[Senate Hearing 107-355]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1416
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
MAY 15 AND JULY 12, 2001
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002--Part 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1416
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
MAY 15 AND JULY 12, 2001
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-350 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2002
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
Les Brownlee, Staff Director
David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Department of Energy's Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs
may 15, 2001
Page
Gordon, Gen. John A., USAF (Ret.), Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy...................... 4
Jones, Ms. Gary L., Director of Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office.................... 17
Baker, Kenneth, Acting Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation
and National Security.......................................... 141
Cooperative Threat Reduction, Chemical Weapons Demilitarization,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nonproliferation Research and
Engineering, and Related Programs
july 12, 2001
Johnson-Winegar, Dr. Anna, Deputy Assistant to Secretary of
Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense)...................... 274
Bongiovi, Maj. Gen. Robert P., USAF, Acting Director of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency................................ 277
Waldron, Robert, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Nonproliferation
Research and Engineering, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 281
Koch, Dr. Susan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat
Reduction...................................................... 286
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 15, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Allard, and
Landrieu.
Committee staff members present: L. David Cherington,
counsel.
Professional staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV,
Carolyn M. Hanna, and Mary Alice A. Hayward.
Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director for the minority; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
counsel; and Creighton Greene, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer L. Naccari and Suzanne
K.L. Ross.
Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier
III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to
Senator Allard; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; Peter A.
Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Brady King,
assistant to Senator Dayton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN
Senator Roberts. The subcommittee will come to order.
General, I apologize to you and the witnesses from the
General Accounting Office (GAO). We had a vote on the Senate
floor, and that takes precedence. I have a statement that I
would like to make, then we will recognize you, General,
because I know your time is valuable, as is the GAO's.
This afternoon the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2002
budget request for the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation in the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Providing testimony for the National Nuclear
Security Administration is Gen. John A. Gordon, who is the
administrator.
I would like to welcome you, General. This is the first
time you have testified before the subcommittee. I look forward
to receiving your remarks and thank you for your testimony last
week, in regards to homeland security.
In addition to the General, we have the GAO here today to
provide testimony on two GAO reports that discuss two programs
with the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
One of these GAO reports, the Nuclear Cities Initiative,
will be released to the public at the conclusion of this
hearing.
Providing testimony for the GAO is Ms. Gary L. Jones, the
Director of Natural Resources and Environment. This is also
your first time before this subcommittee. We thank you and I
welcome you and look forward to your statement.
Following this open session we will move to a closed
session in Hart 219 to hear testimony from representatives of
the Intelligence Community. This subcommittee has had oversight
responsibilities for the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Try saying that five times real fast on CSPAN,
and you will get in a lot of trouble.
The programs within this office work to prevent, detect,
and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and to assist with international nuclear acts for safety and
excess fissile material elimination.
Over 50 percent of the office's budget supports programs in
Russia. The remaining percent of the budget focuses on
improving U.S. capabilities in proliferation monitoring and
detection through research and development.
As many know, last year this subcommittee found
programmatic management problems, problems and challenges with
several programs in this Cooperative Threat Reduction endeavor.
To that end, the subcommittee established greater reporting
controls on these programs to improve management and
accountability in the implementation of these critical national
security programs. It is imperative that the United States have
every measure available to ensure Russia's long-term commitment
to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation cooperative work.
I cannot stress enough how important it is that these
programs are carried out effectively, efficiently, and have the
committed support of the Russians.
Over the next few weeks, I will review in great detail the
administration's budget request for these programs. It will be
a priority of this subcommittee to ensure that the funds
requested will be utilized effectively and efficiently, and
that program goals can be realized with the resources that we
have.
We must ensure that our current and future national
security efforts are not weakened by management failures and
poor implementation on what I consider to be a vital national
security effort.
I look forward to the comments of both witnesses this
afternoon on the progress they have made in addressing this
subcommittee's concerns with these programs, and how they
intend to proceed during the coming year. I believe they are
doing very critical work, very important, critical work in
protecting our nation. I commend them for their perseverance
and dedication.
I thank you for the time and attention that you have placed
in preparing your remarks for this afternoon. I will turn to my
esteemed Ranking Member, when she arrives to the subcommittee,
for any comment that she might have. I would now like to
welcome for his statement General Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
This afternoon the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2002 budget
request for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in National
Nuclear Security Administration. Providing testimony for the National
Nuclear Security Administration is Gen. John A. Gordon, Administrator.
I would like to welcome you, General Gordon. This is the first time you
have testified before the subcommittee and I look forward to receiving
your remarks.
In addition to General Gordon, we have the GAO here today who will
provide testimony on two GAO reports that discuss two programs within
the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. One of these GAO
reports, this one on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, will be released to
the public at the conclusion of this hearing. Providing testimony for
the GAO is Ms. Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment. This is also your first time before this subcommittee. I
welcome you, Ms. Jones, and look forward to your statement.
Following this open session, we will move to closed session in Hart
219 to hear testimony from representatives of the Intelligence
Community.
This subcommittee has oversight responsibilities for the Office of
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. The programs within this office work to prevent,
detect, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and to assist with international nuclear reactor safety and excess
fissile material elimination. Over 50 percent of the office's budget
supports programs in Russia. The remaining percent of the budget
focuses on improving U.S. capabilities in proliferation monitoring and
detection through research and development.
Last year this subcommittee found programmatic management problems
with several programs in this cooperative threat reduction endeavor. To
that end, this subcommittee established greater reporting controls on
these programs to improve management and accountability in the
implementation of these critical national security programs. It is
imperative that the United States have every measure available to
ensure Russian long term commitment to U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation cooperative work. I cannot stress enough how important
it is that these programs are carried out effectively and efficiently
and have committed Russian support.
Over the next few weeks, I will review in great detail the
administration's budget request for these programs. It will be a
priority of this subcommittee to ensure that the funds requested will
be utilized effectively and efficiently and that program goals can be
realized with the resources we have. We must ensure that our current
and future national security efforts are not weakened by management
failures and poor implementation in what I consider to be a vital,
national security effort.
I look forward to your comments this afternoon on the progress you
have made in addressing this subcommittee's concerns with these
programs and how you intend to proceed during the coming year. I
believe you are doing critical work in protecting our Nation and I
commend you for your perseverance and dedication. I thank you for the
time and attention you have placed in preparing your remarks for this
hearing.
Please proceed, General Gordon.
General Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to meet with the subcommittee today and discuss the
fiscal year 2002 budget request for the National Nuclear
Security Administration. I do have a little bit longer formal
statement that I would offer for the record, sir.
Senator Roberts. Without objection, please feel free to
summarize as you see fit, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. GORDON, USAF (RET.), UNDER SECRETARY
FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
General Gordon. I also want to thank the members of the
subcommittee for their continuous support for the mission of
NNSA and for the people who really make it happen here in
Washington and in the field, those traveling overseas, the
Federal workforce, the contract workforce, a lot of folks who
are working pretty hard on these initiatives, Mr. Chairman.
If I could speak for a few moments broadly about NNSA
before we turn to the details of the budget itself, I want to
report to you that we are making steady, albeit somewhat slow
progress towards the goals I think we all share of having
efficient and effective organization to lead and manage the
national security enterprise that's been entrusted to us.
I'm not particularly satisfied with where we are, nor what
we have been able to accomplish to establish NNSA as a full-up
organization with a unique identity and the clear lines of
authority that we need.
We're moving forward, and we've made remarkable progress
when measured against the barriers and bureaucracy that we
confront. Even though it has been difficult to move
dramatically on organizational issues, we've gotten well beyond
some of the issues that confronted us in the beginning, such as
dual hatting.
We have set up a new framework for the organization and
management of NNSA, and we have brought on board critical staff
for vital issues such as counter-intelligence, security and
contracting, and made real progress in each of these areas.
We have on board two senior advisors of immense capacity,
Director of Congressional Affairs and an Environmental Safety
and Health Advisor with professional experience from naval
reactors, a senior military assistant, and a strong chief of
staff who knows the system in considerable detail.
I've established an Office of Policy Planning that will
really help us work better in the inner agency. An acting
principal deputy for NNSA will be starting this week helping
move the organization forward while we seek congressional
authority for a confirmed Presidential approved position.
We plan to announce the choice of an NNSA general counsel
within the next couple of days.
Perhaps most importantly I am hopeful that the President
will very soon be able to announce his intention to nominate
NNSA's two deputy administrators.
That said, Mr. Chairman, let me focus my comments on
efforts on nonproliferation.
In this decade after the Cold War, the United States
continues to wrestle with the dangers arising from enormous
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the materials produced by the
former Soviet Union from the extensive nuclear establishment
inherited by Russia.
We must also contend with concerted efforts by rogue states
and others to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and with the
threat that terrorists might gain access to these weapons or to
quantities of material.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate my thanks to you
and your colleagues for last week's hearings which discussed
the importance of focusing national attention on combating
terrorism, particularly with the focus on WMD.
The NNSA is pursuing programs to address the threats of WMD
proliferation, both in the former Soviet Union and worldwide.
The fiscal year 2002 budget request is $773.7 million for
nonproliferation programs. Our request covers ongoing efforts
to provide security for nuclear materials to implement the
purchase and conversion of weapon-grade usable highly enriched
uranium, and, to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium.
It seeks funding for programs that redirect the activities
of weapons scientists, including the development of commercial
partnerships with U.S. industry, and encourages the down-sizing
of the Russian nuclear weapons complex.
The same request funds the development of new technologies
to detect chemical and biological weapons, to monitor nuclear
testing worldwide, to implement U.S. export controls on nuclear
technology, other international nuclear safeguards, and to
strengthen the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
We literally provide the technical base for much of what
our government does in proliferation protection and provide the
expertise base to work effectively inside Russia and elsewhere.
Before I get to questions, Mr. Chairman, the
administration's request for proliferation programs is $101
million less than last year's appropriation. At that level it
should be apparent and obvious that we will have to curtail
efforts in several areas and potentially lose momentum in
others; however, and I will talk more about this later, the
administration is conducting a review of each program, and we
await the conclusion of that review to see if the budget
request should be modified.
The problems we're trying to address are hard. It's not
easy to persuade Russia that it needs our help in facilities at
the heart of its nuclear weapons complex, nor to find private
sector partners willing to invest in an uncertain and unproven
business environment.
Our Russian counterparts sometimes doubt our motives and
our commitments, and even when we have their support, we still
have to cope with the suspicions of the Russian security
services, as well as their legitimate interests, in protecting
what remain highly sensitive activities and facilities.
We remain concerned about the extent to which Russian
authorities (including MinAtom leadership) share a common view
of nonproliferation objectives.
Nuclear-related exports to Iran continue to be highly
troubling. We need to ensure that our programs do not
inadvertently support continuing military activities and that
our funds are spent on their intended purposes.
Even taking account of these problems, however,
nonproliferation cooperation with Russia remains highly
beneficial to the United States, addressing real threats to our
nation in both immediate and long terms. It reduces the danger
that nuclear materials will find their way to our adversaries,
builds barriers against transfer of nuclear weapon expertise,
and strengthens our ability to combat proliferation globally.
In a number of areas we have built a basis for mutual
confidence with Russian scientists, military officers, and
plant managers, and that has permitted us to work together
towards common security objectives in ways that probably were
not imaginable only a few years ago.
Ultimately, we recognize the resources required to
transform the safeguarding of Russia's nuclear weapon
establishment are probably beyond the scope of any conceivable
U.S. assistance program. Fundamentally, this transformation has
to be a Russian responsibility. But we can show the way, we can
be a catalyst, and we can demonstrate what's possible to the
Russians and to business communities.
Many of the members of this subcommittee are very familiar
with some of the examples of what has been done, and we have
just touched on a couple of those. Rapid security upgrades have
been completed on more than 3,000 nuclear weapons warheads and
some 220 tons of fissile material. The goal for fiscal year
2002 is to complete the upgrades on another 13 sites, bringing
the total to 50.
We have developed training, procurement, internal
accounting, and regulatory measures to help ensure Russia can
sustain operation of the improved security measures we've
provided.
We have initiated the design of a mixed oxide fuel
fabrication facility and a pit disassembly and conversion
facility, to enable us to meet the commitments of our bilateral
plutonium disposition agreement with Russia and support Russian
development of a comparable program.
We've installed monitoring equipment at the first of three
Russian facilities for transparency of the down-blending of the
highly-enriched uranium that the U.S. is purchasing.
As I mentioned earlier, the administration is reviewing
U.S. nonproliferation operations in connection with Russia,
taking a comprehensive look across agency lines. It's quite
likely that the administration will request adjustment of the
budget once these reviews are complete. NNSA is a full
participant in this review process.
I expect and certainly hope the administration will develop
an over arching strategy that really sets the priorities and
the realistic goals, and that it will take a fresh look at how
nonproliferation activities fit into our overall policy toward
Russia. The review is critically examining the effectiveness of
existing programs and will identify needed changes in focus,
organization, or management approach.
We're also considering new ideas and new approaches. But
even so, we're mindful of how difficult it is to operate in
this environment, and the ongoing reviews and policy
development activities must specifically deal with Russian
attitudes, their relationships with proliferation issues,
access, and issues of sustainability. I expect this review to
be completed shortly. After which we can brief the subcommittee
on the results.
Mr. Chairman, with NNSA I'm also committed to my own review
of the management and implementation of our programs and how
the individual pieces fit together. As I noted earlier, I hope
we will soon have on board a Senate-confirmed Deputy
Administrator who can work with me and the program offices to
ensure that our nonproliferation programs have clear, stable
goals and realistic plans that are integrated within NNSA and
integrated within the interagency community.
We'll be careful not to promise more than we can deliver,
and we'll do our level best to deliver what we promise.
We'll be straight with Congress and straight with ourselves
about the real problems of working with Russia, and straight
with the Russians about what we have to have in order to do
business.
In running these programs, I'll be mindful of the
critically important contribution that they can and do make to
national security, and equally mindful of the need to ensure
responsible and accountable management of taxpayer dollars.
Mr. Chairman, I know that in a couple of moments the GAO
will be testifying on their reports on the Nuclear Cities
Initiative (NCI) and the Material Protection Control and
Accounting (MPC&A). Let me offer a few thoughts. First with
respect to NCI.
The closed cities of the Russian nuclear complex clearly
present some of the most difficult environments for success in
nonproliferation. These cities are out of the Russian
mainstream and have little history of commercial business or
economic integration. Our key goal here is to encourage the
downsizing of the Russian nuclear weapons design and production
facilities without creating additional proliferation risks.
NCI is a relatively young program that encountered several
start-up problems, including lack of Russian support in some
channels, high overhead and start-up costs, and program
management inefficiencies.
Nevertheless, it has had some initial successes. Last year
for the first time the Avangard nuclear weapons facility
reduced its footprint, creating some 500,000 square feet of
commercial production space where once nuclear weapons
components were made.
NCI has built a partnership with the Fresenius Medical
Corporation, the world's largest manufacturer of dialysis
equipment, who is eager to utilize this space and take
advantage of the relatively lower production costs in Russia.
Another modest success is the establishment of two open
computing centers in Sarov and Snezhinsk. Mr. Chairman, while
it's my understanding that the about-to-be-released GAO report
on NCI does not take issue with the basic goals of the NCI
program, it clearly identifies several areas in which we need
to make important management improvements.
For example, we can do much better reviewing candidate
proposals for new projects as we do now in the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, largely because we
followed and took on board earlier GAO recommendations.
In fact, this recommendation for the NCI program has
already been implemented. This set of recommendations by the
GAO should help ensure the program is well-managed and
transparent to me and to the subcommittee.
As I mentioned, NNSA will be doing a comprehensive review
of how we manage these programs to ensure we're getting the
best possible return for the taxpayer, and that we have the
right objectives and right programmatic measures. The GAO
recommendations, including an evaluation of possibly combining
the NCI and IPP programs, will be important inputs.
One last point with regard to NCI. We need to continue our
dialogue with the subcommittee and Congress to see if we can
release the $10 million currently conditioned on agreement with
Russia regarding facility closure. We have a written commitment
to that effect from First Minister of MinAtom, Mr. Ryabev.
I'll close, Mr. Chairman, with a comment on the Material
Protection Control and Accounting program. The GAO report here
is fair, balanced, and reflects over a year of work by the GAO
team. I understand the report states that the MPC&A programs
have achieved real threat reductions on some 32 percent--some
190 metric tons of the estimated 603 metric tons of Russian
material that could be used to make a nuclear device. The
report acknowledges that the work being performed by the
program is on an additional 130 tons.
These figures do not reflect the upgraded security
protection on several thousand nuclear warheads controlled by
the Russian Navy. Here, too, however, I also agree with the GAO
that significant work remains to be done, and in this regard,
we will implement the GAO's two major recommendations.
First, the NNSA will develop a system to better monitor the
security systems installed and ensure that they continue to
function--the sustainability question.
Second, our strategic plan will include estimates for
sustainability activities.
Mr. Chairman, I believe I'll stop at this point so we can
turn to your questions or however you would like to proceed. I
do appreciate very much the opportunity to join with you today
to discuss this important program which I believe does provide
such a valuable and important contribution to U.S. national
security.
[The prepared statement of General Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. John A. Gordon
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) nonproliferation fiscal year 2002 budget
request.
The fiscal year 2002 budget request for the Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation is $773.7 million. The request covers the
funding needed to support a broad range of nonproliferation goals.
Specific line items include:
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development ($206,102,000)
International Nuclear Safety ($13,800,000)
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency
Implementation ($13,950,000)
Arms Control and Nonproliferation ($101,500,000)
International Materials Protection, Control and
Accounting ($138,800,000)
Fissile Materials Disposition ($248,089,000)
Program Direction ($51,459,000)
Addressing international threats to U.S. national security
interests from the potential proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is one of the primary mission goals of the NNSA. These
international threats derive largely from the former Soviet Union's
production of enormous quantities of nuclear materials and weapons, and
from potential actions by rogue nations or terrorist organizations. The
NNSA is pursuing a balanced and comprehensive approach to
nonproliferation that seeks to reduce or eliminate these threats to
U.S. national security interests.
NNSA has been hard at work to secure and dispose of nuclear warhead
materials, at home and abroad. We are establishing methods to help
prevent the unthinkable from happening, the use of weapons of mass
destruction in an attack on this country or our citizens. NNSA's world-
class expertise at its national laboratories is vital to the success of
this important effort.
I understand the subcommittee has a particular interest in the work
NNSA is doing in Russia. Therefore, I would like to address our efforts
in that regard up front, and then talk more broadly about NNSA overall
nonproliferation work.
The bipartisan Baker-Cutler Report and numerous other studies in-
and-outside of Government attest not only to the importance of the
proliferation threats in Russia our programs are designed to address,
but to the need for an overarching strategy. We are working to
articulate that strategy as well as to develop and strengthen our long-
range thinking in this area.
To that end, the administration has chartered several major reviews
in order to examine the appropriate national security strategy for this
country. The Department and the NNSA are active participants in these
ongoing reviews. One of these reviews is currently evaluating all U.S.
nonproliferation programs with Russia. At the end of this review, I am
confident we will have a comprehensive strategy for our threat
reduction activities with Russia.
We can lay out the United States' goals we are helping with Russia
into five broad objectives:
Reduce the threat to the United States and its allies
from Russian nuclear delivery systems
Reduce potential for diversion of Russian nuclear
warheads to rogue states or terrorist groups
Reduce potential for diversion of Russian weapons-
useable nuclear materials
Make Russian force reconstitution more difficult, time
consuming, and detectable
Reduce potential for diversion of nuclear-weapon/dual-
use expertise and technologies.
Given this set of objectives for our work in Russia, let me
describe how our activities are supporting this framework. The first
objective to reduce the threat to the U.S. and its allies from Russian
nuclear delivery systems has been the principal goal of the DOD's
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. I will not deal with their
myriad successes other than to note that they continue to make
substantial progress in their programs.
Our next key objective is to reduce the potential of diversion of
nuclear weapons. Both DOD and NNSA have programs that are working with
the Russian military to improve the security of nuclear weapons storage
sites in Russia. The NNSA program is with the Russian Navy and grew out
of our cooperation with the Russian Navy on securing HEU materials used
as reactor fuels on their ships. We feel that we are making good
progress on this program. We have excellent cooperation with the
Russian Navy on this program.
Our third objective is to reduce the potential for diversion of
Russian Federation weapons-useable nuclear materials. This is the
flagship of NNSA's cooperation with Russia. The Materials Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program has been working with MinAtom
on securing weapons-useable nuclear materials throughout Russia. We
work with the civilian sites where such materials are present and we
work at many of the military sites where the Russian weapons grade
nuclear materials are stored.
The NNSA's MPC&A program is working rapidly to complete its
mission, and estimates in its strategic plan that comprehensive
security upgrades will be complete at all of the warhead storage
locations that the Russian Navy has requested, as early as 2007, and
for 603 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material by 2011. Since
1993, the program has completed rapid upgrades for nearly 4,000
warheads and 220 metric tons of fissile material. One programmatic goal
for fiscal year 2002 is to complete security upgrades at thirteen
nuclear sites, bringing the total number of completed sites to fifty.
A part of this goal is to promote sustainable security
improvements. ``Sustainability'' is critical to the long-term mission
of the program, because we must ensure that installed MPC&A systems are
maintained and operated over the long term. Sustainability also entails
fostering the ability of our Russian counterparts to operate and
maintain the MPC&A systems unilaterally. To help ensure sustainability,
we are establishing training centers, identifying credible Russian
suppliers of MPC&A equipment, helping draft national regulations and
security force procedures, and establishing an information accounting
system to track amounts and locations for all of Russia's nuclear
material.
Furthermore, we have developed and implemented a program to
consolidate material into fewer buildings and fewer sites, and to
convert excess highly attractive material to a form that is less
attractive to potential proliferant nations. This program reduces costs
to the U.S. by limiting the number of buildings requiring security
upgrades.
Through the Fissile Materials Disposition program, NNSA is
responsible for disposal of surplus inventories of U.S. weapon-grade
plutonium and highly enriched uranium. We are also responsible for
efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian weapon-
grade plutonium.
The fiscal year 2002 budget request will fund the completion of the
mixed oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility design and proceed with
related MOX fuel qualification activities. We will continue the design
of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility at a reduced rate, and
we will suspend the design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant. These
changes are necessary to reduce the anticipated future-year peak
funding requirements associated with plans for simultaneously building
three plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site. The
NNSA continues to pursue the irradiation of MOX fuel in existing
reactors and, at a much reduced pace, immobilization for the
disposition of surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium. This will enable us
to meet the commitments called for in the recently signed U.S.-Russia
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and to support the
continued consolidation, cleanup, and shut down of DOE sites where
surplus plutonium is stored.
Other activities planned for fiscal year 2002 involve providing
support for the development of facilities in Russia for disposition of
surplus plutonium, and continuing surplus U.S. HEU disposition,
including capital improvements at the Savannah River Site to support
the off-specification blend-down project with the TVA. This project
will eliminate tons of surplus weapons material by converting it to
reactor fuel for use in TVA's reactors, which provide electric power
throughout the Southeast. Equally important, this work will save the
taxpayers $600 million by avoiding the cost to dispose of this surplus
material as waste.
We have a number of other programs that help achieve the objective
of reducing the potential for diversion of nuclear materials. Through
the Second Line of Defense program we have been working with the
Customs Service in Russia to upgrade the Russian capabilities to detect
and interdict nuclear materials at border checkpoints and at airports.
While we have made some progress in this activity, this is a huge job.
The Russian border is thousands of miles long, and borders on a number
of countries where we have concerns about proliferation. We may need to
put more effort into this program in the future or to develop and
explore practical alternatives.
The current administration review of Russian programs will help
guide us on whether or how we should direct our efforts on this issue,
and how we should coordinate with other agencies that have
complementary activities.
The fourth objective is to make reconstitution of the large forces
and enormous nuclear weapons stockpile that existed during the Cold War
more difficult. NNSA shares responsibility with DOD for programs that
address this issue. For NNSA one of our problems is the size of the
Russian nuclear weapons complex. The production complex of the U.S. is
significantly reduced from what it was during the Cold War, while the
Russian nuclear weapons complex is basically unchanged from the Cold
War.
Some of these Russian facilities may be old, but the sense is, they
can still do the job of producing weapons for the Russian stockpile. As
we go into an era of reduced nuclear forces, this excess capability for
production could present a problem for the U.S. We would like the
Russian complex to be reduced to a size consistent with the much-
reduced stockpiles that are needed in the post-Cold War era. Concerned
about the human costs of downsizing, the Russians have asked us to help
them reduce the size of their weapons complex. NNSA is pursuing the
Nuclear Cities Initiative whose main goal is to reduce the size of the
Russian nuclear weapons complex, both its facilities and
infrastructure, as well as manpower.
While the underlying national security objective is valid, I am
aware that there are some serious concerns about this program and I
will elaborate on the Nuclear Cities Initiative a little later in my
testimony. Based on the administration review of this and other
nonproliferation programs in Russia, we may need to reconfigure the
program to be more effective.
A part of this objective to make reconstitution to Cold War levels
more difficult we are monitoring the HEU purchase agreement that is
down-blending 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium to low
enrichment material that will be used in reactor fuel. The 1993 U.S.-
Russia HEU Purchase Agreement remains one of our key threat reduction
achievements of the last decade. As of May 2001, we have overseen the
conversion of more than 117 metric tons of HEU; this is enough material
for over 4,700 nuclear devices.
Our fifth objective is to reduce the potential for diversion of
nuclear weapons or dual-use expertise and technologies. This objective
captures two separate but related needs. One is that we need to work
with the Russian Government to gain their cooperation on limiting the
export of nuclear technology and equipment that may help countries that
are trying to develop nuclear weapons. These exports are not, in our
view, in the interest of either the United States or the Russian
Federation, and mitigating the economic incentives that seem to propel
them in this direction would help to achieve our goals.
The related issue is often referred to as the ``brain drain''.
There are thousands of scientists that worked on the nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons programs of the Soviet Union who were
unemployed, underemployed, or unpaid following the breakup of the USSR.
NNSA and State Department have had programs in place for a number of
years to provide alternate employment to as many of these scientists as
possible and to try to integrate them into the international science
community.
The State Department program is the International Science and
Technology Centers (ISTC). It was created in 1992 and became
operational in 1994. It is a multilateral organization and has
excellent international support and strong support from the Russian
Government. The NNSA programs are working in close cooperation with the
ISTC. While the ISTC focused on providing jobs in basic science and
exploring the possible application of technology to commercial
applications, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)
program of NNSA has focused on the commercialization of Russian
technology in partnership with U.S. industry.
The IPP program is designed to prevent the spread of weapons of
mass destruction technologies and expertise by engaging former Soviet
weapons scientists. It funds non-military joint R&D projects between
former Soviet weapons institutes and U.S. laboratories. The goal is
identifying and creating non-military, commercial applications of
weapons-related technologies. We have instituted a rigorous project
review process within the U.S. government to ensure that no projects
have dual-use potential. These efforts allow us valuable access to
Russian scientific and technical research and development as well as
transparency into the Russian weapons complex. Unlike NCI, the IPP
program works in the nuclear, chemical, and biological arenas and in
Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. As we are focusing the IPP program on
commercialization, all projects must have an industry partner who
provides significant funding for the project--roughly a 3:2 ratio,
private sector to government funding.
Those of you who have followed the progress of both the ISTC and
the IPP programs might remember that both of these took several years
to become mature and develop management processes and project
portfolios that clearly met the intent of the programs.
But today the commercialization efforts of the IPP program are
taking off. Eight IPP projects are now commercially successful,
providing 300 long-term private-sector jobs in Russia and more that $17
million in annual sales revenues. There are another 20 IPP projects
poised for commercialization over the next year. We are pleased with
the progress that the IPP program has made in the past couple of years.
That brings me back to NCI. While the goals of the NCI program are
to reduce the size and capability of the Russian nuclear weapons
complex, it must address the unemployment that accompanies downsizing
to accomplish that goal. NCI works with MinAtom to bring commercial
development to the closed cities where the manpower requirements for
nuclear weapons work are reduced or where entire plants stop weapons
work.
This is a difficult task. Even in the U.S. when we downsize our
weapons workforce or shut facilities, finding new jobs for those who
are displaced is the most difficult part. But the U.S. economy is
robust, and in most cases, our economy is able to absorb the extra
workers within a reasonable amount of time.
In the closed cities in Russia, however, finding jobs for displaced
workers is extremely difficult. There is little if any business
culture, buildings are unsuitable for most western business, there are
access rules, legal obstacles, and perhaps the largest difficulty is
the Russian economy is smaller that it was a decade ago. But in spite
of all these problems we have businesses that are interested in
participating with us in working in the ``closed cities''. We try to
provide them the necessary support to reduce their risks in putting
jobs in these ``closed cities,'' and helping them become successful. We
are coordinating with the ISTC and the IPP program in this effort to
develop jobs in the closed cities. However, the charters of the ISTC
and the IPP program make it difficult for them to sponsor some of the
types of activities that will make it more attractive for businesses to
come to the closed cities; such as refurbishing buildings, and
implementing manufacturing activities. With proper coordination, the
combination of programs will make the prospect for successfully
bringing commercial jobs to these cities much higher.
You might ask, ``if the Russians are going to downsize their
nuclear complex anyway, why should the U.S. spend its taxpayer dollars
to help them?'' The answer is, we can make the downsizing happen
faster, and our involvement also gives us a window into the Russian
complex. This may also allow us to have greater confidence in any
future unilateral arms reductions if we know more about what their
complex looks like.
Let me review the progress that the NCI program has made thus far.
The program has been operating for roughly 2\1/2\ years and has been
funded for only 26 months. Currently, NCI is working in three nuclear
cities. The primary focus is on Sarov (formerly known as Arzamas-16)
which includes both a nuclear weapons design laboratory and a nuclear
weapons assembly/disassembly plant known as the Avangard
Electromechanical plant. Sarov, and Avangard specifically, is MinAtom's
highest conversion priority. Therefore, it is the one city we
anticipate focusing on in fiscal year 2002.
Last year, this program achieved an historic accomplishment when
the Russians moved a concrete fence at the Avangard weapons facility,
creating an open ``Technopark'' for commercial businesses. This is the
first time that a Russian weapons facility has reduced its footprint as
part of the nuclear weapons complex downsizing they have committed to
undertake. The Russian Government has indicated that it intends to shut
down two of its weapons assembly and disassembly facilities. First
Deputy Minister of MinAtom Lev Ryabev stated in an international forum
in January 1999 that the Russian Government planned to close down two
of its four weapons assembly and disassembly facilities, beginning in
2000. This intention was recently reinforced by a letter from Minister
Ryabev to the NNSA in March 2001.
Finally, I would like to address GAO's report that was just
released on the NCI program. Let me first say that I was pleased to
read that the GAO determined that: ``DOE's effort to help Russia create
sustainable commercial jobs for its weapons scientists and help
downsize its nuclear weapons complex is clearly in our national
security interests.'' The report also highlights a number of issues and
areas in the program that must be addressed and be improved upon. In
concert with the administration's nonproliferation review, I am closely
examining this as well as other Russian programs in order to maximize
their effectiveness, and ensure they are operating in a manner
consistent with national objectives and coordinated with other U.S.
government nonproliferation activities.
It should be noted that to produce this report, the GAO review team
obtained cost data from DOE headquarters and the National laboratories,
reviewed NCI projects to determine their impact on program goals and
objectives, and traveled to Russia to visit Sarov to meet with MinAtom
officials. Finally, the GAO also met with proponents of the European
Nuclear Cities Initiative. NNSA NCI program staff were active
participants in this review, and we are prepared to implement any and
all policy recommendations.
The report's focus on job creation as the primary measure of NCI
program success differs from our perspective of the primary goal of the
program, and does not fully appreciate U.S. experience with downsizing
its own nuclear weapons complex. There are multiple measures of success
and we are tracking and reporting on them. For example, NCI's
performance metrics include facility downsizing, infrastructure
upgraded or created, credits and investments provide to local
businesses and so on.
The GAO report cites MinAtom official dissatisfaction with the
amount of NCI funds spent in Russia. The bottom line on funding is that
MinAtom officials would prefer that monies be provided directly to
them, to carry out major projects as they see fit. This top-down
central planning approach has failed Russia in the past and will
continue to fail. In the United States, we have learned that successful
economic diversification is based on an active partnership among
government, industry and the community. We are attempting to pass on
this knowledge and experience to our Russian colleagues by working
directly with the cities and institutes.
In the initial start-up phase of the NCI program, the preponderance
of funds were spent in the U.S. at the National laboratories. We relied
on the labs to make the first contacts for the program since they had
the ongoing, long-standing relationships. The labs also were integral
in developing the projects jointly, and then providing the project
oversight required. Now that the NCI program is entering a new phase,
the role of the labs is being reduced and we anticipate meeting the
congressionally-mandated 51 percent of funds spent in Russia in fiscal
year 2001. We have instituted new processes, including financial
reporting procedures that will help us meet that goal. Additionally, we
have negotiated with some labs a reduction in their project management
costs. Overall, lab activities will be reduced in coming years as the
program attracts more commercial partners. We firmly believe that
oversight of projects is important and that requires lab participation.
The GAO noted that some project funding proposals have been
submitted to both NCI and IPP, in the hope of maximizing the chances of
receiving funding. This does not indicate that the two programs are
identical. All project proposals undergo a vigorous interagency vetting
and review process to ensure, among other things, that scientists are
not getting funded twice for the same work.
That said, I take the GAO observations and recommendations very
seriously and thus tasked my management team to reexamine possible
options for consolidating the NCI and IPP programs in an effort to
achieve cost savings and other programmatic and administrative
efficiencies. However, keep in mind this involves complex issues, and
rather than rush to get the job done, I want to make sure that we do
this right the first time. Therefore, I am waiting for the completion
of the NSC reviews that are now underway, and the recommendations from
my management team.
As we continue to move forward, I am confident that much-needed
changes will occur. This is the nature of these types of programs. In
fact, the IPP program, in its early years, experienced similar growing
pains and was the subject of significant criticism. IPP has now become
a successful program. We want to make sure that NCI is on a similar
path. Furthermore, the U.S. Government's involvement will decrease over
time, and business participation will grow. This increased role for
business will lead the Russians toward self-sustaining civilian and
commercial enterprises in the city, and provide the basis for the U.S.
exit strategy. Our plans are to continue with a strong focus on Sarov.
Now, I would like to quickly touch on the rest of NNSA's
nonproliferation programs. These programs address the issues of
detecting, deterring, and impeding proliferation and the use of weapons
of mass destruction. In addition to the programs already described,
NNSA has extensive efforts in research and development (R&D) and arms
control arenas. Our active role in the U.S. nonproliferation
interagency community derives, in large measure, from the nuclear
expertise found in the national laboratories. NNSA supports U.S.
national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to reduce the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
A key nonproliferation strategy is to enhance the capability to
detect weapons of mass destruction. The NNSA goal of integrating
technical talent and policy expertise is evident in the
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program, which enhances U.S.
national security through needs-driven R&D, with an emphasis on
developing technologies to detect nuclear, chemical, and biological
proliferation, and to monitor nuclear explosions.
The following accomplishment is just one indication of the type of
activities NNSA is involved with in the R&D area. NNSA is proud that,
last year, we achieved a significant milestone in one of our R&D
programs: The Multispectral Thermal Imager satellite was launched in
March 2000. This small research satellite, designed and built by a team
of NNSA laboratories and industry partners, will develop and test
remote-sensing concepts that will add to our country's ability to
monitor nuclear proliferation. The satellite has already achieved most
of its design objectives.
The Proliferation Detection program will develop the requisite
technologies to detect nuclear proliferation. Our unchallenged lead
responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation technology derives from the
expertise and knowledge base resident in our nuclear weapons complex,
and it provides a technology template for the detection of activities
related to all weapons of mass destruction. The objectives of the
detection program are:
to produce technologies that lead to prototype
demonstrations and resultant remote proliferation detection
systems,
to strengthen our detection capabilities to respond to
current and projected proliferation threats, and
to develop technologies that are subsequently made
available to a wide range of government users, including DOD
and the intelligence community.
The separate, yet closely related, Proliferation Deterrence program
seeks to develop technical options to prevent and deter proliferation
of nuclear weapon technology and fissile materials. Research is focused
on developing integrated sensor systems that will improve the accuracy
and timeliness of information.
With the fiscal year 2002 budget, we will continue to develop and
demonstrate innovative remote sensing, sampling, and analysis
technologies needed to improve early detection of a proliferant
nation's nuclear weapons program or non-compliance with international
treaties and agreements, as well as tracking foreign special nuclear
materials.
The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Program is designed to provide the
U.S. with the technical capability to detect nuclear explosions.
Specifically, NNSA technical experts are working to develop and deploy
sensors and algorithms that enable the U.S. to meet its national
requirements for detecting, locating, identifying, and characterizing
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, underground, or
underwater.
To meet threats posed by chemical and biological agents, the NNSA
draws upon the diverse and extensive expertise of its national
laboratories. The goal of the Chemical and Biological National Security
Program is to develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies and
systems that will lead to major improvements in U.S. capability to
prepare for, and respond to, chemical or biological attacks against
civilian populations. The NNSA is the primary agency developing non-
medical technical solutions for this challenge. Our experts are
involved in a broad interagency program to develop sensors that could
detect the terrorist use of a biological agent at a large outdoor
event, such as the Super Bowl or the Olympics.
ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION
Another key strategy is promoting arms control and nonproliferation
treaties, promoting agreements, and regimes, and developing the
associated technologies to support them. The mission of the Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation is to detect, prevent, and reverse
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials,
technology, and expertise. It is the focal point within the NNSA for
activities that support the President's nonproliferation and
international security policies, goals, and objectives, as well as
those activities mandated by statute. The program provides policy and
technical expertise and leadership for NNSA and the Department in
interagency, bilateral, and multilateral nonproliferation and
international security matters. Several projects that had been
initiated last year are not proceeding currently. The NNSA will not be
proceeding with the Separated Civil Plutonium activities, due to
Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. Funding for Spent Fuel Storage
and Geological Repository in Russia are on hold, to allow time for the
new administration's interagency policy review.
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA
While the bulk of our nonproliferation activities take place in
Russia, the NNSA is also involved in nonproliferation and arms-control-
regime projects in many other parts of the world. For instance, since
1995, the U.S. and Kazakhstan have been working to reduce proliferation
risks associated with three tons of weapons-grade plutonium. This
material, which is located at the BN-350 fast-breeder reactor in Aktau,
Kazakhstan, contains enough plutonium to manufacture hundreds of
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, unlike most spent fuel, the majority the
BN-350 spent fuel material poses no significant radiation hazard to a
would-be thief. The project has reduced the threat to our national
security posed by the vulnerability of the weapons-grade material.
Further assistance to Kazakhstan, in implementing the secure long-term
storage of the BN-350 plutonium-rich fuel, will be curtailed.
The Aktau project will continue to support the IAEA in the
implementation of internationally accepted safeguards measures over the
material, continue to provide non-weapons-related employment for
nuclear scientists in Kazakhstan, and provide security and
international safeguards measures for the transportation and long-term
dry storage facility for the BN-350 material.
NNSA experts are also actively working in North Korea to reverse
and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, by securing approximately
thirty kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium contained in Nyongbyon 5
megawatt reactor spent fuel. Similar to the objectives of the Aktau
project, NNSA technicians have:
packaged the 8,000 assemblies in canisters and placed
those canisters under IAEA monitoring, and
performed field operations to maintain packaged spent
fuel in a safe condition, appropriate for future shipment.
We are also supporting the IAEA in the implementation of
verification and international safeguards of the material, while
helping to prepare plans to support future shipment and disposition of
spent fuel.
In an effort to impede the use of weapons of mass destruction, the
NNSA supports several projects targeted at reducing the amount of
fissile material that could be available to potential proliferators to
fashion into a nuclear device. In the Reduced Enrichment for Research
and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, NNSA continues to work to reduce
international commerce in civil HEU, by developing technologies to
convert foreign and domestic research and test reactors from HEU to
LEU.
NNSA is also active in strengthening regional security and
nonproliferation, not only on the Korean peninsula, but also throughout
East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. We are doing this by
participating in U.S. policymaking, promoting regional security
dialogues, and sharing with key states in these regions the expertise
of the National laboratories on technical measures to implement
nonproliferation agreements. Under a program to strengthen the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) regime, NNSA supports the
U.S. in its efforts to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the 1972
BWC. This protocol is part of a larger effort to deter noncompliance
with the BWC and to reinforce the global norm against the proliferation
of biological weapons. Our technical experts facilitate U.S. commerce
through implementation of bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation
agreements with our nuclear trading partners.
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COOPERATION
Another strategy for enhancing nuclear security is to improve
operational safety and safety systems at nuclear facilities of concern.
The NNSA is working to reduce safety risks at the 66 operating, Soviet-
designed nuclear-power reactors in nine countries, through the
International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation program. We plan to
complete safety upgrades for these reactors by 2006. There are three
reactors in Russia that are to be shut down, as part of DOD's program
to eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium. These three
high-risk reactors, at secured sites, are the oldest operating reactors
in Russia, and have not received any safety upgrades under foreign
cooperation. Safety upgrades at these production reactors, prior to
their planned shutdown in 2006, are among our highest priorities.
However, the scope of activities for improved safe operation will be
limited.
We are encouraged not just by our progress to address nuclear
safety at operating reactors, but by the early closure of older
reactors as well. The Ukrainian government shut down Chornobyl's sole
operational reactor in December 2000, as planned. Our efforts to
support the construction of a replacement heat plant at Chornobyl, for
decontamination and decommissioning purposes, are also proceeding well.
We were pleased when Kazakhstan also made the tough decision to shut
down its BN-350 reactor. Our attention is now focused on plans for
decommissioning and decontaminating the reactor's sodium coolant, which
will ensure that this reactor can never be restarted. The fiscal year
2002 budget request will allow us to complete one full-scope, nuclear
plant training simulator, each, in Russia, Ukraine, and Slovakia. We
will also strive for the completion of operational safety improvements
at all plants in Russia and Ukraine. Safety procedure and reactor in-
depth safety assessments will proceed, albeit at a delayed pace.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, I believe that NNSA is on the right course. The NNSA
enjoys the strong support and endorsement of Secretary of Energy
Spencer Abraham. It is the right idea to bring together the national
security missions of DOE, and to focus our work with clear goals and
plans, sharp lines of authority, and a strong view to the future.
The scientists and engineers that are stewards of our nuclear
arsenal have also been making important technical contributions to
controlling, detecting, and deterring the use of weapons of mass
destruction. NNSA's unique contribution is evident in the caliber of
personnel working on these complex, interrelated threat reduction
programs. Their expertise resident in our national laboratories has
been honed by years of working in support of the U.S. nuclear complex.
Our technical experts are ready and willing to share their
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation experience with their
counterparts in Russia.
As a Nation, we may face no greater challenge than preventing
weapons or weapons usable materials from falling into the hands of
those who would use them against the U.S. or our allies. It has been
more than a decade since the Berlin Wall fell, opening a new era in
history. In many ways, we live in a more dangerous world now, since the
demise of the Soviet Union. The threat to our safety and international
security is more diffuse, which makes it harder to defend against.
Rather than one monolithic threat, we must be prepared against rogue
nations or terrorist organizations with interests inimical to ours. I
am very proud of the nonproliferation programs that are rightfully part
of the defense nuclear security enterprise. The review being conducted
at the present time by the White House is timely and I am confident it
will reveal that the NNSA's programs are making solid contributions to
the national security of the United States.
Again, I thank the members of this panel for their commitment and
support of our mission, and for your support of the people of NNSA who
actually do the work and accomplish the mission: scientists, engineers,
technicians, policy planners, administrators, and so many others.
Senator Roberts. We've been joined by the distinguished
Senator and Ranking Member of this subcommittee, Senator
Landrieu, and I would turn to her for any opening comments that
she would like to make.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to
welcome our panelists this afternoon to discuss this important
program. I apologize for being a few minutes late.
I want to express that when Senators Nunn and Lugar had the
foresight in 1991 to start this program to assist Russia with
dismantling its nuclear weapons, protecting its weapons-usable
materials plutonium and uranium, and engaging its weapons
scientists and engineers to stop the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, the U.S. was committed to a major challenge.
Although much has been done along these lines and great efforts
have been made, much more remains undone.
In January, a task force chaired by former Senator Howard
Baker and White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler determined, ``The
most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States
today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or
weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to
terrorists or hostile nations and used against American troops
abroad or citizens at home.''
The task force went on to find that current
nonproliferation programs in the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, and related agencies have, in fact,
achieved impressive results so far, but their limited mandate
and funding fall short of what is required to address
adequately this threat. We still have an opportunity to address
these problems, but it's getting more difficult.
Moreover, there's concern that if we don't continue to move
quickly, we may lose this opportunity completely.
Today we will hear from Ms. Jones, who will focus on the
management issues arising from two of our programs. I look
forward to her testimony.
As we discuss these issues, which are serious, I hope we
don't lose sight of the ultimate goal of all of these programs,
and that we identify how to move forward so that we continue
this valuable effort.
Working with Russia is exceedingly difficult, and the DOE
efforts are made even more difficult because they must occur in
high security environments of closed cities. But there has been
substantial success, and there will be more, if we don't
collectively lose our will to preserve it.
We in Congress must commit to ensuring the success of these
programs, they're in our national security interest, they are
not Russian aid programs.
There's one specific issue I hope we can resolve by the end
of this hearing, one of the nuclear cities projects has stopped
because the NNSA has not released money for the project. I
hope, Mr. Chairman, by the end of this hearing we'll be able to
identify a way to release the money for this project to close
the Avangard weapons facilities. It's important to get this
effort back on track.
I, again, welcome you all today. I look forward to your
remarks, and I thank the chairman for calling the hearing.
Senator Roberts. Senator Allard, would you like to make any
comment?
STATEMENT BY SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity. Just very briefly I want to recognize the great
job that I think General Gordon is doing with the new agency.
I've had a lot of respect for Ms. Jones. She's done some GAO
studies in Colorado on Rocky Flats, and I think she's been very
helpful in that regard. Just to recognize those two efforts,
and I'll have some questions later on when we get around to
questioning.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator. Ms. Jones, please
proceed. Your statement will be made part of the record as well
as findings of your report.
STATEMENT OF MS. GARY L. JONES, DIRECTOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. We
are pleased to be here today to discuss part of the results of
our reviews of two of DOE's nonproliferation programs.
Our report on the Material Protection Control and
Accounting program, or MPC&A, was issued in February. You have
released our report on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
program today.
As part of our work, GAO teams traveled to Russia,
including the closed City of Sarov, to review projects and talk
with Russian scientists, institute directors, and government
officials about both programs.
Our testimony focuses on the impact of and future plans for
each program. From an overall standpoint, both programs are in
our national security interests, but their implementation poses
significant challenges.
The MPC&A program was initiated to help Russia protect the
603 metric tons of nuclear material that are in forms that are
highly attractive to theft. This is important because it only
takes a few kilograms to build a nuclear weapon.
Our report concluded that security systems installed by DOE
are reducing the theft of nuclear material in Russia, but
hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material still need improved
security.
As of February, DOE had spent about $61 million to, among
other things, install completed or partially completed systems
that protect about 32 percent of the at-risk material.
However, DOE has not been allowed access to what Russia
considers sensitive sites that contain several hundred metric
tons of material because Russian officials are concerned that
national security information would be divulged.
The program's continued progress depends on the success of
DOE negotiations to gain access to these sensitive sites and
reach agreement with Russia on reducing the numbers of sites
and buildings where security systems are needed.
However, just installing security systems will not ensure
long-term success. Our report noted that DOE has no mechanism
to monitor the effectiveness of the installed security systems.
But as General Gordon said, DOE has agreed to implement our
recommendation to develop a monitoring system in cooperation
with Russia.
Turning to DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative, that program
focuses on assisting Russia to downsize its nuclear weapons
complex and create jobs for weapons scientists in the 10 closed
nuclear cities that form the core of that complex. These cities
are high security areas and access is very limited.
As they downsize the complex, Russian officials have
identified a need to create 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the cities
over the next several years.
We found that during NCI's first 2 years of operation, the
program has had limited success. According to DOE, the program
employs about 370 people, including many Russian weapons
scientists who primarily work part time on research projects
sponsored by the U.S. national laboratories.
According to Russian officials, most of these scientists
continue to work on Russia's weapons of mass destruction and
also receive a salary from the Russian government.
Further, about one half of the program's projects are not
designed to create jobs but rather include community
development activities such as the delivery of medical
equipment and school exchange programs.
Russian officials told us they did not want the community
development projects because they didn't create jobs. Industry
officials told us they were not relevant to their investment in
the nuclear cities.
Other factors that have contributed to the limited
programming success include lack of Russian support, until
recently no comprehensive review process, the remote location
of the cities, and the poor economic conditions in Russia.
With regard to funding, we found that a disproportionate
amount of NCI program funds has been spent in the United
States. About 70 percent of the $15.9 million that DOE spent
through December 2000 was spent primarily in its national
laboratories for such items as overhead, labor, equipment, and
travel. The remaining 30 percent was spent for projects and
activities in Russia.
DOE is making changes this fiscal year in response to
congressional direction to spend 51 percent of program funds in
Russia. But DOE will have to more effectively monitor and
control spending to meet this goal.
Our report also raises a fundamental question for DOE. Does
it need two programs with a shared common goal of employing
Russian weapon scientists and, in some cases, implementing the
same kinds of projects?
In addition, to NCI, DOE's Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention (IPP) also has projects in Russia's nuclear cities.
There is some duplication between the two, such as two sets of
project review procedures and several similar types of
projects.
Further, IPP already had a presence in the nuclear cities
before NCI was created. Since 1994, DOE has spent over $13
million on about 100 IPP projects in five nuclear cities.
We recommended and as General Gordon said DOE agreed to
review whether these two programs should be consolidated into
one effort to achieve potential cost savings and other
efficiencies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ms. Gary L. Jones
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--DOE'S EFFORTS TO SECURE NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND
EMPLOY WEAPONS SCIENTISTS IN RUSSIA
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: We are pleased to be
here today to discuss our reviews of two Department of Energy (DOE)
nonproliferation programs that address important U.S. national security
concerns--(1) improving the security of hundreds of tons of nuclear
material at various sites throughout Russia and (2) employing weapons
scientists in Russia's 10 closed nuclear cities so that they will not
sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups trying to
develop weapons of mass destruction. Both programs are managed by the
National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation. Our testimony focuses on each of these programs'
impact and future plans. Our statement is based on our February 28,
2001, report on the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
(MPC&A) program and our report on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
program that is being released today.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material
Improving: Further Enhancements Needed. (GAO-01-312, Feb. 28, 2001) and
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in
Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (GAO-01-429, May 3, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, the following summarizes our findings: The security
systems installed by DOE are reducing the risk of theft of nuclear
material in Russia, but hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material
still lack improved security systems. As of February 2001, DOE had
installed, at a cost of about $601 million, completed or partially
completed systems protecting, among other things, 192 metric tons of
the 603 metric tons of nuclear material identified at risk of theft.
These systems, while not as stringent as those installed in the United
States, are designed to prevent individuals or small groups of
criminals from stealing nuclear material. Russian officials' concerns
about divulging national security information continue to impede DOE's
efforts to install systems for several hundred metric tons of nuclear
material at sensitive Russian sites. The program's continued progress
depends on DOE's ability to gain access to these sensitive sites and
reach agreement with Russia on reducing the number of sites and
buildings where nuclear material is located and security systems are
needed. DOE agreed with our recommendation to develop options for
completing the program on the basis of the progress made in gaining
access to these sites and agreement on the closure of buildings and
sites. Furthermore, while DOE currently does not have a means to
monitor the security systems it is installing to ensure that they are
operating properly on a continuing basis, the Department has agreed to
implement our recommendation to develop such a system in cooperation
with Russia. DOE estimates that the MPC&A program will be completed in
2020 at a cost of about $2.2 billion.
Regarding DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative, we found that during its
first 2 years of operation, the program had limited success. The
Department estimates that the program employs about 370 people,
including many weapons scientists who are primarily working on a part-
time basis through research projects sponsored by the U.S. national
laboratories. According to Russian officials, most of the scientists
receiving program funds continue to work on Russia's weapons of mass
destruction and are also receiving a salary paid for by the Russian
government. About one-half of the program's projects focus on such
activities as the delivery of medical equipment and school exchange
programs and are not designed to create jobs for weapons scientists.
With regard to funding, we found that a disproportionate amount of the
NCI program's funding has been spent in the United States. About 70
percent, or about $11.2 million, of the $15.9 million that DOE spent
through December 2000 was spent in the United States--primarily at its
national laboratories--for such items as overhead, labor, equipment,
and travel. The remaining 30 percent was spent for projects and
activities in Russia. DOE, in response to direction provided by
Congress in a conference report on appropriations for fiscal year 2001,
stated that its goal is to spend 51 percent of its program funds in
Russia this fiscal year. DOE will have to more effectively monitor and
control the program's spending to meet this goal. We also found that
DOE's NCI program lacks a plan for the future. DOE agreed with our
recommendations to develop a plan that addresses the program's future
costs and a time frame with quantifiable performance measures to
determine how effectively the program is meeting its goals and whether
it should be expanded. DOE has two programs--NCI and the Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)--operating in Russia's nuclear
cities. We believe that DOE needs to address a fundamental question--
does it need two programs with a shared underlying goal--employing
Russian weapons scientists--and, in some cases, implementing the same
kinds of projects? We recommended that DOE determine if these two
programs should be consolidated into one effort to achieve potential
cost savings and other efficiencies. DOE agreed to review both the IPP
and NCI programs with a view toward consolidation.
BACKGROUND
In 1995, DOE established the MPC&A program to install improved
security systems for nuclear material at civilian nuclear sites, naval
fuel sites, and nuclear weapons laboratories in Russia. Terrorists and
countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms
of uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon. With
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, DOE estimates that Russia
inherited 603 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in
forms highly attractive to theft. As of February 2001, DOE had
identified 252 buildings at 40 sites that require nuclear security
systems. In addition to installing security systems, DOE is providing
sites with long-term operational assistance through equipment
warranties, operating procedure development, and training. DOE also has
projects underway to help Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom)
and nuclear regulatory authority develop (1) a total inventory of
nuclear material, (2) regulations to ensure the effective operation and
maintenance of the systems, and (3) inspection and enforcement systems
to ensure that sites comply with regulations. In addition, DOE is
supporting security improvements for trains and trucks that transport
nuclear material between and within sites and for nuclear material
security training centers.
DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative focuses on weapons scientists in
the 10 closed nuclear cities that form the core of Russia's nuclear
weapons complex. Many of these cities are located in geographically
remote locations and were so secret that they did not appear on any
publicly available maps until 1992. These cities remain high security
areas and access to them is limited. MinAtom manages the nuclear
facilities that are located within the cities and estimates that about
760,000 people live there, including approximately 122,000 residents
who are employed in key nuclear enterprises. The Russian government has
announced its intention to reduce the size of its nuclear weapons
complex, and a critical component of this effort includes finding new
employment opportunities for weapons scientists, engineers,
technicians, and support staff who will lose their jobs from the
downsizing of the complex. Russian officials have identified a need to
create 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the 10 closed nuclear cities over the
next several years. DOE has tasked the National laboratories to play a
major role in the program, which works in conjunction with another DOE
program--the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention--that also seeks
to employ weapons scientists in several countries, including Russia.
DOE HAS REDUCED THE RISK OF THEFT FOR ABOUT 32 PERCENT OF THE NUCLEAR
MATERIAL IN RUSSIA, BUT HUNDREDS OF METRIC TONS OF MATERIAL REMAIN
UNPROTECTED
DOE has installed completed or partially completed security systems
in 115 buildings holding about 192 metric tons, or about 32 percent, of
the 603 metric tons of weapons-useable nuclear material at risk of
theft in Russia. DOE installed completed systems in 81 buildings
protecting about 86 metric tons (or about 14 percent) of nuclear
material. DOE has also installed partially completed systems known as
rapid upgrades in 34 additional buildings protecting 106 metric tons,
or 18 percent of the nuclear material. Rapid upgrades consist of such
things as bricking up windows in storage buildings; installing
strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; and
establishing controlled access areas around the nuclear material.
Completed systems include such components as electronic sensors, motion
detectors, closed circuit surveillance cameras, central alarm stations
to monitor the cameras and alarms, and computerized material-accounting
systems. By installing rapid upgrades, DOE helps Russian sites
establish basic control over their nuclear material while U.S. project
teams finish installing the security systems.
DOE's reviews of installed systems and our visits to nine nuclear
sites in Russia indicate that most of the security systems are
currently reducing the risk of theft. DOE has established a panel of
experts known as the Technical Survey Team that examines project
documents and meets with project teams to determine if the installed
systems meet departmental guidelines for effectively reducing the risk
of nuclear theft in Russia. From January 1999 through September 2000,
the Technical Survey Team reviewed projects for 30 of the 40 sites in
Russia. They found that systems at 22 of the sites were reducing the
risk of theft by increasing the ability of the Russian sites to detect,
delay, and respond to an attempted theft or otherwise strengthen
control over their nuclear material. For six of the sites they
reviewed, little or no risk reduction occurred because the systems were
not installed in accordance with the guidelines, the teams did not have
sufficient access to the buildings to install systems, or the systems
were installed around material presenting a low risk of proliferation.
For two of the other sites, it was too soon to tell if the systems
reduced risk. DOE is taking steps to correct these problems.
At the nine sites we visited in Russia where DOE had installed
systems, we observed, among other things,
storage vaults equipped with strengthened doors,
locks, video surveillance systems, and alarms that can detect
and delay thieves as they attempt to steal nuclear material;
nuclear material containers equipped with computerized
bar codes and tamper-resistant seals that allow site personnel
to perform quick inventories of the material and determine
whether the containers were tampered with; and
nuclear material portal monitors that scan people and
vehicles entering and leaving facilities to ensure that they
have not taken nuclear material from storage locations.
While DOE has made progress in installing systems, DOE's project
teams do not have access to 104 of the 252 buildings requiring improved
security systems. These buildings, located mostly at Russian nuclear
weapons laboratories, contain hundreds of metric tons of nuclear
material. MinAtom is reluctant to grant access to these buildings
because of Russian national security concerns and Russian laws on the
protection of state secrets. DOE officials told us they need access to
these buildings to confirm the type of material to be protected, design
systems that provide adequate protection for the material, ensure that
the systems are installed properly, and ensure that the sites operate
the systems properly. DOE recently reached a draft agreement with
MinAtom to provide program personnel with greater access to sensitive
MinAtom sites. According to DOE officials, even with the agreement,
some of the more sensitive MinAtom sites will remain inaccessible to
program personnel but the agreement, when concluded, will allow the
program to further expand its work.
Just installing security systems will not ensure the long-term
success of the MPC&A program. DOE's Technical Survey Team and our
observations provide only a snapshot of how effectively the installed
systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. DOE
has not established a means to systematically measure the effectiveness
of the security systems that it has installed at Russian nuclear sites.
However, DOE is currently collecting information from individual sites
that would be useful in measuring the new systems' effectiveness. For
example, DOE project teams visit sites and observe systems that have
been installed, and at certain sites, DOE has contracts with the
Russians to collect information on the functioning of equipment. In
addition, before installing security systems, DOE and Russian site
officials conduct vulnerability assessments, which assess the
probability of the existing nuclear security systems at the sites to
prevent nuclear material theft. In commenting on a draft of our report,
DOE agreed with our recommendation to develop a system to monitor, on a
long-term basis, the security systems at nuclear sites in Russia to
ensure that they continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to
steal nuclear material.
DOE FACES CHALLENGES IN ADHERING TO MPC&A PROGRAM'S COST PROJECTIONS
AND TIME FRAMES
From fiscal year 1993 through February 2001, DOE spent about $601
million on the MPC&A program in Russia. DOE spent about $376 million,
or 63 percent of the $601 million, on installing security systems at
Russia's civilian sites, nuclear weapons laboratories, the Russian
navy's nuclear fuel sites, and the Russian navy's nuclear weapons
sites. DOE spent the remainder of the $601 million on, among other
things, operational assistance and program management.
According to DOE, it will complete the MPC&A program in 2020 at a
total cost of $2.2 billion. However, DOE officials told us that the
cost estimate and time frame for completing the program are uncertain
because DOE faces challenges in implementing the program. For example,
DOE does not know how much assistance it will need to provide Russian
sites with to operate and maintain the security systems. Some sites
where DOE is installing systems are in better financial condition and
have a greater potential to generate revenue than other sites and
therefore are more likely to have the resources to maintain the
security systems. Other sites will need more DOE assistance to maintain
the systems. Furthermore, because of a lack of access to many nuclear
sites, DOE is not certain about how many buildings will require
security systems or when it will be able to start and complete the
installation of these systems. DOE is also working with Russia to
consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and convert the
highly enriched uranium in these buildings into forms that cannot be
used in nuclear weapons. While this effort could reduce the program's
costs by reducing the number of sites and buildings needing systems,
MinAtom has not yet identified which buildings and sites it plans to
close. Our report (GAO-01-312) recommends that DOE include in its
strategic plan, currently under development, (1) an estimate of how
much assistance is required to sustain operations at each site on the
basis of an analysis of the costs and the sites' ability to cover these
costs and (2) options for completing the program on the basis of the
progress made in gaining access to sensitive sites and the closure of
buildings and sites. DOE concurred with this recommendation.
doe's nuclear cities initiative projects have had limited impact
During its first 2 years, NCI has had limited success in meeting
the program's principal objectives--creating jobs for weapons
scientists and helping to downsize Russia's weapons complex. According
to DOE, the program is employing about 370 people, including many
weapons scientists who are working primarily on a part-time basis
through research projects sponsored by the U.S. national laboratories.
About 40 percent of the work was generated through the Open Computing
Center in the closed city of Sarov. The center's director told us that
the part-time employees are also working at the weapons design
institute in Sarov on weapons-related activities and are receiving
salaries from the institute. The center has had some success in
attracting business investment, and DOE officials estimated that, with
successful marketing to commercial businesses, the center would be able
to employ 500 people by 2005.
Although some jobs have been created, about one-half of the 26 NCI
projects are not designed to create jobs for weapons scientists.
Instead, these projects focus on, among other things, such activities
as the delivery of medical equipment and school exchange programs. DOE
officials told us that these community development projects are needed
to make the nuclear cities more attractive to business investment.
However, Russian officials have criticized the projects because they do
not create jobs for weapons scientists, which they believe is the
primary goal of NCI and the 1998 agreement between the United States
and Russia. Furthermore, none of the industry officials we spoke with
said that they would be more likely to invest in the nuclear cities
because of municipal and social improvements in the nuclear cities.
Eight of the program's projects are designed to develop sustainable
commercial ventures, but only one of these has successfully created
jobs. Numerous factors have contributed to the limited success of the
NCI projects. Some projects have been canceled or delayed because of
the lack of Russian support and cooperation. Other reasons for these
projects' lack of success include poor economic conditions in Russia,
the remote location and restricted status of the nuclear cities, and
the lack of an entrepreneurial culture among weapons scientists.
Furthermore, DOE and national laboratory officials have told us that
the Department's project selection process has been inconsistent and
``ad hoc.'' According to the program director, projects were approved
for funding without a comprehensive review process in order to
implement the program quickly and engage the Russians. In January 2001,
DOE issued new program guidance that includes more detail on project
selection and approval. For example, the new guidance will give
preference to those projects with the strongest prospects for early
commercial success and those in which the start-up costs are shared
with other U.S. government agencies, Russian partners, and/or private
entities. While the guidance, if effectively implemented, will address
the problems with DOE's inadequate project-selection process, it
remains unclear to us why DOE took over 2 years to develop these
procedures when similar procedures already existed under the IPP
program.
Despite the numerous problems we found with the NCI projects, the
program has made some strides. For example, according to DOE officials,
one of the most successful projects involves the conversion of weapons
assembly buildings at the Avangard weapons facility in Sarov into
production space for commercial ventures, including the proposed
establishment of a kidney dialysis manufacturing facility. The program
has helped facilitate the relationship between a Western business and
the Russian weapons institute, and DOE has allocated about $1.5 million
to support this effort.
Interestingly, Mr. Chairman, the most successful commercial effort
we observed in the nuclear cities involved a major U.S. computer firm
that employs former weapons scientists in Sarov. This effort, which
began about 7 years ago, has been undertaken without U.S. government
assistance and now employs about 100 scientists. When we visited the
software operation in September 2000, we were told that the employees
work full-time and that their salaries are up to three times what they
had been paid at the weapons institute.
MAJORITY OF NUCLEAR CITIES PROGRAM FUNDS HAVE BEEN SPENT IN THE UNITED
STATES
From fiscal year 1999 through December 2000, the expenditures for
NCI totaled about $15.9 million. Of that amount, about $11.2 million
(or 70 percent) was spent in the United States, and about $4.7 million
(or 30 percent) was spent for projects and activities in Russia. The
U.S. national laboratories' costs to implement the program represented
the bulk of the funds spent in the United States and included such
items as overhead, labor, equipment, and travel. In fact, 75 percent of
the funds spent by the laboratories were for overhead and labor costs.
DOE officials told us that laboratory expenditures, although
significant, were part of startup costs for NCI. They noted that the
program has taken longer to start up because of the economic problems
facing Russia and the barriers involved in trying to start new
businesses and related activities in the nuclear cities. DOE officials
told us that they were concerned about the amount of funds spent by the
laboratories to administer the program--particularly the overhead
costs--and have taken steps to reduce these costs such as by managing
some projects directly from headquarters. These officials also told us
that laboratory costs will be reduced and that the laboratories' role
will diminish as commercial investors develop business contacts in the
nuclear cities as a result of the program.
The $4.7 million in expenditures for Russia included contracts with
Russian organizations to buy computers and other equipment, a small
business bank loan program, and various community development projects.
Furthermore, MinAtom officials made it clear to us, during our
September 2000 visit to Russia, that they were dissatisfied with the
amount of program funds that had been spent in Russia. The First Deputy
Minister of MinAtom told us that it was his understanding that DOE
planned to spend the majority of program funds in Russia and wanted to
know what happened to these funds. He said that the lack of progress in
the program increases the negative views of the program held by various
Russian government officials, who allege that the program is a way for
the United States to gain access to weapons data in Russia's nuclear
cities.
In response to direction provided by Congress in a conference
report on DOE's fiscal year 2001 appropriations, DOE stated that its
goal is to spend at least 51 percent of its program funds in Russia
during this fiscal year. DOE will have to more effectively monitor and
control the program's spending to meet this goal. Regarding future
program expenditures, the Department has not developed a plan that
addresses the program's future costs and a time frame with quantifiable
performance measures to determine how effectively the program is
meeting its goals and when and if the program should expand beyond the
three nuclear cities. In 1999, DOE officials believed that the total
funding level for NCI could reach $600 million over a 5-year period.
However, the program's director told us that because the program had
not received expected funding levels during its first years of
operation, he is uncertain about the program's future costs and time
frames.
DUPLICATION HAS OCCURRED IN THE OPERATION OF DOE'S TWO PROGRAMS IN
RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR CITIES
DOE has two programs operating in Russia's nuclear cities--the
Nuclear Cities Initiative and the Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention--that share a common underlying goal--to employ Russia's
weapons scientists in nonmilitary work. We believe that DOE needs to
address a fundamental question--does it need two programs operating in
Russia's nuclear cities with a shared goal and, in some cases, the same
types of projects? The operation of these two similar programs has led
to some duplication of effort, such as two sets of project review
procedures and several similar types of projects. Both programs provide
Russia's nuclear cities with funds and since 1994, DOE has spent over
$13 million on about 100 IPP projects in five nuclear cities, including
the three nuclear cities participating in NCI--Sarov, Snezhinsk, and
Zheleznogorsk. One U.S. national laboratory official told us that there
was not a clear distinction between the two programs, and other
laboratory officials noted that some projects have been proposed for
funding under both programs, have been shifted from one program to
another, or have received funding from both programs. The IPP program
director told us that although he did not believe that the two programs
were duplicative, there is a potential for duplication to occur because
both have a common approach for creating jobs in the nuclear cities.
Both programs reside within DOE's Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration; have
adjoining offices; and share staff to perform budget, travel, and
secretarial functions.
Our work shows that some of the failures of NCI's commercial
development projects might have been avoided if DOE had a common
project approval process and incorporated some of the elements of the
IPP project selection process from the onset of the NCI program.
Furthermore, most of NCI's initial commercial development projects
would not likely have been approved under the IPP program's more
rigorous approval process. This is because, unlike the IPP program, NCI
did not require that projects have industry partners or demonstrate
commercial viability until January 2001, when program guidance was
issued. In addition, NCI has recently (1) begun to develop a more
systematic process, as IPP already has, for obtaining the views of
business or industry experts on commercial development and (2) adopted
practices established under the IPP program regarding the funding of
projects. In commenting on a draft of our report being released today,
DOE agreed to review both programs with a view toward consolidation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee
may have.
CONTACT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
For further information on this testimony, please contact Ms. Gary
L. Jones at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Gene Aloise, Charles Bolton, Ross Campbell,
Joseph Cook, Glen Levis, and Joseph O. McBride.
Senator Roberts. General Gordon, in some ways I think
perhaps if we were a month down the road or maybe 2 or even 3
months down the road, we might be better served with an ability
to respond to some of these questions, and that is a timing
issue, that obviously you do not have your full team up and
running.
But you have indicated that hopefully that will be done in
2 or 3 weeks or at least a month. Then the administration is
conducting a review. They have made a budget request, but that
is dependent, as I understand it, on the review that they are
conducting. There may be some flexibility in that regard.
You are conducting your own review in regards to the IPP
and NCI programs. So we have three very time-sensitive
considerations here. First, to make sure that you have your
team up and running; second, the review by the administration
reflects that any changes in the budget request; third, your
own review.
I am not finding fault with this. This is just the way
things are under the circumstances, but tempis fugit and time
marches on in how the authorizers and appropriators work around
this place. While we have a little bit of time, it really is
not very much.
Can you give us a general estimate? I am not trying to pin
you down. Many of these things, two of them at least, well, all
three of them really you have no way of speeding that up other
than to plead your case before the administration.
But could you comment on these three items in regards to
when we might be up and running with team Gordon?
General Gordon. With respect to the administration's review
that's under way, most if not all of the programs have been
presented to the review panels. So they are beginning to
wrestle with their decisions--with their recommendation
process. I frankly don't know how long it will take to write
that up.
But the process has been very interactive with meetings
held several days each week, in looking at each of the
programs, not just DOE programs and NNSA programs, but other
programs across the government and looking at them
comprehensively. The technical part of that work is basically
wrapping up now in real time.
Senator Roberts. Are we about a month away, 2 months? I do
not mean to be picky about this, but we do have an
appropriations process to get through, and we have to treat the
appropriators well.
General Gordon. I can't speak for them, but that would
certainly be the time frame I'm thinking of it. About a month
or so is the kind of time frame but that's only an estimate.
Senator Roberts. If you could relay to the folks in charge
that the Roberts-Landrieu team was getting a little testy on
the issue.
General Gordon. There's probably a little of that among the
people trying to implement the programs too because we don't
want to go down a road or make a major investment or commitment
and find out we're a little bit out of sync with the overall
approach that the administration would have us take in these
programs. Should we show common interest in them, Mr. Chairman?
With respect to internal work, we will all want to tie that
to the new member of the team as soon as the deputy
administrator is there, and it won't take very long to do that.
Senator Roberts. Isn't that name going to be forthcoming
very quickly?
General Gordon. I'm hopeful that it is within 2 weeks or
less. But, again, we're just waiting for the announcement to be
made by the President.
But what I want to comment on is that while those processes
are going to take a bit of time, more than any of us would
like, we're not standing still, for example, in amending the
initiatives we talked about, the project review proposals and
the recommendations that are being made in the NCI report.
For example, Mr. Baker and his team have already adopted
those review cycles. So we're putting those in place as we go.
Not waiting for other reviews to take place on the things that
we can, in fact, do, and we are proceeding.
We are proceeding at a good pace on many of the programs
where we know we can and have folks in Russia this day working
with some of the Navy programs. So we proceed at a good pace on
those programs.
Senator Roberts. General, according to the GAO and I think
it is common knowledge, that any continued progress in reducing
the risk of theft in regards to the nuclear material in Russia
certainly depends on our gaining access to the Russian sites.
What is the status of the department's effort to gain access to
these sites?
General Gordon. We've had some problems in the military
side of MinAtom, and that's where we're attacking the problem
now. We have had pending agreements with the Russians that are
being negotiated and working ad hoc as we speak. It has been
very difficult. We remain hopeful. But it has been difficult.
Senator Roberts. The GAO found that most of the systems, as
installed by you, are reducing the risk of theft. That is, I
think, obvious. But we seem to be lacking a mechanism to
monitor the effectiveness of the systems on a long-term basis.
This may be a bit premature in regards to what we were talking
about earlier, but what is DOE doing to implement their
recommendation to develop a monitoring mechanism with the
Russians? I emphasize the importance of establishing such a
system.
General Gordon. Just an example of trying to get some
technology to work for us is trying to use some of the ideas
that have been developed by ourselves and by the International
Atomic Energy Agency to look at remote monitoring of sites.
For example, using certain controlled video systems that
would give us a report back that, in fact, systems are working,
and guards are present, we've had at least the initial
discussions, and I'm told by my colleagues that the Russians we
are dealing with find this a fairly attractive program.
We may be able to do that truly jointly on this one because
they would like to do it themselves. But the short answer, Mr.
Chairman, is that we are trying to put some technology to work
for us in these areas. We fundamentally know how to do it as
long as we can secure appropriate Russian agreement.
I do take this idea of the sustainability of these programs
very seriously. It's just not going to work if we go install
the stuff, it breaks, and we walk away from it. That's
absolutely critical to making this whole program work.
Senator Roberts. One of the things that is obvious is the
attempt to enable the Russians, help the Russians consolidate
their material into fewer buildings, and then convert that
material into forms that cannot be used in any weapon. By
consolidation, the hope was we might end up spending less money
and the Russians more.
But it is my understanding that MinAtom has yet to tell DOE
which sites and which buildings would be consolidated. Can you
give us an update on that as to which sites and buildings would
be consolidated?
General Gordon. There are efforts being made in that regard
right now by Mr. Gerard. But I would like to give you a more
considered current answer for the record, Mr. Chairman, give
you the most current.
Department of Energy,
National Nuclear Security Administration,
Office of the Administrator,
Washington, DC, May 18, 2001.
Hon. Pat Roberts,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Roberts: It was a pleasure to testify before the
Senate Armed Services Committee's Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee on May 15, 2001. At that time, I took two questions for
the record from you. In response to your request for more detailed
information about how the fiscal year 2001 funding to the Fresenius
project will be used, documentation from the Lawrence Livermore
National] Laboratory on the project indicates that the $3M of
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) funding will be used to
provide facility improvements and basic process equipment that will be
used in the dialysis joint venture. Fresenius, as part of its
contribution, will provide the actual process/assembly line equipment.
The improvements and basic equipment needed by the joint venture
are such things as water, heating, sanitary, and telecommunications
systems, testing systems, autoclaves, a quality control laboratory,
air-handling systems, sterile steam, chilled water, cooling systems,
electrical power distribution, upgraded fire protection, storage and
mixing tanks, material storage, and material receiving functions. These
are all part of the infrastructure upgrades needed in the Avangard
facility for the dialysis project, which will be funded in fiscal year
2001.
In response to your request for an update on site and building
consolidation: the Department of Energy (DOE)I National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) has witnessed successful closure of 21
buildings located at several Russian sites and has converted more than
2 metric tons of high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium
(LEU). The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) has proposed an
aggressive plan calling for the closure of 60 buildings through
material consolidation and conversion of an additional 27 metric tons
of excess weapons-usable HEU over the next ten years. According to
MinAtom, specific details such as the name and location of the
buildings planned for closure will become available once DOE/NNSA and
MinAtom are engaged in negotiations on a bi-lateral material
consolidation and conversion (MCC) agreement. The DOE/NNSA is prepared
to table a draft Agreement as soon as it receives interagency approval
to proceed.
If you should have any additional questions please feel free to
contact me or have your staff contact Laurie Harrison at (202) 586-
7369.
Sincerely,
John Gordon.
Senator Roberts. All right. It took 2 years for DOE to
develop the NCI program with guidelines that cover such basic
management issues as project selection review and approval
procedures. Some of us feel that time period--well, that that
should have been done from the outset. Any comments?
General Gordon. I think I would agree with you, sir. Again,
what we've done in response to these issues, even on that
particular one and some of the accounting programs, it's my
understanding that the NNSA was responsive to the GAO even in
the initial parts of their investigation and began to correct
that in real time again as opposed to waiting for the their
full reports to come out.
But I must simply agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that if
there are shortfalls in projects--if projects were not fully
thought out at the time and if controls were not in place, we
need not let that happen again.
Senator Roberts. Where are you in encouraging the Russians
in regards to cost-sharing?
General Gordon. That's a continuing discussion with us in
everything we do, and I think in most of these areas they have
put up at least in kind in all of these projects. So it's on
our list for every program we work, sir.
Senator Roberts. One of the suggestions has been, and we
looked into this in the last session of Congress and we are
probably looking at it again very seriously in regards to how
the NCI program differs from the IPP program; why there was a
need to create a separate management structure to implement
both? What are the differences in these programs? There has
been a suggestion by the GAO that perhaps these programs could
be merged and better managed. How do you feel about that?
General Gordon. As I suggest in my statement, we're going
to take a hard look at that as to how to proceed in that area.
There are differences in the two programs, at least in how they
were initially conceived, and they're thought of now.
Senator Roberts. But the basic goal is the same?
General Gordon. But the goal of the NCI program, the way we
now talk about it, is to reduce the floor space, reduce the
plants, and reduce the operation of the facilities to where the
employment and other issues are by-products of that that
naturally occur; where as, the IPP is a little bit more focused
on employment itself and employment opportunities and
commercial opportunities.
But, as I said, Mr. Chairman, we do intend to take a
serious look at that. Again, they operate a little bit
differently. The IPP does operate in some of these cities. They
operate in many other locations as well. They do not operate
under a government-to-government agreement now.
Again, just to repeat, we will take a very serious look at
combining these programs and finding out whether we should
combine the best of the two into one. Whether IPP should become
NCI or NCI should become IPP or whatever the combinations are,
that has yet to be determined. But we're taking that on as a
considered look, sir.
Senator Roberts. This is a cooperative program between the
United States and the Russians. Now you have a pretty good feel
and a lot of past history in dealing with the Russians. I do
not think there is any question that the Russians are
dissatisfied in some respects with both programs, more
particularly NCI. What are their concerns and are they
justified?
General Gordon. I think some of the concerns are, as you
pointed out and as Ms. Jones pointed out in her statement, the
program has been off to a slow start, and there hasn't been a
lot of money flowing into the program.
On the other hand, some Russians have looked at it
differently than others. The MinAtom, as itself, is essentially
a controlled organization, and they would like to have the
money up front and run their programs. What we believe we
should do is operate inside the cities, which gives a totally
different view and perspective on the program, and operate at
some of the smaller levels that can build infrastructure and
can build perspectives on business and economics that are not
likely to come from MinAtom themselves.
Senator Roberts. Let's get specific and bear with me here.
MinAtom has sent DOE letters in the past year that have pointed
out that Russia has only received $3 million out of the entire
amount allocated. In the most recent letter sent last week,
MinAtom states that they believe, ``there are other reasons
impeding the implementation of the NCI agreement.''
I continue, ``the most fundamental of those are the
unsatisfactory funding for the agreed project's ineffective use
of the allocated budget funds.''
They go further by stating, ``we continue receiving quite a
large number of requests for access to the closed cities. Such
visits require significant funds to finance business trips,
drawing resources from the project financing in the nuclear
cities.''
``However, mere visits to the closed cities cannot
obviously resolve the issues related to a job creation in the
nuclear cities.''
How do you plan to respond to them in regards to these
concerns?
General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, the requirements--commitments
that Congress has levied and that we've accepted obviously,
first off, to spend no less than 51 percent of the money in
Russia, will be accomplished, and our goal is actually to begin
spending numbers on the order of 65 percent on the projects, if
at all possible, and I expect to be able to do that.
I think the numbers, some of their own accounting and,
again, I don't want to quibble over the amount too much because
I certainly agree that the largest percentage of funds were not
spent in Russia at the outset, but the balance is probably
twice that because I don't think they count some of the work
that has been done with the European bank and some of those
other programs.
But, again, Mr. Chairman, we need to spend more money in
Russia, if we're going to do this program, and we need to spend
it there.
With respect to access as a whole, I don't know if there
has been too much request for access in the past or not, but,
again, I don't think we're going to be able to sustain these
programs, and I don't think the business partners are going to
play on them very hard if we don't have the degree of access
needed. Again, we're in the middle of the discussions for the
second or third or forth time, with the Russians right now.
Senator Roberts. Let me--and I'm going to cease and desist
here so I can turn it over to Senator Landrieu and to Senator
Allard, but this sort of gets to your feeling in regards to
what the Russians have said and what they will do or may not
do.
I think you are certainly aware last year's subcommittee
established legislation that required the MPC&A program to
establish an access policy with MinAtom and required the NCI to
obtain a written agreement. Let me emphasize the words
``written agreement.'' Not intent, but ``written agreement''
with respect to closure of some of its nuclear weapons assembly
and disassembly facilities.
Now, some may question that as to where we were so
specific, and we had to be specific. But in dealing with this
program, obviously you want to be as open and positive and have
common sense, if I can use that term, with the Russians as
possible.
But we have a coequal in this business. It is called the
House of Representatives. When we went to conference, it was
very clear that they would not agree to continue funding unless
we obtained a written agreement. You and I have talked about
this a little bit in terms of Russian intent. Could you shed a
little light?
It seems to me, we may have to maybe come up with some out-
of-the-box thinking or some art craft here. I do not think they
are objecting to the transparency or the access. But I do think
in regards to the written agreement that may pose some
problems, and yet we think the program certainly merits further
consideration. Any comment?
General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, I don't know quite how to go
with this, but I will say we have received from the Deputy
Minister, Mr. Ryabev, what I think would be fair to call a
commitment on his part and his agency's to begin the efforts to
close out these facilities on Avangard. It's his document
that's signed, and it's written to us. I guess the issue is
whether that constitutes agreement or not.
He's also on record, and we just came across it on a speech
that Mr. Ryabev gave within the last couple of days to the Duma
stating the very clear intent of MinAtom, talking to their own
legislative body about their intent to close these facilities.
So we have that record. They're speaking to themselves,
this is openly available. We have a letter from Mr. Ryabev
toward this point. I guess at issue is whether that satisfies
the term ``agreement'' or not.
I would also tell you we have gone back to Mr. Ryabev in
real time, if there's anything that looks more like a formal
agreement, it's possible that may prove different. I understand
their perspective.
I think, for the reasons that we've discussed and Senator
Landrieu has discussed, that if there is a way creatively to
release those funds towards that end, that would be a benefit
towards many of the programs we're trying to do.
In particular, where we are now kind of on a cusp with this
dialysis company, they're ready to go. We think the Russians
are ready to go. There's $3 or $4 million standing in the way
of being able to do that.
I don't want to stand it up as one of the only things, but
this will be a measure of whether this program is going to be
able to make it or not. If we get a real program in there with
this kind of magnitude with potential to really take over a
significant portion of this material, the jobs, the work, and
the economic benefit that comes from that, it offers at least a
signal to the other companies that are interested that they may
actually be able to work in this environment.
Conversely, if it falls apart, it probably sends a signal
back to business partners equally.
Senator Roberts. I concur with that statement.
Senator Landrieu.
Senator Landrieu. I have an interest in looking to see how
we can actually work through this because I think this
particular program is at a critical juncture here. I thank you,
General, in your work and want to try to be helpful in making
whatever changes are necessary to the program. But overall
ensuring that the funding is there to move ahead with something
that I consider and I think the chairman does and others a real
threat--security risk to the United States.
Again, to reiterate what I said in my opening statement,
this is fundamentally a security issue for us.
I really appreciate your help and support and want to
submit for the record the letter that you referenced which I
have a copy of here, Mr. Chairman, that may or may not be
considered by some as a signed agreement. But it is very
specific in what it says in terms of being ready to close this
facility.
There are 3,000 to 3,500 jobs at stake at this particular
site. So I would like to just submit that to the record.
Senator Roberts. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Landrieu. I also want to submit my other questions
for the record. I have some for open and some for the closed
meeting. Just to take my limited time before Senator Allard
speaks to say how important I think it is to get this funding
in a timely manner.
Because if we do not, it is not going to be there when we
go to ask for it. This program in the budget has been cut
substantially, it has been recommended for cuts. The way things
are moving around here pretty quickly that if we don't get this
money either redirected, the money that's there released and
then for next year that no matter how much we fix it and no
matter how many private partners we may have, we are not going
to have the funding to carry this out.
I think it will be a real step backwards for the security
of our nation. I just want to be on the record saying that. Our
whole side, according, Mr. Chairman, to our Ranking Member,
Senator Levin, is very concerned about this. I wanted to
express this at this hearing and commit these for the record.
Thank you.
Senator Roberts. We had a good conversation yesterday with
Senator Levin on the Senate floor, and his position is
precisely that as described by the distinguished Senator.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The GAO identified
duplication of effort between the Nuclear Cities Initiative and
the Initiative for Proliferation and Prevention. In the nuclear
cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, whatever, and----
Senator Roberts. They have an allergy pill for that if you
want to take it. [Laughter].
Senator Allard. Apparently there's some other programs and
you've reported those, Ms. Jones. Did GAO examine any of these
programs for duplication and the possibility of consulting
them? I think one of them that comes to light is the State
Department's International Science and Technology Center
Program.
Ms. Jones. We have recently looked at that ISTC program,
Senator Allard, but just from the standpoint of looking at the
process that the program uses to select projects and also the
process that the program uses to oversee how the science
centers are functioning. So we did not look at it from the
standpoint of duplication with IPP or NCI.
Senator Allard. Does that possibility exist?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir, it does. Certainly they're going at
the same kind of bottom line goal which is to keep weapon
scientists, also scientists that work on chemical and
biological projects working. They do it from a different
standpoint. They basically look at contract research. They're
not looking for sustainable jobs in the same way that the IPP
program is looking.
But, again, we certainly could look at that to see if there
is potential duplication and a way to consolidate all of those
kinds of nonproliferation activities.
Senator Allard. I think that would be helpful. I hope at
some point in time that we can.
Now, on the Department of Energy's efforts, one of the
issues raised again by the GAO report, General Gordon, is
whether the department should be involved in the area of
business development. They indicated in their report that there
is some question as to how successful your business development
efforts would be.
I do believe the scientists at DOE are some of the best and
the brightest in the technical areas, but I'm not so sure about
their business acumen.
GAO has noted the successful commercial venture in Sarov
was done without U.S. Government assistance. The report noted
that the company representative believed that linking the
research and analytical skills of the Russian scientists with
western companies would be more successful in attempting to
start up new ventures.
I wonder if you would comment on the role at DOE in the
area of nonproliferation security sites and issues and what
experience does DOE have in creating business from scratch?
General Gordon. Senator, I think that the programs are
basically evolving to the way you've just suggested and
described it there.
What we're doing with the NCI program now and its proposal
for this dialysis company is helping provide the basis for
them, for the company itself to come in and be able to conduct
the work in that location. We're trying to provide basically
government agreements, some seed money that would help move in
that direction.
The whole strength, Senator, of the IPP part of the program
is exactly that. It's helping match up the technical side on
both sides with the business folks on both sides. Through IPP
we're literally putting--looking through the economic endeavors
by facilitating contact by American businesses. So their point
is well-taken and well-understood, sir.
Senator Allard. On the European Nuclear Cities Initiative,
there's a perception there that the Europeans are less willing
to get in--consider the scientist as a possibility of serious
threat. They're more focused on actual weapons themselves.
Why do we perceive scientists as a threat and many of our
European allies do not?
General Gordon. I wouldn't propose to know why they don't,
but the knowledge of how to do some of this stuff is just so
important, and I think the more we can control, the more that
we can keep this expertise, from marketing this expertise into
other channels is to our net benefit.
Senator Allard. The follow-up question, what kind of effort
has our European allies done in trying to deal with the
security of the material?
General Gordon. I would like to give you an answer for the
record on that, Senator. I don't have one. I don't have an
answer on the top of my head. Let me give you a for-the-record
answer.
[The information referred to follows:]
Department of Energy,
National Nuclear Security Administration,
Washington, DC, May 18, 2001.
The Hon. Wayne Allard,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Allard: It was a pleasure to testify before the Senate
Armed Services Committee's Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee Hearing on May 15, 2001. At that time, I took a question
that you posed ``for the record.'' I would like to provide you with the
following information concerning the level of support our European
allies have provided in securing Russian nuclear material.
Although the U.S. has provided the majority of assistance to Russia
in securing nuclear material, our European allies have made several key
contributions.
European Union (EU) organizations such as the Joint
Research Center (JRC) and the Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO)
have worked jointly with the Russian Federation (RF) in the
areas of training, analytical capabilities, and reference
materials.
Germany and the United Kingdom have provided Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) assistance at Mayak
facilities such as the Isotope Production Reactor Plant and the
Isotope Production Plant, and at the RT-1 Fuel Reprocessing
Plant. These efforts have been conducted with the knowledge of
the U.S. MPC&A team but totally independent of U.S. funded
MPC&A activities.
The JRC is supporting the establishment of a model
plutonium storage facility laboratory at the All Russian
Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF)
located in Snezhinsk for the purpose of developing the
instrumentation that would be used in such a facility.
European Safeguards Directorate (ESD) has purchased
over $1M of MPC&A equipment for Gosatomnadzor (GAN) to use at
power reactors and fuel fabrication facilities. This includes
tamper indicating devices (TID) and video surveillance systems
which are used by GAN for all Russian nuclear facilities.
The German firm, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen and
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), provided consulting services and
equipment to improve the site perimeter and building security
systems at Bochvar Institute.
Kurchatov Institute in Moscow has worked with the
German government on physical protection upgrades.
The Murmansk Shipping Company in Murmansk is working
with the British and Norwegian governments on physical
protection upgrades and has cooperated with the Swedish
government on a material accounting system.
If you should have any additional questions please feel free to
contact me or have your staff contact Ms. Laurie Harrison at (202) 586-
7369.
Sincerely,
John Gordon.
Senator Allard. General Gordon, would you talk a little bit
about your new guidelines and measurements? GAO noted it took 2
years to develop and implement the new procedures for the
Nuclear Cities Initiative. I guess the question that comes up
is why did you take that long or why was that length of time
required?
Also DOE, and apparently you've concurred with the
recommendations of the report, but how long will it take to
implement those recommendations?
General Gordon. I expect to move pretty quickly on those.
For example, the concept--I don't know the question to the
answer why it took so long, I really don't. But, for example,
the issue about the recommendation, we have a better program
review and acceptance procedure that involved a multiple
process of making sure, for example, economic viability. We
have, in fact, already begun to implement that.
The same individual that developed those procedures for the
IPP program is implementing them now on the Nuclear Cities
Initiative. So we're not letting any grass grow under our feet
on these initiatives, sir.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. General Gordon, there is a great deal of
support in Congress for the project that we were just talking
about, the dialysis project; there is a great deal of support
for additional funds.
Senator Landrieu just spoke about that, and I believe that
the request is around $3 to $4 million. I think, if I am
accurate, that the suggestion has been made that at least some
of that money could be transferred from the IPP program.
But it is my understanding that, I know the IPP program has
specific criteria that perhaps--that this program could not
meet or at least that is my understanding of it.
Can you agree, this is sort of a crossroads project here?
Can you tell me what specifically that money would be used for
in regards to this project? Or maybe you would like to get back
to me on that?
General Gordon. I could either give you an answer for the
record or ask Mr. Baker to comment.
Senator Roberts. If you could comment and then do both.
Senator Levin is very supportive of this. I am supportive of
it. I think with the budget numbers and the request we have, it
is important that we know what that would be used for.
General Gordon. Let me say at the outset that our
understanding is exactly that, that there's about $4 or $4\1/2\
million as the total amount. There is an initial thought that
about $3 million of that could come from IPP. But the
requirements and limitations on that funding make it, in fact,
not available. Mr. Baker.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH BAKER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Baker. I'm Kenneth Baker, Acting Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Sir, we tried to work
this out when Secretary Richardson was still the Secretary of
Energy at that time. To finish the Kidney Dialysis Project, it
would cost us $4\1/2\ million. We did not have that money in
the NCI program.
A decision was made by the past Director of
Nonproliferation and National Security to use $1\1/2\ million
of NCI money, which we had; and $3 million of IPP money to push
this over the goal line to get this Fresenius project done and
put it in the Technical Park.
We found out after I looked at this when I took over Acting
Director that there were rules and regulations for IPP that we
could not meet while trying to use IPP money.
The first one is the benefit to American firms. The $5-$6
million that was provided to Livermore, who was the project
manager on this particular project, could not be spent until
certain IPP project requirements were met.
The $3 million would push it over, but right now we're
trying to work out how IPP can finish this off. That was the
problem, sir.
Senator Roberts. You have defined the problem, but you have
not told me what you are going to spend it on specifically.
Mr. Baker. The money is for seed money, seed money to go
put Fresenius into the Technical Park to get it going, to get
it up and running. This was the money that was promised for the
seed money, and they would take it over completely after that.
That's what the money was used for, to get ground money to get
them going in the Technical Park.
Ms. Jones. Mr. Chairman, if I could raise a question on
that or add a point.
Senator Roberts. Yes, please.
Ms. Jones. During the course of our work, the NCI program
has provided $1.5 million for this project already. During the
course of our work, we were told that it had only been spent
several hundred thousand dollars. So seed money has already
been provided to this project. So it's a little unclear what
the additional $3 million would be for, based on the work that
we've done.
Senator Roberts. It's very important, and I am going to
have a comment a little bit later as I get to the second sheet
here of the GAO report where 70 percent of the NCI fund is
spent in the United States, 30 percent spent in Russia. It may
not be a proper question or maybe I do not understand it
correctly, but if it were $3 million and we still have that
ratio, we were not there yet for the seed money. There aren't
going to be that many seeds.
General Gordon. I think the intent is to spend nearly all
or all of it there, sir.
Senator Roberts. So that $3 to $4 million would be spent
entirely by the seed money or for the seed money to score the
touchdown or----
General Gordon. It's my understanding.
Senator Roberts. There are a lot of us who feel this is
very important, and I do not want this to--I understand the IPP
criteria, but I also understand that--we need to know exactly
what this money is going for. I appreciate the term seed money,
but I wonder what that means.
General Gordon. It includes getting the facility up and
running, getting the water supply up and running, the power
source that would make it go. It's establishing that core
infrastructure.
Senator Roberts. I am an event-oriented guy. If you can
spell that out to me like, ``OK, Roberts, I am going to turn
the water on.'' That makes sense. If you say seed money, who
knows how many grants we have running around on seed money. All
right, enough of that.
General Gordon. Water, electricity, doors, walls.
Senator Roberts. That makes sense.
I have to ask, OK, you know what's coming. If there was a
boy named Sue, we have a girl named Gary. I should not do this,
I apologize. Do you want to make any comment about that?
Ms. Jones. All I can say is I can give you my mother's
phone number. She liked the name and I was the first. I have
three brothers. I'm the only girl.
Senator Roberts. Bless your heart. I apologize for that. I
will catch heck for that from staff.
Ms. Jones. No problem, Senator. I've been getting the
question all my life.
Senator Roberts. My name is Pat Roberts, my first name is
Charles, and you can call me Chuck if it bothers you.
OK. Let me ask a couple of questions in regards to your
work. Your review found that the department is installing
systems that reduce the risk of theft in Russia. Can you give
me any comments for the basis of your findings?
Ms. Jones. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Our findings were based on
reviews conducted by a DOE technical survey team as well as
visits to nine sites in Russia. The technical survey team is a
group of experts that DOE has put together to look at these
projects and how they were installed to make sure they were
following the criteria that DOE has set out for success.
During the course of our review, we looked at the reports
they did on 30 sites. This technical survey team found that 22
had been installed correctly and reduced the risk of theft.
Also we saw a lot of things on the site visits we did to
nine different sites. We saw such things as video cameras being
installed. We saw hardend doors and locks, things that hadn't
been used before. We felt it was comfortable for us to draw the
conclusion that what DOE was doing was reducing the risk of
threat to nuclear material.
Senator Roberts. I don't want to speak for every member of
the subcommittee, but I think in terms of priorities we were
very insistent that that would be one of the priority goals. So
I am very pleased at your observation.
I asked General Gordon about the Russian view. Of course it
depends on the Russian, I suppose, that is there today. The
posthumous period. But their view of the NCI program, in your
view, what did they like and what did they not like about it?
It is a cooperative program.
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir, the officials that we talked to, and
we talked with MinAtom officials, we talked to officials in
Sarov both at the weapons institute as well as the open
computing center and the deputy mayor of the city. These
officials provided a consistent view when it came to the fact
that they're serious about downsizing the weapons complex. They
also believe there is a role for the U.S. Government to help
them do that.
The MinAtom officials we talked to were very disappointed
and dissatisfied with the level of assistance they were getting
under the program. They also believed it did have limited
success in terms of the numbers of sustainable jobs that had
been provided.
They also felt that lack of success was increasing the
skepticism that others in Russia had that this program was
really just there to get the U.S. in the door to get
information on their weapon activities.
Officials in Sarov were very grateful for the program, but
they were also a little dissatisfied with how it had been
implemented. They expressed some displeasure with the European
bank project because they felt that the funds that had been
given out through loans under the bank really weren't focused
on jobs for the weapons scientists. They were small loans. They
weren't starting new businesses, they were really focused on
the retail establishments. So they didn't really feel that was
getting at the goal of employing weapon scientists.
Senator Roberts. When, in fact, if I can read my writing
when I was taking notes in regards to your summary here, that
was in fact the primary goal with regards to weapon scientists.
There may be other programs that are social and economic in
nature that would improve the environment of a community, but
basically the goal was in regards to the weapon scientists; is
that not correct?
Ms. Jones. That's correct. While the community development
projects are, on their face, good projects, they really didn't
contribute to getting jobs for the weapons scientists.
Senator Roberts. You talked to a lot of industry officials
in regards to your study. Give me a take on their attitude
about any impediments that they found in regards to commercial
investment in the nuclear cities. I am not talking about the
NCI program or the IPP program, but their investment.
Ms. Jones. Sure. The industry officials we talked to really
painted a very cautious picture about investing in Russia as a
whole, in particular the nuclear cities. They told us that
Russia really doesn't present a business-friendly environment
because it lacks a market economy.
Also its legal, financial, and banking systems provide for
an uncertain investment climate as well as the uncertainty in
terms of political stability.
When looking at the nuclear cities, they found that the
weapons scientists didn't really have a good business sense or
marketing backgrounds. Of course, the point that all of us have
been making about access to the cities is very limited. So
those were the negative aspects.
From a positive standpoint, they felt that they were very
optimistic about a very talented pool of scientists,
mathematicians, and engineers that they could tap in the future
for their business ventures.
The point that they tried to make to us is that industry
must play to the strengths of the weapons scientists in trying
to develop commercial opportunities in Russia.
Senator Roberts. Let me get to a question that we have been
mulling over for some time now. The NCI program and IPP
program. You mentioned in your conclusion that perhaps they
should be consolidated. Are these programs sufficiently
different to warrant their continued separation, or I could put
it the other way. Are they different to the extent the
consolidation is not the way we want to go? What's your take on
that?
Ms. Jones. I appreciate the fact that General Gordon said
DOE is going to consider and look at consolidating these two
programs. What we saw is they have the same basic underlying
goal of trying to create jobs for weapons scientists.
We also saw that there are so many things happening in
parallel. For example, they both have very similar review
procedures. IPP had very much started to tap industry to help
them figure out what commercial projects are working. NCI is
just now starting to do that. So they could be working together
on a lot of these avenues that they haven't been in the past.
Also, we found that there were some similar projects,
projects started in IPP and ended up in NCI. Projects were
proposed to be funded by both programs, so we thought it would
make more sense to consolidate the two, have some flexibility
to cover the kinds of things that the NCI program has been
focusing on that might be different from IPP, such as business
development, education for scientists. That might become a more
efficient program as a whole.
Senator Roberts. You touched on the status of the European
Nuclear Cities Initiative and a European consortium. I think
you said 15 nations; is that correct?
Ms. Jones. Yes, it's actually the European Union. The
European Commission is the arm of the Union that provides this
kind of money.
Senator Roberts. So it is a commission out of the European
Union not a consortium?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. OK, my mistake. It is 15 nations?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. The EU is into every other thing, they
might as well be into this. Pardon my editorial comment.
You also indicated that it was Italy that was taking the
lead, and that they are making more efforts to cooperate vis-a-
vis Russia; is that correct?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Roberts. I asked you the question, as I recall,
why? You indicated that they wanted to tap the resources of
these scientists to be a specific help as opposed to a more
generic kind of program. Am I on line there with what you told
us?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir. In our conversations with the
Italians, they're interested in focusing the efforts with the
Russians on things like energy efficiency and cleanup of
nuclear waste. They felt they would, rather than try to create
sustainable businesses, contract with weapons scientists and
use their expertise to help develop technologies and different
things in those two arenas.
Senator Roberts. Within the European Union?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Does that make sense to you?
Ms. Jones. I think it does. I think what they're trying to
do is say that we in the European Union, we in Italy have a
need for some help in trying to develop technologies for
cleanup, for energy efficiency. You have scientists that have
backgrounds, mathematicians, engineers, and they want to tap
that expertise in this particular arena.
Senator Roberts. Interesting--I will get myself in trouble
if I say that our programs tend to be somewhat patronizing. But
it seems to me that maybe they are on to something here in
terms of the approach. You get immediate employment, you are
making a difference with exactly the kinds of things that you
have expertise with. I am not trying to make a judgment here.
Staff, don't go nuts now in terms of what is going on.
Have they dedicated any funds to this? Where are they with
this?
Ms. Jones. This is really just a proposal that's in the
discussion stage right now. We're told they would like to come
up with $50 million to spend over the next few years, but it's
really just a proposal at this point, Senator.
Senator Roberts. They'd better fund ESDI first if they
think they can do that, with all due respect.
Seventy percent of NCI funds spent in the United States, 30
percent spent in Russia as of December 2000. The majority of
U.S. expenditures by national labs, three-fourths of lab
expenditures for salaries and overhead, Russian officials very
dissatisfied with the split of funding. I certainly would be as
well.
The DOE was directed by the energy appropriations folks to
fund 51 percent. You want to comment on that? More especially
with the example the Savannah River Site, and they move their
overhead costs from 37 percent to 11 percent.
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Can't we get 70 percent of the funds? I
wrote down here somebody said Russia thinks the United States
has set up the program and is stealing the money. That is a
little harsh, to say the least. We have to do better than this.
Ms. Jones. During the course of our work in talking with
the Savannah River Site officials about the program, they had
changed their overhead fee from, as you said, 37 percent down
to 11 percent.
So we were hopeful that the Savannah River Site approach
might be a model for the rest of the sites in the program. I
know in talking with General Gordon about this, he's talking
about his commitment to looking at this program from a
management overview, and I would hope that the overhead would
be something that they would be looking at.
Senator Roberts. We had some discussion in regards to
overhead costs. I am not going to take up the subcommittee's
time to get into that to the extent that I wanted to, but I
still need to be educated. We are going to be back in touch
with you to see. I think you had, what, 27 projects?
Ms. Jones. 25, 26, yes, that ballpark.
Senator Roberts. Then I was asking questions about what do
those overhead costs entail? Then we got into that to some
degree, but I am very concerned about that, and I think the
subcommittee is as well.
We were going to try to have the NCI project target
approximately 30,000 to 50,000 people over there; is that
correct?
Ms. Jones. What the Russians are saying is that they need
to find jobs for weapons scientists. 30,000 to 50,000 jobs over
the next several years. That's what they're looking for. Not
necessarily that the U.S. has to find that number of jobs.
Senator Roberts. Let me tell you what we hit during
conference in regards to last year when we had the request for
additional funds and to do a better job. It was tossed right
back that the projects were employing about 374 people.
Well, 400 people out of 40,000 doesn't quite cut it. In
regards to any kind of progress. I am not trying to perjure
this program, I am just saying what I have in terms of that our
funding discussion. We had what I would call meaningful
dialogue.
In addition, they said that scientists still receive
salaries from the institute while working on NCI-related
activities, and you have that in your summary. One half of the
projects are not designed to create jobs.
Now, some of these things in terms of a drug program, child
care program, environmental programs certainly could be
justified as to their own worth. But that was not the goal or
the original goal, as I understand it, with regards to
employment of the weapons scientists; is that correct?
Ms. Jones. That's correct. Our point, Senator, is when you
have limited funds, are these the types of activities you want
to focus on to try to get these jobs?
Senator Roberts. You gave the example of a private company,
after a considerable number of years, was able to or is able
right now to pay 100 of the weapon scientists approximately
three times the pay that they would receive under NCI/IPP. They
are involved in software development. Could you amplify on
that?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir. This is a company where one of the
officials of the company did have some ties to Russian
officials, and they worked through those ties to get into
Sarov. They now are employing 100 individuals who were former
employees of the weapons institute in Sarov.
As you said, these individuals are making three times the
salary, and they have cut their ties with the institute, unlike
some of the NCI projects where they're still part time.
So it did take them 7 years to do it.
Senator Roberts. But it is successful?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. You visited that office or that building?
Ms. Jones. Yes, we did. That's actually in the same
building as the open computing center which is one of the NCI
projects. They're on different floors. We were given a tour and
talked with some of the scientists. They seemed all very busy
and interested in what they were doing.
Senator Roberts. Was this the program where you indicated
there was an age difference in regards to the weapons
scientists, or am I suffering my standard memory lapse?
Ms. Jones. I think we raised that issue in regards to the
European program that they are going to be targeting older
weapons scientists. They felt that some of the younger
scientists might have more flexibility in terms of future
careers.
Senator Roberts. What was the difference, if any? You say
that the private company is on floor ``X'' and the NCI project
is on floor ``Y''; is that correct?
Ms. Jones. That's correct.
Senator Roberts. You visited both?
Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Describe what was going on.
Ms. Jones. Our experience at the open computing center was
that mainly the scientists followed our team around. There
didn't seem to be a lot going on versus when we were in the
commercial space, the scientists were all sitting at their
computers working away. That was our observation during the
visit.
Senator Roberts. You had one floor where they are working
away not paying any attention to you, with all due respect,
then the other looking at the friendly tap on the shoulder
judge, if you will, and obviously they were showing you around.
Again, I am not trying to perjure this. I found the same
thing with the ISTC program that I had the opportunity to visit
and always make that mistake of thinking it was an NCI project,
which it wasn't. They were very happy to take you all around
and explain why it was not working and why they needed more
money. Why it really wasn't cogent to that.
I appreciate that very much. Are other companies into this?
Is this a growing kind of program here where private and
international companies are able to do this?
Ms. Jones. I think the NCI program is facilitating some of
those companies coming into the closed cities.
Senator Roberts. They are a catalyst then?
Ms. Jones. They are a catalyst. They are a facilitator,
absolutely.
Senator Roberts. OK, good.
I have no further questions. I appreciate your patience and
thank you for responding.
General Gordon and Ms. Jones, do you have any final
comments you think that might be helpful?
General Gordon. We had a good discussion, Senator. You know
where we're trying to take this organization, where we're
trying to take these programs. We're in broad accord with the
recommendations that are being made by GAO, and we're going to
head down those directions.
Senator Roberts. Tell the folks downtown we need their
review at double time. Well, no, just put quick time. We won't
go double time.
Ms. Jones, any final comments? Thank you for the job that
you have done.
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate it. No final
comments.
Senator Roberts. We will now proceed to the closed session.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Santorum follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum
Chairman Roberts, thank you for scheduling this important
subcommittee hearing today. I know that the U.S. Department of Energy's
nonproliferation programs have been a key concern of yours. Your focus
on the U.S. government's ``return on investment'' has been particularly
helpful for Members of this subcommittee.
I believe Members of the subcommittee would agree that Department
of Energy nonproliferation programs such as the Nuclear Cities
Initiative (NCI) and Material Protection, Control and Accounting
(MPC&A) program are well-intended and are consistent with U.S. national
security objectives. That being said, there are legitimate concerns
that have been highlighted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
on the performance of these and other nonproliferation programs. I am
hopeful that today's witnesses will be able to discuss the GAO's
conclusions and will be able to explore ways to improve on program
performance.
With respect to where NCI funds are expended, GAO's data portray a
phenomenon that deserves further scrutiny and attention. I am concerned
with GAO's conclusion that 70 percent of NCI program funds are spent in
the U.S., rather than inside Russia. The GAO's observation that the
Department of Energy's inability to obtain access to sensitive sites in
Russia is constraining the MPC&A program also bears attention. Lastly,
I am concerned with GAO's observation that the Department of Energy
does not yet have the means to monitor the security systems it is
installing to ensure that they are operating properly over the long-
term.
Again, I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and to
a candid exchange on some of the conclusions reached by the GAO.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
1. Senator Roberts. General Gordon, the GAO report said that DOE is
attempting to help Russia consolidate their nuclear material into fewer
buildings and convert the material into forms that cannot be used in
weapons. By consolidating the material, DOE may end up spending less
money to install new security systems. However, MinAtom has yet to tell
DOE which sites and which buildings would be consolidated.
What is the status of DOE's efforts to get MinAtom to identify
which sites and buildings will be consolidated under the program?
General Gordon. The NNSA's Civilian and Conversion Division, which
includes the Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) Project, has
already successfully closed 21 buildings and significantly reduced the
proliferation risk associated with more than 2 metric tons of very
attractive high-enriched uranium (HEU) by converting it to low-enriched
uranium (LEU). In addition, MinAtom has proposed an aggressive plan or
``roadmap'', which calls for the closure of 60 more buildings and the
conversion of an additional 27 metric tons of HEU over the next 10
years. According to MinAtom, specific details such as the name and
location of the buildings planned for closure will be shared with the
U.S. as soon as DOE and MinAtom are engaged in negotiations on a
bilateral MCC agreement, which would provide an appropriate ``legal
framework'' for the exchange of such sensitive information. For the
last 6 months the U.S. has refused to begin negotiation of a bilateral
agreement because of Russian/Iranian nuclear cooperation. DOE is
prepared to table a draft agreement, as soon as it receives interagency
approval to proceed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
NUCLEAR CITIES
2. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, my understanding of the
fundamental difference between IPP and NCI programs, other than the
number of sites and facilities where the programs are engaged, is that
IPP directly funds work for the scientists in the closed cities and
institutes but NCI is designed to bring economic development.
Is this understanding correct?
General Gordon. NCI is designed to reduce the size of the weapons
complex in the Russian nuclear cities. Economic diversification and
development is a tool to achieve this goal. NCI removes functions and
equipment from the weapons sites within the closed cities; reduces the
physical footprint; and seeks to create sustainable, alternative non-
weapons work outside of the nuclear institutes and within a functioning
city economy.
IPP, on the other hand, is a ``brain drain'' program that engages
former Soviet weapon scientists at institutes across the New
Independent States (NIS)--in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well
as in Russia--in applied research projects having high commercial
potential. The scientists comprise former biological and chemical
weapons researchers and missile development experts in addition to
nuclear scientists.
3. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the GAO has recommended
combining IPP and NCI. How could these programs be combined and still
preserve the unique aspects of each?
General Gordon. The GAO recommended that the NNSA Administrator
``determine whether the two programs should be consolidated into one
effort--including a determination of what changes in authorizing
legislation would be necessary--with a view toward achieving potential
cost savings and other programmatic and administrative efficiencies.''
NNSA is still in the process of making its determination and we will
provide more information as it is available.
4. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the NCI program has an
agreement governing how the Russian government treats programmatic
funds for tax and other purposes, the IPP program does not. As a result
it works through the State Department sponsored International Science
and Technology Center (ISTC) or under the NCI agreement.
How important is this agreement to future efforts, given Congress'
concern about not having programmatic funds taxed?
General Gordon. We believe the NCI Government-to-Government
Agreement is very important. It provides tax and liability protection,
and the structure under which program activities can proceed. Such
agreements are very difficult to negotiate and generally take at least
a year, and often more, to achieve. In any reorganization involving IPP
and NCI, it is important to protect the NCI Agreement, if possible.
5. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, there has been criticism of
the NCI program since its inception, nevertheless it does not seem to
me to be in our best interest to walk away from the Russian nuclear
cities.
Do you agree that it is in our national security interests to
continue to work with these cities?
General Gordon. NCI was conceived as a national security program
whose aim is to bring the Russian weapons complex more in line with
post-Cold War realities, thereby advancing our own security. The
Russian weapons complex is vastly oversized, decrepit, and starving for
resources on the one hand, and dangerously capable of performing its
core functions on the other. We continue to have a strong
nonproliferation interest in maintaining our engagement with these
cities.
6. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, would you look at the broader
objectives of this program and work to develop a program with the focus
and flexibility to meet broad objectives?
General Gordon. We agree with the approach. We are currently
considering how to best preserve the broad objectives of NCI as we look
at the best way to organize this program in the future.
7. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, when Russia announced that it
wanted help to reduce the size of its nuclear weapons complex, and shut
down two of its four weapons assembly and disassembly facilities, this
was viewed as good news. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy,
MinAtom, took a bold step when it made this announcement. The
understanding was that if NNSA is successful in helping to shut down
the facility at Avangard then it will proceed with work to shut down
the second facility, at Penza-19. The fiscal year 2002 budget request
for NCI is $6 million. This level of funding jeopardizes the shutdown
of Avangard and will prevent the accelerated shutdown of Penza-19.
Because DOE has only one similar facility, the imbalance between U.S.
and Russian capabilities has been a concern for many years.
Does it make sense to miss this unique opportunity and long
standing U.S. goal to reduce Russian nuclear weapons manufacturing
capacity?
General Gordon. The NCI program continues to work with the MinAtom
in order to encourage and facilitate the closure of its nuclear weapons
assembly facilities. In order to take maximum advantage of the unique
opportunities created by NCI's cooperative relationship with MinAtom,
and to most effectively utilize the program's funds, NCI will focus its
efforts primarily on facilitating the accelerated closure of Avangard,
which is the best candidate facility among the four Russian nuclear
weapons assembly facilities for accelerated closure.
8. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, if the NCI and IPP programs
were combined, how would the statutory provisions that govern each
program have to modified?
General Gordon. As part of our response to the GAO recommendation
to consider merging the programs, we are currently researching this
question, which involves legal and technical issues. We will provide
the answer as soon as it is available.
At first glance, however, they could be combined without
significant statutory modifications. IPP's statutory limit on funding
to the National Laboratories (35 percent) is both workable and
consistent with DOE/NNSA's efforts to maximize the nonproliferation
impact of program funds. IPP's legislation appears sufficiently broad
to permit such additional activities as infrastructure support. There
are requirements for projects funded under NCI that are not now part of
IPP (e.g., the requirement to commercialize within 3 years). NCI also
does not require the same matching requirements from industry as IPP
does.
THE LABORATORIES AND THE NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
9. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, it appears to me that there is
much confusion, and therefore criticism, about the role of the DOE and
NNSA laboratories in the nonproliferation programs including IPP and
NCI.
What is the role of the labs in these programs and why are they
important?
General Gordon. The primary role of the labs in IPP is to ensure
that the technical claims made by NIS institutes have merit and that,
in the case of commercialization, the engineering transition from R&D
to commercial production follows high and verifiable standards of
excellence. The labs provide technical oversight for and conduct joint
research with the Russian scientists who participate in IPP projects.
In so doing, the labs greatly reduce the technical risks of doing
business with NIS institutes. In addition, the labs play a key role in
helping to ensure that funds intended for a bona fide commercial
project are not diverted from their intended use. The laboratories also
have key roles in the project development process, including technical
evaluations of project proposals, validation of the weapons-research
credentials of Russian scientists, and identification of potential
dual-use problems. The laboratories also provide the legal connection
with the U.S. private sector, through their cooperative agreement
mechanisms, which allocate intellectual property from IPP projects that
are commercialized by U.S. industry participants. These expanded non-
scientific roles were important in getting the programs under way at a
time when only the labs had access to the NIS institutes. These
nonscientific roles are gradually transitioning to DOE/NNSA and the
U.S. companies involved in commercialization.
Laboratory involvement was also essential to the start-up of NCI,
but it is business investment and economic diversification that are the
long-term drivers. The laboratories have been significantly involved at
the outset of many of NCI's efforts, but their role will diminish over
time as business participation increases.
10. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, what do the seven Federal
employees do who manage the NCI program?
General Gordon. Up until June 4, 2001, NCI had only four Federal
employees. Currently we have five. These employees are: the Director
and Deputy Director; a Federal staff member who serves as the desk
officer for Sarov and who manages NCI contracts; a Federal staff member
who serves as the Zhelezoogorsk desk officer and manages the project
review process; and a new Federal staff member who is responsible for
generating outside sources of finding for NCI projects.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
11. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the NNSA research and
development program has been effectively reduced $50 million in the
fiscal year 2002 budget request from the 2001 appropriated level of
$225 million. This is a very large cut and significantly undermines
NNSA efforts to address proliferation and detection.
Can you please describe what programs are not being funded and what
you would do if you had the funding restored or increased?
General Gordon. As noted in the President's budget request, let me
briefly describe the fiscal year 2002 level of funding for the R&D
program. The proliferation detection and deterrence program was
decreased by a total of $36 million. As a result, in proliferation
detection, the remote effluent detection area's hyperspectral
activities and much of the lidar activities will be terminated. In
deterring proliferation, the reduction will slow the development of new
radiation detection materials and nuclear materials analysis
techniques. Chemical and biological national security will decrease by
$12 million. As a result, the milestones will be stretched out for
technology development initiatives involving the development of new
chemical and biological detectors, biological foundations
understanding, modeling of interior structures, and transfer of
decontamination. The decrease will also slow a demonstration project.
The nuclear explosion monitoring program will decrease by $5 million.
This decrease will defer work such as regional seismic characterization
and support to the Air Force Technical Applications Center's advanced
regional monitoring system.
If the funds were available at the fiscal year 2001 appropriation
level, we would return to the previously described R&D program and
development schedule.
If funds were available above the fiscal year 2001 appropriation
level, we would anticipate: funding more new sensor concepts for
detecting proliferation; expanding our research into detecting shielded
fissile materials and detecting fissile materials at greater standoff
ranges; expanding our regional seismic characterization and calibration
program to match the Air Force Technical Applications Center's
accelerated seismic station installation schedule; and making more
rapid progress in characterizing a larger number of biological agent
signatures.
12. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the research and development
program supports the U.S. effort to address the single greatest threat
to U.S. national security interests?
General Gordon. The R&D program is very important to providing the
technical underpinning that supports government efforts addressing
worldwide threats to national security interests. In fact, our focus on
long-range R&D provides operational organizations with innovative
systems and technologies to satisfy their nonproliferation mission
responsibilities.
13. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, will any other agency have
the ability to pick up the shortfall?
General Gordon. Since other agency programs have already defined
and submitted their fiscal year 2002 budgets, it will be difficult for
another agency to incorporate work we are deferring, particularly
because other agencies' priorities are nearer-term and NNSA's focus is
longer-term R&D.
14. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, is the NNSA research effort
closely coordinated within DOE and with other Federal agencies?
General Gordon. The R&D program is coordinated within the DOE and
with other Federal agencies. The R&D program is captured in the
overall, integrated DOE National Security R&D Portfolio, and in fact
closely leverages DOE investments in Defense Programs and the Office of
Science. Coordination with other agencies is primarily documented in
the Department of Defense/Intelligence Community/Department of Energy
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress
and through the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working
Group Report and Symposium, which is jointly chaired by the Departments
of Defense, Energy, and State.
15. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how will the funding cuts in
nonproliferation and arms control affect existing programs that advance
DOE and U.S. core capabilities in detection and monitoring of the
development of weapons of mass destruction?
General Gordon. The requested level of funding will slow the
development of new and emerging technologies for detecting and
monitoring the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly
detection of emerging proliferation programs.
16. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, what is the role of the DOE
laboratories in the national effort to develop technologies to address
proliferation risks?
General Gordon. The DOE laboratories, especially the weapons
laboratories, have unique, comprehensive understanding of nuclear
weapons development, test, and production processes and the
technologies needed to assess proliferation activities. In developing
the technologies required to address proliferation risks, we are able
to leverage current and past investments in the NNSA nuclear weapons
program.
17. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how do the efforts at the DOE
laboratories differ from the efforts sponsored by DOD or other Federal
agencies involved in this national challenge?
General Gordon. The work we sponsor at the laboratories has a
longer-term focus, enabling us to explore higher risk, revolutionary
integrated system solutions to the difficult problems associated with
proliferation, and we often assist other agencies address their most
difficult proliferation questions. Additionally, because of our
knowledge of the expertise at the laboratories, we are able to marshal
multi-disciplinary, inter-laboratory teams to address the significant
technical challenges. Other agencies tend to be driven by near-term
requirements which lead them to short-term evolutionary development
programs.
18. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, while the NSC review is
assessing the value of the existing Russian nonproliferation programs,
is there any corresponding high-level assessment of the adequacy of DOE
core competencies and fundamental technologies to detect and monitor
the development of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world?
General Gordon. There has been no NSC-level review of DOE
proliferation detection and monitoring technical capability. However,
the R&D program is reviewed annually as part of the preparation of the
annual DOD/IC/DOE Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report
to Congress. The program is also coordinated within the interagency
community as part of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology
Working Group. The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program
was reviewed by the Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory
Committee, an independent panel of external experts who found that the
DOE core competencies and fundamental technologies supported by the R&D
program underpin our Nation's capability to detect and monitor the
development of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. A copy
of the Advisory Committee's February 25, 2000 report is attached.
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY
19. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how many reactors of the
Chernobyl type are still operating, where are they, and what is NNSA
planning to do about them?
General Gordon. There are 13 RBMK (Chernobyl type) reactors still
operating. Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant has two reactors.
Eleven reactors are in Russia near her western border: four reactors at
the Leningrad nuclear power plant located about 60 miles west of St.
Petersburg, three reactors at the Smolensk nuclear power plant located
about 250 miles southwest of Moscow; and four reactors at the Kursk
nuclear power plant located about 300 miles south of Moscow.
There are also three plutonium production reactors which have a
design similar to RBMK type reactors. They are located in Siberia, with
two at Seversk and one at Zheleznogorsk. These reactors are even older
and the least safe reactors in the entire former Soviet Union. These
three plutonium production reactors are still needed to provide heat
and electricity to the local communities until replacement power is
available in about 2005-2007. The administration is considering the
possibility of implementing projects to improve near-term safety at the
plutonium production reactors until replacement fossil power becomes
available.
Previously, the program has provided safety improvements in the
areas of safety equipment upgrades, safety analysis, fire safety, and
operational safety. For example: a safety parameter display system was
completed at Kursk unit 2; an in-depth safety assessment was completed
at Leningrad unit 2; fire safety improvements were implemented at the
Smolensk plant; and at the Ignalina plant, excellent results have been
achieved in upgrading the control and protection systems, installing
safety parameter display systems, and implementing emergency
procedures.
The program plans to continue with a limited set of projects to
improve safety. Safety parameter display systems are being completed at
Leningrad units 3 and 4. A project is underway to evaluate and
mitigate pipe cracking problems due to intergranular stress corrosion
cracking. Our planned support emphasizes the area of safety assessments
in order to identify the weakest and highest risk components and
procedures. An in-depth safety assessment is in progress at Leningrad
unit 1, and a review of the Kursk unit 1 safety analysis is planned. At
the Ignalina plant, we are providing limited technical assistance to
complete a safety analysis for unit 2.
20. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the funds for these programs
have been substantially reduced. What is the impact of the funding
cuts?
General Gordon. The reduced budget means that the program must
reorient toward fewer and smaller safety projects, and more limited
interactions between U.S. and Russian nuclear experts. As a result, the
program will have less impact on the safety of the RBMK plants than
otherwise would have been the case. These funding levels cannot support
implementing specific upgrades at all 13 operating RBMK reactors.
Therefore, the program will complete more general safety culture
upgrades such as improving quality control procedures, emergency
operating instructions, and configuration management systems in order
to have the widest possible impact on safety throughout the country.
In Russia, support for safety analyses will be limited, and no
support will be available for safe shutdown evaluations or fire safety
improvements (although they have been identified by international
experts as key areas of concern). In Lithuania, we will not be able to
fund any new safety projects, nor to provide any support for
decommissioning.
Besides the 13 RBMK reactors and the three plutonium production
reactors, there are 54 VVER type Soviet-designed reactors operating in
Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Many of these reactors need help to improve their safety systems,
safety procedures, and safety analyses. We plan to provide very limited
support to the Russian and Ukrainian reactors, but we will be unable to
provide support to those in Bulgaria and other countries.
We feel the program may need to serve an increasingly important
role, considering that Russia plans to continue to operate its older
reactors, including the RBMKs. In addition, with nuclear power as a key
part of our national energy plan, it is important to minimize the risk
of nuclear accidents abroad, as they would adversely impact the
prospects for nuclear power in the United States. We hope that despite
a smaller program with fewer nuclear safety projects, we will be able
to continue to have a meaningful impact on Russia's ability to improve
its nuclear safety and infrastructure.
AVANGARD
21. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how do we know that the
Russians are really closing the Avangard plant? We have heard that the
plant workers are demanding that it not be closed.
General Gordon. It is not surprising that the plant workers do not
wish the plant to be closed. Warhead production is what they know best
and, like people everywhere, many of them wish to go on doing what is
familiar to them. However, the Russian officials have reiterated in a
number of public settings and private meetings their desire to close
Avangard, a desire that makes sense in the light of post-Cold War
realities. NCI worked directly with Avangard to reduce 10 percent of
the facility by moving the security fence line. Such cooperation
suggests that the Russians are serious about their plan to close
Avangard.
22. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, will we have any transparency
into this process?
General Gordon. The best assurance of transparency is the continued
involvement of the NCI program in Avangard's transformation. NCI
officials and their laboratory contractors were the first Westerners to
enter the Avangard facility. If NCI moves forward with its plans to
develop businesses in the Avangard technopark, this will also help
ensure both the transparency and irreversibility of the closure
process. The NCI approach to Avangard is to convert more and more of
the site for commercial ventures that provide alternative employment to
weapons scientists. The site floor space has already been reduced by 10
percent and we hope to keep reducing it by steady increments.
23. Senator Landrieu. How will we know that they are not continuing
nuclear warhead work? How do we know that the Avangard plant is not
being used for a build-up in new tactical nuclear weapons?
General Gordon. The Avangard plant is the oldest of the four
Soviet-era nuclear plants; it has been in operation the longest, and
its physical plant is the oldest, which is why MinAtom has selected it
for early shut-down. From a manufacturing point of view, Russia would
have to undertake a massive retooling and re-equipping of the plant to
make new warhead production possible. In essence, they would have to
build a wholly new production line, which likely would be observable
through alternative technical means.
At the same time, accelerating the decommissioning of the existing
warhead production lines will remove Avangard permanently from nuclear
operations. Restarting warhead work at a ``clean'' plant would be very
expensive and time-consuming, and once Avangard is decommissioned,
Russia would not be able to quickly restart operations there. Thus,
providing NCI's work not only reduces the current Russian weapons
through-put, but also makes it harder to increase the level of
production at Avangard as a result of its reduced size.
24. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, aren't the Russians
emphasizing nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the weakness of
their conventional forces?
General Gordon. A debate has been ongoing in Moscow on this very
issue, and it will probably be some time before we know its complete
and final outcome. However, we do know that President Putin has lately
made some significant decisions that point toward that outcome. Marshal
Sergeyev, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces
(SRF) and, in latter days, the Minister of Defense, had been the
proponent of a nuclear emphasis in Russian military strategy. He was
removed from his position in March, and is now serving as an advisor to
President Putin. Just a few weeks ago, General Vakovlev, the Commander-
in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, lost his job. The position was
downgraded to a commander, the job was given to an individual who is
not an expert on nuclear weapons, and the SRF was placed under the
Army. In the meantime, Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, who during
the debate has been a proponent of modernizing and strengthening
Russia's conventional forces, has seen his position strengthened. This
seems to indicate that the Russians will be emphasizing conventional
modernization, not nuclear weapons. However, I defer to the
Intelligence Community for a more authoritative and detailed response
to this question.
25. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, what happens if we don't
support efforts to shut down Avangard? If it's so bad, won't the
Russians close it anyway without us?
General Gordon. Ending nuclear activities at this plant takes a
significant amount of money and resources, both in direct and indirect
costs. Russia may, in time, be able to accomplish the job, but not by
the end of 2001, as they have said they would like to do. They have
said that they are ready to begin downsizing their nuclear weapons
complex, but that they would like our help in order to accelerate the
process. From the outset, this has been a major rationale for NCI, and
it has given us unprecedented opportunities to work inside the Russian
nuclear weapons complex. At this point, a delay or halt in U.S. funding
under the NCI would have the effect of sustaining Russia's capability
to manufacture warheads at their current rate.
FUNDING DIVERSION
26. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, is there any evidence that
funds from the DOE/NNSA nonproliferation programs have been diverted to
nuclear weapons development programs?
General Gordon. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, is there good cooperation
between the DOE programs and the intelligence community?
General Gordon. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, NNSA has been responsible for
canning the spent fuel in North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework.
Is there any evidence that this material has been diverted?
General Gordon. There is no evidence to date that indicates North
Korea has diverted any of the canned spent fuel. The canned material,
slightly under 8,000 spent fuel rods, is currently stored under water
in 412 canisters at North Korea's spent fuel storage facility in
Nyongbyon, North Korea. The canisters have been sealed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA maintains a
continuous monitoring presence at Nyongbyon, inspecting the seals on a
recurring basis. In addition, continuous coverage is provided by IAEA
surveillance cameras.
NUCLEAR CITIES
29. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, establishing a climate attractive
to western business is hard. Doing business there is more difficult
there, is even more difficult than doing business generally in Russia.
How would you recommend attracting business to these sites, as
opposed to just bringing some work to these sites?
Ms. Jones. As noted in our report, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's
Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face
Challenges (May 3, 2001, GAO-01-429), there are numerous impediments
associated with trying to start businesses in the nuclear cities. The
nuclear cities are geographically and economically isolated, access is
restricted for security reasons, and weapons scientists are not
accustomed to working for commercial businesses. As a result, western
businesses are reluctant to invest in the nuclear cities. However, the
successful collaboration of a major U.S. computer firm in the Russian
nuclear city of Sarov demonstrates what can be accomplished over time
if the skills of Russia's weapons scientists are properly matched with
the needs of business. This was the most successful commercial effort
we observed in the nuclear cities and it has been undertaken without
U.S. government assistance. This effort which began about 7 years ago
employs about 100 scientists who have cut all ties to Russia's weapons
institutes. The U.S. company representative responsible for developing
this business effort told us that the key to establishing successful
commercial ventures in the nuclear cities is to identify the skills and
capabilities of the scientists and match their skills to the company's
specific business needs. For example, the company determined which
scientists in Sarov had math and science backgrounds suitable for
computer software development. These scientists were then trained by
the company in software development and hired away from the Russian
weapons institutes. We believe that the approach followed by this U.S.
firm makes sense and could be used by other companies seeking to employ
Russian scientists. Furthermore, we believe that DOE can play an
important role in identifying the skills and capabilities of scientists
located in Russia's nuclear cities and facilitating contacts between
the scientists and U.S. companies interested in hiring them.
30. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, in your report, you suggest
combining the Nuclear Cities Initiative with the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention Program.
If this is done, what are the goals of the combined program?
Ms. Jones. As noted in our report, both programs already share a
common underlying goal--the employment of Russian weapons scientists in
alternative, nonmilitary scientific commercial activities. Scientists
who are employed in sustainable nonweapons-related jobs will be
financially able to move out of the weapons facilities which will
assist in the downsizing of Russia's weapons complex--another goal of
DOE's efforts. Russian officials we met with told us that they are
judging the success of DOE's programs by one standard--the creation of
sustainable jobs. These Russian officials have criticized those
projects, such as community development projects, that do not lead to
employment opportunities or provide sustainable jobs for weapons
scientists. We believe that DOE needs to concentrate its limited
financial resources on those projects that will most realistically lead
to sustainable employment for weapons scientists.
31. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, if NCI and IPP are combined, what
legislative changes would be needed to the language governing the IPP
program and the language governing the NCI program?
Ms. Jones. Both NCI and IPP operate under the same general
statutory authority granted to the Department of Energy in 42 U.S.C.
5817(a), 42 U.S.C. 7112(10), and 42 U.S.C. 5813(9). No changes would be
necessary to any of these statutory authorities. The authorization
acts, however, contain different requirements and restrictions on the
use of appropriated funds under each program. Section 3172 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398)
restricts the use of funds in the NCI program for the fiscal year.
Section 3136(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) restricts the use of funds for the IPP program
available in any fiscal year after fiscal year 1999. Some legislative
alternatives for combining the programs are listed below.
1. Congress could act now and
(a) define the Initiative for Proliferation Program as
including the Nuclear Cities Initiative activities.
Congress could add a definition section for IPP that
incorporates the definition of NCI and transfers NCI
2001 appropriated funds to IPP, thus creating one
program that would operate under current IPP
authorization requirements and restrictions. To do
this, Congress would also need to revoke authorizing
language that refers to NCI; or
(b) enact more specific statutory authority, under which the
combined program would operate.
2. Congress could wait and combine the programs in fiscal year 2002
authorization act.
Congress would set requirements in new authorizing
language for the combined program.
32. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, does your recommendation imply
that there should only be an IPP program with its fairly narrow focus?
Ms. Jones. We would not characterize the IPP program as having a
fairly narrow focus. The objectives of the IPP program are to (1)
engage weapons scientists and institutes in productive nonmilitary work
in the short term, and (2) create jobs for former weapons scientists in
the high-technology commercial marketplace in the long-term. As noted
in our report, IPP has funded over 100 projects in Russia's nuclear
cities at a cost of over $13 million. The program also funds other
projects at weapons institutes outside of the closed nuclear cities
throughout Russia.
We believe that combining the IPP and NCI programs could result in
a more effective and efficient consolidated effort incorporating the
best aspects of both programs. As noted in our report, both the IPP
program and the NCI program share a common underlying goal--the
employment of weapons scientists in nonmilitary work--and there is not
a clear distinction between the two programs. Combining the two
programs could alleviate many of the concerns we have with the
implementation of the NCI program. For example, the IPP program already
has established limits on the amount of program funds to be spent in
the United States and Russia as well as a strengthened project review
and selection process. We believe that any consolidated effort should
be flexible to allow for worthwhile projects initiated under the NCI
program such as business training and development activities while
concentrating on those projects that lead to sustainable employment for
weapons scientists.
33. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, the NCI program has an agreement
governing how the Russian government treats programmatic funds for tax
and other purposes, the IPP program does not. As a result, it works
through the State Department-sponsored International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) or under the NCI agreement.
How important is this agreement to future efforts given Congress'
concern about not having programmatic funds taxed?
Ms. Jones. While we believe the agreement is important, in our
opinion, DOE could explore several options to avoid program funds from
being taxed by the Russian government. For example, if the IPP and NCI
programs are combined the government-to-government agreement between
the United States and Russia for the Nuclear Cities Initiative can be
renegotiated to accommodate the combined program. In addition, the IPP
program seeks tax relief through the U.S. Civilian Research and
Development Foundation--a U.S. nonprofit organization. Under this
arrangement, IPP funds are transferred to the Foundation, which
provides tax-exempt payments directly into the Russian project
participants' bank accounts. DOE could explore whether this approach
could also be used for all projects initiated under a program that
consolidates the IPP and NCI programs.
[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEMILITARIZATION,
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m. in room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mary L.
Landrieu (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Roberts,
Allard, and Hutchinson.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine,
general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV,
professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional
staff member; and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen and Michele A.
Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator
Byrd; Jason Matthews, assistant to Senator Landrieu; George M.
Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr.,
assistant to Senator Hutchinson; and Wayne Glass, assistant to
Senator Bingaman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN
Senator Landrieu. Good afternoon and let me welcome all of
you to our Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. I
thank you for joining us this afternoon. I want to begin by
thanking my most able ranking member, Senator Roberts, for his
good work in this area, and look forward to working very
closely with him as we did when our chairs were reversed. We
have a wonderful relationship and will work closely together. I
welcome our other members, Senator Allard and Senator
Hutchinson. Thank you for your interest and your involvement in
this important subject.
Let me just do one order of business before we start with
opening statements. We welcome all of you as we said, but we
had a slight problem this morning. We did not receive some of
the written testimony in the usual, customary manner. So, I
just want to, on the record, really encourage our witnesses to
try to get their written material to the staff, which is very
helpful to them in helping us to be prepared for the meetings.
This is the second time today this has happened. Please be
mindful of that for future hearings.
We are going start with our first panel. We have a lot to
cover. This is the last of the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee budget hearings this year. Due to the
late DOD budget request, the ability of this subcommittee to
hold more budget hearings has unfortunately been constrained.
However, we are going to do the best we can under a tight
timeframe and think we have done the best we could do.
As a result, we have a very full agenda to try to cover
some of the matters that we were not able to cover before. We
are here today to discuss the wide-ranging efforts of the
Departments of Defense and Energy to address weapons of mass
destruction.
Our witnesses today are Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and
Biological Defense; Maj. Gen. Robert P. Bongiovi, Acting
Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Dr. Susan
Koch, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat
Reduction; and Robert Waldron, Assistant Deputy Administrator
for Nonproliferation Research and Engineering at the National
Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy.
Today we will focus on the Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar, and the research and
development efforts to assist both the warfighter and the wider
community concerned broadly with weapons of mass destruction to
detect, destroy, protect against, and stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and weapons' usable materials. We
will also discuss the U.S. efforts to destroy stockpiles of
chemical munitions and stockpiles of chemical agents both in
the United States and in Russia.
In January, a task force co-chaired by former Senator
Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler
concluded, ``the most urgent unmet national security threat to
the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
destruction or weapons' usable material in Russia could be
stolen, sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used
against American troops abroad or our citizens at home.'' This
threat is real and our work today is important. The report went
on to state that this threat is a clear and present danger to
the international community as well as to American lives and
liberties.
The task force concluded that much has been done by the
programs that our witnesses here today represent, but much
remains to be done. ``Current nonproliferation programs in the
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and related
agencies have achieved impressive results thus far, but their
limited mandate and funding fall short of what is required to
address adequately the threat.''
Today we would like to review many of those efforts to deal
with this situation. We would like to understand where we have
succeeded and where we have failed; how we can improve and the
barriers left to achieving those results. Again, I welcome you
all and look forward to hearing from each of you. I would at
this time welcome any opening statement from our able ranking
member, Senator Roberts, and then in turn the members who are
present. After those opening statements we will hear from our
panelists and then proceed to a round of questioning of
whatever time will allow us.
Senator Roberts.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to
extend a very warm welcome to the witnesses this afternoon.
Your work on the U.S. programs, as the chairman has indicated,
that address the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction
both at home and abroad represent some of our country's most
important national security efforts. So, I want to thank you
for your tireless work. I want to thank you for your dedication
to this very critical mission. I want to thank you for the time
and attention you have placed in preparing your remarks for
this hearing. I know it is a tough job. As a matter of fact, we
were working on my statement as of last night, so I stand
guilty as you are. I look forward to receiving your testimony.
The subcommittee has had a tradition of holding hearings
that examine how the United States is implementing programs
designed to address the present and future threats to the
United States. We have held hearings in the subcommittee on
cyber threats and critical infrastructure protection,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, civil support teams,
nonproliferation and Russian threat reduction programs, science
and technology research and development, and joint
experimentation. That's pretty wide pasture. Our jurisdiction
is indeed broad. These hearings have established what I hope is
a solid record of accomplishment and challenges in meeting the
emerging threats that face our Nation.
Today's hearing actually compliments the topics that the
subcommittee has examined over the past 2 years. The programs
we will hear about from you attempt to enhance U.S. strategic
capabilities by developing and implementing technologies that
give us the leading edge over known and potential adversaries,
and provide the United States the ability to monitor arms
control agreements. These programs combat threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction either by improving security, as
the chairman has indicated, or by eliminating the chemical,
biological, and nuclear threats posed by these stockpiles.
Finally, these programs augment the U.S. efforts to detect,
deter, and protect vital national security interests to meet
the challenges posed by the evolving threats of the 21st
century.
I cannot stress enough how important this work is and what
a great supporter I am of the mission and your work and your
dedication. I hope today's hearings will illustrate that point.
I am particularly pleased that we will have an opportunity to
discuss the U.S. chemical weapons demilitarization program. The
$1.2 billion requested by the administration for this program
will be necessary to support ongoing destruction operations,
bring new facilities on-line, and ensure the safety of citizens
in communities and towns adjacent to the destruction
facilities.
This subcommittee has been very supportive of this program
and I intend to maintain that tradition. I will note, however,
that the U.S. chemical weapons program is not without its share
of problems. There have been growing concerns about oversight
and management of the program. Many members of this
subcommittee, as well as Senators Shelby and McConnell, have
been outspoken in this regard. Congress, through the work of
this subcommittee, has repeatedly directed the Secretary of
Defense to take a greater oversight role in this program.
Despite the public law that states that no one service will
bear the financial burden of this program, the budget request
for this program is included in the Army procurement account.
That means that as a result, the decisions affecting Black Hawk
helicopters, Abrams tanks, or M-16 rifles could impact or be
impacted by funding for this program. Executing the chemical
demilitarization program and meeting our obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention is a national priority and should
receive a commensurate degree of oversight from the Secretary
of Defense. I am looking forward to hearing from Dr. Winegar on
what steps have been taken to address these concerns.
Now we have received your budget request for fiscal year
2002. I hope you will be able to provide the subcommittee today
with a clear and detailed discussion of how your budget request
meets your mission and what you expect to accomplish with these
requested funds. Shortly the subcommittee, as the chairman has
indicated, will begin marking up the bill. I expect your
testimony will contribute to the subcommittee's oversight role
in the mark-up process, so we look forward to your statements
and answers to your questions.
I would say again to the chairman, thank you for holding
this hearing and this concludes my opening remarks.
Senator Roberts [presiding]. I would assume now acting as
my role of chairman emeritus of the Emerging Threats and
Capabilties Subcommittee, I would recognize the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief. We have a vote ongoing so I will make this opening
statement very quickly so we can begin receiving testimony. I
want to thank you for being here. I want to thank the panel for
their willingness to detail specifically the budget requests.
As the chairman mentioned, the chemical demilitarization
program should be a top national priority. Pine Bluff,
Arkansas, the Pine Bluff Arsenal, is one of the prime sites of
the Department of Defense chemical demilitarization program.
So, I am very interested in the budget numbers regarding that
program and, as Senator Roberts said, the oversight by the
Department of Defense.
I will spend the bulk of my time during the questioning to
discuss an issue that I think is very important not only to our
national security but also to our force protection--that is the
need for a vaccine production facility--a government-owned
contractor-operated (GOCO) facility, the failure of the current
program and the need to accelerate. I am disappointed that the
administration only included $700,000 for this program. I think
it needs to be accelerated.
There is an article in the Chicago Tribune that appeared
just last week regarding two deaths that occurred at the Great
Lakes Naval Training Center; two of our recruits died of viral
infections. It has been linked to the failure to vaccinate
these recruits and the cessation of the production of the
vaccine that would have protected them back in the 1970s
because the manufacturing company determined that they could
not make money at it; that there was a very small demand for
the product and therefore it was not profitable for them in
terms of revenue. That is what commercial companies do and I
think that is the compelling reason that if we are going to
protect our men and women in uniform, we need to have a GOCO
vaccine production facility. So, I am going to have a few
questions regarding that.
I thank you for being here and I look forward to your
testimony.
Senator Roberts. Senator, we have a vote that I did not
realize that we would have so quickly and there are about 9
minutes left. I know the chairman wants to hear your testimony
directly. I do as well. Usually we try to rotate back and forth
in the interest of time, but we put you off so much now, I
think you might as well sit back and relax for about 15 minutes
and we will go vote. We will declare the subcommittee in a
temporary recess until we come back from voting. We apologize.
[Short recess.]
Senator Landrieu [presiding]. We thank you all for your
patience. I appreciate it. We are going to wait just a moment
because our members are very interested in the testimony. So,
if everybody will just be at ease for a few minutes and they
will be making their way back from this vote. [Pause.]
We thank you all for your patience. I believe Senator
Allard has an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD
Senator Allard. Madam Chairman, I do. In light of our being
behind schedule, I am just going to ask permission that we put
it in the record in its full context.
Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard
Thank you Madam Chairman,
I want to thank all of you for coming here today. Cooperative
threat reduction, nonproliferation research engineering, and chemical
weapons demilitarization are areas of significant importance to the
United States and the world. We saw today at the earlier ballistic
missile defense hearing that the United States is working to assure our
security on all fronts. Just as we prepare a ballistic missile threat
defense, we must also prepare defenses for the other major threats of
our times. Nonproliferation, cooperative threat reduction, and BMD are
together a ``defense in depth'' and each area needs development.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has had great success in
reducing the number of ballistic nuclear missiles that can threaten us
and our allies. Additionally, the National Nuclear Security
Administration's Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development Program has been successful at tracking and limiting the
proliferation of nuclear threats. These endeavors coupled with our
success in creating a robust missile defense system will certainly
provide us a more secure world environment.
In 1997, the Senate agreed to ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Meeting the milestones prescribed in this treaty is
critical to our reputation and our credibility on the world stage. The
destruction process at the Pueblo Army Depot in Colorado has shown the
potential to hinder our compliance to the treaty, but I will continue
to insist that all responsible parties work to avoid this.
Thank you, I look forward to hearing today on the progress of these
programs.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator. I think we are ready
for our panelists to begin. Dr. Winegar, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANNA JOHNSON-WINEGAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE)
Dr. Winegar. Madam Chairman and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this subcommittee today to discuss the United
States' chemical demilitarization program. I am Dr. Anna
Johnson-Winegar, but for simplicity's sake, Dr. Winegar is fine
for addressing. I am the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. My office
is the single focal point within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense responsible for oversight, coordination, and
integration of the chemical and biological defense programs,
counterproliferation support, chemical demilitarization, and
assembled chemical weapons assessment programs.
Today I would like to highlight for you the major changes
that the Department of Defense is implementing with regard to
the United States chemical demilitarization program. As you
well know, Mr. E.C. (Pete) Aldridge was confirmed as the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
in the second week of May. On May 21, after examining concerns
related to program cost, schedule and management, Secretary
Aldridge directed that this program be categorized as an
acquisition category 1D program. This change is intended to
streamline future decisions and oversight authority. It is also
consistent with the size and scope of this program, the
international treaty obligations, and the level of local,
state, and Federal interest in the safe and timely destruction
of our Nation's chemical weapons stockpile.
In this capacity, Secretary Aldridge will oversee a
defense-wide review that will provide him with a comprehensive
assessment of our entire chemical demilitarization program.
This defense acquisition executive review, and I will call it
the DAE review, is an extensive and rigorous process that was
initiated approximately 1 year ago when the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics--Dr. Jacques
Gansler at that time--directed this total review of all program
components. This includes the chemical stockpile disposal,
chemical stockpile emergency preparedness, alternative
technologies and approaches, non-stockpile chemical materiel,
and the assembled chemical weapons assessment programs.
As the status and future plans of each of these areas is
examined, the following issues will be covered: The Chemical
Weapons Convention compliance, life cycle cost estimates,
program plans for closure of the stockpile facilities, and
other organizational issues related to program management. This
DAE review is scheduled to be held the first week of September.
Another important focus of this review is the need to
select a destruction technology for the chemical weapon
stockpiles stored in Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky.
In accordance with Public Law 105-261, the Department is
performing detailed assessments of the associated costs,
scheduling, and safety of incineration and the alternative
candidate technologies for those sites. This portion of the DAE
review will occur in the spring 2002 timeframe in order for the
technology decision to be made consistent with the final
environmental impact statements and the subsequent records of
decision for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites.
In closing, I wish to reemphasize that the Department's
intention to address chemical demilitarization program
management issues underscores our commitment to strengthening
and improving overall organizational effectiveness. Change has
already begun at the top with future changes expected to
positively impact different aspects at all levels of program
management.
As we work our way through the DAE review, the Department
will develop its recommendation for a decision on how to
proceed in demilitarizing our Nation's chemical stockpiles. I
welcome your comments on every aspect of how our program is
proceeding. I also welcome the opportunity introduced by
Senator Hutchinson to address his issues and concerns about the
GOCO vaccine facility, which also falls under my purview.
I thank you again Madam Chairman and this entire
subcommittee for inviting me to testify here today and I look
forward to working with each of you to advance our common goals
of the safe and complete elimination of our Nation's chemical
weapons stockpile and the furtherance of our chemical and
biological defense programs. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Winegar follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar
Madam Chairman and distinguished subcommittee members, I wish to
thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today
to discuss the United States chemical demilitarization program. I am
Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Chemical and Biological Defense. My office is the single focal
point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for
oversight, coordination, and integration of the chemical and biological
defense, counterproliferation support, chemical demilitarization, and
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) Programs.
RECENT PROGRAM CHANGES
Today I would like to highlight for you the major changes the
Department of Defense is implementing with respect to the United States
chemical demilitarization program. As you well know, Mr. E.C. (Pete)
Aldridge was confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics) in the second week of May. On May 21, after
examining concerns related to program cost, schedule, and management,
Secretary Aldridge directed that the program be categorized as an
acquisition category-ID program. This change is intended to streamline
future decisions and oversight authority. It is also consistent with
the size and scope of this program, international treaty obligations,
and the level of local, state, and Federal interest in the safe and
timely destruction of our Nation's chemical weapons stockpile.
In this capacity, Secretary Aldridge will oversee a defense-wide
review that will provide a comprehensive assessment of our entire
Chemical Demlitarization Program. The Defense Acquisition Executive
(DAE) review is an extensive and rigorous process that began
approximately 1 year ago when the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed a total program review.
Subsequently, special panels consisting of cost, schedule and program
analysts from the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD)
and PM ACWA were established and have met consistently for the purpose
of conducting a review of each program component. This includes
chemical stockpile disposal, chemical stockpile emergency preparedness,
alternative technologies and approaches, non-stockpile chemical
materiel and the assembled chemical weapons assessment. As the status
and future plans for each of these areas is examined, the following
issues will be covered: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) compliance,
life cycle cost estimates, program plans for closure of the stockpile
facilities, and other organizational issues related to program
management. The DAE review is scheduled to be held the first week of
September.
Another important focus of this review is the need to select a
destruction technology for the chemical weapon stockpiles stored in
Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky. In accordance with Public
Law 105-261, the Department is performing detailed assessments of the
associated costs, schedules, and safety of incineration and the
candidate technologies for those sites. Our analysis also carefully
considers public acceptability as a critical factor. We realize that we
owe the communities our best, not necessarily the easiest, solution to
the problem we face. This portion of the DAE review will occur in the
spring 2002 time frame, in order for the technology decision to be made
consistent with the final environmental impact statements and
subsequent records of decision for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites. The
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Pueblo was released May 9,
2001 with a 45-day public comment period that was extended an
additional 45 days and will end August 8, 2001. The Blue Grass Draft
Environmental Impact Statement is expected to be released by the first
quarter fiscal year 2002.
PROGRAM STATUS
This year the chemical demilitarization program will enter a
critical phase, with two new facilities scheduled to begin operational
verification testing (systemization), and with Tooele chemical
demilitarization facility continuing full-scale operations at our
largest stockpile site. The state-of-the-art features at these
facilities and ability to handle the throughput rates are unparalleled
on a global scale. These efforts are indeed recognized by the
international community as a major step towards continued compliance
with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) destruction deadlines. I am
pleased to report that as of July 5, 2001, the United States had
destroyed 20 percent of the stockpile that existed when the CWC entered
into force 4 years ago. The interim deadlines set forth in the CWC
require 20 percent destruction by April 29, 2002, putting us nearly 10
months ahead of the milestone.
FINAL REMARKS
In closing, I wish to reemphasize that the Department's intention
to address chemical demilitarization program management issues
underscores our commitment to strengthening and improving overall
organizational effectiveness. Change has already begun at the top, with
future changes expected to positively impact different aspects and
levels of program management. As we work our way through the DAE
review, the Department will develop its recommendation for a decision
on how to proceed with demilitarizing our remaining chemical stockpile
sites. I welcome your comments on every aspect of how our program is
proceeding. I thank you, Madam Chairman, and this subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify today. I look forward to working with you to
advance our common goal of the safe and complete elimination of our
Nation's chemical weapon stockpile.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much.
General Bongiovi.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT P. BONGIOVI, USAF, ACTING
DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
General Bongiovi. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman and members
of the subcommittee, I am Maj. Gen. Robert Bongiovi, the Acting
Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I am pleased
to have this opportunity today to testify on the mission of the
agency. I would like to summarize my statement and request that
it be included in its entirety in the record.
Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
General Bongiovi. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
commonly referred to as ``DTRA'', was established in October
1998 as part of the Defense Reform Initiative. The intent was
to consolidate within one agency most of the DOD organizations
executing weapons of mass destruction, or WMD-related missions,
except for the Title 10 responsibilities of the services. This
new, focused agency was intended to enhance overall Department
understanding of the WMD threat and facilitate appropriate
responses. Today, DTRA is far more than just the sum of its
merging organizations. It is an innovative thinker and
responder to the WMD challenge.
Before proceeding further, it might be helpful to define
the term ``weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD. The definition
encompasses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However,
it also includes radiological, electromagnetic pulse, and other
advanced or unusual weapons capable of inflicting mass
casualties or widespread destruction. In addition, conventional
high explosive devices, such as those used in attacks on Khobar
Towers and the U.S.S. Cole, are legally and operationally
considered to be WMD.
Although the spectrum of our mission is large, it can be
simply divided into four major functions: WMD combat support,
technology development, threat control, and threat reduction. I
will summarize each of these in my following remarks. The WMD
combat support function provides operational and technical
support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the warfighting
commanders in chief, the CINCs, and the services to engage the
threat and challenges posed to the United States, its forces,
and allies by WMD. For example, DTRA provided targeting and
consequence management support to the Joint Staff and a U.S.-
European Command during Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force.
In conjunction with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic
Command and the services, DTRA developed the first DOD Nuclear
Mission Management Plan to sustain the U.S. nuclear deterrent
in the years ahead.
At the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
DTRA will integrate threat reduction support and response
capabilities into the warfighters' contingency plans,
operational plans, and theater engagement plans. Also at the
direction of the Chairman, DTRA performs as many as 100 force
protection assessments of U.S. military installations at home
and abroad each year. These assessments identify ways in which
base commanders can improve their force protection posture. At
the direction of OSD, we also perform more detailed balanced
survivability assessments of critical facilities.
The technology development function develops, manages, and
coordinates research and development activities underpinning
other DTRA functions. The DTRA technology development function
includes programs to provide both offensive and defensive tools
to the warfighter; develop technology needed to support arms
control; manage nuclear weapons effects simulators and
simulation; and develop radiation hardening of microelectronics
for the protection of our weapon and space systems.
DTRA managed the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
Program that developed the advanced unitary penetrator and hard
target smart fuze used in Operation Allied Force in the former
Yugoslavia. DTRA munitions effectiveness tools for the defeat
of hardened/deeply buried targets and consequence management
tools are in wide use. Among our top R&D priorities are
improved tunnel and hardened/deeply buried defeat capabilities
with emphasis on stand-off attack, faster detectors for
chemical and biological agents, improved counterforce planning
tools, and terrorist device defeat tools.
The third function, threat control, maintains U.S.
technological security through policy execution, implementation
of technology security programs, and compliance and
enforcement. It includes inspection, escort, and monitoring
missions to help ensure compliance with arms control agreements
and new non-treaty means of threat control. Major
accomplishments within the threat control function include the
establishment of the congressionally-mandated program to
monitor foreign launches of U.S. satellites; reengineering and
revitalization of the DOD export control process; and
successful completion of all arms control missions.
Finally the threat reduction function centers on the
execution of the Cooperative Threat Reduction or ``Nunn-Lugar''
program. This program assists the eligible states of the former
Soviet Union with the dismantlement of WMD and reduces the
threat of WMD proliferation. Specifically, it destroys
strategic delivery systems, stores and safeguards fissile
materials, and improves safeguards for WMD materials and
warheads.
Although our focus will remain on the warfighters, DTRA
contributes to efforts to counter WMD terrorism at home. We
share our WMD expertise with the Department of Justice, FEMA,
the Center for Disease Control, and other Federal, state and
local officials. DTRA also maintains an operation center that
provides the warfighters and government officials on line
access to a wide range of WMD expertise.
DTRA also assists interagency exercise planning. We have
identified issues that national, state and local decision-
makers would face should such an event occur. At the national
level, we have worked directly and regularly with officials as
senior as the Attorney General. Moreover, we have an important
relationship with the Joint Forces Command's Joint Task Force
for Civil Support. As a combat support agency, we offer
planning, exercise, operational, legal, and public affairs
support to this Joint Task Force.
I will conclude by noting that the Defense Department and
Congress agree that WMD challenges continue to evolve and grow.
DTRA is an important response to this threat. Our mission
continues to expand. I thank you for your past support of DTRA
and respectfully request your support for our fiscal year 2002
program. Thank you. I would be pleased to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Major General Bongiovi follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF
Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, I am Maj. Gen.
Robert Bongiovi, the Acting Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency. I am pleased to have this opportunity today to testify on the
mission of the agency. I would like to summarize my statement and
request that it be included in its entirety in the record.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, commonly referred to as
``DTRA'', was established in October 1998 as part of the Defense Reform
Initiative. The intent was to consolidate within one agency most of the
DOD organizations executing WMD-related missions, except for the Title
10 responsibilities of the services. This new, focused agency would
enhance overall Department understanding of the WMD threat and
facilitate appropriate responses. Today, DTRA is far more than just the
sum of its merging organizations. It is an innovative thinker and
responder to the WMD challenge.
Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to define the term
``weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD. The definition encompasses
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, it also includes
radiological, electromagnetic pulse, and other advanced or unusual
weapons capable of inflicting mass casualties or widespread
destruction. In addition, conventional high explosive devices, such as
those used in the attacks on Khobar Towers and the U.S.S. Cole, are
legally and operationally considered to be WMD.
Although the spectrum of our mission is large, our missions can be
simply divided into four major functions: WMD combat support,
technology development, threat control, and threat reduction. I will
summarize each of these in my following remarks.
The WMD combat support function provides operational and technical
support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the warfighting commanders in
chief, and the services to engage the threat and challenges posed to
the United States, its forces and allies by WMD. Program activities
include: