are sufficiently persuaded that
overwhelming support, public support, follows.
You cannot sustain anything without it. I quite agree. But
I think that thinking that you are going to have it at the
outset is optimistic.
Second, on overwhelming force. I have watched presidents
look at their situation in a pre-crisis period, a build-up
period. They have very few tools to deal with. The military
tends to come in and the choices are not--you do not have a lot
of arrows in your quiver. It is a proper thing to say we do not
want to do something unless we are going to put the force into
it we need. But the concept of overwhelming force in isolation
I would think needs to have another dimension. It is this.
In the pre-crisis period, in the early period, you can do
things to alter people's behavior that does not require 500,000
troops and 6 months to build up. If we are wise and think these
things through, there are things that can be done in a build-up
period that will persuade people they ought not to be doing
what they are thinking about doing, that will persuade the
people they need to support them in doing what they are
thinking about doing, that those people ought not to support
them.
That does not require overwhelming force. That requires a
lot better intelligence and a lot more tools to affect and
alter thinking in those periods. I think we need to broaden
that concept somewhat.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. My time has expired.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Bingaman is next. We
will then recess and Senator Allard will be first when we
return.
Senator Bingaman. Mr. Rumsfeld, thank you and
congratulations on your stamina in considering all of these
questions.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Senator Bingaman. As well as congratulations on your
nomination. I certainly intend to support you.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Senator Bingaman. One of the issues that we always hear a
lot of talk about, but at least in my view has not been given
adequate priority in defense budgeting, is science and
technology.
It seems like, at least for the last several years, every
time we see a defense budget proposed by the administration,
the percentage of the defense budget that is committed to
science and technology is reduced. It always loses out compared
to procurement, compared to readiness, compared to all these
other things.
I know that President-elect Bush gave a speech at the
Citadel a year and a half ago where he talked about the
importance of science and technology investment. He said he was
committing an additional $20 billion--or he would if elected
President--commit an additional $20 billion to defense research
and development between now and 2006. I think that was the
commitment he made in that speech or the statement he made.
Let me add one other aspect of this. The reductions in
growth in defense research and development in recent years has
been justified at some of our hearings on the basis that the
industrial companies will pick up the difference here, that
U.S. industry is sufficiently strong that we do not need to do
what we once did in science and technology.
That to my mind is very much at odds with what I understand
is happening to our defense industrial base. They do not have
the luxury of putting substantial new resources into this area.
So I would be interested in any comments you have about how we
can increase research and development, defense related research
and development and support for science and technology.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree completely with everything
you have said. When President-elect Bush announced that I was
his choice for this post, I said that I had visited with him. I
had read his pronouncements and plans for defense and that I
supported them enthusiastically. Certainly with respect to
science and technology, he is on the mark and you are on the
mark and I agree.
I came out of the pharmaceutical business where we invest
in research and development that is not guaranteed to produce
anything in the next 5 minutes. You have to be patient. You
have to live with a lot of failures. I have been involved in
the electronics business, quite the same.
If you are not investing for the future, you are going to
die. You simply run out of gas at a certain point. This
wonderful country of ours has such fine leadership in science
and technology. But the reality is an awful lot of the foreign
students who used to come over here and stay and study are now
going back to their countries.
They are leaving with an enormous amount of knowledge and
the country, this committee, this department, simply must be
willing to make those investments.
Senator Bingaman. Well, thank you for that answer. Let me
ask about one other area that I also think tends to get short
changed in the defense budgets that I have seen, and that
relates to test and evaluation. Again, there does not seem to
me at least to be a strong constituency for funding the
necessary infrastructure to accomplish and maintain our ability
in the test and evaluation area. I have a parochial interest in
this. Because White Sands Missile Range is in my state. It's
our largest, and I believe our most capable test and evaluation
facility.
But this is an area that I hope you will give some
attention to. It seems to me to be one of those areas that
falls between the stools when people start putting together
defense budgets. It does not have the natural advocates behind
it the way we are currently structured that would allow it to
be given sufficient attention.
I am glad to hear your comment. Or I will go onto another
question.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I am not knowledgeable about the state of
that and will be happy to look into it.
Senator Bingaman. One other area I wanted to ask about, and
this has been asked about by some of the other Senators. There
was a New York Times editorial that I am sure you saw
expressing concern about what they anticipate would be a
missile defense organization. The MDO recommendation to the new
president that he needs to order construction of a radar system
in Alaska to begin this March in order to meet the deadlines
that you identified in the commission report that you came up
with for actual deployment by 2005 I believe. I believe I have
those dates right.
I wondered if you have any insight into whether or not such
a recommendation will be made, whether or not you would support
such a recommendation to begin construction of a radar site in
March or whether you believe that is premature.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It would be premature for me to comment on
it. There is no question we simply have to get some folks pass
through this committee engaging that subject. I have to get
myself up to speed. It clearly would be an issue that would end
up with the President and the National Security Council.
Senator Bingaman. Let me ask about one other thing, one
other area, and that is export controls. My impression is that
there are major problems in the system we have in place now to
control defense related exports, that it has worked to the
disadvantage of many of our companies that have defense related
work, but also do a lot of commercial work. This is an issue
that involves several departments, not just the Department of
Defense, but the Department of Commerce, Department of State. I
think we have probably added to the problem here in Congress by
shifting responsibilities to the Department of State and not
adequately funding them in this area.
I do not know if this is an area that you are informed
about. If so, I would be anxious to hear your views. If not, I
would be anxious to just urge you to look at this and see if
you could bring some constructive recommendations to this
system.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I agree that it is something that has
to be looked at. It is an enormously complicated set of
problems of which I am only marginally informed. I have bumped
into it through the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission and
watching that set of issues. I have bumped into it through
business on a number of occasions. There has to be a balance
between national security interest and our obvious desire to be
able to encourage investment in this country to create advanced
technologies.
To the extent you inhibit that, you do not stop it. You
simply drive it offshore. A businessman can sit down in a room
in Chicago and decide if he wants to do research and
development in France or in Asia, in Japan or in Skokie,
Illinois. Just with a decision it gets changed one place or
another.
To the extent we are unwise and allow a system that needs
to be very dynamic because there is so much happening to be
static and prevent things that need not be prevented or delay
things to the point where people are unwilling to accept the
costs which delay imposes, then we damage ourselves, not just
economically. We also damage ourselves from a national security
standpoint because we force people to go offshore to develop
these technologies.
So we need to give that system a good look.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you, very much. My time has
expired.
Chairman Levin. We are going to recess now for 1 hour. We
will start with Senator Allard. The order of recognition for
all my colleagues is on a sheet of paper here, so you can see
where in that list you will come. We will stand recessed until
2:05.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m. the hearing was recessed.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Byrd, Cleland,
Landrieu, Warner, Inhofe, Allard, and Sessions.
Other Senators present: Senators Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben
Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Collins, and Bunning.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, counsel; and Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Charles S.
Abell, professional staff member; Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; John R. Barnes, professional staff
member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff member; William
C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward,
professional staff member; Lawrence J. Lanzillotta,
professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel; Joseph T. Sixeas,
professional staff member; Cord A. Sterling, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Eric H. Thoemmes,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Thomas C.
Moore, and Michele A. Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, Terrence E.
Sauvain, Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, and Erik Raven, assistants
to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland;
Jason Matthews and David Klain, assistants to Senator Landrieu;
Gregory C. McCarthy, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M.
Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Thomas A.
Vecchiolla, assistant to Senator Snowe; Robert Alan McCurry,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Charles Cogar, assistant to
Senator Allard; and Scott Douglass, assistant to Senator
Sessions.
Other Senate staff present: Richard Kessler, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Pete Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Sheila Murphy, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Larry
Smar, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Christopher Ford and Sam
Patten, assistants to Senator Collins; and Jeff Freeman,
assistant to Senator Cochran.
Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would echo the
comments that have been made by my colleagues on this
committee, Mr. Rumsfeld, about your qualifications. I do not
think anybody can legitimately question your qualifications,
and I am absolutely delighted with the President's appointment
in appointing you specifically as Secretary of Defense. I do
not see how you are going to apply the Rumsfeld's Rules over
there as Secretary of Defense when you testify before this
committee, and I respect your administrative capabilities, and
I think everybody here also recognizes those.
When you visited my office we shared our experiences. I
shared my experience on the NRO Commission. You shared your
experience as Chairman of the Space Commission. Both reports
are coming out with a recommendation. I guess the Space
Commission's report is coming out today, and ours, the NRO
Commission is already out that there needs to be, in fact it is
critical that there is a dialogue between the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I
just would hope that you would just for a moment at least
express to me how you feel about this and what you plan to do
to improve communications.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I thank you, and I know of your service
on the NRO Commission and, of course, have discussed it with
you. The international community is really not a community. It
is a set of organizations, the CIA and the NSA and the NRO and
the DIA and the Air Force, Army, and Navy Intelligence, the
State Department, the FBI, there are all kinds of pieces to it,
and I think to use the word community is an overstatement, and
because of the way the legislation, the way the funding works,
it is something that I think takes a lot of senior level
interaction so that things do not get bottlenecked.
There are some very complicated issues in rearranging our
intelligence-gathering to fit the new century, to fit the new
circumstance with proliferation, and I think that bureaucracies
do not like to change. They are terribly resistant to change,
and the only way they are going to change is if the very senior
people who meet regularly understand where each is going, and
recognizes the fact that each has responsibilities that cannot
be performed unless the two of them work together.
I suppose you could have perfect organizations and people
who are not too good and you are not going to have very good
organization or operation, and vice versa. You could have
organizations that are not perfect, but if you have people who
really care about it and are willing to force those issues
through the bureaucracies it could work pretty darned well, and
I just think that that is a start.
Senator Allard. With this election, there was a lot of
discussion about voting by members of the military, and I do
not know whether you have given this any thought or not, but I
was disturbed, I think as many members of this committee were
disturbed about credible attempts to disqualify certain
military votes, and most of these were due to hypertechnical
kinds of reasons, but in the legal community they are real
reasons, and I am wondering if you are going to give any
thought about how it is that we can make sure that that problem
does not get repeated again on military votes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I have discussed this with the
President-elect, and thought a bit about it. As you suggest, it
is complicated because of the role the States play, and not one
State but 50 States. I do think it is an enormously
discouraging thing for people serving overseas in the United
States Armed Forces to read in the paper that because there may
not be a postmark or some other issue, that their vote might
not be counted.
It is just not fair, it is not right, and we have to figure
out ways to do it, and I quite agree with you that if confirmed
that the Secretary of Defense should address the issue and put
in place some people to think that through and figure out what
kinds of recommendations might be made so that there is a high
confidence that the men and women in the Armed Services in fact
vote and have their votes counted.
Senator Allard. I just do not know that anybody has ever
really thought through just how those ballots may be handled,
getting from the base or where there will not be a post office
or maybe even a postmark getting them to their State where the
individual is registered to vote, so I appreciate your answer
on that.
On emerging threats, I think your 1998 ballistic missile
report threat, you indicate there is an emerging threat and it
is maturing more rapidly, and do you still believe the threat
is emerging and maturing more rapidly, and also what do you
perceive as our greatest threats?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Maturing more rapidly of course is relative.
More rapidly than the international community at that time had
anticipated, or had described. Our report, as you may recall,
followed the 1995 NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate which
Congress decided they wanted a second look at, so they
empaneled the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission. We did take
a look at it, and we came to a number of distinct disagreements
with that National Intelligence Estimate.
I do not think I would say it is currently evolving more
rapidly than the intelligence community believes, because since
our report we then followed it with an intelligence side letter
to the international community, and Director Tenet empaneled
the entire international community and we presented it, and
they have been addressing the kinds of things that we
suggested.
My impression is that more recent NIEs have begun to take
account of some of the suggestions made, and that I would
think, if you dropped a plumb line through the international
community today and asked where they are on this issue, I would
think that they are probably a lot closer to where we were than
they used to be.
Senator Allard. I have not had a chance to completely
review your Space Commission report, but from my briefings I am
going to be, I think, pleased with its findings. One of the
areas you talked about is vulnerability of our space assets,
and I am wondering if you can comment about the vulnerability
of our space assets and how you would manage that.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I have not had a chance to see the
final report, either. I was asked to become the nominee and I
had to resign from the commission, and the following days they
have completed it and printed it and they are now in the
process of briefing Members of the House and Senate and the
executive branch on that report.
Senator Warner. If I can interrupt, we are going to release
it at 2:30, and I am going to absent myself to go over for a
few minutes.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Adm. Dave Jeremiah, Steve Cambone, the staff
director, other members of the commission are going to be doing
that, but one of the things that became fairly clear is that we
have seen a significant growth in the use of space assets for
all kinds of things, clearly from a military standpoint but
also from a civil governmental standpoint as well as a civilian
private sector standpoint, and as you end up with this greater
degree of dependence on these assets you obviously become more
vulnerable to interruptions of those capabilities.
I forget what the number is, but something like 70 or 80 or
90 percent of the pagers in the country were out for a period
because of an interruption on a Galaxy satellite. We know that
Russia or former Russian republics are selling, in effect,
hand-held jammers that can jam satellite signals. We know that.
There is an organization in England that makes and puts in
space microsatellites that have a variety of capabilities for
lots of countries. They do it for--China has a relationship
with them, and many other countries do as well, and if you are
as dependent as our country is on space, you are, by
definition, vulnerable, more vulnerable than others, and it
seemed to the commission, unanimously, I might say, that that
calls for attention on the part of our country to see that we
have the ability to preserve those assets and defend the assets
in a way that we could have reasonable assurance that we are
going to not be dramatically inhibited, for example, in
presidential leadership during a pre-crisis buildup, that we
are going to be able to communicate with our military forces in
a way that is appropriate in a conflict, to say nothing of the
fact that our economy is so dependent today that significant
economic disruptions could occur, and I am not just referring
to space assets and space systems. I mean, ground stations as
well as these systems.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank, you Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, good morning and welcome to the committee. I
enjoyed our meeting last week and during the course of today's hearing,
I will broach a few of the issues we discussed.
I again look forward to hearing your views on the many important
subjects facing America and the military, but I hope the presence of
the media means that all of America will be introduced to you and your
achievements for the country. Further, I always look forward to any
opportunity when we have a chance to publicly discuss the many crucial
issues facing America's national security and military service members.
Mr. Secretary, as we all know, for the last several years you have
been involved with numerous commissions and studies, most notably your
work on the ``Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States'', and most recently the Space Commission. I carefully
studied the missile threat report, found it detailed, thoughtful, well
researched, and credible. I have been operating with it in my mind
whenever this committee deals with the missile defense issue. A new
administration is seen by many as our only chance for fixing a critical
flaw in our defense--a lack of NMD. Many of us are breathing a sigh of
relief that we might finally be entering a phase of concrete actions.
Better yet--actions with concrete.
Your other recent project, the Space Commission, is also of great
interest to myself and many others in Colorado. Colorado has a close
connection to military and civilian satellite launch and control. We
are aware of the competing needs of civilian, military and
intelligence. I don't want to get into the report too much for it is to
be released today. While I do not have all the details of the report
but from the briefing I received earlier, I am encouraged by the
findings and the forward thinking recommendations. I hope we can
continue to work together on these issues.
Finally, I note that at the press conference announcing your
nomination, President Elect Bush mentioned that one of his defense
goals was to ``strengthen the bond of trust between the American
president and those who wear our Nation's uniform.'' There has been a
real degradation in that area. I hope to see this rapidly addressed. I
will bring up this issue later in my questions.
Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your second tenure in the
Pentagon. I hope we have a productive hearing today and have already
concluded you run a tight ship. I am looking forward to hearing what
your ``Rumsfeld's Rules'' might be.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. Senator Landrieu is
next.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Congratulations
on your nomination. I look forward to working with you through
these hearings, and I just want to say that Senator Durbin's
and Senator Fitzgerald's comments go a long way with me. They
are a ringing endorsement, and my own personal knowledge of
your good work.
I just have a few questions. The first two have to deal
with the nuclear policies of our Nation. In your opening
statement, you made an excellent point about our need to invest
more money and more resources in our defense. I could not agree
with you more, and have a voting record to support that.
We need to make sure our money is spent wisely and well,
but the need to make new investments, to shore up our defenses
and to modernize them I think are crucial, and so I want to
commend you for that, and one of the ways that we will be able
to do that, there are really only two ways to identify new
moneys, or to redirect some of the moneys we are spending now
in new ways to make that goal that you have stated actually
come to pass, and of course one of the big cost drivers is our
nuclear strategic defenses.
Given that, and you are aware, because you served in this
position before, that we are prohibited by law from falling
below our START II levels, but we are coming upon several
crucial and costly, and our underlying costly decision points,
particularly regarding our Peacekeeper missile system, which
the Defense Department has recommended that we move past, if
you will.
I believe that it would make sense for our Nation to
establish a cost-effective and appropriate deterrent,
independent of anything Russia may do, because they have
already provisionally ratified the levels indicated by START
II, but it does not comport with our law, and so my question
is, do you believe that we need to hold to some artificially
mandated level of nuclear weapons, or in light of our great
need to find resources within our budget as well as add to
them, that there is some potential here for not only strategic
thinking but some good cost savings could be applied in other
ways, and would you be willing to explore or to comment today
about some of your thoughts regarding that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I certainly agree with you, we are
going to have to do both. We are going to have to find new
dollars in nontrivial amounts, and we also have to see that the
defense establishment functions in as cost-effective a way as
is humanly possible, and that we find savings, and third, we
are going to have to undoubtedly not do some things we have
been doing, because the nature of our world has changed, and we
are going to do some other things, and it certainly is at least
logical, although I cannot tell you what that is, it is logical
that we ought to be able to not keep on doing some of the
things we have been doing.
With respect to the numbers of weapons, it is not a subject
that I have engaged since the announcement a week or so ago.
The President-elect has commented on the subject of numbers of
weapons. We know that the Russian systems are very likely to be
declining in some numbers, apart from negotiations, apart from
agreements, simply because of their economic circumstance.
We also know that Russia is not the only nation in the
world that one needs to be attentive to. The Chinese are
increasing their--they have a very modest nuclear capability at
the present time, but they are increasing their budget in
double digits. They do have at least a publicly pronounced
desire to be a factor in strategic nuclear weaponry.
I do not know whether we can reduce or not. I suspect that
that will be part of the review, and in what numbers. I am
afraid that the likelihood is that any reduction--there is a
minimum below which you can go and maintain the kind of target
list that rational people think is appropriate. My guess is
that there are very likely not a lot of savings in that, but I
do not know that.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I look forward to working with you
on that, I think to be open to evaluate these questions from
the bottom up, because it brings me actually to my next point,
which is our targeting plan, which is our single integrated
operational plan, our SIOP plan which actually lays out the
nuclear targets and is one of the, for obvious reasons one of
the most carefully guarded secrets of our Nation.
I raise this issue to you today because one of our most
distinguished departing Members, Senator Bob Kerrey, who served
for many years on the Intelligence Committee, has been very
frustrated publicly and privately. Many times publicly on the
floor of the Senate and other places he has expressed his great
concern, and I wanted to express it for him as if he were here
today. This particular plan of targeting our nuclear weapons
has been unavailable to be reviewed by the leadership of our
committee, either Republican or Democrat, or even to the
highest level of congressional Intelligence Committee members.
While it is claimed under our law or rules that he has to
have reason to know, he, as the highest ranking member, was not
given the information in order to make rational decisions,
exactly what you said about not only what can we afford, but
what is an effective deterrent, what do we need to do to
maintain the safety of our citizens.
So my question would be, if you wanted to make a comment
about it today, but at least could you assure this committee
that you would be willing to work with the appropriate Members
of Congress, and not all Members would be on an equal footing
here, but the leadership of our committee and the Intelligence
Committee members particularly, to jointly review that, because
it has a direct bearing on the strategic posture that we either
take or not take, and is driven by the target.
So could you make a comment, please, for the record?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes. For the record, those are decisions that
I think are the President's, and it is not for me to opine as
to what extent, if at all, the current procedures ought to be
changed.
I do know that the U.S. plans are reviewed, admittedly by a
very small number of people in the executive branch, the
National command authorities. They are reviewed regularly. They
are changed as circumstances change in the world. As you
suggested, they are highly classified, and that is about all I
can say.
Senator Landrieu. My third question is, again commenting on
your opening statement, on your phrase that you would like to
try to help us develop weapons systems, I think--I do not know
the exact term you used, but taken off the shelf as opposed to
the more traditional ways we have developed, to try to get
weapons systems more quickly and more cost-effectively. I would
like to commend our current Under Secretary, Rudy de Leon, for
suggesting that we apply that same principle to the Reserve
units in trying to combat terrorism in cyber space, to actually
be able to access the brain power of the American people by
developing more strategic smart Reserve units instead of
developing that intelligence within the Defense Department to
actually, if you would, Mr. Secretary, be able to pull it off
the shelf.
So have you given any thought to perhaps strengthening our
Reserves in this way, that we could get the best and the
brightest minds in the United States to apply their great
ability and intellect to help us to fight this new front in a
smart, cost-effective way for the American people, and one that
I think would tend to be more successful, perhaps, than the old
ways that we are used to doing? Have you been briefed much
about this, or know much about what I am suggesting?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not been briefed on it, and it is not
a subject I have engaged personally. There is no question but
that cyber attacks and information warfare are an exceedingly
important subject for the country. They are important for the
private sector. They are important for the Government. They are
certainly important for the military. I had not addressed the
subject as to what role the Reserves and the Guard might play
in that, but it certainly is worth exploring.
Senator Landrieu. My time has expired. I would just urge
you to think about the strategy to solicit service from a core
of very talented, well-skilled individuals to bring to bear the
new abilities or talents we are going to need to fight the
threats of the future.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Landrieu.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask a
question, I wonder where we are on the possibility of moving
this nomination? I think it would be well if we have as much
support as it appears we have today for this extraordinary
nominee I think the world would well receive the fact that we
could promptly confirm him. Do you have any thoughts about how
we could move this nomination, if there are no objections, as
there appear to be? I think it would help the President-elect
and his team to get started as early as possible.
Chairman Levin. Technically, I think the nomination has to
be submitted by the new President. I think the first thing he
usually does after being sworn in is to sign a number of
nomination sheets and nominate his Cabinet officers. The
nomination then has to be received technically by the Senate.
Then, I believe it will be Chairman Warner's plan at that time,
probably the same day, but I do not want to speak for him, that
we try to meet even on Inauguration Day, if possible, to act on
and confirm, if we are ready at that point to act on and
confirm.
There is significant paperwork which we must go through.
The nominee is working very hard on it with all of us. It has
to be finished, too. I hope we can complete the hearing today,
but there is no guarantee of that. It depends upon how many
questions need to be asked that we have not had a chance to
ask. That is our goal. I agree with your point, in any event
even though it is not technically possible to even receive a
nomination until Inauguration Day, or act on it. We will act
promptly after we are legally able to act on this nomination,
because it does have, indeed, broad bipartisan support.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really believe
we should move on that, and there might be some uncertainty in
the world among those who--we had a prolonged election process,
and I think it might be good for stability if we could move as
promptly as possible.
I remember, when I was back in college, at Huntington
College where I attended, they introduced the old president as
a president proven and the new one as a president challenged,
and you are both a proven Secretary of Defense and a challenged
Secretary of Defense, so we are delighted to have you here. I
think your testimony has been superb. It is wise and thoughtful
and strong, and I know you know there are some real challenges
out there that have to be met.
One thing I would say is that Senator Lieberman's comments
really went to the heart of where we are, in my opinion. I
think this Nation has a serious problem with our defense
funding and structure, that in the past decade we have failed
to maintain adequate funding streams. We are paying salaries
and the like and that kind of thing, but really, recapitalizing
the military has not occurred as it should, and I asked
Secretary Cohen, your predecessor--who by the way was
extraordinarily cooperative with this Senate.
I was a new member of this committee and he just did a
great job of being forthcoming and helpful, and I would ask you
to do the same, and want to compliment him on the work that he
did, but he said this in answer to a question of mine. He said,
as I indicated before, Senator Sessions, ever since the height
of the Cold War we have seen a tremendous decline in defense
spending.
This was last year, and many on this committee and
throughout this body were urging a peace dividend, and we have
been enjoying the fruits of that peace dividend, but it has
come at the cost of relying on what President Reagan did in the
1980s as far as the buildup. We have been living off that, and
now we are at the point where we have to replace it.
Do you understand what he is saying, and would you tend to
agree with that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do, indeed. It is a surprise to me, when
you think about it, but when I was Secretary of Defense I went
to the roll-out for the F-16 and made the decision on the M-1
tank and the B-1 bomber, and that was a long time ago.
Senator Sessions. What we have is the question of how much
needs to be spent. It is my understanding that the number of
$45 billion that President Bush was reported to have estimated
that he would have to spend in addition was based on several
programs he intended to initiate, did not represent his full
commitment to spending more for defense, but I think Senator
Lieberman rightly suggests it is going to take a lot more than
that and a lot more than the $100 billion over 10 years that
was--and I think, Mr. Rumsfeld, that it--and I will ask you to
respond to it, it is going to be your duty, and I think you
have the credibility and the competence to evaluate this
Defense Department to analyze the threats we are facing in the
world, to comprehend what can be done technologically and how
much money can be saved wherever it can be saved, and then I
think it will be your duty to come back to this committee and
use all the credibility that you have to sell this committee
and this Nation on the amount of funding we are going to need
to maintain the strength of the United States in the 21st
century.
How would you respond to that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. First, your understanding of President-elect
Bush's comments about budget are exactly mine, that he
identified some particular things he wanted to see funded. He
priced them, and he mentioned the price tag. I do not believe
that he suggested that that was the totality of what he had in
mind, because he was asked for a defense review and promised
that as well, and that is something that of course has not been
done, and until that has been done, it is clearly not possible
to come up with the numbers.
I think second, with respect to the numbers, I do not know
what the number is, but I have an impression that goes not to
the total number over the 5-year period, but the impression is
that we need some money up-front, and we may very well have to
come back with a supplemental or something that would indicate
the needs that exist now so that--because there have been
things that have been pushed off, as has been mentioned here,
for example, the shipbuilding budget and some other things,
science and technology and others that have been mentioned.
Senator Sessions. There has been a lot put off and, in
fact, we had testimony from one official, one General on
research and development. He used the phrase, we are eating our
seed corn. I am now looking at a National Association for the
Advancement of Science survey, historical table on the amount
of money spent for research and development. Since 1989 in real
dollars, not inflated dollars, in actual dollars, the amount of
DOD research has dropped 20 percent, while other research in
nondefense departments and agencies are up 50 percent. Senator
Bingaman raised that point.
I really do believe that we got squeezed to pay for lights,
to pay for salaries. We were cutting, eating our seed corn. We
were cutting back on things that are going to come back to
haunt us and are going to cost us more money today than it
would have if we had started on a 6 or 8-year program of
research and development.
One more thing and I will give up this questioning. One
expert has said that the post-Cold War, the references to the
post-Cold War foreign policy are really a statement, an
admission that we have not developed a post-Cold War foreign
policy. Is it your opinion, briefly, that we do need to develop
a more comprehensive foreign policy in this post-Cold War
environment that the American people and this Congress can
rally behind?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I certainly agree, but by agreeing I do not
want to suggest that it is easy. There are some who look at our
current period and characterize it as a transition out of the
Cold War into something that is still ahead. There are others
who suggest that possibly history might indicate that this is
it, that we are not transitioning to something else, but what
we are in now is what we will be in for a period, and that if
that is true, and I am certainly not one who can suggest that I
know the answer, but if it is true, it puts a much greater
urgency on fashioning policies and standards and some flags we
can plant down ahead so that we as a country can point
directionally and know how to arrange ourselves to function and
live with a maximum degree of safety and stability during that
period.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you have been around this
track before, and I appreciate your presence here today, and I
compliment the President-elect on nominating you. Certainly it
is my present intention to support you.
My time is brief, and so I will get right into a question.
The Department of Defense continues to confront pervasive and
complex management problems due to its inadequate financial
management systems. This can greatly diminish the efficiency of
the military services operations.
Since 1995, the DOD's financial management has been on the
General Accounting Office's list of high-risk areas vulnerable
to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. While the Department
has made progress in a number of areas of its financial
management operations, no major part of DOD's operations has
yet been able to pass the test of an independent financial
audit.
The Chief Financial Officers' Act of 1990, as amended by
the Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 requires the
Department of Defense to prepare annual audited financial
statements. Nevertheless, 10 years after the enactment of the
CFO Act of 1990, the Department of Defense has yet to receive a
clean audit opinion on its financial statements.
A recent article in the Los Angeles Times, written by a
retired vice admiral and a civilian employee in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, accused the Secretary of Defense of
being unable to account for the funds that Congress
appropriates to it. The authors wrote, and I quote in part,
quote, the Pentagon's books are in such utter disarray that no
one knows what America's military actually owns or spends. That
is the close of my extract.
The thrust of this Los Angeles Times article is backed up
by the DOD's own Inspector General's financial audit for fiscal
year 1999. I have a copy of that here in my hand. I assume you
have seen it.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not. I cannot even say I look forward
to seeing it. [Laughter.]
Senator Byrd. Well, I will look forward to hearing what you
have to say about it after you have seen it. [Laughter.]
That audit report found that out of $7.6 trillion in
Department-level accounting interest, $2.3 trillion in entries
either did not contain adequate documentation or were
improperly reconciled, or were made to force buyer and seller
data to agree.
This DOD IG report is very disturbing. Last year, according
to the General Accounting Office, the Pentagon reported that it
did not expect to have the necessary assistance in place to be
able to prepare financial statements for 3 more years. That was
last year. We are now advised that the Pentagon is currently
telling the Office of Management and Budget that it will take
them until the year 2005 or 2006.
Now, I also note in the Washington Post of January 9, 2001,
this sentence, which I extract from an article titled, ``Bush
Talks Defense with Key Members of Congress.'' Here is the
sentence: The chiefs of the Armed Services have said that they
need a budget increase of more than $50 billion a year to
modernize their forces. That figure dwarfs the $4.5 billion in
added defense spending proposed by Bush during the campaign.
Now, if the Pentagon cannot account for what it is doing
this year, how can it hope to improve its operations next year?
As Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, thank God, now for
17 days----[Laughter.]
I seriously question an increase in the Pentagon budget,
and in the face of the Department's recent Inspector General's
report how can we seriously consider a $50 billion increase in
the defense budget when DOD's own auditors say the Department
cannot account for $2.3 trillion in transactions in 1 year
alone?
Now, $2.3 trillion I would readily assume is a large amount
of money. According to my old style math, there have been 1
billion minutes, give or take a little, it will not make much
difference, since Jesus Christ was born, 1 billion minutes, and
according to that same old math, $2.3 trillion, which the
Department cannot account for in 1 year alone, would amount to
$2,300 per minute for every minute since Jesus Christ was born.
Now perhaps we can begin to understand the magnitude of $2.3
trillion.
So why is this happening? Of course, I would not expect you
to be able to answer that question. The state of affairs did
not occur on your watch, but you are inheriting it. Now, my
question to you is, Mr. Secretary, what do you plan to do about
this?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Decline the nomination. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned in that case.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, I have heard some of that and read
some of that, that the Department is not capable of auditing
its books. It is--I was going to say, terrifying. It is such a
monumental task. I have met with two former officials of the
Pentagon who served in the budget and control areas, and I have
mused over the fact that I have read some of these things and
asked what they thought.
One insight that I got was that to a certain extent the
financial systems have been fashioned and designed to report on
requirements that they receive from various organizations and
they have not been fashioned and designed for financial
management the way you would in a corporation. I do not know
whether that is a useful insight or not, but it is something
that is rattling around in my head, and certainly something
that I think--I doubt, to be honest, that people inside the
Department are going to be capable of sorting this out.
I have a feeling it is going to take some folks from
outside to come in and look at this and put in place a process
that over a period--and I regret to say, but I have seen how
long things take. I think it is going to take a period of years
to sort it out, and it will probably take the cooperation of
Congress to try to get the system so that you can actually
manage the financial aspects of that institution, rather than
simply report on things that have happened imperfectly.
That is not a satisfactory answer, but I hear you. I
recognize the problem and, if it is not solved, I hope at least
that when I leave, if I am confirmed, that it will be better
than it was when I came in.
Senator Byrd. My time is up, but Mr. Secretary, I have
every confidence in you. I think I have the duty to request and
to urge, and I am sure that my colleagues on both sides here
join me, and I am sure as well that you do, because you have
indicated the enormity of the task, and I think this may have
come, perhaps, not as a surprise to you, but you have not seen
it. Will you pledge to make balancing the Pentagon's books a
topmost priority? The simple answer is yes, but I would like to
hear your answer.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I do not know that I can assure you it
will be the topmost priority, but it will certainly be among
the top priorities. It simply must be done for the National
security interests of the country, as well as from the
standpoint of the taxpayers of the country.
Senator Byrd. Absolutely, and let me close by saying that,
as an appropriator, I cannot have much confidence in the budget
request when we have such a track record as we see here, and
the Joint Chiefs come up here and ask for $50 billion, even
$4.5 billion more, whatever it is. I, as an appropriator, and I
would think every member of the Appropriations Committee, would
have to look with a jaundiced eye, perhaps not on some specific
items, with which they are perhaps more acquainted, but with
the overall--it is a terrible record, and it is preposterous
that the Defense Department does not know what has happened to
this money.
But I thank you for your testimony, and I hope you will do
everything you can to set this thing in order and put the
Pentagon's house in order in this regard.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld, I
want to start by echoing the praise of my colleagues in
congratulating you on your appointment, which I hope very much
that you will not decline, and to also commend the President-
elect for making such an outstanding choice.
I want to start with a comment before going to a couple of
other issues, and I want to follow up with the exchange you had
with Senator Kennedy, in that I share both yours and Senator
Kennedy's concerns about the current shipbuilding rates. They
do not support the goal of a 300-ship naval fleet, as
identified by the last QDR and the Clinton administration's
defense budgets have been gradually taking the Navy not toward
a 300-ship Navy but ultimately toward a considerably smaller
fleet.
To make the challenge confronting the new administration
and the new Congress even more stark, even a 300-ship Navy has
been increasingly recognized as inadequate to meet the
increased operational and deployment requirements that we face.
In addition, recent press reports indicate that the DD-21, the
Navy's revolutionary new destroyer program, may be among the
Pentagon programs most at risk of procurement budget cuts.
Now, I know from our brief conversation that you have not
yet had an opportunity to review specific procurement programs,
but I do want to express my concern about the direction that
shipbuilding is heading, or has been heading in, and seek your
commitment to reverse that direction, and to look to increasing
our shipbuilding budget. I believe you gave that kind of
commitment to Senator Kennedy in your earlier exchange, is that
correct?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Indeed, I share your interest and concern,
and if we are each year building fewer ships than are necessary
to maintain the kind of Navy that this country needs, then we
are damaging ourselves, and we are damaging our national
security.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you closely in that area.
Last month, Mr. Rumsfeld, I accompanied Secretary of
Defense Bill Cohen on a holiday trip to visit our servicemen
and women in Kosovo and Bosnia. We brought with us entertainers
such as the Dallas Cowboy cheerleaders, which I will readily
concede the servicemen were far more interested in talking to
than they were in talking to United States Senators and Members
of Congress.
Nevertheless, I did have the opportunity to speak with
members of our active duty components, as well as reservists
and members of the National Guard who were stationed in Bosnia
and Kosovo, and while morale generally appeared to be high, I
nevertheless heard many accounts of the effects of the
increased operational tempo on the lives of those who are
serving, their families and, in the case of reservists and
guardsmen, their employers.
I was concerned about what I heard, because of the
implications for retaining and recruiting men and women to
serve in the military. For example, I spoke to one young
Reservist from my home State who had returned to his family
after an assignment in the Middle East, only to be called on
again to be sent to the Balkans.
In addition, a young naval officer from my home State
recently resigned after 12 years in the Navy because continuous
9-month periods of sea duty proved too great a burden on his
growing family.
I am told that the Army is currently considering reducing
its overseas assignments to periods of 120-days, and that other
services, including the Guard and the Reserves, may adopt
similar models. I realize that this issue really ties to the
underlying issue of peacekeeping forces and these daunting and
protracted missions we have undertaken, but I wonder if you
support looking at ways that we can ease the burden on our
young men and women who are serving so far from home for such
protracted periods.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, indeed. In any organization that does
not use conscription or force to have people work there you
have to fashion the sort of incentives that will enable you to
attract and retain the people you need to run that activity in
an efficient and cost-effective way. I do not know what the
number is, but I think it was Senator McCain who mentioned the
attrition rates with respect to our young captains. I think it
is something like 12, 13, 14 percent.
My goodness. That has to tell anybody that we are doing
something wrong. We simply cannot have that kind of churning
when you train and develop and have this fine talent and then
lose it. It costs so much to bring people through the intake,
bring them along, get them experience, train them, and then you
lose them, and so we have to arrange ourselves so that we have
a high confidence that we can attract and retain the people we
need, and that is a mixture of things.
It is a mixture of how they feel about their Government,
and how they feel about the defense establishment. It is partly
how their families are functioning and whether or not they feel
that they are able to do what they need to do for their
families. As you suggested, the operations tempo can be a
difficult thing, time away from families. It is pay, it is
health, it is education, it is a whole host of things,
opportunity, and it is also feeling that the country cares and
appreciates what they have done and what they are doing.
Senator Collins. You are absolutely right about that, and I
did in my discussions with the young men and women whom I met--
I was so impressed with their pride and their professionalism,
their dedication to their jobs, and many of them want to stay
in the service, or they want to continue in the Guard, and we
need to figure out ways to deal with the very real family
concerns they have, and I appreciate the fact that you
obviously acknowledge that and are committed to looking at
that.
I want to raise quickly just one final issue. The Defense
Department has for years tried to take steps to reduce the
physical and electronic security, or the vulnerability of its
communications satellites, but in recent conflicts such as
Kosovo, and even in peacetime, it is my understanding that the
military has come to depend more and more heavily upon
commercial communications satellites.
It seems to me the Defense Department needs a stronger
effort to work with the private sector and other appropriate
parties to improve the safety, not just of our military
satellite communication links, but of civilian ones as well,
and I would be interested in knowing whether this is a priority
area for you and whether you have any plans in this regard.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It is an area of interest to me. I am
certainly not an expert. We do know that commercial
capabilities in this area have for the most part no hardening
or no ability to survive mischief and attacks. We also know
that properly, in my view, the United States Government,
including the military, are using more and more and should use
more and more civilian capabilities for communications, for
imagery, for a variety of things. It is efficient. They are
good at it.
On the other hand, we have to be certain that we have
secure systems so that we are not blinded at critical times. It
is an area that I do intend to interest myself in, and I thank
you for bringing it up.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Collins, thank you.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, before the Senator responds,
may I ask consent that the audit report to which I referred in
my questions be included in the record, report number D-2000-
179, dated August 18, 2000?
Chairman Levin. It will be made a part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I ask my opening statement be placed in the
record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am honored to join the committee for today's hearing. I want to
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing me with the opportunity to
participate today.
I look forward to working with you and Senator Warner and the other
distinguished members on this committee to address issues involving our
National Security and our Armed Forces, beginning with the confirmation
hearing for the Secretary of Defense.
The Department of Defense has a substantial impact on my home State
of Hawaii. We proudly have military installations from every Armed
Service branch in the State of Hawaii.
We have traditionally had a very good relationship with the United
States military, and I look forward to continuing to work with the
Department of Defense in fostering these relationships.
I am familiar with Mr. Rumsfeld's experience, accomplishments and
impressive record, including his service as the chair of the U.S.
Ballistic Missile Threat Commission.
I look forward to hearing more from Mr. Rumsfeld on his vision for
our Nation's security and military preparedness, and again, I thank my
colleagues on the committee for welcoming me to participate today.

Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, we are sitting in this hearing
with a man who has had tremendous experience, and has had lots
of confidence given by others, and is now being considered for
Defense Secretary. After reading your bio, I think that this is
the kind of person we would expect much from because of your
experience. I think, talking about deals, I think we have a
good deal in hand with you.
In the Pacific and in other areas, we have had some issues,
and besides issues of appropriate funding, issues of the
criteria for the deployment of U.S. troops, and necessary
situations. There have been issues in the community regarding
encroachment, including the importance of dealing with
communities surrounding military installations and training
ranges, and the environmental constraints on training ranges.
I must tell you that in Hawaii we have had over the years,
as long as I can remember, very, very good relationships with
the military. We work well together. We live well together. We
respect the leadership of the military, and they have helped us
out in many ways.
Now, they have really tried to deal with our communities as
well, so encroachment is an issue. I understand you intend to
deal with these issues in a more comprehensive and systematic
fashion, and that you are open to work with all parties
involved, so my question to you is, how do you intend to
implement a more comprehensive approach to these issues?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I wish I had an answer that represented
a solution to the problems. As you properly point out, not just
in the United States, including Puerto Rico, and Japan, and in
other parts of the world where the United States Armed Forces
has a presence there are pressures and difficulties that run to
this issue that is characterized as encroachment.
I do not know the way the encroachment goes, whether the
base is encroaching or the community is encroaching on the
base, which happens to be historically the case in most
instances, but it is a problem that is real, it is serious. The
United States needs bases, it needs ranges, it needs test
ranges, and it cannot provide the training and the testing that
people need before they go into battle unless those kinds of
facilities are available, and each year that goes by there are
greater and greater pressures on them.
Admittedly, I suspect, and I do not know enough to say, but
I suspect that, as with many things, there are ways that
technology can assist us in these areas that will enable the
military to do things that they need to do that they used to do
physically that they will be able to do with computers and
various other types of technologies. Certainly that is true
with all kinds of simulations and what-have-you, but you cannot
do everything, and you do need to do live fire for people
before they go into battle to have some sense of what that is
like.
I am afraid it is not so much a problem as a fact of our
times that, not to be solved, but to be coped with over a
period of time. I think it is going to be a constant pressure
on the defense establishment, and all we can do is our best.
Senator Akaka. I was glad to hear your commitment to
research and development, and how you feel about not standing
still, or static, but in order to move ahead we must move into
areas like that.
You also mentioned in your response to Senator Kennedy the
book on the Corona satellite program. I feel that space and the
military, of course, can work so much together. What role, if
any, do you see for the new commercial satellite imaging
industry to supplement our classified systems?
Mr. Rumsfeld. My impression is that the United States
Government, including the military, will and should be
increasingly using commercially available capabilities,
satellite capabilities. Whether it is communications or
imagery, there are a great many instances when you could take
available off-the-shelf products and services of the type and
use them to great effect.
Senator Akaka. I know you are well-versed in missile
defense. In your response to the committee's advance policy
questions you state, before deploying a national defense,
missile defense, a factor to be considered is, and I quote,
``the urgency of the ballistic missile threat to the United
States.'' How do you assess the urgency of that threat now, and
has it changed since the Rumsfeld Commission report?
Mr. Rumsfeld. The Ballistic Missile Threat Commission I
think have the subject right, and I think that has been agreed
to by both Secretary Cohen and by others. What has happened in
the intervening 2 years is that time has passed. Proliferation
has continued. People have advanced in their development
programs of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
I do not believe it possible to stop the proliferation of
things we do not want proliferated. I think we ought to try,
and we ought to work hard at it, but the reality is today that
in this relaxed environment, and so much available on the
Internet, and so many people willing to sell almost anything
for a price, that we have to learn to live in that world, and
we are capable of living in that world. There is no question
but that we can do it, and so I think that time passes, and
capabilities grow.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. My time is up. I just
want you to know that you have my support.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to
say that I am honored to serve with all of the other people on
this committee, this esteemed Senate Armed Services Committee.
It has been a promise I made to my constituents, and a desire
of mine since coming to the Senate 2 years ago, to serve on
this great committee, and I am very happy to be here.
Second, Secretary Rumsfeld, welcome. It is good to see you.
Assuming you are confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense, I
am looking forward to working with you and your Department of
Defense.
Of course, the United States has the strongest military in
the world. There is no arguing that fact. However, our biggest
challenge may be to keep it strong, and to redefine it in this
new century.
It has been said that our military is stressed,
overdeployed, and underfunded. Many talk of the last 10 years
as the decade of decline for our military. I hope you find it
not to be true.
I look forward to this committee and Congress working with
you to take on the tough issues regarding missile defense, the
readiness of our military, particularly recruitment and
retention, and the overall wellbeing and safety of our
citizens, soldiers, and Nation.
Over the past 8 years, I have watched generals and officers
come before this committee and testify about the readiness and
overall strength of the military. Time and facts have proven
that they were either ill-informed or not giving Congress the
full picture as to what really was happening, for whatever
reasons, with our military.
I simply ask you that you urge those under your watch to
tell us the truth, the good, the bad, and sometimes the ugly,
for only with the truth can we help to shape a military through
policy and funding that is strong and ready to protect this
Nation with peace through strength throughout the world.
Now, I am looking forward to working with you. As I stated,
over the last 8 years many generals have testified before this
committee regarding the overall readiness, strength, and
quality of our military. Time and facts have proven the
generals were either ill-informed or not fully up-front with
the committee, and things turned out worse than they had
testified. Therefore, we in Congress made decisions about
funding and policy based on the words of those generals. What
will you do to make sure that this does not happen again under
your watch?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I suppose for one thing, if I find that
people are telling Congress something that is not so, you will
not find them back up here telling Congress anything.
Senator Bunning. We can count on that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator Bunning. Senator Allard talked about this, but I
think it needs to be reiterated, about the military ballots,
particularly voting by our soldiers on bases. We know that
there was a proposal to not allow our military to vote on
bases, and Congress stopped that and allowed it to happen for
one more year.
I would like to ask you the question if you think that is
the right or wrong thing to do, that we continue to extend the
privilege to our military to vote on base?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not know enough about it to answer. I am
not an attorney. I do not know the extent to which State law
governs, and I am simply not current, and I should be, and I
will get current.
Senator Bunning. Can you give me a general idea about your
thinking about military people voting on bases, if it is legal?
Mr. Rumsfeld. If it is legal, sure. I just do not know
enough about the legalities, but I think that in our country we
like to have people participate in the elections of our
country, and certainly people who are serving in the Armed
Services ought to be treated at least equally in terms of
having an opportunity to vote.
To the extent the defense establishment can find ways to
facilitate the ease of that voting, I think we ought to try to
do that, and to the extent we cannot because of legalities, I
think it is perfectly proper to recommend to other entities,
whether it is the White House or State and local governments,
that this is our view and we would hope that they would take
steps to provide so that men and women of the Armed Forces can,
in fact, vote.
Senator Bunning. This is a more localized question. This is
about Fort Knox, which is a training and doctrine post, and the
U.S. Army Recruiting Command is located there as well. When
initial entry trainees come to Recruiting Command at Fort Knox
they see 50-year-old barracks that are run down and literally
patched together. Fort Knox has the oldest entry training
barracks in the Army, with no barracks being built since before
the Korean War.
Despite that fact, Knox has been absent on TRADOC's list of
recommended posts to receive new training barracks or a
Starbase complex which integrates barracks, classrooms, and
dining facilities and other soldier components. How will you go
about assessing the condition of trainee barracks in
recommending new construction of training barracks complexes
for the Army?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I suppose the first thing to do would
be to try and see if we can find the best possible people to
serve in the posts of leadership in the Army that share the
concern you have expressed about the circumstances of these
barracks. That is a part of the broader question we were
talking about earlier.
This establishment will not function if we do not have
talented people, and talented people are simply not going to
accept an environment for themselves and their families and a
circumstance that drives them away from the military. We need
people who we can attract and retain, and who are proud to be
there and available to be there.
Senator Bunning. My last question, I read in your answers
to the committee policy questions that you cannot fully give
your opinion on whether you do or do not support another round
of base closures because you are awaiting the DOD's next
defense review. I have been seeking answers as to whether or
not the last round of BRAC has saved money, or whether or not
we have reduced our strength and readiness. I have never
received any real answers with numbers either way.
We all know the policies of BRAC, but I hope in your tenure
as Secretary of Defense you can illustrate to us the realities
and simple facts as to how past base closures and possible
future ones have and will affect the taxpayers and the
military, because no one has ever shown me actual numbers on
the actual savings of the last BRAC, so before I ever look at
anything new I want to see the old.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I am sure that there must be data. My
general impression on the subject is that there is no question
but that savings result from adjusting base structures to fit
force structures. There is also no question but that they tend
not to occur in the first or second year. They tend to come out
over a period of time, so there is a cost factor. There is also
a factor of military efficiency, and both benefit, the former
being somewhat more easy to quantify than the latter.
Senator Bunning. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bunning.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this
opportunity to appear at today's confirmation hearing, even
though my membership on the committee is not fully official,
and should I serve on the committee I would be honored to be a
part, and I look forward to it.
I have been tremendously impressed, Mr. Rumsfeld, with your
knowledge of the whole subject of national defense, your
concern about readiness, your concern about budget realities,
the external and internal security risks, and those
unpredictable circumstances which are always there, and at this
point in time virtually every question that could be asked
seems as though it has been asked, and I do not want to be
redundant, but there are a couple of questions that I would
like to ask you.
First of all, I think it was Senator Cleland who mentioned
that defense does not poll very high among the public. Maybe
that is because the public seems to be falsely secure when we
are not. There are different kinds of threats today, as you
have indicated, and there are limited resources to deal with
those threats, so my first question is, do you have some plans
that would engage and raise the public awareness and interest
in the importance of the kind of defense we need to provide for
today's world to get more resources and more money to be
supported for national defense?
It is always a challenge when there are limited resources
and seem to be unlimited demands in all kinds of areas, and I
wonder if you do have some specific plans to make the public
far more aware of the need for these increased resources.
The second question is, it has been often said that someone
who takes on a new challenge can bring to it one big idea, and
while you have been very generous with your thoughts about all
of the realities that we are dealing with and what you propose
to do, to the extent that you know at the present time, I would
like to ask, do you have one big idea, and if you do, what is
it? You can choose which order you prefer to respond.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, let me just make a comment on the first
point you have posed while I think about the second. With
respect to the first, I do not think there is any one person
who is going to help our country and, indeed, our allies as
well fully understand what needs to be done and why. It is a
task that takes a lot of people, multiple centers of leadership
in Europe and Asia and in this Congress, in the executive
branch.
I give President-elect Bush high marks on the
pronouncements he has made with respect to national defense,
and I think that that is a good start. That bully pulpit of the
White House is an important place, and we need leadership there
that is sensitive to these issues and concerned about them.
We all know that history is filled with instances where
people were surprised. There were plenty of signals, plenty of
warnings, plenty of cautions, but they were not taken aboard.
They did not register. They were not sufficient to cause a
person to act on those concerns. It was not that the
information was not there. It just did not register.
It happens to people in businesses. They go along, and
pretty soon they do not see all those warning signs out there
and they do not act on it. We see it in families when a
youngster goes wrong, and when do you step in and do something,
or try to do something?
We know that the thing that tends to register on people is
fear, and we know that that tends to happen after there is a
Pearl Harbor. It tends to happen after there is a crisis, and
that is too late for us. We have to be smarter than that. We
have to be wiser than that. We have to be more forward-looking.
So I would throw that back and say, it is going to take
you, and it is going to take every member of this committee,
and it is going to take Presidents, and it is going to take our
friends in other countries to make sure that we understand that
it is a world full of hope and opportunity, but it is also a
world filled with dangers, and there are different kinds, and
we need to be attentive to them, and I think we can be wise
enough to do that.
There is a wonderful book on Pearl Harbor by Roberta
Wohlstetter, and a forward by Dr. Schelling, that talks about
this problem of seeing things happen and not integrating them
in your mind and saying, yes, we need to be doing something
about that now, that I reread periodically because it is so
important.
As to a single big idea, I do not know, but it may be this.
It may be that one of the biggest things we have to do is what
I mentioned earlier, and that is, recognize that the deterrence
of the Cold War worked. Those deterrents very likely will not
work as well or as broadly as we will need during the period of
this era of globalization, or post-Cold War period, or whatever
we are going to end up calling it, that the problems are
different, and the demands will be different, and that we as a
people have an obligation to be smart enough to think about
those things and to see that we get arranged as a defense
establishment with our allies so that in fact we dissuade
people from doing things.
We do not want to win wars, we want to prevent them. We
want to be so powerful and so forward-looking that it is clear
to others that they ought not to be damaging their neighbors
when it affects our interests, and they ought not to be doing
things that are imposing threats and dangers to us, and I think
we can do that, but I think it is going to take some fresh
thinking.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Next, under our early bird rule, is Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you very much for your support in my obtaining a spot on
this esteemed committee. I understand Senator Warner's dismay
about the expansion of the membership after seeing how long it
takes to move once around the cycle here.
Senator Warner. I did not express dismay, I expressed
appreciation to so many Senators wanting to come on. In years
past we used to be like the old Navy. We went out and pressed
them out of the bars and dragged them in. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. He was not referring to Senators in bars,
by the way.
Senator Dayton. As you can see, if you were to cut it any
finer, I would be the one who would be cut off, but feeling my
lofty 100th position in seniority I can see I am going to be
sitting at the end of a lot of tables for the next couple of
years.
But Mr. Rumsfeld, I join with the others in congratulating
you for your willingness to take on this huge responsibility.
Your career in both the public sector and the private sector is
certainly admirable, and as a citizen and a public servant I
think to combine those careers with the longevity of years is
extraordinary, and I wish you well, and I do not presume to
have the expertise that my colleagues here or you have, so my
questions are inquisitory, not meant to be presumptive.
I know that you said in your opening statement, you talked
about the timetable, the cycle time for the development of new
major projects, now 8, 9 years, and how that pace has slowed
while technology has accelerated. To what do you attribute that
lengthening delay, and what would you think might be some of
the approaches to improving it?
Mr. Rumsfeld. It is interesting to me that this is the
case. We have seen in the sixties things could go from concept
to deployment in a very short period of time. They had much
more flexibility with respect to acquisition.
There was much greater secrecy, and there was much greater
urgency, quote-unquote, perceived urgency which allowed much
more flexibility in acquisition rules and much greater secrecy,
so at a time when those numbers have gone from a year or 2 to 8
or 9, and in a period when technologies--in those days took 5,
10, 8 years to change.
Today they are changing in a year, so you have those two
things conspiring to produce equipment that when it is there is
not the most advanced possible. There has to be a way to
shorten that process.
Business is finding ways to do it. Silicon Valley has
dozens of ways to do it. I do not know, beyond what I have
said, that in some cases I think you leapfrog systems, but in
other cases I think you probably keep platforms and leapfrog
elements of that and provide flexibility as advanced
technologies come along.
We are going to have to do it. We cannot simply be spending
money to produce things that are going to be behind the curve.
We have to find ways to do it.
It sure will not be Don Rumsfeld that will figure it out,
but if I am lucky we will find people who are smart enough and
a lot smarter than I am to put down and screw their head into
it and then come up to Congress and talk about how we can
adjust these systems so that they will work in the environment
we are in, which is much more rapidly paced.
Senator Dayton. It has certainly done a lot for Minnesota
business. The difficulty and the length of time and the
cumbersome procurement requirements, bidding contracts,
procedures, anything that can be done it seems to me to reduce
by two-thirds or more the amount of paperwork requirements and
therefore the timetables involved will benefit the private
sector as well as the Government.
Perhaps related to that, you talked also about the need to
try to have the technological systems of the various services
better coordinated. You talked about, I think your phrase was,
borne jointly, where they would start again, given the
disparity of the services and the contracting procedures, like,
how realistically are you going to effectuate it. I cannot get
my Washington office computers and my Minnesota office
computers joint at this point yet, so when you talk about the
complexity of what you are doing, isn't that problem going to
get worse?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I am having the same problem with my
computers, but it could. I mean, we have to see that the
services can talk to each other. They simply must be able to do
that, and the effort that occurred really well after my watch
on, quote, jointness, has I think made strides in that
direction.
But I mean, your point about the private sector, the
Government of the United States has not been a good customer.
We have not been a good interactor with the defense industry.
It is not an accident. The last time I looked the three top
defense contractors in size, Boeing and Raytheon and Lockheed,
had a market cap that was less than Wal-Mart. Now, why is that?
Because doing business with the Government is not a great deal.
Senator Dayton. I might prefer that you stick with the
analogy of Target, but I would not quarrel with you.
[Laughter.]
In your response to the questions you were asked about the
international criminal court, and particularly the Rome Accord.
You said you opposed it. Is it that you oppose that concept in
the entirety, or oppose the particular framework of the Rome
Accord? What is your position, sir?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not have the letter I signed along with
George Shultz and a host of Republicans and Democrats
expressing our concern about that, but if I am not mistaken
President Clinton has recently signed that and announced he was
not going to send it to the Senate, is that correct? I think
that is right.
Again, I am not an international lawyer, but my view of it
was that it posed a risk to the men and women in the Armed
Services that they could be doing the bidding of the United
States Government and the United States Senate and be hauled
before an international court for war crimes, and it concerned
me, and it concerned a whole series of former Secretaries of
State and Secretaries of Defense, which is the reason we signed
the letter.
The current status of the situation as I understand it is
that the President has signed it and said that he had concerns
about it and was not going to send it to the Senate for
ratification. I am further advised that a signed agreement like
that, even though not ratified, has standing, standing in the
sense that if you sign it and it is not ratified, you take unto
yourself the obligation not to undermine it and to support it
and to behave reasonably in accordance with it. That concerns
me, so I am uncomfortable with the position that President
Clinton has taken.
I am not the nominee for Secretary of State, nor am I the
President-elect. It is up to them to take--in the National
Security Council context to consider this, and my understanding
is that President-elect Bush has indicated that is what will
happen, that he will not send it up either, but whether or not
he wants to leave it stand I think is an issue that the
National Security Council would engage at some point in the
future, and I would need to know a lot more than I currently
know.
Senator Dayton. My time has expired. Just quickly, we are
sending you up there with all of the responsibilities, all this
good advice. We talked just before this afternoon about your
going there essentially by yourself. What can this committee do
to help you get underway most productively over the next couple
of months?
Mr. Rumsfeld. If I get through this process and it looks
like I am going to be confirmed, then the next order of
business is twofold. One is to get briefed up by the fine
people who have been serving there and understand what the
circumstance is, and the second is to come to some judgments as
to who I think ought to be recommended to President-elect Bush
for nominees, and there are an enormous number of critical jobs
that need to be filled.
With a backlog in clearances and a backlog in FBI
approvals, and the amount of time it takes to get through the
Office of Government Ethics, and the amount of time it takes to
process a human being through this thing, the odds are, if I
get there, I will be there alone, without another soul that has
been brought in to help, and you have to be very careful about
bringing people in on a temporary basis to help you, because of
the assumptions and presumptions, and because they have not
been confirmed by the Senate they are really not in a position
to make decisions.
So we have a strange complication here, where we are kind
of tangled up on ourselves. On the 20th we are going to have a
President of the United States in office, and who knows how
many of his Cabinet will be there. He cannot even nominate
until he is sworn in, as the chairman said. I do not know what
the answer is.
As I said earlier, I know that I am just one human being,
and there is no way I can do that job down there. The only way
I can ever do anything in my life is to find the best talent
around.
Chairman Levin. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, this is a pleasure for
me to be a member of your committee, one in which you and the
next chairman operate in such a bipartisan manner, and I am
privileged and honored to be a part of the committee.
Mr. Secretary--I will call you that ahead of time--welcome.
Clearly, the issue of terrorism is going to be one that is
going to be facing us quite a bit in the future.
As we look back in the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is
questionable whether the United States moved quickly enough to
do what it could, as in the resulting chaos, where people
utilizing money perhaps spirited away nuclear weapons, tactical
nuclear weapons, the command and control system, all of the
temptations that came into the system at that time, I would
like to have your comments on that, and what you think we
should be thinking about in this committee, assisting you as we
try to confront this issue of containing this proliferation.
Mr. Rumsfeld. The problem of terrorism is an exceedingly
serious one. It is a problem for us in our homeland. It is a
problem for deployed forces. It is a problem for our friends
and allies, and I think it was Lenin who said that the purpose
of terrorism is to terrorize, and that is what it does. It
changes people's behavior, and the wonderful advantage is, a
terrorist can attack at any time in any place using any
technique, and it is physically impossible to defend at every
time and every place against every technique.
In Beirut, I watched a process where they first used trucks
with explosives to drive into a barracks and kill 241 American
Marines. The next thing, people started putting barricades up
like we have around the White House, and what do they do then?
Well, you change your method.
What you do is, you start using rocket-propelled grenades
and lobbing them over, so the next thing, you look at the
embassy, the British Embassy in Beirut, and they have wire nets
hanging off the building to reject rocket-propelled grenades.
Fine. It did not happen again.
The next thing, they go after targets. They go after
people, families, going to and from their place of work. So it
is not something that ends. It is something you need to be
attentive to. It is something we need to have vastly better
intelligence than we do today, and it is something that needs
to not simply be a Defense Department problem, or a homeland
defense problem, but it is also a diplomatic problem.
We have to find ways to function in this world where we
work with people and try to create an environment that is less
hospitable to terrorists and to terrorism. I do not know the
number, but I have something rattling in my head that we are
spending today something like $11 billion on this problem, and
I do not have any idea if that is the right number or the wrong
number, but it is a lot, and it is a lot more, for example,
than is being proposed to spend on some other defense
techniques, but it is a problem.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, we are looking forward to
working with you on this. Down in Florida we had an interesting
election this year.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I noticed that.
Senator Bill Nelson. Part of the problem was military
overseas ballots, and I want to work with the committee
particularly in devising a way that--in Florida, for example,
42 percent of the ballots were not counted, of the military
overseas ballots were not counted because they did not qualify
under Florida law, even though the Attorney General issued a
ruling in the midst of all the controversy actually changing
the effect of the law so that it did not have to be just a
postmark, that it could be a signature, a date, and a witness,
and what we need is some uniform procedures, and I am going to
propose to the committee that we have voting by military
overseas personnel by the Internet.
It is interesting that just today a consortium of
companies, both software and hardware companies, are proposing
to do software for Internet voting for the entire country.
Well, that is on down the road, but I think we ought to look at
the Internet for our military overseas personnel. We can
discuss that later.
Finally, I have some knowledge of launch vehicles and the
competition of American launch vehicles with foreign launch
vehicles, and we are getting into a situation, as you have
responded to other questions on space-based assets, of, we have
to have the assurance that we can get those assets to space and
now it is not necessarily the DOD payloads that we have to have
on expendable booster rockets, which are Government vehicles,
but we have a great reliance now of getting our commercial
satellites on orbit, many of whom perform a function that is
absolutely essential to the functioning of the free world, and
we are relying on foreign competitors getting over half of
those payloads to orbit.
So I am going to look forward to working with you and your
staff on this, and this committee as well on that. I would love
to have any comments you have.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, you are of course exactly correct.
There is no question but that the launch capability of the
United States has been diminishing relative to the rest of the
world, and there have been three or four studies that have
analyzed in some depth the nature of the problem with respect
to U.S. launch capabilities, and I think it is important you
have raised it, and certainly I am aware of those studies.
Our Commission on Space Management and Organization did not
go into detail on it because it had been addressed by so many
previous organizations, and I think the problems are
fundamentally rather well-known. They are not being attended
to, but they are rather well-known.
Senator Bill Nelson. Did your report get into the transfer
of technology by putting American spacecraft on the top of
foreign vehicles, particularly the Chinese?
Mr. Rumsfeld. It did not. There have been others who have
looked at that, and there is no question but that if you are
going to marry a payload with a launch vehicle, that it
requires inevitably a certain amount of technology transfer.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rumsfeld, you have certainly shown this committee
impeccable credentials, and you have shown a great deal of
candor and forthrightness in answering all of the questions
that have been presented to you today, and I thank you for that
and for your patience.
Because of the length of the day and the brevity of my
seniority I will confine myself to just one question. Fort
Leonard Wood in Missouri is a major part of the Army training
system, with a chemical school, an engineering school, and an
MP school and I have been told that, from Congressman Ike
Skelton, that the readiness level at this TRADOC post is not
all that it should be, as it is not in other posts as well. I
was wondering what your thoughts might be on how we would
address the readiness level at TRADOC posts.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I am certainly not knowledgeable about
that particular situation, but people are aware of their
circumstance, and to the extent readiness levels in an
institution like that, an organization like that are not what
they ought to be, the people there know they are not what they
ought to be, and it affects their attitude, it affects their
morale, it affects their feeling about their jobs, and whether
or not they want to stay in the service, so it seems to me it
is part of a much broader problem that we must address, and
certainly if it is true there, as I understand that it is, then
it is very likely true in other locations.
I would say one other thing about readiness. It is one
thing to say, here are our readiness categories and here are
the levels of readiness that we need to meet, and that is well
and good, but the first thing to do is say, ready for what? We
need to make sure what we are getting ready for, and that they
are not simply categories that existed in the prior period that
are not well-adapted to the future, because people understand
that, too, the people who have the responsibility for that.
It is not good for morale if you know you are breaking your
neck trying to get your readiness level up for something that
in fact made a lot of sense yesterday but may not make as much
sense tomorrow.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Mr. Rumsfeld, let me go back to national missile defense. I
want to press that issue with you. I want to follow up on a
number of questions which I, Senator Cleland, Senator Reed, and
others have asked here.
First, you said this morning that your experience led you
to the view that in a crisis, that a President should not be
presented with just two options, either capitulation or a
preemptive strike. I could not agree with you more. But there
is a third option that is missing from your response, which is
to pursue the policy of the United States and not be deflected
by any threat with a real level of confidence that it would be
a totally irrational act for anybody to carry out that threat.
You this morning said those dictators you enumerated are
rational folks. We do not like them. We do not like what they
do, but that they act rationally.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Maybe not rational in our context, but by
their standards.
Chairman Levin. We have been told over and over again by
our intelligence sources and otherwise that the first goal of
these regimes is survival and self-perpetuation. This third
option, which you did not address this morning, which is to
pursue the course we are on and not be deflected by that
threat, seems to me to be a very important and most likely
option. We should not signal in any way to any of these folks
that one possibility of their having such a weapon of mass
destruction would be that we might acquiesce.
I think Senator Reed made reference to that point. It seems
to me it is absolutely critical, number 1.
Number 2, you indicated that we should consider certain
adverse effects if we fail to deploy a national missile
defense, and I agree with that. I think the pros and cons of
deployment at a time when we have a technologically feasible
missile defense, when that time comes, if it comes, that the
pros and cons should all be on the table.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree.
Chairman Levin. What is essential is to consider the
effects you made reference to. It seems to me those are
important effects, that we also have to consider the negative
effects of a deployment if it is unilateral--if it requires us
to pull out of the ABM Treaty that we have with Russia--and if
it results in a larger number of weapons on Russian soil and
Chinese soil.
We had a report yesterday referred to in this morning's
paper by the writers, Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. I referred
to it this morning, but I just want to read one thing to you,
that the most urgent unmet national security threat to the
United States today is that weapons of mass destruction, or
weapons-usable material located in Russia, could be stolen or
sold to terrorists or hostile nation-States and used against
American troops abroad, or citizens at home. Now, whether that
is the most urgent unmet national security threat or not, and I
happen to think it certainly ranks near or at the top, I think
you would agree that it is a serious concern. I qualify this. I
say, if the effect of our deployment of a national missile
defense would be to increase the proliferation threat of a
weapon of mass destruction, or material that is involved in a
weapon of mass destruction by Russia responding to our
unilateral withdrawal from this treaty by no longer reducing
the number of weapons she has, or increasing the number of
weapons she has, that is a factor which I hope you would
consider. Would you agree it is a legitimate factor to
consider, however you come out in the end?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree completely that in this process the
advantages and disadvantages of deployment should be considered
and the advantages and disadvantages of not deploying should be
considered.
Chairman Levin. I welcome that. It seems to me that is
important. But there are some other disadvantages I just want
to throw in there, and I happen to agree with you that we
should look at all the advantages and disadvantages. But I want
to mention a couple of others.
Our allies have urged us not to unilaterally deploy this
system, not to leave them out of any system. They have not
urged us, as far as I know of, in any case to unilaterally
deploy. I use the word unilateral to mean that we would pull
out of the treaty with Russia and proceed on our own, without
being able to modify it.
Now, you have said in your answers to the questions to the
committee that you would seek modification of that treaty with
Russia. I believe that was in your answers. It seems to me that
is the course which should be followed. If it was not in your
answers, then it was the President-elect that made reference to
an effort to modify the treaty.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It may have been the President-elect.
Chairman Levin. Now, there is one other factor which I
think should be placed on the table.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Am I going to get a chance to comment?
Chairman Levin. Absolutely, and if you cannot remember all
of these points, then I will remind you of them. But there is
another consideration here which seems to me that should be put
on the table. Even if we are willing to take those adverse
effects because we think that the positives outweigh the
negatives, we are still left with the fact that there are other
means of delivery besides missiles, trucks, and ships, which
are cheaper, more reliable, have no return address.
In the case of a truck, we could be threatened by one of
these dictators with the kind of ultimatum like, I just invaded
Kuwait. If you try to throw me out of Kuwait, there is a truck
going around the interstate of the United States that has a
biological or chemical weapon on it. You are going to lose part
of your major cities, or you are going to see your air
poisoned, for example.
We are going to face potential threats even if we
successfully create a national defense technologically, and
even if we decide to take the risk of proliferation, which
might result, if Russia's response is what she said that it
will be, which is, forget the reductions, forget START II,
forget START III. Rather than building down she is going to
build up, creating the threat which Baker and Cutler talked
about in their report.
I would urge you to read the President's signing statement
when he signed the Missile Defense Act, by the way. I think it
is really important that you read that statement.
I made reference this morning to the Missile Defense Act.
Those factors which I have tried to enumerate in the last
couple of minutes are all on the table before a deployment
decision would be made by the current administration. Of
course, it later on decided to delay it because of the failure
of the tests. But I would urge you to read that statement
before he signed the act, relative to the meaning of those two
clauses, before you reach any final conclusion on the meaning
of those two clauses yourself.
I will stop there. I will help you to remember all of these
factors if you were not able to write them all down, but I
surely want to give you a chance to respond.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you. I think I have them all down. My
question is, can I read my handwriting, I was writing so
rapidly here.
I think we have to begin with the fact that the President-
elect has indicated that he intends to deploy a missile defense
capability. I do not want to get ahead of myself and argue in
any way that suggests that I know what the outcome of the
review will be or what he means by that, or what the National
Security Council will end up recommending, and I understand
that Congress has a role in this. The authorization and
appropriation process is there.
First, with respect to the concept of unilateral, I may
overstate for emphasis a little bit, but I have the impression
that for at least a period of 4, 5, or 6 years the argument has
been made by the United States Government that missile defense
would be destabilizing, that missile defense would be a bad
thing, and that it could be, and the feedback we got was yes,
that is right. The Russians say, we do not like it, and the
allies say, we do not want the Russians to be unhappy and we do
not want the agreements between the United States and Russia to
be ruptured by the United States doing something unilaterally.
There is no way I can prove what I am going to say, but I
have a feeling that once the Russians understand that the
United States is serious about this and intends to deploy, as
opposed to the reverse of that, that they will in fact find a
way in the negotiations--I do not know quite how, or when, or
in what way--in the discussions that take place to accept that
reality, recognize that there are threats from States with
capabilities that not only threaten us and our allies and our
friends, but over time will threaten the Russians as well. They
are worried about terrorism. They are worried about military
capabilities.
Second, the implication has been set forth that we would do
something precipitous or unilateral with respect to our allies.
That is just not going to happen. We understand how important
that alliance is. We understand that our allies need to be
consulted. We also understand that to some extent the allies'
concern is twofold. One is that--and I am meandering off into
the Secretary of State-designate's area of responsibility and
not mine, but--and I will tighten this up a little bit, but the
allies are concerned, and I have talked with a number of them,
about being disconnected.
Our program, as it is currently on path, could conceivably
have the effect of providing States with protection, but
leaving our allies with less protection, and that kind of
decoupling would be unwise by us. It would be unhelpful to the
alliance, and I do not think you will see things happen--I
think you will see a much closer consultation take place.
Next, you mentioned the Baker-Cutler thing and connected it
to this in some way. I do not see the connection. My impression
is that--and I did not read the article. I was so busy getting
ready for today that I did not read it carefully, but I was
under the impression, at least, that they were talking about
the loose-nuke problem, the risk that in fact nuclear materials
and nuclear weapons and nuclear competence in terms of people,
could and are and may to a greater degree lead to
proliferation. I agree with that completely.
The Russians have been telling us they have not been doing
it, and they have been doing it. They have been helping Iran.
They have been helping other countries. Certainly they have
been helping India, and we know it and they know it, and they
know we know it.
Is it because they are actively trying to make mischief? Is
it because they're making money, or is it because they do not
have the kinds of controls over what is taking place in that
country and there is a demand for that kind of assistance, or
is it some combination of those? I do not know for sure, but I
know that they in fact are active proliferators.
The Baker issue is, I think, a somewhat different one, is
my impression. You are right, there are other means of
delivery, we know that. We know anything other than fighting
armies, navies, and air forces is attractive because they are
all cheaper. They are all more readily available, and they all
offer the prospect that even without doing it you can affect
people's behavior because you can threaten the use of a terror
weapon and terrorize others and alter their behavior.
My view of that is simply because you cannot do everything
does not mean you should not do anything. I mean, I agree to
the extent it is unattractive to work one end of that spectrum
or some place along the spectrum. It inevitably will lead
people to look for the weak link, to look for another part of
that asymmetrical spectrum to assert their influence. I agree
with that. That is a fact, and yet that does not say to me that
it makes sense for us to remain vulnerable to ballistic missile
attack if we do not have to.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I am sure my time is up.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think everyone
realizes our second round is 6 minutes.
Chairman Levin. Yes. I should have announced that.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to
compliment you and others. This has been an excellent hearing,
and I have moved about a little bit in the course of this
hearing and wanted to go over and welcome your Space Council
and they are carrying on, as you might expect, quite well, and
others, and throughout the whole way this compliment is being
paid to this committee as a whole for undertaking a very
thorough and in-depth hearing.
I shall proceed quickly, under my 6 minutes. Did you want a
seventh-inning stretch here?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, I am fine.
Senator Warner. As you can clearly see, there is a
diversity of views on this very important subject. For the 23
years my good friend and I have been here in this Senate
together, we have from time to time been on opposite sides on
this question of missile defense, but listening to this very
important colloquy between the two of you, let us also include
the following category, and that is accidental.
Military men and women training all over the world on all
types of systems, accidents happen. No treaty is going to stop
that. No form of deterrence is going to stop that, and I have
often said that every President better have a draft statement
on his desk to explain to a half-million American people who
lost their lives and their families and survivors why we were
not prepared to stop an accident, so that is a factor we had
better figure in.
Now, I want to cover some very important subjects that we
touched on, and our very valued ally, Israel. As we have had a
strategic relationship with them for many, many years.
Unfortunately that area of the world is embroiled in conflict,
one which you, as a former negotiator and troubleshooter, have
a clear understanding of the origins. Regrettably, many of
those origins are still there.
I would like to have your views on that, and in the gulf
region we have done our best. We have formed a magnificent
coalition under President Bush. Some 13 nations came together
to stop the aggression of Saddam Hussein, and send his forces
back in-country, and we are in there alone today, except for
some help from Great Britain in the air campaign and from some
other nations in the sea campaign, to contain him. I would like
to have your views on how we approach that.
As I stated this morning, President-elect Bush has put
together an extraordinary and superbly well-qualified national
security team. These questions are going to be on their desk on
the day of arrival.
I would like to also explore with you the relationship
between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Again, we
have had a longstanding relationship with the people of Taiwan.
We have in place certain agreements, and lastly I think we
should cover the policy that you would hope to recommend to the
President with regard to the withdrawal of our peacekeepers and
our timetable, maybe not specifically, but the general
discussion of the withdrawal from Bosnia and Kosovo. This is a
subject I have been active in.
Last year, I and other colleagues--Senator Byrd joined with
me and I joined with him on separate pieces of legislation to
try and bring to the attention of our allies the commitments
they made, the fact that we were trying to fulfill our
commitment, and somehow if they did not continue to live up to
those commitments we would have to address a withdrawal policy.
Well, guess what happened. Very quickly the allies came in
and fulfilled their commitments in terms of money in Kosovo and
troops and likewise, and that situation righted itself.
I think it is important that the United States keep some
presence in both the Kosovo and Bosnian military forces so long
as our allies are there, perhaps not to the level that we have
today, but we do not want to give the perception that we are
not a reliable partner in all of these, so if you would sort of
kick off, and we will take the first one.
Mr. Rumsfeld. OK. Most of what you have posed, well, falls
over in the area of the Department of State and the National
Security Council as much or more than it does the defense
establishment.
Senator Warner. But you are a team, and you are at that
table.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I understand, and I am going to reach out and
comment, but I want to preface it by saying that we are not in
office. We have not had meetings. We have not talked about
these things.
Senator Warner. I understand that.
Mr. Rumsfeld. It would be wrong for me to try to think I
could sketch out policy, so whatever I am saying is coming from
Rumsfeld.
Senator Warner. That is clear, but we have an obligation
under advise and consent to get your views, because you are one
of the most experienced, if not the most experienced person on
that team.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, with respect to Israel, the situation
is very difficult. The hostilities are obvious. People die in
that region regularly. Israel is a very small country. They
cannot make many mistakes about what they give up. There is a
feeling I have had, watching that process, that to the extent
someone leans forward, someone leans back, to the extent
someone leans back, someone leans forward, and it goes that
way.
I do not think it is possible for the United States of
America to go in and grab people by the scruff of the neck and
think they could put them together and have something stick. It
has to make sense on the ground.
I have questions about Mr. Arafat's ability to manage his
affairs, his circumstances, and I think to be dealing with him
as though he were a State in control of his circumstance may
not--may be somewhat unrealistic. I am hopeful. I think that it
is an important issue that I am sure Secretary of State-
designate Colin Powell and Condy Rice and the President will
engage, and certainly I will be happy to be a participant.
The gulf coalition is in fact unraveling and there is no
question but that Saddam Hussein's appetite for weapons of mass
destruction has not disappeared. Under the agreement, he was
allowed to continue working on ballistic missiles below a
certain range and, of course, the weight of the warhead affects
range, so he has his team together, and he is working
aggressively to make better relationships with Syria under the
new Assad, and I suspect that we will not have heard the last
of him by a darned sight.
The control over assets and funding I think is rather
important and fundamental, and ought not to be let go. There is
a lot of pressure from various coalition partners to ease up,
but I think that central principle is one we ought to think
about.
Senator Warner. We have over 20,000 U.S. troops in that
region containing these policies.
Mr. Rumsfeld. They are risking their lives in the north and
south with flights. It is a dangerous situation.
The PRC and Taiwan, so much has been said I think there is
not much I can add. Clearly, we have laws, we have obligations,
we have hopes, and that situation also seems to ebb and flow in
terms of the volume of the words coming out of the PRC on that
subject, and at the moment they seem to have ebbed rather than
flowed.
Senator Warner. But the one thing certain is a steady
buildup in the PRC military capabilities.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Not just generally, but in that area.
Senator Warner. That is correct.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Third, peacekeepers in Bosnia. The first
thing I would say is that we have forces on the ground. We have
troops there, and we ought to be supporting them, and I worry
about forums like this where we talk about altering what we
have, the Government, the President, Congress.
We have to decide what we want to do on these things, but
discussions that lead to uncertainty harm the people on the
ground who are trying to do things, and I went into Bosnia
sometime back and visited with people from various factions,
and they are either leaning forward or they are leaning back,
and you can be sure the more there is talk about departure, the
more they wait you out. It is true across the globe.
I have never been a fan of deadlines. I mean, the original
deadline that we would be out by Christmas was not wise, not
good policy in my judgment. We ought not to do that. It tells
everybody, wait for a year, go on.
I think what we ought to do--and I know the President has
said he will review it. He will. When he has a view--you can be
certain he will not do anything precipitous. He understands the
importance of the relationships with our allies. What he will
decide, I have no idea. He will certainly consult with Congress
as well as allies, and we will all know when that process has
completed.
Senator Warner. I think that term, consult with Congress,
is a very reassuring one, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, and I thank the distinguished witness for those
replies.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I had to leave for
a while. I apologize for that. I must say, coming back, I
thought I would find you weary, mentally worn, but I am
discouraged to find that you are as sharp as you were when I
left this morning. [Laughter.]
I want to thank you particularly for some of the straight
talk. As another member of the committee was fond of saying
earlier last year, you have been on the straight talk express
here for part of today, and I appreciate it.
Chris Williams, sitting behind you, worked with Senator
Lott, and Senator Lott and I have sponsored some legislation on
our concern about proliferation to Iran, and you were dead
right that the Russians have just continued to do that.
Sometimes we do not like to deal with that reality, but it is
real, and I appreciate the straight talk that you gave, and I
hope that we will continue to work on that, because it
threatens our security and the security of our allies.
The same is true of your answer just now on the question of
our forces in the Balkans, and I thank you for it. We made a
serious mistake here some years ago, under political pressure,
where we did set a deadline, and it created a real credibility
gap that we are still fighting to overcome.
Believe it or not, I want to come back to national missile
defense in a slightly different way and make this statement and
ask you for your reaction. I accept the reality of the threat.
I think it is a serious one. I was an original or early
cosponsor of the National Missile Defense Act. I was pleased
when it went through Congress and pleased when the President
signed it, and I was up in my office for meetings, listening to
your earlier testimony, and if I understood correctly, in
response to a question from Senator Akaka you indicated logic
would tell us that in the time since your commission's report
the threat has just naturally become more serious because
proliferation goes on.
My concern is about the timeliness of a response, and just
to say that I am concerned, as the new administration comes in
and thinks about the layered approach to national missile
defense, that if you think about the 2005 date, or whatever
date, even earlier by some estimates, which some of these folks
who have hostile intent toward us could get capacity to do our
homeland damage, I think that one of the reasons--not all, but
one of the reasons the Clinton administration chose the land-
based alternative for national missile defense because it was
possible, assuming technological abilities, to get, if you
will, online earlier. Sea-based is essentially a concept now,
and estimates I have seen say that it will not come online any
earlier than 2010, space-based probably later than that.
So my concern is, as you think about the alternatives you
have as you come into office, that you take a look at the fact
that while the land-based system missile defense may not be the
best, it may be the one that we can get operating earliest.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not disagree with that. I do not know
enough to know, of certain knowledge, that that is right, but I
have a set of impressions, and they are these, that the current
program may very well have been something that could be done
sooner than some of the other alternatives such as sea-based or
space-based capabilities.
On the other hand, my further impression is that the
current system was designed to fit within the treaty. I have
never believed--I mean, that treaty is ancient history. It is
almost--it dates even back farther than when I was last in the
Pentagon. That is a long time.
Think what has happened to technology in the intervening
period. I mean, to try to fashion something that fits within
the constraints of that, and expect you are going to get the
most effective program, the earliest to deploy, and the most
cost-effective, it is just--it boggles the mind. That is not
how people do advance technologies, is to sit down with those
kinds of constraints and try to fit it in that straitjacket.
I do not disagree that at this stage it may be something
that could be done earlier than other alternatives, but I would
say it may very well be that pieces of it might very well fit
in what one might ultimately want to do.
Now, this is all sheer speculation on my part. I mean, the
press has kind of played me up as an expert in missile defense,
and I am not. I know a lot about the threat, and I spent a lot
of time on it, but I have spent much less time on the ways of
dealing with it, and that is something I have simply got to
wrap my head around.
Senator Lieberman. I have one more question. Incidentally,
enjoy whenever the press plays you up as an expert on anything,
because it will not last long. [Laughter.]
I want to come to the fifth of your priorities in the
opening statement you made, reform of DOD structures,
processes, and organization. One of the things that struck me
in my years on the committee is the extent to which the goals
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have not yet been realized.
That is one of them, which is one of the central ones,
which is based on the conclusion, I think correctly, that
warfighting would be joint, that therefore more of the
operation of our military should be joint, and there has been a
natural institutional resistance to that, and look, the four
services have extraordinary histories of capability and unique
functions to play, but I was thinking, in terms of your
background, in this case in the private sector, that too often
probably I found myself saying, I do not think any CEO of a big
company--and there is no company as big as the Pentagon. You
are about to become the CEO of the largest company in the
world, but would tolerate that kind of overlap.
We have made some progress lately, particularly through the
establishment of the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, and I
really commend it to you and hope you can get to know it well,
but ideally we should be having more joint experimentation,
joint acquisition, joint training, so that when we come to
warfighting we will not only have avoided redundancy and saved
some money along the way to do some of the many things that we
have all said today we want you to do, but we will be better
able to fight jointly.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do not disagree at all. I think warfighting
is inevitably going to involve all of the services, and to the
extent they have not trained and exercised and equipped for
interoperability in that kind of an environment they are not
going to do what they could do had they done that.
Senator Lieberman. My time is more than up. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that the
chairman has been a skillful questioner, let us say on national
missile defense.
Now, we went through a long battle on it. Senator Lieberman
and Senator Cochran formed an opinion, as did a number of us,
that we needed to move forward. We accepted your bipartisan
unanimous report that by the year 2005 we did have a threat
that we needed to be prepared to defend against, and in the
Senate I think Senator Roberts had over 90 votes, maybe 3
dissents, to deploy and follow through on this.
The President did, in fact, drag his feet. We did not do
the Alaska radar work that we hoped to have done this summer,
so we have already missed the 2005 year that your commission,
your report suggested we should try to meet, and so we are now
at 2006, and I believe this summer we will have another date
that we will need to make a decision soon to get started with
the Alaska base or we will be at 2007.
I just wanted to say, to follow up on Senator Roberts, I
believe this Congress is for this. I believe we voted
overwhelmingly for this, and with determined leadership, the
technological problems will be overcome, and I think we need to
move forward.
Most Americans have no idea we have no defense to incoming
missiles, absolutely none. They saw in Israel, in the Gulf War,
some Patriot and Scuds, and think maybe we have that here. We
really have none of that here, and I believe we need to move
forward on that. I salute you for coming to it with the
background you do, and I salute you for the report that you
issued, and your fellow members, which we acted on, and the
President did sign.
I would like to pursue a little bit--and by the way, on
national missile defense, we are talking about a $3 billion a
year expenditure, maybe $4. That is hardly 1 percent of the
total defense budget. It is not going to drain our defense
resources to deploy national missile defense.
Colombia has 38 million people. It is a significant trading
partner of the United States, but 40 to 50 percent of that
country is now being held by Marxist guerrillas who are working
with the narcotraffickers. Venezuela is showing some strange
activity.
At best, I do believe we need to give more attention to our
hemisphere, and when you compare that to Kosovo, there are 2
million people we have no trading relationships with, and it is
clearly in the backyard of the Europeans.
Would you share with us your view about the importance of
our involvement in this hemisphere in general?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, in general is about what I can do.
Again, I am reluctant to be continuously infringing on my
friend Colin Powell's areas of prospective responsibility. We
live here. It is important to us, there is no question that
this hemisphere is, and I think that successive administrations
in both parties have recognized that and addressed that over my
adult lifetime.
That is a very complicated problem down there, and I need
to get steeped in it. We have talked a bit about what is going
on. I understand there are a limited number of U.S. military
forces, that the State Department has the lead, that a lot of
what is being done there is being done by contract personnel,
that there is fear around the periphery that whatever is done
in Colombia is not going to end the problem but move the
problem geographically.
I have read the same speculation you have about the
Venezuelan involvement. I do not know much about it beyond
that. It is going to take a lot of very careful thought, and a
combination probably of the kinds of things that are being done
as well as diplomacy, to see if we cannot have that situation
begin to get better rather than worse, thus far.
I have seen the maps that show the minimal control that the
Government is currently exerting in the country, and it tends
to be urban areas, as I understand it.
Senator Sessions. It is a disturbing situation, and I do
not know the answer to it. I do not believe it requires troops,
but I do believe we need to say, which Ambassador Pickering
would not say in one of these hearings when I asked him, that
we endorse--perhaps they have sense, but we need to endorse
unequivocally the oldest democracy in the hemisphere, except
ours, Colombia, in their struggles with the Marxist guerrillas,
in my view, and we need to encourage them to be aggressive, and
if they are not going to defend their country, I do not see how
we can defend it for them.
But I believe they are going to be reaching a point soon
where they are going to decide they have to fight to preserve
their democracy, and if they do not fight they are going to
lose it. At that point I think we are going to have to help
them. I wish we did not, I wish it was not a problem, but I am
afraid it is.
Finally, I would say I agree with you totally that this
treaty with Russia and the missile defense question is ancient
history. It was with a dead empire that no longer exists.
Surely we will deploy the best system and work and just deal
with the Russians in a fair and objective way, tell them we
love them, we want to be partners and friends with them, but we
are going to do what is in our interests to protect our
American citizens, and I think they will accept that if we will
quit waffling and be clear, and I hope that you will do that.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for the
committee's information, I do understand that under the voting
of military ballots and the counting of military ballots
overseas, with your help, Mr. Chairman, and myself and Senator
Hutchison and Senator Warner, we have asked for the GAO to do
an independent investigation on this whole issue of military
ballots being counted, and how military votes overseas, and
that that report will be to us in a matter of months.
Mr. Secretary, let me just say, thank you very much for
waiting us out and for being so patient. A couple of years ago
you signed a letter along with Dick Cheney supporting full
funding for the F-22, which is advanced technology for our
tactical aircraft. I would like to, Mr. Chairman, submit that
letter for the record, if there is no objection.
Chairman Levin. It will be made a part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your support
of the F-22 in the past. I hope we can count on your continued
support for the F-22. Any remarks you would like to make on
that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. No, sir, other than that I said what I said,
I believed it when I said it, I am now in a circumstance where
I have to take a review and look at that and other things and
try to come to some rational conclusions, and I shall do so.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. In terms of airlift
capability, it is interesting that the fiscal year 2000 defense
authorization bill did direct the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to this Congress no later than February. The
airlift requirement report is in. The current requirement for
airlift in the Pentagon is almost 50 million ton-miles, and a
mobility requirement study estimates the requirement may rise
to around 54 or 55 million ton-miles.
With the move away from more forward-deployed forces, an
airlift and air mobility more and more important, the C-130J is
integral to our rapid deployment operations. The last
administration proposed some 24 new C-130Js over the next 4 or
5 years. I have a special interest in this program, Mr.
Secretary, and would hope that you would continue to look hard
at the C-130J program, particularly in terms of its critical
role in moving our forces abroad.
Finally, Warner-Robbins is one of three remaining Air Force
depots. There used to be five. Now there are three. Part of the
challenge here, it seems to me, is to determine if the Pentagon
is going to continue to keep core capability in its maintenance
and depot facilities, and in determining that core capability I
just hope you would work with all of us so that our military
commanders will have the ability in a crisis to ramp up and
work 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, to meet the needs of our
servicemen and women overseas.
So I will just have those thoughts, and any response from
you would be welcome.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not engaged this subject of depots. I
understand that among all the caucuses in Congress these days
the depot caucus may take the cake as being the largest one. It
is a subject that--let me phrase it this way. There is no
question but that the United States military needs to have what
they need to have, and the question is, in what way can they
assure that they have that so that their capabilities, and our
capabilities as a country to contribute to peace and stability
are assured?
I have not looked at it. I understand it is there and will
certainly address it.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. We talked about one
big idea, and when I heard that I thought about maybe a
question on deterrence in this new globalized era, and defining
what could maybe deter the terrorist or the biochemical attack
and so forth, and I appreciate your views on that and look
forward to that continued discussion.
But one of the big ideas I would just like for you to think
about in the challenge of dealing with an all-volunteer force,
and now a married all-volunteer force in terms of a big idea,
in the last few years, in looking at the GI bill and its power
to attract young men and women to the military, maybe one of
the big ideas we ought to explore together is in the American
military being the greatest university in the world.
In other words, we are going to have to train constantly,
and there probably already is the greatest university,
certainly the biggest university in the world, but education
begets education. If the American military can become known not
just as a good place to get a couple or 3 or 4 years of
education and then get out, but some place to educate yourself
and your family over the long haul, then maybe we can work in a
wonderful way on our retention problem as well.
Because people who get out that contact me, get out
basically with tears in their eyes. They love the military,
they love the service, but they get out because they have
pressures on their families. One of the pressures on their
families is their kids' education.
So I would just like to throw that out as an interesting
big idea that we can explore as we walk down this road
together, because it does seem to me that the power of the GI
bill, or the power of education and the military can be a
powerful tool to keep people--I mean, to attract people and to
keep people in that otherwise would get out, but we have to
broaden it so that it includes their families as well.
I might say one of your colleagues in the Cabinet will be
Tony Principi, who was the author a couple of years ago of the
Principi Commission report, which actually recommended the
concept that a serviceman or woman can take their unused GI
bill assets and transfer them to their spouse or to their kids,
thereby creating a college fund for them. Tony Principi was the
author of that idea, and he will be in the Cabinet with you as
head of the Veterans Administration, so I wanted to throw that
out as a big idea that you might consider.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much for your patience, Mr.
Chairman. No further questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland. Let me also add
our thanks for your continuing leadership on the broadening of
the GI bill. It is a very important initiative. You have had a
little success. You deserve a lot more success, and hopefully
will achieve a lot more success in that area.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, in Nebraska we have the
Joint Command and Strategic Command. The military for the last
several years and the civilian leadership have worked toward
finding ways to marry the military establishment in a way that
certainly will work better for cooperation and collaboration,
and obviously under a Joint Command you tend to get that. It
surprises people in Nebraska to see the Strategic Command under
the control of an admiral from the Navy, because Nebraska may
be nearly landlocked, except for the Missouri River.
I have a question that really relates to how you develop an
exit strategy without showing your hand. We have a civilian
military. We have a citizen Government, and yet we know that
the right of the public to know is there, and this body
provides oversight so that when you come with an idea that you
would like to provide some knowledge about, the first question
is, what is your exit strategy? Once you have tipped your hand,
there is no going back. The genie does not go back in the
bottle, whether you say we are not going to use any land
forces, we are going to be out by December--are we somewhat
relegated to going back to 1968? When nominee President Nixon
was running and said, ``I have a plan to end the war,'' he
would not tip his hand.
I think when you have this challenge it is very easy for
people to put you in the box, where they want to know that you
have a plan, they want to know what it is, but once you have
told them, it is like the coach giving his playbook to the
other team, the other coach.
Mr. Rumsfeld. You have put your finger on an enormously
difficult problem. I was chief of staff in the White House when
Vietnam ended, and you had all of these fine people who had
supported that effort, and at some point you pulled the plug,
and when you do, people are killed, people are hurt, people are
damaged, and the reputation of our country for following
through and for consistency and for being a reliable partner is
damaged for a period.
I was the one who had to go tell President Jamail of
Lebanon that the United States and the President and Security
Council had decided to withdraw support, and walked into his
office, and it was a heartbreaker, just an absolute
heartbreaker. There were a whole host of people who had stepped
forward and relied on us to help him try to get the Syrians out
of his country, and at a certain moment it is gone.
You are right, if you talk and if you telegraph something
more people get killed, more people are damaged, and the
hardship is much greater.
What is the answer? Well, I do not know what the answer is.
I think part of the answer is, let us try not to get into
things we cannot get out of. Let us try not to get into things
we cannot finish well.
We are still going to have this happen. We are not always
going to be right. We are going to end up trying to do things
because we are concerned and we care, and it will not work
because we miscalculated. We thought there was a greater
possibility that there could be an institutional capability to
sustain itself and create a nation that could build and go
forward, but that is hard.
We are not geniuses at nation-building, institutional
capabilities. There has to be something where people say, my
gosh, the Marshall Plan, goodness gracious, those countries
there, they were capable, they were competent, we gave them
money. They did what they did, and the analogy of the Marshall
Plan to some of the kinds of continents that we have been
dealing with and problems that we have been dealing with I
think is a mismatch.
You are right, I think that about all you can do is if you
have been wrong, do it fast, confess, and get out. That is all
you can do, and try not to get yourself in a situation where
you cause other people to support you and then you leave them
in the lurch, which is just a heartbreaker.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, I believe that a member of
President Kennedy's Cabinet said that as Secretary you have one
boss and 535 advisors, and I think you have received enough
advice for one day. I wish you well, and I would cede the rest
of my time unless there is anything you would like to say, sir.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I would like to say something, Senator, and I
thank you for that opportunity.
Chairman Levin. By the way, there will be another round of
questions.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Maybe I will save it, then. [Laughter.]
Well, I will say it right now. I must say, if I know
anything I know that you do not tackle Defense Department
problems and issues and challenges by political party. You do
it on a bipartisan basis, and I respect the way you and Senator
Warner have handled your back-and-forth chairmanships, and I
admire it, and I assure you that I approach these issues in a
nonpartisan way, and I intend to work with the committee in
that way and look forward to it.
Chairman Levin. We are going to have a third round for
those who might be interested in asking additional questions.
First, on the space policy question. There was a report in
Defense Daily recently--it quoted--I do not know who was saying
these words, but here are the words: ``Rumsfeld understands the
need for militarization of space.'' My question is, do you see
the need for the ``militarization of space''?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I did not say it, and I do not know who wrote
it, and I do not know quite what it means. Let me see if I can
put some words around my thoughts on the subject. We know what
has been done on land by way of military conflict, we know what
has been done on the sea, and we know what has been done in the
air. I think it would be a stretch to suggest that space will
not at some point in the future find itself receiving similar
attention.
Why do I say that? Well, if, for example, we have an
interest on the sea to maintain the sea lanes open and to
create an environment that is hospitable to sea traffic for
international intercourse, and we have a lot of assets in
space, one would think we would feel or share a similar view
about having the assets in space free to provide these services
and the capabilities that they do, and to the extent we do, as
we do, both civilian and military space assets, and to the
extent they conceivably, as with ships and tanks and planes,
become a target at some point, there is no question in my mind
but that it is in our interest to create the kinds of
deterrence and capability so that it is not attractive to
disable the United States and our enormous dependence on space
assets.
I do not know quite what that means in answer to that
article, but those are my views, and I should say these were my
views as a member of the commission. They are not the views of
the administration, since I have not had a chance to even
discuss these things with President-elect Bush or the National
Security Council.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. You made, I think, brief
reference to this today. That the United States and North Korea
signed an agreement in 1994 which provides that North Korea
will end and disband its plutonium production capacity. By the
way, I actually went up to see with my own eyes that that was
being done. It also called for the United States to lead a
coalition with South Korea and Japan to provide North Korea
with proliferation-resistant light water reactors if it
complies with every step of the agreement, and it also provides
for some fuel, I believe, to substitute for the loss of that
capacity. Assuming that both sides comply with this agreement,
in your judgment does this agreed framework serve our national
security interest?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I will offer some personal views, but I have
to again begin with the beginning, and that is, this is quite a
distance off my turf, and certainly the National Security
Council and President and Secretary-designate Colin Powell will
be addressing it.
My view on North Korea is that they have been as active a
proliferator of technologies across the globe as any country
that I know of. It is hard to believe that a country that
cannot feed its people, that has a dictatorship that is as
repressive and damaging to its country as anything on the face
of the earth, could be developing and marketing and benefiting
financially from the proliferation of these technologies, but
it is a fact.
I was very impressed with the Senator's photograph of the
Korean peninsula earlier today, where it showed lights in the
south, and lights in China, and black, and it is a wonderful
metaphor for the problem.
I think talking is fine. I am glad they are talking. I
think there has not been, to my knowledge, changes in their
military posture with respect to South Korea or with respect to
their activities of proliferation. It is good to be hopeful. It
is good to talk. I am not an expert on the agreed framework. I
have not been there, as you have. I am not sure I would be
welcome.
Chairman Levin. As far as you know, have they dismantled
their plutonium production capacity?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I know that--I know what I know and I know
what I do not know, and I do not know what I do not know.
Specifically, they are world-class tunnelers. They have gone
underground across that country in a way that few other nations
have done. They have underground emplacements that have
enormous numbers of weapons.
For me to sit here, having never been there, and not being
a sufficient expert to know anyway, and say that I have high
confidence that they are doing what the agreed framework
suggested would be foolhardy. They do not have a record of
behaving well, and we know they are a secretive, closed
society, and it is perfectly possible for Americans to go
milling around there, think they see something, and it is over
there. It is a shell game with those folks.
Chairman Levin. Let me try a different question. Is it in
our interests to try to find a way to eliminate North Korea's
plutonium production capacity so they cannot build nuclear
weapons? Is it in our interest to do that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I would broaden it. I think it is in our
interest, and our Asian allies' interests, and our
antiproliferation interest across the globe that North Korea
stop proliferating, stop threatening South Korea, and begin to
behave rationally to its people and stop having them die of
starvation.
So I guess the answer is, sure it is in our interest, but
there are a lot of things that are in our interest with respect
to North Korea, and I do not know that I would stick one ahead
of the other.
Chairman Levin. I would agree with you there are a lot of
things that are in our interest, but it is in our interest to
end the plutonium production?
Mr. Rumsfeld. You bet.
Chairman Levin. There are a lot of other things in our
interest as well, but at least you would agree that it is in
our interest?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Just to put on our old Navy hats for a moment, and that is
the shipbuilding program in the Navy. Any reasonable analysis
of the curves in the outyears, the current projection? We are
going to be moving down precipitously close to the 300 level,
and I just think at the moment the most you can say is, again
climbing back into our purple suits so we are fair to all, we
have to address the level of naval ship construction, and we
have to do it early on. Do you not agree with me?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree. I think that the pressures we face
around the world with respect to bases suggest that we do need
to be able to have capabilities that are afloat.
Senator Warner. My follow-on for that, of course, is that--
and these are true stories--Presidents, when they are awakened
at night by that phone, either you on the other end or someone
else, the Secretary of State advising them of a crisis
somewhere in the world, as Senator John Stennis, the very
valued and wonderful chairman of this committee used to say,
the Presidents would always say to me, well, the first thing
that comes to mind, where is the nearest U.S. aircraft carrier?
Do you recall that?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I do indeed. Mr. Stennis was chairman when I
was last Secretary.
Senator Warner. I testified before him, as did you, many
times. We have to keep that carrier level up. We have 12 now,
one in training capacity, several in upkeep, some in transit,
four to five at max on station throughout the world, and I
would hope that you would indicate to me now that your
preliminary thinking is, we have to maintain that minimal
level, in my judgment, of that key asset of our arsenal of
deterrence.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Senator, as an ex-Navy pilot I am not unaware
of the value of aircraft carriers, but the last thing I am
going to do is start speculating about one weapons system. I
have an enormous task to gather some folks and look at the
whole picture and see that they come into a coherent whole, and
I am reluctant to start piecing things out.
Senator Warner. That is all right, my good friend. You
maintain your reluctance, and I will not have any reluctance to
continue to bring that subject up with you repeatedly from time
to time. [Laughter.]
South Korea. It is so interesting, my modest experience in
the U.S. military, and I have said this before, it did a lot
more for me than I was able to return to them on Active Duty,
but anyway, with South Korea, in the Marines in 1951. We are
still there, 50-plus years, and we have a very significant
number of our troops there.
Now, you have covered the North. Let us talk a little bit
about the South and its importance as our strong ally, and its
importance for the forward-deployment of our troops to be in
that region. I think this record should reflect some of your
views on that.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I think the U.S. presence in Asia
since, essentially since the Korean War and World War II, has
been a superb investment in the sense that we have, without
question, contributed to a more stable region.
Their presence there is still useful in that regard, and I
think that--I am trying to think where I heard it or read it,
but there have been comments to the effect that in
conversations between the North and the South, both have
indicated that the U.S. presence is a useful thing, and I find
that very interesting. The rhetoric sometimes from the North is
a little different, but my impression is that realistically we
are wanted and it is a good thing for us to be there.
I also think it has been helpful from the standpoint of
Japan.
Senator Warner. I do, too, and indeed they are very
valuable allies for the security of that region out there, and
we should really touch a little bit on our valuable allies,
Australia and New Zealand, and you will undoubtedly be visiting
that region of the world, where we have had to dispense some of
our troops not long ago for a contingency situation, but they
are valued allies.
Mr. Rumsfeld. As you look at what is happening in that part
of the globe, and the periodic difficulties that the People's
Republic of China has had with its neighbors, whether it is the
Spratly Islands, or difficulties with India, difficulties with
Russia, difficulties with Vietnam, there is no question but
that Australia is a truly important nation, and it is important
to that region, it is important to us, and it seems to me that
it merits a priority from the standpoint of the United States
of America.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, again, an excellent hearing.
I would yield back the balance of my time. I think our witness
has more than fulfilled our expectations, and the endurance
test he has withstood indicates he can handle that department
pretty well.
Chairman Levin. Just a few more questions. Senator
Sessions, would you like to go first?
Senator Sessions. You go ahead.
Chairman Levin. The Army has been in the process of
transforming itself into a lighter and more agile force that
can deal with the challenges posed by threats in the uncertain
future. In response to the pre-hearing questions, you stated
you would not be in a position to evaluate the Army's plans
until you have conducted a complete review of all the services'
investment programs. That review is expected to take several
months, and therefore I have the following questions.
Does your answer mean that we should not expect any changes
to the Army's transformation plans in this budget cycle?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I just do not know.
Chairman Levin. Are you open to the possibility of
reallocation of resources among the military departments, if
your review points in that direction?
Mr. Rumsfeld. It would be foolish for me to say that I was
not open to anything at this stage, because I really am coming
out of civilian life into an institution that is not easily
understood.
Senator Warner. Or managed. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. You have been asked a number of questions
about the U.S. and China, and I have one additional one in that
area. What approach would you take with respect to military-to-
military contacts between the United States and China? Do you
have any feelings?
Mr. Rumsfeld. We have had some, and I have been there
myself.
Chairman Levin. Do you have any feelings about continuing
or expanding those contacts?
Mr. Rumsfeld. I have not thought about it. Off the top of
my head, I have no reason to believe that they are undesirable.
Chairman Levin. Just a couple of questions to follow up
Senator Sessions' questions on the missile defense issue. I
want to read just a portion of the statement of the President
when he signed the Missile Defense Act. I think it is
important.
Mr. Rumsfeld. I would like a copy of it, if you have it.
Chairman Levin. We will provide that to you.
Before I do that, though, I want to ask you a question
again. I think you answered it clearly this morning, but given
something which was said just a little while ago, did your
report on the North Korean or on the missile threat in general
suggest anything relative to the deployment of missile
defenses?
Mr. Rumsfeld. Not that I can recall.
Chairman Levin. Now, this is just a part of the President's
statement. I am going to give you the whole thing to read after
the hearing. I am going to be putting the whole thing in the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

We have been talking about two sections. One is the
``policy of the United States to deploy as soon as
technologically possible an effective national missile defense
system with funding subject to the annual authorization of
appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for NMD.
By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to the
authorization and appropriations process, the legislation makes
no clear decision on the deployment has been made.'' We call
that the first point.
Mr. Rumsfeld. This is reading from his statement?
Chairman Levin. I am. This is part of what the President
said relative to the second policy that was in that National
Missile Defense Act.
Section 3 puts Congress on record as continuing to support
negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, and he also
said our missile defense policy must take into account our arms
control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. At the end he
said: ``Any NMD system we deploy must be operationally
effective, cost-effective, and enhance our security. In making
our determination, we will also review progress in achieving
our arms control objectives, including negotiating any
amendments to the ABM treaty that may be required to
accommodate a possible NMD deployment.''
I offer you an opportunity to react as to whether you
disagree with any of that. It is kind of hard, because maybe I
read too many excerpts for you to follow. In any event, do you
wish to comment now or not as to whether you have any
disagreement with that. I really would urge that you read the
President's statement after this hearing so that you are
familiar with the thinking of both the administration in
signing that act, but also the thinking of many of us--I will
not say a majority, necessarily--but many of us in supporting
that act after section 3 was added in the Senate.
It is a very important part of the history of that National
Missile Defense Act. Now, let me give you an opportunity to
comment if you want.
Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will read it. As you
went through it I was trying to parse it in my mind, and
clearly, while President Clinton is President that is his view.
We have a President-elect coming in who has expressed some
views that are somewhat different from that.
Chairman Levin. I am talking about the view of the
President about the act he was signing. I do not know if the
President-elect has any different view about this act. He has
not spoken, as far as I know, on that issue. Maybe he has. But
I am talking about just what the President who signed the act
said when he signed it.
Senator Sessions, do you have anything more?
Senator Sessions. I do not.
Chairman Levin. Let me just make a very quick final
statement. First, we will include any statements in the record
by committee Members who either were not able to be here today
or who were here today but would want to expand on any
statements they made. There were a number of Members who had
other commitments. This hearing came up quickly and a number of
our Members were unable to make it, although they are occupied
in a number of instances on business that relate to this
committee's work.
Second, several Senators have indicated that they have some
questions that they would like to submit to you for the record.
We will ask for those questions, if possible, by the end of
this week. You have many things to do. I do not expect there
will be a lot, but there could be some, and I want to keep that
record open. I know Senator Thurmond asked me to keep the
record open for questions he wanted to ask. There may be others
that want to ask questions. The record will be kept open for
that purpose.
We will keep the record open at least through tomorrow. We
urge everybody to get their questions in by tomorrow, and then
urge you to respond by the end of the day next Wednesday. If
any questions come in after that, we will just give you
additional time. We do not expect there will be a lot.
We look forward to getting all of that paperwork you made
reference to.
Mr. Rumsfeld. We have it over at the other places. Before
they want to release it they want to try and massage it.
Chairman Levin. As always, there is an FBI report which we
will receive and we will review. We again want to recognize
your family for your attendance and your patience. You may not
have noticed, but the audience has significantly dwindled. What
has not dwindled is the love, affection, and support of your
family, and we thank them for that. We will now stand in recess
subject to the call of the chair. We do not expect we are going
to need another hearing, but I do not want to preclude that
possibility because we do not know what events may transpire.
We will, therefore, stand in recess subject to the call of the
chair.
We want to thank you for your testimony today. Again I
think you feel that there is broad support to move this
nomination quickly out of this committee as soon as that can
legally happen, after receipt of all the materials and after
the President-elect formally sends in your nomination after he
is inaugurated.
Senator Warner, I do not think you were here at that
moment, but I am sure that you, as our chairman-to-be, will
move expeditiously, within moments after receipt of that
official nomination on the 20th, to convene this committee.
That is going to be his call because it will be his gavel.
Senator Warner. Let us elaborate, because a lot of people
are quite interested in that. What we did last time was,
President Clinton came off the dais after the inaugural
ceremonies and went up and signed a series of documents. Among
them were the nominations of several Cabinet members.
The committees voted, and then the Senate voice-voted that
day, and in discussion with our distinguished Majority and,
indeed, Minority Leaders, I think that is their intention to do
just that, so I think we will follow the protocols that we have
had through the years, and the Good Lord willing, and your
endurance and that of your family, things should be in place
Monday afternoon.
It is important we do that, that the security team,
particularly of the President of the United States,
irrespective of the President, be in place.
I remember our old boss one time, President Nixon, I
happened to be with him one day and he said that the order of
the succession of the presidency should never be in doubt for a
minute. I remember that very well, and the same way with the
team in the National security.
So I congratulate you, I join my colleagues in
congratulating you for a very, very good hearing. Both of us
have been through hearings now for 23 years, and we put this
one at the very top. Again, you and your family have stood the
test side by side.
Chairman Levin. If this ideal process works as outlined,
the Inaugural Ball you will be going to a week from next
Saturday night will be at the Pentagon. [Laughter.]
Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, thank you.
Chairman Levin. We stand in recess.
[The prepared statements of Senators Smith, Santorum, and
Hutchinson follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Bob Smith
Secretary Rumsfeld, I thank you and your family for coming before
the Senate Armed Services Committee today. I am very pleased with your
nomination. President-elect Bush has made an excellent choice to bring
you onto his national security team. I can think of no one more
qualified. You bring to the office your great experience, having held
the position of Secretary of Defense previously in the Ford
Administration. As a former White House Chief of Staff, you bring to
the office your knowledge of the challenges faced by our President. As
a former Congressman, you bring to the office a knowledge of the Hill.
You also bring to the office your experience as a highly successful
businessman. When confirmed, you will be running an organization larger
than any business in the world, an organization chartered to defend the
United States of America. Most of all, you bring to the office a great
appreciation for the two major threats this Nation will face in this
new century which I have long fought to address on this Committee and
in the Senate, namely the threat to our Nation's growing reliance on
space and the threat from missile attack.
Coincidentally, today also marks the release of the report from the
Commission to Assess United States National Security and Space
Management and Organization, more commonly known today as the Space
Commission, which I worked to create in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense
Authorization Act. You chaired that bipartisan group composed of the
Nation's leading military space experts. The Space Commission's
findings confirmed my long-held view of the growing importance of space
to the nation and my belief that space management and organization
reforms are urgently needed as America's commercial, civil, and
military reliance on space assets expands. The Commission's
recommendations lay the foundations for what I have said may be
necessary--the eventual creation of a separate Space Force. These near-
term management and organization reforms will begin to put in place the
leadership and advocacy for space programs that have long been lacking.
The United States has shown the world the value of space in
providing information superiority on the modern battlefield. As we move
into the new century, we need to defend our space-based information
superiority, be able to deny our adversaries that same capability, and
leverage the uniqueness of space to be able to rapidly project military
force around the world. We need a strong advocate for space to fight
for and justify new space programs needed for the 21st century in
competition with many other pressing military investment requirements.
I salute your leadership on the Space Commission, and I am grateful for
the knowledge and appreciation of the issue you will bring to your new
office.
Another of your many recent activities serving the nation was your
chairing the 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the United States. The unanimous finding by that Commission served as a
wake-up call to the nation and set us on a course that I hope will lead
to a robust multilayered national missile defense capability in the
near term.
I thank you for your service to the nation and your willingness to
take on the daunting task of Secretary of Defense again. I look forward
to your testimony.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum
Senator Levin and Senator Warner, thank you for scheduling this
hearing today. I believe it is important that this committee do all
that it can to assist the new administration on helping to address
pressing issues facing our military forces. This confirmation hearing
will help begin that process.
Members of this committee are familiar with Secretary Rumsfeld from
his service in the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and as a
private citizen. Based on Secretary Rumsfeld's past record of service
to this country, President-elect Bush has made a wise choice in
nominating him to be our next Secretary of Defense.
There are significant issues that the next secretary will be forced
to confront. For example, there is the issue of military readiness.
Five times, under the leadership of both Senator Thurmond and Senator
Warner, this committee has examined the status of U.S. military
readiness. To fully examine reports concerning the decline of military
readiness, the committee received the testimony of the Service Chiefs
and asked for their views on these reports.
As you are probably aware, the Department of Defense's most recent
Quarterly Readiness Report indicates that risk factors for executing
ongoing operations and responding to a Major Theater War (MTW) are
moderate, while risk for a second MTW is high. The committee also
learned that of the Army's 20 schools for critical military skills such
as field artillery, land combat and helicopter aviation, 12 have
received C-4 ratings. The most recent readiness hearing confirmed what
members of this committee suspected--that non-forward deployed forces
are being ``raided'' for resources needed to maintain the readiness
levels of our forward deployed forces.
One of the biggest challenges facing the next secretary concerns
the need to adequately fund not only our readiness accounts but also
our modernization accounts. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Airland,
I pay close attention to the modernization needs of the Services. I am
troubled by a recent CBO report which notes, at a minimum, a $50.0
billion disparity between the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2000
and the level of funding needed to sustain our defense forces in a
steady state. The largest gap identified by CBO concerns the funds
needed to modernize our military. Under a worst case scenario, CBO
identifies a gap as large as $62 billion between current funding and
the funding needed to modernize at a ``steady state.''
It will also be necessary to review and scrutinize those programs
and weapons systems currently under development. This will be
particularly important with respect to the development and procurement
costs associated with three tactical aviation programs being pursued by
the military Services. The total costs associated with developing and
procuring the F-22 Raptor, F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and Joint Strike
Fighter will total upwards of $350 billion. It will be important to
view the affordability of these programs against the full range of
requirements facing the Department of Defense.
In addition to the financial burden associated with our TACAIR
programs, the Army has recently unveiled a new transformation
initiative. In late 1999, General Eric Shinseki announced that the Army
intended to embark on an effort to transform the Army to better respond
to today's conflicts. The transformation process includes three
elements: modernization of the current legacy force, establishment of
rapidly deployable Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), and research
and development investments in the Objective Force.
The Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
authorized $637 million for the fielding of the first IBCT, $300
million to begin fielding the second IBCT and another $200 million for
related equipment. The fiscal year 2001 NDAA also required an
acceptable form of side-by-side test against the current inventory of
armor vehicles as well as additional field trials to examine the IAV's
conventional warfare capabilities against a conventional force.
One of the concerns expressed by this committee has been a
perceived reluctance on the part of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to support the Army's transformation effort with sufficient
resources. In order to fund the effort for fiscal year 2001, the Army
was required to terminate or restructure a number of important
programs. Congress subsequently restored many of these cuts. It is
unclear to this committee whether there are sufficient funds to support
modernization of the legacy force, fielding IBCTs and R&D efforts on
the Objective Force. It is essential that you review all aspects of the
Army's plan--fielding schedule, resourcing, testing plan, threat
assessment, acquisition plan and lift requirements--if you are
confirmed by the Senate.
An area of keen interest to this committee has been the need to
protect our critical infrastructure from being attacked or compromised
by enemies, terrorist organization or individuals.
The committee has also been interested in seeing improved
coordination between the public sector and private sector with respect
to identifying threats to our critical infrastructure and in efforts to
safeguard these important networks.
As part of the fiscal year 2001 NDAA, the committee authorized
funding for two important programs which will help address our current
weakness in addressing ``cyber threats.'' First, the committee
authorized $10.0 million for the creation of an Institute for Defense
Computer Security and Information Protection to conduct research and
technology development in the area of information assurance and to
facilitate the exchange of information regarding cyber threats,
technology, tools, and other relevant issues.
Second, the committee authorized $15.0 million to support the
establishment of a Information Security Scholarship Program. The
program would authorize the Secretary of Defense to award grants to
institutions of higher learning to establish or improve programs in
information security and to provide financial assistance to persons
pursuing a baccalaureate or advanced degree in information assurance.
The Department's support for both these efforts is vital to address
this critical problem.
The Clinton administration elected to approach this problem with a
government-sponsored entity, the Institute for Infrastructure
Information Protection. Such an approach fails to capitalize on the
abilities of our Nation's federally Funded Research and Development
Centers (FFRDCs) to disseminate information on cyber threats, promote
best practices to industry, and provide a safe meeting place for
discussions about cyber threats. I hope that you will do all you can to
tap the resources of these FFRDCs in helping to counter cyber threats.
Again, Senators Levin and Warner, thank you for convening this
hearing and I look forward to the testimony of Secretary Rumsfeld.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator Tim Hutchinson
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, Mr. Secretary, I regret
that I could not attend today's hearing. President-elect Bush's
decision to designate an individual as experienced and as capable as
Don Rumsfeld to serve as our Nation's 21st Secretary of Defense sends
an unmistakable signal that this Administration is committed to
tackling the tremendous challenge of transforming our military from the
force that defended our Nation during the Cold War to a force capable
of deterring and winning the wars of the 21st century.
While I look forward to working with the Secretary on all of the
national security-related challenges facing this great nation of ours,
I am particularly anxious to begin addressing a number of critical
personnel issues. Implementation of the Warner/Hutchinson ``TRICARE-
for-Life'' plan must proceed carefully and expeditiously. Equitable
compensation for senior enlisted members of our Armed Forces must be
restored. New programs must be developed so that the men and women who
choose to make a career of the military are able to provide college
educations to their dependents.
I am equally committed to working with the Secretary on a number of
Arkansas-specific matters. Enhancing the continuing missions of Little
Rock Air Force Base and the Pine Bluff Arsenal are two of the main
reasons that my constituents sent me to Washington, DC, and I intend to
continue to work every day to exceed their expectations.
Mr. Secretary, I have every confidence that you will be able to
satisfactorily answer all of the questions put to you by my colleagues,
and I look forward to casting my vote in favor of your nomination. Good
luck, and thank you for your continued dedication to public service.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Donald H. Rumsfeld by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

January 9, 2001
The Hon. Carl Levin,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith are the answers to the policy
questions the Senate Armed Services Committee asked me to complete.
Sincerely,
Donald H. Rumsfeld.
cc: Hon. John Warner
______

1. Fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the new
national security environment;
2. Ensure the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces;
3. Transform U.S. military forces from a Cold War-oriented
force to a 21st century force capable of deterring and
defeating new threats;
4. Modernize the intelligence and command-control-
communications-infrastructure and secure our space assets given
the growing dependence on those assets and their
vulnerabilities; and
5. Reform DOD structures, processes, and organizations.
u.s. defense strategy
Question. The essence of present U.S. defense strategy, as
articulated in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the
President and Congress, is defined as consisting of three elements--
shaping, responding, and preparing.
Do you agree with that defense strategy?
Answer. See response below.
Question. If not, what defense strategy would you substitute for
it?
Answer. Determining what an appropriate defense strategy should be
is one of the most important issues that will need to be addressed by
the Department. From defense strategy flows policies, programs, and
resource requirements. The U.S. must have a national security strategy
that seeks to advance U.S. national interests and to have a positive
impact on world events without the need to resort to armed force. It is
important that we shape and prepare the Armed Forces to respond to
whatever national security challenges may confront us--this is the
essence of deterrence. External events sometimes are outside our
control. Therefore, we must ensure that the military has the tools it
needs to fight and win, should that be necessary.
If confirmed, the defense strategy would recognize that peace is
best preserved when the U.S. remains strong. By providing for a
military that is second-to-none and equipped to meet the newer
challenges of the 21st century, I believe we can best ensure a peaceful
strategic environment that advances U.S. national security interests
and those of our friends and allies.
quadrennial defense review
Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review is required to be
submitted to Congress by September 30, 2001.
Will that deadline provide sufficient time for the new
administration to develop required changes to national security
strategy on which the Quadrennial Defense Review will be based?
Answer. No I do not believe it will. We intend to undertake a
comprehensive review of strategy, forces, and capabilities as
prescribed by law and will consult with Congress should the deadline
prove to be overly burdensome.
Question. How will you keep the committees of jurisdiction informed
during the conduct of the QDR?
Answer. I do not know precisely but I will consult with
congressional leadership and request staff to keep the committees
appropriately informed as the review progresses.
Question. During the past decade, the military departments have
been reduced significantly, both in terms of force structure and
resources, in response to the perceived post-Cold War security
environment. During the same period, the various Defense Agencies have
grown considerably--a prudent investment in some eyes, but a
questionable investment to others.
How will you include the Defense Agencies in the overall QDR
process?
Answer. If confirmed, the Department will undertake a comprehensive
review of our strategy, forces, and capabilities that addresses all
elements of the Department.
Question. Do you envision a separate process to review the Defense
Agencies, apart from the review of the military departments?
Answer. I have not considered the shape of the review process.
hart-rudman commission. the 21st century national security study group
Question. The Hart-Rudman Commission, the 21st Century National
Security Study Group Phase 3 report is scheduled to be completed by
February 2001 to recommend alternatives to the current national
security apparatus and suggest ways to implement the proposed national
security strategy.
What process and organization do you intend to use to review the
report and do you intend to use the results to influence the
Quadrennial Defense Review?
Answer. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century,
commonly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, is composed of a group of
prominent Americans drawn from all sectors of society, well suited to
examine American national security in the 21st century. I fully expect
the commission's phase 3 report to stimulate significant thought and
discussion inside and outside of government and contribute to the
ongoing national security debate and the new administration's defense
review.
two major theater wars requirement
Question. The present requirement to have the capability to fight
and win two major theater wars in overlapping time frames is extremely
demanding. Some argue that as long as that requirement exists, our
Armed Forces will have to be sized in such a way as to address the
least likely contingency with short shrift given to any preparation for
other lesser contingencies and for emerging threats.
Do you believe the two major theater wars requirement should be
maintained?
Answer. Modern history suggests that the U.S. has often faced more
than one security contingency at a time. With that history in mind,
preparations are appropriate. The manner in which the U.S. responds to
two near-simultaneous contingencies is an issue of military strategy
and operations and the adequacy of available resources at the time.
This issue should be examined in the upcoming strategy review.
Question. If so, how do you respond to the above argument?
Answer. The consequences of not being prepared to fulfill the
military's primary mission of deterring war and winning war if
deterrence fails would be devastating. The U.S. military must also be
able to deal with emerging threats. If confirmed, I will work to
restructure our military to meet 21st century threats.
strategic pause
Question. Some have argued for taking a strategic pause now in
modernization programs, accepting some modest risk in the near-term
when we have no peer competitor, while making more fundamental shifts
for dealing with challenges we will face in the future. During the
campaign, President-elect Bush endorsed skipping procurement of a
generation of weapons systems.
What is your view on this issue and, if confirmed, how would you
proceed in implementing your view?
Answer. We cannot allow the effectiveness of our military forces to
degrade while we are modernizing and transforming. The U.S. military
needs to get on a new path that will permit the rapid introduction of
advanced technology that can materially increase military effectiveness
and decrease the cost of operating and maintaining those forces. The
cost of maintaining Cold War era equipment and its associated
infrastructure and the steep reduction in modernization funding since
the end of the Cold War has produced long-term modernization problems
that must be addressed. If confirmed, I will conduct a comprehensive
review of our military structure, strategy and procurement priorities,
as promised by President-elect Bush. This review should help to
determine how best to modernize the U.S. military to deal with future
challenges.
when to use military force
Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should
participate in potentially dangerous situations, including peace
enforcement operations, is one of the most important and difficult
decisions that the national command authorities have to make. Prior
Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
proposed criteria to guide decision making for such situations.
What is your criteria for such situations?
Answer. The use of military force is one of the most important
decisions a President can take. If confirmed, I would work closely with
the President and his senior advisors to develop appropriate policies
to guide the use of our military forces in peacetime, crisis, and war.
Question. If you have not developed such criteria, what are the
factors that you believe are most important with regard to such
decisions?
Answer. My general views are these: A decision to use military
force, whether unilaterally or in coalition with other nations, should
reflect important U.S. national security interests. The U.S. structure
of alliances and its diplomatic ability to build informal, but
effective regional coalitions provides the President with a variety of
options to bring military power to bear in a specific situation where
U.S. interests are involved. U.S. military forces can best be used when
the military mission is clear and achievable and when there is a
reasonable exit strategy. I look forward to working the President and
his national security team on the details of this important question in
the weeks ahead.
participation in peacekeeping
Question. Some have taken the position that the United States
should not generally participate in peacekeeping in view of the
negative impact that such activities have on certain warfighting
skills, and the fact that the U.S. Armed Forces' primary mission is
fighting and winning our Nation's wars. Others have taken the position
that participation in peacekeeping operations is in our Nation's
interest and strengthens U.S. leadership and that such actually
improves certain warfighting skills, such as leadership skills.
What is your view on the participation of U.S. forces in
peacekeeping operations?
Answer. Clear criteria for the use of U.S. military forces should
be established prior to U.S. participation in specific peacekeeping
operations. There should be clear objectives, a coherent strategy to
achieve them, a reasonable chance of success, acceptable command and
control arrangements, and an exit strategy. When the main burden of the
U.S. presence shifts to infrastructure and nation-building, however, we
are into missions that are not appropriate for the U.S. military.
jointness
Question. It became apparent during this year's debate on defense
needs that our military deployments have increased dramatically in the
past decade at the same time our force structure and resources have
declined, increasing the tempo on our military personnel and equipment.
To the consternation of many, including members of this committee, we
seem to encounter the same significant problems with meaningful joint
operations and interoperability of our Armed Forces during each
significant military operation. Most notably, the armed services
continue to be hampered by communications systems, information
management systems, and other capabilities that are often not
interoperable and sometimes redundant. This committee has expended
considerable time on these issues, but continues to observe problems in
the development and fielding of interoperable systems and concepts.
How do you propose to remedy these recurring shortcomings?
Answer. Interoperability among our forces is an issue which I
believe demands immediate attention. Interoperability should be
addressed as new systems are conceived, not simply after they are
fielded. I believe we should devote significant efforts to solving the
warfighter's problems in the field as identified by the CINCs,
including from experiences in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Desert Storm.
Question. In your opinion, do our experimentation, requirements
generation, and acquisition processes need significant reform? If so,
how would you propose to reform these processes?
Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake a review of these processes,
with a special emphasis on innovation and streamlining, and will report
the results of that review to Congress. My current impression is that
the process is mired in unrealistic requirements that unnecessarily
delay the time from concept to deployment at a time when technology is
leaping ahead. Because of the lengthy acquisition process and the rapid
advances in technology, we may have driven ourselves into a position
that is guaranteed to produce technologically obsolete equipment the
day it is deployed.
national security
Question. Most agree the most significant near-term threat to our
national security is not from a military peer competitor, but from
transnational, ideological groups that may attempt to employ some type
of weapon of mass destruction within the United States.
How would you assess our preparedness to respond to such a
situation?
Answer. I am advised that the U.S. government is spending more than
$11 billion to deal with terrorist threats that might be posed by
transnational or ideological terrorists, including the use of weapons
of mass destruction. While some impressive results have been achieved
from this considerable effort, my preliminary impression is that more
remains to be done, particularly with respect to the role of the
Department in providing for homeland defense as well as for defense of
U.S. facilities overseas.
Question. What adjustments would you recommend, if confirmed, to
our national security mechanisms to ensure the collective, accountable
cooperation of all appropriate agencies?
Answer. I am not prepared at this time to recommend adjustments.
While the response to the transnational terrorist threat to the U.S.
has been well supported the distribution of resources, programs, and
leadership over numerous Federal agencies has posed significant
coordination problems. Greater coordination and interagency leadership
is needed to assure an effective U.S. government response to this
threat.
Two areas of particular interest to me are space and intelligence.
Each would benefit from more senior level leadership and closer
coordination between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.
transformation
Question. The December 1997 Report of the National Defense Panel,
titled ``Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,''
contained the following statements: ``The Defense Department should
accord the highest priority to executing a transformation strategy.
Taking the wrong transformation course (or failing to transform) opens
the nation to both strategic and technological surprise. Transformation
will take dedication and commitment--and a willingness to put talented
people, money, resources, and structure behind a process designed to
foster change. Greater emphasis should be placed on experimenting with
a variety of military systems, operational concepts, and force
structures. The goal is to identify the means to meet the emerging
challenges, exploit the opportunities, and terminate those approaches
that do not succeed.'' And: ``At the core of the effort should be a
much greater emphasis on jointness, building upon the legacy of
Goldwater-Nichols.''
Do you agree that there is a need to transform the U.S. Armed
Forces into a very different kind of military from that which exists
today?
Answer. Yes. Our current force structure will be sorely challenged
by asymmetric threats and the growing ability of both state and non-
state actors to deny access to critical forward bases and lines of
communication. We have the opportunity now to critically evaluate both
our force structure as well as how we organize and employ our forces.
Lessons learned from previous operations suggest the need for
improvement in the areas of intelligence, rapid deployment and
employment, decisive operations across the spectrum of conflict,
streamlining of logistics, and improvements in the C\4\ISR capabilities
and architectures.
Question. Do you agree that experimentation, particularly joint
experimentation, is essential to successfully achieving such a
transformation?
Answer. Yes. Joint experimentation is essential in ensuring that
operations, doctrine-related activities, and acquisition are more fully
explored from inception to delivery/implementation. Our concept should
be to field systems and develop capabilities that are ``born joint.''
An essential step in helping to ensure that new capabilities are ``born
joint'' and work is through experimentation. We must avoid radios
usable by only one service, service-specific software, and procedures
that are peculiar to one community or service. Transformation involves
more than merely new weapons systems. Rather, it is a process of
reorganization and reform that can best be validated through joint
experimentation.
Question. Over the last year, we have seen the Army begin a process
to transform the service into a force that will be able to deal with a
wide range of anticipated 21st century national security challenges.
The Navy and Air Force have also begun to explore opportunities to
initiate transformation processes to keep current with evolving defense
challenges. These efforts demonstrate a recognition that fundamental
change is necessary if they are to remain viable over the next 20-30
years.
Are you at all concerned that these initiatives appear to be ``self
defined'' by the services without direct participation of the Secretary
of Defense or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. I am told that a structure is in place in which JFCOM was
designated the lead for joint force integration and for joint force
training. While I am not familiar with it, I intend to assess the
effectiveness of the current arrangement.
Question. Should the Department of Defense play a role in steering
or guiding individual service efforts? If so, how?
Answer. Yes. Service initiative is invaluable. However, if forces
are to fight jointly in the field, transformation must be conducted as
a joint endeavor. Only then can the Services' specific cultures and
capabilities likely to be forged into a joint cooperative endeavor.
army transformation
Question. The Army has begun a process for transforming itself into
a lighter, more agile force that will be able to deal with the
challenges posed by threats in an uncertain future.
Do you believe that the Department should support the Army's
current transformation plan even if it means diverting resources from
other Services' investment programs to pay for it?
Answer. I cannot answer this without an analysis of all the
Services' investment programs. But I can say this: I believe that the
Secretary of Defense should seek an allocation of resources that is
best for the overall defense posture--that gives priority to funding
the most pressing requirements. The transformation of our Armed Forces
will be a high priority. But before recommending major changes in the
allocation of investment funding--which Congress has recently
approved--I intend to assess what new capabilities are being sought and
the soundness of programs advancing those capabilities and their impact
on deterrence and warfighting capabilities.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role that
experimentation, including joint experimentation, should play in
directing the Army's efforts in modernizing the legacy force, fielding
an interim force, and developing the objective force?
Answer. Army Transformation must be coherent with evolving joint
operational doctrine, and that doctrine will only emerge through joint
experimentation. I see experimentation playing an important role. But
let me be clear: experimentation will yield changes in course, exhibit
failures of expectations, or even reveal past mistakes. We must be
careful to learn from experimentation, and acknowledge the risks it
reveals.
Question. Do you believe that the current Air Force and Navy
strategic mobility programs will support the Army's transformation
goals for strategic agility? If not, what changes do you believe should
be made in those programs?
Answer. My preliminary impression is that we need to make
improvements in our strategic mobility capability. As we transform the
forces, we will need an appropriate strategic sea/airlift fleet.
budget priorities
Question. During the 106th Congress, both Congress and the
administration placed the highest priority on increasing pay and
compensation for military personnel and health care benefits for
retirees, and on improving housing for military families.
If you are confirmed, what will be your highest priorities for
increased funding over and above financing the unfunded cost of these
previously enacted benefit increases?
Answer. First, preserving the high quality of our military
personnel and restoring their morale. We need to spend what is needed
to compensate military people fairly and ensure a competitive quality
of life for them and their families. In this tight U.S. labor market
for highly-skilled professionals, we must spend enough to attract and
retain people with the skills required for the technically
sophisticated Armed Forces. Also important is good military health
care, housing, and other quality of life contributors. I would review
the progress made in recent years and decide if further improvements
are needed. President-elect Bush has signaled that taking care of our
military people is a top priority with his pledge to increase pay for
the Armed Forces. Second, readiness. I would look for areas where
increased funding is needed for training, maintenance, and other
readiness essentials--there are also important quality of life
considerations. I also would consider actions to prevent indirect
threats to readiness--that is, to prevent funding shortfalls that could
result in funds being diverted from readiness accounts. Third, future
capabilities--focused on ballistic missile defense and modernization of
air, sea, land, intelligence, and space capabilities. These areas are
complex, and I will likely not complete an assessment of where best to
put added funding until the defense review is completed. I hope to have
identified some immediate funding needs in time to include in the
fiscal year 2002 budget submission, and possibly in a fiscal year 2001
supplemental.
Question. As Secretary you would be called on to make tough
decisions in many areas, one of which would be funding priorities. What
areas in the defense budget represent your highest priorities for
additional resources?
Answer. Again, the highest priorities would be people, readiness,
and future capabilities. It is important to ensure that we are taking
good care of our people, both now and for the future; and to seek the
proper balance between current readiness and investment in the high-
tech capabilities to ensure our future superiority in all security
realms--with special attention to the threats of this post-Cold War
period. Over the past few years I have been focused on the issues of
ballistic missile defense, America's security posture in space, and
intelligence. If confirmed, these would certainly be high priorities.
Question. There are an increasing number of studies from outside
the administration, in addition to the Joint Chiefs, which indicate
that current and projected levels of defense spending will be
inadequate to meet U.S. national security requirements as they are
currently stated.
What is your view of these and other studies, and will you seek
additional funding for defense?
Answer. I agree with the conclusion that projected defense spending
levels are inadequate to meet U.S. national security requirements as
they are currently stated. President-elect Bush has expressed the same
conclusion. If confirmed I would direct a study to specify exactly
where inadequacies lie, where savings could be achieved to help address
those inadequacies, and what additional funding may be required.
readiness for most likely military operations
Question. The Army has been exploring changes to the way readiness
is measured due in part to confusion in some recent deployments where
units were assessing themselves and reporting against one set of
requirements while they were undertaking a different mission at the
time.
Do you believe the readiness reporting system should be made more
comprehensive so that it measures our units not only against the most
demanding requirements contained in the national military strategy but
also assesses the performance of those units in the real world missions
directed by the national command authorities?
Answer. The question ``ready to do what?'' is a good one. The
current system centers on our readiness for high intensity combat
operations, such as a major theater war, and provides broad indicators
of readiness status ranging from personnel to equipment. I understand
that planning is underway for a number of improvements to the existing
reporting system, in both the near and longer term.
Question. Over the last few years many have agreed that we have
seen increasing evidence that the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces
has begun to deteriorate as a result of the over-commitment of an
under-resourced Department of Defense.
What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have
to be addressed by the Bush administration, and, if confirmed, how will
you approach these issues?
Answer. There are a number of readiness challenges that must be
addressed. These include the classic ``unit readiness'' concerns of
robust manning, functioning equipment, and realistic training.
Warfighting commanders have to have the assets to synchronize and use
their units in effective joint and coalition forces. National Guard and
Reserves have a number of unique challenges in meeting their mission
requirements upon deployment that require immediate address.
Some of the more pressing concerns lie in the condition of
equipment, or more broadly, the materiel readiness of the forces.
Problems include higher-than-planned use, inadequate spare parts
inventories, and recruiting and retaining highly skilled personnel.
Joint readiness requires effective command, control,
communications, and computer (C\4\) systems; robust intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; sufficient lift to
mobilize forces and equipment; and healthy logistics practices and
sustainment stocks. The U.S. needs to be better prepared for the
growing threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
threats to critical information and other infrastructure systems, and
vulnerable space assets. As we review our National Military Strategy in
the Quadrennial Defense Review, these concerns must be addressed.
encroachment
Question. Some of the most significant issues that will impact the
readiness of the Armed Forces as we enter the 21st century could be
categorized as outside encroachment upon military resources. This
encroachment includes environmental constraints on military training
ranges, local community efforts to obtain military property, airspace
restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, transfer of radio
frequency spectrum from the Department of Defense to the wireless
communications industry, and many others. Unless these issues are
effectively addressed our military forces will find it increasingly
difficult to train and operate at home and abroad.
In your opinion, how serious are these problems?
Answer. This is an important issue. The myriad forms of
encroachment ranges face threaten to complicate and in some cases
severely restrict the ability to conduct critical training. The number
of external pressures is increasing and the readiness impacts are
growing. We need to address these issues in a more comprehensive and
systematic fashion. It will be important to work with regulators,
special interests, other federal agencies, and communities to more
clearly define the issues from all viewpoints. We must anticipate
pressures and reach acceptable, timely solutions, whenever possible. We
will also need to address the issues raised by the transfer of radio
frequency spectrum from DOD to the wireless communications industry.
Question. If confirmed, what efforts will you take to ensure that
military access to these specific, and other required resources, will
be preserved?
Answer. The Department's approach should be comprehensive and
balanced, supporting test and training and operational requirements,
while seeking to protect the natural environment and operating within a
balanced regulatory framework. Modernizing instrumentation is central
to efforts to make DOD ranges sustainable. Live training is expensive.
Improved range instrumentation can increase the return on investment
by: expanding the battle space and creating a more realistic warfare
environment; providing improved learning by better feedback; and
reducing the impact on the environment by substituting simulated
engagements. All Services are experiencing deterioration of training
range infrastructure, which will require recapitalization. I am advised
that the Senior Readiness Oversight Council recently directed a broad-
based effort to counter encroachment and protect the future capability
of ranges to support required training and testing. The goal is to
maintain fully sustainable ranges. A comprehensive approach is needed
to satisfy both readiness needs and the legal and moral
responsibilities as stewards of public lands.
outsourcing of commercial activities
Question. Over the past several years the Department of Defense has
increased its reliance upon the private sector to perform certain
activities including equipment maintenance and facility operations.
Some have supported this effort while others have expressed concern
that core activities are being jeopardized by reducing our reliance
upon military personnel and civilian employees of the Federal
Government.
What approach would you recommend to balance maintaining military
necessary capabilities and outsourcing?
Answer. The size and composition of DOD's facilities to perform
equipment maintenance is an important aspect of the overall readiness
of the Armed Forces. The appropriate balance between government and
private sector facilities must be struck in a manner that assures the
equipment employed by the Armed Forces will be ready for use when
needed. This balance in turn will be affected over time by the nature
of the technology used in military equipment. A balance will be
reviewed to assure that capabilities essential to national defense that
cannot reliably be provided by the private sector will be provided by
the government sector. Moreover, critical capabilities will be
maintained in the government sector.
counter-narcotics
Question. The U.S. Government has initiated a massive assistance
program to the Government of Colombia to regain control of its
territory in an effort to stem the production of cocaine and other
narcotics that are sent to the United States. The Department of Defense
is playing a particularly significant role in this program by training
and providing resources to the Colombian Armed Forces. This program,
Plan Colombia, has come under criticism as expensive and misdirected
and, some allege, will contribute to the abuse of human rights and lead
the U.S. military into ``another Vietnam.''
What is your view with regard to Plan Colombia--its potential for
success and the appropriate role of the U.S. Armed Forces?
Answer. I have less than well-informed personal views which I
prefer to discuss with the appropriate officials before taking a public
position.
combating terrorism
Question. The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001 (sec. 901) requires the Secretary of Defense to
designate an Assistant Secretary as the individual responsible for
providing ``overall direction and supervision for policy, program
planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the
activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism.''
If confirmed, what are your plans for implementing this legislation
and any other plans you have for streamlining and providing more focus
on the Department's combating terrorism programs?
Answer. I am aware of the Section 901 language requiring the
designation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Department's
combating terrorism activities. I share the committee's concerns with
providing an appropriate focus for combating terrorism. If confirmed, I
would hope to review the current organizational structure. I would of
course inform Congress as implementing decisions are made.
Question. In recent years, there have been numerous congressional
proposals to establish a National Coordinator for Combating Domestic
Terrorism. The proposals have ranged from establishing a position
similar to the current ``Drug Czar'' to creating a Deputy Attorney
General for Combating Domestic Terrorism.
Would you have concerns with such an individual having budgetary
and policy responsibilities over certain Department of Defense
combating terrorism programs?
Answer. The many activities associated with combating terrorism,
domestically and internationally, need to be coordinated. Combating
terrorism is a complex issue involving the expertise and statutory
authorities of many departments and agencies. I would be concerned with
proposals that could limit the Department's ability to fulfill its
responsibilities. I would need to know more than I do now to have
conclusions about such proposals and provide the committee with my
appraisal.
Question. Do you have any suggestions as to what type of a
position, and its responsibilities, should be established to better
coordinate our Nation's combating domestic terrorism efforts?
Answer. I would need some time to be prepared to make a
recommendation.
tactical fighter programs
Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize
our tactical aviation forces, including the F-22, the F/A-18E/F, and
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that these three programs will consume over $300 billion of
our investment resources over the next 20 years. Some have said that we
need to cancel or truncate one or more of these programs in order to
afford other high priority modernization efforts, such as Army
transformation, or recapitalizing the Navy's fleet.
What are your views on the requirements for and timing of these
three programs?
Answer. The modernization of U.S. tactical fighter programs is of
immense importance to the maintenance of U.S. military superiority. It
is costly, and deserves a careful review. The requirements and timing
of the tactical fighter programs will be a subject in the defense
review.
b-2 bombers
Question. Do you favor restarting production of B-2 bombers?
Answer. Long-range bombers are a crucial national military
capability providing timely worldwide reach to American military power.
As is the case with tactical fighters, the bomber modernization
requirement needs to be reviewed in the forthcoming defense review.
Before such a decision could be made, one would have to look at the
overall cost and the impact on other programs, and how that cost would
compare to fielding other weapon delivery systems, including stand-off
missiles that could perform or contribute to the same or similar
missions. One would also likely look at whether more B-2s would be more
effective than additional upgrades and improvements to the current
bomber force structure of B-2, B-1, and B-52 aircraft.
v-22 program
Question. Do you believe that the V-22 program should move to full
rate production now, should substantial additional operational testing
be conducted, or is the Department pursuing a flawed program for which
another alternative should be adopted?
Answer. The two recent crashes of the V-22 which have resulted in
loss of life are disturbing. I have read that the Department is
reviewing the program in light of these incidents. I have no
conclusions at this time.
strateic lift
Question. One of the shortfalls most consistently identified by
Commanders-in-Chief in written and oral testimony has been in the area
of the required strategic lift to support the National Military
Strategy. Study after study has confirmed this shortfall, yet the
shortfall remains.
What steps would you propose to address this deficiency?
Answer. Strategic lift is a key element of U.S. military power
because of our dependence on the ability to conduct expeditionary
campaigns to defend U.S. interests and those of our friends and allies.
Depending on the airlift requirement established, there are several
options to be considered. The question of strategic lift will need to
be addressed in the defense review.
nato expansion
Question. The United States will face a decision on the addition of
new members to the NATO Alliance by the 2002 NATO summit meeting.
What are your views on continued NATO expansion?
Answer. As former Ambassador to NATO, I have great respect for the
value of the NATO Alliance. It has been the key instrument in keeping
the peace in Europe for over 50 years. The key factor in considering
future NATO expansion is whether or not expansion will enhance U.S. and
NATO security. I believe it is important that the broadening of NATO
membership preserve the alliance's capacity for effective collective
action. This suggests that new members should share the democratic
values of the alliance and be prepared to make the necessary
investments in the creation and maintenance of effective and
interoperable military forces.
It is my understanding that Allied leaders agreed to ``review'' the
issue of enlargement at their next summit, to be held no later than
2002. This is an issue that will need to be addressed by the President
and his national security team.
review of overseas military deployments
Question. In an address to the Citadel in September 1999, then-
Governor Bush said that he would order an immediate review of U.S.
overseas military deployments worldwide. According to the Governor,
``the problem comes with open-ended deployments and unclear military
missions.''
In conducting this review, what factors will you use to determine
continued U.S. military participation in on going overseas deployments?
Answer. A decision to employ U.S. military forces in support of our
national interests is one that should never be taken lightly. Likewise
the decision to sustain, reduce, or end the commitment of U.S. forces
to on-going operations must be informed by careful assessment and
deliberation. If confirmed, I will assist the President and his senior
advisors in reviewing these matters, preferably in a way that does not
create unnecessary uncertainties and difficulties for those responsible
for managing such operations.
european security and defense policy
Question. The European Union (EU) is working to implement its
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to enable the EU to take
decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and
conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.
Secretary Cohen recently warned our European allies that NATO could
become ``a relic of the past'' if ESDP is not implemented in a way that
will strengthen the NATO Alliance. Members of Congress have expressed
similar concerns.
What are your views on the EU's ESDP?
Answer. I share these concerns. A free and democratic Europe is a
vital security interest for the United States. The transatlantic
alliance has proven to be the most effective instrument of collective
military action in history. Coming at a time of historically low levels
of investment and public interest in defense matters in Europe, the
ESDP could pose a resource-diversion risk to NATO, and in doing so,
undermine the ability of NATO to undertake effective collective
defense. The U.S. and our NATO allies need to assure that any ESDP
would not diminish the effectiveness of the NATO alliance.
Question. What actions do you believe the EU should take in
implementing ESDP to address the concerns expressed by Secretary Cohen
and others?
Answer. The task is to preserve the integrity of NATO as the
primary instrument of transatlantic security. It will take active U.S.
leadership at both the bilateral and multilateral levels to ensure that
any ESDP does not diminish the effectiveness of the NATO alliance.
Question. Do you believe that ESDP is, or could be, a threat to the
NATO Alliance?
Answer. It could, potentially. But we need to work with our allies
to make sure that it does not.
international criminal court
Question. The United States signed the Rome Treaty on the
International Criminal Court on December 31, 2000, the deadline
established in the Treaty. The decision to sign, despite concerns about
significant flaws in the Treaty, was to put the United States in a
position to influence the evolution of the Court.
What are your views on the Rome Treaty?
Answer. I oppose the Treaty. The Rome Statute has deficiencies that
expose U.S. personnel to certain risks. We must be concerned about the
exposure of U.S. personnel to politically motivated prosecution. I
favor rejecting the assertion of the ICC's purported jurisdiction over
non-party states.
Question. The Pentagon has been very concerned that the court could
claim jurisdiction over American service members and officials, even if
the U.S. has not ratified the treaty.
Do you share those concerns with regards to the ICC?
Answer. Yes. See my comments above.
national missile defense
Question. President-elect Bush has stated his support for deploying
a robust National Missile Defense (NMD) system ``at the earliest
possible date'' to protect the United States and its allies.
Will you only consider deploying the NMD system currently under
development, or will you consider alternative systems and architectures
for deployment?
Answer. I believe it would be good to examine alternative and
complementary architectures to the NMD system currently under
development. In doing so, a number of factors would need to be
considered, including the urgency of the ballistic missile threat to
the United States, U.S. forces deployed overseas, and our friends and
allies, as well as the technical feasibility, cost, and deployment
schedule for potential alternatives.
Question. If you consider alternatives, they are likely to take
longer to develop, test, and deploy than the system currently under
development, perhaps considerably longer.
Are you willing to wait until after 2010 to deploy a system if its
development takes that long, or will you only consider systems that can
be deployed during this decade?
Answer. President-elect Bush is committed to deployment of an
effective NMD at the earliest possible date. This commitment is based
on the need to protect the American people against long-range missile
threats that can evolve rapidly and with little or no warning. I agree.
However, this does not mean we will foreclose alternatives that could
be deployed after 2010, particularly if they can provide increased
effectiveness or would address uncertainties in the evolution of the
long range missile threat
Question. The Bush administration and the Clinton administration
both pursued development of a limited NMD system to defend against
limited attacks. Then-Governor Bush wrote in May 2000, of the need for
missile defense against ``missile attacks by rogue nations or
accidental launches.''
Will you pursue an NMD system designed to defend against such
limited attacks, or will you pursue an NMD system designed to defend
against all Russian and Chinese ballistic missile systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would plan to review the various
alternatives to defend us and our allies against ballistic missile
attacks by rogue nations as well as accidental or unauthorized
launches.
Question. The Clinton administration adopted four criteria for
determining whether to deploy an NMD system: (1) the existence of a
threat that warrants deployment; (2) an NMD system that is
operationally effective; (3) an NMD system that is affordable and cost-
effective; and (4) an assessment of the impact of deployment on our
relations with other nations and on nuclear arms control and non-
proliferation efforts. The overall focus of these criteria was to
determine whether deployment would make the United States more or less
secure.
What will be your criteria for determining whether deploying an NMD
system will make us more or less secure?
Answer. The incoming administration has not issued a specific set
of criteria. However, the President-elect has stated his support of the
deployment of an NMD system as soon as possible. This is founded in a
belief that an effective NMD systems will make us more secure.
Question. Since you chaired the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States in 1998, have your judgments
changed regarding the nature and scope of the ballistic missile threat?
Answer. No. The threat to the U.S. posed by emerging ballistic
missile capabilities is broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly
than had been previously estimated.
Question. The current NMD program being developed by DOD is focused
on the deployment of a single ground-based site in Alaska in the 2005-
2007 timeframe. Some have advocated either substituting a sea-based NMD
system for the ground-based program or adding sea-based systems as
adjuncts to the ground-based system.
What role do you believe sea-based systems might have in a future
NMD architecture?
Answer. I am aware that sea-based systems could play an important
role in defending against ballistic missile threats. I further
understand that the Department has prepared a classified study of the
possible contributions of sea-based systems to National Missile
Defense. If confirmed I will review that study and make recommendations
to the President, as appropriate.
theater missile defense
Question. Theater ballistic missile threats exist today and are
growing. There are currently five U.S. theater missile defense (TMD)
systems under development for deployment against these existing and
growing threats.
What priority will you give to theater missile defense and how will
it compare to National Missile Defense?
Answer. In light of the widespread deployment of ballistic missiles
today, I believe it is imperative that the Department develop, test,
procure, and deploy TMD systems. Given the simultaneous emergence of
the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States, it is
essential that the Department give equal priority to developing and
procuring an effective NMD as well.
Question. Will you continue the ``family of systems'' approach of
layered and complementary TMD systems currently being developed, or
will you change the approach to TMD? If you would change the approach,
what manner of change would you propose?
Answer. It is my understanding that the concept of layered defense
has been adopted because a single TMD system cannot defeat the range of
theater ballistic missiles U.S. forces could face. It also provides
greater confidence in the overall effectiveness of the system. I
currently know of no reason to move away from the ``family-of-systems''
approach currently under development.
Question. Several of DOD's theater missile defense programs are
currently funding-constrained, resulting in either inefficient
production rates or development delays.
What sort of priority would you attach to ensuring that we develop
and field TMD systems in a timely and efficient manner?
Answer. Given the widespread deployment of theater-range ballistic
missiles and the threat those missiles pose to deployed U.S. forces as
well as our friends and allies, I would attach a high priority to the
development and deployment of effective TMD systems in a timely and
efficient manner.
missile defense technology
Question. Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns over the
declining level of funding available for ballistic missile defense
science and technology and follow-on technology development.
Do you believe that it should be a priority to reinvigorate the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's support technology efforts?
Answer. Yes. Effective ballistic missile defense relies on the
application of some of the most advanced technologies available. In
assessing the scope of science and technology work in this area, it is
also important to look beyond the specific dedicated investments in
BMDO programs.
anti-ballistic missile (abm) treaty
Question. Then-Governor Bush stated in September 1999, that his
administration would ``offer Russia the necessary amendments to the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty'' to make possible the deployment of a
U.S. NMD system. ``If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will
give prompt notice, under the provisions of the Treaty, that we can no
longer be a party to it.''
What amendments to the ABM Treaty would you propose to the
Russians?
Answer. The issue of how to handle the ABM Treaty will be part of
the overall review of NMD to be directed by the President.
Question. The ABM Treaty gives each party the right to withdraw
from the treaty if it decides that ``extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests.''
If the U.S. makes a unilateral decision to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty in order to deploy an NMD system, what possible negative
consequences do you foresee from the reaction of our allies, from
Russia, or from China?
Answer. I am aware that concerns have been expressed by some of our
allies about NMD and the prospect of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty. I believe these concerns can be addressed through close
consultations. In the longer run, I believe that deployment of an
effective NMD system can strengthen U.S. and allied security. For
example, the failure to deploy appropriate defensive systems could also
have adverse effects, including:

Paralyzing our ability to act in a crisis or deterring
other countries from assisting us;
Providing incentives to U.S. friends and allies to
develop nuclear capabilities;
Putting the U.S. in a position where its only option
may be preemption; and
Moving the U.S. to a more isolationist position
because of an inability to defend against ballistic missiles.

To date, the Russians have rejected amendments to the treaty to
permit deployment of any U.S. NMD system, and have raised the
possibility of withdrawing from existing arms control regimes and on-
going efforts to reduce strategic offensive arms. The task is to
persuade the world of the truth that deployment of a NMD system will
strengthen global security and stability. As President-elect Bush has
stated, ``America's development of missile defenses is a search for
security, not a search for advantage.''
Question. Could these consequences, possibly including Russia
ending its nuclear weapon reductions, have the effect of reducing our
security or increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation?
Answer. I don't believe that is the case. These are issues the
President-elect and his senior officials will need to address.
nuclear force levels and posture
Question. Then-Governor Bush wrote in May 2000 of the need for a
new approach to nuclear security, saying that ``the premises of Cold
War targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal.''
Concerning the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile,
Governor Bush wrote that he would ``pursue the lowest possible number
consistent with our national security.'' He also stated that, ``It
should be possible to reduce the number of American nuclear warheads
significantly beyond what has already been agreed to under START II,
without compromising our security in any way.''
Under what circumstances do you believe it would be possible to
achieve such reductions?
Answer. President-elect Bush has stated that he will direct his
Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the nuclear force
posture and determine how best to meet U.S. security needs. At the same
time, he has stated he will pursue the lowest possible number of
weapons consistent with our national security. I prefer to wait until
that review is completed before speculating on the circumstances under
which reductions might be advisable.
Question. Do you believe we should pursue such reductions through
negotiated agreement with Russia (and possibly other nations)?
Answer. The President's advisers plan to undertake a review of how
best to pursue President-elect Bush's goal of further reductions.
Logically, this could involve traditional arms control tools,
innovative unilateral initiatives, or some combination. In any case, an
approach to any nuclear reductions would need to be developed in the
context of a number of interrelated factors. These include decisions on
the ABM Treaty and National Missile Defense, as well as measures
relating to tactical nuclear weapons, the evolution in Russia's
unilateral strategic force posture, and the outcome of the planned
Nuclear Posture Review.
Question. Governor Bush also wrote that ``the United States should
remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger
status,'' because ``keeping so many weapons on high alert may create
unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.''
Do you intend to carry out an assessment of ``what we can safely do
to lower the alert status of our forces?''
Answer. This is one of the questions that would be considered as
part of the nuclear posture review.
u.s.-north korean nuclear agreed framework
Question. The United States and North Korea signed an agreement in
1994 that calls for North Korea to end and dismantle its plutonium
production capacity, and for the United States to lead a coalition with
South Korea and Japan to provide North Korea with proliferation-
resistant light water reactors if it complies with each step of the
agreement. To date, both sides have complied with the Agreed Framework,
which has prevented North Korea from producing enough plutonium for
dozens of nuclear weapons.
Assuming both sides continue to comply with its terms, do you
believe this Agreed Framework serves our national security interests?
Answer. It is in U.S. interest to ensure that the North Korean
nuclear weapons program is terminated. I assume that the new
administration will pursue that objective through means it deems most
effective. Those precise means would likely be determined following a
review of U.S. policy towards North Korea and U.S. nonproliferation
policies.
comprehensive test ban treaty (ctbt) and nuclear testing
Question. You have expressed opposition to a permanent, zero-yield
CTBT.
If U.S. ratification were conditioned on a robust Stockpile
Stewardship Program; a firm commitment to preserve the option to test a
nuclear weapon (by withdrawing from the treaty) if necessary to fix a
critical problem with the stockpile; and there were a review of the
treaty after 10 years, would that address some of your concerns about
the treaty?
Answer. I am not convinced that that approach would adequately
protect U.S. national security. The President-elect has opposed CTBT,
but has stated that he would continue the current testing moratorium.
That being said, I believe the new administration is likely to
undertake a review of this matter.
Question. Do you agree that we should maintain our current
moratorium on nuclear testing?
Answer. The President-elect has stated that he will continue the
current moratorium on nuclear testing. The President will review
annually the size, composition, and status of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. This will include a detailed assessment of the safety,
reliability, and effectiveness of the weapons in the stockpile.
Developments in this area need to be monitored closely.
Question. Do you believe that a CTBT would make it more difficult
for such nations to develop and stockpile advanced thermonuclear
nuclear weapons?
Answer. Not necessarily. History teaches that nations that are
determined to cheat do so and I do not see how the CTBT can be
effectively verified.
Question. As Secretary of Defense, what measures do you believe
must be taken to ensure that the U.S. stockpile is reliable and safe?
Answer. I am not an expert, but one point is important. The U.S.
cannot afford to lose too many of its key design and manufacturing
personnel who have had senior-level experience in the nuclear weapons
program when testing was undertaken. The DOD will work closely with the
new Secretary of Energy and the Director of the National Nuclear
Security Administration to ensure a safe, effective, and reliable U.S.
nuclear stockpile and complex.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr) program
Question. The U.S. Defense Department has a Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar that is
designed to reduce the threat of insecure nuclear stockpiles and excess
weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union.
Do you agree that this Cooperative Threat Reduction program serves
U.S. national security interests by reducing the threat from former
Soviet weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. Certainly, the elimination of former Soviet strategic
nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that the CTR program has
funded has benefited U.S. national security. But, we need to be aware
of the fact that Russia, in particular, claims to lack the financial
resources to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, but continues to
invest scarce resources in the development of newer, more sophisticated
ICBMs and other weapons. We would not want the U.S. investment in the
CTR program to become the means by which Russia frees up resources to
finance its military modernization programs. A review of ongoing CTR
projects and their respective national security benefits would be
appropriate.
Question. Are you concerned about continuing this $1 billion
program at the same time that Russia is increasing its military
spending and arms exports?
Answer. Yes. See answer above.
space policy
Question. You have recently served as chairman of a commission to
examine U.S. space policy.
Do you believe that protecting our space assets requires the United
States to develop and deploy offensive means of disabling or destroying
other nations' space assets, either from the ground or from space?
Answer. The United States is increasingly dependent on its civil,
commercial, and defense and intelligence space assets. With that
dependence comes vulnerability to hostile acts. The Nation needs a
capability to deter attack on space assets, and systems to defend
satellites in orbit, the ground stations that control them, and the
electronic links between them.
Question. If the United States were to develop and deploy offensive
means of disabling or destroying foreign satellites, do you believe it
could lead other nations to acquire such means to threaten U.S. space
systems? If so, do you believe that would be contrary to our security
interests?
Answer. The U.S. and other nations that make use of space face real
threats to the operation of their satellites. We know that other
nations have jammed telecommunications from on-orbit satellites, that
Russian entities market devices that can jam GPS signals, and that
foreign satellite manufacturers market so-called ``micro satellites''
to other foreign countries that can be used for offensive actions
against satellites. In light of U.S. dependence on space assets, the
vulnerability of the assets to attack or disruption and the fact that
others have the means of doing harm to U.S. interests in space, it
would be contrary to U.S. security interests not to develop, test, and
deploy the means of deterring attack on and defending space systems.
Question. In light of this experience, what types of management and
organizational changes do you believe are needed in DOD to improve
space management?
Answer. If confirmed, I will give careful attention to the
recommendations of the several recent studies and commissions on space
systems and other matters. There are three areas of particular
interest. First is the relationship between the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI, who together have the greatest responsibility for the
operation of national security space systems. Second, is to assess
whether the existing organizational structure is adequate for
developing space policy, working with the military commanders in chief
(CINCs), and overseeing the development and acquisition of capabilities
by the Services. Third, is to assess whether changes are necessary
within the Air Force so as to facilitate more efficient acquisition and
operation of space systems and to create a dedicated cadre of space
professionals.
Question. The Department of Defense is currently reevaluating the
military requirement for a space-based infrared system to support
ballistic missile defense.
Do you believe that the SBIRS-Low Program is a necessary element in
an overall space and missile defense architecture?
Answer. I am informed that a number of DOD reviews have concluded
that a SBIRS Low capability is a necessary element of an effective
missile defense architecture.
space programs
Question. The Department of Defense has sought to establish a
space-based radar program for surveillance and moving target tracking.
How do you rank such a program in terms of the various new
technologies being developed by the DOD?
Answer. We use space extensively today to support military
operations. A radar in space to provide tracking of moving targets is
an attractive concept. Demonstrating the feasibility of that concept is
important. I understand there are concerns about the cost associated
with space demonstration projects. However, without such demonstrations
it is not possible to know if those systems will help to transform our
military and provide the means for deterring adversaries and defending
the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies.
the balkans
Question. U.S. troops are deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo as part of
NATO-led peacekeeping forces.
Do you support the continued participation of U.S. forces in the
NATO-led peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo?
Answer. President-elect Bush has indicated that a review will be
conducted of U.S. peacekeeping deployments. His national security team
will participate in this review. In the meantime, the deployed forces
have an important job to do and should not be distracted by the fact of
a new administration.
Question. If so, under what circumstances and for what timeframe?
Answer. See previous response.
Question. Do you believe that our European allies should eventually
assume full responsibility for these missions?
Answer. See previous response.
iraq
Question. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the United
States has been working to ensure Iraqi compliance with the obligations
Iraq accepted at the end of the war--particularly those obligations
related to disarmament. Unfortunately, since 1991 we have witnessed the
fragmentation of the coalition that liberated Kuwait; the end of UN
weapons inspections in Iraq; disagreement in the UN Security Council on
how to proceed; and the re-establishment of diplomatic ties with Iraq
by many nations in the Gulf region. At the same time, the United States
continues to deploy thousands of troops to the Gulf region and spends
approximately $1 billion per year for military operations to contain
Iraq.
What are your views on the current U.S. policy toward Iraq?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Are you concerned about the weakening in support for
United Nations economic sanctions?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Do you believe that the benefits relating to enforcement
of the no-fly zones justify the risk to U.S. and British airmen?
Answer. See response below.
Question. What additional or different steps, if any, do you
believe the United States and its allies should take to ensure that
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the means of their
delivery are permanently ended?
Answer. Saddam Hussein it still in power. The UN weapons inspection
program established to ensure Iraqi fulfillment of its commitment to
destroy all of its WMD programs has been suspended for more than 2
years. Baghdad continues to pose a military threat to its neighbors as
well as its own people, and Iraqi planes continue to challenge U.S.
pilots enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones. In addition,
political support for Iraq's position seems to be solidifying among
some Arab states, the economic embargo seems to be collapsing, and the
coalition that successfully prosecuted the war with Iraq seems to be
coming undone. The United States continues to maintain a presence in
the region to deter Iraqi aggression, and daily no-fly zone patrols
expose U.S. pilots to continuous risk. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the national security team to help craft a policy that is
effective and merits the support of Congress and the American people.
iraqi opposition
Question. There is a continuing debate about the implementation of
the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides authority to provide up to $97
million worth of defense articles and services to support the Iraqi
opposition.
What is your view as to how the Iraq Liberation Act should be
implemented?
Answer. In the past I have favored it. However, this is an issue
that the President-elect and his new administration's national security
team will need to address. The Iraq Liberation Act established a policy
of regime-change for Iraq and provides the authority for the Department
of Defense to draw down $97 million worth of goods and services to
support the efforts of the Iraqi opposition to bring about a change in
the regime. I understand that the Department of Defense to date has
utilized this authority only sparingly, primarily with the provision of
training and other forms of non-lethal assistance aimed at improving
the opposition's effectiveness as a political force.
Helping the Iraqi opposition become a more credible alternative
voice for the Iraqi people is useful, but may not, in itself, bring
about a regime change in Baghdad. It could, however, make a useful
contribution toward achieving that aim.
north korea
Question. Please outline your views with regard to the situation on
the Korean peninsula, in particular the talks between North and South
Korea and ongoing missile proliferation talks between the U.S. and
North Korea.
Answer. This is a matter the new administration will need to
address. My personal impression, which is not well-informed, is that
the on-going political discussions between North and South Korea are
encouraging. The summit meeting between the Presidents of North and
South Korea was a dramatic development. Obviously, tensions on the
Peninsula cannot be reduced unless the two principal parties involved
are committed to that effort.
For over 2 years, the Clinton administration has sought to convince
the North Koreans to limit their missile and missile export programs.
In September 1999 the DPRK stated that it would refrain from testing
long-range ballistic missiles (No Dong or greater) while talks to
improve U.S.-DPRK relations were underway. That decision could be
reversed at any time. At the same time, I believe that North Korean
missile exports have continued apace.
Question. In light of developments on the peninsula, what are your
views on U.S. troop levels in South Korea?
Answer. Neither the North Korean military threat nor its forces and
posture along the DMZ have changed. Thus, although the in-coming
administration will undertake a review of our overall military
deployments, I have seen nothing thus far that persuades me that a
change in U.S. troop levels in South Korea should be considered.
russia and iran
Question. In early December Secretary Cohen met with Russian
defense minister Igor Sergeyev to discuss U.S. concern over Moscow's
continued arms sales and proliferation activities with Iran. While this
meeting and subsequent State Department meetings later in December were
considered upbeat, the United States did not receive concrete
assurances from Russia that these activities would cease.
As Secretary of Defense, what policy options would you propose to
President-elect Bush to address and minimize the continued
proliferation activities of Russia with Iran?
Answer. This is a matter for the President-elect and his national
security team. However I would recommend to the President that senior
officials of the new administration who meet with Russian counterparts
bring up the serious U.S. concern on proliferation activities that
strengthen Iran militarily. We must remind Russian policy makers that
they are dealing with a new administration and they have the
opportunity to start the relationship in a productive direction if they
take concrete steps to address our concerns in this area.
vieques
Question. Last fall, Congress enacted legislation that essentially
followed the agreement reached between President Clinton and the
outgoing Governor of Puerto Rico, in particular by calling for a
referendum to decide on whether training will continue there. That
referendum is currently scheduled for November 2001, but recent
comments by the incoming Governor of Puerto Rico suggest that she may
attempt to reopen this deal.
Do you believe there is a requirement to continue live fire
training at Vieques?
Answer. While simulation and non-live fire training certainly have
value and are integral to the Navy and Marine Corps basic training
programs, they do not provide an adequate substitute for live-fire
training. Live-fire training contains an element of realism that is
absent from simulators and non-live fire training. If U.S. forces
cannot train under this realism, Sailors and Marines, when placed in a
combat situation, will not only face the certain chaos that comes with
combat but also the uncertainty which comes from handling and expending
live ordnance for the first time in a highly complex, time synchronized
combat operation. Failing to provide for adequate live-fire training
prior to combat will place our Nation in the position of risking
needless casualties through unpreparedness.
Question. Do you agree with the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps that Vieques is essential to the
readiness of East Coast naval forces?
Answer. I am advised that Vieques is a superior site for rehearsing
amphibious operations, the only site currently used for aerial mine
warfare training, and is the only location currently available on the
east coast where aircraft, naval surface ships, and ground forces can
employ combined arms training with live ammunition under realistic
conditions. It is the only range currently available on the east coast
that allows sailors and marines to conduct naval gunfire training. So
it is a very important site.
Question. Do you intend to look for alternative sites?
Answer. I understand that to date no alternative sites, providing
the ability to conduct combined arms training with live ammunition
under realistic conditions, have been located.
Question. Do you believe the existing agreement should be adhered
to, or is there some alternative solution you believe would be more
agreeable to all the parties involved that you intend to propose?
Answer. I have not had an opportunity to study it.
base closure
Question. Secretary Cohen requested two additional rounds of base
closures in each of his budget proposals to Congress, but so far
Congress has not agreed to authorize any additional base closures.
Do you believe we still have excess military infrastructure that
can and should be reduced?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Do you believe it is in the best interest of the Defense
Department to authorize additional military base closures and
realignments and that such closures and realignments could better align
our military base structure to meet the requirements of the new century
and free up resources for higher priority military needs, while still
protecting key training areas for which we have enduring requirements?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Should any future base closures follow the same basic
procedures as the past four rounds?
Answer. I will withhold an assessment of this issue until after the
completion of the defense review.
crisis in the military
Question. Recent articles and op-eds by James Schlesinger and
Harold Brown forecast that one of the first ``nightmares'' the new
president will inherit is the threat of a ``defense train wreck''
looming in the next 5 to 10 years as the result of a decade of massive
under-funding of the true costs of maintaining the current size and
structure of the U.S. military.
What are your views regarding these assessments of the future of
our Armed Forces?
Answer. Given President-elect Bush's commitment to rebuilding and
reforming the U.S. military, and the commitment of many members of
Congress, I believe we can ensure a strong future for U.S. Armed
Forces. We do face major funding and technological challenges.
Overcoming these challenges is necessarily a multi-year undertaking.
The American people clearly support keeping our Nation secure, and our
economy certainly makes that affordable. I believe my predecessors, Jim
Schlesinger and Harold Brown, are correct in noting that many years of
carefully targeted investment will be needed to guarantee the future
superiority of those forces.
recruiting and retention
Question. The Armed Forces are experiencing significant problems in
retaining company- and field-grade officers (O-3, O-4) who would, if
retained, be contenders for intermediate service schools and command.
The Armed Forces are experiencing similar problems in retaining mid-
grade noncommissioned officers (E-5, E-6). These personnel are the
backbone of the enlisted force, both as workers and as trainers and
role models for younger enlisted personnel.
In your view what are the primary factors associated with this
attrition?
Answer. See response below.
Question. What would you propose to mitigate this attrition?
Answer. It is my understanding that a number of factors have
contributed to recruiting and retention challenges. A robust domestic
economy has made it more difficult for recruiters to compete with the
private sector job market; a heavy operations tempo has placed
significant burdens on family life; and perceptions about a changing
mission for the military have all contributed to stresses on military
recruiting and retention efforts.
President-elect Bush has spoken often about this issue during the
campaign. As he stated, ``the military should be a magnet for the best
and brightest in America.'' I share this view. We will examine a range
of measures to try to make this goal a reality, including an increase
in military pay, improved military housing, and a review of overseas
deployments.
force structure
Question. Force structure has been reduced about 35 percent since
1989. Evidence, both anecdotal and analytical, increasingly indicates
that the force structure of the Armed Forces may not be adequate to
carry out the national security strategy of the United States including
the current range of contingency operations. If this is so, the
alternatives would seem to be a less ambitious strategy, a bolstering
of force structure, or some combination of those alternatives.
In your opinion, is the existing force structure of the Armed
Forces adequate?
Answer. See response below.
Question. If not, what measures would you recommend, if confirmed,
to deal with the problem?
Answer. U.S. forces are stretched thin. This committee has heard
testimony from the service chiefs to that effect. In accordance with
law, the incoming administration will work to develop a national
security strategy within 150 days after inauguration. That is a very
short period. Also in accordance with law, the Department of Defense
will review the overall defense strategy and produce a report to
Congress in the fall. If confirmed, I expect to be fully engaged in
those efforts. Once we have a new national security strategy, and we
have had the opportunity to review our defense strategy, we can make
decisions about the appropriate size and nature of the force.
homosexual conduct policy
Question. The current Department of Defense Homosexual Conduct
Policy went into effect in February 1994 after months of congressional
hearings and debate resulting in the enactment of a Federal statute.
Although there have been some changes in how this policy has been
implemented, the basic policy has not been changed.
Do you believe that the current policy is effective? If confirmed,
do you plan to make any changes to the basic policy or its
implementation? If so, what changes will you propose?
Answer. I am not yet knowledgeable as to how the current policy is
working. Consistent with what President-elect Bush said during the
campaign, and if confirmed, I have no plans to recommend changes either
to current law or policy.
gender integrated training
Question. Basic training for new recruits is structured and defined
differently by each Service. Men training for direct ground combat
positions in the Army and Marine Corps train in all-male units. Men and
women training to serve in positions that are open to women in the
Army, Navy, and Air Force train in gender-integrated units. Men and
women in the Marine Corps are segregated at boot camp, then integrated
during subsequent training.
Do you believe the current DOD policy of allowing each of the
Services to establish its own policy for gender integration in Basic
Training is effective? If confirmed, will you propose changes to the
DOD or Service policies? If so, what changes will you propose?
Answer. Basic training should have one purpose: to transform the
recruit from civilian into a disciplined, physically fit soldier,
sailor, airmen/women, and marine. If and when that goal is not being
met, then changes should be made. Each service has the responsibility
to design and implement the system of basic training that best
accomplishes the goal for that service, and it should do just that. At
present the services have varying policies with regard to gender
integration in basic training. I do not have sufficient information as
yet to comment further.
army corps of engineers
Question. The Army Inspector General recently released a report
criticizing the Army Corps of Engineers for ``institutional bias'' and
``an atmosphere where objectivity in its analyses [has been] placed in
jeopardy.''
Do you agree that the Army Corps of Engineers should institute a
system of independent peer review of studies supporting major projects
by experts from outside the agency before such projects are approved?
Why or why not?
Answer. I am not aware of this matter. I am advised that the
Secretary of the Army and the new Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers
recently developed working arrangements aimed at ensuring open lines of
communication, necessary oversight, and, at the same time, the
application of independent technical judgment by the Corps.
Additionally, the Chief of the Corps has been directed to respond to
the Army Inspector General's findings regarding the objectivity of its
analyses and bring forward improvements aimed at ensuring sound,
unbiased decision making. Those responses will have to be reviewed
before making any recommendations.
u.s.s. cole investigations
Question. When Secretary Cohen took office, one of his first
actions was to review the multiple Defense Department and Air Force
inquiries into the terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia. These investigations were initiated under his predecessor,
then-Secretary William Perry. The attack on Khobar Towers on June 25,
1996, killed 19 military personnel and left hundreds injured. Following
his review, Secretary Cohen directed actions that were opposed by many
in the Air Force and that resulted in the voluntary retirement of the
then-Air Force Chief of Staff. You will begin your term as Defense
Secretary under strikingly similar circumstances. Several
investigations into the October 12, 2000, bombing of the U.S.S. Cole
are being concluded.
Will you make one of your first priorities in office to review the
findings of the multiple Defense Department and Navy investigations
into the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Will you transmit to the President and to Congress your
assessment of the findings and recommendations of the U.S.S. Cole-
related investigations as soon as possible?
Answer. I will transit any findings and recommendations that may
result from the investigations.
Question. If you find that the investigation initiated by your
predecessor or the Navy were deficient in any areas, will you direct
additional inquiries?
Answer. It is important that the findings of the current
investigations be reviewed without prejudgment.
modernization
Question. For the last several years, the Department of Defense
modernization budget has fallen short of critical requirements
identified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the
military services while the operational tempo of our forces is
extremely high. As a result, near term readiness requirements have
often been met at the expense of the long-term readiness, or
modernization arena. We recognize that President-elect Bush has called
for an overall review of military modernization programs and that this
will be an area of great interest to you as the Secretary of Defense.
How will you establish this modernization review process, what will
be considered, and how will you incorporate the conclusions of this
process into Department of Defense modernization budget requests?
Answer. If confirmed, I will undertake congressionally-mandated
review of the U.S. national security strategy and examine the
modernization plans to carry it out in the conduct of the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). Considering which weapons to modernize and which
to replace with new technology should be a major part of the QDR
process.
exports of sensitive technologies
Question. In his October 1999 speech on high tech issues, then-
Governor Bush stated that, as President, he would safeguard sensitive
high technology exports, while letting Americans sell what is already
widely available elsewhere. He stated that wherever there is no
security interest at stake, exports would be permitted. Wherever
security is truly at stake, exports would be barred, with serious
penalties for violations. Governor Bush stated further that his
administration would work to renew the cooperation of U.S. allies in
this effort.
As Secretary of Defense, what policies and procedures would you
consider changing to reflect these criteria as the basis for
determining the exports of sensitive high technology?
Answer. Exports of sensitive high technology affect U.S. national
security interests in many ways. First, we must protect our military
personnel and our security interests by ensuring that sensitive
technologies are not exported to potential adversaries or to foreign
entities that represent a significant diversion risk. Second, we must
have sensible and effective policies and procedures to ensure that
appropriate transfers of military and commercial systems and
technologies that support our coalition warfighting objectives through
greater interoperability with our allies and friends are permitted.
Finally, we must be mindful that the U.S. is not the only country with
advanced military and commercial technology. Thus, we need to work
aggressively with our allies and friends to ensure that our policies
and approaches toward the export of such technologies meet our mutual
security interests. The Department of Defense has an essential role to
play in implementing these principles, and I will ensure that
appropriate resources and senior level attention are devoted to this
area.
information security
Question. Information superiority is widely recognized as an
enabler of U.S. military superiority, and information security is a key
to achieving information superiority.
How do you plan on ensuring the security and integrity of the
defense information infrastructure in the face of ever-expanding cyber
threats?
Answer. Information security poses important challenges and
opportunities for Defense. We must prevent unauthorized access to
information and information systems. We must work with other government
organizations--the FBI, Department of Justice, and the Intelligence
Community--in a collaborative environment to anticipate and counter
such threats. I will ensure that the department devotes considerable
time and attention to information security and information superiority.
intelligence
Question. What would be your top intelligence priority if you are
confirmed as Secretary of Defense?
Answer. We are in a new national security environment.
Characteristics of this new environment include:

- A relaxed attitude with the end of the Cold War.
- The proliferation of powerful weapons and technologies
throughout the world.
- As a result of the Gulf War, a set of threats less likely to
be deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation.
- Considerably more complex intelligence challenges given the
larger number of targets, and the proliferation of deception
and denial capabilities.
- Increasing dependence on space assets and therefore increased
vulnerability.

The intelligence community, just as the Department of Defense,
needs to be rearranged to deal with the new security environment. The
national command authorities need information more than simply numbers
of things--ships, missiles, tanks, and planes--they need better
information on intentions and motives as well.
Certainly the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and the means to deliver them pose a threat to the security of
the United States, its allies, and friends. We must ensure that we are
devoting the appropriate resources to identify these newer threats,
including cyber attack.
Question. What organizational and management changes do you believe
are necessary in the Department of Defense to ensure that the best
possible intelligence support is provided to the warfighter?
Answer. This is an area that I intend to review if confirmed. Most
important is senior level leadership, and a close working relationship
between the SECDEF and the DCI is critical to the challenges ahead.
Question. What specific actions would you pursue to ensure that the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence are able
to cooperate and coordinate on national and military intelligence
matters?
Answer. One of the highest priorities should be to establish a real
partnership with the DCI to ensure cooperation and coordination on
intelligence matters. Reform of the Intelligence Community will require
close collaboration.
science and technology
Question. The Department of Defense Science and Technology program
is at a 20-year low. The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Bill for Fiscal Year 1999 established the goal of increasing the budget
for the defense science and technology program by at least 2 percent
over inflation for each of the fiscal years 2000 to 2008. This goal has
not been met in the fiscal year 2000 nor the fiscal year 2001 budget
request.
Do you believe that a substantial increase in science and
technology funding is needed?
Answer. Determining a sufficient level of science and technology
(S&T) investment is not a precise science. A downsized military needs a
technological edge more now than ever. President-elect Bush has
committed to increasing defense R&D by at least $20 billion between
fiscal year 2002-2006. The S&T accounts should receive a substantial
share of this increase.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Secretary of Defense?
Answer. The new administration will need to consider all of these
aspects in evaluating the National Security Strategy and National
Military Strategy. The goal is to assure that our country has the new
capabilities necessary to deter and defend in our new national security
environment so we are able to contribute to the peace and stability.
This will entail transforming U.S. military forces to a 21st century
force, modernizing the intelligence and command, control and
communications infrastructure, and reforming DOD structures, processes,
and organizations. Further, the new capabilities and readiness must be
sustainable.
Balancing limited resources--even in an atmosphere of projected
budget surpluses--is always a challenge. Properly outfitting our forces
today, while at the same time ensuring we sustain robust modernization
for the future, will be a key challenge for the new administration.
Specific issues--such as morale, recruiting and retention, health
care and benefits--will also be important.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. These issues and others should be components of the
upcoming defense review and Quadrennial Defense Review. Through those
reviews, the new administration can examine priorities and weigh the
fiscal implications associated with those priorities.
most serious problems
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Institutional resistance to change across the board--
executive branch, legislative branch, the private sector, as well as
our allies. Change is difficult for institutions, but change we must.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. It is too soon to establish time lines. If confirmed I
would need to know a lot more than I do now to respond. It will require
close consultation with Congress and this committee.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes. I consider that to be one of the most important parts
of the job.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
1. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Rumsfeld, while the F-18E/F has
significantly modernized our carrier aircraft fleet, many Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft still need to be modernized. The AV-8B Harrier
and EA-6B Prowler are some of the oldest aircraft in our inventory.
Do you see the Joint Strike Fighter as a possible solution to these
aircraft modernization needs?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Joint Strike Fighter, along with other
tactical aircraft programs, will be assessed as part of the planned
review of defense policy and programs.

2a. Senator Kennedy. The risk in being ready to fight the first war
is ``moderate'' and that of the second is ``high.'' As the Department
of Defense prepares to conduct the next Quadrennial Defense Review,
will you consider alternative strategies to the two war scenario as you
prepare to conduct the next review?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I anticipate that a wide range of strategy
options will be considered as part of the upcoming QDR.

2b. Senator Kennedy. If the two war scenario continues to be our
strategy, how can we reduce the risk of each? President-elect Bush has
said that he wants to increase defense spending by $20 billion.
How much of this amount will be dedicated to non-national missile
defense related research and development programs?
Secretary Rumsfeld. No decision has been made on the appropriate
level of resources for defense or how any additional funds would be
distributed.

3a. Senator Kennedy. The Defense Science Board released ``The
Technology Capabilities of Non-DOD Providers'' report in June 2000. In
this report the Board recommends substantially increasing the defense
science and technology base and, in particular, a 30 percent increase
in defense basic research over 3 years. The concern over the eroding
defense science and technology program was addressed by Congress in the
Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act, which stated it
should be an objective of the Secretary of Defense to increase the
budget for the science and technology program by at least 2 percent a
year over inflation each year through 2008.
How do you propose to address this urgent national priority?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the defense science and technology
program needs to be strengthened. However, until I have had an
opportunity to review the program in detail, I am not in a position to
comment on the appropriate funding level for the program.

3b. Senator Kennedy. Many believe that stability will never be
restored in the Balkans as long as indicted war criminals remain at
large. Do you believe that the military should be involved in the
arrest of war criminals?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to review the recent history and
discuss this with my associates in the new administration before
commenting.

4a. Senator Kennedy. For years now, Iraq has refused to accept an
independent monitoring team to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not
rebuilding his arsenal of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of
mass destruction. In addition, the economic and diplomat sanctions
placed on his regime have been weakened by our allies in the region and
in Europe. Some nations are even setting up offices in Iraq, in hopes
of contracting Iraqi oil fields in the future in anticipation of these
weakened sanctions collapsing.
Regarding Iraq and Hussein, the President-elect's choice to be
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has said, ``I think it is possible to
re-energize those sanctions and to continue to contain him and then
confront him, should that become necessary again.''
Under what circumstances could you envision such a confrontation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. policy towards Iraq will no doubt be the
subject of review by the new national security team. If confirmed, I
will look forward to participating in that review. That being said, it
is important to keep in mind that Saddam Hussein has miscalculated
before and therefore any confrontation that takes place might be as a
result of his actions.

4b. Senator Kennedy. What do you think sanctions on Iraq should
accomplish? Are they accomplishing this goal? Are we targeting the
right behavior? Are the objectives of halting chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons production attainable in your view?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Because of the erosion of the sanctions regime,
it is reasonable to assume that weapons of mass destruction and missile
programs are continuing in Iraq. How best to deal with the threat posed
by Saddam will be the subject of review by the new administration.

5. Senator Kennedy. In September 1999, President Clinton issued an
executive order severing all U.S. military ties with Indonesia
following the violence perpetrated against the East Timorese people in
the aftermath of their vote for independence.
Will you support a continuation of the current military cut-off?
What signs or indications within the Indonesian military and government
will you be watching for before you consider re-establishing full
military relations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I am aware of the general state of
U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relations, I have not had an
opportunity to review this matter in detail. If confirmed, I will
undertake to review those relations.

6. Senator Kennedy. There have been substantial changes in the role
of women in our Nation's Armed Forces in the years since you were
Secretary of Defense. Women now serve in a wide range of military
occupations and there are more women generals and admirals than ever
before. Women serve on combat ships and fly combat aircraft; women and
men train together in all services at advanced levels--and in three of
the services at the basic training level.
What is your view of the role of women in today's military?
Specifically, do you have any objection to the ways in which women and
men train together today, or to opening any particular military
occupational specialties to women?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I stated in answer to one of the committee's
questions, basic training should have one purpose: to transform the
recruit from civilian into a disciplined, physically fit soldier,
sailor, airman/woman, or marine. If and when that goal is not being
met, then changes should be made. Each service has the responsibility
to design and implement the system of basic and other training that
best accomplishes the goal for that service. At present the services
have varying policies with regard to gender integration in basic
training. I do not have sufficient information as yet to comment
further.

7. Senator Kennedy. The Pentagon Inspector General conducted a
survey of 75,000 service members last year and found that 80 percent
reported hearing, witnessing, or experiencing anti-gay harassment.
Based on those findings, Secretary of Defense Cohen asked a Department
working group to review the current rules and training to prevent such
harassment. The working group produced a 13-point action plan for a new
regulations by the Department on this issue.
Will you ensure that these new regulations are fully implemented
and enforced?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not had an opportunity to review the
current rules or the working group's findings and recommendations.

8. Senator Kennedy. The lack of good housing for our service
members and their families is an area where I think we really need
improvement. At Hanscom AFB, there is currently a 6-month wait for on-
base housing. The number of families on this list today stands at 106.
I venture that the wait is similar at bases across the country.
What can be done to limit or eliminate this wait? How can we ease
the burden on a service member and his or her family when they've been
assigned to a new base, but have to find short-term living arrangements
while waiting for affordable base housing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that military housing can and should be
improved. Substandard housing and long delays undermine morale and
ultimately affect job performance. If the Department can effectively
tap into the prodigious resources and methodologies of the private
sector to improve this situation, then we should do so. If confirmed,
improving the quality and availability of military housing will be a
priority.

9. Senator Kennedy. You noted in your answers to the advance policy
questions that, ``(t)he Department's approach should be comprehensive
and balanced, supporting test and training and operational
requirements, while seeking to protect the natural environment and
operating within a balanced regulatory framework'' and that ``(t)he
goal is to maintain fully sustainable ranges.''
Last week, three of my colleagues on this committee and I wrote to
Secretary Cohen urging that he consider establishing a Defense
Environmental Restoration Account to begin to deal with the large
amount of unexploded ordnance left at many of our military facilities.
Would you please take a look at this idea? The more quickly the
Department can get a handle on this issue, the more sustainable
training will be at many military bases.
Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will task a review of this
suggestion and report back on the results.

10. Senator Kennedy. Several years ago, President Clinton, the
Joint Chiefs, and Congress agreed that the United States would search
aggressively for alternatives to land mines, and that if suitable
alternatives are fielded the United States will join the Ottawa
Convention. The Pentagon has made progress, but more needs to be done.
Later this year we will also have the benefit of recommendations on
mine alternatives by the Los Alamos/Livermore Laboratories and the
National Academy of Sciences. There is bipartisan support in Congress
for the United States to join our NATO allies and others, and set an
example to rid the world of land mines. We also want to ensure the
safety of our Armed Forces, which includes improving their counter-mine
capabilities.
Will you, as Secretary of Defense, strongly support the effort to
field alternatives to land mines, so we can join the Ottawa Convention?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not familiar with the obligations imposed
under the Ottawa Convention and have not yet been briefed on the
efforts to develop alternatives to land mines. If confirmed, I will
review this issue, keeping foremost in mind the need to protect
American servicemen and women.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
11. Senator Byrd. I am very concerned about the threat of homeland
terrorism. I believe that Senator Levin mentioned in his opening
remarks how easy it would be for a terrorist to poison our public water
systems. As best I can tell, all it would take is a single vial of some
type of chemical or biological agent and you could wipe out the water
supply for an entire city. Frankly, I believe that this threat is a
more likely scenario under current world circumstances than that of the
conventional ballistic missile threat posed by rogue nations.
Do you believe that the threat of chemical and biological
terrorism, as well as the threat posed by simple suitcase or truck
bombs, deserve the same emphasis as a national missile defense system?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Defending the American people against all types
of unconventional or terrorist attacks must be a top priority of the
new administration. If confirmed, I will devote time and attention to
strategies and programs that can address this growing threat. In
addition, because of the sometimes overlapping or conflicting
obligations of the various federal and state governmental departments
and agencies, inter-agency coordination is important. If confirmed, I
will do my best to ensure proper coordination is achieved.

12. Senator Byrd. Turning to terrorism overseas--a Pentagon
Commission reviewing the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole released
its report earlier this week. The Commission determined that the
military lacks coordination with other government agencies to fight
terrorist threats. It recommended that training against terrorism be
made as high a priority as training for combat.
Do you agree with that conclusion?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will review the Crouch-Gehman
report carefully, along with the other reports commissioned on aspects
of the U.S.S. Cole terrorist incident. That being said, I agree that
realistic training against a wide range of terrorist and other threats,
including operating in a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological
environment, is imperative.

13. Senator Byrd. I understand that there was a good deal of
discussion about Colombia at the morning session of this hearing. I
commend Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for recommending that this
committee get more involved in future decisions surrounding our
involvement in Colombia. This is a dangerous mission, and I am deeply
concerned that the United States should not be drawn into Colombia's
civil war.
As you and I discussed earlier, it was my proposal that capped the
number of military and civilian personnel who could be involved in Plan
Colombia in country. The reason that I proposed these caps was to
ensure that mission creep would not inflate the number of American
citizens in Colombia on what is a potentially deadly mission.
Mr. Secretary, you've seen the results of American troops being
drawn into civil conflicts overseas with no exit strategy. I understand
that you want to wait until you can have a full briefing on the
situation in Colombia before recommending a specific course of future
action. However, this is not the first time that the U.S. has run up
against the possibility of being drawn into another nation's civil war.
How do we guard against that happening with this mission? Will you re-
evaluate our presence in Colombia?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I stated during the hearing, I am not
sufficiently informed about the situation in Colombia. I understand the
nature of your concern, however, and if confirmed will review the U.S.
military involvement carefully.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Max Cleland
14a. Senator Cleland. As you may know, language was included in the
Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization bill directing the Secretary of
Defense to submit a report no later than February 2000 describing the
airlift requirements necessary to carry out the various missions of our
Armed Forces. It is my understanding that this report is finally
complete and is awaiting release by the Secretary of Defense.
Preliminary information contained in this report outlines our
current mobility challenges. Our current requirement is 49.7 million
ton miles. The Mobility Requirements Study estimates that the
requirement may rise to around 54.4 million ton miles. This indicates
we are woefully short on meeting the future requirements.
With the move away from more forward-deployed forces, airlift and
air mobility will continue to be the key ingredient in our responding
to future military missions and crises. However, there is uncertainty
on how best to address this challenge. Certainly, the C-130J is
integral in our rapid deployment within the theater of operations.
However, the Air Force has been reluctant to put C-130s in their budget
or in placing the aircraft on their unfunded requirements list--instead
relying on congressional add-ons during the budget process. How would
you rectify the inconsistencies of the C-130J program over the past
several years?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am aware of and appreciate the keen interest
in the C-130J program shown by you and several of your colleagues.
However, I have not had an opportunity to review the program in detail,
nor have I seen the results of the Mobility Requirements Study you
mention. If confirmed, I will review the study and the program.

14b. Senator Cleland. Given your plans to review and revise our
military strategy in the context of President-elect Bush's desire to
review all military operations and the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), would you consider submitting a new mobility requirements
report?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Until I have had the opportunity to review the
above-mentioned study, it would be premature to suggest that an
additional study is needed.

15. Senator Cleland. Military health care is a matter of great
importance to our service members and to this committee. Last year, in
response to concerns raised by the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we enacted legislation that eliminates
deductibles and copayments under TRICARE Prime for families of Active
Duty service members; provides lifetime health care for military
retirees and their families through the TRICARE program; and provides a
comprehensive pharmacy benefit for military retirees. We still hear
concerns from our constituents about lack of timely access to health
care, portability of benefits as our service members move around, and
poor claims processing.
What are your priorities for maintaining a working, accessible,
properly funded health care system?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the provision of effective,
affordable health care to our servicemen and women and their families
is a high-priority objective I have not had an opportunity to review
the Defense Health Program, however, and therefore I am unable to
comment on how best to ensure such coverage and treatment. If
confirmed, I will devote time to this important program.

16. Senator Cleland. Almost all new service members enroll in and
contribute to the Montgomery GI Bill. Only about half of these use
their benefits, and many who use the benefit do not use all of their
entitlement. Many of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines say
they would like to stay in the service, but feel they have to leave so
that they can provide for the education of their spouses and children.
I believe that many of these service members would stay in the
service if they could transfer all or a part of their unused
entitlement to GI Bill benefits to family members in return for a
service commitment. Service Secretaries could use this retention tool
selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses.
Will you give serious consideration to how the Department of
Defense could use the transfer of GI Bill benefits to family members as
a retention tool and give me your thoughts on how we best do this?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I was interested in this suggestion when you
mentioned it during the confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I will give
consideration to this suggestion.

17. Senator Cleland. From what we have heard in today's session and
from what has occurred on Capitol Hill in the past few years, it seems
obvious that one of the most contentious national security issues--
which too often has broken down along party lines--is the subject of
National Missile Defense. I would add, however, that I believe this
important question cannot be viewed in isolation from our overall
national strategic policy. For example, how will NMD be related by the
new administration to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which
unfortunately also broke down along partisan lines in the last
Congress. I believe we must try to achieve a bipartisan consensus on
this whole collection of issues and do so in a fashion which is
comprehensive and coordinated. Therefore, I have proposed that we
consider creating a bipartisan Commission on National Security Policy
composed of respected leaders from both parties which seeks to develop
such a consensus and encompasses both NMD and CTBT as well as related
issues. I fear, Mr. Secretary, that absent a comprehensive, consensus
approach that we may face more partisan wrangling and more internal
division, which will serve our military, our country, and indeed the
entire world.
Would you care to react to any of these points?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that it is vital to consider issues
such as NMD and CTBT in a broader context, and certainly bipartisan
consensus is desirable. That being said, I am not persuaded that
establishment of a commission, as you describe, is needed. The
President-elect has stated that he does not favor ratification of the
CTBT. He has indicated that he plans to continue the moratorium on
underground nuclear testing so long as the safety, reliability, and
effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile can be certified. If confirmed,
I will do what I can to contribute to the achievement of bipartisan
support on topics such as these.

18. Senator Cleland. This committee has expressed its full support
for upgrading and modernizing the C-5 fleet, both A and B models.
Airlift is absolutely vital to America's ability to project military
force. This will continue to be true for the foreseeable future. In
last year's report accompanying S. 2549 (The Fiscal Year 2001 Defense
Authorization Act), this committee expressed concern that the Air Force
appears to have budgeted for just modernizing the B-models first and
yet has not provided any form of explanation for deviating from the
committee's belief that the A and B models both need to be re-engined
as soon as possible. In addition, the Air Force has not explained how
it could arrive at this plan without doing the initial EMD testing on
at least one A and one B model to factually determine the potential for
improving the performance and reliability of the each model. The
committee requested that the Air Force address these concerns by
February 15, 2001.
In the meantime, despite the support of this committee and the
House defense committees, the contracting for the C-5 RERP has been
inexplicably delayed. The contract was supposed to be let in November
and yet still is not complete. For a program as vital to national
security as the improvement of outsized/oversized airlift capability,
this sort of unnecessary and unexplained delay is unacceptable.
What commitment can you give this committee that the C-5 RERP will
proceed as directed? What will you do to get the C-5 RERP back on
schedule? Will you ensure that both A and B models are included in the
initial testing so that any future program decisions are based on real
facts?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not yet had the opportunity to review
the C-5 program. I expect that the C-5 program will be reviewed in the
context of mobility requirements as part of the overall defense policy
review I plan to undertake, if confirmed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
19. Senator Landrieu. Our nuclear posture is essentially frozen by
a law that we not fall below Start I levels. Furthermore, we are coming
upon several crucial and costly decision points with respect to some of
our nuclear systems. I believe that this nation would be well-advised
to establish an appropriate and cost-effective deterrent independent of
anything Russia does.
Do you believe that we need to hold to some artificially mandated
level of nuclear weapons, or is it wise for the Pentagon to evaluate
these questions from the bottom up?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The President has stated that we want to go to
the lowest level of nuclear weapons commensurate with the national
security of the United States and our allies. Upon completion of the
Nuclear Posture Review, we will review this requirement as well as
which criteria to use in determining an appropriate strategic nuclear
force level for the foreseeable future. I do hope that Congress would
provide for the ability to get to the appropriate number of nuclear
weapons, likely to be below today's level.

20. Senator Landrieu. We all understand that the Single Integrated
Operation Plan or SIOP, is, of necessity, one of the most closely
guarded secrets that our Nation possesses. However, one of our esteemed
Senate colleagues, Bob Kerrey, the ranking member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, shared with us the fact that he had been stone-
walled by his every effort to have some opportunity to review these
plans. While the SIOP is obviously one of our most import secrets, it
is also one of our most fundamental defense policy decisions.
Can you assure this committee that you will at least assist the
committee leadership in gaining access to the SIOP for their review and
consideration?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand that there are certain procedures
in place at this time whereby Congress has access to data regarding the
nuclear war plan. I also understand that there are concerns that these
procedures may not be sufficient. I will look into this matter and work
with Congress to reach an acceptable balance between the requirement
for security and the congressional need for information on this highly
sensitive plan.

21. Senator Landrieu. You very cogently argued for the need to
better integrate commercial off-the-shelf technology into our military
force. It is important for us to do, and an important piece of that
work is being done at our Navy Technology Center in New Orleans.
However, I'd like you to consider a slightly different application of
that same principle. I believe that we need to consider the utilization
of commercial off-the-shelf personnel. What I mean by that term is this
nation is creating a vast community of highly intelligent, highly
skilled, and highly sought-after workers in the computer and
communications fields. We also know that with the onset of NET-CENTRIC,
and so-called ``cyber'' warfare, our Nation's military is going to
desperately need more of these minds. Unfortunately, I believe that
there is something of a disconnect between this need for talent, and an
institutional culture that would attract this sort of talent. I have
commended Rudy de Leon for taking the initiative of focusing the
Reserve components on this question.
Would you endorse a new strategy to solicit service from this core
of talented individuals and introduce new standards which may be
outside the box in order to employ them fight this new threat?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the Department can do a better job
of recruiting and retaining individuals with skills in the computer and
communications fields. If confirmed, I will seek to develop strategies
for securing the availability of such individuals and look forward to
working with Congress to implement appropriate strategies.

22. Senator Landrieu. Do you believe that adding funds to the
defense budget alone will solve the problems we face? Do you have an
estimate of an increase that you would desire?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The challenges facing the Department are many.
Certainly, a shortage of resources is evident, and priorities are
needed. There are numerous other challenges as well, as I laid out in
my testimony before the committee. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the committee and Congress as a whole to address these
challenges.

23. Senator Landrieu. I would like to know your opinion with the
approach of decreasing some of our existing infrastructure and
transferring those assets to the operational forces in order to provide
some relief to our deployed forces. Do you have any specific approaches
you could provide us with today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not, as of today.

24. Senator Landrieu. One of the most exciting projects that we
have underway in Louisiana is the Navy Information Technology Center in
New Orleans. I would like to invite you to see this operation first-
hand at your earliest opportunity. This center is really a model for
the sort of innovation required by the Clinger-Cohen Act.
Would you please comment on your views of this act, and what steps
we might take to increase the pace of reform?
Secretary Rumsfeld. First, thank you for the kind invitation. I
have not reviewed the Clinger-Cohen Act, although I understand it
allows for certain innovative ``pilot projects'' associated with
acquisition reform. Given the fact that the existing acquisition system
is in need of substantial reform, it may be that additional use of the
authorities to conduct ``pilot projects'' aimed at that reform is
warranted.

25. Senator Landrieu. As you may know, recent studies estimate that
it will take $30 billion and more than 30 years just to fix the current
backlog of military housing deficiencies. On the bright side, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 included a
series of new authorities that allow the Department of Defense to work
with the private sector to build and renovate military housing by
obtaining private capital to leverage government dollars, and use a
variety of private sector approaches to construct and refurbish
military housing faster and at a lower cost to American taxpayers. This
legislation was recently extended to December 2004.
What is your opinion concerning this approach? Do you support a
broader expansion of this initiative to include permanent authority?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I have not been briefed on the law to
which you refer, I support efforts to ensure that our servicemen and
women have access to quality, affordable military housing. Measures to
harness the productive potential of private industry are important to
this end.
______

Questions submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
26. Senator Thurmond. Due to the leaner Active Duty military and
greater number of operational commitments, the DOD has increasingly
called on the Reserves and National Guard. In 1989, Reservists and
members of the Guard recorded one million days of duty. In each of the
past 3 years, that figure has averaged 13 million days. This increased
workload has had an impact on retention and recruiting. In extreme
cases, the relationship between the reservist and his employer is
adversely affected.
What are your general views on the use of the Reserve components
and, specifically, in peacekeeping operations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Guard and Reserve perform admirably in the
defense of our Nation, including deployments in peacekeeping
operations. Although I have not had the opportunity to study this issue
carefully, the quality of training, the status of equipment, and
national support for the missions of the Guard and Reserve are keys to
recruitment and retention of these essential forces. If confirmed, I
will give priority consideration to this situation including the impact
on civilian employment of deployed individuals.

27. Senator Thurmond. Since your last tour in the Department of
Defense, there has been a concerted effort to privatize many of the
services necessary to support our Armed Forces. Among the most recent
are the efforts to privatize military family housing and the
installation utility systems.
What are your views in regard to the privatization of essential
services within the Department of Defense?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The size and composition of DOD's facilities to
perform equipment maintenance is an important aspect of the overall
readiness of the Armed Forces. An appropriate balance between
government and private sector facilities must be struck in a manner
that assures the equipment employed by the Armed Forces will be ready
for use when needed. This balance in turn will be affected over time by
the nature of the technology used in military equipment. A balance will
be reviewed to assure that capabilities essential to national defense
that cannot reliably be provided by the private sector will be provided
by the government sector. Moreover, critical capabilities will be
maintained in the government sector. As noted above, private sector
support for military housing appears to have potential for accelerated
improvement of that housing.

28. Senator Thurmond. With the end of the Cold War, some of the
leading figures from the nuclear weapons programs and strategic policy
advocated that the existing nuclear states dismantle their nuclear
stockpile, which they considered as pointless and morally dubious
arsenals.
What are your views on the role of nuclear weapons in the future
threat environment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Nuclear weapons remain an important element of
U.S. and allied defense policy. That being said, President-elect Bush
has stated that he will direct the next Secretary of Defense to
undertake a review of the U.S. nuclear posture and associated force
levels. If confirmed, I look forward to conducting that review.

29. Senator Thurmond. The Nation has made the decision not to
produce new nuclear weapons. More importantly, we no longer have the
capability to manufacture plutonium pits on a large scale to modernize
the existing stockpile.
Since you have historically advocated a strong nuclear TRIAD, what
are your concerns regarding this lack of capability to modernize our
nuclear stockpile?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are real challenges associated with
maintaining a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile
in the absence of underground nuclear testing. If confirmed, I will
work with the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration to ensure U.S. nuclear weapons are
capable of fulfilling the missions to which they have been assigned.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
base closures
30a. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, in your answers to the advance
questions for today's hearing, I noticed your response with regard to
additional base closure rounds. As you are aware, Secretary Cohen has
requested two additional rounds of base closures in each of his budget
proposals to Congress, but so far Congress has not agreed to authorize
any additional closures--failing to authorize 40-60 and 36-63 in the
last 2 years--an experience not dissimilar to your experience as the
Secretary of Defense to President Ford.
The National Defense Panel, Secretary Cohen, nearly all the Service
Chiefs and other respected defense experts have been consistent in
their plea that the Pentagon be permitted to divest themselves of
excess infrastructure beyond what was eliminated during the prior four
rounds of base closings. Through the end of 1998, the Pentagon had
closed 97 major bases in the United States. Since then, it has closed
none. Moreover, the savings attained would ostensibly be used for force
modernization purposes.
According to our senior military leaders, the facts are the
Department of Defense still has nearly 23 percent more base facilities
than necessary to support our Nation's military forces.
I say this for my colleagues' benefit: the facts are--billions of
dollars are at stake. Department of Defense figures suggest previous
base closures will save, after one-time closing costs, $15 billion
through fiscal year 2001, $25 billion through fiscal year 2003, and
$6.1 billion a year thereafter. Additional needed closures can save $20
billion by 2015, and $3 billion a year thereafter. Sooner or later
these surplus bases will be closed anyway. The sooner the issue is
addressed, the greater will be the savings, that will ultimately go
toward defense modernization and greater pay raises for
servicemembers--two areas where President-elect Bush and I strongly
agree.
Previous base closure rounds have had many success stories. For
example, after England Air Force Base closed in 1992, Alexandria,
Louisiana, benefitted from the creation of over 1,400 jobs--nearly
double the number of jobs lost. Across the U.S. about 60,000 new jobs
have been created at closing military bases. At bases closed more than
2 years, nearly 75 percent of the civilian jobs have been replaced.
In Charleston, South Carolina, where the number of defense job
losses, as a percentage of the work force, was greater than at any
other base closure location, 23 major entities are reusing the former
Navy facilities and providing more than 3,300 jobs and another 13 more
applications are pending--adding soon even more newly created jobs to
that number. Additionally, roughly 75 percent of the 6 million square
feet of leasable space on the base is occupied. This is comparable to
the successes in my home State of Arizona with the closure of Williams
Air Force Base in the Phoenix East Valley.
Mr. Secretary, I will again propose the questions that you
previously addressed in the advance questions to the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Do you believe we still have excess military
infrastructure that can and should be reduced?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our base structure should fit our force
structure requirements. As the President has noted, it appears that we
have 23 percent in estimated excess infrastructure. We are looking at
the issue, and will make a decision on how best to address as soon as
we can in the review process.

30b. Senator McCain. Do you believe it is in the best interest of
the Defense Department to authorize additional military base closures
and realignments could better align our military base structure to meet
the requirements of the new century and free up resources for higher
priority needs?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As noted previously, our base structure should
fit our force structure requirements. We are reviewing the current
force structure, and will make a decision on how best to address
mismatches as soon as we can in the review process.

30c. Senator McCain. Should any future base closures follow the
same basic procedures as the past four rounds?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is too early to determine a process, but
when we have had the chance to review the proper force structure-
infrastructure alignment in greater detail, we will engage the
committee and others in Congress as appropriate.

31a. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, congressional legislation
authorizing the Pentagon to close bases expired in 1995. Since then,
Defense Secretary Cohen has repeatedly asked for new authority to
conduct two more rounds of base closures. Ostensibly because of a
widespread belief that the 1995 round was politicized by the Clinton
administration, Congress repeatedly rejected efforts to authorize
additional rounds. Last year, for instance, the Senate voted against
legislation mandating base closures by a vote of 36-63.
Mr. Secretary, what actions will you take to ensure that there is
no repetition of the politicization of the base closing process as was
evident in the cases of Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases,
recommended for closure in the 1995 BRAC?
Secretary Rumsfeld. When we have established the proper
relationship between the force structure needed to execute our national
security strategy and the infrastructure needed to support that force,
we will work closely with Congress to develop a process that is fair
and true to that objective.

31b. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, from your previous experience
as Secretary of Defense, will you recommend to the President additional
base closing rounds and what advice can you lend to some of my more
skeptical colleagues in the House and the Senate?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our base structure should fit our force
structure requirements. We are reviewing the current force structure,
and prefer to wait until the review is further along before we decide
to go forward with a legislative proposal seeking authority to conduct
future base closures.
congressional add-ons
32a. Senator McCain. During the last major drawdown following the
Vietnam War, there were instances of pork-barrel spending--a phenomenon
no doubt as old as the Republic--totaling 0.1 to 0.3 percent of the
President's budget request or roughly about $100 to $300 million, but
it is miniscule compared with the rampant abuse of the process today.
During the post-Cold War drawdown, in contrast to the 1970s, spending
for parochial purposes expanded to 2.2 percent of the President's
defense budget request--which doesn't seem like that much money but
represents about $5.5 to $6.0 billion annually. Now that the budget is
on an upswing, that expansion has grown even more. Last year, for
example, Congress added over $4 billion to the President's budget
request. Similarly, the Defense Appropriations Bill contained over $7
billion in unrequested and non-defense add-ons that is a net loss to
national security of at least $3 billion. Moreover, each year during
markup of the defense bill, this committee receives requests from
Senators for parochial projects produced in their home state, last year
those requests totaled $30 billion, a 25 percent increase over the
prior year.
Mr. Secretary, that is the state of the defense budget that you are
inheriting, could you comment on your intended approach to dealing with
the hundreds of member-adds that will most assuredly come your way?
Secretary Rumsfeld. When presenting my budget plan, I will urge
Congress to give it strong support. President Bush has emphasized that
strategy should drive our resource decisions--I support his position.

32b. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, do you see this type of
congressional behavior of congressional add-ons at cross purposes to
President Bush's modernization plan, which I support, that skips a
generation of weapon systems for ``programs that propel America
generations ahead in military technology'' and what will you try to do
to curb these excesses?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our on-going reviews across a wide array of
matters will yield information that can be developed into operational
concepts and, from these, program decisions. I will work closely with
Congress to seek its support for these decisions.

33. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, a process evolved during the
post-Cold War drawdown wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service
Secretaries were asked to produce so-called Unfunded Priority Lists or
``wish lists'' detailing where they would allocate additional funds if
provided by Congress. These wish lists, over time, grew from several
pages to lengthy binders. This was understandable given the degree to
which the Armed Forces were under-funded by the Clinton administration.
My concern, however, has to do with the degree to which the Department
of Defense has been pressured by Members of Congress to include items
too numerous to list here on the Unfunded Priority Lists.
What will you do to resist such pressure and minimize pork-barrel
spending when pressing modernization, long-term research and
development, and readiness problems remain?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I feel it is important that the Department
speak with a unified voice, across the Services, in seeking to fund our
Defense programs to achieve the President's objectives. That is the
principle that will guide our interactions with Congress, in budgetary
and other matters.

use of force: kosovo and others
34. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, one of the fundamental
unresolved questions that must be faced by every President and
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense is ``when to use military
force.'' Beyond that is the equally important question of ``how to
apply that force once the decision is made to use it.'' You are on the
record, I believe, as having been reluctant to become militarily
engaged in the Balkans, but once President Clinton initiated air
strikes, as having opposed his announced decision not to use ground
forces.
Mr. Secretary, could you articulate for the committee your sense of
the criteria that should guide the use of military force and, once
force is used, how it would be employed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This is an issue for the President and his
national security team, not the Secretary of Defense alone. Each case
is unique. Some of the questions that should be discussed when
considering the use of force include: Are the goals achievable? Do we
have the resources? What interests are at stake? Are there constraints,
such as the command structure, that will impact how we can carry out
the operation? How would we characterize success? In the end, the
President, following careful consultation with his national security
team, must decide each case.

35a. Senator McCain. Those of us who assailed the administration
and NATO's conduct of gradual escalation during the Balkans campaign
took heart in your comments of that time, particularly your reflections
on CNN on April 4, 1999, with respect to comparisons of Kosovo to
Vietnam, which went as follows: ``There is always a risk in gradualism.
It pacifies the hesitant and the tentative. What it didn't do is shock
and awe, and alter the calculations of the people you're dealing
with.'' Similarly, during an interview with Chris Matthews, you noted
that ``. . . it was a mistake to say that we should not use ground
forces, because it simplifies the problem for Milosevic. . . It seems
to me we ought to stop saying things to appease and placate our
domestic political audiences and we ought to start behaving in a way
that suggests to Milosevic that it's . . . in his interest to end this
and stop ethnic cleansing and come to the negotiating table. . .''
Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate adopting this approach as one of
the key figures in the chain of command?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We must approach each potential use of military
force mindful of the unique circumstances at play. Our decisions must
be made with an understanding of the goals we seek to achieve and our
readiness to honestly evaluate the resources needed to achieve those
goals.

35b. Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, could you offer some insight on
the philosophical approach you intend to bring to the job of Secretary
of Defense when the question of military deployments arise? How do you
approach the issue of moral imperative when no compelling national
interest is involved?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I fundamentally believe that America has
compelling interests as a global leader and that our interests will
continue to be challenged in ways that will threaten this Nation's
security. Deciding when and where to employ military forces to protect
our interests is a matter for the President in consultation with his
national security team. We must be a reliable ally, but resist hasty
decisions to use force. I also believe that, by remaining strong and
capable, we can dissuade potential adversaries from taking actions that
will ultimately lead to far more costly consequences for both of us.

36. Senator McCain. During the early phase of fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, there existed a decision-making process, chain of command,
and rules of engagement that virtually guaranteed failure. Our pilots
found themselves having to receive the personal okay of the U.N.
Secretary General and his deputy for the Balkans prior to retaliating
against Bosnian Serb forces. In Kosovo, during Operation Allied Force,
we witnessed the spectacle of military commanders vetting their
tactical targeting plans through a 19-nation alliance built on
unanimity that also limited the effectiveness of the military
operation.
Mr. Secretary, what policies would you propose be implemented in
order to avoid a recurrence of such situations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The key to avoiding such awkward command and
control situations in the future is to carefully review our procedures
and come to agreements with our allies before we ever have to put those
procedures into practice. This would entail several steps. First, we
need to refine and update our regional contingency plans where we are
likely to engage in combined operations within established alliances.
For different wartime scenarios, we must define what our mission would
be, and what would constitute success. We must also define appropriate
target sets that support the mission. Together with our allies, we
should define what military targets would contribute to the success of
operations described under the various scenarios, and define rules of
engagement for each type of target under each scenario. We must
establish operational guidelines within the framework of each alliance.
In addition, it is essential that we wargame each scenario, using
realistic command and control procedures, at the highest staff levels.
Finally, it is important to review agreements within the alliance on a
periodic basis to ensure currency.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
37. Senator Smith. You understandably resigned from the Space
Commission which you chaired to focus on your nomination. However, you
left before signing onto the report and the unanimous conclusions of
the remaining 12 Commissioners. Do you in fact agree with the findings
and recommendations of the Space Commission?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that the United States is increasingly
dependent on its civil, commercial, and defense and intelligence space
assets. With that dependence comes vulnerability to hostile acts. The
Nation needs a capability to deter and defend against attack on space
assets and systems.

38. Senator Smith. The Space Commission report recommends several
actions for the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, will you implement
those changes?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will give careful attention to
these recommendations and the recommendations of several other recent
studies and commissions on space systems.

39. Senator Smith. There are several recommendations for the
President and other agencies of the administration. Some are even
suggestions for Congress.
If confirmed, will you encourage the President, other agencies of
the administration, and Congress to implement the changes recommended
by the Space Commission?
Secretary Rumsfeld. See answer above.

40. Senator Smith. The Commission's report stated that we have not
adequately funded a number of space activities. In particular, it noted
that we need space control and satellite negation capability.
Do you believe the U.S. should have an anti-satellite capability?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. and other nations that make use of
space face threats to the operation of their satellites. We know that
other nations have jammed telecommunications from on-orbit satellites,
that Russian entities market devices that can jam GPS signals, and that
foreign satellite manufacturers market so-called ``micro satellites''
to other foreign countries that can be used for offensive actions
against satellites. In light of U.S. dependence on space assets, the
vulnerability of these assets to attack or disruption and the fact that
others have the means of doing harm to U.S. interests in space, it
would be contrary to U.S. security interests not to develop, test, and
deploy the appropriate means of deterring attack on and defending space
systems.

41a. Senator Smith. The Commission had concerns about the Air Force
not doing a good job of growing space experts from within the space
community for senior leadership positions. Rather, they tend to bring
in rated officers with little or no space experience to fill key space
leadership positions.
If confirmed, will you encourage the Air Force to promote more
career space experts to senior leadership positions rather than drawing
so heavily from the pilot community while space officers stagnate?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.

41b. Senator Smith. Based on what you know of the emerging missile
threat and the current administration's planned National Missile
Defense concept, do you believe the planned concept by itself is
sufficiently robust and capable of providing the defense you and the
President-elect have described to the nation? When do you anticipate
completing your review of the critical missile defense mission and
bringing forward to Congress the robust missile defense architecture to
protect America and our friends and allies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I believe it would be good to examine alternate
and complementary architectures to the NMD system currently under
development. I cannot now predict when that review will be completed or
the architectures that will be found to be appropriate.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Olympia J. Snowe
42. Senator Snowe. In its review of the fiscal year 2001 budget
request, the Seapower Subcommittee took testimony from Congressional
Research Service that indicated a $10 to $12 billion annual investment,
depending on the actual ship mix, and an average build rate of 8.7
ships per year is required to maintain 308 ships. However, in its
budget request for fiscal year 2001, the administration in its Future
Years Defense Program included only 7.5 ships per year and over the
last 8 years of the Clinton administration requested only 4.75 ships
per year. Congress helped raise that average to 5.5 ships per year.
Given that the CNO has testified that 34 percent of the Navy is
deployed at any given time and that he is hard-pressed to meet that
requirement with the current fleet, are you committed to review the
shipbuilding account for adequacy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.

43. Senator Snowe. In a New York Times article dated January 8,
2001, the authors questioned the DOD's ability to pursue leap-ahead
technologies while modernizing the military. The article specifically
mentioned three programs that might be candidates for cancellation or
postponement to pay for pursuit of leap-ahead technologies: the F-22,
the MV-22, and the DD-21. Witnesses testified before the Seapower
Subcommittee that the Marines have been at considerable risk in naval
surface fire support since the retirement of the Iowa-class battleship
and will remain so until the DD-21 joins the fleet in strength.
Slippage of the DD-21 would increase risk to the Navy team's capability
for forced entry operations and its ability to conduct Operational
Maneuver From The Sea.
Do you plan to review the resources necessary to meet naval surface
fire support requirements of the United States Marine Corps to perform
the missions we expect of them?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.

44. Senator Snowe. The safety and efficacy of the Department of
Defense Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP) continues to be of
great concern to our men and women in uniform and their families. In
light of the divisive nature of the DOD anthrax policy, do you plan to
review this policy, and what actions might you plan to take to regain
the trust of our service members and their families lost due to AVIP?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am not familiar with the details of the AVIP
program. However, the trust of our service members and their families
is essential to the effectiveness, morale, and welfare of the U.S.
Armed Forces. If confirmed, I will get briefed on the program. In the
interim, it would not be appropriate for me to comment in detail.

45. Senator Snowe. In your 1998 commission report you highlighted
the missile threat faced by not only our own forces, but America's
allies like Israel as well. U.S.-Israeli cooperation on the Arrow
missile system has been a critical component to Israel's defensive
capabilities as well as a centerpiece for our strategic relationship.
Also, during your service in the Ford administration you were
supportive of Israeli security requirements.
As Secretary, do you foresee this joint initiative continuing? Will
you continue to facilitate Israel's qualitative military edge,
including the provision of advanced U.S. defense technologies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I support continued cooperative efforts in the
area of ballistic missile defense. I have not been briefed on the ARROW
program in detail, however, and therefore do not believe it appropriate
to comment on possible future directions or funding for that program.

46. Senator Snowe. The Taiwan Relations Act declares America's
intention to provide for the defensive capabilities of Taiwan with no
veto by China. The Taiwan Relations Act also states that ``the
President and Congress'' shall determine Taiwan's defense requirements.
What recommendations to the President will you make based on the
needs of Taiwan in order to defend itself as required by the Taiwan
Relations Act?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Any recommendations regarding arms sales to
Taiwan will be made to the President. However, I understand the
requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act and support a strong
relationship between Taiwan and the United States, in support of
Taiwan's need for effective self-defense capability against the threats
posed to it.

47. Senator Snowe. In addition to U.S. military aid to present
recipients, as Secretary would you recommend to President Bush that
there is a need to expand this aid? If so, do you have any regions or
countries that you foresee need this assistance?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not had an opportunity to review U.S.
arms sales policy. If confirmed, I will assess U.S. arms sales policy,
in conjunction with the other members of the President's national
security team.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard
48. Senator Allard. As a member of the NRO Commission, we found
that there is a valuable role to be played by commercial space systems
in order to allow our defense and intelligence assets to be available
for critical tasks.
Do you see a role for commercial systems and will you advocate a
clear national strategy and a commitment of funding for acquisition of
imagery in order to take full advantage of commercial satellite
capabilities?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I stated in the confirmation hearing, my
impression is that the United States government, including the
military, will and should increase the use of commercially available
satellite capabilities, especially in the area of communications and
imagery. There are a number of instances where the government might
take advantage of commercial off-the-shelf type products and services,
and use those products and services to good effect.

49. Senator Allard. A concern for me is the adequate funding for
our long lead space research and development programs--such as the
space based radar.
What key areas and needs do you see as a focus for technological
development in order to move our systems to the next generation?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree that there needs to be considerable
investment in ``leading edge'' technologies. The United States cannot
afford to lose its preeminence in science and technology.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Hutchinson
50. Senator Hutchinson. I am concerned that the military's basic
pay table has become compressed over the last decade--that senior
enlisted members of our Armed Forces are no longer receiving
compensation commensurate with the great responsibilities placed upon
their shoulders.
If confirmed, will you thoroughly examine the area of compensation
for senior enlisted members of our Armed Forces before President Bush
sends an amended fiscal year 2002 budget request to Congress?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes.

51. Senator Hutchinson. Nearly every soldier, sailor, airman, or
marine that I have spoken to has told me that the need to provide a
college education for a spouse or child has become a major factor in
most re-enlistment decisions. While I have, in the past, supported
efforts to make Montgomery G.I. Bill benefits portable, I am not
convinced that this would provide the best solution.
If confirmed, will you commit yourself to working with Congress to
explore new methods by which those who make a career of the Armed
Forces will be able to provide college educations for their dependents?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If confirmed, I will be pleased to work with
you and your colleagues in the Senate and the House of Representatives
to identify options for improving the overall morale and welfare of our
servicemen and women, including the dependent's education option you
have suggested.

52. Senator Hutchinson. One of the many programmatic challenges
facing the Department of Defense is the modernization of our Nation's
fleet of C-130 transport aircraft.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure a modern and
viable mission-ready C-130 force for today and for the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am aware of and appreciate the keen interest
in the C-130J program shown by you and several of your colleagues.
However, I have not had an opportunity to review the program, nor have
I seen the results of the mobility requirements study you mention. If
confirmed, I will review the study and the program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
53. Senator Sessions. The U.S. government is faced with the
enormous task of destroying unexploded ordnance at munitions sites that
have been found across the United States, most notably recently at
Massachusetts Military Range on Cape Cod, in Massachusetts and Rocky
Mountain Arsenal in Denver, Colorado. There are hundreds of U.S. sites
with similar problems. These munitions and their toxic explosives can
pose serious environmental problems both in terms of their storage or
if they are destroyed by open burn or open detonation.
What plans would your Department have to destroy munitions found in
current and former U.S. bases? Will you focus on closed disposal
technologies rather than continuation of open burn/open detonations as
a solution to this problem? What priority would you give to the funding
of new methods of destroying these hazardous materials, including
finding private sector solutions to this problem that would not require
the hazardous transport of conventional unexploded ordnance?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I appreciate your concern about unexploded
ordnance. However, I have not been briefed on the Department's plans
and programs in this area, and am unable to comment at this time. If
confirmed, these activities will be reviewed and assessed.

54. Senator Sessions. Areas of the former Soviet Union, Central and
Eastern Europe, and Asia have numerous outdated and hazardous munitions
sites that could pose a proliferation problem if those munitions and
explosives are not properly destroyed. The U.S. government currently
funds this program in the former Soviet Union.
Would you support the continuation of this non-proliferation
program and an increase in budgetary allocations to help stem this
proliferation concern? Would you support the extension of this program
to include Central and Eastern Europe and Asia? Which areas pose a
particular concern? Would your administration support the extension of
non-proliferation programs to China that would help American companies
enter this market, destroying munitions that pose an environmental
hazard? Would you support the use of Foreign Ministry Financing Funds
for the destruction of unexploded ordnance and chemical weapons if
requested by an eligible country?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am unaware of the program to which you refer.
If confirmed, I will undertake to have this program reviewed in light
of your questions.
______

[The nomination reference of Donald H. Rumsfeld follows:]
Nomination Reference
[On January 20, 2001, the Senate received the Donald H.
Rumsfeld nomination. It was not referred to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, but was signed by the President, placed on
the Senate Executive Calendar, and then confirmed by the full
Senate by voice vote all on the same day. A confirmation
hearing was held by the Senate Armed Services Committee on
January 11, 2001.]
------

[The biographical sketch of Donald H. Rumsfeld follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Donald H. Rumsfeld

Donald Rumsfeld was born in 1932 in Chicago, Illinois,
attended Princeton University on scholarship, served in the
U.S. Navy (1954-1957) as an aviator, and was All Navy Wrestling
Champion. Married in 1954, he and his wife Joyce have three
children and five grandchildren.
Mr. Rumsfeld is in private business and is Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Gilead Sciences, Inc. He serves as a
member of the boards of directors of ABB (Asea Brown Boveri)
Ltd. (Zurich, Switzerland), Amylin Pharmaceuticals, and Tribune
Company. He is also Chairman of the Salomon Smith Barney
International Advisory Board and an advisor to a number of
companies, including Investor AB of Sweden. He is currently
Chairman of the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security
Space Management and Organization.
In 1962, at the age of 30, he was elected to his first of
four terms in the U.S. Congress. In 1969, he resigned from
Congress to join the President's Cabinet. He served as Director
of the Office of Economic Opportunity and Assistant to the
President, and later as Director of the Economic Stabilization
Program and Counselor to the President. In January 1973 he was
posted to Brussels, Belgium, as U.S. Ambassador to North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
In August 1974, Mr. Rumsfeld was called back to Washington,
DC, to serve as Chairman of the transition to the Presidency of
Gerald R. Ford. He served as Chief of Staff of the White House
and as a member of the President's Cabinet, 1974-1975, and as
the 13th U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1975-1977, the youngest in
history.
In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld left Washington, DC, after some 20
years of public service and lectured at Princeton University's
Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs and at
Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management
prior to entering business.
In June 1977, he became Chief Executive Officer of G.D.
Searle & Co., a worldwide pharmaceutical company, where he
served until 1985. The turnaround there earned him awards as
the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical
Industry in 1980 and 1981. He was in private business from 1985
to 1990. From 1990 to 1993, Mr. Rumsfeld served as Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of General Instrument Corporation, a
leader in broadband and digital high-definition television
technology. After taking the company public, Mr. Rumsfeld
returned to private business.
During his years in business, he has continued public
service in a variety of federal posts including service as
President Reagan's Special Envoy for the Middle East, and as a
Member of the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms
Control, and the National Economic Commission. His current
civic activities include service on the Boards of Trustees of
the Chicago Historical Society, Eisenhower Exchange
Fellowships, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the
Rand Corporation and the National Park Foundation. He is also a
member of the U.S.-Russia Business Forum, and recently
completed service as Chairman of the U.S. Government Commission
to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
Honors include: Distinguished Eagle Scout Award (1975),
George Catlett Marshall Award (1984), Woodrow Wilson Award
(1985), Dwight Eisenhower Medal (1993), and eleven honorary
degrees. In 1977, Mr. Rumsfeld was awarded the nation's highest
civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom.
------

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Donald H.
Rumsfeld in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Donald Henry Rumsfeld.

2. Position to which nominated:
U.S. Secretary of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
Expected to be on January 20, 2001. Date of announcement by
President-elect December 28, 2000.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
July 9, 1932; Chicago, Illinois.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Marion Joyce Pierson; December 27, 1954.

7. Names and ages of children:
Valerie Jeanne Rumsfeld, age 44 (born March 3, 1956)
Marcy Kay Rumsfeld, age 40 (born March 28, 1960)
Donald Nicholas Rumsfeld, age 33 (born June 26, 1967).

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From To Name of School Address Degree
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/46............................ 6/50.............. New Trier High Winnetka, IL...... H.S. Diploma
School.
9/50............................ 6/54.............. Princeton Princeton, NJ..... B.A.
University.
10/54........................... 1/56.............. U.S. Naval Flight Pensacola, FL..... Naval Aviator
School.
1956............................ 1956.............. Instructors Basic Pensacola, FL..... Naval Flight
Training School Instructor
(IBTU).
1959............................ 1959.............. Georgetown Law Washington, DC.... None
Center.
1959............................ 1960.............. Western Reserve Cleveland, OH..... None
Law School.
1963............................ 1963.............. National War Washington, DC.... N/A
College.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Position Company
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/93-Present................... Private Business.. 400 N. Michigan,
#405, Chicago, IL
60611
10/90-08/93..................... Chairman and Chief General Instrument
Executive Officer. Corp., 181 W.
Madison St.,
Chicago, IL 60602
10/85-10/90..................... Senior Advisor William Blair &
(part time) and Co., 135 S.
private business. LaSalle St.,
Chicago, IL 60603
08/85-09/30/85.................. Chairman of the G.D. Searle & Co.,
Board, President 4711 Golf Road,
& CEO. Skokie, IL 60076
06/77-08/85..................... President, CEO & G.D. Searle & Co.,
Director. 4711 Golf Road,
Skokie, IL 60076
11/3/83-04/84................... Presidential Envoy U.S. Government,
for the Middle Washington, DC
East (part-time,
temporary W.O.C.--
on leave of
absence from G.D.
Searle & Co.).
10/82-02/83..................... Presidential Envoy U.S. Government,
for the Law of Washington, DC
the Sea (part
time--on leave of
absence from G.D.
Searle & Co.).
01/77-06/77..................... Lecturer (part Northwestern
time). Graduate School
of Mgmt. and
Princeton
University,
Woodrow Wilson
School of
International
Affairs
01/77-06/77..................... Consultant........ G.D. Searle Co
11/18/75-01/20/77............... Secretary of U.S. Dept. of
Defense. Defense,
Washington, DC
08/74........................... Chairman of Gerald The White House,
R. Ford's Washington, DC
Transition to the
Presidency.
09/27/74-11/18/75............... White House Chief The White House,
of Staff; Asst. Washington, DC
to the President;
Cabinet Member.
02/02/73-12/05/74............... U.S. Ambassador to U.S. Dept. of
NATO. State,
Washington, DC
1971-1973....................... Member of the The White House,
Cabinet. Washington, DC
12/10/70-02/02/73............... Counsellor to the
President.
10/07/71-02/02/73............... Director, Economic
Stabilization
Program (Cost of
Living Council).
1969-1973....................... Member of the The White House,
Cabinet. Washington, DC
05/26/69-2/2/73................. Asst. to the
President.
05/26/69-12/10/70............... Director, Office
of Economic
Opportunity.
1963-1969....................... Member, U.S. House U.S. Congress,
of Washington, DC
Representatives
(R-IL).
1960-1962....................... Registered A.G. Becker & Co.
Representative. (investment
banking) Chicago,
IL
1959-1960....................... Campaign Manager.. Hon. David
Dennison, Warren,
Ohio
1959............................ Staff Assistant, Congressman Robert
U.S. House of Griffin (R-
Representatives. Michigan)
Washington, DC
1957-1959....................... Administrative Honorable David
Asst., U.S. House Dennison, Warren,
of Ohio.
Representatives.
1954-1957....................... Naval Aviator, U.S. Navy and then
then Flight U.S.N.R.
Instructor, then
Instructor of
Flight
Instructors.
1950-1954....................... Midshipman........ N.R.O.T.C.
(Regular).
1949 (Summer)................... Counselor......... Camp Owakanze, Ft.
Williams, Canada
1949 (Xmas)..................... Mailman (part U.S. Post Office,
time). Winnetka, IL
1948 (Summer)................... Counselor......... Philmont Scout
Ranch.
(Xmas)........................ Mailman (part U.S. Post Office,
time). Winnetka, IL
1947 (Summer)................... Laborer, Skokie Country
construction and Club.
gardening.
(Xmas)........................ Mailman (part U.S. Post Office,
time). Winnetka, IL.

OTHER:
1948............................ Janitor (part Dress shop,
time). Winnetka, IL
1947............................ Rug Cleaner....... Lewis Mothproof,
Northbrook, IL
1946............................ Gardening and snow Winnetka, IL.
shoveling.
1945............................ Newsboy, gardening Coronado, CA.
1944............................ Newsboy, chopped Port Orchard,
wood, delivered Washington;
ice, dug clams. Seaside, Oregon.
1943............................ Newsboy, shop boy Elizabeth City,
(fish market), NC.
raised and sold
watermelons,
cantaloupe and
chickens.
1942............................ Newsboy, magazine Winnetka, IL.
salesman,
delivery boy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to
the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional
omissions.

APPOINTMENT DATES--DONALD RUMSFELD
------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Date Title
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nixon.......................... 5/26/69 to 2/2/73 Assistant to the
President
Nixon.......................... 5/26/69 to 12/10/70 Director of the
Office of
Economic
Opportunity
Nixon.......................... 4/20/70 to 2/2/73 Property Review
Board (member 4/
20/70; chairman 9/
11/71)
Nixon.......................... 12/10/70 to 2/2/73 Counselor to the
President
Nixon.......................... 1/20/71 to 2/2/73 Member of Domestic
Council
Nixon.......................... 10/7/71 to 2/2/73 Director of the
Cost of Living
Council
Nixon.......................... 2/2/73 to 12/5/74 U.S. Permanent
Representative on
the Council of
North Atlantic
Treaty
Organization with
the Rank and
Status of
Ambassador
Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Ford........................... 9/27/74 to 11/18/75 Assistant to the
President
Ford........................... 11/18/75 to 1/20/77 Secretary of
Defense
Ford........................... 2/24/76 to 1/20/77 Governor of Board
of Governors,
American National
Red Cross
Reagan......................... 9/23/82 to 10/29/86 Member of the
General Advisory
Committee of the
U.S. Arms Control
& Disarmament
Agency
Reagan......................... 5/17/83 to 9/17/84 Member of the
Presidents
Council on the
Conduct of U.S.-
Japan Relations
Reagan......................... 11/3/83 (no end Personal
date) Representative of
the President of
the U.S.A. in the
Middle East
------------------------------------------------------------------------

U.S. GOVERNMENT RELATED--CURRENT:

Director of Central Intelligence--Washington, DC--Consultant (WOC)
(7/98-)
Congressional Policy Advisory Board, Republican Policy Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC--Member, Advisory Board
(1/98- )
Congressional Leadership National Security Advisory Group,
Washington, DC--Chairman (6/22/00- )
Senator Peter Fitzgerald Business Advisory Committee, Chicago, IL--
Member (12/98- )
National Park Foundation, Washington, DC--Member, Board of Trustees
(8/90-8/96) (1/93-7/94) (11/97- ); Selection Committee for Theodore
Roosevelt Medal (3/95- ); Selection Committee for Board (6/95-4/96);
Development Committee (1/98- ); Executive Committee (10/92-4/96)(1/98-
); Finance Committee (10/92-4/96); New Initiatives Task Force (1/93-7/
94); Government Relations Committee (7/94-4/96); Governance Committee
(1/98-9/98)(11/98- ); Chairman, Governance Committee (11/98-7/00).
Lt. Governor Corinne Wood Business Advisory Committee, Chicago,
IL--Member (3/99- )

FORMER ACTIVITIES (PARTIAL)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximate Dates Activity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1967-1969................................. THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTER-
PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL--Co-
Founder, Washington, DC
1968-1968................................. COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS
FOR THE HOUSE REPUBLICAN
CONFERENCE, Washington, DC--
Member.
1968-?.................................... THE NAVAL ACADEMY ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, Annapolis,
Maryland--Honorary Member
1968-1969................................. NAVAL RESERVE ASSOCIATION--
Member, Chicago, IL.
1968-1969................................. RESERVE OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION--Member,
Washington, DC
1977-?.................................... U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE,
Washington, DC--Advisor
(W.O.C.)
02/81-1981................................ INTERIM FOREIGN POLICY
ADVISORY BOARD FOR
PRESIDENT REAGAN--Member
09/82-11/86............................... PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GENERAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS
CONTROL (GAC), Washington,
DC--Member
10/82-2/83................................ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL
ENVOY FOR THE LAW OF THE
SEA TREATY--(W.O.C.),
Washington, DC
11/82-06/85............................... PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COUNCIL
FOR INTERNATIONAL YOUTH
EXCHANGE, Washington, DC--
Member
12/82-09/85............................... PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COUNCIL
FOR PHYSICAL FITNESS &
SPORTS, Washington, DC--
Special Advisor
12/82-10/90............................... NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
FOUNDATION, Washington, DC--
Honorary Member, Board of
Directors
01/83-1984................................ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PANEL ON
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS--(MX
Panel)--(W.O.C.),
Washington, DC--Senior
Advisor.
06/83-10/84............................... U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON THE CONDUCT OF U.S./
JAPAN RELATIONS (U.S.),
Washington, DC--Member; and
THE JOINT ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON U.S./JAPAN
RELATIONS (Bi-National)--
(W.O.C.), Washington, DC--
Member
10/83-1/89(?)............................. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC--Advisor/
Expert (W.O.C.) (Dates are
uncertain.)
11/83-4/84................................ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPECIAL
ENVOY TO THE MIDDLE EAST--
(W.O.C.), Washington, DC
03/87-06/88............................... ASSOCIATION OF NAVAL
AVIATION, Washington, DC--
Member.
10/87-08/90............................... NATIONAL (Paul Volker)
COMMISSION ON PUBLIC
SERVICE, Washington, DC--
Member
02/88-03/89............................... NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION
(Reagan Administration),
Washington, DC--Member
02/88-08/92............................... NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
Washington, DC--Member,
Board of Advisors
05/89-08/91............................... COMMISSION ON U.S.-JAPAN
RELATIONS (U.S.-Japan
2000)--Member
08/89-2/90................................ NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE,
Washington, DC--Member,
Panel on the Future Design
and Implementation of U.S.
National Security Export
Controls
1992-1994................................. INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN
INSTITUTE, Washington, DC--
Member
03/92-10/93............................... U.S. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION--HIGH DEFINITION
TELEVISION ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
12/97-7/98................................ COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO
THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, DC--Chairman
2/99-6/99................................. PANEL TO ASSESS THE
CAPABILITIES FOR DOMESTIC
RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ACTS
INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (RAND)--
Washington, DC
1/99-11/00................................ U.S. TRADE DEFICIT REVIEW
COMMISSION--Washington, DC--
Commissioner
6/00-12/00................................ U.S. COMMISSION TO ASSESS
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATION, Washington,
DC--Chairman
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SELECTED U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approx. Dates
----------------------------------------------------- Activity
From To
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sep-50.......................... Jun-54............ Midshipman,
N.R.O.T.C.
Jan-54.......................... Jan-57............ Naval Officer,
Ensign/LTJG
Nov-57.......................... Honorable
discharge from
the U.S. Navy
Nov-57.......................... 1989.............. Naval Reserves,
Captain/USNR-
Retired
Dec-57.......................... Jan-59............ Administrative
Assistant to
Congressman David
Dennison (R-OH)
1959............................ 1959.............. Staff Assistant to
Congressman
Robert Griffin (R-
MI)
Jan-63.......................... Apr-69............ Member (R-IL),
U.S.House of
Representatives,
88th Congress
Jan-63.......................... Apr-69............ Member, House
Committee on
Science &
Astronautics
Jan-63.......................... Jan-65............ Member,
Subcommittee on
Advanced Research
& Technology
Jan-63.......................... Jan-65............ Member,
Subcommittee on
Tracking & Data
Acquisition
Jan-65.......................... Apr-69............ Member,
Subcommittee on
Manned Space
Flight
1965............................ 2000.............. Member, 88th
Congressional
Club
Jan-65.......................... Jan-67............ Member, House
Committee on
Foreign
Operations &
Government
Information
Jan-65.......................... Jan-67............ Member, Government
Operations
Subcommittee on
Legal & Monetary
Affairs
Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Government
Operations
Subcommittee on
Military
Operations
Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint
Economic
Committee
Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint
Economic
Committee
Subcommittee on
Economy in
Government
Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint
Economic
Committee
Subcommittee on
Economic
Statistics
Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint
Economic
Committee
Subcommittee on
Fiscal Policy
Jan-67.......................... Apr-69............ Member, Joint
Economic
Committee
Subcommittee on
Inter-American
Economic
Relationships
1967............................ President of
Republican
Members, 88th
Congress, U.S.
House of
Representatives
1968............................ 1969.............. Member,
Presidential
Transition Team
for President-
Elect Richard
Nixon
Apr-69.......................... Jan-73............ Member,
President's
Cabinet (Nixon)
May-69.......................... Feb-73............ Assistant to the
President (Nixon)
May-69.......................... Dec-70............ Director, Office
of Economic
Opportunity
Apr-70.......................... Feb-73............ Member, Property
Review Board.
Chairman (9/11/71-
2/73)
Dec-70.......................... Feb-73............ Counselor to the
President (Nixon)
Jan-71.......................... Feb-73............ Member, Domestic
Council
Oct-71.......................... Feb-73............ Director, Economic
Stabilization
Program (Cost of
Living Council)
Feb-73.......................... Dec-74............ U.S. Ambassador to
NATO, Brussels,
Belgium
1974............................ ................ Chairman of the
Presidential
Transition Team
for Gerald Ford
1974............................ 1975.............. Member,
President's
Cabinet (Ford)
1974............................ 1975.............. White House Chief
of Staff
Sep-74.......................... Nov-75............ Assistant to the
President (Ford)
Nov-75.......................... Jan-77............ U.S. Secretary of
Defense
Feb-76.......................... Jan-77............ Governor, American
National Red
Cross Board of
Governors
1977............................ 1980.............. Consultant, U.S.
Department of
Defense (W.O.C)
1980............................ Member of Ronald
Reagan's Foreign
and Defense
Policy Advisory
Committee
1981............................ Member, Interim
Foreign Policy
Advisory Board
for President
Reagan
1982............................ 1983.............. Senior Advisor to
Commission on
Strategic Systems
(Scowcroft MX
Panel), (W.O.C)
Sep-82.......................... (?)............... Member, U.S.
General Advisory
Committee on Arms
Control (W.O.C.)
Oct-82.......................... Feb-83............ Presidential Envoy
for the Law of
the Sea Treaty
May-83.......................... Sep-84............ Member, U.S.
Presidential
Commission on
U.S.-Japan
Relations
(W.O.C.)
May-83.......................... Sep-84............ Member, U.S. the
Joint Advisory
Commission on
U.S.-Japan
Relations
(W.O.C.)
Nov-83.......................... Jan-89............ Consultant/Expert
Advisor, U.S.
Department of
State (W.O.C.)
(dates uncertain)
Nov-83.......................... Apr-84............ President Reagan's
Personal
Representative to
the Middle East
Feb-88.......................... Mar-89............ Member, National
Economic
Commission,
Washington, DC
Aug-90.......................... Aug-96............ Member, Board of
Trustees,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Nov-97.......................... Dec-00............ Member, Board of
Trustees,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Oct-92.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Executive
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Oct-92.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Finance
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Mar-95.......................... Jan-01............ Member, Selection
Committee for
Theodore
Roosevelt Medal,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Jan-93.......................... Ju1-94............ Member, New
Initiatives Task
Force, National
Park Foundation,
Washington, DC
Ju1-94.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Government
Relations
Committee
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Jun-95.......................... Apr-96............ Member, Selection
Committee for
Board, National
Park Foundation,
Washington, DC
Jan-98.......................... Sep-98............ Member, Governance
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Jan-98.......................... Jan-01............ Member,
Development
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Jan-98.......................... Jan-01............ Member, Executive
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Ju1-98.......................... Jul-00............ Chairman,
Governance
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Nov-98.......................... Jan-01 ........... Member, Governance
Committee,
National Park
Foundation,
Washington, DC
Jan-98.......................... Jan-01............ Member,
Congressional
Policy Advisory
Board, Republican
Policy Committee,
House of
Representatives,
Washington, DC
Ju1-98.......................... Jan-01............ Consultant to the
Director of
Central
Intelligence,
Washington, DC
Jan-99.......................... Nov-00............ Member, U.S. Trade
Deficit Review
Commission,
Washington, DC
Jun-00.......................... Jan-01............ Chairman,
Congressional
Leadership
National Security
Advisory Group,
Washington, DC
Jun-00.......................... Dec-00............ Chairman, U.S.
Commission to
Assess National
Security Space
Management and
Organization,
Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to
the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional
omissions.
current activities
*Organizational affiliations which I might wish to continue during
the term of my appointment
**Investments in entities which I might wish to continue during the
term of my appointment.

BUSINESS:
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: PUBLIC COMPANIES

ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd., Zurich, Switzerland--Member, Board of
Directors (6/99- ); Nominating Committee (12/99- )
AMYLIN PHARMACEUTICALS, La Jolla, California--Member, Board of
Directors (11/91-9/96), (9/99- ), Advisor (9/96-10/99)
GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., Foster City, California--Chairman, Board of
Directors (1/97- ); Member, Board of Directors (7/88- ); Audit
Committee (4/89-97); Compensation Committee (4/91-97)
TRIBUNE COMPANY, Chicago, Illinois--Member, Board of Directors (7/
92- ); Executive Committee (5/96- ); Audit Committee (7/92-5/95);
Governance and Compensation Committee (5/95- ); Incentive Compensation
Subcommittee of the Governance and Compensation Committee (5/96-5/99);
Finance Committee (7/92-5/95); Technical Advisory Committee (9/92-2/
00)--Chairman (5/95-2/00); [Leave of Absence from 7/8/96 to 11/6/96].

BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: PRIVATE COMPANIES

OVERX, INC., Chicago, IL--Member, Board of Directors (7/99- );
Compensation Committee (10/99-12/99)
*,**SHOTPUT HOLDINGS, INC. (Owned 100 percent by Donald Rumsfeld to
hold fractional interest in aircraft that are operated and maintained
by a third-party), Chicago, IL--Member, Board of Directors and
President (11/95- ).

ADVISORY RELATIONSHIPS: PUBLIC COMPANIES

INVESTOR AB, Stockholm, Sweden--Advisor (1/94- )
METRICOM, INC., Los Gatos, California--Member, Advisory Board (1/
94- )
NVIDIA, Sunnyvale, California--Business Advisor (2/98- )
SALOMON SMITH BARNEY, New York, New York--Chairman, International
Advisory Board (11/98- ).

ADVISORY BOARDS: PRIVATE COMPANIES

THE HAMILTON GROUP, Washington, DC.--Member, Advisory Board (2/97-
)
TRANSACTION INFORMATION SYSTEMS (TIS), New York. NY--Advisory Board
(4/99- )
THESCIENCE.COM--Menlo Park, CA--Advisory Board (4/00- ).

U.S. GOVERNMENT RELATED

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--Washington, DC--Consultant
(WOC)(7/98- ).
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY ADVISORY BOARD, Republican Policy Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC--Member, Advisory Board
(1/98- ).
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP,
Washington, DC--Chairman (6/22/00- )
SENATOR PETER FITZGERALD BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Chicago, IL--
Member (12/98- )
NATIONAL PARK FOUNDATION, Washington, DC--Member, Board of Trustees
(8/90-8/96) (1/93-7/94) (11/97- ); Selection Committee for Theodore
Roosevelt Medal (3/95- ); Selection Committee for Board (6/95-4/96);
Development Committee (1/98- ); Executive Committee (10/92-4/96)(1/98-
); Finance Committee (10/92-4/96); New Initiatives Task Force (1/93-7/
94); Government Relations Committee (7/94-4/96); Governance Committee
(1/98-9/98)(11/98- ); Chairman, Governance Committee (11/98-7/00)
U.S. COMMISSION TO ASSESS NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND
ORGANIZATION, Washington, DC--Chairman (6/00-12/00).
LT. GOVERNOR CORINNE WOOD BUSINESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Chicago,
IL--Member (3/99- ).

BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: NOT FOR PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

CHICAGO HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Chicago, Illinois--Member, Board of
Trustees (7/97- ); Exhibitions Committee (10/97-11/99); Finance
Committee (10/97-4/00)
*DHR FOUNDATION, Chicago, Illinois--President (12/85- ). (Possibly
without investment control)
EISENHOWER EXCHANGE FELLOWSHIPS, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania--
Chairman Emeritus (5/93- ); Chairman, Board of Trustees (5/86-5/93);
Executive Committee (5/93-5/95)
EMPOWER AMERICA, New York, New York--Member, Board of Directors (1/
93- )
*GERALD R. FORD FOUNDATION, Grand Rapids, Michigan--Member, Board
of Trustees (9/81- ); Awards and Grants Committee (3/82-7/90); Program
Committee (7/90-7/92); Endowment/Development Committee (7/92- )
HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE, Stanford,
California--Member, Board of Overseers (8/83-2/87, 7/88-6/94 & 7/97- );
Finance Committee (7/97-3/98); Nominating Committee (7/97- ); Executive
Committee (4/98- )
JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE, Japan--Member, Board of
Trustees (1990- ).
RAND CORPORATION, Santa Monica, California--Chairman, Board of
Trustees (4/81-4/86)(4/95-12/96); Member, Board of Trustees (4/77-4/
87)(4/88-4/98)(4/99- ); Executive Committee (4/77-4/87) (4/88-4/98)(4/
99- ); Member, Audit Committee (4/95-4/98)(4/99-4/00); Endowment Fund
Subcommittee (4/95-12/96); Corporate Development Advisory Committee (7/
904/98- ); Chairman, Nominating Committee (4/97-4/98); Member,
Nominating Committee (4/78-4/87 & 4/95-4/98); and Ad Hoc Committee for
the National Defense Research Institute (4/94-11/94); Member, Corporate
Development Advisory Committee (7/90-4/98); President's Council (9/93-
4/98); RAND Graduate School Committee (4/95-4/98); Member, Advisory
Committee of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy (5/96-4/98); Member,
Long-Term Investment Fund Subcommittee (4/99- ); Member, Ad Hoc Venture
Advisory Committee (7/99- ). RAND Transition 2001, Washington, DC--
Panel Member (1/00-12/00). [Took leave of absence as Chairman/Member of
the Board of Trustees of RAND from 6/96-12/96.]
RAND Russian-American Business Leaders Forum, Santa Monica,
California--Member (11/97- )
SMITH RICHARDSON FOUNDATION, New York, New York--Member, Grant
Advisory Committees--Domestic (6/98-12/99); Foreign Policy (6/98- )
THE NATIONAL SECURITY FUNDERS INSTITUTE, New York, New York--
Advisory Board (3/00- ).
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois--Member, Department of
Economics Chairman's Council (6/97- )
*AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY, Washington, DC--Member (10/83- )
BRETTON WOODS COMMITTEE, Washington, DC--Member (7/96- )
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Chicago, Illinois--Member (6/
93- ). (Member, Board of Directors, 5/85-6/92)
*COUNCIL OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS, Washington, DC--Member (8/83- )
FIRST FLIGHT CENTENNIAL FOUNDATION, Raleigh-Durham Airport, NC (6/
99- )
*FORMER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, Washington, DC.--Member
(1975- )
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS), London,
England--Member (6/78- )
THE MARSH INSTITUTE (former Congressman John Marsh; D-VA),
Shenandoah University, Winchester, Virginia--Member, Honorary Committee
(11/98- )
*NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (NAPA), Washington,
DC.--Member (9/81- )
NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM, Chicago, Illinois--Member (9/83- ).

ADVISORY:

ALEXIS de TOCQUEVILLE INSTITUTION--NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM,
Arlington, VA--Member, Senior Advisory Board (9/93- )
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES--The Global
Organization on Crime, Washington, DC.--Member, Steering Committee (11/
97- )
COMMITTEE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE, Arlington, Virginia--Senior
Advisory Board member (9/93- )
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Washington, DC.--Member, Committee
for Democracy in Russia (4/96- )
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, New York, New York--Member,
International Advisory Board (6/88- ); Member Board of Trustees (6/86-
6/88)
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, Washington, DC.--Member, Advisory Board
(10/85- )
JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE, INC. (JCIE/USA), New York,
New York--Board of Trustees (10/92- )
JOHN E. MOSS (former Congressman John Moss; D-CA) FOUNDATION
CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, Chicago, IL--Member (1/99- )
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE STUDY GROUP ON U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY
STEERING COMMITTEE, Washington, DC--Member (2/00- ).

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES:

42ND WARD REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATION, Chicago, Illinois--Member (9/85-
).

OTHER:

*ALFALFA CLUB, Washington, DC--Member (1976- )
*BOHEMIAN CLUB, San Francisco, California--Member (12/86- ); H.B.
Camp (8/87- )
*CAPITOL HILL CLUB, Washington, DC--Member (5/85- )
*CASTLE PARK PLATFORM TENNIS ASSOCIATION, Castle Park, Michigan--
Member (1980- )
*COMMERCIAL CLUB, Chicago, IL--Member (3/79- ). Executive Committee
(5/92-5/93)
*88TH CONGRESSIONAL CLUB, Washington, DC--Member (1965- )
*THE FEBRUARY GROUP (President Nixon Administration Alumni),
Alexandria, Virginia--Member (4/91- )
THE 410 CLUB, Chicago, Illinois--Member (12/93- )
*FOURTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, Chicago, Illinois--Member (9/90- )
*FRIENDS OF PRINCETON WATER POLO, Princeton, New Jersey--Member
*FRIENDS OF PRINCETON WRESTLING COMMITTEE, Princeton, New Jersey--
Member (7/96- )
OUTSTANDING AMERICANS SELECTION COMMITTEE, National Wrestling Hall
of Fame, Stillwater, Oklahoma--Member (10/97- )
*PRINCETON CLUB OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois--Member (10/91- ).
Honorary member, Board of Directors. Awards Committee (06/93-06/94)
*PRINCETON CLUB OF NEW YORK, New York, New York--Member (4/79-10/
91, reinstated 4/93- )
*RACQUET CLUB OF CHICAGO, Chicago, Illinois--Member (1/86- )
*REAGAN ALUMNI ASSOCIATION, Alexandria, Virginia--Member (1990- )
*SOS CLUB, Washington, DC.--Member (1964- ).

FIDUCIARY:

*DONALD H. RUMSFELD REVOCABLE TRUST u/a/d October 6, 1978, as
amended (1978- )
*DONALD H. RUMSFELD 1998 GRANTOR RETAINED ANNUITY TRUST (1998- ).

INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIPS:

The entities listed under this heading overwhelmingly represent
investments in which I have no active role. My participation is
predominately that of a passive investor
**BIOTECHNOLOGY VENTURE PARTNERS, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited
Partner (1995- )
**BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES VII, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner
(1995- )
**BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES VIII, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner
(1997- )
**BRENTWOOD ASSOCIATES IX, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner
(1998- )
**CERBERUS INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERS, L.P., New York, NY--Limited
Partner (1999- )
**CHENGWEI VENTURES FUND I, L.P., Shanghai, China--Limited Partner
(2000- )
**COMPASS I, L.P., Chicago, IL--Limited Partner (1997- ).
**CONVERGENCE CAPITAL GROUP, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited
Partner (2000- )
**DEERFIELD PARTNERS, L.P., New York, NY--Limited Partner (1994- ).
**FLAG GROWTH CAPITAL, L.P., Stamford, CT--Limited Partner (2000- )
**FLAG VENTURE PARTNERS IV, L.P., Stamford, CT--Limited Partner
(2000- )
**FLC XXX PARTNERSHIP, New York, NY--General Partner (1998- )
**HAMILTON TECHNOLOGY VENTURES, L.P., San Diego, CA--Limited
Partner (2000- ).
**JORD PARTNERSHIP, Schaumburg, IL--General Partner (1990- )
**KINGSBURY CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P. III, San Diego, CA--Limited
Partner (1998- )
**LASALLE RECOVERY VENTURE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Chicago, IL--
Limited Partner (1994- )
**LAZY O RANCH LTD. PARTNERSHIP, Schaumburg, IL--Limited Partner
(1988- )
**LCOR, INC., Schaumburg, IL--50 percent shareholder (1996- )
**LLANO HOT SPRINGS PARTNERSHIP, Taos, NM--General Partner (1992- )
**MAVERICK CAPITAL, Dallas, TX--Limited Partner (1997- )
**MUTUALFUNDS.COM, Boston, MA--Limited Liability Company Member
(1999- )
**OCM OPPORTUNITIES FUND III, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited
Partner (1999- )
**OCM OPPORTUNITIES FUND, L.P., Los Angeles, CA--Limited Partner
(1995- )
**OPTION ADVANTAGE PARTNERS, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited
Partner (2000 )
**POLARIS VENTURE PARTNERS III, L.P., Waltham, MA--Limited Partner
(2000- )
**R. CHANEY & PARTNERS III L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner
(1997- )
**R. CHANEY & PARTNERS IV, L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner
(1998- )
**ROBERTSON STEPHENS RESIDENTIAL FUND, L.P., San Francisco, CA--
Limited Partner (1994- )
**SCF PARTNERS III, L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner (1995- )
**SCF PARTNERS IV, L.P., Houston, TX--Limited Partner (1998- )
**SILVER LAKE SPECIAL TRUST, New York, NY--Limited Partner (1999- )
**STINSON CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited
Partner (1998- )
**SUMMIT VENTURES IV, L.P., Boston, MA--Limited Partner (1995- )
**TECOLOTE LAND LLC, Schaumburg, IL--Limited Liability Company
Member (2000- )
**THOMAS H. LEE FUND V, L.P., Boston, MA--Limited Partner (2000- )
**TIGER MANAGEMENT L.L.C., New York, NY--Limited Partner (1993- )
**TRANSPAC CAPITAL 1996 INVESTMENT TRUST, Tortola, British Virgin
Islands--Limited Partner (1997- )
**TWP CEO FOUNDERS' CIRCLE (QP), L.P., San Francisco, CA--Limited
Partner (1999- ).
**VECTOR LATER STAGE EQUITY FUND II, L.P., Deerfield, IL--Limited
Partner (1997- )
**WASHINGTON CAPITAL PARTNERS, L.L.C., Washington, DC--Limited
Liability Company Member (2000- )
**YBR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Chicago, IL--General Partner
(1987- )
**YBR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP II, Chicago, IL--Limited
Partner (1992- )

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
See Question 11.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
See Attachment A-13(a)
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to
the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional
omissions.

AWARDS AND HONORS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Awards/Honors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1947...................................... Eagle Scout Award
1948...................................... Elected Vice President of
Junior Class, New Trier
High School, Winnetka,
Illinois
1949-50................................... Elected Vice President of
the Tri-Ship Club, New
Trier High School,
Winnetka, Illinois
1949-50................................... Awarded the Fathers Club
Award as the Outstanding
Wrestler in 1949 and in
1950, New Trier High
School, Winnetka, Illinois
1949-50................................... Elected Co-Captain of the
New Trier High School
Varsity Wrestling Team
(State Champions),
Winnetka, Illinois
1950...................................... Awarded scholarship to
Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
1950-51................................... Awarded the Hooker Trophy as
the Outstanding Freshman
Wrestler, Princeton
University, Princeton, New
Jersey
1951-54................................... Selected in a national
competition for an NROTC
Regular Scholarship,
Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
1953...................................... Elected Captain, Princeton
University Varsity 150 lb.
Football Team, Princeton,
New Jersey
1953...................................... Elected Captain of the
Princeton University
Varsity Wrestling Team,
Princeton, New Jersey
1953-54................................... Awarded the Triede Award as
the Outstanding Varsity
Wrestler in 1953 and in
1954, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey
1/55...................................... Designated Naval Aviator
1956...................................... Won the All Navy Wrestling
Championship title at 147
lbs
1956...................................... Won the Olympic District
Wrestling Championship at
160 lbs
1956...................................... Selected as a Flight
Instructor in the
Instructor's Basic Training
Group, U.S. Navy,
Pensacola, Florida
1962...................................... Elected to the U.S.
Congress, 13th District of
Illinois
1964...................................... Re-elected to the U.S.
Congress, 13th District of
Illinois
1964-66................................... Awarded the Watchdog of the
Treasury Award, by the
National Association of
Businessmen in 1964, 1966
and 1968
1965...................................... Selected as one of the ten
Outstanding Young Men by
the Chicago Chamber of
Commerce & Industry,
Chicago, Illinois
1966...................................... Re-elected to the U.S.
Congress, 13th District of
Illinois
1967-68................................... Elected President of the
88th Club (Republican
Members of the U.S.
Congress who were elected
in 1962)
1968...................................... Re-elected to the U.S.
Congress, 13th District of
Illinois, by the highest
percentage (76) of all
Congressmen in the U.S
1975...................................... Awarded the Distinguished
Eagle Scout Award
1975...................................... Awarded the Opportunity
Industrial Centers (OIC)
Executive Government Award,
presented by Rev. Leon
Sullivan
5/18/75................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor
of Laws Degree--Illinois
College, Jacksonville,
Illinois
5/25/75................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor
of Laws Degree--Park
College, Kansas City,
Missouri
6/7/75.................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor
of Laws Degree--Lake Forest
College, Lake Forest,
Illinois
10/2/76................................... Awarded the Leadership
Citation for Outstanding
Public Service, presented
by the American Friends of
the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem
1/10/77................................... Awarded the Presidential
Medal of Freedom--with
distinction--the Nation's
highest civilian award,
Washington, D.C
3/17/80................................... Awarded the Gold Medal as
the Outstanding Chief
Executive Officer in the
Pharmaceutical Industry,
presented by Wall Street
Transcript
1981...................................... Received the Northwest
Suburban 1981 ``Good
Scout'' Award, presented by
Northwest Suburban (Ill.)
Boy Scouts
2/23/81................................... Awarded the Bronze Medal as
the #3 Outstanding Chief
Executive Officer in the
Pharmaceutical Industry,
presented by Wall Street
Transcript
3/11/81................................... Presented the Outstanding
Chief Executive Officer
Award in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, by Financial
World
4/81...................................... Elected Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of The
RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California
4/12/81................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor
of Laws Degree--Tuskegee
Institute, Tuskegee,
Alabama
5/16/81................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor
of Science in Business
Administration Degree--
Bryant College, Smithfield,
Rhode Island
9/81...................................... Elected to the National
Academy of Public
Administration
1/25/82................................... Awarded a Silver Medal as
the #2 Outstanding Chief
Executive Officer in the
Pharmaceutical Industry,
presented by Wall Street
Transcript
1/31/83................................... Awarded the Sliver Medal as
the #2 Chief Executive
Officer in the
Pharmaceutical Industry,
presented by Wall Street
Transcript
4/1/83.................................... Awarded the Executive of the
Year Award, by the
University of Arizona
Business Advisory Council,
Tucson, Arizona
5/6/83.................................... Awarded the Invest-in-
America Eagle Award for
dedication to the country's
enterprise system
5/26/83................................... Presented the City Club of
Chicago 80th Anniversary
Award honoring Outstanding
Chicagoans
7/9/83.................................... Presented the Golden Plate
Award, by American Academy
of Achievement
10/17/84.................................. Awarded the George Catlett
Marshall Medal, by the U.S.
Army Association,
Washington, DC
2/16/85................................... Awarded the Woodrow Wilson
Medal, by Princeton
University, Princeton, New
Jersey
3/5/85.................................... Presented the Marketing Man
of the Year Award, by the
Commercial Development
Association, Inc
9/27/85................................... Awarded an Honorary Doctor
of Laws Degree, by the
National College of
Education, Evanston,
Illinois
11/20/85.................................. Presented the Shelby Cullom
Davis Award, by the Ethics
& Public Policy Center,
Washington, DC
4/28/86................................... Presented the Award of Merit
for Entrepreneurship from
the Wharton School of
Business of the University
of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
7/86...................................... Awarded the George
Washington Honor Medal for
Excellence in Public
Address, by the Freedoms
Foundation, Valley Forge,
Pennsylvania
7/86...................................... Presented the Outstanding
Private Sector Leader
Award, by The American
Legislative Exchange
Council
9/87...................................... Presented the Professional
Manager of the Year Award,
by the Society for the
Advancement of Management,
Chicago Chapter, Chicago,
Illinois
5/88...................................... Awarded Honorary Doctor of
Letters Degree, by
Claremont University Center
and Graduate School,
Claremont, California
4/8/90.................................... To be inducted into the
Illinois Wrestling Coaches
and Officials Hall of Fame
6/10/90................................... Awarded Honorary Doctor of
Laws Degree, DePaul
University College of
Commerce, Chicago, Illinois
11/22/91.................................. Awarded Certificate of
Appreciation, Private
Sector Council, Washington,
DC
4/23/92................................... Presented the Henry Townley
Heald Award by Lewis
Collens, President,
Institute of Technology at
Ceremony honoring 10-year
members of the President's
Council, Chicago, Illinois
5/2/92.................................... Induction as a Distinguished
American by the National
Wrestling Hall of Fame &
Museum, Stillwater,
Oklahoma
5/22/93................................... Awarded Honorary Doctor of
Laws Degree, Illinois
Wesleyan University,
Bloomington, Illinois
5/27/93................................... Presented the Dwight David
Eisenhower Medal,
Eisenhower Exchange
Fellowships, Inc.,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
7/10/93................................... Awarded Honorary Degree of
Doctor of Public Policy,
The RAND Graduate School,
Santa Monica, California
6/19/97................................... Presented the Atlantic Legal
Foundation Award for Free
Enterprise, New York, New
York
5/10/98................................... Presented the Doctor of Laws
from Hampden-Sydney
College, Hampden-Sydney,
Virginia
10/7/98................................... The Center for Security
Policy 10th Anniversary
``Keeper of the Flame''
Award, Four Seasons Hotel,
Washington, DC
4/27/00................................... Presented the Distinguished
Community Service Award,
Princeton Club of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois
9/21/00................................... Named 42nd Ward Republican
of the Year 2000, Chicago,
Illinois
------------------------------------------------------------------------

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
This attachment represents my best recollections. It is complete to
the best of my ability, but I suspect there may be some unintentional
omissions.

DOCUMENTS WRITTEN BY DR
1/65...................................... ``Freedom of Information
Law''
1966...................................... ``Summary of Congressman
Rumsfeld's Efforts on the
Freedom of Information
Bill''
1967...................................... ``Account of Effort to Free
Future Farmers of America
(FFA) from Federal
Control''
10/68..................................... ``The Long Day''--written
draft unpublished
1976...................................... ``Which Five Year
Shipbuilding Program?''
written for the Naval
Institute Proceedings
1/6/77.................................... ``The All Volunteer Force:
Myths & Realities''
``The Economics of Good
Intentions: The Carter
Guidelines'' for Wage and
Price Guidelines/
Commonsense
2/13/79................................... ``Costly Education: History
Gives a Lesson on Wage
Price Controls,'' The San
Diego Union
12/79..................................... ``Is the Regulatory Process
Working?'' Pharmaceutical
Technology
6/27/80................................... ``The U.S. in a Dangerous,
Untidy World'' National
Review
11/80..................................... ``A Presidency for the
1980s''
12/10/80.................................. ``The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)''
12/80..................................... ``ORBIS: A Journal of World
Affairs''
1980...................................... ``Rumsfeld's Rules''
1980...................................... ``America Must Respond,''
Comparative Strategy
1983...................................... ``The Gauntlet-In Search of
a Bipartisan Foreign
Policy, The Challenge to a
Genuine Debate''
1/14/83................................... ``The Nuclear Balance in
Europe: Status, Trends,
Implications''
(introduction by DR) for
the United States Strategic
Institute
2/83...................................... Defense Forum, Armed Forces
Journal International
1984...................................... ``Beyond Containment? The
Future of U.S.-Soviet
Relations''
11/84..................................... ``Five Business Views of
Deficits & Taxes,''
Commentary
3/13/85................................... ``Rumsfeld Recollects''
Wilson Award Winner,
Princeton Alumni Weekly
10/18/85.................................. ``The Middle East & State
Sponsored Terrorism'' The
Commonwealth
Winter, 1985.............................. ``Analysis of Capitalism,''
Keynote Address, Business
Today
7/28/86................................... Statement by The Honorable
Donald Rumsfeld as read to
Duncan Sellars of
Conservative Caucus
2/21/87................................... ``America's Competitive
Position in the World, The
Commonwealth
2/92...................................... Message from the Chairman
6/96...................................... ``Economic Freedom,
Political Liberty, and
Prosperity'' for Freedom
House
6/96...................................... Statement for The Wall
Street Journal on Missile
Defense
7/30/96................................... Reprint of Freedom House
article, ``Economic
Freedom. . .'' published by
the Christian Science
Monitor
9/05/96................................... ``The Bob Dole Tax Plan Will
Work'' Chicago Tribune--
Voice of the People
3/05/97................................... ``No to the Chemical Arms
Treaty'' The Washington
Post, written by James
Schlesinger, Caspar
Weinberger, and Donald
Rumsfeld
Fall 1998................................. The Ambassador's Review
1/65...................................... Freedom of Information Law
1966...................................... Freedom of Information,
Summary
1967...................................... Account of Effort to Free
Future Farmers of America
(FFA) from Federal Control
10/68..................................... The Long Day--written draft
unpublished
1977...................................... Which Five Year Shipbuilding
Program? Naval Institute
Proceedings
1/6/77.................................... The All Volunteer Force:
Myths & Realities
Date?..................................... The Economics of Good
Intentions: The Carter
Guidelines
12/79..................................... Is the Regulatory Process
Working? Pharmaceutical
Technology
6/27/80................................... The U.S. in a Dangerous
World, National Report
12/10/80.................................. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
1980...................................... Rumsfeld's Rules
1980...................................... American Must Respond,
Comparative Strategy
1983...................................... The Gauntlet
1/14/83................................... The Nuclear Balance in
Europe: Status, Trends,
Implications (introduction
by DR)
2/83...................................... Defense Forum, Armed Forces
International Journal
5/19/85................................... Book foreword for Wadi
Haddad
7/28/86................................... Statement by The Honorable
Donald Rumsfeld read to
Duncan Sellars of
Conservative Caucus
12/86..................................... Book foreword for John
Andrews' Collected Essays
12/2/86................................... The Arms to Iran and Money
to the Contra's Issue
(unpublished)
4/27/92................................... Book forward for Tom Curtis
Congressional Intent

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete
Donald H. Rumsfeld
This 9th day of January, 2001.

[The nomination of Donald H. Rumsfeld was reported to the
Senate by Senator John Warner on January 20, 2001, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on January 20, 2001.]

NOMINATION OF DR. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Allard,
Hutchinson, Sessions, Collins, Bunning, Levin, Cleland, Reed,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Carnahan.
Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Anita H.
Rouse, deputy chief clerk; and Scott W. Stucky, general
counsel.
Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, John
R. Barnes, Edward H. Edens IV, William C. Greenwalt, Gary M.
Hall, George W. Lauffer, Patricia L. Lewis, Thomas L.
MacKenzie, Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority
staff director; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member; Gerald J. Leeling, professional staff member; Peter K.
Levine, minority counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer Key, Thomas C. Moore,
Jennifer L. Naccari, and Michele A. Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier
III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to
Senator Allard; Michael P. Ralsky, assistant to Senator
Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; Menda Sue Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Barry Gene
(B.G.) Wright, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant
to Senator Cleland; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; and Sheila Murphy, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin
Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning. The committee meets today on
a very important nomination by President George W. Bush for the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. I have had the
privilege of knowing Dr. Wolfowitz for many years, worked with
him in various capacities, and I commend the President for his
nomination of this outstanding public servant.
You are a man of accomplishments in many venues. You have
many years of service in government and academia. You served in
the Department of Defense on two previous occasions, as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs from 1977
to 1980 and as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the
period 1989 through 1993. You were Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy during the Persian Gulf War, a critical juncture in
the history of our country. The tenth anniversary is now being
observed by our Nation and the coalition partners who came
together under the leadership of President George Bush to mount
that most important offensive against the aggression of Saddam
Hussein.
You have served in various other government assignments,
including Chief of the State Department Policy Planning Staff
and as Ambassador to Indonesia under the Reagan administration.
In addition, you have had a distinguished career in the
academic world, having taught at Yale, Johns Hopkins, and the
National War College. Most recently, you served as Dean and
Professor of International Relations at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University.
You have also appeared before this committee many times,
providing valuable testimony, throughout your public career.
Your insights and expertise have assisted this committee, and
indeed Congress as a whole, in our deliberations and
responsibilities, and we are confident, at least this Senator
is, that you will continue to give that valued counsel and
advice to this committee and Congress as a whole.
If confirmed, you will be returning to the Department of
Defense at a very challenging time in our history. In the
judgment of many, and certainly this Senator, the threats
growing against our interests as a Nation and those of our
allies are more diverse, more complicated, than any time in
contemporary history.
I agree wholeheartedly with the directions which President
George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld are taking
towards their new leadership roles in national security
affairs, and most particularly the Department of Defense. It is
a wise decision for the President and the Secretary of Defense
to determine that they would undertake a top-to-bottom study
long-term of the issues, beginning with the threat, the need to
realign the military in many ways to meet these changing
threats, and to take a long and counseled course for deciding
which programs should continue and those that should be
terminated.
I continue--and I am perhaps a lone voice in some respects
on this--to believe that we have short-term interests that have
to be addressed, hopefully eventually in a supplemental
appropriation late this summer or perhaps even earlier--before
the Fourth of July is the target date I have. We will work
along on that issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld has asked this committee, during his
confirmation hearing and in subsequent consultations, to move
as quickly as we can on key nominations. I think that we are
doing that in every respect. I commend my distinguished
colleague, the ranking member, Mr. Levin, in working to see
that this nomination has been handled properly and promptly,
and we will continue to do that.
Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me welcome our
nominee. I see Senator Sarbanes is here to introduce him and we
are delighted that he is present this morning. I am pleased to
join you in welcoming Paul Wolfowitz and his family to the
Armed Services Committee for today's hearing.
Mr. Wolfowitz is familiar with the work of this committee
from the many times that he has testified before us and the
House in his role as Dean of the Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies. He surely is familiar
with the job to which he has been nominated from his previous
service as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense serves in a position of
awesome responsibility. He is the alter ego of the Secretary.
In this capacity, the new Deputy Secretary will play a key role
in determining how our country will meet the national security
challenges that face us today. For example:

How do we need to transform our military
forces to meet a new set of threats over the coming
decades?
What new weapons systems and technologies do
we need to field? Do we need to skip a generation of
technology to do so?
Will the National Missile Defense make us more
or less secure?
Should we commit to deploy such a system?
If so, what system should we deploy and under
what circumstances?
To what extent should the United States remain
engaged around the world--for example in Kosovo,
Bosnia, Colombia, and even on the Korean peninsula?
What is the best approach to restrain Saddam
Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction and
from threatening his neighbors in the Persian Gulf?

Over the years, the best approach to foreign policy and
national security policy has always been a bipartisan one. The
administration is properly conducting a strategic review to
determine the direction of our national security strategy and
what direction our defense programs should take in the years
ahead.
I have supported President Bush's and Secretary Rumsfeld's
decision to conduct this review before determining the level of
resources that we should apply to our national defense. I look
forward to working with them on these issues over the next
several years.
In addition, the Deputy Secretary has traditionally served
as the chief manager of the Defense Department. A wide array of
management challenges, including financial management,
information security, and human capital issues, cut across
functional areas in the Department to such an extent that no
official other than the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary has
the authority needed to address them.
To take just one example, DOD's financial systems remain in
need of modernization, with hundreds of partially-linked,
error-prone computer systems spread throughout the Department.
As a result, the Department remains unable to account for
billions of dollars of property, equipment, inventory, and
supplies, and unable to reconcile billions of dollars in
differences between checks issued by the Department of Defense
and reported to the Treasury.
So if Mr. Wolfowitz is confirmed, and I expect that he will
be, he will have a very full plate indeed. I look forward to
working with you, as I know all members of this committee do.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Sarbanes, we are very fortunate, and indeed the
nominee, to have you appear before this committee this morning.
In my 23 years in the Senate I have come to know you very well
and respect your knowledge on foreign affairs and national
security matters. Indeed, we have traveled abroad together many
times in this context of our security responsibilities. It is a
privilege for this committee to welcome you this morning and to
have you speak on behalf of this distinguished nominee.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Levin, members of the Armed Services Committee.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to recommend this
morning to you, very strongly recommend, a distinguished
Maryland resident, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, for the position of
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Now, Mr. Chairman, I hope you will
not hold it against him that he chose to live on the Maryland
side of the Potomac and not the Virginia side.
Chairman Warner. We observed that, but we will let it go
by.
Senator Sarbanes. We will let it pass. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. He will be working in Virginia, though.
Senator Sarbanes. I understand.
Chairman Warner. If confirmed.
Senator Sarbanes. Paul Wolfowitz has had a long and
impressive career in both government and academia. Actually,
his involvement in public service dates back to 1966, when he
was a management intern in the Bureau of the Budget. From 1973
to 1977 he held various positions at the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. That posting was followed by his service as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs
from 1977 to 1980, then Director of the Policy Planning Staff
at the State Department in 1981 and 1982, and Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1982
to 1986.
President Reagan then sent him from 1986 to 1989 as U.S.
Ambassador to Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in
the world. During his tenure there, his post was cited as one
of the four best-managed embassies reviewed by the inspectors
in 1988. His last government position was Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993, when Dick Cheney was the
Secretary of Defense.
This is a very wide-ranging and balanced government
service, involving both the State Department and the Pentagon,
and I think a very impressive blend of responsibilities.
Shortly after leaving government service in 1993, Paul was
appointed Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University here in
Washington, commonly known as SAIS. SAIS is one of the
preeminent institutions of higher learning devoted to the study
of international relations. It is no wonder, of course, that he
was appointed dean at this prestigious school because, in
addition to important government service, he has outstanding
academic qualifications: a B.A. in mathematics and chemistry
from Cornell University in 1965, followed by an M.A. and a
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in political science and
economics. He has taught at Yale, SAIS, and the National War
College, where he was the George F. Kennan Professor of
National Security Strategy.
In my view, in the post-Cold War environment in which we
operate, Paul's extensive background and experience should
serve him well in this very significant and important post of
Deputy Secretary of Defense. He has a solid grasp of complex
defense and security issues, the diplomatic skills to operate
in the international arena, the intellectual strength to look
ahead to the challenges facing us in the 21st century, and the
administrative skills to be the number two person in our
largest government agency. No doubt his mathematics degree and
his experience on budget matters will also come in handy at the
Pentagon from time to time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with a quote from a
statement released by the President of the Johns Hopkins
University, William Brody, an outstanding educational leader,
issued at the time of President Bush's announcement of his
intention to nominate Paul to this position. President Brody
said: ``The bad news is that Johns Hopkins is losing a great
dean. The good news is that the country is getting a very
smart, very focused, clear-thinking leader as Deputy Secretary
of Defense. Paul Wolfowitz will serve the Nation well.''
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I strongly
concur with this assessment. I believe you have a highly
qualified nominee before you who will serve our country well as
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I strongly urge his favorable
consideration by the committee.
Chairman Warner. Senator, we thank you. I think those of us
who had the opportunity to know this distinguished nominee
concur in your observations and that of the distinguished
President of Johns Hopkins. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. At this point, I submit for the record the
statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, who could not be here
in person due to other Senate responsibilities.
I also submit for the record the statement of Senator Strom
Thurmond.
[The prepared statements of Senator Mikulski and Senator
Thurmond follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara A. Mikulski
Mr. Chairman: I appreciate the opportunity to express my support
for the nomination of Dr. Paul Wolfowitz to be Deputy Secretary of
Defense.
Dr. Wolfowitz is well known to members of the Armed Services
Committee. For over 30 years, he has committed his life to public
service. As the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, he was the
principal civilian responsible for strategy, plans and policy. As the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and as our
Ambassador to Indonesia, Dr. Wolfowitz understands foreign policy as
well as defense policy--and how the two are linked.
Most recently, Dr. Wolfowitz served as dean of the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins
University. He repositioned the school from a Cold War orientation,
which it had since its founding, to a focus on the impact and
challenges of globalization in the post-Cold War era. He strengthened
the faculty, increased the endowment, raised funds for student aid and
enhanced the school's visibility among policymakers in Washington and
around the world.
At the Pentagon, Dr. Wolfowitz will face great challenges. We need
to improve the quality of life for our men and women in uniform--so
that we can continue to attract the best and the brightest to serve in
our military. We also need to upgrade our weapons and technology. For
example, the average Navy aircraft is 18 years old. We need to invest
in new aircraft quickly--to give our pilots what they need to defend
America.
I am pleased that Dr. Wolfowitz will bring his keen intellect and
wide ranging experience to the important position of Deputy Secretary
of Defense. I look forward to working with him to ensure that our
military remains strong in a world constantly challenged by ethnic
conflict, civil and nationalist tensions, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry that other Senate responsibilities prevent
me from being here in person, but I look forward to voting for Dr.
Wolfowitz when his nomination is considered by the full Senate.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Thank you, Mr. Chairman:
Mr. Chairman, I join you and the members of the Committee in
welcoming Dr. Wolfowitz. I also want to take this opportunity to thank
Deputy Secretary of Defense DeLeon for his service to our Nation while
on the House Armed Services Committee and during the past 8 years in
the many challenging positions he held in the Department of Defense. We
may not always have been on the same side, but we always had the same
goal of providing the best for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and
Marines.
Secretary Wolfowitz, congratulations on your nomination and on your
superb record of public service. Your willingness to serve a third tour
in the Department of Defense speaks highly of your dedication to our
country and to the men and women who wear the uniforms of our military
services. It is also noteworthy because holding public office requires
many sacrifices and the rewards are few.
Mr. Secretary, once confirmed, you will be part of the team that
will face the challenge of transforming our armed forces, and for that
matter the Department of Defense, to meet the challenges and threats of
a new century. I want you to know that you can count on me, and, I
believe the entire Armed Services Committee, to provide, on a
bipartisan basis, the support that will be so critical toward achieving
that goal. I wish you success and hope you will not hesitate to speak
out forcefully on behalf of the men and women of our Armed Forces and
the civilian employees of the Department of Defense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Dr. Wolfowitz, you now have the unlimited
opportunity to express such views as you wish. Following that,
we will have a 6-minute round of questions by our members.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, NOMINATED TO BE DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that
unlimited opportunities are best kept short and I will read
just a part of my statement and submit the rest for the record.
I want to thank Senator Sarbanes for being so gracious as
to make time in a very busy schedule to come and introduce me.
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of the Armed
Services Committee, it is a great honor to appear again before
this committee, one that has done so much over the years to
make our Nation strong and the world more peaceful. I am
grateful to the President and to Secretary Rumsfeld for the
confidence that they have shown in me by nominating me for a
position of such great responsibility.
If confirmed by the Senate, this will be my third tour in
the Pentagon. It is also the second time that I come before
this distinguished committee to seek confirmation for a senior
position in the Department of Defense. On the previous occasion
in 1989, it was a very different world. The Cold War was still
a reality. Even in the heyday of Mr. Gorbachev, the principal
threat to our Nation still came from a Soviet Union that was
armed to the teeth with nuclear and conventional weapons. We
had well over two million men and women on active duty to deter
and, if necessary, to defend against this constant threat.
Twelve years ago many observers believed that the United
States was in a period of permanent decline and many pointed to
other nations as models for reforming our economy. Budget
deficits were taken as a given, the personal computer was a
toddler, and the Internet was a mere infant.
In the intervening years, the Cold War has become truly a
part of history and we've fought and won a major war in the
Persian Gulf. America did not decline, it prospered. We remain
a vibrant world power with a position that is in many respects
unique in the history of the world.
Under these circumstances, it was only natural that our
Nation desired to reap a peace dividend. We reduced our defense
budget by 40 percent. We cut the force by nearly the same
amount. Our defense budget was drawn down to the lowest
percentage of our gross domestic product since the late 1930s.
But the world remains, in Secretary Rumsfeld's phrase, a
dangerous and untidy place. The need, indeed the demand, for
U.S. leadership has increased as well. So, despite declining
defense budgets and a shrinking force structure, in the past
decade we drastically increased the number of military
deployments for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. This
added greatly to the workload of an already busy force, one
that was struggling to maintain its combat readiness, with
dedicated but tired troops manning aging equipment.
Today, as General Shelton has said, the force is frayed. We
must begin a long overdue renovation and transformation of the
armed forces, so that we can preserve and extend the peace well
into the 21st century. President Bush has set this task as one
of the highest priorities of his administration.
The President has set three important goals for the
Department of Defense. First, we must strengthen the bond of
trust with the American military. As General Creighton Abrams
said when the all-volunteer force was first created: ``People
aren't in the Army; they are the Army.'' The same is true of
all the military services. Building on the dedicated work of
the Senate and the House, we must continue to improve military
pay and quality of life.
But good pay and fair allowances by themselves won't keep
the best people in the service. Working with Congress and our
allies, we must also re-examine the balance among force levels,
commitments, and deployments. We will have to make sure that we
are focused on the most important defense tasks and not placing
unreasonable demands on our men and women in uniform.
We will also have to acknowledge the relationship between
morale and readiness. President Bush has said that even the
highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back
deployments, poor pay, shortage of spare parts and equipment,
and declining readiness.
Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against
missiles, terrorists, and the complex set of threats to our
information systems and our all-important assets in space. U.S.
military strength in the field is unparalleled. Many of our
enemies therefore have determined that in order to move against
us they must be able to strike us at home. Some have chosen to
develop long-range missile systems. Others have chosen to
support or direct terrorist attacks with conventional devices,
weapons of mass destruction, or cyber weapons against our
Nation, our forces, or our diplomats abroad. We must do
everything in our power to stop them.
Third, the Department of Defense must take advantage of the
technological revolution to help us create a military for the
21st century. To this end, at the direction of the President,
Secretary Rumsfeld has already launched a review of our defense
strategy and programs designed to provide a sound understanding
of the state of our armed forces and their readiness for the
21st century security environment.
This work must be done quickly and it must be done before
we can know what our true defense resource requirements are.
President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld believe, as the Secretary
puts it, that we need to engage our brains before we open the
taxpayers' wallets. I strongly support that approach and will
work hard to shape a prompt and effective review.
In addition to that review, to support and make progress on
the President's goals, the Secretary has set five key
objectives for the Department of Defense: First, to fashion and
sustain a new form of deterrence appropriate to the new
strategic environment, a deterrence based less on massive
levels of punishment or retaliation and more on the use of both
defensive and offensive means to deny our adversaries the
opportunity and benefits that come from the use of weapons of
mass destruction.
Second, to assure the readiness and sustainability of our
armed forces now and into the future. This will require not
only spending to bring up current readiness levels, but also
investment in the modernization efforts that our forces need to
avoid being caught in a trap of making ever-increasing
expenditures to maintain aging equipment.
Third, to modernize our command and control and space
capabilities to support our 21st century needs. That
infrastructure is the foundation of American military strength.
Fourth, to begin reshaping the U.S. defense establishment
to meet new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities,
we must begin to move, as President Bush has said, beyond
marginal improvements to replace existing programs with new
technologies and strategies. Building on the superb human
capital of the current force, we must fashion a future force
that is at once more agile, more lethal, and more rapidly
deployable. It must be able to operate over increasingly longer
ranges. It must integrate the capabilities of all of the
services so that field commanders have the best possible
combination of air, sea, and land weapons for each situation,
and it must have the best technology that America can offer.
Our dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast
Guardsmen deserve no less.
Finally, we must reform Department of Defense structures,
processes, and organizations. We need to seek greater
efficiencies, not only to safeguard the taxpayers' money, but
also because that will allow us to create better weapon systems
and invest more in the cutting edge of our Nation's defenses.
There is no more solemn responsibility that the American
people entrust to the Federal Government than to provide for
the common defense. There is no group of Americans who deserve
more respect and honor from their fellow citizens than the men
and women of our armed forces who daily put themselves in
harm's way for that constitutional purpose. It is both exciting
and humbling to be asked once again to help lead them in their
work for the common defense.
Mr. Chairman, it is more than just an honor to be nominated
by the President to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is also
a great responsibility. I appreciate the trust that President
Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have placed in me. If confirmed, I
look forward to continuing to work closely with this committee
to achieve our common goals. Indeed, I pledge to you that, if
confirmed, I will work with the services, Congress, and the
defense industry to help the President and the Secretary
prepare our armed forces to meet the challenges of the 21st
century.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul Wolfowitz
Senator Warner, Senator Levin, Members of the Armed Services
Committee: It is an honor to appear again before this great committee,
one that has done so much over the years to make our Nation strong and
the world more peaceful. I am grateful to the President and Secretary
Rumsfeld for the confidence that they have shown in me by nominating me
for a position of such great responsibility. When I think of the men
and women who have sought confirmation here in the past, and the number
of important laws--like the Goldwater-Nichols Act--that have originated
with this committee, I feel truly humbled.
If confirmed by the Senate, this will be my third tour in the
Pentagon. It is also the second time that I have come before this
distinguished committee to seek confirmation for a senior position in
the Department of Defense.
On the previous occasion, in 1989, it was a very different world.
The Cold War was still a reality. Even in the heyday of Mr. Gorbachev,
the principal threat to our Nation still came from a Soviet Union that
was armed to the teeth with nuclear and conventional weapons.
We had well over 2 million men and women on Active Duty to deter
and, if necessary, defend against this constant threat.
Twelve years ago, many observers believed that the United States
was in a period of permanent decline, and many pointed to other nations
as models for reforming the U.S. economy. Budget deficits were taken as
a given, the personal computer was a toddler, and the Internet was a
mere infant.
In the intervening years, the Cold War has become part of history,
and we have fought and won a major war in the Persian Gulf. America did
not decline, it prospered. We remain a vibrant world power, with a
position that is in many respects unique in the history of the world.
Under these circumstances, it was only natural that our Nation
desired to reap a peace dividend. We reduced our defense budget by 40
percent, and cut the force by nearly the same amount. Our defense
budget was drawn down to the lowest percentage of our gross domestic
product since the late 1930s.
But the world remained, in Secretary Rumsfeld's phrase, a
``dangerous and untidy'' place. Amidst the peace that encompassed the
developed world, ethnic conflict, regional thugs, failed states,
terrorists, and the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass
destruction presented new challenges. The need, indeed the demand, for
U.S. leadership increased, as well.
Despite declining defense budgets and a shrinking force structure,
in the past decade we drastically increased the number of military
deployments for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. This added
greatly to the workload of an already busy force, one that was
struggling to maintain its combat readiness with dedicated, but tired
troops manning aging equipment. Today, as General Shelton has said, the
force is ``frayed.''
We must begin a long overdue renovation and transformation of the
Armed Forces in order to preserve and extend the peace well into the
21st century. President Bush has set this task as one of the highest
priorities of his administration. As the President has reminded us,
peace is not ordained, it is earned; and it must be earned, in
particular, by the hard and often dangerous work of our men and women
in uniform.
The President has set three important goals for the Defense
Department:

First, we must strengthen the bond of trust with the American
military.
As General Creighton Abrams said when the All-Volunteer Force
was first created, ``people aren't in the Army, people are the
Army''--and the same is true of all the military services.
Building on the dedicated work of the House and the Senate,
we must continue to improve military pay and quality of life.
But good pay and fair allowances by themselves won't keep the
best people in the service. Working with Congress and with our
allies, we must also reexamine the balance among force levels,
commitments, and deployments. We will have to make sure that we
are focused on the most important defense tasks, and not
placing unreasonable demands on our men and women in uniform.
We will also have to acknowledge the relationship between
morale and readiness. President Bush has said that ``even the
highest morale is eventually undermined by back-to-back
deployments, poor pay, shortage of spare parts and equipment,
and rapidly declining readiness.'' Our men and women in uniform
must have first-class equipment, adequate materiel for training
and maintenance, decent barracks, modern family quarters, and
suitable working conditions.
Second, we must develop the capabilities to defend against
missiles, terrorists and the complex set of threats to our
information systems and our all-important assets in space. U.S.
power in the field is unparalleled. Many of our enemies have
determined that in order to move against us, they must be able
to strike us at home. Some have chosen to develop long-range
missile systems. Others have chosen to support or direct
terrorist attacks--with conventional devices, weapons of mass
destruction, or cyber weapons--against our Nation, our forces,
or our diplomats abroad. We must do everything in our power to
stop them.
Third, the Department of Defense must take advantage of the
technological revolution to help us create a military for the
21st century. To this end, at the direction of the President,
Secretary Rumsfeld has already launched a review of our defense
strategy and programs designed to provide a sound understanding
of the state of our Armed Forces and their readiness for the
21st century security environment. This work must be done
quickly, and it must be done before we can know what our true
defense resource requirements are. President Bush and Secretary
Rumsfeld believe, as the Secretary puts it, that we need to
``engage our brains before we open the taxpayer's wallet.'' I
strongly support that approach and will work hard to shape a
prompt and effective review.

In addition to that review, to support and make progress on the
President's goals, the Secretary has set five key objectives for the
Department of Defense:

First, we must fashion and sustain a new form of deterrence
appropriate to the new strategic environment. The proliferation
of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is a key element in
the new strategic environment. We need new concepts and forms
of deterrence to deal with it. We need a deterrence based less
on massive levels of punishment or retaliation, and more on the
use of both defensive and offensive means to deny our
adversaries the opportunity and benefits that come from the use
of weapons of mass destruction.
Second, we must assure the readiness and sustainability of
our Armed Forces, now and into the future. This will require
not only spending to bring up current readiness levels, but
also investment in the re-capitalization and modernization
efforts that our forces need to avoid being caught in the trap
of making ever-increasing expenditures to maintain aging
equipment.
Third, we must modernize our command and control, and space
capabilities to support our 21st century needs. Our command,
control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure is the
foundation of American military strength. That infrastructure
is essential for current operations and indispensable for
adapting today's force to take advantage of new technology to
meet 21st century challenges. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said,
we must significantly improve our intelligence and space
capabilities, as well as our ability to protect them against
various forms of attack.
Fourth, we must begin reshaping the U.S. defense
establishment to meet new challenges and take advantage of new
opportunities. We face the demanding task of preparing for an
uncertain future where there are many individual, unpredictable
threats but no single major adversary to focus our efforts. We
will have to make a stronger effort to define the key tasks and
begin to move, as President Bush has said, ``beyond marginal
improvements to replace existing programs with new technologies
and strategies.''
Building on the superb human capital of the current force, we
must fashion a future force that is at once more agile, more
lethal, and more rapidly deployable. It must be able to operate
over increasingly longer ranges. It must integrate the
capabilities of all of the services so that field commanders
have the best possible combination of air, sea, and land
weapons for each situation; and it must have the best
technology that America can offer. Our dedicated soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines and coast guardsmen deserve no less.
Finally, we must reform Department of Defense structures,
processes, and organizations. We need to seek greater
efficiencies not only to safeguard the taxpayer's money, but
also because that will allow us to create better weapons
systems and invest more in the cutting edge of our Nation's
defenses.

There is no more solemn responsibility that the American people
entrust to the Federal Government than--in the words of the
Constitution--``to provide for the common defense.'' There is no group
of Americans who deserve more respect and honor from their fellow
citizens than the men and women of our Armed Forces, who daily put
themselves in harm's way for that constitutional purpose. It is both
exciting and humbling to be asked again to help lead them in their work
for the common defense.
Mr. Chairman, it is more than just an honor to be nominated by the
President to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, it is also a great
responsibility. I appreciate the trust that President Bush and
Secretary Rumsfeld have placed in me. If confirmed, I look forward to
continuing to work closely with this committee to achieve our common
goals. Indeed, I pledge to you that I will work with the Services,
Congress, and the defense industry to help the President and the
Secretary prepare our Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st
century.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Wolfowitz.
By the long-standing tradition of this committee, the Chair
now propounds to you questions that are given to each nominee.
First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflict of interest?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, I have, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Dr. Wolfowitz. No, I have not, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure that you and your staff
comply with the deadlines established for requested
communications, including questions for the record, by this
committee and other committees of Congress?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I consider that a high
priority. I also will work with Secretary Rumsfeld, as he
indicated in his testimony, to try and see if we can streamline
some of those requirements, because they are quite substantial,
I have observed already.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Will those witnesses be protected from any
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, they will.
Chairman Warner. The Chair notes that you have responded to
the questions propounded by this committee and that they will
be made a part of the record today.
Now we will proceed on a round of 6 minutes to each member.
Dr. Wolfowitz, you were in the Department of Defense during the
Gulf War, and I copied a note from your opening statement in
which you said, ``We fought and won the war in the Persian
Gulf.'' Unquestionably, the coalition of military forces did
fight bravely and win that war. It is interesting, it was a war
of about 100 hours.
The decision was made not to pursue Saddam Hussein's forces
back into Iraq and I have always defended that decision that
was made by our then-President George Bush. But the aftermath
is not necessarily one of victory. We have seen 10 consecutive
years now in which, although early on there was some compliance
with the UN Security Council resolutions by Iraq, there has
been absolute defiance of the Security Council resolutions and
the understandings that were agreed to by Saddam Hussein.
This morning I looked at the headlines and it said the U.S.
is prepared to revise the sanctions regime and the caption was
that we would lessen the sanctions. My question to you is, what
do we get in return from Saddam Hussein and what is the
likelihood that he will now comply with the clear obligations
he undertook at the end of the conflict and the clear mandates
of the Security Council?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, in compliance with the
strictures on me as a not yet confirmed nominee, I have not
been intimately involved in the policy process on Iraq. I saw
the same article you saw in the paper this morning. I have not
yet seen a complete transcript of what Secretary Powell said.
Chairman Warner. I recognize that you have not been
involved in that. I understand that. But you have devoted much
of your career to these types of issues and questions. What
counsel and advice would you share with the President and the
Secretary of Defense?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe that what one has to do in
approaching this issue, and it is a very difficult issue and
you are absolutely correct in saying that we may have won the
war, but we still have a major problem there as long as Saddam
Hussein is in power--one needs not just a single policy
decision, for example one concerning sanctions, one needs an
overall strategy.
That strategy has to reflect the reality of where you are
today and where you hope to be a year from now or 2 years from
now. I do believe that part of the reality is that where we are
today is that we have lost a lot of ground since the end of the
Gulf War and he has gained a lot of ground. In particular, the
coalition that the first President Bush assembled to confront
Iraq is not anything like what it used to be.
Part of that problem is that Saddam has succeeded to a
disturbing degree in cultivating the notion that the sanctions
are not punishing him, they are only punishing the Iraqi
people. I believe that part of what we need to do is make clear
that the sanctions that are in place are not intended and
should not prevent humanitarian assistance or food or medical
supplies from getting to the Iraqi people.
But I would also emphasize sanctions are not a policy; they
are at best a part of a policy. I think the overall policy has
to focus on how one can prevent him from getting weapons of
mass destruction or get rid of them if he has them, how to keep
him from becoming a threat to his neighbors by conventional or
unconventional means, and hopefully, if possible, to devise a
strategy to assist the Iraqi people in freeing themselves from
this tyrant. That is not going to be something that is going to
happen overnight.
Chairman Warner. I have just returned from a trip to that
region. Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, and I and several other Senators, visited in Egypt
with President Mubarak. We visited in Israel with Prime
Minister-designate Sharon. It seems that there is a feeling
that we can reconstitute under U.S. leadership in some measure
the coalition of nations that fought that battle 10 years ago.
Speaking for myself, I think that is probably the key to such
new policies as we have towards Iraq.
Regrettably, the United States and Great Britain have been
going it alone certainly in the containment of Saddam Hussein
through the very courageous air operations in the north and the
south. In the Gulf itself we have been joined by several other
nations in the naval activities to curtail the smuggling and
other trafficking to and from Iraq in the Gulf waterways. But
largely it has been the United States and Great Britain alone.
My question to you is what is the likelihood that we can
reconstitute in some measure that some 20-plus nations, is my
recollection, that participated in that Gulf action?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think it is going to depend on what we
want them for, and in fact we may not need all of them,
depending on what we want to do. But I do think the key to
putting the coalition together the first time and the key to
reassembling another coalition if we need it is to convince
people that there is a long-term outcome that benefits them.
I think one of the problems we face today is they see many
short-term costs. Every time there is a military strike, Arab
governments suffer criticism from their own people. That is
just one of many short-term costs. They do not see the long-
term gain or benefit. It is crucial, I think, as the American
piece of putting this coalition together to convince people
that there is an outcome that is worth enduring those obvious
costs.
Chairman Warner. During the course of the early comments by
President George W. Bush and based on his campaign commitments
to the American people was the commitment to say that we would
not engage the U.S. forces in the many and diverse actions that
were undertaken by President Clinton. We now recognize that the
Department of Defense was underfunded and the troops
overextended in that period and corrections have to be made.
In your work with Secretary Rumsfeld and indeed with the
extraordinary competent security team the President has put
together, what is the general framework? What are the general
guidelines that should be laid down, in your judgment, to guide
future military commitments by the United States and to guide
those situations in which we will simply say, no, we will not
participate?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think clearly one of the most important
criteria is that it has to be something that is important to
our national interests. It also has to be something where
military forces can achieve the objectives of our national
interest, and I think it has to be something where we have a
strategy for success, that we have a way of achieving our goals
and completing the mission and not end up in something that is
an unending commitment with no way out.
It is also true, Mr. Chairman, that I believe we need to be
more careful about how we engage our forces. But one also has
to be very careful about how you disengage. One cannot rewrite
history and it is very important as we try to reduce the
requirements and burdens that we have imposed by many
commitments all around the world that we not recreate the very
situations that we went in to prevent.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, applying those criteria, where are we
currently deployed where we should not be?
Dr. Wolfowitz. It is not so much that we are deployed
somewhere that we should not be, but I think everywhere that we
are deployed we should look at the question of whether we need
as much as we have. We should look at the question of whether
we are heading down a road where we may tragically pull out
precipitously.
I think one of the very important things we want to avoid
is the precedent--and it has been a bipartisan failure--in
Beirut where we lost Marines and then suddenly pulled out, and
Somalia where we lost Rangers and suddenly pulled out. It is
very dangerous to have a commitment where we are undertaking
dangers that we have not fully appreciated and that the
American people are not prepared to support.
As a general principle, I think we need to look as much as
possible at turning responsibilities over to other people.
Sometimes that means turning responsibilities over to our
allies, sometimes--and I would hope this might be true in some
places like East Timor and the Balkans--turning more
responsibility over to the indigenous people themselves.
Sometimes, where it is a matter where our highly trained combat
people are performing what is essentially a police function, I
would hope we could find policemen, hopefully not Americans,
who can perform those functions.
So it is less a matter that there is a specific place that
we should pull out of, but rather everywhere that we have this
very precious resource engaged we should try to make sure that
there are not better alternatives.
Senator Levin. I think we always should do that on an on-
going and continuing basis. But you are not prepared to tell us
where, applying those criteria and asking those questions, we
should now plan on withdrawing forces?
Dr. Wolfowitz. No, I am not. I think that is part of what
this defense review that the Secretary is undertaking has to
look at, although it is not entirely a Defense Department
responsibility.
Senator Levin. On the Iraq questions that the Chairman
asked, you have previously said that the no-fly zones do not
matter. You have been highly critical of that policy. You have
also advocated what you have called a serious policy aimed at
liberating the Iraqi people by creating a liberated zone in
southern Iraq that could be used as a base by the Iraqi
opposition. You have stated that it will take American forces,
to use your words, to create a protected area in which the
opposition forces can organize.
Now, General Zinni, who is our most recent CINC in that
area of the world, has taken a very different approach, saying
that that approach which you have proposed is a dangerous
illusion that was likely to lead to what he called a ``Bay of
Goats''--like a Bay of Pigs kind of an operation.
Do you still advocate the commitment of U.S. forces to
support opposition elements within Iraq in an effort to
overthrow Saddam?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, it would depend on what those
opposition forces are actually capable of doing. Every
statement one makes, thoughtful statement about Iraq policy, as
I said to the Chairman before, has to look at the context. In
1991, a month after the end of the Gulf War, we actually did
put ground forces back into northern Iraq to create a protected
zone under which Kurdish opposition forces could operate, and
to this day, although there was a significant failure in 1996,
northern Iraq is a largely liberated area.
I think some of the statements you are referring to go back
to a time a few years ago when Sandy Berger, President
Clinton's National Security Adviser, was saying that the
problem of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction was something
worth fighting for, and my reaction was, if it is worth
fighting for, then it is worth fighting with whatever
capabilities we need and not simply limiting ourselves to air
power.
Senator Levin. Is it worth fighting for?
Dr. Wolfowitz. It depends on what we are being asked to do.
When we were asked in 1991 to get the Kurdish refugees back
into northern Iraq, it was a plausible plan that made sense. I
have not yet seen a plausible plan today, but I would be very
interested in seeing one.
Senator Levin. Is that goal worth seeking?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think there is no question that the whole
region would be a safer place, Iraq would be a much more
successful country, and American national interests would
benefit greatly if there were a change of regime in Iraq.
Senator Levin. That being the case, why then do you
apparently now back away from your previous statement that it
is worth achieving a base from which the Iraqi opposition can
attack Saddam?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, because I believe it depends on the
context. It depends on what your real options are. If there is
a real option to do that, I would certainly think it is still
worthwhile.
Senator Levin. But you are not then saying that as of today
there is a real option?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I have not seen it yet.
Senator Levin. On North Korea, do you have evidence that
North Korea has cheated on the Framework Agreement?
Dr. Wolfowitz. No, I do not, Senator. But during the months
I spent with now Secretary Rumsfeld on the Ballistic Missile
Threat Commission that he chaired, we kept hearing statements
that there is no evidence of this and no evidence of that, and
the commission as a whole began to come up with the saying,
which I think George Tenet adopted, that absence of evidence is
not evidence of absence.
In the case of a country like North Korea, where it is so
hard to know what is going on, it is very hard to get hard
evidence. There are bits of information that suggest it might
be possible, but there is certainly no proof.
Senator Levin. Do you advocate abrogating the Framework
Agreement at this time?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Not if the North Koreans comply with it, no.
Senator Levin. Based on what you know, do you favor
abrogating it at this time?
Dr. Wolfowitz. No.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, I do not think I have ever seen someone come
in for confirmation with a more glittering array of credentials
than you have. I think we are very fortunate to be having you
at this confirmation hearing. Your credentials, as I think
outlined by the Chairman and others, are both in the world of
academia as well as in the Pentagon.
What do you in your mind feel particularly qualifies you
for this job with your background?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I appreciate the question, Senator, because
you have been polite, but I think one of the questions is: You
are taking on--I am asking to be confirmed for a job that is
essentially the chief operating officer of the Pentagon and it
is quite a management challenge. I have had quite a bit of
management experience. I would say for the last, ever since I
was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, so
that makes it the last 18 years, I have been managing
organizations of 100 or multiple hundreds of people, and I
think I would say reasonably successfully.
I think there are two things that I bring to it as a
manager. One is I believe in managing for results, whether the
result was a focused American policy that helped to remove
Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines or the result when I was
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy implementing, designing
and implementing a strategy that helped to keep Israel out of
the Gulf War, or designing and implementing a strategy that
raised $50 billion, more than $50 billion, from our allies and
friends to support the war effort, or, on a more modest scale,
but I hope I had a real impact, as Dean of the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, managing an
enterprise of, if you count our students, over a thousand
people, tens of millions of dollars, which is just a rounding
error at the Pentagon, but it's real money, and a very
successful capital campaign that raised four times our original
goal.
So I believe results is the way you measure management, not
how many jobs you've held, and I believe people are the way you
get results. That is the other thing I hope I bring to the job.
There is something I think that some private sector
managers do not quite appreciate about managing in government.
It is even more so in the academic world. Your flexibility to
reward people or to penalize people tangibly is limited. You
have to motivate them in other ways. I think I have had the
experience of motivating very good people to work ungodly hours
for the national interest, and I hope I can continue to do
that.
Senator Inhofe. I am sure you can.
The Chairman talked about how it might become necessary to
reconstitute the 20-plus nation alliance that we once had
should it become necessary in the Middle East. My concern is,
while I am concerned for that, I am also concerned equally
about reconstituting our state of readiness. The CINCs have
identified some 87 readiness-related deficiencies, of which 31
of these are listed as category one, and that is our ability to
fight a war.
Are you prepared to try to address these? We brought these
up before and nothing has happened in the last few years. How
do you look at these identified deficiencies?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think that is one of the most important
issues that this defense review that Secretary Rumsfeld is
undertaking has to address. It is really central to the first
of the President's priorities, because readiness is both a
matter of our ability to fight wars, but it is also a measure
of our ability to keep competent, capable people in the
military services. So it is a top priority.
Senator Inhofe. Also, some of the readiness issues that are
there today, where there are some $4.5 billion of near-term
readiness requirements, some of these I have been out in the
field and I have seen. I use the example of out at Fort Bragg
during a rain storm just that there is no roof on the barracks
and they are covering up their equipment with their bodies.
Real Property Maintenance (RPM) accounts that are supposed to
be done immediately, they are robbing one account for the other
to get ammunition.
What is your feeling about a supplemental covering some of
these things that really have to be done?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As the Secretary said, we really have to do
this review and do it quickly and see what our total
requirements are and see if everything we are doing we need to
do. But clearly we cannot have a force that is suffering from
the kinds of problems that you have identified and we have to
cover those things.
Senator Inhofe. They are immediate.
In your statement, I appreciate the fact that you talked
about the problems that are out there threatening us, not just
being missiles but other types, the suitcase type. When you sit
on the floor of the Senate, those who are opposed to a National
Missile Defense system are saying the real threat is that in a
truck or a suitcase. Certainly, being from Oklahoma and the
Murrah Federal Office Building, which you are very familiar
with, I guess the most significant domestic terrorist attack in
the history of America, I am very sensitive to that. Yet, just
one nuclear warhead has a thousand times that explosive power.
So I hope that you would look at both of these tracks at the
same time as the real threat that is out there.
You performed very well in the Rumsfeld Commission
concerning the necessity for a National Missile Defense system
and I applaud you for that, and I look forward to working with
you in this committee to achieve that goal.
Thank you.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Cleland.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX CLELAND

Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, welcome and we appreciate your commitment to
public service. You talked earlier in your testimony today
about the over-commitment of American men and women and the
stress on families from our commitments, the need to review
those commitments, which I certainly share. Senator Pat Roberts
and I took the Senate floor a number of times last year to talk
about the sense in which we were over-committed and under-
funded as a Nation.
Then, in terms of Iraq, I hear that the air campaign may
not be enough, that certain things are worth fighting for. I
just want to get it straight. Are you prepared to support an
American ground invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein?
Dr. Wolfowitz. No one has proposed that, Senator, and I do
not believe that even the statement Senator Levin referred to
has to do with how we might support efforts by the Iraqi people
to overthrow their own government.
Senator Cleland. I just wanted to say that that would be a
dramatic increase in American commitment abroad and American
forces are now stretched pretty thin. I just wanted to make
that clear, since you have talked about over-commitment and
then in effect indicated the air campaign may not be enough and
that certain things were worth fighting for. I just wanted to
clarify your position on that. You do not now support an
American ground invasion with American forces to overthrow
Saddam Hussein?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I have never supported an American invasion
to overthrow Saddam.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Dr. Wolfowitz. But Senator, I think it is also fair to say,
to point out that the prolonged commitment to that region of
our forces that Chairman Warner referred to earlier is in part
because that war ended inconclusively. We can debate endlessly
whether we should have fought longer, fought differently. But
the fact is one of the things that produces protracted
commitments is inconclusive conclusions.
Senator Cleland. As a Vietnam veteran myself, I am familiar
with inconclusive conclusions and situations that turn out
badly if you do not pursue them in the right way. Enough said.
May I just say that part of my concern about the
overcommitment of American forces is the inability to get them
there quickly. If we are to actually make sure that we are not
overcommitted, but are able to respond to hot spots in the
world, that means that we have to have global airlift strength.
The Hart-Rudman Commission recently reviewed American airlift
capability and found it basically inadequate.
I would just like to call that to your attention, because
great aircraft like the new C-130J, the C-5B, and its possible
modernization, are all part of a global airlift strategy that I
think fits into our strategic needs very well, and I would just
call that to your attention, the deficit in the airlift
capability.
There is another deficit I would like to bring to your
attention. The key to our defense is our defenders and I think
we would all agree with that. Almost all new service members
enroll and contribute to the GI Bill, the Montgomery GI Bill,
yet only about half of these service men and women actually use
these benefits. Many who use the benefits do not use all of
their entitlement. The great historian Steven Ambrose has said
that the creation of the GI Bill was the single most important
law ever passed by the Federal Government. Yet many of these
soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines are getting out of
the service. Many would like to stay in the service, they tell
me as I get around to bases, not only here in this country but
around the world, but they feel they have to leave so that they
can provide, especially for the education of their spouses and
children.
I believe many of these service members would stay in the
military if they could transfer part of their unused
entitlement to the GI Bill to family members in return for a
service commitment. That is a win-win situation, it seems to
me. It is an idea actually supported by the Hart-Rudman
Commission report. Service secretaries could use this retention
tool selectively, just as they use reenlistment bonuses
selectively.
I would deeply appreciate it if you would give serious
consideration to how the Department of Defense can use the
transfer of GI Bill benefits to family members, in other words
making the GI Bill more family-friendly, as the military itself
has become a more family institution, use it as a retention
tool, and continue to give us your best thoughts on how we
might pursue this idea.
Is that something that might be of interest to you?
Dr. Wolfowitz. It sounds very interesting and it certainly
addresses probably our highest priority, which is how to keep
good people, attract good people, and keep them in the service.
I know there is nothing that a parent cares more about than the
education of their children. I know that as a father.
Senator Cleland. You put your finger right on it. The old
saying is you recruit a soldier, but you retain a family. I was
just in Osaka, Japan, and a Navy admiral mentioned to me that
the decision to stay in the Navy is made at the dinner table.
So these retention decisions of our aviators, of our top
quality people, of our high tech people, of our senior captains
and senior NCOs seem to be made around the dinner table. This
question of the ability to care for the education of our
spouses, the education of our kids, is something that is of
growing importance.
We thank you very much for your testimony today.
Mr. Chairman, no further questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I wish to associate
myself with your observations about that GI Bill. You know that
I will work with you again to achieve those goals. Just
yesterday in Virginia I had a constituent raise that very issue
of transferability.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you would yield
for 10 seconds so I could join in the Chairman's support of
Senator Cleland's comment on the GI Bill transferability issue.
This committee has been very supportive of that effort. So, if
you are confirmed, maybe you can help us persuade some of our
House colleagues on it.
Dr. Wolfowitz. It will be high on my list to look at,
Senator.
Chairman Warner. Senator Hutchinson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON

Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, I join my colleagues in welcoming you and in
expressing our belief that our Nation is very fortunate to have
you. I also want to pick up on what Senator Cleland was saying.
I chair the Personnel Subcommittee. Senator Cleland is our
ranking member. We have worked closely on this whole issue of
retaining our men and women in uniform. While at one time most
of our service men and women were single, that is not the case
any more. Most of them have families, and the issue of not just
their education, but the education of dependents, is foremost
in their minds.
I have supported, and still support very strongly, Senator
Cleland's efforts at portability on the Montgomery GI Bill. But
I also believe that there may be other areas, other methods by
which service men and women can ensure that their children are
going to receive an education. I just ask for your commitment
to work with our committee in exploring ways in which we can
ensure that that opportunity is there for all of the dependents
of our men and women in uniform.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will do so with enthusiasm.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you. I think when you speak of
strengthening the bond of trust, that is a big part of the
quality of life that we are all concerned about.
Also, I want to raise an issue concerning the acquisition
policy of the Department of Defense on vaccine production. In
the early 1990s the Department made the mistake, I believe, of
abandoning its plans to construct a GOCO vaccine production
facility. The consequences of that erroneous decision are only
now being made fully evident and fully demonstrated.
Last summer, partly as a result of prodding from this
committee and our subcommittee's hearings, the gentleman that
you will replace if confirmed, wisely, I think, decided to
throw in the towel on that existing vaccine acquisition
strategy and signaled that the Department would return to the
pre-1994 strategy, namely the construction of a GOCO.
Now, during this time of transition there are grumblings
that there are those who now want to abandon that or head in
another direction, which concerns me. I have written Secretary
Rumsfeld and have asked him personally to investigate that
matter. If confirmed, will you assure me that you will
personally look into this vaccine acquisition strategy to
ensure that it is an open and fair process?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, I will.
Senator Hutchinson. I also want to raise something I have
been very concerned about, as well as Senator Reed and Senator
Cleland, and that is the C-130 acquisition and beddown schedule
for the future. The Little Rock Air Force Base, in my home
State of Arkansas, is the schoolhouse for the training for the
C-130s, and the Little Rock Air Force Base is scheduled to
receive the C-130J flight simulator, it should be up and
running by 2004.
But Little Rock is not scheduled to receive the first C-
130J aircraft until 2006. That means there will be a 2-year gap
between the availability of the simulator and the arrival of
the aircraft. That is obviously a problem. It is a problem that
Senator Reed faces in his State as well. That would be eased
considerably if OSD and the Air Force provided $130 million in
the budget, the 2002 budget, as was promised last year, for the
purchase of two C-130J aircraft.
I do not ask you to make a commitment on that, but I do ask
you to make a commitment that you will examine this budget
issue and get back to me on what the possibilities are, because
obviously if you are going to have a schoolhouse to train the
pilots and you have the simulators there you need the aircraft
there.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will look into that.
[The information referred to follows:]

There are two C-130J aircraft in the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2002, while a third aircraft is on the Air Force's unfunded
priority list. For now, the Air Force will continue to conduct in-
flight training at the students' ultimate operational training bases.

Senator Hutchinson. That is a very brief answer, but we are
going to hold you to that.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will do it.
Senator Hutchinson. We look forward to working with you,
and we are very pleased that the President has nominated you
and I look forward to your confirmation and being able to have
the next couple of years to really see that commitment to the
quality of life, to health care, to housing, to pay, being
fulfilled and the whole retention issue that has been such a
severe problem eased.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. It is, I think, a unique time to
both fix some old problems and move forward on some new ones,
and I really look forward to working with you and this
committee to do that.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Dr. Wolfowitz.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. Senator Nelson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Dr. Wolfowitz, there is a report coming out from the
Pentagon that questions the policy in ``Plan Colombia'' as it
relates to strengthening the efforts at controlling the growth
in coca and therefore the growth of cocaine to the United
States. It is questioning whether the policy ought to be on
controlling the area of supply or whether our efforts in ``Plan
Colombia'' ought to be more in the nature of working with sub-
south countries as well as within Colombia to build those
economies and to work with those countries.
I wonder if you can give us your distinction between what
you would consider to be an appropriate role for the United
States in Colombia with ``Plan Colombia'' and what might border
on nation-building. My concern is that there is a lot of
discussion and things are categorized as nation-building when
we disagree with the efforts, but also it seems to be sanitized
language when we say we need to work with these countries to
help them with their infrastructure and with their democracy.
Can you give us a distinction? I note that in the answers
to the questions about Colombia that you have reserved the
right to make statements later, given the fact that you are
only being considered for approval here at the present time,
and I can appreciate that. But I wonder if you could share with
us a distinction that you would have between, let us say, what
we are doing in Colombia and what might be considered by others
as nation-building.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I have a lot to learn about Colombia,
Senator, I think, including from you. I think you were just
down there, I understand. I know the other Senator Nelson was
and I met with him yesterday.
It does seem to me that one of the essential things that
has everyone concerned, including myself, is that we not find
ourselves in a situation as we were 35 years ago where we are
fighting someone else's civil war. I think that is the
essential thing to stay out of, and that that means I would
draw the line, I think, less at--I try to understand what we
mean by the exact terms, but I think most importantly we know
when they are doing the job as opposed to us taking over the
job.
I think helping the Colombians to help themselves is
something that probably does serve American interests. But I
would be very leery of something that looked like we were
starting to get our troops involved in another war down there.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it a question of an internal
struggle or is our policy and our national interest to stem the
flow of drugs north to the United States, which may be a
completely different mission than strengthening Colombia,
although it may have some connection, but it may be a different
mission?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think that is ultimately a major part of
our interest, although I would think also it is not in our
interest from either point of view to see a so far rather
democratic government in Latin America taken over by drug
lords. So yes, I think there is a difference, and I think the
primary purpose of our efforts to date has been to stem the
flow of narcotics.
One of the things I need to learn is whether you can really
disentangle those two as much as we say we are doing.
Senator Ben Nelson. At some point you might be in a
position to help us understand which is the primary role and
which is the secondary role.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will work very hard on that, and I look
forward to actually learning from those of you who have just
been down there. I think there is nothing like being on the
spot.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. That is a very important
subject before this committee and I commend you and our
distinguished ranking member for undertaking a trip down there.
Senator Sessions.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, we are delighted to have you here. You have
an extraordinary background, the kind of background I think is
most valuable in public service. You have had three tours in
the Pentagon, the State Department, SALT talks, but have also
been in the private sector and in a university, where you have
had the opportunity to study, maybe more objectively, the
events that go on around the world, and now back in the
leadership. I think it is tremendous that you have agreed to
take on this challenge, which I think is very great.
When I first came here about 4 years ago, George Gilder
gave a little talk and told us that the 19th Century was a
century of progress, the 20th Century was the century of the
devil, with wars and oppressions and death, the likes of which
we had never seen before, in a time when it really should not
have happened, and that the 21st century has the potential to
be the greatest in the history of mankind.
I guess I want to ask you, do you feel that the United
States has an interest, a responsibility, and an ability to
help shape this new century in a way that promotes peace and
prosperity around the world, and if so, would you comment in
general about how that might be done?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe very strongly, Senator, and I
think the reference you made to past history is unfortunately
all too true. The 20th Century started on an extremely
optimistic note. People thought technology and economic
progress was going to bring untold benefits and even outlaw
war, that people would see war was not worth pursuing any
longer. Then World War I came and it was all downhill from
there. Once that terrible genie is out of the bottle, the
consequences ripple on for decades. The consequences of World
War I were felt well into the end of the last century.
I think one of the greatest things to be concerned about is
that we come to take for granted the structures that have
produced a relatively peaceful world today. I say relatively.
It is peaceful for us. It is peaceful for the big countries of
Europe. Obviously, there are a lot of parts of the world that
do not look peaceful at all. But the big wars do not threaten
us now.
I think it is very important to have an active strategy
that is not just a military strategy--in fact, I think
diplomacy and even economic policy may be just as important or
more important--a policy that tries to protect those large
zones of peace that we have created in the world and to try to
extend them. I do believe a strong American military is part of
that. I think it is an indispensable part of that. I think the
goal is to keep wars as small and as far away as possible, and
hopefully smaller and further away, until eventually the whole
world benefits from that.
Senator Sessions. So I take it that you are committed to
creating the kind of defense force that would be relevant to
this new world we are in for the purpose of promoting peace and
prosperity?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Exactly, and I also think that is a
significant part of what Secretary Rumsfeld means when he talks
about the need for rethinking the concept of deterrence for
this new world.
Senator Sessions. That is going to take a challenge,
because we have constructed a defense establishment designed
for a different kind of threat. Institutions, I think maybe
even government institutions most of all, are reluctant to
change. Do you think and believe at this point that you will
have to confront some outmoded thinking and to recreate some
strategies and equipment that would meet these new challenges?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I am sure we will, and I know there is
resistance to change. I would say that I also think there is
particularly high resistance to change when you have a
situation, as I think we have today, where we are trying to do
too much with the force that we have and when people are
stretched thin, when you are losing people because of excessive
deployments, when they are afraid that if they identify some
function they do not need that money will get taken away and
they will suffer in their operational readiness accounts.
I think all of that puts a pressure on the force that makes
it much harder to be innovative. So I think on the one hand we
have to fix some of these immediate needs, but if you want to
create the head room for people to think in an innovative
fashion, I think you have to give them some confidence that
when they do try to do things differently there will be rewards
for that, rather than people saying, oh, well, you have just
demonstrated we can do without that division because you are
experimenting with it.
Senator Sessions. I agree. I have been to Kosovo a couple
of times and I do believe that our men and women are basically
doing police work. In fact, the UN was under an obligation and
agreed to produce police forces that would allow our military
to leave and they have not done so. So I think generating a
system that actually produces police force in those kind of
circumstances, so that our military do not have to be deployed,
is the correct policy.
Let me mention one other thing. I am on the Seapower
Subcommittee and I chair it now. We have learned that we had,
perhaps when you were last in the Department or in the early
1990s, we had over 500 ships; we are now at 315. We have seen,
as you note in your opening remarks, a 40 percent reduction in
funding and personnel pretty much across the board.
I believe that there will be no way to transform this
military, to maintain it at the right level, without some
increasing expenditures to accomplish those goals. I hope and
believe you will find every possible efficiency. I hope and
believe you will find programs that you do not have to continue
to fund, that could free up money for the things that we do
have to fund.
But how are you feeling about this review that is going to
take place, and how are you feeling about how much additional
funding the Defense Department is going to need?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I would not, even in the security of a
closed hearing, feel comfortable taking a guess at a number
like that. I do share Secretary Rumsfeld's general feeling that
we probably need more, but if we are going to ask for more we
had better be very sure that everything we are asking for is
something we need. I suspect there are things we are doing now
that we could either stop doing or do much more efficiently.
I think it was President Bush during the campaign said that
we need to spend more, but we need to spend smarter. Part of
this review is going to be focused very much on spending
smarter, so that if we come and ask you for more you can be
convinced that it is needed.
Senator Sessions. I support your idea that you need to
conduct a review before we just continue to continue programs.
But I do believe that you will need some additional support. We
will need to increase this budget, not beyond reason. A solid
increase for a number of years to compensate for a long period
now of neglect is going to be necessary if we are going to
maintain our ability to defend our just national interests
around the world.
I look forward to working with you. I am absolutely
convinced that you and Secretary Rumsfeld are about to lead a
tremendous revitalization of our Defense Department, and we
thank you for it.
Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to add my welcome to Dr. Wolfowitz this
morning. I am familiar with you, as others who have been in
Congress for a while, and I am familiar with your experience,
accomplishments, and of course as has been said already,
familiar with your impressive record here of service to our
country.
I am also familiar with your prior service as Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993. I'm
particularly pleased to know that you have given service as
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, since policies in the Pacific have the most direct
impact in my home State. I should tell you, in case you were
not aware, that my friend who worked at East-West Center, Mike
Oxenberg, just recently passed on. I know you have known him
and have worked with him on China.
Dr. Wolfowitz. It is a great loss to our country, Senator.
Senator Akaka. News reports indicate that China has been
helping develop a fiber optics communication system for Iraq's
military. This is the same system that British and American
forces just attacked, I understand. How important do you think
it is that we should prevent this system from becoming
operational and how persistent should we be in attacking it?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I have not had the benefit yet of
classified briefings on the details of that. It does seem to me
the principle is very clear. If they are building something
that threatens the safety of our air crews, we should do what
we have to do to eliminate it or otherwise assure their safety.
We should also, I think, make it very clear to the Chinese
that this is behavior that has a real cost in our relations.
Senator Akaka. I know, as I said, you have been in policy.
Do you support a policy which would permit the Chinese to
resume the launching of commercial satellites which the U.S.
licenses?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think it depends crucially on whether we
can have the kind of adequate safeguards that make sure that
our missile guidance technology does not end up in the hands of
the Chinese. As a commercial matter, it is probably good all
around, but I think there is evidence that suggests the
practices in the past were not sufficiently rigorous.
Senator Akaka. As I have indicated, I regard you as a
person who has had such a broad view of our country and our
security. So let me ask you this one. There have been
discrepancies in the readiness reports of operational forces.
It is my understanding that some of the discrepancies have been
attributed to a reporting system which is designed to provide a
view of the current state of readiness, rather than a
projection of the future.
If confirmed, how will you address the issues surrounding
the accuracy of determining the readiness of operational
forces?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The first thing I would do, if it has not
been done already, is to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to make
sure that we have a really first class person in that Under
Secretary job, Manpower and Readiness, because this is a huge
task. I would work with that individual to try to consider
carefully whether the kinds of measures we are using for
readiness are, number one, measuring what we want them to
measure; and number two, to make sure they are not--every time
you set up a way of measurement, whether it is military
readiness or academic excellence, people start to game the
system and they start to design to the measurement instead of
to something else.
So you have to be very careful. I suppose this is a
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. When you start to measure and
you put out a certain measurement, you change how people
behave. You want to make sure that you are changing it in the
way you want to change it and not in an unintended way. But it
is a very big issue that you raise and a very legitimate one.
Senator Akaka. I am also aware of your work out in the
Pacific Rim and in the Philippines and what you have done
there. Again, I want to say that I am glad to see you here and
seeking, I think, the position here with this administration.
We all know that the future of our country and the security of
our country leans in the Pacific and that area, so it is
important to have a person like you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Bunning.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING

Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, welcome to the committee.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Senator Bunning. I want to explore just three different
areas with you, Doctor. First, base realignment and closures. I
notice in your answers that Senator Warner has shared with all
the members that you took what we call a powder. You did not
answer the question. You said: ``As Secretary Rumsfeld noted in
his response to advance policy questions from this committee,
we withhold an assessment of this issue until after the
completion of the defense review.'' At least that is what is
written down here.
Do you have any idea what the President's feelings are on
base realignment and closure, because I am deeply concerned
until I have seen the savings that occurred from the first and
the second round of base closures and had them proven to me,
not just put down on paper and here is what we saved, but a
much more thorough examination. If we proceed in another round
you are going to have a terrible time up here on the Hill
trying to convince anyone that this is in the best interests of
this country.
So do you have anything to add to your statement here?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think I would say what I believe Secretary
Rumsfeld said when he was up here, that he believes, and I
agree with him, that the base structure should correspond to
the force structure. We are only now looking at what the force
structure ought to be as a product of this review.
There is a general feeling that we have more base structure
than our present force structure requires. But until the review
is done, it is a little early to state that as a firm
conclusion.
You bring up another issue which I discussed with you in
your office yesterday, and I concur very strongly that we need
to make sure that the savings that are attributed to past BRACs
have actually been realized and if we end up in another process
of that kind, that we get real savings out of it. That is
certainly something I will look into very hard if I am
confirmed.
Senator Bunning. Second, there is a statement that you just
made this morning and I wonder how that fits into this
statement. I will read from the statement: ``Finally, we must
reform the Department of Defense structures, processes, and
organizations. We need to seek greater efficiencies, not only
to safeguard the taxpayers' money, but also because that will
allow us to create better weapons systems and invest more in
the cutting edge of our national defense.''
I want to make sure that if we are going to do something
here in closing down a base or removing structures that it is
not just to save money, but that it does not force us to try to
do more with less. If I have heard it once in the last 14
years, I have heard it an awful lot of times, that the Defense
Department can do more with less.
It can like heck, and it has been proven that it cannot do
more with less and ask for more deployments. So does that fit
into that statement that you made?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I certainly agree with you we have been
trying to do more with less and the consequences are that
frayed force that General Shelton referred to. I do believe--
when I wrote those words in that statement, I am thinking much
more of the kinds of efficiencies that people say we could
achieve in things like the way we do our pay and accounts
system, the way we purchase electricity for our bases.
There seem to be a lot of places where we are much less
efficient than the private sector and there is no obvious
reason why we ought to be. But I certainly agree with you the
purpose is not simply to save money. We need that money. There
are a lot of needs, both immediate needs and long-term needs,
it has to be applied to.
Senator Bunning. Last but not least, Britain's Foreign
Minister, Robin Cook, recently was before this committee. He
told us about the effort of the European allies to form a
60,000-member force which would perform humanitarian action and
perform military police type duties, such as overtaking
security checkpoint duties in the Kosovo region and those
things.
Are you familiar with this effort of our European allies?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I am in general terms and in some detail.
Senator Bunning. Let me give you an experience that I had
that shows that maybe we should encourage our European allies.
I just spent a day or 2 at Fort Campbell in Kentucky, and 3,000
of our finest young men and women are about on June 1st to go
off and replace 3,000 people that are in Kosovo.
I went out to the training site on site, and those men and
women were being trained to be MPs. I asked the general, how is
that in the best national interest of our country, national
security, to be MPs in Kosovo? He disagreed that it was not in
our best interest, but they were being trained to secure their
own safety when they were there.
Would you like to expand on that a little bit?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I repeat I think what I said earlier, which
is I believe it is in our interest, where possible, to get our
allies to take over jobs that they can do and that we do not
need to do. It is in our interest to get local forces to take
over tasks that they can do that we do not need to do. Where we
are talking about police work, we really ought to be looking
for policemen or their equivalent to do it and not sending
highly trained combat troops, in fact, as you correctly point
out, untraining them, retraining them for a whole new task, and
then having to retrain them for their combat missions when they
come home. There is a lot in that that does not make sense and
we ought to be looking for alternatives.
Senator Bunning. I wish you good luck. Thank you.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Carnahan.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN

Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome you to the committee today. I also want
to congratulate you on your nomination and for your years of
national service.
Although we live in a time of peace and prosperity, these
are certainly challenging times for the Department of Defense.
Once the threat to our national security was formidable and
apparent. Now the overall threat has been reduced, but we do
not always know where the enemy is or where he is located or
who he is or what weapons are at his disposal.
We live in a time of unprecedented budget surpluses, but
the pressure on the defense budget remains quite heavy. If we
are to continue to have the best and the most highly trained
and most effective military in the world, we have to invest in
our military personnel. That means higher salaries and better
health care and improved quality of life for those who wear the
uniform.
I think we also owe it to our troops that when they are
placed in harm's way that they are properly equipped and that
they are trained to perform the tasks for which they have been
sent.
The military services continue to demand newer and
sophisticated weapons systems, but these demands must be
evaluated against the type of threats we expect to face and
balanced against competing defense and domestic spending
priorities. There are discussions of transforming our entire
armed forces structure, but we face a bureaucracy that is set
in its ways and very resistant to change. So I expect that you
will have a difficult time, but hopefully a very rewarding job.
I look forward to working with you in those efforts.
I have a few questions I would like to ask today. Senator
Bond and Congressman Gephardt have been very involved in urging
the South Korean government to purchase F-15s. I am very
supportive of those efforts as well. The new purchase of F-15s
is necessary to keep the F-15 production line running.
Given the uncertainty of whether we will be relying on the
Super Hornet or the F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter, do you
agree that it is in our national interest to continue the
production of the F-15?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I certainly think it is very much
in our national interest to maintain a strong industrial base.
Clearly, aircraft production is a big part of that. You asked
me when I met with you yesterday about this forthcoming Korean
decision. It seems to me that there are two strong principles
here which we should emphasize to our Korean allies in their
consideration of what kind of aircraft to buy. One is that it
will be far more effective if we are both flying the same kind
of aircraft. It is not just a matter of interoperability, but
the ability to repair one another's systems.
Second, given that their budgets are tight as well as ours,
I hope they will buy the best value for the dollar or for the
won, and I suspect very much that is going to be the American
plane.
Senator Carnahan. I also mentioned to Secretary Rumsfeld
when he was here a concern that had been expressed to me a
number of times. That has to do with the readiness of our
TRADOC posts, especially the one at Fort Leonard Wood. I would
like for you to, if you would, check on that for me and get
back to me with more information about that.
[The information follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The question I will ask today is one that is a little bit
more general. I understand the Department is doing a
comprehensive review, but I would like to hear what your views
are on what measures the Department should take to address the
short-term readiness of our troops.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Clearly, one of the most serious readiness
deficiencies that I have been briefed on is shortages in
training facilities and lack of training time and lack of
resources to do training properly. There is no, I think, more
important contributor to the readiness of forces than the fact
that they are well-trained.
I remember going right after the Gulf War with Secretary
Cheney to visit the Second Armored Division inside Iraq, and
Secretary Cheney talked to a tough-looking senior master
sergeant who I think had spent 26 years in the Army and asked
him, was it tough? He said it wasn't anywhere near as tough as
the National Training Center. That is the kind of training you
want to have. It is an essential part of readiness and it is
certainly something we will be looking hard at in this review.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Collins.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wolfowitz, I first want to echo the comments of my
colleagues in thanking you for accepting this considerable
challenge and for bringing your considerable expertise and
talents to bear in this exciting new position.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Collins. As a new member of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, I have had a parade of service chiefs and
senior officers come to my office to brief me and those
meetings have been very helpful. I have, however, been
concerned by what I have heard. Over and over again, senior
officers have told me that there has been a pattern in the last
administration of robbing our modernization accounts to pay for
pressing readiness problems.
Indeed, one senior officer told me that he was actually
instructed to prepare a budget in the last administration that
he knew would not possibly meet the readiness needs of his
service. In fact, there was a reliance on supplementals in the
last administration that caused there to be lots of concerns
about the training moneys available for our troops and other
readiness issues.
It seems to me we need a new approach and that is a lousy
way to go about budgeting. Are you going to commit today to a
truth-in-budgeting process so that we really know what the
numbers are and can make sure that we are not essentially
gaming the system?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think it is essential not only for
Congress to know, but for the President and the Secretary of
Defense to know. I certainly agree with you it is a misuse of
the budgeting process to have expenditures that you fully know
you are going to need submitted as an emergency supplement to
your budget. We have to figure out how we work our way out of
that process that you correctly identify we have gotten into.
Senator Collins. On a related issue, I have also heard from
these senior officers about inefficiencies within the Defense
Department's acquisition and procurement process. For example,
one senior officer told me that the Defense Logistics Agency
adds a markup of 22 percent to each uniform that it buys. He
was saying that if he could eliminate the middleman within DOD
that he could save a great deal of money.
Are you planning to take a thorough look at the internal
acquisition and procurement systems of DOD to see whether there
are ways to improve efficiencies and perhaps save substantial
sums of money?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Absolutely. One of the things that has
struck me a lot in briefings I have had over the last 6 weeks
or so is there just are shelves full of studies going back at
least to David Packard's commission in the early 1980s that
identify all kinds of reforms. I keep asking the question: We
do not need more studies; we need to implement these things;
why is it not happening?
It is not that people have not tried, and it is not as
though it is going to be simple to do so. But I certainly
think, with this unusual man we have as Secretary of Defense,
we have a real opportunity now to get some things done that
everyone agrees are long overdue.
Senator Collins. I agree. I think everyone knows what the
problems are, but there has been too much internal resistance
to solving them that has prevented needed reforms from being
implemented, so I appreciate that commitment.
Finally, I want to echo Senator Sessions' concerns about
our current shipbuilding rates. The current rates of
shipbuilding do not support the goal of a 300-ship naval fleet
as identified by the last QDR. The Clinton administration's
defense budgets have been gradually taking the Navy, not toward
a 300-ship Navy, but rather toward a considerably smaller
fleet.
Adding to the challenges are the facts that many defense
experts believe that even a 300-ship Navy is inadequate for our
current operational and deployment requirements. I hope as part
of the top-to-bottom review that you and the Secretary are
conducting that you will take a very hard look at what we can
do to make sure that our shipbuilding budgets are adequate to
make up for the deficiencies of the past 8 years.
Dr. Wolfowitz. That will be a very important part of what
we look at, yes.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Nelson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to say to the ranking member, thank you again
for that trip to Colombia over the last few days. It was
extraordinary, it was informative, it was personally enjoyable
to be with you and the other members, and I thank you very
much.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Your contribution to that very
quick trip was really crucial. Our learning was mutually at a
high level. You and Senator Ben Nelson, Senator Jack Reed, and
I travelled and again, thank you for participating.
Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Wolfowitz, it was a pleasure to
visit with you yesterday. I want to encourage you on the
seeming new policy of the administration to break the mold, to
think outside the lines. It is, I think, refreshing that you
approach it this way, and with the changing nature of the
threat to the United States I think it is essential. I thank
you about that.
Now, what I would like to get from you is some of your
ideas about what are going to be the appropriations needs over
the course of the next decade. Chairman Warner and a group of
other Senators from this committee had recently written a
letter asking for necessary appropriations having to do with a
supplemental for this year. Senator Warner, if I recall, it
totaled some perhaps $7 billion additional moneys in this
particular year. This is for the 2001 budget, even before we
get to the 2002 budget.
If I recall also, that had to do with pay and benefits,
health benefits. It had to do with spare parts. It had to do
with the cost of fuel and a number of things like that. That is
$7 billion before we even get to the decade that we are talking
about.
Can you give me some clue as to what you think are going to
be the needs of increased defense spending over the course of
the next decade?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I suppose the real answer is without the
review I cannot say very much. But I guess if you want a clue,
it seems to me there is a general feeling, unless we are going
to radically change what we try to do in the world--and I say
radically because I think we probably do have to change what we
try to do in the world, and we may want to do more. But unless
we are going to do radically less, we probably need more
resources.
But we also have to find savings within what we do, because
we cannot simply add to the defense budget. That is why even
the short-term question of what do we need to make it through
2001 is something that requires a thorough look at what we are
already spending our money on.
Senator Bill Nelson. I know that that is the answer that
you have to give at this point and I respect that. So let me
suggest what I think the truth is on the answer. The fact is,
as we change the nature of our defense posture we can save
money, but at the same time, since the reason for a Federal
Government in large part is to provide for the national
defense, we cannot be penny wise and pound foolish,
particularly with research and development and particularly
with regard to the provision of our forces in the field, the
supplies, the material, and the quality of the troops by virtue
of what it is going to cost in competition with the private
sector in order to be able to retain them.
I think the bottom line is that there is going to be a
considerable demand for increased spending over the course of
the next decade. I think we are fooling ourselves if we do not
plan for that. We have some choices to make very shortly in
formulating a budget and how much are we going to allocate for
defense and how much for education and for prescription drug
benefit, and balance all that against the need to protect
social security and the surplus in the Medicare trust fund, and
then balance all of that on the question of how large is going
to be the tax cut.
So I think there are, as we approach the subject matter of
this committee, people that are fooling themselves if they
think that we are not going to need substantial defense
increases over the next 10 years and do so at the peril of
providing for the common defense if you use it up in other
areas so that we do not have it, or so that the only choice
that is left to us is the choice of going back into deficit
financing, which was one of the reasons of a poorly performing
economy in the decade of the 1980s.
So you see where I am coming from, Dr. Wolfowitz. I
congratulate you on your nomination. I congratulate you ahead
of time. I am going to be visiting with you about these
budgetary matters in the future.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I look forward to it, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
We will now have a second round of questions. I will
initiate those questions and my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Levin, will follow up.
I was quite interested in your selection of a quote in your
opening statement, that General Creighton Abrams said when the
all-volunteer force was first created that, ``People are not in
the Army; people are the Army.'' I was privileged to serve in
the Pentagon at that time when he was Chief of Staff and I have
the greatest respect for that military leader. He was exactly
right.
As you said, you will become the chief operating officer
and people will be at the very top of your agenda. This
committee, indeed Congress as a whole, are very concerned about
the inability of the Department of Defense, all services, some
with varying degrees, but all services, having difficulty
retaining particularly that critical group of younger officers,
captains, so to speak, lieutenants in the Navy, who are making
that pivotal decision as to whether to go on and perhaps commit
for a career of at least 20 years.
Similarly, the enlisted ranks, the middle grade and senior
petty officers, sergeants and the like, are likewise not
staying in the numbers that we need.
Now, there has been some modest improvement here recently,
possibly as a consequence of the initiatives taken by the past
administration and Congress. This committee took the initiative
to increase the pay raises, took the initiative to increase the
quality of health care.
What are your initiatives that you are going to assert, if
confirmed and you take on this responsibility, to stem the flow
of these young people out of the military, somewhat induced by
very lucrative opportunities for their trained skills in the
private sector?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Pay and allowances are one of the first
things one looks at. You are absolutely correct, this committee
has taken very important decisions, including just at the end
of the last year, that I think should help us. Some of I
suppose the kinds of tangible benefits that Senator Cleland
referred to earlier that can help service people think that by
staying in they are ensuring their children's future, that is
very important.
I think, as I said earlier, it is equally important to make
sure that people feel that they are getting the right kind of
training and equipment to perform the missions, because at the
end of the day I think what keeps people in the service will
never be the pay and allowances. Pay and allowances have to be
adequate, but they can almost always earn more money with less
time away from home and less risk of life doing something else.
It is the sense of mission.
It is very hard to convince people of a sense of mission if
they are not being given equipment for that mission or the
training for the mission is not adequate.
I also believe that, and I think hopefully this will be
part of this review, we need as a country--and certainly this
committee makes a big contribution in that respect--to convince
the country that the mission these men and women are doing is
important, because that I think is one of the greatest psychic
rewards and therefore one of the greatest rewards that they get
for service.
So you have to look at it, I think, as a whole. It starts
with pay and allowances, but it goes right up to what the
President, Congress, and the country believe is the importance
of what they are doing.
Chairman Warner. It is also family separation, Dr.
Wolfowitz. That is brought about by overdeployments in terms of
the number of times that these young men and women are sent
abroad. They will accept not only a reasonable level, but a
high level, because that is what they joined to do. But I think
we have in the past few years seen where we have crossed that
invisible line to where they are now confronted with serious
family situations because of their departure from family for
prolonged periods, and they are all too often coming at a
critical time when they are trying to raise some young
children. How well all of us who have had that great privilege
and challenge in life know the essential need for the two
parents to be together as much as possible with those children
in their formative years. Bear that in mind.
Dr. Wolfowitz. You are absolutely right, Senator.
Chairman Warner. Also, but for a spare part no bigger than
that tip of that pencil, airplanes cannot fly. The mechanics
are instructed to go over and take it out of another airplane
which is operational and cannibalize it and put that airplane
parked for a while. That is why I am urging consideration of
this supplemental. We have to get into the spare parts
replenishment and the distribution of those spare parts right
away, because these young people working, whether it is on
ships or on the line of airplanes on the tarmac working on it,
they need to feel that we are supplying those parts such that
they can keep those pieces of equipment up and ready.
In my most recent visit to Kosovo a week or so ago, we
visited a young captain who had several tanks and other
motorized vehicles high on a hill in that sector that is
becoming more and more destabilized, the valley. He said some
of those units that he had up there were in a precarious
situation because of spare parts. There is a trooper right out
on the front line taking risks.
Again, I know this question of the supplemental is not a
cheerful one, but I take the brunt of criticism directed. I
just think it has to be studied and studied very carefully. I
am confident that Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, and others
that are entrusted with the appropriations--therein is the
primary responsibility--can manage that in a way that we can
achieve it, hopefully for the military, and maybe restrict it
and let the President indicate that he will veto if this thing
becomes a giant snowball rolling down the hillside with
everybody's need attached to it. So I will continue to work on
that.
The industrial base. We can really be no stronger as a
Nation and a military if we do not have those companies who are
willing to get out there and put at risk their capital and to
have the ability to attract the talent that is necessary to do
the research and development and the test and evaluation on
these systems that are coming along.
What are your views about assisting the industrial base,
and particularly the question of across-the-ocean mergers? They
are primarily in the Atlantic, trans-Atlantic, but they could
well become also in the Pacific region a factor that concerns
the industrial base here at home. That will be your
responsibility. What are your views on that subject?
Dr. Wolfowitz. First, Senator, Mr. Chairman, I am very
concerned about the health of our industrial base. It is
crucial to our ability to support forces in the future. It is
crucial to our ability to innovate. I think it is hurting
badly.
I think when one looks at this issue of trans-Atlantic or
even possibly trans-Pacific mergers, I think the crucial
question is do these mergers contribute to our ability to
innovate, contribute to the long-term health of our industrial
base, or conversely are they a kind of fire sale where we are
transferring absolutely essential American capabilities abroad
in a way that will hurt our long-term competitiveness.
I think some degree of distributing production across
defense establishments of our allies as well as ourselves may
be a way to make the overall industrial base more efficient.
But certainly one of the things we better look at is to make
sure that if some of that is going eastward across the Atlantic
that there is enough gain coming back the other direction that
we are all better off in the long run.
Chairman Warner. I thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to Colombia first. Senator Bill Nelson
indicated that four of us went down to Colombia last weekend.
Let me just give you a quick impression, and then ask you for a
response. First, our focus clearly has to be on the demand side
of this equation. We are creating the demand which is creating
the supply that Colombia currently is supplying in the area of
cocaine. But stemming the flow of cocaine and the supply of it
is an important goal as well. That is number one.
Second, we should not send our forces there to try to go
after the narco-terrorists and the narco-suppliers, but we
should, as you put it, assist them to assist themselves, to go
after those folks that are creating this problem.
This is third--unlike many other countries in Latin
America, the army in Colombia has been supportive of the
democratic government in Colombia traditionally and is now.
Strengthening that army is essential to the survival of that
democracy against the onslaught of the narco-traffickers,
number one. Those narco-traffickers are now funding the threats
to that democracy both from the guerrillas and from the
paramilitaries. So, when we strengthen the professionalism and
the training and the protection of human rights by that army,
we are in the process trying to accomplish two things. First,
we are stemming the flow of narcotics to this country,
attempting to reduce that coca crop. Second, we are in the
process strengthening Colombian democracy. Both things are
going on and they are inseparable.
So when you talk about disentangling the two goals, the
goal of supporting Colombian democracy or nation-building and
the goal of stemming the flow of cocaine, both of those goals
are dependent upon strengthening the professionalism, training
of the army, and making sure that they protect human rights in
order to reduce the power of the narco-traffickers. So the
goals, it seems to me, are inseparable and talking about
disentangling them may miss the point. I just want to give you
that thought and give you a chance to respond if you want, or
just to think about it, either way.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will respond. You are taking me in the
direction I was heading already. I can see a clear difference
between their doing the job and our doing the job, and that is
the line I would like to keep clear and bright. I know people
make a distinction between fighting narco-terrorists and
fighting the civil war. I guess I have--you are saying it
yourself. It is hard to disentangle because the instrument for
doing both, especially if they are going to do it themselves,
is their own military.
When I was Ambassador in Jakarta, the Colombian
Ambassador--and it may have been the first they ever sent to
Indonesia--was not a foreign service officer. He was a judge
who had sent some narco-terrorist to jail and he was in
Indonesia essentially to protect his life. He told me with
great bitterness that all that money from the United States
that's sucking cocaine up from Latin America is destroying his
country and destroying democracy in his country. It was very
poignant and very moving. People like that judge-become-
ambassador are very courageous people.
It seems to me if they want our financial support, our
material support, our training support, within limits we ought
to provide it. If they want the lives of our service people,
then we will say, it is your country, it is your lives that
should be on the line.
Senator Levin. They have not asked for that.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I know they have not.
Senator Levin. I do not think there is any support for that
that I know of in this country. What there is, however, support
for in ``Plan Colombia'' is what I just described and what you
just described. I gather you, in general, are supportive of
that goal; is that fair to say?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes.
Senator Levin. Back to Iraq for a moment and what many
thought, including myself, was an unclear signal to Saddam
prior to his invasion of Kuwait. Would you comment on that? I
think you have spoken on that issue before. Comment on the
importance of clarity of our signals and the lack of clarity in
terms of that signal to him as to what the impact would be
should he move on Kuwait.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Well, I believed at the time and I believe
now that we sent ambiguous signals. I argued strongly at the
time that we should send a clearer signal. In fairness to that
administration, it also has to be said that one of the greatest
ambiguities came in congressional testimony where an Assistant
Secretary of State was pushed in my view a little bit too hard
to say exactly what our commitments were.
I liked Secretary Cheney's formulation at the time, which
was: We have stood by our friends in the past and we will stand
by them in the future, no further questions. I think if the
administration had stuck to that line it would have been a
better signal.
But having said that, two things. Number one, given how
Saddam behaved when he was faced with the threat of Desert
Storm and his unwillingness to yield at that point, I think
there is every reason to be skeptical that even a very clear
signal would have deterred him. He was convinced that we were
weak, that we had lost in Vietnam, we would lose again there.
Number two, there is no question that once he invaded it
was a great help in dealing with our Arab friends in the region
that no one could accuse us of having provoked the attack.
There is always a little bit of a tradeoff between sending
clear signals on the one hand and being seen as being
belligerent on the other.
At the end of the day, I think history probably would have
taken a similar course.
Senator Levin. Just two last questions, and I thank our
Chairman for yielding to me and so graciously allowing me to
extend my questions so I can go to another hearing.
When you were Under Secretary for Policy in President
George Bush's administration, there was an employee in the
Office of Nonproliferation Policy who became convinced that the
administration was about to present false information to
Congress in a classified briefing about Pakistan's nuclear
capabilities. The individual complained to his supervisor and
the supervisor then became concerned that the employee might
take it upon himself to correct the inaccurate information
presented to Congress.
I am not getting into the merits at all of that case, as to
who was right or who was wrong. But there was a response by the
supervisor there ordering him not to supply that information,
and terminated the employment and apparently acted to ensure
that security clearances be removed from that employee. I do
not want to get involved in the specifics of that, either. That
is the background. There is apparently litigation going on, so
I am not asking you to comment in any way which could affect
that litigation. The reason I am asking you this is because of
the questions asked of you at this hearing about providing
information to this committee and to our designated staff, who
are cleared to receive classified information. It is important,
I believe, to us that people who wish to come to give us
classified information in no way be deterred from doing so or
be threatened or be in any way deterred from providing that to,
again, designated staff who are cleared to receive classified
information.
The Whistleblower Protection Act does not apply to this
type of case because information is classified. But putting
that aside, do you believe that it is appropriate in any way to
retaliate against an employee who threatens to take accurate
information to properly cleared congressional staffers, as a
matter of policy?
Dr. Wolfowitz. My answer is absolutely not. I do not
believe that kind of retaliation is appropriate at all. I would
go a bit further, too. I think it is terribly important, and on
that specific issue of what Pakistan was doing with nuclear
weapons there was a legal obligation to keep Congress
appropriately informed.
Senator, I was not even aware of that employee or the
entire case until about 18 months ago when I was asked to give
a deposition in a civil suit. Most of the events he alleged
took place before I was confirmed as Under Secretary.
Senator Levin. I did not want to get into your----
Dr. Wolfowitz. Well, OK, but you brought it up. So I
believe----
Senator Levin. I assume you were aware of it one way or
another.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Only within the last----
Senator Levin. The issue. I do not mean back then. I mean
you are aware of it.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I have been aware of the issue. In fact,
there have been times on that issue when I specifically sensed
that people thought we could somehow construct a policy on the
house of cards that Congress would not know what the Pakistanis
were doing. I have always thought policies based on withholding
information from Congress are going to fail in the long run. In
that case, there was a clear legal obligation to keep Congress
informed.
Senator Levin. I appreciate that.
My final question is the question of whether and how to
deploy a National Missile Defense part of the strategic review
or is it left out of the strategic review as far as you know?
Dr. Wolfowitz. My understanding is it is a piece of the
strategic review. There are many pieces. There is not a
single--as Secretary Rumsfeld said when he was up here, surely
one of the things that is going to come out of this strategic
review is we can make some decisions now, we are going to have
to review some more. I do not think this is a process that is
going to end. But clearly you cannot make decisions about long-
term resource requirements without factoring in what missile
defense requirements are going to be.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, let me just again thank you. I
want to congratulate Dr. Wolfowitz and wish him the best of
luck. I know there will be a lot of important efforts here to
keep this committee on the bipartisan tack that it has always
tried to follow and that we can look to you to assist us in
that process.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. I think I have had courtesy calls
with 18 members of this committee, and every one of them has
been a strong bipartisan supporter of a strong national
defense. So I am sure the other six are as well, and I really
look forward to working with this committee if I am confirmed.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I have several more questions I wish to
ask. Speaking for myself and I think others, we were shocked
about this recent series of allegations regarding a long and
trusted member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
allegations of his sharing classified material with another
nation. Also, regrettably, a person who preceded you in the
office to which you aspire to serve this Nation was the subject
of a pardon recently by the President with regard to
allegations about his handling of classified materials.
As the chief operating officer, it seems to me, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other persons in
the administration, you should undertake a review of the
Department of Defense with regard to the handling of classified
material and the means by which to detect any violation of the
regulations of the use of that material by employees at all
levels of the Department.
Therefore, my question to you is how do you view the
importance of classification, the responsibility that those
entrusted with documents that are classified and how they
should deal, not only in the safeguarding of that, but the
sharing of that information? How do you intend to deal with
that issue and what are your views with regard to classified
material?
I feel very strongly that the most rigid rules should apply
and that when an individual is found to have violated, and
subject to the appropriate legal actions that have to be
reviewed to verify that violation, whether it is a court case
or whatever, that accountability of the strongest measures
should be done. What are your views?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I agree very strongly with you about that,
Senator. It is kind of shocking, the extent to which classified
information frequently and with great speed finds its way into
public in one form or another. I do think we need to do
everything we can to hold people accountable, to make it clear
that we take this seriously.
I know any one of us has come across a classified document
that we may have thought was overclassified. But that does not
give you an individual right to take it on yourself to
declassify it or downgrade it. There are procedures for doing
that and they should be stuck with.
You are talking about two very different things and the
second one--the first one is a matter of treason. We clearly
have to look at what that whole Hansen case tells us about our
counterintelligence capabilities, which clearly have missed two
big ones in recent times, and think about how to protect
ourselves from that kind of traitor.
On the more almost mundane matter of the day-to-day
handling of classified materials, I think we lead by example.
We have to be careful ourselves. We have to take infractions
seriously. If we think that things are overclassified, then we
need in an orderly way to take care of that problem, but not
let individuals take it on themselves.
Chairman Warner. Are you prepared to commit to this
committee that, if confirmed, you will undertake as one of your
top priorities a review of that subject within your Department?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will do so, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
The President, I think quite wisely, and the Secretary of
Defense, in the course of his hearing before this committee,
put increased emphasis on the subject of homeland defense. This
committee has taken a number of initiatives to strengthen the
ability of our communities to deal with a terrorist attack
involving weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical. We
have really been out on the cutting edge. We have a
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities and it has
been one of the most active subcommittees. I commend the
chairman and ranking member for the past work and indeed what
they propose to do in the coming year.
But this is a subject of great concern to this Senator and
I think many others. It is astonishing. I do not want to harp
too much on my recollections, but I remember when we had
blackouts in Washington, D.C., in the early stages of World War
II. I was a youngster then. I remember it well. People would
sit here and listen to me make that statement in astonishment.
But that was the last time, really, that this Nation felt
imperiled at the hands of an adversary. At that time it was
primarily the Nazi submarine fleet, which was actively sinking
shipping off of the shores. I will not go into further details,
but it was the silhouetting of the shipping as a consequence of
the lighting emanating from the shores. A drastic number of
ships lost right off the Atlantic coast of the United States.
There have been other incidents. But now we have come to
the point where we are threatened by intercontinental ballistic
missiles, we are defenseless. I commend the President for his
strong initiatives to address the question of missile defense.
We have covered it here today.
But the terrorism that could strike here at home is a major
concern. We have taken initiatives in the last authorization
bill of this committee, to try and urge a reorganization of the
lines of responsibility in our Federal Government. I do not
have it with me, but I will see that you get it, a chart
showing the voluminous number of crossed lines and crossed
authority that exists today. I do not say that as a criticism
of the past administration. It is just a statement of fact.
I would hope that you would put this high on your list of
priorities to address, because we have to have, I think,
greater involvement by all departments and agencies of the
Federal Government in this question of homeland defense. I just
wondered what you thought about the missions for the Department
which you will hopefully be responsible as Deputy Secretary of
Defense. Right now the Department of Justice has primary
authority, and we come up against the time-honored law of Posse
Comitatus which limits the involvement of the U.S. military as
it relates to the daily lives of our people in this country. I
think that doctrine is well-founded in history and should be
protected.
But again, the assets and the knowledge of the Department
of Defense need to be shared at every level of government and
with the communities as to how best to protect themselves and,
if an incident were to happen, how we can best assist those in
the community that will come to the rescue of their fellow
citizens.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Actually, I know John Hamre, when he was
Deputy Secretary, took a very strong interest in this issue, as
will I if I am confirmed.
Chairman Warner. I commend him. He did indeed. We talked
many times on this subject.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Actually, during, I guess it was the
transition--it was actually the period of the recount of the
Florida vote--he convened a very interesting 3-hour session
over at CSIS of officials from the Clinton administration with
a number of people prospectively on both the Gore and Bush
group, to talk about this issue. What that discussion and many
others reveals is there is a fundamental problem that you
identify of how the U.S. Government organizes itself to deal
with this problem, which has both a domestic and a foreign
aspect, both a law enforcement and a security aspect.
We need to do everything we can to prevent that kind of
attack, everything we can, where possible, to defend against
it. But also this question of how you respond is crucial. I was
in Israel during the Gulf War with Deputy Secretary Larry
Eagleburger, whom President Bush sent over to persuade the
Israelis not to get in the war. So I have been in a country
under missile attack. We knew the odds and the odds
individually were not that dangerous, but the whole country is
immobilized by it.
The Israelis had a very substantial civil defense effort
and they were quite clear that without that civil defense
effort, without the little bit of warning that our satellites
were able to provide so the people could go into shelters, they
would have had a mass panic. So the ability to deal with an
event if it happens I think is very important for the stability
of society as a whole. It has to get a high priority.
Chairman Warner. That is an interesting historical footnote
that you mention about your visit with my old friend Dr.
Eagleburger, former Secretary of State. I too was in Israel, on
February 18th, 1991, with Senator Nunn--then Chairman of the
Armed Services Committee--Senator Stevens, and Senator Inouye.
We were in the headquarters of the Defense Ministry when the
last Scud fell on Tel Aviv. We had to stop our meetings and put
on our gas masks.
The strike landed a mile or two away. I never felt--well,
you are in the hands of the gods when that thing came in,
because it did not have any particular target except to hit the
population. It was used as a terrorist weapon, not as a
military.
The people of Israel and the government of Israel showed
enormous courage at that time to withhold their ability, and
they had it, to retaliate because they knew of how it could
fracture and impede the progress of the coalition at that time
engaged in repressing Saddam Hussein.
So I share that. But I hope that you put this high on your
agenda, this subject of homeland defense.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will, Mr. Chairman. I hope our whole
government does.
Chairman Warner. The National Missile Defense system, as I
said, the President is taking a strong leadership role,
together with other members of his cabinet. Secretary of State
Powell, I think in a very forceful and successful way, based on
the reports received, asserted the right of the United States
to defend itself in the face of this threat. We stand, as I
think we have to repeatedly say, defenseless against an
incoming strategic intercontinental ballistic missile, and
indeed other missiles for that matter, and we must marshall the
resources of this country to determine whether or not we can
devise a limited ability to interdict the accidentally fired or
terrorist missile or whatever the case may be, up to a dozen or
more of these missiles.
As the President and Secretary Powell and others have
pointed out, it is not a system that in any way should lessen
the deterrence that Russia looks to its system to provide, or
indeed other nations. It is simply an essential protection for
our cities and communities here at home.
Now, you have spent time on this. Have you ever sorted out
the sea-based system and how that could be brought in a timely
way to augment the current architecture that was employed by
the last administration?
Dr. Wolfowitz. If I may make one general point quickly and
then get to your question. I think you said something which I
think is missed too often, and that is we are not talking about
missile defense as it emerged during the Cold War. We are not
talking about SDI, we are not talking about how to compete with
the Soviet Union. We are talking about a limited missile
defense, of a kind that, frankly, I would think the Russians
themselves would want to have.
On the specific question of sea-based options or, I would
say, other options more generally, I think one of the things we
need to do, and hopefully the Russians will concur in this and
we can do it cooperatively, is to relax a number of the
restrictions of the ABM Treaty that I believe have prevented us
from looking adequately at those kinds of options. I am just
starting to get read into this on a classified basis, but it is
quite clear to me from what I have seen already that our
development would have looked very different over the last 10
years if the ABM Treaty had not been there or if it had been
modified.
What we want to do is find the most effective, least
expensive, and least provocative way of proceeding in this
direction. I think that is something that hopefully we can
persuade the Russians and our allies and many other people is
in their interest as well.
Chairman Warner. I thank you for that observation and I
share that. Actually, I was in the Department at the time the
ABM Treaty was negotiated and happen to have been part of the
delegation that attended the signing, that ceremony. I was
there for other purposes.
Dr. Wolfowitz. It was a different era, was it not, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Warner. It was a different era. It was May 1972,
and at that time I was Secretary of the Navy and had finished
negotiations of the Incidents at Sea agreement which was signed
the day before the ABM Treaty.
The point being that, yes, we do need to address
modifications, amendments, to the ABM Treaty because the Treaty
does serve, I think, an important role in the architecture, the
world architecture of arms control agreements. But I think
progress is being made with the Russians to come to the
realization that this country has a right to defend itself and
employ that technology which can be most efficiently and cost
effectively used to achieve that system.
Again, I commend the President for his very clear, forceful
message to the entire world that he is going to protect the
rights of this country to defend itself and that he will
pursue, I think, in a diligent way, in consultation with our
allies, amendments to the ABM Treaty.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I think we are getting more of a bipartisan
consensus in this country, which is progress.
Chairman Warner. I think you are correct in that.
But I do believe that we have to begin to put more focus on
the sea-based option as a follow-on or an adjunct, whatever
phraseology you wish, because that gives us in my judgment a
greater protection of the instruments themselves on the high
seas from interdiction of the defense system as a part of any
attack, a limited attack.
Now, moving on to Secretary Rumsfeld's very important point
when he was before this committee, he said that this Nation
needs ``a reasonable exit strategy'' as a precondition for the
decision to make a military intervention. What definition would
you apply to ``a reasonable exit strategy''?
Dr. Wolfowitz. That we can define what our goals are,
successfully achieve those goals, and then take our forces out.
I suppose one might--at least that would be what I would
generally strive to achieve. I suppose there might be a
situation like the one we used to have in Europe or the one we
still have in Korea, where ``exit'' is not the right word; it
is a long-term commitment, but a stable one where you have a
deterrent force in place.
But certainly for most of the things we are talking about I
would hope it is the kind of thing where you can finish the job
and be done.
Chairman Warner. Dr. Wolfowitz, that concludes the
questions from the committee. I think that your responses have
been very clear. I thank you for your what I perceive as total
cooperation today. This committee will very shortly gather to
determine the balance of the confirmation process, but at the
moment I am optimistic we can conclude it in an expeditious
manner.
I thank you very much.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz by
Chairman Warner prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]

February 23, 2001.
Hon. John Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith are the answers to the policy
questions the Senate Armed Services Committee asked me to complete.
Sincerely,
Paul D. Wolfowitz.
cc: Senator Carl Levin,
Ranking Minority Member.
______

Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. More than 10 years have passed since the enactment of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and
the Special Operations reforms. From your close association with
defense issues, you have had an opportunity to observe the
implementation and impact of those reforms.
Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Answer. The establishment of the unified and specified combatant
commands, the delineation of responsibilities, and most importantly,
the focus on ``jointness'' outlined in the Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 has enhanced the readiness and warfighting capabilities of the
U.S. Armed Forces.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense
reforms have been implemented?
Answer. These reforms have changed the way the Department of
Defense works by strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, and significantly
improving the ability of the Department to protect America's security
and further its vital interests. The reforms have helped improve the
interaction among the services in conducting military operations by
making joint operations the norm.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of
these defense reforms?
Answer. I would consider each of the goals noted below to be an
important aspect of these defense reforms. Each one has enhanced the
ability of the Department of Defense to carry out its assigned
responsibilities.
Question. The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms,
as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian
control; improving military advice; placing a clear responsibility on
the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions;
ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with
their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of
strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use
of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military
operations and improving the management and administration of the
Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes, I support the goals of Congress in enacting the
reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
Question. Do you anticipate submitting legislative proposals to
amend Goldwater-Nichols?
Answer. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will work
with the Secretary to review the extent to which the reforms have been
implemented and the extent to which they have achieved their stated
goals. As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted, we would consult with Congress
on any changes that might be appropriate.
Question. If so, what areas do you plan to address in these
proposals?
Answer. It would be premature to offer any thoughts on the question
at this time.
relationships
Question. What do you see as the relationship between the Deputy
Secretary of Defense and each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense
Answer. If confirmed, it is the Secretary's intent that I act as
the Department's chief operating officer under the Secretary's
direction as chief executive officer. It will be my duty to execute the
policies of the President and the Secretary within the department, and,
when new direction or guidance is needed, to facilitate the timely,
accurate, and reasoned presentation to the Secretary of issues that
require his or the President's consideration.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense
Answer. My relationship with all other senior officials of the
Department will, for the most part, be based on the chief operating
officer role described above. If I am confirmed, I will seek to carry
out the policies and guidance of the Secretary with respect to actions
and initiatives of the respective Under Secretaries, and bring to the
Secretary's attention facts, options, analyses, and recommendations
from the Under Secretaries when such guidance or direction is needed.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Answer. My relationship with Assistant Secretaries of Defense and
other senior officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would
be similar to that described above in relation to the Under Secretaries
of Defense.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
the Chairman to assure his full participation in the leadership team of
the Department of Defense.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a vital
role in developing and implementing joint plans, programs, and policies
for the Services. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with
the Vice Chairman.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments carry out the
policies of the President and the Secretary of Defense in their
respective Military Departments and make recommendations to the
Secretary and to Congress relating to their Military Departments and
the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
the Secretaries of the Military Departments. I will assure that they
are aware of the President's and the Secretary's policies and
priorities and assist them in contributing to the successful
development and implementation of effective DOD policies and programs.
This includes assuring that the recommendations of the Secretaries of
the Military Departments are brought to the Secretary of Defense and
that they understand his policies.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff provide advice to the Secretaries of
their respective Military Departments and other senior officials, and
carry out the policies of the Secretaries of their respective Military
Departments and the Secretary of Defense. My relationship with the
Service Chiefs will follow the model outlined above, but with the extra
dimension that my relationship will be in the context of my overarching
relationship with the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Question. The Service Acquisition Executives
Answer. The Service Acquisition Executives are most directly
involved with their respective Service Secretaries and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In the
role of chief operating officer of the Department, I will, if
confirmed, promote the successful involvement of the Service
Acquisition Executives in the development and execution of the policies
and initiatives of the Secretary of Defense in the acquisition field.
Question. The Inspector General
Answer. As the Department's chief operating officer, I consider it
my responsibility to support the Department of Defense Inspector
General (DODIG) in carrying out his or her duties as set forth in the
Inspector General Act.
qualifications
Question. Section 132 of Title 10, United States Code, provides
that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed
by the Secretary of Defense.
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that
Secretary Rumsfeld will prescribe for you?
Answer. In general, if confirmed, I expect to be the chief
operating officer of the Department while the Secretary fulfills the
role of the chief executive officer. It will be my duty to execute the
policies of the President and the Secretary within the Department and,
where necessary, to present well-reasoned advice when policy must be
changed or modified. If confirmed, I will endeavor to establish close
and effective relationships with Congress and to insist that
responsible officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Military Departments do likewise.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. If confirmed, this will be my third senior position in the
Department of Defense and the second one that requires confirmation by
the Senate. I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Regional Programs from 1977-1980 and as Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy from 1989-1993. This latter position covered a period of time
that included the end of the Cold War, the revision of our national
strategy, and the planning for and conduct of major military operations
in Panama and the Persian Gulf region. In addition to these positions,
I have held senior management positions as Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and served as U.S. Ambassador to
Indonesia, running one of the most important U.S. embassies in Asia.
Finally, for the last 7 years I have managed a school of international
affairs that entailed the development of fiscal and academic programs
for 750 students on campuses in Washington, D.C.; Nanjing, China; and
Bologna, Italy. The school is a $30 million per year operation. While
in the job, I also supervised a team that more than doubled the
school's endowment.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take
to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Deputy Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. I believe that I have an excellent, general base of
experience for this position. Without presuming confirmation, I have
already begun to benefit from excellent information briefings from the
SASC Staff, various offices within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Staff. Courtesy calls with over a dozen members
of this committee have been invaluable. I believe if confirmed, I am
ready to assume the duties of the position of Deputy Secretary of
Defense, which will remain a learning experience, as long as I hold the
office.
budgetary impact of contingency operations
Question. Over the past several years, military units have been
increasingly deployed to contingency operations around the world. While
participation in these operations may improve discipline, unit cohesion
and leadership skills that are not generally possible to develop during
normal garrison activities, they disrupt operating budgets, cause lost
training opportunities, and accelerate wear and tear on equipment.
Additionally, increased OPTEMPO impacts quality of life and could
jeopardize retention of high-quality people. Finally, unless funded
through timely emergency supplemental appropriations, they divert funds
from programs designed for needed readiness or modernization.
Do you have any ideas as to how to reduce the impact of these
operations on both near and long-term readiness and modernization
programs?
Answer. Near term, contingency operations--regardless of their
intrinsic merits--can damage readiness by interrupting needed training
for wartime operations, accelerating wear and tear on equipment, and
eroding the quality of life of military personnel and their families.
However, that damage can be minimized through careful management, and
whatever damage is unavoidable can sometimes be offset by benefits to
the units participating in these operations. Key to avoiding damage is
robust funding for readiness accounts, so that readiness needs can be
met before, during, and after contingency operations. Looking long-
term, damage to modernization programs is best prevented by timely
funding so that the Department does not have to disrupt procurement and
RDT&E programs. Especially key is accurate DOD projections of
operational costs and timely congressional approval of supplemental
appropriations that are needed for unbudgeted contingency operations.
preparation for future threats
Question. We have heard a great deal recently about the fact that
Russia no longer poses the threat to U.S. interests that the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact once did. Because of this, many argue that we
can continue to cut back on defense spending and force structure beyond
that which we have already achieved. Recognizing the need for a
comprehensive examination of our national security requirements,
Congress passed legislation last year that would make permanent the
requirement for the Department of Defense to conduct the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). As a result of the last QDR, the Department
recommended a reduction in military personnel levels despite the
recognition that we will continue to engage in numerous peacekeeping
activities. This, in part, led the National Defense Panel to state that
``there is insufficient connectivity between the strategy on the one
hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement
decisions on the other.''
Do you believe that the Two Major Theater War scenario continues to
be the most appropriate basis for determining force structure,
operational concepts and procurement decisions for U.S. armed forces?
Answer. Modern history suggests that the United States has often
faced more than one security contingency at a time. With that history
in mind, preparations are appropriate. The increasing diversification
of current and emerging threats requires that we build forces and
operational concepts aimed at fashioning a new approach to deterrence.
The manner in which the United States underwrites deterrence--for
example, how we posture our military to be able to respond to multiple
contingencies--is an issue of military strategy and operations and the
adequacy of available resources at the time. This issue will be
examined in the strategic review.
Question. Do you believe that the force structure, operational
concepts, and procurement decisions recommended by the QDR are
sufficient to provide the capability to engage in overlapping Major
Theater Wars today, and to prepare for the potential military threats
of the future?
Answer. It is important that we shape and prepare the armed forces
to respond to whatever national security challenges may confront us. We
must ensure that the military has the tools it needs to fight and win,
should that be necessary. The technological revolution makes possible
new forces and concepts of operations that can transform the way we
fight in the future. These matters will be among those examined in the
strategic review.
Question. What are the principal threats to U.S. vital national
security interests that you believe the Department should examine both
in the near and long term?
Answer. The centrifugal forces in world politics have created a
more diverse and less predictable set of potential adversaries, whose
aspirations for regional influence and whose willingness to use
military force will produce challenges to important U.S. interests and
to those of our friends and allies. Modern technology and its
proliferation also confront us with an expansion of unconventional
threats, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons,
missiles, terrorism, and the newer threats against space assets and
information systems. At the same time, we have traditional
responsibilities to existing allies in key strategic theaters that
remain in our vital interests.
Question. Would you agree that the uncertainty which we face in the
future requires us to maintain a military which is both strong and
flexible?
Answer. In addition to fielding strong, flexible military forces
for an uncertain future, the United States can help build a new
national security environment by integrating the economic,
technological, and diplomatic tools at our disposal, maintaining and
strengthening our alliances, and promoting continued market and
democratic reforms around the world. By providing for a military that
is second-to-none and equipped to meet the newer challenges of the 21st
century, I believe we can best ensure a peaceful strategic environment
that advances U.S. national security interests and those of our friends
and allies. The goal is to assure that our country has the new
capabilities necessary to deter and defend in this new security
environment so we are able to contribute to lasting peace and
stability.
readiness indicators
Question. Over the past several years, the committee has observed
discrepancies between the readiness reports we receive from the
Pentagon and the information we receive from the operational forces.
Many of these discrepancies are attributed to a readiness reporting
system including the SORTS data which is designed to provide a snapshot
of the current state of readiness rather than a projection of the
future.
If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, will you work with
the Services to try to develop a better system of measuring and
reporting readiness, including a way to predict future readiness, so
that we have an adequate understanding of any readiness problems within
the operational forces?
Answer. At its core, our readiness reporting system centers on the
readiness of our forces for high intensity combat operations. While the
current system is useful, I know that it can be improved, and I support
efforts to do so. The basic position as developed in this committee and
others and as outlined by President Bush remains clear: we have an
urgent need to address any decline in operational readiness.
plan colombia
Question. The United States is heavily involved in resourcing and
training Colombian security forces that are fighting the growth and
processing of coca leaves and the transport of refined cocaine. U.S.
forces are specifically precluded, by policy, from taking a direct part
in any such operations.
Do you favor continuing U.S. support for Colombian security forces
in this effort?
Answer. The Department's counterdrug programs and policies are
currently under review. This is a process in which I will participate
if confirmed. At this point, however, it would be premature on my part
to comment on this review until it is completed.
Question. Are you committed to maintaining the policy that
precludes U.S. forces from taking a direct part in these operations?
Answer. As with all other Department policies, if confirmed I will
reserve the right to review the existing policy and make my
recommendations to the Secretary. However, in principle, I support the
policy which prohibits DOD personnel from accompanying drug law
enforcement and foreign military forces on counterdrug field
operations.
Question. Would you favor increasing U.S. assistance to the
countries bordering Columbia to prevent a relocation of coca growth
elsewhere?
Answer. U.S. counterdrug policy relative to programs in the region
is currently under review within the interagency, to include the
Department of Defense. It would be premature on my part to speculate on
the outcome of these reviews.
maintaining our infrastructure
Question. The Department of Defense maintains the world's largest
infrastructure, with a physical plant value exceeding $500 million. It
is widely acknowledged that much of this infrastructure is in poor
condition and therefore impacts quality of life and readiness.
What are the most critical infrastructure issues facing the
Department of Defense?
Answer. Our physical plant is too big, too old, and too often in
poor condition. The Department faces the daunting task of rationalizing
its infrastructure and finding the resources to properly sustain,
restore and modernize the facilities and installations we will keep.
Improving the quality of life and workplaces for our servicemembers and
their families is critical to readiness and retention. The Department
believes that it has excess facility capacity and infrastructure in the
wrong locations. We will address these issues during our planned review
and the months thereafter.
Question. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative was enacted
to provide a means for solving the military services' housing crisis.
Has the initiative lived up to its expectations? If not, what
actions would you advocate to assure the success of the program?
Answer. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative was slow to
start, but with nine projects now awarded, it has demonstrated that it
is a powerful and important tool to solve our housing shortfall.
Enthusiasm is high in the Military Services to do more, but the success
of the program depends on capturing lessons learned at the initial
projects and applying them as we move forward.
defense health funding
Question. As you are aware from your current position, the
Department of Defense has identified a core program shortfall in the
Defense Health Program of $6 billion from fiscal year 2002-2005. These
figures do not include any expansion of the Department's capabilities
or resources to meet the commitment to the over 65 military retiree
population and their families.
If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, how do you plan to
address this shortfall?
Answer. Addressing this or any other major program funding
shortfall will be our task once the DOD strategic review is completed
and used to set guidelines for future spending. Additionally, however,
we will be scrutinizing processes and management--including those in
the Defense Health Program--to make improvements, increase efficiency,
and save money.
aviation modernization programs
Question. In a recent presentation, the Air Force Chief of Staff
stated that if all of our current aviation modernization programs
execute as planned, in 15 years the average age of aircraft in the
inventory will be 30 years. Specifically there has been much
speculation that the current tactical aviation modernization plan is
not affordable.
Is this a viable program?
Answer. The requirements and timing of the tactical fighter
programs are subjects in the on-going review which Secretary Rumsfeld
has initiated. Although a major investment, the modernization of U.S.
tactical fighters is of immense importance and deserves careful review.
Question. With the cost of individual platforms escalating, will we
ever be able to rejuvenate our fleet of aircraft without a significant
increase in our modernization budgets?
Answer. Given the aging of the current fighter force structure,
replacement aircraft must be procured. Once the review is complete, we
will be in a position to address the budget necessary to satisfy the
required future force structure.
Question. How do you expect the development of unmanned aerial
vehicles to impact our requirements for manned platforms over this
period?
Answer. Our unmanned aerial vehicles have demonstrated their value
as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. As the
quantity and capability of these unmanned systems increase, we expect
them to pick up more of these roles, complementing our heavily tasked,
manned intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance fleet. We also have
technology programs to begin to develop combat roles for unmanned
aerial vehicles. If the technologies prove successful, these unmanned
systems will complement our manned combat fleet.
readiness
Question. Over the last few years we have seen increasing evidence
that the readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces has begun to deteriorate as
a result of the over-commitment of an under-resourced Department of
Defense. Whether you look at the comments of Army Training and Doctrine
Command commanders, the testimony of the Service Chiefs, or reports of
severe shortages aboard deployed naval vessels, all point to a pending
readiness crisis. Many have argued that we are approaching a readiness
death spiral where maintaining today's aging equipment and facilities
is preventing the modernization necessary to maintain readiness in the
future.
What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have
to be addressed by the Bush administration, and, if confirmed, how will
you approach these issues?
Answer. Our new administration faces a number of readiness
challenges across the military. These include the classic ``unit
readiness'' concerns of robust manning, functioning equipment, and
realistic training so that our military is prepared to defend the vital
national interests of the United States. Our war fighting commanders
around the world must have the assets to synchronize and use their
units in effective joint and coalition forces. This ``joint readiness''
requires effective command, control, communications, and computer
(C\4\) systems; robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) systems; sufficient lift to mobilize forces and equipment;
interoperability; and healthy logistics practices and sustainment
stocks. I believe that the U.S. also needs to be better prepared for
the growing threats posed by terrorism, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), threats to critical information and other infrastructure
systems, and vulnerable space assets. Some of the more pressing
concerns lie in the condition of equipment, or more broadly, the
materiel readiness of the forces. Of particular concern is the
readiness of our aviation forces. They continue to struggle to overcome
the ill effects of higher-than-planned use and inadequate parts support
that have accrued since the end of the Cold War. While increased
funding in the past 2 years has had some positive effect on materiel
readiness, there is more work to be done. DOD's equipment is growing
older, and we will be continually challenged to keep our existing
forces ready while preparing for the threats of the future. Our
National Guard and Reserve Forces also have a number of unique
challenges in meeting their mission requirements upon deployment that
require our immediate attention. As we undertake a thorough review of
the National Military Strategy, we will address these concerns.
readiness supplemental funding requirement
Question. The military services have provided this committee with a
list of $4.5 billion in near-term readiness requirements, such as spare
parts and equipment maintenance, and another $2.5 billion for emergency
personnel and modernization programs, that they have identified for
this fiscal year.
Have you taken a look at the military services fiscal year 2001
emergency requirements and will the administration submit a
supplemental budget request to fund these items?
Answer. I have not studied in detail the service's unfunded fiscal
year 2001 requirements. The administration's position is that DOD's
strategic review must be completed before any decision on submitting an
fiscal year 2001 supplemental appropriations request is made.
vieques
Question. Over the past 18 months Naval forces deploying from the
east coast of the United States have been prevented from conducting
live-fire training on the Navy's training range on Vieques, Puerto
Rico, which has had a significant impact on the readiness of these
forces to execute their wartime missions. An agreement was reached with
the then-Governor of Puerto Rico, and legislation passed to implement
that agreement, which will provide economic incentives to the people of
Vieques in return for their cooperation in the restoration of live-fire
training. Unfortunately, the current Governor has stated that she will
not abide by the terms of this agreement and that she will insist the
Navy cease operations immediately.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to achieve the restoration
of live-fire training on Vieques?
Answer. It is my understanding that Vieques is a superior site for
rehearsing amphibious operations, the only site currently used for
aerial mine warfare training, and is the only location currently
available on the east coast where aircraft, naval surface ships, and
ground forces can employ combined arms training with live ammunition
under realistic conditions. It is also the only range currently
available on the east coast that allows the Navy and Marine Corps to
conduct naval gunfire training. I understand that to date no
alternative sites, providing the ability to conduct combined arms
training with live ammunition under realistic conditions, have been
located. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Rumsfeld and the
Department of the Navy to explore all possible options for solutions
that best meet the national interest.
outsourcing of commercial activities
Question. Do you believe that the military services need to retain
a core capability to perform certain activities such as equipment
maintenance, and what approach you take to allocate workloads between
the public and private sector?
Answer. The size and composition of DOD's facilities to perform
equipment maintenance is an important aspect of the overall readiness
of the Armed Forces. The appropriate balance between government and
private sector facilities must be struck in a manner that assures the
equipment employed by the Armed Forces will be ready for use when
needed. This balance in turn will be affected over time by the nature
of the technology used in military equipment. A balance will be
reviewed to assure that capabilities essential to national defense that
cannot reliably be provided by the private sector will be provided by
the government sector. Moreover, critical capabilities will be
maintained in the government sector.
Question. Do you believe that significant savings can be achieved
through outsourcing, and if so, do you have any data that would be
applicable to those activities which you would outsource?
Answer. I believe significant savings can be achieved by competing
the Department's non-core activities with the private sector. While
there has been some debate over the actual magnitude of the savings,
recent studies have all agreed that savings are substantial. I believe
specific functions should be identified for study where the most
potential for savings and efficiency improvement exists. For example,
past studies indicate base operating support functions achieve above
average savings. I would review all functional areas to identify and
target those commercial activities that offer the most promise for
competition with the private sector.
commercial vs. military requirements for frequency spectrum
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to review the
Department's total spectrum requirements and ensure that new systems
are designed to ensure efficient spectrum utilization by the Department
of Defense?
Answer. I understand the Department has reviewed its current and
long-term electromagnetic spectrum needs, and will continue to re-
assess these regularly. The Department has also revised its acquisition
regulations to mandate more stringent procedures for determining and
validating, prior to production decision, the requirements for and
availability of spectrum for all equipment and systems to be utilized
by the Department. If confirmed, I plan to support these efforts and
ensure that the Department continues to investigate new technologies
for the more efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum such as
software programmable radio technology.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take if the study
currently being conducted within the Department of Defense determines
that there will be a significant cost and operational impact if the
military services surrender the 1755--1850 MHz band of frequencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will need to be thoroughly briefed on the
study to fully appreciate its findings. The Department will continue to
work closely with the National Telecommunication and Information
Administration and the Federal Communications Commission in determining
the best decision for the Nation, balancing national security and
economic development, in identifying spectrum for the next generation
of wireless systems while understanding that the Department's readiness
must not be comprised. I know that Secretary Rumsfeld assigns a very
high priority to this. I would also like to acknowledge the tremendous
support the Department has received from this committee in supporting
the Department's assured access to the electromagnetic spectrum.
base realignment and closure
Question. The previous administration insisted that another round
of base closures was needed to streamline the defense budget and to
shift resources into personnel programs and weapons procurement.
However, when asked if in the absence of an additional base closure
round they would provide, for congressional consideration, a list of
those facilities that they consider excess and eligible for closure,
they have been unable, or unwilling, to do so.
Do you believe that we have excess defense facilities and, if so,
where does this excess capacity exist?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Would you recommend additional rounds of base closures?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Would you provide a list of those facilities for
congressional consideration absent the authorization of another round
of base closure?
Answer. See response below.
Question. Would you support another round of BRAC but limited to
where excess capacity exists?
Answer. As Secretary Rumsfeld noted in his response to Advance
Policy Questions from this committee, we will withhold an assessment of
this issue until after the completion of the defense review.
policy toward iraq
Question. Ten years after the successful conclusion of Operation
Desert Storm, tens of thousands of U.S. troops remain in the Persian
Gulf region--at a cost of $1 billion per year--to enforce the current
U.S. policy of containing Saddam Hussein. Despite our efforts, Saddam
remains in power in Iraq, his weapons programs unchecked; the
international coalition that repelled him from Kuwait has virtually
collapsed; and our friends and allies in Europe and the Gulf region are
reestablishing diplomatic ties with Iraq.
What steps do you think the United States should take to
reinvigorate the international community's efforts to ensure Iraqi
compliance with the obligations Iraq accepted at the end of the Gulf
War--particularly those obligations related to disarmament?
Answer. The administration is in the process of reviewing all the
elements of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This review will have to address
whether more can be done to secure Baghdad's compliance with the
conditions laid down by the United Nations, particularly its obligation
to foreswear the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. It will also
have to address the complex task of rebuilding support for an effective
policy in the region and in the international community.
Question. What role do you believe the Iraqi opposition can play in
these efforts?
Answer. This is an issue that the Iraq policy review now underway
will have to address. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on it
at this time.
Question. Do you believe that sanctions are an effective tool
against Saddam Hussein?
Answer. Sanctions can be a part of an effective policy, but they
are not a substitute for a policy. The administration is reviewing
whether any adjustments are needed in the U.S. approach to
administering the sanctions. It is important to remember that the focus
of the sanctions is not the Iraqi people but preventing Saddam Hussein
from developing and using weapons of mass destruction against his own
people or his neighbors, as he has done before.
u.s. military presence in bosnia
Question. Last December marked the 5-year anniversary of the NATO
military presence in Bosnia. Although reduced from its early high of
about 60,000 troops, the international community, under NATO
leadership, today maintains a force of over 20,000 troops in Bosnia,
almost 4,600 of whom are American. Despite over 5 years of an
international military presence in Bosnia, we are far from achieving
the goal of a unified, multi-ethnic nation, as envisioned in the Dayton
Accords which ended the war. In fact, during the most recent nation-
wide elections in Bosnia, the Nationalists--those who oppose the aims
of Dayton--made surprising gains.
What should the United States do to break the stalemate in Bosnia
and help create the conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops?
Answer. NATO is currently assessing options. It would be
inappropriate for me to comment further.
Question. Should we consider a renegotiation of the Dayton Accords?
Answer. Dayton has served the central purpose of stopping the war.
The Dayton Accords include procedures for making changes. Whether any
changes are made is ultimately a matter for the Bosnians themselves to
decide.
north korea
Question. What is your view of the agreed framework between the
United States and North Korea?
Answer. The Agreed Framework is one element of an overall effort by
the U.S. and its democratic allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, to
prevent war and reduce the level of confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula. It is important to remember that their overall problem is
not only a nuclear one but also involves a large North Korean
conventional military threat and a long record of North Korean
hostility toward the South. The historic summit between Kim Dae-Jung
and Kim Jong-Il is a significant positive step, but we need to proceed
with caution. We also need to make sure that North Korea honors its
commitments as we live up to ours.
Question. What steps can the United States take to reduce the risks
from North Korea's weapons proliferation activities?
Answer. The risks posed by North Korea fall in three areas: the
potential to build an ICBM capable of hitting U.S. territory; the
continued domestic deployment of missiles that put our allies at risk;
and the export of long-range missiles and missile technology to world
trouble spots that heighten regional tensions. The administration is
committed to the deployment of an effective national missile defense as
soon as it is technologically feasible. Given the widespread deployment
of North Korean derived theater range ballistic missiles and the threat
those missiles pose to deployed U.S. forces as well as our friends and
allies, the administration would attach a high priority to the
development and deployment of effective theater missile defense systems
in a timely and efficient manner. It is in the U.S. interest that the
North Koreans terminate their programs and stop exporting missile
technology to other countries. The administration will pursue that
objective--the precise means would likely be determined following a
review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and its proliferation
policies.
africa
Question. The Defense Department is currently involved in a number
of initiatives in Africa to help certain nations be better prepared to
provide their own regional peacekeeping forces and humanitarian
missions. The African Crisis Response Initiative and the ongoing
training of several Nigerian army battalions for peacekeeping duty in
Sierra Leone are two examples of this policy.
Do you support such initiatives which are aimed at helping African
nations be better prepared to respond to a regional crisis?
Answer. Yes. The current strategy to develop peace operations and
humanitarian response capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa includes two key
objectives: to develop defense partnerships with important states, and
to actively engage sub-regional organizations. One of these important
states is Nigeria, with whom the U.S. is currently implementing peace
operations training in support of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (Operation
Focus Relief, or OFR).
export controls
Question. The domestic satellite industry has complained that it
has lost a significant amount of market share, and billions of dollars,
as a result of the satellite licensing provisions that were enacted as
part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
What is your view of these complaints?
Answer. Let me start by saying that the satellite industry is an
important industry for national defense. We must ensure that government
processes are not unnecessarily impeding legitimate exports of
satellites that provide the critical revenues for the industry to
continue to invest in advancing the state of the art. The satellite
industry itself has released information suggesting that competitive
pressures facing the industry are the result of a number of factors
including launch failures, competition from land-based communications
systems, and growing capabilities of foreign suppliers. All of these
factors must be reviewed in the course of establishing an appropriate
policy on the export of satellites. National security must always be of
paramount consideration.
Question. Do you believe that Congress should revisit the issue of
how we license exports of satellite technology?
Answer. I believe that the administration will be examining this
issue carefully (including any statutory or regulatory changes that
might be required), and will consult closely with Congress as this
review proceeds. Any review must be undertaken in a manner that
preserves fundamental national security interests.
Question. Over the past 2 years, 16 ambassadors from NATO countries
have written to the Secretary of State expressing their deep
frustration with the U.S. export control system. Deputy Secretary of
Defense Hamre initiated an effort to streamline export control process
without weakening controls. What is your view of Secretary Hamre's
reforms?
Do you believe that further streamlining is required?
Answer. The administration will be reviewing this issue.
Question. What policies and procedures do you believe need to be
changed in the export license control process that would reflect the
right balance between national security and commercial interests?
Answer. Exports of sensitive high technology affect U.S. national
security interests in many ways. First, we must protect our military
personnel and our security interests by ensuring that sensitive
technologies are not exported to potential adversaries or to foreign
entities that represent a significant diversion risk. Second, we must
have sensible and effective policies and procedures to ensure that
appropriate transfers of military and commercial systems and
technologies that support our coalition warfighting objectives are
permitted. Finally, we must be mindful that the U.S. is not the only
country with advanced military and commercial technology. Efforts to
control exports can sometimes become counterproductive if they weaken
American technical capacity without protecting truly critical
technologies. Thus, we need to work aggressively with our allies and
friends to ensure that our policies and approaches toward the export of
such technologies meet our mutual security interests. The Department of
Defense has an essential role to play in designing export control
policies and implementing the principles I have outlined. We will be
working closely with Congress and the other Executive Departments on
these important matters.
Question. Do you believe the Department of Defense should play a
greater role in the export licensing process than it currently does in
determining whether sensitive technologies should be exported overseas?
Answer. The Defense Department must play a strong role in the
export control policy process. Defense has a tremendous amount of
technical expertise in the export control area and should have the
ability to apply these assets to the overall export control process. I
will be reviewing whether there are specific changes that should be
proposed concerning DOD participation in these processes.
Question. What critical military technologies do you believe the
United States should not license for export overseas and why?
Answer. There are obviously a number of critical military and dual-
use systems and technologies that must be export controlled to preserve
U.S. military technological advantages and to ensure that these items
do not fall into the wrong hands. This is a changing picture as
military capabilities advance and technology become diffuse worldwide.
We must ensure that we have a system in place that regularly reviews
the specifics to make sure that we are controlling the most important
items and that we are not controlling items that cannot be effectively
controlled because of widespread availability.
Question. Senator Gramm recently reintroduced his bill to
reauthorize the Export Administration Act. Senator Gramm has
characterized his bill as an effort to build a higher fence around a
smaller number of items, the export of which would have a detrimental
impact on our national security. Others have expressed concern that the
bill does not pay sufficient attention to national security concerns.
What is your view of Senator Gramm's bill?
Answer. I have not studied the bill but will do so as soon as
possible.
Question. Do you support the reauthorization of the Export
Administration Act?
Answer. It is my understanding that the administration is in the
process of reviewing the bill and will have some comments soon.
technological capabilities of terrorists
Question. A key disadvantage of the proliferation of information
technology is that potential and acknowledged adversaries can now
gather data, imagery, and intelligence updates from many of the same
sources and means that the U.S. military uses. Keeping a step ahead of
these capabilities is a great concern for this committee.
What would you propose the Department of Defense do to address this
concern?
Answer. While greater access to multiple sources of data has many
advantages for the U.S., it is also true that our adversaries can use
commercial imagery and other burgeoning information technologies to
monitor and target U.S. interests. While we cannot prevent commercial
capabilities from becoming more sophisticated and widespread, we do
have the ability, with the proper blend of resources, personnel and
processes, to enhance the likelihood that the U.S. will continue to
maintain the information advantage it needs. Furthermore, the control
of certain technologies remains an issue of significant concern to the
Department. We will continue to review each export license request and
appropriately apply conditions and provisos to those licenses to
protect our national security interests. The Secretary has made it
clear that information superiority is one of his top priorities. If
confirmed, I intend to fully support these efforts.
Question. According to the Department of Defense's most recent
annual report to Congress entitled ``Worldwide NBC Weapons and Missile
Threat'', ``technology to improve the delivery of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons is becoming more advanced and in some cases more
available. Some countries are focused on the production of better
missile guidance and control mechanisms and countermeasures to defeat
ballistic missile defense systems.''
What options should the Department of Defense pursue to address the
threat posed by this growing capability?
Answer. The Department of Defense needs to continue to support U.S.
Government nonproliferation efforts intended to prevent or reverse the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means
of delivery, and associated technologies. It needs to press ahead with
its counterproliferation programs to ensure that U.S. forces are
prepared to fight and win in chemical and biological weapons
environments. It must develop and deploy missile defenses that are
effective against current and emerging ballistic missile threats. We
also must strive to build stronger international non-proliferation
regimes and simultaneously look for opportunities for cooperative
programs with like-minded Defense Ministries.
cooperative threat reduction (ctr)
Question. Last month Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee that
``we need to be aware of the fact that Russia, in particular, claims to
lack the financial resources to eliminate weapons of mass destruction,
but continues to invest scarce resources in the development of newer,
more sophisticated ICBMs and other weapons. We would not want the U.S.
investment in the [DOD] CTR program to become the means by which Russia
frees up resources to finance its military modernization programs. A
review of ongoing [DOD] CTR projects and their respective national
security benefits would be appropriate.''
What are the most important factors that should be considered
during this review?
Answer. The most important factor for this review should be the
extent to which the assistance provided to the eligible states of the
former Soviet Union enhances the security of the United States. Each
eligible state is unique and that will also be an important
consideration. Russia is the only eligible state that is permitted by
international treaty to retain and modernize its nuclear forces.
Therefore, an important factor for review should be whether the
Department's CTR program is structured to prevent support for Russian
military modernization programs.
Question. Do you agree that the CTR program serves the U.S.
national interests by reducing the threat from former Soviet weapons of
mass destruction?
Answer. Certainly the elimination of former Soviet strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that the CTR
program has funded has benefited U.S. national security. As the
previous answer indicates, we need to monitor the details of
implementation to insure that those purposes continue to be achieved.
reserve components
Question. Although the Department of Defense is committed to the
``Total Force,'' as recently demonstrated by the deployment of the 49th
Armored Division of the Texas Army National Guard to Bosnia, there is
concern among the Reserve community that this commitment to the ``Total
Force'' is only ``lip service.'' Those who question the Department's
support of the Reserve components point out the Reserves do not receive
an appropriate share of the defense budget for modernization and
military construction. A specific issue was that the fiscal year 2000
military construction program. While the request for the National Guard
amounted to about 3 percent of its critical needs, the active-component
funding request covered nearly 20 percent of their critical needs.
What role should our Reserve components have in the post-Cold War
era?
Answer. Over the last several years, the National Guard and
Reserves have been transformed from a Cold War force held in Reserve to
an essential force serving in the ``front lines'' daily. For example,
during each of the past 5 years, Reserve component personnel have
performed between 12.5 and 13.5 million workdays per year supporting
the active force. The Total Force Policy is now a fundamental principle
guiding the restructuring and reorientation of our Nation's military
forces. At the same time, though, we must be careful not to place too
much of the burden of our national security objectives on the Guard and
Reserve. These are immensely capable forces that play a critical but
well-defined role in our force structure. As such, the role of our
Reserve components will be examined, along with our other Armed Forces,
during the review of the overall defense strategy.
Question. Do you believe the Reserve components are fully
integrated into the ``Total Force?'' If not, what further steps should
be taken to make the integration a reality?
Answer. The integration of the Reserve components has improved
steadily. Although barriers to full integration into the Total Force
have been reduced or eliminated, work remains. For example, quality of
life programs are needed to recruit and retain Reserve component
forces. We need to work together to address employers' concerns and
provide family support programs.
Question. What should be the basis for level of funding in the
administration's budget request for the Reserve components?
Answer. Keeping the required force trained and ready remains our
top priority. The basis for the level of funding for the Reserve
components in the administration's budget request should be based on
the readiness requirements placed on the Reserve components by the
National Military Strategy, the ongoing strategic review being
undertaken by Secretary Rumsfeld at the President's direction, the
fiscal year 2001 QDR, and other missions assigned by the Services. The
Reserve components should then be resourced to ensure interoperability
to meet the requirements identified by those mandates.
Question. Due to the leaner Active Duty military and greater number
of operational commitments, the Department of Defense has increasingly
called on the Reserves and National Guard. In 1989, reservists and
members of the Guard recorded one million days of duty. In each of the
past 3 years, that figure has averaged 13 million days. This increased
workload has had an impact on the individual reservist and on his
civilian employer. As a result, retention and recruiting are impacted
and in extreme cases the relationship between the reservist and his
employer.
In your judgement, is it realistic to expect the Reserve components
to assume an increasing role in operational deployments and in the
``Total Force'' without adverse impact on their civilian jobs?
Answer. The Reserve Forces are a major and integral part of our
National Defense team. The key to their effective use is maintaining
the proper balance of utilizing their capabilities without overusing
any specific segment of the force. We will endeavor to seek a level of
participation for our reservists that maximizes the investments made in
their training and equipping while mediating the potential for
inadvertent harm done by their overuse.
Question. What can the Department do to mitigate the impact of
increasing Reserve deployments on the civilian employers?
Answer. The key to mitigating the impact of Reserve component
deployments on civilian employers is early notification, a predictable
return of the Reserve component member, and not calling upon the same
individual too often. We will continue to improve our ability to return
reservists from deployments when they are scheduled to return. Work
needs to be done to ensure that the force structure contains sufficient
high demand units so the same reservists are not used too frequently.
Question. The Reserve components represent a great asset to our
Nation as they support the National military strategy while also
serving to link our military forces to hometown populations where they
serve. These forces also provide state governments with a critical
ability to respond to natural disasters and are available to be the
first responders to homeland defense mission requirements.
Unfortunately, a significant portion of these forces appear to be
improperly structured as there are a number of medium and heavy
divisions in the Reserve components that have not been required or
assigned to support warfighting requirements. These forces are
similarly not equipped to properly support state missions. Tanks and
mechanized infantry units are of little utility to governors who need
these forces to respond to natural disasters. Modernizing these forces
with combat support and combat service support equipment appears to be
the most appropriate course to follow but would require Department of
Defense oversight and a significant investment in resources.
How do you believe this issue should be addressed and what will you
do to restructure our Reserve components to be in a better position to
support both Federal and state mission requirements?
Answer. The National Guard and Reserve Forces play an essential
role within today's force in supporting the day-to-day operations, at
home and abroad. It is also my understanding that today's Guard and
Reserve Force structure provides a significant portion of the Total
Force's combat support/combat service support capability, which
coincidentally, is also likely to be needed to help mitigate the
consequences of a domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction event. While we
anticipate that the Guard and Reserve will continue to play an
important role in supporting our homeland security for the reasons you
have articulated, it is important to note that the President and his
key national security advisors are in the process of developing a new
National Security Strategy. The President has already asked the
Secretary of Defense to be prepared to undertake appropriate actions to
reshape and restructure our force to meet that strategy. Therefore, it
would be premature to predict with any precision what changes in
structure are appropriate at this time.
privatization of services
Question. The Department is relying increasingly on the private
sector to provide critical services. Among the most significant
privatization efforts are the areas of military family housing and
utility systems.
What are your views on the ever-increasing reliance by the
Department of Defense on the private sector to provide essential
services to our military personnel?
Answer. I believe the Department should seek out private sector
performance for non-core functions where they are more cost effective
and efficient.
Question. If you support additional privatization of defense
activities, what are they?
Answer. Following the success of housing and utility privatization,
other defense activities should be reviewed as possible privatization
candidates. This is an issue that, if confirmed, I will have to study
in further detail.
Question. Although initial privatization efforts have resulted in
near term savings, there is concern that over the long term there will
be no savings.
What are your expectations of the long term benefits from these
privatization initiatives?
Answer. All of our privatization efforts require analysis of life
cycle savings to ensure they benefit the government over the long term.
My understanding is that analysis of specific competitive sourcing
competitions indicates that initial savings do, in fact, hold up over
the life of the contract. In addition to savings, privatization
supports the rapid infusion of best business practices, and attracts
private sector capital to augment Department resources.
management issues
Question. During your tenure as Deputy Secretary, what key
management performance goals do you want to accomplish, and how would
this committee be able to judge whether you have accomplished them?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to
establish key management performance goals. At this point, it would be
premature for me to offer specific performance initiatives, but in
general, one of our primary goals should be to hire, support, and
retain military and civilian personnel with the necessary skills to
meet our mission needs. As we establish our goals, we must carefully
consider the results of our ongoing strategic reviews as well as the
QDR process, and look to closely tie DOD's strategic plans to our
desired mission outcome. We also need to establish financial management
operations that provide reliable information and foster accountability.
Finally, we must look to reform our acquisition processes, establishing
business practices that are more efficient and effective. I look
forward to working with this committee and Congress as we strive to
reduce or eliminate bureaucratic redundancies in the Department of
Defense and streamline our management practices.
Question. To successfully lead an organization, a leader must be
able to create and share a vision that inspires people to follow.
In your past experience, what specific steps have you taken to
successfully create a vision for an organization, and how did you make
sure that the entire organization had a common understanding of the
mission and was aligned so that it could be accomplished?
Answer. In previous questions and in many documents supplied to the
committee, I have outlined my work history and the many organizations
that I have run. I have always believed that the importance of
leadership and management jobs is measured not by the title but by the
results that the whole organization achieves. Perhaps most telling in
the area of establishing a vision were my positions as Under Secretary
for Policy, and my work as Dean at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS), The Johns Hopkins University. In OSD
Policy from 1989-1993, I redrew the organization, picked new people,
and held numerous team building sessions to drive home my vision for
how policy would operate. I don't want to say that my team did it all
alone. Indeed, working closely with Congress, the Military Departments,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and our allies were integral parts of our
standard operating procedures. I hope that the results--a new strategy
and force structure, success in the Gulf War and in Panama, improved
relations with our allies, highly successful arms control initiatives,
and a whole set of new defense relationships with former adversaries--
validated my approach. At SAIS, I followed the same organizational
strategies and was very pleased with the results--we doubled the goal
for the school's 5-year capital campaign, focused it on the school's
top priorities and then reached our goal in 2\1/2\ years (eventually
reaching almost four times the original goal by the end of the
campaign). Through a combined team effort, we were able to not only
achieve significant increases in the school's endowment, but also
created new and up-to-date programs, better faculty, improved
facilities, and improved communications with the central university
administration in Baltimore. In both cases, the keys to success were
setting sensible objectives that could inspire support, clear
communications, good people, and lots of hard work. I agree strongly
with someone who once said that good government is a team sport. If
confirmed by the Senate, that is the spirit I will bring to my duties
as Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Question. What steps do you intend to take to accomplish these
objectives at the Department of Defense?
Answer. As noted above, it would be premature for me to offer
specific performance initiatives at this time. If confirmed, I will
work with Secretary Rumsfeld to establish key management performance
goals. I look forward to working with this committee and Congress as we
move ahead.
Question. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is
intended to provide managers with a disciplined approach--developing a
strategic plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and
reporting on the results--for improving the performance and internal
management of an organization.
What are your views on this law and your experience with it, as
well as your preliminary ideas on how this law might be implemented?
Answer. Congress enacted GPRA in 1993 to strengthen performance
management within the Federal Government. At the time GPRA was enacted,
most Federal agencies did not routinely use strategic planning or
performance management to shape resource decisions. DOD was a major
exception, having relied for more than four decades on the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to guide program development
and resource-allocation decisions. The PPBS is well aligned, in
structure and intent, with the results-oriented mandate of GPRA.
Instead of introducing a new data reporting or management system to
implement GPRA, DOD has elected to use GPRA reporting to provide an
executive-level overview of how the Secretary employs PPBS performance
objectives to manage the Department's resources.
Question. Are you familiar with the strategic plan, annual
performance plans, annual accountability report, and financial
statements of the Department of Defense?
Answer. Yes, I'm familiar with these plans and reports, which are
an important part of communicating the President's and the Secretary's
priorities to the Department, Congress, and in a larger sense, to the
American people. GPRA requires each Federal agency to produce a
strategic plan every 3 years, to submit a performance plan with each
budget, and to publish a performance report at the end of each budget
year, summarizing progress in implementing the performance plan. In the
case of DOD, Congress subsequently passed legislation establishing the
Report on the Quadrennial Defense Review as DOD's strategic plan. DOD's
annual performance plans and reports are structured to track progress
in executing the defense strategy. In the next month or 2, the
Department will forward its fiscal year 2000 performance report to
Congress. If confirmed, I will give it close attention.
Question. What do you consider to be the most important priorities
and challenges facing DOD as it strives to achieve these management
goals?
Answer. Fundamentally, I believe the Department has effective
processes in place for developing its strategic plan, establishing
goals and measuring performance, and reporting the results. The
challenge is to make sure that the substantive results of those
processes reflect the true needs of U.S. national security in the 21st
century and that goals are clearly articulated. Overall, the quality of
the data we use to monitor performance has allowed us to measure and
report our progress in meeting annual goals. In those cases where data
is lacking, we are working to improve the underlying data support
systems. Over the past several years, the Department has worked closely
with Congress, the General Accounting Office, and the DOD Inspector
General to enhance the performance of its internal management systems.
In that process, several challenges have been identified, including the
effective management of information technology investments and the need
to streamline and improve the efficiency of financial management
systems. The Secretary has made the modernization of these financial
management systems one of his priorities, and I certainly support that
objective.
Question. What changes, if any, do you feel might be necessary in
these plans?
Answer. With the change of administration, the Department will
revise its strategic plan and annual performance plans to reflect the
priorities of President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld as informed in the
ongoing strategic reviews. We will continue to work with Congress as we
present future GPRA strategic plans, performance plans, and performance
reports to ensure that our GPRA activities reflect a full and effective
implementation of the law.
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of
financial information in managing operations and holding managers
accountable?
Answer. These are immensely important. Accurate financial
information is critical to evaluating outputs, services, costs,
efficiency, productivity, and other essential management indicators.
Such information is a vital tool for holding managers accountable.
Question. How would you address a situation in which you found that
reliable, useful, and timely financial information was not routinely
available for these purposes?
Answer. I would move decisively to improve the system or get a
different one that works. It is my understanding that given the
financial challenges we are facing, systems will need to be replaced
over time.
Question. What is your view of the importance and role of internal
controls (i.e., management controls) in ensuring the reliability of
financial information?
Answer. Internal controls are very important. Their most critical
role is to hold managers accountable for results and the wise use of
resources. Also, these controls are essential to ensuring the proper
allocation, disbursement, and accounting of funds and to prevent waste,
fraud, and abuse.
Question. How would you determine whether the Department has in
place the key information management processes required by law,
including a detailed architecture, an investment control process, and
appropriate information security plans?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look to the DOD Chief Information
Officer to advise the Secretary and me on what information management
initiatives are currently in place and what additional steps need to be
taken to ensure that information technology investments are consistent
with plans, process change requirements, architectures, and other
information management guidance. I believe that the Department already
has laid the foundation for a structured and systematic process for
determining whether the key information management processes required
by law are in place.
Question. What role do you envision you would play in managing or
providing oversight over these processes?
Answer. As I indicated above, if confirmed I will look to the DOD
Chief Information Officer to provide guidance for DOD information
management and to spearhead the coordination of information technology
activities across the Department. As such, I intend to fully support
the DOD Chief Information Officer in these and other information
technology management efforts.
Question. How would you go about implementing or improving these
processes?
Answer. It would be premature for me to make any recommendations
until I have had more time to study this area. However, if confirmed I
intend to work closely with the DOD Chief Information Officer and other
senior leaders in the Department to identify opportunities to improve
existing information technology and management processes, and to
achieve those improvements.
Question. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
envisions that agencies will link their human capital planning with
their strategic and annual plans.
Can you describe your experience in building and maintaining the
human capital needed to achieve results (getting the right employees
for the job and providing the training, structure, incentives, and
accountability to work effectively)?
Answer. Attracting the right people, matching ``faces with
spaces,'' ensuring professional development, and rewarding outstanding
performance have been essential parts of every management job that I
have ever held. Indeed, I believe that recruiting the right people for
the right jobs and motivating them to perform are the most important
keys to effective management. In government and in the academic world,
where I have managed medium to large organizations, there are fewer
tangible incentives to offer for performance and less flexibility to
hire and fire. That means that one has to pay more attention, not less,
to how you motivate people and provide as much intangible job
satisfaction as possible, most importantly by empowering capable
performers and entrusting them with meaningful responsibilities. Given
our tight labor market, the Department of Defense's senior leadership
and personnel managers will have to become more people-centric and
rethink our incentive structure. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge
to make personnel issues--military and civilian--a central concern for
senior departmental management.
Question. The DOD workforce has undergone significant downsizing in
the past several years, and with the current tight labor market, it is
becoming increasingly difficult to attract and retain talent.
How would you work to attract and retain individuals with the
experience, education, and skills needed throughout the Department of
Defense?
Answer. The issues facing DOD in recruiting, developing, and
retaining an excellent civilian workforce require a multi-faceted
approach. I believe we begin by determining carefully what future
workforce needs will be. Armed with that information, we need to
strengthen or put into place the appropriate accession and retention
strategies, including policies, legislation, and compensation. We also
need to offer development opportunities, both as key accession and
retention tools and as insurance that we are growing the cadre of
leaders and managers necessary to implement our Defense strategy.
Finally, we must continue to manage the workforce transition
effectively.
Question. To become a high-performance organization, an agency
needs senior leaders who are drivers of continuous improvement.
What is your approach to motivating career employees to achieve
excellence?
Answer. Career civil servants represent the core of operations, as
they provide the continuity and institutional knowledge that support
all of our military operations. Therefore, I believe in recognizing
that value and rewarding excellence. One of the most important things
is to communicate clearly the importance of the mission and an
understanding of how their work contributes to the mission. Another way
of doing so is to provide the education and training necessary to meet
the increasingly complex mission. If confirmed, I will review existing
education and training programs to ensure that they give current and
prospective leaders the tools they need to manage effectively in the
highly complex Defense environment. I will also make every effort to
ensure that our career employees are appropriately compensated for all
they do and would encourage public recognition of excellence.
science and technology
Question. The Department of Defense Science and Technology program
is at a 20-year low. The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Bill for Fiscal Year 1999 established the goal of increasing the budget
for the defense science and technology program by at least 2 percent
over inflation for each of the fiscal years 2000 to 2008. This goal has
not been met in the fiscal year 2000 nor the fiscal year 2001 budget
request submitted by President Clinton. In President-elect Bush's
speech at the Citadel he spoke of his support for a strong and stable
technology base.
If confirmed, how will you reflect this support in the defense
budget?
Answer. One of my goals will be to fund the Science and Technology
(S&T) program at a level adequate to ensure the technological
superiority of our armed forces. A downsized military needs a
technological edge now more than ever. President Bush has committed to
increasing defense R&D by at least $20 billion between fiscal years
2001-2006. The S&T accounts should receive a substantial share of this
increase.
Question. The defense laboratories are facing a future of continued
reductions in research and support personnel. This trend, if unchecked,
could result in a loss of ``critical mass'' in research efforts across
a number of areas critical to future programs. This situation is
further complicated by the fact that in the current economy the
Department is vying with industry for the best and the brightest high
tech personnel, but is unable to compete on salary and quality of work.
Finally, the process for hiring can take up to 18 months as opposed to
direct hiring in industry.
If confirmed, how will you attract and retain scientists and
engineers in the Department of Defense?
Answer. This is an important issue, central to transformation.
Unfortunately, I do not yet know enough about it to give you a complete
answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that attracting and retaining
scientists and engineers is a key priority of the Department of
Defense.
modernization
Question. Last fall, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that
if the Department were to execute just the current procurement plans,
at the rates included in the approved acquisition strategy, that an
additional $30 billion a year would be required in the procurement
accounts alone.
Do you agree that the procurement accounts are not executable
unless there is an infusion of additional funds?
Answer. The CBO estimate is based on the assumption that the
currently approved plans are appropriate. The ongoing defense review
directed by Secretary Rumsfeld will specify where shortfalls lie and
what must be done to address those shortfalls. If confirmed, I will
actively support that review.
Question. Do you believe that significant changes are needed in the
Department's current procurement plans?
Answer. See previous answer.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to address this
shortfall, if it in fact exists?
Answer. The aforementioned review of the U.S. national security
strategy will result in consideration of which capabilities to
modernize, upgrade or replace with new technology. Properly conducted,
this process would address the Department's procurement plans.
Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization
programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical,
strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever-
increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance
costs, readiness levels continue to decline.
How can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the
modernization efforts be affordable at anywhere near the current budget
levels?
Answer. I look at Secretary Rumsfeld's ongoing defense review as
the first step to addressing these issues. That review should clarify
the appropriate balance between legacy forces and modernization
efforts.
department of defense organization
Question. In the 50 years of DOD's existence, there has grown up a
substantial bureaucracy, much of which duplicates functions in the
military departments.
In your opinion, are there areas where functions should be
centralized in DOD, at the expense of the military departments, or
should functions be devolved from DOD to those departments? Please give
examples.
Answer. Without a more careful internal review, it would be
premature for me at this point to offer any thoughts on administrative
restructuring. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary Rumsfeld and
the Service Secretaries to identify redundancies in our bureaucratic
infrastructure and to streamline our operations where possible.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Deputy Secretary of Defense?
Answer. We will need to consider a number of issues in evaluating
our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. Our goal
is to assure that our country has the new capabilities necessary to
deter threats and defend our national security interests and contribute
to peace and stability. This will involve transforming our U.S.
military into a 21st century force, modernizing the intelligence and
command, control, and communications infrastructure, and reforming DOD
structures, processes, and organizations. In addition, our new
capabilities and readiness must be sustainable. Balancing limited
resources--even in an atmosphere of projected budget surpluses--is
always a challenge. Properly outfitting our forces today, while at the
same time ensuring we sustain robust modernization for the future, will
be a key challenge for the new administration. Specific quality of life
issues--such as morale, recruiting and retention, health care and
benefits--will also be important.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. These issues and others will be considered in the defense
review and the QDR. Through these reviews, we will examine priorities
and consider the fiscal implications associated with those priorities.
most serious problems
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Department of Defense?
Answer. As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted, institutional change
across the board--in the executive branch, the legislative branch, the
private sector, as well as our allies--will present a great challenge.
If confirmed, I plan to work with Secretary Rumsfeld to establish key
management performance goals and to reduce or eliminate bureaucratic
redundancies in the Department of Defense and streamline our management
practices.
Question. What management actions and time lines would you
establish to address these problems?
Answer. It is too early to establish time lines. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with this committee and Congress as we address
current problems in the Department of Defense.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
overseas presence
1. Senator Thurmond. The United States maintains a significant
number of forces in forward deployed locations such as Europe and South
Korea. With the end of the Cold War and ongoing peace initiatives on
the Korean Peninsula, what is the justification for keeping the large
number of forces forward deployed?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Although the Cold War has ended and tensions on the
Korean Peninsula have begun to lessen, forward-deployed U.S. forces in
Europe, South Korea, and elsewhere continue to serve a number of vital
national purposes. Our forces in Europe not only ensure the continuing
security and stability of this critical region, they are also well
postured to respond to crises both in Europe and in adjoining regions
such as the Middle East.
Despite some lessening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North
Korea remains a significant military threat to South Korea. U.S. forces
in South Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia represent a powerful
deterrent to North Korean aggression and, should deterrence fail, would
constitute a critical element of the initial response to that
aggression. Moreover, as with our forces in Europe, our forces in
Northeast Asia provide broader benefits. They demonstrate our ongoing
security commitment to the region, underwrite regional stability, and
provide rapid response to crises throughout Asia.

most significant challenge
2. Senator Thurmond. Unlike the period of the Cold War, the United
States Armed Forces are facing the challenges of a world that is
politically and economically unstable and unpredictable. In view of
this uncertain future what in your personal views will be the most
significant challenge facing the U.S. Armed Forces in the next 10
years?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The most pressing challenge we face in the next 10
years will be ensuring our men and women in uniform have the
wherewithal they need to address the threats of a new security
environment, in which a more diverse, less predictable set of potential
adversaries will seek to challenge the strategic interests of the
United States and of our allies. Maintaining a capable and flexible
force appropriate for this environment will require us to address
issues ranging from recruitment and quality of life concerns to the
expansion of unconventional threats brought by the proliferation of
modern technology, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons, missiles, terrorism and newer threats against space assets and
information systems.

junior rotc programs
3. Senator Thurmond. As you may be aware, I am very interested in
the Junior ROTC program. While the primary purpose of the program is to
develop good citizens, there are tangible benefits to our Nation's
Armed Forces. Statistics show that more than 40 percent of the students
who graduate from the Junior ROTC program choose some form of military
service.
Although I have expressed my goal to enhance the program to
Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to make you aware of my interest in the
program and would appreciate your views regarding Junior ROTC?
Dr. Wolfowitz. In his February 21 letter to you, Secretary Rumsfeld
underscored his support for the Junior ROTC program and reported the
intent to look into expansion during the Department's forthcoming
defense review. I agree that JROTC is a great way to improve the
citizenship of America's high school youth, while helping students and
faculty better understand and appreciate their armed forces.

dod transformation
4. Senator Thurmond. Our services are undergoing or are planning
major transformation to meet the challenges posed by threats of
spreading technologies, increased nationalism, and weapons of mass
destruction. In your personal view, why has it taken this long to begin
the transformation and are these changes looking far enough into the
future to be effective against emerging threats?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Implementing rapid transformation of the world's
premier fighting force is difficult absent a compelling case for how
and why the future security environment demands such change. It is a
difficult challenge to balance this transformation with our nearer-term
readiness concerns. As a greater consensus emerges on future security
challenges, the pace of transformation should accelerate. The means to
measure progress toward transformation goals are also required in order
to manage the allocation of resources appropriately. It is our goal to
achieve a clearer articulation of emerging challenges in the context of
the current strategy review. The metrics for measuring success should
follow closely. We must carefully look at process changes that will
bring new transformed capabilities to the field more rapidly.

key issues
5. Senator Thurmond. Your experience and knowledge regarding the
Department of Defense and Congress will serve you well during your
tenure as Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Based on that experience and on the needs of our Armed Forces, what
is the one key issue that you would like to resolve before you leave
office?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I have no single issue that will animate my work in
the Department. Rather, I will focus my efforts on helping Secretary
Rumsfeld attain the President's three major goals for the Defense
Department:

First, to strengthen the bond of trust with the
American military;
Second, to develop the capabilities to defend against
missiles, terrorists and the complex set of threats to our
information systems and our all-important assets in space; and
Third, to take advantage of the technological
revolution in order to help us create a military for the 21st
century.

At the end of my tour, if I have improved the well-being of the
Department's people--military and civilian, Active and Reserve--and
their ability to defend our Nation, I will consider my mission
accomplished.

multinational force and observers--sinai force deployment
6. Senator Thurmond. A significant concern with both the Bosnia and
Kosovo deployments is that they appear to have no end. We only need to
look at our deployments to the Sinai Peninsula that started in 1982.
The 900 servicemembers year round commitment contributes to the high
operations pace of our Armed Forces and is a drain on the Department of
Defense's resources.
In this era of peace between Egypt and Israel, what do these forces
contribute to the peace in the region and when will this commitment
end?
Dr. Wolfowitz. MFO-Sinai has been a particularly successful
peacekeeping operation and a highlight of the continued peace between
Egypt and Israel. The presence of U.S. forces in the MFO has been a
major contributor to mutual Egyptian-Israeli confidence in the Camp
David Accords. This success now presents the opportunity to consider
whether this commitment is still necessary. The Department is now
reviewing options for the possible reduction of U.S. troop commitment
in the Sinai.

department of defense facilities
7. Senator Thurmond. The average age of the Department of Defense
facilities is 41 years and is increasing. To support this
infrastructure the Department is investing less than 2 percent of its
replacement value while the accepted corporate standard is at least 3
percent. In simple terms, we are not investing sufficient resources to
maintain our facilities to ensure the quality of life and readiness.
As the next Deputy Secretary of Defense you will have a significant
role in ensuring the readiness of our facilities. Other than providing
the necessary fiscal resources to maintain our facilities, what other
steps can the Department take to resolve this critical issue?
Dr. Wolfowitz. You are right, Senator, our physical plant is aging.
DOD has previously reported that it maintains excess infrastructure. We
will continue to demolish and dispose of excess facilities
individually. We plan to improve utilization of existing facilities
through more joint use and through partnering with the private sector
on leasing underutilized facilities. However, the Department is
currently conducting a comprehensive defense review that will help
guide decisions regarding our infrastructure strategy. Until that
review is complete, I will defer judgment on whether further
initiatives and additional funding are needed.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
u.s.-china military-to-military relations
8. Senator Smith. I believe China is a serious threat to U.S.
national security and our allies in Asia. In 1999, Rep. Tom DeLay and I
addressed the threat posed by the Clinton administration's policy of
engagement with China with an amendment restricting military-to-
military exchanges, a law which we believe the Clinton administration
circumvented. We believe the military-to-military briefings given by
DOD made available sensitive U.S. military information to the People's
Liberation Army.
Would you support ending this military-to-military exchange
program? Or would you propose to overhaul it to convert it into a
program that teaches code of conduct for soldiers, the role of a
military in a democratic society, etc., information which would
actually benefit the PLA and would promote our stated goals of
encouraging China to democratize?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Section 1201 of the Fiscal Year 2000 National
Defense Authorization Act prohibits ``inappropriate exposure'' of U.S.
operational capabilities and technologies to Chinese visitors. The
Department of Defense will continue to strictly comply with the
requirements of this provision in our military-to-military engagement
with the PRC. As the new administration settles in place, we are
undertaking a serious review of the schedule of military-to-military
events with the PLA planned for 2001. In this review, we will ensure
that our military-to-military program with the PLA supports U.S. policy
objectives and will emphasize that the program must have increased
reciprocity and transparency on the part of the PLA. Secretary Rumsfeld
conveyed this message clearly and directly to senior Chinese leaders
during his March 22, 2001 meeting at the Pentagon with Chinese Vice
Premier Qian Qichen.

export controls
9. Senator Smith. I am very concerned over easing export control
restrictions to China, which has allowed the Chinese Government to
purchase powerful computers and garner sensitive aerospace technology
assistance from the United States that can be employed for military
purposes. How do you see the DOD working to prevent such dual-use
transfers of technology from occurring under the Bush administration?
Do you believe the DOD should have a heightened role in determining the
sale of sensitive dual-use technologies to China?
Dr. Wolfowitz. My objective is to ensure that we have a robust
export control system that controls sensitive items and technologies
that represent national security or proliferation risks. I am committed
to ensuring that DOD plays a key role in the development and
implementation of export control policy. In this regard, I will be
paying close attention to the operation of existing interagency
mechanisms and will work to revise them if it is necessary to protect
our national security interests, particularly with regard to exports of
sensitive dual-use technologies to high risk destinations.

taiwan policy
10. Senator Smith. I support the sale of U.S. military hardware,
including the Aegis system, to Taiwan in order for the island nation to
defend its democracy against Chinese threats to reunify through
military aggression. Furthermore, I support the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act (TSEA).
Do you agree that the U.S. should sell advanced military hardware
such as the Aegis system and other types of military hardware to Taiwan
to balance the military situation in the Taiwan Strait? Will you push
for TSEA's passage in the Senate since President Bush endorsed the
measure as a candidate?
Do you believe the United States military has a role to play in the
collective defense of Taiwan as a democratic friendly nation beyond
military hardware sales should China initiate military aggression
towards Taiwan?
Dr. Wolfowitz. We support the provision of defense articles and
services in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. We are currently
evaluating this year's Taiwan's arms sales requests, to include the
Aegis-derived Evolved Advanced Combat System. With regard to the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act, we support the intent of the legislation--
ensuring the security of Taiwan. As has been stated publicly, the
United States remains committed to maintaining regional peace and
stability in this region, and we continue to stand firmly for the
peaceful resolution of differences between the PRC and Taiwan. With
regard to U.S. military support to Taiwan beyond arms sales, our forces
are postured to safeguard U.S. interests and to react quickly to a
range of possible contingencies in the region.

ke-asat
11. Senator Smith. Over the last decade I have encountered
considerable difficulty within the DOD and the previous administration
to ensure the development and deployment of the Kinetic Energy Anti-
Satellite (KE-ASAT) program. I believe we should finish the KE-ASAT
program (which is 90 percent complete), which provides defensive
measures against hostile space assets surveiling U.S. forces.
Do you support programs such as KE-ASAT that will protect U.S.
troops and ensure U.S. military dominance? I would like to ask you for
your commitment to completing this vital program and providing the
necessary oversight over SMDC to do so, including returning the team to
the program and necessary funding for completion, as General Shinseki
committed to me to do.
Dr. Wolfowitz. I fully support protecting our U.S. troops and doing
what is necessary to ensure U.S. military dominance. We will be looking
at a new strategy for America's defense in our strategic review and
subsequently in the Quadrennial Defense Review. As part of these
reviews, we will look at how to programmatically and operationally
support these very important goals.

space commission report
12. Senator Smith. Last month, Secretary Rumsfeld released the
findings of the Space Commission Report which made several
recommendations to improve military space management and assets.
What are your views on the need to reform military space management
and the need to implement the recommendations made by Secretary
Rumsfeld and the Commissioners?
Dr. Wolfowitz. It is clear that the United States relies
significantly on space for our national security. We need to ensure
that the management and the organization of our national security space
program reflect the importance of space to the Nation today. I believe
that a more comprehensive approach is necessary to assign clear
responsibilities and accountability for national security space
programs. The Space Commission has presented a thorough, independent
and objective assessment of our national space program. In our
strategic review, we must seriously consider their recommended
management and organizational changes if we are to meet the national
security space needs of the 21st century.

cooperative threat reduction
13. Senator Smith. I have serious concerns with the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program which I believe subsidizes the Russian
Government's ability to improve their military at U.S. taxpayers
expense--allowing the Russians to use our funds to replace obsolete
weapons with more sophisticated ones. Meanwhile, the Russians continue
to modernize their military and proliferate weapons of mass destruction
to other hostile states.
Do you believe the Cooperative Threat Reduction program could be
reinvented to reach its original objectives--i.e. reducing the threat
and conditioning funding to Russian compliance, particularly on
proliferation issues?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As Secretary Rumsfeld has noted to Congress, the
elimination of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and their
delivery vehicles under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program
has benefited U.S. national security. I would note that the CTR program
does not provide funds to the Russian Government. All assistance is in
the form of contracts to either U.S. companies or to Russian
enterprises and institutes. The weapon systems being eliminated are
mainly operational systems while the pace of Russian strategic
modernization remains slower than projected. Nevertheless, a review of
ongoing CTR projects and their national security implications is
appropriate and has now begun.

chinese missiles
14. Senator Smith. Last year, I addressed in a floor amendment the
sale of the Russian-made Moskit sea-skimming missiles purchased by
China for use on Sovremenny Class destroyers, which China now
possesses.
How do you view this direct threat to U.S. naval forces in the
Pacific and how do we aid Taiwan as required under the TRA to counter
this escalated threat?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Due to its high speed and maneuverability, the
Moskit sea-skimming missile does present technical challenges to navies
around the world. The Taiwan military has some limited capability
against Moskit missile through U.S. supplied weapons systems. Perry-
class and Knox-class frigates are equipped with the PHALANX Close-In
Weapons System (CIWS), which is designed to intercept surface skimming,
low-flying anti-ship missiles. In the event of a conflict, Taiwan's F-
16 aircraft, equipped with the air-launched Harpoon missiles, could be
used to attack People's Republic of China ships equipped with the
Moskit anti-ship cruise missile.

phalcon sale
15. Senator Smith. I have recently read in defense industry
publications that Israel is attempting to resurrect its Phalcon early
warning radar sale with China. This sale will increase China's ability
to project force in the Taiwan Strait and into the South China Sea. I
believe this sale would also threaten the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet. What
would you do as Deputy Secretary of Defense to deter this sale to
China?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The United States has consulted with the Israeli
government closely on its proposal to sell the Phalcon early warning
aircraft to China. We have made clear to the Israelis that we view the
Phalcon as a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability in Asia,
as well as a potential threat to any U.S. forces involved in a military
conflict with China, and we have clearly stated our opposition to the
sale. Then-Prime Minister Barak announced in July 2000 that the sale
would not go forward, and we consider the matter closed.

national missile defense
16. Senator Smith. I am an ardent supporter of the creation of a
multi-tiered missile defense system. I believe the United States should
move forward with developing and deploying this system. Furthermore, I
am in full agreement with Secretary Rumsfeld's assessment that without
a missile defense, hostile nations will be able to alter the actions
and limit options available to the United States.
Would the abrogation of the ABM Treaty help with the goal of
pursuing missile defense?
How should the United States approach providing Great Britain,
Japan and Taiwan and other allies with missile defense capabilities?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The issue of how to handle the ABM Treaty will be
part of our overall strategic review. However, as senior administration
officials have made clear, the ABM Treaty, in its current form, is no
longer relevant. We will look at missile defense options unconstrained
by the ABM Treaty, to see what makes the most sense. We hope to
persuade the Russians of the need to permit deployment of effective
missile defenses. But as Secretary Powell has noted, it may be
necessary to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if the government of the
Russian Federation will not agree to modifications necessary to
accommodate our missile defense programs.
The administration has made clear that our proposed missile
defenses would protect our friends and allies as well as the United
States. We have also made clear our commitment to close and substantive
consultations with allies. These consultations have begun, and we will
seek the views of our allies about specific missile defense responses
to the growing ballistic missile threat.

peacekeeping and humanitarian missions: impact on readiness
17. Senator Smith. I am disturbed at the dangerous decline of the
U.S. military over the last decade. There is a long list of issues that
concern me, but in particular, I see a pressing need to address
military readiness. Furthermore, I believe peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions correlate directly to our current readiness
dilemma. What do you believe is the best way to work with the DOD to
reverse our readiness deficiencies and to terminate U.S. peacekeeping
and humanitarian missions that have no bearing on U.S. national
security interests? Is anyone at DOD conceiving an exit strategy for
the Balkans?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Secretary is actively reviewing U.S. military
participation in the full range of ongoing peace operations,
humanitarian operations, and routine engagement activities to ascertain
ways for reducing tempo strains on our personnel while also continuing
to advance U.S. interests. In this regard, it is worth noting that in
some cases, such as communications, engineering, and civil affairs, the
impact of ongoing operations on readiness is not entirely negative, as
they can provide excellent training for certain military specialties.
Our strategic goals in the Balkans are to maintain peace and
security in South Eastern Europe, protect the strength of the NATO
Alliance, and maintain U.S. credibility with our European Allies. With
that in mind, we want to avoid precipitous withdrawals while
continuously reviewing troop levels to tailor them properly to mission
and environment. Changing conditions in Bosnia and Kosovo will allow
adjustments with the intent of ``right-sizing'' our forces to the tasks
at hand.

defense review
18. Senator Smith. I am pleased that Andy Marshall has been
selected to review the structure of the Defense Department. When will
this review be completed and what kind of input will you or other
appointees have in it? Will Senate Armed Services Committee members be
briefed on Marshall's findings?
Dr. Wolfowitz. To clarify the structure of our review, Andy
Marshall has been asked to review the Department's overall strategy.
Additional reviews will be conducted to look at other areas of concern.
Later this spring, Secretary Rumsfeld will provide testimony in support
of the fiscal year 2001 Supplemental Budget, at which time he will
outline some broad aspects of the review for Congress.

security clearance backlog
19. Senator Smith. Last year, I passed legislation that tightened
the requirements for people seeking DOD security clearances for job-
related purposes following revelations of clearances being granted to
felons. But there is another problem, the clearance backlog.
The Defense Security Service (DSS) is still a chaotic and
demoralized agency and the security clearance backlog has not improved.
What is being done to resolve this problem? Will new leadership be
appointed at the DSS?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I share your concern that this is a very serious
issue that must be addressed quickly. As we assemble our senior
leadership team, it will be a priority to consider any process changes
that may be necessary to alleviate the current backlog in security
clearances.

base closures
20. Senator Smith. As I understand it, a BRAC round is being
considered as a way to save money by the DOD. Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard, (PNSY), which is located in New Hampshire, represents the
best performance shipyard for attack subs. PNSY successfully rolled out
``smartbase'' technologies to demonstrate to the DOD the cost saving
improvements of the ``smartbase'' technology. Can you outline what you
believe are the parameters of any BRAC Secretary Rumsfeld and you would
like to see?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Our base structure should fit our force structure
requirements. We are looking at the issue of excess infrastructure, and
will make a decision on how best to address this as soon as we can in
the review process. When we have established the proper relationship
between the force structure needed to execute our national security
strategy and the infrastructure needed to support that force, we will
work closely with Congress to develop a process that is fair and true
to that objective.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum
basic research funding
21. Senator Santorum. President Bush has emphasized the need to
fund ``leap ahead'' technologies and has mentioned the possibility of
``skipping a generation of weapons to make them more lethal and
mobile.'' The only way this policy will succeed is if President Bush
commits to investing heavily in basic sciences in American
universities.
The Department of Defense has historically played a major Federal
role in funding basic research and has been a significant sponsor of
engineering research and technology development conducted in American
universities. For over 50 years, Department of Defense investments in
university research have been a dominant element of the Nation's
research and development (R&D) infrastructure and an essential
component of the U.S. capacity for technological innovation.
Supporting university research benefits the Department of Defense
in many ways. In addition to producing important advances in knowledge,
support to university research helps keep top scientists and engineers
involved in defense research. Also, students who get hands-on research
training become the highly qualified scientists and engineers of the
future who go to work in academia, industry, and Federal laboratories.
In the 1990s, Basic Research funded through the Department of
Defense peaked at $1.489 billion in fiscal year 1993 and declined to a
level of $1.059 billion in fiscal year 1998. In fact, funding for
Department of Defense Basic Research began to increase, beginning in
fiscal year 1999, only after Congress took the lead in reversing this
trend.

Do you believe that there exists a mismatch between the goals of
President Bush and levels of investment in our Department of Defense
Basic Research accounts?
If so, what do you believe is a more accurate figure that ought to
be invested in Department of Defense Basic Research funding?
Can you indicate any short-term goals that you feel are achievable
with respect to Department of Defense Basic Research funding?

Dr. Wolfowitz. First, it is important to review the funding history
for the Department's Basic Research program. The funding numbers you
have cited for fiscal years 1993 and 1998 are appropriated values in
fiscal year 2001 constant dollars. The table below shows both the
requested and appropriated amounts for the Department's Basic Research
program in fiscal year 2001 constant dollars.

BASIC RESEARCH DOLLARS IN MILLIONS/FISCAL YEAR 2001 CONSTANT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requested...................... 1,277 1,398 1,337 1,300 1,220 1,215 1,148 1,133 1,217
Appropriated................... 1,489 1,312 1,282 1,176 1,090 1,059 1,098 1,157 1,314
Difference..................... +213 -86 -55 -124 -130 -156 -50 +24 +97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated in ``A Blueprint for New Beginnings,'' outlining the
President's Budget Request to Congress, ``the President believes that
the Nation's defense strategy should drive decisions on defense
resources.'' Such is the case with Basic Research. However, determining
a sufficient level of investment for Basic Research is not a precise
science, rather it is a strategic decision to invest in broad areas of
research that have the potential of yielding revolutionary advances, as
well as pursuing solutions to known operational problems. An investment
in Basic Research pays dividends in many ways. Basic research is a
long-term investment with an emphasis on opportunities for military
application in the future, yet it also, as you note, contributes to our
national academic and scientific knowledge base by providing
approximately 40 percent of the research funding for the Nation's
colleges of engineering. The Department will sustain an investment in
Basic Research because of proven significant, long-term benefits.
It has always been the Department's goal to fund Basic Research,
and the remainder of the Science and Technology program, at a level
adequate to ensure the technological superiority of our armed forces.
However, we also need to ensure that the funding levels of the various
components of the DOD budget are balanced based on our assessment of
the most urgent requirements at any given time. The Department's
compelling desire to increase the modernization budget, while
sustaining readiness at a high level, must also be considered. The
amount of funding the Department will request for Basic Research will,
I believe, be adequate to maintain our technological superiority both
near-term and in the future.

defense industrial base
22. Senator Santorum. Last year, based on concerns articulated by
the defense industry, the Department of Defense initiated a review of
ways to improve not only the health of the defense industrial base but
also competition among these companies. The review was carried out by a
Defense Science Board (DSB) panel. The goal of the process was to see
what kinds of actions in terms of acquisition practices, rules and
regulations needed to be changed in order to help the Department get
lower costs and more innovation.
The DSB report, Preserving a Healthy and Competitive U.S. Defense
Industry to Ensure our Future National Security, concluded that the
Department of Defense must move aggressively to help American companies
attract and retain top talent as well as improve overall profitability
by continuing changes in profit policies boosting investment in defense
research and development.
The DSB panel issued a listing of 27 regulatory and policy changes
designed to help ensure the financial health of the defense industry.

Have you reviewed the DSB panel's report on improving the health of
the defense industry?
Are there other policy or regulatory changes that you would
recommend to improve the health of the defense industry and improve
innovation that were omitted by the report?
Are there ways that the Department could do a better job at
encouraging firms to increase their independent research and
development (IR&D) efforts?
Are there changes that can be made which will enable individuals
who leave the private sector for public sector service the ability to
return to private sector employment?

Dr. Wolfowitz. We are continuing to address the recommendations of
the DSB panel's report. As we assemble our management team, we will be
examining recommendations made by a variety of groups, such as the
Business Executives for National Security Tail-to-Tooth Commission, in
order to establish the initiatives we intend to pursue. It is
recognized that we must consider ways that the Department can encourage
firms to increase their IR&D efforts. For example, the recommendation
made by the DSB to revise the IR&D policy regarding fees could
incentivize contractors to spend IR&D dollars. This is an area that
certainly requires further analysis and careful consideration. At this
point, it would be premature to offer more specific detail on changes
that may be necessary.

base closures
23. Senator Santorum. The military base closure process (BRAC) was
first established in 1988. Since that time, 97 bases have been closed
and about 400 have been realigned. The process of closure and community
development after the base closes has suffered from problems in the
past, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Accordingly,
between 1992 and 1995, the Federal Government adopted policies to
improve the reuse and redevelopment process governing these closed
facilities.
Congressional efforts to authorize additional base closing rounds
have been unsuccessful due in large part to the belief that President
Clinton interfered with the integrity of the process during the 1995
BRAC review.
In an effort to re-start the base closing process, several Members
of Congress have discussed the creation of a ``two-step'' BRAC process.
Under this proposal, the military services would identify certain
``core'' bases that would not be considered for closure. Facilities
like the Pentagon or Andrews Air Force Base would fall into this
category. These core facilities, which might comprise up to 25 percent
of all bases, would be exempt from further review by the base closure
commission.
A full assessment of ``non-core'' bases would follow this initial
review period. Proponents of this approach believe that the two-step
process would help eliminate community uncertainty and also help ``core
base'' communities avoid the expense of hiring consultants and other
experts to guide them through fighting the closure process.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense should recommend to
President Bush that he request authorization of additional BRAC rounds?
If so, do you believe that the process must be changed to restore
faith in the fairness of the process?
What are your thoughts on the proposed ``two-step'' BRAC process
that has been suggested?

Dr. Wolfowitz. Our base structure should fit our force structure
requirements. We are looking at the issue of excess infrastructure, and
will make a decision on how best to address this as soon as we can in
the review process. When we have established the proper relationship
between the force structure needed to execute our national security
strategy and the infrastructure needed to support that force, we will
work closely with Congress to develop a process that is fair and true
to that objective.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
strategic review
24. Senator Lieberman. What is your role in the current strategic
review?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As the Deputy Secretary of Defense I am part of a
small group reviewing the work of each panel associated with our
overall look at the Defense Department structure. I provide guidance
regarding the particular areas each panel undertakes, as well as
reviewing their results. I also make recommendations to Secretary
Rumsfeld on various aspects of the overall review.

transformation
25. Senator Lieberman. What do you think are the necessary actions
to effect transformation?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Successful military transformation will require
several actions, the first of which is to generate organizational slack
and free-up resources needed to develop future capabilities. Second, we
need to create new, experimental forces dedicated to the development of
new combat capabilities. These forces would conduct long-term
experiments, develop operational concepts and even look at new ways of
organizing forces. Finally, when the U.S. engages in conflict, these
new units, should they prove effective, would be vanguard forces to
test and refine our new methods.

strategic review
26. Senator Lieberman. How do you intend to assure the strategic
review puts the main focus on these actions?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As discussed earlier, Andy Marshall is conducting
one element of the strategy review. For the past 8 years, he has
carefully reviewed past military transformation efforts and the
conditions that allowed them to be successful. Also, there is a panel
dedicated solely to the issue of transformation among the group of
panels contributing to the Defense review.

quadrennial defense review
27. Senator Lieberman. How do you see the review connecting to the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Defense review is an iterative process that will
be ongoing. The findings and recommendations of the various elements of
the Defense review will serve as road maps for key issues that must be
considered during the QDR process, and subsequently, in the development
of future budget requests.

defense review
28. Senator Lieberman. Please tell us the time lines for the
review.
Dr. Wolfowitz. Again, I want to emphasize that the Defense review
is an iterative process that will be ongoing. Accordingly, specific
completion dates have not been established.

top priorities
29. Senator Lieberman. What do you see as the top priorities for
the Defense Department and the Pentagon?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Department's top priorities, as outlined by
Secretary Rumsfeld are:

1. Fashion and sustain deterrence appropriate to the new national
security environment, aimed at devaluing investment made in weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems. This must be based on a
combination of nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities working
together to deny the opportunity and benefits associated with the
threat or the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces,
our homeland, and our allies.
2. Assure the readiness and sustainability of our forces, reducing
unnecessary risks to American interests and to the lives of American
service men and women. Inadequate readiness takes a larger toll on the
future quality of our forces. Even the highest morale is eventually
undermined by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare
parts and equipment, and declining readiness.
3. Modernize U.S. Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (C\3\I) capabilities to support our 21st century needs.
Modern C\3\I infrastructure is the foundation upon which military power
rests, and is fundamental to the transformation of U.S. military
forces. We must also strengthen our intelligence capabilities and our
space capabilities and protect those assets against various forms of
attack.
4. Transform the U.S. defense establishment to address our new
circumstance by swiftly introducing new weapons systems. Undertake
near-term investment to acquire modern capabilities derived from U.S.
scientific and industrial preeminence.
5. Reform DOD structures, processes, and organization. The legacy
of obsolete institutional structures, processes, and organizations
creates unnecessary costs and imposes unacceptable burden on national
defense. We will examine omnibus approaches to changing the statutory
and regulatory basis for the most significant obstacles to reform.

the role of the deputy secretary of defense
30. Senator Lieberman. Will you adhere to the habitual role of the
DEPSECDEF and manage the day-to-day operations of the Pentagon?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes, it is fair to say that while the Secretary is
the Chief Executive Officer, the Deputy functions mainly as the Chief
Operating Officer (COO). This normal business relationship does not
extend to the day-to-day supervision of military operations, but does
cover most other areas of responsibility in the Department.

31. Senator Lieberman. Will your role be policy or management?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe it is impossible to separate policy
formulation and management. In general, I intend to be the COO of the
Department. I realize that we will have an Under Secretary for Policy,
as well as other senior officials in the Department with responsibility
for various aspects of policy. My prior service as Under Secretary for
Policy will in no way limit the traditional authority of those
officials.

32. Senator Lieberman. Given your depth of policy expertise, how
will you coordinate your role with the Under Secretary for Policy, once
he/she is nominated?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Under Secretary for Policy will function in much
the same way as they have in the past. I will assist and give guidance
as necessary, but the fact that I once held this position will not
limit the prerogatives of the incumbent.

homeland defense
33. Senator Lieberman. What should be the Pentagon's role in the
broader issue of homeland defense?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Homeland defense is not a new mission area. The U.S.
military has a long and proud tradition of protecting the American
homeland from a wide variety of threats. Over time, the nature of the
threat has changed--from traditional land and maritime invasion in the
country's early years, to potential nuclear attack during the Cold War,
to the present day potential of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile
and information attacks from both state and non-state actors, such as
terrorists. As part of our strategic review we will be addressing how
the Department of Defense should be postured to ensure continued
defense of the U.S. homeland from these evolving threats.

military pay
34. Senator Lieberman. Do you believe there is a pay gap for
military members?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Much has been written about the existence of a
military ``pay gap.'' Many argue that difficulty in recruiting and
retaining high quality people in itself suggests the presence of a pay
gap, but I believe the fundamental issue is the ability of pay to
attract and retain a quality force. Recognizing that it has become
increasing difficult to recruit and retain amidst today's economy, one
can make a case that pay may not be adequate. One of my important
responsibilities will be to ensure that great attention is paid to
sustaining a level of military pay that is competitive, and supportive
of consistent success in recruiting and retention.

35. Senator Lieberman. Do you support a military pay raise?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Yes. The President recently announced an additional
$1.4 billion to be directed to military pay. This will provide for a
minimum pay raise of 4.6 percent on January 1, 2002, and $1 billion to
be used to address specific recruiting and retention needs.

36. Senator Lieberman. Should the next pay raise be across the
board or targeted, as in pay for skill?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I believe all military members should receive a pay
raise, and the President has proposed that all members will get a
minimum of a 4.6 percent raise on January 1, 2002. Exactly how to use
the President's additional billion dollars needs further review.

defense health program
37. Senator Lieberman. What do you consider to be the most
significant threats to the Defense Health Program (DHP) and the ongoing
implementation of TRICARE?
Dr. Wolfowitz. It is imperative that the Defense Health Program
(DHP) maintains a fully funded budget that allows for a stable business
environment. The absence of adequate funding directly impacts patient
care in the Military Health System. With the implementation of expanded
TRICARE benefits for our Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, directed by
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, funding
continues to be a challenge. The Department has identified an
approximate shortfall of $1.4 billion for fiscal year 2001 and will
continue to assess DHP funding requirements as well as necessary
solutions during the Secretary's strategic review.

tempo for our armed forces
38. Senator Lieberman. Do you have any plans to reduce tempo for
our armed forces?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The use of military force is one of the most
important decisions a President can make. We in the Department will
work closely with the President and his senior advisors to develop
appropriate policies to guide the use of our military forces in
peacetime, crisis and war. A decision to employ U.S. military forces in
support of our national interests is one that should never be taken
lightly. Likewise, the decision to sustain, reduce, or end the
commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations must be informed by
careful assessment and deliberation. Working with Congress and our
allies, we will reexamine the balance among force levels, commitments
and deployments. We will ensure that we are focusing on the most
important defense tasks and not placing unreasonable demands on our men
and women in uniform. Still, we recognize that deployments will always
be a part of military life, and we will continue to improve the ways we
monitor and manage them.

39. Senator Lieberman. Given that the Services are different and
even define tempo differently, how do you plan to measure tempo in a
consistent manner?
Dr. Wolfowitz. We recognize that deployments will always be a part
of military life, and we continue to improve the ways we monitor and
manage them. Last year, DOD implemented a department-wide tempo
management system to allow us to identify the activities that have most
affected the pace of operations and help us to better manage the
demands on our people. Also adopted was a common definition for
personnel tempo that allows us to measure it in a consistent manner
across the Department. Personnel tempo is defined as the time an
individual spends away from his or her home station.

two major theater war (mtw) force structure
40. Senator Lieberman. Is the two MTW force structure the right
planning tool to create a military prepared for the dangers of a new
century? If not, what would you support using instead?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Modern history suggests that the United States has
often faced more than one security contingency at a time. With that
history in mind, the Department's preparations to deal with multiple
challenges have been appropriate. However, the increasing
diversification of current and emerging threats requires that we build
forces and operational concepts aimed at fashioning a new approach to
deterrence. This issue will be examined in the strategic review.

national missile defense
41. Senator Lieberman. What type of NMD system should the U.S.
pursue?
Dr. Wolfowitz. President Bush has said that the U.S. must build
effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the
earliest possible date, and that missile defenses must be designed to
protect all 50 states, our friends and allies, and our deployed forces
overseas. The administration is currently undertaking a major review of
missile defense as part of a broader strategic review examining our
future offensive and defensive requirements. In this review, we are
examining all available technologies and basing modes that could
contribute to an effective and affordable missile defense.

42. Senator Lieberman. Given the limited funds available, what
recommendations would you give regarding finding money for NMD?
Dr. Wolfowitz. We are currently reviewing our policy with regard to
missile defenses and how they can best contribute to deterrence in the
current and emerging strategic environment. Given this, no decisions
have yet been made with regard to possible deployments or funding
requirements.

43. Senator Lieberman. What is your priority if forced to make
choices among NMD and conventional forces?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The top priorities of the Department include the
deployment of effective missile defenses, the assured readiness and
sustainability of our deployed conventional forces, the modernization
of command, control, communications, intelligence and space
capabilities, and the transformation of the means by which we acquire
these forces. Additionally, the Secretary is currently conducting a
comprehensive review of the defense strategy and program, which
includes our missile defenses as well as our conventional forces. Given
this, no decisions have yet been made with regard to making funding
choices among different programs.

44. Senator Lieberman. How will the U.S.'s plans change if our
European allies refuse to support U.S. NMD plans and Russia and China
execute a nuclear force expansion as a result?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As we move forward with missile defense, the
administration is committed to consulting closely with our friends and
allies to address their concerns and explore their possible
participation in the program. The U.S. wants to deploy defenses that
would protect our friends and allies as well as ourselves. We see
missile defense as a necessary element of deterrence and an opportunity
for a collective approach to enhancing security for all.
We will also engage Russia and China on missile defense and seek to
address their concerns about our defenses.
Clearly, the missile defenses we are pursuing are so limited that
they would not call into question Russia's nuclear deterrent. As for
China, the Chinese have already embarked upon significant modernization
of their nuclear forces that predates, and will take place regardless
of, current U.S. NMD planning.

45. Senator Lieberman. What is your reaction to the Russian
European Missile Defense proposal?
Dr. Wolfowitz. We are currently examining the Russian proposal. The
U.S. government welcomes the fact Russia recognizes that Europe also
faces a serious threat from weapons of mass destruction and missile
delivery systems. While we welcome the prospect of cooperation in
principle, the deployment of a ``Pan-European'' TMD system would not
defend North America from ballistic missile attacks, and is therefore
not a substitute for the deployment of a missile defense capable of
defending North America.

stockpile stewardship program (ssp)
46. Senator Lieberman. Will you support full funding for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As Secretary Rumsfeld made clear in his confirmation
hearing, maintaining high confidence in the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile is critically important to the national security interests of
the United States. I believe that the administration needs to review
the Stockpile Stewardship Program and to evaluate how well it has done
its job to date, and how well it will likely meet future stockpile
issues. Following on that review and evaluation, it should be in a
position to make informed decisions on the future of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, including appropriate levels of funding.

nuclear weapons testing
47. Senator Lieberman. You have stated that continued nuclear
weapons testing is not an impediment to arms reductions. That, on the
contrary, our confidence in the reliability of our weapons has enabled
us to take the lead in nuclear arms reductions since the end of the
Cold War. Can you explain this? If the U.S. tests, what argument would
you use with the nations who might then decide on their own limited
test program?
Dr. Wolfowitz. During the last 5 years that the United States was
conducting nuclear tests (1987-1992), we concluded arms control
agreements and announced unilateral initiatives to reduce the number of
U.S. nuclear arms by many thousands of warheads. So clearly, nuclear
weapons testing is not an impediment to nuclear arms reductions.
Indeed, our decisions to make these reductions were in part based upon
the fact that due to nuclear testing we believed that our residual
stockpile of nuclear weapons was safe, secure, and highly reliable.

balkans policy
48. Senator Lieberman. What policy do you expect to promote for
U.S. forces in the Balkans?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The presence of U.S. forces in the Balkans is key to
the successful outcome of these missions with associated issues of
regional stability, both U.S. and NATO credibility, and alliance
cohesion. However, we do believe that conditions in Bosnia have changed
so as to allow a restructuring of the force, and we are working with
our allies through the normal NATO 6-Month Review process and
associated Stabilization Force (SFOR) Restructuring Options Study to
achieve this. In Kosovo, the situation remains unstable enough to
require engagement at current levels. However, we will pursue a change
in the capabilities of the existing force more appropriate to the
current mission.

49. Senator Lieberman. Do you advocate a full or partial withdrawal
of U.S. forces in the Balkans?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Balkans is a
function of many things: the security situation, our position in NATO,
regional stability. I am committed to withdrawing U.S. troops when the
situation warrants. That will be done through the established NATO
processes. I do feel that the situation in Bosnia should allow for
restructuring of SFOR. Kosovo, however, is still unstable, and will
require a more careful examination in consultation with our allies
before any decisions are taken there. Within these factors, then, I am
committed to withdrawing our soldiers as quickly as possible.

50. Senator Lieberman. What strategy would you recommend we
undertake regarding the Balkans?
Dr. Wolfowitz. With the fall of Milosevic, and the consequent rise
of a democratic-oriented government in Belgrade, the dynamics of the
region have changed. We should clearly be able to focus on things such
as: promoting rule of law, respect for human rights and civil society;
combating crime and corruption; assisting in economic reform and
revitalization; and regional cooperation as basis for integration into
European institutions. These are the means by which we may capitalize
on the change in the strategic context.

51. Senator Lieberman. How do you intend to pursue that with our
European allies and the Russians?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The current engagement with our European allies
continues to be effective. Increasingly, they are assuming more of the
burden, and we will continue to press them on this.
Ironically, our relations with Russia by way of the SFOR and
International Security Force (KFOR) missions continue to be strong and
cooperative. Our goal should be to build on these relationships through
the NATO Permanent Joint Council and other bilateral means so as to
gain their effective cooperation in dealing with the Balkan states.

accelerating drawdown for iraqi opposition
52. Senator Lieberman. Will you act to accelerate the drawdown
authority you have for the Iraqi opposition?
Dr. Wolfowitz. It all depends on how the drawdown authority is to
be used. The administration is in the process of reviewing all elements
of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This review will address whether efforts to
promote regime change are appropriately focused. Until that review is
complete it would be premature to make a judgment as whether the use of
the drawdown authority should be changed.

upgrading support for the iraqi opposition
53. Senator Lieberman. Some speculate that the new administration's
most promising option for putting Saddam ``back in the box'', in
addition to bombing, is to support the Iraq National Congress (INC).
How would you recommend the U.S. upgrade our political, economic, and
military support of the opposition? What are the plans to do this?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The administration is in the process of reviewing
all elements of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This review will address
whether our efforts to promote regime change are appropriately focused.
Until that review is complete it would be premature to make a judgment
on the exact nature of our future support to the Iraqi National
Congress.

support for the iraqi opposition
54. Senator Lieberman. How far should we be willing to go with
regards to support for the INC-funds, weapons, equipment, sales, joint
training, TMD, etc.?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As part of our comprehensive policy review on Iraq,
we are exploring how best to work with the Iraqi National Congress and
other opposition groups to promote a regime transition in Iraq. Until
the policy review is completed, it would be premature to speculate on
the details of our support.

inc charter
55. Senator Lieberman. What will the INC task force's charter
include? When do you see it in place and functioning?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The administration is reviewing its Iraq policy,
including how it will work with the INC.

regime change strategy
56. Senator Lieberman. You have talked about the current policy of
containment regarding Iraq. You have stated that when this policy
collapses, the U.S. will face a Saddam who has new nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons and a renewed capacity to conduct conventional
warfare and terrorism, and who is bent on avenging his 1991 defeat.
Further, this policy would risk many more lives than trying to
overthrow Saddam by force. What are your recommendations regarding this
new Iraqi strategy? What do you see as the Pentagon role? How will this
affect U.S. force posture and OPTEMPO? What would you do to deal with
increased OPTEMPO?
Dr. Wolfowitz. There can be do doubt that Iraq under Saddam Hussein
remains a threat to the Gulf region and to U.S. interests and that this
threat must be deterred and contained. Part of the administration's
Iraq policy review must be to consider whether more can be done to
secure Baghdad's compliance with the conditions laid down by the United
Nations in a way that would satisfy us and the world community at large
that Iraq is no longer a threat. We also are exploring whether more can
be done to hasten the replacement of the present regime by one that is
prepared to live at peace with its neighbors and with the people of
Iraq. Clearly, our armed forces will have a prominent part to play in
our national strategy toward Iraq. Until our review is completed,
however, it is not possible to say what the effect will be on OPTEMPO.

taiwan policy
57. Senator Lieberman. You suggested that Taiwan point the way of
democracy to China. That is no doubt several years down the road. How
should the U.S. plan to assist in this endeavor?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Taiwan today is a full-fledged democracy, with a
vibrant multiparty system, a popularly elected president and
representatives at all levels of government, a free and spirited press,
and the people's strong commitment to democratization. One of the most
important measures the United States can take to foster the development
of democracy in the PRC is to support Taiwan's fledgling democracy by
acting in accordance with the principles outlined in the Taiwan
Relations Act.

58. Senator Lieberman. You are known as a fierce defender of
Taiwan, yet you have proposed a status quo in your writings. Can you
elaborate on your approach?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The status quo can best be maintained by ensuring a
dynamic equilibrium of forces in the Taiwan Strait. Such a balance
requires provision of necessary defense articles and services to Taiwan
in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act to offset an increasingly
capable PRC military.

59. Senator Lieberman. How far should we be willing to go with
regards to support for Taiwan--funds, weapons, equipment, sales, joint
training, TMD, etc.? What about a formal mutual defense pact?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Department of Defense is engaged with Taiwan in
several ways to ensure the United States is appropriately prepared to
implement relevant sections of the Taiwan Relations Act. The United
States actively monitors the security situation in the Taiwan Strait,
provides articles and services to Taiwan to ensure it can maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability, works with Taiwan on a series of
non-hardware related initiatives to address shortcomings in Taiwan's
readiness, and maintains capabilities to assist in the defense of
Taiwan if required. However, establishment of a formal defense pact
would contradict the unofficial nature of our relationship with Taiwan.

missile defense and china
60. Senator Lieberman. You support NMD. Is this contrary to your
previous call for a status quo approach? Can you clarify this, since
NMD might spur aggressive actions by China?
Dr. Wolfowitz. Missile defense must be designed to protect all 50
states, our allies and friends, and deployed forces overseas from
missile attacks by rogue states and from unauthorized or accidental
launches. The missile defenses that will be deployed by the U.S. are
intended for defense.
Nevertheless, we understand that China has voiced its concerns
about the potential implications for its deterrent posture of any
future U.S. missile defense system. China has recently expressed a
willingness to engage in substantive dialogue on missile defense
issues. We welcome and encourage such dialogue.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Max Cleland
u.s. airlift requirements
61. Senator Cleland. The recently released Hart-Rudman Commission
report places a high priority on the development of expeditionary
forces, much of which is dependent on our strategic and tactical
airlift capabilities. The Mobility Requirements Study estimates we are
woefully short on meeting the future requirement.
With the move away from more forward-deployed forces, airlift and
air mobility will continue to be the key ingredient in our responding
to future military missions and crisis. Do you agree that we need to
focus attention on our airlift needs?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The recent Mobility Requirements Study 2005,
required by the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, is
the most exhaustive study on this subject to date. It provides a
comprehensive assessment of our overall mobility requirements in the
context of a two major theater war strategy and shows that, under
certain extremely demanding conditions, we have insufficient airlift
assets to meet the requirement. Clearly strategic and tactical airlift
capability will remain a vital element of our national military
strategy, and the results of the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 are a
good point of departure for establishing airlift requirements in the
context of the current strategy review. Options for meeting airlift
requirements, however, need to be carefully considered in a manner that
allows them to be balanced with other strategic risk and affordability
decisions.

military health care
62. Senator Cleland. Military health care is a matter of great
importance to our service members and this committee. Last year, in
response to concerns raised by the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, we enacted legislation that eliminates
deductibles and co-payments under TRICARE Prime for families of Active
Duty service members; provides lifetime health care for military
retirees and their families through the TRICARE program; and provides a
comprehensive pharmacy benefit for military retirees.
We still hear concerns from our constituents about lack of timely
access to health care, portability of benefits as our service members
move around, and poor claims processing. What are your priorities for
maintaining a working, accessible, properly funded health care system?
Dr. Wolfowitz. As you point out, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001 includes significant health care benefit
enhancements for military beneficiaries, both for families of Active
Duty members and for retirees and their families. The Department is
working hard to implement these important new programs. In addition, we
have made significant strides recently in improving our health care
business practices, in areas such as providing a portable health care
benefit, exceeding industry standards for claims processing timeliness,
and enhancing appointment systems to ease access to care. Our number
one priority is to assure medical readiness to support wartime
missions; delivery of an excellent peacetime health care benefit on a
cost-effective basis is a vital secondary mission.

montgomery gi bill
63. Senator Cleland. Almost all new service members enroll in and
contribute to the Montgomery GI Bill. Only about half of these use
their benefits, and many who use the benefits do not use all of their
entitlement. Many of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines say
they would like to stay in the Service, but feel they have to leave so
that they can provide for the education of their spouses and children.
I believe that many of these service members would stay in the
service if they could transfer all or a part of their unused
entitlement to GI Bill benefits to family members in return for a
service commitment--an idea supported by the Hart-Rudman Commission
report. Service Secretaries could use this retention tool selectively,
just as they use reenlistment bonuses.
Will you give serious consideration to how the Department of
Defense could use the transfer of GI Bill benefits to family members as
a retention tool and give me your thoughts on how we best do this?
Dr. Wolfowitz. I will certainly give this full consideration. I
agree that we must be prepared to adapt our incentive systems to
address the changing needs and aspirations of service members.

hart-rudman commission
64. Senator Cleland. The Hart-Rudman Commission review suggested
numerous initiatives to help prepare for the domestic threats that
endanger the continental U.S. Several of these initiatives involve
reform and restructuring at the Department of Defense in an effort to
streamline and make DOD more efficient and effective to address the
threats in this new world ``disorder.'' With your past experience at
the Department of Defense, you know of the challenges that face the
Department of Defense in this new century. Do you anticipate the need
to review and implement any of the suggestions?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Hart-Rudman Commission made an important
contribution to the debate about the challenges of the evolving
security environment and how the U.S. government should be aligned in
order to prepare for future threats, particularly to the U.S. homeland.
I welcome the insights of the Commission, whose members represent a
vast wealth of experience in the national security arena, in addition
to recommendations from other experts both inside and outside the
Department.

problem accounting for appropriated funds
65. Senator Cleland. You noted in your response to an advance
question that ``damage to modernization programs is best prevented by
timely funding so that the Department does not have to disrupt
procurement and RDT&E programs.'' However, my distinguished colleague
Senator Byrd has recently reminded us that the Pentagon has a
longstanding problem accounting for the funds appropriated for its use.
As a two-time veteran of senior positions in the Department of Defense,
what are your thoughts on the roots of this problem? Do you believe the
solutions to this problem are internal to the Department, or is there
something Congress can do to facilitate a solution?
Dr. Wolfowitz. The Department's accounting problems are of a very
specific nature. We have had no major problem tracking and accounting
for appropriated funds in terms of ensuring that no more than the
precise amount is spent on specifically the uses for which those funds
were appropriated. Indeed, DOD accounting systems were designed exactly
for this purpose, and that design is one of the root causes of the
accounting problems referred to by Senator Byrd--that problem being
that DOD accounting systems cannot yet produce annual financial
statements that can receive an unqualified (most favorable) audit
opinion. DOD accounting systems were not designed to produce such
statements, and now that such statements are required the Department is
moving expeditiously to transform its accounting systems to do so. This
is an immense challenge, especially since much of the financial data
needed for DOD financial statements originates outside the Department's
accounting and finance systems. The massive effort to achieve
acceptable financial statements is primarily internal to the
Department, but as with all genuine reform the support of Congress
remains essential.
______

[The nomination reference of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz
follows:]
Nomination Reference
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
February 15, 2001.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Paul D. Wolfowitz, of Maryland, to be Deputy Secretary of Defense,
vice Rudy F. de Leon, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz

On February 5, 2001, President Bush announced his intention to
nominate Dr. Paul Wolfowitz to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed by the Senate, this will be Dr. Wolfowitz's third tour of
duty in the Pentagon.
For the last 7 years, Dr. Wolfowitz has served as Dean and
Professor of International Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University.
SAIS is widely regarded as one of the world's leading graduate schools
of international relations with 750 students, studying on campuses in
Washington, DC.; Nanjing, China; and Bologna, Italy. As Dean, he led a
successful capital campaign that raised more than $75 million and
doubled the school's endowment. Also under his leadership, the
curriculum and facilities were modernized and new faculty and programs
were added to shift the school's focus from the Cold War to the era of
globalization.
From 1989 to 1993, Dr. Wolfowitz served as Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy in charge of the 700-person defense policy team that
was responsible to Secretary Dick Cheney for matters concerning
strategy, plans, and policy. During this period Secretary Wolfowitz and
his staff had major responsibilities for the reshaping of strategy and
force posture at the end of the Cold War. Key initiatives included the
development of the Regional Defense Strategy, the Base Force, and two
presidential nuclear initiatives that led to the elimination of tens of
thousands of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Under his leadership, the
Policy Staff also played a major role in reviewing war plans for the
Gulf War, and developing and executing plans that successfully raised
more than $50 billion in Allied financial support for the war and
prevented Iraq from opening a second front with Israel.
During the Reagan administration, Dr. Wolfowitz served for 3 years
as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia--the fourth largest country in the
world and the largest in the Moslem world. There he earned a reputation
as a highly popular and effective Ambassador, a tough negotiator on
behalf of American intellectual property owners, and a public advocate
of political openness and democratic values. During his tenure, Embassy
Jakarta was cited as one of the four best-managed embassies inspected
in 1988. Prior to that posting, he served 3\1/2\ years as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he was in
charge of U.S. relations with more than twenty countries. In addition
to contributing to substantial improvements in U.S. relations with
Japan and China, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz played a central role in
coordinating the U.S. policy toward the Philippines that supported a
peaceful transition from the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos to
democracy.
Dr. Wolfowitz's previous government service included: 2 years as
head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1981-82); an
earlier Pentagon tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Regional Programs (1977-80), where he helped create the force that
later became the United States Central Command and initiated the
Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, the backbone of the initial U.S.
deployment 12 years later in Operation Desert Shield; and 4 years
(1973-77) in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working on the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and a number of nuclear
nonproliferation issues. His first government service was as a
Management Intern at the Bureau of the Budget (1966-67).
Dr. Wolfowitz taught previously at Yale (1970-73) and Johns Hopkins
(1981). In 1993, he was the George F. Kennan Professor of National
Security Strategy at the National War College. He has written widely on
the subject of national strategy and foreign policy and was a member of
the advisory boards of the journals Foreign Affairs and National
Interest. Among his many awards for public service are: the
Presidential Citizen's Medal, the Department of Defense's Distinguished
Public Service Medal, the Department of State's Distinguished Honor
Award, the Department of Defense's Distinguished Civilian Service
Medal, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Distinguished
Honor Award.
Dr. Wolfowitz received a bachelor's degree from Cornell University
(1965) in mathematics, and a doctorate in political science from the
University of Chicago (1972). He is the father of Sara, David, and
Rachel and lives in Chevy Chase, Maryland.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Paul D.
Wolfowitz in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Paul Dundes Wolfowitz.

2. Position to which nominated:
Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense.

3. Date of nomination:
February 15, 2001.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
December 22, 1943; New York, NY.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Separated since January 1999; Frances Clare Selgin Wolfowitz.

7. Names and ages of children:
Sara Elizabeth Wolfowitz, 22.
David Samuel Wolfowitz, 19.
Rachel Dahlia Wolfowitz, 13.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dates Degree
Institution attended received Date granted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ithaca High School, Ithaca, NY 9/58-6/61 ............ ............
Cornell University Ithaca, NY. 9/61-6/65 AB.......... 1965
University of Chicago, 10/65-6/70 Ph.D........ 1972
Chicago, IL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Job title Employer Location Dates of employment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dean................................. Johns Hopkins Washington, DC......... January 1994-present.
University School of
Advanced International
Studies.
Professor............................ National Defense Washington, DC......... January 1993-December
University. 1993.
Under Secretary for Policy........... Department of Defense.. Washington, DC......... May 1989-January 1993.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Foreign policy advisor to Bush/Cheney Presidential Committee, 2000.
Foreign policy advisor to Dole/Kemp Presidential Committee, 1996.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Amount Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
01-08-96........................... $250 Maggie Tinsman.
03-18-96........................... $1000 Bob Dole.
03-22-96........................... $250 John W. Warner.
09-16-96........................... $500 Republican Primary
PAC.
10-07-97........................... $500 Dylan C. Glenn.
2000............................... $2000 George W. Bush--
(in kind) Primary Campaign.
2000............................... $1000 George W. Bush--
General Campaign.
2000............................... $500 George W. Bush--
Recount Effort.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
President's Citizen's Medal; Department of Defense Distinguished
Public Service Medal; Air Force Decoration for Exceptional Civilian
Service; Department of state Distinguished Honor Award; Department of
Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal; Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency Distinguished Honor Award; Bangkok Embassy Refugee
Coordinator's ``Pirate Buster'' Award; 1989 Lempad Prize from
Indonesian Cultural Foundation; Embassy in Jakarta selected as one of
four best-managed embassies in 1988; Phi Beta Kappa; National Science
Foundation Fellow; Woodrow Wilson Fellow; General Motors Scholar;
Telluride Scholar.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any
duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

______

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz.
This 15th day of February, 2001.

[The nomination of Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz was reported to
the Senate by Senator John Warner on February 28, 2001, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 28, 2001.]

NOMINATIONS OF DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
COMPTROLLER; CHARLES S. ABELL TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
FORCE MANAGEMENT POLICY; AND VICTORIA CLARKE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

----------

TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:40 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Thurmond,
McCain, Inhofe, Hutchinson, Bunning, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Ben
Nelson, and Dayton.
Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; Scott W.
Stucky, general counsel; and Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant
counsel.
Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, John
R. Barnes, William C. Greenwalt, Gary M. Hall, Lawrence J.
Lanzillotta, George W. Lauffer, Patricia L. Lewis, Cord A.
Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director for the minority; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel;
Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; and Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Thomas C. Moore, Suzanne K.L.
Ross, and Michele A. Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; George M. Bernier III, assistant
to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael
P. Ralsky, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Kristine Fauser,
assistant to Senator Collins; David Young, assistant to Senator
Bunning; Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina
Evans and Barry Gene Wright, assistants to Senator Byrd;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani
Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to
Senator Ben Nelson; and Brady King, assistant to Senator
Dayton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Chairman Warner has asked me to open up the
hearing. He has been delayed just a few additional minutes, so
we will get going. We meet today to consider the nominations of
Dr. Dov Zakheim to be Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller;
Charles Abell to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force
Management Policy; and Victoria Clarke to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
We want to first welcome all of our nominees, and the
colleagues of ours who will be introducing them to the
committee. I know that Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz want us to proceed expeditiously with these
nominations. I think they are probably feeling a bit lonely in
the Pentagon these days without the help that you all are going
to be providing them, assuming you are confirmed. I know he has
been looking forward to getting that assistance. The Department
has a lot of important decisions to make. It needs senior
civilian leadership in place to help make those decisions.
Dr. Zakheim, we are all anxious to get the Department's
fiscal year 2002 budget so that we can do our work here in
Congress. The Comptroller, the chief financial officer for the
largest department in the Federal Government, is a critical
leadership position in the Department of Defense. It is an
awesome responsibility. The financial management challenges
facing the Department of Defense are enormous. As we've
discussed, you are going to be in an important position to
address those.
It's always a pleasure to see Charles Abell. He is one of
our own staff, who has been nominated for this important
position in the administration. His service to this committee
and to the Personnel Subcommittee for the last 8 years has been
exceptional. Your committment to the well-being of our military
members and their families is well known to us. We will miss
your experience and expertise on this committee, but it will be
put to good use in the department on behalf of our men and
women in uniform and the civilians who serve in the Department
of Defense.
Ms. Clarke, you've been nominated to the very important
position of public spokesperson for the Department of Defense.
If confirmed, the American people will count on you to tell it
like it is, like the man who sits to your right is famous for
doing. [Laughter.]
A lesser known, but just as important, aspect of the duties
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, is
the responsibility to keep the men and women in the military
well-informed. So if you're confirmed, I am confident you will
give this duty the attention that it rightfully deserves.
So we have three well-qualified candidates for positions
that the Secretary is anxious to fill. We all look forward to
hearing from our nominees.
I understand, Dr. Zakheim, your wife, Deborah, and your
son, Roger, are here today. We welcome them. Mr. Abell, I
understand that your wife, Kathy, is with you today, and we
surely welcome her. I understand, Ms. Clarke, that your
husband, Brian Graham, and children, Colin, Devon, and Charlie
are here, as well as your parents, Charles and Cecilia Clarke,
and your sister, Caitlin Clarke. We welcome all of them. Family
support is essential in these positions. You will all be put
under great time pressure. There will be too many times when
you're not going to be able to get home as promised, and we ask
your families for their service when we confirm you for your
service.
At this point, I think before I ask the questions that are
traditionally asked, I'm going to call upon Senator Thurmond
for his opening statement. Following that, I will ask the
nominees the standard questions we ask all our nominees, and
then we are going to call upon our colleagues to introduce our
nominees. Senator Thurmond, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I join
you in welcoming Dr. Zakheim, Mr. Abell, and Ms. Clarke. Each
of them has had a long and distinguished career, either in the
private sector or within the government, and I do not expect
any surprises on their nominations.
I am especially pleased by Charlie Abell's nomination to be
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy.
Charlie has been truly professional in carrying out his
responsibilities as a staff member of the Armed Services
Committee. He was instrumental in formulating many of the pay
and benefit programs that have started to reverse the
recruiting and retention programs in our military services. I
only regret that the committee's retention program was not
enticing enough to keep him here on the committee staff.
To each nominee, I congratulate you on your nomination and
on your superb record of public service. Your willingness to
serve our Nation in the challenging positions for which you
have been nominated speaks highly of you. I wish you all
success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator. We're going to move
directly to the introductions. Let me call first on Senator
McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator
Thurmond, members of the committee. I have known all three of
the nominees. Dr. Zakheim and I had a professional relationship
for many years.
I am especially here on behalf of Victoria Clarke, who
will, as you mentioned, be the voice of the Department of
Defense. This doesn't mean Secretary Rumsfeld can't speak for
himself, which he does very eloquently, but obviously, the job
of spokesperson is one that requires talent and skills and a
certain degree of sensitivity, particularly when we are faced
with crises, as we have experienced just recently, some of
which entailed the risk or even loss of American lives.
I've known Victoria Clarke and have had the privilege of
working with her since 1983. She has been able to balance the
responsibilities of a true professional and wife and mother.
She not only, I believe, will be an excellent member of the
Bush team, but she will also be a role model to other women in
America as she has moved up the ladder of success to this very
important position.
I recommend her highly. She's a very dear and beloved
friend of mine, and I'm very proud of her at this moment that
she will take over these very difficult and awesome
responsibilities. I hope my colleagues will consider her
positively and I look forward to working with her in the years
ahead.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for allowing me to
speak.
Senator Levin. Senator McCain, thank you.
Senator Hutchinson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON

Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman, I am very honored today
to be able to appear before the committee and to introduce
someone who doesn't need an introduction to this committee,
President Bush's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management Policy, Charlie Abell, one that we all
love dearly. I understand how lonely Secretary Rumsfeld is
getting these days, but I seriously considered putting a hold
on the nomination if it would have given us a chance of keeping
Charlie around. I would ask unanimous consent that a more
lengthy introduction be included in the record.
Charlie served in the Army, in the enlisted ranks, in 1967,
became an officer, served two tours in Vietnam, and is highly
decorated. The distinguished medals he's received include the
Legion of Merit, 4 Meritorious Service Medals, the Purple
Heart, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 14 Air Medals, including 2 for
valor, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor, and the Combat
Infantry Badge. So he is highly decorated. But more than that
is he joined our staff, and I've had the opportunity to serve
with him for the last 2\1/2\ years.
We all know him to be knowledgeable, professional, and
totally dedicated. He is committed to the welfare of our men
and women in uniform. Having had the opportunity to work with
him as chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee, I am enthused
about his new opportunities, and I know that he will do an
outstanding job for those he loves and for the country he
serves.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Tim Hutchinson
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before the committee.
Today, I have the privilege of introducing President Bush's nominee to
be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, Mr.
Charles S. Abell.
In the 2\1/2\ years that I have worked with Charlie, I have learned
what so many of our colleagues already knew--that Charlie is one of the
most patriotic, dedicated, and hardworking public servants in the
Nation's capital.
For those who do not know Charlie personally, let me tell them
something about his background.
Charlie joined the enlisted ranks of the Army in 1967--it was not
long before he became an officer. He served two tours in Vietnam as
both a Cobra helicopter pilot and as an infantry platoon leader.
After Vietnam, Charlie served in numerous command and staff
positions within the Army, including Congressional Affairs Officer for
the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel and as a member of the Army
Legislative Liaison Office.
The decorations he earned during his distinguished career as a
soldier include the Legion of Merit, 4 Meritorious Service Medals, the
Purple Heart, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 14 Air Medals including 2 for
valor, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor, and the Combat
Infantryman's Badge.
After retiring as a Lieutenant Colonel, after 26 years in the Army,
Charlie joined the staff of this committee.
As the lead staffer on the Personnel Subcommittee, which I now have
the privilege of chairing, he was responsible for issues concerning
military readiness and quality of life. Included in that not-
insignificant portfolio are the topics of manpower; pay and
compensation; health care; personnel management issues affecting Active
Duty, Reserve and civilian personnel; and nominations, both military
and civilian.
During his tenure here on the Hill, Charlie has worked with the
present, and former, members of this committee to achieve great things
for our men and women in uniform and for our Nation's military
retirees. Those accomplishments include:

Significant pay increases for Active Duty and Reserve
service members;
Improving recruiter access to our Nation's high
schools; and,
Enactment of the Warner/Hutchinson Tricare-For-Life
plan, with which our Nation will finally fulfill the decade's-
old promise of lifetime healthcare for those who choose to make
a career of the Armed Forces.

Now, Charlie is in the position, if confirmed, to take the next
logical step in an already distinguished career of public service. From
his new vantage point across the Potomac he will be able to build on
the successes he helped over the last 9 years on behalf of millions of
men and women in uniform, their families, and military retirees.
If confirmed, Charlie will serve as Secretary Rumsfeld's senior
policy advisor on matters concerning the management of military and
civilian personnel and the welfare of their families.
He will promulgate policies relating to recruiting, retention,
career development, compensation, quality of life, equal opportunity
and other force management concerns.
By forwarding to us the nomination, President Bush has publically
declared to the Nation that he has every confidence that Charlie is the
best man for the job. For someone who's relatively new to this town,
that decision marks our President as an excellent judge of character
and a pretty fast learner.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, my fellow
Americans, I present to you Mr. Charles S. Abell.

Senator Levin. Senator Hutchinson, thank you very much.
Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
all the nominees, but I'm particularly pleased and privileged
to be able to introduce Dr. Dov Zakheim.
One of the best ways to take a measure of a person is to
debate that person on important issues of great consequence to
the Nation, and I had that opportunity last fall at Duke. I
became impressed, as we all will become impressed, with Dov's
intelligence, his patriotism, and his dedication to this
country. We don't agree on everything, but I believe this
committee will agree that he is a superbly qualified and
prepared nominee to become the next Comptroller of the
Department of Defense.
Dr. Zakheim has an extraordinary academic record--after
graduating, summa cum laude, from Columbia University, he
earned his doctorate in economics and politics from Oxford
University. Dr. Zakheim's public career began at the
Congressional Budget Office, where he was an analyst. In the
1980s, he served in a number of senior Defense Department
positions. So he takes great experience to this task.
He became, in 1985, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Planning and Resources. He knows the Department of Defense,
and he will bring that experience and that intellect to bear on
critical issues of financial management of the Department of
Defense.
His skill has been recognized by both Democratic and
Republican administrations. The Clinton administration
appointed him in 1997 to the Task Force on Defense Reform, and
he has had numerous significant positions.
Dr. Zakheim twice has been awarded the distinguished Public
Service Medal from the Department of Defense. He received the
CBO Director's Award for Outstanding Service, the Director's
Award for Outstanding Service for his present firm, System
Planning Corporation. He is eminently qualified and prepared
for the difficult challenges of Comptroller. I know he will
give his all, and he will be tireless in his efforts to improve
the management of the Department of Defense. I would urge his
rapid approval. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Senator Reed, thank you very much. We will
start with the opening statements now of our nominees, if they
have opening statements. Why don't we call on you first, Dr.
Zakheim?

STATEMENT OF DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, NOMINEE TO BE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, COMPTROLLER

Dr. Zakheim. Thank you, Senator Levin, and thank you so
much, Senator Reed, for those very kind words.
Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is an honor to
come before you as President Bush's nominee to become the next
Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. I thank President Bush
and Secretary Rumsfeld for their confidence in nominating me
for this important position. Many people made this honor
possible. I especially want to thank my wife, Deborah, and my
sons and my parents for their love and support throughout my
career. I will try to keep my remarks brief, and I ask that my
full statement be included for the record.
Senator Levin. It will be. Also, I forgot to mention
Senator Hutchinson's statement will be made part of the record,
too.
Dr. Zakheim. Over the years, it's been my good fortune to
have been guided by sage mentors and thoughtful colleagues. I
especially appreciate the opportunities that were afford me by
President Reagan and Secretary of Defense Weinberger during
their stewardship over America's security, and Secretary
Weinberger's support ever since then.
During my service at the Pentagon, I was also privileged to
work for and with two especially talented and brilliant men,
Fred Ikle and Richard Perle, who also afforded me wise counsel
and support over the years. It was thanks to another good
friend, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, that I first joined the Pentagon in
1981, and I'm delighted that he has returned to the Department
of Defense as Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy.
This is an important and challenging time for the
Department of Defense. The Cold War may be over, but the
international environment is hardly serene. As leader of the
free world, the United States bears a special responsibility to
protect, not only its interests, but to support those of its
friends and allies. Those responsibilities bear most heavily on
our military personnel, whose welfare must remain our highest
priority, as well as on their civilian colleagues at the DOD.
The office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller,
is especially critical to ensuring a robust national security
posture. The Comptroller has to budget and manage funds to
achieve the greatest payoff from every taxpayer dollar. The
Department faces many tough choices in the area of strategy,
military capabilities, as well as infrastructure and support
activities. We have to allocate scarce budget dollars to give
our fighting forces the greatest advantage on both current and
future battlefields as they evolve. I assure you that, if I am
confirmed, I will do everything possible to get our uniformed
men and women the resources they need to excel in the difficult
missions assigned to them.
If confirmed as DOD Comptroller, I also intend to make
financial management reform a top priority. We have to improve
our management, including management information and accounting
systems. Congress and the American people have to have full
confidence that the Department maintains the very highest
standards in managing and accounting for its funds. We also
have to ensure that our planning, programming, and budgeting
system remains relevant to the demands of the new century, and
we have to rigorously pursue economies and efficiencies
wherever we might find them.
As one who has spent 6 years on Capitol Hill, I recognize
and profoundly believe that the security of our country depends
on wise decisions in both the legislative and executive
branches of our government. If confirmed, a key goal of mine
would be to foster a close cooperation between the Department
of Defense and its oversight committees, in particular. My
years in the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office taught me
that, on matters of national security, bipartisan cooperation
is essential.
Let me close by saying again how honored I am to have been
nominated by President Bush for a position of such immense
importance for America's future security. I pledge to do my
utmost to fulfill the trust placed in me. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Dov S. Zakheim
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is an
honor to come before you as President Bush's nominee to become the next
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). I thank President Bush and
Secretary Rumsfeld for their confidence in nominating me for this
important position.
Many people made this honor possible. I especially want to thank my
wife, Deborah, my sons, and my parents for their unwavering love and
support throughout my professional career.
Over the years it has been my good fortune to have been guided by
sage mentors and thoughtful colleagues. I particularly appreciate the
opportunities afforded me by President Reagan and Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger during their extraordinary stewardship over America's
security. Secretary Weinberger has also been especially supportive to
me since I left the Pentagon, and I will always be grateful to him for
writing an exceedingly warm foreword to my book, The Flight of the
Lavi.
During my service at the Pentagon, I was privileged to work for,
and with, two extraordinarily brilliant and talented men, Under
Secretary Fred Ikle and Assistant Secretary Richard Perle. Both have
afforded me wise counsel and support when I most needed it. It was
thanks to another good friend, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, that I first joined
the Pentagon in 1981, and I am delighted that he has returned to the
Department as Secretary Rumsfeld's deputy.
This is an important and challenging time for the Department of
Defense. The Cold War may be over, but the international environment is
hardly serene. As leader of the Free World, the United States bears
special responsibility to protect not only its interests, but to
support those of its allies and friends. These responsibilities bear
most heavily on our military personnel, whose welfare must remain our
highest priority, as well as on their civilian colleagues at the DOD.
The Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is
especially critical to ensuring a robust national security posture. The
Comptroller must budget and manage funds to achieve the greatest payoff
from every taxpayer dollar. The Department faces many tough choices in
the areas of strategy, military capabilities, as well as infrastructure
and support activities. Scarce budget dollars must be carefully
allocated to give our fighting forces the greatest advantage on current
and future battlefields as they evolve. I assure you that if confirmed
I will do everything possible to get our uniformed men and women the
resources they need to excel in the difficult missions assigned them.
If confirmed as DOD Comptroller, I intend to make financial
management reform a top priority. We must improve our management,
including management information, and accounting systems. Congress and
the American people must have full confidence that the Department
maintains the very highest standards in managing and accounting for its
funds. We also must ensure that our planning, programming, and
budgeting system remains relevant to the demands of the new century. We
must rigorously pursue economies and efficiencies wherever they are to
be found.
As one who spent 6 years on Capitol Hill, I recognize, and
profoundly believe, that the security of America depends on wise
decisions in both the legislative and executive branches of our
government. If confirmed, a key goal of mine would be to foster a close
cooperation between the Department of Defense and its oversight
committees in particular. My years in the non-partisan Congressional
Budget Office taught me that on matters of national security,
bipartisan cooperation is essential.
Let me close by saying again how honored I am to have been
nominated by President Bush for a position of such immense importance
for America's future security. I pledge to do my utmost to fulfill the
trust placed in me. Thank you.

Senator Levin. Thank you.
Ms. Clarke.

STATEMENT OF VICTORIA CLARKE, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, and members
of the committee, thank you very much. It is a real honor for
me to be here today. I am deeply grateful to President Bush for
nominating me to this position, and to Secretary Rumsfeld for
giving me the opportunity to serve. I am very grateful to
Senator McCain for his remarks. They mean a great deal to me.
As President Bush has said, the Department of Defense is in
the business of protecting America's freedom, and the essence
of that freedom demands that we join the American people in a
discussion of and commitment to how we defend it. This, for me,
is a matter of patriotism. It is also my professional
philosophy. This committee knows far better than I that the
portrait of international security and national defense is
vastly different today from what it was even just a few years
ago.
As Secretary Rumsfeld has made clear, our challenge is
building a military that fits in that portrait. We must attract
and retain the very best people to serve. We must use public
dollars effectively and efficiently, and we must explore the
use of innovative technologies and policies that promote peace
and stability. Our challenges change, changing an institution
whose roots in our communities and our consciousness runs
deeper than perhaps any other. That demands an aggressive
program of outreach and education, a national conversation
about the challenges, the risk, and the solutions.
If confirmed, I will embrace that challenge in a spirit of
openness and honesty with this committee, with our men and
women in uniform, and with the people of the United States, on
whose support this life-or-death challenge for our country
ultimately depends.
That is my professional philosophy. It is also my patriotic
feeling. I thank the committee, the President, and the
Secretary for giving me the opportunity to act on it. Thank
you, Senator.
Senator Levin. Ms. Clarke, thank you.
Mr. Abell.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES S. ABELL, NOMINEE TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT POLICY

Mr. Abell. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
members of the committee, I want to thank you and Senator
Hutchinson and Senator Thurmond for the kind words this
afternoon. I really appreciate them. I'm honored to have been
nominated by the President. I'm honored to appear before this
committee today.
If confirmed, I will be privileged to serve in a position
that provides for the personnel readiness of the force and for
the quality of life for service members, retirees, and their
families. It will be an awesome responsibility; however, I look
forward to the challenge.
Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to personally
and publicly thank you for your confidence in my abilities and
for being a mentor and an inspiration to me during my time here
on the staff.
I've had the good fortune to serve with so many of my
personal heros and those whom I have admired throughout my
life. I plan to thrill my grandchildren with tales of working
on important issues with many noted Americans. Being a part of
this staff--of this great committee--has been a much greater
experience than I could have ever imagined. I'm excited about
the opportunity to serve in the Department of Defense and to
continue to work for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
As a result of my position here as one of your professional
staff members, I'm aware of some of the many critical issues
and important challenges that I will face as the next Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy. I also know
that there are challenges that are not yet apparent to me. Mr.
Chairman, if confirmed, I will eagerly accept each of these
challenges that I will face. I pledge to you and to the men and
women who serve our nation that I will work hard to meet these
challenges. I will conduct my dealings with the force, my
colleagues in the Department of Defense and the administration
and Congress in an open and direct manner.
As the members of this committee know, I prefer to be
forthright and open when dealing with any issue. If confirmed,
I will be the professional this committee has come to know.
As excited as I am for the opportunity that awaits me,
leaving the committee staff will be difficult. I've worked on
the staff of this committee for more than 8 years. I recall the
pride and honor I felt when Senator Thurmond hired me. I fondly
remember my first official trip as a member of the committee
with you, Mr. Chairman. I've had extraordinary opportunities to
be a part of history and to meet some of the most influential
and important people in the world. I've been enriched beyond my
greatest expectations.
I will find another occasion to thank my fellow staff
members, but I would be remiss if I did not publicly
acknowledge the very positive impact that my staff director,
Les Brownlee, has had on my life. As everyone knows, this
gentleman is truly unique, and I owe much of what I am today to
this friendship and his tutelage.
If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I will serve the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines--active, Reserve, retired--and
their families to the best of this ability. I will also miss
this committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Abell. Senator Levin, thank
you for initiating this hearing on time. I had to testify
before another committee of the Senate. I might just start my
opening remarks following your very thoughtful, very insightful
statement to the committee.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. We are very proud of you, as we are of our
professional staff. We take pride in this committee. Through
the 23 years that I've been privileged to be a member--my
colleague, Senator Levin, and I came to the Senate together
these many years ago, almost a quarter of a century--this
committee has enjoyed the finest of professionals on its staff
throughout these years, and they have gone on to positions of
great responsibility, not only in the public sector, but the
private sector. You stand preeminent among those who have
served this committee.
I think it would be important for those in attendance today
just to know a few facts. You started your career as an
enlisted soldier, a private, and concluded with your retirement
as a lieutenant colonel. You served as a Cobra attack
helicopter pilot. You were decorated as an officer who led an
infantry platoon, an infantry company, and attack helicopter
units during two tours in Vietnam. I remember that war well
because I was then Secretary of the United States Navy, and I
know the personal sacrifice that all those who wore the uniform
during that period made.
Your decorations include the Legion of Merit, 4 Meritorious
Service Medals, the Purple Heart, 2 Bronze Stars for Valor, 14
Air Medals, the Army Commendation Medal for Valor and the
Combat Infantryman's Badge. I think that says it all. After
your 26-year Army career, you joined the committee in 1993, and
you have been a most valuable member of our team. So we wish
you well.
I am confident that the Senate will give you the advice and
consent the President has sought favorably on your nomination.
Would you at this time kindly introduce your family who are
present in the hearing room?
Mr. Abell. Sir, I am accompanied by my wife, Cathy.
Chairman Warner. We welcome you. Thank you, sir.
Now, Dr. Zakheim, I've come to know you, through the years,
with your distinguished career, and you served with the
Congressional Budget Office--that's an experience, isn't it?
[Laughter.]
--and in the Department of Defense during the Reagan
administration in a number of senior positions from 1981 to
1985. From 1985 to 1987, you served as Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Planning and Resources and played an active role
in the planning, programming, and budget process. In that
capacity, you successfully negotiated arms cooperation
agreements with various U.S. allies.
Subsequently, you served two terms as the President's
appointee to the United States Commission for the Preservation
of America's Heritage Abroad. In 1997, former Secretary of
Defense Cohen named you to the Task Force on Defense Reform and
later named you to the first Board of Visitors of the
Department of Defense Overseas Regional Schools and the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Impact of DOD Acquisition Policies
and on the Health of the Defense Industry.
You currently serve as Corporate Vice President of Systems
Planning Corporation, a high-technology research analysis and
manufacturing firm. Also, you're Chief Executive Officer of SPC
International Corporation, which specializes in political,
military, and economic consulting and international analysis--
again, a very distinguished public service career. Once again,
you volunteered to go back to serve your country with a most
exciting team. So I commend you.
Would you introduce the members of your family, please?
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, Mr. Chairman. My wife, Deborah, sitting
right behind me and, next to her, one of my sons, Roger.
Chairman Warner. We welcome you. As I've said many times in
the course of these hearings, it is a family affair, serving in
the Department of Defense. There are no hours. The clock
knoweth no finality. Days go into nights and nights into day.
But I must say it was one of the most exciting challenges of my
life, the 5 years, 4 months, and 3 days I spent in that
building. So when I speak to each of you, I speak to your
families, because they are very much a part of the team.
Now, Ms. Clarke served as Press Assistant to Vice President
Bush's office early in the 1980s, and later served as Press
Secretary to Senator McCain. That's a challenge.
[Laughter.]
I say that with respect to our colleague--working in both
the House and Senate offices and then served as Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for Public Affairs and the private-sector
liaison under Ambassador Carla Hills in 1992, Press Secretary
for President George Bush's re-election campaign in 1992. Ms.
Clarke is currently the General Manager of the Washington
Office of Hill and Knowlton, one of the most distinguished and
venerable institutions of its type in the Nation's capital, and
we welcome you. Would you kindly introduce those who have come
to join you today?
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have my parents, Dr.
and Mrs. Charles Clarke; my sister, Caitlin; my husband, Brian
Graham; my son, Colin, who is having his sixth birthday
tomorrow; Devon, who is four; Charlie, who is a little over
two; and my friend Lorraine Voles, who is graciously helping us
out today.
Chairman Warner. That's lovely. Those kids are beautifully
well-behaved and turned out, as we say in the military, for
parade dress.
Well, we thank you for considering, again, public service
and for undertaking it as an exemplary parent with the duties
at home and the duties in the office, and all three of you are
serving on, I think, what will be one of the most exciting
teams--I don't say this, Republican and Democrat, because I've
worked with all the teams in these 23 years we've been here--
but you're going to be on an exciting team and the cutting edge
of history in our Department of Defense. So I wish you well.
Now, the committee has standard questions which we propound
to each of our nominees, and I will do so on behalf of the
committee and ask each of you to respond.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflict of interest? Mr. Abell.
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Dr. Zakheim.
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Ms. Clarke. No, sir.
Dr. Zakheim. No, sir.
Mr. Abell. No, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you ensure your staff complies with
the deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in the hearings? Charlie, I
want you to answer that loud and clear.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir.
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Would those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, why don't you start the
questioning period here on behalf of the membership?
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Zakheim, does
the administration plan to file a detailed budget for defense
for the year 2002?
Dr. Zakheim. To the best of my knowledge, they plan to do
so. I don't have those details myself, obviously.
Senator Levin. Do you know when they plan to do that?
Dr. Zakheim. I do not at this time.
Senator Levin. Do you know whether the administration plans
to request any supplemental funding for defense for fiscal year
2001?
Dr. Zakheim. I believe that is under active consideration,
but I don't know the final answer to that one, sir.
Senator Levin. When will that decision be made, whether or
not to do it? Do you know?
Dr. Zakheim. I don't know the exact date. If confirmed, I
suspect that I'll be part of that decision-making process.
Senator Levin. Do you have any idea as to how much funding
would be requested, if it's requested?
Dr. Zakheim. Not at this time, sir, no.
Senator Levin. You've written in the past, Dr. Zakheim, on
the need for additional base closures.
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Do you believe there is excess
infrastructure in the Defense Department today? If so, are
there unfunded needs within the Department that could benefit
by redirecting resources away from the excess infrastructure?
Dr. Zakheim. I believe the infrastructure is in excess of
the force structure, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Does that mean it's in excess, you believe,
of what is needed?
Dr. Zakheim. I believe that it is. I think we have to look
closely at the details, of course. But yes, I believe that
there is an excess.
Senator Levin. Have previous rounds of base closures, in
your opinion, resulted in significant reductions in DOD costs
that have made resources available for higher priorities?
Dr. Zakheim. As I understand it, GAO and CBO have said as
much. They have never put a dollar figure on that, though.
Senator Levin. Do you believe that it is true that there
have been significant savings over time from previous rounds of
base closures?
Dr. Zakheim. I haven't done the analysis. I believe there
are savings; but since I haven't done the numbers, I don't know
how big they are.
Senator Levin. Dr. Zakheim, you've also written that
peacekeeping is a ``strategically marginal'' use of U.S.
defense funds. You have advocated, ``withdrawing from much of
the peacekeeping business,'' so that funds can be used for
other needs. Do you believe we should withdraw our forces
unilaterally from the following places: Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai?
Dr. Zakheim. With regard to Bosnia and Kosovo, I think that
it's a function of consultation with allies. The ``unilateral''
word is key here. We shouldn't do anything unilaterally. The
events in the last few months, particularly in Macedonia,
demonstrated that this is really a very sensitive region. I
believe the same holds true for the Sinai. Clearly, both Israel
and----
Senator Thurmond. Speak a little bit louder. I didn't hear
you.
Dr. Zakheim. I'm sorry, Senator. What I just, Senator--can
you hear me now, sir? What I just said was that the word
``unilateral'' is key here, that on Kosovo and Bosnia, we can't
just pull out without consultation with allies. The events in
Macedonia have indicated how sensitive that region is. So these
issues are a function of what is happening on the ground.
I believe the same applies to the Sinai. The Israelis and
the Egyptians both are deeply concerned about how we approach
this process. So it will certainly have to involve
consultation, Senator.
Senator Levin. I'm glad to hear those answers. It is
somewhat reassuring, both given prior positions, but, in any
event, given current circumstances, I think those are
reassuring answers, at least for me.
Dr. Zakheim, when there are differences between the amounts
that are authorized by us and the amounts that are appropriated
by the appropriators for specific programs, will you work with
the defense committees of Congress to identify and resolve such
differences between authorization and appropriation reports
prior to obligation?
Dr. Zakheim. We have to, and I know it's been the
Department's practice all along, to try to work with all the
oversight committees and resolve these matters as amicably and
as efficiently as possible, and I am committed to consultation
with the committees on a case-by-case basis to resolve these
matters to everyone's satisfaction.
Senator Levin. Thank you. On the financial management end
of your work, you and we all know the Department faces serious
financial management problems. Because these problems are
widespread, they can't be solved at one time, but require
higher-level attention. I was pleased to read in your answers
to the committee's advance questions that you are, in your
words, fully committed to improve financial management in the
Department of Defense. Could you give us just an idea, in your
judgment, as to what needs to be done. What steps do you plan
to take to improve financial management at the Department?
Dr. Zakheim. Senator, there really are some very serious
problems, whether it's a matter of clean audits, whether it's a
matter of proper training, whether it's a matter of inventory
management or management information. I'm coming out of the
private sector, and when you're in the private sector, these
sorts of matters are second nature. You can't run a business
without having the kind of information that is being sought
from the Department of Defense.
If I were confirmed, it's a top priority for me to do a
number of things--first, to reorganize the Comptroller's office
to bring in some first-rate people as deputies to the
Comptroller so that we can have focus on management reform and
on management initiatives.
Second, I would hope, if confirmed, to bring in outsiders,
people with a financial management background, former CFOs and
the like, who could provide what you might call mid-term--mid-
course guidance on a regular basis to see how we're doing.
Finally, I want to work with this committee and with other
interested Members of Congress who have very valuable input and
have made a very big difference over the years in passing a
variety of financial management acts that have to be really
fulfilled.
Senator Levin. Just one last question for you and my time
is up. Do you have any plans to reorganize the Office of the
Comptroller; and if so, what types of changes would you make?
Dr. Zakheim. If confirmed, Senator, I would very much like
to do that. I believe that it would be in everyone's best
interest to have at least one, and probably two, Deputy Under
Secretaries who focus specifically on financial management
issues, and then a third one who focuses on program budget
issues. Financial management is simply not being dealt with as
smoothly and as capably, in my view, as has the program budget
side, and it really needs a lot of work. We need competent,
excellent people to do this, and I'm committed to doing this,
if confirmed.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. For the record,
the chair of this committee, together with the ranking member,
has the responsibility to review the material that is forwarded
on all nominees from the White House to the United States
Senate through this committee. Senator Levin and I have
reviewed that material. We took it upon ourselves to have a
briefing in executive session on three nominees, and that has
been completed. Do you have anything further to add--but we
reviewed this material and it met our criteria. Am I correct in
that?
Senator Levin. There may be an additional executive
session, if possible.
Chairman Warner. I'm going to momentarily defer to my other
senators, but I cannot let go saying that, one, a very valued
staff member of this committee is to do a transfer from this
committee to the Department of Defense to work under your aegis
as your principal deputy. We wish to recommend him very highly.
He is an extraordinary, able, well-trained professional, and
it's been my experience--and I think my staff, who share these
views--that the staff of the Pentagon and your department have
served their country very well. While you certainly have the
right to do certain reorganization, we would want you to do so
knowing that this committee has very high respect for their
performance in their respective duties.
Senator Levin, do you have a statement? Then I'll yield to
Senator Bunning, because I'm going to stay here for a period of
time. Senator, do you have a statement you'd like to make? Just
a brief announcement?
Senator Thurmond. I will pass on the opportunity to ask
questions of our nominees. I have complete confidence in their
abilities and will support their nominations.
Chairman Warner. I thank you.
Now, Senator Bunning, you take my----
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
want to thank all of you for coming.
The most important thing I can convey to you today is the
importance of providing, here in Congress to the members of
this committee, timely, accurate information. If an
administration official is asked a question, we need that
official to provide us with accurate information or we cannot
do our jobs. If confirmed, I look forward to working with all
of you.
Dr. Zakheim, there have been many reports of the
deterioration of our readiness in the armed services. Do you
believe that the proposed budget is sufficient to adequately
resource our force at their current levels of commitment?
Dr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, Secretary Rumsfeld is
conducting the strategic review right now, and the budget
submission for 2002 is going to reflect that review. So, in a
sense, I can't really comment on the relationship other than to
say that, clearly Secretary Rumsfeld is going to take into
account exactly the concerns you've talked about.
Senator Bunning. It's my understanding that there's going
to be a request from the Department of Defense for a
supplemental appropriation bill. Do you have that same
understanding?
Dr. Zakheim. I believe that it is under active
consideration. I'm not aware yet of any timing or sizing of it.
Senator Bunning. You're not aware of any sizing or timing.
Dr. Zakheim. Not yet, no, sir.
Senator Bunning. Gee, that's funny, because we are, and
you're about to ask us to confirm you. You're not in any loop
at all?
Dr. Zakheim. Well, Senator, again, I'm briefed. People have
tried to educate and get me up to speed, but on this particular
decision loop, I am simply not aware of any final decision on
either of those matters, Senator.
Chairman Warner. The practice of the Department, Senator,
is the nominee has to await the confirmation process before the
Secretary of Defense can call on you to be an active
participant in the decision making.
Senator Bunning. I understand that. But, in other words, if
he's had a briefing on the proposed budget and/or a possible
supplemental, I thought maybe he might share some of that
information.
Today's Washington Times reports the Secretary of Defense
is forming an executive committee of senior civilian leaders,
including the Comptroller, to implement the transformation
policy. What would be the specific function of that committee,
and what would the Comptroller's role be?
Dr. Zakheim. Again, I have not been given details as to
exactly what the committee will do, except in the most general
sense that you described. The Comptroller is also a chief
financial officer and, in that respect, obviously has input
into acquisition policy. I presume that that is what the
article is alluding to.
Senator Bunning. Senator Levin brought up BRAC and a
possibility of another BRAC, and you were pretty firm in your
statement that you didn't have a handle on any savings, if they
occurred, from the first two rounds, other than to say that you
thought that some savings might have occurred.
Before I ever look at another BRAC, you're going to have to
convince me that there were actual savings in the first two
rounds. I don't think there's any question that the size of the
force doesn't fit the facilities; but sometimes--as I just
stopped on Midway Island on the way home from Taiwan--sometimes
what is shut down is still operating. I say that only to point
out that Midway had been BRAC-ed in 1996; and yet there is a
big need on Midway for refueling and doing a lot of other
things that the military needs to have done.
So I want you to be prepared, if you are ready to recommend
BRAC to us again, that you show us some substantial savings
from the first two rounds. Let me ask a couple of other
questions.
Chairman Warner. Senator, you take such time as you need
and then we'll turn to our other colleague momentarily.
Senator Bunning. Yes, I want to ask our staff member--a
number of years ago, General Mundy, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, proposed to no longer enlist anyone who is
already married. One of the objectives behind this was to
reduce the pressure placed on newly-enlisted personnel,
particularly given the high number of days per year they are
deployed away from home--and I can speak from personal
experience, with a son in the Air Force. Do you feel that this
would be an effective way to reduce stress on our enlisted
personnel during their initial enlistments?
Mr. Abell. Senator, the short answer is no. I think it's a
fact that more and more of our young soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines are enlisting with existing families. Even a
greater number acquire a family shortly after enlistment.
You're right, it is stressful. I have a great deal of
confidence in the abilities of those young men and women to
handle that stress, and I have a great deal of confidence in
their chain of command to assist them in that endeavor.
Senator Bunning. Then why are we falling short in every
service on our enlistment goals?
Mr. Abell. Sir, I think recruiting--recruiting especially,
but retention, as well--is a very tough job. Currently, we
enjoy a very robust economy. I think that probably contributes
more. The opportunities available to young men and women today,
especially the high quality young men and women we seek for the
military, are probably unmatched. I think that is the
difficulty, not so much family.
Senator Bunning. Do you think our current force structure
is large enough to assume the commitments that we have made
presently?
Mr. Abell. Senator, I think there's no doubt the current
force structure is stressed and overtaxed by its missions.
Whether it's the right size or not, I think, is going to be one
of the outcomes that we will see from Secretary Rumsfeld's
several studies, and I look forward to seeing the details of
that--of those studies before I could give you a definitive
answer on that.
Senator Bunning. OK. Ms. Clarke, the Department of Defense
usually uses individual Social Security numbers as their
service-identification numbers. Recently, there have been some
reports of identity theft from active duty military members.
Given the Social Security numbers may be more accessible to
outside parties, Privacy Act requirements notwithstanding, how
do you plan to minimize the danger to service members from this
crime?
Ms. Clarke. Senator, I don't have enough information about
that particular issue to address today, but I do think, when it
comes to the Privacy Act, that one of the utmost priorities of
my department is to respect and protect the privacy of
individuals. I will do everything possible, if confirmed, to
ensure that I and my staff are fully trained and sensitized to
that protection and respect we should give to individual
privacy. I would be happy to take the question for the record
and get back to you with an answer.
Senator Bunning. Well, the question I have is, why does the
military continuously use the Social Security numbers as an ID
number, when most of the banks, most of the driver's licenses,
most other people are starting to phase that out since the
access to the Social Security number and the maiden name of the
mother allows access to your Social Security records?
Ms. Clarke. I don't have an answer for you, Senator, but I
would be happy to get you one.
[The information follows:]

The Department of Defense shares your concern about the potential
misuse of social security numbers and the need to protect the privacy
of the men and women of our Armed Forces. While Defense Department
policies and practices do not appear to have contributed to misuse, we
will continue to be vigilant in safeguarding such information.
The issue of using the social security number (SSN) as the service
identification number, a practice first begun in the 1960s, was
recently studied by both the Defense Department and the General
Accounting Office. In addition to identity theft, we studied the
potential use of the SSN to obtain information that could be used
against captured or detained personnel. However, given the ubiquitous
access to personal information via the Internet, the senior officials
who studied this issue determined that removal of the SSN and
substitution of another number would not remove or even markedly reduce
this threat. Further, any such attempts would likely waste hundreds of
millions of dollars while not providing any significant protection for
servicemembers.
This issue poses a difficult challenge, but we remain committed to
protecting the privacy of servicemembers and will vigilantly safeguard
personal information. We take very seriously our responsibility to
protect social security numbers and limit access to only those uses
permitted by law.

Senator Bunning. OK. During the recent incident with the
U.S.S. Greeneville, the Navy was criticized for initially
providing misleading and inaccurate information. How do you
plan to address this in similar situations in the future?
Ms. Clarke. Senator, if confirmed, I hope one of the mottos
of my department will be ``maximum disclosure with minimal
delay.'' I think one of the priorities for the Department is to
disseminate news and information, the good and bad, as quickly
and as accurately as possible.
Senator Bunning. We are counting on you to do just that.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator, and particularly for
the question about Social Security. I think that this committee
will follow your lead on that issue and look into that question
with some thoroughness.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, because, as Chairman of the
Social Security Subcommittee in the other body, that was one of
my primary concerns, and that now you can tell the bank to go
you-know-where if they ask for your Social Security number.
Chairman Warner. We will look into that.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am pleased
to be participating in this hearing and want to welcome the
families of the nominees here to the hearing, and to tell you I
was impressed with introductions that were given by our
Senators of each one of you, which tells me that the President
made some good choices of well-qualified people, and I look
forward to working with you as we move forward with this new
administration.
In advance questions that we received, Dr. Zakheim, you
provided the committee--you indicated that you expect Secretary
Rumsfeld to charge you--and I'd like to quote this loud and
clear--``to do everything possible from every budget dollar.''
That is a high calling, and I agree with your assessment that
accurate and timely financial management information is
critical for managers across the Department to ensure
accountability and the most effective use of taxpayers'
dollars, and I then realize why you suggested reorganization of
some of the top-level people under you.
My question is a large one that has been around. I would
just ask you one question, and then ask some of each of the
others. My question to you, Dr. Zakheim is, how long do you
think it will take before the Department can provide Congress
with an accurate accounting of DOD expenditures?
Dr. Zakheim. I can answer it the following way. I have been
told that it will take many years to do that. Many years is not
a good enough answer for me. I would hope that Congress will be
in a position to receive cleaner audits, far more timely
information, certainly within the next few years--in other
words, hopefully, if confirmed, while I'm still around there.
Senator Akaka. I do, too. I've enjoyed working with you,
Mr. Abell, during the past few years, when I was not a member
here on this committee, but we worked in other ways, and I
really appreciate what you've done to help me in other ways.
I'm sure that you will do your best to address the challenges
facing the Assistant Secretary for Force Management and Policy.
I agree with your assessment that, while recruitment is
essential, retention is critical to force readiness. In your
answers to questions by the committee, you referred to
``balancing deployments and military training requirements with
the stability necessary for long-term health of military
families.'' I took that off--a quote. So my question to you is,
if confirmed, how would you address this issue?
Mr. Abell. Well, Senator, this is a tough issue. It is one
that the military services have talked to us about while I've
served on the committee for many years. We--the committee and
Congress--have put into effect some legislation requiring that
the deployments now be tracked on an individual basis and that
the individuals be apprised of how many days they have been
deployed, and that those deployments be managed by senior
officers.
I think as this procedure gets implemented, just getting
visibility on the subject will help a lot. But as we do get the
visibility of how many days soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines are actually deployed, we will get a good feel for the
types of units, the types of military specialties and the types
of missions that are consuming these service members' time. I
think then we'll be able to make some judgments as to how to
better balance the needs of the family, the needs of the
individual, and the needs of the service.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Ms. Clarke, I liked
your proposal that, if confirmed, your motto would be, and I
quote, ``maximum disclosure exposure and minimum delay.'' I
agree that accuracy is very important in dealing with the
dissemination of information, as evidenced by recent events
that have occurred in the past few months. In my case, many of
these have occurred in the Pacific and Asian areas. How do you
propose to engage and gain the support of the public as the
Department of Defense addresses the threats of the 21st
century?
Ms. Clarke. I think there are two answers, Senator. The
first part is to make sure, on a regular, consistent basis, in
as timely and accurate a fashion as possible, you give them
complete information, the good and the bad, about what is going
on. I think that is an absolute priority.
At the same time, I think it's critical that we do
something that probably hasn't been done for quite some time.
That is, on an ongoing basis, engage the American people, not
just the men and women in uniform and their families, although
I think they're absolutely critical as well, but engage the
American people in a conversation and a dialogue, if you will,
about the risks we face in the 21st century, about the kinds of
changes that might be appropriate. The challenges are too
great, and the issues too serious, not to engage all of them in
that.
So if the first motto of the Department, I hope, will be
``maximum disclosure and minimum delay,'' I hope another motto
that people will come to think about is ``outreach, outreach,
outreach.'' I think we should be talking to and responding to
and educating and making aware everyone we can find. Talk to
them about the risks, about the solutions, talk to them about
the commitments these men and women make. It's very telling,
you asked many questions about the people who are actually
serving, and the stresses and the pressures on them. I think
it's very important the American people see, up close and
personal, the kind of commitment these men and women are
willing to make, the kinds of challenges they face and the
kinds of risks they face, as we've seen over the last few
weeks. Increasingly, there are few people in society who have
much real-life experience with the military. So I think it's
really important that we focus on that outreach so they can see
what's going on.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses, and
I congratulate you on your nominations. Thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed, I'm going to be the wrap up,
so I'm going to let all members go ahead. You go right ahead.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Then to Senator Dayton, and then we'll go
into another round of questions if there are others.
Senator Reed. Let me first address a question to Mr. Abell.
But before I do that, let me associate myself with all the high
praise that you richly deserve. You've been a key member of
this committee's staff, and you've served every member with
great diligence and professionalism, Charlie. It's a mixed
blessing; we're glad for you, but sorry to see you go.
Let me address a question. We often spend a great deal of
time about the recruitment and retention within the uniformed
services, but I think you're going to be facing a real
challenge with respect to recruitment of civilian Department of
Defense officials and retaining a very qualified workforce. I
wonder if you've given any thought to what you might do.
Mr. Abell. Yes, Senator, I have. I'm concerned about that.
There are a number of senior civilians who will be retiring.
I'm concerned about the developmental programs that enable
folks to be developed professionally to fill those positions.
I'm concerned about whether or not Federal civil service is
attractive to men and women out in America, just like the
military service is, and I look forward to getting into those
issues. I'm not as familiar with those as I am with the
military personnel policies, and so it is going to be a matter
of some focus to me to roll up my sleeves and get involved in
it.
Senator Reed. Well, we have every confidence you will roll
up your sleeves.
Dr. Zakheim, again, welcome. One of the major initiatives
that has been taking place over the last two decades has been
an attempt to foster more ``jointness'' in the Department of
Defense, and we have made some progress with uniformed officers
serving in joint assignments with a requirement for promotion
to have a joint assignment. But I think in the area of
management systems and procurement systems, in the financial
guts of DOD, we have made very little progress in
``jointness.'' Could you mention how you perceive the problem
and what your instincts are at this moment?
Dr. Zakheim. Certainly, Senator. First, again, thanks so
much for the very kind words. I really do appreciate them.
Certainly, one cannot say that on financial management
we've received anything like a Goldwater-Nichols. Of course, it
was this committee that was very much behind that. We have
``jointness'' in the military that was unprecedented when I
came to the Pentagon in 1981. I believe that the only way one
can achieve anything remotely like that in the financial
management side of the Department is by conveying the sense of
high-level attention. The Secretary of Defense is personally
committed to making this happen. If I am confirmed, I'm
personally committed to making this happen. I hope to work with
the team of people who will focus on this full-time.
In addition, the Secretary of Defense has made it clear
that he wants the service secretaries to work as a team. One of
the highest priorities in that team effort is getting
coordinated financial management. So I believe with that degree
of top-level involvement, we will make some progress.
Senator Reed. I know it's very early. In fact, I presume
you really have been barred from any significant discussions
about planning as it goes on today in the Pentagon. That is a
correct presumption, isn't it?
Dr. Zakheim. Yes.
Senator Reed. But do you anticipate, given your background,
that legislation would be required to effectuate the kind of
integration of financial measures and systems that you
anticipate?
Dr. Zakheim. It may well be, in certain respects, and I
would hope to work with this committee and with other cognizant
committees to identify those sorts of requirements. It's very
important that the Department work very closely with Congress
on these matters. Certainly, if I'm confirmed, I intend to make
this not just an occasional practice, but a regular one.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Zakheim. Ms. Clarke,
best wishes. I'm sure you're going to do a fabulous job.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Senator Reed. You also have a problem of ``jointness,''
which is you have three services that have their own public
affairs operations. Do you have a plan at the moment to either
do more integration or more decentralization, or less?
Ms. Clarke. Sir, I've actually had the opportunity to meet
with the heads of public affairs from the three services in my
private-sector life, and----
Chairman Warner. Let me interrupt. There are four
services----
Ms. Clarke. Yes.
Chairman Warner. The United States Marine Corps, I say to
my graduate of the West Point Academy here----[Laughter.]
Excuse me for the interruption.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I obviously stand corrected. I
don't know what came over me. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. All right. What came over Ms. Clarke? She
picked right up on the same response. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Well, she's in an awkward position. She has
to be polite. I should be accurate. Forgive me.
Senator Levin. Actually, you were really testing Ms.
Clarke, and she came through.
Senator Reed. She came through. She was wonderful.
Senator Levin. It was a very conscious effort. I've seen
him do that before. He really knew there were four services,
but he wanted to see just how much you knew. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed. Well, what I--I misspoke. There are three
service secretaries. Chairman Warner is right--I misspoke.
Chairman Warner is always right. That's a good rule on this
committee, by the way. [Laughter.]
Ms. Clarke. As I've been told many times by those in the
Navy, there is no secretary of the Marines, is there--but there
are four heads of Public Affairs, and they are all very
talented, very professional people, and I have had the
opportunity to meet with them. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with them closely. I think the focus on ``jointness''
is absolutely appropriate and absolutely vital, so I look
forward to working with them.
I have not thought through--because I did not want to
presume anything--I haven't thought through the structure, but
I have thought, in general terms, about trying to find a
process, trying to find a way to work more closely together.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Just one final question. Dr.
Zakheim, you have spent a lifetime studying strategic issues
and bringing to that study, not just academic theoretical
instincts, but also the knowledge of budgets and how they work,
how they're put together. I'm just wondering about your view,
as we look ahead, the budget you're seeing emerging, is that
adequate to do modernization and then attempt, if feasible, to
do some very expensive projects, like national missile defense?
Dr. Zakheim. Well, the Secretary of Defense wants very much
to have a top-down approach to this whole matter--that is to
say, to lay out the strategy and then to coordinate the budgets
with that strategy. So, in fact, right now, he has a strategic
review that is ongoing; and hopefully, the budgets and the
program would then reflect that review. If confirmed, I would
hope very much to participate in that activity, but we're
putting first things first.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Clarke, I
won't use any numbers in my questioning or comments, but I want
to second what Senator Bunning said about--I'm new to this
committee, and when I read your remarks there that there is a
Principles of Information, I made a note to myself to get a
copy of that, because I'm not aware that--what I imagine they
must be, and what your remarks have suggested is followed in
practice. The U.S.S. Greeneville incident, to me, was a classic
case of providing as little information as absolutely
necessary. Except for watching the television news,
investigative reports, and the newspapers, I don't think a lot
of it would have come to light. So I certainly support his
comments and urge you to act accordingly.
Similarly with the bombing of the Iraq radar installations,
I remember my staff picking that up on CNN and trying to find
somewhere to call and inquire as I was about to walk into a
Minnesota defense establishment and not being able to even get
a courtesy of reply. So I would say good luck to you. You have
a long way to go.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Senator. I will need the support.
The Principles of Information, which I'd be happy to provide,
do state clearly that it's the utmost responsibility to release
news and information in as timely and accurate a fashion as
possible. The only time you withhold information, according to
the Principles, is if it would adversely affect national
security or it would threaten the privacy or the safety of the
men and women in uniform.
I absolutely believe that, as many people say, bad news
doesn't get better with age; so get it out there, and get it
out there accurately.
Senator Dayton. Well, I would like to receive a copy of the
Principles. My solution would be to get a direct phone number
for your office. But in either respect, I'm----
Ms. Clarke. You can have it.
Senator Dayton.--encouraged by what you said.
Mr. Abell, I note your comments about the importance of
recruiting and retaining top-qualified military personnel, and
I assume that applies to the Department, as well. Could you
elaborate a bit on what you propose to do, or what you
contemplate, in terms of--especially in making life better for
the families of men and women in our service and improving the
retention of them?
Mr. Abell. Senator, I think, first, recruiting and
retention are a matter of constant vigilance. It is my
experience that anytime that a service takes its eye off of
either of those two tasks, it is inevitable that they have
suffered. So I will be, if confirmed, one who pushes for
maintaining that constant vigilance.
I also believe that the services are now--have responded
well to some problems in the recent past and are being very
innovative and visionary in their approaches to recruiting and
to retention, and they are to be congratulated. I think the
results, both last year and the projected results for this
year--we just had a hearing this morning in the Personnel
Subcommittee--are very encouraging, and they reflect well on
the hard work of a lot of people. I think we need to keep
looking for the fresh way to address these problems with a
crisp delivery of a good message.
As for the quality of life of our families--again, very
important for retention--it is one of the focuses of Secretary
Rumsfeld's strategic review. I have not been briefed on their
progress, and I look forward to receiving that brief, if
confirmed.
Senator Dayton. I would just note that, in the budget
process, there were a couple of amendments, including the
Chairman's, which was adopted, which provided additional funds
which could be used for, among other purposes, those
improvements.
I was at the National Training Center in California during
the recess and asked a couple of the commanding generals there
what they thought were the greatest needs. They both--one said,
``I'm an armaments expert, but the quality of life for the pay
benefits and standards of living for our families is what would
be most valuable and supportive of my mission.'' So I look
forward to your returning and to the administration coming
forward, whether it's a supplemental appropriation or future
requests, and really take advantage of the support of the
members of this committee for those kinds of improvements.
Mr. Abell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Dayton. I would add, as part of that--and I noted
with interest your referencing the health benefits dilemma that
many reservists and National Guard members face. In Minnesota,
we have reservists and members of the Guard who were called up
for a period of 3 to 5 months, and the economic hardships which
they and their families encountered, health being one of them--
again, I would hope and urge that they not be forgotten when it
comes to these kinds of financial and other improvements.
Mr. Abell. I assure you, Senator, I will look at the total
force.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Dr. Zakheim, when Secretary
Rumsfeld has met with us, he has cited his concern about the
length of time and increasing length of time from the
authorization and design of these weapons systems to their
deployment now, some getting to be some 8 to 10 years. I wonder
if you've had the chance to think about what kind of financial
procedures--I know from the standpoint of military contractors
in Minnesota, it's often very time consuming and contributes to
these overall delays, getting swift billing and receipts and
the like.
Conversely, on the other side, according to Senator Byrd
and others that have longer experience than I, it's almost
astronomical amounts of money that can't be accounted for
within the system. So we have this anomaly that, on the one
hand, it seems that many of the procedures and requirements
just extend delays, but they don't end up accounting for the
money. Do you have a way to reconcile and solve those problems?
Dr. Zakheim. Well, it's not an easy challenge, Senator. I
understand that, in the matter of what Senator Byrd is very
concerned about--and he mentions, I think, $4\1/2\ trillion--
there are technical answers to that question, but I think there
is more than a germ of truth to his concern. If confirmed, one
of my highest priorities would certainly be to, in particular,
work to make sure that the various different sources of
information are all congruent, because it is my impression--and
I do have to study this more, Senator--but it is my impression
that the various--what are called feeder systems and various
sources of information simply don't speak to each other, and
that is where a lot of this falls between the cracks.
As to your first point, Senator, regarding the acquisition
cycle, I am fully aware of Secretary Rumsfeld's concerns. There
are some studies going on, as part of the overall strategic
review, to look at this particular question. Obviously, how one
deals with the funding of these programs is an integral part of
it.
So, if confirmed, I very much would hope to be involved in
reconciling the financial side to the pure mechanics of the
acquisition side so that the program can be speeded up.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. I would appreciate your sharing
those reports with me when they become available. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. Senator Bunning, do
you have a question, too? Senator Levin? All right. You go,
then I'll do wrap-up.
Senator Levin. Thank you. I appreciate your yielding to me,
Mr. Chairman, so I could leave in a few minutes.
First, Ms. Clarke, last year, the editor of Stars and
Stripes resigned because he was not allowed to publish a story
even after the story was published in the Washington Post. I'm
wondering whether or not you believe that Stars and Stripes
should enjoy the same freedom to publish as other U.S.
newspapers.
Ms. Clarke. Absolutely, Senator. I think Stars and Stripes
should be as independent and as credible as possible. It
provides a very valuable service to the men and women in
uniform and their families who serve overseas. It gives them
news and information that they want, and they need and deserve
to know that it is absolutely credible and independent. I think
the safeguards are there. If confirmed, I would make sure the
safeguards are enforced.
Chairman Warner. That's encouraging to hear that. I concur
in your response.
Senator Levin. There is some real concern about that here,
which you've just alleviated.
Mr. Abell, what actions are you going to take to enhance
recruiter access to secondary schools? This is a big part of
our recruiting issue.
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. As you're aware, sir, as you recall,
in last year's defense authorization bill, there was a
provision that actually requires recruiter access unless the
local school board takes some action. That provision is not
effective until July 2002. This morning in the hearing,
recruiters reported to us that their access was improving as a
result of that, but they still sought more support. I think
there are some things that we can do to encourage school
systems to be more open to recruiters between now and 2002.
Then in 2002, we'll follow the implementation of that
provision.
Senator Levin. What initiatives would you propose to
improve the employment of spouses of our service members? That
also is a big part of retention.
Mr. Abell. Yes, sir. It's a difficult problem and one that,
as I've traveled on the committee's staff, we find, at almost
every location, is brought to our attention. There are a number
of things that could be done, Senator--more education, tuition
assistance for spouses. I, if confirmed, look forward to
working with local civic organizations and chambers of commerce
on initiatives like that to see what we can do.
Senator Levin. There's been some evidence at least--
perhaps, anecdotal evidence--that we're beginning to lose the
support of employers of our Reserve component personnel because
of the deployments that we have seen. Any plans to address
those concerns?
Mr. Abell. Senator, I've heard the same anecdotes. I, if
confirmed, would like to work very closely with the Assistant
Secretary for Reserve Affairs to examine this and try to
determine the causal factors and actually determine--change it
from anecdote to evidence to find out what the real problem is
and then address that problem. It may be one of communication,
it may be one of over-deploying certain units and not others.
Senator Levin. If confirmed, will you recommend a medal for
children who sit through these confirmation hearings?
[Laughter.]
Ms. Clarke, I must tell you, you have really extraordinary
children. They have been wonderful. I can't take my eyes off
them. We will call it the ``Clarke Medal,'' if Mr. Abell is
able to produce that. I just want to thank all of you. I
shouldn't single out family members. You're all really
deserving of medals for many reasons, but your children have
really been extraordinary. So please give them all of our
thanks.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. The committee
really enjoys its responsibilities in the confirmation process.
It gives us an opportunity to share, not only views and elicit
responses, but we really are appreciative of the overall family
contribution to this public service. I thank you, Senator
Levin.
I will start with you, Ms. Clarke. Crisis management--it's
just remarkable how your predecessors from time to time really
are on the point at all hours of the day and night. Secretary
Rumsfeld, I think, has a very good policy. He's been very
careful in keeping Congress informed, certainly this
committee--I can speak for the Senate side--in consultation
with members of this committee and others about decisions that
he's making.
But then we have the tragic incident of the accident with
the Chinese aircraft. I was called early in the morning, as
were other members of this committee. I'm sure those
responsibilities will fall on you. Tell us a bit about how
you're going to go about this, because often you are the point
person, particularly when the military families had their loved
ones, at the end of the long voyage, or flight, whatever the
case may be, at some remote part of the world and trouble is
there--the anxiety in their hearts--you recognize that, being a
family person, yourself.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Tell us a bit about how you're going to
approach that responsibility.
Ms. Clarke. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. I hesitate to quote
from somebody from just one service, but I think it was General
MacArthur who said, ``The key to success and victory is
preparation.'' I think that holds true across the board,
including crisis management, including being prepared for the
inevitable crises.
If confirmed, one of the first things I want to do is to
look into what is the planning, what processes do we have in
place, and who is responsible for making sure the public
affairs aspect of these incidents is addressed at the earliest
possible position. I know there are some things in place, but I
want to give it the utmost attention to ensure, when things do
happen, the right people know, and the American people know as
quickly as possible. So it's a matter of planning and process.
Chairman Warner. Would you elaborate a little bit? By the
way, I don't question General MacArthur's quote, but Admiral
Jellico used to say, ``All preparation for naval battles starts
in the engine room.'' In those days, they battened the hatches,
and everybody in the engine room knew they were not going to
come out and they had better stoke those old coal boilers and
get full power for the captain to maneuver his ship. I've
always enjoyed military history, and I hope that you share that
curiosity and find a few moments to probe the magnificent
contributions, certainly of those who have worn the uniform of
this country for generations past. Congress--how do you propose
to deal with Congress? Now, there's a long history about
relationships with Congress and I would hope this Department
sets a new high record for fairness and firmness, when
necessary.
Ms. Clarke. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will work closely with my
legislative counterpart to make sure that you, this committee,
the staff, and 535 Members of Congress get as much information
as quickly as possible. Just by way of insight to how
passionately I feel about this, I did work for John McCain for
6\1/2\ years, and every day was a delight; but I know how
important it is to be kept informed by the agencies, so I'll
make that a priority.
Chairman Warner. Also, I must say, you had the privilege of
working with our former president, George Bush. I know of no
finer American. I really have the greatest admiration for him,
and I envy you for your close relationship with him.
Ms. Clarke. It was an honor to work for him.
Chairman Warner. It was mentioned in the hearing today, the
problems that we're having with recruiting and retention, and
the stories you relate and how you relate them will have a
direct impact. I'm sure the secretary-to-be Abell can work with
you on that, because he has studied it from afar, and now he
will be in the responsible position on that. Do you have any
special insights into that problem?
Ms. Clarke. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Two years ago, I was
fortunate to work on a recruiting study. It started out as a
very narrow look at the advertising that was being used by the
recruiting commands, and then it became a broader look at the
recruiting marketing. We spent 6 very intense months working
with the services, working with everybody, from the Secretary
on down, on how we could improve the marketing on recruiting
efforts. One of the things that was so extraordinary to us--we
came about it by chance, and we made part of the research--is
we interviewed everybody from the Secretary on down to the rank
and file to the general public. There was very little
consistency expressed about the role of the U.S. military--very
little consistency. It's very hard to go out there and recruit
when people, including people in uniform, don't have a real
clear picture of what they're about, about what their mission
is.
So I think it's absolutely critical, and part of my agenda
will be, to make sure the American people do know what the role
of the U.S. military is in the 21st century. I think that will
help with recruiting and retention.
Chairman Warner. Well, that's a good response, because that
is a key thing that we're going to have to deal with. There's a
tremendous investment the American taxpayers make in the
training of our service persons. We're so fortunate, when
numbers of them decide to repeat their tours of duty, in the
case of enlisted or, indeed, in the case of the officers, to go
ahead and accept another promotion with the obligation of
active duty associated. So I wish you luck.
The other--and I think I'd better speak and you just
listen--but, again, having had some experience in the
Department and watching it from this side now for these many
years, there's a certain degree of independence that a
Secretary of Defense should and does accord to the Service
Secretaries and their respective chiefs, but from time to time,
we see examples of how a military department will go out on an
issue and then problems begin to arise.
I'm not being critical, but recently the Army made
decisions with regard to the simplest of things, the beret, and
we were besieged on Capitol Hill. Then, of course, they could
not have foreseen the tragic problem with China. That
exacerbated it. Then had to go back through a reassessment. I
would hope that the Secretary and yourself can work with these
departments on certain decisions which have a high profile of
public interest and do everything possible to go ahead and
implement that decision and do it by laying a careful base of
understanding before it is rolled out.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I hope that one of
the things I can do is inject the public affairs sensitivities,
if you will, at the earliest stages to prevent just those sorts
of problems.
Chairman Warner. Well, that's wonderful. I'm very reassured
by your responses. We haven't heard a peep from the back row
yet, so I guess----
Ms. Clarke. Well, my colleagues are actually being very
patient, because we're hearing lots of peeps back here. They're
being very patient. [Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Dr. Zakheim, we had a marvelous
conversation the other day--it's always enjoyable to have those
calls from the nominees--and you reflected, and I would like to
have the record reflect, your comments to me about one of your
predecessors, Dr. John Hamre. He is just so respected by this
committee. My parting comment was to you, call him up every now
an then when things are going tough and say, ``How did you deal
with this?''
Dr. Zakheim. Mr. Chairman, for the record then, I have
known John Hamre since he left graduate school, and I know he
served this committee with distinction. John Hamre is one of
the finest people--not just public servants, but people who I
have ever come across. The man has truly a heart of gold. He
demonstrates that in very quiet