    [Senate Hearing 107-355]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1416

    AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
       OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
    DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
      STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   ----------

                            MAY 15 AND JULY 12, 2001

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                  2002--Part 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                                     S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 5

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1416

    AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
       OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
    DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
      STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 5

                       EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                   __________

                            MAY 15 AND JULY 12, 2001

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    STROM THURMOND, South Carolina       CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    BOB SMITH, New Hampshire             ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania          MAX CLELAND, Georgia
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               BILL NELSON, Florida
    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    JIM BUNNING, Kentucky                JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
                                         MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

                          Les Brownlee, Staff Director

                David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN WARNER, Virginia
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico            JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

                         David S. Lyles, Staff Director

                    Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director

                                     ______

               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

                         PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman

    BOB SMITH,  New Hampshire            MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
    RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania          EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             BILL NELSON, Florida
    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

                     MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico            JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

                                      (ii)

    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
            Department of Energy's Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs
                                  may 15, 2001

                                                                       Page

    Gordon, Gen. John A., USAF (Ret.), Under Secretary for Nuclear
      Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security
      Administration, U.S. Department of Energy......................     4
    Jones, Ms. Gary L., Director of Natural Resources and
      Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office....................    17
    Baker, Kenneth, Acting Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation
      and National Security..........................................   141

       Cooperative Threat Reduction, Chemical Weapons Demilitarization,
        Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nonproliferation Research and
                       Engineering, and Related Programs
                                 july 12, 2001

    Johnson-Winegar, Dr. Anna, Deputy Assistant to Secretary of
      Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense)......................   274
    Bongiovi, Maj. Gen. Robert P., USAF, Acting Director of the
      Defense Threat Reduction Agency................................   277
    Waldron, Robert, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Nonproliferation
      Research and Engineering, National Nuclear Security
      Administration.................................................   281
    Koch, Dr. Susan, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat
      Reduction......................................................   286

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 15, 2001

                               U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

            DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat
    Roberts (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Allard, and
    Landrieu.
        Committee staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    counsel.
        Professional staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV,
    Carolyn M. Hanna, and Mary Alice A. Hayward.
        Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director for the minority; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
    counsel; and Creighton Greene, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer L. Naccari and Suzanne
    K.L. Ross.
        Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier
    III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry,
    assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to
    Senator Allard; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator Byrd; Peter A.
    Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Brady King,
    assistant to Senator Dayton.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Roberts. The subcommittee will come to order.
        General, I apologize to you and the witnesses from the
    General Accounting Office (GAO). We had a vote on the Senate
    floor, and that takes precedence. I have a statement that I
    would like to make, then we will recognize you, General,
    because I know your time is valuable, as is the GAO's.
        This afternoon the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2002
    budget request for the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation in the National Nuclear Security
    Administration. Providing testimony for the National Nuclear
    Security Administration is Gen. John A. Gordon, who is the
    administrator.
        I would like to welcome you, General. This is the first
    time you have testified before the subcommittee. I look forward
    to receiving your remarks and thank you for your testimony last
    week, in regards to homeland security.
        In addition to the General, we have the GAO here today to
    provide testimony on two GAO reports that discuss two programs
    with the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.
        One of these GAO reports, the Nuclear Cities Initiative,
    will be released to the public at the conclusion of this
    hearing.
        Providing testimony for the GAO is Ms. Gary L. Jones, the
    Director of Natural Resources and Environment. This is also
    your first time before this subcommittee. We thank you and I
    welcome you and look forward to your statement.
        Following this open session we will move to a closed
    session in Hart 219 to hear testimony from representatives of
    the Intelligence Community. This subcommittee has had oversight
    responsibilities for the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration. Try saying that five times real fast on CSPAN,
    and you will get in a lot of trouble.
        The programs within this office work to prevent, detect,
    and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
    and to assist with international nuclear acts for safety and
    excess fissile material elimination.
        Over 50 percent of the office's budget supports programs in
    Russia. The remaining percent of the budget focuses on
    improving U.S. capabilities in proliferation monitoring and
    detection through research and development.
        As many know, last year this subcommittee found
    programmatic management problems, problems and challenges with
    several programs in this Cooperative Threat Reduction endeavor.
        To that end, the subcommittee established greater reporting
    controls on these programs to improve management and
    accountability in the implementation of these critical national
    security programs. It is imperative that the United States have
    every measure available to ensure Russia's long-term commitment
    to U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation cooperative work.
        I cannot stress enough how important it is that these
    programs are carried out effectively, efficiently, and have the
    committed support of the Russians.
        Over the next few weeks, I will review in great detail the
    administration's budget request for these programs. It will be
    a priority of this subcommittee to ensure that the funds
    requested will be utilized effectively and efficiently, and
    that program goals can be realized with the resources that we
    have.
        We must ensure that our current and future national
    security efforts are not weakened by management failures and
    poor implementation on what I consider to be a vital national
    security effort.
        I look forward to the comments of both witnesses this
    afternoon on the progress they have made in addressing this
    subcommittee's concerns with these programs, and how they
    intend to proceed during the coming year. I believe they are
    doing very critical work, very important, critical work in
    protecting our nation. I commend them for their perseverance
    and dedication.
        I thank you for the time and attention that you have placed
    in preparing your remarks for this afternoon. I will turn to my
    esteemed Ranking Member, when she arrives to the subcommittee,
    for any comment that she might have. I would now like to
    welcome for his statement General Gordon.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts

        This afternoon the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2002 budget
    request for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in National
    Nuclear Security Administration. Providing testimony for the National
    Nuclear Security Administration is Gen. John A. Gordon, Administrator.
    I would like to welcome you, General Gordon. This is the first time you
    have testified before the subcommittee and I look forward to receiving
    your remarks.
        In addition to General Gordon, we have the GAO here today who will
    provide testimony on two GAO reports that discuss two programs within
    the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. One of these GAO
    reports, this one on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, will be released to
    the public at the conclusion of this hearing. Providing testimony for
    the GAO is Ms. Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and
    Environment. This is also your first time before this subcommittee. I
    welcome you, Ms. Jones, and look forward to your statement.
        Following this open session, we will move to closed session in Hart
    219 to hear testimony from representatives of the Intelligence
    Community.
        This subcommittee has oversight responsibilities for the Office of
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration. The programs within this office work to prevent,
    detect, and reverse the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
    and to assist with international nuclear reactor safety and excess
    fissile material elimination. Over 50 percent of the office's budget
    supports programs in Russia. The remaining percent of the budget
    focuses on improving U.S. capabilities in proliferation monitoring and
    detection through research and development.
        Last year this subcommittee found programmatic management problems
    with several programs in this cooperative threat reduction endeavor. To
    that end, this subcommittee established greater reporting controls on
    these programs to improve management and accountability in the
    implementation of these critical national security programs. It is
    imperative that the United States have every measure available to
    ensure Russian long term commitment to U.S. threat reduction and
    nonproliferation cooperative work. I cannot stress enough how important
    it is that these programs are carried out effectively and efficiently
    and have committed Russian support.
        Over the next few weeks, I will review in great detail the
    administration's budget request for these programs. It will be a
    priority of this subcommittee to ensure that the funds requested will
    be utilized effectively and efficiently and that program goals can be
    realized with the resources we have. We must ensure that our current
    and future national security efforts are not weakened by management
    failures and poor implementation in what I consider to be a vital,
    national security effort.
        I look forward to your comments this afternoon on the progress you
    have made in addressing this subcommittee's concerns with these
    programs and how you intend to proceed during the coming year. I
    believe you are doing critical work in protecting our Nation and I
    commend you for your perseverance and dedication. I thank you for the
    time and attention you have placed in preparing your remarks for this
    hearing.

        Please proceed, General Gordon.
        General Gordon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
    opportunity to meet with the subcommittee today and discuss the
    fiscal year 2002 budget request for the National Nuclear
    Security Administration. I do have a little bit longer formal
    statement that I would offer for the record, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Without objection, please feel free to
    summarize as you see fit, sir.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. GORDON, USAF (RET.), UNDER SECRETARY
       FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
           SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        General Gordon. I also want to thank the members of the
    subcommittee for their continuous support for the mission of
    NNSA and for the people who really make it happen here in
    Washington and in the field, those traveling overseas, the
    Federal workforce, the contract workforce, a lot of folks who
    are working pretty hard on these initiatives, Mr. Chairman.
        If I could speak for a few moments broadly about NNSA
    before we turn to the details of the budget itself, I want to
    report to you that we are making steady, albeit somewhat slow
    progress towards the goals I think we all share of having
    efficient and effective organization to lead and manage the
    national security enterprise that's been entrusted to us.
        I'm not particularly satisfied with where we are, nor what
    we have been able to accomplish to establish NNSA as a full-up
    organization with a unique identity and the clear lines of
    authority that we need.
        We're moving forward, and we've made remarkable progress
    when measured against the barriers and bureaucracy that we
    confront. Even though it has been difficult to move
    dramatically on organizational issues, we've gotten well beyond
    some of the issues that confronted us in the beginning, such as
    dual hatting.
        We have set up a new framework for the organization and
    management of NNSA, and we have brought on board critical staff
    for vital issues such as counter-intelligence, security and
    contracting, and made real progress in each of these areas.
        We have on board two senior advisors of immense capacity,
    Director of Congressional Affairs and an Environmental Safety
    and Health Advisor with professional experience from naval
    reactors, a senior military assistant, and a strong chief of
    staff who knows the system in considerable detail.
        I've established an Office of Policy Planning that will
    really help us work better in the inner agency. An acting
    principal deputy for NNSA will be starting this week helping
    move the organization forward while we seek congressional
    authority for a confirmed Presidential approved position.
        We plan to announce the choice of an NNSA general counsel
    within the next couple of days.
        Perhaps most importantly I am hopeful that the President
    will very soon be able to announce his intention to nominate
    NNSA's two deputy administrators.
        That said, Mr. Chairman, let me focus my comments on
    efforts on nonproliferation.
        In this decade after the Cold War, the United States
    continues to wrestle with the dangers arising from enormous
    stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the materials produced by the
    former Soviet Union from the extensive nuclear establishment
    inherited by Russia.
        We must also contend with concerted efforts by rogue states
    and others to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and with the
    threat that terrorists might gain access to these weapons or to
    quantities of material.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate my thanks to you
    and your colleagues for last week's hearings which discussed
    the importance of focusing national attention on combating
    terrorism, particularly with the focus on WMD.
        The NNSA is pursuing programs to address the threats of WMD
    proliferation, both in the former Soviet Union and worldwide.
    The fiscal year 2002 budget request is $773.7 million for
    nonproliferation programs. Our request covers ongoing efforts
    to provide security for nuclear materials to implement the
    purchase and conversion of weapon-grade usable highly enriched
    uranium, and, to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium.
        It seeks funding for programs that redirect the activities
    of weapons scientists, including the development of commercial
    partnerships with U.S. industry, and encourages the down-sizing
    of the Russian nuclear weapons complex.
        The same request funds the development of new technologies
    to detect chemical and biological weapons, to monitor nuclear
    testing worldwide, to implement U.S. export controls on nuclear
    technology, other international nuclear safeguards, and to
    strengthen the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
        We literally provide the technical base for much of what
    our government does in proliferation protection and provide the
    expertise base to work effectively inside Russia and elsewhere.
        Before I get to questions, Mr. Chairman, the
    administration's request for proliferation programs is $101
    million less than last year's appropriation. At that level it
    should be apparent and obvious that we will have to curtail
    efforts in several areas and potentially lose momentum in
    others; however, and I will talk more about this later, the
    administration is conducting a review of each program, and we
    await the conclusion of that review to see if the budget
    request should be modified.
        The problems we're trying to address are hard. It's not
    easy to persuade Russia that it needs our help in facilities at
    the heart of its nuclear weapons complex, nor to find private
    sector partners willing to invest in an uncertain and unproven
    business environment.
        Our Russian counterparts sometimes doubt our motives and
    our commitments, and even when we have their support, we still
    have to cope with the suspicions of the Russian security
    services, as well as their legitimate interests, in protecting
    what remain highly sensitive activities and facilities.
        We remain concerned about the extent to which Russian
    authorities (including MinAtom leadership) share a common view
    of nonproliferation objectives.
        Nuclear-related exports to Iran continue to be highly
    troubling. We need to ensure that our programs do not
    inadvertently support continuing military activities and that
    our funds are spent on their intended purposes.
        Even taking account of these problems, however,
    nonproliferation cooperation with Russia remains highly
    beneficial to the United States, addressing real threats to our
    nation in both immediate and long terms. It reduces the danger
    that nuclear materials will find their way to our adversaries,
    builds barriers against transfer of nuclear weapon expertise,
    and strengthens our ability to combat proliferation globally.
        In a number of areas we have built a basis for mutual
    confidence with Russian scientists, military officers, and
    plant managers, and that has permitted us to work together
    towards common security objectives in ways that probably were
    not imaginable only a few years ago.
        Ultimately, we recognize the resources required to
    transform the safeguarding of Russia's nuclear weapon
    establishment are probably beyond the scope of any conceivable
    U.S. assistance program. Fundamentally, this transformation has
    to be a Russian responsibility. But we can show the way, we can
    be a catalyst, and we can demonstrate what's possible to the
    Russians and to business communities.
        Many of the members of this subcommittee are very familiar
    with some of the examples of what has been done, and we have
    just touched on a couple of those. Rapid security upgrades have
    been completed on more than 3,000 nuclear weapons warheads and
    some 220 tons of fissile material. The goal for fiscal year
    2002 is to complete the upgrades on another 13 sites, bringing
    the total to 50.
        We have developed training, procurement, internal
    accounting, and regulatory measures to help ensure Russia can
    sustain operation of the improved security measures we've
    provided.
        We have initiated the design of a mixed oxide fuel
    fabrication facility and a pit disassembly and conversion
    facility, to enable us to meet the commitments of our bilateral
    plutonium disposition agreement with Russia and support Russian
    development of a comparable program.
        We've installed monitoring equipment at the first of three
    Russian facilities for transparency of the down-blending of the
    highly-enriched uranium that the U.S. is purchasing.
        As I mentioned earlier, the administration is reviewing
    U.S. nonproliferation operations in connection with Russia,
    taking a comprehensive look across agency lines. It's quite
    likely that the administration will request adjustment of the
    budget once these reviews are complete. NNSA is a full
    participant in this review process.
        I expect and certainly hope the administration will develop
    an over arching strategy that really sets the priorities and
    the realistic goals, and that it will take a fresh look at how
    nonproliferation activities fit into our overall policy toward
    Russia. The review is critically examining the effectiveness of
    existing programs and will identify needed changes in focus,
    organization, or management approach.
        We're also considering new ideas and new approaches. But
    even so, we're mindful of how difficult it is to operate in
    this environment, and the ongoing reviews and policy
    development activities must specifically deal with Russian
    attitudes, their relationships with proliferation issues,
    access, and issues of sustainability. I expect this review to
    be completed shortly. After which we can brief the subcommittee
    on the results.
        Mr. Chairman, with NNSA I'm also committed to my own review
    of the management and implementation of our programs and how
    the individual pieces fit together. As I noted earlier, I hope
    we will soon have on board a Senate-confirmed Deputy
    Administrator who can work with me and the program offices to
    ensure that our nonproliferation programs have clear, stable
    goals and realistic plans that are integrated within NNSA and
    integrated within the interagency community.
        We'll be careful not to promise more than we can deliver,
    and we'll do our level best to deliver what we promise.
        We'll be straight with Congress and straight with ourselves
    about the real problems of working with Russia, and straight
    with the Russians about what we have to have in order to do
    business.
        In running these programs, I'll be mindful of the
    critically important contribution that they can and do make to
    national security, and equally mindful of the need to ensure
    responsible and accountable management of taxpayer dollars.
        Mr. Chairman, I know that in a couple of moments the GAO
    will be testifying on their reports on the Nuclear Cities
    Initiative (NCI) and the Material Protection Control and
    Accounting (MPC&A). Let me offer a few thoughts. First with
    respect to NCI.
        The closed cities of the Russian nuclear complex clearly
    present some of the most difficult environments for success in
    nonproliferation. These cities are out of the Russian
    mainstream and have little history of commercial business or
    economic integration. Our key goal here is to encourage the
    downsizing of the Russian nuclear weapons design and production
    facilities without creating additional proliferation risks.
        NCI is a relatively young program that encountered several
    start-up problems, including lack of Russian support in some
    channels, high overhead and start-up costs, and program
    management inefficiencies.
        Nevertheless, it has had some initial successes. Last year
    for the first time the Avangard nuclear weapons facility
    reduced its footprint, creating some 500,000 square feet of
    commercial production space where once nuclear weapons
    components were made.
        NCI has built a partnership with the Fresenius Medical
    Corporation, the world's largest manufacturer of dialysis
    equipment, who is eager to utilize this space and take
    advantage of the relatively lower production costs in Russia.
        Another modest success is the establishment of two open
    computing centers in Sarov and Snezhinsk. Mr. Chairman, while
    it's my understanding that the about-to-be-released GAO report
    on NCI does not take issue with the basic goals of the NCI
    program, it clearly identifies several areas in which we need
    to make important management improvements.
        For example, we can do much better reviewing candidate
    proposals for new projects as we do now in the Initiatives for
    Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, largely because we
    followed and took on board earlier GAO recommendations.
        In fact, this recommendation for the NCI program has
    already been implemented. This set of recommendations by the
    GAO should help ensure the program is well-managed and
    transparent to me and to the subcommittee.
        As I mentioned, NNSA will be doing a comprehensive review
    of how we manage these programs to ensure we're getting the
    best possible return for the taxpayer, and that we have the
    right objectives and right programmatic measures. The GAO
    recommendations, including an evaluation of possibly combining
    the NCI and IPP programs, will be important inputs.
        One last point with regard to NCI. We need to continue our
    dialogue with the subcommittee and Congress to see if we can
    release the $10 million currently conditioned on agreement with
    Russia regarding facility closure. We have a written commitment
    to that effect from First Minister of MinAtom, Mr. Ryabev.
        I'll close, Mr. Chairman, with a comment on the Material
    Protection Control and Accounting program. The GAO report here
    is fair, balanced, and reflects over a year of work by the GAO
    team. I understand the report states that the MPC&A programs
    have achieved real threat reductions on some 32 percent--some
    190 metric tons of the estimated 603 metric tons of Russian
    material that could be used to make a nuclear device. The
    report acknowledges that the work being performed by the
    program is on an additional 130 tons.
        These figures do not reflect the upgraded security
    protection on several thousand nuclear warheads controlled by
    the Russian Navy. Here, too, however, I also agree with the GAO
    that significant work remains to be done, and in this regard,
    we will implement the GAO's two major recommendations.
        First, the NNSA will develop a system to better monitor the
    security systems installed and ensure that they continue to
    function--the sustainability question.
        Second, our strategic plan will include estimates for
    sustainability activities.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe I'll stop at this point so we can
    turn to your questions or however you would like to proceed. I
    do appreciate very much the opportunity to join with you today
    to discuss this important program which I believe does provide
    such a valuable and important contribution to U.S. national
    security.
        [The prepared statement of General Gordon follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Gen. John A. Gordon

        Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's (NNSA) nonproliferation fiscal year 2002 budget
    request.
        The fiscal year 2002 budget request for the Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation is $773.7 million. The request covers the
    funding needed to support a broad range of nonproliferation goals.
    Specific line items include:

             Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
            Development ($206,102,000)
             International Nuclear Safety ($13,800,000)
             Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency
            Implementation ($13,950,000)
             Arms Control and Nonproliferation ($101,500,000)
             International Materials Protection, Control and
            Accounting ($138,800,000)
             Fissile Materials Disposition ($248,089,000)
             Program Direction ($51,459,000)

        Addressing international threats to U.S. national security
    interests from the potential proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction is one of the primary mission goals of the NNSA. These
    international threats derive largely from the former Soviet Union's
    production of enormous quantities of nuclear materials and weapons, and
    from potential actions by rogue nations or terrorist organizations. The
    NNSA is pursuing a balanced and comprehensive approach to
    nonproliferation that seeks to reduce or eliminate these threats to
    U.S. national security interests.
        NNSA has been hard at work to secure and dispose of nuclear warhead
    materials, at home and abroad. We are establishing methods to help
    prevent the unthinkable from happening, the use of weapons of mass
    destruction in an attack on this country or our citizens. NNSA's world-
    class expertise at its national laboratories is vital to the success of
    this important effort.
        I understand the subcommittee has a particular interest in the work
    NNSA is doing in Russia. Therefore, I would like to address our efforts
    in that regard up front, and then talk more broadly about NNSA overall
    nonproliferation work.
        The bipartisan Baker-Cutler Report and numerous other studies in-
    and-outside of Government attest not only to the importance of the
    proliferation threats in Russia our programs are designed to address,
    but to the need for an overarching strategy. We are working to
    articulate that strategy as well as to develop and strengthen our long-
    range thinking in this area.
        To that end, the administration has chartered several major reviews
    in order to examine the appropriate national security strategy for this
    country. The Department and the NNSA are active participants in these
    ongoing reviews. One of these reviews is currently evaluating all U.S.
    nonproliferation programs with Russia. At the end of this review, I am
    confident we will have a comprehensive strategy for our threat
    reduction activities with Russia.
        We can lay out the United States' goals we are helping with Russia
    into five broad objectives:

             Reduce the threat to the United States and its allies
            from Russian nuclear delivery systems
             Reduce potential for diversion of Russian nuclear
            warheads to rogue states or terrorist groups
             Reduce potential for diversion of Russian weapons-
            useable nuclear materials
             Make Russian force reconstitution more difficult, time
            consuming, and detectable
             Reduce potential for diversion of nuclear-weapon/dual-
            use expertise and technologies.

        Given this set of objectives for our work in Russia, let me
    describe how our activities are supporting this framework. The first
    objective to reduce the threat to the U.S. and its allies from Russian
    nuclear delivery systems has been the principal goal of the DOD's
    Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. I will not deal with their
    myriad successes other than to note that they continue to make
    substantial progress in their programs.
        Our next key objective is to reduce the potential of diversion of
    nuclear weapons. Both DOD and NNSA have programs that are working with
    the Russian military to improve the security of nuclear weapons storage
    sites in Russia. The NNSA program is with the Russian Navy and grew out
    of our cooperation with the Russian Navy on securing HEU materials used
    as reactor fuels on their ships. We feel that we are making good
    progress on this program. We have excellent cooperation with the
    Russian Navy on this program.
        Our third objective is to reduce the potential for diversion of
    Russian Federation weapons-useable nuclear materials. This is the
    flagship of NNSA's cooperation with Russia. The Materials Protection,
    Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program has been working with MinAtom
    on securing weapons-useable nuclear materials throughout Russia. We
    work with the civilian sites where such materials are present and we
    work at many of the military sites where the Russian weapons grade
    nuclear materials are stored.
        The NNSA's MPC&A program is working rapidly to complete its
    mission, and estimates in its strategic plan that comprehensive
    security upgrades will be complete at all of the warhead storage
    locations that the Russian Navy has requested, as early as 2007, and
    for 603 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material by 2011. Since
    1993, the program has completed rapid upgrades for nearly 4,000
    warheads and 220 metric tons of fissile material. One programmatic goal
    for fiscal year 2002 is to complete security upgrades at thirteen
    nuclear sites, bringing the total number of completed sites to fifty.
        A part of this goal is to promote sustainable security
    improvements. ``Sustainability'' is critical to the long-term mission
    of the program, because we must ensure that installed MPC&A systems are
    maintained and operated over the long term. Sustainability also entails
    fostering the ability of our Russian counterparts to operate and
    maintain the MPC&A systems unilaterally. To help ensure sustainability,
    we are establishing training centers, identifying credible Russian
    suppliers of MPC&A equipment, helping draft national regulations and
    security force procedures, and establishing an information accounting
    system to track amounts and locations for all of Russia's nuclear
    material.
        Furthermore, we have developed and implemented a program to
    consolidate material into fewer buildings and fewer sites, and to
    convert excess highly attractive material to a form that is less
    attractive to potential proliferant nations. This program reduces costs
    to the U.S. by limiting the number of buildings requiring security
    upgrades.
        Through the Fissile Materials Disposition program, NNSA is
    responsible for disposal of surplus inventories of U.S. weapon-grade
    plutonium and highly enriched uranium. We are also responsible for
    efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian weapon-
    grade plutonium.
        The fiscal year 2002 budget request will fund the completion of the
    mixed oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility design and proceed with
    related MOX fuel qualification activities. We will continue the design
    of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility at a reduced rate, and
    we will suspend the design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant. These
    changes are necessary to reduce the anticipated future-year peak
    funding requirements associated with plans for simultaneously building
    three plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site. The
    NNSA continues to pursue the irradiation of MOX fuel in existing
    reactors and, at a much reduced pace, immobilization for the
    disposition of surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium. This will enable us
    to meet the commitments called for in the recently signed U.S.-Russia
    Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and to support the
    continued consolidation, cleanup, and shut down of DOE sites where
    surplus plutonium is stored.
        Other activities planned for fiscal year 2002 involve providing
    support for the development of facilities in Russia for disposition of
    surplus plutonium, and continuing surplus U.S. HEU disposition,
    including capital improvements at the Savannah River Site to support
    the off-specification blend-down project with the TVA. This project
    will eliminate tons of surplus weapons material by converting it to
    reactor fuel for use in TVA's reactors, which provide electric power
    throughout the Southeast. Equally important, this work will save the
    taxpayers $600 million by avoiding the cost to dispose of this surplus
    material as waste.
        We have a number of other programs that help achieve the objective
    of reducing the potential for diversion of nuclear materials. Through
    the Second Line of Defense program we have been working with the
    Customs Service in Russia to upgrade the Russian capabilities to detect
    and interdict nuclear materials at border checkpoints and at airports.
    While we have made some progress in this activity, this is a huge job.
    The Russian border is thousands of miles long, and borders on a number
    of countries where we have concerns about proliferation. We may need to
    put more effort into this program in the future or to develop and
    explore practical alternatives.
        The current administration review of Russian programs will help
    guide us on whether or how we should direct our efforts on this issue,
    and how we should coordinate with other agencies that have
    complementary activities.
        The fourth objective is to make reconstitution of the large forces
    and enormous nuclear weapons stockpile that existed during the Cold War
    more difficult. NNSA shares responsibility with DOD for programs that
    address this issue. For NNSA one of our problems is the size of the
    Russian nuclear weapons complex. The production complex of the U.S. is
    significantly reduced from what it was during the Cold War, while the
    Russian nuclear weapons complex is basically unchanged from the Cold
    War.
        Some of these Russian facilities may be old, but the sense is, they
    can still do the job of producing weapons for the Russian stockpile. As
    we go into an era of reduced nuclear forces, this excess capability for
    production could present a problem for the U.S. We would like the
    Russian complex to be reduced to a size consistent with the much-
    reduced stockpiles that are needed in the post-Cold War era. Concerned
    about the human costs of downsizing, the Russians have asked us to help
    them reduce the size of their weapons complex. NNSA is pursuing the
    Nuclear Cities Initiative whose main goal is to reduce the size of the
    Russian nuclear weapons complex, both its facilities and
    infrastructure, as well as manpower.
        While the underlying national security objective is valid, I am
    aware that there are some serious concerns about this program and I
    will elaborate on the Nuclear Cities Initiative a little later in my
    testimony. Based on the administration review of this and other
    nonproliferation programs in Russia, we may need to reconfigure the
    program to be more effective.
        A part of this objective to make reconstitution to Cold War levels
    more difficult we are monitoring the HEU purchase agreement that is
    down-blending 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium to low
    enrichment material that will be used in reactor fuel. The 1993 U.S.-
    Russia HEU Purchase Agreement remains one of our key threat reduction
    achievements of the last decade. As of May 2001, we have overseen the
    conversion of more than 117 metric tons of HEU; this is enough material
    for over 4,700 nuclear devices.
        Our fifth objective is to reduce the potential for diversion of
    nuclear weapons or dual-use expertise and technologies. This objective
    captures two separate but related needs. One is that we need to work
    with the Russian Government to gain their cooperation on limiting the
    export of nuclear technology and equipment that may help countries that
    are trying to develop nuclear weapons. These exports are not, in our
    view, in the interest of either the United States or the Russian
    Federation, and mitigating the economic incentives that seem to propel
    them in this direction would help to achieve our goals.
        The related issue is often referred to as the ``brain drain''.
    There are thousands of scientists that worked on the nuclear, chemical,
    and biological weapons programs of the Soviet Union who were
    unemployed, underemployed, or unpaid following the breakup of the USSR.
    NNSA and State Department have had programs in place for a number of
    years to provide alternate employment to as many of these scientists as
    possible and to try to integrate them into the international science
    community.
        The State Department program is the International Science and
    Technology Centers (ISTC). It was created in 1992 and became
    operational in 1994. It is a multilateral organization and has
    excellent international support and strong support from the Russian
    Government. The NNSA programs are working in close cooperation with the
    ISTC. While the ISTC focused on providing jobs in basic science and
    exploring the possible application of technology to commercial
    applications, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)
    program of NNSA has focused on the commercialization of Russian
    technology in partnership with U.S. industry.
        The IPP program is designed to prevent the spread of weapons of
    mass destruction technologies and expertise by engaging former Soviet
    weapons scientists. It funds non-military joint R&D projects between
    former Soviet weapons institutes and U.S. laboratories. The goal is
    identifying and creating non-military, commercial applications of
    weapons-related technologies. We have instituted a rigorous project
    review process within the U.S. government to ensure that no projects
    have dual-use potential. These efforts allow us valuable access to
    Russian scientific and technical research and development as well as
    transparency into the Russian weapons complex. Unlike NCI, the IPP
    program works in the nuclear, chemical, and biological arenas and in
    Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. As we are focusing the IPP program on
    commercialization, all projects must have an industry partner who
    provides significant funding for the project--roughly a 3:2 ratio,
    private sector to government funding.
        Those of you who have followed the progress of both the ISTC and
    the IPP programs might remember that both of these took several years
    to become mature and develop management processes and project
    portfolios that clearly met the intent of the programs.
        But today the commercialization efforts of the IPP program are
    taking off. Eight IPP projects are now commercially successful,
    providing 300 long-term private-sector jobs in Russia and more that $17
    million in annual sales revenues. There are another 20 IPP projects
    poised for commercialization over the next year. We are pleased with
    the progress that the IPP program has made in the past couple of years.
        That brings me back to NCI. While the goals of the NCI program are
    to reduce the size and capability of the Russian nuclear weapons
    complex, it must address the unemployment that accompanies downsizing
    to accomplish that goal. NCI works with MinAtom to bring commercial
    development to the closed cities where the manpower requirements for
    nuclear weapons work are reduced or where entire plants stop weapons
    work.
        This is a difficult task. Even in the U.S. when we downsize our
    weapons workforce or shut facilities, finding new jobs for those who
    are displaced is the most difficult part. But the U.S. economy is
    robust, and in most cases, our economy is able to absorb the extra
    workers within a reasonable amount of time.
        In the closed cities in Russia, however, finding jobs for displaced
    workers is extremely difficult. There is little if any business
    culture, buildings are unsuitable for most western business, there are
    access rules, legal obstacles, and perhaps the largest difficulty is
    the Russian economy is smaller that it was a decade ago. But in spite
    of all these problems we have businesses that are interested in
    participating with us in working in the ``closed cities''. We try to
    provide them the necessary support to reduce their risks in putting
    jobs in these ``closed cities,'' and helping them become successful. We
    are coordinating with the ISTC and the IPP program in this effort to
    develop jobs in the closed cities. However, the charters of the ISTC
    and the IPP program make it difficult for them to sponsor some of the
    types of activities that will make it more attractive for businesses to
    come to the closed cities; such as refurbishing buildings, and
    implementing manufacturing activities. With proper coordination, the
    combination of programs will make the prospect for successfully
    bringing commercial jobs to these cities much higher.
        You might ask, ``if the Russians are going to downsize their
    nuclear complex anyway, why should the U.S. spend its taxpayer dollars
    to help them?'' The answer is, we can make the downsizing happen
    faster, and our involvement also gives us a window into the Russian
    complex. This may also allow us to have greater confidence in any
    future unilateral arms reductions if we know more about what their
    complex looks like.
        Let me review the progress that the NCI program has made thus far.
    The program has been operating for roughly 2\1/2\ years and has been
    funded for only 26 months. Currently, NCI is working in three nuclear
    cities. The primary focus is on Sarov (formerly known as Arzamas-16)
    which includes both a nuclear weapons design laboratory and a nuclear
    weapons assembly/disassembly plant known as the Avangard
    Electromechanical plant. Sarov, and Avangard specifically, is MinAtom's
    highest conversion priority. Therefore, it is the one city we
    anticipate focusing on in fiscal year 2002.
        Last year, this program achieved an historic accomplishment when
    the Russians moved a concrete fence at the Avangard weapons facility,
    creating an open ``Technopark'' for commercial businesses. This is the
    first time that a Russian weapons facility has reduced its footprint as
    part of the nuclear weapons complex downsizing they have committed to
    undertake. The Russian Government has indicated that it intends to shut
    down two of its weapons assembly and disassembly facilities. First
    Deputy Minister of MinAtom Lev Ryabev stated in an international forum
    in January 1999 that the Russian Government planned to close down two
    of its four weapons assembly and disassembly facilities, beginning in
    2000. This intention was recently reinforced by a letter from Minister
    Ryabev to the NNSA in March 2001.
        Finally, I would like to address GAO's report that was just
    released on the NCI program. Let me first say that I was pleased to
    read that the GAO determined that: ``DOE's effort to help Russia create
    sustainable commercial jobs for its weapons scientists and help
    downsize its nuclear weapons complex is clearly in our national
    security interests.'' The report also highlights a number of issues and
    areas in the program that must be addressed and be improved upon. In
    concert with the administration's nonproliferation review, I am closely
    examining this as well as other Russian programs in order to maximize
    their effectiveness, and ensure they are operating in a manner
    consistent with national objectives and coordinated with other U.S.
    government nonproliferation activities.
        It should be noted that to produce this report, the GAO review team
    obtained cost data from DOE headquarters and the National laboratories,
    reviewed NCI projects to determine their impact on program goals and
    objectives, and traveled to Russia to visit Sarov to meet with MinAtom
    officials. Finally, the GAO also met with proponents of the European
    Nuclear Cities Initiative. NNSA NCI program staff were active
    participants in this review, and we are prepared to implement any and
    all policy recommendations.
        The report's focus on job creation as the primary measure of NCI
    program success differs from our perspective of the primary goal of the
    program, and does not fully appreciate U.S. experience with downsizing
    its own nuclear weapons complex. There are multiple measures of success
    and we are tracking and reporting on them. For example, NCI's
    performance metrics include facility downsizing, infrastructure
    upgraded or created, credits and investments provide to local
    businesses and so on.
        The GAO report cites MinAtom official dissatisfaction with the
    amount of NCI funds spent in Russia. The bottom line on funding is that
    MinAtom officials would prefer that monies be provided directly to
    them, to carry out major projects as they see fit. This top-down
    central planning approach has failed Russia in the past and will
    continue to fail. In the United States, we have learned that successful
    economic diversification is based on an active partnership among
    government, industry and the community. We are attempting to pass on
    this knowledge and experience to our Russian colleagues by working
    directly with the cities and institutes.
        In the initial start-up phase of the NCI program, the preponderance
    of funds were spent in the U.S. at the National laboratories. We relied
    on the labs to make the first contacts for the program since they had
    the ongoing, long-standing relationships. The labs also were integral
    in developing the projects jointly, and then providing the project
    oversight required. Now that the NCI program is entering a new phase,
    the role of the labs is being reduced and we anticipate meeting the
    congressionally-mandated 51 percent of funds spent in Russia in fiscal
    year 2001. We have instituted new processes, including financial
    reporting procedures that will help us meet that goal. Additionally, we
    have negotiated with some labs a reduction in their project management
    costs. Overall, lab activities will be reduced in coming years as the
    program attracts more commercial partners. We firmly believe that
    oversight of projects is important and that requires lab participation.
        The GAO noted that some project funding proposals have been
    submitted to both NCI and IPP, in the hope of maximizing the chances of
    receiving funding. This does not indicate that the two programs are
    identical. All project proposals undergo a vigorous interagency vetting
    and review process to ensure, among other things, that scientists are
    not getting funded twice for the same work.
        That said, I take the GAO observations and recommendations very
    seriously and thus tasked my management team to reexamine possible
    options for consolidating the NCI and IPP programs in an effort to
    achieve cost savings and other programmatic and administrative
    efficiencies. However, keep in mind this involves complex issues, and
    rather than rush to get the job done, I want to make sure that we do
    this right the first time. Therefore, I am waiting for the completion
    of the NSC reviews that are now underway, and the recommendations from
    my management team.
        As we continue to move forward, I am confident that much-needed
    changes will occur. This is the nature of these types of programs. In
    fact, the IPP program, in its early years, experienced similar growing
    pains and was the subject of significant criticism. IPP has now become
    a successful program. We want to make sure that NCI is on a similar
    path. Furthermore, the U.S. Government's involvement will decrease over
    time, and business participation will grow. This increased role for
    business will lead the Russians toward self-sustaining civilian and
    commercial enterprises in the city, and provide the basis for the U.S.
    exit strategy. Our plans are to continue with a strong focus on Sarov.
        Now, I would like to quickly touch on the rest of NNSA's
    nonproliferation programs. These programs address the issues of
    detecting, deterring, and impeding proliferation and the use of weapons
    of mass destruction. In addition to the programs already described,
    NNSA has extensive efforts in research and development (R&D) and arms
    control arenas. Our active role in the U.S. nonproliferation
    interagency community derives, in large measure, from the nuclear
    expertise found in the national laboratories. NNSA supports U.S.
    national, bilateral, and multilateral efforts to reduce the threat
    posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

                       RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

        A key nonproliferation strategy is to enhance the capability to
    detect weapons of mass destruction. The NNSA goal of integrating
    technical talent and policy expertise is evident in the
    Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program, which enhances U.S.
    national security through needs-driven R&D, with an emphasis on
    developing technologies to detect nuclear, chemical, and biological
    proliferation, and to monitor nuclear explosions.
        The following accomplishment is just one indication of the type of
    activities NNSA is involved with in the R&D area. NNSA is proud that,
    last year, we achieved a significant milestone in one of our R&D
    programs: The Multispectral Thermal Imager satellite was launched in
    March 2000. This small research satellite, designed and built by a team
    of NNSA laboratories and industry partners, will develop and test
    remote-sensing concepts that will add to our country's ability to
    monitor nuclear proliferation. The satellite has already achieved most
    of its design objectives.
        The Proliferation Detection program will develop the requisite
    technologies to detect nuclear proliferation. Our unchallenged lead
    responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation technology derives from the
    expertise and knowledge base resident in our nuclear weapons complex,
    and it provides a technology template for the detection of activities
    related to all weapons of mass destruction. The objectives of the
    detection program are:

             to produce technologies that lead to prototype
            demonstrations and resultant remote proliferation detection
            systems,
             to strengthen our detection capabilities to respond to
            current and projected proliferation threats, and
             to develop technologies that are subsequently made
            available to a wide range of government users, including DOD
            and the intelligence community.

        The separate, yet closely related, Proliferation Deterrence program
    seeks to develop technical options to prevent and deter proliferation
    of nuclear weapon technology and fissile materials. Research is focused
    on developing integrated sensor systems that will improve the accuracy
    and timeliness of information.
        With the fiscal year 2002 budget, we will continue to develop and
    demonstrate innovative remote sensing, sampling, and analysis
    technologies needed to improve early detection of a proliferant
    nation's nuclear weapons program or non-compliance with international
    treaties and agreements, as well as tracking foreign special nuclear
    materials.
        The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Program is designed to provide the
    U.S. with the technical capability to detect nuclear explosions.
    Specifically, NNSA technical experts are working to develop and deploy
    sensors and algorithms that enable the U.S. to meet its national
    requirements for detecting, locating, identifying, and characterizing
    nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, underground, or
    underwater.
        To meet threats posed by chemical and biological agents, the NNSA
    draws upon the diverse and extensive expertise of its national
    laboratories. The goal of the Chemical and Biological National Security
    Program is to develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies and
    systems that will lead to major improvements in U.S. capability to
    prepare for, and respond to, chemical or biological attacks against
    civilian populations. The NNSA is the primary agency developing non-
    medical technical solutions for this challenge. Our experts are
    involved in a broad interagency program to develop sensors that could
    detect the terrorist use of a biological agent at a large outdoor
    event, such as the Super Bowl or the Olympics.

                       ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION

        Another key strategy is promoting arms control and nonproliferation
    treaties, promoting agreements, and regimes, and developing the
    associated technologies to support them. The mission of the Office of
    Arms Control and Nonproliferation is to detect, prevent, and reverse
    the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials,
    technology, and expertise. It is the focal point within the NNSA for
    activities that support the President's nonproliferation and
    international security policies, goals, and objectives, as well as
    those activities mandated by statute. The program provides policy and
    technical expertise and leadership for NNSA and the Department in
    interagency, bilateral, and multilateral nonproliferation and
    international security matters. Several projects that had been
    initiated last year are not proceeding currently. The NNSA will not be
    proceeding with the Separated Civil Plutonium activities, due to
    Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. Funding for Spent Fuel Storage
    and Geological Repository in Russia are on hold, to allow time for the
    new administration's interagency policy review.

                  NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA

        While the bulk of our nonproliferation activities take place in
    Russia, the NNSA is also involved in nonproliferation and arms-control-
    regime projects in many other parts of the world. For instance, since
    1995, the U.S. and Kazakhstan have been working to reduce proliferation
    risks associated with three tons of weapons-grade plutonium. This
    material, which is located at the BN-350 fast-breeder reactor in Aktau,
    Kazakhstan, contains enough plutonium to manufacture hundreds of
    nuclear weapons. Furthermore, unlike most spent fuel, the majority the
    BN-350 spent fuel material poses no significant radiation hazard to a
    would-be thief. The project has reduced the threat to our national
    security posed by the vulnerability of the weapons-grade material.
    Further assistance to Kazakhstan, in implementing the secure long-term
    storage of the BN-350 plutonium-rich fuel, will be curtailed.
        The Aktau project will continue to support the IAEA in the
    implementation of internationally accepted safeguards measures over the
    material, continue to provide non-weapons-related employment for
    nuclear scientists in Kazakhstan, and provide security and
    international safeguards measures for the transportation and long-term
    dry storage facility for the BN-350 material.
        NNSA experts are also actively working in North Korea to reverse
    and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, by securing approximately
    thirty kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium contained in Nyongbyon 5
    megawatt reactor spent fuel. Similar to the objectives of the Aktau
    project, NNSA technicians have:

             packaged the 8,000 assemblies in canisters and placed
            those canisters under IAEA monitoring, and
             performed field operations to maintain packaged spent
            fuel in a safe condition, appropriate for future shipment.

        We are also supporting the IAEA in the implementation of
    verification and international safeguards of the material, while
    helping to prepare plans to support future shipment and disposition of
    spent fuel.
        In an effort to impede the use of weapons of mass destruction, the
    NNSA supports several projects targeted at reducing the amount of
    fissile material that could be available to potential proliferators to
    fashion into a nuclear device. In the Reduced Enrichment for Research
    and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, NNSA continues to work to reduce
    international commerce in civil HEU, by developing technologies to
    convert foreign and domestic research and test reactors from HEU to
    LEU.
        NNSA is also active in strengthening regional security and
    nonproliferation, not only on the Korean peninsula, but also throughout
    East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. We are doing this by
    participating in U.S. policymaking, promoting regional security
    dialogues, and sharing with key states in these regions the expertise
    of the National laboratories on technical measures to implement
    nonproliferation agreements. Under a program to strengthen the
    Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) regime, NNSA supports the
    U.S. in its efforts to negotiate a legally binding protocol to the 1972
    BWC. This protocol is part of a larger effort to deter noncompliance
    with the BWC and to reinforce the global norm against the proliferation
    of biological weapons. Our technical experts facilitate U.S. commerce
    through implementation of bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation
    agreements with our nuclear trading partners.

                  INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COOPERATION

        Another strategy for enhancing nuclear security is to improve
    operational safety and safety systems at nuclear facilities of concern.
    The NNSA is working to reduce safety risks at the 66 operating, Soviet-
    designed nuclear-power reactors in nine countries, through the
    International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation program. We plan to
    complete safety upgrades for these reactors by 2006. There are three
    reactors in Russia that are to be shut down, as part of DOD's program
    to eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium. These three
    high-risk reactors, at secured sites, are the oldest operating reactors
    in Russia, and have not received any safety upgrades under foreign
    cooperation. Safety upgrades at these production reactors, prior to
    their planned shutdown in 2006, are among our highest priorities.
    However, the scope of activities for improved safe operation will be
    limited.
        We are encouraged not just by our progress to address nuclear
    safety at operating reactors, but by the early closure of older
    reactors as well. The Ukrainian government shut down Chornobyl's sole
    operational reactor in December 2000, as planned. Our efforts to
    support the construction of a replacement heat plant at Chornobyl, for
    decontamination and decommissioning purposes, are also proceeding well.
    We were pleased when Kazakhstan also made the tough decision to shut
    down its BN-350 reactor. Our attention is now focused on plans for
    decommissioning and decontaminating the reactor's sodium coolant, which
    will ensure that this reactor can never be restarted. The fiscal year
    2002 budget request will allow us to complete one full-scope, nuclear
    plant training simulator, each, in Russia, Ukraine, and Slovakia. We
    will also strive for the completion of operational safety improvements
    at all plants in Russia and Ukraine. Safety procedure and reactor in-
    depth safety assessments will proceed, albeit at a delayed pace.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, I believe that NNSA is on the right course. The NNSA
    enjoys the strong support and endorsement of Secretary of Energy
    Spencer Abraham. It is the right idea to bring together the national
    security missions of DOE, and to focus our work with clear goals and
    plans, sharp lines of authority, and a strong view to the future.
        The scientists and engineers that are stewards of our nuclear
    arsenal have also been making important technical contributions to
    controlling, detecting, and deterring the use of weapons of mass
    destruction. NNSA's unique contribution is evident in the caliber of
    personnel working on these complex, interrelated threat reduction
    programs. Their expertise resident in our national laboratories has
    been honed by years of working in support of the U.S. nuclear complex.
    Our technical experts are ready and willing to share their
    nonproliferation and counter-proliferation experience with their
    counterparts in Russia.
        As a Nation, we may face no greater challenge than preventing
    weapons or weapons usable materials from falling into the hands of
    those who would use them against the U.S. or our allies. It has been
    more than a decade since the Berlin Wall fell, opening a new era in
    history. In many ways, we live in a more dangerous world now, since the
    demise of the Soviet Union. The threat to our safety and international
    security is more diffuse, which makes it harder to defend against.
    Rather than one monolithic threat, we must be prepared against rogue
    nations or terrorist organizations with interests inimical to ours. I
    am very proud of the nonproliferation programs that are rightfully part
    of the defense nuclear security enterprise. The review being conducted
    at the present time by the White House is timely and I am confident it
    will reveal that the NNSA's programs are making solid contributions to
    the national security of the United States.
        Again, I thank the members of this panel for their commitment and
    support of our mission, and for your support of the people of NNSA who
    actually do the work and accomplish the mission: scientists, engineers,
    technicians, policy planners, administrators, and so many others.

        Senator Roberts. We've been joined by the distinguished
    Senator and Ranking Member of this subcommittee, Senator
    Landrieu, and I would turn to her for any opening comments that
    she would like to make.

                 STATEMENT BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to
    welcome our panelists this afternoon to discuss this important
    program. I apologize for being a few minutes late.
        I want to express that when Senators Nunn and Lugar had the
    foresight in 1991 to start this program to assist Russia with
    dismantling its nuclear weapons, protecting its weapons-usable
    materials plutonium and uranium, and engaging its weapons
    scientists and engineers to stop the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction, the U.S. was committed to a major challenge.
    Although much has been done along these lines and great efforts
    have been made, much more remains undone.
        In January, a task force chaired by former Senator Howard
    Baker and White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler determined, ``The
    most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States
    today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or
    weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to
    terrorists or hostile nations and used against American troops
    abroad or citizens at home.''
        The task force went on to find that current
    nonproliferation programs in the Department of Energy, the
    Department of Defense, and related agencies have, in fact,
    achieved impressive results so far, but their limited mandate
    and funding fall short of what is required to address
    adequately this threat. We still have an opportunity to address
    these problems, but it's getting more difficult.
        Moreover, there's concern that if we don't continue to move
    quickly, we may lose this opportunity completely.
        Today we will hear from Ms. Jones, who will focus on the
    management issues arising from two of our programs. I look
    forward to her testimony.
        As we discuss these issues, which are serious, I hope we
    don't lose sight of the ultimate goal of all of these programs,
    and that we identify how to move forward so that we continue
    this valuable effort.
        Working with Russia is exceedingly difficult, and the DOE
    efforts are made even more difficult because they must occur in
    high security environments of closed cities. But there has been
    substantial success, and there will be more, if we don't
    collectively lose our will to preserve it.
        We in Congress must commit to ensuring the success of these
    programs, they're in our national security interest, they are
    not Russian aid programs.
        There's one specific issue I hope we can resolve by the end
    of this hearing, one of the nuclear cities projects has stopped
    because the NNSA has not released money for the project. I
    hope, Mr. Chairman, by the end of this hearing we'll be able to
    identify a way to release the money for this project to close
    the Avangard weapons facilities. It's important to get this
    effort back on track.
        I, again, welcome you all today. I look forward to your
    remarks, and I thank the chairman for calling the hearing.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Allard, would you like to make any
    comment?

                   STATEMENT BY SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
    opportunity. Just very briefly I want to recognize the great
    job that I think General Gordon is doing with the new agency.
    I've had a lot of respect for Ms. Jones. She's done some GAO
    studies in Colorado on Rocky Flats, and I think she's been very
    helpful in that regard. Just to recognize those two efforts,
    and I'll have some questions later on when we get around to
    questioning.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator. Ms. Jones, please
    proceed. Your statement will be made part of the record as well
    as findings of your report.

     STATEMENT OF MS. GARY L. JONES, DIRECTOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES
            AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

        Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. We
    are pleased to be here today to discuss part of the results of
    our reviews of two of DOE's nonproliferation programs.
        Our report on the Material Protection Control and
    Accounting program, or MPC&A, was issued in February. You have
    released our report on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
    program today.
        As part of our work, GAO teams traveled to Russia,
    including the closed City of Sarov, to review projects and talk
    with Russian scientists, institute directors, and government
    officials about both programs.
        Our testimony focuses on the impact of and future plans for
    each program. From an overall standpoint, both programs are in
    our national security interests, but their implementation poses
    significant challenges.
        The MPC&A program was initiated to help Russia protect the
    603 metric tons of nuclear material that are in forms that are
    highly attractive to theft. This is important because it only
    takes a few kilograms to build a nuclear weapon.
        Our report concluded that security systems installed by DOE
    are reducing the theft of nuclear material in Russia, but
    hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material still need improved
    security.
        As of February, DOE had spent about $61 million to, among
    other things, install completed or partially completed systems
    that protect about 32 percent of the at-risk material.
        However, DOE has not been allowed access to what Russia
    considers sensitive sites that contain several hundred metric
    tons of material because Russian officials are concerned that
    national security information would be divulged.
        The program's continued progress depends on the success of
    DOE negotiations to gain access to these sensitive sites and
    reach agreement with Russia on reducing the numbers of sites
    and buildings where security systems are needed.
        However, just installing security systems will not ensure
    long-term success. Our report noted that DOE has no mechanism
    to monitor the effectiveness of the installed security systems.
    But as General Gordon said, DOE has agreed to implement our
    recommendation to develop a monitoring system in cooperation
    with Russia.
        Turning to DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative, that program
    focuses on assisting Russia to downsize its nuclear weapons
    complex and create jobs for weapons scientists in the 10 closed
    nuclear cities that form the core of that complex. These cities
    are high security areas and access is very limited.
        As they downsize the complex, Russian officials have
    identified a need to create 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the cities
    over the next several years.
        We found that during NCI's first 2 years of operation, the
    program has had limited success. According to DOE, the program
    employs about 370 people, including many Russian weapons
    scientists who primarily work part time on research projects
    sponsored by the U.S. national laboratories.
        According to Russian officials, most of these scientists
    continue to work on Russia's weapons of mass destruction and
    also receive a salary from the Russian government.
        Further, about one half of the program's projects are not
    designed to create jobs but rather include community
    development activities such as the delivery of medical
    equipment and school exchange programs.
        Russian officials told us they did not want the community
    development projects because they didn't create jobs. Industry
    officials told us they were not relevant to their investment in
    the nuclear cities.
        Other factors that have contributed to the limited
    programming success include lack of Russian support, until
    recently no comprehensive review process, the remote location
    of the cities, and the poor economic conditions in Russia.
        With regard to funding, we found that a disproportionate
    amount of NCI program funds has been spent in the United
    States. About 70 percent of the $15.9 million that DOE spent
    through December 2000 was spent primarily in its national
    laboratories for such items as overhead, labor, equipment, and
    travel. The remaining 30 percent was spent for projects and
    activities in Russia.
        DOE is making changes this fiscal year in response to
    congressional direction to spend 51 percent of program funds in
    Russia. But DOE will have to more effectively monitor and
    control spending to meet this goal.
        Our report also raises a fundamental question for DOE. Does
    it need two programs with a shared common goal of employing
    Russian weapon scientists and, in some cases, implementing the
    same kinds of projects?
        In addition, to NCI, DOE's Initiatives for Proliferation
    Prevention (IPP) also has projects in Russia's nuclear cities.
    There is some duplication between the two, such as two sets of
    project review procedures and several similar types of
    projects.
        Further, IPP already had a presence in the nuclear cities
    before NCI was created. Since 1994, DOE has spent over $13
    million on about 100 IPP projects in five nuclear cities.
        We recommended and as General Gordon said DOE agreed to
    review whether these two programs should be consolidated into
    one effort to achieve potential cost savings and other
    efficiencies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
    respond to any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Ms. Gary L. Jones

    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION--DOE'S EFFORTS TO SECURE NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND
                      EMPLOY WEAPONS SCIENTISTS IN RUSSIA

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: We are pleased to be
    here today to discuss our reviews of two Department of Energy (DOE)
    nonproliferation programs that address important U.S. national security
    concerns--(1) improving the security of hundreds of tons of nuclear
    material at various sites throughout Russia and (2) employing weapons
    scientists in Russia's 10 closed nuclear cities so that they will not
    sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups trying to
    develop weapons of mass destruction. Both programs are managed by the
    National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation. Our testimony focuses on each of these programs'
    impact and future plans. Our statement is based on our February 28,
    2001, report on the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
    (MPC&A) program and our report on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)
    program that is being released today.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material
    Improving: Further Enhancements Needed. (GAO-01-312, Feb. 28, 2001) and
    Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in
    Russia's Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (GAO-01-429, May 3, 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Chairman, the following summarizes our findings: The security
    systems installed by DOE are reducing the risk of theft of nuclear
    material in Russia, but hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material
    still lack improved security systems. As of February 2001, DOE had
    installed, at a cost of about $601 million, completed or partially
    completed systems protecting, among other things, 192 metric tons of
    the 603 metric tons of nuclear material identified at risk of theft.
    These systems, while not as stringent as those installed in the United
    States, are designed to prevent individuals or small groups of
    criminals from stealing nuclear material. Russian officials' concerns
    about divulging national security information continue to impede DOE's
    efforts to install systems for several hundred metric tons of nuclear
    material at sensitive Russian sites. The program's continued progress
    depends on DOE's ability to gain access to these sensitive sites and
    reach agreement with Russia on reducing the number of sites and
    buildings where nuclear material is located and security systems are
    needed. DOE agreed with our recommendation to develop options for
    completing the program on the basis of the progress made in gaining
    access to these sites and agreement on the closure of buildings and
    sites. Furthermore, while DOE currently does not have a means to
    monitor the security systems it is installing to ensure that they are
    operating properly on a continuing basis, the Department has agreed to
    implement our recommendation to develop such a system in cooperation
    with Russia. DOE estimates that the MPC&A program will be completed in
    2020 at a cost of about $2.2 billion.
        Regarding DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative, we found that during its
    first 2 years of operation, the program had limited success. The
    Department estimates that the program employs about 370 people,
    including many weapons scientists who are primarily working on a part-
    time basis through research projects sponsored by the U.S. national
    laboratories. According to Russian officials, most of the scientists
    receiving program funds continue to work on Russia's weapons of mass
    destruction and are also receiving a salary paid for by the Russian
    government. About one-half of the program's projects focus on such
    activities as the delivery of medical equipment and school exchange
    programs and are not designed to create jobs for weapons scientists.
    With regard to funding, we found that a disproportionate amount of the
    NCI program's funding has been spent in the United States. About 70
    percent, or about $11.2 million, of the $15.9 million that DOE spent
    through December 2000 was spent in the United States--primarily at its
    national laboratories--for such items as overhead, labor, equipment,
    and travel. The remaining 30 percent was spent for projects and
    activities in Russia. DOE, in response to direction provided by
    Congress in a conference report on appropriations for fiscal year 2001,
    stated that its goal is to spend 51 percent of its program funds in
    Russia this fiscal year. DOE will have to more effectively monitor and
    control the program's spending to meet this goal. We also found that
    DOE's NCI program lacks a plan for the future. DOE agreed with our
    recommendations to develop a plan that addresses the program's future
    costs and a time frame with quantifiable performance measures to
    determine how effectively the program is meeting its goals and whether
    it should be expanded. DOE has two programs--NCI and the Initiatives
    for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)--operating in Russia's nuclear
    cities. We believe that DOE needs to address a fundamental question--
    does it need two programs with a shared underlying goal--employing
    Russian weapons scientists--and, in some cases, implementing the same
    kinds of projects? We recommended that DOE determine if these two
    programs should be consolidated into one effort to achieve potential
    cost savings and other efficiencies. DOE agreed to review both the IPP
    and NCI programs with a view toward consolidation.

                                   BACKGROUND

        In 1995, DOE established the MPC&A program to install improved
    security systems for nuclear material at civilian nuclear sites, naval
    fuel sites, and nuclear weapons laboratories in Russia. Terrorists and
    countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms
    of uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon. With
    the dissolution of the Soviet Union, DOE estimates that Russia
    inherited 603 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in
    forms highly attractive to theft. As of February 2001, DOE had
    identified 252 buildings at 40 sites that require nuclear security
    systems. In addition to installing security systems, DOE is providing
    sites with long-term operational assistance through equipment
    warranties, operating procedure development, and training. DOE also has
    projects underway to help Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom)
    and nuclear regulatory authority develop (1) a total inventory of
    nuclear material, (2) regulations to ensure the effective operation and
    maintenance of the systems, and (3) inspection and enforcement systems
    to ensure that sites comply with regulations. In addition, DOE is
    supporting security improvements for trains and trucks that transport
    nuclear material between and within sites and for nuclear material
    security training centers.
        DOE's Nuclear Cities Initiative focuses on weapons scientists in
    the 10 closed nuclear cities that form the core of Russia's nuclear
    weapons complex. Many of these cities are located in geographically
    remote locations and were so secret that they did not appear on any
    publicly available maps until 1992. These cities remain high security
    areas and access to them is limited. MinAtom manages the nuclear
    facilities that are located within the cities and estimates that about
    760,000 people live there, including approximately 122,000 residents
    who are employed in key nuclear enterprises. The Russian government has
    announced its intention to reduce the size of its nuclear weapons
    complex, and a critical component of this effort includes finding new
    employment opportunities for weapons scientists, engineers,
    technicians, and support staff who will lose their jobs from the
    downsizing of the complex. Russian officials have identified a need to
    create 30,000 to 50,000 jobs in the 10 closed nuclear cities over the
    next several years. DOE has tasked the National laboratories to play a
    major role in the program, which works in conjunction with another DOE
    program--the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention--that also seeks
    to employ weapons scientists in several countries, including Russia.

     DOE HAS REDUCED THE RISK OF THEFT FOR ABOUT 32 PERCENT OF THE NUCLEAR
      MATERIAL IN RUSSIA, BUT HUNDREDS OF METRIC TONS OF MATERIAL REMAIN
                                  UNPROTECTED

        DOE has installed completed or partially completed security systems
    in 115 buildings holding about 192 metric tons, or about 32 percent, of
    the 603 metric tons of weapons-useable nuclear material at risk of
    theft in Russia. DOE installed completed systems in 81 buildings
    protecting about 86 metric tons (or about 14 percent) of nuclear
    material. DOE has also installed partially completed systems known as
    rapid upgrades in 34 additional buildings protecting 106 metric tons,
    or 18 percent of the nuclear material. Rapid upgrades consist of such
    things as bricking up windows in storage buildings; installing
    strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; and
    establishing controlled access areas around the nuclear material.
    Completed systems include such components as electronic sensors, motion
    detectors, closed circuit surveillance cameras, central alarm stations
    to monitor the cameras and alarms, and computerized material-accounting
    systems. By installing rapid upgrades, DOE helps Russian sites
    establish basic control over their nuclear material while U.S. project
    teams finish installing the security systems.
        DOE's reviews of installed systems and our visits to nine nuclear
    sites in Russia indicate that most of the security systems are
    currently reducing the risk of theft. DOE has established a panel of
    experts known as the Technical Survey Team that examines project
    documents and meets with project teams to determine if the installed
    systems meet departmental guidelines for effectively reducing the risk
    of nuclear theft in Russia. From January 1999 through September 2000,
    the Technical Survey Team reviewed projects for 30 of the 40 sites in
    Russia. They found that systems at 22 of the sites were reducing the
    risk of theft by increasing the ability of the Russian sites to detect,
    delay, and respond to an attempted theft or otherwise strengthen
    control over their nuclear material. For six of the sites they
    reviewed, little or no risk reduction occurred because the systems were
    not installed in accordance with the guidelines, the teams did not have
    sufficient access to the buildings to install systems, or the systems
    were installed around material presenting a low risk of proliferation.
    For two of the other sites, it was too soon to tell if the systems
    reduced risk. DOE is taking steps to correct these problems.
        At the nine sites we visited in Russia where DOE had installed
    systems, we observed, among other things,

             storage vaults equipped with strengthened doors,
            locks, video surveillance systems, and alarms that can detect
            and delay thieves as they attempt to steal nuclear material;
             nuclear material containers equipped with computerized
            bar codes and tamper-resistant seals that allow site personnel
            to perform quick inventories of the material and determine
            whether the containers were tampered with; and
             nuclear material portal monitors that scan people and
            vehicles entering and leaving facilities to ensure that they
            have not taken nuclear material from storage locations.

        While DOE has made progress in installing systems, DOE's project
    teams do not have access to 104 of the 252 buildings requiring improved
    security systems. These buildings, located mostly at Russian nuclear
    weapons laboratories, contain hundreds of metric tons of nuclear
    material. MinAtom is reluctant to grant access to these buildings
    because of Russian national security concerns and Russian laws on the
    protection of state secrets. DOE officials told us they need access to
    these buildings to confirm the type of material to be protected, design
    systems that provide adequate protection for the material, ensure that
    the systems are installed properly, and ensure that the sites operate
    the systems properly. DOE recently reached a draft agreement with
    MinAtom to provide program personnel with greater access to sensitive
    MinAtom sites. According to DOE officials, even with the agreement,
    some of the more sensitive MinAtom sites will remain inaccessible to
    program personnel but the agreement, when concluded, will allow the
    program to further expand its work.
        Just installing security systems will not ensure the long-term
    success of the MPC&A program. DOE's Technical Survey Team and our
    observations provide only a snapshot of how effectively the installed
    systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. DOE
    has not established a means to systematically measure the effectiveness
    of the security systems that it has installed at Russian nuclear sites.
    However, DOE is currently collecting information from individual sites
    that would be useful in measuring the new systems' effectiveness. For
    example, DOE project teams visit sites and observe systems that have
    been installed, and at certain sites, DOE has contracts with the
    Russians to collect information on the functioning of equipment. In
    addition, before installing security systems, DOE and Russian site
    officials conduct vulnerability assessments, which assess the
    probability of the existing nuclear security systems at the sites to
    prevent nuclear material theft. In commenting on a draft of our report,
    DOE agreed with our recommendation to develop a system to monitor, on a
    long-term basis, the security systems at nuclear sites in Russia to
    ensure that they continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to
    steal nuclear material.

     DOE FACES CHALLENGES IN ADHERING TO MPC&A PROGRAM'S COST PROJECTIONS
                                AND TIME FRAMES

        From fiscal year 1993 through February 2001, DOE spent about $601
    million on the MPC&A program in Russia. DOE spent about $376 million,
    or 63 percent of the $601 million, on installing security systems at
    Russia's civilian sites, nuclear weapons laboratories, the Russian
    navy's nuclear fuel sites, and the Russian navy's nuclear weapons
    sites. DOE spent the remainder of the $601 million on, among other
    things, operational assistance and program management.
        According to DOE, it will complete the MPC&A program in 2020 at a
    total cost of $2.2 billion. However, DOE officials told us that the
    cost estimate and time frame for completing the program are uncertain
    because DOE faces challenges in implementing the program. For example,
    DOE does not know how much assistance it will need to provide Russian
    sites with to operate and maintain the security systems. Some sites
    where DOE is installing systems are in better financial condition and
    have a greater potential to generate revenue than other sites and
    therefore are more likely to have the resources to maintain the
    security systems. Other sites will need more DOE assistance to maintain
    the systems. Furthermore, because of a lack of access to many nuclear
    sites, DOE is not certain about how many buildings will require
    security systems or when it will be able to start and complete the
    installation of these systems. DOE is also working with Russia to
    consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and convert the
    highly enriched uranium in these buildings into forms that cannot be
    used in nuclear weapons. While this effort could reduce the program's
    costs by reducing the number of sites and buildings needing systems,
    MinAtom has not yet identified which buildings and sites it plans to
    close. Our report (GAO-01-312) recommends that DOE include in its
    strategic plan, currently under development, (1) an estimate of how
    much assistance is required to sustain operations at each site on the
    basis of an analysis of the costs and the sites' ability to cover these
    costs and (2) options for completing the program on the basis of the
    progress made in gaining access to sensitive sites and the closure of
    buildings and sites. DOE concurred with this recommendation.
        doe's nuclear cities initiative projects have had limited impact
        During its first 2 years, NCI has had limited success in meeting
    the program's principal objectives--creating jobs for weapons
    scientists and helping to downsize Russia's weapons complex. According
    to DOE, the program is employing about 370 people, including many
    weapons scientists who are working primarily on a part-time basis
    through research projects sponsored by the U.S. national laboratories.
    About 40 percent of the work was generated through the Open Computing
    Center in the closed city of Sarov. The center's director told us that
    the part-time employees are also working at the weapons design
    institute in Sarov on weapons-related activities and are receiving
    salaries from the institute. The center has had some success in
    attracting business investment, and DOE officials estimated that, with
    successful marketing to commercial businesses, the center would be able
    to employ 500 people by 2005.
        Although some jobs have been created, about one-half of the 26 NCI
    projects are not designed to create jobs for weapons scientists.
    Instead, these projects focus on, among other things, such activities
    as the delivery of medical equipment and school exchange programs. DOE
    officials told us that these community development projects are needed
    to make the nuclear cities more attractive to business investment.
    However, Russian officials have criticized the projects because they do
    not create jobs for weapons scientists, which they believe is the
    primary goal of NCI and the 1998 agreement between the United States
    and Russia. Furthermore, none of the industry officials we spoke with
    said that they would be more likely to invest in the nuclear cities
    because of municipal and social improvements in the nuclear cities.
        Eight of the program's projects are designed to develop sustainable
    commercial ventures, but only one of these has successfully created
    jobs. Numerous factors have contributed to the limited success of the
    NCI projects. Some projects have been canceled or delayed because of
    the lack of Russian support and cooperation. Other reasons for these
    projects' lack of success include poor economic conditions in Russia,
    the remote location and restricted status of the nuclear cities, and
    the lack of an entrepreneurial culture among weapons scientists.
    Furthermore, DOE and national laboratory officials have told us that
    the Department's project selection process has been inconsistent and
    ``ad hoc.'' According to the program director, projects were approved
    for funding without a comprehensive review process in order to
    implement the program quickly and engage the Russians. In January 2001,
    DOE issued new program guidance that includes more detail on project
    selection and approval. For example, the new guidance will give
    preference to those projects with the strongest prospects for early
    commercial success and those in which the start-up costs are shared
    with other U.S. government agencies, Russian partners, and/or private
    entities. While the guidance, if effectively implemented, will address
    the problems with DOE's inadequate project-selection process, it
    remains unclear to us why DOE took over 2 years to develop these
    procedures when similar procedures already existed under the IPP
    program.
        Despite the numerous problems we found with the NCI projects, the
    program has made some strides. For example, according to DOE officials,
    one of the most successful projects involves the conversion of weapons
    assembly buildings at the Avangard weapons facility in Sarov into
    production space for commercial ventures, including the proposed
    establishment of a kidney dialysis manufacturing facility. The program
    has helped facilitate the relationship between a Western business and
    the Russian weapons institute, and DOE has allocated about $1.5 million
    to support this effort.
        Interestingly, Mr. Chairman, the most successful commercial effort
    we observed in the nuclear cities involved a major U.S. computer firm
    that employs former weapons scientists in Sarov. This effort, which
    began about 7 years ago, has been undertaken without U.S. government
    assistance and now employs about 100 scientists. When we visited the
    software operation in September 2000, we were told that the employees
    work full-time and that their salaries are up to three times what they
    had been paid at the weapons institute.

    MAJORITY OF NUCLEAR CITIES PROGRAM FUNDS HAVE BEEN SPENT IN THE UNITED
                                     STATES

        From fiscal year 1999 through December 2000, the expenditures for
    NCI totaled about $15.9 million. Of that amount, about $11.2 million
    (or 70 percent) was spent in the United States, and about $4.7 million
    (or 30 percent) was spent for projects and activities in Russia. The
    U.S. national laboratories' costs to implement the program represented
    the bulk of the funds spent in the United States and included such
    items as overhead, labor, equipment, and travel. In fact, 75 percent of
    the funds spent by the laboratories were for overhead and labor costs.
    DOE officials told us that laboratory expenditures, although
    significant, were part of startup costs for NCI. They noted that the
    program has taken longer to start up because of the economic problems
    facing Russia and the barriers involved in trying to start new
    businesses and related activities in the nuclear cities. DOE officials
    told us that they were concerned about the amount of funds spent by the
    laboratories to administer the program--particularly the overhead
    costs--and have taken steps to reduce these costs such as by managing
    some projects directly from headquarters. These officials also told us
    that laboratory costs will be reduced and that the laboratories' role
    will diminish as commercial investors develop business contacts in the
    nuclear cities as a result of the program.
        The $4.7 million in expenditures for Russia included contracts with
    Russian organizations to buy computers and other equipment, a small
    business bank loan program, and various community development projects.
    Furthermore, MinAtom officials made it clear to us, during our
    September 2000 visit to Russia, that they were dissatisfied with the
    amount of program funds that had been spent in Russia. The First Deputy
    Minister of MinAtom told us that it was his understanding that DOE
    planned to spend the majority of program funds in Russia and wanted to
    know what happened to these funds. He said that the lack of progress in
    the program increases the negative views of the program held by various
    Russian government officials, who allege that the program is a way for
    the United States to gain access to weapons data in Russia's nuclear
    cities.
        In response to direction provided by Congress in a conference
    report on DOE's fiscal year 2001 appropriations, DOE stated that its
    goal is to spend at least 51 percent of its program funds in Russia
    during this fiscal year. DOE will have to more effectively monitor and
    control the program's spending to meet this goal. Regarding future
    program expenditures, the Department has not developed a plan that
    addresses the program's future costs and a time frame with quantifiable
    performance measures to determine how effectively the program is
    meeting its goals and when and if the program should expand beyond the
    three nuclear cities. In 1999, DOE officials believed that the total
    funding level for NCI could reach $600 million over a 5-year period.
    However, the program's director told us that because the program had
    not received expected funding levels during its first years of
    operation, he is uncertain about the program's future costs and time
    frames.

      DUPLICATION HAS OCCURRED IN THE OPERATION OF DOE'S TWO PROGRAMS IN
                            RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR CITIES

        DOE has two programs operating in Russia's nuclear cities--the
    Nuclear Cities Initiative and the Initiatives for Proliferation
    Prevention--that share a common underlying goal--to employ Russia's
    weapons scientists in nonmilitary work. We believe that DOE needs to
    address a fundamental question--does it need two programs operating in
    Russia's nuclear cities with a shared goal and, in some cases, the same
    types of projects? The operation of these two similar programs has led
    to some duplication of effort, such as two sets of project review
    procedures and several similar types of projects. Both programs provide
    Russia's nuclear cities with funds and since 1994, DOE has spent over
    $13 million on about 100 IPP projects in five nuclear cities, including
    the three nuclear cities participating in NCI--Sarov, Snezhinsk, and
    Zheleznogorsk. One U.S. national laboratory official told us that there
    was not a clear distinction between the two programs, and other
    laboratory officials noted that some projects have been proposed for
    funding under both programs, have been shifted from one program to
    another, or have received funding from both programs. The IPP program
    director told us that although he did not believe that the two programs
    were duplicative, there is a potential for duplication to occur because
    both have a common approach for creating jobs in the nuclear cities.
    Both programs reside within DOE's Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration; have
    adjoining offices; and share staff to perform budget, travel, and
    secretarial functions.
        Our work shows that some of the failures of NCI's commercial
    development projects might have been avoided if DOE had a common
    project approval process and incorporated some of the elements of the
    IPP project selection process from the onset of the NCI program.
    Furthermore, most of NCI's initial commercial development projects
    would not likely have been approved under the IPP program's more
    rigorous approval process. This is because, unlike the IPP program, NCI
    did not require that projects have industry partners or demonstrate
    commercial viability until January 2001, when program guidance was
    issued. In addition, NCI has recently (1) begun to develop a more
    systematic process, as IPP already has, for obtaining the views of
    business or industry experts on commercial development and (2) adopted
    practices established under the IPP program regarding the funding of
    projects. In commenting on a draft of our report being released today,
    DOE agreed to review both programs with a view toward consolidation.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We would be happy to
    respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee
    may have.

                          CONTACT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

        For further information on this testimony, please contact Ms. Gary
    L. Jones at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to
    this testimony included Gene Aloise, Charles Bolton, Ross Campbell,
    Joseph Cook, Glen Levis, and Joseph O. McBride.

        Senator Roberts. General Gordon, in some ways I think
    perhaps if we were a month down the road or maybe 2 or even 3
    months down the road, we might be better served with an ability
    to respond to some of these questions, and that is a timing
    issue, that obviously you do not have your full team up and
    running.
        But you have indicated that hopefully that will be done in
    2 or 3 weeks or at least a month. Then the administration is
    conducting a review. They have made a budget request, but that
    is dependent, as I understand it, on the review that they are
    conducting. There may be some flexibility in that regard.
        You are conducting your own review in regards to the IPP
    and NCI programs. So we have three very time-sensitive
    considerations here. First, to make sure that you have your
    team up and running; second, the review by the administration
    reflects that any changes in the budget request; third, your
    own review.
        I am not finding fault with this. This is just the way
    things are under the circumstances, but tempis fugit and time
    marches on in how the authorizers and appropriators work around
    this place. While we have a little bit of time, it really is
    not very much.
        Can you give us a general estimate? I am not trying to pin
    you down. Many of these things, two of them at least, well, all
    three of them really you have no way of speeding that up other
    than to plead your case before the administration.
        But could you comment on these three items in regards to
    when we might be up and running with team Gordon?
        General Gordon. With respect to the administration's review
    that's under way, most if not all of the programs have been
    presented to the review panels. So they are beginning to
    wrestle with their decisions--with their recommendation
    process. I frankly don't know how long it will take to write
    that up.
        But the process has been very interactive with meetings
    held several days each week, in looking at each of the
    programs, not just DOE programs and NNSA programs, but other
    programs across the government and looking at them
    comprehensively. The technical part of that work is basically
    wrapping up now in real time.
        Senator Roberts. Are we about a month away, 2 months? I do
    not mean to be picky about this, but we do have an
    appropriations process to get through, and we have to treat the
    appropriators well.
        General Gordon. I can't speak for them, but that would
    certainly be the time frame I'm thinking of it. About a month
    or so is the kind of time frame but that's only an estimate.
        Senator Roberts. If you could relay to the folks in charge
    that the Roberts-Landrieu team was getting a little testy on
    the issue.
        General Gordon. There's probably a little of that among the
    people trying to implement the programs too because we don't
    want to go down a road or make a major investment or commitment
    and find out we're a little bit out of sync with the overall
    approach that the administration would have us take in these
    programs. Should we show common interest in them, Mr. Chairman?
        With respect to internal work, we will all want to tie that
    to the new member of the team as soon as the deputy
    administrator is there, and it won't take very long to do that.
        Senator Roberts. Isn't that name going to be forthcoming
    very quickly?
        General Gordon. I'm hopeful that it is within 2 weeks or
    less. But, again, we're just waiting for the announcement to be
    made by the President.
        But what I want to comment on is that while those processes
    are going to take a bit of time, more than any of us would
    like, we're not standing still, for example, in amending the
    initiatives we talked about, the project review proposals and
    the recommendations that are being made in the NCI report.
        For example, Mr. Baker and his team have already adopted
    those review cycles. So we're putting those in place as we go.
    Not waiting for other reviews to take place on the things that
    we can, in fact, do, and we are proceeding.
        We are proceeding at a good pace on many of the programs
    where we know we can and have folks in Russia this day working
    with some of the Navy programs. So we proceed at a good pace on
    those programs.
        Senator Roberts. General, according to the GAO and I think
    it is common knowledge, that any continued progress in reducing
    the risk of theft in regards to the nuclear material in Russia
    certainly depends on our gaining access to the Russian sites.
    What is the status of the department's effort to gain access to
    these sites?
        General Gordon. We've had some problems in the military
    side of MinAtom, and that's where we're attacking the problem
    now. We have had pending agreements with the Russians that are
    being negotiated and working ad hoc as we speak. It has been
    very difficult. We remain hopeful. But it has been difficult.
        Senator Roberts. The GAO found that most of the systems, as
    installed by you, are reducing the risk of theft. That is, I
    think, obvious. But we seem to be lacking a mechanism to
    monitor the effectiveness of the systems on a long-term basis.
    This may be a bit premature in regards to what we were talking
    about earlier, but what is DOE doing to implement their
    recommendation to develop a monitoring mechanism with the
    Russians? I emphasize the importance of establishing such a
    system.
        General Gordon. Just an example of trying to get some
    technology to work for us is trying to use some of the ideas
    that have been developed by ourselves and by the International
    Atomic Energy Agency to look at remote monitoring of sites.
        For example, using certain controlled video systems that
    would give us a report back that, in fact, systems are working,
    and guards are present, we've had at least the initial
    discussions, and I'm told by my colleagues that the Russians we
    are dealing with find this a fairly attractive program.
        We may be able to do that truly jointly on this one because
    they would like to do it themselves. But the short answer, Mr.
    Chairman, is that we are trying to put some technology to work
    for us in these areas. We fundamentally know how to do it as
    long as we can secure appropriate Russian agreement.
        I do take this idea of the sustainability of these programs
    very seriously. It's just not going to work if we go install
    the stuff, it breaks, and we walk away from it. That's
    absolutely critical to making this whole program work.
        Senator Roberts. One of the things that is obvious is the
    attempt to enable the Russians, help the Russians consolidate
    their material into fewer buildings, and then convert that
    material into forms that cannot be used in any weapon. By
    consolidation, the hope was we might end up spending less money
    and the Russians more.
        But it is my understanding that MinAtom has yet to tell DOE
    which sites and which buildings would be consolidated. Can you
    give us an update on that as to which sites and buildings would
    be consolidated?
        General Gordon. There are efforts being made in that regard
    right now by Mr. Gerard. But I would like to give you a more
    considered current answer for the record, Mr. Chairman, give
    you the most current.

                             Department of Energy,
              National Nuclear Security Administration,
                                  Office of the Administrator,
                                          Washington, DC, May 18, 2001.
    Hon. Pat Roberts,
    U.S. Senate,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Senator Roberts: It was a pleasure to testify before the
    Senate Armed Services Committee's Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee on May 15, 2001. At that time, I took two questions for
    the record from you. In response to your request for more detailed
    information about how the fiscal year 2001 funding to the Fresenius
    project will be used, documentation from the Lawrence Livermore
    National] Laboratory on the project indicates that the $3M of
    Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) funding will be used to
    provide facility improvements and basic process equipment that will be
    used in the dialysis joint venture. Fresenius, as part of its
    contribution, will provide the actual process/assembly line equipment.
        The improvements and basic equipment needed by the joint venture
    are such things as water, heating, sanitary, and telecommunications
    systems, testing systems, autoclaves, a quality control laboratory,
    air-handling systems, sterile steam, chilled water, cooling systems,
    electrical power distribution, upgraded fire protection, storage and
    mixing tanks, material storage, and material receiving functions. These
    are all part of the infrastructure upgrades needed in the Avangard
    facility for the dialysis project, which will be funded in fiscal year
    2001.
        In response to your request for an update on site and building
    consolidation: the Department of Energy (DOE)I National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) has witnessed successful closure of 21
    buildings located at several Russian sites and has converted more than
    2 metric tons of high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium
    (LEU). The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) has proposed an
    aggressive plan calling for the closure of 60 buildings through
    material consolidation and conversion of an additional 27 metric tons
    of excess weapons-usable HEU over the next ten years. According to
    MinAtom, specific details such as the name and location of the
    buildings planned for closure will become available once DOE/NNSA and
    MinAtom are engaged in negotiations on a bi-lateral material
    consolidation and conversion (MCC) agreement. The DOE/NNSA is prepared
    to table a draft Agreement as soon as it receives interagency approval
    to proceed.
        If you should have any additional questions please feel free to
    contact me or have your staff contact Laurie Harrison at (202) 586-
    7369.
                Sincerely,
                                                           John Gordon.

        Senator Roberts. All right. It took 2 years for DOE to
    develop the NCI program with guidelines that cover such basic
    management issues as project selection review and approval
    procedures. Some of us feel that time period--well, that that
    should have been done from the outset. Any comments?
        General Gordon. I think I would agree with you, sir. Again,
    what we've done in response to these issues, even on that
    particular one and some of the accounting programs, it's my
    understanding that the NNSA was responsive to the GAO even in
    the initial parts of their investigation and began to correct
    that in real time again as opposed to waiting for the their
    full reports to come out.
        But I must simply agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that if
    there are shortfalls in projects--if projects were not fully
    thought out at the time and if controls were not in place, we
    need not let that happen again.
        Senator Roberts. Where are you in encouraging the Russians
    in regards to cost-sharing?
        General Gordon. That's a continuing discussion with us in
    everything we do, and I think in most of these areas they have
    put up at least in kind in all of these projects. So it's on
    our list for every program we work, sir.
        Senator Roberts. One of the suggestions has been, and we
    looked into this in the last session of Congress and we are
    probably looking at it again very seriously in regards to how
    the NCI program differs from the IPP program; why there was a
    need to create a separate management structure to implement
    both? What are the differences in these programs? There has
    been a suggestion by the GAO that perhaps these programs could
    be merged and better managed. How do you feel about that?
        General Gordon. As I suggest in my statement, we're going
    to take a hard look at that as to how to proceed in that area.
    There are differences in the two programs, at least in how they
    were initially conceived, and they're thought of now.
        Senator Roberts. But the basic goal is the same?
        General Gordon. But the goal of the NCI program, the way we
    now talk about it, is to reduce the floor space, reduce the
    plants, and reduce the operation of the facilities to where the
    employment and other issues are by-products of that that
    naturally occur; where as, the IPP is a little bit more focused
    on employment itself and employment opportunities and
    commercial opportunities.
        But, as I said, Mr. Chairman, we do intend to take a
    serious look at that. Again, they operate a little bit
    differently. The IPP does operate in some of these cities. They
    operate in many other locations as well. They do not operate
    under a government-to-government agreement now.
        Again, just to repeat, we will take a very serious look at
    combining these programs and finding out whether we should
    combine the best of the two into one. Whether IPP should become
    NCI or NCI should become IPP or whatever the combinations are,
    that has yet to be determined. But we're taking that on as a
    considered look, sir.
        Senator Roberts. This is a cooperative program between the
    United States and the Russians. Now you have a pretty good feel
    and a lot of past history in dealing with the Russians. I do
    not think there is any question that the Russians are
    dissatisfied in some respects with both programs, more
    particularly NCI. What are their concerns and are they
    justified?
        General Gordon. I think some of the concerns are, as you
    pointed out and as Ms. Jones pointed out in her statement, the
    program has been off to a slow start, and there hasn't been a
    lot of money flowing into the program.
        On the other hand, some Russians have looked at it
    differently than others. The MinAtom, as itself, is essentially
    a controlled organization, and they would like to have the
    money up front and run their programs. What we believe we
    should do is operate inside the cities, which gives a totally
    different view and perspective on the program, and operate at
    some of the smaller levels that can build infrastructure and
    can build perspectives on business and economics that are not
    likely to come from MinAtom themselves.
        Senator Roberts. Let's get specific and bear with me here.
    MinAtom has sent DOE letters in the past year that have pointed
    out that Russia has only received $3 million out of the entire
    amount allocated. In the most recent letter sent last week,
    MinAtom states that they believe, ``there are other reasons
    impeding the implementation of the NCI agreement.''
        I continue, ``the most fundamental of those are the
    unsatisfactory funding for the agreed project's ineffective use
    of the allocated budget funds.''
        They go further by stating, ``we continue receiving quite a
    large number of requests for access to the closed cities. Such
    visits require significant funds to finance business trips,
    drawing resources from the project financing in the nuclear
    cities.''
        ``However, mere visits to the closed cities cannot
    obviously resolve the issues related to a job creation in the
    nuclear cities.''
        How do you plan to respond to them in regards to these
    concerns?
        General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, the requirements--commitments
    that Congress has levied and that we've accepted obviously,
    first off, to spend no less than 51 percent of the money in
    Russia, will be accomplished, and our goal is actually to begin
    spending numbers on the order of 65 percent on the projects, if
    at all possible, and I expect to be able to do that.
        I think the numbers, some of their own accounting and,
    again, I don't want to quibble over the amount too much because
    I certainly agree that the largest percentage of funds were not
    spent in Russia at the outset, but the balance is probably
    twice that because I don't think they count some of the work
    that has been done with the European bank and some of those
    other programs.
        But, again, Mr. Chairman, we need to spend more money in
    Russia, if we're going to do this program, and we need to spend
    it there.
        With respect to access as a whole, I don't know if there
    has been too much request for access in the past or not, but,
    again, I don't think we're going to be able to sustain these
    programs, and I don't think the business partners are going to
    play on them very hard if we don't have the degree of access
    needed. Again, we're in the middle of the discussions for the
    second or third or forth time, with the Russians right now.
        Senator Roberts. Let me--and I'm going to cease and desist
    here so I can turn it over to Senator Landrieu and to Senator
    Allard, but this sort of gets to your feeling in regards to
    what the Russians have said and what they will do or may not
    do.
        I think you are certainly aware last year's subcommittee
    established legislation that required the MPC&A program to
    establish an access policy with MinAtom and required the NCI to
    obtain a written agreement. Let me emphasize the words
    ``written agreement.'' Not intent, but ``written agreement''
    with respect to closure of some of its nuclear weapons assembly
    and disassembly facilities.
        Now, some may question that as to where we were so
    specific, and we had to be specific. But in dealing with this
    program, obviously you want to be as open and positive and have
    common sense, if I can use that term, with the Russians as
    possible.
        But we have a coequal in this business. It is called the
    House of Representatives. When we went to conference, it was
    very clear that they would not agree to continue funding unless
    we obtained a written agreement. You and I have talked about
    this a little bit in terms of Russian intent. Could you shed a
    little light?
        It seems to me, we may have to maybe come up with some out-
    of-the-box thinking or some art craft here. I do not think they
    are objecting to the transparency or the access. But I do think
    in regards to the written agreement that may pose some
    problems, and yet we think the program certainly merits further
    consideration. Any comment?
        General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, I don't know quite how to go
    with this, but I will say we have received from the Deputy
    Minister, Mr. Ryabev, what I think would be fair to call a
    commitment on his part and his agency's to begin the efforts to
    close out these facilities on Avangard. It's his document
    that's signed, and it's written to us. I guess the issue is
    whether that constitutes agreement or not.
        He's also on record, and we just came across it on a speech
    that Mr. Ryabev gave within the last couple of days to the Duma
    stating the very clear intent of MinAtom, talking to their own
    legislative body about their intent to close these facilities.
        So we have that record. They're speaking to themselves,
    this is openly available. We have a letter from Mr. Ryabev
    toward this point. I guess at issue is whether that satisfies
    the term ``agreement'' or not.
        I would also tell you we have gone back to Mr. Ryabev in
    real time, if there's anything that looks more like a formal
    agreement, it's possible that may prove different. I understand
    their perspective.
        I think, for the reasons that we've discussed and Senator
    Landrieu has discussed, that if there is a way creatively to
    release those funds towards that end, that would be a benefit
    towards many of the programs we're trying to do.
        In particular, where we are now kind of on a cusp with this
    dialysis company, they're ready to go. We think the Russians
    are ready to go. There's $3 or $4 million standing in the way
    of being able to do that.
        I don't want to stand it up as one of the only things, but
    this will be a measure of whether this program is going to be
    able to make it or not. If we get a real program in there with
    this kind of magnitude with potential to really take over a
    significant portion of this material, the jobs, the work, and
    the economic benefit that comes from that, it offers at least a
    signal to the other companies that are interested that they may
    actually be able to work in this environment.
        Conversely, if it falls apart, it probably sends a signal
    back to business partners equally.
        Senator Roberts. I concur with that statement.
        Senator Landrieu.
        Senator Landrieu. I have an interest in looking to see how
    we can actually work through this because I think this
    particular program is at a critical juncture here. I thank you,
    General, in your work and want to try to be helpful in making
    whatever changes are necessary to the program. But overall
    ensuring that the funding is there to move ahead with something
    that I consider and I think the chairman does and others a real
    threat--security risk to the United States.
        Again, to reiterate what I said in my opening statement,
    this is fundamentally a security issue for us.
        I really appreciate your help and support and want to
    submit for the record the letter that you referenced which I
    have a copy of here, Mr. Chairman, that may or may not be
    considered by some as a signed agreement. But it is very
    specific in what it says in terms of being ready to close this
    facility.
        There are 3,000 to 3,500 jobs at stake at this particular
    site. So I would like to just submit that to the record.
        Senator Roberts. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Landrieu. I also want to submit my other questions
    for the record. I have some for open and some for the closed
    meeting. Just to take my limited time before Senator Allard
    speaks to say how important I think it is to get this funding
    in a timely manner.
        Because if we do not, it is not going to be there when we
    go to ask for it. This program in the budget has been cut
    substantially, it has been recommended for cuts. The way things
    are moving around here pretty quickly that if we don't get this
    money either redirected, the money that's there released and
    then for next year that no matter how much we fix it and no
    matter how many private partners we may have, we are not going
    to have the funding to carry this out.
        I think it will be a real step backwards for the security
    of our nation. I just want to be on the record saying that. Our
    whole side, according, Mr. Chairman, to our Ranking Member,
    Senator Levin, is very concerned about this. I wanted to
    express this at this hearing and commit these for the record.
    Thank you.
        Senator Roberts. We had a good conversation yesterday with
    Senator Levin on the Senate floor, and his position is
    precisely that as described by the distinguished Senator.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The GAO identified
    duplication of effort between the Nuclear Cities Initiative and
    the Initiative for Proliferation and Prevention. In the nuclear
    cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, whatever, and----
        Senator Roberts. They have an allergy pill for that if you
    want to take it. [Laughter].
        Senator Allard. Apparently there's some other programs and
    you've reported those, Ms. Jones. Did GAO examine any of these
    programs for duplication and the possibility of consulting
    them? I think one of them that comes to light is the State
    Department's International Science and Technology Center
    Program.
        Ms. Jones. We have recently looked at that ISTC program,
    Senator Allard, but just from the standpoint of looking at the
    process that the program uses to select projects and also the
    process that the program uses to oversee how the science
    centers are functioning. So we did not look at it from the
    standpoint of duplication with IPP or NCI.
        Senator Allard. Does that possibility exist?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir, it does. Certainly they're going at
    the same kind of bottom line goal which is to keep weapon
    scientists, also scientists that work on chemical and
    biological projects working. They do it from a different
    standpoint. They basically look at contract research. They're
    not looking for sustainable jobs in the same way that the IPP
    program is looking.
        But, again, we certainly could look at that to see if there
    is potential duplication and a way to consolidate all of those
    kinds of nonproliferation activities.
        Senator Allard. I think that would be helpful. I hope at
    some point in time that we can.
        Now, on the Department of Energy's efforts, one of the
    issues raised again by the GAO report, General Gordon, is
    whether the department should be involved in the area of
    business development. They indicated in their report that there
    is some question as to how successful your business development
    efforts would be.
        I do believe the scientists at DOE are some of the best and
    the brightest in the technical areas, but I'm not so sure about
    their business acumen.
        GAO has noted the successful commercial venture in Sarov
    was done without U.S. Government assistance. The report noted
    that the company representative believed that linking the
    research and analytical skills of the Russian scientists with
    western companies would be more successful in attempting to
    start up new ventures.
        I wonder if you would comment on the role at DOE in the
    area of nonproliferation security sites and issues and what
    experience does DOE have in creating business from scratch?
        General Gordon. Senator, I think that the programs are
    basically evolving to the way you've just suggested and
    described it there.
        What we're doing with the NCI program now and its proposal
    for this dialysis company is helping provide the basis for
    them, for the company itself to come in and be able to conduct
    the work in that location. We're trying to provide basically
    government agreements, some seed money that would help move in
    that direction.
        The whole strength, Senator, of the IPP part of the program
    is exactly that. It's helping match up the technical side on
    both sides with the business folks on both sides. Through IPP
    we're literally putting--looking through the economic endeavors
    by facilitating contact by American businesses. So their point
    is well-taken and well-understood, sir.
        Senator Allard. On the European Nuclear Cities Initiative,
    there's a perception there that the Europeans are less willing
    to get in--consider the scientist as a possibility of serious
    threat. They're more focused on actual weapons themselves.
        Why do we perceive scientists as a threat and many of our
    European allies do not?
        General Gordon. I wouldn't propose to know why they don't,
    but the knowledge of how to do some of this stuff is just so
    important, and I think the more we can control, the more that
    we can keep this expertise, from marketing this expertise into
    other channels is to our net benefit.
        Senator Allard. The follow-up question, what kind of effort
    has our European allies done in trying to deal with the
    security of the material?
        General Gordon. I would like to give you an answer for the
    record on that, Senator. I don't have one. I don't have an
    answer on the top of my head. Let me give you a for-the-record
    answer.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                  Department of Energy,
                      National Nuclear Security Administration,
                                          Washington, DC, May 18, 2001.
    The Hon. Wayne Allard,
    United States Senate,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Senator Allard: It was a pleasure to testify before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee's Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee Hearing on May 15, 2001. At that time, I took a question
    that you posed ``for the record.'' I would like to provide you with the
    following information concerning the level of support our European
    allies have provided in securing Russian nuclear material.
        Although the U.S. has provided the majority of assistance to Russia
    in securing nuclear material, our European allies have made several key
    contributions.

             European Union (EU) organizations such as the Joint
            Research Center (JRC) and the Euratom Safeguards Office (ESO)
            have worked jointly with the Russian Federation (RF) in the
            areas of training, analytical capabilities, and reference
            materials.
             Germany and the United Kingdom have provided Material
            Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) assistance at Mayak
            facilities such as the Isotope Production Reactor Plant and the
            Isotope Production Plant, and at the RT-1 Fuel Reprocessing
            Plant. These efforts have been conducted with the knowledge of
            the U.S. MPC&A team but totally independent of U.S. funded
            MPC&A activities.
             The JRC is supporting the establishment of a model
            plutonium storage facility laboratory at the All Russian
            Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF)
            located in Snezhinsk for the purpose of developing the
            instrumentation that would be used in such a facility.
             European Safeguards Directorate (ESD) has purchased
            over $1M of MPC&A equipment for Gosatomnadzor (GAN) to use at
            power reactors and fuel fabrication facilities. This includes
            tamper indicating devices (TID) and video surveillance systems
            which are used by GAN for all Russian nuclear facilities.
             The German firm, Gesellschaft fur Anlagen and
            Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), provided consulting services and
            equipment to improve the site perimeter and building security
            systems at Bochvar Institute.
             Kurchatov Institute in Moscow has worked with the
            German government on physical protection upgrades.
             The Murmansk Shipping Company in Murmansk is working
            with the British and Norwegian governments on physical
            protection upgrades and has cooperated with the Swedish
            government on a material accounting system.

        If you should have any additional questions please feel free to
    contact me or have your staff contact Ms. Laurie Harrison at (202) 586-
    7369.
                Sincerely,
                                                           John Gordon.

        Senator Allard. General Gordon, would you talk a little bit
    about your new guidelines and measurements? GAO noted it took 2
    years to develop and implement the new procedures for the
    Nuclear Cities Initiative. I guess the question that comes up
    is why did you take that long or why was that length of time
    required?
        Also DOE, and apparently you've concurred with the
    recommendations of the report, but how long will it take to
    implement those recommendations?
        General Gordon. I expect to move pretty quickly on those.
    For example, the concept--I don't know the question to the
    answer why it took so long, I really don't. But, for example,
    the issue about the recommendation, we have a better program
    review and acceptance procedure that involved a multiple
    process of making sure, for example, economic viability. We
    have, in fact, already begun to implement that.
        The same individual that developed those procedures for the
    IPP program is implementing them now on the Nuclear Cities
    Initiative. So we're not letting any grass grow under our feet
    on these initiatives, sir.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Roberts. General Gordon, there is a great deal of
    support in Congress for the project that we were just talking
    about, the dialysis project; there is a great deal of support
    for additional funds.
        Senator Landrieu just spoke about that, and I believe that
    the request is around $3 to $4 million. I think, if I am
    accurate, that the suggestion has been made that at least some
    of that money could be transferred from the IPP program.
        But it is my understanding that, I know the IPP program has
    specific criteria that perhaps--that this program could not
    meet or at least that is my understanding of it.
        Can you agree, this is sort of a crossroads project here?
    Can you tell me what specifically that money would be used for
    in regards to this project? Or maybe you would like to get back
    to me on that?
        General Gordon. I could either give you an answer for the
    record or ask Mr. Baker to comment.
        Senator Roberts. If you could comment and then do both.
    Senator Levin is very supportive of this. I am supportive of
    it. I think with the budget numbers and the request we have, it
    is important that we know what that would be used for.
        General Gordon. Let me say at the outset that our
    understanding is exactly that, that there's about $4 or $4\1/2\
    million as the total amount. There is an initial thought that
    about $3 million of that could come from IPP. But the
    requirements and limitations on that funding make it, in fact,
    not available. Mr. Baker.

      STATEMENT OF KENNETH BAKER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
                 NONPROLIFERATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

        Mr. Baker. I'm Kenneth Baker, Acting Deputy Administrator
    for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Sir, we tried to work
    this out when Secretary Richardson was still the Secretary of
    Energy at that time. To finish the Kidney Dialysis Project, it
    would cost us $4\1/2\ million. We did not have that money in
    the NCI program.
        A decision was made by the past Director of
    Nonproliferation and National Security to use $1\1/2\ million
    of NCI money, which we had; and $3 million of IPP money to push
    this over the goal line to get this Fresenius project done and
    put it in the Technical Park.
        We found out after I looked at this when I took over Acting
    Director that there were rules and regulations for IPP that we
    could not meet while trying to use IPP money.
        The first one is the benefit to American firms. The $5-$6
    million that was provided to Livermore, who was the project
    manager on this particular project, could not be spent until
    certain IPP project requirements were met.
        The $3 million would push it over, but right now we're
    trying to work out how IPP can finish this off. That was the
    problem, sir.
        Senator Roberts. You have defined the problem, but you have
    not told me what you are going to spend it on specifically.
        Mr. Baker. The money is for seed money, seed money to go
    put Fresenius into the Technical Park to get it going, to get
    it up and running. This was the money that was promised for the
    seed money, and they would take it over completely after that.
    That's what the money was used for, to get ground money to get
    them going in the Technical Park.
        Ms. Jones. Mr. Chairman, if I could raise a question on
    that or add a point.
        Senator Roberts. Yes, please.
        Ms. Jones. During the course of our work, the NCI program
    has provided $1.5 million for this project already. During the
    course of our work, we were told that it had only been spent
    several hundred thousand dollars. So seed money has already
    been provided to this project. So it's a little unclear what
    the additional $3 million would be for, based on the work that
    we've done.
        Senator Roberts. It's very important, and I am going to
    have a comment a little bit later as I get to the second sheet
    here of the GAO report where 70 percent of the NCI fund is
    spent in the United States, 30 percent spent in Russia. It may
    not be a proper question or maybe I do not understand it
    correctly, but if it were $3 million and we still have that
    ratio, we were not there yet for the seed money. There aren't
    going to be that many seeds.
        General Gordon. I think the intent is to spend nearly all
    or all of it there, sir.
        Senator Roberts. So that $3 to $4 million would be spent
    entirely by the seed money or for the seed money to score the
    touchdown or----
        General Gordon. It's my understanding.
        Senator Roberts. There are a lot of us who feel this is
    very important, and I do not want this to--I understand the IPP
    criteria, but I also understand that--we need to know exactly
    what this money is going for. I appreciate the term seed money,
    but I wonder what that means.
        General Gordon. It includes getting the facility up and
    running, getting the water supply up and running, the power
    source that would make it go. It's establishing that core
    infrastructure.
        Senator Roberts. I am an event-oriented guy. If you can
    spell that out to me like, ``OK, Roberts, I am going to turn
    the water on.'' That makes sense. If you say seed money, who
    knows how many grants we have running around on seed money. All
    right, enough of that.
        General Gordon. Water, electricity, doors, walls.
        Senator Roberts. That makes sense.
        I have to ask, OK, you know what's coming. If there was a
    boy named Sue, we have a girl named Gary. I should not do this,
    I apologize. Do you want to make any comment about that?
        Ms. Jones. All I can say is I can give you my mother's
    phone number. She liked the name and I was the first. I have
    three brothers. I'm the only girl.
        Senator Roberts. Bless your heart. I apologize for that. I
    will catch heck for that from staff.
        Ms. Jones. No problem, Senator. I've been getting the
    question all my life.
        Senator Roberts. My name is Pat Roberts, my first name is
    Charles, and you can call me Chuck if it bothers you.
        OK. Let me ask a couple of questions in regards to your
    work. Your review found that the department is installing
    systems that reduce the risk of theft in Russia. Can you give
    me any comments for the basis of your findings?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Our findings were based on
    reviews conducted by a DOE technical survey team as well as
    visits to nine sites in Russia. The technical survey team is a
    group of experts that DOE has put together to look at these
    projects and how they were installed to make sure they were
    following the criteria that DOE has set out for success.
        During the course of our review, we looked at the reports
    they did on 30 sites. This technical survey team found that 22
    had been installed correctly and reduced the risk of theft.
        Also we saw a lot of things on the site visits we did to
    nine different sites. We saw such things as video cameras being
    installed. We saw hardend doors and locks, things that hadn't
    been used before. We felt it was comfortable for us to draw the
    conclusion that what DOE was doing was reducing the risk of
    threat to nuclear material.
        Senator Roberts. I don't want to speak for every member of
    the subcommittee, but I think in terms of priorities we were
    very insistent that that would be one of the priority goals. So
    I am very pleased at your observation.
        I asked General Gordon about the Russian view. Of course it
    depends on the Russian, I suppose, that is there today. The
    posthumous period. But their view of the NCI program, in your
    view, what did they like and what did they not like about it?
    It is a cooperative program.
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir, the officials that we talked to, and
    we talked with MinAtom officials, we talked to officials in
    Sarov both at the weapons institute as well as the open
    computing center and the deputy mayor of the city. These
    officials provided a consistent view when it came to the fact
    that they're serious about downsizing the weapons complex. They
    also believe there is a role for the U.S. Government to help
    them do that.
        The MinAtom officials we talked to were very disappointed
    and dissatisfied with the level of assistance they were getting
    under the program. They also believed it did have limited
    success in terms of the numbers of sustainable jobs that had
    been provided.
        They also felt that lack of success was increasing the
    skepticism that others in Russia had that this program was
    really just there to get the U.S. in the door to get
    information on their weapon activities.
        Officials in Sarov were very grateful for the program, but
    they were also a little dissatisfied with how it had been
    implemented. They expressed some displeasure with the European
    bank project because they felt that the funds that had been
    given out through loans under the bank really weren't focused
    on jobs for the weapons scientists. They were small loans. They
    weren't starting new businesses, they were really focused on
    the retail establishments. So they didn't really feel that was
    getting at the goal of employing weapon scientists.
        Senator Roberts. When, in fact, if I can read my writing
    when I was taking notes in regards to your summary here, that
    was in fact the primary goal with regards to weapon scientists.
    There may be other programs that are social and economic in
    nature that would improve the environment of a community, but
    basically the goal was in regards to the weapon scientists; is
    that not correct?
        Ms. Jones. That's correct. While the community development
    projects are, on their face, good projects, they really didn't
    contribute to getting jobs for the weapons scientists.
        Senator Roberts. You talked to a lot of industry officials
    in regards to your study. Give me a take on their attitude
    about any impediments that they found in regards to commercial
    investment in the nuclear cities. I am not talking about the
    NCI program or the IPP program, but their investment.
        Ms. Jones. Sure. The industry officials we talked to really
    painted a very cautious picture about investing in Russia as a
    whole, in particular the nuclear cities. They told us that
    Russia really doesn't present a business-friendly environment
    because it lacks a market economy.
        Also its legal, financial, and banking systems provide for
    an uncertain investment climate as well as the uncertainty in
    terms of political stability.
        When looking at the nuclear cities, they found that the
    weapons scientists didn't really have a good business sense or
    marketing backgrounds. Of course, the point that all of us have
    been making about access to the cities is very limited. So
    those were the negative aspects.
        From a positive standpoint, they felt that they were very
    optimistic about a very talented pool of scientists,
    mathematicians, and engineers that they could tap in the future
    for their business ventures.
        The point that they tried to make to us is that industry
    must play to the strengths of the weapons scientists in trying
    to develop commercial opportunities in Russia.
        Senator Roberts. Let me get to a question that we have been
    mulling over for some time now. The NCI program and IPP
    program. You mentioned in your conclusion that perhaps they
    should be consolidated. Are these programs sufficiently
    different to warrant their continued separation, or I could put
    it the other way. Are they different to the extent the
    consolidation is not the way we want to go? What's your take on
    that?
        Ms. Jones. I appreciate the fact that General Gordon said
    DOE is going to consider and look at consolidating these two
    programs. What we saw is they have the same basic underlying
    goal of trying to create jobs for weapons scientists.
        We also saw that there are so many things happening in
    parallel. For example, they both have very similar review
    procedures. IPP had very much started to tap industry to help
    them figure out what commercial projects are working. NCI is
    just now starting to do that. So they could be working together
    on a lot of these avenues that they haven't been in the past.
        Also, we found that there were some similar projects,
    projects started in IPP and ended up in NCI. Projects were
    proposed to be funded by both programs, so we thought it would
    make more sense to consolidate the two, have some flexibility
    to cover the kinds of things that the NCI program has been
    focusing on that might be different from IPP, such as business
    development, education for scientists. That might become a more
    efficient program as a whole.
        Senator Roberts. You touched on the status of the European
    Nuclear Cities Initiative and a European consortium. I think
    you said 15 nations; is that correct?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, it's actually the European Union. The
    European Commission is the arm of the Union that provides this
    kind of money.
        Senator Roberts. So it is a commission out of the European
    Union not a consortium?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. OK, my mistake. It is 15 nations?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. The EU is into every other thing, they
    might as well be into this. Pardon my editorial comment.
        You also indicated that it was Italy that was taking the
    lead, and that they are making more efforts to cooperate vis-a-
    vis Russia; is that correct?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Senator Roberts. I asked you the question, as I recall,
    why? You indicated that they wanted to tap the resources of
    these scientists to be a specific help as opposed to a more
    generic kind of program. Am I on line there with what you told
    us?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir. In our conversations with the
    Italians, they're interested in focusing the efforts with the
    Russians on things like energy efficiency and cleanup of
    nuclear waste. They felt they would, rather than try to create
    sustainable businesses, contract with weapons scientists and
    use their expertise to help develop technologies and different
    things in those two arenas.
        Senator Roberts. Within the European Union?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Does that make sense to you?
        Ms. Jones. I think it does. I think what they're trying to
    do is say that we in the European Union, we in Italy have a
    need for some help in trying to develop technologies for
    cleanup, for energy efficiency. You have scientists that have
    backgrounds, mathematicians, engineers, and they want to tap
    that expertise in this particular arena.
        Senator Roberts. Interesting--I will get myself in trouble
    if I say that our programs tend to be somewhat patronizing. But
    it seems to me that maybe they are on to something here in
    terms of the approach. You get immediate employment, you are
    making a difference with exactly the kinds of things that you
    have expertise with. I am not trying to make a judgment here.
    Staff, don't go nuts now in terms of what is going on.
        Have they dedicated any funds to this? Where are they with
    this?
        Ms. Jones. This is really just a proposal that's in the
    discussion stage right now. We're told they would like to come
    up with $50 million to spend over the next few years, but it's
    really just a proposal at this point, Senator.
        Senator Roberts. They'd better fund ESDI first if they
    think they can do that, with all due respect.
        Seventy percent of NCI funds spent in the United States, 30
    percent spent in Russia as of December 2000. The majority of
    U.S. expenditures by national labs, three-fourths of lab
    expenditures for salaries and overhead, Russian officials very
    dissatisfied with the split of funding. I certainly would be as
    well.
        The DOE was directed by the energy appropriations folks to
    fund 51 percent. You want to comment on that? More especially
    with the example the Savannah River Site, and they move their
    overhead costs from 37 percent to 11 percent.
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Can't we get 70 percent of the funds? I
    wrote down here somebody said Russia thinks the United States
    has set up the program and is stealing the money. That is a
    little harsh, to say the least. We have to do better than this.
        Ms. Jones. During the course of our work in talking with
    the Savannah River Site officials about the program, they had
    changed their overhead fee from, as you said, 37 percent down
    to 11 percent.
        So we were hopeful that the Savannah River Site approach
    might be a model for the rest of the sites in the program. I
    know in talking with General Gordon about this, he's talking
    about his commitment to looking at this program from a
    management overview, and I would hope that the overhead would
    be something that they would be looking at.
        Senator Roberts. We had some discussion in regards to
    overhead costs. I am not going to take up the subcommittee's
    time to get into that to the extent that I wanted to, but I
    still need to be educated. We are going to be back in touch
    with you to see. I think you had, what, 27 projects?
        Ms. Jones. 25, 26, yes, that ballpark.
        Senator Roberts. Then I was asking questions about what do
    those overhead costs entail? Then we got into that to some
    degree, but I am very concerned about that, and I think the
    subcommittee is as well.
        We were going to try to have the NCI project target
    approximately 30,000 to 50,000 people over there; is that
    correct?
        Ms. Jones. What the Russians are saying is that they need
    to find jobs for weapons scientists. 30,000 to 50,000 jobs over
    the next several years. That's what they're looking for. Not
    necessarily that the U.S. has to find that number of jobs.
        Senator Roberts. Let me tell you what we hit during
    conference in regards to last year when we had the request for
    additional funds and to do a better job. It was tossed right
    back that the projects were employing about 374 people.
        Well, 400 people out of 40,000 doesn't quite cut it. In
    regards to any kind of progress. I am not trying to perjure
    this program, I am just saying what I have in terms of that our
    funding discussion. We had what I would call meaningful
    dialogue.
        In addition, they said that scientists still receive
    salaries from the institute while working on NCI-related
    activities, and you have that in your summary. One half of the
    projects are not designed to create jobs.
        Now, some of these things in terms of a drug program, child
    care program, environmental programs certainly could be
    justified as to their own worth. But that was not the goal or
    the original goal, as I understand it, with regards to
    employment of the weapons scientists; is that correct?
        Ms. Jones. That's correct. Our point, Senator, is when you
    have limited funds, are these the types of activities you want
    to focus on to try to get these jobs?
        Senator Roberts. You gave the example of a private company,
    after a considerable number of years, was able to or is able
    right now to pay 100 of the weapon scientists approximately
    three times the pay that they would receive under NCI/IPP. They
    are involved in software development. Could you amplify on
    that?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir. This is a company where one of the
    officials of the company did have some ties to Russian
    officials, and they worked through those ties to get into
    Sarov. They now are employing 100 individuals who were former
    employees of the weapons institute in Sarov.
        As you said, these individuals are making three times the
    salary, and they have cut their ties with the institute, unlike
    some of the NCI projects where they're still part time.
        So it did take them 7 years to do it.
        Senator Roberts. But it is successful?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. You visited that office or that building?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, we did. That's actually in the same
    building as the open computing center which is one of the NCI
    projects. They're on different floors. We were given a tour and
    talked with some of the scientists. They seemed all very busy
    and interested in what they were doing.
        Senator Roberts. Was this the program where you indicated
    there was an age difference in regards to the weapons
    scientists, or am I suffering my standard memory lapse?
        Ms. Jones. I think we raised that issue in regards to the
    European program that they are going to be targeting older
    weapons scientists. They felt that some of the younger
    scientists might have more flexibility in terms of future
    careers.
        Senator Roberts. What was the difference, if any? You say
    that the private company is on floor ``X'' and the NCI project
    is on floor ``Y''; is that correct?
        Ms. Jones. That's correct.
        Senator Roberts. You visited both?
        Ms. Jones. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Describe what was going on.
        Ms. Jones. Our experience at the open computing center was
    that mainly the scientists followed our team around. There
    didn't seem to be a lot going on versus when we were in the
    commercial space, the scientists were all sitting at their
    computers working away. That was our observation during the
    visit.
        Senator Roberts. You had one floor where they are working
    away not paying any attention to you, with all due respect,
    then the other looking at the friendly tap on the shoulder
    judge, if you will, and obviously they were showing you around.
        Again, I am not trying to perjure this. I found the same
    thing with the ISTC program that I had the opportunity to visit
    and always make that mistake of thinking it was an NCI project,
    which it wasn't. They were very happy to take you all around
    and explain why it was not working and why they needed more
    money. Why it really wasn't cogent to that.
        I appreciate that very much. Are other companies into this?
    Is this a growing kind of program here where private and
    international companies are able to do this?
        Ms. Jones. I think the NCI program is facilitating some of
    those companies coming into the closed cities.
        Senator Roberts. They are a catalyst then?
        Ms. Jones. They are a catalyst. They are a facilitator,
    absolutely.
        Senator Roberts. OK, good.
        I have no further questions. I appreciate your patience and
    thank you for responding.
        General Gordon and Ms. Jones, do you have any final
    comments you think that might be helpful?
        General Gordon. We had a good discussion, Senator. You know
    where we're trying to take this organization, where we're
    trying to take these programs. We're in broad accord with the
    recommendations that are being made by GAO, and we're going to
    head down those directions.
        Senator Roberts. Tell the folks downtown we need their
    review at double time. Well, no, just put quick time. We won't
    go double time.
        Ms. Jones, any final comments? Thank you for the job that
    you have done.
        Ms. Jones. Thank you, Senator, I appreciate it. No final
    comments.
        Senator Roberts. We will now proceed to the closed session.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Santorum follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum

        Chairman Roberts, thank you for scheduling this important
    subcommittee hearing today. I know that the U.S. Department of Energy's
    nonproliferation programs have been a key concern of yours. Your focus
    on the U.S. government's ``return on investment'' has been particularly
    helpful for Members of this subcommittee.
        I believe Members of the subcommittee would agree that Department
    of Energy nonproliferation programs such as the Nuclear Cities
    Initiative (NCI) and Material Protection, Control and Accounting
    (MPC&A) program are well-intended and are consistent with U.S. national
    security objectives. That being said, there are legitimate concerns
    that have been highlighted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
    on the performance of these and other nonproliferation programs. I am
    hopeful that today's witnesses will be able to discuss the GAO's
    conclusions and will be able to explore ways to improve on program
    performance.
        With respect to where NCI funds are expended, GAO's data portray a
    phenomenon that deserves further scrutiny and attention. I am concerned
    with GAO's conclusion that 70 percent of NCI program funds are spent in
    the U.S., rather than inside Russia. The GAO's observation that the
    Department of Energy's inability to obtain access to sensitive sites in
    Russia is constraining the MPC&A program also bears attention. Lastly,
    I am concerned with GAO's observation that the Department of Energy
    does not yet have the means to monitor the security systems it is
    installing to ensure that they are operating properly over the long-
    term.
        Again, I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and to
    a candid exchange on some of the conclusions reached by the GAO.

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Question Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

        1. Senator Roberts. General Gordon, the GAO report said that DOE is
    attempting to help Russia consolidate their nuclear material into fewer
    buildings and convert the material into forms that cannot be used in
    weapons. By consolidating the material, DOE may end up spending less
    money to install new security systems. However, MinAtom has yet to tell
    DOE which sites and which buildings would be consolidated.
        What is the status of DOE's efforts to get MinAtom to identify
    which sites and buildings will be consolidated under the program?
        General Gordon. The NNSA's Civilian and Conversion Division, which
    includes the Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) Project, has
    already successfully closed 21 buildings and significantly reduced the
    proliferation risk associated with more than 2 metric tons of very
    attractive high-enriched uranium (HEU) by converting it to low-enriched
    uranium (LEU). In addition, MinAtom has proposed an aggressive plan or
    ``roadmap'', which calls for the closure of 60 more buildings and the
    conversion of an additional 27 metric tons of HEU over the next 10
    years. According to MinAtom, specific details such as the name and
    location of the buildings planned for closure will be shared with the
    U.S. as soon as DOE and MinAtom are engaged in negotiations on a
    bilateral MCC agreement, which would provide an appropriate ``legal
    framework'' for the exchange of such sensitive information. For the
    last 6 months the U.S. has refused to begin negotiation of a bilateral
    agreement because of Russian/Iranian nuclear cooperation. DOE is
    prepared to table a draft agreement, as soon as it receives interagency
    approval to proceed.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

                                 NUCLEAR CITIES

        2. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, my understanding of the
    fundamental difference between IPP and NCI programs, other than the
    number of sites and facilities where the programs are engaged, is that
    IPP directly funds work for the scientists in the closed cities and
    institutes but NCI is designed to bring economic development.
        Is this understanding correct?
        General Gordon. NCI is designed to reduce the size of the weapons
    complex in the Russian nuclear cities. Economic diversification and
    development is a tool to achieve this goal. NCI removes functions and
    equipment from the weapons sites within the closed cities; reduces the
    physical footprint; and seeks to create sustainable, alternative non-
    weapons work outside of the nuclear institutes and within a functioning
    city economy.
        IPP, on the other hand, is a ``brain drain'' program that engages
    former Soviet weapon scientists at institutes across the New
    Independent States (NIS)--in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well
    as in Russia--in applied research projects having high commercial
    potential. The scientists comprise former biological and chemical
    weapons researchers and missile development experts in addition to
    nuclear scientists.

        3. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the GAO has recommended
    combining IPP and NCI. How could these programs be combined and still
    preserve the unique aspects of each?
        General Gordon. The GAO recommended that the NNSA Administrator
    ``determine whether the two programs should be consolidated into one
    effort--including a determination of what changes in authorizing
    legislation would be necessary--with a view toward achieving potential
    cost savings and other programmatic and administrative efficiencies.''
    NNSA is still in the process of making its determination and we will
    provide more information as it is available.

        4. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the NCI program has an
    agreement governing how the Russian government treats programmatic
    funds for tax and other purposes, the IPP program does not. As a result
    it works through the State Department sponsored International Science
    and Technology Center (ISTC) or under the NCI agreement.
        How important is this agreement to future efforts, given Congress'
    concern about not having programmatic funds taxed?
        General Gordon. We believe the NCI Government-to-Government
    Agreement is very important. It provides tax and liability protection,
    and the structure under which program activities can proceed. Such
    agreements are very difficult to negotiate and generally take at least
    a year, and often more, to achieve. In any reorganization involving IPP
    and NCI, it is important to protect the NCI Agreement, if possible.

        5. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, there has been criticism of
    the NCI program since its inception, nevertheless it does not seem to
    me to be in our best interest to walk away from the Russian nuclear
    cities.
        Do you agree that it is in our national security interests to
    continue to work with these cities?
        General Gordon. NCI was conceived as a national security program
    whose aim is to bring the Russian weapons complex more in line with
    post-Cold War realities, thereby advancing our own security. The
    Russian weapons complex is vastly oversized, decrepit, and starving for
    resources on the one hand, and dangerously capable of performing its
    core functions on the other. We continue to have a strong
    nonproliferation interest in maintaining our engagement with these
    cities.

        6. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, would you look at the broader
    objectives of this program and work to develop a program with the focus
    and flexibility to meet broad objectives?
        General Gordon. We agree with the approach. We are currently
    considering how to best preserve the broad objectives of NCI as we look
    at the best way to organize this program in the future.

        7. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, when Russia announced that it
    wanted help to reduce the size of its nuclear weapons complex, and shut
    down two of its four weapons assembly and disassembly facilities, this
    was viewed as good news. The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy,
    MinAtom, took a bold step when it made this announcement. The
    understanding was that if NNSA is successful in helping to shut down
    the facility at Avangard then it will proceed with work to shut down
    the second facility, at Penza-19. The fiscal year 2002 budget request
    for NCI is $6 million. This level of funding jeopardizes the shutdown
    of Avangard and will prevent the accelerated shutdown of Penza-19.
    Because DOE has only one similar facility, the imbalance between U.S.
    and Russian capabilities has been a concern for many years.
        Does it make sense to miss this unique opportunity and long
    standing U.S. goal to reduce Russian nuclear weapons manufacturing
    capacity?
        General Gordon. The NCI program continues to work with the MinAtom
    in order to encourage and facilitate the closure of its nuclear weapons
    assembly facilities. In order to take maximum advantage of the unique
    opportunities created by NCI's cooperative relationship with MinAtom,
    and to most effectively utilize the program's funds, NCI will focus its
    efforts primarily on facilitating the accelerated closure of Avangard,
    which is the best candidate facility among the four Russian nuclear
    weapons assembly facilities for accelerated closure.

        8. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, if the NCI and IPP programs
    were combined, how would the statutory provisions that govern each
    program have to modified?
        General Gordon. As part of our response to the GAO recommendation
    to consider merging the programs, we are currently researching this
    question, which involves legal and technical issues. We will provide
    the answer as soon as it is available.
        At first glance, however, they could be combined without
    significant statutory modifications. IPP's statutory limit on funding
    to the National Laboratories (35 percent) is both workable and
    consistent with DOE/NNSA's efforts to maximize the nonproliferation
    impact of program funds. IPP's legislation appears sufficiently broad
    to permit such additional activities as infrastructure support. There
    are requirements for projects funded under NCI that are not now part of
    IPP (e.g., the requirement to commercialize within 3 years). NCI also
    does not require the same matching requirements from industry as IPP
    does.

               THE LABORATORIES AND THE NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

        9. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, it appears to me that there is
    much confusion, and therefore criticism, about the role of the DOE and
    NNSA laboratories in the nonproliferation programs including IPP and
    NCI.
        What is the role of the labs in these programs and why are they
    important?
        General Gordon. The primary role of the labs in IPP is to ensure
    that the technical claims made by NIS institutes have merit and that,
    in the case of commercialization, the engineering transition from R&D
    to commercial production follows high and verifiable standards of
    excellence. The labs provide technical oversight for and conduct joint
    research with the Russian scientists who participate in IPP projects.
    In so doing, the labs greatly reduce the technical risks of doing
    business with NIS institutes. In addition, the labs play a key role in
    helping to ensure that funds intended for a bona fide commercial
    project are not diverted from their intended use. The laboratories also
    have key roles in the project development process, including technical
    evaluations of project proposals, validation of the weapons-research
    credentials of Russian scientists, and identification of potential
    dual-use problems. The laboratories also provide the legal connection
    with the U.S. private sector, through their cooperative agreement
    mechanisms, which allocate intellectual property from IPP projects that
    are commercialized by U.S. industry participants. These expanded non-
    scientific roles were important in getting the programs under way at a
    time when only the labs had access to the NIS institutes. These
    nonscientific roles are gradually transitioning to DOE/NNSA and the
    U.S. companies involved in commercialization.
        Laboratory involvement was also essential to the start-up of NCI,
    but it is business investment and economic diversification that are the
    long-term drivers. The laboratories have been significantly involved at
    the outset of many of NCI's efforts, but their role will diminish over
    time as business participation increases.

        10. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, what do the seven Federal
    employees do who manage the NCI program?
        General Gordon. Up until June 4, 2001, NCI had only four Federal
    employees. Currently we have five. These employees are: the Director
    and Deputy Director; a Federal staff member who serves as the desk
    officer for Sarov and who manages NCI contracts; a Federal staff member
    who serves as the Zhelezoogorsk desk officer and manages the project
    review process; and a new Federal staff member who is responsible for
    generating outside sources of finding for NCI projects.

                       RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

        11. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the NNSA research and
    development program has been effectively reduced $50 million in the
    fiscal year 2002 budget request from the 2001 appropriated level of
    $225 million. This is a very large cut and significantly undermines
    NNSA efforts to address proliferation and detection.
        Can you please describe what programs are not being funded and what
    you would do if you had the funding restored or increased?
        General Gordon. As noted in the President's budget request, let me
    briefly describe the fiscal year 2002 level of funding for the R&D
    program. The proliferation detection and deterrence program was
    decreased by a total of $36 million. As a result, in proliferation
    detection, the remote effluent detection area's hyperspectral
    activities and much of the lidar activities will be terminated. In
    deterring proliferation, the reduction will slow the development of new
    radiation detection materials and nuclear materials analysis
    techniques. Chemical and biological national security will decrease by
    $12 million. As a result, the milestones will be stretched out for
    technology development initiatives involving the development of new
    chemical and biological detectors, biological foundations
    understanding, modeling of interior structures, and transfer of
    decontamination. The decrease will also slow a demonstration project.
    The nuclear explosion monitoring program will decrease by $5 million.
    This decrease will defer work such as regional seismic characterization
    and support to the Air Force Technical Applications Center's advanced
    regional monitoring system.
        If the funds were available at the fiscal year 2001 appropriation
    level, we would return to the previously described R&D program and
    development schedule.
        If funds were available above the fiscal year 2001 appropriation
    level, we would anticipate: funding more new sensor concepts for
    detecting proliferation; expanding our research into detecting shielded
    fissile materials and detecting fissile materials at greater standoff
    ranges; expanding our regional seismic characterization and calibration
    program to match the Air Force Technical Applications Center's
    accelerated seismic station installation schedule; and making more
    rapid progress in characterizing a larger number of biological agent
    signatures.

        12. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the research and development
    program supports the U.S. effort to address the single greatest threat
    to U.S. national security interests?
        General Gordon. The R&D program is very important to providing the
    technical underpinning that supports government efforts addressing
    worldwide threats to national security interests. In fact, our focus on
    long-range R&D provides operational organizations with innovative
    systems and technologies to satisfy their nonproliferation mission
    responsibilities.

        13. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, will any other agency have
    the ability to pick up the shortfall?
        General Gordon. Since other agency programs have already defined
    and submitted their fiscal year 2002 budgets, it will be difficult for
    another agency to incorporate work we are deferring, particularly
    because other agencies' priorities are nearer-term and NNSA's focus is
    longer-term R&D.

        14. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, is the NNSA research effort
    closely coordinated within DOE and with other Federal agencies?
        General Gordon. The R&D program is coordinated within the DOE and
    with other Federal agencies. The R&D program is captured in the
    overall, integrated DOE National Security R&D Portfolio, and in fact
    closely leverages DOE investments in Defense Programs and the Office of
    Science. Coordination with other agencies is primarily documented in
    the Department of Defense/Intelligence Community/Department of Energy
    Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress
    and through the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working
    Group Report and Symposium, which is jointly chaired by the Departments
    of Defense, Energy, and State.

        15. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how will the funding cuts in
    nonproliferation and arms control affect existing programs that advance
    DOE and U.S. core capabilities in detection and monitoring of the
    development of weapons of mass destruction?
        General Gordon. The requested level of funding will slow the
    development of new and emerging technologies for detecting and
    monitoring the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly
    detection of emerging proliferation programs.

        16. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, what is the role of the DOE
    laboratories in the national effort to develop technologies to address
    proliferation risks?
        General Gordon. The DOE laboratories, especially the weapons
    laboratories, have unique, comprehensive understanding of nuclear
    weapons development, test, and production processes and the
    technologies needed to assess proliferation activities. In developing
    the technologies required to address proliferation risks, we are able
    to leverage current and past investments in the NNSA nuclear weapons
    program.

        17. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how do the efforts at the DOE
    laboratories differ from the efforts sponsored by DOD or other Federal
    agencies involved in this national challenge?
        General Gordon. The work we sponsor at the laboratories has a
    longer-term focus, enabling us to explore higher risk, revolutionary
    integrated system solutions to the difficult problems associated with
    proliferation, and we often assist other agencies address their most
    difficult proliferation questions. Additionally, because of our
    knowledge of the expertise at the laboratories, we are able to marshal
    multi-disciplinary, inter-laboratory teams to address the significant
    technical challenges. Other agencies tend to be driven by near-term
    requirements which lead them to short-term evolutionary development
    programs.

        18. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, while the NSC review is
    assessing the value of the existing Russian nonproliferation programs,
    is there any corresponding high-level assessment of the adequacy of DOE
    core competencies and fundamental technologies to detect and monitor
    the development of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world?
        General Gordon. There has been no NSC-level review of DOE
    proliferation detection and monitoring technical capability. However,
    the R&D program is reviewed annually as part of the preparation of the
    annual DOD/IC/DOE Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Report
    to Congress. The program is also coordinated within the interagency
    community as part of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology
    Working Group. The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program
    was reviewed by the Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory
    Committee, an independent panel of external experts who found that the
    DOE core competencies and fundamental technologies supported by the R&D
    program underpin our Nation's capability to detect and monitor the
    development of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. A copy
    of the Advisory Committee's February 25, 2000 report is attached.

                          INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY

        19. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how many reactors of the
    Chernobyl type are still operating, where are they, and what is NNSA
    planning to do about them?
        General Gordon. There are 13 RBMK (Chernobyl type) reactors still
    operating. Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant has two reactors.
    Eleven reactors are in Russia near her western border: four reactors at
    the Leningrad nuclear power plant located about 60 miles west of St.
    Petersburg, three reactors at the Smolensk nuclear power plant located
    about 250 miles southwest of Moscow; and four reactors at the Kursk
    nuclear power plant located about 300 miles south of Moscow.
        There are also three plutonium production reactors which have a
    design similar to RBMK type reactors. They are located in Siberia, with
    two at Seversk and one at Zheleznogorsk. These reactors are even older
    and the least safe reactors in the entire former Soviet Union. These
    three plutonium production reactors are still needed to provide heat
    and electricity to the local communities until replacement power is
    available in about 2005-2007. The administration is considering the
    possibility of implementing projects to improve near-term safety at the
    plutonium production reactors until replacement fossil power becomes
    available.
        Previously, the program has provided safety improvements in the
    areas of safety equipment upgrades, safety analysis, fire safety, and
    operational safety. For example: a safety parameter display system was
    completed at Kursk unit 2; an in-depth safety assessment was completed
    at Leningrad unit 2; fire safety improvements were implemented at the
    Smolensk plant; and at the Ignalina plant, excellent results have been
    achieved in upgrading the control and protection systems, installing
    safety parameter display systems, and implementing emergency
    procedures.
        The program plans to continue with a limited set of projects to
    improve safety. Safety parameter display systems are being completed at
    Leningrad units 3 and 4.  A project is underway to evaluate and
    mitigate pipe cracking problems due to intergranular stress corrosion
    cracking. Our planned support emphasizes the area of safety assessments
    in order to identify the weakest and highest risk components and
    procedures. An in-depth safety assessment is in progress at Leningrad
    unit 1, and a review of the Kursk unit 1 safety analysis is planned. At
    the Ignalina plant, we are providing limited technical assistance to
    complete a safety analysis for unit 2.

        20. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, the funds for these programs
    have been substantially reduced. What is the impact of the funding
    cuts?
        General Gordon. The reduced budget means that the program must
    reorient toward fewer and smaller safety projects, and more limited
    interactions between U.S. and Russian nuclear experts. As a result, the
    program will have less impact on the safety of the RBMK plants than
    otherwise would have been the case. These funding levels cannot support
    implementing specific upgrades at all 13 operating RBMK reactors.
    Therefore, the program will complete more general safety culture
    upgrades such as improving quality control procedures, emergency
    operating instructions, and configuration management systems in order
    to have the widest possible impact on safety throughout the country.
        In Russia, support for safety analyses will be limited, and no
    support will be available for safe shutdown evaluations or fire safety
    improvements (although they have been identified by international
    experts as key areas of concern). In Lithuania, we will not be able to
    fund any new safety projects, nor to provide any support for
    decommissioning.
        Besides the 13 RBMK reactors and the three plutonium production
    reactors, there are 54 VVER type Soviet-designed reactors operating in
    Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
    Many of these reactors need help to improve their safety systems,
    safety procedures, and safety analyses. We plan to provide very limited
    support to the Russian and Ukrainian reactors, but we will be unable to
    provide support to those in Bulgaria and other countries.
        We feel the program may need to serve an increasingly important
    role, considering that Russia plans to continue to operate its older
    reactors, including the RBMKs. In addition, with nuclear power as a key
    part of our national energy plan, it is important to minimize the risk
    of nuclear accidents abroad, as they would adversely impact the
    prospects for nuclear power in the United States. We hope that despite
    a smaller program with fewer nuclear safety projects, we will be able
    to continue to have a meaningful impact on Russia's ability to improve
    its nuclear safety and infrastructure.

                                    AVANGARD

        21. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, how do we know that the
    Russians are really closing the Avangard plant? We have heard that the
    plant workers are demanding that it not be closed.
        General Gordon. It is not surprising that the plant workers do not
    wish the plant to be closed. Warhead production is what they know best
    and, like people everywhere, many of them wish to go on doing what is
    familiar to them. However, the Russian officials have reiterated in a
    number of public settings and private meetings their desire to close
    Avangard, a desire that makes sense in the light of post-Cold War
    realities. NCI worked directly with Avangard to reduce 10 percent of
    the facility by moving the security fence line. Such cooperation
    suggests that the Russians are serious about their plan to close
    Avangard.

        22. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, will we have any transparency
    into this process?
        General Gordon. The best assurance of transparency is the continued
    involvement of the NCI program in Avangard's transformation. NCI
    officials and their laboratory contractors were the first Westerners to
    enter the Avangard facility. If NCI moves forward with its plans to
    develop businesses in the Avangard technopark, this will also help
    ensure both the transparency and irreversibility of the closure
    process. The NCI approach to Avangard is to convert more and more of
    the site for commercial ventures that provide alternative employment to
    weapons scientists. The site floor space has already been reduced by 10
    percent and we hope to keep reducing it by steady increments.

        23. Senator Landrieu. How will we know that they are not continuing
    nuclear warhead work? How do we know that the Avangard plant is not
    being used for a build-up in new tactical nuclear weapons?
        General Gordon. The Avangard plant is the oldest of the four
    Soviet-era nuclear plants; it has been in operation the longest, and
    its physical plant is the oldest, which is why MinAtom has selected it
    for early shut-down. From a manufacturing point of view, Russia would
    have to undertake a massive retooling and re-equipping of the plant to
    make new warhead production possible.  In essence, they would have to
    build a wholly new production line, which likely would be observable
    through alternative technical means.
        At the same time, accelerating the decommissioning of the existing
    warhead production lines will remove Avangard permanently from nuclear
    operations. Restarting warhead work at a ``clean'' plant would be very
    expensive and time-consuming, and once Avangard is decommissioned,
    Russia would not be able to quickly restart operations there. Thus,
    providing NCI's work not only reduces the current Russian weapons
    through-put, but also makes it harder to increase the level of
    production at Avangard as a result of its reduced size.

        24. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, aren't the Russians
    emphasizing nuclear weapons as a way to compensate for the weakness of
    their conventional forces?
        General Gordon. A debate has been ongoing in Moscow on this very
    issue, and it will probably be some time before we know its complete
    and final outcome. However, we do know that President Putin has lately
    made some significant decisions that point toward that outcome. Marshal
    Sergeyev, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces
    (SRF) and, in latter days, the Minister of Defense, had been the
    proponent of a nuclear emphasis in Russian military strategy. He was
    removed from his position in March, and is now serving as an advisor to
    President Putin. Just a few weeks ago, General Vakovlev, the Commander-
    in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, lost his job. The position was
    downgraded to a commander, the job was given to an individual who is
    not an expert on nuclear weapons, and the SRF was placed under the
    Army. In the meantime, Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, who during
    the debate has been a proponent of modernizing and strengthening
    Russia's conventional forces, has seen his position strengthened. This
    seems to indicate that the Russians will be emphasizing conventional
    modernization, not nuclear weapons. However, I defer to the
    Intelligence Community for a more authoritative and detailed response
    to this question.

        25. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, what happens if we don't
    support efforts to shut down Avangard? If it's so bad, won't the
    Russians close it anyway without us?
        General Gordon. Ending nuclear activities at this plant takes a
    significant amount of money and resources, both in direct and indirect
    costs. Russia may, in time, be able to accomplish the job, but not by
    the end of 2001, as they have said they would like to do. They have
    said that they are ready to begin downsizing their nuclear weapons
    complex, but that they would like our help in order to accelerate the
    process. From the outset, this has been a major rationale for NCI, and
    it has given us unprecedented opportunities to work inside the Russian
    nuclear weapons complex. At this point, a delay or halt in U.S. funding
    under the NCI would have the effect of sustaining Russia's capability
    to manufacture warheads at their current rate.

                               FUNDING DIVERSION

        26. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, is there any evidence that
    funds from the DOE/NNSA nonproliferation programs have been diverted to
    nuclear weapons development programs?
        General Gordon. [Deleted.]

        27. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, is there good cooperation
    between the DOE programs and the intelligence community?
        General Gordon. [Deleted.]

        28. Senator Landrieu. General Gordon, NNSA has been responsible for
    canning the spent fuel in North Korea as part of the Agreed Framework.
    Is there any evidence that this material has been diverted?
        General Gordon. There is no evidence to date that indicates North
    Korea has diverted any of the canned spent fuel. The canned material,
    slightly under 8,000 spent fuel rods, is currently stored under water
    in 412 canisters at North Korea's spent fuel storage facility in
    Nyongbyon, North Korea. The canisters have been sealed by the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA maintains a
    continuous monitoring presence at Nyongbyon, inspecting the seals on a
    recurring basis. In addition, continuous coverage is provided by IAEA
    surveillance cameras.

                                 NUCLEAR CITIES

        29. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, establishing a climate attractive
    to western business is hard. Doing business there is more difficult
    there, is even more difficult than doing business generally in Russia.
        How would you recommend attracting business to these sites, as
    opposed to just bringing some work to these sites?
        Ms. Jones. As noted in our report, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's
    Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Face
    Challenges (May 3, 2001, GAO-01-429), there are numerous impediments
    associated with trying to start businesses in the nuclear cities. The
    nuclear cities are geographically and economically isolated, access is
    restricted for security reasons, and weapons scientists are not
    accustomed to working for commercial businesses. As a result, western
    businesses are reluctant to invest in the nuclear cities. However, the
    successful collaboration of a major U.S. computer firm in the Russian
    nuclear city of Sarov demonstrates what can be accomplished over time
    if the skills of Russia's weapons scientists are properly matched with
    the needs of business. This was the most successful commercial effort
    we observed in the nuclear cities and it has been undertaken without
    U.S. government assistance. This effort which began about 7 years ago
    employs about 100 scientists who have cut all ties to Russia's weapons
    institutes. The U.S. company representative responsible for developing
    this business effort told us that the key to establishing successful
    commercial ventures in the nuclear cities is to identify the skills and
    capabilities of the scientists and match their skills to the company's
    specific business needs. For example, the company determined which
    scientists in Sarov had math and science backgrounds suitable for
    computer software development. These scientists were then trained by
    the company in software development and hired away from the Russian
    weapons institutes. We believe that the approach followed by this U.S.
    firm makes sense and could be used by other companies seeking to employ
    Russian scientists. Furthermore, we believe that DOE can play an
    important role in identifying the skills and capabilities of scientists
    located in Russia's nuclear cities and facilitating contacts between
    the scientists and U.S. companies interested in hiring them.

        30. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, in your report, you suggest
    combining the Nuclear Cities Initiative with the Initiatives for
    Proliferation Prevention Program.
        If this is done, what are the goals of the combined program?
        Ms. Jones. As noted in our report, both programs already share a
    common underlying goal--the employment of Russian weapons scientists in
    alternative, nonmilitary scientific commercial activities. Scientists
    who are employed in sustainable nonweapons-related jobs will be
    financially able to move out of the weapons facilities which will
    assist in the downsizing of Russia's weapons complex--another goal of
    DOE's efforts. Russian officials we met with told us that they are
    judging the success of DOE's programs by one standard--the creation of
    sustainable jobs. These Russian officials have criticized those
    projects, such as community development projects, that do not lead to
    employment opportunities or provide sustainable jobs for weapons
    scientists. We believe that DOE needs to concentrate its limited
    financial resources on those projects that will most realistically lead
    to sustainable employment for weapons scientists.

        31. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, if NCI and IPP are combined, what
    legislative changes would be needed to the language governing the IPP
    program and the language governing the NCI program?
        Ms. Jones. Both NCI and IPP operate under the same general
    statutory authority granted to the Department of Energy in 42 U.S.C.
    5817(a), 42 U.S.C. 7112(10), and 42 U.S.C. 5813(9). No changes would be
    necessary to any of these statutory authorities. The authorization
    acts, however, contain different requirements and restrictions on the
    use of appropriated funds under each program. Section 3172 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398)
    restricts the use of funds in the NCI program for the fiscal year.
    Section 3136(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) restricts the use of funds for the IPP program
    available in any fiscal year after fiscal year 1999. Some legislative
    alternatives for combining the programs are listed below.
        1. Congress could act now and

              (a) define the Initiative for Proliferation Program as
            including the Nuclear Cities Initiative activities.

                      Congress could add a definition section for IPP that
                    incorporates the definition of NCI and transfers NCI
                    2001 appropriated funds to IPP, thus creating one
                    program that would operate under current IPP
                    authorization requirements and restrictions. To do
                    this, Congress would also need to revoke authorizing
                    language that refers to NCI; or

              (b) enact more specific statutory authority, under which the
            combined program would operate.

        2. Congress could wait and combine the programs in fiscal year 2002
    authorization act.

                    Congress would set requirements in new authorizing
                    language for the combined program.

        32. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, does your recommendation imply
    that there should only be an IPP program with its fairly narrow focus?
        Ms. Jones. We would not characterize the IPP program as having a
    fairly narrow focus. The objectives of the IPP program are to (1)
    engage weapons scientists and institutes in productive nonmilitary work
    in the short term, and (2) create jobs for former weapons scientists in
    the high-technology commercial marketplace in the long-term. As noted
    in our report, IPP has funded over 100 projects in Russia's nuclear
    cities at a cost of over $13 million. The program also funds other
    projects at weapons institutes outside of the closed nuclear cities
    throughout Russia.
        We believe that combining the IPP and NCI programs could result in
    a more effective and efficient consolidated effort incorporating the
    best aspects of both programs. As noted in our report, both the IPP
    program and the NCI program share a common underlying goal--the
    employment of weapons scientists in nonmilitary work--and there is not
    a clear distinction between the two programs. Combining the two
    programs could alleviate many of the concerns we have with the
    implementation of the NCI program. For example, the IPP program already
    has established limits on the amount of program funds to be spent in
    the United States and Russia as well as a strengthened project review
    and selection process. We believe that any consolidated effort should
    be flexible to allow for worthwhile projects initiated under the NCI
    program such as business training and development activities while
    concentrating on those projects that lead to sustainable employment for
    weapons scientists.

        33. Senator Landrieu. Ms. Jones, the NCI program has an agreement
    governing how the Russian government treats programmatic funds for tax
    and other purposes, the IPP program does not. As a result, it works
    through the State Department-sponsored International Science and
    Technology Center (ISTC) or under the NCI agreement.
        How important is this agreement to future efforts given Congress'
    concern about not having programmatic funds taxed?
        Ms. Jones. While we believe the agreement is important, in our
    opinion, DOE could explore several options to avoid program funds from
    being taxed by the Russian government. For example, if the IPP and NCI
    programs are combined the government-to-government agreement between
    the United States and Russia for the Nuclear Cities Initiative can be
    renegotiated to accommodate the combined program. In addition, the IPP
    program seeks tax relief through the U.S. Civilian Research and
    Development Foundation--a U.S. nonprofit organization. Under this
    arrangement, IPP funds are transferred to the Foundation, which
    provides tax-exempt payments directly into the Russian project
    participants' bank accounts. DOE could explore whether this approach
    could also be used for all projects initiated under a program that
    consolidates the IPP and NCI programs.

        [Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2001

                                 U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
                                      and Capabilities,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

       COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEMILITARIZATION,
        DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND
                       ENGINEERING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:18 p.m. in room
    SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mary L.
    Landrieu (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Roberts,
    Allard, and Hutchinson.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
    W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine,
    general counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV,
    professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional
    staff member; and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen and Michele A.
    Traficante.
        Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Erik Raven, assistant to Senator
    Byrd; Jason Matthews, assistant to Senator Landrieu; George M.
    Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
    McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr.,
    assistant to Senator Hutchinson; and Wayne Glass, assistant to
    Senator Bingaman.

        OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Landrieu. Good afternoon and let me welcome all of
    you to our Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. I
    thank you for joining us this afternoon. I want to begin by
    thanking my most able ranking member, Senator Roberts, for his
    good work in this area, and look forward to working very
    closely with him as we did when our chairs were reversed. We
    have a wonderful relationship and will work closely together. I
    welcome our other members, Senator Allard and Senator
    Hutchinson. Thank you for your interest and your involvement in
    this important subject.
        Let me just do one order of business before we start with
    opening statements. We welcome all of you as we said, but we
    had a slight problem this morning. We did not receive some of
    the written testimony in the usual, customary manner. So, I
    just want to, on the record, really encourage our witnesses to
    try to get their written material to the staff, which is very
    helpful to them in helping us to be prepared for the meetings.
    This is the second time today this has happened. Please be
    mindful of that for future hearings.
        We are going start with our first panel. We have a lot to
    cover. This is the last of the Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee budget hearings this year. Due to the
    late DOD budget request, the ability of this subcommittee to
    hold more budget hearings has unfortunately been constrained.
    However, we are going to do the best we can under a tight
    timeframe and think we have done the best we could do.
        As a result, we have a very full agenda to try to cover
    some of the matters that we were not able to cover before. We
    are here today to discuss the wide-ranging efforts of the
    Departments of Defense and Energy to address weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Our witnesses today are Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy
    Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and
    Biological Defense; Maj. Gen. Robert P. Bongiovi, Acting
    Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Dr. Susan
    Koch, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat
    Reduction; and Robert Waldron, Assistant Deputy Administrator
    for Nonproliferation Research and Engineering at the National
    Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy.
        Today we will focus on the Cooperative Threat Reduction
    programs, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar, and the research and
    development efforts to assist both the warfighter and the wider
    community concerned broadly with weapons of mass destruction to
    detect, destroy, protect against, and stop the spread of
    weapons of mass destruction and weapons' usable materials. We
    will also discuss the U.S. efforts to destroy stockpiles of
    chemical munitions and stockpiles of chemical agents both in
    the United States and in Russia.
        In January, a task force co-chaired by former Senator
    Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler
    concluded, ``the most urgent unmet national security threat to
    the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
    destruction or weapons' usable material in Russia could be
    stolen, sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used
    against American troops abroad or our citizens at home.'' This
    threat is real and our work today is important. The report went
    on to state that this threat is a clear and present danger to
    the international community as well as to American lives and
    liberties.
        The task force concluded that much has been done by the
    programs that our witnesses here today represent, but much
    remains to be done. ``Current nonproliferation programs in the
    Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and related
    agencies have achieved impressive results thus far, but their
    limited mandate and funding fall short of what is required to
    address adequately the threat.''
        Today we would like to review many of those efforts to deal
    with this situation. We would like to understand where we have
    succeeded and where we have failed; how we can improve and the
    barriers left to achieving those results. Again, I welcome you
    all and look forward to hearing from each of you. I would at
    this time welcome any opening statement from our able ranking
    member, Senator Roberts, and then in turn the members who are
    present. After those opening statements we will hear from our
    panelists and then proceed to a round of questioning of
    whatever time will allow us.
        Senator Roberts.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS

        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to
    extend a very warm welcome to the witnesses this afternoon.
    Your work on the U.S. programs, as the chairman has indicated,
    that address the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction
    both at home and abroad represent some of our country's most
    important national security efforts. So, I want to thank you
    for your tireless work. I want to thank you for your dedication
    to this very critical mission. I want to thank you for the time
    and attention you have placed in preparing your remarks for
    this hearing. I know it is a tough job. As a matter of fact, we
    were working on my statement as of last night, so I stand
    guilty as you are. I look forward to receiving your testimony.
        The subcommittee has had a tradition of holding hearings
    that examine how the United States is implementing programs
    designed to address the present and future threats to the
    United States. We have held hearings in the subcommittee on
    cyber threats and critical infrastructure protection,
    terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, civil support teams,
    nonproliferation and Russian threat reduction programs, science
    and technology research and development, and joint
    experimentation. That's pretty wide pasture. Our jurisdiction
    is indeed broad. These hearings have established what I hope is
    a solid record of accomplishment and challenges in meeting the
    emerging threats that face our Nation.
        Today's hearing actually compliments the topics that the
    subcommittee has examined over the past 2 years. The programs
    we will hear about from you attempt to enhance U.S. strategic
    capabilities by developing and implementing technologies that
    give us the leading edge over known and potential adversaries,
    and provide the United States the ability to monitor arms
    control agreements. These programs combat threats posed by
    weapons of mass destruction either by improving security, as
    the chairman has indicated, or by eliminating the chemical,
    biological, and nuclear threats posed by these stockpiles.
    Finally, these programs augment the U.S. efforts to detect,
    deter, and protect vital national security interests to meet
    the challenges posed by the evolving threats of the 21st
    century.
        I cannot stress enough how important this work is and what
    a great supporter I am of the mission and your work and your
    dedication. I hope today's hearings will illustrate that point.
    I am particularly pleased that we will have an opportunity to
    discuss the U.S. chemical weapons demilitarization program. The
    $1.2 billion requested by the administration for this program
    will be necessary to support ongoing destruction operations,
    bring new facilities on-line, and ensure the safety of citizens
    in communities and towns adjacent to the destruction
    facilities.
        This subcommittee has been very supportive of this program
    and I intend to maintain that tradition. I will note, however,
    that the U.S. chemical weapons program is not without its share
    of problems. There have been growing concerns about oversight
    and management of the program. Many members of this
    subcommittee, as well as Senators Shelby and McConnell, have
    been outspoken in this regard. Congress, through the work of
    this subcommittee, has repeatedly directed the Secretary of
    Defense to take a greater oversight role in this program.
        Despite the public law that states that no one service will
    bear the financial burden of this program, the budget request
    for this program is included in the Army procurement account.
    That means that as a result, the decisions affecting Black Hawk
    helicopters, Abrams tanks, or M-16 rifles could impact or be
    impacted by funding for this program. Executing the chemical
    demilitarization program and meeting our obligations under the
    Chemical Weapons Convention is a national priority and should
    receive a commensurate degree of oversight from the Secretary
    of Defense. I am looking forward to hearing from Dr. Winegar on
    what steps have been taken to address these concerns.
        Now we have received your budget request for fiscal year
    2002. I hope you will be able to provide the subcommittee today
    with a clear and detailed discussion of how your budget request
    meets your mission and what you expect to accomplish with these
    requested funds. Shortly the subcommittee, as the chairman has
    indicated, will begin marking up the bill. I expect your
    testimony will contribute to the subcommittee's oversight role
    in the mark-up process, so we look forward to your statements
    and answers to your questions.
        I would say again to the chairman, thank you for holding
    this hearing and this concludes my opening remarks.
        Senator Roberts [presiding]. I would assume now acting as
    my role of chairman emeritus of the Emerging Threats and
    Capabilties Subcommittee, I would recognize the distinguished
    Senator from Arkansas.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON

        Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
    brief. We have a vote ongoing so I will make this opening
    statement very quickly so we can begin receiving testimony. I
    want to thank you for being here. I want to thank the panel for
    their willingness to detail specifically the budget requests.
    As the chairman mentioned, the chemical demilitarization
    program should be a top national priority. Pine Bluff,
    Arkansas, the Pine Bluff Arsenal, is one of the prime sites of
    the Department of Defense chemical demilitarization program.
    So, I am very interested in the budget numbers regarding that
    program and, as Senator Roberts said, the oversight by the
    Department of Defense.
        I will spend the bulk of my time during the questioning to
    discuss an issue that I think is very important not only to our
    national security but also to our force protection--that is the
    need for a vaccine production facility--a government-owned
    contractor-operated (GOCO) facility, the failure of the current
    program and the need to accelerate. I am disappointed that the
    administration only included $700,000 for this program. I think
    it needs to be accelerated.
        There is an article in the Chicago Tribune that appeared
    just last week regarding two deaths that occurred at the Great
    Lakes Naval Training Center; two of our recruits died of viral
    infections. It has been linked to the failure to vaccinate
    these recruits and the cessation of the production of the
    vaccine that would have protected them back in the 1970s
    because the manufacturing company determined that they could
    not make money at it; that there was a very small demand for
    the product and therefore it was not profitable for them in
    terms of revenue. That is what commercial companies do and I
    think that is the compelling reason that if we are going to
    protect our men and women in uniform, we need to have a GOCO
    vaccine production facility. So, I am going to have a few
    questions regarding that.
        I thank you for being here and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Senator Roberts. Senator, we have a vote that I did not
    realize that we would have so quickly and there are about 9
    minutes left. I know the chairman wants to hear your testimony
    directly. I do as well. Usually we try to rotate back and forth
    in the interest of time, but we put you off so much now, I
    think you might as well sit back and relax for about 15 minutes
    and we will go vote. We will declare the subcommittee in a
    temporary recess until we come back from voting. We apologize.
    [Short recess.]
        Senator Landrieu [presiding]. We thank you all for your
    patience. I appreciate it. We are going to wait just a moment
    because our members are very interested in the testimony. So,
    if everybody will just be at ease for a few minutes and they
    will be making their way back from this vote. [Pause.]
        We thank you all for your patience. I believe Senator
    Allard has an opening statement.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Madam Chairman, I do. In light of our being
    behind schedule, I am just going to ask permission that we put
    it in the record in its full context.
        Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

        Thank you Madam Chairman,
        I want to thank all of you for coming here today. Cooperative
    threat reduction, nonproliferation research engineering, and chemical
    weapons demilitarization are areas of significant importance to the
    United States and the world. We saw today at the earlier ballistic
    missile defense hearing that the United States is working to assure our
    security on all fronts. Just as we prepare a ballistic missile threat
    defense, we must also prepare defenses for the other major threats of
    our times. Nonproliferation, cooperative threat reduction, and BMD are
    together a ``defense in depth'' and each area needs development.
        The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has had great success in
    reducing the number of ballistic nuclear missiles that can threaten us
    and our allies. Additionally, the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
    Development Program has been successful at tracking and limiting the
    proliferation of nuclear threats. These endeavors coupled with our
    success in creating a robust missile defense system will certainly
    provide us a more secure world environment.
        In 1997, the Senate agreed to ratify the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. Meeting the milestones prescribed in this treaty is
    critical to our reputation and our credibility on the world stage. The
    destruction process at the Pueblo Army Depot in Colorado has shown the
    potential to hinder our compliance to the treaty, but I will continue
    to insist that all responsible parties work to avoid this.
        Thank you, I look forward to hearing today on the progress of these
    programs.

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator. I think we are ready
    for our panelists to begin. Dr. Winegar, please proceed.

      STATEMENT OF DR. ANNA JOHNSON-WINEGAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO
         SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE)

        Dr. Winegar. Madam Chairman and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before this subcommittee today to discuss the United
    States' chemical demilitarization program. I am Dr. Anna
    Johnson-Winegar, but for simplicity's sake, Dr. Winegar is fine
    for addressing. I am the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
    Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. My office
    is the single focal point within the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense responsible for oversight, coordination, and
    integration of the chemical and biological defense programs,
    counterproliferation support, chemical demilitarization, and
    assembled chemical weapons assessment programs.
        Today I would like to highlight for you the major changes
    that the Department of Defense is implementing with regard to
    the United States chemical demilitarization program. As you
    well know, Mr. E.C. (Pete) Aldridge was confirmed as the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
    in the second week of May. On May 21, after examining concerns
    related to program cost, schedule and management, Secretary
    Aldridge directed that this program be categorized as an
    acquisition category 1D program. This change is intended to
    streamline future decisions and oversight authority. It is also
    consistent with the size and scope of this program, the
    international treaty obligations, and the level of local,
    state, and Federal interest in the safe and timely destruction
    of our Nation's chemical weapons stockpile.
        In this capacity, Secretary Aldridge will oversee a
    defense-wide review that will provide him with a comprehensive
    assessment of our entire chemical demilitarization program.
    This defense acquisition executive review, and I will call it
    the DAE review, is an extensive and rigorous process that was
    initiated approximately 1 year ago when the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics--Dr. Jacques
    Gansler at that time--directed this total review of all program
    components. This includes the chemical stockpile disposal,
    chemical stockpile emergency preparedness, alternative
    technologies and approaches, non-stockpile chemical materiel,
    and the assembled chemical weapons assessment programs.
        As the status and future plans of each of these areas is
    examined, the following issues will be covered: The Chemical
    Weapons Convention compliance, life cycle cost estimates,
    program plans for closure of the stockpile facilities, and
    other organizational issues related to program management. This
    DAE review is scheduled to be held the first week of September.
        Another important focus of this review is the need to
    select a destruction technology for the chemical weapon
    stockpiles stored in Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky.
    In accordance with Public Law 105-261, the Department is
    performing detailed assessments of the associated costs,
    scheduling, and safety of incineration and the alternative
    candidate technologies for those sites. This portion of the DAE
    review will occur in the spring 2002 timeframe in order for the
    technology decision to be made consistent with the final
    environmental impact statements and the subsequent records of
    decision for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites.
        In closing, I wish to reemphasize that the Department's
    intention to address chemical demilitarization program
    management issues underscores our commitment to strengthening
    and improving overall organizational effectiveness. Change has
    already begun at the top with future changes expected to
    positively impact different aspects at all levels of program
    management.
        As we work our way through the DAE review, the Department
    will develop its recommendation for a decision on how to
    proceed in demilitarizing our Nation's chemical stockpiles. I
    welcome your comments on every aspect of how our program is
    proceeding. I also welcome the opportunity introduced by
    Senator Hutchinson to address his issues and concerns about the
    GOCO vaccine facility, which also falls under my purview.
        I thank you again Madam Chairman and this entire
    subcommittee for inviting me to testify here today and I look
    forward to working with each of you to advance our common goals
    of the safe and complete elimination of our Nation's chemical
    weapons stockpile and the furtherance of our chemical and
    biological defense programs. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Winegar follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar

        Madam Chairman and distinguished subcommittee members, I wish to
    thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee today
    to discuss the United States chemical demilitarization program. I am
    Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
    for Chemical and Biological Defense. My office is the single focal
    point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for
    oversight, coordination, and integration of the chemical and biological
    defense, counterproliferation support, chemical demilitarization, and
    Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) Programs.

                             RECENT PROGRAM CHANGES

        Today I would like to highlight for you the major changes the
    Department of Defense is implementing with respect to the United States
    chemical demilitarization program. As you well know, Mr. E.C. (Pete)
    Aldridge was confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics) in the second week of May. On May 21, after
    examining concerns related to program cost, schedule, and management,
    Secretary Aldridge directed that the program be categorized as an
    acquisition category-ID program. This change is intended to streamline
    future decisions and oversight authority. It is also consistent with
    the size and scope of this program, international treaty obligations,
    and the level of local, state, and Federal interest in the safe and
    timely destruction of our Nation's chemical weapons stockpile.
        In this capacity, Secretary Aldridge will oversee a defense-wide
    review that will provide a comprehensive assessment of our entire
    Chemical Demlitarization Program. The Defense Acquisition Executive
    (DAE) review is an extensive and rigorous process that began
    approximately 1 year ago when the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed a total program review.
    Subsequently, special panels consisting of cost, schedule and program
    analysts from the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD)
    and PM ACWA were established and have met consistently for the purpose
    of conducting a review of each program component. This includes
    chemical stockpile disposal, chemical stockpile emergency preparedness,
    alternative technologies and approaches, non-stockpile chemical
    materiel and the assembled chemical weapons assessment. As the status
    and future plans for each of these areas is examined, the following
    issues will be covered: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) compliance,
    life cycle cost estimates, program plans for closure of the stockpile
    facilities, and other organizational issues related to program
    management. The DAE review is scheduled to be held the first week of
    September.
        Another important focus of this review is the need to select a
    destruction technology for the chemical weapon stockpiles stored in
    Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky. In accordance with Public
    Law 105-261, the Department is performing detailed assessments of the
    associated costs, schedules, and safety of incineration and the
    candidate technologies for those sites. Our analysis also carefully
    considers public acceptability as a critical factor. We realize that we
    owe the communities our best, not necessarily the easiest, solution to
    the problem we face. This portion of the DAE review will occur in the
    spring 2002 time frame, in order for the technology decision to be made
    consistent with the final environmental impact statements and
    subsequent records of decision for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites. The
    Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Pueblo was released May 9,
    2001 with a 45-day public comment period that was extended an
    additional 45 days and will end August 8, 2001. The Blue Grass Draft
    Environmental Impact Statement is expected to be released by the first
    quarter fiscal year 2002.

                                 PROGRAM STATUS

        This year the chemical demilitarization program will enter a
    critical phase, with two new facilities scheduled to begin operational
    verification testing (systemization), and with Tooele chemical
    demilitarization facility continuing full-scale operations at our
    largest stockpile site. The state-of-the-art features at these
    facilities and ability to handle the throughput rates are unparalleled
    on a global scale. These efforts are indeed recognized by the
    international community as a major step towards continued compliance
    with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) destruction deadlines. I am
    pleased to report that as of July 5, 2001, the United States had
    destroyed 20 percent of the stockpile that existed when the CWC entered
    into force 4 years ago. The interim deadlines set forth in the CWC
    require 20 percent destruction by April 29, 2002, putting us nearly 10
    months ahead of the milestone.

                                 FINAL REMARKS

        In closing, I wish to reemphasize that the Department's intention
    to address chemical demilitarization program management issues
    underscores our commitment to strengthening and improving overall
    organizational effectiveness. Change has already begun at the top, with
    future changes expected to positively impact different aspects and
    levels of program management. As we work our way through the DAE
    review, the Department will develop its recommendation for a decision
    on how to proceed with demilitarizing our remaining chemical stockpile
    sites. I welcome your comments on every aspect of how our program is
    proceeding. I thank you, Madam Chairman, and this subcommittee for the
    opportunity to testify today. I look forward to working with you to
    advance our common goal of the safe and complete elimination of our
    Nation's chemical weapon stockpile.

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much.
        General Bongiovi.

        STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT P. BONGIOVI, USAF, ACTING
            DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

        General Bongiovi. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman and members
    of the subcommittee, I am Maj. Gen. Robert Bongiovi, the Acting
    Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I am pleased
    to have this opportunity today to testify on the mission of the
    agency. I would like to summarize my statement and request that
    it be included in its entirety in the record.
        Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
        General Bongiovi. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
    commonly referred to as ``DTRA'', was established in October
    1998 as part of the Defense Reform Initiative. The intent was
    to consolidate within one agency most of the DOD organizations
    executing weapons of mass destruction, or WMD-related missions,
    except for the Title 10 responsibilities of the services. This
    new, focused agency was intended to enhance overall Department
    understanding of the WMD threat and facilitate appropriate
    responses. Today, DTRA is far more than just the sum of its
    merging organizations. It is an innovative thinker and
    responder to the WMD challenge.
        Before proceeding further, it might be helpful to define
    the term ``weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD. The definition
    encompasses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However,
    it also includes radiological, electromagnetic pulse, and other
    advanced or unusual weapons capable of inflicting mass
    casualties or widespread destruction. In addition, conventional
    high explosive devices, such as those used in attacks on Khobar
    Towers and the U.S.S. Cole, are legally and operationally
    considered to be WMD.
        Although the spectrum of our mission is large, it can be
    simply divided into four major functions: WMD combat support,
    technology development, threat control, and threat reduction. I
    will summarize each of these in my following remarks. The WMD
    combat support function provides operational and technical
    support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the warfighting
    commanders in chief, the CINCs, and the services to engage the
    threat and challenges posed to the United States, its forces,
    and allies by WMD. For example, DTRA provided targeting and
    consequence management support to the Joint Staff and a U.S.-
    European Command during Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force.
    In conjunction with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic
    Command and the services, DTRA developed the first DOD Nuclear
    Mission Management Plan to sustain the U.S. nuclear deterrent
    in the years ahead.
        At the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    DTRA will integrate threat reduction support and response
    capabilities into the warfighters' contingency plans,
    operational plans, and theater engagement plans. Also at the
    direction of the Chairman, DTRA performs as many as 100 force
    protection assessments of U.S. military installations at home
    and abroad each year. These assessments identify ways in which
    base commanders can improve their force protection posture. At
    the direction of OSD, we also perform more detailed balanced
    survivability assessments of critical facilities.
        The technology development function develops, manages, and
    coordinates research and development activities underpinning
    other DTRA functions. The DTRA technology development function
    includes programs to provide both offensive and defensive tools
    to the warfighter; develop technology needed to support arms
    control; manage nuclear weapons effects simulators and
    simulation; and develop radiation hardening of microelectronics
    for the protection of our weapon and space systems.
        DTRA managed the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
    Program that developed the advanced unitary penetrator and hard
    target smart fuze used in Operation Allied Force in the former
    Yugoslavia. DTRA munitions effectiveness tools for the defeat
    of hardened/deeply buried targets and consequence management
    tools are in wide use. Among our top R&D priorities are
    improved tunnel and hardened/deeply buried defeat capabilities
    with emphasis on stand-off attack, faster detectors for
    chemical and biological agents, improved counterforce planning
    tools, and terrorist device defeat tools.
        The third function, threat control, maintains U.S.
    technological security through policy execution, implementation
    of technology security programs, and compliance and
    enforcement. It includes inspection, escort, and monitoring
    missions to help ensure compliance with arms control agreements
    and new non-treaty means of threat control. Major
    accomplishments within the threat control function include the
    establishment of the congressionally-mandated program to
    monitor foreign launches of U.S. satellites; reengineering and
    revitalization of the DOD export control process; and
    successful completion of all arms control missions.
        Finally the threat reduction function centers on the
    execution of the Cooperative Threat Reduction or ``Nunn-Lugar''
    program. This program assists the eligible states of the former
    Soviet Union with the dismantlement of WMD and reduces the
    threat of WMD proliferation. Specifically, it destroys
    strategic delivery systems, stores and safeguards fissile
    materials, and improves safeguards for WMD materials and
    warheads.
        Although our focus will remain on the warfighters, DTRA
    contributes to efforts to counter WMD terrorism at home. We
    share our WMD expertise with the Department of Justice, FEMA,
    the Center for Disease Control, and other Federal, state and
    local officials. DTRA also maintains an operation center that
    provides the warfighters and government officials on line
    access to a wide range of WMD expertise.
        DTRA also assists interagency exercise planning. We have
    identified issues that national, state and local decision-
    makers would face should such an event occur. At the national
    level, we have worked directly and regularly with officials as
    senior as the Attorney General. Moreover, we have an important
    relationship with the Joint Forces Command's Joint Task Force
    for Civil Support. As a combat support agency, we offer
    planning, exercise, operational, legal, and public affairs
    support to this Joint Task Force.
        I will conclude by noting that the Defense Department and
    Congress agree that WMD challenges continue to evolve and grow.
    DTRA is an important response to this threat. Our mission
    continues to expand. I thank you for your past support of DTRA
    and respectfully request your support for our fiscal year 2002
    program. Thank you. I would be pleased to answer your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Major General Bongiovi follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Robert P. Bongiovi, USAF

        Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, I am Maj. Gen.
    Robert Bongiovi, the Acting Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency. I am pleased to have this opportunity today to testify on the
    mission of the agency. I would like to summarize my statement and
    request that it be included in its entirety in the record.
        The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, commonly referred to as
    ``DTRA'', was established in October 1998 as part of the Defense Reform
    Initiative. The intent was to consolidate within one agency most of the
    DOD organizations executing WMD-related missions, except for the Title
    10 responsibilities of the services. This new, focused agency would
    enhance overall Department understanding of the WMD threat and
    facilitate appropriate responses. Today, DTRA is far more than just the
    sum of its merging organizations. It is an innovative thinker and
    responder to the WMD challenge.
        Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to define the term
    ``weapons of mass destruction'' or WMD. The definition encompasses
    nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, it also includes
    radiological, electromagnetic pulse, and other advanced or unusual
    weapons capable of inflicting mass casualties or widespread
    destruction. In addition, conventional high explosive devices, such as
    those used in the attacks on Khobar Towers and the U.S.S. Cole, are
    legally and operationally considered to be WMD.
        Although the spectrum of our mission is large, our missions can be
    simply divided into four major functions: WMD combat support,
    technology development, threat control, and threat reduction. I will
    summarize each of these in my following remarks.
        The WMD combat support function provides operational and technical
    support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the warfighting commanders in
    chief, and the services to engage the threat and challenges posed to
    the United States, its forces and allies by WMD. Program activities
    include:

             Support for the planning, safety, security, and
            reliability of the nuclear deterrent;
             Warfighter support across the spectrum of threats and
            capabilities to include expanded support for CINC contingency
            plans, operational plans, and theater engagement plans; and
             Assessments of the vulnerabilities of U.S. military
            installations to terrorist threats.

        DTRA WMD combat support has aided the Joint Staff and Commander,
    U.S. European Command with targeting decisions during Operations Desert
    Fox and Allied Force. DTRA has also developed, in conjunction with the
    Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, and the services, the first
    DOD Nuclear Mission Management Plan to sustain the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent in the years ahead. A top priority for DTRA at the direction
    of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the integration of
    threat reduction support and response capabilities into the
    warfighters' plans--that is, providing them the offensive and defensive
    tools to prevail in WMD environments. Also at the direction of the
    Chairman, DTRA performs as many as 100 force protection assessments of
    U.S. military installations at home and abroad. These assessments
    identify ways in which base commanders can improve their force
    protection posture. At the direction of OSD, we also perform more
    detailed balanced survivability assessments of critical facilities.
        The technology development function develops, manages, and
    coordinates research and development (R&D) activities underpinning
    other DTRA functions. It is important to understand that DTRA is an
    integrator and shaper of technology rather than a ``bench science'' R&D
    center. We reach out to wherever the needed technology exists, bringing
    together diverse ideas and capabilities, and shaping them into
    integrated R&D programs responsive to the needs of the warfighters. We
    rely heavily on a contractor base, including the DOE national labs, for
    the performance of the R&D we manage. As appropriate, DTRA either
    develops and delivers the final product direct to the customer, or
    provides the technology to the services or other appropriate
    organization for final refinement and fielding. Conceptually, we strive
    to dedicate 75 percent of our technology development to identified
    requirements while focusing about 25 percent on new concepts we can
    ``push'' to customers.
        The DTRA technology development mission includes efforts to:

             Develop and test systems to characterize and strike
            WMD sites;
             Provide both offensive and defensive tools to the
            warfighter;
             Develop technology needed for DOD engagement
            activities involving arms control implementation, verification,
            monitoring, and inspection requirements;
             Manage nuclear weapons effects simulators and
            simulation;
             Develop radiation hardening of microelectronics for
            the protection of our weapon and space systems; and
             Provide electromagnetic pulse (EMP), radiation, blast,
            thermal effects data and related next generation technologies.

        Products developed by DTRA have been used operationally. DTRA
    managed the ACTD that developed the advanced unitary penetrator and
    hard target smart fuze which were used in Operation Allied Force in the
    former Yugoslavia. Our munitions effectiveness tools are widely used
    for the defeat of hard and deeply buried targets. DTRA consequence
    management tools have also supported operations worldwide and are
    relied upon by domestic first responders to WMD events. Among our top
    R&D priorities are improved tunnel and hardened/deeply buried defeat
    capabilities with emphasis on stand-off attack, faster detectors for
    chemical and biological agents, improved counterforce planning tools,
    and terrorist device defeat tools.
        The threat control function maintains U.S. technological security
    in three basic areas: policy, implementation, and compliance and
    enforcement. It includes inspection, escort, and monitoring missions to
    help ensure compliance with arms control agreements; and new non-treaty
    means of threat control.
        Major accomplishments within the threat control function include
    the establishment of the congressionally-mandated program to monitor
    foreign launches of U.S. satellites; re-engineering and revitalization
    of the DOD export control process; and successful completion of all
    arms control missions.
        The threat reduction function centers on the execution of the
    Cooperative Threat Reduction or ``Nunn-Lugar'' program. This program
    assists the eligible states of the former Soviet Union with the
    dismantlement of WMD and reduces the threat of WMD proliferation.
    Specifically, it destroys strategic delivery systems, stores and
    safeguards fissile material, and improves safeguards for WMD materials
    and warheads. Under this program, 5,580 strategic warheads have been
    deactivated, 428 ICBMs destroyed, 388 ICBM silos eliminated, 87
    strategic bombers eliminated, 483 long-range nuclear air-launched
    cruise missiles destroyed, 20 ballistic missile submarines destroyed,
    352 submarine ballistic missile launchers eliminated, 217 submarine-
    launched ballistic missiles eliminated, and 194 nuclear test tunnels
    and holes sealed.
        DTRA performs these missions with 2,000 personnel primarily
    concentrated in northern Virginia and New Mexico. We also have people
    literally across the globe. The workforce is divided nearly equally
    between civilians and military personnel.
        The DTRA budget request for fiscal year 2002 is over $1.1 billion.
    However, we will also provide executive management for the
    approximately $900 million Joint Chemical/Biological Defense Program.
    We also assist the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and other
    U.S. Government organizations on a reimbursable basis. For example, the
    interagency Technical Support Working Group funds many of our blast
    mitigation and structural response field tests in order to make
    government facilities safer against car and truck delivered high
    explosives attack.
        Although our mission spectrum is wide, our focus remains on
    supporting the warfighters. DTRA is a combat support agency and,
    therefore, subject to direct tasking by the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Secretary of Defense.
        Although our focus will remain on the warfighters, we make
    important contributions to efforts to counter WMD terrorism at home.
    The Department of Defense does not have the lead responsibility for
    responding to acts of WMD terrorism within the United States. However,
    as the Department would likely be called upon should such an event
    occur, DTRA assists both preparedness and consequence management
    activities.
        We share our WMD knowledge with the Department of Justice, FEMA,
    the Centers for Disease Control, and other Federal, state, and local
    officials. DTRA also maintains an operations center that provides the
    warfighters and government officials on-line access to a wide range of
    WMD expertise. DTRA also assists interagency exercise planning. We have
    also aided with the identification of issues that national, state, and
    local decision-makers would face should such an event occur. At the
    national level, we have worked directly and regularly with officials as
    senior as the Attorney General. Moreover, we have an important
    relationship with the Joint Forces Command's Joint Task Force for Civil
    Support. As a combat support agency, we offer planning, exercise,
    operational, legal, and public affairs support to this Joint Task
    Force.
        I will conclude by noting that DOD and Congress agree that WMD
    challenges continue to evolve and grow. For fiscal year 2002, DTRA is
    requesting a budget growth for its R&D and mission-related O&M
    accounts. Specifically, we are requesting increases to enhance our
    capability to defeat the hard and deeply buried targets proliferating
    around the world, ensure the availability of radiation-hardened
    microelectronic components essential for our military and commercial
    space systems, and develop ``energetic materials'' to improve weapon
    lethality and chemical/biological agent defeat. The growth in our O&M
    budget request principally reflects expanded targeting support,
    additional balanced survivability assessments of critical command,
    control, and communications facilities, and expanded underground
    facility assessments support. In addition, we are pursuing a terrorist
    device defeat initiative that will enable us to defeat nuclear devices
    improvised by terrorists, attribute the origin of domestic nuclear
    events, and detect special shielded nuclear material. I respectfully
    request your support for our fiscal year 2002 program.
        I would be pleased to answer your questions.

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Waldron.

     STATEMENT OF ROBERT WALDRON, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
      NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
                        SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Waldron. Thank you. Madam Chairwoman and members of the
    subcommittee, I am Robert Waldron, Assistant Deputy
    Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and Engineering at
    the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I would
    like to summarize my statement and request it be included in
    its entirety.
        Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
        Mr. Waldron. Thank you. The NNSA's Nonproliferation and
    Verification Research and Development Program is focused on
    providing technology to operational users whose mission it is
    to strengthen U.S. responses to current and projected threats
    to national security posed by the proliferation of nuclear,
    chemical, and biological weapons. This program compliments the
    other nonproliferation programs within the NNSA which are
    Russian focused. We provide technologies that can be used
    worldwide and can be applied to making assessments about
    regional proliferation activities. Our goal is to enhance U.S.
    national security through needs-driven research and
    development. The emphasis is on developing the requisite
    technologies to detect and deter nuclear proliferation, to meet
    U.S. nuclear explosion monitoring goals, and to develop and
    demonstrate chemical and biological detection and related
    technologies to enable us to better prepare for and respond to
    the threat of domestic and biological attacks.
        I used the phrase ``needs-driven R&D'' earlier to draw a
    distinction between the focus of our work and that of the DOD
    which is primarily requirements-driven. Since a significant
    portion of our R&D work is not tied to DOD or other formal
    requirements, we are able to take a longer-term focus and stay
    the development course to mature the technology. This needs-
    driven approach also allows us to pursue revolutionary, higher
    risk solutions that frequently push the state-of-the-art.
    Having NNSA conduct this needs-driven R&D allows us to marshal
    multi-disciplinary, inter-laboratory teams from the national
    laboratories to address these very challenging technical
    science and engineering problems.
        Our tie to the operational community is strongest in the
    area of nuclear explosion monitoring where we have had an
    almost 40-year history of working together. Our relationship
    with the operators of the space and ground nuclear explosion
    monitoring systems is close and productive, and they
    acknowledge us as critical to the success of their efforts.
        In addition to our connections to individual operational
    organizations, we also work closely with other developers. Our
    collaborations include a variety of projects and cooperative
    mechanisms from jointly funding development to developing joint
    technical roadmaps. While we have very close ties to individual
    developers and operational users, there are other more formal
    coordination mechanisms like the Counterproliferation Review
    Committee and various memoranda of understanding for technical
    operation with other agencies.
        Based on our extensive cooperation and relationships and
    coordination with operational and development organizations,
    let me highlight some of the technical challenges we face. In
    the nuclear explosion monitoring area, challenges in the
    development of the next generation of NNSA satellite-based
    sensors are primarily in improving the sensor detection
    performance while maintaining or decreasing the sensor size,
    weight, and power. For the ground-based nuclear monitoring
    system, most of the challenges are seismic and brought about by
    the transition from current long-range--or teleseismic--methods
    to new regional monitoring methods. This change requires
    significant improvement of our understanding of how the earth's
    crust affects the passage of seismic signals.
        For our program supporting homeland defense, the chief
    challenge facing researchers in the chemical/biological areas
    is biological detection. The challenge of distinguishing a
    threat pathogen from its harmless, very close relatives is
    pushing scientists to discover new and finer distinctions among
    organisms. Other technological gaps we face include accurately
    predicting where and how the plume of a threat agent will
    spread in, out, or around a building and in a city. An accurate
    understanding of the hazard area is critical to a rapid and
    effective response.
        Detecting the diversion or smuggling of nuclear materials
    remains a constant challenge. The ability to detect plutonium
    and highly enriched uranium at standoff distances is driving us
    to explore not only new radiation detection materials, but also
    new detection systems.
        Now let me move to our technology supporting national
    efforts to detect and understand WMD proliferation at its
    source. The challenge is to catch clandestine WMD programs at
    the earliest stage of development. Potential adversaries have
    taken considerable steps to disguise activities that might
    provide clear indications of the nature of their weapons
    development programs. Our challenge is to obtain sufficient
    information to enable us to distinguish steps in a weapons
    production program from closely related legitimate industrial
    activities. New sensors that detect new kinds of signatures are
    necessary and advanced processing and exploitation methods must
    be developed to create useful information out of this data.
        The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program is
    essential to the agencies responsible for combating
    proliferation being able to fulfill their operational missions.
    It is well coordinated with individual users and other
    developers. There is no simple solution to this problem and we
    alone cannot solve it. With the support of Congress and through
    continued collaboration with DOD and others, and the necessary
    advances in technology and analysis techniques, we can make a
    quantum leap in our ability to detect and understand these
    threats. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Waldron follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Robert E. Waldron

        Madam Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the Department of Energy (DOE) National
    Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and
    Verification Research and Development Program.
        The NNSA's Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
    Development (R&D) Program conducts a full-scope R&D program from basic
    research through test and evaluation to produce technologies that lead
    to prototype demonstrations and resultant weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD) detection systems. Our mission is to provide these technologies
    to the operational users whose mission it is to strengthen the United
    States response to current and projected threats to national security
    posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
    and diversion of special nuclear material. The technologies are
    developed for a wide range of government users including the Department
    of Defense (DOD), the intelligence community and Federal health and
    safety agencies.
        Detecting the proliferation of foreign nuclear weapons capabilities
    is an increasingly daunting task. A number of countries are seeking to
    acquire nuclear weapons. These nations and organizations take great
    pains to elude detection. The challenge is to detect and understand the
    threats posed by weapons of mass destruction at the earliest stage of
    development, to guide diplomatic actions and, if necessary, a military
    response. We must also deter the use of such weapons by being able to
    trace a weapon to its source before its use--or, in the worst case,
    after its use.
        The NNSA's laboratories are the Nation's repository of expertise on
    nuclear weapons design and production. For more than 50 years, the
    Nation has tapped this resource in assessing foreign nuclear weapons
    programs. The labs have also supplied detection technologies to monitor
    these programs. The goal is to enhance U.S. national security through
    needs-driven R&D. The emphasis is on developing the requisite
    technologies to detect and deter nuclear proliferation, to meet U.S.
    nuclear explosion monitoring goals, and to develop and demonstrate
    chemical and biological detection and related technologies to enable us
    to better prepare for and respond to the threat of domestic chemical
    and biological attacks. To address the broad array of mission
    challenges our program objectives are to:

             Develop and demonstrate technologies needed to
            remotely detect the early stages of a proliferant nation's
            nuclear weapons program.
             Develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies to
            detect, locate, identify, and characterize nuclear explosions
            underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, and in space.
             Develop technologies to improve our national
            capability to counter nuclear smuggling, to identify the
            origins of nuclear materials, to monitor global fissile
            material production, and to monitor Russian nuclear warhead
            dismantlement and Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.
             Develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies and
            systems that dramatically improve our ability to detect the
            proliferation or use of chemical and biological agents, and to
            minimize the consequences of potential use of chemical or
            biological agents.

                                  COORDINATION

        The importance of stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction is unquestioned. The Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
    Program fills a gap between basic research and application-specific
    acquisitions. These needs are not always documented in DOD or
    intelligence community requirement statements, but are based upon the
    realization that current technology will eventually become obsolete
    and/or understood by adversaries, thus new capabilities must be
    constantly pursued.
        I used the phrase ``needs-driven R&D'' earlier to draw a
    distinction between the focus of our work and that of DOD which is
    primarily requirements-driven. Since a significant portion of our R&D
    work is not tied to formal DOD requirements, we are able to take a
    longer-term focus and stay the development course to mature the
    technology. This needs-driven approach also allows us to pursue
    revolutionary, higher risk solutions that frequently push the state of
    the art. Having NNSA conduct this needs-driven R&D allows us to marshal
    multi-disciplinary, inter-laboratory teams from the national
    laboratories to address these very challenging technical science and
    engineering problems.
        A distinguishing feature of our work in recent years has been our
    success in understanding and communicating with the user community,
    both in understanding their needs and in transitioning technologies
    from purely R&D efforts into operational use or to follow-on R&D.
    Technology transition is always a challenge for research and
    development organizations, but without it the value of the R&D is not
    fully realized. I believe we are showing the way in terms of
    maintaining a cutting-edge research program while also keeping abreast
    of user needs and interests and transitioning technologies to satisfy
    them.
        The tie to the operational community is strongest in the area of
    nuclear explosion monitoring where we have an almost 40-year history of
    working together. We provide remarkably capable and robust hardware for
    space systems, as well as expert advice in analyzing the data they
    produce, and are authors of the knowledge base critical to modernizing
    the Air Force Technical Applications Center's seismic monitoring
    capability. Our relationship with the operators of the space and ground
    nuclear explosion monitoring systems is close and productive, and they
    acknowledge us as critical to the success of their efforts.
        In addition to our connections to individual operational
    organizations, we also work closely with other developers like the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Our collaboration with DTRA
    includes a variety of cooperative mechanisms from jointly funding
    development activities in nuclear warhead dismantlement to developing
    joint technical roadmaps for chem/bio.
        While we have very close ties to individual developers and
    operational users, there are other more formal coordination mechanisms.
    The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) was
    established by Congress to coordinate all DOD, DOE, and intelligence
    community R&D programs for countering proliferation. We have been
    actively involved in the CPRC and its various focus or working groups.
    Recently the Chemical and Biological (CB) Defense Research,
    Development, and Acquisition Focus Group was established to develop a
    coordinated plan for DOE and DOD's CB technology development programs.
    Building on the success of an initial biodetection ``roadmap'',
    chemical detection, and soon decontamination, will be included in the
    CB roadmap. This will enable us to resolve any areas of possible
    duplication and to better integrate our technology development efforts
    toward national needs.
        A few other formal interagency coordination mechanisms we
    participate in include:

             The Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology
            Working Group (NPAC TWG), a multi-agency group I co-chair with
            my colleague here at the table Anna Johnson-Winegar and Sallie
            Mullen at the State Department. This group coordinates all
            Federal agency R&D programs related to nonproliferation and
            arms control.
             The NRO-NNSA Technology Partnership Panel, a working
            group to coordinate interactions in research and development,
            information systems, personnel exchanges, and security.
             The Space Technology Alliance, a multi-agency forum to
            address national space technology issues such as the health of
            the U.S. space industrial base, maintenance of critical U.S.
            space infrastructure and skills, and coordination of
            interagency technology development activities.

                             TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES

        Based on our extensive cooperative relationships and coordination
    with operational and development organizations, let me highlight some
    of the technical challenges we face.
        Nuclear Explosion Monitoring: Challenges in the development of the
    next generation of NNSA satellite-based sensors going on-orbit aboard
    the next block of Global Positioning System satellites in 2005 are
    primarily for the optical sensors. This challenge is extreme, involving
    the development of focal plane array ``active pixel'' technology. In
    effect, thousands of individual optical sensors will be fit into a
    space not appreciably larger than that required for today's single
    optical sensor. In addition to solving substantial hardware challenges,
    we will have to develop the on-board processing algorithms needed to
    discriminate natural events, such as lightning, from nuclear explosions
    on thousands of individual optical sensors as opposed to a single
    sensor. Significant technology challenges also exist for us as we
    develop a small, low-weight, low-cost payload to replace existing
    neutron and gamma-ray sensors. Size, weight, and power restrictions
    present challenges to provide sufficient sensor sensitivity with an
    acceptably low false alarm rate.
        Most of the challenges for the ground-based nuclear explosion
    monitoring systems are very computationally intensive. Seismic
    challenges are brought about due to the transition from current long-
    range, or teleseismic, methods to new regional monitoring methods. This
    change requires significant improvement of our understanding of how the
    earth's crust affects the passage of seismic signals through it and to
    differentiate a nuclear explosion from the enormous number of
    background nonnuclear events like mining blasts and earthquakes. With a
    better understanding of the earth's geology on a regional basis, we
    will improve the capability for identification, location, and
    characterization of nuclear explosions and be able to lower the yield-
    detection thresholds. We also need to automate the calibration of new
    seismic stations to increase the speed with which they can be brought
    into the monitoring system and enable the user to do more of the future
    data upgrade themselves.
        Homeland Defense: In the chem/bio area, the chief challenge facing
    researchers is biological detection. Specific and selective detection
    of biological agents is generations behind that of chemical agents. The
    challenge of distinguishing a threat pathogen from its harmless, very
    close relatives is pushing scientists to discover new and ever finer
    distinctions among organisms. The more we learn about pathogens, the
    less we know. As these distinctions are developed, we must develop
    detection methods to exploit these differences. Once these methods are
    developed, engineers must advance the state of the art in detectors to
    utilize and apply these methods. Eventually, these detectors will need
    to be refined to increase the breadth of biological agents covered and
    decrease their costs.
        Other technological gaps we face include accurately predicting
    where and how a plume of a threat agent will spread in a building and
    in a city. Specifically, we face the challenge of working backward from
    detector measurements to decipher information about the amount,
    location, and type of agent released. This release information is a
    crucial variable in accurately predicting the hazard cloud. An accurate
    understanding of the hazard area is critical to a rapid and effective
    response.
        A new detector alone, regardless how sophisticated, cannot protect
    its user from harm unless it is integrated into the user's standard
    operating procedures. We are proud of our efforts in addressing this
    gap between the laboratory and the `real world.' Our demonstration and
    application programs work closely with user partners to integrate
    emerging and off-the-shelf technologies into potential systems to
    address real world needs in areas such as biological aerosol detection
    at special events, a chemical detection and response system in subways
    and airports, and biological forensic investigations. This gap is
    especially crucial in the civilian realm, where structured requirements
    and identified needs for technology to fill do not exist.
        Detecting the diversion or smuggling of nuclear materials remains a
    constant challenge. The ability to detect plutonium and highly enriched
    uranium at stand-off distances is driving us to explore not only new
    radiation detection materials, but also new detection system concepts.
    In addition to new detectors and materials, we are confronted with the
    need to develop new concepts for networking a collection of sensors
    into an integrated architecture for layered defense networks and
    perimeter monitoring systems.
        Proliferation Detection: Now let me move to our technology
    supporting national efforts to detect and understand WMD proliferation
    at its source. The challenge is to catch clandestine WMD programs at
    the earliest stage of development. Potential adversaries have become
    witting of our traditional monitoring methods. They have taken
    considerable steps to disguise activities that might provide clear
    indications of the nature of their weapons development programs.
    Analysts are left to piece together a more complex puzzle, often
    attempting to determine how much of legitimate industrial activity
    might be used in support of a weapons program.
        Our challenge is to obtain sufficient information to enable us to
    distinguish steps in a weapons production program from closely related
    legitimate industrial activities. Yet we are forced to gather this
    information from great distance, during limited access opportunities,
    or under other stressing circumstances. New sensors that detect new
    kinds of signatures are necessary, and advanced processing and
    exploitation methods must be developed to make sense of this data.
    Ground breaking science and engineering is needed to open up new
    detection and monitoring opportunities, but it must be built on a
    foundation that includes:

             a thorough understanding of the current and likely
            future threat,
             assessments of the adequacy of current capabilities to
            detect and monitor this threat,
             identification of gaps in our capabilities and
            recognition of opportunities to improve our capability, and
             feedback and evaluation of the technical limits and
            programmatic feasibility of implementing new capabilities in an
            operational environment.

        This foundation comes from the historical expertise of the DOE's
    nuclear weapons program and intimate involvement with both the arms
    control/intelligence analysis community and the intelligence collection
    community. This foundation ensures that our technology developments are
    relevant, and we are working on complete end-to-end approaches to
    solving national priorities. We must ensure that the problems we are
    addressing are critical, the new or improved collection methods are
    robust, the information has utility, and the employment concept of the
    technology is realistic. Some of the key challenges we face include:

             Validation that new sensor systems will provide
            actionable information. This involves field trials in an
            environment where we often don't have surrogates of the threat
            we are attempting to detect and monitor. In some case we can
            make use of U.S. weapons program infrastructure or rely on the
            cooperation of American industry. In specific cases, we operate
            special test facilities such as the Spill Test Facility, a
            national resource we maintain for our own and other agencies'
            use.
             Acceptance of new complex detection methods in an
            environment of shrinking analytical resources. We must ensure
            our exploitation methods are robust and save time. New tools
            are difficult to adopt unless they lessen overall workload,
            especially when existing data sources swamp the limited
            analytical personnel.
             New detection and monitoring systems produce massive
            quantities of data, and we are often limited by small data
            bandwidths. Thus, we must develop methods to autonomously
            process the data at the sensor and send back only the
            meaningful parts. This raises the issue of confidence in both
            the sensor and the data exploitation that must be thoroughly
            addressed through testing.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program is essential
    to the agencies responsible for non/counterproliferation being able to
    fulfill their operational missions. It is well coordinated with
    individual users and other developers, as well as through formal
    coordinating organizations.
        Our technology will get even better--because it must. Rogue
    countries, terrorists and the suppliers of the nuclear, biological, and
    chemical tools of their trade are using increasingly sophisticated
    means to evade detection. Our methods and technology must outpace this
    growing threat.
        There is no simple solution to this problem, and we alone cannot
    solve it. With the support of Congress and through continued
    collaboration with DOD and others and the necessary advances in
    technology and analysis techniques, we can make a quantum leap in our
    ability to detect and understand these threats to the American people.
        I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
        Dr. Koch.

      STATEMENT OF DR. SUSAN KOCH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
                      DEFENSE FOR THREAT REDUCTION

        Dr. Koch. Thank you Madam Chairman. I am Susan Koch, Acting
    Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy
    and Threat Reduction.
        It is a pleasure to appear before the subcommittee to
    discuss the DOD's plans to continue to use the Cooperative
    Threat Reduction, or CTR, program, to address the threat posed
    by the remnants of the former Soviet arsenal of weapons of mass
    destruction. I too have submitted a longer statement, which I
    would request be included in the record.
        Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
        Dr. Koch. Thank you. I would like just to touch now on some
    of the highlights of our request for the Cooperative Threat
    Reduction program for fiscal year 2002. Let me preface my
    remarks by noting that the administration is completing its
    review of nonproliferation and nonproliferation-related
    cooperative programs with Russia to include CTR. Thus our
    budget request and the proposed assistance activities that I
    will discuss this afternoon are subject to the conclusion of
    that review.
        Our program's single largest effort, as it has been for the
    last several years, will be in strategic offensive arms
    elimination programs in Russia. This program will accelerate
    elimination of strategic nuclear delivery systems, ballistic
    missiles, silo launchers, and ballistic missile-carrying
    submarines. Another important effort in Russia will be our
    nuclear weapons storage security program. This assistance will
    enhance Russia's ability to secure, control, and account for
    nuclear weapons and their storage by providing equipment and
    training for guard forces, security upgrades at nuclear weapons
    storage sites, and furthering developing an inventory control
    system to track nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement.
        Closely related is the request for nuclear weapons
    transport security, which primarily funds transportation
    services to move nuclear warheads from deployed sites to
    storage and from storage to dismantlement, thereby facilitating
    Russia's acceleration of warhead dismantlement.
        An important element of our request for fiscal year 2002
    will be the slightly over $41 million for the elimination of
    weapons grade plutonium production in Russia. As originally
    envisioned, this project would convert the cores of the three
    remaining Russian plutonium producing reactors so that they
    would continue to provide heat and electricity to the
    surrounding regions without producing weapons grade plutonium.
    Unfortunately as we worked on the project, it became
    increasingly clear that the reactor cores could not be
    converted safely enough to meet our standards. We therefore,
    about 18 months ago, embarked on a study of the best approach
    to bringing an end to Russian plutonium production and have
    determined that the provision of fossil fuel alternatives,
    which would allow for the complete shut-down of the plutonium
    producing reactors while continuing to provide needed heat and
    electricity, would be the fastest, least risky, and most cost-
    effective approach to the overall problem, and have the
    distinct advantage of having the complete shut-down of
    reactors, as I mentioned.
        Another important planned program is in the area of
    chemical weapons destruction and an end to Russia's ability to
    produce chemical weapons. We have requested funds to continue
    to help Russia dismantle two former Soviet chemical weapons
    facilities and to help construct a destruction facility for
    something over 5,000 metric tons of dangerous artillery and
    missile delivered nerve agent at a town called Shchuch'ye.
        The Shchuch'ye project has been discussed with this
    committee more than once in the past. The committee and the
    Senate have, in the past, laid down important conditions for a
    project that would serve U.S. security interests in the most
    efficient, cost-effective manner. The conditions outlined by
    the Senate have definitely attracted the attention of our
    Russian partners and we believe they have made substantial
    progress in addressing congressional concerns over Russia's
    slow progress in meeting destruction-related requirements. We
    have also made considerable progress with friends and allies in
    increasing international assistance to the project.
        Turning to Ukraine, the major effort is the continuation of
    our strategic arms elimination effort there, which will
    continue to work on the final elimination of SS-24
    intercontinental ballistic missiles in Ukraine and begin
    eliminating Backfire bombers. In Russia, Kazakhstan, and
    Uzbekistan in particular, we also plan to continue our
    biological weapons proliferation prevention program to enhance
    safety and security for dangerous biological pathogens,
    consolidate and dismantle production and research facilities,
    and support peaceful collaborative research projects with
    former Soviet scientists once involved in offensive biological
    weapons programs.
        Finally, we hope to continue and expand our Defense and
    Military Contacts program under CTR to nearly 500 events
    involving high-level meetings between defense officials, staff
    talks, and unit exchanges. We particularly value these
    activities which help restructure former Soviet defense
    establishments, professionalize the military units, promote
    democratic civilian control of the military, and establish
    programs of cooperation on counter-proliferation.
        We believe that our 2002 budget request, which I have just
    summarized, is a sound and reasonable approach to increasing
    U.S. security through nonproliferation and threat reduction
    assistance to the former Soviet Union. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Koch follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Dr. Susan Koch

                                  INTRODUCTION

        When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it left behind a huge
    arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated delivery
    systems, materials and infrastructure. The Nunn-Lugar Act of 1991
    (i.e., the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act) charged DOD with
    establishing a program to assist the Soviet Union and any successor
    states to destroy, safeguard and prevent the proliferation of WMD.
        Over the past 10 years, the resulting $3.6 billion CTR Program has
    proven effective in pursuing these objectives. CTR assistance helped
    Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine become nuclear free and accede to the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by 1996. The CTR Program also has
    assisted in the deactivation of 5,586 nuclear warheads and elimination
    of 740 ballistic missile launchers, 87 heavy bombers, 20 ballistic
    missile submarines, and 645 ballistic missiles. Additionally, CTR
    assistance has reduced the likelihood that sensitive materials,
    technology, expertise, and equipment may fall into the wrong hands.
        Beyond this, CTR assistance is working to improve the
    accountability for warheads, enhancing safe storage of WMD and related
    materials, and reducing the opportunities for unauthorized acquisition
    of nuclear weapons and materials, related systems, and technology.
        The administration is completing a review of all nonproliferation
    assistance programs to Russia. One area of concern is that we do not
    want U.S. investment in the CTR Program to become a means by which
    Russia frees up resources to finance its strategic modernization
    programs. In this regard, the CTR Program does not provide funds
    directly to the Russian government. Instead, DOD contracts with
    entities that provide specific, measurable deliverables related to
    weapon elimination, transportation, and security services. It is not
    clear the Russians would eliminate their weapons without the CTR
    Program of assistance. Leaving them in place makes them vulnerable to
    theft or sale to other countries or groups.

                          FISCAL YEAR 2002 CTR PROGRAM

        DOD's overall fiscal year 2002 budget request for CTR is $403.0
    million. As noted earlier, the administration's review of
    nonproliferation assistance to Russia is not yet complete, and DOD's
    budget request for CTR for fiscal year 2002 and the description I will
    give today of the projects that would be pursued under that request
    remain subject to the conclusion of that review.
        Under CTR's the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program area
    in Russia ($133.4 million), the U.S. will seek to accelerate the
    elimination of nuclear delivery systems and missile launchers. We hope
    to eliminate SLBM launchers and dismantle the associated SSBNs. We will
    transport, dismantle, and eliminate 117 liquid fueled SLBMs, 16 liquid
    fueled ICBMs, and 70 solid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. Also, we will
    continue to construct a solid propellant disposition facility, continue
    to operate and maintain liquid propellant disposition systems and
    eliminate 48 mobile ICBM launchers.
        Under the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program area in Russia
    ($56.0 million), we hope to enhance the security, control and
    accounting of nuclear weapons and their storage. We will continue to
    test, integrate and train at the Security and Assessment Training
    Center and procure 10 suites of security equipment to be deployed at
    nuclear warhead storage sites. Additionally, we will continue site
    renovation and installation of five suites of security enhancement
    equipment, procured with fiscal year 2001 funds, at nuclear warhead
    storage sites. In addition, we plan to install 31 kilometers of
    perimeter security systems at MOD nuclear weapons storage sites;
    procure communications and other safety, support and heavy duty
    equipment for site security operations; continue to procure additional
    portable drug and alcohol testing equipment to ensure personnel
    reliability; and continue maintenance and life cycle support for the
    Automated Inventory Control and Management System for tracking nuclear
    weapons scheduled for dismantlement.
        Also, the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program area
    ($9.5 million) will facilitate warhead movements from alert systems to
    secure storage and dismantlement facilities in Russia. More
    specifically, this project will fund transportation services for
    deactivated nuclear warheads to move from deployed locations to
    enhanced security storage sites and to dismantlement facilities.
        The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production project
    ($41.7 million) originated in 1997 when the U.S. and Russia agreed to
    convert the cores of the three remaining Russian reactors (two at
    Seversk and one at Zheleznegorsk) that produce weapons-grade plutonium
    to eliminate this production capability. The U.S. agreed that the
    reactors could not be shut down because they serve the energy needs of
    the local regions. By early 2000, however, it became clear that the
    reactor cores could not be converted safely. DOD notified Congress of
    the need to explore an energy alternative to supply the local needs.
    The results of these studies determined a fossil alternative is the
    most effective and efficient means to stop weapons-grade plutonium
    production. It has the added benefits of being low risk since it uses
    well known technologies and it permits the complete shutdown of these
    three Chernobyl-type reactors.
        In Ukraine, the Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) program
    area ($51.5 million) will sustain joint efforts to eliminate SS-24
    ICBMs to include continued storage of 163 solid rocket motors,
    completion of construction of a solid propellant disposition facility,
    removal of propellant and elimination of 66 missile motors. Under the
    WMD Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) program area in Ukraine ($6.0
    million), we also hope to eliminate ICBM liquid propellant facilities,
    strategic airbase infrastructure and nuclear weapons storage
    facilities. The WMDIE program area in Kazakhstan ($6.0 million) will
    continue securing fissile and radioactive materials and initiate
    elimination of strategic airbase infrastructure and ICBM liquid fuel
    storage facilities in fiscal year 2002.
        With regard to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) at
    Shchuch'ye, the Russian government allocated $100 million in 2001 for
    Chemical Weapons Convention compliance including $25 million to support
    the CWDF at Shchuch'ye. This project will enable the destruction of a
    nerve agent stockpile of 5,460 metric tons in highly portable artillery
    and missile munitions, and will provide an opportunity for more
    international assistance. The U.S. has encouraged other countries to
    assist with the Shchuch'ye project. Canada has provided $70,000 for
    infrastructure design and plans to provide an additional $180,000 this
    year. Italy recently agreed to provide $7.15 million in assistance for
    Shchuch'ye. The European Union also has committed $1.8 million to this
    project. The United Kingdom is considering providing up to $18 million
    for Shchuch'ye infrastructure projects. Other countries have expressed
    interest in supporting these kinds of projects at the indicated
    approximate funding levels: Netherlands $2 million, Norway $1.0
    million, Sweden $700,000, and Switzerland a significant portion of $20
    to $30 million. These offers are contingent upon resumption of the
    project by the U.S. The fiscal year 2002 budget includes $35.0 million
    for the CWDF and $15.0 million for dismantlement of former CW
    production facilities.
        Under the Biological Weapons (BW) Proliferation Prevention program
    area ($17.0 million), we will continue to seek enhanced safety and
    security for dangerous pathogen collections, consolidation and
    dismantlement of infrastructure associated with BW production and
    research facilities, and collaborative research projects with former
    Soviet BW scientists.
        The CTR Program also provides funding ($18.7 million in fiscal year
    2002) for a wide range of defense and military contacts between DOD and
    FSU defense establishments. Overall, the objectives of the Defense and
    Military Contacts (DMC) program are to encourage denuclearization and
    nonproliferation, to enhance stability by regular exchanges on issues
    of mutual concern, to encourage and assist the restructuring and
    downsizing of FSU defense establishments, and to encourage support for
    democratic reform. In short, while this component of the program helps
    reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction in a way that is less
    direct and less quantifiable, it is no less important to addressing the
    larger threat.
        Funding for program management, administrative support, audits and
    examinations and other assessments, or ``overhead'' are 3.3 percent of
    the total fiscal year 2002 budget ($13.2 million), reflecting the fact
    that this is an efficient enterprise.

                                   CHALLENGES

        At the program implementation level, our biggest challenges are
    transparency across the board, and access to facilities. Despite their
    generally sincere interest in achieving program objectives, the
    Russians are reluctant to give us visibility into sensitive military
    processes and access to sensitive facilities. One example of this is
    the continuing struggle to include a measure of weapons origin and
    complete a transparency regime for the Mayak Fissile Material Storage
    Facility. Visibility and access are critically important, not only to
    conduct agreed activities, but to conduct required audits and
    examinations that help ensure that CTR resources continue to be used
    for the intended purposes.

                                   CONCLUSION

        CTR contributions to national security include the elimination of
    START-accountable nuclear weapon delivery systems and warheads; and
    efforts to reduce the threat from the use or proliferation of chemical
    and biological weapons through the Chemical/Biological Weapons
    Proliferation Prevention Program; the relationships formed through
    professional exchanges foster greater mutual understanding, increase
    confidence, encourage denuclearization, nonproliferation, and enhance
    stability through the regular exchange of views on issues of mutual
    concern. Additionally, CTR Programs inhibit the transfer into the wrong
    hands of sensitive materials, technology, expertise and equipment.
        Continued congressional support is important to the future success
    of CTR's nonproliferation efforts and its role in enhancing U.S.
    national security vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union.

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you all very much for your
    testimony. I think our time will allow us two rounds of
    questions, 5 minutes each. But to the subcommittee members, if
    you require more time, please just let me know.
        Let me begin with you, Dr. Winegar, for just a few
    questions. There have been a number of concerns about the
    safety of the primary disposal method being used to eliminate
    our chemical weapons. Naturally, people want to make sure that
    this process is safe and effective. Could you comment on the
    risks associated with destroying relative to the risk of
    keeping these stockpiles in communities where they are now
    being stored? Or the risk of not eliminating them? If you could
    compare those risks and elaborate somewhat along those lines.
        Dr. Winegar. Certainly. I think our desired goal is the
    safe and complete destruction of the existing stockpiles. As
    you indicated in your question, it is a matter of balancing the
    risks between the alternative of doing nothing--that is leaving
    the stockpiles intact and taking the chance of further
    deterioration or the possibility of an inadvertent, outside
    event such as an earthquake or lightning or something like that
    that we cannot control which could cause significant impact--
    and contrast that with the safety record that has been compiled
    in the program thus far where we have essentially completed the
    destruction of the weapons at Johnston Island and are well on
    the way to completing the stockpile that is at the Tooele
    facility. Those have been done with a safety record that I
    think is outstanding and certainly is comparable to, if not
    better, than similar types of industry records.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Earlier this year Secretary
    Aldridge--and you mentioned this in your statement and I just
    wanted to follow up--decided to increase the level of oversight
    for the chemical demilitarization program in the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense in part by making it a major acquisition
    program. You testified to this. Can you explain in more detail
    what the practical effect of this will be, the changes that it
    has made, and what benefits you can see?
        Dr. Winegar. Certainly. By elevating the program to an A-
    CAT 1D, that in essence means that Secretary Aldridge himself
    will be involved in all major decisions related to the program.
    He is by definition the official milestone decision authority
    for the chemical demilitarization program. The first actual
    event that will occur is the comprehensive DAE review that I
    also mentioned in my testimony. That has been such an extensive
    undertaking that in point of fact, it has been ongoing for
    about a year now. So, I think that attests to the fact of the
    level of detail that we are accumulating for him. That detail
    is being scrutinized by a number of independent offices from
    the Office of Secretary of Defense level both from a
    comptroller's point of view, the PA&E point of view, and from a
    number of different groups who have not had the opportunity to
    review all of that information in that level of detail.
        Senator Landrieu. Did we discuss when that review will be
    completed?
        Dr. Winegar. Yes. It will be completed the first week in
    September.
        Senator Landrieu. We can expect that. One more question
    regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention to eliminate all of
    our chemical weapons by 2007 and our efforts to try to remain
    on schedule. In previous years, Congress has reduced the
    funding for this program below the requested levels because
    there was a view that it was such a large budget--more than a
    billion dollars this year--that it wouldn't hurt the program to
    do with a little less money. Am I right in understanding that
    the funding you have requested for this fiscal year is
    necessary to keep us on track toward meeting that goal? Do we
    look like we are going to be on track if in fact we can keep
    the money that is in the budget, or do we need more?
        Dr. Winegar. I certainly support the budget that was
    submitted in the President's budget request, which is
    approximately $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2002. I think we
    have adequately justified the particular items in the budget
    that are needed. Again, this will be subjected to that fine
    level of scrutiny and detail that I mentioned, in the upcoming
    DAE review.
        Just to refresh your memory, this budget was prepared by
    the Army in accordance with direction from the previous
    administration, and so this will be Secretary Aldridge's and
    indeed Secretary Rumsfeld's first opportunity to have this
    level of detail in the review of that budget.
        Senator Landrieu. Was there anything that you know of
    regarding how that study is being conducted that would indicate
    we would need significantly more or could do with significantly
    less money? Is anything clear at this point about that study?
        Dr. Winegar. There are a number of working teams doing this
    on a daily basis. I have not at this point been briefed on the
    results of their discussions and I think it would be premature
    at this point to speculate what the possible ramifications
    might be.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Dr. Winegar.
        Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairman. In 1998,
    Secretary of Defense Cohen held up a bag of sugar on television
    and stated the extraordinary killing power of an equal amount
    of anthrax. Secretary Cohen, our former colleague, planned to
    have all 2.4 million personnel immunized before 2004. He
    testified in hearings last year which were extremely helpful.
    We learned about BioPort and that is not good news to say the
    least. We had an expenditure of millions of dollars in exchange
    for no usable vaccine.
        So basically the program has been terminated. Riding to the
    rescue  was  Senator  Hutchinson,  who  said  we  ought  to
    fund  something called government-owned, contractor-operated--
    the acronym is GOCO--vaccine production facilities. He had the
    place to do it, the expertise to do it, and the money to do it.
    We are waiting for a report. I yield to the person that has
    more expertise on this than I do, Senator Hutchinson, because I
    know this is a pertinent issue with all of us. I would like to
    reserve the balance of my time, but I would like to yield to
    the Senator to follow up on that question. I feel it is
    exceedingly important.
        Senator Landrieu. Go right ahead.
        Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator Roberts. Dr.
    Winegar, let me ask you first, when is the report expected?
        Dr. Winegar. Sir, the report has been completed for quite
    some time now and has been delayed being delivered to Congress
    pending delivery of the budget. It is certainly my
    understanding that it is imminently going to arrive here.
        Senator Hutchinson. Can you tell me what its recommendation
    is?
        Dr. Winegar. Well, sir, there are a number of parts to that
    report as you would recall from the language. One specifically
    addresses the projected costs--the lifecycle costs--for a
    vaccine facility. While I do not have those numbers on the top
    of my head, I can assure you it is a very detailed analysis of
    not only the planning, design, and construction, but the
    follow-on 20 years or more to operate such a facility because
    that has to be factored into the decision.
        The other part of the report summarizes and indeed provides
    all the detail of an expert group, an expert panel commissioned
    by the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. DeLeon, where we
    brought in their expertise to leverage best practices from the
    industry to again help us make some of these decisions.
        Finally, we were directed in that report to consult and
    coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services,
    specifically the U.S. Surgeon General, and that part of the
    report is included also.
        Senator Hutchinson. Back in the 1990s you did an exemplary
    job in heading up a group that made recommendations for a GOCO
    for vaccine production which would have, had it been
    implemented, averted the BioPort disaster. I think the
    jeopardizing of our troops who are not getting the anthrax
    vaccinations as they should be. The site selection process that
    was used at that time, will the same criteria be used in the
    site selection for a new GOCO facility?
        Dr. Winegar. All of those criteria will be used but the
    acquisition strategy that we plan to pursue this time is a bit
    more broad. Let me be specific on that. The earlier study
    limited possible site selection to military bases for a variety
    of reasons; number one being security, number two being
    availability of land, etc. We have decided that the best
    approach is to make it a totally open competition so that
    potential competitors to our solicitation could indeed offer to
    build such a facility on private land, and then of course one
    of the evaluation criteria would be cost in addition to all the
    other criteria.
        Senator Hutchinson. Will you assure the subcommittee that
    the site selection process will be fair and transparent?
        Dr. Winegar. Absolutely.
        Senator Hutchinson. Would you give me the assurance that as
    the criteria is established for site selection, that I will be
    briefed on that and before site selection is made, that I will
    receive such a briefing?
        Dr. Winegar. Absolutely. We intend to keep this
    subcommittee and any other interested members of Congress fully
    apprised of the situation, bearing in mind that we do have to
    adhere to the rules regarding the procurement of sensitive
    information, etc.
        Senator Hutchinson. The President's budget recommendation
    for this, I think, was $700,000. Under that funding scheme, it
    will be 2008 before such a GOCO facility will be fully active.
    I think that is absolutely unacceptable. We have too much in
    jeopardy with the growing threat of biological weapons. I think
    it is imperative that we accelerate that. If the subcommittee
    were able to plus up the authorization to say $40 million,
    would the Department be able to utilize that kind of a funding
    level over the next 2 years to accelerate a GOCO facility?
        Dr. Winegar. Well, I certainly am one that is ready to
    admit my limited expertise in the areas of construction.
    Certainly the time frame that we have developed is one that can
    be critically reviewed. In addition to the actual design,
    planning, and construction, I want to say for the record that,
    even once such a facility is built, an imperative part of the
    process is the validation and certification by the Food and
    Drug Administration, which will indeed encompass several years,
    the latter part admittedly----
        Senator Hutchinson. Hopefully with much greater success
    than Bioport.
        Dr. Winegar. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hutchinson. Well, let me just close. I want to
    thank again the Senator from Kansas for yielding his time. This
    is not only a critical national issue but something very
    important to me personally. As I stated in my opening
    statement, we actually had an instance of two deaths of
    recruits because a commercial vaccine production facility would
    not make them any longer. This is a prime example of the need
    for us to move very expeditiously on this GOCO concept. I thank
    you for your leadership on it and I look forward to working
    with you.
        Dr. Winegar. If I could just add one point of minor
    clarification. Senator Roberts specifically mentioned the need
    for anthrax vaccine and Senator Hutchinson is referring to a
    vaccine for adenovirus. I want to make sure that the record is
    clear that our concept for such a vaccine facility is one that
    is flexible and broad enough to be able to encompass the
    appropriate kinds of technology for multiple vaccines.
        Senator Hutchinson. I appreciate that because I think that
    is a very critical point because the emphasis gets placed on
    anthrax and that is certainly a part of the program. But there
    are a number of vaccines that we are not seeing the commercial
    sector produce because it is not financially viable.
        Dr. Winegar. Right. I just wanted to make sure that the
    subcommittee was aware of the fact that we are looking not only
    to today, but as the title of your subcommittee suggests, to
    the emerging threats and whether the next ones on the horizon
    are smallpox and plague or further down the road is Ebola or
    whatever. That indeed will be the challenge to us as we try to
    design such a facility with maximum capability and surge
    capability to meet all the needs.
        Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Senator
    Roberts, have I forgotten anything?
        Senator Landrieu. Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. I am going to yield again, Madam Chairman,
    in that our resident veterinarian and taxidermist and chemical
    demilitarization expert here was straining there with a
    question. Senator Allard, did you want to follow up?
        Senator Allard. I just wanted to compliment you on the fact
    that you are having an open, competitive process to decide to
    turn to the private sector. I was glad to hear you were
    thinking in terms of flexibility on the production lines
    because you never know what kind of organism you might have to
    deal with in turn.
        Dr. Winegar. Exactly.
        Senator Allard. The other thing I would share with you is
    that if you put your production facility all in one spot, there
    are things that could happen: power supply, maybe contamination
    of the facility. Depending how critical--I hope there is an
    analysis of how critical you think this constant supply is--if
    it is very critical then you may want to consider having two
    production spots so you do not have all your apples in one
    basket. If you think there is a moderate, critical need there,
    then maybe one facility would meet your needs. But I would
    assume that you have given that some thought as you have gone
    through this process.
        Senator Hutchinson. If I might just add to a very valid
    point. I think multiple production facilities might be viable.
    Having multiple storage facilities under FDA approval might
    meet the same need as the concern of having that deterrent in
    one location.
        Senator Allard. You may need to have some legislation to
    speed along, although I think they have an emergency process
    where they can rapidly approve vaccines and I would not think
    we would need legislation because I think that is already in
    place. But if not, we may have to consider something to make
    sure this moves more rapidly. I would agree with my colleague
    from Arkansas that 2007 seems a long way out to me.
        Dr. Winegar. I certainly want to reassure the subcommittee
    that on a professional and personal basis, I am constantly in
    contact with my colleagues from the FDA who do have the
    resident expertise that will be required for validating and
    approving such a facility, and also have very strong
    connections with Pharma and Bio and a number of the other
    organizations to whom the industry and the manufacturing sector
    report. I take your comments very seriously with regard to both
    multiple production sites and clearly multiple storage sites
    for what I consider a key element for our National defense
    program.
        Senator Allard. I have another question.
        Senator Landrieu. Why don't we see with Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. It is going to have to wait because I have
    yielded twice now and I am just not going to do it anymore.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Landrieu. We will get back to order. We were
    thinking about these two sites, Yucca Mountain and offshore
    Florida, which are interesting sites for this anthrax. Senator
    Roberts, I am going to step out for a minute to take care of
    some business--would you continue with your round of
    questioning?
        Senator Roberts. I would be delighted to and I will finish
    up quickly so Senator Allard can follow up. Dr. Winegar, you
    have added some capacity to your duties. You are the chemical
    demilitarization poster person down at the Department in your
    capacity as the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
    Staff informs me that when we took a look at the issue areas
    that this subcommittee would explore--``the things that keep us
    up at night''--that was a question that we asked quite a few
    folks in the last session and the session before that. Your
    portfolio has now increased to include all the things that are
    now in our pasture. So, welcome to our insomniac club.
        Dr. Winegar. Sir, I think I am a charter member of that
    club.
        Senator Roberts. Your position is starting to resemble
    something that was formerly at the Pentagon--the Assistant to
    the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
    Defense. We have said over and over again, why can't we have
    another one of those. If you wanted to call it something else,
    I guess you could. I do not know what the acronym for that is--
    A-S-D-N--nevermind.
        Dr. Winegar. A-T-S-D-N-C-B.
        Senator Roberts. You know it.
        Dr. Winegar. I know it well.
        Senator Roberts. What are your thoughts on filling the
    position? That was a nominated position. That was something
    that we had to approve.
        Dr. Winegar. That's correct.
        Senator Roberts. How are you doing down there? Why don't we
    get you that title if you want it? Because we have tried to
    single out how important this is, and with this new position I
    think it is at least commensurate with what was happening
    before. So my question is, should this position continue to go
    unfilled? How can we help you do your job so we all get a good
    night's rest?
        Dr. Winegar. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to
    address that. Mr. Aldridge who is the Under Secretary of
    Defense has indicated to me that this is a high priority for
    him and that he does intend to nominate someone to fill that
    position. It is my understanding that he is interviewing
    potential candidates for that. As you mentioned, the complete
    title of that job is Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. I have no
    expertise and no part of my portfolio encompasses nuclear
    matters.
        The way that office has been structured in the past is that
    there have been in fact two deputies: one to handle nuclear
    matters and the other, which I am currently filling, is the
    Deputy for Chemical and Biological matters. You are absolutely
    right. That is and should be a Senate-confirmed position. I
    look forward to getting a new boss to stay up late at night
    with me too.
        Senator Roberts. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just wanted to
    ask a question about how are we faring with meeting some of the
    deadlines with some of these weapons conventions. They are
    coming upon us here. Are we going to meet those deadlines? What
    are the biggest challenges you see in us being able to meet
    them?
        Dr. Winegar. Certainly I think that it is going to indeed
    be a very big challenge for us to meet the ultimate deadline
    which is the complete safe destruction of all the weapons we
    have in our stockpile. I think we are off to a good start. I
    think that with the other facilities that are well under way
    with regard to construction or actually in systemization
    planning that we have a very good chance of destroying the vast
    majority of the weapons in the stockpile. Of course there are
    always issues that might come up that could delay what we have
    projected to be the throughput rates for those facilities, etc.
        In my personal opinion, the major obstacles for us to
    overcome are to make technology decisions regarding the
    stockpiles at Pueblo and Blue Grass. Until we make those
    decisions we cannot really move forward down the path with the
    construction and operation of a facility.
        Senator Allard. If I recall your testimony, spring 2002 was
    when you would get your first decision.
        Dr. Winegar. That is correct.
        Senator Allard. If you do not see any impediments coming
    up, when would you predict we could get moving with the Pueblo?
        Dr. Winegar. Well, we actually have money in the fiscal
    year 2002 budget and we are starting some of the infrastructure
    improvements that are not technology specific, such as upgrades
    to utilities. We cannot do anything that would be determined
    pre-decisional until the entire RCRA process is completed, etc.
    But I think we are well-positioned with the money we have in
    the 2002 budget and our projections for the budget beyond that
    time to quickly execute whatever path we decide to follow.
        Senator Allard. In some of the communities we have been
    discussing the possibility of impact fees. My question is,
    where would the money for these proposed impact fees have to
    come from? How could it effect the chemical demilitarization
    programs for these sites?
        Dr Winegar. It is my understanding that the Department of
    Defense has no authorization and no legal grounds to provide
    such impact fees to these communities.
        Senator Allard. So if a community decides to apply an
    impact fee, the ultimate decision that would come out of the
    Department of the Defense is what?
        Dr. Winegar. The Department has no authorization to pay
    such fees.
        Senator Allard. So their response would be what?
        Dr. Winegar. Their response would be we have a program in
    place to complete the destruction of these and we have not
    factored in any funds to address an impact fee.
        Senator Allard. If the community insists on the impact fee,
    then you would have to walk away from where you are at that
    point? How would you deal with that?
        Dr. Winegar. I would certainly think we would have to seek
    help in negotiation or seek some type of relief outside the
    current limitations that are set on the Department.
        Senator Allard. Well, I know in Pueblo there was some
    discussion about applying an impact fee by City Council or some
    of the elected officials there locally.
        Dr. Winegar. Yes.
        Senator Allard. The message that we left is that it would
    severely impede the ability to move forward on that project.
        Dr. Winegar. That is correct.
        Senator Allard. Would that be the proper response?
        Dr. Winegar. That is correct.
        Senator Allard. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam
    Chairman.
        Senator Landrieu. I have several more questions but Senator
    Roberts, why don't you go ahead.
        Senator Roberts. We do not want to leave the rest of the
    witnesses out. But I have just two quick questions for Dr.
    Winegar. The United States Marine Corps has been testing a new
    technology called electro-chemically-activated decontamination
    solution. I understand that in a recent 3-day test that was
    conducted by the Corps--the Marine Corps Assistance Command and
    the CBERF Team--this, what we call ECA technology, did
    demonstrate it was an effective decontaminate and exceeded all
    test requirements. Any thoughts on this? Does this sound to you
    that this is an area where we ought to plus up some investment
    on behalf of the Marine Corps?
        Dr. Winegar. Sir, I have been briefed on that electro-
    static decon program, as a matter of fact, from the Clean Earth
    Technologies Group and the folks at the University who are
    cooperating with that project. I think the results to date are
    promising and we have spoken with them. Again this is another
    example of a program that can be conducted in academia and
    industry to a certain point, and then when they actually need
    to test it against some of the pathogens we have to develop a
    collaborative relationship with our Defense Department
    laboratories and I believe that is the status of that project
    at the moment.
        Senator Roberts. I mispronounced this program. This is
    electro-chemically-activated decontamination solution. What did
    I say? Oh, I am getting static. [Laughter].
        The reason I ask you that, because I am going to ask the
    General a question down the road here on our vulnerability in
    regards to the warfighter on chem/bio defense and how DTRA is
    doing. This is the kind of thing that we really need to press
    ahead on. Two years ago I was out in California when I saw the
    CBERF outfit work through its training. So if we are not doing
    the job we ought to do--not that we don't want to do the job--
    why this is extremely important.
        The last thing I have for you, in my opening statement I
    talked about the fact the money is coming out of the Army in
    regards to procurement. Why can't we get a general funding
    program? Is it possible for the chemical/demilitarization
    funding to be transferred within the Army procurement account
    to other programs? This is a national program. Why are we
    making the Army pay for it, or the Air Force for that matter?
        Dr. Winegar. Sir, I think that again is one of the options
    that we will be looking at as we complete our comprehensive DAE
    review for Mr. Aldridge. We have made it clear that all options
    are on the table and whether that should be a defense-wide
    account versus an Army account is clearly one of the issues
    that we will be discussing at that time.
        Senator Roberts. Tell Secretary Aldridge that a very
    reasonable and effective Chairman of the Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities Subcommittee asked that question and a very
    obstreperous ranking member asked it as well.
        Dr. Winegar. Yes sir, I will convey that to him.
        Senator Landrieu. Great. That will put fear in him. Let me
    ask Mr. Waldron, I understand that DOD and DOE--you testified
    to this--are working together to develop bio detectors. What is
    the status of our demonstration and application programs? In
    other words, the devices that can detect chemical and
    biological agents in heavily populated areas like subways,
    airports, even events of limited duration, will these
    technologies eventually be installed or used on military
    installations as well? Could you also talk about the state-of-
    the-art standoff chemical and biological detectors today and
    how the agencies are contributing to development efforts in
    this? How are your agencies contributing to the development
    efforts in this arena?
        Mr. Waldron. I think I have all that. First of all, in
    regards to demonstration projects, we have two major
    demonstrations--we call them DDAPS factored after the Defense
    Department's ACTDs, one of which will be conducted in Salt Lake
    City for the Salt Lake City Olympics. We have already done a
    quarter-scale demonstration in Salt Lake City with Utah public
    health people. Basically it is some distributed air sampling
    systems that continually pull in the air deposited onto a piece
    of filter paper and then every 4 hours we have someone go out
    and change the filter paper. The filter paper goes back to a
    laboratory and then we use laboratory techniques to look for
    the potential biological agents.
        So, we have in place a field laboratory that we will be
    using in Salt Lake City for the Olympics. This has been
    coordinated with the FBI, the Salt Lake City Olympic Committee,
    and the Utah public health people. We are going to provide a
    capability for the Utah public health people to make an
    assessment if there may be a release during the Olympics.
        Senator Landrieu. Let me just follow up with this. Maybe
    this is a common sense question. If you detected it on the
    filter would it be too late? Once it is detected on a filter,
    the danger of the agent already spreading in that way, is that
    what the technology is positioned to do?
        Mr. Waldron. Well, what we are doing is, it is being
    collected on the filter paper and then we take it to a
    laboratory and analyze it. The answer is that you can either
    have a detection system that detects right away and alarms or
    you can have a system that you use and detect so you can then
    treat the exposed people. The technology is not there, right
    now, that would not have a significant false alarm rate, for
    detecting something right away.
        Senator Landrieu. So this is for the accurate analysis and
    then effective treatment in the event something terrible
    happened.
        Mr. Waldron. Right. So then the Public Health Service will
    be able to say, everyone that was in the Correll Center or
    whatever venue it was during the certain time, you need to get
    to a hospital to get treated. Our understanding is that as long
    as you can get people to treatment within the 12- to 24-hour
    timeframe after exposure then they can be successfully treated.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you for clarifying that. Dr. Koch,
    during conference on last year's defense authorization bill, we
    talked about the closure of these plutonium plants in Russia
    and I know we are proceeding. You mentioned that we have
    decided that it is too costly and too dangerous to try to
    convert so we are going to close and try to reorganize with a
    fossil fuel source. What are our options there, would there
    perhaps be some green energy options for the region or clean
    energy production? I understand our options may be coal or
    another fuel source--you did not elaborate. What are our
    options, since we are doing this, to try to skip a generation
    of technology and get some clean power to this region?
        Dr. Koch. Madam Chairman, I confess I do not know the
    details and so if I could expand on my answer for the record, I
    would appreciate it. We are looking at both coal and oil-fired
    plants that would at a minimum be to American environmental
    standards--so it would be, I would think, an increase in
    environmentally sound approaches compared to traditional
    Russian fossil fuels.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        During 2000, the Department of Defense and Ministry of Atomic
    Energy evaluated options for providing heat and electricity to the
    surrounding communities in the closed cities of Seversk and
    Zheleznogorsk, which is a Russian requirement in order to shut down the
    three remaining Russian plutonium production reactors. The final U.S.
    study compared the costs of producing the required heat and electricity
    by coal or converting the reactor core design to allow continued
    operation without production of weapons-grade plutonium. The study
    included a section evaluating the prospects of increasing the energy
    efficiency in the distribution and consumption of the heat and
    electricity.
        The final study was restricted to coal and conversion because other
    technologies, which were evaluated in earlier studies, were rejected
    for technological, meteorological, or economical reasons. Other
    technologies were not included in the final report. The cost to the
    Russian utility to purchase oil or natural gas at competitive rates is
    approximately five times the cost per megawatt for coal. In addition,
    pipelines to supply oil or natural gas to the two cities do not
    currently exist and would have to be built, also adding to the project
    cost. New nuclear reactors were eliminated because the capital
    investment was an order of magnitude greater than coal or conversion.
        Hydroelectric power was rejected because it is seasonal, and not
    available in the winter when demand is highest. In addition,
    hydroelectric power generates only electricity and does not directly
    satisfy the primary requirement for district heat. Solar energy was
    eliminated due to location and weather. Both of these cities are
    located only 600 miles south of the Arctic Circle. In the winter, when
    the heat and electricity demand is the highest, the days at these
    northern latitudes are very short and production from solar
    technologies are at their lowest and intermittent. Similarly, wind
    power was also rejected as being intermittent and is regarded as a
    supplemental, not a primary, source of power.
        Hence, only projects involving coal plants are practical for this
    location.

        Senator Landrieu. Compared to what they have there, I am
    sure it is going to be an improvement. But I would like you to
    get back to me about those options because there is
    extraordinarily fast moving technology in this area and whether
    it is clean coal or cleaner oil or even solar, there are many
    exciting and interesting opportunities.
        While we already have a certain distribution network in the
    United States for new places in the planet, there are other
    options that we did not necessarily have when we began. I think
    we should be open to that. So, if you could give me some
    details I would be interested.
        I have one more question. The NNSA research program, Mr.
    Waldron, has been cut substantially. If our analysis is
    correct, there appears to be approximately a $50 million cut in
    research. What impact is this going to have on ongoing research
    projects? What impact will this have on the future? What will
    the impact be on the people who actually do the research?
        Mr. Waldron. The simple answer obviously is that it is
    going to delay a significant amount of work that we have had
    underway. We are also looking at terminating a few efforts
    prematurely. We have not gotten to formal, final assessment of
    the technology. It impacts our ability, obviously, in the
    future to address the technical challenges that I presented in
    my testimony. It draws things out. It makes our ability to make
    these technologies available on a fairly rapid basis drawn out.
    We are also not able to address as many technical options as we
    would like to. Obviously the impact on the people doing the
    work is not an impact on the DOE and NNSA and my staff. We are
    going to have jobs, but the impact is going to be substantial
    at the NNSA laboratories.
        Senator Landrieu. Let me ask you this and forgive me for
    not knowing the totals, but what does this $50 million
    represent in terms of a percentage cut?
        Mr. Waldron. About 25 percent.
        Senator Landrieu. So it is a pretty steep cut in research.
        Mr. Waldron. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Landrieu. While you have not determined how exactly
    you are going to deal with that, could you just indicate a few
    things that you know of that may have to be cut, that we may
    have to walk away from? I know we have not decided exactly how
    this cut is going to be implemented and all of those decisions
    have yet to be made, but could you just share some of that with
    us?
        Mr. Waldron. One of the things is in our proliferation
    detection area. We are going to substantially scale back. Our
    look at hyperspectral technologies that would be able to detect
    chemicals associated with the production of nuclear weapons and
    potentially chemical agents, that is one area; also some laser-
    based technology doing the same type of work to look at various
    chemical species. That is one significant area. The other is
    that we will substantially delay our support to the Air Force
    Technical Application Center in seismic calibration as they
    move to this regional-based monitoring system. So there are a
    couple of areas.
        Senator Landrieu. There are consequences for every cut and
    of course we want to try to maintain our balanced budget and
    our fiscal discipline. I want the record to reflect that I
    believe the ranking member has also indicated this in other
    cases, we know how important the research and technology
    aspects of our budgets are to maintain our ability to refocus
    and reshape and redesign and explore places we have not been
    before but where real threats exist. Sometimes you save money
    in the short run, but when you cut your research you lose a
    great deal of the money over the long term. I would like to
    work with all of you and look forward to working with the
    members, thank you for your testimony.
        That completes my questioning. Senator Roberts, do you have
    anything to add?
        Senator Roberts. I have just a couple of questions.
        Senator Landrieu. We have about 5 minutes. Go right ahead.
        Senator Roberts. General, last November the GAO reported
    that the services were not really integrating chemical and
    biological defense into unit exercise, and the training, if
    done, was not always realistic in terms of how the units would
    operate in war. In your opening testimony, you indicated that
    DTRA is basically a combat support or warfighter support
    agency. DOD reported last year that the Army's combat training
    centers continued to see units of all levels unable to perform
    all chemical and biological defense tasks to standard. That is
    what I was referring to in my other question. What is your
    assessment of the chemical and biological defense training by
    our combatant commanders? How is DTRA assisting the CINCs and
    the warfighter?
        General Bongiovi. Sir, I would say right now we do work
    with the warfighting CINCs and we exercise with them. It would
    be hard for me to assess right now what their capability is
    because I think they are just beginning to understand the
    threat out there and their capabilities. We work in the area of
    chemical and biological defense and the technology side of
    that. We work under the joint chemical and biological defense
    program, which Dr. Winegar oversees. That program establishes
    the technologies and capabilities out there in terms of
    detection, protection, clean-up, training, and those kinds of
    things.
        Under that program, we are executing right now what is
    called an ACTD, an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration,
    over in Korea at Osan Air Force Base called Reststops--
    restoration of operations. That process is really looking at a
    fixed site, a chemical/biological simulated attack on a fixed
    site and how we would respond procedurally and with technology.
    It is actually a 3-year activity.
        Senator Roberts. Excuse me for interrupting--you always
    have the threats that you have to prioritize and deem whether
    they are appropriate or not. When we went to North Korea
    several years ago with Chairman Stevens trying to assess what
    Kim Jong Il was up to, at that particular briefing we were told
    a whole series of things that could very well happen and the
    closeness of that base and Seoul to the border, etc., could be
    utter chaos if that ever took place. As a matter of fact, I do
    not know how you could really treat anybody. I think it was
    about 17 minutes away or something similar if anything were to
    happen. But was that factored in, in terms of when you got to
    conduct the exercises? Does that mirror what you think a
    possible threat----
        General Bongiovi. Yes sir. When we----
        Senator Roberts. There's a criteria there.
        General Bongiovi. Yes, sir. When we do a demonstration of
    that nature with a warfighter, one of the CINCs will volunteer
    to be the operational manager of that. In this case, PACOM
    chose U.S. forces in Korea because of the immediacy of the
    threat. We simulate the attack as it would be likely to happen
    under those scenarios.
        Senator Roberts. I apologize for interrupting you again.
    One of the lessons learned in the Intelligence Committee and
    the Armed Services Committee on the U.S.S. Cole was the need
    for increased frequency of vulnerability assessments like the
    Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessments--basically
    military installations, ports, air facilities, both around the
    world and the United States. We have just seen the Pentagon
    step up to that, and you have that requirement. How is that
    impacting your agency, your personnel, and are you conducting
    exercises along those lines?
        General Bongiovi. Not necessarily exercises, sir. As I
    mentioned in my statement, we do a hundred force protection
    assessments under the direction of the Chairman. That is what
    you referred to, what you called JSIVAS.
        Senator Roberts. What's the acronym?
        General Bongiovi. JSIVAS. Joint Staff Integrated
    Vulnerability Assessments. We just increased the number of
    teams doing that. We are now moving away from fixed
    installations to forces in transit. So, the Chairman is
    restructuring that program as a result of the U.S.S. Cole. We
    have not been asked to expand it beyond the hundred that we are
    doing right now.
        Senator Roberts. Right. I did not want to leave you out,
    Dr. Koch. Thank you for your past testimony and your work. You
    referred to the conditions that we have with Shchuch'ye. When
    we were in the majority those were called the Roberts
    Initiatives, but now we just call them conditions.
        Senator Landrieu. We can still call them the Roberts
    Initiatives.
        Senator Roberts. Where do you think we are on that? We even
    had the Russians come here and say that the conditions were
    appropriate for them to step up to their responsibilities. We
    got into a situation with the House of Representatives where
    the funding was not forthcoming. I need to know where you think
    we are in terms of the administration's support. I think they
    have recommended that the restriction on the funding be lifted,
    but they haven't said anything about the conditions. I think
    the conditions have been very helpful for long-term
    cooperation. Am I right in this respect? What do you think?
        Dr. Koch. Senator, I absolutely think you are right and
    perhaps it is even more important that the Russian responsible
    for chemical weapons destruction thinks you are right. He has
    said more than once that the conditions you outlined helped him
    greatly within his government with focusing attention and
    pointing them on a good path ahead. We have had good progress
    on all fronts.
        They have dramatically increased their fiscal year 2001
    budget for chemical weapons destruction, including $25 million
    for Shchuch'ye. They are working very hard on a systematic
    overall destruction plan, which they had lacked before. They
    are working on being able to transport chemical weapons for
    destruction in just a very few sites as opposed to the many
    that they had once planned. Their work at the Shchuch'ye site
    on the general infrastructure, which we would require to go
    ahead, continues apace. On the non-Russian front, our friends'
    and allies' contributions, commitments, and statements of very
    strong interest about contributions now total about $55
    million.
        Senator Roberts. So we have not only statements of support
    but actual contributions. Senator Lugar is extremely interested
    in this. $20 million in fiscal year 2000 funds were authorized
    for security enhancements. But how can we do this unless the
    Russians step up? Are they going to destroy the other nerve
    agents at this plant? So we decided that the most important
    thing that we do is enhance the security. But I note here that
    only $6 million has been obligated. Why is that? There is $14
    million here that--and this is back in fiscal year 2000. Do we
    know that?
        Dr. Koch. Again I will have to find some details. I do know
    that the actual costs of the needed security enhancement was
    less than initially projected, but if----
        Senator Roberts. I am not sure the GAO feels that those
    security enhancements are the best that we could do. But my
    final response for the record is that $442 million authorized
    and appropriated for fiscal year 2001 CTR still not obligated.
        Dr. Koch. On its way, sir. We are, of course, required to
    notify Congress of our intention to obligate funds each fiscal
    year and we had delayed notification while the administration
    was reviewing all the assistance programs to Russia. We did in
    early June send up an initial notification for several projects
    using fiscal year 2001 funds. As the review completes, we will
    send up the notification for the remainder.
        Senator Roberts. Well, we have 2002, $458 million
    authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 2000 still
    unobligated. Why don't you include all of that in one report
    and get it back to us? That is all, Madam Chairman. Thank you.
    Thank you Dr. Koch for the job you do.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Roberts, for focusing
    on that because it is very important and a bone of contention
    between our committee and the House. We need to move forward on
    that.
        Thank you all for your testimony and as I said the record
    will be open for another 48 hours and you are welcome to submit
    additional statements. Please respond to the questions that
    were asked to be submitted. Thank you all very much, the
    meeting will be adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
        1. Senator Roberts. General Bongiovi, the U.S. has demonstrated in
    the Gulf War and subsequent military operations worldwide that we have
    weapons with pinpoint accuracy. As a result, our potential adversaries
    are increasingly locating critical command facilities and WMD-related
    infrastructure in hard-to-destroy bunkers and tunnels.
        Do we have the capability today to defeat bunkers and tunnels?
        General Bongiovi. We have the capability to defeat most bunkers
    (those structures that are excavated, then covered with soil and
    concrete), but under limited circumstances. We generally have to fly
    directly over or very near the target to drop our penetrating weapons
    (``direct attack''), which often carries significant risk since such
    high-value targets are often heavily defended. An improvement is the
    current procurement of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Munition (JASSM),
    which has some standoff capability (such that the aircraft would still
    have to fly over the threat country, but not the target itself), and
    can penetrate on the same order as our workhorse direct attack
    penetrator, the 2,000 pound BLU-109. Weapons that will provide improved
    penetration and significant standoff (no aircraft flight over the
    threat country) are the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile
    Penetrator (Initial Operational Capability 2002), and the potentially
    Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant (Initial Operational Capability
    2005) depending on U.S. Navy support. Both of these weapons will be
    developed under an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
    program managed by DTRA.
        We have even less capability to defeat tunnels (structures that are
    excavated directly under existing rock). These structures can be
    protected by up to several hundred meters of hard rock versus the 2-20
    meters of soil and concrete used for most bunkers. Significant
    shortfalls exist in both our capability to collect and analyze
    intelligence data, and our capability to functionally defeat these
    facilities with conventional weapons. Current nuclear weapons can
    defeat most tunnel structures. However, shortfalls still exist against
    the very deepest structures, and in our ability to reduce the resulting
    nuclear collateral effects.

        2. Senator Roberts. General Bongiovi, what is DTRA contributing to
    this?
        General Bongiovi. DTRA is a central player in providing capability
    to characterize and defeat hard and deeply buried targets. We apply our
    significant background in underground facility design to assist the
    intelligence community in identifying typical signatures and reverse
    engineer to fill knowledge gaps. We have robust defeat programs that
    cut across conventional weapon, nuclear weapon, and special operations
    capabilities against this target set. Our ACTDs have delivered the
    Advanced Unitary Penetrator (BLU-116/B), the Hard Target Smart Fuse,
    and are supporting the development of penetrators with significant
    standoff capability, such as the CALCM Penetrator and the Tactical
    Tomahawk Penetrator Variant. DTRA's test division has pioneered the
    delivery concepts of Optimized Dual Delivery (multiple weapons
    optimally released along a common laser path), and the skip-bomb
    delivery as an alternative method to penetrating deep targets. DTRA
    tunnel defeat demonstration facilities at the Nevada Test Site have
    provided a community focus in working the hard and deeply buried target
    (HDBT) problem end-to-end using all warfighting capabilities. DTRA also
    chaired the HDBT Defeat Interagency Working Group for OSD that authored
    the draft DOD/DOE-DP HDBT Science and Technology Master Plan. Finally,
    as a Combat Support Agency, we are able to quickly transition new
    capabilities to the warfighter through the use of deployable expert
    teams, or through reach-back support in a 24 hours, 7 days per week
    operations center.

        3. Senator Roberts. General Bongiovi, under the terms of the
    Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), U.S. government and privately-owned
    facilities are subject to inspection. DTRA has the implementation role
    for the CWC and is responsible for escorting the inspectors of the CWC
    when they inspect U.S. government and commercial facilities.
        Is DTRA able to provide these escorts and fulfill the requirements
    of the CWC or is DTRA facing compliance issues regarding the staffing
    of these escort positions?
        General Bongiovi. There are no Chemical Weapons Convention
    compliance issues currently foreseen regarding the staffing of these
    escort positions. However, DTRA has determined that the most economical
    and effective way to fulfill the escort requirements for Department of
    Defense (DOD) facilities is through the use of contractor employees
    reporting to a U.S. Government employee team chief. This would maximize
    flexibility, minimize cost, and accommodate the fact that the escort
    mission at DOD facilities is of finite duration. However, the language
    in the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 precludes
    the use of contractor employees. Unless the proposed amendment is
    adopted, DTRA will be required to hire civilian employees to perform
    these escort functions.

        4. Senator Roberts. Mr. Waldron, I have reviewed the fiscal year
    2002 budget request for the Office of Nonproliferation Research and
    Engineering in the National Nuclear Security Administration. If the
    goal of this office is to conduct R&D on technologies that detect and
    deter nuclear proliferation, meet U.S. nuclear explosion monitoring
    goals, and to develop and demonstrate chemical and biological detection
    and related technologies, why is your office funding a construction
    project?
        Mr. Waldron. You are correct Senator. The goal of our office is to
    conduct R&D that advances nonproliferation technologies. Therefore, it
    was a corporate decision for us to sponsor the construction of a
    facility that will consolidate many of our activities and other related
    activities of the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and the
    Office of Intelligence because of our program management and technical
    oversight skills. This new facility will enhance the efficiency of R&D
    development and improve the physical infrastructure and security at Los
    Alamos National Laboratory by centralizing activities that are
    currently scattered over six different technical areas at the Los
    Alamos site. The fiscal year 2002 funding represents the final request
    for funds for construction of the facility, which will be operational
    during fiscal year 2003.

        5. Senator Roberts. Dr. Koch, last year the Fiscal Year 2001
    National Defense Authorization bill required the CTR program to provide
    several reports to the committee during fiscal year 2001. These reports
    are long overdue. For example, the Section 1307 Fossil Fuel
    Alternatives Options Report was due to the committee on December 30,
    2000. Similarly, the Section 1308 Consolidated Annual CTR Report was
    due to the committee on February 5, 2001. Finally, the Section 1309
    Russian Chemical Weapons Elimination Report was due to the committee on
    January 30, 2001. To date we have not received these reports nor have
    you been able to tell staff when these reports will be delivered.
        Are you now in a position to tell the committee when these reports
    will be delivered?
        Dr. Koch. The Department regrets that these reports were not
    submitted in a more timely fashion to the committee. The response
    required for Section 1307 Fossil Fuel Alternatives Options Report, the
    annual report called for by Section 1308, and the Section 1309 Russian
    Chemical Weapons Elimination Report are awaiting the results of
    administration and departmental review of nonproliferation programs for
    Russia. We will provide the reports as soon as possible.

        6. Senator Roberts. Dr. Koch, why is the $442 million authorized
    and appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for CTR still not obligated?
        Dr. Koch. According to CTR's authorizing legislation, Congress must
    be notified prior to obligation of appropriated funds. While waiting to
    learn of the results of the administration's Russia review, the
    Department of Defense notified Congress on June 2, 2001 of its intent
    to obligate $105.9 in fiscal year 2001 funds for several CTR programs
    expected to be supported by the review. As of August 3, 2001, $23.9
    million had been obligated. When the review is completed, the
    Department will send Congress notification of the remaining $336.5
    million.

        7. Senator Roberts. Dr. Koch, of the $458 million authorized and
    appropriated for fiscal year 2000, why is half still unobligated?
        Dr. Koch. Section 1306 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2000 requires a determination of whether DOD is the
    most appropriate agency to execute CTR and a congressional report
    reflecting the results of this determination. Once the Secretary makes
    the determination, we will prepare the report for submission. Section
    1306 precludes DOD from obligating 50 percent ($229.1 million) of its
    fiscal year 2000 funds until this report is submitted. As of August 3,
    2001, the Department has obligated 91 percent of the fiscal year 2000
    funds available for obligation.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

        8. Senator Collins. Dr. Winegar, in your prepared testimony you
    stated that the Department of Defense owes the local communities around
    demilitarization facilities the best, and not necessarily the easiest,
    disposal possible. The Department is expending a substantial amount of
    funding to develop effective sensor technologies to provide real-time,
    near-instantaneous detection of chemical agents to protect American
    troops.
        Does the chemical demilitarization program at the present time have
    adequate technologies for the monitoring of demilitarization of
    facilities?
        Dr. Winegar. Yes, the chemical demilitarization program has
    adequate sampling and analytical technologies to monitor the
    demilitarization facilities. The environment inside and outside all
    demilitarization facilities is continuously monitored for protection of
    workers and the public. The demilitarization facilities have installed
    a network of ``near real-time'' (less than a 10-minute cycle time
    response) monitors at all the facilities. The monitors, automatic
    continuous air monitoring systems (ACAMS), are devices that
    continuously sample and analyze ambient air for the presence of agent
    in the plant and stack effluent. The ACAMS is an automatic gas
    chromatograph that cycles from sampling to analysis, providing a direct
    readout of the chemical agent concentration. The ACAMS computes the
    chemical materiel masses associated with the monitoring level based on
    its calibration of instrument response, sample collection time, and
    sample flow rate through a preconcentrator tube. A strip chart recorder
    provides real-time printouts and a historical log of the ACAMS
    chromatogram. The ACAMS generates an audible alarm when the chemical
    materiel concentration exceeds the preset alarm level. The ACAMS
    provides internal diagnostic checks to determine the operability of the
    system and software determines whether various operating parameters are
    within predetermined limits. If the ACAMS are operating outside the
    limits, an error message appears on the front control panel, and a
    malfunction status signal is sent to the control room.
        The demilitarization sites also use a depot area air monitoring
    system (DAAMS) to confirm ACAMS alarms and provide historical
    monitoring of the facility perimeter. The DAAMS is comprised of solid
    sorbent tubes and associated equipment. Air monitoring with DAAMS
    employs air aspiration through the sorbent tube for a predetermined
    period of time at a controlled air flow rate. The DAAMS samples are
    then analyzed in the laboratory to detect chemical materiel at the
    desired monitoring levels TWA (time weighted average), ASC (allowable
    stack concentration), and GPL (general population level). Laboratory
    analysis uses thermal desorption of the analytes from the sorbent tubes
    into a gas chromatograph/flame photometric detector (GC/FPD) or gas
    chromatograph/mass selective detector (GC/MSD) analytical system.
    Duplicate DAAMS sampling at sample stations allows for confirmation of
    chemical materiel readings by analyzing replicate samples on dissimilar
    analytical columns or on the GC/MSD if sufficient analyte mass is
    available.

        9. Senator Collins. Dr. Winegar, would any leakage be detected in a
    timely fashion?
        Dr. Winegar. Yes, each facility has numerous monitoring devices
    strategically positioned throughout the demilitarization facility to
    detect any potential releases from the demilitarization process. The
    locations are dependent on such conditions as: (1) probability that
    agent will be present at concentrations in excess of established
    limits; (2) nature of the source of agent; (3) probability that
    individuals are present in the area; and (4) level of protective
    clothing used in the area. All demilitarization facilities have a
    network of automatic continuous air monitoring system (ACAMS) devices
    that continuously sample and analyze ambient air within near real-time
    (less than a 10-minute cycle response time). These ACAMS units are used
    as process monitors and early warning devices in the event of a
    chemical agent leak or spill. The ACAMS are networked into the
    continuously manned facility control room to provide alarms in the
    event of equipment malfunction and leak or spill of chemical agent
    materiel. The depot area air monitoring system (DAAMS) is used to
    confirm ACAMS alarms and provide historical data of sampling locations.
    Throughout chemical demilitarization operations, monitoring and
    sampling will be performed routinely at locations selected to provide
    optimum information to ensure maximum protection for workers, the
    public, and the environment during operations.
        The program manager for chemical demilitarization (PMCD) has
    detailed and intricate quality control and monitoring concept programs
    defining requirements to ensure that the monitoring system and
    analytical methods can reliably detect and quantify chemical agents.
    The PMCD reviews and evaluates the laboratory quality control data from
    each facility. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is an
    oversight agency that reviews and evaluates the effectiveness of the
    monitoring system and laboratory activities. DHHS and PMCD annually
    inspect laboratory operations to determine their readiness and
    preparedness to operate and support safe facility operations.

        10. Senator Collins. Dr. Winegar, is the demilitarization program
    tracking the advances made in detection/sensor technology?
        Dr. Winegar. The demilitarization program tracks advances in
    detection/sensor technology by routinely attending vendor's
    presentations and briefings on recent and state-of-the-art advances in
    monitoring and analytical equipment. In addition, we work with
    technical companies to assist this program in evaluating advances in
    monitoring and analytical technology. Also, we use the services of
    technical contractors to evaluate the latest advances in monitoring
    technology. The scope of tasks range from performing literature
    searches to testing, sampling, and monitoring equipment with chemical
    agent to determine sensitivity and specificity in identifying and
    quantifying chemical agents. The PMCD communicates frequently with DHHS
    personnel, providing them with current information and details on the
    evaluations and studies performed to improve and enhance the PMCD
    monitoring program. The PMCD briefs the National Research Council of
    the National Academies of Science at least once a year on the status of
    efforts to improve monitoring of chemical agents and potential future
    efforts that could improve the monitoring of chemical agents. PMCD has
    tasked various laboratories to evaluate different technologies such as
    the operability of the Fourier Transform Infra-Red (FTIR) Spectrometer,
    Chemical Ionization (CI) Mass Spectrometer/Mass Spectrometer (MS/MS),
    Ion Mobility Spectrometer (IMS), and others. The FTIR study was
    performed with an ACAMS unit to determine the sensitivity during a
    demilitarization operation. The FTIR was able to identify chemical
    agent at high concentrations, but it could not identify and quantify
    chemical agent at required lower concentrations. The CI-MS/MS was used
    for a study at the common stack for the three types of furnaces and was
    not able to quantify chemical agent at the required current monitoring
    level. The IMS was tested but could only identify chemical agent at
    high levels or what would be described as battlefield concentrations.
    Since the demilitarization facilities require a much lower level of
    detection, each of these approaches was considered impractical for
    operational use.

        11. Senator Collins. Dr. Winegar, is the Department's
    demilitarization program pursuing any R&D on improved detection and
    monitoring technologies? If so, could you elaborate on what those
    technologies are?
        Dr. Winegar. Yes, the PMCD has developed several technical tasks
    for development of improvements to the monitoring program. PMCD
    constantly evaluates and upgrades current methods and technology to
    improve detection efficiencies. Though the current capabilities meet or
    exceed the requirements as outlined by DOD and the EPA, the PMCD is
    continuing to evaluate and modify the current ACAMS devices and
    software to reduce the response time to facility releases and increase
    performance efficiency. PMCD plans to evaluate the depot area air
    monitoring system (DAAMS) technology to collect sufficient sample in
    satisfying proposed lower exposure levels. One possibility is to equip
    the ACAMS monitoring system with a DAAMS sampling device on the front
    end to collect a great volume of sample for the lower detection limits.
    The PMCD has evaluated the gas chromatograph/atomic emission detector
    to determine its sensitivity and specificity. This technology has
    adequate sensitivity; yet, it requires large sampling volumes to reach
    this sensitivity and the instrument is maintenance-intensive.
        The technologies that are used to monitor for chemical agents at
    U.S. chemical stockpile sites provide excellent capabilities for
    detection and identification of agents at low levels in near real-time.
    The ACAMS can identify the presence of chemical agent in near real-time
    at less than half the concentration of the stated worker population
    limited time weighted average, which is the regulatory limit
    established to which a worker may be exposed for 8 hours a day over an
    entire career with no adverse health effect.
        The DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program is investing in
    sciences and technology for the detection and identification of
    chemical and biological agents. However, these technologies are being
    developed for the primary purpose to protect the warfighter against
    attacks by adversaries with chemical or biological weapons. As a
    result, the system needs are focused on providing real-time detection
    of concentrations of agent that pose an immediate threat to life and
    health. In addition, these capabilities are generally intended to be
    more compact and ruggedized for field use. This is in contrast to the
    monitoring capabilities for chemical demilitarization sites, which use
    laboratory quality instrumentation of high sensitivity to monitor in
    support of operations at the stockpile and destruction sites. One
    project that may yield information to support chemical demilitarization
    monitoring activities is the Low Level Chemical Agent Research Program,
    which is conducting research to determine the effects of exposures to
    low levels of chemical agents.

        12. Senator Collins. Dr. Winegar, the Department of Defense has
    been actively pursuing research and development of sensor technologies
    to help defend against chemical and biological weapons. Congress, and
    particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, has supported this
    DOD research effort and has included substantial increases beyond the
    budget request in recent years.
        Are you satisfied with the progress that has been made in this
    technology area?
        Dr. Winegar. Since Operation Desert Storm, there have been
    increased investments in chemical and biological sensor technologies to
    improve upon our capabilities. Significant progress has been made in
    fielding new capabilities to protect our warfighters against the
    continuing threats from chemical and biological weapons, and new
    systems are in development that will provide further improvement in the
    next few years. Additionally, investments in the science and technology
    base are addressing many of the difficult technical and scientific
    challenges in order to allow detection and identification of existing
    and emerging threat agents in sufficient time to provide warning to
    protect against the threat before our forces have been exposed. In
    summary, there has been a great deal of progress over the past decade
    and our strategy promises to yield further improvements over the coming
    decade. However, technical barriers and the evolving threat environment
    will continue to pose challenges.
        Since Operation Desert Storm, the services have fielded the
    following detection capabilities:

             Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm (ACADA)--
            Automatic point detection of nerve and blister agents.
             Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS)--
            Vehicle-mounted biological detection and identification
            capability.
             Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM)--Handheld
            surface off-gas sampling capability for nerve and blister
            agents.
             Improved Point Detection System (IPDS)--Ship-based
            improved automatic point detection of nerve/blister agents.
             Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD)--Shipboard
            biological point detection capability.
             Portal Shield network sensor system--Biological point
            detection capability to protect high value fixed sites against
            BW attacks.
             Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL)--Standoff
            detection of nerve and blister agents.

        The following developmental systems are planned to be fielded in
    the mid-term:

             Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS)--
            Automatic long line source and point/mobile biodetection to
            detect and identify bio-agents; programmable.
             Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD)--Improved, all-
            agent programmable automatic point detection; portable monitor,
            miniature detectors for aircraft interiors; interior ship
            spaces; wheeled and tracked vehicles; and individual soldiers.
             Joint Service Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector
            (JSLSCAD)--Lightweight, on-the-move, passive standoff detection
            for chemical agent vapors.

        In addition, there are several being explored in the technology
    base:

             Joint Chemical Biological Agent Water Monitor
            (JCBAWM)--Detection of CB contamination in water.
             Joint Modular Chemical/Biological Detector System
            (JMCBDS)--Automated, integrated detection of both biological
            and chemical agents in a single sensor package.
             Joint Service Warning and Identification LIDAR
            Detector (JSWILD)--Standoff detection, ranging, and mapping of
            chemical vapors and aerosols.
             Chemical Imaging Sensor--Passive standoff detection
            technology for detection on-the-move at high speeds from a
            distance.

        Additionally, there is investment in science and technology base
    for detection of contamination on surfaces, non-specific agent
    identification, standoff biological agent detection, and other key
    technologies.

        [Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.]