- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002

[Senate Hearing 107-355]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1416

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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PART 1

UNIFIED COMMANDS
MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT
SERVICE SECRETARIES/SERVICE CHIEFS
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

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MARCH 22, 27; JUNE 28; JULY 10, 12, 17, 19, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002--Part 1

UNIFIED COMMANDS b MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT b SERVICE
SECRETARIES/SERVICE CHIEFS b BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

S. 1416

__________

PART 1

UNIFIED COMMANDS
MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT
SERVICE SECRETARIES/SERVICE CHIEFS
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

__________

MARCH 22, 27; JUNE 28; JULY 10, 12, 17, 19, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

Les Brownlee, Staff Director

David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

David S. Lyles, Staff Director

Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Unified Commanders on Their Military Strategy and Operational
Requirements
march 22, 2001

Page

Ralston, Gen. Joseph W., USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. European
Command, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe...................... 4
Franks, Gen. Tommy R., USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 32

Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and
Operational Requirements
march 27, 2001

Blair, Adm. Dennis C., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
Pacific Command................................................ 78
Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States
Southern Command............................................... 98
Schwartz, Gen. Thomas A., USA, Commander, United States Forces
Korea; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined
Forces Command................................................. 107

Military Posture/Budget Amendment
june 28, 2001

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
Dr. Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)... 179
Shelton, Gen. Henry H., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 189

Secretaries and Chiefs of the Military Services
july 10, 2001

White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army..................... 261
Shinseki, Gen. Eric K., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army.. 270
England, Hon. Gordon R., Secretary of the Navy................... 271
Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............ 274
Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.. 282
Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force................. 293
Ryan, Gen. Michael E., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force.......................................................... 322

Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
july 12, 2001

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense............. 436
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization........................................... 449

Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
july 17, 2001

Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense............. 586
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization........................................... 586

Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
july 19, 2001

Berger, Hon. Samuel R., Chairman, Stonebridge International,
Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 686
Coyle, Hon. Philip E., Senior Adviser, Center for Defense
Information, Former Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
Department of Defense.......................................... 692
Perle, Hon. Richard N., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 703

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

UNIFIED COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:49 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Smith, Inhofe,
Levin, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Carnahan.
Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; and Scott W.
Stucky, general counsel.
Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell,
Charles W. Alsup, John R. Barnes, Edward H. Edens IV, Gary M.
Hall, George W. Lauffer, Thomas L. MacKenzie, Joseph T. Sixeas,
Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director for the minority; Richard D. DeBobes, minority
counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel;
and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Shekinah Z.
Hill, and Suzanne K.L. Ross.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul
and Dan Twining, assistants to Senator McCain; George M.
Bernier, III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
Senator Collins; David S. Young, assistant to Senator Bunning;
Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.)
Wright and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M.
Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; Sheila Murphy and Eric Pierce, assistants
to Senator Ben Nelson; and Larry Smar, assistant to Senator
Carnahan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. The hearing will come to order. As you are
well aware, we are having a vote in the Senate, and as a
consequence many of our colleagues are in transit from the
Senate floor back to the committee.
The committee meets this morning for the first of a series
of hearings on the status and requirements of our regional
commands. Today we have two of our most distinguished regional
commanders, Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, Commander in Chief,
U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
and Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central
Command.
Clearly, you individually and those in your commands are on
the very forefront of the risks that our men and women of the
Armed Forces take the world over, but particularly in your two
areas. You represent the finest troops that this country has
ever produced, and they are not only carrying out faithfully
the orders of the Commander in Chief, but doing so in keeping
with the finest traditions of our U.S. military.
We rely on your unique perspectives as we here in Congress
strive to fulfill our constitutional responsibilities as a co-
equal branch of Government in providing for those troops and
their families.
As we meet this morning, the largest contingency operations
the U.S. military is engaged in around the world are in the
Central Command and the European Command. Over 20,000 U.S.
troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey and,
indeed, the waters surrounding them, to enforce the no-fly
zones over Northern and Southern Iraq and to help provide for
the defense of Kuwait.
In Bosnia, we have entered our fifth year of peacekeeping
duties with over 5,000 U.S. troops participating in NATO's
Stability Force (SFOR) operation, 4,600 of whom are in the
Bosnia region. I know there are plans to somewhat reduce those
forces in keeping with the objectives of the President. I
support the President in this, and we look forward to your
comments. I think we are doing it in a very orderly way, in
consultation with our allies, and in no way in derogation of
our commitment as a full partner to NATO in this and all other
responsibilities that we collectively face with that historic
treaty organization.
In Kosovo, almost 6,000 U.S. troops participate in NATO's
Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation, 5,500 of whom are in-country.
With the rising tension in neighboring Macedonia, I am
increasingly concerned, as we all are, about the safety of our
troops in the Balkans, particularly those stationed in Kosovo
and near Macedonia. If we are not careful, those troops and
other NATO troops could be drawn into the conflict more than
they are today. We will hear from you, General Ralston, on this
developing situation.
This past year has also seen its share of tragedy,
particularly in the Central Command's area of operation. The
devastating terrorist attack of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of
Aden on October 12 last year, and the training accident in
Kuwait just a week or so ago, brings home to all Americans the
very real dangers our men and women in uniform face every day.
There are enormous risks in carrying out their missions in the
cause of freedom.
The U.S.S. Cole tragedy also highlighted the growing
terrorist threat facing our Nation and our military forward-
deployed units, and the need for additional force protection
measures to protect our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
General Franks, we look to you to provide the committee with an
update of the steps you have taken since the U.S.S. Cole
attack, and the views that you have for the future as to that
force protection enhancement within your area of
responsibility. We would also like you to reexamine the
engagement policy which led our forces into that region, and
the necessity to continue that engagement policy, but I presume
under somewhat different conditions. We welcome your testimony.
Before we begin, I would like to enter into the record at
this time statements by Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Jim
Bunning.
[The prepared statements of Senator Thurmond and Senator
Bunning follow:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ralston and General Franks, I want to join the Chairman and
the members of this committee in welcoming you.
Mr. Chairman, General Ralston and General Franks represent regions
of the world in which the United States has a vital interest and has
expended huge resources to secure peace and stability. Yet, more than
10 years after the end of the Cold War and the devastation in the
desert of Iraq, our forces are deployed on commitments that appear to
have no ending in the very same regions. In hindsight, we should have
taken a different approach to the situations in the Balkans and Iraq. I
hope that both our witnesses will focus on the future and on how we can
end the cycle of violence in these regions. More importantly, I hope
they will give us their perspective on how we can minimize the impact
of the commitments in Kosovo and Southwest Asia on our troops and the
readiness of our Armed Forces.
Mr. Chairman, I am also very interested in the quality of life of
our forces stationed in Europe and those deployed to the Persian Gulf
region. In particular, after the U.S.S. Cole incident, I would like to
hear the witnesses' views on force protection and the terrorist threat
facing our military personnel.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony and again want to
thank General Ralston and General Franks and the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines they represent for their dedication and
professionalism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator Jim Bunning

General Ralston and General Franks, thank you for coming before
this committee today. We appreciate your service to this country.
Like my other colleagues, I applaud our men and women in uniform.
They are indeed the best in the world. However, I have concerns about
our military being stretched too thin and stressed, and participating
in areas of the world where I believe we may have no national security
interest. I fear that this is affecting our military's readiness and
operations, as well as the safety and morale of our troops.
I've expressed my frustration before about our military's chain of
command system. It is tough to get the truth and expertise that we need
on these issues because of the chain of command.
We know the President is the Commander in Chief. Whatever his
policy is, you have to salute and come over here and do it. I
understand that. But it makes it very frustrating for us because we
need to hear your expertise. Because you are the experts and the ones
directly involved in these operations.
This committee is trying to work with you to be helpful. If we
don't get candid answers from you all, then we simply can't do our
jobs. Therefore, you can't do your job the way you'd like to do it, and
neither can our troops.
So we would appreciate candor. We don't want your candor as soon as
you retire and put on a suit. I'm always amazed how those who retire
from the military, as soon as they put on a suit, say, ``Now let me
tell you how it really is.''

Chairman Warner. Now, Senator Levin will be forthcoming. I
think in the need of time we have to get underway. Do you all
have a preference as to who would like to proceed?
General Franks. I will defer to General Ralston.
Chairman Warner. All right.
General Ralston.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear before the committee today, along with my
colleague, General Franks. I would like to submit my statement
for the record----
Chairman Warner. Without objection.
General Ralston.--and then spend a few moments here on oral
testimony, if I may.
I would draw your attention to the poster board that we
have over here and just--I know you know this, Mr. Chairman,
but for some of our other people that are watching here,
sometimes I feel that the U.S. European Command Area of
Responsibility (EUCOM AOR) may be misnamed, because it includes
a lot more than Europe. It stretches, as you see, from the
northern part of Norway to the end of South Africa. It includes
the Middle East countries of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. It
includes all of Africa that you see there in green on that map.

Mr. Chairman, that encompasses 91 countries, and we have a
little over 100,000 troops that are forward-based in the EUCOM
theater to engage with these 91 countries.
Now, I might add that that is 8 percent of our uniformed
Active Duty military. I do not believe that is too big of a
price to pay for engagement with those 91 countries.
I would also add that those troops, being forward-based in
Europe, as you can see on the map, are that much closer to
General Franks' AOR should he need help there for redeployment.
I have some operations that I would like to talk about that
are ongoing within the EUCOM AOR, and I would like to start
with Operation Northern Watch, and if I could talk for a few
minutes about this, and then, Mr. Chairman, as I understand
later on perhaps we could have an opportunity go into closed
session where we could talk about this in more detail.
Chairman Warner. You are correct. We can do that in 222
Russell.
General Ralston. First of all, as you can see, in Operation
Northern Watch I support General Franks in his operation
overall in Iraq, and what I am talking about here is just the
northern part of that, which is the no-fly zone north of the
36th parallel.

I thought it might be useful to show a typical mission. We
take off out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. You fly to the
east for about an hour. You form up where those little circles
are in different orbits, with a rather large force, about 40-
some airplanes. There are tankers, there are Airborne Warning
and Control System (AWACS), there are F-15s, F-16s, EA-6Bs for
defense suppression, there are reconnaissance airplanes, there
are U.K. aircraft, there are Turkish aircraft that are involved
in this. We then go into northern Iraq. A typical mission may
be 3 hours long, and then another hour back home.
Now, this is all done in support of our national policy,
and what I am about to say is in no way intended to say that we
have it wrong, or that we cannot support it, but I also want to
get the facts on the record.
Let me give you an example of last year. In 2000 we flew in
the north about 7,500 sorties. Now, this is not without risk,
Mr. Chairman. I know you know that, but over 250 times last
year our people were fired at that we know of.
We responded over 60 times. That is more than once a week,
and I might add that we are flying a lot of single-engine
aircraft over northern Iraq. We have been doing that for a long
time, and if the law of averages caught up with us, we should
have had engine failure by now.
We willingly accept that risk, but I just want to point out
to the committee that it is not a risk-free operation that our
men and women are carrying out in Operation Northern Watch.
Next I would like to talk about Bosnia for a moment. We
have had an operation ongoing, a NATO operation in Bosnia.
Sometimes people do not realize the progress that has been
made. In 1996, when we went into Bosnia, as you see on the blue
bar on that chart we had 60,000 forces that went into Bosnia.
Those forces depicted in red are the U.S. forces. That was
20,000. We were 33 percent of the force in 1996.

Based on the improved conditions on the ground, and in
consultation with our NATO allies, we were able to draw that
force down, and as you notice today, we are just right at
20,000. The U.S. has just a tad over 4,000. We are about 20
percent of the force. I got approval from NATO, supported by
the administration, just in the last couple of weeks, to make a
further reduction in those forces. I think here in a few months
we will be down to probably 3,500 Americans. We will be about
18 percent of the force.
So I think that chart dramatically shows the progress that
we are making in terms of not only the conditions on the ground
that allowed that, but in the drawdown of the forces.
Let me talk for a moment about Kosovo.
Chairman Warner. Before you leave that subject, is it your
professional judgment that that force level, be it ours or the
combined force levels, is still essential to reach the goals
that the United Nations and ourselves and our allies have set?
That is where we fall into problems here. We put our troops
somewhere, and then we are distracted, or go look at other
situations. That situation in Bosnia has quieted down, it is
not on the front pages. Who is looking to determine whether
that level, indeed, is still necessary?
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, every 6 months we do a
review, in conjunction with our allies in NATO, and you are
correct. It is my judgment that--well, first of all, the
situation on the ground has improved dramatically since 1995.
Chairman Warner. Basically no conflict.
General Ralston. The reason that there is no conflict there
today is because we have had those forces there. I do not want
to keep forces there any longer than necessary, but at the same
time, we need to keep forces there in order to keep that safe
and secure environment.
Now, on a military aspect we have made enormous progress.
In fairness, I must also tell you that economically,
politically, we still have a ways to go, and we need to
continue to keep that pressure on, but I would not recommend
back to NATO, nor to the administration, nor to the Congress of
the United States, that we do something that I do not believe
is militarily sound. I fully support this force level, this
reduction. We will continue to look for ways to bring that
down, to ease the burden, but at the same time, we have a
mission to carry out, and I want to make sure that we can do
that.
Chairman Warner. What you are saying is that ethnic
tensions that gave rise to that conflict are still there with
such force and effect that if you pulled out the troops there
would be a war tomorrow.
General Ralston. Well, it is my professional judgment that
if we precipitously pulled out the troops right now, that
conflict would start again. Whether it is tomorrow or next
week, people can debate.
With regard to Kosovo, let me show you a similar chart
here. In 1999, when our forces went into Kosovo, we had about
47,000 troops from 39 nations, by the way. Sometimes people
erroneously think that the United States is pulling the bulk of
this effort, but you can see there, 39 nations went together
with 47,000 troops. We had about 7,000 Americans.

Today, overall we have about 42,000 troops in the Kosovo
force. About 37,000 of those are in Kosovo itself, and another
approximately 5,000 are in Macedonia. The U.S. contribution is
about 5,500 people inside of Kosovo, and that varies between 13
and 14 percent of the force, so my message here is, this is not
a U.S. operation. The U.S. troops are represented in the red
that is on there, and the other nations, the other 38 nations
are carrying the bulk of the operation that is there.
Next, please. There has been a lot of interest in the press
in the past few days on Macedonia. Let me talk about that, if I
might for a moment, in open session here, and perhaps we can go
into more detail in the closed session. Let me have the big map
first. This is Kosovo right here.

Chairman Warner. The problem with that is that this is
being transcribed for use by many others.
General Ralston. Let me talk to colors. The country in
orange is Macedonia, that is what we are talking about.
Now, if you would come down to the southeast there, in
Greece, at the top of that border, you will see Thessaloniki.
Point out Thessaloniki, right there. That is where all of our
supplies going into Kosovo come into that port. They then go
overland, up through the orange country of Macedonia, into
Kosovo, which is right at that point, right there.
Now, as I said before, we have about 5,000 of the KFOR
forces, mostly supply troops, mostly logistics troops that are
in Macedonia. One of the things that is of concern when we have
the instability there is our supply route, so I have
recommended to NATO, and NATO is looking at alternate ways of
making sure that we can supply our forces that are in Kosovo.
One way to do that is through Albania. Another way is
through Montenegro. Another way is through southern Serbia, as
our relationships with Belgrade have improved, and we are doing
the prudent planning now that would allow us to have
alternative supply routes.
The problem in Macedonia itself--let me go to the next
chart. On this same map, you see where Kosovo is there, and
notice the area in blue that goes into southern Serbia and down
into Macedonia. Those areas in blue are those areas in Serbia
and in Macedonia where there is a majority Albanian population.
Even in Serbia, that area in blue, they have greater than 50
percent Albanian population there. In Macedonia itself you have
about a 65-35 split. About 65 percent of the population is
Slavik, about 35 percent is Albanian.

The Government of Macedonia is a democratically elected
Government, and it is a coalition Government, including members
of the Albanian population. We have encouraged the Macedonian
Government to give political access and economic opportunity to
the minority Albanian citizens that are there.
The extremists that you hear about in the paper, right now
I believe this is not something to be alarmed about. It is
something always of concern when you have potential violence,
but we believe that there are approximately 100 extremist
Albanians that are involved in the hostilities.
My advice to NATO has been that we need to condemn
extremism wherever it comes from, and in this particular case
from the Albanian extremists. We need to encourage the
Macedonian Government to give political access to all their
citizens, and I do believe that we can bilaterally, the nations
can help the Government of Macedonia. They can help them
diplomatically, politically, economically, and we in NATO and
in the Kosovo force need to do our part inside Kosovo to make
sure that there are not armed extremists coming from Kosovo
into Macedonia. We can talk more about that in detail in the
closed session.
Chairman Warner. The Secretary-General said he needed 1,400
additional troops. Now, could you speak to your military
judgment as to that request, and most specifically, how it
would affect the U.S. and our U.S. response? As a participant
we wish to bear our share of the burdens and the risks in this
operation.
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Unfortunately, if I could say
this, when the Secretary-General made his comments it was in a
news conference that was associated with Macedonia. In fact,
the two battalions that we asked for several weeks ago are to
replace some Portuguese troops that are leaving. They have not
left yet, but two companies to do that, and for some of the
activities there.
Now, some of the nations have come forward and said that
they will provide additional troops to back-fill. My judgment
right now is, we do not need additional American forces. I
think we are carrying our proper share of that at this time,
and I think we are going to be OK.
Now, what we have done, we have taken forces out of that
37,000 that are in Kosovo, and we have moved more forces down
to the border to do a more effective job of patrolling the
border.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to point out that this is
an enormously difficult border to police. It is very
mountainous terrain. It is wooded. There are trails that have
gone back and forth across for centuries. The people there do
not know there is a border there. I mean, they have brothers
and sisters and uncles and aunts that live on either side of
that. They have traded back and forth for centuries, and so it
is enormously difficult to seal that border. I think that would
be a mistake for us to set that as the goal, or the mission.
Now, we can do, I think, a good job of making sure that
there are not armed extremists that are going back and forth,
and that is what we should be concentrating on from a NATO
perspective on our side of the border.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend a moment talking about
Africa. We have significant problems in Africa in terms of
economic, political, humanitarian issues. We are working with
many of the countries in Africa to address this. We have just
recently trained two battalions of the Nigerian Army for their
further employment in Sierra Leone. We are about to undertake
training a Ghana battalion in Ghana, and a Senegalese battalion
in Senegal, and then the plan is to go back and train some
additional Nigerian battalions.
This is, I think, a proper role for us to try to help the
African nations deal with the problems that they have there. I
do not want anyone on the committee to be surprised if you hear
that we have American soldiers in Ghana, or Senegal, or
Nigeria. What they are there doing are training the local
battalions for their employment in support of the United
Nations in Sierra Leone.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, there are two issues that I
have worked hard with the Pentagon in terms of resources for
the EUCOM area, and only two issues. I had two major budget
issues that I worked with them, and that was for real property
maintenance and for military construction in the European
theater.
Mr. Chairman, I know you know this, but 10 years ago we had
about 360,000 troops in Europe, and we drew them down to just a
little over 100,000. Now, it was a proper decision back in 1991
to not spend money on military construction and real property
maintenance until we knew what we were going to keep in Europe.
Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, we went for the better part of
a decade without any military construction or real property
maintenance, and as a result, the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines that are living and working in EUCOM are in
facilities that I am not very proud of. Here are some pictures,
for example, of barracks problems that we have in EUCOM. Next
slide, please.

Military family housing is a problem. Let me outline the
standards that we have for our military housing, and I believe
the American people would understand this. If you have a family
that is big enough that entitles you to a three-bedroom
apartment, we believe that you ought to have two bathrooms for
that apartment. We believe you ought to have a stove and a
refrigerator in the kitchen, and we believe you ought to have a
washer and a dryer in that apartment.

Many of these are three-story walkup apartments. We have
young mothers that have two or three young children. For her to
wash the clothes she has to go down three or four flights of
stairs to the basement. What does she do with the young
children while she is doing that? She has to carry them along
with the laundry downstairs to do that.
I do not believe that is asking too much for these
standards, and I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, even with these
very modest standards, 69 percent of our Army families in
Europe are living in conditions that do not meet those
standards of a washer and a dryer, a stove and a refrigerator,
and two bathrooms.
Mr. Chairman, when I worked this with the Pentagon, I
briefed the Joint Chiefs, I briefed the Defense Resources
Board, I talked to the Secretary of Defense, and I believe that
I have a sympathetic ear. I do not know what will be in the
budget when it comes over. I have not seen that, but if it
comes over the way that I hope that it does, I would encourage
the support of the committee.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
[The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, it is my
privilege to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United States
European Command (USEUCOM), to discuss the posture of U.S. Forces.
First, however, I want to make a few comments about the area in
question.
The U.S. European Command encompasses American military activities
in over 13 million square miles of the globe and includes 91 sovereign
nations. It stretches from the northern tip of Norway to South Africa,
and from the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and Africa, to parts of the
Middle East and out beyond the Black Sea.
I began my tenure in the U.S. European Command last May. Since my
arrival, our men and women have continued to carry out a multitude of
operational commitments throughout Europe, Africa, the Levant, the
waters of the Mediterranean, the skies over Iraq, and throughout the
Balkans in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
commitments to our regional friends and allies, and our national
interests. Additionally, there are new opportunities in this theater--
opportunities that properly approached will further strengthen the
international position of the United States. These opportunities
include working with African allies to improve their peacekeeping
capabilities, engagement with Russia and the countries of the Caucasus
region, U.S. influence on the evolving European defense posture and the
future of NATO, and the enhancement of important and vital interests to
the economic and national security of the United States. Our forward
presence in Europe, engagement programs in Africa and Eastern Europe,
and the ability to deploy and respond quickly and effectively
throughout the region contributes to the preservation of stability
throughout much of the area of responsibility (AOR).
While success should be acknowledged, we must exercise continued
vigilance by pursuing modernization to meet ongoing requirements, as
well as develop future forces to take advantage of key strategic
opportunities as they arise. Inadequate funding for, and attention to,
critical readiness and modernization issues will jeopardize the careful
balance between USEUCOM's missions and available resources. Like
operation and maintenance (O&M) dollars, modernization funding must
also be balanced to ensure resources remain proportionate to mission
requirements. American military personnel positioned overseas and going
about the business of the Nation every day have proven time and again
that they are our greatest national resource. Like every national
asset, they require care and cultivation to ensure they maintain the
capability edge over any potential adversary. Addressing critical
quality of life, military construction (MILCON), real property
maintenance (RPM), and modernization needs is central toward
maintaining this edge.
During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many
programs. I should note, however, that the programs I will discuss, and
their associated funding levels may change as a result of the
Secretary's strategy review that will guide future decisions on
military spending. The administration will determine final 2002 and
out-year funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask that
you consider my comments in that light.

A CHANGING AND CHALLENGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--READINESS

Readiness of USEUCOM assigned forces is my top priority. It is the
cornerstone of our ability to respond to crises and it enhances our
strategy of engagement. Most of our activities relate to readiness
because they demonstrate and enhance our capability to deter potential
adversaries, while reassuring our friends. Such activities require
ready forces and exercise our ability to meet commitments and promote
joint and multinational interoperability. Taken together these
activities can serve to help shape the international environment by
incorporating other nations and improving our multinational expertise
in the region; they improve our ability to respond unilaterally or in
concert with other nations; and they prepare us now for the uncertain
regional requirements of the future.
Thanks to the support of Congress, forces assigned to this theater
are ready and well supported in their current operations. The command's
forces are fully engaged and continue to rely upon augmentation and
Reserve Forces to carry out our many diverse missions. Dedicated young
men and women valiantly executing a wide variety of operations to
support our national strategy make up the heart of our theater
readiness. Over the last year, we demonstrated our readiness by
supporting air operations over Northern Iraq, NATO-led peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian relief operations in
Mozambique, and training of Sub-Saharan African troops to support
United Nations (UN) operations in Sierra Leone.

JOINT TRAINING

Training is a primary pillar of readiness and an inherent
responsibility of being in command. For USEUCOM, readiness training has
increasingly become part of our Theater Engagement Plan. However, over
the past 2 years efforts to cope with rapidly shrinking training and
training-dependent budgets, such as strategic lift, have resulted in
several cancelled and restructured exercises. These cancellations have
frustrated our efforts to provide high-quality readiness training to
meet theater engagement needs.
Our challenge is to support a proper mix of readiness and theater
engagement training within resource constraints. The U.S. European
Command has met its congressional mandates for Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercise-related operations and personnel tempo
(OPTEMPO-PERSTEMPO) reductions. Additionally, strategic lift funding
cuts during this fiscal year may force cancellation of continental U.S.
(CONUS)-based participation by active, Reserve, and National Guard
forces in various training and engagement exercises. In a worst case
scenario, these cuts may also reduce training and engagement in Israel
and Nigeria, and result in cancellation of half of the Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) activities in Africa.
After taking a hard look at our training program for potential
improvements in quality, effectiveness, and efficiency, we began
implementation of a 3-year transition plan to take USEUCOM from a
training program focused on events, to one focused on readiness and
theater engagement objectives. This revised program will exploit
opportunities within the total program, resulting in fewer, but higher
quality CJCS-sponsored exercises. I do not anticipate that this
transformation of USEUCOM's part of the CJCS exercises in fiscal year
2002 and beyond will result in a significantly less costly program. A
requirements-based, objectives-driven exercise program will, however,
provide higher quality training and engagement at a size and cost that
is appropriate to, and justified by, our National Security Strategy.

ENGAGEMENT

Side-by-side with readiness activities are the other exercises,
operations, and training which focus primarily on assisting and
supporting other nations in the region to develop effective democratic
political and military systems.
To help guide Congress in its decision-making, many of you have
traveled to the European theater and have witnessed efforts to extend
contacts beyond Western Europe through engagement. Over the past
several years this process has helped to positively shape our security
environment. I believe this approach is key to continued long-term
peace, security, and prosperity as USEUCOM works along side, and in
active cooperation with, a number of governmental and non-governmental
organizations.

FORWARD PRESENCE

America's permanently stationed forces in Europe number just over
100,000 troops--down from well over 300,000 during the Cold War. The
current force level represents a 65 percent reduction from 1990. In my
opinion, this must be considered the minimum level needed to execute
our current National Security Strategy, meet NATO requirements, and
provide support and staging for U.S. based forces that in time of need
would flow into or through the theater.
Key to our engagement efforts are our forward-deployed and forward-
based forces, which continue to make significant contributions in
protecting U.S. national interests. In peacetime, forward presence of
naval, land, and air assets provides unparalleled access to countries
in transition. In crises, the forward presence of our forces enables a
rapid transition from engagement to response. Forward presence is a
critical enabler for USEUCOM activities.
Continued forward presence is vital to implementing our current
strategy, as our forces are able to respond more quickly--demonstrated
through a number of deployments last year to the Balkans, Southwest
Asia, and Africa. Surrendering this forward position would seriously
degrade our ability to engage in peacetime or deploy in the event of
armed conflict. The General Accounting Office (GAO) traveled through
the AOR recently to discuss issues related to forward basing. Their
report is due for release this spring and I believe we presented solid
evidence of the benefits of forward basing.

DEFENSE COOPERATION AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance programs are vital
components of Departments of State and Defense initiatives supporting
the development of interoperable defensive capabilities, the transfer
of defense articles and services, and the international military
training of foreign military and civilian personnel. Through the medium
of 38, and soon to be 40, Offices of Defense Cooperation, we are in
partnership with U.S. embassies throughout the theater conducting
primary military engagement in support of American foreign policy
goals.
Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA) promotes vital security
interests through enhanced cooperation among key defense industries,
and between DOD and West European Ministries of Defense. DCA encourages
the development of interoperability on the ``drawing board'' and
inherently strengthens U.S.-European military and political
relationships.
Likewise, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of $4.7 billion in fiscal
year 2000 to Europe demonstrates the continued primacy for U.S.
security interests of trans-Atlantic defense relationships. FMS
encourages interoperability between U.S. and European forces, maintains
a strong U.S. presence in the development and implementation of the
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and helps modernize the
militaries of new friends and partners in ways critical to our security
interests. We in Europe work closely with the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency and the Services to ensure that U.S. European
Command priorities are reflected.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides irreplaceable resources
for our friends and allies, without which U.S. influence over the
dynamic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and key African
partners would be affected. The program provides access to U.S.
expertise in defense restructuring and management, and enables
participants to acquire U.S. military goods, services and training. The
new NATO members and the stronger aspirants for membership provide
excellent examples of the value of this program.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

I cannot overemphasize the importance of International Military
Education and Training (IMET) as an integral component of long-term
beneficial change in foreign militaries, as foreign military and
civilian leaders encounter first hand the American civil-military
culture. The priorities of the program are professional development,
the role of the military in a democratic society (under the Expanded
IMET initiative, or E-IMET), and English language development. In
fiscal year 2000, the program trained almost 1,500 military and
civilian international students in U.S. military schools, with nearly
550 officers attending professional schools--including senior and
intermediate service schools. Under E-IMET, Mobile Education Teams
(MET) traveled to 30 countries in the region last year providing
instruction to over 2,000 civilian and military personnel in military
justice and human rights, civil-military relations, health resources
management and integration, defense resources management and budget
planning, equal opportunity, and maritime counter-drug law enforcement.
Student projections for this year match last year's numbers.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program continues to meet its goal
of deepening interaction, extending stability in the East, providing
consultation mechanisms for participants who feel threatened, assisting
in the pursuit of democratic reforms, and preparing for possible NATO
membership. The program has returned huge dividends for operations in
Bosnia, with over 30 nations providing support and nearly one-third of
the forces coming from non-NATO nations. The growth of the PfP program
over the past 6 years has been dramatic and, in addition to real world
operations, Partnership exercises provide superb training and equally
important exchange opportunities.

JOINT CONTACT TEAM PROGRAM

The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) has been one of USEUCOMs most
successful engagement programs over the past 9 years. Through modest
investments of money, personnel, and expertise, it has helped host
nation militaries become familiar with the culture of the U.S.
military, and through this process exposed to the best in American
values and democratic ideals. By leveraging the expertise of America's
Active and Reserve Forces, especially the unique capabilities of the
Reserve component's (RC) State Partnership Program (SPP), JCTP has
modeled and demonstrated the best practices of America's military
force. It has thus helped host nation militaries move toward providing
constructive roles to their developing democracies.
The program's success is most evident in the three new NATO member
countries. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic's needs have matured
beyond familiarization and exposure--they are ready to ``graduate''
from JCTP. Their needs must now be met with additional services and
technical training properly administered under U.S. security assistance
programs and plans are now being formulated to move beyond JCTP. Where
possible, links to their SPP states will be maintained to facilitate
this transition.
This natural transition in the new NATO countries is the
realization of USEUCOM's Theater Engagement Plan and is the eventual
goal for all of the JCTP countries. This transition also allows the
program to move, by close coordination with the U.S. Department of
State, to new host nations requesting the unique engagement
capabilities available through JCTP.

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

A key program in this important engagement effort is the Reserve
Component's State Partnership Program. SPP grew out of JCTP and uses
Reserve personnel from various National Guard and Reserve organizations
to partner with defense ministries of Central and Eastern European
countries. Last year was extremely successful as National Guard
soldiers and airmen conducted dozens of events including 51 Minuteman
Fellowships (MMFs), nine ``Guardex'' events, six PfP as well as several
``In the Spirit of Partnership for Peace'' exercises, executed more
than 25 percent of all events for USEUCOM JCTP, facilitated civic
leader visits, and conducted a number of engagement activities with the
Russian Federation. The MMF program bridges gaps in other engagement
programs and touches levels of society that other programs cannot
reach. Through this program we were able to share with our partners our
experience and expertise in education, economic development, disaster
response, environmental topics, and numerous other subject areas.
When delegations from Tennessee, Minnesota, Indiana, Alabama,
Vermont, Illinois, Kansas, and California conducted civic leader visits
to SPP counterpart countries, the long-term vision for SPP had been
realized--moving beyond military-to-military contacts into other
important elements of society. Through these activities, state civilian
officials in the realms of education, commerce, agriculture, medical
emergency services, and disaster response exchange their considerable
knowledge and expertise with their partner-nation counterparts.

MARSHALL CENTER

One of the most important and effective regional engagement
activities within the U.S. European Command is the George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies. The Marshall Center strengthens
security and cooperative relationships among key nations within the
theater. It serves as an essential institution for bilateral and
multilateral communication and military and civilian exchanges
throughout the region.
This organization builds bridges between militaries that once
stared at one another through the crosshairs of weapons of war. Under
the auspices of the Marshall Center, the once-warring parties of Bosnia
came together last year and agreed to slash military spending. Marshall
Center graduates have served as peacekeepers in Bosnia and as far away
as East Timor. Graduates from Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
are now helping to integrate their militaries into NATO. Marshall
Center programs have led a number of nations to the democratic
restructuring of their defense planning and crisis management
processes. Graduates from the Republic of Georgia wrote Tbilisi's
recently announced national security strategy. Many Marshall Center
graduates now serve as ambassadors, defense attaches, chiefs of
defense, members of parliament, and advisors to presidents around the
world. These graduates possess a deeper appreciation and respect the
concepts of democracy as we understand them, and for human rights and
the rule of law.
The Marshall Center is at the forefront in reaching out actively
and comprehensively to militaries and defense establishments to lower
regional tensions, strengthening civil-military relations in developing
nations, and addressing critical regional challenges. Open to leaders
from over 47 countries, the Marshall Center is a pillar of America's
efforts to shape the world in ways that reinforce and reflect our
values and national security interests. It is therefore important that
the Marshall Center remains fully resourced in order to continue its
excellent work in support of American foreign policy objectives.

THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Drawing on the success of the Marshall Center, the Africa Center
for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established in December 1999 and
conducted its second seminar last July in Botswana. While it does not
yet have a permanent location to call home, its rotating seminars
provide a unique engagement vehicle in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both
civilian and military senior defense officials of almost every African
nation gather with U.S. and other friendly nation counterparts to
examine and compare experiences on national security strategy, defense
economics, and civil-military relations. They then validate their
impressions in an end of session capstone exercise. Its forum of open,
two-way discussion has enjoyed great success on the continent and
builds and strengthens bilateral and multilateral relationships.

NEAR EAST--SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

In January a year ago the Secretary of Defense approved the
establishment of the Near East--South Asia (NESA) Center under the
management of the National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C.
The purpose of the Center is to enhance regional stability by providing
an inclusive, neutral institution where regional military, diplomatic,
and national security professionals can broaden their understanding of
the national strategy formulation process, examine regional security
issues, improve their defense-related decision-making skills, and
develop cooperative relationships with one another. Participation is
open to military and official civilian representatives of all countries
within the NESA region with which the U.S. Government maintains formal
diplomatic relations. It is also open to non-NESA countries that have
strategic interests in the NESA region. The inaugural two-day
conference was held at NDU in November, and the first executive seminar
will be held in Washington during May.

AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a Department of
State training program designed to improve the capabilities of several
African nations to conduct humanitarian crisis response and
peacekeeping operations. ACRI-trained forces could be offered by their
governments for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted by
the Organization of African Unity, the UN, sub-regional African
organizations, or any other multinational coalition. ACRI also works to
shape the African environment by promoting professional and apolitical
militaries, reinforcing respect for human rights, and providing a
strong example of democratic civil-military relations. This UN-approved
program of instruction combines U.S. and UN peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief operations doctrine. Program instruction develops
common standards for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations
among the participating ACRI countries. Recently, the program was
expanded to include brigade-level training focusing on the command,
control, and logistical aspects of supporting a multinational brigade
in the field.

OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF

Last year USEUCOM was tasked to help train five Nigerian
battalions, one Ghanaian battalion, and one Senegalese battalion in
order to participate in UN operations in Sierra Leone, and more
strategically, to support the professional development of the Nigerian
military--an important force for regional stability. This operation is
being conducted in fiscal year 2001 using State Department peacekeeping
operations (PKO) funding as well as DOD resources made available under
Presidential drawdown authority.
To accomplish this mission, Special Operations Command, Europe
(SOCEUR) was tasked to execute the mission with Army and Air Force
units in support. Based on information provided by the SOCEUR-led
Military Survey Team, a 10-week training program using U.S. instructors
and an equipment support package was developed. Execution of the train-
and-equip program was designed for three-phase completion, commencing
last October, with mission accomplishment likely later this year. Upon
completion of the training program, each battalion should be capable of
operating and maintaining newly acquired equipment, conducting daylight
company level attacks and conducting day and night defensive operations
as a maneuver company under command and control of a battalion
headquarters.
We have now completed phase one of the three-phase program and our
personnel have performed magnificently. However, interagency policy-
level decisions must be made early enough in the process so funding and
resources can be programmed to meet timelines and support requirements.
Additionally, human rights vetting must be complete for all personnel
to be trained, to include attached units, prior to the initiation of
training. There must also be host nation agreement on the training
program at every political and military level in order to assure
mission success. Operation Focus Relief is not an operation without
risk. However, with only 200+ U.S. personnel assigned in non-combatant
roles, the dollar investment is minimal and the payoff great in that it
is successfully training local forces to deal with regional problems.
In this way, Operation Focus Relief is pioneering a new method of
engagement.

KEY THEATER MISSIONS AND CHALLENGES

Challenges in the USEUCOM AOR will continue as the U.S. works to
strengthen and maintain the NATO structure, prepares forces to better
respond to future conflict, shapes the international environment
through engagement, executes contingency operations, and monitors
potential future conflict areas. I have highlighted key challenges and
continuing missions below to give an idea of the diversity of theater
challenges and missions.

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY

``The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is .
. . dependent upon interoperability between organizations,
processes, and technologies.''

Joint Vision 2020

The U.S. European Command and America's allies and friends
recognize that most military operations in the future, from
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief to a major theater war, will
typically be multinational in character. Success in multinational
operations will depend on two factors: the capabilities of the national
forces involved in the operation; and the degree to which these forces
can be melded to create an effective force. These factors will demand a
high level of interoperability and enhanced capabilities between the
participating national forces.
In this vein NATO has met and excelled at every challenge since the
end of the Cold War precisely because of its ability to commit
multinational forces structured to meet military threats to its
members. NATO's greatest challenges today originate not externally, but
from within. The growing asymmetry in technology between European and
U.S. military forces is producing a serious imbalance in our military
capabilities. Furthermore, Europe's shrinking defense industrial base
and limitations in production of advanced military capabilities could
lead to a future where only the U.S. has the ability to engage
globally.
The Defense Capabilities Initiative, launched in April 1999, is an
effort by the European members of NATO to resolve glaring capabilities
shortfalls between them and the U.S. as evidenced by past NATO
exercises and Operation Allied Force in and over Kosovo. The
Capabilities Initiative's two primary thrusts, improving national
capabilities and exploring ways to pool capabilities, allow our allies
and partners to enhance interoperability, take advantage of economies
of scale, and afford participation by those countries that do not
possess the resources to go it alone. The initiative specifically
targets five capabilities: effective engagement; deployability and
mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; sustainability
and logistics; and communications/information systems. As Europeans
work to improve their national and collective security, we have
encouraged defense cooperation and procurement using the DCI roadmap
and believe it mutually reinforces the needs of NATO and the European
Union (EU).
The DCI's success depends upon whether Europeans are willing to
spend more, and more wisely, in narrowing the gap between their
military technology and warfighting capability, and our own. Should
Europe prove unable to engage in military operations at or near the
level of U.S. capabilities, it may leave them vulnerable and limit the
U.S. in some cases to unilateral action. Such a future undermines
America's strategic vision and assumptions--diplomatically,
economically, and militarily. Finite resources and domestic political
realities dictate that unilateral action cannot be the future norm.
Unilateral action endangers the historical link between the American
and European peoples. While the issue of DCI is being worked at the
highest levels in NATO, it is critically important that Congress work
to engage their European counterparts on this issue. The U.S. must
continue to engage with its European allies to help foster the
necessary changes to enable Europe to remain a contributing strategic
partner across the spectrum of potential operations. DCI is a crucial
area on which the future of a strong Trans-Atlantic link may very well
depend.

EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO SECURITY STRUCTURES

The establishment of a common foreign policy, supported by a
military capability, within the EU is one of the most important
political-military issues facing Europe and the United States today.
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is worked hard,
continuously, and at presidential and prime ministerial levels in every
capital in Europe. If the military and political links that eventually
define the relationship between NATO and the EU do not result in
transparency, coordination, and a cooperative effort, it places at
serious risk the future of the alliance. Indeed it is the form these
permanent arrangements between the two will take, and assured EU access
to NATO's planning capabilities, that are the most contentious and
potentially destructive questions currently under debate.
The recently completed Foreign Minister's meeting in Brussels was
not able to reach agreement on these issues and will require much
effort by the new administration. We believe that SHAPE headquarters
can play a constructive and indispensable role by accomplishing the
future military planning for both organizations, thereby negating the
need for a duplicative headquarters solely to support the EU.
The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO
continues to evolve within U.S. redlines as the EU develops, through
the ESDP, both capabilities and institutions for its security and
defense aspirations. Even though the progress to date has generally met
U.S. expectations, I would suggest that officials in Washington remain
vigilant to ensure that ESDP remains relevant from a U.S. perspective.
They should emphasize the requirement for Europeans to develop their
capabilities, maintain NATO-EU linkages, and underscore the necessity
for the inclusion of non-EU NATO members in emerging security and
defense arrangements.
Successful implementation of the European Security and Defense
Policy within the European Union will require a concerted effort
between the European members of NATO, EU members who are not in NATO,
and Canada and the United States. This cooperation is essential to
build the military and political links between NATO and the Union
necessary to achieve a common strategic vision and make the needed
improvements in technological capabilities.
Last November witnessed positive developments in the Capabilities
Commitment Conference. This effort has been a primary focus of the
French during their 6 months as President of the EU last year. The
planning scenarios used to determine capabilities and forces required
for the ESDP Headline Goal Force have remained realistic. In this
regard, the EU has commitments for a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up
to 60,000 personnel, which is the minimum goal. The EU member countries
placed a total of 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 warships
at the EU's immediate disposal to support this RRF. If this force
becomes reality it is sufficient to establish the EU as a significant
military power.
The military staff at SHAPE played a very constructive role in
assisting the EU's interim military staff in the development of these
goals. The Catalogue of Forces turned out to be impressive, with high-
end capabilities that are fully in line with Europe's DCI efforts. My
main apprehension regarding capabilities is that they remain compatible
with NATO Force Goals once the EU force is established and that the
Europeans follow through with the necessary financial commitments to
correct identified capability shortfalls.
In my role as the military commander of NATO's forces (SACEUR), I
am fully engaged in providing advice and perspective as this issue
evolves. In my estimation, if handled successfully by NATO HQ in
Brussels and the European Union, the ESDP process will strengthen the
security posture of the European continent. However, there are many
complicated factors remaining before this capability is realized. The
central issue, in my view, is the method by which a plan is developed
and presented. When a potential conflict or crisis emerges the planning
should be conducted by the SHAPE staff, with EU military augmentation.
The Deputy SACEUR would then take the completed plan to the EU and I
would send it to the NATO political authorities. If NATO elects not to
involve itself, the EU could pick up the mission and deploy forces as
required. If the process does not follow this model the EU will be
unnecessarily creating large and redundant staffs and a real
possibility of double counting and tasking existing NATO forces.
Realization of ESDP largely hinges on the Europeans' willingness to
make the necessary fiscal and political commitments. Any newly financed
capabilities, however, must be in line with DCI--not duplicating but
rather reinforcing alliance capabilities.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION

There are currently nine European nations that aspire to NATO
membership. While the decision to expand the alliance is a political
one and will ultimately be made in capitals across Europe and North
America, an aspirant's military readiness will be scrutinized and is
certainly part of the equation. Thus far, the nine aspirants have
benefited from U.S.-funded defense assessments as well as from the NATO
Membership Action Plan with its associated Partnership Goals. These
mechanisms have provided a valuable roadmap toward reform and
interoperability in the event that additional nations are offered NATO
membership.
As for the three newest members of the alliance--Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic--the Interagency Group estimated that a 10-year
process would elapse before these nations fully transition from past
Warsaw Pact doctrine, equipment, and organization to NATO
interoperability. One should avoid any unrealistic expectations of full
integration this early--only 3 years since the Madrid invitations.
Nevertheless, they have made great progress. Each has performed well in
both exercises and deployments, including the very demanding
environments of Bosnia and Kosovo where they share the burden through a
contribution of nearly 2,500 troops to the international effort.

EUROPEAN REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

A number of potentially hostile nations are working to develop
long-range missiles to coerce and threaten countries in North America
and Europe. President Bush has stated that we will deploy missile
defenses as soon as possible. These defenses, he has made clear, must
protect not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also
our friends and allies.
NATO's Strategic Concept also recognizes that ``the Alliance's
defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the
proliferation of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and their
means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work
on missiles defenses.'' As the U.S. pursues this capability, I suggest
it continues to consult our friends around the world. Open and frank
discussions on this initiative between the U.S., NATO, and our other
European allies, will further understanding and help avoid alienating
our valued friends.
The defenses envisaged will reinforce the credibility of U.S.
security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. No one can
reasonably argue that Europe would be more secure if the U.S. were less
secure from a missile attack. An America able to defend itself from
missile attacks is an America better able to defend Europe and common
Western security interests. As consultations proceed with allies on
missile defense, we realize they will continue to consider the
appropriate role of missile defenses in their respective national
security strategies for dealing with the changing international threat
environment. In keeping with the fundamental principle of the alliance
that the security of its members is indivisible, the United States is
open to discussing possible cooperation with allies on longer-range
ballistic missile defense, just as we have with our discussions and
cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force Protection (FP) remains a top USEUCOM priority. We are
exercising an aggressive Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) program
providing clear AT/FP policy, measures, and tools to mitigate risk and
maximize security for our personnel and their families. We have
implemented a number of innovative AT/FP programs, examining the
application of state-of-the-art technology to enhance access control
and explosive detection, and are continuing our efforts to field mass
notification systems throughout the theater. We are making progress,
but resourcing continues to challenge our AT/FP Service priorities.
U.S. European Command is in the staffing process of publishing a
significantly updated AT/FP Operations Order (OPORD) 01-01 prescribing
AT/FP standards and requirements. These new mandatory requirements
encompass FP engineering design standards for new construction, major
renovations, and existing facilities. USEUCOM has also instituted a
comprehensive Installation AT/FP Program Manager course to train the
unit FP officers in our AT construction and design standards. To date,
we have established AT/FP responsibilities for DOD elements and
personnel at 67 Chief of Mission locations throughout the USEUCOM AOR.
Coupled with this, 137 AT/FP vulnerability assessments, including
74 Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, have been
undertaken over the past year. These assessments have identified AT/FP
vulnerabilities and assisted commanders in addressing those
deficiencies through the use of countermeasures, procedural changes,
and resourcing--endeavoring to eliminate or mitigate their potential
exploitation by terrorists.
We have developed and fielded a web-based Vulnerability Assessment
Management Program (VAMP). The VAMP captures results of vulnerability
assessments, prioritizes AOR vulnerabilities, identifies deficiencies,
and lists corrective actions needed or completed. VAMP is a management
tool available to every commander and AT/FP officer from the theater
down to the installation level and allows commanders and decision
makers the ability to track and identify the actions taken or required
to correct and/or mitigate vulnerabilities at specific installations
throughout the AOR.
We employ risk management and mission analysis processes in all
deliberate, crisis, and contingency operational planning and exercises.
Threat working groups and assessment tools, such as the VAMP, play a
critical role in these processes. In light of recent events these
processes are receiving additional scrutiny. Although we cannot
eliminate all vulnerabilities, we continue to use risk management when
deciding missions in this theater in order to reduce risk to our
personnel--identifying vulnerabilities and resources required to reduce
exploitable FP vulnerabilities.
Our intelligence operations continually analyze and assess
potential terrorist threats to U.S. installations, facilities and
personnel. We use a variety of systems to disseminate intelligence
within the command and provide routine and time-sensitive threat
warning notifications. Our systems and procedures provide the ability
to rapidly disseminate information regarding specific terrorist threats
to units, installations and individuals throughout the AOR. In
conjunction with our national intelligence agencies, we are exploring
better methods of sharing and disseminating more accurate AT/FP
prediction and tracking threat information. Recently, we initiated
closer cooperation with the U.S. Central Command to share and maximize
our efforts, including assets, analytical and database capabilities.
While intelligence operations support for AT/FP in theater is good,
we concur with the recent U.S.S. Cole Commission recommendation to
reprioritize resources for collection and analysis, including human
intelligence and signals intelligence, against terrorist threats, and
to increase our national intelligence agencies counterintelligence
resources dedicated to combating terrorism.

BALKANS

One of the greatest challenges to peace, stability, and democracy
in Europe is the integration of the Balkans into the rest of Europe, a
strategic objective the U.S. shares with NATO and the EU. Last year saw
a watershed opportunity to overcoming that challenge--the toppling of
Slobodan Milosevic and the election of Vojislav Kostunica as President
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It has been clear for a
decade that only a change from dictatorship to democracy in Belgrade
would set the conditions for a regional approach to the problems in the
Balkans. This transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in the
FRY should have a beneficial impact on the integration of the entire
region into the west. President Kostunica still has much work to do in
consolidating democratic gains. While the FRY has begun its re-
integration into the western world, rapidly joining the UN, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, and establishing diplomatic
relations with the U.S. and other key NATO allies, much remains to be
done in the Balkans.
Greater ethnic reconciliation in Bosnia and Kosovo is elusive and
while recent voting in Serbia and Bosnia marked another milestone in
the rule of law and movement toward democracy, it also reinforced some
hard-line nationalist parties and their platforms. Additionally,
despite the first democratic elections in Kosovo, where municipal
voting saw moderates win, the province is still volatile.
Security conditions permitting the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
the region have not yet been fully realized. The status of Montenegro
within the federation, a final settlement for Kosovo, and Serbia's
future links with the Republika Srpska remain open issues whose
resolution are required in order to bring stability and democracy to
the Balkans. There is no short-term solution to the problems in the
Balkans without developing a comprehensive, region wide, and long-term
approach. The economics in the region are driving the turmoil and
fractious nature of the ``peace.'' International involvement in the
Balkans must include substantive initiatives that address the economic
problems of the region. Without such initiatives, we cannot hope to
forecast peace.
Military forces, too, must continue to foster an environment in
which peaceful actions are rewarded, but do it with fewer resources.
This can be accomplished by leveraging existing national and allied
exercises that occur across this theater and by executing them as much
as possible in the Balkans. By conducting exercises in the Balkans, we
show resolve in the regional policies, deter the outbreak of
hostilities, and improve regional infrastructure leading to increased
interaction among Balkan peoples.
In Bosnia, force numbers have been reduced from 60,000 when the
mission began, to just over 20,000 personnel. Of 34 nations
contributing forces to this effort, 28 are European and their forces
make up 80 percent of SFOR. The U.S. has successfully reduced its
proportion of committed troops from 33 percent in 1996 to 20 percent
today. The way ahead in Bosnia, including future force reductions,
remains contingent upon the implementation of Dayton's various military
and civil tasks. We are working within the administration to address
possible ways to implement the civil tasks and set the conditions for
additional NATO force reductions.
The KFOR military effort is considerable and has not changed to any
degree since last year. KFOR's strength remains at 37,000 deployed in
Kosovo proper and an additional 4,400 supporting in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, and Albania. This force is drawn
from 39 nations, with 33 European countries deploying over 80 percent
of the total. The U.S., with 5,500 troops in Kosovo, continues to
provide 14 percent of the force. Europe as a whole has endeavored to
live up to its personnel and financial commitments of support to Bosnia
and Kosovo. The following charts indicate their specific levels of
military troop support:

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) police force enjoys continued
success. Current numbers indicate that 53 nations contribute 4,485
officers. This number represents 95 percent of the UN goal of 4,718
police officers. Additionally, the domestic police academy graduated
its twelfth class on 3 February and has placed 3,128 multi-ethnic
officers on the beat as a result. I can report the UN's policing plan
is on target and the effort continues to put 300+ officer graduates on
the street every month to work--and learn--alongside UNMIK's veteran
contract officers.
U.S. contributions to NATO are based on the North Atlantic Treaty
signed on 4 April 1949. The annual U.S. funding commitment is an
obligation to cover approximately one-quarter of the NATO funding
requirements as set by consensus of the Military Budget Committee
composed of representatives from each of the participating nations.
Once funding is committed, the prestige and credibility of the United
States is irrefutable and must be met. Consequently, a failure to
provide adequate funding to meet this commitment forces the DOD to
reprogram funds from other established mission-essential programs.
Shortfalls in NATO funding have been chronic in the past and have only
served to erode national programs. I encourage Congress to realize that
full funding of our NATO commitment will ensure the full execution and
realization of national programs, as well as the continued security and
stability of Europe as afforded by NATO.
In closing on the topic of the Balkans I do want to make one
further comment, and that is in regards to the pursuit and eventual
apprehension of Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). There are few
higher priorities in the international community's efforts in the
Balkans than bringing PIFWCs to justice regardless of what you might
hear or read, but it is slow and dangerous work. American forces,
working alongside their NATO counterparts, are fully committed and one
day I am confident these indicted criminals will be delivered to the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the
Hague. To date approximately 100 have been indicted and 71 delivered to
the ICTY, killed during apprehension efforts, or have otherwise died.
This process will continue until such time as justice is satisfied.

OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation Northern Watch,
consisting of forces from the U.S., Turkey, and the United Kingdom,
continue to fly dangerous and complex missions in the enforcement of
the No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Northern Iraq, and monitoring Iraqi
compliance with applicable UN Security Council Resolutions.
In the last few months, however, the situation in the zone has been
further complicated by a dramatic increase in the number of
international ``humanitarian flights'' into Iraq, as well as the
introduction of domestic Iraqi flights into the NFZ. Coalition forces
have taken appropriate measures to ensure that civilian aircraft will
not be endangered by ONW activities. There is no guarantee of what
actions Saddam Hussein might initiate; however, he has altered his
primary strategy from open defiance of ONW presence, to eroding
international support for applicable UN resolutions.

RUSSIA

U.S. and Russian soldiers execute common missions side by side
against common threats in the Balkans. Our deployed forces have
performed ably together and have developed positive and extremely
important combined training and operational activities. In spite of 5
years of operational cooperation and success however, our overall
attempts to engage more broadly with Russia are mixed. Ideally, Russia
will harmonize its security concerns with NATO, further strengthening
stability in the region. A remilitarized or a failed Russia would lead
to increased instability and danger not only to its neighbors, but to
vital U.S. security interests as well. The U.S. supports favorable
developments in Russia with its bilateral engagement efforts, as well
as through its support for the stability, sovereignty, and economic
development of the Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus' states.

CAUCASUS

The Caucasus region is vitally important to the United States for
at least two major reasons: the impact on the emerging Russian national
self-definition, and its capacity to fulfill European hydrocarbon
energy deficits. Despite its remoteness from the U.S., the region will
have a decisive impact on international political developments in the
early 21st century.
The importance of Caucasus oil and gas reserves, and the necessity
of their supply to meet growing European energy needs, comes precisely
at a time when Russia is still immersed in its yet to be completed
social, political, and economic revolution. It also comes at a time
when China is emerging as a major regional economic and political
power, with vastly increased energy requirements. Despite this critical
time, America has imposed on itself considerable constraints toward our
policy and influence in this region.
A key constraint to full American peaceful engagement in this
region is Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. The Act
prohibits government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan until such
time as ``steps are taken'' to lift the economic embargo sponsored by
Azerbaijan against Armenia, with the exception of counter-proliferation
programs. The DOD applies an ``equal treatment'' policy toward Armenia
to avoid compromising the U.S. position as mediator in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Other subsequent legislation has opened up several
narrow ``carve out'' areas to Section 907 for military and other
engagement activities: democratization; counter-proliferation;
humanitarian demining operations; and humanitarian assistance. While
these niches have allowed us to initiate preliminary military contacts
with Armenia and Azerbaijan, they are extremely narrow and do not allow
USEUCOM to respond to both nations' enthusiastic desire for substantive
engagement activities.
Were it not for Section 907, Azerbaijan, based largely upon its
geo-strategic position, pro-western economic, political, and military
orientation, and its abundant energy resources, would be a very high
priority for USEUCOM engagement efforts. A stable Azerbaijan is
necessary not only for its vast energy deposits, but also to help
forestall terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. U.S. policy has had the effect of frustrating Azerbaijan's
pro-NATO policy and desires to expand its relationship with Europe and
the U.S. I would ask you to take a hard look with the intent of
modifying this legislation to afford the opportunity for our military
to properly engage with our counterparts in this vitally important
region of the world. Such an initiative would strengthen our ability to
influence this region for the next generation and beyond.
Armenia has also persistently and vocally pursued at the highest
levels closer ties to the U.S. Armenia's motivation lies in its
eagerness to balance its historic dependence and partnership with
Russia, enlist the U.S. to mitigate historically hostile relations with
Turkey, and attract potential economic development assistance and
investment that Russia has not been able to provide. In particular,
Armenia has asked for our advice on establishing a program of
instruction for a national military senior service college and for help
in establishing peacekeeping units that could participate in
international efforts such as the Balkans. Due to Section 907, however,
these are opportunities USEUCOM cannot exploit and we are limited in
our efforts to assist these nations in sorting out mutual problems and
their futures.
Very briefly, our activity in the case of Georgia has continued to
increase since being assigned to USEUCOM's area of responsibility 3
years ago. Georgia will host its first large multinational NATO
Partnership for Peace exercise with USEUCOM support in 2001, providing
a good example of the kind of engagement opportunities we are missing
in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

AFRICA

Africa is a complex, diverse, and often dangerous region of the
world. Its countries are evolving into clusters of stability and
instability, leading in some areas to promising economic growth and
democratic government, and in others to stagnation and autocratic rule.
A few are simply chaotic due to coups, civil wars, widespread
corruption, or lack of an effective government. While this dynamic mix
of political trends and institutions will continue for the foreseeable
future, the administration seeks to bolster stability and democratic
transformation through a policy of engaging with key partner states and
regional ``success stories.'' We who watch Africa closely anticipate
fewer African ``wars'' but an ever-increasing scope of conflict as
failed states and the emerging transnational threats and humanitarian
crises provide the conditions for instability. Unstable political
environments, austere conditions, and asymmetrical threats where the
enemy is not clearly defined, either by uniform or position on the
battlefield, will characterize the operating environments.
Small programs, such as our Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP),
are key engagement initiatives in Africa that satisfy both DOD and
State Department objectives. Small dollar amounts have yielded big
dividends in terms of the U.S. military impact in Africa. With
approximately $17 million for fiscal year 2001, USEUCOM will be able to
complete more than 120 projects in roughly 50 African and Eurasian
countries. Engagement through the African Center for Strategic Studies
(ACSS), Near-East South Asian Center, African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI), and the West African Training Cruise (WATC) are also
helpful for promoting African stability. Joint Combined Engagement
Training with African partners, in addition to giving our soldiers the
chance to improve their capabilities to work in multiple environments,
expose African soldiers to the U.S. military, challenging them to
improve their professional skills. By leveraging the resources of
programs such as these we seek to help shape the African environment in
a positive way.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The portion of Sub-Saharan Africa in USEUCOM's area is an immense
geographic area comprised of 37 countries and four primary sub-regions,
each with significant environmental, cultural, political and economic
differences. USEUCOM has identified its three principle objectives for
military engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: promote stability, democracy
and a professional military; provide prompt response to humanitarian
crisis; and ensure freedom of air and sea lines of communication. By
applying resources against established objectives, the intent is to
reinforce success and work to prevent crises before they occur. There
are three critical issues preventing peace, stability, and economic
development in the Sub-Saharan Africa region: the war in the Congo
(DROC); the conflict in Sierra Leone; and the HIV/AIDS pandemic; all of
which are unrestrained by boundaries or borders. Each is a contagion
that threatens current and future stability throughout the continent.
With the assassination of President Laurent Kabila on 16 January
2001, the future situation in DROC is uncertain. Joseph Kabila, the
late President's son, was sworn in as President on 26 January 2001.
Within DROC there are military forces from six different nations
participating in the conflict. The countries previously supporting the
late President--Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia--have pledged continued
support to the new government in its civil war. Additionally, the nine
countries bordering DROC are significantly impacted socially and
economically by the war to varying degrees. The sheer size, geographic
location, vast mineral wealth, and economic potential in DROC guarantee
that peace in the Congo is inextricably linked to stability throughout
the region. The existing Lusaka Peace Accord is the best opportunity to
resolve this conflict. President Joseph Kabila recently held a historic
meeting with Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington in February
where both sides pledged to renew efforts to implement the Lusaka Peace
Accords. President Kabila also met with Secretary of State Colin Powell
the same day. Within the limits of U.S. law and policy, U.S. European
Command continues its limited engagement with all parties in an effort
to demonstrate neutrality and urge support for the Accord and the UN
Mission to the Congo.
The situation in coastal West Africa continues to smolder and
destabilize the sub-region. While centered in Sierra Leone, this
conflict also involves Liberia, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, as well as
the sixteen other members, directly or indirectly, that comprise the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Through support of
the UN's mission to Sierra Leone, support to British efforts, and
training and equipping countries contributing to the ECOWAS Military
Observers Group, USEUCOM works to contain the spread of this conflict,
as well as create the conditions for future peace and stability in the
region.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the region most heavily infected with HIV in
the world. The region accounts for two out of every three of the
world's HIV infections, and represents over 80 percent of global HIV/
AIDS deaths. The prevalence of HIV in Sub-Saharan militaries varies
greatly, but it generally exceeds that of the civilian populace. Many
militaries have infection rates as high as 20 to 50 percent of the
force. As African militaries participate not only in conflicts but also
in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations outside their
borders, HIV follows. We are committed to working with African
militaries to contain the spread of HIV/AIDS through education,
awareness, and behavior modification.

NORTH AFRICA

The strategy in North Africa is anchored by bilateral relationships
with what USEUCOM sees as two cornerstone countries--Morocco and
Tunisia. Recent developments in Algeria have also prompted measured
engagement activities with that country. Complementing these bilateral
relationships is a developing regional approach to engagement in North
Africa and the Mediterranean.
There are three prime sources of tension in North Africa. The first
is the Islamist insurgency in Algeria where the government's amnesty
offers have persuaded moderate rebels to surrender, while security
forces remain engaged in fighting hardliners. The behavior of both the
military leadership and insurgents will be critical to the progress of
political reform efforts and the environment for badly needed foreign
investment. Complete restoration of civil order in the countryside will
likely take years, and social tensions will exist long after the
conflict. There is optimism, however, as it appears there is a general
trend toward greater internal stability.
The second key source of tension is Libya--long a source for
concern as its leader, Muammar Qadhafi, continues to pursue the
development of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery
systems. Islamist opposition to Qadhafi has found limited popular
support and has met with a strong effective response from Qadhafi's
security forces.
The third source of tension is the unresolved dispute in the
Western Sahara. The King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, has initiated a series
of measures to make the administration of the territory more positive,
but the UN-sponsored process to hold a referendum on the final status
of the territory remains bogged down over disagreements about the voter
list. At times, this confrontation contributes to dangerous tensions
between Morocco and Algeria.
Africa will remain a challenging environment for the foreseeable
future. USEUCOM will continue to pursue a program of active peacetime
military engagement to shape the region and pursue our objectives with
the aim of maintaining stability and preventing crises before they
occur. Solutions to many of Africa's challenges are elusive, but
USEUCOM is managing threats and capitalizing on opportunities where we
can.

MODERNIZATION AND PERSONNEL ISSUES

Several modernization and personnel issues are being addressed at
USEUCOM and I want to highlight some of those that Congress might
positively influence and support.

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION BENEFITS TO USEUCOM

There is high probability that there will be repeated demands at
the center of the spectrum of conflict, as well as the possibility of
high intensity small-scale contingencies. Responding to this reality
the Army has articulated a new vision for a strategically responsive
and dominant force to effectively meet the full spectrum of future
military operations. The Army's ``Transformation'' will occur in three
phases, eventually resulting in the ``Objective Force.'' The Objective
Force aims to be able to send a brigade anywhere in the world in 96
hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. The two
divisions in Europe must also meet this standard by resourcing the
training, exercises and infrastructure that support strategic mobility.
Only through proper resourcing of our two divisions will this Objective
Force be able to provide the deployability, maneuverability, and
lethality necessary to conduct operations throughout the full spectrum
of conflict.
Another key benefit for USEUCOM is the ability to rapidly move
lighter vehicles between training areas and countries within this
theater. As a potential force provider to other unified commands, most
notably U.S. Central Command, future commanders will find that enhanced
mobility of the Transformed Army also enhances deployability. The
capability to deploy within a matter of hours to trouble spots in
Africa and less developed countries of Eastern Europe offers a range of
options that are simply unavailable today.
As the Army transforms it will reduce the logistics tail
considerably. By operating from a single family of vehicles,
significant efficiencies will follow. Much of the larger and more
demanding logistics support activities will occur outside the
operational area, reducing the logistics footprint.
Permanently stationed forces will be able to train effectively in
the AOR, where many of the training activities of heavier forces will
become increasingly problematic. Less noise and disruption of the local
populations during movement to and from major training areas (MTAs)
make it more likely that permission will be granted for maneuver
training off MTAs. This will allow the widely dispersed units of the V
Corps to greatly expand maneuver training, at a much-reduced cost.
Similarly, the Air Force transition to the Expeditionary Air Force
(EAF) concept has resulted in improved responsiveness in meeting the
diverse needs of USEUCOM. Organized into multiple AEFs to support
ongoing operations, Air Force personnel are now afforded predictable
rotations. This new stability has improved morale, stabilized training,
and assured necessary reconstitution time, thereby improving the combat
readiness of all involved forces. USAFE forces are integral to the EAF.
They provide, in addition to resident combat capability, the backbone
that supports ongoing AEF operations over the Balkans and northern
Iraq.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

An invaluable tool for the effective implementation of our
engagement programs is Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces
focus largely on their unique capability to organize and train
indigenous forces in internal defense. By interacting with foreign
military counterparts throughout the theater, SOF instills in host
nation forces a sense of loyalty and professionalism that support
democratic government and ideals. In the process, SOF gains valuable
training and cultural experiences from these regional engagements. In
fiscal year 2001, Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) has
scheduled 101 JCET initiatives in 52 countries. Special Operations
Forces become USEUCOM's force of choice for engaging on the fringes of
the theater in uncertain environments to open new doors and to shape
the battlespace in preparation for possible contingency operations.

RESERVE COMPONENTS

Total Force integration means conducting military operations that
fully utilize the unique capabilities of the Reserve components (RC) of
all Services. Reserve utilization requires a balanced and proportional
approach that considers Service competencies and capabilities and
matches those competencies to best support theater missions. The U.S.
European Command's ability to undertake missions is growing
increasingly dependent upon capabilities offered by the Reserves and
the National Guard.
In an effort to ease active component operational tempo the
Services are increasing their use of Reserves in contingency operations
in the Balkans. The 49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard)
successfully completed a rotation as the command element of Multi-
National Division (North) in Bosnia last October. Their performance was
superb and I want to take this opportunity to publicly applaud the
great job they did last year. The Navy Reserve contributory support to
this AOR for Operations Joint Guardian, Joint/Deliberate Forge and
Northern Watch has included filling 89 percent (237,600 workdays) of
all Navy billet requirements as of July 2000. The Air Reserve component
provides 60 percent of the total KC-135 tanker aircraft needed for
Operation Deliberate Forge providing air-refueling support to NATO
aircraft flying missions over the Balkans. At the end of last fiscal
year there were 1,244 Guard and 2,775 Reserve members on Active Duty in
support of the two operations in the Balkans. The reality is SFOR and
KFOR stability operations will continue to require augmentation from
the Reserve community for the foreseeable future, especially in the
area of civil-military operations and peace support operations.
Reserve components are an increasingly important asset for
USEUCOM's operational activities, combined exercises, training,
combined education, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance
efforts. Reserve support to the theater, however, is not limitless.
There are constraints that require a deliberate and well-thought-out
balance of Reserve force functions in the total equation of
requirements. The requirements of employers and families demand advance
notice of deployment and training. Reserve Service members require
predictability in order to manage business and personal affairs.
Accessibility and volunteerism are factors that require reasonable
lead-time to match and mobilize assets to the mission.
The PERSTEMPO management legislation enacted in the fiscal year
2000 National Defense Authorization Act will help provide standards and
limits for all Service member deployments. While PERSTEMPO management
provides stability and predictability for the Service member, it may
increase personnel turbulence and cost due to an increased frequency of
personnel rotations. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that increasing
use of the RC has a negative impact on Service members' personal lives
and may affect recruiting and retention goals.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION

To a large degree tactical aviation has shouldered much of the
Nation's foreign policy when that policy called for the use of force. A
decade ago Operation Desert Storm commenced with an unprecedented air
assault against Iraq's military forces involving hundreds of U.S.
aircraft flying tens of thousands of sorties around the clock. Since
that time American aviators and aircraft have maintained the NFZ over
Iraq, and since Operation Northern Watch was established have flown
nearly 13,000 fighter sorties alone. More recently we have seen the use
of our strike assets over the Balkans to stop the killing in Bosnia and
to compel Milosevic to withdraw Yugoslav forces from Kosovo during
Operation Allied Force. The demands of modern warfare for precision
strike to maximize combat effectiveness while minimizing collateral
damage clearly demonstrate the increased need for all-weather/all-
target capability. The fact of the matter is, however, many of our
tactical aircraft--F-18s, F-15s, F-16s, AV-8s, and A-10s--are aging and
nearing the end of their service lives. Even the F-117 ``Stealth
Fighter,'' thought by most to be a new system, has an average age of
9.7 years and relies on dated technology. Currently, possible
replacements--the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter, and F-18E/F--continue in
development and are likely part of the administration's defense review.

AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION

Systems modifications are required to keep our airlift aircraft
viable, particularly for USEUCOM's fleet of C-130s. These airplanes,
now approaching 30 years of age, are essential to the success of
several USEUCOM mission areas. From support of USEUCOM army units,
including combat airdrop and resupply, to execution of humanitarian
relief operations, these aircraft are a critical ingredient in
maintaining a force projection capability in both combat and during
peacetime. It is almost a certainty that the missions and roles this
aircraft fulfills will only be more crucial in the future.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

The tremendous growth in air traffic and communication industries
in Europe presents increasing challenges for air traffic control
agencies, civil air carriers, and military aviation. Just as in the
United States, the European air traffic system requires significant
improvements to increase capacity and reduce delays. At the same time,
expansion of communication technologies is pressuring a limited radio
frequency spectrum. To address these challenges, European countries are
mandating more efficient air traffic communications systems and
avionics. The U.S. has many similar plans; however, Europe is leading
worldwide implementation due to its current frequency and air traffic
congestion. We have no choice but to equip our aircraft for flight in
the airspaces of Europe as well as the rest of the world to allow
access to perform our mission.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

For the past several years, we have been living in a new
operational environment for both conventional and support operations as
technological advances change the way our potential adversaries and the
U.S. military operate. At the same time, military forces have become
the spearhead for several nation-building efforts. To meet these
challenges, our intelligence collection and analytical efforts must
constantly adapt to keep pace with the evolving intelligence demands
associated with these new mission areas. Potential asymmetric attacks,
including WMD, terrorism and information operations, may be directed
not only at our deployed forces, but also at our critical
infrastructures.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO USEUCOM

National agency support, including overhead collection, analysis
and reporting, is critical to supporting our operational forces and
engagement strategies. While we continue to revalidate our commanders'
intelligence requirements and economize our requirements on these
national resources, there is no theater capability to complement
national collection support.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) capabilities are critical to
meeting USEUCOM intelligence needs. In particular, the contributions of
the Defense Attache System provide first-hand insights into the
military-to-military relations in each country and timely reporting on
crisis situations. The initiative to expand Defense Attache Office
presence in Africa is important to our engagement programs. In
addition, DIA is leading a defense intelligence community effort to
meet future challenges. This effort includes improvements to the
database to enhance future targeting capabilities, increased
interoperability between national levels and tactical commanders, and
an emphasis on new threats such as WMD and terrorism. The most
significant of these is the emphasis on the workforce to ensure the
intelligence workforce is capable of meeting these and other threats
now and in the future. I am confident these initiatives will shape and
improve defense intelligence support for the warfighter.
USEUCOM relies heavily on National Security Agency (NSA) products
and services. The actions undertaken by the Director of the NSA to
transform the agency into an organization that will successfully
respond to future threats of the Information Age are critical to
ensuring the safety of our forces. Funding support for NSA's efforts
will help mitigate trade-offs during NSA's transformation process,
while ensuring the timely deployment of capabilities needed to exploit
and defeat modern adversaries. Such funding will have the added benefit
of meeting USEUCOM's needs now, and into the rapidly evolving future.
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provides critical
imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial information support and has
repeatedly demonstrated its responsiveness to USEUCOM crisis
operations. The need to precisely engage targets while minimizing
collateral damage requires accurate and timely spatial and temporal
intelligence. NIMA initiatives to develop a global geospatial
foundation are critical in achieving our operational and engagement
objectives. Additionally, NIMA's efforts to provide a critical IMINT
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) system are
crucial in fully realizing the benefits of our next generation imaging
satellites. The recent congressionally-directed NIMA Commission,
however, concluded TPED is under-resourced overall, and the U.S. cannot
expect to fully realize the promise of the next generation of IMINT
satellites unless NIMA TPED is adequately funded.

INFORMATION DOMINANCE

In conducting our missions and executing our responsibilities,
USEUCOM commanders have an indispensable edge: We enjoy ``information
dominance'' that comes from the interaction of superior intelligence
and information infrastructures. However, that edge is perishable and
is constantly threatened. The section addresses our health in both.
command, control, communications, and computer systems infrastructure
Europe's Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
(C\4\) infrastructure needs improvement to be able to handle a major
crisis. Many USEUCOM networks were built in the 1940s and 1950s to
support low-bandwidth voice service, and are simply inadequate for
evolving high bandwidth demands, such as worldwide command and control
video conferences, live Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video feeds,
electronic tasking orders for our air and land forces, theater-wide
situational awareness, and full implementation of DOD's Global Combat
Command and Control and Global Combat Support Systems. These systems
are the foundation of USEUCOM's command and control capabilities.
The theater's World War II-era infrastructures suffer weather-
related degradation in copper cables still insulated with wrapped
paper. Increased network loads and failure of critical components cause
unacceptable system delays and outages. Many naval sites in particular
are unable to meet the minimum requirements for the Navy/Marine Corps
Intranet--their primary information service network. Furthermore,
current infrastructure does not support Information Assurance (IA)
measures, potentially allowing our collection, analysis, dissemination,
and command and control functions to be jeopardized by hostile or
inadvertent interference.
We depend upon information services and network-centric command and
control to enable smaller forward deployments, rapidly deployable joint
task forces and task force component commands, shorter decision times,
and improved force protection capabilities. This reliance makes
targeting our networks an attractive option for adversaries unable to
field conventional forces against us, and makes IA an absolute must if
we are to maintain information superiority, and the integrity of our
command and control.
USEUCOM's satellite communications lack flexibility, and capacity
is extremely limited. In the event of a major crisis in Southwest Asia,
nearly all of our mission-essential communications could be preempted
by the surge in bandwidth requirements from U.S. Central Command.
Realistically, this infrastructure needs to be replaced with modern
high-bandwidth capability, preferably within the next 5 to 7 years--a
significant investment, but one that we can't afford not to make.

OTHER AREAS FOR INVESTMENT AND IMPROVEMENT

Recent process improvements have enhanced coordination and
prioritization of scarce intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) resources across numerous worldwide requirements. However,
airborne collectors remain a ``low density--high demand'' asset. Our
ability to penetrate denied and high-risk airspace is critical to
deliver the real-time threat awareness to deployed forces in places
like the Balkans, Northern Iraq, and the Levant. We need to ensure the
development of these capabilities, including long dwell UAVs with both
imagery and signals collection capabilities, stays on track in order to
deliver necessary warning and force protection in threatening and
uncertain environments.

RESOURCES

America's most precious military resource, servicemembers and their
families, are our number one combat multiplier. The well-being of the
family is one of our top theater priorities, and is inextricably linked
to readiness, retention, and reinforcement of core values, healthy
family life, high morale, and mission accomplishment.

QUALITY OF LIFE

The quality of our housing, medical care, schools, religious
services, public facilities, community services, and recreation
activities in Europe should reflect the American standard of living--a
value we have all pledged to defend. Our most important fiscal year
2000 Quality of Life (QOL) objective was to analyze and quantify the
impact QOL has on readiness and retention. We took ``expert testimony''
from senior enlisted advisors and family members across the theater.
Their conclusions paralleled previous evaluations, with family housing
and barracks, spouse employment, childcare and health care, dependent
education, and now the work environment consistently identified as
lagging the farthest behind.

MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

We have seen many positive results from increased congressional
funding last year and we all applaud and are thankful for congressional
efforts to ensure the readiness of our forward deployed forces and
families. Of particular note, the recently added $25 million provided
to the Army in Europe to plan and design their ``Efficient Basing
Initiative'' is greatly appreciated, and will prove important as we
work to revitalize our existing infrastructure. However, there is still
a substantial amount of work to do to adequately provide for our
servicemembers, civilians, and family members who deserve quality
housing, workplace, and community facilities.
Housing, both unaccompanied and family, has improved continuously
for the last 3 years and the outlook is promising. The elimination of
gang latrines and the renovation of the barracks and dormitories to
DOD's 1+1 standard has been a major morale booster for our troops and
our components are on track to meet the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
requirement for fiscal year 2008. Military family housing throughout
Europe as a whole remains old, however, and is well below contemporary
standards, and in need of extensive repairs and modernization. Although
our housing programs in Europe are generally on track to meet DPG
requirements for fiscal year 2010, for the Air Force alone, military
housing construction allocations of over $100 million per year for the
next decade will be required to achieve minimum housing requirements.
Quality housing for military members and their families continues to be
a critical element in attracting and retaining the high caliber
personnel who make our military forces the best in the world.
With trends in housing and barracks positive, it is now essential
to focus our attention on the quality of the infrastructure of our
communities and work facilities in Europe. Sustaining, restoring, and
modernizing facilities are critical to properly supporting the military
mission within the theater. From runways for our aircraft to the work
place for our troops, the infrastructure support for our operations and
people has weakened over time. This failing infrastructure is due to
almost a decade of placing MILCON and Real Property Maintenance funding
at a lower priority than other needs. Significant investments need to
be made over the next decade to enhance our warfighter's support
infrastructure and demonstrate to our people that they are indeed our
most valuable resource.
USEUCOM is aggressively using all available funding sources,
including the NATO Security Investment Program, Residual Value,
Payment-in-Kind, and any additional funds provided by Congress, such as
last year's Kosovo MILCON Supplemental Appropriation, to help reduce
costs and meet escalating requirements. Additionally, some European
base closures and consolidations will reduce future costs, enhance
readiness, and increase effectiveness. Current ongoing efforts include
the Army's proposed relocation of an entire brigade combat team
currently spread across more than 13 sites, to the Grafenwoehr/Vilseck,
Germany area. This consolidation will significantly improve command and
control, enhance training opportunities and vastly improve quality of
life for the troops and family members--while saving approximately $40
million per year in infrastructure costs.
With our continuing resolve to reduce the footprint while
maintaining presence in our AOR, recapitalization has also become a
critical issue. Progress is ongoing with the Naples Improvement
Initiative nearly completed and construction efforts at Naval Air
Station (NAS) Sigonella about to commence. These efforts will provide a
significant improvement in both quality of life and service for sailors
stationed in the European Southern Region.
These and other initiatives are essential for posturing our forces
to better perform their missions, both now and in the future. In the
meantime, we will continue to endeavor to help ourselves first and work
every opportunity for internal efficiencies through consolidation,
privatization, and ensuring maximum benefit from available funding.

DEPENDENT EDUCATION

With over half of USEUCOM servicemembers supporting families with
children in school, the quality of DOD's dependent education programs
ranks very high in determining QOL for our civilian personnel and
servicemembers. As with many of our other QOL programs, lack of
adequate infrastructure funding is the top concern. Since many of our
schools are remote, program-based staffing is critical to provide a
full range of educational opportunity for all students in music, art,
and associated after school activities. We must take aggressive action
to expand vocational, technical and school-to-work opportunities for
our students. Finally, we must work toward establishing an 18:1
student-teacher ratio for kindergarten and to provide a Talented and
Gifted program for middle schools similar to what is currently
available at our high schools.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. European Command, which I am proud and honored to command,
is executing new and exciting missions everyday, while successfully
maintaining its warfighting edge. USEUCOM has also been active and has
indeed expanded its engagement efforts, working to influence the
military evolution of NATO, PfP, and emerging European defense
structures. Finally, USEUCOM has seized new opportunities involving
Russia, the Caucasus, and Africa, and will continue to seek new
openings to expand our relationships.
Although our current posture is favorable and capable of meeting
our national security interests, our infrastructure in particular is in
need of upgrade and replenishment. Generally, significant increases in
funding are necessary to maintain our readiness, continue current
engagement efforts, and make the necessary investments to sustain our
quality of life.
Without bipartisan congressional support, USEUCOM would not have
been able to realize the achievements accomplished over the past year.
On behalf of all personnel in the USEUCOM theater, I want to thank the
committee for its support.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General Ralston.
General Franks.

STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General Franks. Mr. Chairman, first of all let me reinforce
the point that you made earlier when you talked about the
quality of the young people that we have serving today in the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, our Special Operating Forces,
our Coast Guard. In fact, they are the best that we have had,
and that brings to my mind the fact that what I would like to
do with the committee is express on the record our condolences
in Central Command to the families and the loved ones of those
young people who were lost last week in that training accident
on the Udairi Range at Observation Post 10 in the state of
Kuwait. Five Americans and a New Zealand Army officer were
killed in this tragic accident, while they were in the
performance of duties designed to increase the stability in a
region that is inherently unstable.
It reminds me of the fact that ours is a dangerous
profession, and these young people do in fact go in harm's way
as they do the mission. All of us are in their debt, and in
Central Command we join friends and allies in saluting the
courage and the patriotism, commitment, and sacrifice of these
young people.
Additionally, I would like to thank the Government of
Kuwait, as well as others in the region, for the magnificent
support that they provided with respect to this accident.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today
before the committee to have an opportunity to talk about the
central region, an area of vital importance to the United
States of America, and what our activities are all about, what
our interactions are, what are difficulties are, and what our
needs are.
As this committee certainly knows, in this region on a
given day will be between 18,500 and perhaps as high as 25,000
American personnel. Today we stand at a bit over 21,000
Americans deployed in the region, 175 to 200 airframes involved
in our operations there, and generally between 25 and 30 ships
with a carrier battle group in the Northern Arabian Gulf.
This region, as the committee knows, includes 25 countries,
in an area about twice the size of the continental United
States. Our forces around the clock, 365 days a year, are
involved in enforcement of the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq, a
security zone that extends from south to north, that being from
the Kuwait or Saudi border up to the 33rd parallel about 180
nautical miles, and our sailors, and marines, additionally
serve in Marine Expeditionary Units as they are in the region
about 6 months of each year interacting with forces there.
Our maritime forces include, as I mentioned, a carrier
battle group involved in maritime interception operations to
ensure that the regime in Iraq is not afforded the unrestricted
opportunity to smuggle gas oil using maritime routes in order
to enhance Saddam Hussein's disposable income, which he has
provided every evidence he will use to enhance his military
position by building up and modernizing his conventional
forces, his integrated air defense systems, as well as his
weapons of mass destruction program.
These people who serve in the central region are doing this
every day, and I mentioned to the committee, Mr. Chairman, they
do, in fact, go in harm's way. Witness the Khobar Towers
incident, or witness the bombing of the Saudi Arabian National
Guard facility several years ago, witness 12 October this past
year, where 17 Americans, 17 sailors lost their lives in the
Port of Aden in a terrorist incident.
We ask a lot of these young people, we expect a lot of
these young people, we owe them what we seek in Central
Command, in fact all the military services to provide, and that
is the appropriate balance of our resource levels to ensure
appropriate force protection, to ensure appropriate policy-
level decisions, to provide the benefit of experience from
within the region to the policy level, as the policies are
being formed by this administration, to ensure that we do the
best things we can to work toward the assurance of maintaining
access to this region of vital and enduring interest to the
country.
Mr. Chairman, I have asked that my prepared remarks be
included in the record, and at this point I will stop the oral
remarks and be pleased to entertain the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)
includes 25 nations, extending from Egypt and Jordan to the Horn of
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and Central
Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. Included are the waters of the
Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, with maritime
chokepoints of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of
Hormuz.
The current National Security Strategy specifies that our core
objectives in this vital region are to enhance U.S. security, promote
democracy and human rights, and bolster American economic prosperity.
To meet these goals, USCENTCOM promotes regional stability, ensures
uninterrupted access to resources and markets, maintains freedom of
navigation, protects U.S. citizens and property, and promotes the
security of regional friends and allies.
As we work with policymakers to define USCENTCOM's approach in the
AOR, we address our objectives and goals in light of the political-
military dynamics of the region. The Middle East Peace Negotiations
(MEPN) and U.S. relationships with Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey
influence our relations with Egypt, Jordan, and the states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). Pakistan is important to the U.S. because of
regional tensions and its proximity and relationship to Afghanistan.
U.S.-Pakistan relations continue to be influenced by these issues and
by progress toward a return to civil, democratic government.
Transnational issues including humanitarian disasters, refugees,
international crime, drug smuggling and terrorism, and state-to-state
conflicts such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia War, will continue to define our
tasks in the Horn of Africa. Our relations with the Central Asian
states will be influenced by their relationships with Russia, their
concern about extremism generated from Afghanistan, and our efforts and
commitments to help the Central Asian states in maintaining their
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through democratic
and defense reform.
Natural resource distribution will continue to influence regional
dynamics. Control of water sources and uses downstream may heighten
existing international tensions, particularly along the Nile, Tigris,
Euphrates, and Jordan Rivers. Competing claims over the control and
distribution of energy resources will continue to influence relations
between states, particularly around the Caspian Sea.
On a given day, USCENTCOM operates in the region with some 30 naval
vessels, 175-200 military aircraft, and between 18,000 and 25,000
soldiers, sailors, airmen, coast guardsmen, and marines. Activities
range from missions such as Operation Southern Watch enforcement of the
No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Southern Iraq, to Maritime Intercept Operations
(MIO) in the northern Persian Gulf, to Security Assistance, to
International Military Education and Training (IMET), to Joint and
Combined Exercises, and Humanitarian Demining (HD). Our military men
and women continue to do a remarkable job across the board in enhancing
U.S. relationships in the region, in promoting stability, and in
supporting diplomatic efforts aimed at securing America's vital and
enduring national interests.
There is, however, a price for America's visibility in pursuit of
our interests. Some, opposed to the values for which our country
stands, have determined to take direct and violent action against our
presence in the region. The terrorist bombing of the Office of Program
Management for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM SANG), the Khobar
Towers bombing, the attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and
last October's attack on U.S.S. Cole continue to demonstrate that our
opponents are dedicated, determined, and resourceful. Our clear task is
to remain resolutely committed to the principles we stand for while we
provide the best possible protection for our people. Efforts to counter
the terrorist threat are ongoing, but much remains to be done as our
men and women in uniform daily go ``in harm's way.''
I will now describe our AOR in greater detail, highlight our
ongoing challenges and opportunities, and identify our essential
requirements.

REGIONAL TRENDS

Overview
The Central Region is of vital interest to the United States.
Sixty-eight percent of the world's proven oil reserves are found in the
Gulf Region and 43 percent of the world's petroleum exports pass
through the Strait of Hormuz. The developing energy sector of the
Central Asian states, with the potential for discovery of additional
oil reserves, further emphasizes the importance of the Central Region
to America and the world.
The words that best describe the AOR are ``diversity'' and
``volatility.'' The region is home to more than 500 million people,
three of the world's major religions, at least 18 major ethnic groups,
and national economies that produce annual per capita incomes varying
from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of dollars.
Portions of USCENTCOM's AOR are characterized by instability. We
find social volatility due to pressures created as governments
transition toward democracy, and we find additional social, economic
and military stresses from humanitarian crises, the strains of resource
depletion or overuse, religious or ethnic conflict, and military power
imbalances. While national instability is not uncommon, the volatility
of USCENTCOM's AOR is particularly significant because of its
geographical and economic importance. The natural resources of Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and others have provided extraordinary opportunities for
these nations, but also have given rise to a range of socio-economic
problems and rivalries. States such as Egypt and Jordan have
compensated to a large extent for their lack of mineral wealth through
positive use of their human resources. Yet, there are nations in the
region that have not generated the will, resources, or organization to
move ahead. These factors will not be easily overcome, and portend
potential regional challenges for the future.
Iraq
Ten years ago, American leadership produced a coalition that
defeated Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Despite victory, we
remain engaged in current operations in the Gulf because of Iraq's
refusal to abide by the terms of a series of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).
In the past year, coalition forces flew more than 19,000 sorties in
support of Operation Southern Watch (enforcement of the Southern Iraq
NFZ), with almost 10,000 of those sorties in Iraqi airspace. The
purpose of these missions in support of United Nations (UN) resolutions
remains the protection of Iraqi civilians (Kurds in the north/Shia in
the south) from Saddam Hussein and the prevention of Iraqi aggression
against its neighbors. Our forces have been engaged by surface-to-air
missiles or anti-aircraft fire more than 500 times during the period,
and coalition forces have responded to these provocations on 38
occasions. Enforcement of the NFZ will remain dangerous but necessary
business as long as the Iraqi regime continues to threaten its
neighbors and its own people. Similarly, our naval forces maintain
continuous presence in the Persian Gulf, and have intercepted 610 ships
in the past year in support of MIO, enforcing UN sanctions designed to
limit Saddam Hussein's ability to smuggle oil out of Iraq. Iraqi oil
smuggling provides uncontrolled revenues, which could be used to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and rebuild his
conventional forces. Sixty-five of these ships have been diverted to
Gulf coalition partners where contraband oil has been confiscated and
sold. Again, necessary but dangerous business.
As allied forces continue to enforce the resolutions, Iraq has
become more aggressive in attempts to circumvent them. As the second-
largest producer of oil after Saudi Arabia, Iraq has attempted to
manipulate the UN Oil-for-Food (O-F-F) program. Because of Saddam's
obstruction, not all revenues and supplies intended for the direct
relief of the Iraqi people under the O-F-F program have found their way
to the population. Additionally, by halting and restarting crude oil
exports of up to 2.3 million barrels per day, Iraq has attempted to
establish leverage that it can use to end sanctions. Saddam's ability
to circumvent UN sanctions leaves little incentive for him to accept
UNSCR 1284 or permit the resumption of UN inspections. In the absence
of inspectors and a long-term monitoring program, we cannot verify that
Iraq is not continuing research, development and production of WMD and
ballistic missiles.
Despite the overwhelming defeat of Iraq's conventional military
force, it remains a threat to its neighbors and has repeatedly
demonstrated an ability to project force as evidenced by significant
deployments to western Iraq in October and November/December 2000. Iraq
continues to challenge coalition aircraft in the NFZs despite the
effects of 10 years of sanctions on its air force and continued
attrition of its air defense forces. Despite the degradation of Iraq's
military capability, our regional partners do not yet possess the
capability to deter Iraqi aggression without our assistance.
Saddam is as secure now as at any time in the past decade. Iraqi
participation in the 21-22 October 2000 Arab Summit and the 12-13
November 2000 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) signals his
attempt to reenter the Arab fold, and renewed contacts between Baghdad
and a number of moderate Arab countries following the breakdown of the
MEPN make the U.S. leadership role critical as we work to rebuild the
Gulf War coalition. USCENTCOM operations and military-to-military
relationships remain key to this effort.

IRAN

Iran's future is an enigma in the question of stability in the AOR.
Since 1997, President Khatami has attempted to change the image of Iran
by initiating diplomatic rapprochement with Europe and the Gulf States.
Domestically, moderate legislators have the majority in the parliament
and have attempted to reform the system by introducing greater
transparency and accountability within government. However,
conservative hard-liners have closed Iran's free press, blocked reform
legislation, and intimidated and jailed moderate legislators and
popular figures, effectively maintaining an atmosphere of social and
political repression.
Iran faces severe internal challenges including domestic political
and economic problems, massive unemployment, and increasing drug use.
While a majority of Iranians, especially the young, demand change, they
find themselves virtually powerless. President Khatami has not
succeeded in changing the system while Supreme Leader Khamenei and the
ruling conservatives have clearly demonstrated that they will not
accept change, nor will they share the principal elements of state
power with an increasingly restless population.
Meanwhile, Iran continues to improve its conventional and
unconventional military capabilities. Tehran's ability to interdict the
Strait of Hormuz with air, surface, and sub-surface naval units, as
well as mines and missiles remains a concern. Additionally, Iran's
asymmetrical capabilities are becoming more robust. These include high
speed, fast attack patrol ships; anti-ship missiles; unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs); and hardened facilities for surface-to-surface
missiles and command and control. WMD programs and the Shahab-3/4
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) also continue to receive priority
funding. Although President Khatami is attempting to change Iran's
image, sustained hostility of conservative hard-liners is evident as we
see continued support of terrorism aimed at derailing efforts for peace
between Israel and the Palestinians.
As Tehran deals with the stresses of a growing and increasingly
discouraged population, internal political volatility could result in
diplomatic, military, or asymmetric attacks on Iran's neighbors or
American citizens and our interests. If we factor Iran's burgeoning WMD
capability into this equation, the risks increase significantly and
Iran becomes the greatest long-term threat in our AOR.
Gulf States
Increased revenues from high oil prices have benefited Gulf oil
producers. This financial shot in the arm has reduced budget deficits
and reactivated previously stalled infrastructure projects. However,
socio-economic problems, such as increasing population, high
unemployment, declining public services, and a depressed worldwide
financial market, have focused the nations on the Arabian Peninsula on
economic reforms that are intended to diversify and stimulate their
economies.
Regional stability was recently enhanced through the resolution of
long-standing Saudi-Yemeni border and Kuwaiti-Saudi maritime boundary
disputes. But, unresolved United Arab Emirates (UAE)-Iran and Bahrain-
Qatar territorial disputes, and Kuwait-Iran maritime boundary disputes
remain.
The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence is of continuing concern
in the Gulf region. This violence has increased internal pressures on
moderate Arab governments who must balance responses to public opinion
with the value placed on their relationships with the West. If the
Peninsula states begin to distance themselves from the U.S., their
inability to face the dual threats of Iran and Iraq will leave them
vulnerable to intimidation by these aggressive powers.
Northern Red Sea
The Northern Red Sea sub-region (Egypt and Jordan) is on the front
lines of the MEPN and has the most to gain or lose from the process.
Peace would usher in the prospect of economic development, a stable
financial environment, and social stability. Continued conflict
encourages extremism, deters economic investment from outside the
region, and inhibits tourism, a major source of income in both Egypt
and Jordan. President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan have
walked a fine line on the issue despite domestic difficulties, calls
for breaking diplomatic relations with Israel, and for boycotts of
Israeli and U.S. goods.
Economically, Egypt's move toward privatization is hampered by
concerns about unemployment and the expected economic downturn that
would initially follow. As Egypt's major source of hard currency is
tourism, its economy reacts dramatically to advances or setbacks in
MEPN.
Jordan suffers from water shortages, high unemployment, deficit
spending, and a stagnant economy hampered by sanctions imposed on Iraq,
Jordan's largest trading partner and its sole supplier of oil. Jordan's
economic prospects are limited by the region's instability, magnified
by the fact that 60 percent of the population of Jordan is Palestinian.
King Abdullah has managed to support the Palestinian cause while
maintaining ties with Israel, and dealing with the economic impact of
sharing borders with Syria and Iraq.
Central and South Asia
Central Asia's primary security concern is the threat posed by
religious extremism generated from the continuing conflict in
Afghanistan. In response to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
incursion in 1999, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan began developing new
tactics and deployed military forces to critical defensive corridors in
anticipation of renewed IMU activity. Consequently, and due to
increased logistical and training support provided by the U.S., Turkey,
Russia, and China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan anticipated and
effectively countered IMU infiltration into their territory in the
summer and fall of 2000. But these countries, and the Central Asia
region as a whole, will remain vulnerable to renewed IMU attacks in the
coming spring and summer. USCENTCOM will continue to work with the
militaries in Central Asia to enhance their abilities to secure their
borders, build multilateral relationships through exercises, and
support diplomatic efforts to enhance stability and nurture democracy.
Pakistan remains key to achieving stability in South and Central
Asia. Peace initiatives instituted by Pakistan and India have the
potential to develop into meaningful dialogue and dramatically reduce
tensions in the region, but both these nuclear states require
encouragement to move forward. Pakistan perceives U.S. policy as
``tilting'' in favor of India, which complicates dialogue on the
subcontinent. This perception is fueled by our limited military-to-
military interaction with Pakistan coupled with the current moratorium
on International Military Education and Training (IMET). Historically,
the Pakistani military is one of the most influential forces within the
country and USCENTCOM's relationships at the military level could
create leverage to enhance stability in South Asia.
Afghanistan remains a destabilizing influence in the region. In one
way or another, all of Afghanistan's neighbors are affected by
Afghanistan's internal war--either as a supporter of one side or the
other, or by proximity to the chaos generated by the war.
The military, economic and social stresses brought on by the Afghan
conflict and the continuing tension between India and Pakistan impact
each of the Central Asian governments and regional economies as well,
and have prompted the Central Asian states to look for increased
collective security opportunities. USCENTCOM has effective mil-to-mil
programs with Khazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgystan, and is interested
in beginning engagement with Tajikistan, a country key to the region
because of its geostrategic location and close ties to Russia.
Tajikistan has submitted paperwork to join the Partnership for Peace
program, and the Department of State is actively working to obtain
Cooperative Threat Reduction certification and IMET funding to support
their request.
Africa
The 2\1/2\-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea appears to have
ended with the 12 December 2000 peace agreement. With the deployment of
the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), both
countries have promised to uphold the principles of the peace
agreement. As long as UN peacekeepers are present, renewed fighting is
not expected. As these states implement the peace agreement, we will
reopen military contacts and seek to build on relationships that
provide balance and enhance regional stability.
Other countries in the Horn of Africa are still suffering from the
impact of a 5-year drought that places 20 million in need of aid, about
10 million of whom are facing starvation. Despite donor fatigue, aid
agencies remain responsive to this humanitarian disaster, and USCENTCOM
will continue to assist with humanitarian programs in every way
possible.
Sudan continues to provide support and safe haven to transnational
terrorists and opposition groups. President Bashir has been unable to
end the civil war in southern Sudan, and factional fighting has caused
the UN and other relief agencies to periodically suspend relief
efforts.
Despite Djiboutian efforts to revive a national Somali government,
there is little prospect that Somalia will emerge as a coherent state
in the near future. Djibouti itself will continue to face challenges as
it struggles to deal with its own economic, political and social
problems.
Despite the continuing drought-induced humanitarian crisis
described above, economic stagnation, and political turmoil, Kenya
remains key to stability in East Africa and is an important friend for
the United States. Kenya's apolitical Army remains a source of
stability that will be important as Kenyans go to the polls in 2002 to
elect their first new president in 23 years. The African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI) will help that Army build capacity to
respond to Kenya's needs.
Terrorism
The threat of terrorist activity remains high throughout the
Central Region. Events such as the attack on U.S.S. Cole serve as
constant reminders of this fact. Despite our counterterrorism successes
over the past year, including the disruption of terrorist cells in
Jordan and Kuwait, extremist groups continue to recruit, train, and
conduct operations. One evolving trend that has helped terrorist
organizations rebound from our counterterrorism successes is
unprecedented cooperation between known and obscure groups. This
cooperation includes moving people and materials, providing safe-havens
and money, and training new recruits. The trend is especially
disturbing as known organizations gain plausible deniability for
operations, while the obscure groups achieve an increased capability
from training and financial support.
Terrorists' persistent interest in larger devices, more lethal
tactics, and unconventional (chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear) weapons points to an even more significant problem in the
future. In addition to the use of unconventional weapons, the potential
for terrorists to regard unconventional targets (civilians and civilian
infrastructure) as practical options for attack seems likely. As
terrorist networks improve their ability to operate within the global
communications environment, we see increased capability to support
recruitment, conduct fund-raising, and direct sub-elements worldwide.
The complex terrorist threat we face today is less predictable and
potentially much more dangerous than we have seen in the past.
Proliferation of WMD
Russia, China and North Korea remain the primary external suppliers
of WMD and missile-related technology to countries in the AOR, and some
regional states with maturing WMD programs have joined the ranks of
potential suppliers. As proliferation in the Central Region
accelerates, coalition partners feel mounting pressure to offset the
WMD threat with comparable weapons of their own.
As mentioned previously, Iraq's WMD capabilities have been degraded
but not eliminated. The reconstitution of key weapons programs may have
begun, facilitated by the long absence of UN arms monitors. The 2+ year
gap in the UN disarmament presence makes it difficult to verify the
current status of biological, chemical and prohibited missile
capabilities.
Meanwhile, Iran continues to place a high priority on developing
WMD, specifically chemical weapons (CW), ballistic missiles and
possibly biological agents. Tehran is aggressively pursuing nuclear
technology and is progressing in its development of a large-scale,
self-supporting CW infrastructure. Additionally, they have pursued the
development of the Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) to
augment existing SCUD-B and SCUD-C systems. Two Shahab-3 flight tests
were conducted in 2000 and, despite a failure on the last attempt, this
system may now be available for use. Additional programs and
capabilities can be expected in the future.
In South Asia, the missile and nuclear race between Pakistan and
India continues. Both states are developing and testing a variety of
technologies capable of delivering nuclear devices out to ever-greater
ranges. Although the Central Asian states neither produce nor store WMD
on their territories, given the geopolitical situation, WMD could
transit their borders. DOD's WMD Customs and Law Enforcement programs
support nonproliferation efforts in Central Asia.
Environmental Security (Water)
Water will dominate the environmental factors that pose the
greatest threat to regional stability. The combination of water
scarcity, water contamination, the lack of equitable water-sharing
agreements, population growth, and exponentially increasing demand for
water will exacerbate an already challenging and volatile situation in
the Central Region. While environmental factors can easily trigger
conflict, cooperation on these issues can promote regional stability
and contribute to the ongoing process of conflict resolution. As such,
environmental security remains an important element in shaping a future
made complex by competition over natural resources. USCENTCOM-sponsored
environmental conferences will continue to provide a valuable forum for
the region to discuss environmental issues.

PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

Operational Activities
The focus of our day-to-day operations in the Gulf region remains
Iraq. Iraq's long-term intransigence and non-compliance with UNSCRs has
resulted in continued NFZ operations in both northern and southern
Iraq, and our naval forces continue to conduct maritime intercept
operations to limit Iraq's ability to smuggle oil outside the Oil-for-
Food Program. Additionally, we maintain a rotational ground task force
in Kuwait to assist with initial defense of Kuwaiti should Iraq attempt
aggression.
USCENTCOM's Joint Task Force--Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) conducts NFZ
enforcement, along with our UK partners, in order to monitor Iraqi
compliance with UNSCR 688 and deter enhancement of Iraq's military
capabilities in violation of demarches and UNSCR 949. Despite the
resumption of both international civilian flights to Iraq and intra-
Iraq flights, JTF-SWA remains capable of effectively enforcing the
southern NFZ.
One of the most visible examples of our commitment to the region is
the presence of Naval Forces U.S. Central Command (NAVCENT) in Manama,
Bahrain, the only component headquartered in our AOR. Operating with
other coalition members, NAVCENT enforces UN sanctions against Iraq and
protects our interests in the Gulf. Along with containing Iraq and
ensuring freedom of navigation in shipping lanes critical to world
commerce, NAVCENT operations serve as a constant reminder of U.S.
commitment to stability in the Gulf region and Strait of Hormuz.
Since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield (August 1990),
Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) have resulted in the search of
almost 13,000 ships bound for or departing from Iraq, with more than
760 diversions. Support for MIO has been significant with ships from
Kuwait, Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Italy,
Australia, and the Netherlands, and boarding teams from Argentina and
Poland having participated. Additionally, our naval units ensure
freedom of navigation, execute maritime rescue missions, and conduct
directed contingency operations.
USCENTCOM provides ground presence in Kuwait with Operation Desert
Spring (ODS). This ongoing operation, under the command and control of
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Kuwait, is built around a mechanized
infantry or tank battalion task force, an Apache helicopter company,
and a Multiple Rocket Launch System (MLRS) battery. The units which
rotate on 120-day tours come from both the active and Reserve
components with a deployed strength of just over 2,500 personnel. This
force level has been present in Kuwait since October 1999.
These on-going operations promote stability in this volatile
region, acting as a deterrent to potential crises. However, the
destabilizing influence of Iraq, Iran and failed states such as
Afghanistan and Somalia, require us also to maintain Operational Plans
(OPLANs) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) to respond to a variety of
crises when directed.
Maintaining our ability to meet the command and control
requirements of our OPLANs and CONPLANs is an important mission. This
requirement is particularly significant, as USCENTCOM is responsible
for a major theater warfighting mission in an AOR 7,000 miles away. In
view of this, we have initiated the development of a Deployable Command
Post (CP) that can be introduced into any country in the AOR early and
increase strategic flexibility to respond across the full spectrum of
operations. This CP is being designed to be deployable by air (C-5/C-
17) and modular. Depending on the situation, it can range in size from
the CINC's aircraft with a small operational staff to a full up
headquarters with all the critical command nodes available.
The USCENTCOM Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) provides direction and
a common vision for our ``shaping'' of the security environment.
Through theater engagement planning, we integrate the engagement
activities of U.S. Central Command with those of other U.S. Government
agencies, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations, and our
friends and allies. The TEP draws resources from various agencies to
include the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and
the military services. We are working closely with the Joint Staff to
streamline funding processes and to develop a framework to better align
resources with missions.
TEP engagement activities are divided into eight broad categories,
including operations addressed above. Significant aspects of the
remaining seven engagement categories are summarized below.
Exercises and Combined Training
The Joint and Combined Exercise Program is a key element of our
current National Military Strategy, and is coordinated with other
agencies' regional activities through the Theater Engagement Plan. The
USCENTCOM exercise plan includes 10 major exercises and 80 smaller
exercises for fiscal year 2001. Our aim is to maximize the use of in-
theater forces, increase multilateral exercise and simulation
opportunities, gain the greatest possible training benefit for our
forces, and combine exercises whenever practicable. The program remains
a cornerstone of our mil-to-mil relationships and serves to guarantee
access and enhance coalition capabilities.
In November of 2000, we executed Internal Look 01 (IL01), our
premier battlestaff and coalition training exercise, by establishing a
Contingency Forward Headquarters and simulating the execution of one of
our principal plans. During the remainder of this year, we will execute
several major sub-regional exercises. In May, Eagle Resolve, a senior-
level symposium held in Bahrain, will be our principal mechanism for
advancing the Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) among the GCC
states. In early July, we will execute Regional Cooperation--formerly
known as CENTRASBAT--a multinational peacekeeping command and staff
exercise with various Central Asian, NATO and other Newly Independent
States (NIS) at the Warrior Prep Center in Germany. In late July, we
will execute the Golden Spear symposium in Kenya, bringing together the
Ministers of Defense (MOD), Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) and Foreign
Ministers of 10 East African nations to formulate regional strategies
for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This fall, Bright Star
will culminate our exercise program in Egypt when more than 35
participating or observing nations and approximately 65,000 personnel
take part in a coalition field training exercise.
Combined Education and International Military Education and Training
(IMET)
The Combined Education and IMET programs are pivotal to sustaining
U.S.--host nation bilateral military relationships. These programs are
relatively low cost, high value investments that support U.S. national
interests and help shape the security environment for the future. The
programs afford military members of regional states, many of whom are
destined to become senior leaders in their respective countries,
opportunities to attend courses in our military institutions such as
Command and Staff Colleges and Senior Service Schools. Combined
Education and IMET support congressionally-mandated democratization
initiatives by exposing regional military officers to the concepts of
military professionalism, respect for human rights, and civilian
control. Some 540 students from our AOR will attend U.S. military
courses, schools, colleges, and training this year.
Security Assistance
In coordination with our ambassadors and country teams, we manage
security assistance programs to help the countries in the AOR improve
their military capabilities and interoperability. Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) in the Central Region have accounted for a significant
portion of America's worldwide sales--38 percent from 1990 through
1999--while our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs have allowed
us to assist AOR countries in meeting their legitimate self-defense
needs and improving interoperability with U.S. forces.
In the aftermath of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, a
primary emphasis of countries in the region, particularly the countries
of the Persian Gulf, was modernization of their armed forces through
FMS and Direct Commercial Sales of U.S.-built equipment. Saudi Arabia
is the largest FMS customer in the world, accounting for over $83
billion in FMS thru fiscal year 2000. Combined with the other countries
of the GCC, the total for this sub-region is over $94 billion through
fiscal year 2000.
Two significant security assistance highlights of this past year
include:

In March 2000, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a
$6.4 billion commercial contract with Lockheed-Martin to
purchase 80 F-16 Block 60 aircraft. Associated with this
commercial sale is a projected $1.6 billion in FMS. FMS cases
will include program support, pilot and maintenance training,
and F-16 munitions, which include AMRAAM, AIM-9, HARM, Maverick
and Harpoon missiles. Though the F-16 purchase was a Direct
Commercial Sale, U.S. Government and industry worked closely
together to bring this to fruition. As a result, the sale is a
step toward enhanced strategic partnership.
Similarly, the sale of ATACMS missiles to the
Government of Bahrain was finalized on 15 December 2000, as the
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) continues to place emphasis on
equipping and training their land and air forces with U.S.
resources and making them more capable contributors to Gulf
collective security.
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
HA programs provide basic economic and social benefits for the
civilian populations of developing countries in the region. These
activities, in concert with a variety of State Department programs,
focus on developing indigenous disaster response capabilities. We
expect in the coming year to complete projects that include rudimentary
construction and water well drilling, disaster preparedness
assessments, transportation of DOD excess non-lethal property, and
various other medical, dental, and veterinary projects in seven
countries.
Humanitarian Demining (HD)
USCENTCOM currently provides HD training to Yemen, Oman, Djibouti,
and Jordan. The purpose of this program is to train host nation
military and civilian personnel in demining operations, with the
ultimate goal of establishing local, self-sustaining capabilities. U.S.
led demining training efforts have helped several countries to develop
significant capabilities. Jordan, for example, is developing a regional
response team that will be able to assist other regional partners in
their own demining efforts--an important step which enhances multi-
lateral relationships.

KEY REQUIREMENTS

During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many
programs. For fiscal year 2002, the President's budget includes funding
to cover our most pressing priorities. I should note, however, that the
programs I will discuss and the associated funding levels may change as
a result of the Secretary's strategy review which will guide future
decisions on military spending. The administration will determine final
2002 and outyear funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask
that you consider my comments in that light.
USCENTCOM priority requirements are as follows:
Strategic Lift
With few permanently-stationed forces in the region, our vitally
important power projection capability depends upon strategic lift and
robust land and sea-based prepositioned assets. Our ability to deploy
forces and equipment quickly remains the linchpin for conducting rapid
response to contingencies in USCENTCOM's AOR. We must continue
modernization and maintenance of our strategic deployment triad:
airlift, sealift, and prepositioning.
The accelerated retirement of the C-141 fleet and the significant
challenges of maintaining readiness levels of the C-5 fleet make
continued production of the C-17, progress toward C-5 modernization,
and support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program critical to meet
major theater war deployment timelines. Our requirements for strategic
airlift combined with intratheater airlift are addressed in Mobility
Requirements Study 05, which we support.
The procurement of Large, Medium Speed Roll-on Roll-off (LMSR)
ships is on track and will significantly enhance our lift capability.
Under the current procurement plan, we will meet our force and
sustainment deployment timelines with these LMSRs and Ready Reserve
Fleet (RRF) assets by the end of fiscal year 2003.
Prepositioning in the region, the third leg of the strategic
deployment triad, helps mitigate our time-distance dilemma, ensures
access, demonstrates our commitment to the region, and facilitates
sustainment of forces until the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are
established. I will expand on this later.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C\4\I)
USCENTCOM is responsible for executing a major theater war (MTW)
plan without a headquarters located physically within the geographic
AOR. As mentioned above, USCENTCOM requires a deployable command and
control headquarters that provides the necessary flexibility to direct
operations throughout the AOR during a crisis or armed conflict with
assured 24-hour communications to the National Command Authorities
(NCA), other Combatant Commands, the Services, USCENTCOM staff, our
Component Commands, and deployed forces. We request the committee
support our initiative to build this capability as provided for in our
current funding plan.
Additionally, the strategic environment in our AOR mandates a
capable and reliable C\4\I infrastructure. The C\4\I infrastructure in
place today is a mix of legacy equipment and modern components that
have been assembled ad hoc as a contingency system. Intelligence,
operations, and support systems increasingly rely on assured
communications bandwidth. USCENTCOM must have a robust C\4\I
infrastructure that supports these warfighting requirements. We will
bring robust tactical communication systems into the AOR in wartime,
but we need a joint theater C\4\I infrastructure to plug them into, one
that takes advantage of fiberoptic cable and commercial satellite
services that are now available in the Gulf states. Forces must
maintain the ability to rapidly deploy to the theater, immediately
access, and operate within our communications infrastructure and the
global networks. Investing in our theater infrastructure will give us
the tools we need to operate across the full spectrum.
Full Dimensional Protection
USCENTCOM focuses on full dimensional protection for forces and
facilities around the clock. Protection begins with timely, high
confidence early warning of terrorist planning and targeting. Recent
intelligence community efforts to improve performance in this area
through improved analysis and information sharing are steps in the
right direction, but more needs to be done. We need a dedicated, long-
term effort with access to all terrorist-related information, both
intelligence and law enforcement, leveraged by state-of-the-art
information technology tools, to get in front of the next attack.
Timely warning will generate defensive and offensive options that we do
not currently have. I view this as our most important initiative to
protect forces and facilities. We must concurrently ensure that we are
effectively postured in the event timely warning does not come.
Improvements are needed in our ability to identify friend or foe (IFF),
create standoff, and counter the delivery of explosives (direct or
indirect) used against component forces and facilities. Approximately
81 percent of USCENTCOM's funding for military construction projects is
directed toward force protection requirements. I expect our funding
requirements to increase in the near future as we finalize ongoing
vulnerability assessments and increase our emphasis on elimination of
force protection construction waivers.
Successful execution of USCENTCOM OPLANs/CONPLANs also requires the
capability to detect and characterize chemical, biological,
radiological or potentially hazardous elements, as well as the ability
to decontaminate fixed sites and provide collective protective measures
in order to build and sustain forces within the AOR. We intend to
retrofit existing structures and incorporate chemical/biological
hardening into all new construction.
Finally, integrated theater air and missile defense will remain a
priority to provide robust and responsive defense of theater forces and
critical assets against the full range of enemy Theater Ballistic
Missiles (TBMs) and cruise missiles.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
We have made progress in bringing shared situational awareness to
our components and regional partners, but still have more work to do.
USCENTCOM has teamed with national intelligence agencies, other
Combatant Commands and components to devise a DOD-wide interoperability
strategy employing a common set of analytical tools and security
safeguards that will allow us to rapidly share information at multiple
security levels and across echelons. USCENTCOM currently serves as the
``warfighter proving ground'' for several interoperability evaluations,
having invested some $3 million in this effort in concert with the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Battle Center, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for C\3\I, and others.
Synchronizing U.S. and coalition operations via a secure shared
network is an essential USCENTCOM interoperability initiative. Our
concept begins with hardware/software installations for the six GCC
states plus Egypt and Jordan, to provide our partners with near-real
time threat data and releasable operational information to support our
contingency plans. While intelligence community and Commander in Chief
(CINC) Initiative Funds have enabled us to make some initial progress,
we will need congressional support to operationalize this capability as
provided for in our current funding plan.
Theater airborne ISR remains a critical enabler for effective
regional indications and warning. Shortfalls in our current
capabilities jeopardize our ability to obtain the warning necessary to
execute our OPLANs. Solutions lie in fielding additional modernized
airborne reconnaissance systems and next-generation long-dwell unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms. Such assets are necessary to fill early
warning and mobile target collection gaps and provide a surge
capability in the event of crisis.
The health and status of national systems is also of concern to
USCENTCOM. A robust national imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement
and signature intelligence (MASINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT)
systems architecture is essential to providing indications and warning
and situational awareness to all echelons of command. We will continue
to rely on these systems in tandem with the direct threat warning
provided by our theater ISR assets. The current mix of platforms and
sensors does not provide the full range of collection required for
comprehensive threat warning and support to fast-paced combat
operations. Continued congressional support for existing and planned
national sensor platforms and upgrades, as provided for in our current
out-year funding plan, is essential.
MASINT provides key indications and warning, theater ballistic
missile warning and battle damage assessment. However, the current lack
of operational sensors and a formal architecture significantly reduces
MASINT's ability to support military operations. MASINT has great
potential and can provide tremendous support to the warfighter. Your
continued support is needed for existing and planned operational
sensors and associated architectures to make the system more capable.
It is also essential that we maintain a robust tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) architecture. This remains a
daunting challenge, as current limitations impede our ability to
process, exploit and disseminate large imagery files and move this
critical data through the ``last tactical mile'' to our components and
their supporting units.
Active duty intelligence personnel manning and systems support also
remain challenges at USCENTCOM, given our high operating tempo. That
said, our Reserve program is thriving. Reserve personnel have been
integrated across all functional lines including systems,
counterterrorism, analysis, imagery, targeting, and battle damage
assessment. We would be unable to accomplish our missions and meet
emerging requirements without this Reserve component contribution.
Working with Regional Forces
As I discussed earlier, key elements of our current national
strategy include ensuring continued access for U.S. forces and
enhancing the ability of regional states to provide for their own
security in concert with us and with each other. To meet these
objectives, USCENTCOM has developed a program that includes operations,
exercises, security assistance, education, humanitarian demining, and
military-to-military contacts.
With few permanently-stationed forces in the AOR, a strong mil-to-
mil program provides access to our friends and allies. Our engagement
program provides not only training to our forces and those of our
partners, it also provides an outstanding example of a successful,
professional, and apolitical military to nations striving to build
their own military traditions. Military-to-military interaction
engenders trust and confidence and ultimately translates to greater
security for our people. Our combined commitment to aligning resources
with these programs will ensure success in achieving our national
objectives.
Prepositioning and Forward Presence
Prepositioning in our AOR is the third leg of our strategic
deployment triad. The Navy and Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning
Force (MPF) program, comprised of Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadrons
(MPSRONS) 1, 2, and 3, maintains a high materiel readiness rate. It
will become more robust when the MPF Enhancement (MPF(E)) Program,
scheduled for completion in March 2002, is fully fielded. Each MPSRON
will gain a fleet hospital, a Navy mobile construction battalion, an
expeditionary airfield, and additional warfighting equipment. The
MPSRON-1 Enhancement ship is already on station.
The Army's prepositioning program, with a goal of placing a heavy
division of equipment in the region, is advancing on schedule. The
brigade set in Kuwait maintains high operational readiness and is
exercised regularly. The prepositioned site in Qatar (Camp As Saliyah)
houses the second brigade set and a division base set estimated to be
completed before the end of fiscal year 2003. The afloat combat
brigade, APS-3, is complete, and combat ready, and a second afloat
brigade is planned to augment APS-3 with an equipment fill of 83
percent of requirement in the near term. The Army is evaluating other
actions which could lead to a fill of 92 percent of requirement.
The Air Force Harvest Falcon bare-based materiel program is also a
vital asset to meet our requirements, as these assets support the
generation of Air Force combat sorties in the early stages of
contingencies. Having these sets positioned in the AOR lets us avoid
diverting critical strategic lift assets at the start of a conflict to
the movement of bare-base materials, thereby delaying the arrival of
warfighting elements. Currently, our on hand Harvest Falcon assets are
45 percent mission capable.
Transformation
Our ability to shape the environment and influence the battlespace
is linked to transformation efforts by the Services and members of the
joint team. In particular, USCENTCOM supports the development of the
doctrine, organization, and training that will enable joint, combined
operations in the multinational setting. We support further development
of a process for integrating coalition members into our transformation
efforts.
Across the board, USCENTCOM endorses Service efforts aimed at
transformation of existing force structures to modernized, versatile,
full spectrum forces. Of special importance to USCENTCOM is Army
transformation, which will provide required adaptive, lethal, and
survivable forces responsive to the diverse operating continuum in our
AOR.
Quality of Life
Finally, the requirements identified above mean little without our
most important resource, people. An essential component of force
readiness is continued emphasis on improving the quality of life for
service members and their families. I applaud the leadership shown by
Congress with passage of the ``TRICARE For Life'' program for retirees
and family members. I ask for your continued support to the Defense
Health Program as we fully realize the ``TRICARE promise'' for our
personnel and families stationed overseas and in remote locations.
``Taking care of our own'' through medical, pay, and other entitlement
programs provides the Services a set of powerful recruitment and
retention tools.

CONCLUSION

In the near-term, Saddam Hussein will continue to challenge our
resolve as we rebuild and strengthen the Gulf coalition. In the long-
term, Iran's moves toward regional hegemony could be of greater
concern. The Central Region is as dynamic as it is volatile. Weapons of
mass destruction, state-to-state conflict, terrorism, and general
instability will continue to place special demands on our people and on
our ingenuity.
Interaction and cooperation with regional militaries will remain a
vital ingredient in enhancing stability and security in this AOR. This
interaction equals access and goes a long way toward building trust and
confidence with our friends and allies. Our presence strengthens
relations with our hosts and improves our ability to protect ourselves
by eliminating suspicion, demystifying intent, opening the door to
communication, and denying the closed environment in which terrorists
thrive.
The volatility of our region requires that USCENTCOM remain
adaptable and agile. Without a large footprint in the region, we must
be truly ``deployable.'' Responsive command, control, and
communications during peace, crisis, and conflict will remain key to
our ability to accomplish the mission. We have the finest soldiers,
sailors, airmen, coast guardsmen, and marines in the world. Your
steadfast, superb and visible support has made it so and you can count
on them to do all we ask of them--and more.

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Ralston, I am going to pick up on your last
presentation about the need for the military construction in
your area. I think that is a very important issue. It does not
have the drama of conflict and all of the other things that
come to the attention of people through media and otherwise,
but it is just as important to give your troops the basic
requirements of a quality of life which they deserve,
commensurate with the onerous burdens of picking up here in the
United States, moving overseas and adapting to the local
economy. Often it is difficult for the wife to engage in other
activities and care for the family if the income level of the
family requires her to work.
You and I understand those things through long years, and I
am going to very much participate in trying to give you this
support, but I have to tell you that that is but one part of
the overall concern here in Congress of the United States, and
certainly with this Senator on this committee. Another area of
concern is a drifting attitude that I see with respect to NATO,
brought along by this European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP).
Yesterday, our committee had the pleasure of receiving the
British Secretary of State for Defence, and we had a long
discussion with him on that subject. I will speak for myself
for the moment--there is a concern about further augmentation
of U.S. spending and so forth with regard to NATO.
Now, it may well be that we will have to do this by
necessity, because the evolution of this new concept in NATO is
going to take a long time. This is an emergency situation that
has to be addressed, but I would be less than candid if I did
not point out my concern, and I think of others, about this
situation.
I remember when I first came to the Senate some 23 years
ago, the then-Majority Leader of the Senate, or he had just
stepped down, he had an amendment, the Mansfield amendment, to
bring our troops out of NATO. In the early years in my Senate
career, time and time again we had to go to the floor of the
Senate to gain the support of the whole Senate to do an orderly
withdrawal of our forces, and not a precipitous one.
I am not suggesting that that is going to happen here
tomorrow, but nevertheless, that is a part of Senate history,
and it could be brought up in an orderly way. Yesterday with
the visit of our British colleague, one of our colleagues
brought up the question of whether or not U.S. force levels in
Europe need to be kept at the 100,000 figure that you
mentioned, in view of the desire for this initiative within
NATO. I think it is important to get this into the record every
time we have the opportunity, through your appearance and
others.
General Ralston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me give a
little bit of background on the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) and ESDP that we talk about. For years, we as
Americans have asked the Europeans to do more to carry their
own security, so I would like to be supportive of anything that
improves the security posture of our European nations, and so
therefore I want to be supportive of ESDI with the caveat that
it should be done in a way that does not detract from the NATO
alliance.
Now, I think there is a way to do this. Let me give you
what I think is the right way ahead, and then I will come back
and talk about some of the downsides if we do not do that.
There are four nations, Mr. Chairman, that are in the
European Union that are not in NATO: Finland, Sweden, Austria,
and Ireland. I think the proper way to do this is to bring
those four nations' military planners to Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters, where we have the 19
NATO nations there, and in terms of operational planning,
military planners will do what military planners always do.
They will come up with military options. We will have option A,
and option A will have a certain set of forces, and a certain
risk factor, and a certain chance of success, and option B will
have a different set of forces, and a different risk, and
different chances of success, and option C, and once those
options are designed, then they can be provided simultaneously
to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Council.
Now, the two political bodies will have the same set of
plans, the same set of facts, and the two political bodies can
then deliberate as to who should do this operation, should this
be a NATO operation, or should it be a European Union
operation, and the United States will be well-represented in
that debate as it sits around the table in Brussels.
Now, my concern is if we do not do it the way I have
outlined, and instead the European Union sets up their own
planning mechanism over here, that has three major downsides.
First, it is wasteful of resources. The last thing that the
European nations need to be doing is spending money on more
jobs for generals in headquarters in Paris. That is money that
needs to be going into the battalions and the squadrons and the
ships, not in more headquarters.
Second, if we do not do the planning the way I said, then
the European Union will come up with options 1, 2, and 3, NATO
will have A, B, and C, and when it gets to the two political
bodies, there will be more confusion than normal in times of
crisis. We do not need that.
Third, the European Union, if they pick battalion X that
they want on their operation, how do they know that battalion X
is not assigned to a NATO plan, and a NATO operation?
So if we do it the way that I said, where we bring the
European Union planners that are not already part of NATO,
those four nations to SHAPE, I think this can be well-managed,
and I think it can, in fact, be an improvement, but we do not
have those details ironed out yet, and that is something I am
very concerned about. It is something that we need to keep
pushing on, and I think we need to do it in the next few months
to get that tied down the way that it should be.
Chairman Warner. I thank you. So it is in the next few
months that we will get some clarity to this situation.
General Ralston. That is certainly my hope.
Chairman Warner. I want to address an article which
appeared on March 21 in the London Daily Telegraph, and I will
give you a copy of it. Would you quickly pick up on the point
they are trying to raise here. I think this record today should
incorporate your testimony to strongly refute the principle
they are trying to advocate.
``NATO's attempt to quell the growing conflict in the
Balkans is being hampered by Americans' reluctance to risk
casualties, alliance officials said yesterday.'' Now, that is
attributing it to alliance officials, who I presume would be
persons who work in the same command structure that you are
working in, if there is credibility to this.
The problem is not discussed openly, but British officers
speak of ``body bag syndrome,'' as the major brake on NATO
operations to stop infiltrations of Albanian extremists from
Kosovo into Serbia and Macedonia.
The U.S. forces may be highly motivated by fighters and
superbly equipped, but there is frustration with the perception
that American commanders are under the intense political
pressure not to shed soldiers' blood. ``The body bag syndrome
is a real problem now, said a senior European officer. It is
not that the American soldier doesn't want to fight. The
politicians won't let him.''
The issue has become urgent, since ethnic Albanian rebels
began to infiltrate both Yugoslavia and Macedonia late last
year, using the American sector of Kosovo as a base of
operations.
Now, certainly, whether we are military field commanders
like yourself, or those of us here at home in Congress, we have
foremost in our mind the safety of our military in the
forefronts of the world, and the same may be said of this
article about your AOR, General Franks, but the Kosovo war was
fought in a unique way, unprecedented with almost total
dependence on air, as opposed to any ground elements. The
planners devised that and essentially brought about the
cessation of hostilities in that region, and I think it was a
successful operation. That is my personal opinion.
We were very proud of the fact that the performance of our
military, under the command of the leadership of their senior
officers, performed this mission with a minimum of casualties.
Clearly it is my perception that our military is willing to
accept the risks for which they chose this profession, and that
they will follow the orders of the Commander in Chief, our
President. Congress does not issue any orders, but we are very
vocal, and a very important co-equal partner of the
infrastructure supporting our troops, but I do not know that
anything has emanated from Congress that would give rise to the
accusation in this article.
I know of no commands or orders given by the senior
military commanders that give rise to it. To the contrary, I
feel that our forward-deployed troops will accept those risks
professionally associated with their mission, and if it results
in casualties, it is highly regrettable, but that from time
immemorial has been the role of those in uniform.
Now, I would like to have your comment. I presume your
views coincide with mine, but this is a fairly serious
indictment that was raised in the British press, particularly
at a time when we see requests coming in for additional troops.
I think it is important that you speak out with clarity on this
article, because while you may not be familiar with this
article, you have heard this accusation before.
General Ralston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did read the
article, and I will tell you that I take strong exception to
the sentiments expressed in that article. Soldiers that are in
Kosovo today that are on the border are doing, in my judgment,
a magnificent job.
Chairman Warner. Incidentally, Senator Stevens and I and
others were there just 3 weeks ago. We were on that very border
where the fighting is taking place in the valley with you and
our troops.
General Ralston. Yes, sir, and Mr. Chairman, I very much
appreciate the fact that so many members of the Senate took the
time to go and look at that, and you saw those magnificent
young soldiers up there. They were not afraid of anything, they
were there to do their job.
Just a couple of weeks ago, on the Macedonian border, we
had a case where an American patrol was there. They were
threatened by armed extremists, and they shot two of them. They
followed the rules of engagement exactly as they should have,
and they did that, but that is a risk that they take every
night and every day. It could have been that the Albanian
extremist fired the first shot, and shot our people. As it was,
they protected themselves. They did the right thing.
So I would take strong exception to the sentiments
expressed in that article. Our people are there. We do not
expect them to go do things that are irresponsible. There were
some minefields on that border. When you are operating in
minefields, you have to do that very carefully, and so we are
going to make sure that our people are protected to the best
extent that they can be, but they will willingly accept that
risk, we will accept that risk, in order to carry out the
mission.
Chairman Warner. As commander, you are not asking of other
military units to take any greater degree of risks than being
assumed by our own troops.
General Ralston. That is exactly right.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Yes, General Franks.
General Franks. If I might add to the same point, I also
read the article, and I also take exception to it. It brings to
my mind several things, not the least of which is a letter
which I received from an Australian officer after last week's
training accident in Kuwait.
I published it on our web site for everyone to see, wherein
the Australian officer talked about the sense of pride that he
had had when he had been a member of that coalition force
standing in Kuwait, had had the opportunity to work with
coalition people, U.K., his own, New Zealand, Kuwaitis, a
variety of other Gulf States, as in fact they had gone about
their business, whether it be training, or whether it would be
maritime intercept operations, or whether, in fact, it be
Operation Southern Watch, where these young people fly in
harm's way every day.
I have not, sir, and I do not expect to see any reluctance
whatsoever in the will of these young people from across the
coalition wherein all of us serve to do what they are asked to
do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my
welcome. I am sorry I was late. I was on the Senate floor. I
have had a chance to chat frequently with both our witnesses
and congratulate them on the terrific job that they and the
forces under their command are doing.
First, I want to talk to each of you about the no-fly
zones. Each of you have a no-fly zone under your command, I
believe. It is a very frustrating engagement, I think. So the
question is whether or not flyers are at risk. From time to
time when threatened they act to remove the threat, as they
should. We are spending a tremendous amount of effort and money
to maintain these no-fly zones.
At the same time, we are told that the sanctioned regime is
gradually becoming weaker. I guess my question for each of
you--because one of you has the northern no-fly zone and one of
you has the southern--is whether or not you see any daylight in
terms of accomplishing a mission of removal, either through
those no-fly zones, which obviously you have a different
mission, or through some other means, removing the regime. If
not, whether or not you believe that the maintenance of those
no-fly zones is really accomplishing a useful purpose.
Are we satisfied that, for instance, Saddam is not building
up his forces on the ground in those no-fly zones? Do you feel
that they are accomplishing their limited mission? Is it worth
the risk, in your judgment, to our flyers to maintain those no-
fly zones? Is it also worth the cost?
Now, I know there are a lot of policy questions wrapped up
into that, but I would like to get your judgment on this as
professionals.
General Ralston. OK, let me go first.
You are right, Senator Levin, there are a lot of policy
issues there, and what I try to do is to make sure that I can
articulate as best I can to the Joint Staff, to the Secretary
of Defense, and to the administration, not whether we should or
should not be doing this, but what the military consequences
are of doing it.
Once again, as I said at the beginning, there is a risk
that every time our pilots enter Iraq to enforce that no-fly
zone, they willingly accept. We are, in fact, doing I think a
very credible job of enforcing the no-fly zone, and do believe
that it has a deterrent effect in terms of what the Iraqi
military does, either to move in the north against the Kurdish
citizens that are there, and I will let General Franks talk
about the southern part.
As the administration reviews their policy, only the
President can ultimately make the decision as to whether the
risk and whether the cost in terms of resources is worth what
comes out on the positive side, and so I am not going to try to
make a judgment here today. The administration is reviewing
that, and what we are doing on the military side is carrying
out whatever that policy happens to be.
I do believe we have a responsibility to tell them, as I
have told you this morning, what those risks are in terms of
the chances of an American airman being downed over Iraq, but
ultimately that has to be a policy decision.
Senator Levin. General Franks.
General Franks. Mr. Chairman, I would add to the comments
of General Ralston by saying, my direct experience with the
southern no-fly zone goes back about 4 years in the immediate
past, 8 or 9 months in Central Command, and several years as
the Army component commander before that, having supported
Operation Southern Watch, and having observed the maritime
interception operations.
I agree with the observations that General Ralston made.
That said, this is not a without-cost enterprise--both
monetarily and in terms of the way we put our people at risk as
we enforce this no-fly zone.
As this committee knows, some 153,000 times our pilots have
been in the southern no-fly zone, 153,000 times since 1992. If
you go back just the past 12 months, we have put our young
pilots and support crews in the southern no-fly zone 10,000
times. We have had more than 500 occasions where our people
have either been illuminated by radars, or engaged by surface-
to-air missiles, or engaged by antiaircraft artillery fire.
Senator Levin. Over what period of time was that?
General Franks. Over the past year, sir.
As I look at what has been accomplished, I look at the
reason we engaged in these no-fly zone enforcement processes in
the first place, and I am reminded of the Security Council
resolutions which came about at the end of the Gulf War,
provisions of which the Iraqi regime has not yet complied with.
I look at occasions where the regime has threatened the
Kurds in the north, Saddam's own people, the Shia in the south,
his own people, and as recently as 7 years ago, massed large
Republican Guard formations down in the vicinity of Kuwait
again, in violation of the resolutions that came about at the
end of the Gulf War.
So, sir, as I look at what we have done, placing our troops
in harm's way, I have to believe that the containment of the
regime has had some positive effect.
I will defer to the policy team, the State Department,
Secretary Rumsfeld, Dr. Rice, the President, the Vice
President, to review the risk-gain analysis with respect to our
current policy. I believe, as General Ralston said, that
process is ongoing. I have high confidence in that process, and
I have had the opportunity to inform that process. I believe
that a quality policy will emerge from it, and I believe that
that policy will address the pillars upon which we should stand
as we look back at the reasons why we are involved in this key
region of the world.
Senator Levin. Just one followup question, and then I will
be done on this particular subject. This is on a very directly-
related matter. Secretary Powell stated that the rules had been
changed to enable a more effective response to Iraqi activities
to develop weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them.
Can either of you shed some light on the comment of
Secretary Powell about rules being changed so we can more
effectively respond to the efforts of Saddam to develop those
weapons?
General Franks. Senator Levin, I cannot talk directly to
Secretary Powell's comment. I can tell you that the policy
review that is ongoing is, in fact, reviewing what we have
heretofore called the red line associated with weapons of mass
destruction, and the means to deliver them along with the other
issues that we have included in the policy in the past, and
beyond that I am not sure how to comment.
Senator Levin. You do not know about a change of rules yet?
General Franks. No, Senator.
Senator Levin. General Ralston?
General Ralston. No, sir.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, General Franks, General Ralston.
I want to mention three areas that to some extent overlap
both of your commands that are very troubling to me, and I
think to the region, if you could just comment briefly on them.
First, there are reports that Russia has agreed to supply
some $7 billion worth of weapons to Iran over the next few
years, specifically three kilo-class submarines that, to my
knowledge, are the only submarines owned by a Gulf country. We
also know that Iran is now interested in the SU-25 fighter
aircraft, which, of course, would close the air power gap
between Iran and its Gulf neighbors.
Second, there are reports that the Chinese helped to
upgrade the Iraqi air defense systems, and General Franks, you
just talked quite at length in response to Senator Levin's
question about our pilots in harm's way, so if you would
comment on that point. Third, we received in Congress the
recent report for the first half of 2000 that notes that China
continues to send ``substantial assistance to Pakistan's
missile defense program,'' not only Pakistan, but also Iran and
Libya.
There are some reports saying this proliferation is
continuing despite the previous administration's lifting of
U.S. sanctions against China based on a promise that Beijing
would stop the sales.
So in summary, we are seeing both Russia and China making
decisions that severely impact, I think, not only the
volatility of the region, but the safety of our forces in those
regions.
Let me just go back to each point, and if you would prefer
to take the one in your area, that is fine. Let me go
specifically now to the Chinese helping to upgrade the Iraqi
systems. First of all, is that true?
General Franks. Senator, it is true.
Senator Smith. Second, can you characterize the increase of
that effectiveness and how this might impact our forces as they
go up in the no-fly zone?
General Franks. Senator, I propose in closed session to
give you some greater details, but for the purpose of open
session, I would say that as we consider the threat our pilots
face in the southern no-fly zone, the thing that gives us the
biggest problem is the integrated air defense capability of the
regime.
That integrated air defense capability involves several
factors. One is the command and control ability, that being the
bunkers, the communications and so forth, where the leaders
command and control the air defense operations. Another is the
communications capability, and in this case that involves some
fiber optic cable link, which is the point of your question.
Senator Smith. A Chinese company.
General Franks. Affirmative. Also involved are the weapons
platforms themselves that are involved in the integrated air
defense, and as we look at the threat it is always in our best
interest to assure that it is not possible for the Iraqis to
have early warning, and to have competent target-tracking
radar, and to be able to move signals around southern Iraq
which will cause their weapons platforms to effectively engage
our air frames.
That was the case, and so the part of this that relates
directly to your question about the Chinese is this business of
the communications architecture that supports this integrated
air defense capability, specifically this business of fiber
optics, and it was in that context that I answered your
question. Yes, the Chinese were involved.
Senator Smith. There have been press reports--and if you
choose to go into this in closed session, that is OK--that the
taking out of the Iraqi sites was based on the fact that we
might injure Chinese technicians. Is there any truth to that?
General Franks. Senator, what I will tell you is that that
would never be a reason that would cause us to place our people
in harm's way. I will give you the specifics in closed session,
if I may, but I will tell you that at no time were our airmen
subjected to increased risk as a result of these capabilities
while we did not strike them.
Senator Smith. To the best of your knowledge, was there any
information about what the Chinese were doing in Iraq with
their defenses during the Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) debate?
General Franks. Sir, I cannot answer that question. I do
not know.
Senator Smith. Just let me know when my time has expired,
Mr. Chairman.
We move over to your area, General Ralston, on the arms
proliferation, in terms of assistance to Pakistan, and how that
might impact the relationship between India and Pakistan: What
is your assessment of how that impacts volatility of the
region?
General Ralston. Senator Smith, let me make a comment and
then defer to General Franks. Neither India or Pakistan are in
my AOR----
Senator Smith. I apologize.
General Ralston.--so I am not the expert on that, but from
my previous job as Vice Chairman----
Senator Smith. Libya.
General Ralston. Obviously, Libya is one that I do worry
about. Yes, arms proliferation, weapons of mass destruction is
certainly a topic that is of concern to me in EUCOM, and it is
of concern to NATO. This is one of the issues that we have been
pushing hard in NATO, that the European nations have to
acknowledge the fact that there is a weapons of mass
destruction threat, and that we need to be prepared to counter
that.
Senator Smith. General Franks, if you would just briefly
comment on the India-Pakistan portion.
General Franks. Sir, the comment that I would make would be
that weapons of mass destruction, as General Ralston said, are
obviously of great concern to us, and the proliferation of
technologies associated with that, to include missile
technologies, is a problem for us.
We can talk about the specifics of weapons types and so
forth, if we could, again sir, in closed session, but I will
tell you that proliferation associated with the parties that
you mentioned is, along with other parties, a continuing
concern for us in the Central Region.
Senator Smith. Last point, the Russians and the Chinese
obviously in seemingly isolated ways are impacting both of
these regions, the European Command and Central Command. Do we
have any evidence of coordination of those efforts between the
two countries?
General Franks. Sir, I have no evidence of it.
Senator Smith. General.
General Ralston. Neither do I, Senator.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks, I have been struck by the breadth of our
continuing operation to contain Saddam Hussein. The average
American would probably be surprised to learn that coalition
forces flew 20,000 sorties in the past year to control the no-
fly zone in southern Iraq, and that our forces have been fired
on 500 times with surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft
fire. We should be quite proud of our dedicated forces
participating in these potentially dangerous missions,
stationed for long periods of time far away from home.
You have stated that enforcement of the no-fly zone is
necessary business to assure that Iraq does not threaten its
neighbors and its own people. Since Saddam Hussein appears to
have strengthened his grip on power, the United States and its
coalition partners have no choice but to remain vigilant and
maintain a strong presence in the region.
Would you agree that more needs to be done to keep the
American people informed of the threats posed by Saddam
Hussein, and the importance of maintaining our military
presence in the region?
General Franks. Senator, that is my view, yes.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you. One other question. I share
your concern that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence
could lead moderate Arab governments to distance themselves
from the United States, but as you point out, these states rely
on the U.S. presence in the region to deter intimidation by
Iran and Iraq.
Clearly, the self-interest of these moderate Arab states is
essential in relieving the current tensions, and I believe they
have an important role to play in urging a stop to the current
violence, and a resumption of negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians. What communications have you had with the
leaders of these countries to urge them to play a constructive
role in ending the violence?
General Franks. Senator, with respect to precisely that
point, my interaction with the leaders in our region has not
talked to, has not made suggestion as to what they could do in
order to ease the Palestinian-Israeli problem. What we in
Central Command do is, by way of constant visit and constant
interaction, provide the opportunity for them to inform us of
what they believe the issues to be, which we then work very
closely with not only defense but also----
Senator Carnahan. You are not being proactive in this
respect?
General Franks. In terms of the military side of our
organization, no, ma'am. What we are doing is informing them of
our own policy, assisting with consultations, providing advice
within our own governmental construct, the new policy team, and
taking the results of their ongoing consultations with each of
the leaders out in this region.
Senator Carnahan. General Ralston, I certainly applaud you
for your focus on readiness in the European Command's forces,
and you have stated it is one of your top priorities. Your
testimony, however, includes many examples of cuts in training
exercises throughout the theater.
This brings me to a much broader subject. We are currently
considering a budget that would significantly reduce revenues
to the Government over the next decade, yet we are being asked
to commit to this budget before the Department's review is
completed, and before we have a firm idea of what our military
needs are going to be.
If the anticipated surpluses are not as large as we expect
them to be, there will be calls for restraint in domestic
spending, including defense spending. Do you have any concerns
that, like in the past, the overall budget outlay could
adversely impact our ability to fund important military needs?
General Ralston. Yes, ma'am. First of all, I am not privy
to the budget that will be coming over, so I cannot talk in
detail to what that is. I do not know what is going to be in
there.
What I tried to point out in my statement is a statement of
fact, what has happened in the past. All I can do is outline
for the administration and for Congress what steps we would
have to take in terms of cutting back on exercises, cutting
back on deployments, and cutting back on training if our
operation and maintenance budget is not funded at the proper
level.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I have
been in and out. We have two committee meetings at the same
time.
General Ralston, I do appreciate the fact that you did
single out readiness. It is a crisis, not just in your area but
all over. I chair the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee. We had two hearings, one yesterday and one the
day before. The one yesterday was on facilities, Mr. Chairman,
and we had 14 witnesses from all ranks, and some Reserve and
Guard components, most of them regular services. It is a crisis
throughout here, in the United States, and I heard you mention,
and I am very sensitive to the conditions that you showed us on
your chart in your theater, but also the same thing is
happening here. In fact, 67 percent of our facilities were
rated C-3 or below, and that is all here in the United States.
I applaud you for being concerned with doing something about
that over there. We also must concentrate on doing it over here
at the same time.
You think about the retention problems that we are having
and I do not think there is anything that contributes to that
more than these kinds of deplorable conditions and quality of
life, and so this is a problem.
Now, second, I want to say, I really do appreciate the fact
that you have come out and talked about Africa. During the
whole situation in Kosovo, I was trying to get the point across
that if you would take the countries of Burkina Faso, Sierra
Leone, Cote D'Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Gabon, Rwanda, Burundi,
Kinshasha, Congo-Brazzaville, in just those countries, for
every one person who is ethnically cleansed in Kosovo, there
are 100 persons ethnically cleansed in those West African and
Central African countries.
I applaud you for your interest and for bringing it out,
and letting America know that there is a serious problem there,
and that we are doing what we can to prevent such atrocities.
General Franks, I was down in the Sinai, in that area down
there. Quite often we talk about what is happening to our
readiness as a result of deployment to places like Kosovo and
Bosnia, and I am concerned about that, because from a ground
logistics standpoint, if something should happen in the Persian
Gulf, we would not be able to handle those without, I think,
being totally dependent on Guard and Reserve. I was told that
by the senior officer down there.
But in areas like the Sinai, where we have troops, do you
see any areas where you think that we might be able to reduce
the number of troops for the benefit of an increased readiness?
General Franks. Senator, as you know, and certainly as the
committee knows, Central Command is a bit of an unusual command
in that we really do not have assigned forces, and so the
answer to your question honestly is, yes, sir, weekly and
daily.
We will change our force levels, and they will range
generally between, as I mentioned, 18,500 up to perhaps 25-
26,000, dependent on what particular contingency operation we
may be running at a given point in time, or depending on
whether we have a Marine Expeditionary Unit in our AOR at a
point in time, and so, sir, what we do, literally, is we move
up and down the force levels, depending on what the needs are
in the AOR on a given day.
Senator Inhofe. In the case of the U.S. troops, did they go
through the Vieques training?
General Franks. Vieques, yes, sir, they did.
Senator Inhofe. But was it inert?
General Franks. With inert, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. With inert. What is your feeling about
inert versus live ordnance?
General Franks. Senator, as a matter of fact we also, in
all of our training areas we will use sometimes inert only, and
sometimes a combination of live, in this case Mark-82 bombs, or
inert bombs, and so the preference is to use the live munitions
when we can, and I think that is responsive to your question.
But my experience has been that the other munitions also
provide great training value.
Senator Inhofe. Well, we had a hearing before my
subcommittee 2 days ago on encroachment, and of course Vieques
is the poster child for that kind of a problem.
General Franks. Right.
Senator Inhofe. All of them came forward and said that in
the cases of the Marines, the Expeditionary Units, as well as
the live Navy support fire, and the ability to use our pilots
was absolutely necessary, and it did affect the quality of it.
I want to get your perspective.
General Franks. I agree with that. I think there is a place
for both inert and live. Obviously, the most realistic training
we get is with live munitions.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Now, lastly, right after the U.S.S.
Cole attack occurred, I went over there and tried to determine
what I could from my perspective to determine what happened
there. Every naval officer I talked to said that if they had
had the option of refueling at sea, they would have done it,
and this was without exception.
You cannot say for sure whether it would not have happened,
but it certainly would not have happened in Yemen, and Yemen
was a terrorist code red at that time, and yet there were no
choices.
As you go along from the Mediterranean down through the
Suez and the Red Sea and turn left and go up toward the Persian
Gulf, everything has to refuel someplace. I came back with the
opinion, and it was fortified by every Navy officer that I saw,
that we should have that capacity out there somewhere, when you
turn that corner up to the Arabian Sea.
After that, we went back to a couple of the boneyards and
we found two excellent oilers that could be deployed in a very
short period of time. I am trying to get this done. What would
be your feeling about trying to get some oiler capacity,
refueling at sea capacity in that area?
General Franks. Senator, I will give you a two-part answer.
First off, I would always defer to the CNO, Adm. Vern Clark,
and his determination within a given resource level of what he
thinks is the appropriate mix.
Now, having said that, from an operational perspective,
increased operational flexibility is always good for a
geographical commander, and I would say to you, we keep right
now two U.S. and one U.K. oilers in the region, and we are able
to use those by some repositioning in order to not put our
people in harm's way unnecessarily, as you are aware, Senator,
and also by paying very close attention to march rates against
the global naval force presence policy. Which is to say, if you
provide an extra day here and an extra day there in transit,
then the speeds of transit are reduced and much less fuel is
burned, and so, sir, I would end by saying that a combination
of operational flexibility, and some flexibility in global
naval forces presence, provides to us what we need to have in
the CENTCOM AOR.
Senator Inhofe. Well, yes, and my time has expired, but I
do want to say that I have talked to Admiral Clark about it and
others, but still recognize it gets down to a capacity that we
do not have that we could have fairly inexpensively, so I would
like to ask if you would spend some time talking about this
with Admiral Clark.
General Franks. I will, Senator, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Franks. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I want to thank you. I was going
to follow on that same line of questioning, because as soon as
I heard about that tragic accident on that bombing range, the
first thing that occurred to me was whether or not that
accident could in some way be traced back to what we understand
is a shrinking ability of the Navy to properly train the
deploying units to that region to face the rigors of the combat
in which the aviators, certainly, and to some extent others,
are immediately injected, and you said, of course, the Truman
got the inert training. Was it a full range of inert training,
or was that even curtailed?
General Franks. Sir, I cannot answer the question. I am not
sure what the full breadth of the training they received in
Vieques was, but I know that they were able to do close air
support, and I know that they did use inert munitions as they
did the training.
Chairman Warner. What about the next carrier task force
being deployed? What is the status of that training?
General Franks. That training is not going to be done in
Vieques, as I understand it, from information that I read this
morning.
Chairman Warner. That is my understanding also, so I think,
Senator Inhofe, these are matters which you are going to have
to bear down on in your Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee.
Of course, we are also advised that there are shortfalls in
shipmates on some of these deploying ships. I think it is a
matter that this committee is going to have to look into with
greater intensity.
Do you think in any way that freak accident on the bombing
range could be attributed to the inability of live fire
training? He was off the Truman, was he not?
General Franks. He was off Truman, affirmative.
Mr. Chairman, as you and I discussed yesterday, I do not
want to speculate on it. In terms of, as we pull the thread out
of the ball of yarn and look to see whether we had the right
level of training competencies, I would prefer to hold an
opinion on that.
Chairman Warner. I can fully understand that.
Senator Carnahan, Senator Smith, and others talked about
Iraq--indeed, Senator Levin raised in his opening questions
Iraq, but there is another note of irony about this policy. I
know it affects your military commanders a great deal. I
remember from my own modest experience when I was a ground
officer with a combat operation in Korea, our pilots were
flying missions when the peace talks were taking place at
Panmunjong, and they were saying, why am I taking this risk at
the same time peace talks are taking place.
To some extent, there are no peace talks taking place as
far as I know on Iraq right now. I respectfully urge our
President to convene the coalition of nations that brought
about the cessation of hostilities in 1991 in the Gulf and say,
now, look, if you have a better idea as to how to continue the
containment of Saddam Hussein and limit the proliferation of
his desire to use mass destruction weapons, then tell us what
it is. If you have not got a better idea, then I guess the
United States and Britain are just going to have to carry on as
best we can see, and stop the criticism.
But the other aspect of it is, we are facing an energy
crisis in this Nation, whether it is in the California region,
or we are told that on the east coast we are going to
experience brownouts in the heat of the summer. Therefore we
are looking for all possible sources of energy, and at the same
time we are flying these missions in Iraq we are buying Iraqi
oil to meet our own energy needs. Am I not correct about that,
General Ralston?
General Ralston. Yes, sir, you are correct.
Chairman Warner. You have been in that combat situation as
a young aviator. What does your aviator think about carrying
out a high risk mission of containment at the same time the
United States is buying the oil, as one of our colleagues, in a
very colorful and I think factually correct way said it, we use
that oil? Indirectly some of it could get into the very gas
tank of the airplane flying the mission that bombs Iraq.
How do we deal with that? When you sit down to talk with
them, as I am sure you do, do your young pilots raise that
issue with you?
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Our young aviators that we have
out there are well-educated, bright young men and women.
Chairman Warner. Indeed they are.
General Ralston. They also are very dedicated. If we tell
them this is the mission that they are to go do, then they
salute, and they go do that with great dedication.
What they really need is to make sure that the
administration and Congress and the American people are behind
them. If they believe that, they will do anything that we ask
them to do, and so that is why I think it is appropriate that
the administration go through their policy review, and then
whatever that policy is that comes out the other end, we should
not be in the military the tail wagging the dog on this. We
need a policy, and then tell us what it is, and tell us what
our role is, and we will do that and the young men and women
will respond admirably.
Chairman Warner. Well, that is always the way it has been,
but it has to be in the minds of those aviators that the very
cars back home are using Iraqi petroleum.
General Franks. I think, Mr. Chairman, and I know you are
aware of this, but with this being a public hearing and on the
record, I think my personal view is, the purchase of this
percentage of Iraqi oil is entirely appropriate, because under
the oil-for-food program, under the existing rules for the
purchase of this petroleum, I think that what this does is send
a signal that says that the purpose of our policy is not to
punish the people of Iraq.
The purpose of our policy is to assure that Saddam Hussein
does not have an opportunity to put unencumbered money in his
own pocket for the purpose of building his military
organizations, and for the purpose of reconstituting his
weapons of mass destruction.
So, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say that, because I believe
the young men and women who are involved in Operation Southern
Watch, as well as this maritime intercept operation we have
ongoing, are very much aware of that, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. If we ever experience the misfortune of a
downed aviator, and he is marching or being dragged through the
streets of Baghdad, stand by. I think a lot of the public have
not focused on this. Some of our allies, including Turkey and
Jordan, who are participating in getting some of those hard
dollars into Saddam Hussein's pocket, are very valued allies.
So at the same time we are asking our pilots to put their lives
in danger, our policy in this region is fractured in so many
different ways. The pilot's total dedication does not seem to
me to be matched by the total dedication of those who bear the
burden of trying to resolve this conflict, which has dragged on
for over 10 years.
General Franks. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. General Ralston, this problem that we are
seeing in Macedonia, do you see other areas of the bordering
nations, particularly around Kosovo, experiencing some
destabilization--Montenegro, for example, as a consequence of
their forthcoming elections--in the same way we are seeing in
Macedonia?
General Ralston. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. As you and I
discussed, and as we heard in Greece when we were on our last
trip, this area of the world has long been a clash between
different civilizations, and it all comes to a head around the
Balkans area, so clearly there is the potential for
instability.
One of the issues that I think the committee needs to think
about, the election upcoming in Montenegro on April 22. I think
it is going to be very significant, because it is in large part
going to indicate whether the people of Montenegro want
independence from Yugoslavia. If so, and if that proceeds, then
that will start another series of questions. What about Kosovo?
Should they be independent or not, and what about the Republic
of Srpska in Bosnia, should they be independent or not?
So it is, I think, a pretty profound event, that I know you
are focused on. I am not so sure the American people are
focused on this upcoming election on 22 April in Montenegro.
Chairman Warner. I am glad you raise that, because again,
it comes down to the risks in the deployment of our troops, the
expenditures of this Nation, and it is still a very fragile
situation.
General Franks, missile defense is very much a part of our
initiatives here in Congress and, indeed, certainly our
President. How do you rate Iraq's current ability to employ
ballistic missiles against U.S. forces and/or our allies in
that region?
Saddam Hussein has the authority, under the accords that
were drawn up at the time that that conflict was terminated, to
go ahead with the production of missiles with a range that
presumably only ensured his ability to defend his country. That
same technology can be used to extend the range of those
missiles, in my judgment, in relatively simple ways.
General Franks. Chairman Warner, I agree with exactly what
you just said. We obviously have concern and should be
concerned about missile development that is permitted to go on
under the existing rules which allow for development as long as
a range of 150 kilometers is not exceeded by those weapons. The
issue for us is the possibility of doing solid propellant
investigative work or scientific development of solid
propellants which could perhaps at some point be used in
weapons systems, missiles with much greater range. Sir, I share
your concern.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, I see our colleague,
Senator Nelson has joined us just as I was beginning to ask the
second round, so Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Franks and General Ralston, first of all I want to
commend the 125,000 men and women under your commands, the
125,000 troops in harm's way for being so committed to peace in
the world, and certainly to represent their country so
admirably.
Senator Inhofe, before I arrived, mentioned something about
the deplorable conditions of housing, and I know, General
Ralston, you also made reference to that. Senator Inhofe and I
in a hearing earlier this week received a lot of information
about the inadequate housing situation for our troops. I am
concerned to hear most of the discussion was about here at home
as opposed to in foreign locations, so I hope that we are able
to do something to help correct that. If we want a family-
friendly and a military-friendly environment, housing is
certainly going to have to be part of that.
My question here is, in the wake of the U.S.S. Cole tragedy
as we have experienced concerns about the protection of our
troops in foreign locations, with the ethnic extremism in
Macedonia today, and the enormous border that you police, can
you describe for us the steps that are being taken for security
of our locations in that part of the world?
General Ralston. Senator, if I may, that is an excellent
question, and it is an issue that we spend a lot of time
working, and I must tell you, I am probably more concerned
about other areas than I am our troops that are in Kosovo,
because in Kosovo they are focused on this every day. They are
wearing their flak jackets and their helmets, and they are in
patrols, and we constantly work on that issue. It is not risk-
free, as we have mentioned before, but I think they do a good
job on that.
Sometimes we forget that our forces that are living in
England and in Germany and in Italy are far more vulnerable to
a terrorist act than we would like to think about. We have had
to go through several actions in the past couple of months in
the U.K. and in Germany and in Italy and in Turkey, and I could
go on and on, Belgium, no place is immune from potential
terrorist acts. The bigger challenge is, these places that for
many years have been considered very safe places, it is like
living in Virginia or Maryland, and all of a sudden we find
that is not true, so how do you keep the people focused on
that, and how do you make sure that you can deal with the
resource implications here?
In other words, if we were going to put the same level of
security around our installations in Germany or in England as
we are doing in Kosovo today, that is an enormous bill, and
there are issues with host nation countries. How are we going
to be able to do that?
So I know General Franks spends a great deal of time on
this, as we both do, looking at all of the various airfields
and all of the various ports that we have where our airplanes
fly into and our ships go to refuel, so it is an enormously
difficult issue. We try to work it with good intelligence.
It is less than perfect intelligence. I know that I
probably get 15 messages a day from the intelligence community
that say something is about to blow up in Europe. That is 450 a
month, and you cannot disregard them. You have to look at every
one of them, do the very best you can to say, is this real, or
is this a false report, and how do you keep all the people down
the line in the squadrons and in the battalions who get these
same messages, how do you keep them focused that this is not
somebody crying wolf?
I do not have a solution to that. I am not complaining
about it, but I am trying to at least make people be aware of
what we are trying to deal with on a day-to-day basis.
General Franks. Senator, if I could add to the same thing,
I think one of the points General Ralston just made is a very
important point, that point having to do with the specificity
of intelligence.
As we looked at the U.S.S. Cole attack, and as we thought
our way through ways and places where we can close seams and
provide better force protection for our people, I actually
directed a bit of an inquiry into the issue of threat
information received. Senator, I will tell you that in the 12
months that preceded U.S.S. Cole, our headquarters received
127,000 messages that indicated, as General Ralston mentioned,
that there was the potential for difficulty associated with our
forces in this region.
To increase the specificity of this information, I will add
to what General Ralston said, which is very important to us as
we move through time. The business of bringing together
agencies, improving our human intelligence capability,
improving our ability to analyze the information we have, in my
personal view, is a first major step, which our Defense
Department is undertaking now, to move us in the direction of
providing better force protection.
Now, sir, knowing that that is not precisely the intent of
your question, I will talk a little bit about the military
construction that we have going on in our area. We have more
than 20 projects underway, and the chairman would remember when
General Tony Zinni, my predecessor, came before the committee
after the U.S.S. Cole, at the chairman's request and at the
request of Senator Levin. General Zinni talked about waivers
for force protection, and we have, in fact, about 20 of those
associated projects across our area of responsibility,
associated in some cases with the stand-off that we are able to
provide from our installations and so forth.
So we have worked very hard, and the work did not begin
with the U.S.S. Cole, and it did not begin with me. It has been
ongoing for several years, to work our way through these places
where we perceive that we have a problem. If you look at the
money involved in this over the next 5 or 6 years, with the
help from this committee, as well as from the other body, we
have put about $150 million to this task.
Now, interestingly, the host nations where we keep our
forces, as the chairman rightly pointed out, in harm's way,
have put about $350 million to this task. So it is this work
that I believe we need to continue over time that talks to
quality of life, certainly, but force protection is a major
piece of our quality of life effort.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, General
Ralston, about your comments on Montenegro. It seems to me from
what I know of the history of Montenegro, Kosovo and Republika
Srpska, and the other pieces of the Balkan puzzle, that we
should differentiate between Montenegro and some of the other
very complex areas.
It was independent for many years, so it has a history, or
had a history of independence. Its vote is coming up. It will
probably be a close vote, but nonetheless it will be a
democratic vote. I think we should, number one, in light of its
history of independence and in light of the fact that it may,
in fact, opt for independence, or some variety thereof in the
near future, that it may not be wise for us to suggest that
there would be an unraveling in Kosovo or Republika Srpska or
other areas should that event occur.
I am not an expert. I am far from it, on that history. But
just from what I do know about it, I would simply say I think
we should be a little cautious at least about kind of lumping
some areas which have some different histories into one general
commentary.
I will leave it at that. I more than welcome your comment
on it, though.
General Ralston. Senator Levin, I think you are exactly
right, and I did not intend to imply a value judgment on the
outcome of that vote. That is for the people of Montenegro and
the people of the FRY to decide. I was merely trying to make
the point that those issues will be in the debate. Whether they
should or should not, I agree. I am not trying to make a value
judgment on what it should be, but it will start a debate on
those issues, was my point.
Senator Levin. But to help us in the debate, I think it
would be probably useful to at least incorporate the fact that
there are some differences in the histories of the areas. I am
going to start doing some historical reading myself. I am
really talking to myself more than to you, I think. I think it
is important that we have at least the beginning of that
historical background. I am again going to gain that for
myself, in the event that that is what the people of Montenegro
opt for.
On Macedonia, we have a very complicated situation there,
General Ralston. We have the Albanian extremists, the rebels
there who seem to have burst on the scene fairly quickly. I
think there probably was plenty of advanced warning of what was
happening. Nonetheless, from kind of a press perspective, or
our perspective, it seems to have come quite suddenly.
In the Presevo Valley we have had a lot of attention
focused on that problem, but now we have allowed the Yugoslav
Army to enter a small area in that valley--apparently a 3-mile-
wide ground safety zone on the border of Kosovo and Macedonia;
agreed in principle to the entry of that army into a larger
ground safety zone area; and then there's the question of what
the limitations are on their presence, both the army and the
special police, both in that narrower area into which they have
been allowed, and into the border area.
Basically, if you could give us a thumbnail sketch as to
how the situation is unfolding, what the dangers are, and how
you see us responding to those dangers.
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Let me ask for the chart. Put
the chart up with the ground security zone on it.

While they are doing that, this ground security zone is a
5-kilometer-wide ribbon, if you will, that goes around Kosovo.
You can use that one, if they can see the green on it. The
red probably shows up. The red area there is the ground
security zone that goes around Kosovo, and as I say, this was
instituted back in June 1999 as part of an agreement with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, and what it is, it was
for the force protection of the KFOR forces.
We did not want the then-FRY army bringing their tanks and
their artillery and putting it right up on the border where
they could threaten the KFOR forces with no warning, so we
said, you cannot have heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, VJ army
forces in that 5-kilometer-wide zone.
Now, as we have gone through the democratic changes in
Belgrade, starting last September and then again in December,
with the parliamentary elections, and as the FRY and Serbia try
to reenter the international community, the chances of the VJ
army attacking KFOR have declined tremendously.
The unintended consequence of this ground security zone,
since we were not in there and the FRY military was not in
there, was that the extremist elements set up camp in this free
zone, if you will, and that was causing its own instability and
its own threats.
So the North Atlantic Council has made the decision, as you
mentioned, that we will do a phased and conditioned return of
this ground security zone back to the FRY. Phased means a piece
at a time, and we started with the first piece, which is the
piece just north of the Macedonian border. That was done on the
13th of this month, 13 March.
There were certain conditions that were agreed to by the
FRY before they did that, and I will not take you through all
of them, but basically it said, they will not bring tanks in
there. They do not really need tanks in there to do that. They
do not need self-propelled artillery and that kind of thing.
That reentry went very smoothly. They cooperated very well.
They showed us their plans. There were phase lines as they came
across. They reported in. The very last one, right up against
the border, we have checkpoints, where our soldiers and their
soldiers meet so that we are not shooting across the border
inadvertently, so all those procedures are in place.
The North Atlantic Council is looking at the next phase of
this, which will be most of the northern part of that, all the
way around to the east border. That should happen, I would
think, here in the next few days, and once again, if that goes
well, then we will look at the more contentious area, which is
over on the eastern border.
There is still some work to do, because once again this is
not just a military problem, this is a political and economic
problem as well, and in those areas in blue on that map, where
the ethnic Albanian majority have been denied political access
and economic access for a number of years, that needs to be
addressed by the Serbian authorities.
But to summarize, I think the conditions in the so-called
Covic Plan, which was the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, said
that the Serbian authorities would, in fact, give political
access and some economic opportunities to the Albanian
citizens, and we would give the Serbs access back to the ground
security zone. I think that is working well. I think that is
the proper approach. We need to keep working through this.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe, we have some people who
have traveled a long distance, and their message is directly
germane to the line of questioning that you raised with our
witnesses earlier, so at this point in time I recognize you to
proceed as you desire.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks,
earlier in this hearing I brought up the fact that you are
responsible for the quality of training of those individuals
who serve in the Persian Gulf many times in a combat
environment, and from the East Coast deployments where our
battle groups go, we have learned sometime ago that there is
only one place where you can get the integrated live training
to give them that degree of competency to carry out those
missions.
That is the island of Vieques and, because of the problems
that have come up, starting about a year ago, we have been
inhibited from having the freedom to carry on the live fire
training on this island, on this land that is owned by the
United States Navy.
In fear that we would lose this, I took the time to go
around the world, look at every possible alternative source,
including Capa del Lata and Cape Rath and all the rest of them,
and there is none. In fact, they are becoming fewer and fewer
as each month goes by.
For that reason, I have spent quite a bit of time in Puerto
Rico, and then actually on the island of Vieques. A lot of
people do not realize, Mr. Chairman, that Vieques is a
municipality of Puerto Rico. It is not a separate system, it is
a town, but it is an island.
I had the occasion to go over to the island and actually
visit with the citizens, and I did this, Mr. Chairman, for one
very significant reason, and that is that I had heard all the
opposition from the politicians on Puerto Rico, but I had not
heard it from the citizens who were directly affected, who live
on the island of Vieques.
Let us keep in mind there are 9,300 residents in Vieques.
Of that, there would be something less than 4,000 registered
voters in Vieques. The way the law is currently structured, it
is very likely that there could be a referendum as to whether
or not they want the Navy to continue live fire. Obviously, if
it turned out the wrong way, our presence and our activity on
the whole island of Puerto Rico would be diminished.
But I think it is very significant, Mr. Chairman, as I
introduced you to the group out in the hall, to recognize that
in my trips to Vieques, I have met with these citizens, only to
find that the majority of the citizens on the island of Vieques
that would be directly affected--not the politicians in Puerto
Rico, but the citizens--like the Navy, by and large.
They recognize that the Navy needed some improvement, they
have improved the relationships, and they are satisfied with
it. They recognize the economic benefit to the people of
Vieques, and I invited them to come here to the United States,
to Washington, so that we would be able to see what the real
people on Vieques want.
The leader of the delegation, Mr. Chairman, is Luis
Sanchez. I met with these people on the island of Vieques.
Chairman Warner. Senator, I think it would be important if
they came forward.
Senator Inhofe. Would you come forward at this point. You
have all of your petitions with you. If you would come forward
to this side of the table so we can see you, as I saw you in
Vieques. The second gentleman there is Luis Sanchez, who is the
leader of the group, and these are all citizens.
They are carrying with them, Mr. Chairman, over 1,700
petitions, signatures of registered voters on the island of
Vieques. On those, they have listed their names, addresses, and
social security numbers and registrations of all 1,700. As you
can see, this almost constitutes a majority of everyone who
lives on the island of Vieques. I thought it was significant
that, since I could not get anyone to listen to me back here on
what the people of Vieques want, as opposed to the politicians
on Puerto Rico, that they come forward and show this.
If you just put those on the table there. I am not sure
whether it would be in order or not, Mr. Chairman, I would
defer to you on that, but if you would like to hear from any of
them, or if you would like to ask questions of these
individuals----
Chairman Warner. Well, I think that you and I should first
indicate that a copy of one of these petitions will be
incorporated into today's record. This clearly indicates that
there is a very substantial number of the citizens of Vieques
who support the ongoing naval operations that existed when I
was Secretary of the Navy, many years ago, 30-plus years ago.
This training is so essential, as General Franks has recounted
today, to preparing elements of the Navy and the Marine Corps
for going into harm's way, that this is a clear manifestation
of the desire of those people to work with the United States
Government and particularly our military to resume that
training as it was performed for many years.
[The information referred to follows:]

Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I know that when you were
Secretary of the Navy you had an appreciation for what was
going on over there, but let me clarify. It is much more
significant than just these individuals. 1,700-plus are
supportive of the Navy. All of these people are signing a
petition saying, if necessary, they would secede from Puerto
Rico and become a separate entity and vote themselves out so
that they would be able to do what has been taking place since
1950, in terms of supporting the Navy, and offering us the kind
of training that gives us the quality that we need in that war-
torn region of the Persian Gulf.
I think it would be significant, Mr. Chairman, if each one
gave the recorder his name so that we would be able to properly
enter them into the record.
Chairman Warner. We will see that that is done.
[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Luis E. Sanchez
Mr. Ralph Perez

Now, Senator, I think what we are going to do, unless there
are further comments from yourself or our other colleagues,
Senator Levin and I are recommending that this committee stop
this open portion of the hearing. We will resume a classified
session in room 222 Russell immediately.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum

ARMY TRANSFORMATION GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC LIFT

1. Senator Santorum. General Ralston and General Franks, the Army
has initiated a transformation process that is designed to result in a
lighter, more deployable and mobile force. Recognizing the Army will
provide you with the bulk of your ground force should military action
be required in your theater of operations, what are your views of the
Army Transformation goals and objectives? To what extent has the Army
initiative addressed concerns you might have about strategic
responsiveness? Do we have the strategic lift assets required to
execute established deployment goals and objectives?
General Ralston. There is high probability that, in the USEUCOM
AOR, there will be repeated demands at the center of the spectrum of
conflict, as well as the possibility of high intensity small-scale
contingencies. USEUCOM has been engaged in 25 operations since October
1996. The average number of operations per year has doubled since the
years 1991-1995.
Responding to this reality, the Army has articulated a new vision
for a strategically responsive and dominant force to effectively meet
the full spectrum of future military operations.
A key benefit for USEUCOM is the ability to rapidly move lighter
vehicles within the theater. As a potential force provider to other
unified commands, most notably U.S. Central Command, future commanders
will find that enhanced mobility of the Transformed Army also enhances
deployability. The capability to deploy within a matter of hours to
trouble spots in Africa and less developed countries of Eastern Europe
offers a range of options that are simply unavailable today.
The operations conducted by USEUCOM over the past decade have
required the use of ground forces that are not necessarily structured
or equipped for small scale contingency operations. The two divisions
in Europe must meet this standard of responsiveness and strategic
dominance by resourcing the training, exercises and infrastructure that
support strategic mobility. Only through proper resourcing of our two
divisions will this Objective Force be able to provide the
deployability, maneuverability, and lethality necessary to conduct
operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict.
The current level of strategic lift assets is not adequate to meet
the full range of requirements, primarily due to identified intra-
theater lift joint requirements and to the consideration of missions
additional to those directly supporting the two major theater war
scenario. In accordance with Mobility Requirements Study 2005, DOD
should develop a program to provide 54.5 MTM/D (Million Ton Miles per
Day), the airlift capacity for a single major theater war while
supporting other high priority airlift missions. The program should
consider capabilities that could be provided by additional C-17s,
additional services that could be provided by commercial operators, and
sources that could be useful for missions of short duration.
General Franks. I support any and all efforts by each of the
services to increase the deployability and mobility of combat forces.
Having few assigned forces within the CENTCOM AOR, I rely on the rapid
deployment of forces to meet contingency requirements (as long as the
U.S. Army keeps them modernized and sustainable). The faster lethal,
survivable and sustainable ground forces deploy, the more likely it is
that I can successfully protect and defend United States interests in
the region. [Deleted].
The Army's pre-positioning system gives CENTCOM adequate strategic
responsiveness for responding to the region's major theater war
threats. The Army transformation initiative will enhance my command's
ability to meet smaller scale contingencies, especially if urban
operations are required. CENTCOM however, has not participated in any
qualitative analysis pertaining to future force structure and
deployment platforms.
All CENTCOM operation plans and concept plans are executable.
However, risk within some of these plans remains high in the early
phases, in the large part due to strategic airlift deficiencies. Given
the distance to the CENTCOM AOR, the small number of assigned forces
and still developing regional infrastructure, strategic lift is one of
my concerns.

LAND FORCES MODERNIZATION

2. Senator Santorum. General Ralston, the Army currently provides
the bulk of our forces in the Balkans, where they are serving our
Nation very well in difficult circumstances. These operations are
clearly stressing the equipment we have in the region and there appears
to be no relief in sight. What are your concerns regarding the
modernization posture of the land forces you have at your disposal?
Based on what you see in the land forces that are currently deployed,
where would you focus modernization efforts to ensure that our forces
have the best, most modern equipment available?
General Ralston. Based on U.S. Army, Europe's (USAREUR) experience
in the Balkans, the gap between the equipment in the active Army and
the Reserve Army is widening, particularly the equipment in the War
Reserve Stocks/Army Prepositioned Stockage (APS).
To take some examples, Bradley fighters in the APS are older than
Operation Desert Storm, there are shortages of Single-Channel Ground
and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) radios and installation kits,
fielding delays of rolling stocks, including Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles (FMTVs) and Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs), as well as
our 800-series trucks being over 40 years old. The bottom line is that
when CONUS-based units come to theater, they train with obsolete APS/
War Reserve equipment, and training suffers accordingly.

TACTICAL MOBILITY OF WHEELED VEHICLES IN DESERT

3. Senator Santorum. General Ralston, the Army is in the process of
fielding an interim force that is designed to span a perceived near-
term operational shortfall first recognized during the Persian Gulf
War. To that end, the Army recently selected a vehicle to serve as the
armored vehicle that will be used by interim brigade combat teams in
operations from peacekeeping through full spectrum combat. There has
been a lot of debate over wheels versus tracks for armored vehicles and
I don't expect to conduct such a debate here. I am curious, however,
about any lessons we may have learned in the Gulf about mobility
tradeoffs between different vehicle types, especially in vehicles
currently available in the world today. Put differently, what are your
views about the tactical mobility of current generation wheeled
vehicles in a desert environment?
General Ralston. The Army's Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV)
represents a good step forward towards properly equipping the lighter,
more mobile, Army of the future. Wheeled vehicles have been used in the
desert for years with excellent results. The Army's IAV will, in my
estimation, enjoy the same excellent results as it becomes an integral
piece of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).
While there have been concerns about the IAV, primarily about the
amount of protection (armor) and fire power provided in the new
vehicle, I feel it is unfair to compare the IAV with traditional
tracked-vehicle tanks, such as the M1A1 Abrams. The IAV was not
designed to replace the M1, but rather to become an integral part of a
more mobile, faster, lighter, IBCT. In other words, the IAV is more an
augment to the foot soldier of Army's Infantry forces, rather than a
replacement for the heavy armor of the Army's Cavalry forces.
For a view of the issue from one who has a keen understanding of
the desert environment as well as armored vehicles operating in combat,
I recommend you ask General Franks, Commander in Chief Central Command,
for his views.

READINESS LEVELS

4. Senator Santorum. General Ralston and General Franks, in your
respective AORs you are responsible for the continuing commitments of
Operation Northern Watch (ONW) and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).
These operations continue to require rotational deployments and large
numbers of tactical aviation sorties flown by an aging fleet of
tactical fighters. Do you see any indicators in your theaters that
readiness levels of our tactical air forces are declining?
General Ralston. The majority of forces provided to ONW are from an
Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). The balance is comprised of U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps, and coalition forces. For the past 6 months, the majority
of tactical aircraft used in ONW came from outside of our AOR. There
are no indicators that the tactical aircraft assigned to the AEF to
support ONW from outside our AOR or our own organic tactical aircraft
are suffering declining readiness levels. As you may know, the
readiness indicators of many of our fighter aircraft have shown a
recent increase as the funding for spare parts in fiscal year 1998,
1999, and 2000 has begun to take effect.
General Franks. The Services support Operation Southern Watch by
deploying a wide variety of aircraft including tankers; theater
airlifters; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms;
combat search and rescue assets; and several types of fighter aircraft.
At their current level of activity, U.S. air forces combine for over
[deleted] sorties per year in support of Operation Southern Watch.
These forces, whether land or carrier-based, arrive in my AOR fully
combat ready. On a regular basis they demonstrate superb readiness
levels by responding to hostile Iraqi actions with strikes on Iraqi air
defenses in the Southern No-Fly Zone. [Deleted.] From what I have seen,
the Services are doing an excellent job bringing trained and ready air
forces to the fight, and I have no doubts about their preparedness to
perform the missions for which they are responsible.

HIGH DEMAND/LOW DENSITY ASSETS

5. Senator Santorum. General Ralston and General Franks, during
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, one of the newly coined terms was
High Demand/Low Density assets. If these assets were so highly tasked
in this small contingency, doesn't that indicate we do not have enough
of these assets to execute the National Military Strategy?
General Ralston. The term High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) was
coined well before Operation Allied Force (OAF). In addition, it is my
belief that OAF, from an air perspective, was not a small contingency.
I believe that we do have the assets necessary to conduct the National
Military Strategy--but that strategy says we will quit all operations
around the world and devote all our assets to the two MTWs if we are
required to fight two MTWs. During the Kosovo air operation we
continued to support all our operations around the world--Operation
Southern Watch, Operation Northern Watch, Korea, South America,
peacetime training, etc.
General Franks. Senator, every geographic Commander in Chief places
tremendous value on HD/LD assets. They perform unique missions and
yield great operational benefits. Any time combat operations are
ongoing, they will be needed continuously.
While General Ralston will undoubtedly give you the expert answers
on Operation Allied Force, I would characterize it as more than a
``small'' contingency. Operation Allied Force placed virtually the
entire burden of combat operations upon joint and combined air forces,
causing them to fly sorties at relatively intense rates. Moreover, the
allies considered it imperative to avoid collateral damage and minimize
friendly losses, causing heavy use of HD/LD assets to gather
intelligence and protect our aircraft. Given these factors, the call
for HD/LD assets is understandable.
Keep in mind also that Operation Northern Watch and Operation
Southern Watch continued during Operation Allied Force, as well as
other operations to monitor countries like North Korea. In other words,
HD/LD assets performed global missions in addition to Operation Allied
Force. Had another contingency arisen, the National Command Authorities
could have diverted HD/LD assets from these other operations if mission
priorities so dictated.
The bottom line is that judging whether we have enough HD/LD assets
is a complex question, and the Operation Allied Force case alone
doesn't lead to a definitive conclusion. The Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are better positioned to respond
to the issue of resourcing the National Military Strategy, and may be
better able to discuss HD/LD assets with you.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

TRAINING, EQUIPMENT READINESS, AND RETENTION

6. Senator Allard. General Franks, for several years now we have
maintained a military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Units
include naval forces enforcing sanctions, air forces enforcing the no-
fly zones, and soldiers in Kuwait. How are these missions affecting the
training and equipment readiness of the units involved? What is the
effect on retention of personnel?
General Franks. You are correct that the Services support
operations in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf region with significant
resources, including over [deleted] personnel, [deleted] aircraft, and
[deleted] naval vessels on any given day. These forces arrive in my AOR
fully combat ready and well-equipped to sustain operations as needed.
My component commanders exploit every opportunity to provide
quality training for deployed forces whenever possible, consistent with
operational responsibilities. Some of that training, such as the land
force training integral to Operation Desert Spring, includes
opportunities for combined operations and live fires that deployed
units do not always get at home. From what I have seen, the Services
are doing an excellent job bringing trained and ready forces to the
fight, and we do our best to keep them that way.
If you need more information on what goes into training, equipping,
and retaining our troops, the Service Chiefs are better positioned to
address these issues.

MILITARY OPTIONS AGAINST SADDAM

7. Senator Allard. General Franks, what military options are
available to curtail Saddam's ability to circumvent UN sanctions? What
military options are available to affect Saddam's efforts to research,
develop, and produce weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles?
General Franks. The options span the breadth of military
capabilities from passive monitoring of Iraqi actions to applying
combat forces using kinetic solutions against Iraqi sanction
violations. Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch are
ongoing efforts aimed at keeping Saddam from circumventing specific UN
resolutions. Operation Desert Spring, which keeps a joint task force in
Kuwait, exists as a hedge against Iraqi circumvention of other
sanctions. Maritime Interception Operations in the Gulf deny
international waters to Saddam's effort to circumvent UN sanctions.
Other contingency plans exist that use various military capabilities to
hinder any Iraqi circumvention or respond to violations.
Saddam's knowledge of United States military intelligence
capabilities has forced him to go to great lengths in concealing his
ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development
programs, driving up the costs of these efforts and slowing their
progress. Additionally, Iraq remains dependent on foreign supply of
some raw materials and advanced technology. Our military capability to
interdict shipments of sensitive cargoes could potentially hamper Iraqi
WMD and missile development even further. Our ability to target key
research and production nodes, as demonstrated in Operation Desert Fox,
can set back Baghdad's advanced weapons programs for limited periods.
Ultimately, without an in-country disarmament regime, consisting of
active and passive surveillance systems, routine and intrusive
inspections, and export/import controls, Iraq is otherwise unhindered
from reconstituting its unconventional weapons capabilities.

ARMY INTERIM FORCE AND OBJECTIVE FORCE

8. Senator Allard. General Ralston and General Franks, in your
statements, both of you mentioned a strong support for the
transformation of our military. You specifically mentioned a support
for Army Transformation. How do you see the Interim Force impacting
your command? How do you see the Objective Force impacting your
command?
General Ralston. Interim capability is far better at meeting my
small scale contingency (SSC) requirements than the current legacy
ground formations. The interim formations are far more tactically
mobile and considerably more lethal than light units--they can serve
just as effectively as a deterrent in these environments and will not
require near the logistics support of Legacy formations. Bottom line:
interim is a win-win for the less than very high-end operations that I
routinely conduct in my AOR.
However, there exists a strategic gap between SSC mission
requirements and the theater's force structure design. The heavy forces
within the theater currently do not provide the optimal level of
responsiveness required to support SSCs. A forward deployed Interim
Brigade Combat Team/Interim Combat Regiment would greatly enhance
CINCEUR's response options for SSCs and will address the risk inherent
in the strategic gap created by the theater's current force structure
until the Objective Force is fielded.
Objective capability will provide many more options than are
available to me today. I can deploy and employ these formations quicker
and the situational understanding inherent in the Objective Force and
its full integration within the joint force can reduce collateral
effects associated with conflict. Further, by means of its introduction
deeper into the battlespace (enemy rear) the objective capability will
contribute to faster conflict resolution.
General Franks. The Interim Force adds capability that did not
exist before. The Interim Force increases the lethality and mobility of
light forces which are more easily deployed and sustained than heavier
forces. This type of force is well-suited for deployments over long
distances into regions with still developing infrastructures, such as
those in the United States Central Command's AOR. I envision the
Interim Force having a potential in smaller scale contingencies,
especially operations in urban areas.
Overall the Objective Force supports our war plan requirements,
though the transition to the Objective Force needs to be managed
carefully. The major threats in the Central Region still possess a
significant heavy ground capability. This threat, the short indications
and warning available, and the significant distances that must be
traveled requires an Army preposition system that can match trained
forces to compatible pre-positioned equipment capable of surviving and
defeating this heavy threat. The Objective Force must also validate
that its enhanced reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
capability increases the lethality and survivability of transformed
Army units against tank heavy opponents.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

9. Senator Allard. General Ralston and General Franks, what are
your most significant shortfalls in the intelligence and communications
infrastructure? Do you have sufficient satellite communications
capability? What must we do to ensure we have the capacity and
flexibility to support mission-essential communications in the next 5
years? Ten years? Fifteen years?
General Ralston. Our growing dependence upon information services
and network-centric command and control to shorten decision times and
improve force protection capabilities is fundamentally changing our
intelligence and communications requirements. These changes will tax
the ability of the intelligence community to rapidly adapt collections
and analysis priorities to keep pace with the evolving requirements.
They will also outstrip the capacity of the existing theater
communications infrastructure.
Theater intelligence production is augmented by national
intelligence agency support that is critical to our operational forces
and engagement strategies. The unique production support provided by
national agencies places a tremendous demand on the communications
architecture. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) efforts to
provide a robust IMINT Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and
Dissemination (TPED) system remains one of our greatest concerns. As
the recent congressionally-directed NIMA Commission concluded, NIMA is
under-resourced overall, and the U.S. cannot expect to fully realize
the promise of the next generation of IMINT satellites unless NIMA TPED
is adequately funded.
In order to deliver the time-critical intelligence produced at the
theater and national level, USEUCOM is dependent upon a Command,
Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C\4\) infrastructure
that is routed through networks built largely in the 1940s and 1950s to
support low-bandwidth voice service. These problems are even worse
south of the Alps and in the Balkans, while Africa suffers from a near
total lack of communications infrastructure, with only pockets of
development in countries like South Africa. These shortfalls force a
heavy reliance on already limited satellite communication networks.
This system is insufficient to meet current and evolving high bandwidth
demands such as worldwide command and control video-conferences, live
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video feeds, electronic tasking orders
for our air and land forces, and full implementation of DOD's Global
Combat Command and Control and Global Combat Support Systems. These
systems form the foundation of USEUCOM's command and control
capabilities. Furthermore, current infrastructure does not support
Information Assurance (IA) measures, potentially allowing our
collection, analysis, dissemination, and command and control functions,
to be jeopardized by hostile or inadvertent interference. Finally,
USEUCOM's satellite communications lack flexibility and its capacity is
extremely limited.
This infrastructure needs to be replaced with modern high-bandwidth
capability within the next 5 to 7 years if we are to realize the full
potential of the ``information dominance'' that will come from the
interaction of superior intelligence and information infrastructures.
General Franks. With regard to the intelligence infrastructure,
significant shortfalls include: shortages of airborne reconnaissance
platforms and supporting systems; an intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability to locate, track, and target mobile
missiles; inadequate number of imagery analysts, intelligence
specialists, and systems maintenance personnel; incompatibilities
between Service, Joint, and Coalition intelligence systems; lack of an
end-to-end ISR information management system; and inadequate
intelligence support to information operations. These have been
identified as deficiencies via the Joint Monthly Readiness Review
(JMRR) and ISR Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA)
processes.
Regarding communications infrastructure shortfalls and satellite
communications, no, sir, I do not have sufficient satellite
communications, nor do I have sufficient theater communications
infrastructure for daily operations or to support a contingency. The
lack of adequate communications infrastructure and capacity into and
within the area of responsibility (AOR) severely limits the successful
dissemination of mission-critical products to the warfighter. Fiber
optic connectivity is expanding in some of the key AOR countries (e.g.,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar), however,
inadequate funding limits CENTCOM's ability to exploit this medium. So,
I must rely on over-taxed military satellite communications incapable
of providing the required increases in connectivity should a crisis in
the CENTCOM AOR arise. Our theater and headquarters communications
infrastructure is my number two priority item on my IPL and for good
reason. We need the infrastructure to ensure we can selectively respond
to the full spectrum of military options and sustain our forces to
prepare for an uncertain future.
In the next 5 years, assistance with increased funding to exploit
available fiber and build an adequate C\4\ infrastructure in the AOR
would reduce CENTCOM's over-dependence on satellite communications and
improve reliability and redundancy for critical intelligence and
command and control voice, data, and video connections. In the next 10
to 15 years increased bandwidth and modern, reliable, and adequately
provisioned networks will be critical as new ISR and C\2\ systems are
fielded.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

IMPORTANCE OF JSTARS

10. Senator Lieberman. General Ralston and General Franks, for the
last 3 years, Congress has added funds to continue procurement of the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems' (JSTARS) aircraft
moving the fleet size toward the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) requirement of 19. Would you please give us your view of the
importance of that system to the U.S. Central Command?
General Ralston. The JSTARS' ability to acquire, monitor, target,
and report ground force movement has proven crucial to supporting
combat operations and maintaining situational awareness during high-
intensity contingency operations in the USEUCOM AOR. JSTARS has
deployed to USEUCOM three times over the past 6 years: 1995,
Implementation Forces' (IFOR) move into Bosnia; 1996, Operation Joint
Endeavor monitoring of the Dayton Peace agreement; and 1999, Operation
Allied Force in Kosovo. Each of these deployments highlighted JSTARS'
ability to provide near real time (NRT) indications and warning, force
protection, situational awareness, airborne command and control, attack
support, and intelligence collection to commanders. JSTARS' ability to
incorporate data collected by other sources, and subsequently linked to
the aircraft, to create fused analysis has been critical to the
positive identification of the targets and movement it monitors. This
was particularly important during the Operation Joint Endeavor
deployment where the system monitored fixed garrisons and the movement
of small groups of vehicles within civilian traffic. The adaptive use
of crew and external sensor input via satellite communication has
proven JSTARS' effectiveness in complex, high-intensity EUCOM
contingency operations.
General Franks. JSTARS provides an operational joint airborne
command and control (C\2\) platform and tactical/operational
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. These
capabilities provide JSTARS subscribers a terrestrial picture with
excellent moving target fidelity and unparalleled air-to-ground
battlespace C\2\ and surface situational awareness. Close air support,
combat search and rescue, and moving target information distribution
are evolving capabilities provided by JSTARS. Additionally, the Navy
and Marine Corps have recently purchased ship-based receiving systems
to monitor littoral operations which, if netted with the Army and Air
Force systems, could produce an even keener operational surface picture
and an enhanced air-land C\2\ structure in and around the Arabian Gulf.
I strongly desire to validate the importance of JSTARS to U.S.
CENTCOM with a deployment to the Arabian Gulf region. The last time
JSTARS was in CENTCOM's AOR was in early 1998 during Operation Desert
Thunder. The lack of available aircraft and difficulties obtaining
diplomatic permissions have delayed efforts to deploy JSTARS into the
CENTCOM AOR this year. Nevertheless, my air component continues to plan
for a JSTARS deployment this fall.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS

11. Senator Bill Nelson. General Franks, there has been some
discussion about the possibility of relocating U.S. Central Command
headquarters from its current location at MacDill Air Force Base,
Florida to an undetermined location within your Area of Responsibility
in Southwest Asia. Given recent terrorist attacks, and the continuing
threats in the region, this raises understandable concern regarding
force protection for members of your headquarters and their families.
At the same time there is understandable concern over the ``7,000-mile
commute'' members of your command must endure when traveling to and
from the area. What are your thoughts on the issue of your
headquarters' location and moving it to Southwest Asia? What steps can
be taken to mitigate the challenges of command and control from the
United States and avoid increasing the risks to members of your command
by increasing our physical presence in that region?
General Franks. There are currently no plans to relocate the
CENTCOM headquarters from Tampa to Southwest Asia. Ideally, any
commander would want to be located in his AOR but the political
situation and existing infrastructure in the region make this
unfeasible for the foreseeable future.
CENTCOM compensates for the separation from its AOR several ways.
CENTCOM conducts day-to-day operations in the region through the
command and control of four forward-deployed headquarters elements on
the Arabian Peninsula. These are the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia,
responsible for air operations in the southern no-fly zone; the
Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, responsible for the ground defense of
Kuwait; Special Operations Command Central (Forward), responsible for
all of our Special Operational Forces in the northern Red Sea, Arabian
Gulf, and Horn of Africa; and Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in
Bahrain, responsible for all maritime operations in CENTCOM. NAVCENT is
CENTCOM's only forward-deployed service component headquarters.
This command and control structure has proven itself a capable and
robust substitute for a forward-deployed CENTCOM headquarters.
Technology is the enabler in this process by providing ever increasing
``reach back'' and even ``reach forward'' capability for communication
between Tampa and our forward headquarters elements. My staff strives
to employ the latest technology not only to move information swiftly
but also to provide redundancy to work around the loss of key nodes or
capabilities.
Currently there are four fixed locations in the region that are
designated as possible CENTCOM forward headquarters locations, should a
crisis or contingency require moving my battlestaff to the AOR. All are
on the Arabian Peninsula and access to these facilities is not
guaranteed in time of crisis. Consequently, we are developing a
capability to rapidly deploy the battlestaff along with an air-
deployable command post that provides the same command and control
capabilities I have in Tampa or at any established headquarters in the
region. There are over 100 C-5 or C-17-capable runways throughout the
region where we could fly in this deployable command post. The
technology exists to do this right now; all we require is $10.1 million
in funding.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Smith, Inhofe,
Santorum, Sessions, Collins, Levin, Kennedy, Cleland, Landrieu,
Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Dayton.
Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; and Scott W.
Stucky, general counsel.
Majority staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV, Gary M.
Hall, Carolyn M. Hanna, George W. Lauffer, Thomas L. MacKenzie,
Joseph T. Sixeas, and Cord A. Sterling.
Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director for the minority; Richard D. DeBobes, minority
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Kristi M. Freddo, Shekinah Z.
Hill, and Suzanne K.L. Ross.
Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining,
assistant to Senator McCain; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to
Senator Smith; J. Mark Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert
Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
Senator Collins; Menda S. Fife and Sharon L. Waxman, assistants
to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, assistant to
Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland;
Jason Matthews, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; and Sheila Murphy and Eric Pierce,
assistants to Senator Ben Nelson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Warner. Good morning. We hold our second series of
hearings to receive testimony on the status and requirements of
our regional commands. We do that in this committee each year.
It provides us a basis of fact upon which we can then proceed
to have our long and lengthy series of hearings on the
authorization bill.
Last Thursday, the committee heard from Gen. Joseph
Ralston, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command; and Gen.
Tommy R. Franks, Commander in Chief, Central Command. Today we
are pleased to have Adm. Dennis C. Blair, United States Navy,
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Gen. Peter Pace,
United States Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern
Command; and Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, United States Army,
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces
Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
I would like to just focus on concerns that this Senator
has with respect to issues in each of your AORs. In the Asia-
Pacific region, China remains a growing concern. Each year
there is another incremental set of facts that I think directly
impacts on our planning here. First, our line of deterrence,
our effort to work with our allies and friends in that region
to maintain peace and tranquility, but we note that China will
increase its defense budget by nearly 18 percent this year.
I would hope, Admiral, in your testimony you can give us
the baseline on which that 18 percent is predicated. Very often
we see significant increases like that, but if you go back to
the baseline, in real terms so to speak, there is not that
much. But that is an issue which I have studied, and I would
like to have your perspective on exactly what you believe the
18 percent represents.
This dramatic increase in spending, which will enable the
further acquisition of many advanced weapons systems, I presume
many coming from Russia, and the positioning of additional
short-range ballistic missile launch sites within range of
Taiwan are matters we have to take into consideration.
At this point, I am going to do something that is unusual,
but I have studied it several times, and I will provide each of
the witnesses with a copy, and that is the Washington Post
editorial of March 25, titled the Taiwan Arms Decision. In
reading that, it comports generally with my approach and
philosophy towards this issue.
You have just returned, Admiral Blair, from a trip to
China, South Korea, and Japan, and therefore your insights are
of particular value.
Under statute and law, the administration is to consult
with Congress regarding the annual review of the Taiwan arms
situation and their ability to defend themselves.
Representatives of the Departments of Defense and State have
come up and briefed. I can testify on this side. Yesterday I
had a special briefing for members of the committee on that
subject.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains very volatile
and extremely dangerous. Over the past year, while there
appeared to be some approachment towards lessening the tensions
between the north and the south, the fruits of that effort
remain to be seen in my judgment because we view the actions,
as well as the words, and the actions reflect that North Korea
took no significant reduction in any of its massive number of
troops deployed in that border region. Perhaps you will touch
on that, General.
In light of our relationship with South Korea, it is a very
important one, critical to the overall posture of deterrence in
the region of the Pacific, and we look forward to your update.
37,000 U.S. troops--I think that is the number--are stationed
in South Korea. Accompanying them are many families, and we
have many industrialists and others from the United States. So,
we should always be mindful that very significant numbers of
our own population are right there within the range of weapons.
Now, in SOUTHCOM, the situation in Colombia and its
bordering nations is, of course, of great concern. We had an
opportunity to visit last night with the senior staff, and we
want to hear from you this morning with regard to your view of
that situation down there. I take note that my distinguished
colleague, the ranking member, traveled there with other
Senators recently, as did our colleague, Senator McCain.
We continue to support the efforts of the previous
administration with regard to the $1.6 billion U.S. aid
package. I say we. I speak for myself and I think the majority
of this committee. But the precariousness of that situation,
and particularly the spill-over effect on the adjoining
nations, is of concern to us. We have our own military
personnel there now in the position of training.
These are just some of the issues, and we should have, I
think, a very informative and profitable hearing from our
distinguished witnesses this morning.
If you will forgive my voice. It is not up to prime time,
but I am still here in every respect. Thank you. At this time,
without objection, I submit the opening statement of Senator
Strom Thurmond.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Admiral Blair, General
Schwartz, and General Pace to the second in the series of hearings with
our regional and warfighting commanders. Our panel represents areas of
the globe that are an ever increasing political and security challenge
to the United States.
In the Pacific, we are confronted by the two sleeping giants, India
and China, optimistic peace talks between North and South Korea, and
ethnic strife ready to explode in various parts of the region. In South
America, the strife in Colombia is forcing the drug lords and their
operations into neighboring countries threatening to spread our so-
called war on drugs. Although the historical focus of our Nation has
been toward Europe, in my judgment, the future lies in the Pacific and
south of our borders. Today's witnesses are bringing a focus on their
regions and effectively securing our vital national security and
economic interests. They accomplish their missions despite quality of
life challenges for their personnel and underfunding of vital readiness
accounts.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
group of commanders and thank them for their professionalism and
distinguished service to our Nation. I would also like to assure them
that the committee will take into consideration their requirements as
we deliberate on the defense budget for fiscal year 2002 whenever it
arrives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me first join
you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses here this morning.
They have made great contributions in the past to our Nation's
security, and their advice and commentary to us is indeed
welcomed.
At the outset, let me thank you, General Pace, for your
assistance and your counsel and your hospitality as three
colleagues of myself and the chairman of this committee and I
went to Colombia not too many weeks ago. Senators Reed, Bill
Nelson, Ben Nelson, and I made that visit. It was a very
important one for us, and your participation contributed a
great deal to that importance.
This morning's hearing takes place as the administration
continues to conduct a review of existing policies toward
China, including potential arms sales to Taiwan, and existing
policies which are being reviewed toward North Korea, Colombia,
the Andes, and a number of other hot spots in the world.
In recent weeks, President Bush has expressed support for
Plan Colombia and for the peace process, but declined to have
the United States represented at the peace negotiation table.
In recent weeks, President Bush has expressed skepticism
about the course of negotiations with North Korea, thereby
weakening the position of the South Korean president in his
negotiations with North Korea.
In recent weeks, the President has characterized the United
States and China as strategic competitors, quite a contrast to
the prior characterization of his predecessor of our
relationship with China as one of strategic partnership.
There is an impression here and abroad that the
administration appears to be backing away from U.S. engagement
in a number of critical areas around the world, from the
Balkans, to the Middle East, to the Korean Peninsula. If so, I
am concerned that that disengagement could cause us to lose
some opportunities to ease tensions in several regions of the
world and, therefore, lose opportunities to make this country
more secure.
So, this is a very timely hearing. There is a huge number
of issues to be reviewed with our witnesses. I look forward to
their testimony this morning and the opportunity to ask them
questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Unless other members of the committee have a comment, we
will proceed to receive the testimony from our witnesses, and
Admiral Blair, we will ask you to lead off.
The full statement of all witnesses will be admitted to the
record.

STATEMENT OF ADM. DENNIS C. BLAIR, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Blair. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and other
distinguished members of the committee, I need to begin by
thanking all of you for the support that you have given to the
men and women of the Pacific Command. They know you care and it
comes through to them. Thank you very much.
Our priorities in the Pacific Command are readiness,
regional engagement, transformation of the Armed Forces, and
resources.
I must tell you readiness is a mixed picture. We have made
progress in some areas in the past year; we have lost ground in
others. We can do our job today, but I remain concerned for the
future unless we address some of the structural readiness
issues in operations and equipment, as well as sustainment,
restoration, and modernization.
I just returned, as the Chairman mentioned, from a trip to
China, Korea, and Japan. With our forward-based and our
forward-deployed forces, we reassure our friends, we are
deterring our potential enemies, and we are making some
progress on enhanced regional cooperation which will build a
security structure which will posture us for the missions of
the future, as well as those of the past.
Third, transformation. Working with the Joint Forces
Command, we are experimenting our way into the future in the
Pacific Command using our existing exercise program, including
our allies. Our concept for the future is called a joint
mission force.
Finally, resources. Our strategy for the Asia-Pacific
region is built on a foundation of ready, balanced, forward-
deployed forces with information networks that can enable them
to move around the theater with confidence and a mobility
system to get them there quickly. We need sustained funding and
support for those forces and for the headquarters which direct
them. It is important because this region is dynamic, because
America has big security interests there, and our Armed Forces
play a strong role in there.
As far as the question that you raised, Mr. Chairman, on
China, based on my recent trip there I can make a couple of
points. We probably will want to discuss it further, sir.
Chairman Warner. Please do. In particular, review the
package that has come forward from Taiwan, the procedure by
which it is to be reviewed, both by yourself and the
administration, and the likely timetable of the announcement,
to the extent you have knowledge of that.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir.
The requests for arms sales this year were delivered by the
Taiwan Deputy Chief of the General Staff last fall, and it was
an extensive list of equipment really across all three of their
Armed Forces: Army, Air Force, and Navy.
My role in the process is to evaluate sufficient defense
for Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. We do a detailed military
analysis of the balance of likely developments and trends, and
then I submit that up the chain for the President to make the
final decision on which arms should be made available based on
my military input and other factors.
That process is in progress right now. The rough deadline
that we generally set for ourselves is next month, the month of
April, that we generally reply. We are doing the work now to
meet that deadline.
Chairman Warner. When you use the word ``my,'' my
understanding of that is that it is yourself, of course, as
CINCPAC. But you take into consideration your senior Army
commander, your senior Air Force commander. You have also a
senior Navy commander and a senior Marine commander. So, it is
a composite of the senior commanders of all of our forces in
that region.
Admiral Blair. It is a composite. We benefit from several
assessments that have been made over the last couple of years
in which teams have visited Taiwan, have talked with the
Taiwanese. We have looked carefully at the intelligence and we
have come to a judgment as to what is the state, both right at
the moment and the trends in terms of Taiwan's sufficient
defense, and what would make that defense sufficient.
Over the long term, the most destabilizing parts of the
Chinese buildup are their intermediate-range and short-range
ballistic missiles, the CSS-6s and CSS-7s, of the type that
were used in 1996 to fire in the waters north and south of
Taiwan. I have told the Chinese directly on numerous visits,
including the one last week, that the buildup of these
missiles, which presently are weapons of destruction, not of
military significance, but as their numbers increase and as
their accuracy improves, become militarily significant, will
force a response by the United States eventually in order to
maintain that sufficient defense. That really is the most
troubling aspect of the buildup.
I talked to the Chinese about the 18 percent increase that
you mentioned when I was there. I was told at many different
levels, not simply Beijing, but the field commanders that that
would largely go for personnel expenses, maintenance, and then
a certain amount to acquisition. But they understand, as do all
armed forces, that you need to compensate people beyond your
conscript force in order to be effective under modern
conditions, and they are putting some money to that. So, I do
not translate that directly into weapons.
They are having mixed success with the weapons that they
are purchasing from the Russians. It is not just a case of
having the systems themselves, but the entire logistical
support, training, and integrating with the mother systems is
difficult business. As I say, the People's Liberation Army is
having mixed success in turning those into effective combat
capability.
So, my overall assessment, which is in my written
statement, is that for the near term, the balance across the
Straits is stable. There are certain trends that have to be
addressed in order to keep it stable. I emphasized with the
people I talked with in China that military means are not the
best way to achieve the one China, which is Chinese policy,
American policy, that the military side of this equation should
be kept in the background. The things that will draw China and
Taiwan are nonmilitary ties, commercial, financial,
information, travel, those sorts of activities.
The Chinese agree. They want a peaceful resolution as well,
but they maintain the right to use force, and we maintain that
resolution must be peaceful. That is where we are, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Do you wish to cover other areas of your
area of responsibility (AOR)? I think it is important that you
do.
Admiral Blair. Why do I not wait for questions, sir, if
that is all right with you.
Chairman Warner. We will do just that then.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Blair follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. Dennis C. Blair, USN

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and
women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this
opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Having served as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
(USCINCPAC) for over 2 years, I continue to believe, as we enter into
this century, that a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
region is very much in the interests of America, and the world.
Alternatively, an uncertain Asia may present only crises and dangers.
We base our power and influence on our values, our economic vibrancy,
our desire to be a partner in this critical region, and the forward-
stationed and forward-deployed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM).

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Since I last testified before you, developments in the region have
offered promise and continuing challenges.
Japan
Japan remains our most important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Although
the economy is virtually stagnant, Japan remains the second largest
economy in the world and continues to have a strong economic impact on
the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts nearly 41,000 U.S. Armed Forces
personnel and serves as a forward-deployed site for about 14,000
additional U.S. naval personnel. Japan also contributes $4.86 billion
in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally. These forward-
stationed and forward-deployed forces are key for the United States to
meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-
Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S.
security interests in Asia, and it is fundamental to regional security
and peaceful development.
Over the past year, we made steady progress in strengthening our
alliance with Japan. The two countries signed a new 5-year Special
Measures Agreement (SMA) that will take effect on April 1, 2001. While
the utilities cost-sharing levels are down slightly from the previous
SMA, the new agreement provides for the same levels of labor cost-
sharing and training relocation costs as those of the previous SMA.
Over the past year, working groups took the first steps to
implement the Defense Guidelines. In addition, Japan's Diet passed the
final piece of Defense Guidelines-related legislation: a law
authorizing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to conduct ship
inspections to enforce UN sanctions. Now that a site for the
replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been
selected in northern Okinawa, detailed discussions have begun over the
type and scale of the facility. U.S. and Japan ballistic missile
defense cooperation continued on Navy Theater-Wide research.
On February 9, 2001, U.S.S. Greenville collided with the fishing
vessel Ehime Maru, resulting in the loss of the ship and nine lives,
including students. The U.S. Government and Navy have apologized to the
Government of Japan and the families of the victims, are evaluating the
feasibility of raising the vessel, and will provide compensation to the
victims. The Navy has convened a Court of Inquiry to examine the events
contributing to the incident and accountability. The U.S. and Japan
have a strong bilateral relationship whose enduring strength has
benefited both sides for close to half a century. We believe we will be
able to move forward from this tragedy in the interests of both nations
and our peoples.
The roles and capabilities of the JSDF are slowly evolving to meet
future challenges. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force provided a
45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan Heights UN
Disengagement Observer Force. The JSDF has also worked closely with
USPACOM components to restructure bilateral exercises to develop skills
for humanitarian assistance, search-and-rescue, non-combatant
evacuation, consequence management for chemical, biological, and
nuclear incidents, and complex contingency operations that are likely
to occur in the future. JSDF is sending observers to Team Challenge, a
linked series of exercises addressing these missions and involving
several Asia-Pacific nations. I am also encouraged by the increased
attention that the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional armed
forces--the Republic of Korea in particular.
I remain deeply concerned about the Shinkampo private industrial
waste incinerator abutting Naval Air Facility Atsugi. While dioxin
levels have fallen significantly since Shinkampo completed the
installation of bag house filters last May, construction has not
started on a 100-meter smokestack that the Prime Minister of Japan
committed to building by March 2001. This situation continues to be a
serious health risk to our servicemembers and their families.
We must solve individual local issues arising from our forces based
in Japan. As important, however, is that the U.S. Pacific Command and
the JSDF maintain the capability to defend Japan and build the
capability to operate together in order to face the common regional
challenges of the future--peace operations, noncombatant evacuation
operations, humanitarian relief and dealing with transnational
concerns. The Defense Guidelines show the way to the future for the
U.S.-Japanese alliance and we must proceed in that direction.
South and North Korea
Last year, the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) began the
commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. About 37,000
U.S. troops remain stationed in the ROK to deter North Korean
aggression.
Political developments in Korea have been breathtaking, highlighted
by the June 2000 summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and his North
Korean counterpart Kim Jong-Il. Other North-South reconciliation
activities included reunions between selected families separated by the
war, increased aid, and agreements to increase economic links including
a road and railway passing through the demilitarized zone.
At the same time, North Korea's military training cycle in the
winter and summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever, and the ongoing
winter training cycle remains robust. North Korea continues to maintain
60 percent of its forces within 100km of the DMZ.
Given North Korea's continuing significant military capabilities,
the Republic of Korea and the United States must maintain the deterrent
power of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Any changes to the CFC
posture must come through mutual and verifiable confidence-building
measures that increase warning times for aggression.
I remain concerned about the lack of frequency clearances granted
by the ROK government to U.S. forces for planning and training. For
example, there are no frequencies cleared to support UAV training on
the peninsula. Likewise, we are currently limited to only 126 VHF/FM
frequencies for planning purposes, far short of the over 1,000
frequencies we would expect in an operational scenario. We will
continue to work to resolve this deficiency.
Whatever the future holds, it remains in the interests of both the
Republic of Korea and the United States to have a continued U.S.
forward presence on the Korean Peninsula. Recent developments have been
encouraging. The recent renewal of our Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA), the conclusion of the No Gun Ri investigation, and the
agreement on missile guidelines reflect the mature relationship between
the United States and South Korea and provide a strong foundation for
future cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. The Commander in Chief of
U.S. Forces Korea has also proposed a Land Partnership Plan that, once
enacted by Korea, will make U.S. force presence less burdensome while
enhancing training and combined warfighting capability. We also will
begin negotiations for a new Special Measures Agreement that we hope
would increase South Korea's financial support for the stationing of
U.S. troops in the country.
The Republic of Korea increasingly contributes to meeting regional
security challenges by contributing 419 troops to peacekeeping in East
Timor, consulting and cooperating with the JSDF, participating in
exercises such as RIMPAC (a major, multilateral naval exercise) and
PACIFIC REACH (a submarine rescue exercise also involving naval forces
from Japan, Singapore, and the United States), and participating as
observers in Team Challenge.
China
During the past year, military developments in China have been
mixed. A White Paper issued in February 2000 emphasized China's
commitment to peacefully resolving its differences with Taiwan, but
also specified conditions that could trigger the use of force against
Taiwan. Chinese military spending increased, and Beijing continued to
acquire advanced weapon systems from Russia.
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing and making
organizational changes in all branches of service to strengthen
homeland defense, expand regional influence and support sovereignty
claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea. China continues to increase
its modern combat aircraft inventory and improve air defenses,
particularly across the Taiwan Strait. The PLA navy conducted sea
trials for eventually fielding additional surface ships and submarines,
continued testing of anti-ship missiles, and received its second modern
Russian guided missile destroyer. PLA ground forces continued
downsizing to reduce force structure and increase mobility. The PLA
missile force continued testing and fielding of newer inter-continental
and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and is building additional
SRBM launch sites within range of Taiwan. China's exercise program,
while extensive, was not explicitly threatening to Taiwan.
Over the past year, we have reinitiated military relations with
China on a realistic foundation. We have fashioned policies that offer
China areas for productive relations, while ensuring that we can deal
with a more confrontational posture, should it be necessary. We
emphasize areas of mutual interest and encourage Chinese participation
in regional security cooperation while maintaining that diplomacy, not
armed force, should settle disputes.
We have exchanged visits between senior PLA delegations and U.S.
counterparts, and ships have conducted reciprocal port visits. PLA
forces participated in a search-and-rescue exercise in the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong, and four Chinese officials (two
from the PLA and two from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) attended the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. We have invited
the PLA to participate in more multinational conferences on topics
involving regional security cooperation than it has chosen to attend.
We carefully vet our engagement in accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act.
The Taiwan Armed Forces also continue their restructuring and force
modernization. A civilian Defense Minister now oversees the Armed
Forces. The Taiwan military relies heavily on the United States to
modernize its forces. Through last year's arms sales, Taiwan's Armed
Forces increased surveillance capabilities and modernized air-to-air,
air-to-ground and air-to-surface weapons. Taiwan is looking forward in
its modernization plans by improving a number of bases and
infrastructure to support acquisition of future weapons.
As Taiwan modernizes its Armed Forces to ensure a sufficient
defense, training, inter-service interoperability, and logistics
support become even more important. The Taiwan Armed Forces will have
to put resources and attention into these areas to retain the
qualitative edge.
Based upon our assessments, I conclude that the changes in PLA and
Taiwan military forces have not significantly altered the balance of
power across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's military maintains a
qualitative edge over the PLA, and the PLA still lacks the capability
to invade and hold Taiwan. China maintains a quantitative edge in all
branches of service, but does not have adequate power projection to
quickly overcome Taiwan's more modern air force and inherent
geographical advantages, which favor defense. Beijing's military
forces, however, have the ability to inflict significant damage to
Taiwan.
We expect China to accelerate military modernization, but pressing
economic and social issues will temper this effort. Military
modernization will not decisively alter the military situation across
the Strait in the next several years. The continuing buildup of Chinese
ballistic missiles, combined with increases in accuracy, will
increasingly pressure the sufficiency of Taiwan's defenses. The U.S.-
China-Taiwan relationship will continue to be a critical factor in our
regional engagement strategy.
India
U.S. military relations with India have been restricted since
India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. Areas for military cooperation
exist, however. Peacekeeping is the most promising. We have also agreed
to discuss search-and-rescue, humanitarian assistance, and
environmental security. The U.S. and India have also set up a working
group to address counter-terrorism cooperation. The response to India's
recent earthquake demonstrated the value of cooperation, both civilian
and military. We are pursuing opportunities to build a foundation for
closer relations. I believe a gradual strengthening of military
interaction is in the interests of both countries. The more we work
with India and Pakistan, the better we can defuse tensions by
supporting productive relations between those two nuclear-armed
countries.
Insurgents and Communal Violence
Beyond Kashmir, which remains a flash point of tension between
India and Pakistan, insurgents and communal violence affect many states
in the Asia-Pacific Region.
Indonesia faces violent separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya
(West Papua) and sectarian violence in the Maluku Islands and
Kalimantan. Intense fighting on the Jaffna Peninsula between the Tamil
Tigers and Sri Lankan Armed Forces continues without significant gains
by either side. Nepal faces an increasingly troublesome Maoist
insurgency. For much of the year, the Philippine Armed Forces have
battled the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and operated against
hostage takers, including the Abu Sayyaf, which took American Jeffrey
Schilling hostage. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Philippines are
still searching for the right combination of political, economic
development, and military/police measures to effectively address these
insurgencies and sectarian strife.
In Fiji, a coup overthrew the democratically elected government,
and the Solomon Islands have experienced separatist violence that
caused a change in government and the evacuation of foreign nationals.
Also, fighting among various ethnic groups on Burma's borders, much of
it connected to illegal drug trafficking, has spilled into Thailand.
Communal violence not only causes suffering and slows the
political, social, and economic development of countries in the region;
violence also fosters terrorism, causes refugees to migrate, and
creates humanitarian disasters that spill across national borders.
Indonesia
Indonesia is still undergoing major political, social, and economic
changes after 40 years of authoritarian rule.
The Armed Forces of Indonesia, or TNI, began reforms in 1999 that
they have yet to complete. The reforms call for the TNI to become a
professional, modern armed force, focused on external defense and
divorced from political practices. The number of TNI seats in
parliament has been reduced and the police force separated from the
TNI. However, elements of the TNI have been reluctant to continue
reforms. The TNI remains a major political force, particularly on the
local level, and retains the major role in internal security. It has
not brought under control the militias in West Timor, resulting in the
deaths of three UN workers and a continuing security threat to East
Timor, nor has it yet brought to justice any of those who orchestrated
or engaged on atrocities in East or West Timor. TNI reform is an
important aspect of restoring order in Indonesia in a manner that
promotes democratic development and regional security.
Most interactions between U.S. and Indonesian Armed Forces have
been suspended until there is credible progress toward accountability
for East Timor human rights abuses and the return or resettlement of
refugees. During the past year, limited interaction with the TNI
involved a Navy humanitarian exercise and Indonesian Air Force
observers at Exercise Cobra Gold. The objectives of interaction with
the TNI are to favor reform and build capability for coalition
operations.
Under the protection of international peacekeepers, East Timor
today is generally secure from the militias, but the work has just
begun to establish a fully functioning society. Our Australian allies
did a great job in leading this UN-mandated peace operation and remain
the backbone of the security forces. The Philippines and Thailand have
stepped forward to assume leadership of the peacekeeping forces since
it became a UN operation. The U.S. Armed Forces continue to conduct
operations in East Timor by providing liaison officers, engineers, and
humanitarian assistance during ship visits.
Philippines
The Philippines experienced a peaceful transition of power from
former President Estrada to former Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA). Throughout the period of the impeachment hearings and
transfer of authority, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) acted
with restraint and used constitutional precepts as guiding principles.
Following the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
in May 1999, the frequency and quality of interactions between U.S. and
Philippine Armed Forces has also improved. The AFP has actively
participated in initiatives to enhance regional cooperation and promote
regional security. It deserves credit for taking a leading and
responsible role in East Timor, contributing ground forces to the
International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) coalition, providing the
first force commander for the peacekeeping force of the UN Transition
Authority for East Timor (UNTAET).
The United States maintains its Mutual Defense Treaty with the
Philippines, and our defense relations have steadily improved over the
past year. The Defense Experts Exchange, a consultative group
established between OSD and the Philippines Department of National
Defense in 1999, has made progress in identifying the Philippines'
national security and force structure needs. The talks address ways to
help the Philippines increase readiness and become a more active
contributor to regional security. Operations with, and assistance from,
the United States cannot substitute for adequately funded Armed Forces,
and the Philippines has not yet made the necessary investments.
The Philippines continues to face significant internal security
challenges from organizations such as the MILF, the Communist New
People's Army (NPA) and the Abu Sayyaf Group. This past year, the
United States initiated a $2 million program using Nonproliferation,
Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) program funds to train and
equip a counter-terrorist unit that will improve the AFP's capability
to deal with hostage taking and other terrorist incidents.
Thailand
A strategic ally, strongly oriented to U.S. military training and
equipment, Thailand aspires to adopt force modernization and
``jointness'' along U.S. models. Thailand consistently responds
positively to U.S. requests for access, training, and transit. Thailand
is one of the nations in Asia most committed to building regional
approaches to future challenges--peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
and transnational concerns. Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand is
developing into a multilateral training event to improve participating
countries' capabilities to cooperate in peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions.
Thailand has taken a leading Southeast Asian regional role in
support of peacekeeping by maintaining battalion strength forces in
East Timor. The current military commander in East Timor is Thai LTG
Boonsrang Niumpradit. We support humanitarian demining in Thailand and
will transfer that program over to Thailand by fiscal year 2002. Joint
Task Force Full Accounting Detachment-1 in Bangkok logistically anchors
our POW/MIA recovery efforts throughout Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Within the last year, Thailand has requested U.S. assistance to the
Royal Thai Army in combating drug traffic across the Burma-Thai border.
U.S. Pacific Command is in the early stages of establishing a modest
program of assistance against this common threat. Joint Interagency
Task Force West (JIATF-WEST) is the standing task force for all
counterdrug (CD) issues in the theater and has the lead to work
training, equipment, and organizational coordination initiatives to
assist the Thais with their CD mission.
Australia
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty, and
Australia remains America's closest ally in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australian Armed Forces not only took the lead in East Timor
operations, but they remain the largest part of the UN security force
there. They also evacuated civilians and provided peace monitors in
Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The Australian government has
been active in promoting the return of democracy in Fiji and in
promoting security and peaceful development throughout the archipelagic
states of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australia has also
constructively engaged in dialogue with China and North Korea to
promote peace in Northeast Asia.
In recognition of our special relationship, we have pursued an
agreement to exempt qualified Australian firms from U.S. International
Traffic in Arms Regulations controlling unclassified military
technology.
Australia recently completed an extensive Australia Defence 2000
White Paper that clearly lays out its future defense requirements. The
White Paper achieved broad national support and general bipartisan
consensus through a unique consultation process that involved the
public and all government agencies. The product is a plan to acquire
the skills and equipment Australia will need to succeed across the full
range of defense tasks, along with required funding.
Singapore
Completion of the deep draft pier at Changi Naval Base signifies
Singapore's contribution and desire for continued U.S. presence in the
region. Though not an ally, Singapore is a solid security partner in
the Asia-Pacific region, a vocal proponent for U.S. access, and
supports and hosts multilateral activities. Singapore hosted PACIFIC
REACH, a multi-lateral submarine rescue exercise; participated in Cobra
Gold and in numerous anti-piracy regional conferences; and is planning
a regional Mine Counter-Mine exercise in May 2001.
Singapore seeks greater interoperability with the U.S. Armed
Forces. It views high technology and advanced hardware as a deterrent
and is increasing its cooperation with the U.S. in joint
experimentation. Singapore participates with the Extension of the
Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
and is active in other experiments such as the Joint Mission Force and
Asia Pacific Area Network.
POW/MIA Efforts in Southeast Asia
Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues to make
progress on achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans
unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. JTF-FA
conducted 10 joint field activities (JFAs) in fiscal year 2000--4 in
Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. During these JFAs, the JTF-FA
field teams investigated 219 cases and excavated 44 sites. JTF-FA will
continue to maintain its robust pace of operations in fiscal year 2001,
with 10 JFAs scheduled--4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia.
Each JFA is about 30 days in duration.
In calendar year 2000, 40 sets of remains previously recovered in
JTF-FA operations were successfully identified and returned to their
loved ones. As of January 31, 2001, Americans unaccounted for total
1,900. In the same period, JTF-FA recovered and repatriated 24 remains
we believe to be those of unaccounted-for Americans from Southeast Asia
(17 from Vietnam and 7 from Laos).
Achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans is a U.S.
Pacific Command priority, and we will continue to devote the necessary
personnel and resources to obtain the answers the POW/MIA families so
richly deserve.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND PRIORITIES

The challenges to security and peaceful development in the Asia-
Pacific region require regional cooperation to address effectively.
They include:

-- Unresolved wars in Korea, across the Taiwan Strait, and in
Kashmir that have flared, on occasion, but have been restrained
for over 50 years.
-- Conflicting territorial claims such as the Spratly Islands,
the Kuril Islands, and the Senkaku Islands.
-- Major powers--China, India, and Russia--that seek greater
roles in regional security.
-- Communal violence driven by separatist movements and
historic grievances.
-- Transnational concerns--including terrorism, illegal drug
trafficking, piracy, and weapons proliferation.

Our objective is an economically prosperous and interdependent
region that shares dependable expectations of peaceful change. To
achieve this objective, the strategy of the U.S. Pacific Command
involves:

-- Deterring aggression in Korea;
-- Determining the future of Taiwan by peaceful means;
-- Encouraging responsible development of growing powers;
-- Developing multilateral capabilities to handle complex
contingencies and transnational challenges;
-- Planning for transition as security challenges evolve;
-- Transforming our Armed Forces to increase their warfighting
edge.

The priorities for the U.S. Pacific Command in executing this
strategy continue to be readiness, regional engagement, transformation,
and resources.
(1) Readiness
During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many
programs. I should note, however, that the programs I will discuss and
the associated funding levels may change as a result of the Secretary's
strategy review, which will guide future decisions on military
spending. The administration will determine final 2002 and outyear
funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask that you
consider my comments in that light.
U.S. Pacific Command forces must be fully ready to execute any
assigned mission. Readiness revolves around people. If we are to
recruit and retain the quality personnel that we need, service must be
professionally rewarding to the members of our Armed Forces and must
meet their personal and family needs. If we do not meet their basic
professional and personal needs, they have many, often more lucrative,
alternatives to a life of service to their Nation.
Professionally and personally rewarding service involves confidence
that financial compensation is fair, that educational opportunities are
available to prepare for a world that values knowledge, and that
healthcare is adequate. It also involves the provision and maintenance
of suitable housing and facilities in which to live and work. It
involves confidence that we fill personnel billets to match the tasking
and that we are properly trained to conduct the full spectrum of
operations expected of us. It involves having the resources to maintain
equipment in a high state of readiness both during and between
deployments, and adequate munitions to train and fight. It involves
adequately protecting our forces on and off duty.
Pay, Education, and Healthcare. First, let me thank you for all the
positive quality of life initiatives in the Fiscal Year 2001 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The pay raise of 3.7 percent,
targeted pay table reform for mid-grade non-commissioned officers,
basic allowance for housing amendments, partial reimbursement for
mandatory pet quarantine fees, impact aid to help civilian schools
educate military dependents, and tuition assistance up to 100 percent
for off-duty education are all outstanding efforts that servicemen and
women appreciate. Also, thanks to your support, the performance of DOD
schools is second to none, though we need help in funding operating
expenses and maintaining infrastructure.
We greatly appreciate the initiatives of the 106th Congress to
enhance the TRICARE benefit and its coverage to include our retirees
over the age of 65. This is the right thing to do--such quality of life
enhancements favorably impact recruitment and retention and ultimately
force readiness. Yet, challenges remain in establishing consistent,
adequate funding of the healthcare benefit in a way that does not
compromise other essential programs. We must ensure health services
support functions organic to our operating forces, which are not in the
Defense Health Program, receive adequate funding and attention within
the Service POMs.
Real Property Maintenance. Real property maintenance (RPM)
continues to reveal the combined effects of aging facilities and under
funding. The current and accumulating RPM backlog for U.S. Pacific
Command components will amount to $7.1 billion over the next 5 years,
assuming no fundamental changes emerge from the Secretary of Defense's
ongoing strategy review. Funding intended for facilities repair and
maintenance often goes to more immediate operational needs, and the
backlog grows. The result is that our camps, posts, and stations across
the U.S. Pacific Command are shabby and deteriorating. This shortfall
in real property maintenance affects readiness, quality of life,
retention, and force protection that we can no longer ignore. Our
people deserve to live and work in a quality environment.
Housing. Good top-rate housing that meets family housing goals of
2010 remains one of my top quality of life concerns. Projects are
underway, ranging from whole barracks renewals at Fort Richardson,
Alaska, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to new family housing at Pearl
Harbor and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and Marine Forces Pacific
(MARFORPAC) expect to meet the 2010 housing goal if funding continues
at current levels for their programs. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)
anticipates adequate housing for Hawaii by 2010 if their Residential
Community Initiative is successful. However, housing in Alaska and
Japan will remain inadequate until substantial MILCON funding is
allocated to their revitalization programs. U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) also face shortages, forcing
servicemembers to live off base in Korea and Japan, often in inadequate
housing. Lack of available real estate acquisition for new housing is
the biggest obstacle in Japan and Korea. When additional real estate is
procured, we will need additional MILCON housing funding to meet
requirements above what host nation-funded construction can provide in
Japan and Korea.
Munitions. Although we are beginning to procure additional
munitions, because they have just recently entered full-rate
production, or have yet to do so, a number of preferred munitions are
available only in limited quantities and do not support training and
operational requirements. Such already limited quantities have been
drawn down as a result of expenditures in Kosovo and ongoing
consumption in Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch.
Alternative munitions will get the job done, but with greater combat
risk and losses. Funding to further increase stock levels of preferred
and precision munitions is a top priority.
Force Protection. Before the terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole,
U.S. Pacific Command's Force Protection Program had expanded over the
last year to include rear-area protection program during increased
hostilities and critical infrastructure protection. The U.S.S. Cole
bombing resulted in a command-wide, top-to-bottom review of our
antiterrorism policies and procedures.
Funding obtained through the Combating Terrorism Readiness
Initiative Fund (CbT RIF) has helped with critical emergent
requirements, but the U.S. Pacific Command still has $110 million in
unfunded requirements. Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
(JSIVA) play a significant role in assessing our program and
identifying requirements.
Following the U.S.S. Cole bombing, the command began a full
reassessment of vulnerabilities at ports and airfields not under U.S.
control. Negotiating force protection memoranda of understanding with
foreign countries is an ongoing process to ensure clearly delineated
responsibilities.
A major challenge is to prevent increased effort from becoming a
bureaucratic drill rather than a routine way of operating. Instructions
and checklists help, but they are not enough. Our commanders must think
tactically about force protection. On every deployment, every exercise
and even at home stations, we must ingrain force protection in the very
fabric of our forces. Having said that, terrorists can choose their
time and place of attack. That gives them an advantage. As long as we
are engaged around the world, there will be further attacks. Our goal
is to minimize the impact to our forces.
Staffing, Training, and Operations. As we exploit information
technology and revise our organizations, the character of combatant
command headquarters is changing. Increasingly, headquarters staffs
perform operational functions that forward forces used to do. As
examples, my staff in Hawaii provided many logistics, communications,
and intelligence support functions for our operations in East Timor
that allowed us to keep the number of U.S. personnel in country to a
minimum. This further reduced requirements for force protection and
living support. Also, PACAF is establishing a Joint Air Operations
Center at Hickam Air Force Base. This center will similarly perform
many functions of the Joint Forces Air Component Coordinator, reducing
the number of personnel that must forward deploy to conduct operations.
As our headquarters staffs become more involved in supporting
operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in addition to their
administrative functions, we are finding our staffs working harder than
before, even as they downsize. We have turned to the Reserve Components
for help, and they have done a splendid job. But our shortfalls are
growing, and we are just beginning to exploit the capability that
information technology gives us to allow forward forces to reach back
to staffs.
Increasingly, the measure of staffs to deployed forces is shifting
from ``tooth to tail'' toward ``brain to brawn.'' While the fiscal year
2001 NDAA provides some relief from the fiscal year 1998 and fiscal
year 2000 NDAAs, there is still a requirement for OSD designated
activities to reduce personnel by 7.5 percent. These additional
headquarters cuts will hinder our ability to provide effective
management and oversight of command readiness and operations. It will
be difficult to execute these reductions in a way that does not impact
our operational readiness. In the U.S. Pacific Command our staffs are
fully engaged in operations forward.
We are experiencing shortfalls not only in available billets, but
also in the funds needed to train, exercise, and operate our forces.
Particular areas affecting readiness are funding for flight hours, ship
depot maintenance, joint exercises, and Reserve support.
The funds allocated to component flying hour programs (FHP) are
increasing, but not fast enough to cover escalating costs. The rising
costs of fuel and spare parts for aging aircraft appear to be driving
the escalation. These costs may increase even faster in the years ahead
as DOD aircraft and avionics fall further behind commercial standards.
The Navy FHP is growing 15 percent annually. PACFLT is facing a $317
million shortfall in fiscal year 2001. This figure includes a MARFORPAC
shortfall of $94 million. Both PACFLT and MARFORPAC would exhaust their
fiscal year 2001 FHP funding by August without reprogramming funds.
USARPAC's and PACAF's programs also have shortfalls. The Services
increasingly rely upon supplemental appropriations to avert the
consequences of unprogrammed escalation in operation and maintenance
program costs.
PACFLT's ship depot maintenance program continues to be underfunded
relative to the full requirement. Growing deferred maintenance backlogs
have been kept in check largely through execution year supplemental
funding from Congress. This affects battle group inter-deployment
training readiness, which continues to decline as training resources
are continually sacrificed to maintain deployed readiness. Forces enter
training cycles at low state of readiness, fall to lower levels and
then ``recover'' rapidly right before deployment. The resultant
``spikes'' in our readiness curves could become vulnerabilities if
asked to respond to unforeseen contingencies.
The ability of U.S. joint forces to fight in a seamless battle
space and to conduct combined operations with our coalition partners
will provide the greatest gains in U.S. warfighting capability over the
coming decade. Joint training represents 5 percent of the operations
tempo (OPTEMPO) of forces assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. Currently,
we are well within the congressionally-mandated joint exercise man-days
reduction directives. Our USPACOM-wide man-day reduction through fiscal
year 2000 was 32 percent, 7 percent below the objective of 25 percent.
Simultaneously, we have shaped a solid Joint Training Program. This
program provides us confidence that our Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are
ready to fight. Further fiscal reductions to the Joint Exercise Program
put our JTF and joint warfighting readiness at risk. We need full
funding of the currently planned minimum exercise program. This
includes Service Incremental Funding and the Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT)
provided through the Chairman's Exercise Program. Inflation of flying
hour costs has increased exponentially over recent years, significantly
eroding our STRATLIFT buying power. This impacts us greatly in USPACOM
where STRATLIFT is our lifeblood due to our vast area of responsibility
(AOR). We need full funding to ensure we get the right forces, to the
right place, to exercise with the right joint and coalition partners,
so we can indeed remain ready.
Shortfalls also exist in funding designed to employ Reserve and
National Guard personnel. U.S. Pacific Command's Reserve billets are
based upon a single major theater war. Reservists' 2 week training
period is sufficient for them to support one major exercise per year,
which leaves the command short of personnel to support several other
major exercises in the joint training plan. Defense plans include
provisions for Reserve personnel to volunteer to support exercises, but
funds are inadequate to accommodate the volunteers.
Summary. Overall, the majority of readiness concerns of a year ago
remain today. While making progress in some areas, we are declining in
others. I continue to have no reservations about the U.S. Pacific
Command's ability to do its job today. However, I do have doubts about
its ability to do so in the future unless we make more progress in
addressing structural readiness issues.
(2) Regional Engagement
While readiness prepares us to respond, through regional engagement
we shape the region to promote security and peaceful development.
Current circumstances provide the opportunity and the necessity to
develop more mature security arrangements among the nations of the
region. Opportunities derive from dynamic regional security
developments and a new generation of leaders willing to reexamine what
policies are genuinely in their national interest. Necessity derives
from strong nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalry, and historic
grievances that drive desires to settle old scores prevalent throughout
the region. Steady and focused efforts ensure the region develops in
ways favorable to American interests.
Engagement is a process to achieve national objectives, not an end
in itself. Our efforts improves the ability of regional partners to
defend themselves, deters potential aggressors, strengthens security
alliances and partnerships, increases regional readiness for combined
operations, promotes access for American forces to facilities in the
region, and promotes security arrangements better suited to the
challenges of the 21st century.
Enhanced Regional Cooperation. Over the past year, the U.S. Pacific
Command has worked closely with the Joint Staff, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the interagency community to develop enhanced
regional cooperation. The objectives of enhancing regional cooperation
have been to improve regional readiness for combined operations and to
expand the set of states in the region that share dependable
expectations of peaceful change.
Transnational concerns affect all states in the region in varying
degrees. Many of the states in the region contribute armed forces and
police to UN peacekeeping operations. Terrorism, weapons proliferation,
illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, piracy, and other
transnational criminal activities represent problems that require
regional cooperation. Some of this is police work and some of it is
military work. Different countries organize differently. Since
adversaries operate freely without regard for borders, seeking support,
bases of operation, and weak points to attack throughout our region,
the only way to win against them is international cooperation.
By developing capabilities to work effectively as coalitions in
complex contingencies (such as East Timor); as partners in countering
terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and piracy; in managing the
consequences of chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks, natural
disasters and accidents; in evacuating citizens caught in the path of
violence; in search-and-rescue of mariners in distress; and in
providing humanitarian assistance, the armed forces of the region
improve their readiness to contribute to combined operations. Working
side-by-side on these missions builds confidence and trust among the
participants as it improves operational capabilities. It provides a way
for states that want to exert more influence in the region to do so in
constructive ways that contribute to regional security. It provides the
United States with competent coalition partners so that our Armed
Forces need not shoulder the entire load.
The U.S. Pacific Command's efforts to enhance regional security
include expanding dialogue among the armed forces of the region,
developing standard procedures and training staffs to use them, and
exercising to hone our capabilities and learn where to improve.
In addition to my visits around the region and those of my
component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command sponsors a wide range of
activities to promote regional security dialogue. The Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies (APCSS--see Appendix A) brings together
military officers from around the region at the colonel/brigadier level
and government officials of equivalent grades for a 12-week course.
APCSS also conducts a 1-week course for more senior officers and
officials, and hosts about five conferences each year. The U.S. Pacific
Command also hosts annual conferences on military operational law and
logistics, and for the past 3 years has held a conference for Chiefs of
Defense from around the region. These conferences have been very
effective in promoting military cooperation against common threats.
At the Chiefs' conference, we also demonstrated our new Asia-
Pacific Area Network (APAN). APAN is a non-secure web portal, which
provides an internet-based communications and collaboration ability for
the armed forces of the region and civilian organizations that
participate in complex contingencies to share sensitive, but
unclassified, information. On it, we have begun web-based collaboration
by posting standard procedures for combined operations. These web pages
have mechanisms so that anyone can suggest improvements. Like many
things on the web, no government signs up to use these procedures, but
they are available for those who need them. Web-based planning and
distributed simulations are also possible to add new, affordable means
to build regional capacity. Additionally, the APAN concept provides a
simple and economical means to provide a networking of institutions and
training centers with this new form of collaboration and information
exchange. These networks will be the building blocks for Asia-Pacific
Security Communities that were previously unaffordable.
We also have held Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)
conferences to refine procedures, and conducted workshops to train
staff officers from around the region as a cadre of Asia-Pacific
military planners ready to reinforce a multinational force
headquarters. We rely on lessons learned in East Timor and other
peacekeeping operations to improve the region's capability to conduct
combined operations. In November, the Philippines hosted an MPAT Staff
Planning workshop attended by 18 nations, non-governmental
organizations, and UN representatives. Many armed forces in the region
want to improve their abilities to work together, and use APAN to
continue their MPAT dialogue between workshops.
Team Challenge links bilateral exercises Cobra Gold with Thailand,
Balikitan with the Philippines, and Tandem Thrust with Australia to
address bilateral training objectives and to improve the readiness of
regional armed forces to contribute to multilateral operations. This
year Singapore will participate and other nations, such as Japan and
Korea, will observe with an eye toward participating in future years.
In Team Challenge we will exercise elements from the full spectrum of
missions that our combined forces may be called upon to do together,
from complex contingencies to humanitarian assistance.
These are examples of efforts to enhance regional security
cooperation. As we progress, we find many requirements to coordinate
better on logistics, intelligence and other aspects of our operations,
and take steps such as developing a coalition-wide area network
(successfully employed in RIMPAC, our multinational naval exercise).
With cooperation from the nations of the region, and the initiative
that my staff and my components have demonstrated, enhanced regional
cooperation and security communities have grown from a concept to a
substantial approach for promoting security and peaceful development
over the past year.
The reactions to the U.S. Pacific Command's efforts have been
largely positive, with some reservations. Some allies have expressed
concern that multinational efforts will dilute the quality of our
bilateral relations. For enhanced regional cooperation to succeed, we
must strengthen our traditional bilateral relations, focusing our
efforts on capabilities to pursue common interests, and then reach out
to other nations in the region. The Team Challenge planning efforts
have demonstrated our commitment to meeting bilateral training
objectives and enhancing them with skills required for coalition
operations.
Other nations have expressed concerns that this is a precursor to
the United States reducing its involvement in the region. Quite the
contrary! By improving our capabilities to work together, the nations
of this critical region can more effectively address the broad range of
security challenges that none can solve alone.
Also, some nations fear that it is a scheme for containing China.
Instead, it is a way to encourage China to contribute to regional
security in constructive ways. We welcome the fact that China has sent
15 police officers as part of the CIVPOL contingent to East Timor. We
would welcome greater Chinese involvement in peacekeeping such as they
provided in Cambodia in 1994. The last class at APCSS included two
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers and two officials from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They learned that many nations in the
region share American security concerns and that cooperation in many
areas is in China's interest. The way ahead in U.S. Pacific Command's
relations with the PLA is, with the support of other armed forces, to
encourage cooperation in areas where our Nations genuinely share mutual
interests, while maintaining that disputes must be resolved peacefully.
As with many nations in the region, we must work to transform PLA
leadership mindsets from measuring differences in military power to
measuring progress in regional security.
The $10 million in Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) funds
provided by Congress in fiscal year 2000 and $24.6 million provided in
fiscal year 2001 have been essential to the initiatives to enhance
regional cooperation. The dollars we invest in these regional
activities pay huge dividends in U.S. security.
Currently, U.S. Pacific Command interactions with armed forces of
14 of the 43 nations in the region are restricted in some form. Some of
these restrictions are in the U.S. interest. Others, I question. I
encourage the close review of restrictions to ensure we have drawn the
lines at the right places. The objective is to build relationships and
influence for the long term as we exact penalties in the short term.
Foreign Military Officer Education (FMOE). One area where I would
recommend eliminating restrictions is in foreign military officer
education. The experience of American officers who have attended
foreign military colleges provides an unparalleled understanding of how
foreign armed forces see their role and approach operations. Similarly,
foreign officers who attend American military colleges develop an
understanding of the value of professional armed forces, removed from
politics and subordinate to civilian government authority. They come to
appreciate that reliance on force to resolve internal disputes, rather
than political accommodation and economic development, stokes the fires
of rebellion and drives away investments needed for national growth.
They also acquire a deeper appreciation of America's interest in
maintaining international security so all may prosper. The contacts
they develop with Americans and officers from their region establish a
network for dialogue and become particularly valuable as they assume
leadership roles within their armed forces.
International Military Education and Training (IMET). We should
also examine restrictions on many aspects of our IMET program.
Education is a long-term investment and the IMET program, a main source
of funding for FMOE, is our primary tool in this effort. I believe
unrestricted IMET programs are fundamentally in the national interest.
Some say military education is a reward for countries that behave
according to international standards. On the contrary, military
education is a valuable tool we use to gain influence with foreign
militaries. Military training--teaching tactical skills and equipment
maintenance--should be carefully tailored and controlled. However,
military education--study at command and staff colleges--introduces the
ideals of democracy, civilian control of the military, and respect for
human rights, and should be available to all. Many reform-minded, pro-
U.S. military leaders in the Asia-Pacific region today are IMET
graduates who strongly advocate a continued U.S. presence and
engagement in Asia.
IMET is a modest, long-term investment to help build a secure,
peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. Following a declining trend,
with your help U.S. Pacific Command's funding for IMET is now on the
right path. In fiscal year 2000 we received $6.659 million for 17
countries, and in fiscal year 2001 our budget is about $7.2 million for
19 countries. Further increases would yield real benefits to U.S.
security.
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. U.S. ratification of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is another action that would
enhance regional security cooperation. Many Asia-Pacific countries
assert excessive maritime claims that challenge navigation rights. Over
the past few years, parties disputing territory in the South China Sea
have shifted their approach from occupying reefs to negotiating over a
Code of Conduct. In this and other disputes, the U.S. position is that
agreements should be in accordance with UNCLOS. Ratification will
strengthen our hand in demanding compliance with UNCLOS requirements
and in countering excessive maritime claims.
Summary. We have continued to make significant progress this year
in better structuring our engagement programs in the Asia-Pacific
region to advance U.S. interests. Through continued emphasis on
education, dialogue, standard procedures, staff training, improved
communications, exercises and coordination on matters of common
interest, we will continue to expand the set of nations in the Asia-
Pacific region that share dependable expectations of peaceful change.
We will enhance regional cooperation and access of U.S. forces to
facilities in the region, strengthen alliances and security
partnerships, and deter aggression.
(3) Transformation
Transformation involves changes in operational concepts and
organizational schemes that take advantage of technology to provide
decisive advantages in warfare. The Armed Forces of the United States
are committed to leading that change in the 21st century. At U.S.
Pacific Command, our transformation strategy is based on two parallel
initiatives--technology insertion efforts such as the Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program run out of OSD and the Joint
Experimentation program that is led by U.S. Joint Forces Command.
Since I last spoke with you, U.S. Pacific Command has been rewarded
for its aggressive pursuit of ACTDs with 3 fiscal year 2001 new start
ACTDs and a fourth ACTD-like project, bringing the total number of
ACTDs we are involved in today to 13.
The Tactical Missile Systems-Penetrator ACTD will provide a
penetrator weapon designed to deal with specific high threat targets in
Korea within 3 years. The Coalition Theater Logistics ACTD will provide
vital logistics command and control capabilities for coalition forces
operating in campaigns similar to that in East Timor. The Hunter
Standoff Killer Team ACTD will provide vital joint C\4\I capabilities
to engage time critical targets and massed armor. The Coalition Rear
Area Security Operations Command and Control (CRASOC\2\) is an ACTD-
like project in that it will have streamlined management and early
operator involvement. CRASOC\2\ will develop force protection C\4\I
capabilities to improve coordination between U.S. security forces and
host nation police and military agencies for improved protection of our
forces stationed overseas.
The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program is serving
U.S. Pacific Command well. We need such programs designed to get
advanced technology rapidly into the field for evaluation and
experimentation.
The pace of joint experimentation in the U.S. Pacific Command has
increased since I last testified before you. Over the past year, U.S.
Pacific Command has supported U.S. Joint Forces Command in the Unified
Vision and Millennium Challenge series of experiments and planning
conferences. We participated in Joint Warrior Interoperability
Demonstration (JWID) 2000 as a primary demonstration site and the
Combined Task Force Commander's headquarters in the Pacific Scenario.
We have agreed to team, as host CINC, with the Joint Staff and U.S.
Marine Corps in the execution of JWID 2002-2003 and have already
stepped forward to influence the C\4\ISR interoperability challenges
that will be addressed. We continue efforts to develop joint
interoperability at the tactical level through the Expanding the
Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD. With the support of U.S. Joint Forces
Command and the Services, we have made significant progress in
developing the Joint Mission Force (JMF) concept into a capability.
A Joint Mission Force is a seamless Joint/Combined Pacific Theater
response force capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions
from a complex contingency through humanitarian assistance and of
serving as the leading edge of a major war. This force will execute
operations more effectively, rapidly, and efficiently than we can
today. This transformation effort has moved from its infancy into
wargames and exercises that enhance our ability to rapidly form and
deploy a Joint Task Force. We have identified the top 10 challenges to
more effective Joint Task Force operations and have made significant
progress in developing procedures to address them. We also have
incorporated JMF and other mature experimentation into our exercise
program.
We have concentrated our efforts over the past year on the
improvements we need to establish a relevant, common operational
picture and communicate tasking and information among the headquarters
of components of a Joint Task Force. Our JMF Command and Control
exercise program, or C\2\X, is identifying clear requirements to enable
a JTF and assess where specific deficiencies exist, with the intent of
fixing deficiencies by 2003. We are receiving strong support from the
Services in rectifying these deficiencies that are basic to our joint
warfighting capability. The greatest gains in warfighting capability
that we will see over the coming decade will come from our ability to
eliminate seams in the battlespace and let all units assigned to a
Joint Task Force exploit their full potential. We have received
significant financial and staff support from U.S. Joint Forces Command
in taking the JMF concept from its infancy to a near-term capability.
By including our allies and close security partners in our wargames, we
ensure that our JMF efforts are in harmony with our other efforts to
improve regional readiness for combined operations.
Australia, Japan, Korea, and Singapore all have the technological
resources to work with the United States in developing advanced warfare
capabilities. We share information on our efforts with these countries,
and work together to improve coalition interoperability at the high end
of military technology.
Some have expressed concerns that by strengthening coalition
capabilities and working with potential adversaries on skills required
for peacekeeping operations and complex contingencies, we are
jeopardizing our warfighting edge. The reverse is true. We are
continuing to widen the gap in warfighting capabilities between the
United States, its allies and partners, and potential adversaries. As
we experiment, we improve our readiness, enhance regional cooperation,
and transform our forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Indeed, U.S. Pacific Command's priorities of readiness, regional
engagement, and transformation are not wholly distinct activities. Let
me try to bring this idea alive by describing a visionary Western
Pacific deployment of a carrier battle group (CVBG) on its way to the
Arabian Gulf.
During workups, the battle group acts as the Navy component of a
joint task force under a realistic exercise scenario. The battle group
maintains a common operating picture with a JTF commander's
headquarters and subordinate Service components. During that time, it
experiments with a new C\4\ system being developed by the Army--for
example a new version of the Coalition Wide Area Network--holding
common operational picture checks with brigade headquarters in
Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines.

-- As the battle group approaches Japan, it forms a two-
carrier task force, and conducts an area access exercise
involving Japanese and ROK forces in both coalition and
opposition force roles. The battle group joins the Japanese
Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
-- It then integrates into the Korean area air defense and
conducts experiments integrating joint and combined fires,
including live ordnance fire on ranges.
-- The task force then transits from Korea down to the South
China Sea.
-- It exercises operational deception, employing information
from national technical means to evaluate effectiveness.
-- It conducts Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) exercises, working
the seams between CVBG and area ASW in littoral regions,
developing new concepts and establishing C\4\SIR requirements.
-- It exercises area air and missile defense with an Air Force
component out of Okinawa and Guam, working Air Tasking Order
improvements and experiments with information operations, and
routinely operating with Global Hawk to hone new joint
concepts.
-- The transit culminates with a dissimilar air engagement
exercise with Singapore and port calls in South East Asia.
During the port calls, battle group officers hold seminars with
counterparts in host countries to improve coalition
interoperability at the tactical level.

All of this could be done in 10-14 days. What would we have
accomplished?

-- Increased readiness of all forces involved, to respond to
contingencies;
-- Conducted regional engagement that both reassured allies,
and deterred those who would use aggression to impose their
will;
-- Made progress in transforming the way we operate, both to
take advantage of emerging technology and to address emerging
challenges.

This vignette illustrates that readiness, regional engagement, and
the transformation of our Armed Forces are not distinct efforts,
accomplished by separate organizations at separate times. We do them
together, with operational units. If we experiment and adapt, we are
increasing our readiness, while we make the evolutionary changes in
technology and concepts which will lead to the transformation of
warfighting. If we do them with our allies and security partners, we
have the most effective kind of military engagement.
Transforming our Armed Forces to maintain their leading edge and
interoperability with coalition partners is essential to protecting
American security interests in the 21st century. Several members of
Congress have been active in pushing us to pursue this program, and we
need your continued support and leadership.
(4) Resources
The U.S. Pacific Command's ability to execute its strategy rests on
its ability to command ready, forward-deployed and forward-stationed
forces, to move them where they need to be in the theater, and to
reinforce them in the event of a major war. Ultimately this depends on
the resources Congress and the American taxpayers provide us. In this
section, I will discuss resources in several key areas that are
important to the Pacific Command's strategy.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C\4\)
Capabilities
Information technology is changing every aspect of warfare in an
evolutionary way and warfare as a whole in a revolutionary way. From my
perspective, C\4\ support fits into three main categories: (1) an end-
to-end infrastructure; (2) the capability to integrate and process data
into usable information and make it available when needed; and (3) the
protection of information.
First, the end-to-end enterprise enhances the ability to command
and control forces and consists of a space segment, a downlink
capability, and the ground segment.
The U.S. Pacific Command's vast area of operations, covering 52
percent of the earth's surface, requires forces to rely heavily on
strategic satellite communications (SATCOM). Since my testimony to you
last year, we've made great strides in many of the SATCOM programs. For
example, we accelerated the Advanced Extremely High Frequency program
to compensate for a Milstar launch failure; agreed to launch a third
Wideband Gapfiller System satellite to complete global coverage as the
Defense Satellite Communications System constellation replacement; and
scheduled the launches of the three Milstar satellites. The challenge
is to keep these critical satellite programs on track.
As I also stated last year, my Joint Task Force commanders and
deployed units must have access to the strategic defense information
infrastructure, the Global Information Grid, or GIG. This capability is
critical to providing them with vital command, control, and
intelligence information. I strongly supported the DOD Teleport
program, as did many of my fellow CINCs, and I am now satisfied that
this program is on course.
Advances in the space segment and downlink capability provide
little value if we cannot push the information out to the user. The
base, post, camp, and station infrastructures must keep pace. Since we
still have antiquated cable plants, network wiring, and end-user
equipment, we must attack this ground infrastructure as aggressively as
we have the space segment. The recent decision that injected
significant funding into the U.S. Army's European and Pacific theaters
is a tremendous boost in our fight to keep pace with technology, and I
applaud your and OSD's efforts in directing that funding to us.
However, requirements go beyond the U.S. Army. The U.S. Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps are also encountering the same problems and
require much-needed funding support if we are to modernize entire
theaters. While single-Service efforts significantly help in the
modernization battle, we realize maximum payoffs when we collectively
raise all Services to the same capability level.
Not to be overlooked in the end-to-end infrastructure is the
frequency spectrum. We must proceed cautiously with the sell-off of DOD
frequencies since that loss directly translates into potential
operational risks. Once we sell them, they are forever unavailable for
military use.
The second C\4\ category involves converting data into useful
information that will optimize synchronous planning and execution, and
improve decision support. At the heart of this requirement is
interoperability and accessibility. Interoperability allows all parties
to share the same capabilities and information, while accessibility
allows them to get the information they require when and where they
need it.
The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is the backbone of the
joint and combined command and control capability. Yet, Service
variants of GCCS are not fully interoperable with the joint version.
For example, the GCCS Integrated Imagery and Intelligence application
being developed for the joint version of GCCS is falling behind, while
the Services continue to modernize their individual intelligence
applications. To fix this, we must mandate new C\4\ systems be joint
`from cradle to grave.'
There are also GCCS incompatibilities in combined operations; for
example, GCCS-Joint and GCCS-Korea. These two systems share some common
operational picture data, but do not share information via files, e-
mail, and other web service tools. Obstacles to combined
interoperability lie in information release restrictions. Our allies
understandably restrict release of their classified information.
Likewise, we want to control release of U.S. classified information. To
achieve effective combined interoperability, we must develop much more
capable security procedures and sophisticated tools to allow
information exchange while protecting our national and allied data.
Technology is changing the way the warfighter prepares, trains, and
executes the mission. We must develop a mindset promoting innovation
and technology insertion. It is through continued support of Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations, experimentation programs, and
exercises with our coalition partners, that we find ways to improve
interoperability and enhance capabilities. We must put more emphasis on
acquisition by adaptation, put proven prototypes into a joint field
environment, and mature them through a tight spiral development cycle.
Information is power, and a fully interoperable atmosphere allows us to
collaborate with coalition partners, share operational pictures,
increase the speed of command, and ultimately, win the day.
Obviously, sharing information among Services, sub-unified
commands, and coalition partners is a complex security challenge. That
leads me to the third category, information assurance (IA). How do we
provide access to, and share information with, Asia-Pacific countries
while protecting U.S. and coalition-sensitive data from potential
adversaries?
To improve IA in the U.S. Pacific Command, we are taking several
measures. We are evaluating the Automated Intrusion Detection
Environment. Our Theater C\4\ISR Coordination Center is building a
theater IA common operational picture (COP) (similar to the COP we use
in the command and control arena) and tracking intrusion attempts and
methods. We also are working closely with the Defense Information
Systems Agency on an improved configuration that will provide full
coverage of external connections to our Pacific networks.
Yes, we can improve IA in the theater; however, to do so requires a
heavy investment in people and additional hardware. The payback is not
always as easily recognizable as with the production of new airplanes,
ships, or tanks. You cannot touch and feel information protection, but
a loss of critical or time-sensitive information or a denial of service
can be far more detrimental to national security than a single weapon
system. I request your continued support as we implement IA into our
daily operations.
As you can see, C\4\ is a major concern in the Pacific and my top
resource priority. While we have made great strides recently in
addressing satellite communications shortfalls, we still have a long
way to go. We must now focus on modernizing the ground infrastructures
and ensuring the protection of our networks and the information that
traverses them.
Intelligence
Intelligence is essential to monitor potential adversary
developments and preparations so that we can train our forces for the
threats that they face and move them into position in a timely fashion.
Shortages of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets--U-2s, RC-135s, EP-3s, significantly impact USPACOM's
readiness ratings. These shortfalls diminish our situational awareness,
early indications and warning (I&W), and deep knowledge of the
capabilities, plans, and intentions of key theaters in our area of
responsibility. Although Joint Staff-planned allocation of airborne
reconnaissance assets is adequate for routine operations in the Pacific
Theater, we do not have the surge capability to monitor crises or
cyclical increases of potential adversary activities. Other chronic
shortfalls in high priority intelligence include linguists, tactical
signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems, intelligence specialists, and
intelligence interoperability.
The core of intelligence analysis and dissemination in the theater
is the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC), located near Pearl
Harbor. JICPAC's operational efficiency and impact suffers because
almost 100 JICPAC personnel must work in a revamped hangar at Hickam
AFB, due to space limitations in the main JICPAC facility. These split-
based operations cost almost $300,000 per year for the separate
facility, as well as lost time and efficiency. In addition, JICPAC's
building, in a vulnerable location near a major highway, presents a
serious force protection issue. At the same time, the Kunia Regional
SIGINT Operations Center (RSOC) occupies an aging facility, built in
1945, renovated for cryptologic operations in 1979, and then updated
throughout the last 20 years. Collocating the RSOC with the new JICPAC
facility on an intelligence ``campus'' would improve intelligence
exchange, analytical dialogue, and efficiencies in infrastructure.
Advances in global telecommunications technology continue to place
enormous pressure on the need to modernize both national and tactical
cryptologic capabilities. USPACOM supports the National Security
Agency/Central Security Service's (NSA/CSS's) strategic transformation
actions and changes undertaken in the last year. NSA must transform to
address the global net, but warfighters' knowledge of adversary
battlefield communications will also continue to be a high USPACOM
priority. NSA must be funded to continue modernizing tactical SIGINT
collection capabilities, operations of the RSOC and accompanying land-
based collection architecture, addressing ELINT collection shortfalls,
and operations of the Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC).
Specifically, NSA needs more capable, joint tactical cryptologic
systems. Rapid advances in widely available communication technology
have rendered obsolete much of the current inventory of tactical
cryptologic systems. At the same time, the Services' R&D funding has
declined. NSA and the Services must continue to aggressively pursue
standards and common architectures, such as the Joint Tactical SIGINT
Architecture.
Increased HUMINT capabilities are critical to support collection
against strategic and operational requirements in the Pacific.
Improvements are needed to enhance collection against key USPACOM
indications and warning requirements and hard-target organizations and
countries. Continuing investment in theater-based HUMINT resources,
specifically computers and communications capabilities, is essential to
improve collection against hard targets. Any further Defense HUMINT
Service (DHS) reductions will adversely impact USPACOM-based U.S.
Defense Attache Offices (USDAOs), field operating bases, and DHS
support to key USPACOM collection requirements and contingency
operations. The USDAO system, in particular, already is experiencing
serious resource constraints in the USPACOM AOR.
The Nation's future imagery and geo-spatial architecture will
deliver unmatched capability, including enhanced imagery collection
provided by unmanned aerial vehicles and the future imagery
architecture. However, USPACOM warfighters will not reap the full
benefits of this capability without full tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) investment. A robust TPED
architecture is essential to ensure that dynamically tasked national,
airborne, and commercial imagery and geo-spatial products connect the
sensors to the analysts and, ultimately, to the tactical consumers.
Services and agencies must institutionalize the need to properly
program resources that incorporate TPED capabilities. Progress is
occurring and CINC interests are being addressed. However, we will work
to identify outyear funds to meet substantial portions of Senior
Warfighting Forum priority requirements. Specifically, the Services
must work with National Imagery and Mapping Agency to fund the
capabilities needed to make Joint Vision 2010/2020 a reality. These
include required technical enhancements to theater digital
infrastructure, advanced analytical exploitation tools, and improved
imagery analyst training (especially for advanced sensor products).
Asian linguist deficiencies are acute and a documented USPACOM
readiness concern. Despite additional student slots at the Defense
Language Institute, there are recurring and persistent shortages of
Asian linguists to meet Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Contingency Plan
(CONPLAN) requirements. Also, resources for low-density linguists in
support of probable Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) continue
to be problematic. Service recruiting and retention shortfalls, coupled
with the inherent difficulty of Asian languages and the longer training
periods required, aggravate these deficiencies.
Mobility Infrastructure and Strategic Lift
With congressional and Service support, we have made solid progress
in correcting deficiencies in our mobility infrastructure. A total of
15 MILCON projects are either in work or programmed through fiscal year
2004. We will apply supplemental MILCON funding for fiscal year 2001 to
critical en route and currently unfunded infrastructure projects, such
as those at Wake Island.
We support the fiscal year 2001 MILCON language that would restore
MILCON contingency funding. While we are making headway with some near-
term MILCON projects, sustained funding is still required. The
continued appropriation of resources is absolutely essential to
maintain an upward trend and complete the necessary repairs of our
aging mobility infrastructure.
In addition to a well-maintained mobility infrastructure,
contingency throughput in our theater largely depends on strategic
lift. As identified in the recently released Mobility Requirements
Study 2005 (MRS-05), there are ``areas where improvements are needed in
mobility programs. . . An airlift fleet of 49.7 million-ton-miles per
day, (the previous established level), is not adequate to meet the full
range of requirements.'' I fully support the MRS-05 recommendation that
``DOD should develop a program to provide [additional] airlift
capacity.''
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4)
A key logistics and sustainment shortfall remains in Army
Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) in Korea. Sustainment shortfalls limit
ability to reconstitute the force and sustain missions, resulting in
increased risk. Major end item shortages include M1A1/A2 tanks, MLRS,
HEMTT fuelers, and some chemical defense equipment. Equipment shortages
currently total about $450 million. Lack of repair parts and major
assemblies within the APS-4 sustainment stockpile will directly impact
the ability to return battle-damaged equipment to the fight. The Army's
current plans are to cascade additional equipment into the APS-4
sustainment stocks over the next couple of years, thus reducing this
shortfall.
Infrastructure in Japan and Korea
The Host Nation-Funded Construction (HNFC) programs in Japan and
Korea provide almost $1 billion annually in new construction to support
U.S. Forces. However, the United States must fund the initial project
planning and design (P&D) effort. For fiscal year 2001, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers allocated $20.5 million for the HNFC program. This
is a return on investment of 46:1. Continued congressional support for
the planning and design funding is critical.
One provision of the latest Special Measures Agreement is that
Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) funds can no longer be
used for ``revenue producing'' projects. Examples of projects
disallowed in the fiscal year 2001 program were Army and Air Force
Exchange Service warehouses, exchanges, commissaries, and gymnasiums.
The effect of this provision is that additional MILCON funding will be
required for the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Army and Air Force
Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, Defense Commissary Agency, and DOD
schools to support quality of life initiatives for our servicemembers
in Japan. We will need strong congressional support for these MILCON
projects when programmed. There has not been a MILCON project completed
in Japan since 1989.
New Headquarters Building
I would like to offer my thanks again for your support for the new
U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters building. We held the groundbreaking
ceremony in February and are on track to provide a facility designed to
support the 21st century.
Security Assistance
Security assistance funding in the Pacific theater is an important
component of my theater engagement strategy.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF). For fiscal year 2001, two U.S.
Pacific Command countries will each receive about $2 million in FMF:
Mongolia, to increase its border security capabilities; and the
Philippines, for critical aircraft and patrol boat spare parts. State
Department has allocated FMF for East Timor, as those funds meet
legislative requirements.
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC). The Asia-
Pacific region needs better capabilities to respond collectively when
the United Nations or the nations of the region determine that an
international response is required. Approximately $2.2 million in
fiscal year 2001 EIPC funds have been requested for five Pacific
Command countries, to either enhance existing or establish new
peacekeeping operation (PKO) training centers. These well-spent dollars
are helping our neighbors share the PKO burden around the world.
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Program
(NADR), and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). NADR
funding has helped the Philippines improve its ability to deal with
terrorists, and, in combination with DOD OHDACA money, has done much to
reduce the threat of unexploded ordnance in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam. Anticipated fiscal year 2001 funding will expand demining
operations in those countries.
These security assistance programs, along with IMET, are crucial to
our continued engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and I request your
continued support in their funding.
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
(COE)
Since its beginning in 1994, the Center of Excellence in Disaster
Management and Humanitarian Assistance has bridged the gap between
civil and military activities related to humanitarian emergencies.
Historically an annual increase to DOD appropriations has funded the
COE. Collaborating the resources and strengths of governmental and non-
governmental organizations, the Center of Excellence has participated
in relief efforts following floods in Vietnam and Venezuela,
earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan, and population displacement in Kosovo
and East Timor. The Center's approach to response, education and
training, research, and consulting for disaster relief has become the
model for successful interaction between the military and private
humanitarian organizations.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Asia-Pacific issues are growing in importance on the
American security agenda. Our people are the foundation for everything
that we do, and providing professionally rewarding service must be our
first concern. Next must be our strategy, and ensuring that we have the
capability to sustain our forward basing, support increasingly
information-rich operations, and the mobility to move our forces across
this vast theater and across the globe. The coming year will continue
to present challenges for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
We neglect developments in the region at our peril, but with sustained
attention we can help build a region which will support American
interests over the long term.

APPENDIX A

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a regional
studies, conference, and research center in Honolulu. Established in
September 1995 as a preventive defense and confidence-building measure,
its mission is to enhance cooperation and build relationships through
mutual understanding and study of comprehensive security issues among
military and civilian representatives of the United States and other
Asia-Pacific nations. The cornerstone of the Center's program is the
College of Security Studies, which provides a forum where future
military and government civilian leaders from the region can explore
pressing security issues at the national policy level within a
multilateral setting of mutual respect and transparency to build trust
and encourage openness. Central to the College's effectiveness are the
relationships forged between participants that bridge cultures and
nationalities. Full and unobstructed participation by all nations in
the region, to include such countries as Indonesia and Cambodia, is
essential to achieving this. Complementing the College is a robust
conference and seminar program that brings together current leaders
from the region to examine topical regional security concerns,
including peacekeeping, arms proliferation and the role of nuclear
weapons in the region, and energy and water security.
The Center directly serves to further our regional engagement goals
in several ways. First, it serves as a resource for identifying and
communicating emerging regional security issues, within the constraints
of non-attribution. Second, the Center functions as an extremely
effective ``unofficial'' engagement tool to continue critical dialog in
cases where official mil-to-mil relations are curtailed. Recent
conferences and regional travel involving contact with, or
participation by, prominent representatives from China highlight this
role. Additionally, the Center frequently coordinates or hosts
conferences addressing topical issues of interest to the U.S. Pacific
Command or the region. Finally, the Center serves as a forum for
articulating U.S. defense policy to representatives from the region.
Authorization to waive certain expenses as an incentive for
participation, and expanded authority to accept domestic and foreign
donations to help defray costs are crucial to the continued success of
the Center.

Chairman Warner. Now, General Pace.

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

General Pace. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is
really an honor to have this opportunity to appear before you
this morning, and thank you very much for that.
I would like to reserve most of the time available to
answer your questions so we can get to the meat of what you
want to know about, sir.
I would like to mention two things up front.
First is to thank you, sir, and the very strong bipartisan
support of this committee that has enabled your Armed Forces to
be as strong as we are to do what we do. Visits such as that
led by Senator Levin and the members of his delegation and
Senator McCain and the members of his delegation are very
tangible evidence of the concern and leadership of our Congress
and this Senate and this committee, and we very much appreciate
that.
Second, sir, it is my great honor for the last 6 months to
be the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command. The
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen with
whom I serve are absolutely first class, sir. They are
wonderful young men and women. It is a distinct honor to serve
with them. I would just like to highlight before this
committee, sir, that your Armed Forces in this Nation are
extremely well-served by the young folks who volunteer today.
With that, sir, I would like to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Pace follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Peter Pace, USMC

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to present my assessment of security in Latin
America and the Caribbean. I would also like to thank the Members of
Congress and particularly this committee for your outstanding support
to the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). I appreciate your
interest in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) and the support
you have consistently provided to our mission with partner nations in
this theater.
Since assuming command of USSOUTHCOM 6 months ago, I have traveled
to 21 of the 32 countries and 3 of the 14 separate territories in my
assigned AOR, visiting many of the Andean Ridge nations several times.
I have met key military and civilian leaders in the region, and I have
worked to ensure Southern Command's plans and initiatives are well-
coordinated with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and other U.S. government agencies. My visits to our
neighboring nations have provided important insights to the region and
its leaders, as well as to specific challenges and opportunities.
In this statement, I will provide the committee our strategic
assessment of the AOR, highlighting the most serious transnational
threats that challenge the growth of democracy in several countries.
Next, I will detail our progress in resetting the theater architecture
in the post-Panama era, followed by an overview of our engagement
efforts and most important requirements. I will conclude by presenting
my priorities for the way ahead.

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

U.S. Southern Command's AOR includes all of Central and South
America, the Caribbean, and surrounding waters, totaling more than 15.6
million square miles. The AOR is divided into four sub-regions: the
Caribbean, Central America, Andean Ridge, and the Southern Cone. Total
population in the AOR exceeds 404 million people. Twenty-five languages
are spoken, and the people practice 10 different religions. The theater
is a diverse region, rich in natural resources with largely untapped
industrial potential. Today, the per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) ranges from a low of about $1,300 to a high of $25,000.
The United States has strong economic, cultural, and security ties
to Latin America and the Caribbean. More than 39 percent of our trade
is conducted within the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, 49 cents out
of every dollar spent in Latin America is spent on imported goods and
services from the U.S. Latin America and the Caribbean supply more oil
to the U.S. than all Middle East countries combined. In addition to our
strong economic ties, we share an increasingly strong cultural bond.
Today, one of every eight Americans is of Hispanic origin, and that
ratio is projected to increase to one in four by 2050.
Except for Cuba, all nations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR have some form
of democratically elected government and free market economy. During
the past 20 years, we have seen a positive trend as nations adopted
democratic principles and institutions, subordinated their military to
civilian leadership, instituted the rule of law, and promoted respect
for human rights. However, democracies have not matured or flourished
equally in the region. Some countries are struggling to complete the
full transition to democratic rule. In other countries, democracy
itself is at risk as failing economies, deteriorating security, and
endemic corruption undermine institutions and public support.
Although several age-old border disputes still provide ample
opportunity for disagreement between neighbors, this region does not
have an arms race or a ``shooting'' war between nations. In fact, the
region spends less per capita on arms than any area of the world.
Today, democracies in this AOR generally maintain open and amicable
relations with each other and reject armed conflict between nations.

THREATS

The greatest threats to democracy, regional stability, and
prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean are illegal migration,
arms trafficking, crime and corruption, and illegal drug trafficking.
Collectively, these transnational threats destabilize fragile
democracies by corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal
activity, undermining legitimate economies, and disrupting social
order.
Illegal Migration. Illegal migration is a potential problem in our
AOR. The ongoing violence in Colombia associated with fighting between
illegally armed groups is expected to displace Colombian refugees
across the international borders of neighboring nations. Panama and
Venezuela have already reported displaced Colombian refugees inside
their sovereign territory. Several countries that share porous borders
with Colombia will remain vulnerable to illegal migration and
incursions by armed insurgents and paramilitaries, resulting in
political and social instability.
Arms Trafficking. The illegal trafficking of arms poses a serious
threat to the national security of several nations. In our AOR, the
breakup of the drug cartels in the early 1990s resulted in smaller,
more adaptable drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that have formed a
symbiotic relationship with the insurgents and paramilitaries. These
illegal and violent groups receive significant financial support from
the DTOs, which they use to procure weapons. The insurgents can afford
anything available on the international arms market, possibly including
man-portable air defense weapons systems (the possession of which we
cannot confirm).
Crime and Corruption. Local and international criminal
organizations are an increasing threat to the security and stability of
the region. Many nations in the AOR lack the organization and resources
to effectively counter criminal activity within their borders. In some
areas, criminal organizations are so pervasive that the governments
cannot effectively protect their citizens.
Although money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, and bribery of
government officials are common criminal activities within many Latin
American and Caribbean countries, the impact is regional, as evidenced
by the recent kidnapping of oil workers in Ecuador. In calendar year
2000, Colombia reported more than 3,000 kidnappings. Although criminal
activity in the Caribbean has typically been less violent and
characterized as local, we are seeing a proliferation of street gangs.
Drug Trafficking. The illicit drug industry is a corrosive force
that threatens the stability and rule of law in the Andean Region.
Partner nation governments realize the importance of working together
to develop regional approaches to counter the production and
trafficking of illegal drugs. However, effective and sustainable
counterdrug operations are beyond the capabilities of our partner
nations' thinly stretched security forces. U.S. counterdrug assistance
to security forces will help Colombia and other nations in the region
develop more effective counterdrug capabilities while enhancing United
States Government support to partner nation interdiction efforts.
Drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable skill in
adjusting their operations in response to our counterdrug efforts.
These small but efficient organizations will change the place of
production, transport routes, points of transshipment, and markets when
eradication or interdiction programs achieve success. Many DTOs provide
financial support to the insurgents and illegal self-defense groups to
secure protection from counterdrug operations conducted by the Colombia
National Police (CNP) and Colombian Military (COLMIL).
We are encouraged by the success of cocaine eradication programs in
Peru and Bolivia and by the initial results of Phase I of Plan
Colombia. Unfortunately, reductions in Peru's and Bolivia's cultivation
appear to have been offset by Colombia's increased coca cultivation in
calendar year 2000. However, further assessment is required to
determine the full impact of the intensive aerial eradication effort
recently conducted by the Government of Colombia in the Putumayo
Department.
The illicit drug industry is also a growing threat to the U.S.
homeland. According to the most recent interagency assessment, law
enforcement and security forces detected 645 MT of cocaine
hydrochloride (HCl) moving toward the United States from the source
zone during 2000. The assessment also reports that 128 MT were
interdicted, leaving the possibility that an estimated 517 MT were
available for domestic consumption. According to the Office of the
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), nearly 17,000 Americans lost
their lives last year to drug overdoses and drug related violence. In
addition to this tragic loss of life, the direct and indirect costs of
illegal drug use to the U.S. taxpayer exceeded $110 billion.

THEATER ARCHITECTURE

The United States Southern Command, located in Miami but based in
Panama until 1997, is responsible for planning, coordinating, and
conducting all U.S. military activities in our AOR. We promote
democracy and stability by working cooperatively with host nation
security forces, responding to crises or contingencies such as the
recent earthquakes in El Salvador, and supporting partner nation
security forces and U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in reducing
the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. To accomplish our
mission, we have established the post-Panama theater architecture that
includes our headquarters in Miami and component headquarters forward
deployed in Puerto Rico.
Puerto Rico has replaced Panama for forward basing headquarters in
the region. United States Army South (USARSO) has completed its
relocation to Fort Buchanan, where it draws heavily on the Puerto Rican
Army and Air Force National Guardsmen and Reservists to accomplish its
assigned missions. United States Navy South (USNAVSO) was activated
last year and is collocated with Special Operations Command South
(USSOCSO) at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.
To compensate for the loss of the 8,500 ft. runway at Howard Air
Force Base, the United States Government (USG) negotiated long-term
agreements for the use of forward operating locations (FOLs) at Aruba-
Curacao in the Netherland Antilles, Manta in Ecuador, and Comalapa in
El Salvador. These locations provide us the capability to conduct
sustained CD operations throughout the source and transit zones. U.S.
detection, monitoring, and tracking (DM&T) operations from the FOLs
improve our support to partner nation interdiction efforts. Thanks to
the support of the U.S. Congress, funding has been provided for
necessary operational and safety improvements for Manta and Aruba-
Curacao and for construction design at Comalapa.
The Aruba-Curacao FOL provides effective, rapid response DM&T
operations in the northern source zone, which includes the Guajira
Peninsula of Colombia and the Venezuelan border region, as well as a
large part of the transit zone. The formal 10-year access agreement
with the Kingdom of the Netherlands was signed on March 2, 2000, but
awaits final parliamentary debates and ratification.
The FOL at Manta extends our Airborne Early Warning aircraft
coverage deep into the source zone. It is the only FOL from which
aircraft can reach all of Peru, Colombia, and the drug producing areas
of Bolivia. In January 2001, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court issued
the favorable ruling that the November 1999 access agreement complies
with the country's constitution. Construction at the Manta FOL is on
schedule. We will begin operating AWACS aircraft from Manta in October
of this year and all construction will be completed by June 2002.
The Government of El Salvador offered the use of the Comalapa
International Airport as an FOL for U.S. aircraft in Central America.
Excellent relations between the U.S. and El Salvador, strengthened by
years of solid military-to-military contact, helped produce favorable
negotiations on the FOL agreement. This FOL extends the reach of our
DM&T aircraft into the Eastern Pacific, Western Caribbean, and all of
Central America.
In addition to our headquarters in Miami and three component
headquarters in Puerto Rico, USSOUTHCOM has permanently assigned
headquarters in the following locations: our Air Force Component
(United States Air Force South) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in
Arizona; our Marine Corps Component (United States Marine Corps Forces
South) in Miami, Florida; Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E)
in Key West, Florida, which plans, coordinates, and supervises the
execution of our support to counterdrug operations in the transit and
source zones; Joint Southern Surveillance & Reconnaissance Operations
Center (JSSROC), collocated with JIATF-E in Key West, which receives,
fuses, and disseminates the radar common operating picture from AWACS
and ground based, aerostat, and ROTHR radar; and Joint Task Force Bravo
(JTF-B) in Soto Cano, Honduras, which provides responsive helicopter
support to USSOUTHCOM missions in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Most of our post-Panama theater architecture is firmly in place,
and we look forward to permanently anchoring our headquarters in CONUS,
accomplishing necessary improvements at the FOL in Comalapa, and
completing previously approved but temporarily suspended military
construction projects in Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico.

STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY

The United States Southern Command's military-to-military
engagement with host nation forces seeks to build mutual trust and
understanding that will engender regional stability and shared
solutions to common problems. Our approach focuses on combined
operations, exercises, training and education, security assistance, and
humanitarian assistance programs. While maintaining strong bilateral
relationships throughout the AOR, we promote regional cooperation and
transparent operations among all our regional partners.
Caribbean. The fiscal year 1997 Unified Command Plan assigned
responsibility for U.S. military activities in the Caribbean, a region
of more than 32 million people, to USSOUTHCOM. The countries and
territories in this region, as a rule, have very small security forces
that need modernization and training assistance. They are receptive to
regional cooperation and are well represented in the Organization of
American States (OAS) and Caribbean Nation Security Council (CANSEC).
During calendar year 2000, USSOUTHCOM conducted medical readiness
training exercises (MEDRETE) and New Horizon engineer exercises;
assisted partner nation security force training and new equipment
fielding; and hosted Tradewinds 2000, a multi-national exercise that
fosters maritime and land-based forces cooperation in response to
regional crises and drug trafficking. In addition, many of the
countries hosted other regional events to improve partner nation
capabilities. For example, in January 2001, Jamaica hosted a regional
disaster preparedness seminar that included representatives from more
than 20 countries throughout the AOR.
Caribbean countries conduct operations and training with the United
States Coast Guard that improve their capabilities to interdict illicit
drug shipments through the transit zone. Most countries in the
Caribbean have assisted U.S. efforts to interdict the flow of illicit
drugs through the central and eastern Caribbean. One of our most
successful efforts is Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT), a
multi-agency international effort based in Nassau, Bahamas. The mission
of OPBAT is to interdict the flow of cocaine and marijuana transiting
through the Bahamas destined for the United States. OPBAT was
established on July 12, 1990 by the TRIPART Agreement, a diplomatic
engagement signed by the Governments of the Bahamas, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. U.S. government agencies participating
in OPBAT include DOS, DOD, USCG, and the U.S. Customs Service.
Another prominent counterdrug operation in this region is
Weedeater, which is conducted in the Eastern Caribbean. DOD provides
helicopters for host nation law enforcement agencies and DEA to conduct
marijuana eradication. The most recent Weedeater operation eradicated
1,013,635 marijuana plants and seedlings with an estimated Miami street
value in excess of $800 million. Total helicopter operating costs for
this Weedeater were slightly more than $129,000.
Central America. Four factors stimulate our engagement initiatives
in this region. First, Central America, with more than 36 million
people, is one of the least developed regions in our AOR. The military
budgets of these nations cannot support large forces or large
modernization efforts. Second, this region is vulnerable to natural
disasters, as evidenced by Hurricane Mitch a few years ago, wildfires
last year in Guatemala, and the recent earthquakes in El Salvador.
Third, powerful criminal organizations, often fueled by drug related
activities and money, challenge democratic institutions, and in many
cases, exceed the capacity of the nations' security forces to provide
protection to the population. Last, governments in this region are
understandably sensitive to border disputes that have been ongoing for
many years. Examples include the border disputes between Belize and
Guatemala, between Honduras and Nicaragua, and the maritime
disagreement concerning the Gulf of Fonseca. Last summer, USSOUTHCOM
helped diffuse the Fonseca disagreement by providing Global Positioning
Systems (GPS) and night vision goggles to Honduran and Nicaraguan
military vessels to aid them in precise navigation.
Military forces in this region range from none to very capable.
Costa Rica and Panama now have only police forces, while El Salvador
demonstrated a very professional and capable military force during
recovery operations following the recent earthquakes. Nicaragua has a
large inventory of mechanized equipment, but needs assistance in
training and sustainment.
Our engagement activities in Central America mirrored our efforts
in other regions. Last year, we relied heavily on our New Horizons
Exercise program to provide much needed assistance to several
communities in Belize, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In total, our forces
renovated 12 schools, drilled 12 water wells, and provided road and
bridge improvements. We also conducted a total of 32 medical
deployments that provided health and dental services to more than
95,000 people. Medical teams on these deployments provided veterinary
services as well.
Peacekeeping operations and seminars are excellent vehicles to
promote cooperation and interoperability between neighboring nations.
This past year, we conducted several combined activities in Central
America, including the Peacekeeping Operations--North (PKO-North)
exercise, hosted by Honduras and attended by 20 nations. This exercise
trained multinational staffs from Caribbean and Central American
nations in peacekeeping operations.
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, El Salvador, and Panama
have also participated in Central Skies counterdrug operations. In
support of Central Skies, the United States provides transportation
support to Central American country teams and host nation military and
counterdrug law enforcement agencies. The most recent Central Skies
operation in Costa Rica eradicated 385,563 marijuana plants with a
Miami street value that exceeded $300 million. U.S. helicopter
operations costs for this iteration of Central Skies was approximately
$164,000.
USSOUTHCOM has a long history of providing assistance to Central
American nations following natural disasters. Last April, JTF-B from
Soto Cano provided emergency assessment and fire fighting assistance to
help Guatemalan forces extinguish nearly 250 wildfires. In November
2000, Hurricane Keith hit the eastern coast of Belize. USSOUTHCOM
provided humanitarian assistance to the Belize government in the form
of emergency shelters, vehicles, disaster relief equipment, and medical
supplies. In the most recent disaster in El Salvador, USSOUTHCOM
provided emergency assistance that included the movement of 560
personnel and 160 tons of supplies by JTF-B helicopters. USSOUTHCOM
relief and sustainment efforts following the earthquakes will include
several medical readiness training exercises, technical expertise, and
humanitarian assistance supplies and equipment.
Central America is key to U.S. counterdrug efforts. El Salvador
agreed to allow the U.S. to use Comalapa International Airport as an
FOL for counterdrug operations. This facility supports U.S. DM&T
aircraft coverage in Central America, Eastern Pacific, and Western
Caribbean. El Salvador's rapid agreement to our request for ramp space
is reflective of the outstanding military to military relationship that
has been nurtured over the years.
Southern Cone. Harmonious relations among Southern Cone countries
provide the necessary preconditions for increased defense cooperation,
dialogue, and multilateral training exercises. Keeping pace with new
training opportunities, Chile and Brazil have recently begun military
modernization programs. In December 2000, the Chilean government made a
formal decision to negotiate the possible purchase of F-16 aircraft
with Lockheed Martin. Brazil has also initiated programs to modernize
its Air Force and Navy. In some neighboring countries, budget
constraints still limit military procurement and modernization.
Argentina and Uruguay both participate routinely in United Nations
peacekeeping operations. Last year, Argentina hosted the USSOUTHCOM
annual CABANAS training program, a peacekeeping exercise that included
military forces of seven other nations. Argentina and Chile each hosted
phases of the UNITAS exercise, the largest multinational naval exercise
in this hemisphere. In addition to nations from the USSOUTHCOM AOR,
UNITAS 2000 included Canada and several European nations. This exercise
is one of Southern Command's most important engagement tools and
contributes significantly to regional cooperation in the Southern Cone.
Andean Ridge. USSOUTHCOM operations in the Andean Ridge are the
most diverse of any region. Recent activities have included
humanitarian civic assistance, demining operations, training exercises,
and extensive counterdrug operational support. Militaries in this
region range from small and under-equipped to standing forces with
considerable capabilities.
One of USSOUTHCOM's most important and visible missions during
fiscal year 2000 was Operation Fundamental Response in Venezuela.
Following torrential flooding and mudslides that devastated Venezuela's
northeastern coast, USSOUTHCOM performed life saving rescue, medical
evacuation, and disaster relief operations. With Venezuela reporting an
estimated 30,000 dead, USSOUTHCOM provided immediate rescue assistance,
ultimately saving more than 5,500 lives and delivering 673 tons of food
and water. U.S. forces, largely JTF-B aviation assets, Special
Operations, and Reserves, produced more than 2.8 million gallons of
potable water, flew more than 1,300 aircraft sorties, and distributed
more than $650,000 worth of medical supplies. Total cost of USSOUTHCOM
directed support to Venezuela was $8.25 million.
In Ecuador, USSOUTHCOM has worked closely with the U.S. Ambassador
and President Noboa's administration to provide assistance to Ecuador's
military, particularly in the management of national crises. We have
also worked closely with military leaders to improve Ecuador's
capability for detecting and interdicting illegal drug traffic. As
previously noted, Manta Air Base on the northwestern coast is a
linchpin in resetting our AOR architecture and extending the reach of
our DM&T aircraft coverage in the source zone.
U.S. counterdrug support to Andean Ridge nations includes training
and equipment for the riverine forces of both Peru and Colombia. The
Joint Peruvian Riverine Training Center in Iquitos, Peru is the finest
facility of its kind in the AOR. Peruvian and Colombian riverine units
have significantly increased their capabilities during the past year.
USSOUTHCOM has provided extensive support to the training of
Colombia's Counternarcotics (CN) Brigade. The second CN battalion
graduated from training in December 2000, and the third battalion is
scheduled to complete training on May 24, 2001. To provide air mobile
capability to the CN Brigade, USSOUTHCOM is supporting the Department
of State (DoS) led effort to field Huey II and UH-60L helicopters to
the Colombian Army and to assist in training the required aircrews.
USSOUTHCOM is cooperating with the security forces of each Andean
Ridge nation to build more effective counternarcotics capability.
Bolivia, with perhaps fewer resources than any other country in the
region, has achieved unprecedented success in eradicating illegal coca
cultivation and aggressively interdicting drug trafficking
organizations' (DTOs) movement of precursor chemicals. We have assisted
Bolivia's military training effort with mobile training teams and
facility construction. We are also assisting the Bolivian Army in
renovating troop barracks to establish a permanent presence in the
Chapare coca-growing region.

REQUIREMENTS

The United States Government has provided substantial support in
military hardware, training, and services to Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Each year, USSOUTHCOM executes engagement programs
throughout this AOR, to include combined operations and training
exercises, educational opportunities, mobile training teams, unit
exchanges, humanitarian civic assistance, foreign military financing
and sales, and counterdrug training and operations.
USSOUTHCOM's exercise program is the engine for our Theater
Engagement Plan. USSOUTHCOM will conduct 17 joint or combined exercises
and 178 training deployments with partner nations this fiscal year. We
conduct four different types of exercises and deployments. First, our
operational exercises are based on USSOUTHCOM contingency plans and
normally include only U.S. forces. The primary purpose of these
exercises is to train the CINC's and the JTF's battlestaffs.
Foreign military interaction (FMI) exercises are the core of
USSOUTHCOM's engagement program. They are conducted throughout the AOR
and are generally hosted by the many participating nations in the
region. All of these exercises, which include Unitas, Tradewinds, PKO
North and South, Cabanas, United Counterdrug, and Fuerza Allidas
Humanitarians, are multilateral.
New Horizons (NH) are the command's civic assistance exercises that
focus on engineering and medical projects. Humanitarian and civic
assistance (HCA) projects are embedded in these programs but can be
conducted as stand alone deployments for training as well. USSOUTHCOM
plans to conduct six NH exercises in fiscal year 2001. Planned sites
include the Bahamas, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Paraguay.
The fourth type of exercise is stand-alone training deployments.
USSOUTHCOM will conduct a total of 178 stand-alone training deployments
in fiscal year 2001. These deployments will include Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET), Riverine Training Teams (RTT), and
Counterdrug Training Support (CDTS). Included in the training total are
66 stand-alone medical assistance deployments that predominantly
support Central America and the Andean Ridge.
In a typical year, USSOUTHCOM deploys more than 12,000
servicemembers, the majority of which are National Guardsmen and
Reservists, in support of the FMI and NH exercise programs. In fiscal
year 1999, the U.S. Congress provided funding to expand the NH exercise
concept. Funding has remained relatively constant for 2000 and 2001.
These exercises have been very successful in providing schools, water
wells, road and bridge improvements, and medical outreach programs to
needy communities. NH exercises have the added benefit of providing
U.S. forces with realistic training opportunities generally not
available in the United States. In fiscal year 2000, USSOUTHCOM
completed 98 HCA projects in 19 countries; 105 construction and repair
projects are planned or fiscal year 2001. Scenarios for the seven FMI
exercises conducted in fiscal year 2000 and the six planned for this
year focus on peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, and counterdrug
coordination.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and its
companion program, Expanded IMET (EIMET) provide professional education
opportunities to selected military and civilian candidates in our AOR
on a grant basis. These programs are the backbone of our combined
professionalization and military education. They provide funding for
military and civilian personnel from our partner nations to attend
professional development courses in United States military
institutions. At only modest cost, these programs represent valued
investments as many of the students go on to become senior leaders in
their respective militaries and government agencies. In fiscal year
2000, USSOUTHCOM received $9.89 million for IMET and trained 2684
students, including 474 civilians. We invested roughly two-thirds of
our IMET dollars in professional military education (PME), management,
postgraduate courses, mobile education teams, and english language
training. The remainder paid for technical assistance training
throughout the AOR.
With declining military budgets, most countries in the USSOUTHCOM
AOR request military equipment through the Excess Defense Articles
(EDA) program or Section 506 Emergency Drawdown Authority. Few
countries are able to purchase new equipment in large quantities
through the Foreign Military Sales Program. Although we have been very
successful in assisting partner nations through EDA and Drawdown,
transport costs and sustainment of the received equipment fall to the
requesting country. Absent host nation funding and the availability of
foreign military financing (FMF), we have not been able to help these
nations build the maintenance programs to sustain the equipment. At its
peak in 1991, the FMF program for Latin America was $220 million. Last
year, the Caribbean received $3 million, while Latin America received
only $450,000.

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C\4\I)

As we reset our theater physical architecture in the post-Panama
era, we are also enhancing our C\4\I architecture for fixed and mobile
operations throughout the AOR. Because most of the countries in this
theater are still maturing their C\4\ infrastructure, satellite
communications are vitally important to our deployed forces, especially
in time of crises. However, satellite communications are currently
limited by available bandwidth.
We have initiated several programs to increase our C\4\I
effectiveness throughout a very large AOR. Programs like the
Cooperating Nations Information Exchange (CNIES) and the
Counternarcotics Command and Management System (CNCMS) have helped
optimize satellite bandwidth. We have also initiated the Theater Signal
Support Program, which is focused on streamlining and enhancing C\4\
operational and maintenance support that was degraded by our exit from
Panama.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Our top readiness priorities for this AOR remain intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Although OSD and the Joint
Staff have helped us a great deal in this area, we still have
unresourced requirements in national, theater, and tactical collection
and processing for signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence
(HUMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).
IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and signals intelligence
(MASINT) provide commanders at all echelons indications and warnings
(I&W), situational awareness, battle damage assessments (BDA), and crop
cultivation estimates. However, the current suite of national sensors
and platforms meets only part of our requirement for a comprehensive
intelligence and counterdrug picture in this AOR. USSOUTHCOM needs
greater redundancy in ISR assets to mitigate risk during crises.
Specifically, we need additional airborne quick-reaction ISR capability
and the focus of a tactical military intelligence unit dedicated to
this AOR. Funding support for planned and existing MASINT capabilities,
plus an effective MASINT architecture, will significantly enhance the
conduct of future operations.
The USSOUTHCOM AOR is a mixture of legacy and 21st century
technology systems. While we are making progress in transitioning to
more sophisticated and more reliable systems, we still need significant
support for three important activities: wide area surveillance for
maritime and ground detection and monitoring; theater air surveillance,
tracking, and sorting; and force protection against asymmetric threats.
First, a real-time integrated wide area surveillance capability is
required to track and monitor maritime and ground targets of interest,
particularly in support of counterdrug operations in this theater. This
system should be compatible with both manned and unmanned ISR
platforms. Second, the theater air surveillance system will provide air
space detection, sorting, monitoring, and management that will promote
regional cooperation in support of theater engagement strategies.
Third, asymmetric warfare challenges our best force protection measures
and strategies. Sophisticated surveillance systems are needed to
enhance force protection for our limited number of forward-deployed
personnel in high threat areas.
Our ability to execute effective operations is often hampered by
restrictions on sharing data with our partner nations. We need to
streamline sharing procedures that are currently used for time
sensitive counterdrug information. Like other unified commands, we are
developing information-sharing networks that will allow us to combat
the drug trafficking problem more efficiently. The South American Net
(SURNET), the Caribbean Information sharing Network (CISN), and the
Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) are all ongoing
initiatives that enable us to share certain types of counterdrug
information expeditiously.
We experience continuing shortages of intelligence personnel,
especially qualified linguists and other SIGINT experts. A fully manned
and functioning regional SIGINT operating center at Medina, Texas, is
essential to support our AOR operations. We also face many difficulties
in our efforts to maintain a robust tasking, processing, exploitation,
and dissemination architecture (TPED). Due to persistent C\4\I
shortfalls, these issues are expected to continue in the near term.

COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

Congress appropriated significant funding last year to support
President Pastrana's Plan Colombia. During the past several months,
USSOUTHCOM has worked with the U.S. interagency to develop the plan and
begin executing the support package. This program is on track and is
increasing partner nation counterdrug capabilities. Although most of
the supplemental funding was directed to Colombia, neighboring nations
also received assistance.
USSOUTHCOM is using the funds designated for military purposes to
improve partner nation capabilities in counterdrug operations. We are
lead for execution of DOD support and provide assistance to DoS as
needed on military related programs. We have coordinated the intended
use of the funding in the U.S. interagency process to ensure our
actions complement other agencies' activities and comply with
congressional law and OSD directives. U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia
will significantly improve the COLMIL capability to successfully
support eradication and interdiction operations. Although $180 million
was also distributed in the aid package to Colombia's neighbors,
several of these neighboring nations will need additional assistance in
the form of both military and non-military programs to effectively
challenge the illicit drug industry within their own borders. We also
anticipate that nations in this region, particularly Colombia, will
likely need international assistance to sustain these programs in the
long term.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection is Job #1. We are committed to providing the best
possible protection measures to our forces in this theater. Since the
terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole, we have conducted a comprehensive
review of our force protection requirements and have focused our
efforts on improving policies and procedures for deterring, disrupting,
and mitigating terrorist attacks.
Each of my Component Commanders has formed ``Red Teams'' to assess
his force protection posture on a continuous basis. Throughout the AOR,
we have intensified ongoing efforts to identify potential threats and
the corresponding force protection measures to mitigate risk to these
threats. We are also looking specifically for seams in our force
protection posture that could be exploited. We have implemented a suite
of preventive measures, such as limiting travel to known or suspected
high-risk areas, to minimize exposure of DOD personnel.
We have used the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund to
resource emergent and unforeseen high priority requirements. However,
we still require better access to enhanced national signals collection
and processing, organic airborne reconnaissance capability, a military
intelligence unit permanently assigned to this theater, and expanded
human intelligence collection. Our components continue to work with
host nation security forces, to include establishing U.S. controlled
security zones when necessary, to ensure protection of our deployed
aircraft, vessels, and personnel. Component Commanders tailor threat
conditions and random antiterrorism measures based on their assessment
of the threat for assigned and in-transit units.
The U.S.S. Cole Commission recommendations address the diversity of
threats that could potentially target U.S. personnel and interests in
the USSOUTHCOM AOR. We continue to make good progress in hardening our
headquarters, bases, and forward operating locations. Where we are
unable to mitigate threats through physical or structural enhancements,
we are addressing the risk with procedural modifications for our
personnel.

STRATEGY

Our vision for this theater has not changed. These nations can
become a ``community of stable, democratic, and prosperous nations
served by professional, modern, and interoperable security forces that
embrace democratic principles and human rights, that are subordinate to
civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral
responses to regional challenges.''
Five objectives guide our engagement and security activities in
this AOR:

Promote and support stable democracies;
Promote and support respect for human rights and
adherence to the rule of law;
Assist partner nations to modernize and train their
security forces;
Sustain and strengthen multilateral security
cooperation; and
Cooperate with regional forces to detect, monitor, and
reduce the transit of illegal drugs.

CONCLUSION

Thanks to the hard work and vision of many U.S. Government
agencies, we have been able to assist our neighbors, some gravely
threatened by insurgencies, narcotics, and other transnational threats.
Because of this committee's efforts and the strong bipartisan
support in Congress for programs key to this hemisphere, we are making
a positive difference in helping to strengthen democracy, promote
prosperity, and foster regional security in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you.

Chairman Warner. General Schwartz.

STATEMENT OF GEN. THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES FORCES KOREA; COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

General Schwartz. Sir, thank you very much for having me,
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and other committee members.
Thanks a lot. I am glad to be here today.
It is exciting to be in Korea. I have been there 15 months.
It is an exciting time. Like you said, Senator Warner, things
are changing at a rapid pace. Who would have predicted that the
summit would have taken place like it did last year? Who would
have predicted the amount of dialogue, the exchange, the
cultural exchanges, all the things that are happening, the
Nobel Peace Prize, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
revision that we had, a big success in my opinion, the Nogun-Ri
and the resolution of that very successfully? The list goes on
and on. Who would have predicted? Almost nobody. Then the visit
of Kim Jong-Il to the south and the next couple of months. Who
would have predicted? I do not think anybody could say ``I knew
positively that was going to take place.''
But I can tell you one thing you could predict, that our
forces over there stay trained and ready, the 37,000 you have
there under my command, as well as those great Republic of
Korea military. I am really high on them because when anybody
from this committee comes, they look at them, they see them,
they always comment to me. They say, ``Tom, they are good. Are
they not? They are trained and ready. Are they not? They are
well-spirited and have high morale. Do they not?'' Those are
the kinds of things that are reinforcing about this alliance.
We should be tremendously proud.
That 2nd Infantry Division we have over there, in my
opinion, is the most well-trained, fit-to-fight division in the
world. I am proud of what they do and the pace they maintain,
the things they do every day to stay trained and ready on that
Demilitarized Zone. I know you, Senator Warner, and the other
committee members are very proud.
I think the key over there right now is our presence. We
have been there for 50 years. We might be there for 50 more. We
do not know. But I tell you, when the north looks south and
they see 37,000, when they look south, and they see the 750,000
South Koreans trained and ready, they know for sure one thing:
they are not going to do anything. They know we are ready. They
know we are together, and that has deterred war for 50 years.
We are tremendously proud of that.
We have to mix all of that readiness too with our quality
of life and our infrastructure. We cannot just be trained and
ready. We cannot just let Korea be a place we have been for 50
years, 1 year at a time, and not look at the infrastructure and
not look at the quality of life of those great soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines. So, I have looked at that, and I
have talked to a lot of those great people. I am tremendously
impressed with our soldiers.
I tell you, Senator, the other day I had a stand-up in
front of those soldiers, and I said, ``this is my third tour.
Who has me beat?'' One of those great sergeants, E-5, stood up
and said, ``Sir, I have been in 10 years. This is my fourth
tour in Korea. I have you beat.''
Then a staff sergeant E-6 stood up. He said, ``Sir, I am a
staff sergeant E-6 in this great Army of ours. I have 12 years,
and I have five tours in Korea. I have you beat.''
I started to look around. I started to think, gosh, these
young men and women are recycling in here. When I started to do
some statistics on this thing, I realized that 17 percent of
the Army is either getting ready to go in, is in Korea, or just
came out of Korea.
So, it does have a tremendous impact on our force and on
the morale and on the reenlistment, and on the quality of life
and decisions that these young people make every day when they
sit down at the dinner table. They go back home after a tour in
Korea, and they say to the family, should I stay or should I
get out? So, Korea does have an impact. It matters. We have to
care about what we do with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines over there, every year as we touch those great people.
So, it is things like separate rations that we take away
from them, that the spouse back home who loses $227 a month and
is still cooking the same pot of spaghetti, even though he is
serving for a year over in Korea, and she is saying to herself,
``Where is my $227?'' She is saying to herself, ``Where is my
$4,000 that it equates to over a year? Where did that go?'' She
is asking her spouse, ``how much is it costing you to live over
there?'' They are saying about $4,000 to $6,000 out of their
pocket, hidden costs. Senator, you and I discussed this a
couple of times.
There is a price to be paid by these young people when they
serve their country overseas. We have to take a hard look at
some of these things and make sure we are doing the right thing
with respect to these people when they are sacrificing so much
for us. So, I would lay that on the table.
But I would like to make a comment, if I could, Mr.
Chairman, about the transformation that the Army is doing right
now under the great General Shinseki. He is creating a new
force. He is shaping a force, an Army that is much different
than we had before. I told him I am the first guy to stand up
and say, I want one of your brigades. I want one of those light
brigades. I want one of those wheeled brigades. I want its
flexibility. I want its mobility. I do not just want it for the
peninsula, but I want it for the region. I want it because it
can do a lot of things I cannot do right now. So, I am an
advocate of what we are creating there, and I am one of the
first ones to sign up as a CINC and say, send it to me because
we can certainly use it.
A couple of my top priorities that I have in my statement
are quite well outlined, but I would like to emphasize just a
couple of them because I think they are important to lay on the
table.
One is we have to look hard at the command, control,
communications, computers, and information (C\4\I) architecture
that we have in Korea. If we are going to fight tonight like we
do, we have a bunker system. We have hardened systems of
command and control that were created over the last 30 and 40
years, and we work hard to keep them fit to fight. But we have
to keep putting the money into them to make sure they are hard,
and to make sure they are redundant, and to make sure that they
do for us what we need to do. So, I have some needs in that
area that I laid out in my formal statement that I will submit.
Also, I think we need some money for our battle simulation
centers. The way we keep 37,000 people trained and ready, when
96 percent of them change every year, is that we have three
very robust exercises. We have the largest simulation exercise
in the world called Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL). To run that battle
simulation center, to run the Air Force simulation center,
costs a lot of money. That cost is going up and up. So, I laid
some dollars on the line there that we need to keep that going.
I would just mention one other area, and it is called force
protection. We are now in the second most densely populated
country in the world, Korea, 45 million people in a peninsula
the size of the State of Indiana. We have plopped ourselves
down in 95 camps and stations all over that peninsula. Believe
me, we did not have any thoughts when we plopped down about
force protection, but we have a lot of thoughts about it today.
We need some money and we need to put some effort into it. We
need to do some consolidation of that effort as we see
ourselves on that peninsula to make sure we are protecting our
people, like we need to protect them all over the world. So, I
would say that to you.
But when you look across that peninsula, Senator Warner,
and you look north, some people down south think, well, the
security situation is changing and everything is OK and there
is no threat. But I am telling you as a Commander in Chief,
when I look north, I do not think the same thing. When I look
north, I see an enemy that is bigger, better, closer, and
deadlier. I can prove it.
This guy puts 33 percent of his gross national product into
his military. People are starving. His own figures say that
250,000 starved last year. We think it is close to a million.
Whatever the figure is, he puts more money into his military
than any other nation Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-wise, 33
percent. He has a military-first policy and he is getting
better.
Now, does he have the economy to sustain that great
military? Yes. It is coming apart a little bit. It is coming
down and we all know that. But the fact of the matter is he is
very capable, bigger, better, closer, and deadlier and we have
to keep our eye on it.
This is a period of uncertainty like I said. Tremendous
change, dramatic change. I think the danger during this period
of time is miscalculation. We just have to keep ourselves
trained and ready. We are doing that in the peninsula, and I am
tremendously proud of those soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines.
I am prepared to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, USA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members, I am honored to
appear before you as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command,
Republic of Korea--United States Combined Forces Command (CFC); and
Commander, United States Forces Korea. We want to first express our
deep gratitude to Congress for the consistent support you provided our
forces over the years. The more than 37,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines, and Department of Defense civilians of United States
Forces Korea benefit every day from your support, which enables us to
accomplish our vital mission. We welcome this opportunity to present
the current security situation in the Korean theater of operations
through five major categories: (1) Korean Peninsula Overview, (2) Post-
Summit Korea: Perceptions vs. Reality, (3) North Korea, (4) The
Republic of Korea and United States Alliance, and (5) Command
Priorities.

KOREAN PENINSULA OVERVIEW

The physical presence of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces in
Korea and Japan contributes significantly to U.S. and northeast Asian
interests. These contributions endure well into the future. As shown in
the figure below, the vital U.S. national interests in the region are
many, and the threats to those interests are great. However, the U.S.
presence provides the military access in east Asia that allows and
encourages economic security, and political stability.
While the U.S. has made great strides in our ability to rapidly
project power around the globe, there is still no substitute for some
degree of forward presence when faced with limited warning times, and
vast distances. Our presence in Korea provides the access necessary for
defending the Republic of Korea today, and responding to regional
threats in the future. It is physical, not virtual, U.S. presence that
brings peace of mind to the democratic nations of the region, and
provides tangible deterrence.

The security offered by this presence is directly and indirectly
responsible for the economic vitality and political stability of the
region. The physical security has fostered the rapid expansion of the
mutually reinforcing elements of democratization and market economies.
The political and military stability resulting from U.S. involvement in
northeast Asia provides the confidence necessary for foreign investment
to flow into the region. The results are staggering. In the course of a
single generation, Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore have
risen respectively to numbers 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 in total trade with
the U.S., and comprised over $425 billion in trade in 1999. Most of
this would not have been possible without the direct security offered
by the U.S. presence. It is the U.S. presence that will allow this
regional prosperity, so critical to the global economy, to flourish in
the future.

POST-SUMMIT KOREA: PERCEPTIONS VS. REALITY

In June of last year, the world witnessed the historic meeting
between President Kim Dae-Jung and Chairman Kim Jong-Il. This
remarkable event, the centerpiece of a great deal of diplomatic
activity on the Korean peninsula, touched off a wave of reconciliation
euphoria in South Korea and generated the public perception that peace
was just around the corner. However, the situation's reality is far
from the perception.
The pace of diplomatic activity is indeed staggering. Both before
and since the summit, the North Korean government has greatly expanded
its diplomatic outreach to a number of countries. Three reunions of
families separated since the war have occurred since August 2000.
Athletes from both sides marched together under a single flag during
the opening ceremonies of the Sydney Olympics. North Korea's second
most powerful official, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok met with President
Clinton in October. U.S. Secretary of State Albright reciprocated by
visiting Pyongyang later that month. Since the summit, the two Koreas
have conducted multiple ministerial and working level economic talks,
and the first ever meeting between the two defense ministers. The two
sides have agreed to restore the Seoul-Sinuiju railway through the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), create an economic development zone in the
North Korean town of Kaesong, and conduct sports and cultural
exchanges.
Despite this welcome increase in direct North-South dialogue, the
military threat from North Korea continues to improve. The perception
of a peaceful peninsula differs from reality. North Korea has yet to
discuss or implement any meaningful military confidence building
measures beyond agreement of the opening of a railroad corridor through
the DMZ. The North has focused thus far on obtaining significant
foreign aid in exchange for political and humanitarian gestures. As
recently as December 2000, the North threatened to halt the entire
reconciliation process, including family reunions, unless the South
immediately provided 500,000 kilowatts of electrical power, to be
followed by up to 2 million kilowatts. It subsequently resumed the
exchanges even though it did not receive the power.
The gap between reduced political tensions and the current North
Korean military capacity and capability in certain areas concerns us.
If the North Korean regime is serious about reconciliation, it is the
time now for it to reduce the military threat and reciprocate to the
peaceful gestures from other nations. North Korea should begin now to
reduce military capabilities, both conventional and weapons of mass
destruction.

NORTH KOREA

Despite the perception of political and humanitarian change, the
reality is that there is as yet no permanent ``peace dividend.'' North
Korea still poses a major threat to stability and security in the
region and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Kim
Jong-Il stubbornly adheres to his ``military first'' policy, pouring
huge amounts of his budget resources into the military, at the expense
of the civil sector, as he continues his military buildup. As a result,
his military forces are bigger, better, closer, and deadlier since last
year's testimony. We define this dangerous military threat in simple
terms as capability and intent.
Capability: Bigger and better. The military is the overwhelming
power and dominant presence in North Korea. Its ability to strike South
Korea without warning and to employ nonconventional weapons and systems
continues to grow bigger and get better. The North Korean People's
Army, which includes the Army, Navy, and Air Force, numbers over 1.2
million, making it the fifth largest Active-Duty Force in the world.
Limited military production continues in aircraft and artillery systems
with renewed manufacturing efforts in missiles, submarines, and armored
vehicles.
The ground force alone numbers 1 million active-duty soldiers and
ranks third in the world. The North Korean Air Force has over 1,700
aircraft. The Navy has more than 800 ships, including the largest
submarine fleet in the world. There are an additional 6 million
Reserves supporting the Active-Duty Force. In total, over 25 percent of
its population is under arms, with all able-bodied children and adults
receiving military training every year--although admittedly in a
country where ``the quest for food'' is a daily reality for the average
citizen and the vast majority of people lack adequate food, clean
water, heat, clothing, or access to even basic medical care.
Recent force improvements include forward repositioning key
offensive units, emplacing anti-tank barriers in the forward area,
establishing combat positions along major routes between Pyongyang and
the Demilitarized Zone, improving coastal defense forces in the forward
area, constructing missile support facilities, and procuring air
defense weapons and fighter aircraft. Applying lessons from U.S.
operations in Europe and Southwest Asia, the North Koreans also
modified key facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved
camouflage, concealment, and deception measures.
Training levels over the past 2 years have been record-breaking,
with the focus on improving the readiness of major offensive forces.
Immediately following the June 2000 summit, the North Korean People's
Army training cycle in the summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever
recorded. It was preceded by the most ambitious winter training cycle
for the past 10 years. High levels of training continue as we speak to
you today.
Capability: Closer. As big as they are, North Korea continues to
position forces into the area just north of the DMZ--in a position to
threaten Combined Forces Command and all of Seoul with little warning.
Seventy percent of their active force, including approximately 700,000
troops, over 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is postured
within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. This percentage continues to
rise despite the June 2000 summit. Most of this force in the forward
area is protected in over 4,000 underground facilities, out of over
11,000 nationwide. From their current locations, these forces can
attack with minimal preparations or warning. The protracted southward
deployment follows a tactic of ``creeping normalcy''--a significant
movement over a period of many years that would attract too much
international attention if accomplished over weeks or months.
The North fields a total artillery force of over 12,000 systems.
Without moving any pieces, Pyongyang could sustain up to 500,000 rounds
per hour against Combined Forces Command defenses, and Seoul, for
several hours. This artillery force includes 500 new long-range systems
deployed over the past decade; however, most dangerous is the
accelerated deployment over the past 2 years of large numbers of long-
range 240 mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170 mm self-propelled
guns to hardened sites located along the DMZ. Current training
continues to improve their capabilities.
Capability: Deadlier. To keep Combined Forces Command off balance
and offset the conventional military technological superiority of the
United States and Republic of Korea, the North's leadership has
developed substantial asymmetrical capabilities in ballistic missiles,
special operations forces, and weapons of mass destruction. The North's
asymmetric forces are dangerous, receive an outsized portion of the
military budget, and are well trained. Improvements continue in each
area.
The North's progress on its ballistic missile program indicates it
remains a top priority. Over the past year, North Korea upheld its
moratorium on flight-testing missiles. However, they continue to make
enhancements in their missile capabilities. Their ballistic missile
inventory includes over 500 SCUDs of various types that can threaten
the entire peninsula. They continue to produce and deploy medium-range
No Dongs capable of striking Japan and our U.S. bases there. Pyongyang
is developing multi-stage missiles aiming to field systems capable of
striking the continental United States. They have tested the 2,000-
kilometer range Taepo Dong 1 and continue significant work on the 5,000
plus kilometer Taepo Dong 2. North Korea also threatens American
interests through the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities--
missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers, and
underground facility expertise--to other countries of concern. North
Korea has reportedly sold at least 450 missiles to Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Pakistan, and others.
At the tip of the spear are North Korea's special operations
forces--the largest in the world. They consist of over 100,000
personnel and are significant force multipliers. During wartime, these
forces, which Kim Jong-Il would use as an asymmetrical capability from
a ground, air, and naval perspective, would fight on two fronts,
simultaneously attacking both our forward and rear forces. They
continue to train year around in these skills, and just completed a
robust training period last month.
North Korea also possesses weapons of mass destruction. A large
number of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our military
forces and civilian population centers. We assess North Korea to have
large chemical stockpiles and is self-sufficient in the production of
chemical components for first generation chemical agents.
Additionally, North Korea has the capability to develop, produce,
and weaponize biological warfare agents. They could deploy both
chemical and biological warheads on missiles.
Finally, we continue to be concerned with the potential nuclear
threat from North Korea. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea
may have produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two
nuclear weapons.
Intent: The Kim Jong-Il regime maintains a ``military-first''
orientation. The army is North Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and
consumer, the central unifying structure in the country, and the main
source of power and control for the ruling clique--the ``pillar of the
revolution.'' North Korean state-run media pronouncements continue to
insist on unification under Kim Jong-Il's leadership. In an
unprecedented interview with ROK news media executives on August 12,
2000, Kim Jong-Il stated, ``In relations with foreign countries, we
gain strength from military power, and my power comes from military
power,'' thus openly stating his belief that military power is his
security imperative and the cornerstone of his philosophy. This
``military first'' policy was reiterated in the North Korean leader's
New Year's editorial on 1 January this year. Maintaining a large and
credible military force does a number of things: It provides
deterrence, defense, an offensive threat, and gives the regime leverage
in international negotiations.
The North Korean economy is in ruins. Let's take a look at some
stark numbers: a decline in Gross National Product (GNP) by 55 percent
from 1990 to 1998, down to about $12 billion; a foreign debt
approaching the same figure; foreign trade at only 10 percent of GNP;
per capita income of less than $600; many factories closed, with those
remaining open in operation at less than 20 percent of capacity; daily
grain rations for common people at between 100 and 200 grams (one-half
to one bowl); estimates of the number of deaths from hunger and disease
in the last 5 years ranging from several hundred thousand to three
million--despite foreign aid of over $1.6 billion since 1995. The
result of this past winter's harsh weather--the worst in over 2
decades--will likely be thousands of deaths, serious injuries, and
major illnesses among the general populace.
In the face of this human tragedy, North Korea continues to invest
25 to 33 percent of their GNP annually in the military (as compared to
3 percent in the U.S.). Top priority for the nation's scarce economic
resources are the military related industries. For additional hard
currency infusion, the North Korean regime continues to export weapons
and engage in state sponsored international crime to include narcotics
trafficking, and counterfeiting U.S. currency.
Without major fundamental economic reforms, the North will continue
to rely on charity to avert complete economic collapse. Absent a
sustainable economic turnaround, the North faces the potential for huge
humanitarian disaster. The North Korean leadership appears to recognize
its dire economic circumstance. The economic and human weakness brought
by natural disaster and the failure of state planning likely prompted
the diplomatic offensive that we are seeing from the North Korean
regime. However, until North Korea undertakes meaningful confidence
building measures, it will be necessary for the United States and our
allies to remain vigilant against the threat posed by North Korea's
sizable military machine.
Conclusion: While the growing inter-Korean dialogue evident over
the past year gives cause for hope, the tense security situation on the
Korean peninsula is unpredictable and serious, and will so remain for
the foreseeable future. The North Korean military remains the main
element of national power and source of leverage that Kim Jong-Il
possesses to advance his interests. Despite North Korea's continuing
interests in foreign aid and economic reform, the Kim regime continues
to field far more conventional military force than any conceivable
sense of self-defense would warrant. We and our allies in the Pacific
must encourage tangible military confidence building measures that are
verifiable and reciprocal. The measures taken so far (economic,
diplomatic, and cultural) are first steps, but tangible military
measures are key to reducing the risk of conflict. Throughout this
process and into the future, the unequalled ROK-US alliance will remain
vigilant, trained, and ready to fight and win decisively!

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES ALLIANCE

The Republic of Korea and United States alliance remains the best
in the world. It is an alliance built on mutual trust, respect, a
common set of values, and commitment to the defense of freedom of South
Korea. Our combined forces can fight and win today if called upon. Our
power, might, and daily readiness are unparalleled. Unquestionably, our
South Korean partners are professional war fighters. They can mobilize
over 4.5 million servicemembers and can bring 54 divisions to the
fight. Our combined war fighting assets include over 1,500 strike
aircraft that can launch over 1,000 daily sorties, over 1,000 rotary
aircraft, more than 5,000 tracked vehicles, 3,000 tanks, and over 250
combat ships to include 4 or more carrier battle groups. If necessary,
this unequalled combined combat power and might can defeat a North
Korean attack and destroy its military and regime. It is this power and
might that strengthens our deterrence mission and ultimately provides
regional security.
Our continuing cooperation and understanding is a success story in
many ways. It is institutionalized in our Mutual Defense Treaty and in
our Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings. Four
alliance areas deserve particular note: alliance successes, military
procurement, defense burdensharing, and a brief discussion of command
initiatives that will shape our alliance.
Alliance successes: Overall, our alliance is stronger because of
U.S.-South Korean cooperation to conclude three significant issues in
the past year. Most notably, we successfully revised our Status of
Forces Agreement, which safeguards the rights of our servicemembers
while better respecting the laws, customs, and culture of the Republic
of Korea. Second, both nations concluded a cooperative investigation on
the tragic events that occurred 50 years ago at the Korean village of
Nogun-Ri. Here again, this issue has been resolved in a manner that is
consistent with an alliance based on democratic ideals and an honest
quest for truth and accountability. Finally, South Korea, in
consultation with the U.S., established a policy of developing
operational missiles with a range of no more than 300 kilometers and a
payload of 500 kilograms, which are the Missile Control Technology
Regime limits.
Military Procurement: The Defense White Paper 2000, published by
the Ministry of National Defense, addresses aggressive modernization
goals for the South Korean forces. United States Forces Korea
wholeheartedly supports these efforts and feels that they will set the
conditions for an autonomous South Korean military in the future.
Modernization and improvements are being made in many key areas through
indigenous production, co-production, and procurement through Foreign
Military Sales. South Korea continues to demonstrate overwhelming
preference for U.S. military equipment. South Korean military purchases
from the U.S. as a percentage of total foreign procurement has ranged
from 59.2 percent to 98.9 percent in the last 10 years. The decade
average is 78.6 percent.
Last year the South Korean military purchased Multiple Launch
Rocket Systems (MLRS), theater airborne collection systems, and weapons
and electronics upgrades for their newest destroyers. Additionally, we
are encouraged by the serious consideration that the Republic of Korea
is devoting to purchase the F-15E strike fighter jet, the AH-64D Apache
Longbow attack helicopter, and the Patriot (SAM-X) missile systems.
These powerful systems are interoperable with U.S. systems and will
ensure that military might can be brought to bear quickly and
decisively, at a time when it may be required. Not only will these
systems improve today's alliance combat power, they also contribute to
the future regional security for Northeast Asia.
There are three areas where the Republic of Korea must procure
capabilities to support our combined combat readiness: (1) Command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C\4\I)
interoperability; (2) Chemical and biological defense capabilities; and
(3) Preferred munitions necessary for the early stages of the war plan.
Defense Burdensharing: Of the four burdensharing categories in the
2000 Report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,
South Korea met the congressional goal in one. The Republic of Korea
increased the number of peacekeepers in support of multinational
military activities, primarily in East Timor. The Republic of Korea did
not meet congressional targets in the three other areas: (1) cost
sharing, (2) defense spending as percentage of Gross Domestic Product,
and (3) foreign assistance. This is a downward trend from the previous
year and must be reversed, as key U.S. congressional leadership has
articulated.
In the cost-sharing category for fiscal year 2000, the Republic of
Korea paid $751 million out of $1.83 billion United States non-
personnel stationing costs. This is a 41 percent contribution that fell
short of the congressional 2000 goal of 75 percent. The U.S. and South
Korea enter negotiations this year to adjust this level of cost sharing
and sign a new Special Measures Agreement. The Republic of Korea must
raise its present percentage of non-personnel stationing costs. The
U.S. State Department concurs.
South Korean defense spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product dropped from 3.2 to 2.8 percent between 1998 and 1999. The 1999
value of 2.8 percent was below the U.S. defense investment of 3.2
percent.
South Korean outlays for foreign assistance failed to increase by
10 percent between 1998 and 1999, and at 0.04 percent of Gross Domestic
Product, they fell below the congressional goal of 1 percent.
Command Initiatives: During this past year, we have developed a
number of initiatives designed to better meet the needs and demands of
our great alliance. The most important of these are support to the
North-South transportation corridor, the ``good neighbor'' initiatives,
environmental programs, and the Land Partnership Plan.
The United Nations Command will continue to fully support President
Kim Dae-Jung's reconciliation process and the development of a road/
rail transportation corridor through the Demilitarized Zone. The
command has already modified the 1953 Armistice Agreement to allow the
Republic of Korea to coordinate construction issues on behalf of the
Military Armistice Commission. Close cooperation between United Nations
Command and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense has, and will
continue to ensure sufficient levels of security in the Demilitarized
Zone during demining, corridor construction, and future operation. As
we work closely with North Korea over issues concerning access and
commerce in this corridor, we will continue to insist that all actions,
and all confidence-building measures, are both reciprocal and
verifiable.
During the summer of 2000 the command and the government of South
Korea initiated comprehensive good neighbor initiatives in response to
an alarming rise in ``anti-U.S. Forces Korea'' sentiment that turned
violent in some situations. The program includes education programs for
both U.S. servicemembers and the Korean public, public affairs programs
to offer a balanced perspective to the Korean press, and increased
interaction between U.S. servicemembers and local Korean military units
and citizens. To educate and nurture an understanding between our
servicemembers and South Korean citizens we began a bilingual quarterly
newsletter jointly published by U.S. Forces Korea and the South Korean
government, and posted on the Korean Defense Ministry's internet
website. Still in its infancy, these initiatives have already paid
dividends and will continue to do so into the future.
Being good stewards of the environment in our host country is
important to our mission and the alliance. We have accomplished much
but there is more we will do. Future problem mitigation and
environmental protection requires continuous funding from both the
Republic of Korea and United States. Our investment in protecting the
Korean environment is the responsible course that serves to strengthen
our alliance.
The final future initiative is the Land Partnership Plan begun in
December 2000 with our Korean partners. This program seeks to improve
the combined forces readiness posture, improve force protection,
enhance public safety, stop training range encroachment, advance
quality of life for U.S. forces, support South Korean economic growth,
and posture our forces for cooperation well into the future. The
combination of a robust and growing Korean economy, rising population,
and very limited land on the Korean peninsula is placing extreme
pressure on the command. Encroachment by farming and construction on
training ranges and in safety zones around ammunition storage areas
endangers the public and is lessening our ability to properly train.
This initiative will reconfigure and protect training areas, and
consolidate our forces around hub installations. Both nations stand to
gain significantly from this effort, but the program requires strong
support from the Korean government. U.S. Forces Korea must have access
to small new purchases of rural land for consolidation before we can
release large areas of valuable urban land and facilities.
Additionally, both sides must approach the plan as an integrated whole,
and not piecemeal the package, to maximize benefits.

COMMAND PRIORITIES

During my comments today, I will discuss the status of programs and
programmatic areas in which resource allocations are of significant
concern to me. My intent is to discuss possible problem areas as they
now appear. However, these program areas and their associated funding
levels may change pending the outcome of the new administration's
strategy and defense review which will guide future decisions on
military spending. For fiscal year 2002, the President's budget
includes funding to cover our most pressing priorities. I ask that you
consider my comments in that light.
Achieving our vision and accomplishing our missions requires us to
prioritize scarce resources. Our command priorities are (1) War
Fighting Readiness, (2) Support to War Plans, (3) Force Protection, (4)
Future Force Development, and (5) Quality of Life.
War Fighting Readiness: Our number one command priority of war
fighting readiness consists of training, exercises, and headquarters
operations:
Training is the cornerstone of our combat capability and level of
readiness. Our combined forces continue to remain trained and ready. We
can fight and win! The North knows it. They fear our power and might.
We are fully capable of decisively defeating North Korea and destroying
the regime. However, the command faces significant training challenges
ranging from training range encroachment to required modernization. We
need to reverse problems in three specific areas: (1) Training area
requirements, (2) Korea Training Center modernization, and (3)
Realistic urban operations training facility.
Our first concern is that our joint forces experience a lack of
adequate training areas on the peninsula. The problem stems from
training areas being widely dispersed, non-contiguous, often
temporarily unavailable, and too small to support the range of our
modern weapon systems. Current training areas also suffer from
sustained civilian construction and farming encroachment. The Land
Partnership Plan addresses this urgent problem by consolidating and
protecting necessary training areas. The new Inchon International
Airport scheduled for full operation in 2003 creates additional
problems for airspace management. The Republic of Korea government must
energize a realistic and near term program to improve their airspace
management system. Failure to do so will increase the risk for both
commercial airlines and military aircraft.
The second long-term challenge is the support for our Korea
Training Center, Synthetic Training Environment Vision. Currently, we
have the ability to train a battalion task force in the live
environment at the Center but only under manpower intensive, manually
supported efforts. We need to increase training realism by modernizing
range instrumentation. We are working with Department of the Army to
fund this requirement.
To squeeze the most benefit out of every training minute and
dollar, we must infuse new training technologies. In the near term,
full funding of our joint exercise program is critical to maintaining
our current level of readiness. Currently, our vital simulation centers
(Korea Battle and Korea Air Simulation Centers) are not fully funded
which requires us to reprogram dollars from other programs to fund
these readiness enablers. This is a less than ideal situation. Third,
and finally, urban combat training is imperative for all forces in
Korea as urbanization now dominates South Korea, the second most
densely populated country in the world. We greatly appreciate the
fiscal year 2001 military construction (MILCON) you provided and
efforts are ongoing to construct our Combined Arms Collective (urban
warfare) Training Facility. However, instrumentation for this critical
project is not funded. To achieve the maximum training benefit from
this facility, we need to install the prescribed instrumentation
systems.
The second component of war fighting readiness is exercises. Both
the content and timing of our combined and joint exercises successfully
posture this command to deter, defend, and decisively win a military
engagement. Exercises equal deterrence! Because of the proximity of the
threat, the complexity of this theater, and our high personnel
turnover, we must conduct robust theater level exercises annually to
maintain combat readiness. Each exercise is unique and focused on a
different essential component of the combined war fight. The loss or
reduction of dollars to support these exercises will weaken readiness
and deterrence, and hamper our combined forces training to fight and
win.
Our vital Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise support is
currently under-funded. Budget constraints have seriously impacted our
joint and combined exercise program. The combination of the increasing
cost of strategic lift, and a flat-line strategic lift budget, has
degraded our exercise strategic lift capability. It would be unwise to
let this continue over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
We will try to maintain our major exercises, but we must not
sacrifice realistic, quality training opportunities in the process.
Again, we must monitor our cuts carefully because these exercises are
not hypothetical--they are the exercising of real, ``go to war'' plans.
Korea is the only theater in the world where real war plans drive all
exercises.
Finally, we need significant help with our headquarters operations.
We anticipate needing additional funding in this area in order to
conduct day-to-day operations in the headquarters for United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Eighth U.S.
Army.
Support to War Plans: The four principle categories of support to
war plans are logistics; personnel; command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C\4\I); and intelligence capability.
Although we have made great strides in recent years, all four
categories require additional support.
The distance between the northeast Asian theater and the U.S. make
logistics support a healthy challenge to overcome. The task that is
most vital to our success in Korea is the current readiness of our
forward deployed forces. It is time to change the way Korea-based units
are viewed in our logistics system. Instead of considering our forces
as forward based or stationed, we must be considered ``forward
deployed'' in much the same manner as forces in the Balkans. The
proximity of the enemy and short warning times mandate our forces be
ready to fight tonight. In order to ``fight tonight,'' our units must
have the supplies and equipment necessary to defeat any attack. We will
defeat any North Korean attack early, while our augmentation forces and
supplies are overcoming the tyranny of distance from the United States.
To accomplish this our forces must have a support priority equal to the
highest priority of each of the four services. We intend to work
through the services to improve this posture.
Intra-theater sea and airlift form the cornerstones of our ability
to integrate forces and provide responsive theater support during
conflict. We fully support the Army's initiative to forward station
Army watercraft close to northeast Asia. We also are avid supporters of
Air Force programs that will ensure adequate availability of C-130 and
C-17 aircraft for intra-theater lift during a crisis. The geography of
the Korean Peninsula makes the effective use of theater-controlled air
and sealift essential to our success.
The limitations of airlift and sealift to rapidly move forces and
supplies to Korea are a concern. We fully support the planned and
continued modernization and maintenance of our Defense Department's
strategic enroute infrastructure.
The U.S. also needs to improve the strategic deployment triad: (1)
For airlift, this means a robust acquisition program for the C-17,
increased efforts to improve the reliability of the C-5, and strong
support for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet; (2) For sealift, this means
the completion of our Ready Reserve Force and Large, Medium Speed Roll-
On, Roll-Off programs; and (3) For pre-positioning programs, this means
100 percent fill of equipment and adequate sustainment for these
programs for all services.
Pre-positioning programs for equipment offer us the ability to
reduce the strategic movement requirements early in any conflict. In
Korea, our ability to defeat a North Korean attack is critically
dependent upon the pre-positioning of key items of equipment and
supplies. We primarily focus on the Army's brigade set of equipment and
supplies, the pre-positioning of critical munitions and repair parts,
and the location of assets critical to our ability to integrate and
sustain forces early in the fight. Our pre-positioning programs focus
on the initial 15 to 30 days of the campaign while the United States'
strategic sustainment base gears up. We have shortages with regard to
our stocks of preferred munitions, Air Force replacement parts,
replacement ground combat systems, and the Army's pre-positioned
Brigade set.
Key logistics and sustainment shortfall remains in Army
Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4). Sustainment shortfalls limit ability to
reconstitute the force and sustain missions, resulting in increasing
risk. Significant major end item shortages do exist. Lack of repair
parts and major assemblies with the APS-4 sustainment stockpile will
directly impact the ability to return battle-damaged equipment to the
fight. The current funding stream does not adequately support
sustainment shortfalls in APS-4. However, the Army's current plans are
to cascade additional equipment into APS-4 sustainment stocks over the
next couple of years, thus reducing the shortfall. We strongly support
the services' requirements to improve our ability to sustain combat
operations. Failure to support these requirements increases our risk.
The second element of supporting our war plans is personnel. Our
main challenge is the turnover of our people. In a theater with
approximately 95 percent turnover per year, the small size of our joint
staff is currently our major concern. We are manned at about 34 percent
of our wartime staff requirements. In addition, new mission areas such
as force protection, information assurance, information operations, and
critical infrastructure protections are being established without any
authorized billets. We cannot continue to handle new requirements
without the manpower to do the job. This must change. Korea cannot go
on at the 34 percent manning level.
We are most concerned about our command and control systems. Today,
severe deficiencies in command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C\4\I) functionality impairs our ability to execute the
war plan. To achieve the information superiority that President Bush
describes in A Blueprint for New Beginnings--A Responsible Budget for
America's Priorities, we must pursue technologies that provide
collaborative, interactive, real-time common operational understanding.
This is best achieved by building a C\4\I architecture that embraces
the principles of network-centric warfare while leveraging emerging
space based capabilities and sensor to shooter technologies. We are
also engaging Joint Forces Command to integrate ongoing C\4\I
experimentation in our major peninsula exercises to help us stay on the
forefront of emerging technology. We feel this relationship will put us
in a solid position to integrate maturing technologies into our theater
architecture.
Pursuing leading edge technologies alone will not guarantee success
in the future. Transitioning to modern technology requires an
accompanying shift from the current analog processes that served us
well during the Cold War to the digital processes needed to address
regional threats in the information age. To begin this transition, we
need to balance current readiness with the imperative to pursue C\4\I
capabilities that ensure full functionality. As such, the vast majority
of our anticipated fiscal year 2002 budget for C\4\I supports the
minimum required to sustain current ``go-to-war'' systems while we
expect to pursue this new vision over the Future Years Defense Plan.
This includes maintaining the funding previously earmarked for Korea
support through U.S. Army Forces Command and Army Signal Command.
Our ``go-to-war'' command and control (C\2\) systems consist of the
Global Command and Control System ((GCCS), both U.S.-only and combined
versions), as well as a combined secure video teleconferencing (VTC)
system. These combined systems are the Department of Defense's largest
and most complex bilingual command and control systems and are
absolutely imperative to commanding and controlling U.S. and South
Korean forces. Over the last 5 years, U.S. Forces Korea has had to
divert funds from other operations and maintenance programs to sustain
these C\2\ systems. We can no longer afford to take this approach. Our
funding shortfall is significant, but contains only what is required to
maintain the status quo. We have deferred new growth and operational
enhancements to the outyears.
Any discussion of C\4\I must include two near term challenges--
information assurance and spectrum availability. These capabilities are
critical to protecting our investments in C\4\I. Our increasing use of
information systems breeds a growing dependence. While this dependence
does create opportunities for us to exploit adversary information and
information systems, it does, however, expose our own vulnerabilities.
We are pursuing a viable information assurance program to protect our
information while defending our information systems, but we anticipate
facing a severe funding shortfall with regard to our top down driven
projects. However, this could change as a result of the defense
strategy review.
I share the same concerns as other CINCs regarding the upcoming
plan to sell off major portions of the U.S. frequency spectrum. Today,
we are hindered from fielding new systems as well as training as we
will fight because of host nation spectrum access. We will soon be
fielding the Apache Longbow attack helicopter in Korea but have not yet
gained frequency approval for armistice training and operations due to
conflicts with South Korean commercial telecommunications providers.
Additionally, there are no available frequencies to support unmanned
aerial vehicles during armistice, and only limited frequency approval
for Joint STARS and Patriot air defense system. Further sell-off of
additional spectrum in the U.S. will reverberate around the world and
significantly impair on our ability to execute operations. I strongly
urge great caution in this area.
Enhancement to our intelligence capability is an absolute
necessity. President Bush's articulation of the need for ``leap-ahead
technologies for new . . . intelligence systems'' (A Blueprint for New
Beginnings. . . ) hits the mark in Korea. Our top priority is to
advance our intelligence backbone, the Pacific Command Automated Data
Processing Server Site Korea (PASS-K) with 21st century technology.
This is a General Defense Intelligence Budget Program (GDIP) that has
operated with insufficient funding for over 5 years, and is now running
on fumes. I fully support the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
requests for funding to expedite long neglected modernization, and
acquire next-generation improvements. Failure to do so risks degrading
our already diminished indications and warning posture while hampering
our collaboration with the entire joint intelligence community. This
must be funded!
We must improve our theater's intelligence systems' functionality.
Our VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) satellite network provides us
mobile communications, but is currently separated into three isolated
networks. We intend to integrate the three into one network, while
modernizing and upgrading in the process. This will improve capacity
and reduce costs while providing much needed redundancy in this fragile
system. However, we have a funding shortfall in this program.
We need to leverage our capability to collaborate with the entire
joint intelligence community off peninsula to perform rapid targeting,
battle damage assessment, and threat analysis. We plan to install
hardware and software onto the existing systems and networks to
accomplish this essential requirement. This will facilitate the
integration of U.S. Forces Korea collection efforts into national
databases and threat assessments, seamlessly collaborating theater and
national intelligence related to Korea. Without increasing our
footprint in Korea, this will increase our accessibility to analysts at
National Security Agency (NSA), DIA, and Joint Intelligence Center-
Pacific Command. We need funding support for this effort.
Finally, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
assets must not dip below current levels in imagery intelligence and
signals intelligence (SIGINT) . . . it must improve. Until the unmanned
aerial vehicle proves itself reliable and affordable as a replacement
for the U2, we must hold the number of U2 pilots we have and not let
this precious high-demand, low-density asset decrease on peninsula. I
also fully support the U.S. national intelligence community,
particularly National Security Agency, requests for funding to improve
ISR and SIGINT capabilities.
Force Protection: The environment in Korea presents several unique
challenges for the protection of our servicemembers, civilians, and
family members. While our force protection posture continues to
improve, United States Forces Korea has 95 installations across the
peninsula, many quite small and remote. We have organized these 95
installations into 12 ``enclaves'' for more centralized planning,
execution, and coordination of resources and to provide a clear chain
of command responsibility.
During this past year, we have reviewed and updated the force
protection plans for each of our enclaves. We are now taking the next
step by exercising these plans, using likely terrorist scenarios, to
continue to improve them. I have established a U.S. Forces Korea level
``Tiger Team'' to conduct an exercise at each of our enclaves during
this fiscal year. Each exercise is preceded by a ``Red Team''
assessment, which simulates a terrorist group attempting to penetrate
and attack one of our installations. We have conducted four of these
exercises thus far. We have shared the lessons learned from each of
these with the joint community and all of our units as we continue to
refine our force protection plans.
We have identified four systemic force protection concerns within
United States Forces Korea: lack of standoff, access to installations,
off-post housing, and off-post activities.
Our most resource intensive vulnerability is lack of standoff.
Urban encroachment on our installations, decaying infrastructure, and
the lack of available real estate for force protection modifications
contribute to the vulnerabilities. In the short term we have used Joint
Staff Combating Terrorism Initiative Funds to install blast walls and
mylar coating in limited areas to protect our most critical facilities.
Our Land Partnership Plan addresses some of our long-term weaknesses.
This plan will shift many of our installations and training areas from
urban centers to rural areas and allow us to move more of our people
onto our installations.
Access to our installations poses another significant challenge. We
have taken positive steps to improve our access control through
implementation of a fingerprint scanning identification system and
reducing the number of non-U.S. Forces Korea persons who can be
sponsored onto our facilities. The Army currently fully funds our
contract security guard force that maintains installation access
control and perimeter security without diverting soldiers to this task.
Continued funding is vital.
We are conducting a complete study of off-post housing and
temporary lodging to assess our vulnerability and determine appropriate
protection policies. Our long-term goal is to substantially reduce the
number of personnel being housed off-post through increased
construction of on-post quarters. In the near term we execute a very
proactive force protection public awareness program for those living or
traveling off post.
We have routinely conducted force protection assessments for all
high profile off-post activities and events. We have expanded risk
assessments to assess our vulnerabilities with regard to the lower
profile activities such as inter-camp bus routes and personnel
attending college classes on local campuses. We continue to look for
and implement innovative ways to mitigate our vulnerabilities and
educate our personnel and their families on threat avoidance. We
believe force protection funding shortfalls will be significant for
fiscal year 2002, and we need your help to ensure our American
personnel are properly protected.
Future Force Development: As technology advances we must constantly
seek innovative improvements to our capabilities through force
development. We support the efforts of the research and development
community, and would benefit most from improved intelligence analysis
capability; ability to locate and track weapons of mass destruction;
protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack; ability to
defeat hard and deeply buried targets; and missile defense.
We are excited about the Army's transformation concepts and I am
pushing for the stationing of one Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in
Korea to replace one existing brigade. This will provide the
maneuverability and combat power necessary to operate in the
mountainous and increasing urbanized terrain of Korea. It will also
prepare us to refocus the Army's forward deployed forces in Korea to a
regional role. The IBCT provides a rapidly deployable ground force to
complement Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, and Marine
Expeditionary Forces, and Navy Amphibious Ready Groups and Carrier
Battle Groups as U.S. Forces Korea's role transitions to that of
northeast Asia regional security.
Quality of Life: Quality of life, our final command priority, is a
basic element of overall readiness and is critical to our mission. As
stated in President Bush's A Blueprint for New Beginnings. . ., ``we
cannot honor our servicemen and woman and yet allow substandard housing
and inadequate compensation levels to endure.'' The Korean peninsula
faces shortfalls in both areas. The investment philosophy of ``50 years
of presence in Korea . . . 1 year at a time'' has taken a severe toll
on our housing, infrastructure, and morale. Personnel tempo is 365 days
a year in this ``hardship tour'' area. Our servicemembers wake each day
within artillery range of our adversary knowing he will be the one who
decides if we go to war. Our intent is to make a Korean tour the
assignment of choice for our military personnel by providing the best
quality of life possible. Our goal is a quality of life that is
comparable to other overseas assignments. This is clearly not the case
today. A Korea assignment today involves the greatest loss of pay in
the military, the highest command declination rate, the highest ``no
show'' rate in the U.S. Army, and the poorest quality of life of any
permanent change of station assignment in the military. We have a plan
but we need help. To attack these problems, we need to address Pay and
Morale, Housing and Infrastructure, and MILCON.
Even with the great assistance we received from Congress last year,
we continue to face grim conditions regarding housing and
infrastructure throughout this command. Nearly 40 percent of the
servicemembers in U.S. Forces Korea live in inadequate quarters.
Overcrowded facilities force us to billet many unaccompanied personnel
off-post, increasing their personal risk and cost of living.
Unaccompanied housing and dining facilities suffer from rapid
deterioration and excessive wear through overcrowding and lack of real
property maintenance and repair (RPM) funding. Some military personnel
still live in quonset huts and Vietnam-era pre-fabricated buildings.
However, if funded, by 2008 the barracks will be upgraded to an
acceptable standard. Fifteen percent of all buildings in the command
are between 40 and 80 years old and 32 percent are classified as
temporary buildings. In 1999 and 2000 alone, the command suffered 295
electrical power and 467 water supply outages from decaying
infrastructure.
The lack of adequate family housing is the most serious quality of
life issue we face in Korea. It contributes to high personnel
turbulence and discontinuity, degrades morale and productivity,
resulting in high assignment declinations and retention problems for
our services. Indeed, Korea's uniqueness as a yearlong unaccompanied
tour has been purchased at a price. We provide government owned and
leased housing for 1,987 personnel--less than 10 percent of our married
servicemembers--compared to more than 70 percent in Europe and Japan.
Our goal is to increase the command-sponsored rate for Korea.
The solution is to raise the quality of life for personnel that
serve in Korea, and we have a plan. This current plan includes new
construction and leasing local housing units. We intend to apply more
than half of this cost from our host nation construction funding to
build 4,200 of the 6,300 units needed over the next 20 years, but we
will need your help to fund family housing construction. In addition,
we need leased housing (800 units authorized by Title 10 now, and add
an additional 2,000 units to expand the command sponsored population).
This year's ``New Housing Project'' budget includes 60 new units at
Camp Humphreys. This project must not be cut. A total of 6,300 units
across the peninsula are required.
Congressional funding that you provided last year has enabled us to
improve water distribution systems at Kunsan and Osan Air Bases, and
improve existing barracks at Camp Carroll, Camp Hovey, and Camp Page.
Nevertheless, chronic under-funding of military construction (MILCON)
funding for Korea during the past 15 years and the interruption of
MILCON dollars for our command between 1991 and 1994 has limited our
ability to give our servicemembers the quality of life they deserve. We
desperately need to execute a comprehensive construction program and
begin to eliminate the unacceptable living and working conditions in
aging facilities that U.S. forces in Korea face every day.
Aging facilities are also more costly to maintain. Under funding of
RPM exacerbates an already serious problem with troop housing, dining
facilities, work areas, and infrastructure. We hope to receive
additional funding that will allow us to keep the doors open to our
facilities and make emergency repairs only. It will still leave us
short of our total requirement.
Finally, utilities costs are soaring. This is an area where
increasing costs can no longer be absorbed. Oil costs are up 60
percent. Electricity is up 5 percent and scheduled to go up 15 percent
more. Because of these increased energy costs, we anticipate needing
additional funds.
In summary, we work our command priorities through a balanced
readiness approach--carefully addressing combat readiness,
infrastructure, and quality of life with limited resources. Our ability
to fight and win decisively is tied to proper balance in all of these
essential areas. Overall, our top priorities for fiscal year 2002 are
as follows: (1) C\4\I architecture modernization and protection, (2)
Combat readiness: air and ground battle simulation centers, (3) Anti-
terrorism and force protection, (4) Environmental protection and damage
mitigation, (5) Real property maintenance, and (6) Family housing.

CONCLUSION

We would like to leave you with five thoughts:
First, we want to emphasize that the support of Congress and the
American people is vitally important to our future in Korea. We thank
you for all you have done. However, we must also ensure that our
resolve is consistent and visible so that North Korea, or any other
potential adversary, cannot misinterpret it. We have an investment of
over 50 years in this region. I believe we should continue to build on
it to guarantee the stability that is so important to the people of
Korea, northeast Asia, and to our own national interests. We urge
committee members to come to Korea and see first-hand the importance of
the American military presence and the strength and vitality of the
United States--Republic of Korea alliance.
Second, the North Korean military continues to increase its
nonconventional threat and conduct large-scale training exercises in
spite of severe economic problems and a perception of a thawing
relationship between North and South Korea. North Korea's continued
growth in military capability and the intent implied, amounts to a
continued significant threat. Now, more than ever, the strength of the
Republic of Korea--United States alliance, built on a foundation of
teamwork and combined training, provides both nations with a powerful
deterrent as well as the readiness to fight and win. Make no mistake;
there is no ``peace dividend'' yet in the Korean theater at this time.
The North Korean threat to peace and stability in northeast Asia will
not fundamentally diminish until the North engages in tangible military
confidence building measures, both now and in the future, that are
verifiable and reciprocal.
Third, this is the second year of commemorations recognizing the
significance of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, viewed by many
of our veterans as the ``forgotten war.'' We are committed to honoring
the brave veterans living and dead and hope you can join us in Korea
for these commemorations to remember their sacrifice.
Fourth, now and in the future, the U.S. and northeast Asian nations
cannot secure their interests and economic prosperity without credible,
rapidly-deployable, air/land/sea forces in Korea. Presence is security,
commitment to friends, and access into the region. As the only presence
on the mainland of east Asia, U.S. forces in Korea will play a vital
role in the future peace and stability of the region.
Finally, you can be justifiably proud of all the exceptional things
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Defense Department
civilians continue to do with great spirit and conviction. They remain
our most valuable asset. They sacrifice for our Nation every day. This
is why we remain so firm that we owe all those who faithfully serve
proper resources for training, a quality infrastructure, and an
adequate quality of life. Again, thank you for this opportunity to
share our thoughts with you.

Chairman Warner. Thank you.
We will have a 6-minute round of questioning for each
member.
I am going to lead right off, General Schwartz. During the
course of President Bush's campaign, he addressed the serious
problems associated with retention of our middle grade officer
corps and senior enlisted. One of the root problems was over-
deployment. While you speak with great pride as to the number
of times that you and your subordinates have served in Korea,
nonetheless, President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld and the team
have to look to determine whether or not there are areas of the
world in which we can reduce the U.S. presence which, in turn,
hopefully will reduce the number of deployments. In our
judgment--at least mine--the last administration was over-
deployed with our Armed Forces and underfunded.
Now, is your AOR one in which the Bush team can look at and
determine, based on your recommendations, that there is a basis
for a reduction of the total number of personnel which, in
turn, would reflect Army-wide fewer deployments?
General Schwartz. I think my answer to that, Senator
Warner, would be this. With the current situation like it is,
with the threat as we see it, with the words that I used,
``bigger, better, closer, deadlier,'' I would not recommend any
cut or reduction of force in the Korean peninsula at this time.
If, however, in the future we go down the path of
reconciliation, if we go down the path of confidence-building
measures that are verifiable and reciprocal, and we see that
the north takes the actions--not the words, as you indicated in
your opening statement, but the actions--to reduce the tension
and to reduce the threat, then there could be a concomitant
reduction of troops. But until we reach that period of time, I
would not recommend to do so.
Chairman Warner. You were present before this committee
last year and have rejoined us this year. Is your AOR in your
judgment subject to greater tensions and threat or about the
same as last year?
General Schwartz. Sir, I have to tell you the threat has
gotten identifiably better in those areas that I talked about,
and I can be more specific in a closed session. But the threat
is better than we saw it last year. They are training at a
higher level.
Chairman Warner. When you say it is better, in other words,
it places a more serious threat to our forces and those of
South Korea.
General Schwartz. Right, sir. I think the threat is more
serious today than it was last year when I testified.
Chairman Warner. Let us start off with your AOR, Admiral
Blair. What about the threat condition last year when you
appeared before this committee versus this year?
Admiral Blair. Sir, the concerns that you have about the
strain on our people of operations I think are more true of
other theaters than of the Pacific Command. I would, in fact,
point to the East Timor operation as an operation in which we
were able to come up with some very creative ways of working
within an international coalition in order not to have large
deployments of U.S. forces.
Right now we have 12 on-the-ground personnel in Dili, East
Timor. That is down from about 500 last year. The rest of our
presence is visits by Navy ships and often embarked Marine
units. For instance, we have the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group
with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit making a visit
during its regularly scheduled deployment.
So, we are taking advantage of the deployment capability we
have within the force to get the job done. All of our ships are
within their personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) limits, and the same
is basically true for the other services.
Chairman Warner. Do you feel that within your AOR there
could be some reduction in deployments, thereby reflecting on
lessening the overall stress in the Navy on deployments and
hopefully improving retention?
Admiral Blair. I do not think the PERSTEMPO is a factor in
retention in the Pacific theater. I think we are in good
balance, sir.
Chairman Warner. Returning again to the work that you
perform--and it is a very valuable contribution to this most
difficult decision that is facing our President with regard to
how to structure this year's arms package for Taiwan--did you
have consultations with our allies and friends, other nations
in this region, and are their thoughts factored in? Because if
we had the misfortune of an outbreak of hostilities requiring
the presence or enhancement of U.S. forces to, hopefully,
either stabilize or prevent it or, indeed, confront this
problem, it would impact the entire region. Therefore, I think
consultation with our allies should be a factor to be taken
into consideration as we structure this package. All I need to
know is procedurally, have you and your subordinates done that?
Admiral Blair. We did not have specific discussions on the
particular Taiwanese request this year. It is something that we
discuss in general terms with allies, but there is not a
procedure for a specific consultation with them.
We do have specific consultations with the Taiwanese
delegation itself. It comes to Washington to present the
requests, along with rationale, and then it visits my
headquarters in an unofficial capacity also to discuss it.
Chairman Warner. As you look at the relations between China
and Taiwan and compare those relationships today with 1 year
ago, do you believe the tensions are about the same or higher?
Admiral Blair. About the same, sir.
Chairman Warner. Now, as you look at the military situation
with a trend in China of putting in place specific
installations, missiles foremost, they are predicated
presumably solely for the balance of military power between
China and Taiwan. Given that I think I understood you to say
that that trend is increasing on behalf of China and therefore
places upon Taiwan the need to enhance its own defenses, will
the arms packages now being constructed in your judgment result
in a balancing of this trend brought about by the initiatives
in China?
Admiral Blair. My recommendation is to take the actions
necessary to maintain that balance, and I believe that balance
is well attainable under current conditions. There have been
improvements in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as I said.
It is a mixed picture as far as the advanced weaponry goes.
There have also been improvements in the Taiwanese Armed Forces
as they also bring new systems on line. So, what you are
talking about is the balance here, and that is the way my
staff, my components, and I evaluate it.
Chairman Warner. But in simple language, given the trend of
increases you see on the behalf of China in its defense,
increased spending, and the placement of missiles, that balance
will no longer be present unless there is an enhancement of the
arms package to Taiwan. Is that correct?
Admiral Blair. There has to be an enhancement of Taiwan's
capability through a combination of what they buy from us, what
they manufacture from us, and what they buy from others.
Chairman Warner. To bring that back in balance again.
Admiral Blair. To maintain the balance.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. General Pace, one of the conclusions that
Senators Reed, Ben Nelson, Bill Nelson, and I reached following
our visit to Colombia was that--and here I am quoting--``the
continued strengthening, modernization, and professionalization
of the Colombian military is the best hope for weakening the
narcotraffickers' strangle-hold on Colombian society, advancing
the rule of law to protect the rights of all Colombians, and
ending the massive violations of human rights in Colombia.''
Would you agree with that?
General Pace. Sir, I agree with that 100 percent.
Senator Levin. Could you tell us, General, about your views
as to how serious you believe the Colombian army leadership is
to end the cooperation between the Colombian army units in the
field and the paramilitaries?
General Pace. Senator, thank you.
I am convinced that the senior leadership is dedicated to
do that. I have been to Colombia seven times, sir. I have had
the pleasure of meeting, on various occasions, with President
Pastrana; on almost every occasion, Minister of Defense
Ramirez; and on every occasion, General Tapias, who is their
chairman, and the service chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. We have had discussions. We have visited field units. We
have talked both about human rights violations and about
collusion with the paramilitary.
The Army of Colombia initially attacked the problem that
they had with human rights. They have embedded in their
training program human rights training. As an example of the
success they have had there, 2 years ago about 60 percent of
the accusations of human rights abuse inside Colombia were
against the Colombian military. This past year, just under 2
percent of all accusations of human rights abuse was against
the Colombian military. The Colombian military's standing
within the public has raised from number 10 in public opinion
polls to number 1. So, the Colombian military has, in fact,
taken on the human rights responsibilities that they have with
vigor.
They have now turned that same focus onto collusion with
the paramilitary.
Senator Levin. In an attempt to end it.
General Pace. Correct, sir. The leadership understands that
it has been going on. They understand that it is unacceptable.
They have undertaken to train their units in that regard, and
in fact they have specifically said that they view the
paramilitaries and, in their words, the ``illegal self-defense
forces,'' to be the largest long-term threat to the survival of
their democracy. Colombia uses the term illegal self-defense
forces, because they think the use of paramilitary gives the
organizations too much credibility.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Blair, on the question of Chinese military
spending, I understand there has been about a 17 percent hike
in military spending in China. But most experts have previously
concluded that China put economic development above military
modernization. I am wondering whether in your view the hike in
military spending means that the Chinese leadership has changed
its priorities.
Admiral Blair. No, Senator, I do not believe it does. It is
interesting. The Chinese proudly announced a 17.7 percent
increase, and when I asked 17.7 percent of what, the answers
got a little vague. Chinese military budget accounting is
evolving, to put it charitably, opaque to put it more
realistically. There are various items off budget, and clearly
the claims that they make of an overall spending of on the
order of less than $20 billion just does not make any sense.
That being said, I do not believe that the fundamental
priorities of the Chinese Government have changed. The Chinese
officers that I talked to clearly feel underfunded. They feel
that they are not being given the resources that they need, and
the government leaders, according to the most careful estimates
that I have, are keeping them underfunded.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Admiral, this goes to both you and General Schwartz. It has
to do with the Perry recommendations, the two-track policy
approach that he recommended relative to North Korea. I
understand that he worked carefully with your command, General
Schwartz, and I believe also with the Pacific Command before
those recommendations were made. It is my understanding that
his recommendations had the full support of both commands. Is
that correct? I could ask either or both of you.
Admiral Blair. I can start because I was there, Senator
Levin, when Secretary Perry was doing his study. The
fundamental pieces of what he recommended, that we must
maintain the deterrent capability, that we must consult closely
with both Japan and Korea, and that we should pursue a policy
of offering Korea a balanced set of incentives to stop the
behavior that was dangerous to its neighbors and to us in
return for relief with their diplomatic and economic isolation
was certainly something that we supported.
General Schwartz. I think I add, sir, that the Perry
process was a comprehensive review, and it went across the
Agreed Framework of the missile moratorium. Certainly from what
I hear from the administration right now that same
comprehensive review is taking place, looking at everything
that is in place and reviewing what we had done in the past and
trying to make recommendations to move forward. So, I think it
is a starting point certainly for all of us. As I testified
last year, I think the Perry process took us a long way towards
where we find ourselves on the peninsula at this time in terms
of negotiation and even the summit that we have had and some of
the historic things that have taken place in the last year.
Senator Levin. Did he work carefully with your command
before making those recommendations?
General Schwartz. Sir, he did. In fact, I was almost
flabbergasted at the amount of time that he spent on the
peninsula talking to us and working with us in developing his
recommendations.
Senator Levin. Did the recommendations have the support of
your command?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir, they did.
Senator Levin. On the question of the Framework Agreement,
it has kept North Korea from producing enough plutonium for
dozens of nuclear weapons. Are we better off militarily if
North Korea does not have those additional weapons, does not
produce that additional plutonium? Does that leave us better
off?
General Schwartz. Sir, I do not think there is any doubt
about it. If they are not producing fissile material, they are
not then able to produce the nuclear weapons that we are so
concerned about. So, when we have an agreement like the Agreed
Framework and it freezes that capability, at least at two
locations, like it has, that is beneficial. There is no doubt.
Senator Levin. Just a quick brief answer, if I can, from
each of you. As the CINCs, can you tell us whether or not you
are participating in the strategy review that is going on now
in the Defense Department? Can you just tell us if you have an
active role now in that strategy review?
General Schwartz. Sir, I will give you an example for
Korea. Ambassador Hubbard is there right now with a team that
is the policy formulation team for this current administration.
It's on the peninsula for the next 3 or 4 days, briefing some
draft recommendations, getting feedback from us, as well as the
Koreans, then moving on to Japan. So, that process is active
and taking place on the peninsula.
Senator Levin. Admiral, are you actively involved in that
review?
Admiral Blair. Are you talking about the review of North
Korean policy?
Senator Levin. No, generally.
Admiral Blair. The overall strategy review. Yes, sir, I am
involved in the overall strategy review.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
General Pace. Sir, Secretary Rumsfeld gave me a draft last
night and asked me to be prepared to discuss it with him
tonight.
Senator Levin. Great. Thanks.
Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, you used in your opening statement the
term ``well-trained, fit-to-fight.'' I have visited you in
different incarnations that you have had, and one thing I have
noticed is you are able to get fitness programs squeezed out of
nothing. Are you satisfied with your quality of life and your
fitness program there?
General Schwartz. Sir, I am not, to be honest with you. I
am looking hard at the fitness programs. I am looking hard at
the quality of life, and I am trying to articulate some of our
needs. I have done so in my formal statement, and I am doing so
as I make visits around to Congress and the Senators. So, I am
trying to articulate a better effort in that regard.
We are trained and ready, but when we look at the
infrastructure and we look at the quality of life aspects of
Korea, 50 years, 1 year at a time, there is a lot of work that
needs to be done to get that theater and that peninsula up to
speed.
Senator Inhofe. When you talk about when you look up north
the threat that is up there, I know that right now they are
reviewing a lot of this new equipment that we are talking
about, such as the Crusader, but do you see a real need for a
high rate of fire artillery piece in terms of reducing the
threat that you are facing?
General Schwartz. Senator Inhofe, I do. One of the
imbalances we have on the peninsula is artillery. The
capability of the North Koreans--they have the world's largest
stockpile of multiple rocket launchers. They have the world's
largest artillery force for such a small nation. I am very
concerned about that capability, and anything we can do in the
south to offset that to bring that into balance with respect to
the Crusader or any other artillery systems, I would be in
favor of.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, because we are right now deficient
compared to them in the rapid fire realm.
General Pace, this is not consistent with what we are
supposed to be asking at this hearing, but because of something
else that is going on right now and because of the Pace-Fallon
report that you were involved in, I would just like to ask you
the question. As far as Vieques is concerned, I made an effort
to see all of the possible alternative sites and came back
satisfied that there is none.
But just recently the two sites in Nevis came up. Since
they were not on my list to go see, I would like to ask if you
remember why they were or were not alternatives for this type
of integrated training.
General Pace. Sir, Admiral Fallon and I looked at that
early on in our deliberations for the report we provided. It
did not make the final cut because it lies in the path of a
very heavily trafficked civil aircraft area.
Senator Inhofe. So, neither one of those made your list to
examine.
General Pace. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral Blair, when Senator Warner talked
about how you would assess the threat today relative to 5 years
ago, you thought for a while and said, about the same. I think
your answer is probably accurate, but it is very serious. It
was 5 years ago, as I recall, when China was putting on its
show there in the Taiwan Straits. I think at that time it was
to influence the elections. That is when one of the high
officials said we are not concerned about America intervening
because they would rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei.
Then more recently, when they made the statement that war
with America is inevitable--now, these are things that have
been happening over the last 5 years.
Then just a few months ago, when you met privately with
some of the Chinese generals in Beijing and informed them that
the United States stands ready to defend Taiwan in the event of
Chinese attack, according to one official, he dismissed your
statement as a laughable bluster.
Now, in light of the buildup that is going on there, we
talked about the budget. We have not talked about the fact that
they are buying an unknown number of SU-27s, SU-30s, things
that are as good or better than those things that we have right
now. Even though you assess the threat the same today, I did
not want that answer to imply that, for some reason, it is not
that serious.
Admiral Blair. Sir, no, I was answering the question about
there is a relative threat today.
I read that same newspaper article, and I do not know what
the hell they were talking about. When I talk to Chinese
officials and tell them that we can take care of our
responsibilities there, they do not dismiss it one bit. In
fact, quite the contrary.
Senator Inhofe. In your opening statement, you talked about
readiness and some of your problems. In terms of readiness, I
would like to ask both of the Generals to respond in the same
way. What is the nature of your readiness problems for the RPM
accounts, quality of life, which I always consider to be a
readiness issue, not a personnel issue, force structure? What
are your readiness problems, General Pace and then General
Schwartz?
General Pace. Sir, in my area of responsibility, I have
very few troops actually assigned to me. I get all troops
deployed to me from the Joint Forces Command under the
authority of the Secretary. So, I am very fortunate in that the
troops who come to work in the SOUTHCOM AOR are, in fact, fully
trained and ready to perform.
Senator Inhofe. You do not have the problem.
General Pace. So, I do not have readiness problems. That is
right, sir.
Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz.
General Schwartz. I think I would comment on it just to
reinforce a couple that I started my opening statement with.
Some of the readiness concerns that I have, of course, are in
the C\4\I area, command and control and the protection of our
command and control facilities in terms of hardening and in
terms of the fiber optics we need. I would say that was number
one.
The upgrading of our battle simulation center so we can
have the robust exercises that we have, and the sustainment of
dollars to conduct those exercises is very important to us.
The force protection effort, as I indicated, is
tremendously important because we found ourselves all over that
peninsula and we find ourselves in a situation now where we
have not been able to take the force protection measures that
we are confident that we need to take for the future. So, we
will need some dollars to fix some of that.
Then, of course, I would just maybe end with this, the RPM,
the real property maintenance account. We have a tremendous
need for dollars to fix some of the things that are 30- and 40-
years-old that we just have not been able to fix. Those dollars
are in the millions, and we just need to get our hands around
that and some money to fix some of the things.
Senator Inhofe. By the very nature of an RPM account, that
is something that should be done immediately. Yet, you do have
a great need there, just as the other CINCs do that we have
talked to. That seems to be consistent.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. There is no doubt.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Pace. Senator, if I may, I answered your question
based on the troops and equipment that deploys to my AOR. To be
more complete in my answer, I can give you a very thorough
answer about ISR in the closed session.
Senator Inhofe. Very good. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, I noticed that you are originally from
St. Paul, Minnesota, and your distinguished service greatly
enhances your native State. So, thank you.
General Schwartz. Thank you very much.
Senator Dayton. You spoke briefly and you mentioned that
you had discussed this at greater length with the Chairman
about the treatment of our service men and women who are
deployed, as well as their families who are left behind. I had
the very sad duty last week to go to Fort Bragg to attend the
memorial service for an Army Ranger, Sergeant Troy Westburg
from Minnesota, who was deployed to Kuwait, his first overseas
tour of service, and 1 month later was returned home to his
family with the loss of his life. So, it underscored to me the
sacrifices that these men and women are prepared to make and
are sometimes called upon to make are very real. For their
families, the separation over that period of time at best is a
hardship and at worst is a lifelong tragedy.
So, I wonder if you could elaborate on your brief comment
about how the rations and other ways in which these families
are subjected to what you would consider unfair, undue hardship
financially and otherwise and what can we do, what should we do
to remediate that?
General Schwartz. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate
the opportunity to comment on that.
The separation is tough. It is long. It is hard. When you
look into the eyes of these great people, you can see the hurt.
There is a hurt there. They serve and they are willing to do
that. That is what they signed up for. There is tremendous
opportunity on that peninsula for them to train and do the
things that they love. So, there is a hurt but there is also a
love of what they do.
But if you just look on the hurt side and the quality of
life side, we need to improve the barracks situation over
there. We need to improve the quality of life over there in
terms of the facilities that we have, dining facilities and
gyms. So, we need to pick up on that.
But when you get into the individual soldier, sailor,
airman, and marine, I think there are a couple of things we can
do. We can look at this whole issue of separate rations, which
I commented on, because when they deploy to that theater and
they leave that family and that spouse behind, that is a big
hurt. That is about a $4,000 a year hurt that she or he has
when they are deployed away from home for a year. So, we need
to take a hard look at that and see if we are doing the right
thing there and see if we can provide the means to give it back
to them, or at least not take it away.
The second thing is--and I have talked several times about
this--we ought to look seriously about a tax exclusion for
these folks because when they are deployed in other areas of
the world, when they are deployed to the Balkans, when they are
deployed to Kuwait, we give these great soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines a tax exclusion. It is a tremendous boost
in morale. It is a tremendous vote of confidence for their
sacrifice when they are deployed away from home. It helps that
family back home. It helps that soldier say, this is not
hurting me as much when I am gone for a year, and it kind of
covers some of those hidden expenses.
I have been doing some surveys about those hidden expenses,
and they are anywhere from $4,000 to $6,000 out of each
servicemember's pocket per year. Plus the separate rations
hurt. When you add that all together, you are starting to talk
about $10,000 to $12,000 that a servicemember has to pay to
serve away from home. So, there are some things that we need to
do and take a hard look at to try to help them when they are
repetitively going back to a theater like Korea.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, sir.
If you have any specifics on that, being a freshman member
of this committee, you can help educate me and also additional
remedies. I would appreciate if you would send those to me.
Thank you.
General Schwartz. Thank you, sir. We will do. I will follow
up on that.
Senator Dayton. Thank you very much.
General Pace, you mentioned Colombia. We have had a couple
of briefings on that, including a meeting with the Defense
Minister of Colombia. Some of the comments that he made struck
a note in my memory bank. He referred to the light at the end
of the tunnel in the situation there. Your testimony, sir,
refers to the increased paramilitary activity, kidnappings, and
the like which seems, given our involvement in what some might
view as the domestic affairs of that country, would be almost a
natural follow-on to what we are doing.
I understand that these policies are made by civilian
authorities, but from a military standpoint, how do you view
realistically the situation there?
As a corollary to that, I appreciate that in your prepared
remarks you referred to this illicit drug industry as a growing
threat to the United States homeland which corroborates in my
own view that one of, if not the greatest, threat to our
national security is this flow of illicit drugs into this
country and the devastating effect it is having on our cities,
our youth, and the like.
What, if anything, from a military standpoint could we do
to increase the interdiction of these narcotics coming into
this country to make the transport of them something that would
be seen as so life-threatening that we would have a greater
deterrence on those who are trafficking, it seems often without
impunity?
General Pace. Senator, thank you very much. I will try to
give you the Reader's Digest version of the answer to both
those very important questions.
With regard to the situation, sir, President Pastrana's
Plan Colombia, which we are supporting through the bipartisan
support of our Congress, has 10 very distinct parts, one of
which is the military piece. The other nine are such things as
revamping the judiciary, improving the schools, improving the
health, building roads, alternative crop development, and all
the kinds of things that will actually be the make or break
part of the plan and will determine whether or not it is
successful in the future. But to get there, the military and
police are providing a secure environment, which allows the
other nine parts to take place and is very important.
Today, the combined capabilities of the Colombian military
and Colombian police is not sufficient to provide security for
the entire country. They can, in fact, do set-piece battles and
win. They can go to a particular part of the country, take
control of it, and sustain that control, but they are not large
enough to be able to provide security for the entire country.
As a result of that, the military support that we are
providing in the form of assisting them to train their
counternarcotics brigade and assisting them through our State
Department to obtain helicopters and to marry up the
helicopters with the counternarcotics brigade is, in fact,
helping them very much.
The plan by President Pastrana to increase the size of his
military by 10,000 a year, each year for the next several years
will, in fact, go a long way toward allowing him to have the
size force and the professional size force to be able to
provide the security he needs.
So, from my perspective, the plan as laid out, if
aggressively pursued, can in fact reach the goal for which it
is intended, sir.
To your second question, sir, as far as threat to the
homeland, sir, I consider drugs to be a weapon of mass
destruction. It is a threat to our homeland. If I had $1 to
spend, I would spend it on demand reduction. The second place I
would spend money is in the source zone we are helping right
now, and the third place I would spend money would be in the
transit zone. The reason I put it in that priority is that is
where I believe our efforts will provide the most success in
the long term. It is very difficult, once it is produced and it
begins its transit to the United States, through the eastern
Pacific, up through Central America, through the Caribbean, up
through the islands, to chase those arrows once they have left
the bow to try to catch them in flight or determine where they
are going to land.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
We will now hear from Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Blair, I was reading excerpts of some remarks you
made recently in a speech regarding the concept of security
communities. Some of what you say makes sense. A couple of
things concern me. Let me just briefly pull out a couple of
lines and then ask for your comment.
The prevalent way of thinking about international relations
throughout Asia and the Pacific is in balance of power.
You go on to say that is the world of Bismarck in 19th
century Europe. An alternative approach, offering the prospect
of a brighter future in Asia and better suited to the concerns
of the 21st century is one in which states cooperate in areas
of shared interest, such as peaceful development, diplomacy
promotion, and the use of negotiation. In essence, it would be
preferable to promote security communities as opposed to the
old balance of power.
Then you go on to say the problem is not force structure.
It's zero sum balance of power mindsets and ambiguous
intentions, fueled by ethnic and religious zeal, et cetera.
Then you say here part of the answer lies in developing
regional, multilateral approaches to common security
challenges. The most effective method is to develop policy
coordination, including combined military cooperation, on a
particular regional security military issue or a series of
related security issues.
I understand where you are coming from in terms of trying
to relax tensions and work together in a community sense, a
security community. But combined military cooperation, if you
were to move that to a region such as the Taiwan Straits and
try to come up with a common security community, how would you
do that in such a region as that?
My understanding of the military cooperation with China is
it is a one-way street. We give and they give nothing. So, I am
very concerned about that particular statement as to how it may
apply to China in your region of AOR.
Admiral Blair. Sir, I think in our relationship with China,
we have areas in which our interests coincide and we have areas
in which we are at odds. Clearly, Taiwan is the area where we
are most at odds because they reserve the right to use force
and we reserve the right for them not to use force.
On the other hand, there are many areas in which the
interests of the two countries run parallel: resolving the
Korean Peninsula situation peacefully without conflict,
ensuring that southeast Asia is a region which is secure and
developing peacefully, the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf,
on which China is becoming dependent, and many other allies of
the United States of that region are dependent on,
transnational issues such as narcotics. General Pace was
talking about narcotics coming up from Colombia. There is also
a flow from the Golden Triangle through southern China out to
all countries in the region. It is affecting China. It is
affecting other countries in southeast Asia. Part of it comes
to the United States. Terrorism, which is a threat to both of
our countries.
In addition, virtually all of those areas that I have
talked about are areas that are not just in China's and the
United States' interest. They are in the interest of the other
countries in the region. North Korea is the interest of all of
the countries in the region. Transnational issues are in the
interest of all. Southeast Asian stability is in the interest
of all.
So, I believe that in those areas, the United States,
China, and other countries can cooperate, including military
cooperation on things like peacekeeping, disaster relief,
basically the non-warfighting military cooperative areas. I
think we can develop areas in which we can productively work
together and stand a better chance of isolating the holdovers
from past conflicts, such as the Korean standoff, such as the
Taiwan Strait standoff. So, I think it offers a way for China
to develop constructively and for the United States and other
countries to make that same approach.
Senator Smith. Did you make any recommendations to
Secretary Rumsfeld on Taiwan arms sales?
Admiral Blair. I did.
Senator Smith. I assume you choose to keep those private at
this point.
Admiral Blair. I would rather let the decision process play
out, sir.
Senator Smith. All right.
Again, in the Taiwan Straits and looking at any possibility
of what you call a security community, we have reports, at
least from Taiwanese newspapers, about the Chinese using the
Russian-made Sunburn missile in the region. The most
significant purpose of that missile is to take out an aircraft
carrier, to ``kill it'' is the exact term that they use. That
sends to me a pretty clear message from the Chinese that they
are intent on countering the U.S. Seventh Fleet's presence in
the Taiwan Straits. With all due respect, I do not see how
there can be shared or combined military cooperation with a
country that is basically threatening our entire Seventh Fleet
carrier force out there.
What are we doing now to be able to protect our forces from
any possible attack from a Sunburn missile, especially the
several thousand men and women who would be on an aircraft
carrier? What countermeasures are we taking to that missile
being introduced into the region?
Admiral Blair. The Seventh Fleet, in conjunction with the
other forces that I can bring to bear, can ensure that China
would not be successful in aggression against Taiwan should the
decision be made to commit our forces. So, when you look at the
whole picture, China right now cannot be successful in
aggressing and, therefore, coercing Taiwan. That is the job
that we have.
As I mentioned, I think we should not have Taiwan define
the entire U.S.-Chinese relationship. It should not define the
entire military relationship. It certainly should not define
the entire national relationship, which includes economic
cooperation and all of the changes that information technology
and generational change are bringing to China. So, I do not
think that a military confrontation between the United States
and China is inevitable, and I believe that we should pursue
policies which makes it less likely rather than more likely.
Senator Smith. My time is expired. If you want to say it in
closed session fine, but I just want to ask, are our carriers
in the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits threatened by
Sunburn missiles?
Admiral Blair. The carriers in the Taiwan Strait can carry
out their jobs, Sunburn missiles or no Sunburn missiles.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
General Pace, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Ann
Patterson, has indicated that spray planes in Colombia were
shot at 122 times last year and American civilians are involved
in flying those planes. Her assessment is that Americans are at
risk in Colombia and that we will have Americans shot down.
What is your view about the risk that Americans have in
Colombia? Is it inevitable that Americans will be shot down?
General Pace. Senator, thank you.
The American civilians who are flying those aircraft are
hired by our State Department to fly those airplanes. They are
U.S. contractors who are flying the airplanes. They have, in
fact, had at least 128 hits in the last year on these small
airplanes that they fly. They continue to fly into the more
difficult areas to reach. Where they have been spraying so far
is in the flat areas. As they get into the more mountainous
terrain where the folks on the ground can shoot at them not
only straight up but from the sides, the environment in which
they fly becomes more and more dangerous. It would not surprise
me that over time that one of those aircraft will be shot down.
Senator Kennedy. Well, if that happens, what are the
procedures for search and rescue operations? Who is responsible
for the Americans' safety?
General Pace. Sir, those aircraft are flying in support of
and as part of the Colombian National Police effort. The
Colombian National Police have the search and rescue
responsibilities. The helicopters that they use currently are
manned both by Colombian pilots and by U.S. civilian contract
pilots.
Senator Kennedy. So, our military would not be involved in
any of the search and rescues?
General Pace. That is correct, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Are the American civilians who are
involved in flying these spray planes armed?
General Pace. I do not know, sir. I can find out.
[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.] I defer to DOS for further information on this policy.

Senator Kennedy. On the issue of collusion between the
Colombian Armed Forces and the paramilitary, it is widely
recognized that collusion between the two groups exists at the
grassroots level, notwithstanding the efforts at the higher
levels to address the problem. The State Department Human
Rights Report states that in 2000 members of the security
forces collaborated with the paramilitary groups that committed
abuses, in some cases allowing such groups to pass through
roadblocks, sharing information, or providing them with
supplies and ammunition.
Who is the highest ranking U.S. military person who has
conveyed concerns about the links to the Colombian Government?
General Pace. Sir, the highest ranking U.S. military
officer who has conveyed that concern is me.
Senator Kennedy. I know you made a brief reference earlier
to Senator Levin. I know you have been there seven times, and I
appreciate your earlier responses. Could you give us some idea
about what the response was and what your own reaction is to
it?
General Pace. Sir, thank you.
Sir, the response from President Pastrana, who broached the
subject with me, Minister Ramirez, who broached the subject
with me, General Tapias and all of his service commanders, who
briefed me on it first, have all been of great concern. They
recognize that they do have, at the lower levels, collusion
with what we call the paramilitaries. They are determined to
stamp out that collusion.
As one indicator, I have been invited next week by General
Tapias to go to sit down and debrief his senior staff, his
service chiefs, and their senior staffs on my testimony in
front of these committees so that they can better understand
what issues are of importance to the United States Congress.
Obviously, two of the issues I will talk to them about and
debrief them on are human rights and collusion. So, they are
very dedicated, sir, from the president on down, to stamping
this out, just as in the past they focused on human rights
violations and their record has improved dramatically.
Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you this before I come to the
human rights. Have the American military personnel on the
ground in Colombia seen evidence of this collusion?
General Pace. No, sir. We operate solely inside the
training bases. We do not go out on operations, sir.
Chairman Warner. Senator Kennedy, could I interrupt just a
minute? I have to absent myself to go up and introduce the new
nominee for the General Counsel of the Department of State, a
former Deputy Secretary of Defense. So, I will be back in just
a few minutes.
If you, Senator Sessions, would take the chair.
Senator Kennedy. On the issues of human rights, I have
appreciated the percentages and the population. As one who was
around during the pacification in Vietnam, I remember we used
to have a checklist too. A hamlet was pacified if they had a
well. They had 10 different things. If they had a well, they
had a school, they had employment, they had housing, they had
the other, it was pacified. So, it took us a long time to
realize that we ought to look at what has happened in the
inflation of rice that is coming into that hamlet in terms of
understanding of what was really happening in that area or
region. We became much more sophisticated in terms of the
evaluation. I am sure you will want to do that as well.
When we talk about the human rights, I am sure you will
want to know the kinds of charges that were made, what level of
human rights charges were made, what has been dropped, or what
has not been dropped on this. They have gone from the
percentages. I would like to know who is doing the polls. We
have all been through polls. I am sure you have your own
intelligence people who are looking at it. I am sure you are
appropriately skeptical, as you would be, in trying to make any
judgment on any policy sort of question.
My time is up. If you have any reaction to that.
But then if I could, Mr. Chairman, ask if SOUTHCOM is
preparing a report on Colombia's paramilitary groups and their
links with drug traffickers. I would like to see if SOUTHCOM
could do one for the committee, if that is possible. I suppose
that request order for the committee ought to come through the
chair, but I will ask that and I will talk to the chair and the
ranking member.
General Pace. Sir, we can do that.
[The information referred to follows:]

Colombia has the most complex human rights environment in the Area
of Responsibility (AOR) due to the symbiotic relationship between drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) and several illegal armed groups. We
continue to see allegations that members of the Colombian Military
(COLMIL) and National Police (CNP) maintain covert links to illegal
self-defense forces, despite strong government and legal pressure to
discontinue these ties.
Illegal self-defense forces and insurgent groups are Colombia's
worst human rights offenders. [Deleted.]
In a concerted effort to improve its human rights record, the
Colombian government has implemented the most aggressive human rights
program in the hemisphere. Along these lines, the government and, in
particular, the COLMIL, have made significant progress. During the
1980s and early 1990s, about 60 percent of all reported accusations of
human rights abuses were made against the security forces. In 2000, the
number of accusations attributed to the security forces amounted to
less than 2 percent, marking the fifth consecutive year in which
accusations of human rights violations against the military have
declined. This progress is a direct result of the effort made by
Colombia's military leadership to change the culture of their
institution. Specific measures have included educating their military
on human rights standards, establishing a staff judge advocate corps,
developing rules of engagement for the troops, and increasing the
military's cooperation with civilian investigative and prosecutorial
agencies.
Civilian and military investigators pursue officers and soldiers
accused of collusion. The military penal code that went into effect in
August 2000 took human rights investigations out of the hands of field
commanders and created a cadre of military prosecutors. The Colombian
government has given civilian courts jurisdiction in cases not
involving official duties. Punishments for security force members found
guilty of collusion with illegal self-defense forces have ranged from
administrative discipline to prison sentences.
The COLMIL has declared a ``no tolerance'' policy against collusion
by military members with self-defense forces and has successfully
sought to condemn members linked to these groups and human rights
violations. Reliable evidence on collaboration is limited, making it
difficult to assess confidently the degree of collaboration within the
COLMIL.
USSOUTHCOM uses all source information to poll human rights abuses
in Colombia: [Deleted.]

General Pace. My human rights information, sir, came from
Ambassador Patterson and her country team. I am parroting
information I received in country from the U.S. embassy.
Senator Kennedy. I would just say that in your own
evaluation to know the types of charges, what the allegations
are, and how they are being dismissed, what officers, if they
are officers, or noncommissioned people, to give a complete
picture I think is going to be called for as well.
But I thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and I thank the Senator from Louisiana.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. General Schwartz, I think it
is my time to ask a few questions.
With regard to Korea and the assignment of your fine
soldiers there and the detriment and losses they incur in terms
of income and their families--Senator Dayton I think mentioned
it--where are we in getting that fixed? I think you are exactly
correct. It is something that in terms of cost is not that
great, but it strikes me as a real unfairness. It has to be a
sore spot for the soldiers. Can we fix it and how close are we
to getting it fixed?
General Schwartz. Sir, let me say this. We are doing some
of the things that we can do on our own. For example, we have
just won a victory on the peninsula in terms of Korea being
defined as a hardship tour. So, that allowed our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines to get up to as much as $150 a
month this year that they did not get last year. That is a
victory. They are tremendously excited about that. As I travel
around the peninsula, all of them say to me, General Schwartz,
thank you. It makes a difference. So, we have had some success
ourselves.
We are talking to the service chiefs about this separate
ration issue and trying to articulate exactly the number of
dollars that it would take for each service chief to chip in
and try to pay that bill because it will have to come from the
service chiefs. I am working that on my side.
As far as the tax exclusion piece of it, I have seen many
Members of the Senate and House and we are talking about that
and the positive impact that it would have on the service
people.
So, I would tell you that we are moving, but we still have
some work to do in terms of making it a reality.
Senator Sessions. I hope you will keep us informed on it. I
think this Congress would be ready to help you on that. It does
strike me to be a significant matter.
With regard to force protection in the 95 stations--you
mean locations that you have troops in Korea--can those be
consolidated? In the long run, would that be a cost-saver for
our deployment in Korea?
General Schwartz. Sir, thank you very much.
Yes, they can be consolidated. I have started an initiative
which I call the Land Partnership Plan, which we introduced
this year for the first time. To give you an example of the
magnitude of that effort, of the 95 I spoke of, 46 are major
installations. We are going to reduce that, according to the
plan, to 25 major installations. That is significant.
We are cooperating with the South Koreans right now in that
effort. We are moving it along, and I think it is going to be
very successful. It is a 10-year plan. We have the ball
rolling, and it looks like it is going to be a very successful
one. We will save money in that effort, and we will improve the
quality of life, and we will enhance the force protection
effort for our servicemembers serving overseas. So, there are
many benefits to that partnership plan that I am excited about.
Senator Sessions. I think you are on the right track with
that. I think that is what the President and the American
people want to see. We want to see enhanced ability to do our
job, and we like to do it in a way that saves money rather than
costs us money. If in the short term it costs us some money, we
are willing to put it up if in the long term we will receive a
benefit.
I do hope that we can reduce the number of personnel there.
Every time we can, we can afford to do more for the ones who
are there, you have fewer people away from their family, and it
is less transfer of American wealth, it seems to me.
So, I think you are on the right track and I hope that we
can continue along that way. I believe you will have support
here.
General Schwartz. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Pace, have you had prior
experience with the drug effort prior to this assignment?
General Pace. Sir, in a minimal way in my previous
assignment as the Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces in the
Atlantic. We had some detachments that deployed to Peru and to
Colombia to assist with riverine training. We also had some
detachments that deployed to the southern border of the United
States to assist law enforcement agencies there in detecting
and monitoring traffic coming across the border. But that is
the extent of my involvement.
Senator Sessions. As a Federal prosecutor, beginning in
1975, on the Gulf Coast dealing oftentimes with smuggling cases
from Colombia which was the main source country for cocaine--
and remains so--I have seen and wrestled with that. I have seen
a lot of plans that are going to fix the problem. Through
interdiction we are going to stop it, or we are going to do it
through focusing on the source countries.
You correctly stated in your priority that demand reduction
is number one. Demand reduction is a combination, in my view,
of law enforcement and education and drug treatment and drug
testing and things of that nature that do work in the United
States.
But I will just tell you--and I think I have expressed this
to you before--we are not going to solve our drug problem by
spraying the coca plant in Colombia. At one of our meetings in
the Drug Caucus recently, I asked the DEA Director what his
budget was. It was $1.3 billion, the same amount of money we
are spending on Plan Colombia. Trust me, we will get a lot more
anti-drug benefit from doubling DEA than we will for this Plan
Colombia.
Now, I supported Plan Colombia and expressed real concern
about our full understanding of what it is about.
So, I would like to ask you, again from what you understand
the policy of the United States with regard to Colombia and
Plan Colombia, if you would discuss with me what our goals are.
How much of it is focused on drugs and how much of it is
focused on helping Colombia reestablish a democratic society
throughout its nation?
General Pace. Sir, concerning the $1.3 billion supplemental
last year, DOD has the responsibility to oversee about $250
million. Of that $250 million, about $110 million to $120
million is going to improving the capabilities of the three
forward operating locations in Ecuador and El Salvador and in
Aruba-Curacao so our airframes can fly so that they can do the
detection and monitoring mission. The next large chunk of money
is about $55 million that has gone into the support for the
Colombian military, to assist them in improving their
intelligence capability. The next level down then is the amount
of money we are spending to train up a 3,000-man brigade, to
assist them with some of the logistics and their maintenance,
to assist in building the helicopter pads for the three groups
of helicopters that are being bought by our State Department
and sent down there. So, from the U.S. military standpoint,
sir, the vast majority of the money is going into cement and
into intelligence.
Senator Sessions. I am just concerned. I will just restate
my concern with this whole matter. Colombia is the oldest
democracy in this hemisphere, I believe, except the United
States, and it is 38 million people. They have been allies and
friends of ours. They are a significant trading partner of the
United States, and their nation is in jeopardy. Some of their
best people are fleeing the country, are they not, a real
emigration because of the terrorism and the attacks and the
marxist guerillas taking over substantial portions of their
country. We suggest the only way we can help them is to help
them fight drugs.
I think we need to be much more realistic about that. It
would be a tragedy if we stand here and allow them to fall or
be undermined or have the economy destroyed as a result of this
guerilla effort.
General Pace. Sir, I agree with you that this is a fight
for democracy in Colombia to support that democracy. It is not
an expectation of being able to wipe out coca. If you did wipe
out every coca plant in the world, some other drug would be fed
to the demand side, and I stand by and agree with you that the
demand reduction is the most important.
I have done a disservice to the State Department because I
cannot speak to their numbers, but I do know that inside of
their $1 billion plus of the $1.3 billion, that there are
alternative crop developments and support for the other nine
parts of Plan Colombia other than military that are the key to
success.
But I agree with you, sir, this is supporting our friends
and neighbors, supporting a fellow democracy, while we also
assist ourselves.
Senator Sessions. We have a huge demilitarized zone for the
FARC that allows them to operate without any attack, under
complete protection. Now--I believe yesterday--the United
States Ambassador to Colombia, Ann Patterson, has endorsed a
proposal to grant Colombia's second largest rebel group a
demilitarized enclave, another one, a second one, a 5,000-
member National Liberation Army, another marxist group. Do you
think that makes good sense militarily?
General Pace. Sir, if I may give you an answer to that
question in detail in closed session, I would appreciate the
opportunity to do that.
Senator Sessions. It does not make good sense to me. I hope
that somehow we can reach a stage that we can help Colombia.
They are a good nation and important to this hemisphere.
Admiral Blair. Senator Sessions, may I just add one point
to your discussion with General Schwartz earlier? I think it is
important to note that both Korea and Japan provide support to
the U.S. forces there to the tune of $5 billion, $4.5 billion
from Japan in direct contributions, half a billion in direct
contributions from Korea. So, it is a shared responsibility
over there.
Senator Sessions. We certainly do not want to destabilize
that area and not be too rapid, but to the extent to which we
could reduce our numbers, make life better for the ones who are
there, it would be helpful.
Senator Landrieu.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Generals, thank you for your service and for your testimony
this morning. Let me just follow up because Senator Sessions
and I have similar views about our operations and our focus on
Latin America and Central America. Representing Alabama and
Louisiana, they are neighbors right to our south, and so our
attention is drawn quite naturally, if you will, to that
particular area of the world. His expertise in this area I have
come to respect in terms of his prosecutorial skills.
I happen to agree that our Plan Colombia has to be much
more comprehensive. It is not just a war against drugs, but it
is a war for democracy, to help strengthen those nations. It is
most certainly in our interest, the entire country, and
particularly in the southern part of our Nation, because of the
close proximity of Colombia.
So, let me just ask you to follow up, General Pace. I know
that you are only responsible for one part of this plan, but
could you state one or two constructive either criticisms or
changes you would make based on what you have seen in the last
year or 2 that we could focus our attention on in terms of
reaching the goals of Plan Colombia, anything that you could
direct us? I know you have said some of that in your testimony
already, but one or two things that you could suggest to us
that we could do to perhaps reach the goals as outlined in Plan
Colombia.
General Pace. Yes, ma'am, thank you. Senator, one of the
problems about Plan Colombia is that there will be spill-over.
Just as when Peru and Bolivia in recent years were very
aggressive in attacking their problem, as they were aggressive,
the businessmen, who are interested in making money, moved from
the point of resistance, Peru and Bolivia, into the point of
least resistance, Colombia, and set up shop there. So, as
Colombia becomes aggressive in their implementation of their
plan, the businessmen will look for another place to set up
shop.
I think what we need to do collectively is to encourage the
regional nations, the bordering nations especially with
Colombia, to discuss with each other how best to handle the
overall impact so that we do not continually have things
seeping over borders. Then once they have had a chance to come
up with regional solutions to regional problems, then we can be
their partner in assisting them to attain those goals together.
Senator Landrieu. So, a more regional approach, which is I
think the way we originally started with Plan Colombia, but
perhaps as it went through the process, it got somewhat watered
down. So, we should, in your opinion, focus on strengthening
the regional aspects of that plan so that we could increase our
chances of success.
General Pace. Last year there was about $180 million
allocated inside the $1.3 billion that went to the region.
About $110 million of that went to Bolivia. About $32 million
was earmarked for Peru, and the rest went to about five or six
other nations. As I said, I think now we are in a position, now
that we have seen the beginning impacts of Plan Colombia, to
have a much more robust dialogue with the other nations to
determine how to have a better regional approach.
Senator Landrieu. On another subject, each year through the
budget cycle, we go through an annual debate over the needs of
our CINCs and their battlefields and their theaters for
surveillance. We talk a great deal about new technologies
developing in that area. But currently we are bolstered by our
JSTAR technology. General Pace and Admiral Blair, do you have
enough access to these platforms? Are you having any difficulty
with your surveillance? Are you getting adequate coverage in
this regard?
General Pace. Senator, thank you.
I do not know that you will ever get a commander to sit in
front of you and say he or she has all the intelligence they
need. We always want more.
I do believe that my requirements receive a fair hearing
inside the decision process here in Washington and that I am
allocated a fair share of those intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets that are available. I would like to give
you a more complete answer in closed session, to be more
definitive about the types of problems I have.
The short answer is I do not have enough ISR, but it is not
because of the system not being adequate or fair with me. It is
just that across the board, we do not have enough national
capability. Therefore, when you spread out what I need and what
Tommy needs and what Denny needs and what the other CINCs need,
there is just not enough to go around.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, and I will look forward to
that closed session.
Admiral Blair.
Admiral Blair. The primary airborne assets that are used to
keep track of what is going on in the theater are virtually all
in the so-called high demand/low density category, which means
that the Joint Staff and then the Secretary of Defense have to
make priority decisions.
We find in the Pacific theater that when there are no
crises in other parts of the world, we can keep a pretty good
eye on what we have to keep it on. When something is going on
in other parts of the world that draws assets, an air war in
Kosovo or heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf, then we are
cut a little short with those assets that support General
Schwartz and the rest of the theater that I keep an eye on.
We have been able to take partial measures to compensate,
but we are squeezed a little tight. We made this input
internally. We need additional Rivet Joints, EP-3s, and similar
systems.
Senator Landrieu. I would like to help you with that.
Just one final comment, Mr. Chairman, if I could. General
Schwartz, I look forward to helping you in your efforts to
build up our bases in Korea. I have tried to focus my time on
this committee on the areas of retaining in terms of retention.
As my good friend from Georgia says, we may recruit a soldier,
but we retain a family. When you are talking about retention,
the issues that you have so beautifully expressed this morning
I think are very important and sometimes overlooked. The
importance of housing and compensation and steady paychecks and
predictable deployments I think have a great deal to do with
the strengthening of our force. They are not soft issues.
Sometimes we want to think there are hard issues and soft
issues, but they are all important issues and they are all
about building our force. So, I look forward to working with
you.
My time is up at this point, but I would like some specific
numbers from you about what we are talking about in terms of
investments because this Senator thinks that we should take a
part of this surplus and invest in our military now. We do not
have to wait for the strategic plan in many instances to
understand what our housing and our maintenance and operation
budgets and our MILCON budgets need. So, I am hoping that this
committee can be forceful in getting some of that investment
made sooner as opposed to later.
General Schwartz. Thank you very much, ma'am, and I will
make it a point to come by and brief you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
Our committee is fortunate to have two distinguished
Senators, both with the name of Nelson, and our records show
you arrived simultaneously this morning. [Laughter.]
If you gentlemen would sort out between yourselves, based
on seniority or any other formula you wish, as to who goes
first and who goes second.
Senator Bill Nelson. I am senior but I will defer.
Chairman Warner. That is very gracious. I hope your
colleague remembers that in the future.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you, Senator Nelson.
We appreciate very much the three of you being here today.
It is good to see you and have the opportunity to visit with
you. It is good to see General Pace who accompanied us and so
very ably hosted us on our trip recently to Colombia. I
appreciate very much every courtesy, as well as the opportunity
to learn more about what is happening in that part of the
world.
One of the subjects that is getting more attention today
than it has maybe rather recently, but has in the past flared
up and raised questions, is the relationship between the
Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, the
tensions that continue to exist and are exerted. Admiral Blair,
you may have already gotten into this before we arrived. I
apologize for being late. I was on the Senate floor for the
campaign finance reform matter, so I was delayed getting over
here.
But I guess the question I would have, having visited both
Taiwan and mainland China, is what the threat level is to
Taiwan from China at the present time, and what impact would
the sale of certain military craft that is being sought by the
Taiwanese have on U.S.-China relations?
Admiral Blair. Sir, I am senior but I will yield to General
Pace on that. [Laughter.]
The current military state across the Strait, Senator, is
that China is capable of causing damage to Taiwan. It is not
capable of taking and holding Taiwan.
The requests which Taiwan has made include strengthening of
their fleet air defense. It is largely an antiquated system and
the types of surface combatants they have asked for would allow
their surface combatants to take part in both defense of naval
forces and in a joint defense of other areas within Taiwan.
Senator Ben Nelson. If we were to assist Taiwan by the sale
of additional military hardware to them, what impact do you
think that might have on U.S.-China relations?
Admiral Blair. It really depends on the nature of the
equipment that is sold to them. Those decisions are in process
now. My input to it is based on what is necessary to maintain
sufficient defense, which is the standard that we use. That
recommendation is rolled in with the sort of considerations
that you mentioned and then the President will be making a
decision. So, that is in process right now and I have made my
input.
Senator Ben Nelson. The effort, though, would be to try to
maintain some level of parity so that Taiwan may be able to
maintain a position that would be sufficient to defend against
whatever Chinese incursion might be threatened. Is that fair to
say?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. I would say ``balance'' is
probably a better word than ``parity'' since you are talking
about one side on the defense and the other side that would be
committing the aggression. But our policy is that the defense
will be sufficient; that is, that aggression will not succeed.
Senator Ben Nelson. We would not want it to get out of
balance if we can do something to help maintain that balance.
Is that fair too?
Admiral Blair. That is what our policy is.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is our commitment.
Admiral Blair. Right.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. I will defer to the Senator
with more seniority. [Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Very well. The Senator from Florida,
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me follow up on that, Admiral. You refer to your input.
What is your advice to the White House with regard to the sale
of the more sophisticated systems to Taiwan?
Chairman Warner. Senator, we intend to go into a closed
session. I am going to propound a question much along those
lines in a moment.
The way I would suggest we phrase it is not the precise
advice that this distinguished officer has given the President,
which I think is of a confidential nature, but what are the
various pros and cons of elements of the issues before the
President and indeed before Congress, which does have a role in
this. May I suggest we pursue that course in open session?
Senator Bill Nelson. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, but we are going
to have to vote on that issue.
Chairman Warner. That is correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to be the best prepared that I
possibly can and would like to have the advice of knowing the
recommendations from the CINCs as we evaluate all the
information and have to make our decision.
Chairman Warner. Admiral, you may wish to pursue this.
I am not going to take your time. I will yield back. But I
am going to talk about the ship requests and the pros and cons
of the Kidd class of cruisers versus a follow-on of the current
production line. What are the pros and cons of those two? That
is the way I am going to proceed with it.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Chairman like to proceed and
I will just defer to the Chairman?
Chairman Warner. No. I am going to yield to you to go
ahead. I was just giving you an example of ships as one area
which I am going to probe.
Senator Bill Nelson. What I want is the best of advice from
many different quarters. So, do you want to proceed in
executive session on this issue?
Chairman Warner. No. I am going to proceed in open session.
I gave you an example of how I am going to address the question
as it relates to the different views as to two types of
cruisers which they are looking at. So, you proceed with your
line of questions, but I am just showing you how I am going to
do mine.
But I think the exact words that he transmits to the
President of the United States are a matter of confidence.
Senator Bill Nelson. I respect that. Then what I am going
to do is I am just going to defer any of my questions on Taiwan
and come back after you have.
Let me mention just a couple other things. I noticed,
General Schwartz, throughout your testimony, you keep coming
back to intelligence and command and control. The more that I
get into this from a standpoint as a member of this committee,
as well as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, there
are a bunch of heroes every day that we do not know anything
about because terrorist acts are not being committed because of
our intelligence. I certainly agree with your comments there.
General Schwartz. Thank you, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think what we need to do is to
commit whatever resources we have to, without blinking an eye,
to see that we have sufficient intelligence to meet the
terrorist threat around the world.
General Pace, I would just say that I thoroughly enjoyed
your hospitality going to Colombia with a number of the members
of this committee. I had never thought of the sensitivity and
appropriateness of the location of your headquarters where so
many of the foreign leaders happen to come in and out of Miami,
and as a result, you get another crack at them in order to
visit with them in order to develop a personal relationship
with them to carry out your duties. Would you care to comment
on that?
General Pace. Sir, thank you. That is exactly one of the
great benefits of being in Miami, that it is a hub for
transportation. We are about 15 minutes from the airport, so I
am able to meet with the senior leadership of most of the
countries who come through, who either come specifically for
business in Miami because it is such a great Latin hub, or who
continue to transit up to DC. But it works out extremely well
from my perspective, sir.
Thank you, both you and Senator Nelson, for going along
with Senator Levin and Senator Reed. Your time in theater made
a huge difference.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, I am getting ready
to go with the Intelligence Committee Chairman to Korea. You
have heard the recent flap over whether or not--and this is a
political issue. I do not need you to get into this, but
whether or not we might have undercut the president of South
Korea's attempts to reach out to North Korea. Do you have any
comments in this area that you would share with us?
General Schwartz. Sir, I think right now we are in a policy
formulation stage with the current administration. So, we are
waiting for that policy to be articulated to us. I mentioned
earlier, before you got here, Ambassador Hubbard is in country
right now with some effort to gather information, as well as
propose some of the draft approach for the future. So, we are
in the stage of a comprehensive review and policy formulation
that I think will result in some real strategic guidance in the
future.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would be appreciative of that policy
formulation being passed on when you formulate it.
To what degree is the starvation continuing in North Korea?
General Schwartz. Sir, I think nobody knows. One of the
problems with North Korea is it is not open, it is not
transparent. It is hard to get inside and really ascertain
everything that is going on. They announced some figures of
250,000, their own figures, that died of starvation in the last
18 to 24 months. We have estimations up to a million that have
died from starvation in the same period of time. The fact of
the matter is it is serious, it is extensive, and it is
continuing.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is there food from outside of North
Korea that is getting in to try to help with the starvation?
General Schwartz. Sir, there is. There is food coming in.
Of course, the United States is providing food, Japan, the
South Koreans, the Chinese. It is coming from all over the
world.
They are struggling, as best they can, to produce some of
their own food products. One of the only factories that they
have that runs day and night, 24 hours a day, because of their
energy shortage, is their food factories. So, they are trying
to produce their own, as well as take all the aid they can, and
they are still coming up short.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. You can take another 2 minutes because I
invaded your time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, no, I would be just as happy for
you to proceed on your questions about Taiwan.
Chairman Warner. Then we will have an opportunity for
further questions.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. I think we have had very good testimony,
Admiral Blair, with regard to the importance of this Taiwan
arms package. We conduct this oversight this morning against
our obligations in law which are quite clear in many respects,
but left somewhat unclear in others, purposely so because there
should never be any doubt about the United States' commitment
to help Taiwan defend itself and, if necessary, come to its
aid. I think you have been quite explicit and clear on that
this morning.
Second, to maintain the balance, you expressed the need to
continue to find ways to cooperate with China. So, there is
this balance.
We are not here to discuss the question of independence.
That is something our Nation has never stepped out on and I
think quite properly because that issue is entirely left to the
will of the people of Taiwan, together with the will of the
people of mainland China, to resolve, hopefully in a peaceful
way in the future sometime.
But the right to defend itself is inherent in this review
of the package of arms that comes before us, and at the core of
that is the issue of the type of destroyers. I mentioned
cruisers earlier. I meant destroyers. The options are the Kidd
class, which are ships that were built on the old Spruance type
hull, and they are in a status of inventory today where they
can be brought back on line with some renewed outfitting and,
therefore, made an integral part of the Taiwan navy in perhaps
2 to 3 years, whereas the more recent production line of the
Aegis Burke class would take a number of years.
Why do you not give us, first, the technical analysis of
the two classes of ships, their likely availability to be
integrated into the Taiwanese navy, and the pros and cons, as
you view them, from a military standpoint? I think this package
should be decided on military principles, hopefully, as nearly
as we can. Give us an evaluation because that, I think, will be
at the heart of this, certainly for this particular Senator, as
we review this. So, if you would give us that.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. Before I do that, let me, if I
may, talk a little bit about the consequences of a short-term
military solution of the Taiwan issue which is basically
reunification with China.
I have looked at that hard and from the points of view of
both China and of Taiwan, that is a lose-lose situation. Not
only would there be military losses on both sides, there would
be civilian suffering on both sides. There would be tremendous
economic damage on both sides: on the Chinese side, the loss of
foreign direct investment, the loss of foreign trade; on the
Taiwanese side, the sorts of effects that we saw even in 1996
when there was the near possibility of military action. Also,
there would be secondary effects which always happen when
conflict occurs, which you have spoken more eloquently about
than any other Member of this Congress.
Chairman Warner. We should make note of the fact that the
Taiwanese people have invested a tremendous amount of their own
resources in mainland China's industrial base. Am I not correct
in that?
Admiral Blair. There are 70,000 Taiwanese living in
Shanghai as we speak.
Chairman Warner. Also, they have invested in the industrial
base very heavily.
Admiral Blair. They are the single largest investor, and
the trade across the Straits has been increasing since the
current Taiwanese government came into office. So, all of the
positive incentives are on the side of down-playing the
military confrontation and emphasizing those things which would
bring Taiwan and China together over time.
Chairman Warner. When you say ``together,'' you mean some
resolution between the wills of the people of the two nations,
whatever that may be.
Admiral Blair. However that may be negotiated. There are a
large number of arrangements which could be worked out if there
were trust, and today there is simply not trust on either side.
The only way that I know to build the conditions for enduring
security for Taiwan is long-term development of some sort of a
political arrangement between Taiwan and China with the sorts
of guarantees and assurances that Taiwan requires to feel safe,
as well as to be safe.
So, the great area that Taiwan, China, and the United
States have in common is to emphasize those things which lead
to a peaceful solution and to deemphasize those things which
tend to raise tensions, bring confrontation, and exacerbate
that sort of a situation. So, I think even while I am sitting
here in my uniform talking about the military aspects of the
situation, we need to keep in mind that this is a tool toward
the larger end, which is security for Taiwan and a long-term
development of China and long-term development of the United
States.
I really find that people want to classify everyone who is
involved in this issue as either pro-China or pro-Taiwan. I am
pro-American. I want to do what is best for the United States
in this instance, and I think that is what we have to keep in
mind. Certainly what is best for the United States is the long-
term peaceful resolution of the issue between them.
Chairman Warner. I think there is even a larger
perspective. It would be enormously destabilizing to the entire
region were there open conflict. So, it is not just the United
States, but it is the region.
Admiral Blair. It absolutely is. Just look at 1996, what
the short-term shock waves were that went through Asia when the
confrontation went up.
So, we make our military evaluations, we carry out our
responsibilities, but I think we have to remember our role in
the overall policy and in the overall direction which is in the
interest of both Taiwan and China.
Now coming to the Aegis combatants versus the Kidds, the
Kidds have about 12 to 15 years of service. That is plenty of
useful life left. As you mentioned, they could come on line and
actually be available in about 2 years. They would be equipped
with a fleet air defense system called the New Threat Upgrade,
or NTU.
An Aegis combatant could take various configurations, but
it would basically come on line about 2008-2009, and it would
be equipped with some variant of the more capable Aegis weapons
systems. The area in which the Aegis weapons system is more
capable than the NTU system is in the volume of threats that it
can handle and in some of the extreme profile missiles.
There are two other things that you have to think about as
you make the decision, Mr. Chairman. One is the ability of the
Taiwan navy to absorb complicated systems. Either one of these
would be the most capable surface combatant that the Taiwan
navy had operated, and that is a consideration as far as
logistics and manning and training.
The second thing is major differences from a capabilities
point of view. The Aegis system could eventually provide a
platform on which the theater missile defense systems that the
United States Navy is developing could be fielded. The NTU Kidd
could not. So, the major capability difference in the two
systems would be in its future upgrade potential. That is
fundamentally the difference between those two systems.
As I mentioned, the requirements of the Taiwan navy for
fleet air defense are there today. It is not very robust right
now, and it is something that is of concern to the Taiwanese
navy.
Chairman Warner. Now, let us once again look at the pros
and cons because in my opening questions to you, my
recollection is you clearly agreed with me that as China
proceeds to install more and more missiles, the balance is
slipping away and that this arms package should be viewed as
restoring that balance of military capabilities of deterrence
and defense for Taiwan.
Now, given that trend of the putting in of the Chinese
missiles--and it appears that it is going to go on for some
period of time--will the Kidd class of ships right the balance
for a period right now?
Admiral Blair. No, Mr. Chairman, it will not. Right now we
cannot sell a theater missile defense system to Taiwan because
we have no theater missile defense systems to sell to them.
Chairman Warner. I understand.
Admiral Blair. They have the Patriot PAC-2 missiles, which
is the most capable system we have. They are point defense
systems.
Chairman Warner. So, the Kidd class of ships will not bring
about a balancing of the missile threat as perceived by Taiwan.
Admiral Blair. That is correct, and neither will the Aegis.
Chairman Warner. At this point in time.
Admiral Blair. At this point.
Chairman Warner. Because you have to bring in software and
perhaps some modification to hardware and certainly an
inventory of missiles to incorporate that into the Aegis
system.
Admiral Blair. We have to develop that, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. You have to develop it, and we do not have
a really good time line as yet on the development of that. Am I
not correct?
Admiral Blair. That development program is underway and it
is in the order of about 2008-2009 itself.
Chairman Warner. Of that software and hardware to bring
that system up for a theater missile.
Admiral Blair. For the shorter range of the two Navy
systems in development, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Do you want to have any amplification of
that?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, for this new member
of the committee, would you or one of your staff or perhaps one
of the panel describe the difference between the Aegis and the
Kidd class? What are the capabilities?
Chairman Warner. The Aegis is interesting. When I was
Secretary of the Navy, we began the development of Aegis. Aegis
is a generic term with regard to an electronic system to engage
various types of threats to a ship. It is in an evolution and
expanding.
Now, let us go back again. I think it is very clear because
this is the sort of record that will be before the Senate, such
that those Senators who wish to address it, by virtue of speech
or otherwise, can have the benefit of it.
We go back to the Spruance hull, which has been in
inventory for many years in the Navy, and these Kidd class are
on that hull. But you say that the system is primarily air
defense and not missile defense. Not primarily, but that is the
distinction. Am I not correct?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. The Aegis class is also on a
Spruance hull for the cruisers. For the destroyers, it is on a
new hull.
But the primary difference is that an Aegis system, which
was originally designed against the Soviet threat, can handle a
higher volume of incoming missiles at the same time than can
the Kidd class NTU. So, it is primarily having to do with the
volume of missiles arriving.
As far as the performance of missiles that can be handled,
they are roughly comparable. So, from the fleet air defense
point of view, they would be virtually the same, that is, for
handling anti-ship missiles against the fleet.
The primary difference is that once the United States Navy
does develop theater missile defense (TMD) programs, they will
be based on the Aegis fire control system. Therefore, if Taiwan
had Aegis platforms, they could be upgraded with missiles
software and some hardware to TMD configuration.
Chairman Warner. In the same way we are going to upgrade
our own units.
Admiral Blair. The same way we plan to upgrade our own,
yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. But I think we have to go back again. We
are talking about land-based mobile missiles which China is
putting in right now.
Admiral Blair. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. I want to make it very clear in the
record, that the Kidd class cannot engage those at the present
time. Is that not correct?
Admiral Blair. That is correct, and neither can the Aegis.
Chairman Warner. Neither can the Aegis. It is the Burke
class.
Admiral Blair. Or the Ticonderoga class.
Chairman Warner. Or the Ticonderoga class, which was the
initial Aegis-type hull.
Admiral Blair. Which is the cruiser level and the Burke is
the destroyer level. Right now neither of those can engage the
CSS-6s and CSS-7s, which is what China is deploying right now.
They have about 300 of them that can range Taiwan.
Chairman Warner. So, with the Kidd class, they can be
introduced into the fleet and integrated into the Taiwan navy
within, say, 24 to 30 months, somewhere in there.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. For the hulls, including the upgraded
system, we are looking at 2008, 2009, 2010, many years out.
Admiral Blair. That is right. We have a building program
going on in two yards. You put in the order. It will be 2008-
2009 before it is available.
Chairman Warner. Then you have to look at what is the
threat facing Taiwan not only from the land-based missiles, but
other threats that the Kidd class could engage and help deter.
What would be the advantage of the Kidd class being integrated
into the Taiwan navy now in, say, 24 to 30 months?
Admiral Blair. It would be able to provide fleet air
defense so that the Taiwanese navy would have air cover as it
operated at sea out of range of land-based air, which it does
not now have.
Chairman Warner. Now, would that help bring into balance
the disparity that we see between mainland China and Taiwan?
Admiral Blair. That would increase the Taiwanese capability
to engage other aircraft across the Strait which the Taiwanese
navy has very little capability.
Chairman Warner. So, the Kidd class does make a substantial
contribution to add to the deterrence of the threats.
Admiral Blair. That is correct, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. It gives their navy really a training base
for that class of ships which they could profit from between
now and, say, 2008-2009 timeframe so that if they took the Kidd
class now, they would be better prepared to accept at a later
date, either an exchange program or the addition of the
upgraded Burke class.
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. That is correct. It is the same
propulsion system, for example, many of the same auxiliary
systems, and so it would give them capability in complex
surface combatant operation, which they do not have now.
Chairman Warner. So, one of the options that is before the
President would be to offer the Kidd class now with the
understanding that it substantially enhances the naval element
of deterrence, and it would provide a training base for a
follow-on acquisition, if the threat persisted, for the
upgraded Aegis system which would have the theater missile
defense capability.
Admiral Blair. Exactly correct, sir.
Chairman Warner. I think we have pretty well put that
record together. Do you wish to add to it, Senator?
Senator Bill Nelson. Just to go back to the Admiral's
statement of his two goals, the long-term guarantees for
Taiwan. It sounds like that system would give long-term
guarantee. But the other goal of the Admiral was a long-term
peaceful resolution. Does it enhance that? That is the question
that we have to answer.
Admiral Blair. Sir, that is correct. As I mentioned, the
lower the level of missiles on the Chinese side and responses
on the Taiwanese side and counter-responses on the Chinese side
and counter-responses on the Taiwanese side, I think the more
conducive to a long-term resolution. So, restraint on the
Chinese side would be a definite factor in doing that. If the
Chinese continue to add 50 missiles a year and increase their
accuracy, which has been their program in the past, then it
does not take a detailed military analysis to tell you that at
some point that makes a military difference and defense is not
sufficient. It is that ratcheting up that I think does not
serve the interests of either Taiwan or China, but it requires
restraint by China, which has not been shown yet, which I have
talked to them about and many other representatives of our
Government have talked to them about frequently and I would
hope we could see.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I?
Chairman Warner. Go ahead.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is useful information to me
because with the Intelligence Committee Chairman, I am going to
Beijing as well. Are they, in fact, increasing their missiles
50 a year?
Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, they are right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. At this present time.
Admiral Blair. At this present time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Those are the ones you described as
CSS-6s and 7s?
Admiral Blair. 6s and 7s, right.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are those air-breathing missiles or
are they rockets?
Admiral Blair. They are ballistic missiles. They go out of
the atmosphere and come down.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, they are liquid-propelled, not
air-breathing engines.
Admiral Blair. Solid.
Senator Bill Nelson. As opposed to air-breathing like
cruise missiles.
Admiral Blair. Yes, as opposed to cruise missiles which go
a couple hundred feet. They are ballistic missiles.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are the ranges of these 6s and
7s?
Admiral Blair. It is about 500-600 kilometers. They are on
the longer range of the short range. They are like Scud Deltas,
the kind that threaten General Schwartz's forces.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is very helpful information, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator.
Senator Dayton, did you wish to participate in this
colloquy?
Senator Dayton. No, I will wait until the closed session.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. On the issue of the fixed-wing aircraft,
Admiral, they wanted some P-3s. Did you talk about the fixed-
wing package and what are the pros and cons of some of those
requests?
Admiral Blair. I would say Aegis and Kidds have been enough
publicly discussed that I think it is fine to talk about them
in open session. I would rather go to closed session to talk
about some of the other aspects of the program.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I just have one additional question of
General Pace. It relates to the SOUTHCOM's engagement program.
I have been a supporter of our engagement program with foreign
militaries, particularly relative to activities on our part
which would impart respect for human rights and the proper role
of a military in a democratic society.
So, I was very supportive of our effort last year to close
the U.S. Army School of the Americas, but to reopen a different
school with a different focus, which was to authorize the
Secretary of Defense to establish the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). I am wondering if
you would describe for us the Southern Command theater's
engagement program, tell us how the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation fits into that.
General Pace. Senator, thank you.
One of the things that we are able to do is, through the
support of Congress, to provide training and education
opportunities for almost 2,500 officers per year from 31 of the
32 countries in my area of responsibility. They go to various
schools, our war colleges, our command and staff level schools.
They also go to the WHINSEC where they are able to learn about
planning, about logistics, et cetera.
Embedded in that training, especially at the WHINSEC, are
courses in human rights, in proper subordination of the
military to civilian authority. In all of our exercises
throughout the region, of which we conduct about 17 per year,
either bilateral or multilateral, we take the opportunity
through both demonstration and scenario development to train in
subordination of the military to civilian rule.
I have not had the opportunity, Senator, to visit WHINSEC
yet, so I do not have a complete layout in my mind of the
curriculum that they have, but I do know that they do, in fact,
address human rights.
Senator Levin. Could you familiarize yourself with that
curriculum and then tell us how the two fit for the record?
General Pace. Yes, sir. I will, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. Southern Command's engagement strategy incorporates promoting
a culture of respect for human rights within the military and security
forces of nations in our AOR. The human rights program focuses on
strengthening respect for human rights through education, training,
conferences, seminars, and subject matter expert exchanges.
At the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, or
WHINSEC, the human rights curriculum provides critical support to this
program. Their human rights course is pass-fail and ensures each
graduate gains a basic knowledge of human rights principles. In
addition, all WHINSEC instructors are required to pass an intensive
human rights course and to integrate human rights principles into every
course. Students are therefore taught human rights in the context of
different subjects.
The curriculum developed by the WHINSEC human rights staff is
unquestionably one of the most comprehensive offered in any military
institution anywhere. It includes well-researched, in-depth, case
studies based on historical events, which are used in advanced human
rights training.
The WHINSEC human rights staff also supports USSOUTHCOM strategy by
traveling throughout the AOR to provide courses to larger groups of
military officers and noncommissioned officers. Many of the students
that attend WHINSEC advance to senior positions of leadership in their
country's security forces. By incorporating respect for human rights as
a central theme in their professional education, we effectively
influence the culture of the security forces at large.
WHINSEC's human rights curriculum is one of the most important
tools available to USSOUTHCOM for strengthening respect for human
rights by military and security forces in the area of responsibility.

Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Gentlemen, I want to cover some other subjects rather
quickly so that the open record has reference to them.
Panama is an ever-present concern to us, General Pace. We
discussed that last night in our private meeting, and you gave
me certain reassurances. There was concern at one time that
mainland China was trying to gain a stronger foothold of
influence in that region, and also the respective operation of
the Panama Canal from a technical standpoint, and also the
stability of the government down there, and any other aspect
you wish to cover.
General Pace. Sir, thank you.
There is a Chinese company on each end of the Panama Canal.
They provide port services. They in no way interfere with or
are a part of the actual operation of the canal. So, unless a
ship requires on-load or off-load at either end of the canal,
they play no part at all in the day-to-day operation of the
canal.
The canal itself, under the commission that is being run by
the Panama Government, is being run extremely efficiently. From
an outsider's point of view, they have run that extremely well,
and their plans to increase capacity in the future look very
well laid out.
As they will tell you and as I said to you yesterday, the
greatest threat to the operation of the canal right now is the
environmental impact on the watershed. As development takes
place, silt and runoff----
Chairman Warner. Are you talking about land development
which removes the natural growth, and that results in a water
runoff that impairs the operation of the canal because I think
it takes--what did you say--500 million gallons of water to----
General Pace. It takes 55 million gallons of water per ship
per transit. There are 40 ships per day, give or take. So, you
have a huge amount of fresh water being used every day that
comes from those watersheds. The canal commission, rightfully
so, is concerned that as they have development of what is
currently vacant land, that the silting and the runoff will
impact the ability of the country to collect the water it needs
to run the canal.
Chairman Warner. Now, the government and the stability and
the relationships with that government.
General Pace. Sir, we have excellent relationships with the
government through the U.S. Ambassador. Minister of Security
Contero is very friendly toward the United States. He has made
possible such opportunities for us as assisting them in putting
together a national command and control location, which they
are building in the former Howard Air Force Base. So, as far as
today's environment inside of the ministries with whom I do
business, it is very friendly, sir, and looking to the future.
Chairman Warner. Now, the forward operating locations for
our air elements in the counternarcotics operation. Is that
proceeding at a satisfactory rate?
General Pace. For the most part, it is, sir. We're on
track. At Manta in Ecuador, we will close that facility in
about a week. The major part of the $60 million worth of
upgrade to that facility will take place over the next 6
months. That is on track.
Chairman Warner. Last night you spoke about your own
professional judgment with regard to the time line of the
ability of Colombia to come to grips with this very serious
problem. There were two aspects of it that impressed me, and
that is your professional views as to the length of that time
line. My recollection is you said about a decade, and we are
barely into it at this time. Second, the impact on the adjacent
countries and how the United States will be considering,
independent of Plan Colombia, financial packages to help them
stem any flowing into their nations of the current operations
in Colombia.
General Pace. Senator, my estimate, based on my discussions
with the Colombian leadership, is that for the Colombian
military to be large enough and well enough educated and
trained, it will take about 3 to 5 years for them, in
conjunction with the Colombian police, to provide security,
inside of which then the other nine elements of Plan Colombia
can take root. My estimate, again talking to government
leaders, is that Plan Colombia itself overall will take about
10 years to show the benefits of rebuilding the fabric of that
democracy that has been destroyed by the drug traffickers.
With regard to the spill-over and therefore the impact on
the neighboring countries, yes, sir, regional solutions to the
regional problem, properly supported by the U.S. Government, I
think is the requirement.
Chairman Warner. You might enumerate those countries
presently under consideration for that assistance.
General Pace. Sir, my recommendation would be primarily
those that border Colombia, which include Panama, Ecuador,
Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, if in fact we are able to
have satisfactory accommodation with that particular
government. We should not, however, completely overlook places
like Paraguay, Uruguay, and other nations through which drugs
transit to get to the sea to get to Europe.
Chairman Warner. Part of our training involves the use of
their helicopters, which we are going to supply. We are always
concerned--and we saw the concerns manifested in the Kosovo
operation--about hand-held small weapons that can interdict
airborne platforms such as the helicopter. How serious is that
threat? Do we have any indication that the insurgents will be
trying to acquire on the open market in the world such weapons?
How are we training to deal with that situation?
General Pace. Sir, we take that threat very seriously. We
presume that an entity that possesses hundreds of millions of
dollars in illegal profits every year has the capacity to go on
the open market and buy shoulder-held surface-to-air missiles.
We have no intelligence to confirm that. Yet, we train to that
probability. The configuration of the helicopters that the
State Department is buying took into consideration the
likelihood that they would operate in the same environment.
Chairman Warner. So, they have the state-of-the-art
equipment for defensive measures.
General Pace. Sir, they do.
Chairman Warner. Periodically Haiti should be examined.
Give us an update on that. That posed in the past serious
problems in this country.
General Pace. Sir, Haiti is very much in the policy arena
right now for me. I am prepared and have on the shelf ready to
execute four exercises this year, which are called medical
readiness exercises. Those medical readiness exercises will, in
fact, go in and assist the population with their medical
problems. But those are currently on hold pending a policy
decision on government-to-government issues.
Chairman Warner. Senator Reed, I am just doing wrap-up
questions. I see you are present. Why do you not take your
regular time at this time?
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, first let me welcome and
commend General Pace, Admiral Blair, and General Schwartz and
thank them for their service to the country and the fidelity of
the great men and women they lead each and every day.
I have been on the Senate floor and I understand many
questions have been asked. I also understand that we are going
into a closed session. So, Mr. Chairman, rather than taking
some time now, I would simply yield back my time to you and
then move forward.
Chairman Warner. General Pace, the Vieques problem is a
continuing one. We now have a carrier task force that is on the
verge of deployment. It is my understanding that the previous
one, the Truman task force, was only able to do inert. What is
the status of this current task force and its ability to use
those ranges in your judgment?
General Pace. Sir, I need to defer to the Chief of Naval
Operations for the train-up of his forces. I could restate my
comment that I made before this committee when I was Commander
of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic.
Chairman Warner. Well, we know the essential nature of it.
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. The problems in your AOR, General
Schwartz, from time to time of the attitude of South Korea
toward the presence of our military and their families. Where
does that situation rest today versus a year ago?
General Schwartz. I think overall I would characterize the
attitude of the South Koreans towards our military as very
positive. The majority of the people, high into the 90s,
respect the presence of and the deterrence value of U.S.
servicemembers on the peninsula. There is no doubt about it.
There is a small percentage of the people who do not understand
our presence, who do not understand the war itself, how it
originated, why we are there. Most of them are younger,
college. They spend their summers protesting and they get a lot
of visibility, but I would have to tell you the silent
majority, the majority of the South Koreans, fully understand
the deterrence value and the presence of U.S. servicemembers on
the peninsula.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Pace. Senator, I apologize. May I give you just a
little bit more information on Vieques? I would be remiss as a
leader if I do not bring up one problem.
Chairman Warner. All right.
General Pace. It is a quality of life problem, sir, the
quality of life for my very dedicated Army soldiers and
families who have moved from Panama to Fort Buchanan. In the
process of doing that, renovations were to be made. For
understandable reasons, policy reasons, right now the
construction money that was allocated to build an elementary
school, $8 million last year, and the money to renovate
housing, $25 million this year, has been held in abeyance. So,
as we go through the policy debate, which I understand, the
Army families there are being held hostage.
Chairman Warner. We will take note of that, and thank you
for bringing that up.
Admiral Blair, you have India in your AOR. The Central
Command has Pakistan, and when the Central Command commander
was before this committee, he stated that the two of you work
very closely together. Give us an update of that situation, the
seriousness of it compared to last year and now, as well as the
28 percent increase in military budget that India has
announced, and any other aspects of that situation that you
think is important that we learn.
Admiral Blair. Sir, I think the developments on the Indian
side have been quite positive since I last appeared before this
committee. Although they have not signed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty and they are continuing to develop their nuclear
weapons arsenal, I think they are working their way towards the
principles of a high nuclear threshold and a good stewardship
of those weapons.
The earthquake that took place in Bhuj, India was a
terrible human tragedy. The loss of life was on the order of
20,000 to 30,000. On the other hand, the response to it was a
real regional and, in fact, international effort, including
supplies from Pakistan. A couple of flights of C-130 aircraft
with relief supplies from Pakistan landed in India and off-
loaded the supplies, and they were welcomed by India.
The situation in the Kashmir itself, there continues to be
casualties within Jammu/Kashmir, fire across the border. But
there are intermittent contacts between India and Pakistan,
looking at talking about the situation again after the
disappointment following the Lahore Summit and the conflict in
Siachen Glacier.
So, on the Indian side, there are some positive
developments, and it certainly does not seem to be any worse.
General Franks and I both agree that the United States needs to
maintain contact with both sides of southern Asia, both with
Pakistan and with India, so we can exert the restraining
influence on their interaction with each other and develop
independent relationships. We do not want to shift our weight
from Pakistan where it had traditionally been and put it all on
India. We think we need a balance on both sides. I think we are
taking steps to do that on the Indian side.
Chairman Warner. Last question. I would like to have both
Admiral Blair and General Schwartz comment on the status of the
North Korean ballistic missile program. We will take it up in
greater detail in closed session, but I would like to have your
views, to the extent possible, here in open session. Why do you
not lead off, General Schwartz?
General Schwartz. Let me characterize it like this. It is
still very aggressive. They are producing a certain number of
missiles each year that we could talk about in closed session.
But they are the number one proliferator of missiles in the
world, and they are being very aggressive in that regard.
Chairman Warner. They are selling them. What countries do
we know now are actively engaged in negotiations?
General Schwartz. We know Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria,
Yemen, and Egypt are recipients of some of their missiles at
this time.
Chairman Warner. Admiral Blair.
Admiral Blair. Sir, I would not add anything to what
General Schwartz said except that the moratorium on testing
missiles, which the North Koreans have undertaken to maintain
as long as negotiations with the United States continue, has in
fact continued. Although the North Koreans seem uniquely
capable of selling missiles that have not been tested, and some
fool countries seem uniquely capable of buying them even though
they do not know if the damned things work or not, they have
not in fact fired them since that time took place.
Chairman Warner. Members of the committee, we are now in
the process of Senate floor voting, three consecutive votes. I
would suggest that we all go to the floor at this point in
time, ask our witnesses to extend us the courtesy to do this
most important function, and then we will resume next door in
the Intelligence Committee hearing room for a closed session.
My estimate would be it could be as long as 30 minutes before
we return.
Senator Levin. I have three quick questions.
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
Senator Levin. Admiral, is it in our national security
interest that that moratorium on flight testing on the part of
North Korea continue?
Admiral Blair. From the military point of view, it is
certainly in our interest that it continue. As to the price we
pay for it, that is for another to decide.
Senator Levin. But militarily at least it is in our
interest.
Admiral Blair. Militarily, just as with the Agreed
Framework, the less development of nuclear technology, the less
missiles they test, the better from our point of view.
Senator Levin. General Pace, on the unmanned aerial
vehicles that are being used in Colombia by Department of State
contractors, our report to the four of us who went there, who I
have referred to before, indicated that the low cost and the
low risk technology that is reflected in those UAVs should be
assessed for expanded use for the detection of drug labs and
other important missions such as border control and that
Colombia offers an excellent area for such an assessment. Could
you tell us very briefly in your view whether those UAVs have
performed a useful function down there?
General Pace. Sir, they performed a very useful function.
We were delighted. Senator, they were a test bed. They were fed
to us as an opportunity. As it happened, during the time they
were there, we had some things going on in the region I can
talk more about in closed session to which they were very
useful. So, from my vantage point, not only for my
responsibilities today but also as a military person who might
need to employ them elsewhere in the world, very useful.
Senator Levin. Would you like to see them continue there?
General Pace. I would, yes, sir.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Any other questions from members? We will recess for a
period of time, maybe up to 30 minutes, and then reconvene in
the Intelligence Committee hearing room to continue our
hearing.
We have had an excellent session this morning. I commend
each of you for your important contributions and look forward
to the additional testimony in closed session. We are
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum

ARMED WHEELED VEHICLES

1. Senator Santorum. General Schwartz, the Army is in the process
of fielding an interim force that is designed to span a perceived near-
term operational shortfall first recognized during the Persian Gulf
War. To that end, the Army recently selected a wheeled vehicle to serve
as the armored vehicle that will be used by interim brigade combat
teams in operations from peacekeeping through full spectrum combat.
There has been a lot of debate recently over wheels versus tracks
for armored vehicles and I don't expect to conduct such a debate here.
I am curious, however, about any lessons we may have learned in the
past about mobility tradeoffs between different vehicle types. It seems
likely that in the event of hostilities in your theater of operations
that access to roads will be limited due to damage, debris, or
refugees.
While the new Army wheeled vehicles may be good for peacekeeping
activities, do you have any concerns about the tactical mobility of
wheeled vehicles in off-road environments in the Korean theater of
operations? To what extent has the Army initiative addressed concerns
you might have about strategic responsiveness? Do we have the strategic
lift assets required to execute established deployment goals and
objectives?
General Schwartz. No. There are two primary reasons that these new
vehicles improve our capabilities in Korea. First, there is a large
amount of terrain and road/bridge limitations on the Korean peninsula
that favors wheeled vehicles. Second, these vehicles will not operate
in isolation but as part of tailored, combined arms units. The
complementary nature of ``wheeled'' units with traditional ``heavy''
units will increase our warfighting effectiveness. They will also
reduce our logistical footprint, thus extending our operational reach.

HIGH DEMAND/LOW DENSITY ASSETS

2. Senator Santorum. Admiral Blair, General Pace, and General
Schwartz, during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, one of the newly
coined terms was high demand/low density assets. If these assets were
so highly tasked in this small contingency, doesn't that indicate we do
not have enough of these assets to execute the national military
strategy? What are the key high demand/low density assets in your area
of responsibility?
Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]
General Pace. The availability of some high demand/low density (HD/
LD) assets may be inadequate to satisfy multiple CINC requirements if
surge operations are occurring in one or more theaters. With the
national military strategy (NMS) currently under review, I must defer
to the Joint Staff to provide a more detailed assessment of HD/LD
availability to support the current or revised NMS.
The key HD/LD assets that support our AOR are the [deleted].
General Schwartz. [Deleted.]

DEMILITARIZED ZONE FOR THE ELN

3. Senator Santorum. General Pace, one of the issues being
considered by senior government officials of Colombia has been the
creation of a demilitarized zone for members of the National Liberation
Army (ELN). Do you see the creation of a demilitarized zone for the ELN
as a positive or negative development in reducing the flow of narcotics
into the United States and in achieving a lasting peace in Colombia?
General Pace. The creation of the demilitarized zone for the ELN
will not significantly reduce the flow of narcotics into the United
States. The vast majority of coca is cultivated and transported outside
the area under consideration. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

4. Senator Allard. Admiral Blair or General Schwartz, I understand
you recently revised your Status of Forces Agreement with Korea. What
improvements did you make and what prompted the change?
Admiral Blair. The force structure is correctly sized for our
current mission but must be fully-manned and equipped to maintain it as
an effective and ready force. The force structure plan details the
number and type of forces. Fully manning the planned force structure is
the problem. Increasing the force structure may compound the personnel
shortage by placing a greater personnel demand on the under-manned
critical specialties.
In U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), shortages exist in several of
our critical specialties, especially in our mid and senior level non-
commissioned officers (E5-E9) which represent the bulk of our
experience and enlisted leadership. For example, in our latest
readiness assessments, USPACOM intelligence specialists (E5-E9) are
only manned at 66 percent; aviation maintenance technicians (E5-E9) are
manned at 70 percent; and communication specialists (E5-E9) are manned
at 83 percent. Korean linguists manning specialty remains at 64
percent. Additionally, rated pilot staff manning at Pacific Air Forces
is at 81 percent with no projected increase in the near term.
Personnel in these low density and high demand specialties cannot
be replaced overnight. Length of training and the years required to
gain valuable experience require time. Support of retention-related
incentives is essential to the health of our forces and keeping the
experienced personnel we have today. Recent pay increases have helped
and need to continue, but support of infrastructure and readiness fixes
also weigh in our members' quality of life, and their decision to stay
in the Armed Forces. Where manning shortfalls are most severe,
selective reenlistment bonuses should be considered as an option.
In addition to manning considerations, headquarters reductions
continue to impact our ability to be proactive and plan as the reduced
staff manages an increasing number of critical programs required in
support of national security and the NMS. As I testified, our staff is
taking the lead on future capabilities such as the joint mission force,
expanding the littoral battlespace, and the combatant headquarters of
the future with CINC21. These capabilities suffer when our limited
staffs are cut further.
Within the Defense Department, we are minimizing the impact of our
shortages with reliance on the outstanding capabilities of the Reserve
components. This capability must be recognized and supported within and
outside the Defense Department. The services and our components have
made significant progress in correcting personnel problems, but
maintaining Active and Reserve personnel accounts at appropriate levels
in each skill area and grade is a challenge that will receive our
continuous attention and emphasis.
General Schwartz. Let me answer the second part of your question
first. We felt we needed to revise the SOFA in order to address long-
standing perceptions of the Korean people that the SOFA was unfair to
them in several respects, especially in comparison to our SOFA with
Japan. In 1995, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government raised about 20
issues for discussion, headlined by their strong desire for pretrial
custody of SOFA personnel accused of violating ROK law, similar to that
in Japan. Former Secretary William Perry offered comparable treatment
to Japan and our other allies on custody in exchange for certain
assurances of fair treatment and a substantial reduction of issues.
However, after considerable effort to reach agreement, negotiations on
these issues stalled and were suspended by the two sides in 1997.
After a technical review of the issues at the expert level in May
1999, the Korean side attempted to restart negotiations with a
compromise proposal. As it failed to fully address our concerns for the
rights of accused persons and as our mutual failure to resolve these
issues threatened to drive a wedge in the alliance, former Ambassador
Stephen Bosworth and I asked our team to develop creative solutions for
resolving the impasse. After a lot of hard work, a new U.S. proposal on
custody and assurances was delivered to the Korean side in May 2000. In
addition, the Korean side raised several other high priority issues,
including environmental protection, labor rights of Korean employees of
USFK, and plant quarantine. That led to a resumption of formal
negotiations on 2 August 2000 and ultimate agreement for revision of
the SOFA on 18 January 2001. The revisions were subsequently approved
under the procedures of both governments and entered into force on 2
April 2001.
A number of significant changes were made. First, although under
the previous agreement the U.S. was permitted to retain custody until
the completion of all judicial proceedings, including appeals, the ROK
may now receive custody upon indictment if it requests in any one of 12
categories of serious cases. Such cases include murder, rape,
kidnapping, arson, drug trafficking or manufacturing, robbery with a
dangerous weapon, and also cases of assaults, drunk driving, or fleeing
the scene of an accident that result in death. In very serious cases of
murder or rape, if the Korean police arrest a SOFA accused in the act,
in hot pursuit, or before he or she returns to military control, they
may retain custody.
However, our personnel will be protected by a very strong package
of ``due process'' rights while in Korean pretrial custody and
confinement, including the right to release on bail. A person subject
to custody upon arrest (e.g., caught in the act for murder) may not be
interrogated until BOTH a U.S. representative and a lawyer representing
the accused is present. Statements taken without their presence are not
admissible in court. Korean authorities may not question an accused in
their custody after indictment, except about totally unrelated matters;
even then, a U.S. representative must be present during the
interrogation. Thus, our concerns about the real possibility of an
involuntary confession during a custodial interrogation have been
substantially alleviated.
In addition, SOFA personnel will be entitled to a pretrial
confinement hearing with a lawyer present and will not be confined by
the ROK without a judge's determination that confinement is warranted
because there is reasonable cause to believe (1) that he/she committed
the offense; and (2) that he/she may flee, or (3) that he/she has
destroyed or may destroy evidence, or (4) that he/she may cause harm to
a victim, witness, or family member of a witness or victim. This is
very similar to the due process procedures existing in U.S. law. The
accused will also be protected from unfair violations of privacy while
in pretrial confinement, especially during staged reenactments of the
alleged offense.
In the area of environmental protection, we added an Agreed Minute
emphasizing the commitment of both governments to recognize the
importance of environmental protection. The U.S. Government agreed to
implement the SOFA consistent with the protection of the environment
and public health and confirmed its policy to respect relevant ROK
environmental laws. The ROK Government confirmed its policy to
implement its environmental laws with regard for the health and safety
of U.S. personnel. In short, we sought and obtained a mutual and
aspirational agreement to protect the environment.
The word ``respect'' is used intentionally here. The U.S. sees it
as a goal to try to operate within relevant ROK environmental laws, as
enforced and applied, to the best of its ability and within resource
constraints. However, as an equal sovereign, the U.S. is not obligated
to comply strictly with each and every ROK law or regulation.
Basically, we all hope to live and work in a better environment.
The real problem is that environmental cleanup (or restoration)
requires a large commitment of resources. We could not commit to
environmental restoration, except to the extent necessary to protect
the public health, without the availability of funds. In addition, an
agreement to restore the environment fully would be inconsistent with
the basic trade-off in Article IV, SOFA. Under Article IV, when the
U.S. returns facilities and areas to the ROK Government, the U.S. is
not obligated to restore them to their original condition. In turn, the
ROK Government is not obligated to compensate the U.S. for any
improvements or structures left behind.
In a separate, non-binding ``Memorandum of Special Understandings
on Environmental Protection,'' we mutually agreed to cooperate on
environmental governing standards (EGS), to share information and to
provide for appropriate access to USFK facilities and areas and to
consult on risks. In addition, the U.S. Government confirmed its policy
to conduct environmental performance assessments and the ROK Government
confirmed its policy to respond to outside contamination sources that
endanger health. It was also agreed that the Environment Subcommittee
and relevant SOFA Subcommittees would meet regularly to discuss
environmental issues.
The agreement is considered a statement of principles, similar to
that declared by the U.S. and Japan in September 2000, not a binding
international agreement. Most of these things are simply standard U.S.
policy--things we have long tried hard to do. Our agreements in this
area, the Agreed Minute clause and this separate agreement, are
designed to be mutual--it is important that both governments do what
they can to improve the environment.
The SOFA Joint Committee must still agree on a means to provide
``appropriate access'' by ROK officials to U.S. facilities. We prefer
``joint visits'' at our option, rather than ``joint inspections,''
especially on Article III facilities and areas where we have been
granted exclusive use and full control by the ROK Government. We also
plan to institutionalize procedures for the rapid notification,
response, and remediation of new environmental incidents or spills. We
are close to an agreement in these areas. However, while we agreed to
remediate new incidents or spills, we did not agree to environmental
restoration of existing facilities and areas upon their return to the
ROK Government as that would be inconsistent with Article IV, SOFA.
In a significant new agreement affecting preferential hiring of our
Korean national employees, it was agreed in exchange for ``positive
consideration'' of applications by family members of military personnel
and the civilian component to accept employment on the Korean economy.
This does not include dependents of invited contractors. Any of the
eight employment status categories (E-1 thru E-8) that previously
required a different visa status will be available to our family
members as long as they meet the employment requirements for a position
under Korean immigration law, whether full or part-time. Family members
will not have to give up their SOFA A-3 visa; instead they may be
granted permission to work as an additional activity while in Korea on
that visa. However, Korean taxes must be paid on any income received.
In another significant agreement affecting criminal jurisdiction,
it was agreed that minor traffic offenses resulting in property damage
only will no longer be reported as a crime as long as adequate private
insurance is maintained as in case of a personally owned vehicle (POV)
accident or if the matter can be settled under Article XXIII, Claims,
as occurring in the course of official duty. The Claims process will be
the ``efficient legal remedy'' for such accidents, without prejudice to
the rights of the victim. In other words, the victim could still file a
criminal complaint if not adequately compensated. Dependents are not
included because the U.S. Government cannot act as an insurer of last
resort under the Claims article for dependents. This should
dramatically lower the statistics of so-called ``crimes'' committed by
SOFA personnel.
Also in the labor area, we streamlined and shortened the mediation
procedures required under Article XVII, SOFA, before collective labor
action or strikes may be taken. We agreed to use the ROK Labor
Relations Commission for this purpose, while preserving the right of
the Joint Committee to make the final decision on a dispute. We also
preserved management's ability to downsize the labor force due to
resource constraints or mission changes and agreed that Korean
employees would not be terminated without ``just cause''.
With respect to plant quarantine, we agreed in principle to accept
``joint inspections'' of animal and plant products brought into Korea
to resupply the troops, under procedures yet to be established by the
Joint Committee. However, we must retain the ability to bring in fresh
fruits and vegetables without undue delay, even those on the ROK banned
list. Negotiations continue in the SOFA Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Subcommittee.
As you may be aware, one of the greatest threats to readiness in
Korea is the denial of access to required training areas due to urban
development, the scarcity of arable land for agriculture and farming,
and encroachments by private landowners, many of whom have not been
fully compensated by the ROK Government for the use of their land by
USFK as required by SOFA Article V. To better protect our facilities
and areas from encroachment, the ROK Government has agreed to promptly
initiate steps toward removing encroachments, including administrative
measures acceptable to both sides. The U.S. is permitted to take
necessary measures to properly manage and prevent encroachment to the
extent possible, with ROK administrative support upon request. We
further agreed to jointly survey existing facilities and areas and to
provide a better accounting for the use being made of them.
We also agreed to notify and consult with the ROK Government
concerning planned modification or removal of indigenous buildings and
concerning new construction or alterations that might affect the
ability of local communities to provide relevant utilities and
services, or may affect the public health and safety. This does not
mean a veto, but consultation. Subsequent discussions regarding
implementation of this provision indicate that the ROK Ministry of
National Defense still insists that USFK should submit building plans
to and obtain building permits from local governments, however, that is
inconsistent with our agreement to consult at the central government
level. We cannot be forced into the position of having to deal with
each and every local government. It is the responsibility of the
central government to elevate any concerns they may have to the
government-to-government level.
We also adopted a new procedure for the service of civil process
upon SOFA personnel so that private lawsuits may be more readily
settled in Korean courts, similar to that recently agreed in Germany.
Finally, although not legally binding upon the two governments or
the Joint Committee, the two chiefs of delegation signed a separate
``Record of Discussions'' regarding Korean access to our Non-
Appropriated Fund Organizations (NAFO), our clubs and recreational
facilities. The delegation chiefs reconfirmed the U.S. commitment that
only qualified persons may use NAFO facilities, recommended that the
SOFA Joint Committee conduct a review to determine who may use NAFO
facilities, the conditions of that use, and the appropriate means of
assuring compliance, and recommended revision of a 25 June 81 agreement
regarding ``Membership in the USFK Club System'' by 31 Dec 2001. (The
Joint Committee agreed to take up these tasks on 2 April 2001.)
The delegation chiefs further recommended that the review should
determine the appropriate number of Korean members who may participate
in USFK clubs; the reasonable and effective measures, including Korean
government officials' access to NAFO facilities to monitor the measures
taken when formally requested and accorded, to prevent unauthorized use
of NAFO facilities; and that it should address the issue of Korean
citizen honorary memberships in NAFO golf clubs. The Korean side
confirmed that it would permit Korean employees and Korean guests
accompanied by USFK personnel to consume food and beverages on the
premises of NAFO dining facilities (in other words, the Korean side
opposes the concept of unescorted guests). Finally, the delegation
chiefs recommended that the 1981 agreement be revised to accommodate
these recommendations by 31 Dec 2001. If the Joint Committee is unable
to do so, they recommended that the matter be resolved through
diplomatic channels.
Overall, we consider these changes to be balanced and positive.
They reflect a maturing ROK-U.S. alliance. We are working hard with our
ROK ally to implement them in good faith in order to preserve and
maintain this great alliance.

PERSONNEL

5. Senator Allard. Admiral Blair or General Schwartz, in your
written statement you mentioned a concern over a shortage of personnel.
Can you handle this within the Defense Department? Do we need an
increase in force structure?
General Schwartz. In peacetime, we experience a 90 percent turnover
every year. My recommendation would be to increase the number of
accompanied tours to Korea and fund infrastructure improvements to make
Korea a tour of choice. We need to man the force to meet our
requirements, especially in forward deployed/assigned units. We also
need to leverage reach back capabilities.
[Deleted.]
Each of these issues can be handled within the Department of
Defense.

INTELLIGENCE

6. Senator Allard. Admiral Blair, General Pace, and General
Schwartz, what is your most significant shortfall in the intelligence
and communications infrastructure? Do you have sufficient satellite
communications capability? What must we do to ensure we have the
capacity and flexibility to support your communications requirements in
the next 5 to 10 years?
Admiral Blair. Senator, I appreciate you asking me this question.
Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C\4\I)
shortfalls have been my major concern in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
since I took command. Of particular concern is satellite service for
the highly mobile maritime and ground forces and last mile network
connectivity for the in-garrison commands. The tyranny of distance, as
well as the lack of formal alliances in this theater increases my
reliance on tactical satellite communications to support commanders.
For example, my Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders are reliant on video
teleconferencing and collaboration to enhance their situational
awareness, synchronize missions, and accelerate command and control.
This requires large satellite bandwidth. Last mile connectivity to in-
garrison forces is just as important, and not to be overlooked. For
force protection, I am especially interested in increasing classified
network services throughout my AOR. We need to ensure this keeps pace
with the rest of the communications infrastructure modernization. It
has also become increasingly evident that we need to operate with our
coalition partners. In USPACOM, we have an initiative called the
Combined Operations Wide Area Network, or COWAN for short. This multi-
purpose network will provide transport capability with enough
flexibility to protect sensitive information within appropriate
communities of interest.
In addition, my Director of Intelligence, Rear Admiral LeVitre,
identified shortfalls in intelligence support during her testimony to
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In the Pacific
theater, our intelligence collection, production, and dissemination
processes depend heavily on the availability of a reliable, robust
communications infrastructure. Despite major advances in communication
technologies, increased availability of high bandwidth transmission
across the Pacific Ocean, and decreasing cost of long-haul
communications, we are still short of bandwidth on the national
networks. The relatively high cost of transoceanic communications in
the Pacific theater AOR prevents planners from providing sufficient
bandwidth on national network infrastructures, and currently programmed
increases in available bandwidth fall far short of low-end requirements
identified in past communications studies and surveys. As a result, we
face a severe and worsening shortage of accessible communications
bandwidth caused by the ever-increasing demand for online and
interactive intelligence information in the form of imagery, video
conferencing, online collaboration applications, intelligence data
bases, Intelink web content, and other forms.
We do not have sufficient satellite communications (SATCOM)
capability. Since my theater is vastly separated by water, satellite
communications are vital assets that link deployed tactical forces with
online, interactive, and responsive intelligence and critical command
and control information. Among the deficiencies are:

(1) lack of readily available high-capacity transmission links;
(2) limited satellite communications ground stations; and,
(3) limited availability of high-cost mobile satellite
terminals.

We must find better ways of disseminating intelligence to our
remotely stationed forces. Though existing programs (e.g., Trojan
Spirit II, fielded in the Pacific theater at Joint Task Force commands,
and the Global Broadcast System) will lessen the current shortfall, new
satellite communications technologies are still needed to meet the
ever-growing intelligence requirements at the lowest tactical level.
[Deleted.]
USPACOM is a dynamic and challenging theater whose AOR is of vital
security interest to the United States. The command and control and
intelligence missions are demanding and difficult. To succeed, there
must be sustained investment in critical capabilities necessary to
support a wide range of military operations in a vast, heterogeneous,
and increasingly tense theater. The snapshot view of our communications
infrastructure appears insufficient to support USPACOM plans,
operations, and associated intelligence requirements. In response to
the increasing information requirements, we must continue to invest in
communications technology refreshments which improve our ability to
manage our vast infrastructure more efficiently, increase remote
operations, improve intelligence access to the tactical warfighter,
significantly increase available communications bandwidth, and
emphasize coalition connectivity and interoperability. We need
releasable equipment, accreditation of public key infrastructure/
technology that will facilitate virtual private network capability.
[Deleted.]
With the emphasis on unmanned vehicles, I see a great potential for
putting communications relay packages on platforms such as Global Hawk
to improve our capacity when there is an emergent requirement. However,
equipment that use satellite services should evolve their usage to new
formats that leverage satellite channel capacity. We have been
successful in encouraging the use of demand assigned multiple access
circuits, however there are still systems that demand the full
[deleted] channel and unfortunately we have not always been able to
support their missions.
General Pace. [Deleted.]
Our most significant shortfall in communications infrastructure is
the lack of access to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN).
This shortfall impacts our ability to provide voice, data, and video to
U.S. forces deployed throughout our AOR. Currently, we rely on
commercial satellite services procured by the State Department's
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office to provide limited
voice, data, and video capabilities. We are partnering with Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) to extend the DISN into the SOUTHCOM
AOR. This initiative will provide us a faster, more reliable, cost
effective, and robust communications infrastructure.
[Deleted.]
We must continue to pursue new capabilities and systems that
provide reliable and flexible communications services. Sustained
support for promising initiatives, like the Advanced MILSATCOM Program,
which is designed to satisfy military requirements for assured access,
survivability, and flexible mobile-netted communications, will help us
alleviate current shortfalls in meeting our most critical
communications requirements.
General Schwartz. USFK's most significant intelligence
infrastructure shortfall is [deleted]. We have received unprogrammed,
single year ``plus-ups,'' however, the money has been limited to
current year dollars without sustainment. [Deleted.]
Funding constraints have prevented multiyear planning, adequate
staffing, and the timely introduction of emerging technologies. In
fact, every year we maintain the status quo, we actually regress
because we cannot keep pace with the rest of the [deleted].
No, I do not have sufficient satellite communications capability.
[Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

CHINA AND TAIWAN

7. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, the recent rhetoric between
China and Taiwan seems to be at a high level. Can you further define
the recent patterns of activity by China? Is the activity within normal
limits or are you seeing signs of a major exercise or major operation?
Admiral Blair. The People's Republic of China (PRC) appears to have
adopted a more active forward defense of land and sea borders.
People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces have identified operational
weaknesses and are incrementally addressing them as they slowly
transition to a more modern force. This modernization is important to
the PLA not only in a Taiwan scenario, but also for any regional
conflict involving the PRC. As a result, we are beginning to see the
results of this modernization effort. Increased training levels and
modernization make the execution of military options easier; however,
there is no evidence to suggest that ongoing activity is in preparation
for any near term specific military operation.

CHINA'S MISSILE TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS

8. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, China has increased its exports
of missile technology in recent years to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea,
and Libya and now must be watched ``carefully'' to see if China's
communist leaders abide by the terms of a non-assistance pledge they
made last November. Do you have additional comments on China's missile
technology exports?
Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]

TAIWAN ARMS SALES

9. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, China has recently launched a
diplomatic offensive aimed at preventing the high-tech arms sales to
Taiwan. Among other items, Taiwan has requested to buy four Arleigh
Burke class destroyers. Understanding that there is a delicate balance
to strike between supporting Taiwan's self-defense capability and
maintaining relations with China, I am of the mind that the sale of
these destroyers would meet the U.S. legal obligation to assist Taiwan
in maintaining a self-defense capability in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979. I would be interested in hearing your opinion on
Taiwan's need for these systems and the pros and cons associated with
the sale of these destroyers.
Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]

HUMAN RIGHTS STATUS

10. Senator Collins. General Pace, what is the status of human
rights in the AOR? What is the status of human rights in Colombia?
General Pace. I consider human rights to be a developing success
story in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Most of the nations in the AOR continue to
implement legislation and create institutions to protect the human
rights of their citizens. For example, the Dominican Republic
established a school to teach human rights to their military troops,
Colombia established an equivalent of our Staff Judge Advocate Corps,
and virtually all the nations in the region cooperatively developed a
human rights consensus document to establish standards of conduct,
measures of effectiveness, and training criteria for military and
police forces. While there is still much to be done, I am optimistic
the nations in the region are addressing this important issue
seriously.
Colombia has the most visible ongoing human rights challenges and
the most aggressive human rights program. We believe the Colombian
government and, in particular, the Colombian military have made
significant progress in their efforts to curtail human rights abuses.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, about 60 percent of all reported
accusations of human rights abuses were made against the Colombian
military. Last year, the number attributable to the military fell to
less than 2 percent of all accusations. This progress is a direct
result of leadership at the highest levels of the Colombian military
taking an active role in changing the culture of their institution by
educating their forces on human rights standards, establishing a staff
judge advocate school to train their lawyers, establishing Rules of
Engagement for the troops, investigating allegations, and dismissing
those found guilty of committing human rights violations or collusion
with the illegal self defense forces. Last year the Colombian military
under the direction of Minister of Defense Ramirez dismissed 388
officers suspected of human rights violations. The recent appointment
of Gustavo Bell as the nation's Minister of Defense is another sign of
the Colombian government's and military's commitment to
institutionalize human rights standards and practices into everyday
operations. Mr. Bell has been President Pastrana's point man for human
rights reforms during the latter's administration and a strong advocate
of change and evolution in the area of human rights. Mr. Bell's
appointment as Minister of Defense serves to reinforce the Colombian
government's commitment to human rights and should continue to build
upon the significant progress demonstrated by Colombia in recent years.

OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN COLOMBIA

11. Senator Collins. General Pace, what is the status of operations
in southern Colombia, including the program to purchase UH-60s and UH-
1H IIs for Colombia? What are the anticipated regional impacts and
threat assessment as a result of implementation of military aspects of
Plan Colombia?
General Pace. [Deleted.]
The Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(DoS/INL) has contracted with Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation for the
procurement and delivery of 14 UH-60Ls. The first UH-60 aircraft are
projected to arrive in Colombia in July 2001. All 14 aircraft should be
in Colombia by December 2001. DoS/INL is negotiating with Bell
Helicopter Textron Incorporated for the procurement and delivery of 20
Huey IIs. The first Huey II aircraft is expected to arrive in Colombia
by January 2002. All 20 Huey II aircraft are projected to be in
Colombia by June 2002.
The drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable skill in
adapting their manufacturing procedures, production locations,
transportation routes, and markets in response to interdiction efforts.
That said, [deleted].

MISSILE PROLIFERATION

12. Senator Collins. General Schwartz, recent reports indicate that
North Korea has been a key source of missile-related technology,
expertise, and equipment for the Iranians since the early 1990s. Due to
extensive equipment and technical assistance from North Korea, Iran now
can produce Scud missiles. Which technologies do you suspect North
Korea is providing to our other key adversaries and what regions do you
believe are seeking these technologies? What more can or should we be
doing to prevent this proliferation?
General Schwartz. [Deleted.]

AGREED FRAMEWORK

13. Senator Collins. General Schwartz, in October 1994, the U.S.
and North Korea entered into the Agreed Framework in an effort to
control the potential development of nuclear weapons by North Korea.
The heart of the Agreed Framework and the amending accords is a deal
under which the United States will provide North Korea with a package
of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits, in return North
Korea will halt the operations and infrastructure of its nuclear
program. What is your view on the extent to which the Framework's
objectives have been satisfied thus far? What is your view on the
prospect for ultimate success of the agreement?
General Schwartz. We should measure the Agreed Framework against
our nonproliferation objectives. The DPRK made two very significant
nonproliferation agreements beyond the freezing of the facilities at
Yongbyon and the canning of the known fuel rods. First, the DPRK agreed
to permit at the conclusion of the light water reactor (LWR) supply
contract ad hoc and routine inspections by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) of facilities not subject to the freeze. Second,
the DPRK agreed to come into full compliance with IAEA Safeguards
Agreement before completion of the LWR project.
Although the DPRK has, for the most part, lived up to the letter of
the Agreed Framework and the agreement has achieved the near term
objective of shutting down the Yongbyon facilities, implementation of
the Agreed Framework is incomplete. To date these graphite moderated
reactors remain frozen, and all known intact rods are canned, and under
IAEA seal. For the LWRs to become operational the DPRK must be in full
compliance with IAEA safeguards. No indication exists that North Korea
is ready to accept the prerequisite level of transparency.
Unfortunately, the potential and promise of the Agreed Framework have
not yet been fully realized and the DPRK's long-term intentions are not
clear.
[Deleted.]

INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY OF LIFE

14. Senator Collins. General Schwartz, infrastructure and quality
of life have been bill payers for readiness for a long time. However,
despite this fact, the morale and dedication of our service men and
woman are extraordinary. In your professional opinion, what steps can
we take this year to make strides in attaining a balanced approach to
ensure good training, good quality of life, and good infrastructure for
our troops?
General Schwartz. Achieving our vision and accomplishing our
missions require us to prioritize scarce resources. To do this, we
apply the concept of balanced readiness. Balanced readiness blends
combat readiness--our ability to ``fight tonight''--with the categories
of quality of life for servicemembers and their families, and the
condition of the infrastructure. In fact, in terms of prioritizing
military construction resources today, the quality of life and
infrastructure categories of my balanced readiness concept are the most
important. Our military construction (MILCON) command priorities, then,
fall into three categories: (1) War Fighting Readiness, (2)
Infrastructure, and (3) Quality of Life. My immediate concerns right
now are quality of life issues.
A Korean assignment today involves some of the poorest living and
working conditions of any permanent change of station assignment in the
military. Even with the great assistance we received from Congress last
year, $138 million for quality of life construction, we continue to
face grim conditions throughout this command. We cannot sacrifice cuts
in one category to provide for in another category. My goal is to make
a Korean assignment comparable to other Outside Continental United
States (OCONUS) assignments. To do this we need the continued support
of Congress.
Over 50 percent of the servicemembers in U.S. Forces Korea live in
inadequate quarters. These quarters are inadequately maintained due to
lack of funding and are inadequate in terms of size. Quarters in Korea
are very small and become very cramped when furnished to American
standards. Overcrowded facilities force us to billet many unaccompanied
personnel off-post in dense urban areas, creating force protection
concerns. This practice not only increases their personal risk, it also
imposes a high financial burden in terms of out of pocket, cost of
living expenses.
Family housing throughout the peninsula is inadequate as well. As
with the barracks, the family housing on and off post in Korea is very
small and becomes very cramped when furnished to American standards.
Much of the housing in Korea is over 25 years old and many of the units
have never been renovated. Only 9 percent of the Command serves an
accompanied tour due to the lack of available housing on post. This
continuous rotation of personnel every year has a dramatic impact on
all services in Korea and seriously impacts force readiness for U.S.
Forces Korea. Historically, funding for housing in Korea has been
minimal. Since 1959, only $43 million has been targeted for family
housing. We require $49 million, per year, over the next 10 years to
match our host nation funded construction housing effort.
Many of our soldiers along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) are still
living and working in overcrowded and substandard Quonset and H-
relocatable barracks that do not provide the minimum net square footage
required by current Army standards. These substandard facilities have
gang latrines and deteriorated heating systems, do not provide adequate
security for soldiers' personal and military issue items, waste energy
and are becoming structurally unsound.
Furthermore, we cannot renovate these substandard barracks to meet
current standards. These substandard conditions have a significant
negative impact on the health, morale, and mission readiness of the
soldiers and units they serve. We need 28 new UOQs at a cost of $49
million per year over the next 10 years.
We presently have 20 physical fitness centers that need to be
replaced at a cost of $15 million per year over the next 10 years. We
have 12 dining facilities that need immediate replacement at a cost of
$14 million per year over the next 10 years. Replacing these
unsatisfactory buildings will have an immediate effect on improving the
quality of life for our servicemembers.
We desperately need to execute a comprehensive construction program
and begin to eliminate the unacceptable living and working conditions
in aging facilities that U.S. forces in Korea face every day. Last year
we received $76 million.
Substandard infrastructure, living, and working conditions are not
limited to the soldiers at the DMZ, but also exist at other Army, Air
Force, and Navy installations throughout the Korean peninsula. The
problems continue to grow worse. Chronic under-funding of sustainment,
restoration, and modernization (SRM) funding for Korea during the past
15 years and the interruption of MILCON dollars for our command between
1991 and 1994 has limited our ability to give our servicemembers that
quality of life they deserve. Aging facilities are also more costly to
maintain.
The extent of our water and electricity problem is best illustrated
by the fact that in 1999 and 2000 alone, the command suffered 437
electrical power and 515 water supply outages from decaying
infrastructure. Currently, we can only afford emergency repairs, which
is more costly in the long term than having a preventive maintenance
program.
Additionally, we are currently in the process of upgrading and
improving sewer and water disposal systems in many of our installations
and require support to complete these projects. To repair and upgrade
these systems we require $29 million per year for 10 years for water,
$60 million per year for 10 years for electric, and $61 million per
year for 10 years for sewers. In fiscal year 2002, we anticipate $83.4
million in fiscal year 2002 for real property maintenance. This funding
will allow us to keep the doors open to our facilities and make
emergency repairs only. It leaves us $194.0 million short of our total
requirement of $274.4 million, which would allow the command to provide
quality facilities and accomplish the routine maintenance required on a
day-to-day basis. Thirty percent of all buildings in the command are
between 40 and 80 years old and 32 percent are classified as temporary
buildings.
Being good stewards of the environment in our host country is
important to our mission and the alliance, and a major subset of the
infrastructure category. We have accomplished much but there is more we
will do. Future problem mitigation and environmental protection
requires continuous funding from both the Republic of Korea and U.S. We
need an additional $43.6 million in the environmental operations and
maintenance accounts for fiscal year 2002 and approximately $15 million
in MILCON per year over the next 10 years for compliance cleanup,
pollution prevention, wastewater treatment facilities, and
conservation. Our investment in protecting the Korean environment is
the responsible course of action that serves to strengthen our
alliance.
I want to emphasize that the support of Congress and the American
people is vitally important to our future in Korea. We thank you for
all you have done. Your MILCON support since 1995 has allowed us to
upgrade or replace 126 facilities. We have an investment of over 50
years in this region, but we cannot continue this investment 1 year at
a time. The U.S. forces in Korea require a continued investment in
basic readiness and quality of life.

READINESS ASSESSMENT

15. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, General Schwartz, and General
Pace, recently, a senior officer expressed his concern to me that our
current spending pattern is to rob our modernization account to pay for
pressing readiness problems. He also described a disturbing pattern in
which the Clinton administration deliberately under funded readiness
accounts with the expectation of a supplemental fix for these pressing
issues. While you have each addressed readiness issues separately in
your testimony, what is your overall assessment of your respective
command's readiness?
Admiral Blair. As previously mentioned in my written testimony, the
forces in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) are fully ready to execute any
assigned mission. We continue to have no reservation about our ability
to do our job today, but do have doubts about our ability to do so in
the future unless we make progress in addressing structural readiness
issues.
Overall, the warfighting capabilities of U.S. Armed Forces have
leveled out after recent declines, but there are many critical
readiness areas that continue to cause concern. My issues are focused
in eight areas: people; operations and maintenance funding; mobility
infrastructure; sustainment restoration, and modernization; housing;
Army prepositioned stocks; preferred munitions; and medical support.
People. Readiness starts with people. First, I would like to
express the appreciation of the men and women of the USPACOM for the
pay and compensation measures taken this past year. I strongly applaud
the funding in the fiscal year 2000 budget for a base pay increase,
elimination of the REDUX retirement system, return to 50 percent base
pay after 20 years of service, and pay table reform that rewards
achievement more than longevity. These actions demonstrate the interest
of our Nation in equitably and fairly compensating the men and women of
the Armed Forces both on active duty and in retirement. I also very
much endorse Congress's commitment to keep pay raises above the
Employment Cost Index for the next several years to continue to ensure
competitive compensation.
Pay and retirement are not the only areas of concern. To attract
and retain highly motivated, qualified people, we must continue to
emphasize quality medical care, education, and housing while providing
the opportunity to live in a secure and safe environment. We must
increase our efforts to pursue improvements in TRICARE so customer
satisfaction, particularly at military treatment facilities, meets the
national standard. This is critical to taking care of our personnel and
families. I appreciate the ongoing efforts in the area of dependent
education; however, I must emphasize we need to continue our efforts so
educational standards in Department of Defense schools offer programs
and services that meet or exceed the national average. We should be
especially attentive to revitalizing all housing assets. Current
funding gaps and delays in privatization have endangered our goal to
fix the housing problems by 2010.
Operations and Maintenance Funding. The next most important
component of readiness is funding for operations and maintenance. These
funds provide spare parts, fuel for aircraft, ships, and tanks, funds
to train, and upkeep for our bases. Here the news is not positive. The
Pacific component commands gained only marginally from fiscal year 1999
and 2000 Emergency/Readiness Supplemental Appropriations. Further, the
funds provided were only sufficient to prevent further declines in
readiness rather than assist in any measurable increase. Accordingly,
the readiness of our component commands is not expected to reflect any
significant increase this fiscal year from supplemental funding.
Forward deployed forces and forces deploying to contingencies are at a
high state of readiness. Non-deployed and rear area forces are at lower
readiness. Camps, posts, and stations continue to deteriorate.
Mobility Infrastructure. Of particular concern is the
transportation infrastructure required to deploy forces across the
Pacific in support of conflict in Korea or other operations. The
problem centers on aging fuel systems in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and
Japan, specifically, fuel hydrant distribution systems and storage
tanks, which in many cases are nearly 50 years old and nearing the end
of their useful service life. These existing systems are not only very
costly to maintain, but their age reduces our capacity to speed
strategic airlift across the Pacific. The continued appropriation of
resources is absolutely essential to maintain this upward trend and
complete the necessary repairs of our aging mobility infrastructure.
Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM). SRM is showing
the combined effects of aging facilities and cumulative underfunding.
The result is a maintenance backlog that will continue to grow unless
the Services can program more funds. These programs must reflect a
commitment to having first-rate facilities that are on a par with the
quality of our people and weapons systems. Our components require
approximately $3.6 billion over the next 5 years to fix this backlog.
This amount is above what is needed to maintain the status quo on our
bases and infrastructure. The shortfall in SRM affects readiness,
quality of life, retention, and force protection, and can no longer be
ignored. Our people deserve to live and work in first-class buildings.
We have not yet reached this standard.
Housing. Safe, adequate, well-maintained housing remains one of my
top quality of life concerns. In the Pacific area of responsibility,
the latest assessment shows military family housing (MFP) units totaled
79,471, with shortfalls of over 11,000 on the west coast and Hawaii,
4,000 in Japan, and 2,650 in Korea. We are working hard to correct the
housing problems with projects ranging from whole barracks renewals at
Fort Richardson, Alaska, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to new family
housing at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. However, much more
remains to be done and I need your continued support for these very
important programs which are vital to retaining the quality people that
are the cornerstone of our military strength.
Army Prepositioned Stocks. A key logistics and sustainment
shortfall remains the Army Prepositioned Stocks 4 (APS-4) Brigade Set
located in Korea. Army heavy forces deploying to fight on the Korean
peninsula would fall in on this equipment. Although we are happy with
the status of the Brigade Set, crucial shortages exist in sustainment
stocks that impact our ability to replace combat losses. I fully
support CINCUNC/CFC's requirement to have this set of equipment become
a Korean version of the capability that exists in Kuwait to support
Central Command.
Preferred Munitions. Another logistics shortfall in USPACOM is
preferred munitions. Operations in Kosovo severely depleted worldwide
stocks of Navy and Air Force precision guided munitions, including many
types designated in our plans for use in Korea. Although Service
programs have received supplemental funding that will alleviate some of
the shortfalls over time, critical shortages exist now. Theater plans
can still be executed successfully, but only by substituting less
effective munitions early in the conflict. The result is additional
high-risk sorties by combat crews, a longer conflict, and higher
casualties.
Medical Support. Finally, we may be accepting some risk in the area
of medical support. Although funding has been programmed to meet
prepositioned medical supply shortfalls, and a test will be made of the
shortages of prepositioned medical supplies, an initial shortfall in
the number of hospital beds, the movement of additional hospitals and
personnel from continental U.S.-based hospital facilities, and the
untested ability of the industrial base and medical logistics programs
to support massive deployment and initial in-theater requirements,
makes our ability to provide adequate force health protection
uncertain.
In summary, USPACOM can do the job today. However, we need
continued investments to attract and retain quality personnel, maintain
both our equipment and facilities, build stocks of the most modern
munitions and equipment needed to sustain combat operations most
effectively, and provide medical support during a major theater war.
General Schwartz. As I report in my Joint Monthly Readiness Review
(JMRR), all CFC units are prepared to execute their wartime mission.
However, we have some significant deficiencies that are reported in
great detail to the Joint Staff. [Deleted.] While there have been only
minor changes to the readiness issues reported in the JMRR, CFC
believes there is [deleted].
General Pace. There are shortfalls within our units. With one
exception, none of the shortfalls significantly impact our ability to
accomplish assigned missions. [Deleted.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

PLAN COLOMBIA AND NARCO-TERRORISM

16. Senator Landrieu. General Pace, last year I followed the
debates over Plan Colombia, our approach to the problem of narco-
terrorism in South America, and the issues surrounding counter-
narcotics efforts with great interest. I am concerned, however, that
Plan Colombia was significantly watered down. I believe its focus on
Colombia risks simply pushing drug producers, processors, smugglers,
and possibly the rebels themselves across the borders into the
neighboring countries of Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. This
would just exacerbate the problem and turn Colombia's problem into a
regional one. Do you agree with this assessment and, if so, what
changes would you recommend to make Plan Colombia more effective
throughout your AOR?
General Pace. While various elements of the drug trafficking
business already impact virtually all nations in the region, I agree
with your assessment that a successfully executed Plan Colombia
increases the risk of pushing drug producers, processors, and smugglers
across the borders into neighboring countries. Due to the potentially
lucrative profits of the narco-trafficking business, I fully expect
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to employ every measure possible,
including migration of their activities across Colombian borders, to
continue their operations. Fortunately, no major change of direction is
required in planned U.S. support for Colombia and its neighbors. The
Department of State-led U.S. Government interagency effort supporting
Plan Colombia anticipated this DTO reaction and is already coordinating
the regional response required to contain spillover. A substantial
percentage of both the fiscal year 2001 Emergency Supplemental and the
proposed fiscal year 2002 Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) provide
funds to develop bordering country capabilities specifically designed
to address this problem. USSOUTHCOM, through the Department of Defense,
is actively supporting this Department of State-led effort.

COLOMBIAN REBELS

17. Senator Landrieu. General Pace, just last week, the U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia, Anne Patterson, endorsed a proposal to grant
Colombia's second-largest rebel group a demilitarized enclave to help
revive suspended peace talks. This proposal, part of President Andres
Pastrana's land-for-peace policy, would hand over a territory in
northern Colombia to the 5,000-member National Liberation Army with all
government troops and police leaving the zone. Based purely on your
military expertise, what is your assessment of the Colombian military's
ability to execute Plan Colombia and deal with these rebels?
General Pace. [Deleted.]

READINESS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS

18. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, General Pace, and General
Schwartz, last week this committee was briefed by Generals Ralston and
Franks on the status of their AORs. Like them, you have provided superb
prepared statements which address your engagement plans and needs. I
have a few follow-up questions:
JSTARS. The Air Force reports that JSTARS platforms and air crews
are severely burdened due to CINCs' requirements--particularly in the
EUCOM ard CENTCOM AORs. For the past 3 years Congress has added funds
to continue procurement of the JSTARS aircraft moving the fleet size
toward the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) requirement of
19. I would like you to give your views on the importance of that
system to your AOR, your war plans, and if you have been constrained
due to lack of assets.
Force Reductions. Given the fact that our forward-deployed forces
in Korea serve mainly as a ``tripwire'' and source of deterrence, do
you see any room for reductions in those forces in the near future?
Burden-sharing. With regards to the renegotiation of the Special
Measures Agreement, what is the status of those negotiations and what
are your expectations as to increase South Korean support of the
financial costs associated with the facilities and forces we base
there?
Admiral Blair. Moving Target Indicator (MTI) coverage over the
Korean Peninsula is a [deleted]. JSTARS is invaluable in providing
deep-look MTI especially in light of ongoing [deleted]. The aircraft,
however, is allocated to the Pacific theater [deleted] JSTARS support
to the theater is required. During a conflict, JSTARS will play a
critical role in providing MTI coverage of enemy activities. [Deleted.]
This is expected to increase in subsequent re-writes of the OPLANS as
more JSTARS aircraft and trained aircrew come on-line. [Deleted.]
General Pace. [Deleted.]
General Schwartz. [Deleted.]
No. The strength of our alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK)
is our presence. The ROK soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines defend
the Republic everyday. They defend the majority of the Demilitarized
Zone forward of most USFK forces. Northeast Asia will remain vital in
both strategic and tactical terms. Our presence demonstrates our
commitment to regional partners and provides credible and practical
contribution to regional stability and security. Continued access to
Northeast Asia will be critical to respond to future contingencies/
crises. Regional presence enables us to respond more rapidly and
flexibly. Many variables will determine the shape and size of our
presence such as the nature of regional security situation and the
national interest of our host nation and perceived threats to those
interests. However the U.S. will have national interests in the region
well into the future.
Ambassador Marisa Lino, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary
of State for Political-Military Affairs, led the U.S. delegation in the
first round of the 2001 Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations
with the Republic of Korea's Government (ROKG) on 29-30 March in Seoul.
The U.S. proposed a multi-year agreement, within the current SMA
structure, with a baseline contribution of USD 584 million for 2002.
Ambassador Lino further proposed that contributions for future years
should be calculated with a growth equation based upon the previous
year's inflation rate, GDP growth, and a fixed escalator clause to
ensure that the overall ROK contributions reflect an increasing
percentage of USFK non-personnel stationing costs and fair
consideration of the ROK's economic situation. The ROKG SMA
representatives during the initial meeting in March and during three
subsequent working level meetings lead by the U.S. Embassy expressed
concerns about our assessment of their ability to pay, evaluation of
contributions outside of the SMA, commitment to a multi-year agreement,
and overall fairness.
Despite the gaps in our initial positions, we fully anticipate a
new Special Measures Agreement, which results in fair, real, and
meaningful growth in the Republic of Korea's contribution to the
payment of USFK's non-personnel stationing costs.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

19. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair and General Schwartz, in your
opening statements you both allude to the fact that, while the last
year has seen breathtaking developments in North Korea's relationship
with the South and the rest of the world, their training cycle last
winter and over the summer was robust and you evaluate their military
as ``bigger, better, closer, and deadlier'' than when you briefed this
committee last year. At the same time, the North Korean economy is a
shambles and most experts agree that the country is breaking down--the
only question is whether it will explode or implode. Recently, the
President has expressed skepticism about ongoing peace negotiations
between North and South Korea and decided to postpone talks with the
North. Just last Friday, European Union leaders announced they would
dispatch their own team of mediators to try and jump-start the talks.
What is your assessment of the ongoing peace negotiations and what
impact do you believe the EU's actions will have on the process?
Admiral Blair. President Bush's 6 June policy announcement on North
Korea has changed the dynamics of the issue significantly. At this
time, our State Department and its peers in the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and other nations have the lead in the diplomatic campaign to convince
North Korea to move from rogue state to becoming a more normal member
of the international community--with all the benefits and
responsibilities that entails. As a military leader, I am concerned Kim
Jong-Il continues to devote scarce resources to maintaining a large
conventional military force that threatens regional peace and
prosperity. I certainly support the multilateral efforts to reduce that
threat and hold North Korea responsible for adhering to international
norms.
General Schwartz. The historic meeting between President Kim Dae-
Jung and Chairman Kim Jong-Il initiated a great deal of diplomatic
activity on the Korean peninsula which touched off a wave of
reconciliation euphoria in South Korea and generated the public
perception that peace was just around the corner. As I noted in my
statement, the initial pace of diplomatic activity in the summer and
fall of 2000 was indeed staggering. North Korea, however, is not a
predictable and reliable partner for the ROK. The North Koreans have
repeatedly stalled the promised follow-on to the first ever meeting of
defense ministers in September 2001. North Korea has yet to implement
any meaningful military confidence building measures (CBM). A detailed
agreement, which could have served as a model CBM, on the construction
of the Seoul-Sinuiju transportation corridor remains unsigned. Meetings
at the ministerial-level sponsored by the ROK Unification Ministry on a
wide range of non-military issues have yet to yield concrete results.
This spring North Korea abruptly cancelled an April Red Cross meeting
and a March ministerial-level meeting. The promised and long
anticipated follow-on summit between the leaders of North and South
Korea is not yet scheduled. While it is encouraging that Kim Jong-Il
promised to extend the moratorium on missile testing into 2003 the
recent threat to abrogate the Agreement Framework is a more typical
example of their unpredictable behavior. While North Korea's greatly
expanded diplomatic contacts, to included the European Union, provide
the opportunity from the DPRK leadership to hear from a variety of
sources about the requirements for predictable and reliable
international behavior, these contacts have not fundamentally changed
the DPRK's erratic behavior and the reconciliation process is stalled.

MISSILE THREAT

20. Senator Landrieu. General Schwartz, the ongoing debates on
national and theater ballistic missile defense as well as concerns
about threat assessments and the Rumsfeld Commission's report continue
to highlight the danger ballistic missiles pose to regional and world
stability. What is your military assessment of the North Korean missile
program and the threat it poses to our forces in the Pacific as well as
Hawaii and the Continental United States?
General Schwartz. [Deleted.]

TAIWAN ARMS SALES

21. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, just last week President Jiang
Zemin told American reporters: ``We absolutely oppose the sale of
advanced weapons by the United States to Taiwan. If the United States
were to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan such as the Aegis system, that
would be very detrimental to China-U.S. relations.'' At the same time,
China continues to deploy increasingly more sophisticated missile
batteries in the Fujian province (about 100 miles from Taiwan) to
threaten leaders on the island. Given your expertise on Sino-American
relations and the security environment in your theater, what is your
recommendation on the sale of advanced technology systems, including
the Aegis weapons system, to Taiwan?
Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]

CHINESE THREAT

22. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, a source of great debate in
Washington these days is the strategic review Secretary Rumsfeld is
conducting at the Pentagon to determine what our strategy should be in
the coming years. Andrew Marshall is on record as saying he believes
China represents the true threat the United States will face in the
21st century. What is your assessment of the Chinese threat and what
advice would you give this committee on how to deal with it?
Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]
Our engagement tempo and range of activities with China may vary
over time, but it is important to keep a consistent approach that
promotes cooperation, fosters constructive regional agreements, and
deters intimidation or the use of force.

RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INTERACTION

23. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, in your prepared statement you
allude to restrictions on your ability to interact with 14 of the 43
nations in the region and question the validity of some of those
restrictions. What restrictions do you believe should be removed or
modified to enhance your ability to execute your regional engagement
strategy? Are any of those restrictions mandated by Congress or are
they imposed by the administration and/or DOD?
Admiral Blair. U.S. Pacific Command currently is restricted in some
manner in its interactions with 14 of the 43 nations in the region. If
we are to maintain our relationships and ability to influence
throughout the AOR we must seek to propel inevitable changes in Asia in
directions we deem desirable. Inflexible restrictions that impose broad
penalties in the short-term may ultimately damage our overall long-term
strategic interests.
While I do not support a reward to ``bad actors,'' suspension of
all Military-to-Military (Mil-to-Mil) contact activities eliminates the
opportunity for dialogue and the opportunity for positive influence by
the U.S. When Mil-to-Mil contact is totally suspended, no shaping can
occur.
I favor a baseline activity level that we would sustain with all
nations. All nations would generally be entitled to attend
international multilateral conferences, senior service schools, and
institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS). I believe that it is to our benefit to expose officers and
other officials even of nations like Burma, Comoros, and North Korea,
to democratic ideals and international norms.
Expansion of Mil-to-Mil contact above the baseline would include
foreign military sales (FMS)/foreign military financing, port visits,
military training, and exercises. If a nation severely regresses in its
reform efforts or violates international norms, then discretionary
activities are rolled back in proportion to the severity of the event.
For example, under such a Mil-to-Mil baseline policy, Indonesia
would benefit from continual exposure to democratic ideals and
international norms. It is in the U.S. interest to influence Indonesian
armed forces (TNI) to adopt such ideals and norms. Yet, since
international military education and training was discontinued in 1991,
few Indonesian officers have been exposed to the U.S. Armed Forces.
Conversely, we are limited in our ability to influence developments due
to the scarce number of contacts developed.
Positive reforms by TNI could result in increased activities,
ranging from FMS cases like C-130 spare parts and F-16 aircraft, to
port visits, military training, and exercises. Regression in the TNI
reform effort would lead to a proportional rollback in discretionary
activities. Regardless of progress or regression, however, I believe
there should remain a place for Mil-to-Mil contact to provide long-term
opportunities for dialogue and positive influence.
Current restrictions include: New Zealand, Indonesia, North Korea,
Taiwan, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Fiji, Laos, Mongolia, China, Comoros,
India, and Russia.

JAPAN

24. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, you have spoken about our
relationship with Japan and the sensitivity of negotiations on the 5-
year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) as well as issues concerning
various bases in Japan. In your opinion, what impact will the U.S.S.
Greeneville's sinking of the Ehime Maru have on those negotiations and
our security relationship? Based on your experience as a naval officer,
what is your opinion about the calls to raise the Ehime Maru?
Admiral Blair. The new 5-year SMA was ratified by the Japanese Diet
in November 2000 and went into effect on 1 April 2001, before the
U.S.S. Greeneville's collision with the Ehime Maru. I believe the U.S.
and Japan have a strong bilateral relationship whose enduring strength
has benefited both sides for close to half a century. I believe we
will be able to move forward from this tragedy in the interests of both
nations and our peoples. I fully support ongoing efforts to raise the
Ehime Maru. Recovery operations at this depth, though technically
feasible, will be challenging. We are committed to using the best
capabilities in the world. When salvage operations begin later this
summer, the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force will do
everything possible to recover the remains of the missing crewmembers.

[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee was recessed, to
reconvene in closed session.]

DEPARMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Santorum,
Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; Anita R. Raiford, deputy chief clerk; Madelyn R.
Creedon, counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Gerald J.
Leeling, counsel; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
Professional staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
Evelyn N. Farkas, Richard W. Fieldhouse, Creighton Greene,
Michael J. McCord, and Terence P. Szuplat.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority
counsel; Ann M. Mittermeyer, minority counsel; Suzanne K.L.
Ross, research assistant; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel;
and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
Edward H. Edens IV, Brian R. Green, William C. Greenwalt, Gary
M. Hall, Mary Alice A. Hayward, Ambrose R. Hock, George W.
Lauffer, Patricia L. Lewis, Thomas L. MacKenzie, Joseph T.
Sixeas, and Cord A. Sterling.
Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen, Thomas C. Moore,
and Jennifer L. Naccari.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, Barry Gene
(B.G.) Wright, and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd;
Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew
Vanlandinghama, assistant to Senator Cleland; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to
Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal
Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant
to Senator Dayton; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator
McCain; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator Smith; John A.
Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III,
assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Allen McCurry and James
Beauchamp, assistants to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; and Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order. The
committee meets this afternoon to receive testimony from Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; General Hugh Shelton, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dr. Dov Zakheim, Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). We welcome them. They will
be testifying this afternoon on the fiscal year 2002 budget
amendment. We welcome you all back.
This may be the final time that General Shelton will be
appearing before this committee to present his views on a
defense budget before his term ends this fall. General Shelton,
you have always put one cause above all others, and that is the
well-being of America's Armed Forces and their families.
History will record you as an outstanding Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff who left the U.S. military more capable than
you found it. On behalf of all of us, I want to take this
opportunity to express our gratitude for the tremendous service
that you have given to this Nation.
Mr. Secretary, we all know there are many reasons why the
administration is late in submitting the amended budget
request, but as I mentioned in our hearing last week, the
administration's delay is forcing Congress to attempt in an 8-
week session what typically takes 5 months. It will be an
incredibly difficult task.
The men and women of our Armed Forces have a lot at stake
in the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Bill,
and every member of this committee is committed to working hard
to complete action on this bill before the start of the new
fiscal year. To do that, the committee needs an actual budget
proposal from the Department of Defense. So far, we have
received only a budget outline. We need details on specific
budget line items, and we need the justification books
explaining these line items.
This morning, we received some of the legislative proposals
that the Secretary is asking this committee to consider. Mr.
Secretary, given the extremely compressed schedule that I
mentioned, we have to ask again for all of that information
that I have outlined, the specific line items, the
justification books, and legislative proposals by next week.
While we have had only 24 hours to review your budget
request, certain aspects are beginning to emerge. The fog is
still heavy, but it is beginning to lift. There are some
positive aspects to the request, such as efforts to build on
the improvements in quality of life over the last few years by
giving pay raises, reducing service members' out-of-pocket
housing costs, and increasing funds for military health care
and family housing. However, there are some puzzling aspects of
your request as well.
For instance, despite a proposed $33 billion increase in
defense spending over the current fiscal year, spending on
procurement would actually decrease next year by $0.5 billion;
despite this $33 billion increase, funding for basic science
and technology also would decrease next year; and despite a
$7.8 billion increase in spending for operations and
maintenance, Army flying hours and tank training miles also
would decrease.
At the same time, funding for missile defense would
increase by $3 billion, from $5.3 billion to $8.3 billion, a 57
percent jump over this year's level. Every line item in the
budget involves real choices. It is clear that this budget
places a huge increase in missile defense ahead of important
programs in modernization, basic research, and training time
for Army units.
Earlier this year, many of us in the Senate expressed our
concern that the large tax cut sought by the administration
would leave little, if any, room for some essential
investments, including defense. In fact, during the debate on
the budget resolution, Senators Landrieu, Carnahan, and others
introduced an amendment to redirect $100 billion of the tax cut
over 10 years to defense, only to have that amendment defeated.
Our Ranking Member, Senator Warner, offered an amendment,
which was adopted in the Senate but then later dropped in
conference, which also would have added funds for defense.
Under the terms of the budget resolution, the Chairmen of
the Budget Committees in the House and Senate will decide if
the current level of funding for national defense in the budget
resolution should be increased to accommodate your proposed
budget amendment. As the Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee mentioned in a letter to the President earlier this
week, with the new economic estimate from the Congressional
Budget Office due in about a month, it would appear that the
$18.4 billion increase that the administration is requesting
for the Defense Department in fiscal year 2002 could lead to
dipping into the medicare surplus.
Moreover, the request before us is limited to fiscal year
2002. The Secretary will testify today that an additional $18
billion increase, totaling $347 billion, will be required in
fiscal year 2003 just to sustain the proposed 2002 budget level
on a straight line basis. This could take as much as $30
billion of medicare funds next year alone without paying for
any improvements or providing funding for the transformation of
the military to meet new threats, which the Secretary will be
proposing in the fiscal year 2003 budget, following the
completion of his defense strategy review and the quadrennial
defense review.
Our men and women in uniform depend on defense budgets that
are sustainable, yet it is increasingly apparent that the
funding for any future transformation of our Armed Forces
cannot be initiated or sustained without cutting existing
defense programs, using the medicare surplus, returning to
budget deficits, or cutting important programs such as
education, health care, and law enforcement, none of which are
acceptable alternatives.
The bottom line is this: the administration's strategy of
first laying out a banquet of tax cuts unnecessarily leaves
other programs, including our national security programs, in an
extremely precarious position. In order to avoid dangerous
instability in the defense budget in the future, the
administration needs to address this situation and provide a
clear plan for meeting and sustaining our defense needs.
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, the Republicans are going to caucus today at
3:00, so I am going to forego my opening statement and place it
in the record and give my colleagues who will be attending that
conference the opportunity, hopefully, to have some questions
before they depart. I certainly join you in the recognition of
our distinguished chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his lifetime
contribution to freedom and service to this country.
I thank you and your family.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in arranging to
conduct this most important hearing at the earliest possible date. We
both recognize the herculean task we now face in thoroughly reviewing
this defense budget request, crafting an authorization bill, and
gaining the consent of the full Congress prior to the beginning of
fiscal year 2002.
I join Senator Levin in welcoming Secretary Rumsfeld to his first
posture hearing since the 1970s. It was a very different world when you
last appeared before Congress to discuss the budget request 25 years
ago, but the importance of the work we begin today is unchanged.
I want to thank you for the service that you have once again
undertaken for your country and for the work you have already begun. I
also want to commend you and President Bush for submitting a budget
amendment that begins to address the commitment you both made to our
service men and women, past and present, to their families, and to all
American citizens. As President Bush stated at the Citadel last Fall,
we must, ``. . . renew the bond of trust between the American people
and the American military; . . . defend the American people against
missiles and terror; and, . . . begin creating the military of the next
century.''
I also extend a welcome to Gen. Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to what will be your last posture hearing--I won't say
last appearance before this committee--because as a warrior you know
none of us can predict with any certainty what the future may bring.
I do want to extend to you the heartfelt thanks of a grateful
Nation for your extraordinary service, which now spans five decades--
from 1963 to the present--and includes combat service during two tours
of duty in Vietnam and during Operation Desert Storm. As Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, you have been repeatedly called upon to provide sound
military advice to our President and to execute military operations
across the spectrum of conflict that have been the epitome of precision
and military professionalism. We are indebted to you, General Shelton,
and salute your service.
We are clearly at a critical juncture in our military history, and
in the history of our Nation. We all accept that the United States has
assumed a unique leadership role in the world today, especially in the
realm of international security. It is easy to feel secure in our sole,
superpower status, but as our own Director of Central Intelligence,
George Tenet, and many other studies and commissions have repeatedly
reminded us, we, as a Nation, are more vulnerable today than ever
before in this increasingly interdependent and complex world. Mr. Tenet
reaffirmed before this committee in March of this year that threats to
our national security continue to increase, as was so tragically
demonstrated in the vicious terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The
pace of both social and technological change, continues to accelerate,
increasing the concerns and the uncertainty we must accept.
Ironically, we find ourselves in a fractious, complex world in the
aftermath of communism. The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them, as well as the pervasive
spread of information technologies, have combined to empower the
disaffected of this new world order to increasingly threaten our
shores, interests, and friends. Simply put, we are more vulnerable than
ever. Those that would do us harm may not be constrained by
conventional norms of conduct or dissuaded by the vague threat of
prosecution or retaliation. New concepts and capabilities must be
considered to strengthen our deterrence and maintain our security. The
President has properly called for a new ``strategic framework'' to
address this new reality.
Clearly, we must be judicious in determining how and when we commit
our Armed Forces around the world, but just as clearly this global
leadership role requires robust, balanced, versatile, and credible
Armed Forces to deter potential aggressors and defend our vital
national interests, both at home and abroad. To remain a credible
force, we must act now to develop the improved capabilities and
concepts to protect our homeland, and deter and defeat anticipated and
unanticipated threats in the future.
Indisputably, our Armed Forces are the best, most powerful in the
world today. This well-deserved reputation was not earned without cost,
however. While our servicemen and women have performed their military
missions with great dedication and professionalism, our people,
equipment, and infrastructure are increasingly stressed by the effects
of the unprecedented number of military deployments over the past
decade, combined with years of declining defense spending. As the
service chiefs have told us repeatedly, future readiness and the upkeep
of military facilities have been deferred to pay for current operations
and maintenance.
Congress has been sensitive to this issue, providing much needed
extra funding for defense in recent years. In fiscal year 2000, we
reversed a 14-year decline in defense spending by authorizing a real
increase in defense spending. Last year, we continued that momentum by
providing an even larger increase for fiscal year 2001. Over the past 2
years, we have increased military pay by over 8 percent; restored
retirement and health care benefits to keep faith with those who serve;
raised procurement levels to begin recapitalization and modernization
of aging equipment; and significantly increased investment in research
and development for the future.
While much has been done, much remains. The President is to be
commended for the increases he has proposed in defense spending. Since
taking office, the President has recommended increases totaling $38.2
billion. The increases he has proposed for fiscal year 2002 represent
an almost 11 percent increase in defense spending above the amount
available in fiscal year 2001. While this increase begins to address
the shortfalls, I fear it may not be enough.
There is one area of the budget before us I specifically want to
highlight--the funding for the development and deployment of missile
defenses. Ten years after the Gulf War demonstrated our vulnerability
to ballistic missile attack, our forces overseas and our homeland
remain defenseless. The Rumsfeld Commission highlighted--and the North
Koreans demonstrated--the proliferation and growing sophistication of
these ballistic missile technologies increasingly available to rogue
states and lawless elements. We must move rapidly to comply with the
Cochran Act and deploy missile defenses, ``as soon as technologically
possible.'' I would remind my colleagues that this act, which was
passed overwhelmingly by the Senate--97-3--and signed into law by the
President, limits deployment only by technological progress. There are
no limitations based on treaty restrictions. The budget request of $8.3
billion for missile defense is a step in the right direction.
There is a growing consensus in Congress, in the new
administration, and among the American people that significant new
investment in defense is necessary and prudent. I credit the joint
chiefs for the courageous role they have played in building this
consensus. Beginning in September 1998, and at least once a year since
then, the chiefs have come before us to testify to critical shortfalls
in defense spending. I simply ask now, is the budget amendment before
us sufficient to meet the near-term and long-term needs of the
respective services?
General Shelton, you and the Service Chiefs have often spoken of a
strategy-resource mismatch. We have followed a strategy that has led to
a geometric rise in the commitment of our forces, without a
corresponding increase in resources. Secretary Rumsfeld, we are all
very familiar with the review process you have undertaken to address
our military strategy and anxiously await the recommendations you will
make upon conclusion of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Crafting
a strategy that more realistically anticipates near-term, as well as
emerging threats is a noble goal. Whatever strategy is ultimately
adopted must be adequately funded, lest we create another mismatch at a
reduced level of capability.
Mr. Secretary, we look forward to working with you to ensure we
keep faith with our Armed Forces to fully fund all that we ask them to
do. We also look forward to forthright dialogue and partnership that
must be a part of our deliberations this year, as well as the fiscal
year 2003 budget process and beyond, as we truly begin to turn this
mighty ship you lead to best confront the challenges of today, and the
ones that lie ahead.
Thank you.

Senator Warner. At this time I would also like to insert
Senator Thurmond's and Senator Hutchinson's statements for the
record.
[The prepared statements of Senators Thurmond and
Hutchinson follow:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Shelton, I
want to join our Chairman, Senator Levin, and Ranking Member, Senator
Warner, in welcoming you to this long overdue hearing on the fiscal
year 2002 budget. Mr. Secretary, you have been very busy during the
past 5 months and have stirred up much dust. I congratulate you for
setting into motion a critical review of our defense strategy and the
operations of the Department of Defense. I look forward to the
conclusions of your efforts.
General Shelton, although this may not be your last appearance
before the committee, it will be your last posture hearing. You have
weathered many storms during your 4 years as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and will be remembered for the many actions you
advocated to improve the quality of life for our military personnel and
their families. I expect that I speak for many here on the committee
when I say, ``thanks for a job well done!''
Mr. Chairman, as we begin the process that culminates in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, I would like
to share a quote from a poem by Elizabeth Barrett Browning:

Happy are all free people, too strong to be dispossessed. But
blessed are those among nations who dare to be strong for the
rest!

The United States of America is a blessed nation because those who
proceeded us had the foresight to provide for the best equipped,
trained, and motivated Armed Forces in the history of our great Nation.
By our strength we have become the protector of the rest of the world
and must not shed that mantle of responsibility. The budget that we
will consider over the next several months will provide for the
continuation of our leadership whether in the form of a missile defense
system, new high technology weapons or the best quality of life for the
men and women who wear the uniforms of our military services.
I do not think that anyone will dispute the fact that over the past
several years our Armed Forces have become frayed from over commitments
and under funding. We must reverse that trend. I believe this budget
amendment, although less than many of us had hoped for, is a good
start. With this amendment, President Bush will increase the defense
budget by more than $38 billion over the fiscal year 2001 defense
budget. More importantly, the increase will provide real benefits in
terms of improved family housing, readiness, and research and
development. It will also provide robust funding for a National Missile
Defense program which I consider the most urgent requirement for our
Nation's security.
Mr. Chairman, despite all the positive aspects of this budget, I
believe it does not adequately fund the modernization of our Armed
Forces. It is still short of meeting the standard of revitalizing our
infrastructure every 67 years. It will not close the pay gap between
the private sector and the military. More importantly, it assumes
almost $1 billion in savings or efficiencies that are not going to be
realized.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that fiscal and time
constraints will leave us little flexibility to make significant
changes to the budget request. However, we must ensure that we maximize
the resources that are available. I intend to work with you, Senator
Warner and Secretary Rumsfeld, to ensure that we achieve that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______

Prepared Statement by Senator Tim Hutchinson

Mr. Chairman, the President's Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Budget
Amendment directly addresses areas of critical need in our military. It
places the needs of our troops first, and places special emphasis on
quality of life issues. Mr. Secretary you should be applauded for your
efforts in shaping a budget that will significantly improve morale and
retention.
I am particularly pleased about the level of funding provided for
military healthcare. Last year, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Personnel, I worked very hard to improved the military healthcare
system. In cooperation with Senator Warner and other members of this
committee, we passed Warner-Hutchinson Tricare-for-Life, as well a
comprehensive pharmacy benefit. The President's budget includes
substantially increased funding for these and other healthcare items.
I do have concerns about some specific programmatic decisions, and
I look forward to working with the administration and my colleagues on
this committee regarding these issues. However, this budget provides
needed funding for personnel, missile defense, and military
construction. I look forward to further reviewing the details of the
President's submission.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Secretary Rumsfeld.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
ACCOMPANIED BY DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMPTROLLER)

Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I had planned to make
about 10 to 12 minutes of remarks and ask that my statement be
put in the record. I can do that, or if the Senators have to
leave, I could delay it until they have a chance. I can do
whatever you want.
Chairman Levin. With leave of my colleagues on this side,
because of that caucus, instead of alternating, let's have
three or four on the Republican side ask their questions first
and then come to us. Would that be agreeable? I am willing to
forego my first line of questions as well.
We did not have a chance to talk about this--let's start
out in that direction. Secretary Rumsfeld, why don't you start
with your 10-minute opening, and then we will call on our
Republican colleagues, at least for a few minutes each, while
they are here, to give them a chance to ask a few questions,
and then we will take the same number on this side.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that very
special accommodation.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, please proceed with
your opening.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee.
In discussing the budget, it seems to me it is useful to
begin by confronting some less than pleasant but important
facts. The U.S. Armed Forces have been underfunded in a number
of respects over a sustained period of years. We have been
living off of the substantial investments made in the 1970s and
the 1980s. Shortfalls exist today in a number of areas,
shortfalls that I must say are considerably worse than I had
anticipated when I arrived.
Mr. Chairman, as you and members of the committee know
well, the U.S. Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-
equipped, and most powerful military force on the face of the
earth, and certainly the members of this committee have
contributed greatly to that strength. Peace, prosperity, and
freedom across the world are underpinned by the stability and
security that the men and women of the Armed Forces provide.
I was recently in Kosovo and Turkey to visit our troops.
They are dedicated men and women who are ready, willing, and
able to take on any mission the Government may ask of them. Our
country has many strengths. Indeed, in some ways it is because
our forces are so capable that we face the challenges we do.
Over much of the nineties, the U.S. has simultaneously
underfunded and overused the force, and it has taken its toll.
Asked to do more with less, they have saluted, done their best,
but it has been at the cost of needed investment in
infrastructure, maintenance, and procurement.
With an end to the Cold War, there was an appropriate
drawdown, a well-earned peace dividend, but it went too far, in
my view, overshooting the mark by a good margin. We are
certainly well past the time to take steps to arrest the
declines and put the Armed Forces on a path to better health.
For example, many of our facilities are dilapidated and
need repair and replacement. There are shortfalls in spare
parts, flying hours, training and personnel. Navy nondeployed
force readiness is down to 43 percent from 63 percent in 1991.
Only 69 percent of the Air Force total combat units are
mission-ready, down from 91 percent in 1996. Of the Army's
major air and ground combat systems, 75 percent are beyond
their half life, and 60 percent of all military housing is
characterized as substandard.
While the DOD was using its equipment at increased tempos,
procurement of new equipment fell significantly below the
levels necessary to sustain existing forces, leading to steady
increases in the average age of the equipment. It was called a
procurement holiday.
I know you agree that we have an obligation to make certain
that the men and women in the Armed Forces have the proper
equipment, training, facilities, and the most advanced
technologies available to them. The President's 2002 defense
budget adds needed funds to begin stabilizing that force. Using
the 2001 enacted budget of $296.3 billion as a baseline, the
President earlier this year issued a budget blueprint that
outlined a 2002 baseline budget of $310.5 billion. This
included $4.4 billion in proposed new money for presidential
initiatives in pay, housing, and R&D. The request before you
proposes to raise that investment $18.4 billion, as the
chairman said, to a total of $328.9 billion.
Taken together, these increases amount to $22.8 billion. I
am told that represents the largest peacetime increase in
defense spending since the mid-1980s. It certainly would
represent a significant investment of the taxpayer's money. But
let's be clear about this increase; while significant, and
while we certainly need every cent of it, it does not get us
well. The underinvestment went on far too long, the gap is too
great, and there is no way it can be fixed in a year, or even 6
years.
I want to be very straightforward about what this budget
will do and will not do. This budget will put us on a path to
recovery in some categories, such as military pay, housing,
readiness training, and health care. It will start an
improvement but leave us short of our goal in others, such as
maintenance of weapons systems and reaching best standards with
respect to facilities replacement. In other categories there
will be continued shortfalls and modest, if any, improvements.
Considering the private sector, the standard for overall
facility replacement is 57 years. The DOD's target is 67 years.
Under the 2001 enacted budget, the DOD was replacing facilities
at an unbelievably poor average rate of 192 years. The 2002
budget gets us closer. It would allow us to replace facilities
at an average of 101 years. That is an improvement, but it is
still a long way from the acceptable target of 67 years.
In my view, we could do better. With a round of base
closings and adjustments that reduce unneeded facilities, we
could focus the funds on facilities that we actually need and
get the replacement rate down to a lower level. Without base
closings, to achieve the target it would require an additional
$7 billion a year for 9 years, or a total of $63 billion.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say a word about the 2003 budget.
Today, we are proposing $328.9 billion defense budget for 2002.
But to keep the Department going next year on a straight line
basis with no substantial improvements, just covering the cost
of inflation, honestly budgeting for outyears in major weapons
systems, and funding health care, which is going to be another
$4-plus billion, according to the actuaries, we would need a
budget of about $347 billion. That is another $18 billion
increase, which would be before addressing important
transformation issues.
So where do we find the money? We simply have to achieve
some cost savings. We have an obligation to the taxpayers to
spend their money wisely. Today, DOD has substantial overhead.
Despite 128 acquisition reform studies, we have an acquisition
system that is antiquated. It takes twice as long as it did in
1975 to produce a weapons system, and this is at a time when
technology generations are shortened to something like a year
or two, or 18 months.
We have processes and regulations so onerous that a number
of commercial businesses developing military technologies
simply do not want to do business with the Department. The
Department needs greater freedom to manage so we can use the
taxpayer's money more wisely. For example, I think we ought to
consider contracting out commissaries, housing, and some other
services that are not considered core military competencies,
which can be performed more efficiently in the private sector.
For fiscal 2002, the Department proposes a pilot program to
see if this is a good idea; the Army and Marine Corps will
contract out certain commissaries, and the Navy will contract
out refueling support, including tanker aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot promise it, but I have never seen an
organization that could not operate at something like 5 percent
more efficiency if it had the freedom to do so. It is not
possible today, given all the restrictions on the way the
Department must function.
With those savings, we could increase the shipbuilding
budget, which certainly needs it. We are on a six-ship basis
now. It needs nine ships to maintain the 310-ship Navy. If we
keep going in the direction we are going, we are going to end
up down at 230 ships at a steady state and that simply is not
enough. We could procure an additional 700 aircraft annually,
rather than the 189, to help meet and reach a steady state
requirement for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, at enormous
savings in maintenance and repairs.
We have a big task ahead. Since the Cold War, we have a 30
percent smaller force doing 165 percent more missions. This
President's budget proposes a large increase by any standard.
It will allow us to make some improvements to the readiness,
morale, and condition of our military. The taxpayers have a
right to demand that we spend the money more wisely, in my
view. Today, we cannot tell the American people that we are
spending it in the best possible manner. I know I cannot.
Fixing the problem is a joint responsibility. It will
require a new partnership between Congress and the Executive.
We certainly owe it to the men and women in the Armed Forces.
I would point out that one generation bequeaths to the next
generation the capabilities to ensure peace, stability, and
security. Today, we have the security of future generations of
Americans in our hands. We have certainly an obligation to get
it right. I am anxious to work with you to achieve that goal,
and it certainly will take the best of all of us.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to present the
President's 2002 amended budget for the Department of Defense.
In discussing this budget, it is necessary to begin by confronting
some less than pleasant, but important facts: The U.S. Armed Forces
have been under funded in a number of respects over a sustained period
of years. We have been living off of the substantial investments made
during the 1970s and 1980s. Shortfalls exist in a number of vital areas
including readiness, operations, procurement, maintenance,
infrastructure, modernization and health care--shortfalls, I must say,
that are considerably worse than I had previously understood.
The U.S. Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-equipped, most
powerful military force on the face of the earth. Peace, prosperity and
freedom across the world are underpinned by the stability and security
these men and women provide.
I recently took the opportunity to visit our troops in Kosovo and
in Turkey. They are dedicated men and women who are ready, willing and
able to take on any mission their government may ask of them.
No force in the world can do what they do. Only the United States
can quickly move large, effective combat forces across long distances,
or conduct large-scale, all-weather precision strike operations.
The U.S. is unparalleled in conducting aerial operations at night,
amphibious operations anywhere in the world, operating high endurance
Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs), or conducting corps sized expeditionary
operations, and highly complex joint operations.
Our advantages in air-to-air combat and on the high seas have made
it impractical for adversaries to use airplanes to attack us or send
forces across oceans to threaten us.
So our country has many strengths. Indeed, in some ways, it is
because our forces are so capable that we face the challenges we do.
Over much of the 1990s, the U.S. has both under-funded and overused
this force, and it has taken a toll. Asked to do more with less, they
have saluted and done their best--but it has been at the cost of needed
investment in infrastructure, maintenance, and procurement.
With the end of the Cold War, there was an appropriate draw down,
but it went too far--overshooting the mark by a good margin. We are
well past the time to take the necessary steps to arrest the declines
and put the Armed Forces on a path to better health.
The problem goes well beyond op-tempo, and is more profound than I
expected. For example:

Many facilities are dilapidated and in urgent need of
repair and replacement.
Health care costs are rising at a much greater rate
than the funds provided.
Outdated management and acquisition systems and
processes add millions to the department's costs each year.
Due to shortfalls in spare parts, flying hours,
training and personnel, Navy non-deployed force readiness is 43
percent--down from 63 percent in 1991.
Only 69 percent of the Air Force's total combat units
are mission ready, down from 91 percent in 1996.
75 percent of the Army's major air and ground combat
systems are beyond their half-life, and Army aviation ``safety
of flight'' messages have increased 222 percent in the past 4
years.
Sixty percent of all military housing is substandard.
Force protection capabilities have been under funded
and are in need of investments.
Financial management systems are so poor that the
Department can't get a clean audit.
While DOD was using its equipment at increased tempos,
procurement of new equipment fell significantly below the
levels necessary to sustain existing forces--leading to steady
increases in the average age of equipment. It was called a
``procurement holiday.'' Some holiday!
Basic research funding has declined by 11 percent
since 1992, and RDT&E funding levels have declined 7.4 percent
in the same period.

Clearly, we need to arrest this deterioration and to do a better
job of balancing the risks we face.
The first responsibility of the Federal Government is to defend the
American people. That job is done by brave men and women, who wake up
each morning and voluntarily put their lives at risk, so that the rest
of us can go about our days in peace and freedom.
We have an obligation to make certain these men and women have the
proper equipment, training, facilities, and the most advanced
technology available to them.
The current condition of U.S. Armed Forces didn't happen overnight.
Each individual action that caused this situation was hardly noticed--a
little less procurement here, some purchases and repairs put off
there--until one day, the cumulative total shortfalls amount to tens of
billions of dollars.
Even the best built, best-engineered car in the world will
eventually break down if you put off regular maintenance and repairs. A
Ferrari on blocks will get beaten by an Edsel every time.
We have the best Armed Forces in the world. But we cannot allow
them to deteriorate any further.
We are about to face new, emerging threats of the post-Cold War
world. They are real, they are dangerous, and they are just over the
horizon. If we are to meet them, we need to invest now to begin
transforming our Armed Forces for the challenges of the 21st century.
But we cannot build a 21st century force quite yet . . . because
the 20th century force we have is in serious need of repair.
We need to get on a path to correct the most serious deficiencies;
we need to stabilize the force and begin needed modernization; we need
to restore DOD infrastructure; and we need to make progress toward
transformation--so that our forces are ready for the new and different
threats of the new century.
the president's budget
The President's 2002 defense budget adds urgently needed funds to
begin stabilizing the force.
Using the 2001 enacted budget of $296.3 billion as a baseline, the
President earlier this year issued a budget blueprint that outlined a
2002 baseline budget of $310.5 billion.
This included $4.4 billion in proposed new money for Presidential
initiatives, including:

$1.4 billion to increase military pay,
$400 million to improve military housing,
$2.6 billion for research and development.

The request before you proposes to raise that investment still
further to a total of $328.9 billion--$18.4 billion more than the
President's February budget blueprint.
Taken together, these increases amount to $22.8 billion in proposed
new money for the Department in 2002.
I am told that this represents the largest peacetime increase in
defense spending since the mid-1980s. So, if Congress approves this
budget, by historical standards, it would represent a significant
investment of the taxpayer's money.
But let's be clear: This increase, while significant, does not get
us well. The systematic under-investment went far too long--the gap is
too great. There is no way it could be fixed in 1 year, or very likely,
even 6.
Mr. Chairman, allow me to provide an idea of the depth of the hole
we are in. To get well by 2007--to meet existing standards and steady
state requirements in areas like readiness levels with proper flying
time, training, and maintenance; replacement of buildings and
facilities that are falling apart; fixing family housing and restoring
quality of life for the men and women of our Armed Forces--all of this
together would cost the American taxpayers many tens of billions of
dollars. That would do little with respect for the investment needed to
transform the force for the future.
So, yes, $22.8 billion is a large increase by historical standards.
It is a huge commitment of the American people's hard earned tax
dollars. We need every cent of it, but it only begins to make a dent in
the leftover problems we face today.
what the budget will and won't do
I want to be very straightforward about what this budget will do--
and what it won't do.

This budget will put us on the path to recovery in
some categories such as military pay, housing allowances,
readiness training, and health care;
It will start an improvement but leave us short of our
goal in others such as defense-related science and technology,
maintenance of weapons systems and reaching best standards for
facilities replacement;
In still other categories there will be continued
shortfalls such as backlogs in property maintenance
requirements.

Here are a few specific cases to illustrate the pattern. Take, for
example, the Defense health program:

Today, overall health care costs are increasing at an
annual rate of 13 percent.
The 2001 budget provided $12.1 billion--falling short
of what was needed to cover that rate of increase by $1.4
billion.
The 2002 amended budget proposes $17.9 billion for
defense health--a $5.8 billion increase--that will allow us to
cover a 12 percent growth in the costs of medical care and a 15
percent growth in the cost of pharmacy purchases.

So, for the first time in years, the 2002 budget should fund a
realistic estimate of military health care costs. This is an area where
we are getting well.
We are not getting as well, however, when it comes to the state of
DOD facilities. Consider:

In the private sector, the standard for overall
facility replacement 57 years. DOD's target is 67 years.
Here is the reality: Under the 2001 enacted budget,
DOD was replacing facilities at an unbelievably poor average
rate of 192 years.
The 2002 budget which proposes to increase funding for
facilities from $3.9 billion to $5.9 billion gets us closer. It
would allow us to replace facilities at an average rate of 101
years--an improvement, but still well off the acceptable target
of 67 years.
We could do better. With a round of base closings and
adjustments that reduced unneeded facilities by, for example,
25 percent, we could focus the funds on facilities we actually
need and get the replacement rate down to 76 years at the 2002
budget level.
Without base closings, to achieve the target 67-year
replacement rate would require an additional $7 billion
annually for a period of 9 years or a total of $63 billion.
That is simply not going to happen. We will need to close
unneeded bases.
So, by putting off needed spending on facilities replacement, DOD
is now in a deep hole. This budget improves the situation--but leaves
us short of our goal.
Or, take an example where things are continuing to decline--
shipbuilding:

The current standard based on the 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review is to maintain a steady state of 310 ships.
Here is the reality: Under the 2001 enacted budget,
DOD is building 6 ships a year at a cost of $11.5 billion--
which puts us on course to reduce the size of the U.S. Navy to
a clearly unacceptable steady state of 230 ships by 2030.
The 2002 budget, by providing for six ships at a cost
of about $9.3 billion will keep the Navy on the same course
toward a 230-ship steady-state Navy. We need to begin to turn
this trend up.
This puts us in a worse situation than in 2001 because
the cost of reversing the decline and ``catching up'' to the
310 ship steady-state increases by $3.0 billion every year we
put it off.
To meet the target of 310 ships would require building
at least 9 ships each year, at a cost of about $12 billion.

Or consider the aging of Navy aircraft:

The desirable average age for Navy aircraft is pegged
at 11 years. Given the impact of continued low procurement,
that average age has grown steadily to 18 years.
Here is the reality: Today, with the current strategy,
the Navy has a requirement for a total of 4200 aircraft, which
allows them maintain an average age of 18 years.
To meet this steady-state requirement, the Navy needs
180 to 200 new aircraft per year at a cost of $11 billion.
The 2001 budget amendment would provide for 97
aircraft at a cost of $8.4 billion.
The 2002 budget would provide for 88 aircraft at a
cost of $8.3 billion.
Even at the rate of 122 aircraft a year, the cost of
reversing the decline and ``catching up'' to the 4200 plane
steady-state increases by $4 billion every year we put off the
decision to do so.

Facility repair and maintenance:

The deferred maintenance for DOD facilities--the
cumulative amount that has not been funded from year to year--
currently stands at least $11 billion.
The 2001 budget included $4.9 billion for facility
maintenance.
The 2002 amended budget would increase the facility
maintenance budget by $0.9 billion for a total of $5.8
billion--an increase of 18.4 percent.
But this increase only funds facility maintenance at
89 percent of the requirement.
At this rate, because of years of under funding, it
would take 20 years to catch up and eliminate the cumulative
deferred maintenance.

There are some of the difficulties facing the U.S. Armed Forces
today. Despite a proposed increase in defense spending unmatched by any
President since the mid 1980s, this budget still cannot not fix the
problems we face as a result of a decade of a mismatch between
requirements and appropriations.
It is an indication of the depth of the hole we are in today that a
$22.8 billion increase in defense spending makes just a good start in
meeting the shortfalls our Armed Forces are facing.
That is just the tip of the iceberg. Today, we are proposing a
$328.9 billion defense budget. But to keep the department going next
year on a straight-line--no improvements, just covering the costs of
inflation and realistic budgeting--we will need a budget $347.2.
billion. That is a $18.3 billion increase.
So, where do we find money for the rest of our pressing needs? We
simply must achieve cost savings.

FINDING COST SAVINGS

We have an obligation to taxpayers to spend their money wisely.
Today, we're not doing that. DOD:

Has overhead that has grown to the point where it is
estimated by some that as little as 14 percent of DOD manpower
may be directly related to combat operations.
Despite some 128 acquisition reform studies, DOD has
an acquisition system that since 1975 has doubled the time it
takes to produce a weapon system--while the pace for new
generations of technology has shortened from years to 18
months. This guarantees that DOD's newest weapons will be one
or more technology generations old the day they are fielded,
and DOD has processes and regulations so onerous that many
commercial businesses developing needed military technologies
simply refuse to do business with the Department.

But the Department needs greater freedom to manage so we can save
the taxpayers money in areas such as:

Rationalization and restructuring of DOD
infrastructure. A 20-25 percent reduction in excess military
bases and facilities could generate savings of several billion
dollars annually. Legislation authorizing a new round of
facilities rationalization will be transmitted later this year.
Increasing the thresholds in Davis-Bacon. If we could
change the threshold for contracts subject to Davis-Bacon wage
requirements from $2,000 to $1,000,000, it would permit the
Department to achieve savings of $190 million in fiscal year
2002 alone. We need that money for shipbuilding, for
modernizing our aircraft fleets and for modernization.
Contracting out commissaries, housing and other
services that are not core military competencies and that can
be performed more efficiently in the private sector.

In fiscal year 2002, the Department proposes a pilot program with
the Army and Marine Corps to contract out certain commissaries, and
another pilot program with the Navy to contract out refueling support
including tanker aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, I have never seen an organization, in the private or
public sector, that could not, by better management, operate at least 5
percent more efficiently if given the freedom to do so.
Five percent of the DOD budget is over $15 billion! With those
savings, we could do many of the following:

Increase ship procurement from six to nine ships a
year, maintaining a steady state 310 ship Navy and protecting
needed job at Navy shipyards $3 billion annually;
Procure several hundred additional aircraft annually,
rather than 189, to help meet reach the steady state
requirements for Navy, Air Force, and Army aircraft $16 billion
annually; $82 billion from fiscal year 2003-2007;
Meet the target of a 67-year facility replacement rate
$7 billion annually for 9 years;
Fund 100 percent of base operations requirements $1.4
billion annually;
Increase defense-related science and technology
funding from 2.7 percent to 3 percent of the DOD budget $1.2
billion annually;
Purchase needed UH-60 helicopters $50 million;
Replenish precision munitions such as JSOW, JDAM and
ATACMS $200 million;
Buy three additional C-17 aircraft $600 million,
replenish Army trucks $100 million; Buy HMMWVs $50 million;
Bomber upgrades $730 million; purchase high-speed sealift $122
million.

But today there is no real incentive to save a nickel. To the
contrary, the way the Department operates today, there are
disincentives to saving money.
We need to ask ourselves: how should we be spending taxpayer
dollars? Do we want to keep paying for excess infrastructure that
provides no added value to our national security? Or we want to spend
that money on new technologies that will help us extend peace and
security into the new century? That is the choice before us.
We are doing two things:

First, we are not treating the taxpayers' dollars with
respect--and by not doing so, we risk losing their support, and
Second, we are depriving the men and women of our
Armed Forces of the training, equipment and facilities they
need to accomplish their missions. They deserve better.

V. CONCLUSION

We have a big task ahead. It took years of coasting and overuse to
get us where we are today. We can't dig out in a year.
Following the Cold War, we reduced forces and claimed a well-
deserved peace dividend for the American taxpayers. But in the mid-
1990s, we began to overdraw on that account. We kept reducing our
forces, despite the fact that op-tempo increased.
As a result, we have a 30 percent smaller force doing 165 percent
more missions. In short, we have been asking the Armed Forces to do
more and more, with fewer resources.
The President's budget proposes a large increase by any standard.
It will allow us to make significant improvements to the readiness,
morale and condition of our military.
Would all services prefer to have more money to get well faster? Of
course.
But at the same time, the taxpayers have a right to demand that we
spend their money wisely. Today we can't tell the American people we
are doing that. I know I cannot.
To have the support of the American people, we need to be able to
make the case that we are fixing these systemic problems and achieving
significant cost savings.
Fixing this problem is a joint responsibility. It will require a
new partnership between Congress and the Executive Branch. It is a
responsibility we have not only to the men and women who serve in our
Armed Forces today, but to future generations of Americans as well.
Because of the long lead times, most of the capabilities any
President invests in during his tenure are not available during his
service; rather they are available to his successors. The force that
won the Gulf War was built on the decisions of presidents and
congresses over the preceding three decades.
The Tomahawk cruise missile program, the F-15, F-18 and the F-16
aircraft flying today, were developed in the 1970s. Many other
technologies, such as the current generation of space satellites that
gave us dominant battle space awareness in Iraq, were developed in the
1980s.
The point is this: One generation bequeaths to the next generation
the capabilities to ensure its security.
Today, we have the security of future generations of Americans in
our hands. We have a responsibility to get it right.
Because of the long procurement holiday of the 1990s, we have been
left a poor hand. We must resolve to leave a better hand to our
successors.
I am anxious to work with you to achieve that goal. I know full
well it will take the best of all of us.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Rumsfeld. General
Shelton, I know you have a longer statement, but summarize the
highlights in a few minutes, and we will call on our colleagues
who have to leave. I hate to do that to you. We could call on
you later in the afternoon to supplement or amplify.

STATEMENT OF GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can also submit
my statement for the record, if you would like. I would like to
thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for your very kind
words a few minutes ago about my tenure as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been my great honor to serve the
men and women of our Armed Forces, and I want to once again
thank this committee, each and every Senator, for your very
strong and staunch support of our men and women in uniform.
I can highlight a few areas, if you would like, Mr.
Chairman. First of all, with your help, I believe we have made
considerable progress in many areas that have impacted the
overall health and welfare of our troops in recent months.
Increases in pay and allowances, pay table reform, TRICARE
reform and expanded health care coverage, additional funding to
provide adequate housing for our military families, and the
budget plus-ups to arrest a decline in our first-to-fight units
have been critical and have been provided.
But, let me also say that I believe we need to sustain this
momentum if we are to preserve the long-term health, as well as
the readiness, of our force in the years to come. Today, as we
consider new budgets, new national security strategies, and new
ideas of transforming the force, it is important that we always
remember that the quality people in our military are the
critical enablers that allow us to accomplish the things that
we are asked to do.
Since my last testimony, we have been reminded of the human
element of national security in several profound ways. Last
October, U.S.S. Cole was savagely attacked in the Port of Aden.
In that incident, 17 sailors died. Some asked why we put a ship
in harm's way in such a dangerous part of the world. Well, that
is what we do. We go into harm's way to protect America's
interests around the world. The sailors of the U.S.S. Cole were
en route to the Gulf, establishing presence and protecting our
Nation's vital interests.
Last December we had two U.S. Army helicopters that crashed
during a very difficult night-time training mission in Hawaii.
In that crash, nine U.S. soldiers died. Some asked, why would
the U.S. Army put soldiers in harm's way during a dangerous
training mission in the black of the night? Well, that is what
we do. We train for the most difficult missions we may face,
because we know that when America's interests are threatened we
have to be ready to go, day or night, and failure is not an
option. We try to minimize the risk to our great men and women,
but we train like we anticipate having to fight.
Then, as we all know, just a few weeks ago we had an EP-3
that was a reconnaissance aircraft flying in international air
space over the South China Sea struck by a Chinese fighter,
forced to make an emergency landing, and 24 of our personnel
were detained. Some asked why we were conducting surveillance
of another nation. Well, my answer is, that is what we do. We
are vigilant. We are watchful, because we know that our
interests and those of our allies in the region may be
challenged, and if and when they are, we must be ready.
I am very proud of the performance of these great men and
women and the many thousands of others who proudly wear the
uniform of our country. They have been, and will always be, our
decisive edge. Indeed, they are so good at what they do, that
unless there is an accident, or an incident, then we rarely
take notice of their daily contributions to our national
security. They sail their ships, they fly their aircraft, and
they go on their patrols, quietly and professionally, and
America is safe to enjoy great prosperity, in part because of
them.
However, today our forces and our people are experiencing
some significant challenges, a number of which I would like to
bring to your attention. Our first-to-fight forces are, in
fact, prepared, trained, and ready to meet emergent
requirements, but some of our other forces are not as ready as
they should be. These include our strategic airlift fleet, our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, our
combat service support units, and our training bases, all of
which provide critical capabilities to our warfighting forces.
These units are in some cases suffering the consequences of
a high OPTEMPO and a diversion of resources to sustain the
near-term readiness of the first-to-fight forces. In fact,
since 1995, DOD has experienced a 133-percent increase in the
number of military personnel committed to joint operations.
These are real-world events, not exercises, and we are doing it
with 9 percent fewer people. That has, in fact, caused a high
operational tempo on some segments of our force and that, of
course, puts a strain on our people.
I believe the fundamental cause of this situation has, in
fact, been an imbalance between the demands of our national
security strategy and the post-1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) force structure. Fixing this imbalance, of course, will
be one of the top priorities for this year's QDR for Secretary
Rumsfeld and all the Joint Chiefs, because the challenge will
only increase over time, and we owe it to our people to get it
right.
In fact, today we are struggling to reconcile a multitude
of competing demands, near-term readiness imperatives, long-
term modernization, and recapitalization of aging systems, and
infrastructure investments that are central to preserve the
world's best warfighting capability. As I have mentioned in
previous testimony, and as the Secretary just commented on, we
did, in fact, live off of some of our procurement in the 1980s
throughout the 1990s.
Now, we have had a marked reduction in procurement. That
means the average age of most of our systems, and our key
warfighting systems, have been increasing, as was highlighted
to some extent by the Secretary.
Let me provide you with just a few examples. Our frontline
air superiority fighter, the F-15, averages 17 years of age. It
is only 3 years away from the end of its original design
service. Our airborne tanker fleet, as well as our B-52
bombers, are nearly 40 years old. Our intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, along with our electronic
warfare aircraft, such as the RC-135s and EP-3s, the P-3s, and
our EA-6Bs, all average between 19 and 38 years of service, and
our main battle tank, the M-1, and our marine amphibious
assault vehicle, are powered by engines that were designed and,
in some cases, built in the 1960s.
Finally, numerous helicopter platforms for all of our
services have passed or are approaching the end of their
original design service lives. In fact, most of the warfighting
platforms that I just mentioned meet the 25-year rule required
by the great State of Virginia to qualify for antique license
plates.
Our force is not aging gracefully. In fact, we are having
to spend significantly more in each year to maintain our aging
equipment in repair parts and maintenance down time and in
maintenance support, which also increases the operational tempo
of those great soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines that have
to maintain them.
If we do not replace some of these systems soon, either the
force structure will shrink, or we will have to continue to
maintain the old systems, resulting in spiraling operations and
maintenance costs and reduced combat capability. In my opinion,
these are unacceptable alternatives, which begs the question,
what should we do?
I believe there are two answers. First, we must bring into
balance our strategy and our force structure, and we must
significantly increase our efforts in procurement to modernize
and recapitalize our force. The QDR should produce the
strategic blueprint and the investment profile necessary to
shape our force to carry out the new strategy.
Another related concern is the fact that our vital
infrastructure is decaying at an alarming rate, as Secretary
Rumsfeld has commented. Budget constraints have forced us to
make some hard choices. The fact is that in the real property
maintenance accounts today, we currently have a backlog that is
growing, that today totals over $11 billion. I think that a
quality force deserves quality facilities, and therefore it is
essential that we start providing the resources to reverse the
deterioration of out post, bases, camps, and stations.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus for just a second
on the decisive edge of our force, the men and women in
uniform. President Bush stated that a volunteer military has
only two paths. It can lower its standards to fill its ranks,
or it can inspire the best and the brightest to join and to
stay. The latter starts with better pay, better treatment, and
better training.
The President, I believe, had it exactly right. We must
continue to close the significant pay gap that still exists
between the military and the private sector, and we must make
continued investments in health care, housing, and other
quality-of-life programs that are essential to sustain our
force.
One of the most valued recruiting and retention tools that
any corporation can offer potential employees or its current
workforce is a comprehensive medical package. DOD is no
different. For that reason, the Chiefs and I strongly urge
Congress to fully fund the defense health program and all
health care costs as a strong signal that we are truly
committed to providing quality health care to our troops. I do
not think there is a better way to renew the bond of trust
between Uncle Sam and our service members and retirees than
this commitment to quality health care.
Additionally, I would ask for your support to help ensure
that all of our men and women in uniform, single, married, or
unaccompanied, are provided with adequate housing.
Unfortunately, this is not the case today. About 62 percent of
our family housing units are classified as inadequate, and
correcting this situation is essential if we are to improve the
quality of life for our service members and their families. We
have learned over the years that we recruit the member, but we
retain the family.
To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have the best
military, the best Armed Forces in the world today. But having
said this, I believe that we will continue to enjoy our
military advantage, or that it will erode over time if we fail
to prepare for the evolving strategic landscape for the 21st
century. Our greatest adversary today, as I have said so many
times, in my opinion, is complacency. It is imperative that we
take action today to ensure that our men and women in uniform
are properly equipped, trained, and led. If we do so, I am
confident that we will prevail in any challenges that we face
in the future.
I am struck by the fact that today I believe we have an
opportunity to build the foundation for another long era of
U.S. military supremacy and, in doing so, we will help
underwrite the peace and prosperity that our Nation currently
enjoys, and should continue to enjoy well into the future.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to make this
statement, and we now stand ready to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA
It is an honor to report to Congress today on the state of
America's Armed Forces. As every member of this committee knows, our
Nation is blessed with an unsurpassed warfighting force that has been
actively engaged over the past year supporting America's interests
around the globe. I am extremely proud to represent the young men and
women of our Armed Forces. They serve our country selflessly, away from
home and loved ones, and are frequently put in harm's way. They
personify America at its very best.
It is those young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who will
fight tomorrow's wars with the strategy, force structure, doctrine, and
equipment that we develop today. For them to do what we ask--to remain
the best in the world--we must give them the best tools. This means
ensuring that they always have the resources necessary to be trained,
armed, and ready. It means properly compensating them today and
tomorrow. It means recapitalizing our weapon systems and
infrastructure, and modernizing the force to meet tomorrow's
challenges. As we consider the choices ahead, may we always remember
that our great people have the most at stake in the decisions that we
make here in Washington.
In this Posture Statement, I will address two broad topics: (1)
Sustaining a Quality Force, concentrating on those programs that are
critical to maintaining the force; and (2) Building Tomorrow's Joint
Force, what we are doing today to prepare for tomorrow's challenges.

I. SUSTAINING A QUALITY FORCE

America's best and brightest must continue to answer the clarion
call to serve if our Nation is to remain the strongest force for peace
and stability on the planet. It is the quality of our people that gives
us a decisive edge over our adversaries and to sustain this qualitative
edge we must support our personnel with continued investments in pay
compensation, health care, housing, and other quality of life programs.
Compensation Gains
As a result of compensation gains in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal
year 2001, we have made great strides toward improving the standards of
living for members of our Armed Forces. With the significant support
and help of this committee, Congress, and the administration, the
Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided one
of the largest pay raises in recent history, and allowed us to greatly
reduce out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for off-base housing, instituted
retirement reform, and implemented pay table reform.
That same level of outstanding support was evident in the fiscal
year 2001 NDAA. The 3.7 percent pay increase maintains our commitment
to close the pay gap between the military and their civilian
counterparts. Additionally, the fiscal year 2001 NDAA provided $30M in
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) to further reduce OOP expenses to
less than 15 percent. The opening of the Thrift Savings Plan to
military members, the implementation of a monetary allowance for
military members currently receiving food stamps, and revising the
enlistment/retention bonus authority has also demonstrated to our
forces a commitment to their quality of life. This helps us attract and
retain quality people.
We need to sustain the momentum of the past 2 years. The pay raise
slated for fiscal year 2002 and your continued support of our efforts
to reduce OOP expenses for housing to zero by fiscal year 2005 will
further improve the quality of life for our servicemembers and their
families. This is not only important for their well being, it is
equally important to our efforts to recruit and retain a quality force.
Military Health Care
One of the most valued recruiting tools any major corporation can
offer a potential employee is a comprehensive medical package. DOD is
no different. Congress and the administration have done much over the
last year to address the health needs of our active duty and retired
servicemembers and their families. As in the civilian sector,
healthcare costs for the military community have continued to rise
rapidly. Passage of the fiscal year 2001 NDAA demonstrated Congress'
commitment to honor the promise to those currently serving and to those
who served honorably in the past. I appreciate the support of Congress
for this effort.
We are pursuing full funding of healthcare costs as a strong signal
that we are truly committed to providing quality healthcare for our
active duty military members, retirees and their families. This
commitment will have a profound impact on all who wear our uniform, and
will encourage those who are considering a military career. It is also
imperative that we fund healthcare benefits for retirees and their
families in such a manner that this funding no longer competes with
operations, force structure, and readiness. This will honor the
national commitment we made long ago to our military retirees, without
impacting the readiness and military capability of today's force.
Additionally, the Joint Chiefs are working with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs in seeking business practice
improvements and implementing the new benefits identified in the fiscal
year 2001 NDAA. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, TRICARE will pay costs
not covered by Medicare for over-65 retirees and their families.
Housing
Housing continues to be a core element in our efforts to improve
the quality of life for our service members. All our men and women in
uniform deserve adequate housing. The Services remain on track with
plans to eliminate inadequate housing for unaccompanied enlisted
personnel by 2008. The situation for family housing is more
challenging. Last year, the Service Family Housing Master Plans deemed
almost 61 percent of family housing units inadequate. The Services are
revamping their respective Family Housing Master Plans to revitalize,
privatize, or demolish these inadequate units by 2010.
Congressional support for DOD's three-pronged strategy to improve
family housing has been outstanding and is greatly appreciated. First,
the initiative to raise housing allowances to reduce out-of-pocket
expenses for our servicemembers has provided welcome relief to the
force. Second, creating smart partnerships with the private sector
makes defense dollars go further and effectively frees up resources to
revitalize existing housing. Finally, your continued efforts to fund
our construction and privatization programs will pay great dividends by
ensuring our servicemembers and their families can live in respectable
accommodations.
There is an inseparable, direct link between personal and family
readiness and our total force combat readiness. Your continued support
of these and other quality of life programs will provide substantial
returns in retaining not just the member, but also the family.

II. BUILDING TOMORROW'S JOINT FORCE

In this section, I present some of my thoughts on those actions we
are taking today, to build tomorrow's joint force. In my view, these
are the critical enablers for any new defense strategy designed to
confront the challenges of this 21st century.
Modernization
While recent funding increases have arrested the decline in current
readiness, our modernization accounts, which are critical to future
readiness, remain under funded. Solving this problem has become my most
urgent priority.
Modernization will help reduce our capability concerns by
leveraging advanced technology to improve interoperability. Also,
newer, technologically advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) collection assets, communications systems, and
logistics support systems will help reduce manpower requirements while
simultaneously improving the CINCs' warfighting capabilities.
Modernization is also necessary for improved operational flexibility
and to ensure that we retain a technological and qualitative
superiority on the battlefield.
We must modernize our force; however, we must not sacrifice current
readiness to do it.
Recapitalization of Force Structure
After the Cold War, we made a conscious decision to cut procurement
and live off the investments of the eighties as we reduced force
structure. Between fiscal years 1993-1998, approximately $100 billion
was taken out of DOD procurement accounts. The 1997 QDR Report
identified a potentially serious procurement problem if we did not
increase investment in new platforms and equipment. A goal of $60
billion in procurement was established as an interim target to recover
from the sharply reduced procurement spending in fiscal year 1993-1998.
Last year, for the first time, this interim goal was achieved.
However, several recent studies, to include one by the
Congressional Budget Office, have concluded that $60 billion is not
sufficient to sustain the force. Since the QDR will determine the
strategy and size of the force, I cannot give you a precise
recommendation on the additional amount required. What is clear today
is that we must accelerate the pace of replacing our aging and worn
systems if we are to deliver the right capability to meet future
challenges. We simply cannot continue to defer procurement and continue
our usage at existing rates if we expect our force to meet all of our
21st century commitments.
Recapitalization of Infrastructure
Our vital infrastructure is decaying. The understandable desire for
a post-Cold War peace dividend forced us to make hard choices that
redirected funds from military facilities and infrastructure accounts
to support immediate readiness requirements. Years of belt-tightening
have increased the risk of facility failures and have added to the
costs of upkeep.
Within civilian industry, the replacement, restoration or
modernization of physical plant assets is accomplished in roughly a 50-
year cycle. The rate of investment in DOD infrastructure has fallen to
a level that requires over 100 years for recapitalization. We must find
the resources to accelerate the recapitalization of our infrastructure
to avoid further damage and degradation. A sustained period of
increased funding is required to develop a modern infrastructure
capable of supporting our 21st century force and the next generation of
weapon systems.
In its current state, the DOD infrastructure is still capable of
supporting the National Military Strategy; however, in some locations,
we face a high risk of operational limitations that may affect mission
success. Throughout DOD, installation readiness is at an all-time low.
In fact, 60 percent of our infrastructure is rated C-3 (some failures)
or C-4 (major problems). It is particularly alarming that the current
condition of training and operational facilities is lower than any
other facility category in DOD. Usage restrictions and the shortage of
required training ranges and operating areas slowly but inevitably
degrade the readiness of our operational units. The poor material
condition of facilities also directly contributes to lost or degraded
training opportunities.
In sum, our deteriorating infrastructure continues to impair
readiness and detract from the quality of life of our service members
and their families. I ask you to support our efforts to fix this
problem, because it effectively reduces the efficiency of our uniformed
and civilian workforce and further lowers retention rates for highly
qualified and otherwise motivated personnel. A world class fighting
force requires mission-ready facilities.
Additionally, we sorely need further base closure rounds as part of
our overall recapitalization effort. According to the April 1998 DOD
BRAC Report, we have 23 percent excess base capacity in the United
States, a situation that directly impacts the ability of the Service
Chiefs to provide, train, maintain, and equip today's force. By
removing validated excess capacity, we could save $3 billion per year
in the long-term. This money would then be available to fund
appropriately our remaining bases and help fix the remaining
infrastructure.

TRANSFORMATION

Joint Vision 2020
Our future force must be a seamless joint force and our roadmap for
achieving this joint force is detailed in Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020).
Although the Services are busily engaged in the transformation of their
respective forces, in my view these individual transformations will be
most effective operationally only if they mesh fully with the more
encompassing joint transformation called for in JV 2020.
A key feature of this transformation will be the implementation of
dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full
dimensional protection in the context of Joint Task Force (JTF)
operations. Today, we successfully execute JTF operations when they are
needed. But, in my view, we will be more responsive and agile in the
future with JTF operations as our ``national military core
competency.'' This goal will not be achieved through technology and
materiel solutions alone. It will also require intellectual innovation
and the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education,
leaders, people, and facilities that effectively make use of new
technologies.
Using JV 2020 as a conceptual template, the goal of our joint
transformation effort is a force that is dominant across the full
spectrum of military operations. DOD is seeking to transform its forces
to meet future challenges through a comprehensive plan that integrates
activities in several areas:

Service concept development and experimentation
efforts;
Joint concept development and experimentation designed
to integrate Service capabilities where possible and develop
joint solutions where necessary;
Implementation processes in the Services and joint
community to identify rapidly the most promising of the new
concepts; and
Science and Technology efforts focused on areas that
can enhance U.S. military capabilities.

This overall transformation effort is not focused solely on US
military capabilities. USJFCOM has developed an aggressive plan for
outreach to multinational partners as well. Our objective is to bring
allied perspectives into the concept development process to facilitate
our future ability to operate effectively within a coalition
environment.
Based on joint experimentation and implementation programs, we
expect to see some new capabilities that will be operational well
before 2020, while other promising concepts will continue to be
explored and developed. Our overarching goal is to bring these various
capabilities together in a coherent and synchronized fashion.

OTHER TRANSFORMATION ISSUES

Logistics Transformation
Our goal for logistics transformation is to provide the joint
warfighter real-time logistics situational awareness by leveraging
technology and optimizing logistics processes. The Defense Reform
Initiative Directive #54, Logistics Transformation Plans, establishes a
framework of objectives and a means to measure progress toward
accomplishing this goal.
Ultimately, we must create a network-centric environment in which
data can be accessed in real time at its source. This network-centric
environment will provide the warfighter with operationally relevant
logistics information necessary to make accurate, timely decisions and
to maintain our military advantage into the next decades.
Mobility
We are making significant improvements in our ability to deploy
forces. Our fleet of 35-year old C-141s is being replaced with C-17s,
and numerous conventional break-bulk cargo ships are being replaced by
Large Medium Speed Roll-on Roll-off ships. However, we foresee
increased challenges and stresses to the mobility system. These
challenges were carefully examined in the comprehensive 2-year Mobility
Requirements Study 05 (MRS-05). The study determined that programmed
strategic lift capability falls short of requirements for both CONUS
and inter-theater missions. MRS-05 also determined that increased
capability is needed within theaters to move equipment and supplies
forward from pre-positioning sites, airports, and seaports.
Consequently, we are aggressively pursuing policy changes, host-nation
agreements, and, where necessary, considering new equipment as part of
the 2001 QDR to ensure timely force deployment. More than ever,
Congressional support of strategic lift is needed if we are to build a
national mobility capability sufficient for our current and future
needs.
Joint Interoperability
We have made progress in the area of interoperability with an
overall effort focused on creating a force that is ready to fight as a
coherent joint unit, fully interoperable, and seamlessly integrated.
Our long-term goal is to require that interoperability be ``designed
in'' at the beginning of the development process rather than ``forced
in'' after the fact. We intend to achieve this goal through
improvements in the requirements generation process, including
establishment of interoperability Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and
Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) in systems development. A
requirements-based Joint Operations Architecture, well grounded in
joint doctrine, will provide a roadmap for addressing interoperability
issues across the full spectrum of capabilities. These efforts will
enable DOD's senior leadership to focus more on interoperability and
integration of the joint force.

INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TRANSFORMATION

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Achieving and maintaining a decisive advantage in our ability to
access, gather, exploit, and act on information remains a critical
aspect of our combat capability and readiness. A full spectrum ISR
capability is the mainstay of that concept. To achieve this, we need to
place more emphasis on the capability to ``watch'' or ``stare at''
targeted objectives with collection systems able to monitor, track,
characterize, and report on moving objects and dynamic events as they
occur in the battlespace. In other words, a constant rather than
periodic sensor access is required.
Intelligence Interoperability
Intelligence interoperability is the foundation of our capability
for dominant battlespace awareness. Our goal is to ensure that our
forces retain an information edge over potential adversaries. To be
fully interoperable, intelligence must be produced and delivered in a
fashion that immediately supports command decision making and mission
execution. We are gradually tearing down barriers to interoperability
between intelligence and operations systems to ensure we provide the
Common Operating Picture essential to future command and control. The
Common Operating Picture will provide a unified view of the battlespace
for the soldier in the field, the pilot in the cockpit, and the
commander, regardless of location.
Intelligence Federation
The Intelligence Federation is a new concept wherein designated
commands and units provide specified intelligence support to an engaged
CINC during a crisis or contingency operation using a pre-planned
methodology tailored to that CINC's area of responsibility and
operational requirements. The concept evolved from the growing need to
ensure the collective resources of the intelligence community function
as a ``system of systems,'' so that users are able to receive
information tailored to their unique requirements, and with the
necessary fidelity. To do this effectively, we need to create a
federation among intelligence components using Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures.
Global Information Grid (GIG)
The CINCs testified last year that a major warfighting deficiency
in some theaters is the inability to plan quickly and execute
decisively because of C\4\ deficiencies. I wholeheartedly agree. Simply
put, our C\4\ infrastructure falls short of what is needed to support
properly our decision makers and the men and women on the front lines.
To help alleviate this shortfall, we must ensure that our warfighters
have full and reliable access to the GIG from any point on the globe.
The GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information
capabilities, associated processes, and personnel that we are
developing to manage and provide information on demand to warfighters,
policy makers, and supporting personnel. I believe that our ongoing
efforts to bring the GIG online will provide the foundation for
information superiority on the battlefield in the decades ahead. To
that end, it is necessary to continue to invest in and upgrade the GIG
infrastructure. Satellites, fiber optic cables, support of network
operations, information assurance programs, and DOD's use of the radio
frequency spectrum, are all tremendously important to achieving this
goal.
Radio Frequency Spectrum Access
There is an important debate ongoing concerning the proposed
reallocation of a segment of the DOD radio frequency spectrum to
commercial users, an initiative with the potential to disrupt our
transformation effort. In the last 8 years, 247 MHz of the RF spectrum
for Federal use, primarily used by DOD, has been reallocated for
commercial use by the private sector. I am concerned that further
reallocation of frequency spectrum for commercial use, without
comparable spectrum to execute DOD's critical functions, will have a
major impact on our ability to execute our missions. Our success on the
battlefield largely depends on our ability to use advanced
communications technology to exchange vital information between
decision-makers, commanders, and deployed forces.
One of the principal areas of interest to the private sector is the
1755-1850 MHz band. This band is currently used for tactical data
links; satellite telemetry, tracking, and control; precision guided
weapons; air combat training systems; and the delivery of voice, video,
and data information to warfighters and commanders in the field. These
systems are indispensable to our national defense. Some industry
advocates have suggested that DOD share segments of this frequency band
or relocate to another operationally suitable spectrum. I believe this
proposal is problematic for two reasons. First, according to our
analysis, sharing with commercial users is not possible due to
interference over large geographical areas and metropolitan centers.
Second, moving DOD communications to a different, but comparable,
spectrum could be problematic due to the lengthy transition period
required. Some national security satellites will use this frequency
band well into the future. If directed to move, a more detailed cost
and transition timeline will be required to ensure continuity of our
Nation's defense capabilities. It is imperative that we strike a
reasonable and informed balance between commercial needs and military
requirements. I understand that there is a White House process, led by
the National Security Council and the National Economic Council, which
is reviewing this issue to achieve this balance, critical for national
security. We anticipate that suitable solutions will be found that are
acceptable to all parties.

CONCLUSION

Today, even as we seek to transform our force to face an evolving
security environment, our goals remain firm. We must protect America's
interests, deter aggression, support peaceful resolution of disputes
and most importantly, to be ready to intervene or respond to a conflict
and win decisively.
This is a critically important time for our Nation as we move
further into the new millennium as the only global superpower. It is
clear that we have a great deal of work to do with the administration
and Congress as we develop a new NSS and support the requirements of
the QDR. Our professional, highly trained, and motivated young
Americans in uniform are counting on us to make the right decisions. We
have an opportunity in the months ahead to build on successes, address
the challenges, and sustain and support our dedicated forces. We must
provide our warfighting forces with the best tools available as they
defend America's interests, and we must shape a future force that will
help us achieve our national security objectives well into the 21st
century. Together, I am confident we can capitalize on this
opportunity.

Chairman Levin. General Shelton, thank you. We are going to
modify my announcement on the order for questions. I am going
to first call on Senator Warner, who is going to allocate his 6
minutes, and then we will pursue the usual rotation.
Senator Warner. I thank the chairman. Two of my colleagues
are going to be leaving us at 3:00, so if the Senator from
Alabama and the Senator from Maine would like, take my time, 3
minutes each.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I will
not use all that time. I would just like to thank Secretary
Rumsfeld for challenging the system, for asking tough
questions, and for not believing that anything is a sacred cow.
The President indicated he was going to do that.
I think it is your responsibility to do so, and I know you
are just now beginning to get your staff approved, confirmed,
and on board. We are behind in that, and I know it is difficult
to prepare a detailed budget during the time that you are
giving fundamental review to the priorities of the Department
of Defense.
I, for one, am going to be as supportive as I possibly can,
because when you testify that you need this program or that
program, I want you to have had the time to study it and make
that recommendation with the confidence and backing you need.
We are, indeed, increasing spending around this body an
awful lot. Cutting social programs, Mr. Secretary, means that
the projected increases cannot be reduced. That is what cutting
means in a social program. On defense, however, we do not seem
to be as determined to protect it.
I think it is a core function of our Government to provide
for the national defense and the national security. It ought to
be given our highest priority in the tough budget-making issues
that we face. I will support you on that, and I also hope that
at the same time you will follow through, as you have
indicated, on commitments to efficiency, productivity, and
research, which perhaps can save us a lot of money in the years
to come.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, sir.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to
thank Senator Warner for his graciousness in letting me use his
time so that I can participate in the hearing.
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Shelton, you have certainly
painted a very grim picture, which obviously indicates that
these problems did not occur overnight. They have been building
for a long time, which raises questions of why the alarm bells
were not sounded in the previous administration. But leaving
that issue aside, Secretary Rumsfeld, you have emphasized the
difficulty of ``getting well'' in 1 year with this budget. You
have mentioned with regard to shipbuilding that meeting the QDR
target of 310 ships would require building at least nine ships
each year, at a cost of about $12 billion.
Has the Pentagon considered recommending to Congress the
use of advance appropriations to step up the shipbuilding
budget in a way that might be more affordable in the short
term? Ultimately, we are still going to have the same costs,
but is there consideration underway at the Pentagon to looking
at advance appropriations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Collins, that is an important
question, and I am not an expert on it. Dov Zakheim has been
working with the Office of Management and Budget on it. I do
not see any other way we are going to get that shipbuilding
budget up and going in the right direction without doing
forward-funding.
Whether or not the balancing of the pros and cons of it
will be sufficiently persuasive with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) is a question, but it is clearly a way for us
to increase the number of ships per year, which we need to do.
We need to do it because we need the ships. We also need to do
it because the industrial base and the shipyards need the work,
and I am certainly hopeful that we will be able to do that in
addition to increasing funds in the shipbuilding budget in the
coming year.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might just
comment on that too, Senator Levin and I met with you yesterday
and this was central to our discussions. We want to join you on
this. I think hopefully within Congress there is a majority
view that this is a way to aid shipbuilding and maybe other
procurement accounts. So let us work together. If it requires
legislation, let us roll along with it.
Chairman Levin. Very good. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld, just on that last point, I think this
committee is more than happy to look at the pros and cons of
these various approaches, but we have had these considerations
before. There are some definite advantages, but there are some
definite disadvantages to that kind of funding, and the
committee will be happy to look at all of those advantages and
disadvantages when you are ready to submit them to us.
I was struck, Secretary Rumsfeld, by your comment that the
United States Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-equipped,
most powerful military forces on the face of the earth. I can
assure you that this committee will continue to do everything
in our power to keep it that way, just as we have in the past.
This committee has acted consistently on a bipartisan basis
to make sure that we are the best-trained, best-equipped force
on the face of the earth. We worked with our Secretaries of
Defense, with our uniformed leaders, and we will continue to
carry on that role.
Secretary Rumsfeld, the Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee, Senator Conrad, sent a letter to President Bush with
copies to you this week outlining the fiscal challenges we
face, particularly those that relate to your budget amendment
for the Defense Department.
The Chairman of the Budget Committee looked at the
possibility that the impending summer revisions to our economic
forecast could show that the small remaining surplus left for
2002 would evaporate because of a slowdown in the economy. Does
the administration believe that your defense budget amendment
can be paid for in fiscal year 2002 without using the medicare
or social security trust funds?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
Chairman Levin. Last week, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
announced the creation of a senior executive council that would
make key decisions on defense matters. This council does not
include, or at least does not appear to include, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or other senior military leaders. Can you
explain why they are not included in that council?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The group you are referring to is the
Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, and, as
I recall, the three service secretaries. They deal continuously
with the Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the services. The
issues they will address will be issues that are at their level
and of the nature that are appropriate to them.
For example, that group, plus Dr. Zakheim and I, have been
involved with the Chairman and the Chiefs practically every day
now for the last 4 weeks, and the interaction is continuous.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. At your hearing last week, Mr.
Secretary, I asked you if you agreed with General Kadish's
assessment that if you adopted and implemented the
recommendations on missile defense from the missile defense
strategy review that he has just completed, that those
recommendations would not lead to a violation of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in fiscal year 2002.
You said that you would give us your answer relative to
that, after reviewing General Kadish's assessment. Now that you
are presenting the fiscal 2002 budget, let me ask you this: In
this budget request for fiscal year 2002, are you incorporating
recommendations from the National Missile Defense Strategy
Review, which General Kadish briefed us on June 13?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It turns out that in our eagerness to
consult with Congress, General Kadish briefed you and Congress
prior to briefing me on that program. The program has not been
briefed to me. It is in a state of some adjustment because of
changes in the budget plan.
Yesterday, I met with General Kadish, goodness, for I am
sure an hour and a half or 2 hours, and some of the people to
discuss the treaty aspect of it, and I am prepared to speak to
that. But the actual details of the research and development
(R&D) budget, not the deployment budget, but the R&D budget
that General Kadish is working on, as I say, are still in a
state of some flux.
Chairman Levin. In the budget that you are presenting to us
today, is there anything in that budget which would cause a
violation of the ABM Treaty in fiscal year 2002?
Secretary Rumsfeld. They do not know for sure. That is to
say, as you engage in a research and development activity, it
is not clear how it is going to evolve, and General Kadish
cannot answer the question, nor can I. What we can say----
Chairman Levin. Well, let me interrupt you there. General
Kadish did answer the question. He said it did not.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That was a perfectly honest answer from
his standpoint at that stage of his knowledge. As I say, he
has----
Chairman Levin. You were briefed by him. How can you
disagree, then, with his conclusion?
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I finish the sentence here on this,
so that we can get it completely clarified. General Kadish's
program is still being adjusted, and therefore we cannot say
that the program is final and therefore we know.
Second, we cannot know because it is a research and
development budget, and it is impossible to be able to say
exactly which R&D program is going to evolve or progress faster
or slower than another.
What I can say is that the law is the law, and we will
comply with it. I can also say there is a compliance
requirement in the Pentagon that, as things do evolve, it has
to go through a compliance review, so the chances of anything
happening that would be contrary to U.S. law, or contrary to
the treaty, are zero.
Now, let me go the next step. The President has said that
he wants to pursue promising technologies, and he wants to be
able to at some point deploy a missile defense capability. The
ABM Treaty does not permit that. That means that they're in
conflict.
That is why the President has said he wants to enter into
discussions with the Russians and see if we can find a way to
establish a new framework to move beyond the ABM Treaty. Those
discussions and talks began with my visit with the Defense
Minister of Russia, Mr. Ivanov, the President's meeting with
Mr. Putin, and Secretary Powell's meeting with his counterpart.
They will be starting up again soon, and the President's
full intention is to find ways that the ABM Treaty will not
inhibit his goal of providing missile defense for the American
people, deployed forces, and friends and allies.
Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we
have somewhat of a pilot crisis. I think we all agree with
that. One of the issues we talked about last year was
individually contracting out to retired military personnel some
of the flying functions of noncombat vehicles.
We asked in our defense authorization bill last year that
the DOD study this and report back to us by April as to what
their recommendation would be. I would like to ask first, when
are we going to get the report back, and second, what thoughts
do you have on the contracting out provision for retired
military personnel?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Are you familiar with it?
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe, we, in fact, in the Joint Staff, based on
the requirement in the authorization act, completed that study,
and have forwarded that to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) for review. It has not reached the Secretary yet.
We did examine all facets of it. To be candid, and not to go
into too much detail here, it does not look very promising at
this point.
There are numerous things tied into it, including the
combat-readiness of the pilots that we train in those aircraft
to end up being commanders of the larger aircraft in our
strategic lift, but all that has gone up to OSD. You should be
receiving the complete report shortly.
Senator Inhofe. Shortly?
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. In a month?
General Shelton. Sir, I cannot speak for the Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. Why don't you advise us for the record when
you think we will get that, because I think it is something
that does have merit, and I would like to kind of bring it up
for discussion at some point.
[The information referred to follows:]

The report is still under review in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. At this point, we cannot offer a date certain when the report
will be completed. We will ensure that proper notifications are made
when the report is released by the Department of Defense.

Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, in one of your
management reforms, you talk about outsourcing depot
maintenance workloads beyond a depot's capacity. It is my
understanding that you measure capacity by a 40-hour work week.
In other words, you measure one shift when there is capability
in all of our three remaining air logistics centers, for
example, to operate with three shifts.
Wouldn't it be smarter to go ahead and change the
definition of capacity, and maybe have that capacity at two
shifts, as opposed to wasting that infrastructure in
outsourcing when it isn't really necessary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Dov Zakheim has been working on this.
My understanding is that the proposal relates just to backlog
that is not being met, so if a depot is not able to meet the
backlog, that that then would be freed up for different
outsourcing.
Senator Inhofe. But if the depot is not able to meet that
because they are using the current definition of full capacity,
would it not be advisable to at least explore expanding that
capacity by increasing from one to three, or from one to two
shifts?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to take a look at it.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Why don't you do that and answer it
for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Options for overtime and extra shifts were not excluded. The
initiative recognizes that depots could choose to bid on competed work
by increasing overtime and adding extra shifts. However, excessive
overtime cannot be sustained for extended periods of time and could be
uneconomical. The ability to hire additional qualified personnel from
the local labor pool, either for extra shifts or to utilize existing
equipment and facilities, is a factor in determining a depot's ability
to accomplish extra work.

Senator Inhofe. I was pleased to see the Crusader is going
to receive the funding that would put it online, I believe, in
2006. I am not sure, General Shelton, but I think you are in
agreement, as most of the Army people are, as to where we are
with the old Paladin; it is an outdated system, and many of our
prospective adversaries have a lot more capacity than we have.
Is there any chance that you would be able to move that up from
2006 to 2005 in terms of having one deployed and operating?
General Shelton. Senator Inhofe, I think that as a part of
the QDR process, part of the examination of our strategy and
our force structure, that system, like all the other systems
that we have will undergo a review. As part of that, certainly
in the Army's overall plan for transformation, where we would
need it to dovetail in with their objective force, or with
their interim force, even, is what will have to be examined. Of
course, in that comes the priority issues, of where they
prioritize that, and I cannot speak for the Army right now. I
will have to take that one for the record and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Transformation is an evolutionary process and the Fiscal Year 2002
Amended Budget represents a balanced program, which maintains an Army,
trained and ready. To support the Army's future goals, significant
funding increases for Transformation and Science and Technology
development have been included as part of the President's Amended
Budget. The service can best articulate in any discussion pertaining to
transformation tradeoff decisions.
The Army's Future Goals was part of the process in the Quadrennial
Defense Review which was released the end of September 2001.

Senator Inhofe. I am pleased they made the evaluation, the
commitment, and the funding that they did. Senator Warner and I
have both had the opportunity to go out and see the reason that
it is necessary for us to update our 40-year-old Paladin
system, so it would at least be competitive.
General Shelton. Yes, sir. It represents a quantum leap in
capability.
Senator Inhofe. The modernization cuts proposed with the B-
2 include installation of the new satellite communication
system, Link-16. We have been talking about this for quite
sometime, and I understand that in this budget you are
proposing to cancel the $123 million in the B-2 modernization
funding. I was surprised when I saw this, after the performance
that we witnessed with this, and the criticism of not being
able to change missions en route during the Kosovo operation.
Am I accurate on what the budget has on this, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and can you tell me what the thinking was behind it
in terms of cutting the updating of the B-2?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would have to look back into that and
get back to you on that, unless, Dov, do you have that?
Dr. Zakheim. No. We need to look into it.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Well, perhaps it is not true, then. I
would certainly, again, like to have that answer for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

We are not proposing to cancel the B-2 Link-16 Program. We do have
an unfunded requirement of approximately $48 million that would
continue the development efforts that will provide battlefield
situational awareness for improved survivability and flexible
retargeting. It is my intention to fully fund this program in the
Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, thanks for your testimony. Let me say
first that I am pleased to see that the budget that you and the
President are offering us today, despite the fact that it is a
place-holder, does build on the bipartisan efforts in this
committee and Congress over the last year to regain real growth
in defense spending. This is the first time we have done this
since the mid-eighties, and I am pleased that this budget
includes an increase over last year.
Although we have not seen the details, and therefore it is
pretty hard to endorse them, I applaud the increase that you
are recommending and I will support it. In fact, in looking
over the material we have so far, I think the increase in
defense spending which the President and you are recommending
is actually too small to meet our national security needs.
While it does make much-needed progress in quality of life,
in compensation, and in restoring deteriorating infrastructure,
I do not think it meets the goals of bolstering readiness and
transforming military capabilities. Resources to support
OPTEMPO are flat or down in the categories you have shown us so
far, such as flying hours and tank training miles.
I think it was General Patton who once said, ``first-class
training is the best form of welfare for the troops,'' meaning
it is another aspect of quality of life. I think the budget, so
far, falls short there.
Also, after factoring in increases for the ballistic
missile defense, spending for research development, testing,
and evaluation appears to be no better than flat. Basic
research and advanced research, the source of the technology we
will need to transform the entire military, is flat. It is well
below the goal of 3 percent of the budget, which itself, I
think, is too low, and that is not consistent with your
transformation goals.
I am also very concerned that procurement spending in this
budget is not what it should be, even after accounting for
additions from transferring missile programs from the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office to the Services. Even if the QDR
concludes that we will not transform our force, which I hope it
does not, we nonetheless must modernize. One independent
analysis, one of many that have suggested this, was done by the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis headed by Dr.
Krepinevich, and concluded that modernizing the existing force
on the current schedule would require between $65 and $85
billion per year, or $5 to $20 billion more than is in this
year's procurement budget. Accelerating the schedule would
require $75 to $95 billion per year, or between $15 and $35
billion more than is in this year's budget. Even cutting the
current force and modernization programs could cost $65 billion
per year, which is $5 billion more than you have in this year's
budget.
The fact is that bold transformations, such as the one I
think you are hoping for and which I agree with, will add
substantially to those estimated cost increases. So as I said
at the outset, I endorse the defense increases that you
propose. I would personally support a larger increase, because
I believe that is necessary to keep the American military
dominant into this new century.
Let me ask you about two of the points that I have just
made. On procurement, do you agree that we need more, whether
for a transformed or modernized force, than the amount you have
requested for procurement?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The goal for procurement, as
you will recall, in recent years has been to get up to $60
billion. In 2001, with the supplemental, it will be $62
billion. In 2002, we are proposing $61.6 billion, so it is
quite close, but I agree with you that it is not at a level of
increase that would modernize the force.
In regards to OPTEMPO, it is a matter of choices. The Air
Force, for example, has an increase, whereas the Navy and
Marine Corps took a slight decrease, as they chose between
things with finite resources.
With respect to research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E), the number actually is up from $41 billion
to $47 billion, with some focus on transformational R&D,
countering unconventional threats to national security,
improving RDT&E test range infrastructure, reducing cost of
weapons and intelligence systems, and OPTEMPO. It is uneven.
The Army's flying hours, you are quite right, went down from
14.5 to 14. The Navy, on the other hand, went up from 17.8
hours for their tactical air forces to 22.6. The Air Force held
level at 17.1 in terms of flight hours.
The tank miles are different. They actually did go down, as
you suggested, from 800 to 730. The Army made those kind of
choices. The National Training Center stayed level at 97, and
the ship operations stayed exactly level at 15.5. So it's a
mixed bag, some up, some down, and some staying right where
they were on OPTEMPO.
Senator Lieberman. Let me address the first part of your
answer, if I may, Mr. Secretary. As I gather, you agree that in
the best of all worlds we should be spending more on
procurement. Did you request that through the budget process of
OMB?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We certainly presented to the Office of
Management and Budget and the President the budget that we felt
would be desirable for the Department. The process then is, as
you well know, for them to look at all their needs, social
security and various other things that are going on in the
government, and come to a conclusion. This is where we came
out. It is the largest increase since 1986, 7 percent in real
terms, as I understand it, and yet it is not sufficient to dig
us out of the hole that we have been digging ourselves into for
the past 5, 6, or 7 years.
Senator Lieberman. So, it is fair to presume, in the normal
course of the budgetary exercise, that you did not get
everything you wanted.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Seldom do.
Senator Lieberman. Therefore, there is some room for this
committee, hopefully, to make some independent judgments about
the budget.
I would just say briefly, in response to Mr. Chairman, on
the RDT&E, it is true that there has been a substantial
increase. However, as I look at it, most of it, not all of it,
is in the defense-wide area, which is mostly missile defense
and increases to the services. Except for the Navy and Marine
Corps, it is not great.
The one part I do want to focus on, and I hope the
committee can take a separate look at, is the science and
technology budget. The total for this year is $9 billion, and
you are recommending $8.8 billion. I don't think we are going
to be able to do what we need to do unless we are investing in
the technologies of the future.
I have gone over my time. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Lieberman, actually, on RDT&E,
the Army is up from 6.3 to 6.7 billion, the Navy is up from 9.4
to 11.1, Air Force is up from 14 to 14.3, and defense-wide is
11.3 to 15.3.
In regards to transformational R&D, there are any number of
items, including Global Hawk, Future Combat System,
digitization, joint tactical radio systems, and several others.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. General Shelton, well done, sir. Thank
you.
General Shelton. Thank you, sir.
Senator Roberts. At about 3:30, Mr. Chairman, I thought I
had arranged a B-1B flyover from McConnell Air Force Base----
[Laughter.]
--to fly about 30 feet over the Senate Office Buildings and
perhaps over the Pentagon.
That is a poor attempt at humor that perhaps Senator
Cleland would enjoy--a little black humor.
I am discouraged, I am frustrated, and I am angry, Mr.
Secretary. More to the point, the men and women of the 184th
Bomber Wing in Wichita, Kansas, at McConnell Air Force Base,
share my discouragement and my frustration. I do not know if
they are angry. They should be, and I will tell you why.
At our last hearing, I asked you to include Congress as you
go forward with your transformation. I believed your stated
resolute position to review transformation recommendations
carefully before decisions were made.
I was very disappointed--that is not strong enough. I will
not tell you how strong I felt on Tuesday when, without
discussion from Congress of any kind, no consultation, and from
my view, with little close review by senior leaders in the DOD,
the decisions to significantly reduce the B-1 bomber fleet and
take the B-1 bombers from Georgia, Idaho, and Kansas, and put
them in South Dakota and Texas was announced.
Dr. Zakheim, your able assistant there, told staffers that
evening that the way this was handled by the services was a
model of what DOD is trying to do to cut excess. I sure as heck
hope this is not a model on how you are going to consult with
Congress.
I have been quoted as stating that I thought that politics
may have played in the decision to place the B-1's in South
Dakota. Why would I say that? I do not think that this
Secretary is going to do that. I did not think anybody in the
Air Force would do that.
Well, I said it because I have here a political impact
statement from the United States Air Force, and it says here,
in regards to Texas, the home State of POTUS--I do not know of
any Senator named POTUS. [Laughter.]
I do know of a President by the name of Bush whose home
State is Texas. Then the political impact says, Senate Majority
Leader, home State of South Dakota.
It gets to Georgia, it gets to Idaho, and it gets to
Kansas, and you do not find any mention of Senator Cleland,
Senator Roberts, Senator Craig, or Senator Crapo. I do not know
what doofus over at the Air Force put this out, but if there is
a political impact, why he put it on a piece of paper is beyond
me.
I am angry because of the apparent piecemeal approach to
transformation that this represents lack of any coordination
with Members of Congress. Will other programs receive the same
consideration? Will the Senators from affected States and on
this committee find out one morning of the Navy's decision to
reduce or cut the DD-21, or the Army decides to cut the
Crusader? Maybe we are moving from 10 Army divisions to 8.
We cannot have a piecemeal approach to our transformation.
These actions to cut or reshape major weapons systems must be
part of an overall plan, and Congress must be included.
I am going to make every effort--you know this, we have
talked about it--to stop any movement of the B-1B aircraft
until I am confident, and Senator Cleland is confident, that
this decision fits into our national defense strategy, has had
the proper review, and every aspect of such a decision has been
considered. I will do the same for any decision on any major
weapons system if the proper reviews have not been made.
I would appreciate your comments, sir, on this recently
announced decision on the B-1 platform, including the time line
for such action and the choice for the locations of the
remaining B-1Bs. Please include how future weapons system
decisions will be coordinated with the Members of Congress.
You do not have to answer that right now. You have in your
possession somewhere in the Pentagon a letter sent to you by
myself, Senator Cleland, Senator Miller, Senator Brownback,
Senator Craig, Senator Crapo, and about eight or nine Members
of the House of Representatives.
We point out that you have correctly indicated that the
global environment will likely include limited access to
overseas bases and require a strategy dependent more on long-
range precision strike. That is correct. This is the primary
mission of the B-1 bomber. It is being plussed up in terms of
offensive capability, so that cannot be a consideration.
In terms of the strategic portion of this, I do not
understand it. In terms of the cost-benefit, I really do not
understand it. The Kansas Air National Guard has made a
historic mission-capable rate of an average 15 percent higher
than an active duty at 25 percent less cost per flying hour.
They do it better than any other outfit in the United States
from a cost-benefit standpoint, and that is not all.
We have a General Accounting Office (GAO) report--if I can
separate it from the other reports--which is approximately 1
year old, and basically says that we made a good decision in
turning over the B-1 to the Reserve and the Guard. It discusses
the exercises in Kosovo and Operation Desert Fox, which proved
the value of the B-1 as a solid long-range performer and
validated the CINC's option to provide combat punch without the
arduous basing problems that other short wing, short-range
weapons endure. That is a GAO report.
I have a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report saying
the same thing. General Shelton just said we have aging
aircraft--do not come around with that damn note [Laughter.]--
--
--under the B-52, the B-1, and the B-2, and we compare very
favorably, if not more favorably, to the B-52 and the B-2. Let
me quote Gen. John Michael Loh at a Pentagon press briefing. I
will just sum it up.
Throughout this test, we have proved the B-1 can pack up,
go anywhere in the world, and put bombs on target at the combat
readiness rates we need and expect. It is, and remains, the
backbone of our bomber fleet.
In response to our letter, you indicated that McConnell Air
Force Base loses all nine B-1s--no, you did not indicate that;
that was your original statement--and opens up 832 manpower
authorizations. I think there is 1,300, but if you say there is
832, that is better.
Then, the day after we raised a fuss and said that we lose
all nine B-1s, we were going to find new missions. These people
have 15 to 20 years of experience. They have flown in every
aircraft imaginable. I do not know what kind of a new mission
they are going to find in Wichita. I am for that. God, don't
take that away.
We want some answers. We want some answers on the strategic
side and on the cost-benefit side. Mr. Secretary, if this is
the way we are going to be consulted with in regards to
transformation--I thought we were going to have a situation
where we got well first, then consult with Congress for
transformation, and then go to the QDR. I think on a bipartisan
basis, everybody here would support that. This is not the way
that this should happen.
Now, I am way over time. If you would like to say something
I would like to invite your comments.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I would begin with a
very sincere apology to you and Senator Cleland. There is no
question that it was not handled well. The Air Force made this
recommendation and it was executed. Unfortunately, the
Secretary of the Air Force was out of the country, and the
handling of it was not well done. I apologize for it, and I do
not know what else I can say.
With respect to the details and specific questions you have
raised, we will certainly take the time and sit down and get
the specific answers and look at it in the context that you
requested.
Your general comment about how the weapons systems were
going to be handled is exactly correct. It is exactly what I
said when I was last before this committee. It is exactly how
it has happened, and the normal order of things is that these
issues are being addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
They will be addressed in an orderly way, in context with each
other.
Finally, with respect to how it is possible to consult,
what I suppose we could do--I have not really thought it
through as to exactly how we can consult with the House and the
Senate Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations
Committees who have the particular interest in these subjects.
But there is no reason at all that we cannot find periodic
break points in the QDR process and offer opportunities for
Senators and Members of the House to become aware of how the
progression is going.
At some point somebody is going to make a recommendation on
all of these weapons systems that are coming down the road, and
at the point that a recommendation is made, one would hope that
they would be looked at together, as you properly suggest is
the desirable way to do it.
Ultimately, a decision will get made, and someone is going
to like it, and someone is not going to like it. All I can do
is express the hope that when those decisions are made, we will
have looked at them in a manner that is satisfactory to the
Members in terms of the quality of the process, and that we
will have made, particularly members of this committee and the
House committee, knowledgeable about how that decision is
evolving and what the arguments are so people are not
blindsided badly, the way you and Senator Cleland have been.
Again, I apologize.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, I am here to say that the
emotion, the feeling, the rage expressed by my dear friend from
Kansas is bipartisan, deep, and profound. This decision on the
B-1 bomber and the way it was handled looks to me like a
mackerel in the moonlight. It both shines and stinks at the
same time. After all, it was the Reagan-Bush administration
that cranked up production of the B-1 bomber in the first
place, and after the Cold War was over, the country no longer
relied on the triad of missiles, submarines, and bombers to
retaliate in the case of nuclear attack.
Then President Bush, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell found a new role
for the B-1. It is as the Senator from Kansas suggested. It
would no longer be massed in the center of the country to
protect it from enemy attack and preserve precious minutes in
response time for take-off under a nuclear strike scenario. It
would be dispersed and given a conventional role of supporting
forces deployed around the globe. It would be dispersed west to
Kansas and Idaho for quick response to Pacific and Asian
theaters. It would be deployed east to Warner Robins Air Force
Base in Georgia for quick response to action in Europe, the
Middle East, and the Balkans.
Its dispersion meant a quicker response to a changing
global environment, and a reduced chance of a terrorist or
sabotage attack to knock out the force centered in one or two
sites. Although the B-1 bomber saw limited action in both
Desert Storm and the Balkan War, it still serves as the
Nation's only supersonic bomber capable of conventional and
unconventional missions.
Additionally, the decision by the Bush administration
committed the Air Force to build up extensive infrastructure to
support the B-1 bomber in its new dispersion plan. This was
offset, in one way, by letting the Air Guard maintain and
operate the bombers in two States: Kansas and Georgia. This
became a very effective means of accomplishing the B-1 bomber
task.
The two most cost-effective B-1 bomber wings in the world
are the two run by the Air Guards of Kansas and Georgia. As a
matter of fact, the GAO report the distinguished Senator from
Kansas referred to in 1998 says whether the Air Force chooses
among our options or develops options of its own, we believe
millions of dollars could be saved without reducing mission
capability by placing more B-1s in the Reserve component.
Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Air Force to prepare a plan to place more
B-1s in the Reserve component and seek congressional support
for the plan.
As the Senator from Kansas states, the National Guard B-1s
have a mission-capable rate higher than that of the active duty
Air Force. The Air National Guard B-1 units have a lower flying
hour cost than the active duty Air Force B-1s. At Warner Robins
in particular, $100 million was committed over a period of 10
years to bed down a B-1 bomber wing. Some $70 million has
already been spent in that effort. Recently, a $40 million
brand-new hangar was completed. Ironically, the two newest
facilities for the B-1 bomber and the two most cost-effective
facilities for operating a B-1 bomber wing are the very ones
you want to shut down.
I think this puts us back in the Cold War mode, puts us
back where we were before President Bush, Dick Cheney, and
Colin Powell made the decision to embark on the policy we have
lived with for a decade.
Now, walking away from $100 million in brand-new
infrastructure and cost-effective operations does not seem to
be a formula for saving money. I would like to know, and I
would like for you to explain to this panel, why did you go
against the GAO recommendation, and why did you make this
decision?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the decision was made by the
Air Force, and the logic of it is that they wanted to go from
93 B-1 bombers down to 60 B-1 bombers and change the basing
mode from five down to two to save funds. They wanted us to use
those savings to upgrade the remaining B-1 bombers.
It is an interesting footnote in history, I was the
Secretary of Defense in 1976 who first approved the B-1 bomber.
It was later canceled by the Carter administration, as I
recall, and then reinitiated in the Reagan period.
Senator Cleland. I will ask the GAO to take a new,
independent look at this decision, to give this Senator and
this committee an objective analysis of where we are with the
B-1 bomber program and the suggestions as to where we should
go. Any decision regarding the B-1 bomber program should
strengthen the security of the Nation, not weaken it, and I
will be going to Warner Robins tomorrow to see for myself what
the facts are.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland. Senator Warner
is yielding very graciously.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to first add my commendation to General Shelton for his
great service to the Nation.
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed. One would expect nothing less from a former
Brigade Commander in the 82nd Airborne Division.
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Reed. If I may, Mr. Secretary, let me follow up
with a line of questioning about national missile defense that
Senator Levin began.
My understanding of your response is that as we look
forward in this budget cycle, the Ballistic Missile Defense
Office will be involved in intensive, aggressive research
activities. If those activities present opportunities, those
opportunities will be exploited even if they violate the ABM
Treaty.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me clarify that. The President has
said that he does not want to simply give notice under the
treaty, which is permitted, a 6-month notice, and then go on
his way, apart from Russia. He has said he would much prefer,
and told President Putin this, that he would much prefer to
work with the Russians and see if they cannot come to some
understanding of a new framework with respect to the
relationship that goes beyond missile defense; one that
includes reductions in strategic offensive forces and looks at
proliferation and counterproliferation. That is his hope. That
is his intention.
He has also said that he intends to have a ballistic
missile defense capability for this country and for our
deployed forces overseas, and to the extent friends and allies
want to participate, fine.
The treaty is inconsistent with his goal of having the
ability to protect population centers and deployed forces.
Therefore, he has said he wants to set it aside, or get beyond
it, and establish some other framework. That process is
underway. It was started, as I said, with the President's
meeting with Mr. Putin. The two of them have agreed that the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense will meet. We are
supposed to begin that process of discussions at some point in
the period immediately ahead.
The President has also said that he does not intend to give
a veto to Russia over whether or not the United States has the
capability of defending its populations from ballistic
missiles, so I think the way to think of it is that the R&D
program is going forward. There is a compliance, the law
exists, the treaty exists, and the President does not intend to
violate the treaty. The President intends to set a process in
motion to discuss with the Russians how we get beyond it.
Now, clearly, if they are unwilling to do anything to get
beyond it, the President has indicated that therefore he would
very likely give notice to the Russians and allow the 6-month
period and go ahead and do the research and development that is
inhibited by the current treaty. But that is not his intention,
that is not his hope, and I must add, it is not his
expectation.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me turn to a
more specific issue with respect to this area of national
missile defense. There was a story today in the Wall Street
Journal that a contract has been prepared for the construction
of an interceptor site near Fort Greely, Alaska. Has this
contract in fact been prepared, and are you entering into
discussions with a contractor to construct a facility at Fort
Greely?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I saw the article and I asked about
that. My understanding of that situation is that there is a
contract that is in the process of being prepared. It does
involve Alaska. It involves site preparation, and to my
knowledge, it would not violate the treaty--correction, it
would not constitute an act that would be beyond the permitted
acts under the treaty, I am advised.
Senator Reed. This approach sounds similar to an option
that General Kadish briefed to the committee earlier this
month, to have up to 10 test missiles available for operational
deployment using an upgraded existing radar on Shemya Island in
Alaska. Does this budget contain funds to upgrade that radar or
to build the interceptor silos in Alaska, beyond the issue of
the contract preparations?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As I indicated to Senator Levin,
General Kadish, which was perfectly proper, briefed the
committee on his thinking prior to the time that he had firmed
up his research and development plans. Those plans have not
been firmed up as of this moment, nor have I been briefed on
them.
You are exactly right. In his set of options, one of them
involves the possibility of upgrading an existing radar in
Alaska and putting some number of interceptors in silos in
Alaska. To go back to Senator Levin's question, I am told by
the lawyers that there is a debate among the lawyers as to
whether, if you actually did those things, as opposed to just
site-clearing, whether or not that would constitute going
beyond what the treaty permits. There are lawyers on both
sides, and apparently, part of the issue involves intent.
If it is intended that it be a test bed, apparently more
lawyers than not believe that would not exceed the treaty. If
it is intended not to be a test bed but possibly a prototype of
some sort, then some more lawyers would switch over and say,
``well, maybe that might be.''
The problem is, I am not inclined to get into that
business. I am not a lawyer. Why does the United States want to
put itself in a position where someone can say, ``you violated
the treaty,'' or ``you did not violate the treaty,'' and one
lawyer argues with another lawyer? We want to get into the
discussions with the Russians, get the treaty straightened out,
and get a new framework that gets beyond that so this country
can go forward and do what the President has indicated he would
like to do.
Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I am particularly interested in your request
to raise the threshold for contracts subject to Davis-Bacon
wage requirements from $2,000 to $1 million. Your request
states this policy would lead to a savings of $190 million in
fiscal year 2002. I am concerned about the impact that your
proposal would have on local economies and businesses.
The question is, what assurances can you provide to
mitigate the negative impact this would have on Federal workers
and local economies? What steps would the Department take to
avoid the problems experienced by States who have repealed
prevailing wage laws, which include cost overruns and change
orders, to correct mistakes in poor workmanship?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I would like to ask Dr.
Zakheim, who has been working on this specific issue, to
respond to your question. Thank you.
Dr. Zakheim. Senator, the Davis-Bacon Act has been around
for quite some time. At the time it was enacted, $1 million was
an awful lot for a contract, I believe. We are now talking
about contracts much, much larger, and so a $1 million contract
today is really a relatively small contract. That is one point.
Second, the questions you raise are extremely to the point,
and there would certainly be efforts to mitigate the kinds of
impacts you are talking about. But clearly at the present a
$2,000 contract is not terribly much. Most contracts are well
above that, and effectively it means that in no circumstances,
barring very, very minimal ones, can the situation take place
where one pays non-union wages to non-union workers.
We are trying our best to find a variety of management
reforms. We know $190 million is a significant amount, and at
the same time, we take your concerns under advisement. There
are people looking at those.
Senator Akaka. General Shelton, I agree with your goals for
sustaining a quality force. I believe we need to address the
quality of life for our service members and their families to
increase pay, improve housing, reduce out-of-pocket expenses,
and improve health care for our military retirees. I share your
concerns regarding the deteriorating infrastructure and its
impact on readiness and the quality of life for service members
and their families. I support your efforts to address this
situation.
Given your identification of modernization as your biggest
priority, my question to you is, do you believe that the fiscal
year 2002 budget adequately addresses this issue?
General Shelton. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
support on those very key issues for all men and women in
uniform. I believe that the fiscal year 2002 budget is a very
prudent interim budget. It puts people first. It makes sure
that we have fully funded our current readiness, which is very
important. As I have said so many times before, when our Armed
Forces are needed, we do not have time to ask, ``Are you
ready?'' It is normally time to go.
The modernization and the recapitalization, as I indicated,
are still an issue. However, the QDR process right now is
addressing where we go in terms of capitalizing, modernizing,
and transforming. Out of that process now we should come out
with a blueprint, a road map for the way ahead, and see where
we are going to need the significant plus-ups in the
modernization and in the transformation accounts.
As indicated earlier by one of your distinguished
colleagues, the estimates on how much that would be are still
to be determined. I think out of the QDR we should have a
better figure for what that total amount is going to be, where
it should be applied. The estimates, of course, have ranged
from $50 to $100 billion. It is a wide range. I think the QDR
will help us to start focusing that effort and have it ready to
go in the 2003 budget.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
would like to note that General Shelton will be retiring in
September. I would like to express my gratitude for the
patriotism that you have shown, and for all you have done in
the interest of peace around the world. Certainly, the American
people owe you a great debt of gratitude, and I thank you very
much for that.
General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator. It has been
my honor.
At this point, I would like to offer my statement for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jean Carnahan
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wish to welcome Secretary Rumsfeld,
General Shelton, and Dr. Zakheim. I am very pleased that this committee
will begin considering 2002 Defense Authorization and engage our
Pentagon leadership in a substantive dialogue about the defense budget.
I am dedicated to providing a strong national defense and intend to
do what is necessary to ensure we have the best equipped and best
prepared fighting force in the world.
To begin with, we need to develop a suitable framework for
responding to emerging threats around the globe. We need to develop a
force structure that shifts our current focus on Cold War areas of
concern to 21st century dangers emanating from Central and East Asia.
In addition, we must be prepared to confront assymetric threats from
rogue nations and terrorist organizations. To meet the challenges of
the future, we need to expand our capabilities in cyber-warfare, rapid
reaction tactics, and early warning intelligence. Achieving these goals
will require sizable investments in several areas, including airlift
assets, research and development of new technologies, and expansion of
our modern long range bomber fleet.
But above all else, it is essential that we take care of the most
important resources in our arsenal--our men and women in uniform. This
year, I hope that the Department of Defense takes special care to
ensure that the 2002 defense budget addresses critical shortfalls in
personnel's quality of life--this means long overdue investments in
housing units, health care facilities, and education benefits that are
so crucial to the retention of our service men and women and their
families.
It will be a difficult task to meet our pressing needs within the
confines of the Budget Resolution, but I have great confidence in the
leadership of Senators Levin and Warner and look forward to working
closely with them as well as with Secretary Rumsfeld and the Pentagon
leadership.

Senator Carnahan. I would like to now address a question to
General Shelton. In your remarks you emphasize key advancements
in our military health care system. I agree with your statement
that our commitment to health care must extend to personnel and
families of retirees. I supported last year's initiative and
hope we can continue developing these programs.
In addition, I hope that this committee, as well as the
Pentagon, will evaluate our commitment to this component of our
Armed Services. Indeed, we have increasingly come to depend on
our Reserve components in almost every major deployment abroad.
As a result of the post-Cold War downsizing, we have now
maintained fewer active forces in our military, while we
continue to expand our commitments around the world. Would you
describe the expansion of our Reserve component's role in the
total force since the Gulf War ended in 1991?
General Shelton. Senator, our use of our Reserve
components, and I might say great Reserve components, because
they do yeoman's work day-in and day-out around the world, both
the National Guard as well as the Reserve Forces, has become
quite extensive. In fact, I was just in the Balkans this last
month, and every time I go I am reminded, whether it is in
Operation Southern Watch at Prince Sultan Air Base, or Northern
Watch at Incirlik Air Base, wherever I go, the Reserve
components are a key part of the force.
I want to say that roughly a third of those at any given
point in the Balkans come out of the Reserve components, and so
we have been demanding a lot of them. In some cases, in our
civil affairs, the percentage of our force that is actually in
the Reserve components, which we use civil affairs an awful
lot, is 96 percent. In psychological operations it's about 67
percent, and so we are forced to go to the Reserves a lot,
given the types of operations, particularly the long-term
commitments that we have, like in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the
Sinai, to a great degree. That has been a concern.
I have discussed that with the Chiefs of our Reserves, and
the National Guard. They have some concerns about it, although
they do not think that we are in a crisis yet. But certainly as
a part of the Quadrennial Defense Review that has got to be
something that we do address and plan to address as a part of
the look at the total force, and whether or not we have the mix
right in the Guard and the Reserve.
Senator Carnahan. Does the Department of Defense plan to
address health care and other benefits for reservists in
recognition of their increased contribution to the defense of
our Nation?
General Shelton. Senator, I will have to take a look at
that. I do not recall specifically if that was a part of our
terms of reference for the QDR or not, but we will look at that
and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Quadrennial Defense Review process addresses health care and
other benefits and was released by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense September 2001.

On health care, I want to once again thank the members of
this committee for the great support given to our men and women
in uniform, as well as our retirees. You made it happen, and it
is reflected in everything that I see now in terms of morale,
attitude, and recognition and appreciation of their great
efforts.
There is still a concern, as we look at health care, that
it is an entitlement that competes with ammunition, planes, and
ships. We need to try to figure out a way to get that out of
the O&M account and into a category of funding that recognizes
it for what it is: a must-pay that we pay up front and do not
put in the same category with precision munitions.
Senator Carnahan. One other question. In your last
appearance before this committee, you and the secretary
emphasized emerging threats posed by chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons around the globe.
I believe, as you do, that these threats remain imminent.
Even as we plan a long-term strategy for dealing with weapons
of mass destruction, it is essential that our troops remain
sufficiently protected from chemical/biological agents. I hope
that the fiscal year 2002 defense budget will sufficiently
equip our troops with adequate protection to deploy in a
contaminated environment. Has the Pentagon sought to modernize
its defense against chemical and biological agents in the
short-term?
General Shelton. Senator, the answer is yes. In the short-
term, and certainly as part of our long-term analysis and
strategy, that is a growing threat which we know we have to
deal with. We have programs and plans in place to do exactly
that.
We have made some, I think, relatively quantum leaps in the
area of detection, such as our ability to determine what type
of agent it is at greater distances than when you are actually
exposed to it. But that is an area we need to continue to
press, because obviously it is one of those asymmetrical
threats that we have to be very concerned about, and that will
be reflected in the priorities of our programs.
Senator Carnahan. You have also testified before this
committee to illustrate the fact that chemical and biological
agents pose a more imminent threat than most other types of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks. Do you anticipate
substantial increases in long-term investments in chemical/
biological defenses equivalent to other investments in WMD
defense?
General Shelton. I will respond for the record for that,
because I need to go back and look at it in terms of the nature
of your question. Certainly, those are programs that we have to
have funded. They are very important programs. In terms of the
percentage of increase relative to the others, I will have to
go back and check the figures on that, and I will respond to
you in writing.
[The information referred to follows:]

Our troops are equipped with the most modern defense equipment
capable of providing more than adequate protection against traditional
chemical and biological warfare agent attacks. The President's budget
will provide improved chemical point and standoff detection
capabilities, and continue research to improve protective ensembles and
masks, medical, chemical, and biological countermeasures, and
decontamination technologies. Always cognizant of emerging chemical and
biological warfare threats, we continue to modernize and upgrade our
equipment to maintain the highest standards of protection and to meet
the challenge of future military operations. The DOD Chemical and
Biological Defense Program is committed to maintaining the proper
balance between the fielding of state-of-the-art equipment and
continued investments in science and technology programs. The ongoing
QDR is assessing our future requirements for countering nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and means of delivery to include
passive defense capabilities, both for military operations overseas and
in support of civil authorities.

Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
General Shelton. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Bill Nelson. According to the list
that I have, Senator Bill Nelson is ahead of Senator Ben
Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Just on this. [Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. I will hold my tongue.
It is kind of interesting; two Nelsons, both freshmen, both
Democrats, both former insurance commissioners. He likes to
think he is from the State with the football team, but I
reminded him that Florida has six professional football teams.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. I think we are not going to go there.
Senator Bill Nelson. Not only in the NFL, but also the
Gators, the Seminoles, and the Hurricanes.
Mr. Secretary, I said to you a couple of days ago that you
have a tough job. I think you are doing a good job,
notwithstanding the anger of Senators Roberts and Cleland,
which is quite understandable. I think you are trying to get
your arms around a behemoth and bring some rationality to it,
and redirect our force structure to meet the challenges for the
future. I want to commend you for that, as I said a few days
ago.
I would like to discuss what we explored the other day, but
with a slightly different angle. I notice that Senator Stevens
has inserted this in the supplemental appropriation which we
will be voting on probably tomorrow: ``notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may retain all
or a portion of Fort Greely, Alaska, as the Secretary deems
necessary, to meet military operational, logistics, and
personnel support requirements for missile defense.''
My question is, picking up on what we had discussed the
other day, how can you start to deploy something that has not
been developed? You and I discussed that we want to continue
robust R&D, and then you go about testing, but you cannot
deploy something that is not developed.
There are certain lead times that you need, obviously, in
preparation of ground and so forth, but then you get to a point
that you have to start building silos. I would like your
comment in light of the fact that it is a generally accepted
principle in the Nation's defense that you cannot deploy
something that is not developed.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. First let me say that I am
not familiar with the language that you mentioned that may be
in the supplemental. I can comment on the remainder of your
question.
To test something, you frequently need to do something in
the ground, and the single missile defense activity that was
the furthest along was the one that the Clinton administration
had planned to go forward with in Alaska. That concept was to
have a radar and have some interceptors in the ground, in
silos, in Alaska. That particular model was the one they were
working on, to the exclusion of things that might, at some
point, lead to a breach with respect to the treaty.
You are correct that lead times become quite important.
Apparently, in that part of Alaska there are 2 or 3 months, at
the most, when you can do any kind of construction. It is not a
friendly, hospitable environment for construction. The site
preparation and the shipment of materials has to go up and be
there during that brief period when the weather permits it.
Second, they have to go up there, I think, a year in
advance so that they are there when the actual time when
something is permitted.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. All of that is
understandable, Mr. Secretary, but let's get on to the
question, are the interceptors, in fact, developed?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision to do what you are
describing has not been made. There has not been a decision
made to deploy in Alaska. Indeed, I do not even know if the
decision had been made in the previous administration, although
it might have been. Someone here can correct me on this, but
the intention in the previous administration, or the track they
were on, was to, in March or April, I believe, ship up to
Alaska the materials they would need for the radar and possibly
also for some of the interceptor silos. They would not have
done that had they not believed that by the time they were able
to do that the interceptors and the radar would be available.
The purpose of doing it in the prior administration I
cannot speak to, whether it was a deployment or not. The
purpose of doing what they are doing now is something that
General Kadish is currently considering. That is to say,
whether or not it would be a test bed or a prototype.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk about those interceptors
being developed. The theory, you said, is that they would be
developed, and therefore be able to be deployed. Do we have any
evidence in any of our R&D and testing now that that kind of
interceptor would, in fact, work?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The purpose of, of course, a test bed
would be to experiment to see to what extent it would work. My
recollection of that particular interceptor is that they do, in
fact, have something that is in track that could be used,
although there is also, as I recall, an intention to upgrade
it. Do you recall, General?
General Shelton. Sir, you have described it exactly right.
It is still being tested. It has worked. However, it still
needs additional testing, additional work, and there are more
tests scheduled in the next few years.
Senator Bill Nelson. Where is it being tested, General?
General Shelton. It is part of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization (BMDO) testing. Specifically where the
test sites are we will have to provide for the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. This is not part of the test on the
kinetic energy, the one that is launched from California or
Kwajalein?
General Shelton. We will provide you an answer for the
record, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]

In response to your questions about testing, we currently use the
range between Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) in California (for
launching targets) and the Reagan Test Site (RTS) in the Marshall
Islands (for launching interceptors) and it has been useful for
developmental testing. However, the range lacks the required realism
for tests of BMDS interceptors and sensors. Flight test restrictions on
trajectories, impact areas, and debris in space are among the
challenges facing the former ``National Missile Defense'' program, now
called the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
To increase the operational realism of GMD testing, proposals are
being considered to expand our test infrastructure to include
additional test assets and additional intercept areas. Because this
expansion is still being analyzed, MDA has not yet determined the
activities and locations that will be used. The proposals include
making use of early warning radars on the west coast and using both the
Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska and VAFB to launch targets. The Kodiak
Launch Complex may be upgraded to launch single or dual interceptors.
Currently RTS can launch a single interceptor and may be upgraded for
dual interceptor launches.

Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you obviously see where
I am going. We have all this discussion and hand wringing about
breaking the ABM Treaty or maybe not breaking it because it is
a test and so forth. But I think it gets back to a basic
question of physics, that you have to develop something before
you can deploy it. This Senator has not seen that we are at
that point which ought to justify Senator Stevens inserting
this language in the supplemental appropriations bill. Mr.
Chairman, I am going to continue to poke and probe, and
General, I would appreciate it if you would furnish that
information to me, not only about this specific test that might
be applicable to a site in Alaska, but all other tests as well.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, just very briefly, I think you
made the comment that you are concerned about deployment. There
is not a plan to deploy ballistic missile defense at the
present time, and so I do not know quite where you are going
with respect to that; there will have to be testing done, there
is testing being done, and there will prospectively, depending
on which of the R&D programs involved. But there has not been a
decision made to deploy for the purposes of putting in place a
system under the theory that it is developed and ready to go.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, when I start reading
language like this, that I am going to vote on tomorrow, I
start getting concerned. If we are not going down the road in
somebody's mind in your shop about deployment, and if it is
only testing, why is it being considered in that location for
the testing?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is the location it has been
considered for from the very beginning of that particular R&D
project that began back in the prior administration.
Senator Bill Nelson. My response to that would be, why
there? Why not continue the testing at the present location?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The reason there is because of the
decision that was made with respect to where a potential threat
from North Korea might be.
Senator Bill Nelson. That starts to sound like deployment
to me.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, all I can say is what I have
said. Neither General Kadish, nor I, nor anyone I know in the
Pentagon thinks they know enough at this time to deploy. I will
say that the technology has been tested and in some instances
proven very effective. The Arrow system that the Israelis have
been working on suggests that the physics are workable, and
that they are able to do the things that the Ballistic Missile
Defense Office has been working on and believes is possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to continuing this.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, and thank you for pressing these
points. They are very significant ones.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want
to thank and congratulate General Shelton on a job well done. I
appreciate all your courtesies and the opportunities we have
had to get together and your support for our national defense.
You are certainly to be thanked and congratulated.
General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I have not seen my
colleague from Kansas so angry since Nebraska beat Kansas State
in football. Nevertheless, I would like to continue the
discussion that my colleague from Florida has raised about the
difference between development and deployment.
Obviously, there is some difference, or at least I hope
there is some difference. Is there a bright line between
development and deployment? At what point will a decision be
made on deployment, away from development? Will we be
surprised, as the trimming of the B-1 bombers surprised us? Is
this something that is going to happen incrementally, or will
it happen suddenly?
I think that gets to the heart of what my colleague is
trying to probe and explore here, and I feel the same way. I do
not want to suddenly realize that I voted on something in an
appropriations bill that constitutes deployment and not be
aware that that is the decision that I made.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I just cannot imagine
something happening suddenly in government.
Senator Ben Nelson. I would agree with you on that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The situation is that the members of
the committee can get briefed on the progress in the ballistic
missile defense activities any time they want. They have been
briefed on a regular basis, as interested. It is impossible to
know how any R&D program is going to evolve at any given time.
You cannot know it in pharmaceutical research and you cannot
know it in ballistic missile defense research. That is why you
do the research, because you do not know exactly how it is
going to evolve.
Within the Department of Defense there are technical
meanings for the words, and there are definitions of what each
stage of a process is supposed to mean. The problem with them
is that--I am trying to think of a case that could concern you.
Let me see if I can fashion one.
General Shelton can tell you one from the Gulf War, where a
project, an activity that was purely in the development stage,
was in R&D and it was being tested but it had not been fully
developed and it was not ready to go. It had not been deployed,
and suddenly we were in a conflict. Because we had this testing
capability, it was heaved into the war and used very
effectively.
General Shelton. A couple come to mind, including the
Patriot missile system, which still had testing ongoing, and
actually improved the capabilities while we were in the 6-month
pre-deployment phase, or pre-Desert Storm phase. Another was
the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
which was still being tested and developed, and proved to be
very effective.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The reason I mentioned that is because
I wouldn't want someone to come back to me and say, ``goodness,
back in June of 2001 you said we would not be surprised,''
because it is conceivable that something like that could
happen. A system that was under development could be heaved
into a conflict because the need was there, and the value was
there. It might or might not work, because it had not been
fully developed.
I do not want to get nailed down too tight on it, but
certainly anything that anyone could conceive of that would be
considered deployment would be something that would be rather
well understood by this committee and by us.
Senator Ben Nelson. So there will most likely be a
difference between deployment and a decision to deploy, and we
will know the difference?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absent some unusual event like this.
Senator Ben Nelson. Absent a conflict?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. The missile defense system probably
would not fit into the same--except for theater-type weapons,
although that line blurred on us recently as well. But
generally, what you are saying is, we will not end up being
surprised that we made a decision to deploy in a budgetary
context that we did not have the opportunity to visit with you
about.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is for sure.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
consent that I be allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.
Chairman Levin. No objection.
Senator Bill Nelson. JSTARS was developed in my home town
of Melbourne, Florida. It continues to be located there. This
Senator and a Member of the House helped get the initial
appropriations for JSTARS. It indeed was one of the stars of
the Gulf War, and it deployed to the Gulf War from my home town
with a group of civilians.
But that is not an equal comparison to what Senator Nelson
was speaking about. In that case, we were in the midst of a
conflict. In this case, we are talking about a whole new system
of strategic importance that involves applicable treaties, and
I think that we need to make that distinction, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I quite agree. I was not suggesting it
was on all fours with that.
As General Shelton just reminded me, Alaska was supposed to
be the first deployment site by the Clinton administration
because of the North Korea issue. That construction had to
start this year in March, the shipments had to start this year
in March to meet the, he thinks, 2005 date for actual
effectiveness and deployment, because of short construction
periods.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank
you again for accommodating our side in the course of the
afternoon here, and I appreciate your courtesies.
I would just say to our two new members who are preparing
to depart, I can assure you that we will not, as a Nation, get
to the point of deploying anything before such time as our
President has resolved one way or another these treaty issues
with Russia. So sleep well, and we are going to be all right.
But I also say, if someone were to have an accidental firing or
a rogue firing of a missile, I do not know who might be
President, but I hope he would bring together everything we
have to stop and blunt the next one that might come this way.
We have a good system of government, and it will respond well
in time of need.
Gentlemen, I am going to go to some broad questions here
which we would normally reserve for the posture hearing. It is
a great credit to you, Mr. Secretary, to General Shelton, and
to Dr. Zakheim, that three-quarters of the members of this
committee attended this hearing today. It is a day when we have
some of the most intense activity going on on the Senate floor
including party caucuses.
I want to go back, Mr. Secretary, to the years when I was
privileged to be chairman, and we were endeavoring in a
bipartisan way to try and address readiness in particular. We
turned to the service chiefs, and they came before this
committee, as General Shelton well knows, for two successive
fiscal years and told us of their professional opinion. That is
clearly established by this committee as a duty owing to the
committee and, indeed, to Congress at the time they are
confirmed. Each service chief, as part of the record, rendered
a professional opinion that we, the United States, should be
spending greater sums on our defense. Largely at the initiative
of this committee, joined by the balance of Congress, we were
able the last 2 fiscal years to begin to turn around the
declining defense budgets.
General Shelton, I want to pay a special tribute to you,
because you led that effort in many respects, and the other
Chiefs joined in that effort. I happen to know, Mr. Secretary,
that you strenuously tried to get dollars for the 2001-2002
budget in excess of what has been announced by our President.
Because you value the consultation and confidence of sharing
your views with your President, I will not ask you to comment
on that. But I know as a fact, and this record should reflect
it, that you worked arduously with the Office of Management and
Budget to get a higher figure for 2001 and 2002.
But we are where we are. We are going to have to do our
best, but I am going to recommend to our chairman, he will
probably do it on his own initiative, that in due course we
have the service chiefs up to address what Senator Lieberman
said. It was his judgment. This is a bipartisan thing, not
partisan in any way. We are still short, and we will ask the
chiefs for the marginal differences between what appears to be
coming along in 2001 and what they need. In 2002 there is some
certainty as to how these Budget Committees are going to deal
with the 18-and-a-fraction billion.
I am optimistic, but until such time as that gavel falls in
those committees and the Senate acts, there is going to be some
doubt. General Shelton, my record shows that last year the
military services indicated that they wanted a $48 to $58
billion funding increase per year over the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) as it existed then, if the Department is to
restore readiness and modernize for the future.
I think we have to recognize that readiness is a crisis
across the board in our military, and I do not use that word
ill-advisedly. You cannot comment, nor should you, on higher
figures that you have requested, but clearly if the Chiefs were
correct last year, and I will pass this question momentarily to
the General, there is a shortfall. How is that going to impact
on your prime responsibility to deploy our troops when
necessary?
I know there is some expectation that we are going to
reduce the level of deployments, but I think you should address
what clearly is a shortfall in the 2001 and 2002 budgets, and
how that is going to impact your ability as advisor to the
President of the United States with regard to our deployments
and other things of high priority to our military.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Warner, first let me say that
the military leadership has been deeply involved in the budget
preparation and where we are, not in the total amount, that is
for the President and the Office of Management Budget. But
certainly with respect to the allocation, I would say that
readiness did get a priority, people did get a priority, and
where the balancing came out somewhat shorter was with respect
to procurement and investing for the future.
Second, I know that the Chiefs will speak their mind, and I
want them to. I would say this, however: the readiness issue
has to be disaggregated. There is readiness with respect to
various types of training. There is readiness with respect to
the facilities, and they get ratings as well. There is
readiness for the forces that are on the leading edge and have
to be ready to go, and there is readiness levels for the forces
that have just returned from being on the leading edge and are
in a down period. The other way I think we have to disaggregate
it is this, readiness for what?
If the Third Infantry Division is told by the President and
Congress, go to Bosnia, and they are doing a great job, and
they are ready for that, but their other job is to be ready for
a major regional conflict, because they are in Bosnia doing
what they have been asked to do and are ready to do, they end
up with 28 days training instead of 29 days training, and
therefore their readiness level drops.
So if you are asking organizations to do several things,
and your readiness standards do not reflect that, they reflect
only the one major assignment, then it leaves an impression, it
seems to me, that is imperfect, and I am asked, and I think it
will be done in the quadrennial review process, that we give
consideration to that issue that I have just raised.
Senator Warner. Let us turn to modernization, because that
impinges on readiness. I recognize that you have been under a
battering ram today on shipbuilding, and I join in that
battering for reasons that are clear, but let us recognize that
we need to modernize, and we are, in my judgment, right up at
the top level of what we can obtain by way of military spending
in 2001 and 2002.
Where are we going to give in this system? Should we
diminish the size of our end-strength? Should we make a
decision that we are going to have less deployments? Where are
we going to develop the cash that is necessary to go to
modernization?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The risks that we, the Chiefs, the
Chairman, myself, the Under Secretaries and the Secretaries of
the services considered, in terms of reference for the
Quadrennial Defense Review, were really four. One was the risk
about the people. If you do not invest in the people, the
heart, then the total capability of the U.S. Armed Forces
decays.
Senator Warner. I agree.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a risk that tended not to get
elevated with the risks of not being able to meet your
strategy, for example, the operations risks of meeting a war
plan. Can you meet the requirement? Do you have the
requirements? Are the requirements right? Can you have the
capabilities to fulfill those requirements so you can fulfill
your war plan?
A third risk, which is difficult because it is apples and
oranges, is that you have to get up on the table and balance
the question of modernization. What do you do about your legacy
force, your current force? How do you keep bringing in
additional capabilities as you are going along, somewhat
better, but of a kind, so that the aircraft age does not get up
to the point where the budget is getting destroyed with repair
cost and the shipbuilding number does not go all the way down?
The fourth risk was not taking into account that we are in
a period of time when technologies are changing. The world is
changed, and we need to not just modernize, but transform. We
need to invest sufficiently in research and development, S&T,
and new capabilities, new systems in intelligence, and in space
capabilities, so that we have the ability to deal with the
kinds of threats we are likely to face in the period ahead.
If you take all those risks and try to compare them against
each other and weigh them against each other, it is an
enormously difficult, complex task, and you are right,
something has to give. We need savings out of the Department,
and at the present time the Department is wrapped around its
anchor chain. We simply are so tied up in rules and
requirements and stipulations and prohibitions that it is very
difficult to manage. There are not many incentives to save any
money in the Department.
A captain of a base goes out there, and at the end of a
quarter he knows that if he does not spend that money, he is
not going to get it the next year, and so the incentive to save
is not there. It is not intuitive, but that is what is
happening. We have to find ways to fix the financial systems we
talked about. The acquisition system is not working right. It
is perfectly possible to save money in the Department if we
could be freed up to do it.
Senator Warner. I am going to let you a little bit off the
hook. You have just beautifully restated my whole question, and
I am not sure I got clearly the answer where the money is
coming from. You may be able to bring in some savings through
incentives and a few other things, but I am talking about major
dollars for shipbuilding, aircraft, and the transformation of
the Army with new equipment. Those are significant dollars, and
somewhere, somehow, your Department, this committee, and the
House Armed Services Committee have to work to solve that
problem.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir, let me just go directly to
it. There are three ways the money is going to come, and
probably it will take, I am afraid to say, most of them. The
first way is through savings. We have to do a better job, and I
believe we can.
A second way is for something to give among those four
risks. We have to make tradeoffs, just like any business does,
just like any family does. We have to look at it and say, how
much are we willing to give up today in exchange for investing
in the future? Are we willing to give up on the people in
exchange for operational capabilities? I think not.
Senator Warner. No.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think we have to keep the people.
Senator Warner. I agree that is not on the table.
Secretary Rumsfeld. A third way, the way it normally
happens in our country, let us be honest, is that there is a
crisis, a conflict, a major new threat is suddenly on us: North
Korea invades South Korea. What did we do? We said we could not
afford an $18 billion budget when it was a $15 billion budget.
Omar Bradley was asking for $18 billion, they said they could
not afford it, and the next thing you knew we had a $48 billion
budget. We could afford it just fine because we were in a war.
Unfortunately, there is a natural tendency on the part of
people to not recognize how critically important to prosperity
and peace in this world the United States Armed Forces are.
They underpin that prosperity and that peace. We are down to 3
percent of gross national product going to defense. If there
were a crisis, we would be right up to 8 or 10 in a minute, and
we could afford it just fine. The key is to invest what we need
to invest, and manage it in a sufficiently sensible cost-
effective way so that we do not get in a crisis because the
deterrent is sufficiently strong and healthy that we can
dissuade people from doing things that upset stability.
Senator Warner. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Shelton, last year the Chiefs testified that there
are $48 to $58 billion additional dollars needed in the FYDP if
the Department is to restore readiness and modernization for
the future. You recognize there is a shortfall no matter how
valiant the Secretary's efforts were to get the 2001 budget
augmented, and a very significant figure, in a way, for 2002.
We are still short, are we not?
General Shelton. Senator Warner, I do not think there is
any question, this is a budget that does put people first. It
keeps the emphasis on the quality of the great force we have
and it fully funds the current readiness for this year,
something that we are concerned about. If we get called upon
today we want to be ready to go, and the budget has $18 billion
plus-up in the current readiness account.
Of course, that also takes into consideration the fact that
we have old equipment that is costing more to operate, due to
the cost of fuel and other factors. That eats up a lot, but it
ensures that we do not have to come back for a supplemental in
the middle of the year in 2002, assuming that we do not have
some other type of disaster for which we have to use our
forces.
The challenge remains, as I said earlier, with
recapitalization and modernization. There again, we have the
QDR. It is a chance to take a look at our force structure,
decide where we need to recapitalize and where we really need
to really put the money in order to modernize. I do not think
there is any question, when you come out on the other end, that
it is going to require additional funds in the outyears,
starting in the 2003 budget and going beyond. We have all seen
the figures that have come from various studies.
That is, of course, based on today's national security
strategy. It is based on today's force structure, and it is
said that basically somewhere between $30 and $50 billion will
be required.
Senator Warner. So in your judgment, is that over and above
the current FYDP levels?
General Shelton. Over and above the 2002 FYDP level as we
look out to the future for recapitalization and modernization.
Senator Warner. So that is $50 billion over the 6-year
program?
General Shelton. Sir, the estimates range from $30 to $50
billion per year above currently programmed levels. I think
when we come out of the QDR, the Secretary and myself will have
a better feel for what the exact number will be, based on the
strategy and on the force structure to support that strategy.
But I would like to underscore something the Secretary
said. We are a global power. We are the only one in the world,
and sometimes that gets to be lonely, but we have worldwide
responsibilities. It is the great strength of America, and the
men and women in uniform that are out there daily, carrying out
protecting our national interest, help provide for the peace
and prosperity that we have today. It is quite an investment, 3
cents on the dollar. That is what our Armed Forces provide for
us today.
Ultimately, if we want to continue to enjoy peace and
prosperity, be recognized as a leading power in the world, and
provide for the peace and stability for the rest of the world,
which also helps our own prosperity, we have to make an
investment in that force. That may mean that 3 cents on the
dollar will not be sufficient in order to modernize this great
force we have and keep leading technology in the hands of the
greatest force in the world.
Senator Warner. I thank the chairman. I thank you very
much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. I want to return
to the subject that I started relative to the ballistic missile
defense.
Two of our colleagues here today from Kansas and Georgia
expressed very appropriately their frustration in terms of
consultation and, as far as I am concerned, your response was
appropriate as their feelings.
General Kadish came before us and said that he has
completed his review and that his recommendations had not yet
been reviewed by you. Nonetheless, his completed review was
briefed to us. In that completed review, he said that all the
R&D programs which he had laid out for the year 2002 in no case
bumped up against the ABM Treaty.
I asked you today, do you disagree with his brief in that
regard. Your answer was, it seems to me that you had not been
briefed on it yet by General Kadish, which is fair enough, if
that is accurate. I do not have any problem with that. If that
is the situation, that is the situation. But you do not have
any basis, then, to disagree with his conclusion, which we, it
seems to me, have a right to rely on at least in terms of the
head of the BMDO saying that it is his conclusion and his
review that none of the research and development in his plan
for the year 2002 would violate the ABM Treaty. So do you have
any basis to disagree with his conclusion?
I am not talking about what it evolves into in future
years, if you use the word evolve. I am talking about 2002
budget dollars that you are asking us for.
You may want to keep the Russians guessing as to whether or
not you pull out of the ABM Treaty, but we have a greater
responsibility than that in terms of our dollars. We just have
to know, are there any dollars in this budget request for
research and development that violate the ABM Treaty, or any of
these projected programs?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, General Kadish is a fine
officer. He was requested to come up and brief, and he did.
Chairman Levin. By whom?
Senator Warner. I think I was responsible.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not recall.
Chairman Levin. I think you offered him, by the way, and
that is fine.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am delighted he did, and he knows
what he is talking about, and at the moment he came up here he
had a budget figure in mind, and he briefed a presentation
which he tells me now the budget has been reduced on. I could
be wrong on this.
Chairman Levin. There were no budget figures that he
briefed us on, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not say he did brief you on
budget figures. I said his program was based on a budget in his
thinking that he was planning his program on, and that budget,
he tells me yesterday, has been adjusted.
Chairman Levin. Which way?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Down.
Chairman Levin. Which means there is even less money than
he presumably thought he had for 2002.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, that is correct.
Chairman Levin. There is even less money.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Even less money, exactly.
Now, the next thing I would say is, I would repeat, he is a
very fine officer. He is not a lawyer, and he is not the
compliance officer, so he is not the person, in my personal
view, to be advising the committee as to whether or not he
thinks something he is doing conceivably could end up violating
the treaty.
Chairman Levin. End up in 2002? This is very important. You
are asking us for budget dollars in 2002.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
Chairman Levin. We have to know, are any of those budget
dollars going to violate the treaty? It is a fairly direct
question. Are they, or not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have said, not to my knowledge. I am
a conservative person. It is conceivable that there are
lawyers--indeed, there was one in the room yesterday who has
different views from others, so it is--first of all, a treaty
depends on historic practice, it depends on interpretations, it
depends upon debatable legal concepts, and for me to sit here
and tell a committee of the United States Senate that I, Don
Rumsfeld, a nonlawyer, am telling you that I understand every
conceivable thing that an R&D program could conceivably do, and
that I can assure you that no lawyers are going to tell you
that it might be in violation of something, I am not going to
do it.
Chairman Levin. You have not been asked to do it.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will not do it.
Chairman Levin. You have not been asked to.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Good, because I cannot.
Chairman Levin. By the way, General Kadish did consult with
lawyers. He is not a lawyer.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course he did.
Chairman Levin. He got legal advice.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course he did.
Chairman Levin. He gave us his conclusion, not based on
legal advice, but on the advice of his compliance office and
his lawyers.
Your words that you just gave us, however, not to your
knowledge, are the clearest indication that in your judgment
there is nothing in the 2002 R&D budget for ballistic missile
defense, in your judgment, that violates the ABM Treaty. Do I
read you correctly? Have you reached a judgment or not?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have. Let me respond, and see if I
can do it in a way that will add clarity to this.
The first thing I would say is that the administration has
no plans to do anything to violate the Treaty. Now, I do not
know how I could be any clearer on that.
Chairman Levin. That is fine.
Secretary Rumsfeld. What the President intends to do is to
have General Kadish proceed with a research and development
program. One or more of the activities may, eventually will,
the Good Lord willing, run up against the treaty and be a
violation.
Chairman Levin. But not in 2002.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Before that happens, we would be told,
and we would have been in discussions with the Russians, and we
fully intend that we would have fashioned some sort of a
framework to move beyond the treaty.
Now, the reason I am being very careful in what I say is
because I am a conservative person. If you went ahead in
Alaska----
Chairman Levin. Is there money for that in Alaska, in this
budget?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The budget has not been finalized
because I have not been briefed on the R&D program under the
new numbers of dollars.
Chairman Levin. It has been submitted to us.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I know, but you are talking about money
for a program. There is money in the 2002 budget amendment for
an R&D program for missile defense. The missile defense program
itself, that General Kadish is working on, has not been
finalized because we just got the number from the budget
bureau, the Office of Management and Budget, and he just got a
reduced number. He will then fashion that specific program and
make a recommendation.
Chairman Levin. To you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. To me, exactly.
Chairman Levin. Then when will we get it from you?
Secretary Rumsfeld. When I get it.
Chairman Levin. How many days? I mean, we are trying to
make up a budget here. This is an important issue.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can tell you we have no intention of
breaking the treaty, if that is the question.
Now, is it possible someone could say, ``oh, if you went
into Alaska and shipped the stuff there and cleared the site,
and started to do any kind of an upgrade on that radar that is
there,'' I, some lawyer, could say that that is not a test bed,
it is a prototype, and therefore it would be in violation of
the treaty. Could that happen? You bet.
Chairman Levin. That a lawyer would say that, but it is not
your judgment?
Look, you have the responsibility as Secretary of Defense.
We have a responsibility as people who authorize expenditures.
We have to make a judgment the best we can. You have to make a
judgment. There is a lot riding on this judgment, a lot riding
on it, and we have to make an assessment, and you need to make
an assessment, frankly. You need to make an assessment.
If it is not your intention that any 2002 money violate the
treaty in any of your R&D programs, your statement to that
effect is very meaningful. We will reach our own judgment.
Secretary Rumsfeld. All right, let me try it this way. The
administration has no plans to violate the treaty or to break
the law in 2002, 2003, 2010. What we intend to do is to have an
R&D program, begin discussions with the Russians and establish
a framework to move beyond the treaty, because the treaty
inhibits the deployment and testing of ballistic missile
defense, and the President wants to have ballistic missile
defense.
Chairman Levin. Senator Allard.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Therefore, we do not intend to break it
at any time, break the treaty, break the law.
Chairman Levin. You are hoping to amend the treaty so you
do not break it. My question is----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, wait--no.
Chairman Levin. We are going to keep asking.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I see your point. Let me----
Chairman Levin. We are going to keep asking the question,
because we need an answer, the country needs an answer, the
world needs an answer. Is there any money in the 2002 budget
request which, for R&D programs, missile defense, would, in
your judgment, violate the ABM Treaty? I am going to keep
asking it. We need an answer, in your judgment.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me try it--let me finish the
thought, and maybe this will answer it.
Violating the treaty means that the treaty still exists. As
I understand the question, and what I have said is that the
President fully intends to work with the Russians and fashion
something that does not allow the constraints of the treaty to
inhibit the development of missile defense, and if he is not
able to, he has indicated he will give 6 months notice.
I mean, that--and then he would not be breaking the treaty,
or violating the treaty. He would be using the treaty provision
that allows a country to give 6 months notice and step away
from the treaty, and the hope is not to do that. The hope,
obviously, is to fashion an arrangement with the Russians that
is something that is acceptable to move beyond it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I
apologize, I was not here earlier, but a busy schedule dictated
my absence for the first round of questioning. I appreciate the
fact that you are giving me a shot here.
I would like to move to the airborne laser, Mr. Secretary.
According to my understanding, the supplemental includes about
$153 million for the airborne laser, and there is full funding
in the fiscal year 2002 budget. How high a priority is the
airborne laser program for you and for the Department in
regards to the missile defense program?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I wish these answers were easy. I
cannot characterize how high a priority it is. It is one of 8
or 10 or 12 programs that General Kadish and the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office has briefed us on a preliminary basis
that are part of the things he would like to move forward on.
He is now adjusting that program to fit his new budget mark.
It is something that has been underway for sometime. It is
something that, if I am not mistaken, is some way down the
road. Whether or not it is going to be accelerated, it is, I
think, something that is yet to be decided in the Department.
Senator Allard. I want to be supportive in your missile
defense efforts, and move in this direction. Overall, the
ballistic missile defense budget will increase about $1 billion
compared to last year. Some missile defense critics will no
doubt argue that the increase is too large, and meeting other
shortfalls in the Department, they will claim, deserves
priority over missile defense. Can you tell me on what basis
did you accord missile defense the priority it received in your
budget proposal?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I suppose it is safe to say that if one
started out with one's first choice, most of the budgets and
elements of the budget would be higher than they are. As in any
organization and any budgeting process, you end up with making
judgments and tradeoffs.
At the present time, that budget is at $8.2 billion total,
and that includes the theater missile defense as well as the
national missile defense, including the airborne laser dollars.
It is about 2.0 or 2.5 percent of the total budget. It
compares, for example, with something like $11 billion in the
aggregated terrorism number. It is higher than it was. It does
not fund all the things that General Kadish had hoped to be
able to fund, and it funds some of them on a somewhat slower
basis.
Senator Allard. Let me ask you this, do you think the
threat in this area is growing greater than other areas of
threat?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that the threat of a major land
conflict in Europe is very low. I think the threat of a major
strategic nuclear exchange with Russia is very low.
I think that the problem of proliferation and the
advancement of technologies and the relaxed tension in the
world has led to the availability of weapons of mass
destruction and the ability to deliver them in a variety of
ways. Because it is so difficult to cope with western armies,
navies, and air forces, the nations that have an interest in
dissuading us from doing things, and have an interest in
imposing their will on their neighbors, have looked for these
asymmetric threats from terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic
missiles, and I would guess down the road, cyber warfare as
well, because we have vulnerabilities in those areas that are
distinctive, compared to the vulnerabilities we have with
respect to typical warfare.
I would rank all of those as risks. The proliferation of
cruise missiles is taking place. I worry a great deal about
germ warfare and what we read in the intelligence reports about
what is taking place in the world. There is no question that
the number of nations that are getting ballistic missiles is
growing, and I certainly rank the ballistic missile threat up
among those asymmetric threats very high.
Senator Allard. In regard to the ballistic missile defense
program, maybe General Shelton or maybe somebody else on the
panel would like to answer this question, but the budget
structure has been substantially changed from last year from
the one that focused on specific systems, such as national
missile defense, Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),
and the Navy theater-wide, to one that focuses on phases of the
ballistic missile during flight that our forces might
intercept. Could you talk a little bit about the advantages of
this restructuring?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Actually, what happened was that
General Kadish and various others have decided that
reorganizing how that program should go forward led to the
kinds of adjustments that you are talking about, and Dr.
Zakheim can comment on it.
Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. You are correct, Senator, that the
general focus now is on the phases of flight: the initial
phase, mid-course and terminal. There are several things that
were done. Mature systems have been devolved to the services;
the Army PAC-3 the Patriot upgrade; the Navy area-wide, which
used to be known as Navy lower-tier; the international program
we have with the Europeans, to which they attach high
importance, the medium-range extended air defense system
(MEADS).
On the other hand, systems that were not as mature, and I
include among those the airborne laser, which the Secretary
mentioned, space-based laser, and space-based infrared system,
have devolved to the management of General Kadish at the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office. If you aggregate what General
Kadish is essentially now dealing with in his R&D program, it
is slightly over $7 billion.
You mention THAAD. There is some program visibility for
that. Those are being carried as projects within the
overarching structure that I outlined.
Senator Allard. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain. Thank you.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it
has been a long afternoon for you, and I will try not to impose
on your time too much longer.
General Shelton, on September 27, 2000, you said that it is
a real success story to go from $43 billion procurement 3 years
ago to $60 billion in the 2001 budget, a significant
achievement led by Secretary Cohen. Then you go on to say that
the simple reality is that after 3 years of demanding and
unanticipated military and humanitarian operations, we know
that the $60 billion projected by the QDR will not be
sufficient to sustain the force.
I look at the procurement budget, fiscal year 2001, $62.1
billion, fiscal year 2002, $61.6 billion, an actual decrease in
procurement. How do you state on September 27 that $60 billion
projected will not be sufficient to sustain the force and then
come tell us that $62.1 and $61.6 are sufficient?
General Shelton. Senator McCain, what I said was that in
the 2002 budget the emphasis, of course, is sustained quality
of life issues for the force. It has funded current readiness.
In fact, it added $18 billion between 2001 and 2002.
Senator McCain. I am talking about $60 billion projected
for procurement.
General Shelton. What I also said was, obviously the
shortfall, if there is one in the 2002 budget, the place that
it needs most work is in recapitalization and modernization,
which maintains slightly over the $60 billion that is
necessary, but not anywhere near what will be necessary to
recapitalize, modernize, and transform the force for the
future.
That is going to have to be the answer--how much more is
required over the $60 billion should be the answer that comes
out of the QDR. What our strategy is going to be, what the
force structure to support that strategy is going to be, and
consequently how much additional money is going to be required
to support the modernization and in the numbers of things and
types of units that will be required to support the strategy.
It obviously will be a lot more than $60 billion.
Senator McCain. I will not belabor the point.
Mr. Secretary, I was not here for your opening statement,
but I read it, and I think it is a very powerful and important
statement. I think it lays out our requirements and our needs
as strongly as possible.
Part of your statement is that we could do better with a
round of base closing and adjustments that reduced unneeded
facilities by, for example, 25 percent. We could focus the
funds on facilities, et cetera. Without base closings,
achieving the 67-year replacement rate would require an
additional $7 billion annually.
I take that to mean you are proposing a BRAC.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We will be proposing something that
people will call a BRAC. Whether it will fit the previous model
or not, I do not know. We have people working on it right now,
talking with people on the Hill. They will certainly be
visiting with the leadership on this committee, with you, and
those in the House.
It is not something that I, personally, am delighted to be
doing. It causes a lot of heartburn, pain, concern, anger,
apprehension, fear, but we simply have to manage the money in
this Department better than we are doing. BRAC is only one
piece of it. There are a host of other things that we are
prevented from doing that we need to be freed up to do.
Senator McCain. I agree with you that it is one of many
things, but I would assume that $7 billion a year is a fairly
good chunk of some of the things we need to do.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know this because I have never
been around for a BRAC, but I am told that problem with it is
that the money does not start coming in until the fourth or
fifth year.
Senator McCain. Every year you wait, that is another year
delay from the time that it does come in.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator McCain. My point is, I do not care whether you call
it BRAC or not, but we have learned from bitter experience it
has to be a deal where there is an up or down vote on the part
of Congress.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. That has to be an integral part. I would
also argue that we have to make sure that it is not
politicized. It is the view of this Member, I do not speak for
other Members of the Senate, that the BRAC closing round
concerning McClellan Air Force Base and Kelly Air Force Base
was politicized. There cannot be a taint of politicization, so
we are going to have to tighten up that language.
I just want to say, Mr. Secretary, I want to support you in
that. I have been fighting for it a long time, and it is
absolutely necessary. I have never been able to find any
military expert who disagrees with the fact that we need a
BRAC. I have not met a single one, and as we all know, they
come in all sizes and shapes.
But the fact is, we also need to look at depot maintenance,
because a lot of depot maintenance today could be contracted
out by civilian and competitive sources. If you feel, as I read
in the media, that some B-1s need to be taken out of
commission, or any other weapons system in order to modernize
the force, and you come and make that argument here, I want to
support you.
The history of this Congress in recent years has been
protection of depots, bases, and weapons systems while,
unfortunately, men and women in the military are living in
conditions that in many cases are unacceptable, and under
deployment and operational requirements that have made it
extremely difficult for us to recruit and maintain quality
young men and women. I want to help you in this effort in any
possible way that I can.
I would like to add one additional comment, if I could. I
do not believe that you are asking for enough money. I believe
it is because, as you stated in print, there was so much money
taken up in a tax cut that there is not money available. I am
sure that you may have regretted the words, or maybe I
misinterpreted them.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not say that.
Senator McCain. Well, I will get you the quote. It is a
pretty good quote. [Laughter.]
Secretary Rumsfeld. It does not sound like a good one to
me. [Laughter.]
Senator McCain. The fact is, there is not enough money for
defense, medicare, and social security, and when you ask, as I
have been told, for $32 billion and get $18 billion, or
roughly, as the media reports, then I think it is very
unfortunate. In fact, as long as I have been around here that
has been the custom. It is driven by budgets rather than
requirements, and when there is not money available, somehow
that seems to be the case.
I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. May we just make one comment?
Senator McCain. Would you respond? Yes, I would like to
hear your response.
Secretary Rumsfeld. On the depot issue, Dov Zakheim would
like to comment on that.
Dr. Zakheim. Senator, we do have an initiative specifically
on the depot issue. It is one that essentially says if a depot
has back orders, which means by definition they cannot deal
with it now, and that is by their own definition, because it is
a back order, then we would propose to contract out that work.
That results in a savings of nearly $200 million, which we
could then apply to other departmental activities, so that is a
step in the direction that you are talking about, sir.
Senator McCain. Did you want to respond?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to say thank you for your
offer of assistance, and we will certainly appreciate that, and
it is going to take a lot of assistance.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Warner. I want to say with regard to BRAC, that I
was a coauthor with others on these bills. As a matter of fact,
I joined you one year on the BRAC before this politicization
issue came along.
Senator McCain is correct. I think the unanimous view among
the professional military and others is that we have to reduce
the infrastructure. I would hope that legislation will be
brought up here in due course, and I want to support it.
I would suggest, however, that we not get the depot issue
tagged onto that one. If it is to be addressed, let us address
the issues separately. I have been around long enough to know
how trains run at this station. [Laughter.]
You can catch one and get to where you want to go, but you
can't load too many cars on it. With all due respect to my
friend, if there is a depot question out there, maybe we ought
to address it, but let us address it separately.
Mr. Secretary, there have been some hearings in the House
on the subject of Vieques. I asked the chairman to withhold
hearings of this committee on that important issue. The fact
that we have not held hearings should in no means indicate that
Senator Inhofe, myself, and a number of others, it is
bipartisan here, are not gravely concerned about the need to
fully train our men and women of the Armed Forces for combat
activities with live ammunition, under every circumstance
possible that parallels those they would face in a combat
situation.
It is essential for many of our troops deploying to the
gulf, because regrettably, in due course, they are often faced
with hostile fire. Regrettably, they are constantly under a
threat situation.
I hope that we can work our way through that. I have not
had a chance to study your responses to the House today, but I
will do so. I do not know whether you wish to have this
opportunity to tell our committee what you feel procedurally we
should do to work on that. I presume it is a steady
concentration of looking at alternative means to train our
troops. On the question of the referendum, I want to be
supportive of our President, but at the moment I think it is
uncertain just how that legislation would move or not move,
should it be brought to Congress.
I have a suggestion, one that you do represent today, that
you should press as hard as you can on finding alternative
means to train our men and women of the Armed Forces,
particularly those that are faced with deployments to the gulf
region. Perhaps we can sit down quietly and work out in a
bipartisan way some solutions to this problem. Is that a
general summary of where you are on it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. There is no question that we
have to redouble the efforts to find alternative location, or
locations, plural, so that the men and women who go to the gulf
and deploy to the east have the kind of training they need. We
are hard at that task, and we look forward to working with you
on the subject.
Senator Warner. You say redouble the efforts. I have spent
a good deal of time working on this together with Senator
Inhofe, who certainly has spent an enormous amount of time on
this issue. A conscientious effort has been made. I am sure
General Shelton is ready to testify to that point, and we had
two, independent groups that went out and looked at it. Am I
not correct on that, General?
General Shelton. Sir, you are correct, and that work
continues today, as a matter of fact.
Senator Warner. More emphasis is needed, but I want to say
that the Navy Department, in my judgment, has conscientiously,
in the last year, looked at those options very carefully.
I would like to move to another subject, which is that I
certainly commend our President. When he was a candidate and,
indeed, now that he is President, he has recognized we have a
situation here at home, where perhaps only in the times of
World War II did we consider homeland defense. Under the
leadership of our former Chairman Roberts, and now our new
Chairman Landrieu, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee, which looks at the future threats to this Nation,
is bearing down again on homeland defense. I will be
scrutinizing your budget submission to make sure that it is
adequate, because we have to prepare for an attack of a
terrorist nature in cities here in the United States, and
prepare this Nation's response.
You came before the Chairman and Ranking Members of the
Intelligence Committee, Armed Services Committee, Foreign
Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committee and gave
us your thoughts on how you could marshall the resources of
your Department to address this problem.
Clearly, the lines of authority, the lines of
responsibility and how we would respond can be improved. I hope
you will take a leadership role in doing that, so it is better
understood who has what responsibility, should a crisis hit us.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Warner, you know as well as any
the problem is serious. It is not some distant thought, it is
something that this country simply must address.
It is also enormously complex. The Department of Defense,
in people's minds, has the task of defending our country, and
under the law, as we all know, the responsibilities are
elsewhere. The Department of Defense is not a first responder
with respect to the kinds of attacks you are talking about,
here at the homeland.
Senator Warner. The Posse Comitatus Act, which goes way
back in our history and is a well-thought-out concept, stands
as a barrier, and I think it is going to remain. I doubt if we
can modify it, but the Department has enormous resources to
bring to bear on a crisis. If we had 5,000 casualties, we would
have to turn to the supplies within the Department to help that
community instantly.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are exactly right. If something
happened in the United States of America, notwithstanding the
law, notwithstanding the way we are organized, the phone call
would be right to the Pentagon. The Pentagon has the
organization with the capabilities to deal with a major
disruption from weapons of mass destruction in the United
States of America. Yet our society is not organized so that the
Pentagon has that responsibility. It does not, and as you said,
the President has asked Vice President Cheney to address the
issue and to help put some order and structure into it, which
he is in the process of doing.
Senator Warner. General Shelton.
General Shelton. Senator Warner, I believe, about 2 years
ago we gave a tasking to our Joint Forces Commander, General
Kernan, and before that Admiral Gehman, in Norfolk to stand up
Joint Task Force Civil Support. Its primary purpose was to make
sure that within the Department, we knew where all of these
resources that could assist whoever the lead Federal agency
are. Whether it was the Federal Emergency Management Agency or
some other organization, we would know that they were
organized, had the right training, had the equipment, and would
be able to move very rapidly in the event we had multiple
locations that were hit simultaneously, not to take the lead,
but to support whoever was in the lead, realizing that they
would look to us to provide this type of support, as they
normally do.
Of course, in the counterterrorism business we have a
world-class capabilities, but always in support of the
Department of Justice, and again, with a waiver of posse
comitatus by the President.
Senator Warner. More needs to be done.
I will pick up on two other points, Mr. Secretary. First is
the stockpile stewardship program. While it is not under direct
control of your Department, the readiness of the stockpile
itself to some extent, impacts on the men and women of the
Armed Forces who have to deal with nuclear weapons every day.
I suggest to you that you begin to review that, because it
concerns me, not only for the men and women of the Armed Forces
and the civilians that have to deal with this arsenal, but also
for the communities and the environs where they are housed. We
have to make certain of the safety and reliability of these
weapons. From a credibility standpoint if the reliability of
our weapons is in question that bears directly on deterrence.
If a potential enemy feels that our weapons have little value,
then deterence goes.
Secretary Rumsfeld. You are exactly right, there is no
question that the safety and reliability of that stockpile is
enormously important to the Department of Defense, as well as
to the country. It is part of the Department of Energy, as you
well know, and General Gordon has the responsibility
specifically within the Department.
He has a program. I have been briefed on it. In my view, it
is a sensible program, a rational program. The problem that
exists, of course, is like others. At what pace are you able to
fund that program so that in fact you have a confidence level
that you are dealing properly with safety and reliability?
Senator Warner. I think you should fund it at the pace that
technology can accept it, and judiciously and efficiently spend
those dollars. We are coming down on a curve where the
stockpile, by the very nature of its age, is beginning to raise
potential questions of safety and credibility, and we are going
to have to make the decision as a Nation whether we go into
production on certain new weapons.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, that program has been
underfunded for a series of years. It is just a brutal fact.
Senator Warner. All right. I will address that later.
Lastly, could you bring us up to date on the policy that
our President has established together with NATO as to the
utilization of NATO forces with respect to Macedonia. I believe
our President has indicated that our forces would be part of
that effort as NATO makes its decision. Is that generally
correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The circumstance is that the United
States has, in the country of the former Yugoslavian Republic
of Macedonia, somewhere between 400 and 700 U.S. military at
any given time, depending on rotation. They have a variety of
functions, but most of the functions relate to supporting the
forces in Kosovo, which is, of course, just a short distance
away.
They have been there for a number of years now. They do
some UAV work, they do some logistics work, and they do some
transportation work. There is a very small unit that was there
to assist the Government of Macedonia for a period, and I think
that group left.
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The situation in the country is very
difficult. There have been decades of hostility between the
Albanians and the rest of the population, as you know well. At
the moment, the Albanian representatives are still part of the
government. At the moment, most of the ethnic Albanians are
still a part of the military, although some non-trivial number
left within the last 7 days, departed the military, which was
unfortunate.
There are physical threats from Albanian extremists who are
using force and violence against the parliament a short
distance away, against the airport in Skopje, where our troops
and our UAVs are located. So they are at risk. There have been
a lot of so-called envoys. Secretary-General Robertson has been
in and out several times. Solana has been in and out several
times. Now, the French have appointed some man named Leotard
who is going to be going in there.
The government is young and it is facing a very difficult
situation. They are not all in agreement, as anyone who reads
the press can tell. There are some tensions between various
members of the Macedonian Government. There is no way in the
world to predict what the outcome will be, whether or not a
deal will finally be arranged for a cease-fire.
I will say that there recently has been something very good
that has happened in the area, and that was when the ground
safety zone actually was turned back over to the Serbs, and a
great many weapons were turned in voluntarily. It was done
peacefully, there was no violence, and it was exceedingly well
done. It is possible that some good things can happen there. It
is also possible that it can deteriorate rather rapidly. We had
some buses that were assisting in moving some Albanians within
the last 48 hours that were surrounded, and it could have
deteriorated into a very difficult situation, very rapidly.
Senator Warner. I hope that you will consult with Congress
should it require putting our troops in that assignment into
greater risk.
Lastly, Mr. Secretary, this committee took several
initiatives last year with regard to unmanned vehicles. I note
that the Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Amendment has increased
funding for several of these programs with the potential to
transform the military. We commend you, and I hope it moves
forward.
I note the presence of my distinguished colleague from
Alabama, who has returned. We are about to wrap up here. Do you
wish to ask any questions?
Senator Sessions. I have one brief series to ask. Mr.
Secretary, we are in such a new era, it seems to me, in regards
to Russia. I spent 2 weeks there as a private citizen in 1993,
and the people are wonderful. They are our friends now. They
are not our enemies, and we need to build on that. I applaud
the President for doing so.
It strikes me quite plainly that the ABM Treaty, which has
been in effect since 1972, is not appropriate for today's
world. We have threats of missile attacks from other nations
that endanger American lives. I hope that our negotiations and
our efforts to work with the Russians will succeed in getting
them to agree to allow us to construct a national missile
defense system.
First of all, it is important to our national security. I
know you believe that. Your bipartisan commission unanimously
found that we were facing a threat to our Nation from a
ballistic missile attack. I hope we can proceed on that because
the treaty itself provides the United States a way out of it,
with notice. It is not something that binds us forever.
Certainly, the Russia that exists today is not the Soviet
Union that we signed the treaty with. The problem is this: as I
understand it, President Clinton instructed that the
development of national missile defense be treaty-compliant.
There are some ways to do that, but I have heard expert
testimony, and I would ask if you or General Shelton would
comment on it, that if we continue with that treaty-compliant
approach it will delay the implementation of a good system. It
will make the system more expensive, and at its conclusion, we
will probably be less secure than if we proceeded outside the
treaty.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it is certainly my view that
the way to develop the most effective and most cost-efficient
ballistic missile defense is not to try to design something
that fits in a treaty that prohibits you from having a
ballistic missile defense.
Senator Sessions. Well said. What is troubling me, Senator
Warner, is that we have members of this Senate tying the hands
of the President of the United States. They are saying
basically to Russia, ``do not agree to this thing.'' If you do
not agree to the President's request, we may not deploy the
system, and I think that is tying the President's hands. That
is not a bipartisan foreign policy that we are a part of.
The President ran on this issue. It was something that he
took his case to the American people on, and we voted on it,
Mr. Secretary. We voted to deploy this. Maybe there is some
disagreement about how fast we ought to deploy it, but there
should not be disagreement in Congress, because we voted to
deploy the system as soon as it was technologically feasible to
do so.
So I remain troubled that members of this body make
statements suggesting that if the Russians hold out and fail to
work out an agreement with the President, we are prohibited
from protecting ourselves from missile attacks from rogue
nations. Maybe you would want to comment on that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I thank you for your comment.
As one of the individuals that has been asked to begin the
process of meeting with the Russians to attempt to fashion some
sort of a framework that would take us beyond the ABM Treaty, I
have to admit that entering a negotiation where the Russian,
the other side that you are dealing with, may have come to a
conclusion that they have a veto over whether or not the United
States of America should have a missile defense capability
would be a terrible way to enter a negotiation.
So anything that would contribute to the impression on the
part of the Russians that the United States would like to have
a ballistic missile defense capability, but we would not want
it if they did not want us to have it, would clearly mean that
you would not be in a negotiation. The odds are you would
simply be stonewalled, and that is not how one wants to spend
one's time.
The NATO countries have properly told the Russians that
they will not have a veto with respect to NATO enlargement, for
example. There is no reason that Russia should have a veto over
enlargement, and the President told Mr. Putin that. I mentioned
that to Mr. Ivanov, the defense minister of Russia, and NATO
itself has spoken on that subject. If they are not having a
veto on NATO enlargement, I cannot imagine why anyone would
want to hand them a veto with respect to a missile defense
system that would protect the population of the United States
of America, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, and thank you for having the
courage to discuss this issue. I think as the American people
become more aware of it they will be supportive, and you will
find Congress supportive. I am sure they will be. We voted on
it previously.
General Shelton, let me express my appreciation for your
service. You have testified so many times here, and it is an
honor to have known you and worked with you. You have been
truly committed to your Nation's strength and welfare, and we
appreciate it very much.
General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment? I
am a little concerned about all this praise for General
Shelton. I expect to get 3\1/2\ more months work out of him.
[Laughter.]
I hope and pray that that is the case, and I would not want
him to start mentally leaving, because we need this fine
officer. He is doing a superb job for us.
Senator Warner. We know him, and know him well. That will
not occur.
We have had an excellent hearing, Mr. Secretary, General
Shelton, and Dr. Zakheim. Thank you, Senator, for your
observations. I think we had a good, constructive dialogue on
missile defense here today. I hope no comments by any of our
colleagues would be construed to suggest that it would
undermine the President's ability to continue to consult with
our allies and eventually to sit down and work out a new
framework with Russia. I think we are all supportive of the
President in his endeavors to do that. Certainly, I am.
I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

START II

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, section 1302 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires the U.S. to
remain at START I strategic force structure levels until such time as
START II enters into force. Will you be asking Congress to repeal this
provision of the law?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, I will. The DOD supports repeal of Section
1302 in its entirety in order to maintain the President's prerogative
in setting strategic force structure for the defense of the United
States. As currently written, Section 1302 prohibits the obligation of
funds for the retirement or dismantlement, or the preparations for
retirement or dismantlement, of strategic nuclear delivery systems
until entry into force of the START II Treaty. Unnecessarily linking
reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems to START II entry
into force severely limits the President's flexibility and could delay
implementation of important parts of the President's overall deterrent
strategy. The repeal of this legislation would therefore allow the
President to make the necessary changes and modifications to strategic
nuclear force structure in support of his comprehensive review of US
deterrence requirements.

TRIDENT SUBMARINE

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand the amended
budget requests funding to maintain the option to convert two of the
four Trident submarines excess to strategic requirements, to a
conventional non-nuclear role. Have you made a decision as to whether
any such conversion would or would not allow the submarine to be
excluded from START II accounting rules?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Our intention is for the Nuclear-Powered Cruise
Missile Attack Submarine (SSGN) to retain its D5 launch tube and remain
accountable under current START Treaty rules. To convert SSGN by
removing the D5 tubes completely and replacing it with a whole new hull
section would be prohibitive from a cost perspective and would
approximately double the conversion costs. Although accountable under
START I, the only applicable strategic nuclear arms treaty currently in
force, the ``phantom warheads'' associated with SSGN would not cause
the United States to exceed limits. SSGN would have to be addressed as
an exemption in any future arms control agreement.

VIEQUES

3a. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, you have been quoted as
saying you are in ``full agreement'' with Secretary England's recent
proposal to leave Vieques by 2003 and cancel the scheduled referendum
mandated by last year's defense authorization bill.
Did you participate in and approve this decision? In other words,
did you tell Secretary England he needed your approval before proposing
this to White House officials, and did he have your approval before he
did so?
When is the administration going to submit your legislative
proposal regarding the referendum?
Was your agreement with Secretary England's proposal to cancel the
referendum and make a commitment now to leave Vieques based on an
understanding that a suitable alternative exists? If so, can you tell
us where that new training area is located?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The effective training for our sailors and
marines is a matter most appropriately handled by the Department of the
Navy. The Secretary of the Navy has the best vantage point to make
these decisions and he made it. We did discuss the Vieques range issue
before he briefed the White House and Congress. I did not tell the
Secretary of the Navy how to make the decision or specify the mechanics
of briefing it outside of the DOD.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
requiring a referendum by the citizens of the island of Vieques to
decide whether the Navy can continue to train there, has put Navy in
the challenging situation of having training matters effecting fleet
readiness being decided by local vote. Rather than initiating a
precedent where our training range needs are submitted to a plebiscite,
we decided to pursue aggressively both legislative relief from the
referendum and suitable training alternatives now. We expect to submit
the proposal for legislative relief from the November referendum soon.
There are currently no singular satisfactory alternatives to
Vieques. Between now and May 2003, we will work to develop the best
possible combination of methods and places to replace Vieques. The
Secretary of the Navy has already directed a study of alternative with
initial ideas due to him this fall.

3b. Senator Levin. General Shelton, did you support the decision to
leave Vieques without trying to win the referendum that had been agreed
to?
General Shelton. The training and equipping of our forces is a
Title 10 responsibility of each of the Services. In this particular
case, the Secretary of the Navy decided to seek legislative relief from
the referendum, but in the interim to do all the Navy can do to win
should the referendum occur. I support his position.

3c. Senator Levin. General Shelton, the Navy has consistently
stated that they cannot find a suitable replacement for Vieques. Do you
disagree with their assessment, or has their assessment changed your
knowledge?
General Shelton. My primary concern is to provide trained and ready
forces to the warfighting commanders in chief, and where that required
training is performed is not an overriding issue. Navy leadership has
said that they will provide comparable, not necessarily identical,
training opportunities for the East Coast Battle Groups, and are
currently pursuing alternative training methods and locations to ensure
future battle groups continue to be combat ready for deployment.

3d. Senator Levin. Last week you said three alternative sites were
being considered. Can you tell what the three locations you referred to
are?
General Shelton. I was referring to the Navy examining training
opportunities in the Gulf region, in Texas and North Carolina, among
others.

NATIONAL GUARD

4. Senator Levin. Army and Air National Guard requirements are
traditionally underfunded in the Department of Defense budget. What
strategy have you employed to ensure that the resourcing of the
National Guard is commensurate with its missions?
What do you envision as the future missions of the National Guard?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The resourcing of Army and Air National Guard
units, fleet modernization, and new missions are the responsibility of
the service secretaries. DOD's oversight of the process assures unit
resourcing commensurate with missioning within overall DOD fiscal
constraints. Active, Guard, and Reserve units are addressed in our
Total Force planning for the present and into the future. Please be
assured that the Army and Air National Guard and all Reserve Components
will continue to be full partners with their active counterparts, and
their missions (current and future) will reflect that relationship.

READINESS

5. Senator Levin. General Shelton, in the fall of 1998 you told
this committee that ``we have `nosed over' and our readiness is
descending.'' When you appeared before this committee last September
you stated that ``we have made considerable progress these past 2 years
in several key areas'' such as ``arresting the decline in near-term
readiness.'' What is your assessment of the morale of our forces,
including the retention situation in fiscal year 2001, and of the
readiness of our forces to carry out their missions?
General Shelton. Even though there are still some trouble spots,
overall we are doing well. With the significant support of Congress,
this year provided increased authority for retention bonuses, increases
in pay and compensation, and enhancements in quality-of-life areas to
include housing and health care. These continued improvements directly
help our retention effort, morale of our troops, and more importantly,
demonstrates to our Service members that we care about them, their
families, and their quality of life.
I am pleased to report that retention is up across the board;
however, we are not out of the woods yet. It appears the Air Force will
miss its aggregate retention goals. Although their overall retention
picture looks better, particularly in first-term retention, the loss of
second-term and career Service members has had an affect on the
readiness of the Service. Additionally, we continue to see many of our
senior enlisted and junior officers leaving each of the Services. While
the Services' overall retention is good, shortages still exist in
individual skills such as information technology; air traffic
controllers, pilots, and other high tech skills--the same skills that
are in high demand in the private sector. The common reasons members
leave the military are lack of adequate compensation and high OPTEMPO.
In terms of readiness I'm proud to report that our soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines remain ready to accomplish their assigned
wartime mission(s). However, several commanders in chief (CINCs) and
the Services continue to highlight in the Joint Monthly Readiness
Review the impact that lower than desired retention rates have on their
readiness . . . i.e. shortages of experienced personnel. Continued
congressional support is critical to resolving these readiness
concerns. Our long-term goal is to enhance the quality of life of those
who have chosen to defend their country, ultimately ensuring our force
remains both highly motivated and highly trained.
As in the past, continued congressional support will allow us to
achieve higher levels of morale and readiness necessary to maintain the
premier military force in the world.

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jean Carnahan

AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES

6a. Senator Carnahan. Secretary Rumsfeld, in April, General
Robertson, head of U.S. Transportation Command, testified before our
Subcommittee on Seapower. He stated that current U.S. operations
required a massive increase in airlift capabilities. Then just this
Tuesday, General Robertson announced that the military needs at least
60 more C-17 transports to meet its current requirements. The
President's proposed budget seems to be addressing this need, with a
requirement of 15 aircraft.
Secretary Rumsfeld, can you discuss how such an initiative might
address a possible strategic shift to Asia and help in the rapid
movement of new Army brigades?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army strongly supports the proposed 60
additional C-17 aircraft recommended by General Robertson, regardless
of a possible strategy shift to Asia. This figure is consistent with
the 54.5 million ton miles per day (MTM/D) as recommended by the
Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05). Strategic airlift is vital
to the Army's strategic responsiveness goals of a brigade anywhere in
the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and 5 divisions in 30
days. The C-17 in particular is crucial to achieving strategic surprise
anywhere in the world with decisive ground combat power to influence
the battle early on as opposed to reacting to an opponent's strategic
initiative. The Army's Interim and Objective forces will be lighter and
smaller than current legacy heavy divisions and therefore more rapidly
deployable. The vehicles supporting these new organizations are being
designed to fit inside a C-130 for tactical movement within any theater
of operations. From a strategic perspective, the C-17 can maximize
delivery times by delivering much larger cargo loads directly into a
theater. The C-17 has the same small and austere airfield (SAAF)
landing capability as the C-130, but with a significantly greater cargo
capacity. One more advantage of the C-17 is its unique ability to
leverage maximum on ground (MOG). MOG is a constraint at any aerial
port of debarkation (APOD) and is determined by the sufficiency of the
airfield's infrastructure to land, taxi, park, offload, refuel and
maintain aircraft simultaneously. The C-17 optimizes MOG with its
ability to back-up, self-load and provide more throughput delivered
with less time on the ground.
The operational readiness rate of the C-17 combined with its
performance parameters to date, make it the airframe of choice to
rapidly deploy America's Army anywhere in the world expeditiously. Many
do not realize that strategic airlift today is a scarce resource, which
is heavily competed for early in any deployment sequence. For example,
the United States Air Force (USAF) requires nearly 75 percent of the
entire airlift fleet to move its bare-base sets and Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces during the first several weeks of deployment. The
Army requirement to deploy an IBCT in 96 hours will take on the order
of 250 C-17 equivalent missions. Additionally, the USMC has a
requirement similar to the Army's to deploy and activate one Maritime
Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron. The C-17 is also a high demand item
for CINCs in the execution of their peacetime theater engagement plans.
The utility of the C-17 to carry outsize and oversize military
equipment over strategic distances and then land on SAAF in theater
make it an invaluable asset to all CINCs and Services. During the
period fiscal year 1996-2002, surge sealift will realize a 135 percent
increase while Army prepositioned stocks afloat will increase 126
percent. Unfortunately, strategic airlift will not have increased at
all from fiscal year 1996 out to fiscal year 2006 even after the 134
authorized C-17s are in service. The 120th C-17 will be delivered in
2004 and the 134th in 2005. With an average annual production rate of
15 C-17s, and even with decisive action today, the additional 60 would
not be fully realized until 2009. During the interim, as we continue to
retire the C-141 fleet and experience continued poor mission
reliability of the C-5 fleet, our strategic airlift capacity will only
get worse before it gets better. The 60 additional C-17s recommended by
General Robertson--over and above the 134 originally authorized--will
go far in balancing our strategic airlift capability with the actual
requirement as identified in MRS-05. Until then, however, the actual
airlift throughput capacity will diminish or at best remain static.

6b. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, can you elaborate on these
comments?
General Shelton. Yes. Part of your question applies to a possible
shift of our strategic focus. The United States has had strategic
interests in Asia before and after World War II. We have political,
economic, and military allies and friends with whom we have cooperated
for many years. The current or future security environment will dictate
whether we need to have a region of primary focus, but it will not
suggest that we abandon our commitments to our other allies. As
mentioned previously, the new defense strategy is not finalized, so it
would be premature for me to be any more specific about our strategic
focus at this time.
The MRS-05 study shows with great fidelity that to meet our
Nation's contingencies, we must increase our airlift capability to the
Joint Chiefs `agreed-upon' 54.5 MTM/day as a minimum. Please remember
that 54.5 MTM/D still puts us at moderate risk, any less capability and
we enter the high-risk category. The best way for us to accomplish this
is to purchase additional C-17s and modernize the C-5. The C-17 has
continued to meet and exceed our expectations as our military's new
core airlifter. Programmatically, the time is now to execute a follow-
on multi-year contract; otherwise Boeing and its sub-contractors will
begin shutting down the production line. If we delay much longer, the
cost of additional C-17s is going to become prohibitively expensive. A
shift in strategies toward Asia does not invalidate MRS-05 conclusions,
nor does Service transformation efforts. A more Asia-centric defense
strategy naturally carries with it greater deployment distances from
the continental United States (CONUS), keeping the airlift requirement
high. Service transformation may mean lighter, leaner, and more lethal
but it is also means faster. With the lighter forces requiring a faster
deployment, airlift rate of delivery increases and offsets the
reduction in total tonnage delivered.
The 15 C-17s in the President's proposed budget do not address the
need for 60 additional C-17s. Those aircraft are being purchased as
part of the original 120 aircraft multi-year contract. In recent
budgets, 14 additional C-17s were authorized to support the Special
Operations mission. In the President's proposed budget we have added 3
more C-17s to continue addressing the airlift shortfall (if approved,
the total C-17 buy will then be 137). Again, a firm commitment to
acquire a total of 180 C-17s is critical. That would allow us to
purchase the additional aircraft already on the books and 40+ more as a
60 aircraft multi-year, significantly reducing cost.

BASE STRUCTURE

7. Senator Carnahan. Secretary Rumsfeld, we have received limited
information about a new program that the Pentagon is proposing, called
the Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). As I understand it, this
program has the same objectives as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).
General Shelton's statement seemed to endorse another BRAC round,
indicating that the Defense Department is operating at 23 percent
excess base capacity in the United States.
Could you explain the difference between the program being
considered by the administration and the BRAC rounds conducted in the
past?
Mr. Secretary, there is great interest in this subject on our bases
and in our communities. We were advised by the Comptroller about the
EFI during our discussions about the 2002 budget. When do you plan to
advise this committee as to whether the administration proposes to
reduce the base structure in the coming year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Efficient Facilities Initiative that we are
developing supports the Department's efforts to transform its
facilities to meet the challenges of the new century. Three main
components of this initiative are: authorization of an additional round
of base closures and realignments in 2003; authorization of significant
improvements in the existing base closure process; and authorization of
a set of tools for the efficient operation of enduring military
installations.
While using essentially the same process as has been used
successfully before, the proposal would better ensure the primacy of
military value in the selection and execution of base closure and
realignment decisions. It would add authority to better harness the
strength and creativity of the private sector to facilitate
environmental restoration. This process would also continue the
Department's no-cost economic development conveyance authority to
reinvest in the economic redevelopment of the installation and the
surrounding community.
Additionally, this initiative would add a new section to Title 10,
United States Code, providing specific authorities that permit the
military departments to explore ways of supporting its missions and
people at more effectively, more efficiently and at less cost while
maintaining its operational readiness. It is a collection of innovative
authorities for the secretaries of the military departments to partner
with local communities for the ownership, operation, and maintenance of
an installation. This concept has been tested at Brooks Air Force Base
in San Antonio, TX, under a pilot program with promising success. Our
proposal would permanently authorize this program and make it available
to all the military departments.
Our goal is to submit this EFI to Congress before the August
recess.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

8. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, in your last appearance
before this committee, you and the Secretary emphasized emerging
threats posed by chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons around the
globe. I believe, as you do, that these threats remain imminent. Even
as we plan a long term strategy for dealing with Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), it is essential that our troops remain sufficiently
protected from chemical/biological agents. I hope that the fiscal year
2002 defense budget will sufficiency equip our troops with adequate
protection to deploy in a contaminated environment. Has the Pentagon
sought to modernize its defenses against chemical and biological agents
in the short term? We have heard a lot about new approaches to
examining the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its
allies. I share the Secretary's concerns over this threat, and support
research, development, and testing for adequate defenses. I also
understand that you have testified before this committee to illustrate
the fact that chemical and biological agents pose a far more imminent
threat than most other types of WMD attacks. Do you anticipate
substantial increases in long term investments in chemical/biological
defenses equivalent to other investments in WMD defense?
General Shelton. Our troops are equipped with the most modern
defense equipment capable of providing more than adequate protection
against traditional chemical and biological warfare agent attacks. The
President's Budget will provide improved chemical point and standoff
detection capabilities, and continue research to improve protective
ensembles and masks, medical chemical and biological countermeasures,
and decontamination technologies. Always cognizant of emerging chemical
and biological warfare threats, we continue to modernize and upgrade
our equipment to maintain the highest standards of protection and to
meet the challenge of future military operations. The DOD Chemical and
Biological Defense Program is committed to maintaining the proper
balance between the fielding of state-of-the-art equipment and
continued investments in science and technology programs. The ongoing
QDR is assessing our future requirements for countering nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and means of delivery to include
passive defense capabilities, both for military operations overseas and
in support of civil authorities.

RESERVE COMPONENT

9a. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, can you describe the
expansion of our Reserve components' role in the ``total force'' since
the Gulf War ended in 1991.
Are there any DOD plans to address health care and other benefits
for reservists in recognition of their increasing contributions to the
defense of our Nation?
General Shelton. The Department of Defense has actively pursued
equitable health care benefits for Reserve component members
commensurate with their increased contribution to Total Force missions
and their potential for risk and exposure to harm. With the support of
Congress, health care protections have been expanded to ensure we are
able to provide medical and dental care for a member who is injured or
becomes ill while performing military duty. The law was also amended to
ensure the family of Reserve member has access to the military health
care system when the member is retained on active duty for treatment of
or recovery from a service connected injury or illness. The recently
expanded TRICARE Dental Program offers reservists a comprehensive,
affordable and portable dental program that provides a uniform benefit
supported by a robust and stable dental provider network. It also
offers a family member option, not previously available to reservists.
DOD also plans to initiate a contract study to specifically assess
the current health coverage experienced by reserve families. When the
reservist is ordered to active duty for greater than 30 days, cost-
effective options may be considered to lessen the burden on reservists
and their families and the implications for Force Health Protection and
the medical readiness of Reserve personnel.

HEALTH CARE

9b. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, are there any DOD plans to
address health care and other benefits for reservists in recognition of
their increasing contributions to the defense of our Nation?
General Shelton. The Department has actively pursued equitable
health care benefits for Reserve component members commensurate with
their increased contribution to Total Force missions and their
potential for risk and exposure to harm. With the support of Congress,
health care protections have been expanded to ensure we are able to
provide medical and dental care for a member who is injured or becomes
ill while performing military duty. The law was also amended to ensure
the family of a Guard and Reserve member has access to the military
health care system when the member is retained on active duty for
treatment of or recovery from a service-connected injury or illness.
The recently expanded TRICARE Dental Program offers reservists a
comprehensive, affordable and portable dental program that provides a
uniform benefit supported by a robust and stable dental provider
network. It also offers a family member option, not previously
available to reservists.
The Department also plans to initiate a contract study to
specifically assess the current health coverage provided to Reserve
component members and their families, to identify new options that
might be more cost effective, and to evaluate the likely response of
Reserve component members to these new approaches. The project will
consider such factors as healthcare for families of reservists when the
reservist is not on Active Duty; the disruption and expense of
healthcare coverage experienced by reserve families when the reservist
is ordered to active duty for greater than 30 days; cost-effective
options that may be considered to lessen the burden on reservists and
their families; and the implications for Force Health Protection and
the medical readiness of Reserve personnel.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond

FAMILY HOUSING

10. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, the fiscal year 2002
budget amendment provides an additional $400 million for family housing
construction, of which I understand 80 percent must be dedicated toward
the housing privatization initiative.
If you can sustain this level of funding for family housing, will
you achieve the Department's 2010 goal for fixing the housing problem?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Currently, each service is pursuing varied
levels of housing privatization. The Department is working with the
services to increase the rate of privatization, where it makes economic
sense, to better leverage the resources we ask for in annual budget
submissions. Were the Department to receive funding above the current
program levels in its outyear program, the Department, overall, would
not only meet the 2010 goal, but would be able to eliminate all our
inadequate housing prior to 2010. The extent to which the military
services are able to privatize family housing is another key factor in
achieving the 2010 goal.

RESERVE COMPONENT

11. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, historically, funding for
the Reserve component military construction program has been at a level
of $50 million for the Army and Air National Guard and much less for
the other Reserve components. As a result, their aging facilities are
in worse shape than the Active components.
Does your budget contemplate bringing the Reserve components up to
the 67-year replacement standard?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The fiscal year 2002 Reserve component military
construction (MILCON) President's budget of $615 million is the highest
in over 20 years and represents approximately 6 percent of the total
Fiscal Year 2002 MILCON request of $9.9 billion. The fiscal year 2002
budget additions represent an emergency ``down payment'' to begin
restoring the readiness of facilities rated C-3 and C-4. The
allocations for the active and Reserve components were, therefore,
based on readiness ratings rather than on the 67-year recapitalization
goal. The Reserve components received 20 percent of the additional
fiscal year 2002 resources. The goal of future budgets is a Department-
wide 67-year recapitalization cycle for all components, Active, Guard,
and Reserve, as well as Defense Agencies.

MANAGEMENT REFORMS

12. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, according to the briefing
information I have received thus far, you plan to save $1 billion by
implementing a series of management reforms and initiatives.
Additionally, in a recent interview, you described your vision of
saving as much as $10 to $15 billion per year through additional
acquisition and management reforms. Could you briefly discuss your
vision of these future reforms in detail?
Secretary Rumsfeld. On June 18, 2001, I announced the formation of
two new internal management committees that will take action to improve
the Department's overall business practices and transform the military
into a 21st century fighting force: a Senior Executive Committee (SEC)
and a Business Initiative Council (BIC). The mission of the BIC is to
improve the efficiency of the Department of Defense business operations
by identifying and implementing business reform actions that allow
savings to be reallocated to higher priority efforts (i.e., people,
readiness, modernization, and transformation). Such savings will be
retained by the services/agencies for their reallocation.
Past studies have already pointed the way to many beneficial
reforms. We plan to begin by drawing upon the recommendations of those
studies, and then moving quickly toward their implementation, as well
as re-enforcing promising reforms that are underway.
The functional leadership and expertise from both the business and
operational communities of the Department, Joint Staff, and the
Services will be called upon to examine and recommend where we should
devote our energies. The Joint Staff and the Secretaries of the
Military Departments have joined me and pledged their commitment to
provide the steadfast leadership to improve the DOD's business
practices.

MX MISSILES

13. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand your
decision to retire the 50 MX missiles as an economic issue. However, I
am concerned that it will affect on our ability to negotiate further
cuts in Russia's nuclear arsenal.
What were the considerations regarding our overall nuclear arms
reduction negotiations when you decided to retire the MX missiles?
Secretary Rumsfeld. In our on-going effort to properly size and
configure our strategic nuclear forces to deal with the deterrent tasks
of a post-Cold War world, we have determined after careful study that
now is the time to retire our 50-missile MX force. This decision is
consistent with our move toward a new post-Cold War framework and our
effort to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons to the lowest
possible number consistent with our national security and our
commitments to our allies. In our view, such changes to our nuclear
force posture should not require years and years of detailed
negotiations under an out-moded, Cold War-style arms control process.
There is an inherent contradiction in attempting to improve U.S.-
Russian political relations and enhance strategic stability by
remaining committed to the Cold War approach to arms control, a
fundamentally adversarial approach. In 1991, the United States invited
the Soviet Union to join it in removing thousands of tactical nuclear
weapons from deployment. Huge reductions were achieved in a matter of
months, making the world much safer, more quickly. Similarly, in the
area of strategic nuclear weapons, we should invite the Russian
government to accept the new vision put forward by the President, and
act on it. In retiring the Peacekeeper missile force, we have an
opportunity, to lead by example, to a safer world. It is in our best
interest and the best interest of the world to take this step.

INFRASTRUCTURE

14. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the stated fiscal
year 2002 goals is to streamline and upgrade DOD infrastructure.
Although the budget reflects the funding to upgrade the infrastructure,
there is no visibility on how you plan to streamline the
infrastructure.
Please provide some specifics on how you plan to streamline the
infrastructure.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department intends to streamline its
infrastructure by seeking authority to conduct one additional round of
base closure and realignment beginning in fiscal year 2003. The
Department plans on submitting its request as a legislative proposal
for fiscal year 2002 under the title of Efficient Facilities Initiative
(EFI). If legislative authority for EFI is provided in fiscal year
2002, the Department will request funding in the fiscal year 2004
budget submission to begin implementation of approved base closures and
realignments.
EFI is essential to re-shape and properly match installations'
capabilities with changing military operational needs and to improve
installation support for readiness. Strategies for privatization,
competitive sourcing, and housing will be better formulated once
decisions are made to eliminate unnecessary infrastructure. The
Department cannot afford to maintain excess infrastructure while
modernizing its weapons and increasing benefits. While savings will be
significant and reinvested for other priority needs, an equally
important message, is that EFI is an integral part of the military
transformation occurring in all the Services.

GOVERNMENT JOBS

15. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that the
Office of Management and Budget ordered agencies to offer for
competition at least 5 percent of government jobs considered commercial
in nature. The directive also established a deadline of October 2002 to
complete this task.
What are the implications of this directive on the Department of
Defense and how do you plan to accomplish this task?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Through the past several years the Defense
Department has managed the most robust program of competitions of
government-performed commercial type activities among all the Federal
Agencies. The competitions, performed under the procedures identified
in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, take on average 2
years to complete. Therefore, most of those that will be completed by
October 2002 were already initiated by October 2000 and constitute part
of our ongoing program. While our current projections indicate that
those that will complete during fiscal year 2002 alone will fall
modestly shy of 5 percent, the cumulative competitions between fiscal
year 1999 and fiscal year 2002 will be far in excess of the 5 percent
target.

STRATEGIC LIFT

16. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, in your prepared statement
you indicate: ``Congressional support of strategic lift is needed if we
are to build a national mobility capability sufficient for our current
and future needs.'' What are the specific programs for which you are
seeking support?
General Shelton. Our Strategic Mobility Triad is the central
component of our strategy to respond around the world. The triad
consists of strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and pre-positioning.
I will address each portion of the triad that could benefit from your
support, as well as associated infrastructure issues.
Strategic Airlift
Acquisition and sustainment for the full fleet of C-
17s: fund the full complement of C-17s required to attain
strategic airlift requirement identified by MRS-05/QDR and
correct sustainment shortfalls for the currently authorized C-
17 fleet.
C-5 Modernization: fund Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP) and Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program
(RERP). AMP and RERP are needed to improve the C-5 mission
capable rate, to allow us to improve the oversize and outsize
requirements. AMP increases navigational safety and complies
with new internationally mandated Global Air Traffic Management
standards--ensuring continued access to worldwide air routes.
RERP will significantly improve mission capable rates through a
one-time upgrade of aircraft structure, engines, fuel system,
environmental system, flight controls, hydraulic system,
electrical system, pneumatic system, and landing gear.
Large Aircraft Defensive Systems (LADS): fund Air
Mobility Command's (AMC) Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system. The system is designed to
protect critical strategic aircraft from lethal Man Portable
Air Defensive Systems (MANPADS) in Third World and terrorist
areas. LADS provides next generation defensive capabilities to
reduce vulnerability as these aircraft face increasingly
sophisticated portable anti-aircraft systems. The current AMC
program calls for the outfitting of a 79-aircraft Small-Scale
Contingency (SSC) complement, consisting of C-17s, C-5s, C-130s
and KC-135s.
Air Refueling: address aircrew and maintenance
shortfalls in the KC-135 fleet. An AMC initiative to fill the
additional 75 aircrew and 601 maintenance positions is not
funded. Without full funding to correct these shortfalls, our
ability to operate in a timely and flexible manner across the
full spectrum of contingencies will be severely limited.
Materials Handling Equipment (MHE): The modernization
of our MHE fleet consists of Tunner (60,000) loaders and Next
Generation Small Loader (NGSL) (25,000) loaders. Both loaders
are able to service all cargo aircraft, especially the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft with their 18.5-foot upper
cargo decks. The Tunner lacks the funding for the purchase and
sustainment of the final 38 units. The NGSL is fully funded,
but has a shortfall in sustainment funding.
Strategic Sealift
Regarding strategic sealift the following is provided: The continued
decline of U.S. flag merchant marine fleet and the increased
globalization/consolidation of companies within the maritime industry
may affect USTRANSCOM's ability to meet peace and wartime DOD
requirements. Our objective is a stable commercial merchant marine
capability, with maximum emphasis on U.S. flag ships, U.S. citizen
mariners to support DOD contingency pre-positioning, surge and
sustainment requirements.

Continued support to finish the Large Medium Speed
Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) build. This on-going construction
program consists of 19 vessels that will provide the backbone
of our contingency support fleet with over 5.2M square feet of
militarily useful capacity.
Re-capitalization of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
ships. The aging of these critical surge fleet assets causes
increasing difficulty with operation and maintenance and
requires re-capitalization.
Maritime Security Program (MSP)/Jones Act/Cargo
Preference. These programs are critical to ensure available
U.S. flag ships and mariners are available to support national
defense. Additionally, the programs help maintain viability of
the U.S. merchant marine fleet in a highly competitive global
environment.
Merchant Mariner manning. U.S. merchant mariners are
an integral part of national security to crew the organic and
commercial fleets.
Additional sealift issues which are not specifically
defined yet, but will likely require full Congressional support
are:

Maritime tanker re-capitalization. Maritime
tanker situation is adequate at present; however, Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (double hull tanker
requirement) requires extensive recapitalization. All
tankers must be in compliance with OPA 90 by 2015.
Heavy lift for non-self deployable watercraft
(NSDW). Military Requirement Study 2005 identified a
shortfall in our ability to deliver NSDW to overseas
theaters within CINC timeline requirements. Joint
Staff/J4 is chairing a study to determine solutions to
alleviate this shortfall.

Pre-positioning
Pre-positioning is a vital facet of our strategic
mobility triad. It permits us to respond more quickly to
developing crises and enhances our ability to deter aggression
and war. Pre-positioning also helps offset our reduced forward-
deployed presence and decreases reliance on scarce strategic
lift assets. The two main components of our global pre-
positioning strategy require robust investment to ensure their
continued viability.
Afloat Pre-positioned Force: Each service maintains
pre-positioned equipment aboard approximately 30 ships
stationed in the Mediterranean Sea, and Indian and Pacific
Oceans. This flexible method of pre-positioning provides timely
equipment and supplies to the geographic CINCs. Continued
investment in these strategic assets will help improve
responsiveness and deliver greater capability to the
warfighter.
Land-based Pre-positioning: We currently pre-position
equipment and supplies in several European, Southwest Asian,
and Pacific Rim countries. Our overseas commands rely on this
equipment to support the earliest stages of their war and
contingency plans. As global threats evolve, we continually
tailor our pre-positioned assets to meet the warfighting CINCs,
most critical requirements.
Infrastructure
En Route Infrastructure Improvements (Europe and
Pacific). The current strategic airlift enroute infrastructure
system comprises seven bases in the Pacific and six in Europe.
Improvements to ramps, fuel hydrant systems, and fuel storage
systems are needed for these bases to handle the transiting C-
5s and C-17s en route to the theaters.
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is mandated
through Presidential Decision Directive 63. DOD is identifying
what truly is mission-critical (i.e., no Plan B for a
particular go-to-war capability at a particular node) and
assessing and remediating vulnerabilities at those locations.
Ammunition infrastructure improvements to ensure
efficient ammunition flow from depot to destination from CONUS
depots to railcar availability to CONUS ports to overseas
destinations. DOD must improve its container-handling equipment
and intermodal capabilities.
Assured Access. The MRS-05 study pointed out
shortfalls in lift, especially commercial railcars, to carry
large volumes of ammunition and unit equipment from origins to
ocean ports. Assured Access program now underway will negotiate
DOD agreements with carriers, specifying how much equipment is
needed and when during a contingency.

MILITARY PAY

17. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, although I strongly support
increased pay and allowances for our dedicated military personnel, I
believe we must set a goal on what we hope to achieve. If we continue
to increase pay and compensation under the current system, we build
expectations that may not be achievable considering all the other
requirements to maintain our readiness. What is your ultimate goal for
the level of military pay?
General Shelton. The Department's ultimate goal is to attract and
retain quality personnel in numbers sufficient to sustain the National
defense. To do so, the Department needs to remain competitive with the
civilian sector in terms of pay and compensation. The proliferation of
technology and information-based systems and the changing nature of
warfare have increased the demand for highly trained, technically
proficient men and women in the Armed Forces.
The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (9th QRMC)
recommends changes that would not only raise the level of pay for some
grades, but would alter the structure of the pay system as well. The
pay raise slated for fiscal year 2002 and your continued support of our
efforts to bring military pay in line with the civilian sector, such as
the Employment Cost Index +.5 percent initiative, will further improve
the quality of life for our Service members and their families.

LARGE DECK CARRIERS

18. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, as you may be aware, there
has been an ongoing debate in the press on the vulnerability of our
large deck carriers. What are your views on our carriers vulnerability
in future operations?
General Shelton. Carriers have been our first on-scene presence in
many operations over the past decade, protecting our economic,
political, and security interests in both peace and conflict. I do not
see their mission changing in the near future.
To place the on-going debate in context, press articles often do
not account for the challenges of identifying and targeting a mobile
platform. If we consider carriers vulnerable to missiles, then land
bases and land assets share the same vulnerability if not more.
With that premise, the question becomes ``How survivable are
carriers?''
The answer is, they are very survivable.
An enemy not only has to locate, target, and launch a weapon at
what is an extremely mobile platform, but that same weapon has to
penetrate the carriers layered defense systems. Carriers are survivable
because of limitations in weapon systems acquisition capabilities
versus the carriers' mobility, offensive, and defensive capabilities.
In addition, the Navy is developing an array of air and underwater
sensors and capabilities that will only enhance the carriers'
survivability in the future.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum

UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS

19. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, traditionally, the
committee has relied on Service unfunded requirements lists or ``UFR
lists'' as a guide on where best to apply additional resources. That
is, these lists have provided Congress with information on the most
pressing needs facing the services that are not addressed by the
President's Budget Request. Can you update the committee on whether the
Services will permitted to submit UFR Lists for fiscal year 2002? If
not, what recommendations or advice will the Department of Defense
provide on how best to allocate additional resources for our military
branches and defense agencies?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I have concerns about this traditional
practice of unfunded requirements lists, I have not prevented such
lists from being provided to Congress. However, in this or future
budget years, I would urge members of Congress to seek recommendations
from me on how best to allocate added defense resources--rather than
relying on Service lists, which can become dated and which are not a
reliable way to identify the Defense Department's most pressing
security requirements.

20. Senator Santorum. General Shelton, have you begun the process
of generating UFR lists? If additional funds were added to the Fiscal
Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act, and if Service UFR lists will not
be generated, how do you suggest Congress best allocate additional
funds for the Military Services? Has the Office of the Secretary of
Defense told the service chiefs not to generate UFR lists for fiscal
year 2002? Do you have unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2002 that
are not addressed by this Budget Amendment?
General Shelton. The Services provide the resources for the
warfighters and as such they can best articulate unfunded requirements.
Recently, at the request of Congressman Skelton and with full knowledge
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services provided their
fiscal year 2002 unfunded requirements. If additional resources are
made available for defense, allocations should reflect inputs from the
Services' unfunded requirements.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

21. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, traditionally, the
Clinton administration used supplemental appropriations bills to fund
existing military requirements. Will you require additional or
supplemental funds in fiscal year 2002 or is this budget request
sufficient for the year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This budget request should be sufficient for
the year. The Bush administration is committed to preparing realistic
budgets that will not require supplemental appropriations except for
genuine emergencies like war or natural disaster.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

22. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President expressed a
desire to pursue ``leap ahead'' technologies and has been supportive of
``skipping a generation'' in the weapons system acquisition process.
The ability to realize these goals will largely be driven by our
investment in our Department of Defense Science and Technology (S&T)
Program. These budget accounts support research on many of the key
technologies that will be necessary for the Army to transition to its
``objective force,'' for the Air Force and Navy to utilize UCAVs, and
for many of our chemical and biological agent protection/detection
capabilities.
I am alarmed to see that the funding levels for Basic Research
(6.1) and Applied Research (6.2) have remained equal to the levels that
were appropriated last year. In addition, I am perplexed to see that
Advanced Technology Development (6.3) funding has declined versus last
year's appropriated level. Overall, the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget
request asks for less in S&T funding than was appropriated last year. I
am doubtful that the Department can realize advances in ``leap ahead''
technologies or invest in our next generation of engineers and
scientists with this level of S&T funding. While I am encouraged to see
increases in nanotechnology research and chemical and biological agent
research, the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget request fails to robustly
fund our S&T accounts.
How do you intend to support ``leap ahead'' advances with less
money than was requested last year? Since leaders of industry have
bemoaned the lack of funding devoted to basic research, how can you
assure me that the Department of Defense is strongly supportive of
producing the next generation of scientists and engineers?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Determining a sufficient level of S&T
investment is not a precise science, rather I believe it is a strategic
decision. It has always been the Department's goal to fund S&T at a
level adequate to ensure the technological superiority of our Armed
Forces. In fiscal year 2001, the Department's total request for S&T
funding was $7.5 billion and our Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget
request is for a total of $8.8 billion. This represents an increase of
more than 17 percent over the fiscal year 2001 request. A strong S&T
program is required to provide options for responding to a full range
of military challenges both today, and into the uncertain future. The
Department's investment in S&T develops the technology foundation
necessary for our modernization effort, and fosters the development of
``leap ahead'' technologies that produce revolutionary capabilities.
DOD must continue to invest broadly in defense-relevant technologies
because it is not possible to predict in which areas the next
breakthroughs will occur. It is the Department's objective to grow the
S&T budget to be 3 percent of the total DOD top-line budget as soon as
possible. This goal is consistent with the industrial model of
investing 3 percent of a corporation's budget in research. However, we
also need to ensure that the funding levels of the various components
in the Department's total budget are balanced based on our assessment
of the most urgent requirements at any given time.
With respect to your second question, the Department of Defense
gives a high priority to basic research and to the training of future
scientists and engineers in defense-critical fields. DOD basic research
is a wellspring of new knowledge and understanding that underpins
future defense technologies. Moreover, the DOD basic research program
provides the majority of the Department's support to students pursuing
advanced degrees in defense-critical science and engineering fields,
helping to ensure the future availability of talent for defense needs.
The Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget request of $1.3 billion for basic
research is more than 8 percent above the fiscal year 2001 request of
$1.2 billion. Our carefully considered judgment is that this level of
basic research investment makes most sense within available resources,
given that we must maintain a good programmatic balance among all of
the components of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).
A balanced RDT&E investment strategy is important to help assure that
basic research results are fully utilized in a timely way, through
technology transition to applied research and ultimately to development
of defense systems.

TRANSFORMATION

23. Senator Santorum. General Shelton, last year, the Army
terminated or re-structured seven programs to pay for the Chief of
Staff of the Army's ``transformation'' initiative. The Army believed
these terminations and re-structuring were necessary because the Office
of the Secretary of Defense was unable to provide additional funds to
support transforming the Army. Congress then restored several of these
programs because of existing Army requirements. What assurance can you
provide that the Army's transformation initiative is fully funded in
the Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Amendment? If the transformation effort is
not fully funded, what are some of the tradeoffs or choices that the
Army will have to consider seeing that this effort is adequately
funded? What is the funding level for the S&T efforts that are
necessary to support the Army's ``objective force?''
General Shelton. Transformation is an evolutionary process and the
Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget represents a balanced program, which
maintains an Army, trained and ready. To support the Army's future
goals, significant funding increases for transformation and science and
technology development have been included as part of the President's
Amended Budget. The service can best articulate in any discussion
pertaining to Transformation tradeoff decisions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

BOMBERS

24. Senator Roberts. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that within
the Air Force and with other supporters, there is an effort to reopen
the B-2 line. Part of the justification for the cuts in the B-1B
program is to free up funds to support needed modernization accounts.
The strong suggestion is that funds for modernization of this very
capable platform are scarce--and probably for other programs as well.
What is the justification for opening the B-2 line while reducing the
inventory of the B-1B because of funding? If the numbers of long range
precision bombers is an issue, why spend significant scarce dollars
when the current inventory could be modernized at a substantially less
cost?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is premature to say that the Department
supports efforts to reopen the production line of the B-2 bomber.
Funding provided in fiscal year 2002 for the Next Generation Bomber
program is for basic research and development and will be used for
introductory flight dynamics and propulsion technology. If the decision
is made to enter production of a new bomber then a substantial
investment will have to be made. The entire Air Force aircraft fleet is
aging, but the fleet of strategic bombers, on average, is the oldest.
Their current age is 25 years and it is projected to increase to 33
years if nothing is done to modernize the fleet.
As for the B-1, it is becoming increasingly expensive to maintain
the aircraft. I felt it was a prudent decision to reduce the fleet size
and take those savings and reinvest them into modernizing the remaining
aircraft, because, as you point out, funds for modernization are
scarce. Therefore, it was important that funding made available from
the reduction in the B-1 inventory be used to modernize and increase
the mission capable rates of the remaining B-1 aircraft.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

SPACE BASED RADAR

25. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, in earlier visits, we have
discussed the importance of the development of space based radar and
the disappointment of the cancellation of Discoverer II. Last year's
Authorization Bill required a space based radar roadmap to guide the
overall effort. Where is the Department on completing the roadmap? How
does your budget address space based radar?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The space based radar roadmap is now in final
coordination within the Department and should be delivered to Congress
in August. While the roadmap uses fiscal year 2008 as a target date for
initiating deployment of an operational space based radar system, the
specific system architecture and its integration with airborne assets
still needs to be defined. The President's Budget request for fiscal
year 2002 of $50 million sustains and expands the space based radar
technology effort as well as supports the development of requirements,
concepts of operation, and architecture options for a space-based radar
system.

SPACE ASSETS

26. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, I know you understand the
importance of protecting our national security and commercial space
assets. How does the budget fund surveillance capabilities, asset
protection, and attack prevention?
Also, what efforts are underway to coordinate protection against
disruption of our space assets between the commercial and defense
sectors?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget
requests increased funding to modernize the existing space surveillance
network by upgrading the Cobra Dane and Eglin space tracking radars in
Alaska and Florida, respectively, as well as improving the Navy's space
surveillance ``fence.'' It also requests funds to increase the number
and quality of optical sensors in the network to expand coverage and
improve resolution of space objects, improve command and control, and
pursue development of a space-based sensor to enhance the performance
of the existing ground-based surveillance network. With respect to
space asset protection, the budget requests increased funds for
radiation hardening of electronics as well as other technology
development to make satellites, links, and ground control nodes more
robust. This includes technology for threat warning that, when coupled
with improved intelligence, will provide a greater ability to
anticipate and prevent attacks to critical space systems. It also
requests funds to develop an approach to space asset protection that
addresses commercial assets used to support national security missions.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

27. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, how does this budget
request address shortfalls in our satellite intelligence and
communications infrastructure? How will the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) ensure we have the capacity and flexibility to support
our intelligence and communications requirements in the future?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Complete integration of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance systems is a key DOD objective, and
remains one of our greatest challenges. Our joint service Distributed
Common Ground Systems (DCGS) architecture has made great progress, but
much remains to be accomplished through integration of DCGS and
National Mission Ground Stations to meet the TPED requirements
associated with our advanced tactical sensors and future overhead
collectors. New sensors and deployment schemes are being examined that
could provide important intelligence information to military commanders
on the battlefield as well as to decision-makers assessing foreign
leadership intentions.
Evolution of a Defense Surveillance Architecture of integrated
surveillance platforms, networks and databases is a top priority for
meeting DOD requirements in the next 5 to 10 years. The Department is
currently implementing a Surveillance Integration initiative to
integrate both airborne and space surveillance systems. We must add
also new collection capabilities, such as the proposed Space Based
Radar system.
It is critical that we continue ongoing efforts to improve
collection from both space and airborne collectors. This includes
sensor developments such as Hyperspectral Imagery and chemical/
biological ground sensors; and platform developments such as stealth
and tactical UAVs. We must deliver the Future Communications
Architecture, which will allow individual collectors and-ground
processing elements, DCGS and MGSs to inter-operate and relay data more
efficiently and effectively.
In the communications arena, our goal is to provide our forces with
the ability to connect to a ubiquitous information grid, requiring only
the correct communications equipment with the correct security
capabilities. The most significant shortfalls in meeting this goal are
in satellite communications (SATCOM) and terrestrial communications.
SATCOM offers a unique capability for expeditionary forces by allowing
reliable command and control connectivity from the national command
authorities to the forces afield, independent of any infrastructure
where forces are operating. Both spacecraft and connecting ground
communications equipment procurements have lacked synchronization and
are being addressed by the QDR and program initiatives.
System replacement is the near term issue, and DOD has begun the
planning and design activities required to execute the replacement of
the existing Defense Satellite Communication, MILSTAR, and UHF Follow-
On Systems. Looking further into the future, technologies that will
provide exponential increases in communications throughput, security,
and responsiveness are also being studied. The National Security Space
Architect has been tasked to examine space assets, while another task
group is developing an Information Superiority Investment Strategy.
Both groups are reviewing the shortfalls and are providing the
recommendations that span the DOD infrastructure.
To meet our communications requirements, in the next 5 to 10 years,
we will continue to develop an integrated architecture and achievable
roadmap for the acquisition of communications satellites. Replacement
of the existing communication satellite constellations, MILSTAR, UHF
Follow On, and the Defense Satellite Communication System will remain a
priority.
In concert with new platform acquisitions and expanded use of
commercial communications, we will continue our dedicated efforts to
deliver the Global Information Grid (GIG). The communication systems,
computing systems and services, software applications, data, and
security services comprising the GIG provide the force structure the
ability to decisively maintain information superiority over current and
potential adversaries. The GIG represents the integrating construct and
architecture for the DOD's use of information technology that supports
warfighting and other important national security purposes. The GIG
includes all Defense and Intelligence Community Information Technology
(including that which is embedded in airborne and space platforms). We
plan to continue to develop and enforce DOD interoperability policy and
implement key initiatives such as the Global Command and Control
System, Defense Message System, and the Cooperative Engagement
Capability. We also plan to continue and strengthen our
interoperability efforts with our alliance partners.

COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE

28. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, a recent Defense Science
Board study stated that the U.S. military is severely lacking in the
area of computer network defense. They must spend up to $3 billion per
year or $1.4 billion more than today on computer security technologies
and training and recruitment of qualified individuals. What is the DOD
response in this budget to this important and complex problem?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The revised fiscal year 2002 budget submission
has addressed some of these issues and has included an increase of $142
million for efforts in training education and retention, cryptographic
modernization, secured wired and wireless communications, computer
network defense, global information grid, and network intrusion
detection. The Quadrennial Defense Review, which is currently on going,
also addresses these issues and has identified additional requirements.
Efforts will be made to accommodate these requirements in the upcoming
program build process.

ANTHRAX VACCINE

29. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, there have been discussions
regarding the need for a second facility to produce the anthrax
vaccine. Do you address this issue in the budget?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, the Department of Defense is currently
planning for construction of a government-owned, contractor-operated
(GOCO) biological defense vaccine production facility on a generic
site. The site selection process will be conducted in a fair and open
manner. A GOCO biological defense production facility will accommodate
three bulk vaccine production suites, each with different production
technology processes: spore-forming bacteria (e.g., anthrax), a
microbial fermentation, and tissue culture (viral vaccines). A modular
design will allow flexibility and expandable manufacturing capacity for
production of DOD-critical vaccines, such as anthrax, that are intended
for force protection and licensing by the Food and Drug Administration.
Regarding specific funding, there is $0.7 million in the Fiscal
Year 2002 Military Construction, Defense-wide budget to support initial
planning and design efforts. Also, $2.4 million in PE 0604384BP is in
the President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request to establish a program
management office for a biological defense vaccine production facility.

OPTEMPO

30. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, we often hear reports that
the PERSTEMPO and the OPTEMPO are too high and that you are having
difficulty maintaining them with the current force structure. An
increased reliance on the Reserve components has had a positive effect,
but they too are suffering from a high OPTEMPO. At the readiness
hearing last September, the service chiefs implied that the Quadrennial
Defense Review would likely return a recommendation to increase the
size of our force structure, particularly in the Army. Do we need an
increase in force structure? How are you going to reduce the effects of
a high OPTEMPO?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I also share your concerns about tempo strains
on U.S. forces. This issue is under examination in the Quadrennial
Defense Review.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Hutchinson

SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE

31. Senator Hutchinson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I know that there have
been discussions within the Department of Defense about the future of
the spectrum band that the military currently uses. Certainly, any
consideration of changing the DOD's spectrum should have as its primary
goal the maintenance and enhancement of our military's communications
system.
The military's spectrum is also used commercially in most parts of
the developed world. It has been suggested that a stepwise migration to
new spectrum could potentially help prevent future interference
problems in these areas of the world and could be financed through the
sale of the military's current spectrum. Do you believe that such a
move could provide national security benefits to our military?
Secretary Rumsfeld. This is an excellent question that has several
important issues embedded in it. I would like to provide the bottom
line answer first and follow that with my rationale that will address
the embedded issues of both ``new spectrum'' and potential interference
to our systems when employed outside the United States.
Essentially, I do not believe the proposal to transition DOD
systems from the spectrum band of current interest to other bands has
any potential for providing national security benefits. I am, however,
willing to objectively participate in the search for the best national
solution to the spectrum demand problem.
The specific spectrum band of interest is the 1755-1850 MHz band,
which DOD employs for a number of critical major systems. This band is
under consideration, along with others, to be designated for use by
advanced wireless systems, more commonly referred to as Third
Generation cellular systems or ``3G''. This band is technically Federal
Government spectrum, within the borders of the United States, and the
DOD is allowed to employ the band as a Government entity and does so in
the provision of warfighting capabilities that are vital to our Nation.
First allow me to address the issue of ``new spectrum.'' There
could be other spectrum that the DOD would be able to migrate our
systems into, but there is no new spectrum that can be made available
The idea of providing the DOD other spectrum sounds reasonable but the
Nation's two key spectrum regulatory bodies in the Department of
Commerce and the Federal Communications Commission have been examining
this issue for over a year without finding a workable solution. The DOD
systems that operate in this band support functions that we must
maintain or else we will seriously degrade our defense capabilities.
Losing access to the current band, without first being provided
comparable spectrum that is just as useful would weaken the DOD's
ability to protect the Nation and cripple our capabilities to execute
our global missions.
Second, the responsibility for global missions ties in with your
reference to potential interference for our systems when operated in
the developed world. You are correct that the band of interest is used
in the developed world for commercial systems. We recognize this and
there are reasons why we do not view the situation as a hindrance to
fulfilling our obligations in other parts of the world. In the truly
developed areas of the world, we employ our systems in training ranges
and areas that are quite remote from the commercial sources of
potential interference. In those cases where there is a need to use a
system in proximity to a commercial source of interference, our
spectrum experts with the Combatant Commands coordinate with the proper
entities to ensure that any potential interference is avoided. I must
also point out that our systems are designed with ``spectrum
flexibility'' so that those who operate them can respond to the
constraints we experience when we are in other sovereign nations.
Additionally, the majority of situations where we employ critical
weapons systems outside our own country are not in the developed world
but in the less developed regions where interference from commercial
systems is not a concern.
My final point is based on a linkage of the two above issues. Our
nation stands alone with global responsibilities and the requirement to
consider and, when necessary, apply military force as an instrument of
foreign policy. No other country faces the security implications that
we face in designating spectrum for commercial purposes. We cannot
assume that we can reach a decision on this critical spectrum issue by
following the same path or assuming the same options that other
countries may have considered. Our decision must truly be made in the
best national interest that balances all facets of the issue, including
ensuring the maintenance of our vital defense capabilities.

BRAC

32. Senator Hutchinson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am adamantly opposed
to a new round of base closures. With a changing strategic environment,
the high cost of base closures, and the uncertain benefits, I would be
very concerned about the proposal of a new BRAC round.
Does the administration propose a new round of BRAC? It is my
understanding that the budget amendment will include something called
the ``Efficient Facilities Initiative.'' Is that a new name for BRAC?
What would the criteria be for closing military facilities? When does
the administration to provide further details on this issue?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department will be requesting additional
base realignment and closure authority as part of its Efficient
Facilities Initiative. The Efficient Facilities Initiative that we are
developing supports the Department's efforts to transform its
facilities to meet the challenges of the new century. It is not a new
name for BRAC, but BRAC is a central part of the initiative. The three
main components of the EFI are: authorization of an additional round of
base closures and realignments in 2003; authorization of significant
improvements in the existing base closure process; and authorization of
a set of tools for the efficient operation of enduring military
installations.
While the BRAC authority we are requesting uses essentially the
same process as has been used successfully before, the proposal would
better ensure the primacy of military value in the selection and
execution of base closure and realignment decisions. Specific selection
criteria will be worked out after Congress has authorized the new BRAC
round. We intend to submit this EFI to Congress before its August
recess.

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 10, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

SECRETARIES AND CHIEFS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Cleland, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Carnahan, Warner,
Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Collins, and Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gerald J. Leeling,
counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Christine E.
Cowart, chief clerk.
Professional staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
Creighton Greene, Maren Leed, Michael J. McCord, and Arun A.
Seraphin.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
Republican staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
director for the minority; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; William C.
Greenwalt, professional staff member; Gary M. Hall,
professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis,
professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional
staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, minority counsel; Suzanne K.
L. Ross, research assistant; Cord A. Sterling, professional
staff member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F.
Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen, Thomas C. Moore,
and Michele A. Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to
Senator Carnahan; Brady King and Jason Van Wey, assistants to
Senator Dayton; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
Robert Alan McCurry and James Beauchamp, assistants to Senator
Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek
Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to receive testimony on the proposed fiscal
year 2002 amended budget from the secretaries and the chiefs of
the military services. I want to welcome Secretary of the Army,
Tom White; Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki; Secretary
of the Navy, Gordon England; Chief of Naval Operations, Adm.
Vernon Clark; the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Jim
Jones; Secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche; and Air Force
Chief of Staff, Gen. Mike Ryan.
Before we begin, I just want to take a moment to
acknowledge that last night in North Carolina a CH-46
helicopter carrying five marines crashed during a routine
training exercise. Three of the marines were killed, the
remaining two crew members are hospitalized. Our thoughts and
our prayers are with them and their families. General Jones, I
just want to express our condolences to you personally while
you are here and hope that you will extend all of our
condolences to the family and friends of the victims and to the
entire Corps.
These tragedies remind us of the risks that men and women
in our armed services take every day on our behalf. We are
grateful to them and we hope that you will pass along our
condolences to the families and the victims.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. May I join our chairman in that, General.
I think one other thing should be pointed out. Regrettably,
these types of accidents point out the aging of our equipment.
We first started buying that type of helicopter in the sixties
is my recollection. How old would you anticipate that air ship
to be?
General Jones. About 35 years old, sir.
Senator Warner. Thirty-five years old. So it is near the
very end of its extended life.
Chairman Levin. Is the cause of the accident known?
General Jones. It is under investigation, sir. The pilot
and the copilot survived and they are in stable condition in
the hospital as we speak.
Chairman Levin. This is an unusually large panel of
witnesses, but we are in an unusual situation. The delay in
submitting the fiscal year 2002 amended budget to Congress has
left us with just 7 weeks of session to accomplish what
typically takes 5 months. We still need the detailed
justification books that are essential to our review of the
budget request. We just will remind our secretaries here that
it is absolutely critical that we get those detailed
justification books as soon as possible.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the additional $18.4
billion in defense spending that the President is requesting
for fiscal year 2002, along with any increases in defense
spending in future years, cannot be initiated or sustained
without using the surpluses in the Social Security and Medicare
trust funds or without returning to budget deficits or without
cutting important domestic programs, such as education, health
care, and law enforcement.
None of those are acceptable alternatives. The only
alternative that I see is to revisit the upper income tax cuts
which were recently enacted. But once we address the issue of
how we are going to pay for the budget increases that are
proposed, we then have to ask whether or not the
administration's proposed budget reflects the proper balance
between the quality of life and readiness of our military men
and women that they need today and the investments that are
needed to modernize and transform our Armed Forces to meet the
threats of tomorrow.
We will be asking each of our witnesses this morning
whether this budget request addresses what they consider to be
the priorities of their respective services, both for the near
term and the long term. In order for us to evaluate the
programs and priorities included in this budget, we also need a
clear understanding of what was not included. In recent years
each of the service chiefs has provided Congress lists of the
key programs that were not included in the annual defense
budget request. We will be asking each of the chiefs to provide
to this committee the unfunded priorities lists that you
provided in past years, similar to those lists at least, so
that we can get some understanding, not just of what is
requested, but again what has not been able to be funded.
I will also be asking our witnesses their views about some
of the choices that were made in this year's budget. For
example, this budget request would decrease funding for
procurement and for science and technology programs below the
current year's level while increasing funding for missile
defense programs by $3 billion or 57 percent over the current
year.
The budget request would also reduce Army flying hours and
tank training miles in fiscal year 2002 compared to the current
year. In the latter case, Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee
that ``the Army made those kind of choices.'' The committee
looks forward to the testimony of all of the service
secretaries and chiefs on the thinking behind these and other
difficult choices.
All of us share a responsibility to do our best to ensure
that Defense Department programs and activities are conducted
effectively and efficiently. In his recent testimony to this
committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said: ``I have never seen an
organization that could not operate at something like 5 percent
more efficiency if it had the freedom to do so.'' He went on to
say that: ``The taxpayers have a right to demand that we spend
their money wisely. Today,'' he said, ``we cannot tell the
American people we are doing that. I know I cannot.''
That is a very significant and serious statement. If the
American taxpayers cannot be assured that the Defense
Department is spending their money wisely, we will not be able
to sustain public support for the kind of increases in defense
spending that are contained in this budget request.
Each of our service secretaries has had extensive
experience managing large private sector companies. Secretary
Rumsfeld has set up a new senior executive committee and a
business initiative council to draw on this experience and to
help him manage the Defense Department. I hope each of you this
morning will give us recommendations to improve the management
of your respective departments, both those requiring
legislation and those that can be implemented without
legislation.
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
recognizing our service secretaries and service chiefs, and
particularly you, General Ryan. In all likelihood this could be
your last appearance before the Senate as you wind up a most
distinguished career, preceded by your father, who was also
Chief of Staff of the Air Force when I was privileged to be
Secretary of the Navy. I remember him well.
What a proud family tradition. It exemplifies here in the
United States of America how families, generations of families,
have proudly worn the uniform of our country in different
services. That is the very bedrock of our professional military
force, officer as well as enlisted.
I commend you and your wife and your family for this
service.
Chairman Levin. General Ryan, let me just join Senator
Warner in congratulating you for your distinguished service. I
am a little more cautious in saying this is probably your last
visit before the committee, but just on that chance, I surely
want to join, and I know on behalf of all the members of the
committee, in congratulating you and thanking you for an
extraordinary career.
General Ryan. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Across our country we detect a growing
consensus, and indeed here in Congress. The American people
want to improve the quality of life for those who serve in
uniform. They want to obtain modern equipment for those who
constantly take the risks, whether here at home, as we saw last
night, or abroad.
I can think of no more important building block in the
budget process than the testimony that is provided by those who
proudly serve as the service chiefs in our military
departments. I just go back over the past few years, because we
look to you for the complete professional opinions that each of
you are able to give. With due respect to the Commander in
Chief, whoever that may be, this committee time and time again
has called upon you to give us your personal views with regard
to the budget levels and the issues.
Indisputably, our Armed Forces are the best and the most
powerful in the world today. This well-deserved reputation was
not earned without cost. While our service men and women
perform their military missions with great dedication and
professionalism, our people, our equipment, and our
infrastructure are increasingly stressed by the effects of an
unprecedented number of military deployments over the past
decade, combined with years of decline in defense spending.
At the same time our force structure was declining in size
by almost 40 percent, our overseas deployments for peacekeeping
and other military operations increased by over 300 percent. As
the service chiefs have told us repeatedly, future readiness
and the upkeep of military facilities has been deferred to pay
for current operations and maintenance, and service personnel
are being asked to do more with less--less people, less
resources.
In the past week I have visited seven military
installations in my State and, General Jones, I spoke with you
about Quantico. Am I not correct that it has been 60 years
since we put a new housing unit for either an enlisted or an
officer on that base?
General Jones. That is correct.
Senator Warner. Those things simply have to be corrected,
and I am hopeful that we can make progress in this budget.
We have tried here in Congress in the past several years,
together with my distinguished colleague here Mr. Levin. We
have worked together as a team to increase defense spending. In
fiscal year 2000, we reversed a 14-year decline in defense
spending by authorizing a real increase in spending that year.
Last year we continued that momentum by providing an even
larger real increase for defense for fiscal year 2001. Over the
past years we have increased military pay by over 8 percent,
restored retirement and health care benefits to keep faith with
those who serve or have served, raised procurement levels to
begin recapitalization and modernization of aging equipment,
and I think significantly increased investment in research and
development.
We have to keep that momentum going forward, and we must
rely on you for your opinions as to whether the budget now
before us is adequate to keep that momentum.
Again, while much has been done, much remains. The
President is to be commended. I just looked at this fiscal 2002
defense request and our calculations are that $38.2 billion in
increases have been recognized and requested by President Bush.
These increases proposed in 2002 represent an almost 11 percent
increase in defense spending above the amount available in
2001.
While this increase begins to address the shortfalls, it
may not be enough, and we look to you for those answers.
I talked with my distinguished chairman this morning about
the $18.4 billion increase. We still have a battle on our own
home front here with our Budget Committees. They have an
across-the-board responsibility for the entire budget and we
will do our best. I will join our chairman in trying to support
in every way the President's request before those committees.
So this is a very, very important hearing today. I think it
is wonderful to go back to the old style of having the service
secretaries appear side-by-side with the service chiefs,
because it is a partnership between the civilian oversight and
the military chief as you work your way for your respective
departments. Let us do our best.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
In the interest of time and in order to give the members
chances to get into specific issues in their questions, I am
going to ask our witnesses now to limit their opening remarks
to 7 minutes. Secretary White, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary White. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss the state of America's Army. Consistent
with your guidance, Mr. Chairman, I will make a very brief
statement and then submit a longer statement for the record.
Chairman Levin. All your statements will be made part of
the record.
Secretary White. Thank you.
General Shinseki and I want to talk to you today, against
the backdrop of the President's 2002 amended budget, about our
progress in achieving the Army's vision. In our written
testimony, we described the magnificent work the Army has done
in recent months and identified the challenges we continue to
face.
There is still much work to be done, but the Army has moved
up. We are transforming in comprehensive and profound ways into
the most strategically responsive and dominant land force of
the 21st century, decisive across the entire spectrum of
military operations. That being said, I want to be very
straightforward about what this budget does and does not do for
the Army.
First, the budget will put us on the road to recovery in
some categories, such as military pay, housing allowances, and
health care. Second, it will start an improvement, but leave us
short of our goals, in other areas, such as restoring our
deteriorating infrastructure. Third, unfortunately, there will
continue to be shortfalls in a number of critical areas, such
as modernization and recapitalization of the existing force.
Recognizing these budget shortfalls, we must look elsewhere
for cost savings. The key to this effort is the freedom
necessary to efficiently manage the Army and generate near and
long-term savings for reinvestment. Given that latitude, we
hope to improve efficiency within the Army by adopting better
business practices, focusing on our core competencies,
outsourcing or privatizing where it makes sense, and
streamlining processes to reduce operating costs.
Success will be achieved by the redirection of resources to
fully fund the pillars of the Army's Vision: People, Readiness,
and Transformation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary White and
General Shinseki follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. Thomas E. White and Gen. Eric K.
Shinseki, USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we thank
you for this opportunity to report to you today on the United States
Army's readiness to provide for our Nation's security today and in the
future.
The Army exists for one purpose--to serve the Nation. For over 226
years, American soldiers have answered the Nation's call to duty,
faithfully and selflessly performing any mission that the American
people have asked of them. The soldiers are the common denominator that
has allowed us to enjoy economic prosperity and stability in a rapidly
changing global environment.
Throughout that time, the Army--active component, Army National
Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and Army civilians--has maintained its non-
negotiable contract with the American people to fight and win the
Nation's wars decisively. Indeed, the Army stands ready to go into
harm's way whenever and wherever we are asked. Today, The United States
Army is the most formidable land force in the world, a fact that
reassures allies and deters adversaries.
Today, the Army must also be capable of executing the broader
requirements of the National Security Strategy and National Military
Strategy across the full spectrum of operations. The commitment and
dedication of Army soldiers and civilians, coupled with the support of
the administration and Congress, are allowing the Army to meet its
requirements as the decisive landpower component of the U.S. military.
The bipartisan support of Congress during the past 2 years has
helped the Army build sustainable momentum for its Transformation. We
want to talk to you today, against the backdrop of the President's 2002
amended budget, about where we are in achieving the Army Vision. In our
testimony, we will describe the magnificent work the Army has done in
recent months and identify the challenges we continue to face. There is
still much work to be done, but the Army has moved out. It is
transforming in comprehensive and profound ways to be the most
strategically responsive and dominant land force of the 21st century--
decisive across the entire spectrum of military operations.
The budget for fiscal year 2002 ensures the Army is funded at
sufficient levels to support the National Security and National
Military Strategies. It funds people programs to man the force and
address quality of life issues relevant to our soldiers and their
families, ensures our continued warfighting readiness, and advances the
Army's Transformation to a full-spectrum 21st century force. It is a
balanced base program that allows the Army to meet these objectives. It
includes significant increases for installation services and
infrastructure, mitigating the necessity to divert training funds to
installation support.
The Army Transformation is enabled, although not at the optimal
level. The Army is accepting moderate risk in the level of training
OPTEMPO, but these risks are considered acceptable to ensure stable
base operations levels and improved facility maintenance and repair.
Sustainment programs also remain stable, and we are able to begin some
modernization of our aging helicopter fleet.
Today, the Army's active component ``go-to-war'' force is forward
stationed, deployed, or in the field--advancing our National interests,
supporting theater engagement plans, and training for tomorrow's
warfight. But, our Army is one-third smaller, deploys more frequently,
and is more likely to conduct stability and support operations than its
Cold War predecessor. Accelerating operational and deployment tempos
have strained Army capabilities, and over-stretched resources have
leveraged our warfighting readiness on the backs of our soldiers and
their families. Indeed, our mission demands create a requirement for
forces that increasingly can only be sustained by committing the
Reserve components. When we speak of the Army--Active and Reserve
components, soldiers, civilians, family members, retirees, and
veterans--we are acknowledging a single force with common missions,
common standards, and common responsibilities.
The Army has competing requirements that are in constant, daily
tension. First is the Army's requirement to have a trained and ready
force to fulfill its non-negotiable contract with the American people
to fight and win our Nation's wars decisively. That mission is
significantly enhanced by being fully engaged around the globe with our
allies, partners, and sometimes our potential adversaries to promote
stability, to gain influence, and to ensure access in times of crisis.
Further, as contingency operations become long-term commitments, our
mission tempo--both training and operational--increasingly strains our
force structure. Second, but most important, the Army must transform
itself into a force for the 21st century, strategically responsive and
dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations and
prepared to meet a growing array of requirements including threats to
our homeland. The mismatch between strategic requirements and
operational resources forces us daily to prioritize among support for
our people, the readiness demanded by the Nation, and the
transformation necessary to continue our global preeminence.

THE ARMY VISION

More than 10 years ago, during the buildup of Operation Desert
Shield, the Army identified an operational shortfall--a gap between the
capabilities of our heavy and light forces. Our heavy forces are the
most formidable in the world. There are none better suited for high-
intensity operations, but they are severely challenged to deploy to all
the places where they might be needed. Conversely, our magnificent
light forces are agile and deployable. They are particularly well
suited for low-intensity operations, but lack sufficient lethality and
survivability. There is, at present, no rapidly deployable force with
the staying power to provide our national leadership a complete range
of strategic options. The requirements dictated by the rapidly evolving
world situation increasingly underscore that capability gap; therefore,
the Army is changing.
To meet the national security requirements of the 21st century and
ensure full spectrum dominance, the Army articulated its vision to
chart a balanced course and shed its Cold War designs. The vision is
about three interdependent components--People, Readiness, and
Transformation. The Army is people--soldiers, civilians, veterans, and
families--and soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations.
Warfighting readiness is the Army's top priority. The Transformation
will produce a future force, the Objective Force, founded on innovative
doctrine, training, leader development, materiel, organizations, and
soldiers. The vision weaves together these threads--People, Readiness,
and Transformation--binding them into what will be the Army of the
future.

ACHIEVING THE ARMY VISION

Last year, the Army took the initial steps to achieve the vision.
One step was the continued realignment of our budget priorities,
generating investment capital by canceling or restructuring eight major
Army procurement programs. Unfortunately, the Army has had to eliminate
or restructure 182 programs over the past decade and a half. It is not
that these systems and capabilities were unnecessary; rather, our
resource prioritization made the programs unaffordable. Joining with
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in a cooperative research
and development effort, we began to streamline our acquisition process
to focus and accelerate the development and procurement of enabling
technologies for our Objective Force. To reduce the risk from the
capability gap between our heavy and light forces, the Army developed a
concept and began to organize an interim capability until the 21st
Century Objective Force is fielded. The Army also completed a
comprehensive study of how it trains soldiers and grows them into
leaders, knowing that the capabilities of a transformed Army will
reside in competent, confident, adaptive, and creative people.

PEOPLE

The fiscal year 2002 budget continues to emphasize people, the core
of our institutional strength. Well-being--the physical, material,
mental, and spiritual state of soldiers, families, and civilians--is
inextricably linked to the Army's capabilities, readiness, and its
preparedness to perform any mission.
To improve well-being, we are offering technology-based distance
learning opportunities; working to improve pay and retirement
compensation; working with the Department of Defense to guarantee that
TRICARE meets the needs of our soldiers, retirees, and their families;
improving facilities maintenance; and modernizing single soldier and
family housing. The much welcomed increases in housing allowance and
efforts to reducing out of pocket expenses is an important step toward
restoring faith with our soldiers and their families.
The health care provisions in the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act for our soldiers, retirees, and family members
represent the types of significant improvements the Army continues to
seek for the force's well-being. Sustained congressional support for
important well-being initiatives helps us recruit and retain a quality
force.
Indeed, the pay raise, pay table reform, and retirement reform, as
well as diligent efforts by leaders at all levels of the Army helped us
exceed our recruiting and retention goals in fiscal year 2000.
Attention to the well-being of our people will keep trained and
qualified soldiers and civilians in the Army in the years to come.

MANNING

In fiscal year 2000, we started a 4-year effort to increase
personnel readiness levels. The Manning Initiative redistributed
soldiers to fill all personnel authorizations in every active component
combat division and cavalry regiment, but by doing so, we accepted some
risk in the institutional base.
This effort exposed the serious gap that has existed in the
aggregate between manning requirements and authorizations. It is
possible that we will need to increase personnel authorizations to meet
all requirements, dependent upon ongoing reviews of overall Army
missions. Meeting the requirements with the active component, however,
is not enough. As mission demands necessitate increased use of our
Reserve components, we must bolster their full-time support
requirements to better keep them ready and available. Manning the
entire force will reduce operational and personnel tempo and improve
both readiness and well-being.
The fiscal year 2002 budget increases for enlistment and retention
bonuses will enable the Army to sustain its recent recruiting and
retention successes, although some shortfalls remain. Funding for
change-of-station moves helps to ensure we can place soldiers when and
where they are needed to man units at desired grade and skill levels,
and further advance the Army's Transformation.

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Readiness is a top priority. It means we must be prepared to
execute strategic missions across the full spectrum of operational
requirements around the globe. Our military formations must be able to
conduct a range of activities from engagement to stability and support
operations to warfighting. On any given day, the Army has nearly
125,000 soldiers and 15,000 U.S. civilians forward stationed in over
100 countries around the world. In fiscal year 2000, on a daily
average, we deployed more than 26,000 additional soldiers for
operations and military exercises in 68 countries--from East Timor to
Nigeria to the Balkans. In Bosnia, the Texas Army National Guard's 49th
Armored Division assumed the mission for the Multinational Division
(North), the first time since World War II that a Reserve component
division headquarters has led active component forces in an operational
mission. In both Europe and Korea, Army soldiers continue a successful
security commitment made 50 years ago. In Southwest Asia, the Army
continues its support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq,
stability operations in the Persian Gulf, and peacekeeping efforts in
the Sinai. No other military service works as frequently, as
continuously, or on as many levels to deter aggression, operate with
allies and coalition partners, and to respond at home and abroad with
support to civil authorities.

CIVIL SUPPORT

The Army provides military support to civil authorities, both
domestically and around the globe, for crisis response and consequence
management. Army support after natural disasters ranged from personnel
and equipment to suppress wildfires to logistical and medical support
following the disasters in the South African, Central American, and
Asian Pacific regions. Last year, within the United States, the U.S.
Soldier and Biological Chemical Command trained over 28,000 people and
conducted crisis response and consequence management exercises in 105
cities with Federal agencies, state and local governments, and non-
government organizations in support of the Domestic Preparedness
Program. The Army Corps of Engineers prevented an average of $21.1
billion in damages through flood control management projects including
383 major flood control reservoirs and 8,500 miles of flood control
levees as part of its flood fighting authority and the Federal Response
Plan. The Army supported civil law enforcement agencies in more than
380 counter-drug operations in 41 states. Finally, as part of a joint
program, the Army led the development and testing of a fixed, land-
based National Missile Defense system that offers the most mature
technology for a near-term deployment decision. The Army stands ready
to respond to the full breadth of security requirements in the homeland
and abroad now and in the future.

READINESS

The fiscal year 2002 budget request supports our most critical
readiness requirements, although we have accepted some risk in the
level of funding for active component air and ground OPTEMPO to
stabilize the deterioration of our facilities and augment training
enablers.
Measuring the readiness of the Army to respond to the Nation's call
requires accuracy, objectivity, and uniformity. Our current standards
are a Cold War legacy and reflect neither the complexity of today's
strategic and operational environments nor other important factors.
Near-term factors encompass the overall capability of units to deploy
and include training enablers such as training ranges, institutional
support, and depot maintenance; full time support for our Reserve
components; and installation support. Long-term readiness factors
affect the Army's ability to fight in the future and to retain quality
personnel. We are re-examining how to measure Army readiness in the
near-term, the long-term, and across the range of missions we may be
expected to undertake. This new reporting system will provide timely
and accurate information on the status of the Army's readiness, with
measurements that are relevant and quantifiable, to enhance the ability
of commanders to make the best possible employment decisions. It will
also give the American people a more accurate assessment of how ready
their Army is to do what it is asked to do.

INSTALLATION READINESS

Installations are an essential, but often overlooked, part of our
warfighting readiness. They support soldiers and their families,
enhance the rapid deployment of the Army, and provide efficient and
timely support to deployed formations. Funding facility Sustainment,
Restoration and Modernization (SRM, formerly termed Real Property
Maintenance, or RPM) accounts is one of the Army's greatest concerns
this year. We must maintain, modernize, and transform the training
platforms and ranges that prepare the force; the depots and arsenals
that maintain and equip the force; and the power projection platforms
and information infrastructures that support the force when deployed.
The fiscal year 2002 budget provides military facilities and soldier
housing needed to improve Army readiness, quality of life, and
efficiency. The military construction projects provide new and
renovated facilities that improve strategic mobility, modernize
barracks, and support the missions of the Army's active and Reserve
components. The family housing budget includes funding for operation,
maintenance, leasing, construction, revitalization and privatization of
housing in the U.S. and overseas. Only by taking care of installation
infrastructure now can the Army secure readiness for the future also.
In the past, we paid other bills at the expense of facilities
upkeep or masked these costs by migrating funds from operating tempo
accounts--a practice we have stopped.
Of course, the Army would prefer to divest itself of excess
infrastructure and receive full funding to maintain installations and
repair critical facilities. The Army's current goal is to sustain
facilities to a level that prevents further deterioration and to
improve both the quality and the quantity of facilities to meet
validated deficits in strategic mobility by fiscal year 2003, barracks
by fiscal year 2008, and family housing in fiscal year 2010.
However, even with this significant investment, our overall
infrastructure condition continues to decline. While the budget meets
the Army's strategic mobility goal of fiscal year 2003, we need
sustained funding to achieve our goals of barracks renewal and family
housing upgrade. Previously, we have funded SRM at only 60 percent. The
significant increase of SRM funding to 94 percent for fiscal year 2002
will allow the Army to aggressively attack its deteriorating
infrastructure and impede the growth in the backlog of maintenance and
repair. We currently have an unfunded SRM backlog of $17.8 billion and
an unfunded facilities deficit of $25 billion. The solution requires a
30-year commitment to fully fund and focus SRM funding on selected
facility types, in 10-year increments. Army installations will take on
a greater role as we attempt to reduce the deployed logistical
footprint and rely on reach-back links for enhanced command and control
capabilities. Transformation of our operational force without a
concurrent renovation of the installation infrastructure will create an
imbalance that will impinge on advantages gained by a transformed
force.

TRANSFORMATION

The third thread of the Vision requires a comprehensive
transformation of the entire Army. This complex, multi-year effort will
balance the challenge of transforming the operational force and
institutional base while maintaining a trained and ready force to
respond to crises, deter war and, if deterrence fails, fight and win
decisively. Transformation is far more extensive than merely
modernizing our equipment and formations. It is the transformation of
the entire Army from leader development programs to installations to
combat formations. All aspects--doctrine, training, leaders,
organization, material, and soldiers--will be affected.
Transformation of the Army's operational force proceeds on three
vectors--the Objective Force, the Interim Force, and the Legacy Force.
All are equally necessary to our Nation's continued world leadership.
The Objective Force is the force of the future and the focus of the
Army's long-term development efforts. It will maximize advances in
technology and organizational adaptations to revolutionize land-power
capabilities. The Interim Force will fill the current capability gap
that exists between today's heavy and light forces. Today's force, the
Legacy Force, enables the Army to meet near-term National Military
Strategy commitments. Until the Objective Force is fielded, the Legacy
Force--augmented or reinforced with an interim capability--will
continue to engage and respond to crises to deter aggression, bring
peace and stability to troubled regions, and enhance security by
developing bonds of mutual respect and understanding with allies,
partners, and potential adversaries. It must remain ready to fight and
win if necessary, giving us the strategic hedge to allow
transformation.
The fiscal year 2002 budget supports procurement and upgrade of
important Legacy, Interim, and Objective Force systems. It procures 326
Interim Armored Vehicles and five Wolverine systems. It also continues
support for the Abrams-Crusader common engine program and both the
Abrams and Bradley upgrade programs. Finally, it accelerates two M1A2
system enhancement program retrofits.
As the Army works to develop and acquire the technologies for the
Objective Force, the Legacy and Interim Forces will guarantee Army
readiness. Our most pressing concerns this year include the
modernization and recapitalization of selected Legacy Force systems.

LEGACY FORCE MODERNIZATION AND RECAPITALIZATION

Recapitalization and Modernization efforts are necessary to ensure
current and near-term warfighting readiness. Currently, 75 percent of
major combat systems exceed engineered design half-life and will exceed
design life by 2010; system operation and sustainment costs are up over
35 percent, and aircraft safety of flight messages are up 200 percent
since 1995.
We must judiciously modernize key armored and aviation systems in
the Legacy Force to enhance force capabilities. We will further
digitize the Abrams tank to increase situational awareness and
remanufacture early model Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to improve
lethality, situational awareness, and sustainability. We will procure
new systems like Crusader to increase force effectiveness, reduce
friendly casualties, ease logistics support requirements, and improve
deployability. Crusader will maximize the total capabilities of the
Legacy Force. Fielding the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile
defense upgrade and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system will
significantly increase our in-theater force protection. Current legacy
forces will benefit from upgrades and enhancements to proven systems.
Interim forces will demonstrate the power of developmental and off-the-
shelf communications and intelligence capabilities. The Army has made
the hard decisions for selective modernization to sustain combat
overmatch. What is needed is continued support for our prudent
investment strategy to keep our force strong and credible.
Concurrently, the Army will selectively recapitalize Legacy Force
equipment to reduce the rapid aging of our weapons systems. The fiscal
year 2002 budget takes a step in this direction by providing additional
funding to depot maintenance in preparation for recapitalization. The
Army has determined that we preserve readiness best and most cost
effectively when we retire or replace warfighting systems on a 20-year
Department of Defense modernization cycle. Today, 12 of 16 critical
weapons systems exceed this targeted fleet average age. As systems age,
they become more costly and difficult to maintain in peak warfighting
condition. They lose combat overmatch with respect to an adversary's
modernized systems. The Army has established a selective
recapitalization program that will restore aging systems to like-new
condition and allow upgraded warfighting capabilities for a fraction of
the replacement cost. We must maintain the readiness of the Legacy
Force until the Objective Force is operational. As the Legacy Force
maintains our strategic hedge and the Interim Force bridges the
capability gap, the Army will build the Objective Force and complete
the Vision for a trained and ready 21st Century Army.

THE INTERIM FORCE

The fielding of the Interim Force fills the strategic gap between
our heavy and light forces and is an essential step toward the
Objective Force. The key component of the Interim Force is the Interim
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), the first of which is being organized at
Fort Lewis, Washington. Its primary combat platform, the Interim
Armored Vehicle (IAV), will fulfill an immediate requirement for a
vehicle that is deployable any place in the world arriving ready for
combat. The IAV will consist of two variants, a mobile gun system and
an infantry carrier with nine configurations. The IAV will achieve
interoperability and internetted capability with other IBCT systems by
integrating command, control, communications, computer and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Congress
supported the IBCT concept with an additional $600 million in the
fiscal year 2001 Defense Appropriations Act for IAV procurement and
organizing the second IBCT. The Army has programmed resources to field
six to eight IBCTs.
The Army will train and test soldiers and leaders in the doctrine
and organization of these new units to ensure that they can respond to
operational requirements. An IAV-equipped battalion-sized element will
undergo training and initial operational testing and evaluation to
guarantee system suitability and effectiveness. Innovative applications
and technology insertion in supporting forces will complete the IBCT
package and enable full operational capabilities for the first IBCT in
2005.

THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The Army's ultimate goal for Transformation is the Objective Force.
Operating as part of a joint, combined, and/or interagency team, it
will be capable of conducting rapid and decisive offensive, defensive,
stability and support operations, and be able to transition among any
of these missions without a loss of momentum. It will be lethal and
survivable for warfighting and force protection; responsive and
deployable for rapid mission tailoring and the projection required for
crisis response; versatile and agile for success across the full
spectrum of operations; and sustainable for extended regional
engagement and sustained land combat. It will leverage joint and
interagency reach-back capabilities for intelligence, logistical
support, and information operations while protecting itself against
information attacks. It will leverage space assets for communications;
position, navigation, and timing; weather, terrain, and environmental
monitoring; missile warning; and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. The Objective Force will provide for conventional
overmatch and a greater degree of strategic responsiveness, mission
versatility, and operational and tactical agility. With the Objective
Force, the Army intends to deploy a combat-capable brigade anywhere in
the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in
30 days. Our ability to quickly put a brigade-size force on the ground,
with the balance of a division following a day later, fills a current
gap for credible, rapid deterrence. The Objective Force will offer real
strategic options in a crisis and changes the strategic calculations of
our potential adversaries. The Army with Objective Force capability
will provide the National Command Authorities with a full range of
strategic options for regional engagement, crisis response, and land
force operations in support of the Nation.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Advances in science and technology will lead to significantly
improved capabilities for the Objective Force. The Army is programming
over $8 billion for science and technology efforts to begin fielding
the Objective Force by the end of the current decade. This effort seeks
to resolve a number of challenges: how to balance sustained lethality
and survivability against ease of deployability; how to reduce
strategic lift requirements and logistical footprint required in-
theater; how to mitigate risk to our support forces and to forces in-
theater; and how to ensure digitized, secure communications to provide
battlefield awareness at all levels of command. The Army will find the
best possible answers while maintaining the ready, disciplined, and
robust forces our Nation demands, our allies expect, and our
adversaries fear.
Future Combat Systems (FCS), a system of systems, is one of the
essential components for the Army's Objective Force. To accelerate
development of key technologies, the Army partnered with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency in a collaborative effort for the
design, development, and testing of FCS while simultaneously
redesigning the force. The fiscal year 2002 budget funds FCS
demonstrations of system-of-systems functions and cost sharing
technologies. Forces equipped with FCS will network fires and maneuver
in direct combat, deliver direct and indirect fires, perform
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions, and transport
soldiers and materiel. Over the next 6 years, the Army will demonstrate
and validate FCS functions and exploit high-payoff core technologies,
including composite armor, active protection systems, multi-role
(direct and indirect fire) cannons, compact kinetic energy missiles,
hybrid electric propulsion, human engineering, and advanced electro-
optic and infrared sensors.
Equally essential to the Objective Force, and consistent with
Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review, is the fielding of the Comanche
helicopter beginning in 2006. The fiscal year 2002 budget continues our
efforts toward achieving this important capability. Comanche is the
central program of the Army aviation modernization plan and a prime
example of existing modernization programs with significant value for
Objective Force capability. Although Comanche will be fielded as part
of the Objective Force, its digitization will be compatible with Legacy
and Interim Force systems. Comanche will provide a lethal combination
of reconnaissance and firepower.

INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

The fiscal year 2002 budget funds schoolhouse training at 100
percent. This is a first. It funds U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) transformation initiatives to include expansion of one
station unit training, establishment of a land warfare university,
basic officer leadership course enhancements, establishment of an
accession command, and quality assurance initiatives.
As the combat formations are being transformed, the Army's
institutional base--schools, services, facilities, and installations--
must also change to support both the Objective Force and current
mission requirements. TRADOC produces tactically and technically
proficient soldiers and leaders and the doctrine and concepts for
operational success. The Army must train soldiers--in simulations, on
ranges, and in exercises--and grow them into leaders who are capable of
executing rapid and seamless transitions between missions throughout
the spectrum of operations. Training must continuously improve and
respond to emerging technologies. We must recapitalize and modernize
ranges, distance learning centers, Army schools, and combat training
centers to keep pace with changes in force structure, technology, and
the global environment. We must address the increasing challenge to
readiness posed by encroachment to our ranges and training areas while
maintaining our environmental stewardship of these same lands.
Army doctrine and concepts must also transform to keep pace with
our changing operational force and growing technological advantages. As
foundations for the Transformation, the two conceptual baselines for
Army doctrine, Field Manuals, FM-1, The Army, and FM-3, Operations,
were published June 14, 2001. TRADOC is revising and developing
doctrine for organization and operation of the Interim Force and
validating concepts for the Objective Force. We are also developing the
concepts to integrate the capabilities of space and information
operations to provide support across the entire spectrum of military
operations. At every level, the Army is integrating emerging joint and
multinational doctrine to develop the concepts that will field a force,
grounded in doctrine, that is capable of providing the National Command
Authorities a range of options for regional engagement, crisis
response, and sustained land force operations.

ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Key to transformation is the training and leader development
necessary for producing adaptive soldiers and leaders who can lead and
succeed in both joint and combined environments while capitalizing on
the latest battlefield technologies. The Army Training and Leader
Development Panel (ATLDP) has concluded its in-depth study of issues
affecting the Army's culture and its training and leader development
doctrine. The ATLDP surveyed and interviewed over 13,500 officers and
spouses. Follow-on studies of the noncommissioned officer and warrant
officer corps will be conducted over the next 6 months. The primary
objectives of the panel were to identify skill sets required of
Objective Force leaders and to assess the ability of current training
and leader development systems to cultivate those skills. Study
participants addressed issues that included well-being, job
satisfaction, training standards, and the officer education system.
This study represents a candid self-assessment by the Army; it seeks to
restore faith with soldiers and set a course for improving all aspects
of the Army's culture by bringing institutional beliefs and practices
in line. To that end, some steps have already been taken, including
adapting the officer education system to meet the needs of the
transforming Army; eliminating non-mission compliance tasks that
interfere with war fighting training; allocating full resources to our
Combat Training Centers; and protecting weekends for the well-being of
soldiers and their families. It is a testament to the strength of any
organization when it is willing to take such a candid look at itself,
and this kind of healthy introspection characterizes a true profession.
The fiscal year 2002 budget funds development of training, training
products, and materials that support resident and unit training
programs. It provides for the analysis, design, development,
management, standardization of processes and practices integration and
operations of Army training information systems and automation of the
training development process. In the area of leader development it
allows schoolhouse trainers to adapt training programs for future
leaders and increases training support funding for aviation and
specialized skill training. Further, the budget funds active component
unit training OPTEMPO and supports critical training enablers. Our
Combat Training Center program remains the proving ground for
warfighting proficiency, and we currently have scheduled ten brigade
rotations through the National Training Center, ten brigade rotations
through the Joint Readiness Training Center, and five brigade rotations
through the Combat Maneuver Training Center.

LOGISTICAL TRANSFORMATION

We will transform logistical services and facilities to enhance
readiness and strategic responsiveness. Today, logistics comprises
approximately 80 percent of the Army's strategic lift requirement,
creating a daunting challenge to deployability. Prepositioning stocks
and forward presence solves only part of the problem. Currently, the
Army has seven brigade sets of equipment forward deployed on land and
at sea with an eighth brigade set being deployed in fiscal year 2002.
As we fundamentally reshape the way the Army is deployed and sustained,
we will ensure logistics transformation is synchronized with the needs
of the operational forces and supports Department of Defense and Joint
logistics transformation goals. The Army is examining how to reduce the
logistical footprint in the theater of operations and to reduce
logistical costs without hindering warfighting capability and
readiness. Approaches already being explored are recapitalization,
common vehicle chassis design, a national maintenance program, and an
intermediate basing strategy for force protection. We are synchronizing
the critical systems of the institutional Army with our operating
forces to ensure the Transformation of the Army is holistic and
complete.

CONCLUSION

The Army has embarked on a historic enterprise. Recognizing that
the forces we can provide to the combatant commands are becoming
obsolescent in a changing strategic environment, the Army is
transforming. With the support of the administration and Congress, the
Army has charted a course that will better align its capabilities with
the international security environment, enhancing responsiveness and
deterrence while sustaining dominance at every point on the spectrum of
operations. The Army Transformation is the most comprehensive program
of change in a century and is already underway. It comes at a
propitious moment. We live in a time of relative peace. Our Nation's
economic strength has given us a period of prosperity. A decade of
post-Cold War experience has provided us strategic perspective and
American technological power gives us tremendous potential. We have
seized this opportunity to guarantee our strategic capability and our
non-negotiable contract with the American people well into this
century.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we thank
you once again for this opportunity to report to you today on the state
of your Army. The statements made in this testimony are contingent upon
the results of Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review. We ask you to
consider them in that light. We look forward to discussing these issues
with you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES ARMY

General Shinseki. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
distinguished members of the committee: Today more than 24,000
soldiers are operationally deployed around the world in 67
countries. These are not new statistics to you. This committee
in particular gets out to see those soldiers. But I give you
those numbers because it gives you an indication of where the
Army is deployed today.
We remain a warfighting Army and our primary focus day to
day attends to our warfighting prowess. But we also understand
that we provide versatile and agile solutions for all the other
challenges facing the United States. This explains in part our
deployed profile, and in the absence of better alternatives we
do not believe that we should leave the Nation without forces
that can cover the full spectrum of demands that it confronts
as a global leader day to day.
To meet these obligations, the fiscal year 2002
presidential budget amendment reflects a carefully balanced
program that allows the Army to meet its readiness requirements
in fiscal year 2002 while sustaining the other key elements of
our vision--our people and the transformation of the force.
With tremendous bipartisan support from Congress, we have
achieved sustainable momentum in transforming the Army. We are
committed to making that momentum irreversible as we make the
Army faster, more lethal and decisive, and more affordable. In
the next 10 years, we must be prudent about accepting more
operational risk than we are already carrying today without
good analytical foundations for such additional burdening.
To date, we have moved out on our two interim brigade
combat teams at Fort Lewis, Washington, and we are investing in
science and technologies in ways that will enable us to begin
research and development on those Science and Technology (S&T)
initiatives in the 2003-2004 timeframe. Momentum here is good.
In order to protect that momentum, our priority under the new
budget is to extend the life of our Legacy Force systems
through recapitalization and selective upgrades to our current
warfighting platforms.
Today 75 percent of those combat systems exceed their
expected half-life, increasing operations and maintenance costs
by 30 percent over the past 4 years. Apache helicopter safety
of flight messages alone have gone up by over 200 percent since
1995. To combat these spiraling costs, we have identified 19
systems that must be recapitalized in order to extend their
useful readiness. We must also selectively modernize those
capabilities with systems like Crusader and Comanche, which
will cost-effectively maximize the capabilities of the Legacy
Force and also answer Objective Force requirements.
We are grateful for this committee's devotion to improving
the well being of our soldiers and their families. It is making
a difference. These initiatives will begin to slow the rate of
decay of our infrastructure, but not totally reverse it. We
must protect the dollars we have elected to shift to these
accounts and remain vigilant in fixing this problem.
Mr. Chairman, the Army Vision is about future American
leadership at home and abroad. Decisive land power uniquely and
critically counters international threats and defends U.S.
interests, and when resistance is overcome, land power
ultimately guarantees compliance with terms of peace.
Thereafter, it enables the establishment of legitimate
authorities and rebuilding in areas of conflict. In short, land
power provides the National Command Authorities and the
warfighting CINCs with the kind of flexibility to respond to
and resolve crises.
Thank you for your invitation to appear here today. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Shinseki.
Secretary England.

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON R. ENGLAND, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Secretary England. Chairman Levin and Senator Warner,
members of the committee: I am delighted to be here. I am
especially delighted to be here with Admiral Clark and General
Jones. Hopefully, you will see us together much in the future
because we have formed indeed, Senator Warner, a very, very
close leadership team as we lead our forces into the future.
I do want to thank this committee for your support in the
past and for your continuing support of our naval services. In
fiscal year 2001 and particularly with the supplement provided,
as a naval service we were able to meet our commitments, but
with some unfulfilled needs. The submitted budget for fiscal
year 2002 has the naval service getting better in all
categories.
Senator Warner, we do maintain the momentum in 2002 with
the budget we have submitted. It is still short of our end
objective and you will be hearing more of that, I know, from
the chiefs. We are looking to the 2003 budget submittal to
reflect the ongoing studies and the future force structure.
Senator Levin, the CNO and the Commandant and I, in
response to your comment earlier, do plan to include in the
2003 budget specific business practice improvements within the
Department of the Navy to make our organization far more
efficient and effective. We do agree with Secretary Rumsfeld,
we do believe 5 percent is certainly reasonable in terms of
improved proficiency and efficiency and effectiveness, and you
will see that reflected in our 2003 submittal to you.
So I do look forward to working with each of you as we
address these challenges ahead. I thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you, and I also look forward to
your questions.
Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary England follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Gordon R. England
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning. Thank you for
the opportunity to speak with you today. The CNO, Commandant and I are
grateful for your continuing support to keep the Navy and Marine Corps
the very best in the world.
Let me begin by saying the Navy and Marine Corps remain a strong
and potent arm of our Nation's military forces. They have maintained a
forward presence in all corners of the globe ready to perform any
mission called for from humanitarian relief to interdiction operations.
Able to deploy on short notice the Navy Marine Corps team provides the
theater and regional commanders a well trained and effective fighting
force.
In his remarks at the Naval Academy graduation, President Bush
said, ``We must build forces that draw upon the revolutionary advances
in the technology of war that will allow us to keep the peace by
redefining war on our terms--a force that is defined less by size and
more by knowledge and swiftness . . . and that relies heavily on
stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.'' I am in
full agreement with this challenge and, while naval forces inherently
fit the President's vision, some modifications and alignments may be
needed to meet these goals.
But such changes are best made with a full understanding of the
uses to which Navy and Marine Corps units are being put today. For
instance, forward deployed naval forces are present around the world
and are central to assuring the availability of the sea lines through
which international commerce and key resources such as oil flow. Also,
as Theater Commanders in Chief develop their comprehensive Theater
Engagement Plans (TEP) in support of the National Security Strategy and
National Military Strategy, the Navy and Marine Corps play particularly
important roles in TEP execution by virtue of their regular forward
presence. Lastly, we know that naval forces are regularly called upon
to execute combat tasking on short notice in distant parts of the
world. From the time my predecessor testified before this committee on
10 February 2000, Navy or Marine forces have engaged in combat over the
skies of Iraq, in humanitarian support in East Timor, South America and
in Europe.
Looking forward, it is useful to note that for some time the sea
services have undertaken an evolutionary shift from operations
predominantly on the open seas to operations that include the littoral:
an evolution that has underscored the requirement for improved data
networking; tailored battle management systems and sensors; and
innovative ideas for employing marines that are attuned to the
difficult littoral environment--afloat and ashore. This shift in focus
generates a need to look at our equipment across a broader mission
range . . . such as time-critical strike, ballistic and cruise missile
defense; littoral and deep water anti-submarine warfare; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; air and ground mobility; and
expeditionary maneuver warfare.
We also recognize that we need to recapitalize our force--by that I
mean building new platforms--for the future. For instance, even as the
average age of our ships has been steadily increasing to its present
average of 16 years--and trending upward for the next 5 or so years--
our building rates have not been keeping apace. Likewise, the average
age of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft is about 18 years . . . close to
the age of those sailors and marines who maintain them. However, the
shape of the Navy of the future may change, as we work to develop a new
national military strategy that takes new threats and new opportunities
into consideration. Here also building aircraft in sufficient numbers .
. . ideally at economical orders of production . . . is called for.
We have precious few new programs to recapitalize our forces other
than systems like DDG 51, F/A-18E/F, and the new carrier under
construction, U.S.S. Ronald Reagan. In fact, projected replacement
aircraft, such as the F/A-18 E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter do not
meet the entire need under current plans, as there are no replacements
scheduled for the EA-6B, P-3, or E-2 aircraft and some of our
helicopter fleet. New funding may be needed, but I also intend to
identify some funding sources through process improvement.
Modernization of our current force is also an imperative because of
the requirement to be able to prevail if called upon in the near term.
Nonetheless, it is prudent to accept reasonable risk by some reduction
of expenditure in these accounts in order to make available assets for
recapitalization for the future.
With that backdrop. I intend to make the most of our Navy-Marine
Corps team by focusing on four strategic areas: combat capability,
people, technology, and business practices.
First, as this committee is well aware, the primary purpose of the
Navy and Marine Corps is to deter, train for, and when necessary, fight
and win our Nation's battles. In remaining faithful to this charge,
combat capability, which includes readiness, must be our primary
emphasis. In all our decision-making, we will ask the question, ``Does
this task, program, organization, or facility materially contribute to
improving our combat capability?'' Likewise we will recognize that what
has worked in the past may not always succeed in the future. Therefore,
the department will invest more in technical and doctrinal
experimentation, and in new and different ways of accomplishing our
mission. Let me emphasize, our mission is, and will remain, joint. We
are committed to the concept ``One Team, One Fight.'' Along with our
sister services and allies, we will organize, equip and train to fight
jointly, recognizing that forward deployed naval forces are integral to
the combined efforts of all the armed services.
Second, my very highest priority is our men and women in uniform,
their families and our civilian workforce. During my confirmation
hearings, I commented that any capital asset purchased by the
Department of the Navy has no value to the Nation until it is manned by
highly motivated and trained people. Therefore, as we plan for the
future, we need to first be sure that our personnel policies will
provide us the people and skills we require for our future systems.
In this regard, emphasis needs to be placed on ``Quality of
Service''--achieving a higher quality workplace as well as a higher
quality of life for our sailors, marines, active duty and reserve, and
civilians and all of their families. The goal will be to create an
environment where our men and women can excel at their chosen
profession, unimpeded by factors that divert their attention from work
and sap their morale. This includes state-of-the-art tools, cutting-
edge training, competitive compensation and efficient health care, and
an operational tempo that considers the individual, as well as the
family. Fostering a positive working environment where young men and
women believe they contribute meaningfully to their units will
encourage them to want to stay and grow with our team. When people want
to stay with a group, others will want to join that group. Retention is
a great recruiting tool!
Third, the application of advanced technology is central to our
Nation's military strength. I am concerned, however, that the
application of technology in the military has for a generation lagged
its commercial availability. This is a high priority in our combat
systems, but also includes technology for training, testing and
management systems. Technological advances are central to the
priorities set forth by the President and Secretary of Defense as we
shift from the 20th century force, to the more lethal and agile one of
the 21st. Technology will emphasize networks of information and
communications as well as improvements in sensors and weapons.
Initiatives are on going to translate such concepts as the Navy's
Netcentric Warfare and the Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
into reality. The Naval War College's Navy Warfare Development Command
and Marine Corps Combat Development Command along with numerous Fleet
Battle Experiments are but one example of the testing of new concepts,
equipment, and doctrine in both the joint and naval environments.
But technology is changing fast, so care must be taken to plan for
future advances by anticipating logical insertion points early in the
design process. This preplanned improvement schedule combined with
spiral design should allow for the delivery of increased combat
capability over a shorter period of time. Also important, U.S. systems
need to have designed into them conduits that allow our allies to
participate to the best of their significant capabilities at increasing
levels of complexity. It goes without saying that embarking on this
technological transformation will necessitate we recruit, train, and
retain bright and intelligent people to operate and maintain these
systems.
Fourth, our management team should be more process-oriented,
working on ways to improve ``how we do business'' rather than
concentrating only on specific programs and products. To do that, we
need to know where we are and to have clear visibility of where we are
going. Measures and metrics provide the tools to do so and as such,
will be a key element of our process-oriented management strategy. Our
cold war acquisition infrastructure and regulations have been described
as a ``voracious dinosaur consuming dollars which should be applied to
the real mission.'' It is time to change. Borrowing applicable business
practices from commercial industry is a logical step. While the Navy
and Marine Corps will always need good leaders in their primary combat
arms arena, the Department of Navy will also develop leaders with a
better understanding of business strategies, cost control and rapid and
flexible design.
The Department has embraced the use of teams for integrated product
and process development. We intend also to focus on activity based
costing to better understand the actual price we are paying for a
platform or system, both for acquisition and equally importantly for
support over the life of the system. These initiatives should help to
free resources to recapitalize our operating forces, establish
processes that leverage commercial capabilities, maintain excellence
and attract and retain quality people.
The world has changed a great deal over the past decade. But one
thing, has not changed: the Navy and Marine Corps needs to deter, train
for, and when necessary fight and win our Nation's battles. As we steam
into this new century, I am reminded that forward presence provides an
essential benefit for our Nation. The Navy and Marine Corps, and in
fact the entire U.S. military, contribute to a stable global
environment allowing our economy and our citizens to prosper along with
other nations and peoples throughout the world. The stabilizing
benefits of American military strength are key to our National
interests and the well being of the international community. The
investment by our Nation in its military to underwrite this prosperity
is, indeed quite modest.
I look forward to working with Congress, the Secretary of Defense,
and our sister Services to meet the challenges in the next year and
beyond. The changes and transformations I have discussed constitute a
start at the beginning of the new century. Thank you for your time this
morning and your continued support for our sailors, marines . . .
active and Reserve . . . our civilians and their families.
The statements made in this testimony are contingent upon the
results of Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review. I ask that you
consider them in that light.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary England.
Admiral Clark.

STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS

Admiral Clark. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
and members of this committee. I thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today. I am grateful always for your
consistently strong support of the men and women of our Navy.
This morning as I speak, 96 of our 316 ships are forward
deployed, almost 50,000 of our sailors at the far reaches of
the Earth. That is the cycle of deployment for our Navy. Every
day, every year, it never stops and it has not for many years,
thanks in large part to the support of this committee.
The young men and women who volunteer to serve in our Navy,
they work hard, they make it work. We owe them a great deal.
They are doing a magnificent job and you have much to be proud
in their service.
We do this as part of the Navy-Marine Corps team. It is
appropriate that I am sitting next to General Jones. But we
also do it operating jointly with the Army and the Air Force,
projecting sovereign American power on and from the sea, close
to home and in the far corners of the globe. We are doing this
today with a relatively small force, 41 percent fewer ships
than we had 10 years ago.
Our Navy is not breaking under stress, but its operational
elasticity has diminished significantly. We face serious fiscal
challenges due to the mismatch between mission requirements and
resources. For too long we have deferred modernization and
recapitalization of the force and paid for mission
accomplishment by postponing maintenance and repair of our
infrastructure. This trend now poses, in my opinion, a serious
risk to our future.
We also are streamlining our organizations, and I want to
refer to Secretary England's comment. It is important that we
improve our analytical underpinning, our metrics on how we
accurately determine our requirements in the future, to
continue to improve readiness and to maximize investment
effectiveness.
A major focus of our future follows Secretary England's
emphasis on using better business practices throughout our
Navy. I share his enthusiasm for this very important cause. We
need to reform the way we do business in the Department.
Regarding current readiness, I am encouraged by the fiscal
year 2002 amended defense budget. It makes substantial
investments to move the readiness accounts toward required
levels.
In previous appearances I have talked here about being at
war for people. Certainly they are the key to mission
accomplishment. The improvements in compensation that you have
supported and in fact brought about--bonuses, pay table
adjustments, retirement reforms, better medical care, and in
fact the initiative to balance their out of pocket expenses in
housing--they are having the desired impact. Recruiting is on
track for 2001 and this is good news.
But more exciting to me is the substantial improvement that
we are making in retention. The targeted pay raise and other
initiatives in the 2002 budget amendment will reinforce these
positive trends.
One word about quality of service. We have made substantial
gains in our quality of life programs, with the support of
Congress. Our quality of work programs require improvement,
especially the infrastructure. Our Navy's shore structure is in
poor condition. Our recapitalization cycle exceeds 160 years
and my critical backlog is over $2.75 billion. Our real
property maintenance funding is significantly below private
industry norms. I have spoken on this point on virtually every
trip to the Hill and we continue to seek your support to change
the way we think about this vital area.
Certainly the challenge of sustaining current readiness
while investing in key future capabilities is a difficult
balancing act. Following underinvestment in the decade of the
nineties, we face an acquisition bow wave. It has been spoken
about here before. We need nine ships and at least 180
airplanes a year to sustain the 1997 QDR level. I use that
frame of reference because that is what we are targeted against
until we arrive at a new strategy and force structure profile.
But we are proceeding at significantly less than that and we
cannot sustain the Navy that we have today with current funding
levels, which will lead eventually to a Navy of somewhere
around 230 ships.
I am very interested in innovative solutions to accelerate
ship and aircraft procurement rates. To do this, I am convinced
that we must find ways to more effectively partner with
industry and level fund our annual investments in this type of
construction.
Ensuring current readiness, modernizing our fleet,
providing sailors with high quality of service, and
transforming to meet future needs--we also need these things to
do this. This budget moves us in the right direction, but we
need continued and increased investment. The challenges facing
our Navy are significant, but with the help of this committee
and Congress they can be overcome.
I again thank the committee for your continued support to
our Navy, to our sailors, and to their families, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]

Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you. Your consistent support of Navy
requirements and vision of a strong Navy for our Nation have protected
the quality of life of our sailors and enhanced operational readiness
during the past year. I am very grateful and I thank you.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY: ON WATCH FOR AMERICA'S SECURITY

The defense and prosperity of the United States has been tied to
the seas since the founding of our Republic and the United States Navy
has been the principal instrument of that security. Our Navy's history
is one of international engagement in peacetime, effective response in
crisis, and victory in conflict. It includes a rich tradition of
innovation, adaptation, and courage in meeting regional and global
threats that have confronted our Nation over the past two and a quarter
centuries.
Today, on the threshold of this new century, we face emergent
challenges that are adding complexity to the missions our Navy has
traditionally accomplished, providing powerful impetus for change.
Cyberwar, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international terrorism,
and the violence accompanying failed states--to name but some of these
threats--do not replace the specter of state on state conflict. Rather
they add to the danger, providing spark to already combustible
situations.
To counter these challenges, we are investing in a 21st Century
Navy of awesome capability: a Navy that is strategically,
operationally, and tactically agile; technologically and
organizationally innovative; networked at every level; highly joint;
and effectively integrated with allies. It is a Navy that will remain
at the leading edge of the joint and combined fight--forward deployed
to enhance deterrence, react swiftly to crises, and triumph in war.
These attributes are critical because our Navy will operate in a
volatile world of rapid change, more dangerous in some regards than
when we faced the global strike and sea denial capabilities of the
Soviet Union. This strategic environment will place a premium on
freedom of access, and America will need the capabilities of the Navy/
Marine Corps team operating from the maritime domain--free to move
about the world, influencing events, representing our Nation's vital
interests, and remaining ready to fight and win.

THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL FORCES

In 2002 and beyond, our Navy's posture, programs, and character
will be shaped by the mission of projecting sovereign American power in
support of national interests while forward-deployed to the far corners
of the earth.
Such forward-deployed naval forces are central to the success of
the National Military Strategy and integral to regional Commander in
Chief (CINC) plans for peacetime and combat operations. A premier
instrument of American power, your Navy operates around the globe,
demonstrating command of the seas, ensuring the free flow of trade and
resources, providing combat-ready presence, and assuring access for
joint forces.
Our Navy is shaped to meet the national and regional requirement
for forward forces. While some ships and squadrons are homeported
overseas, most deploy rotationally for periods of up to 6 months in an
18-24 month cycle. This construct drives the Navy's force structure.
Fulfilling these important missions has become steadily more
challenging. While the requirement for forward-deployed, combat-capable
naval forces has remained constant since the end of the Cold War,
assets available to meet that requirement have decreased markedly. Our
force structure declined 41 percent since 1991, from 538 to 316 ships.
Currently one-third of our ships are forward deployed every day
compared to approximately one-fifth during the Cold War. Our Navy is a
carefully balanced force optimized to fill the global presence
requirements of the Unified CINCs.
One of today's central defense issues relates to the continued
relevancy of overseas forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the United
States military has become a mostly CONUS-based force. We have
withdrawn two thirds of our permanently stationed forces from Europe
and are fulfilling Middle East presence requirements with rotational
units. With the exception of Korea, Asian commitments are being covered
by naval forces or flyaway units from the United States.
Emerging technologies have offset some of these overseas presence
reductions, yet virtually all strategic planners remain committed to
the importance of forward-deployed forces. They appreciate that
regionally engaged, combat credible assets maximize our ability to
dissuade potential adversaries, deter aggression, and quickly bring
warfighting power to bear when needed. Operationally, such presence is
fundamental to providing sustained precision fires and projecting
defense overland to assure access for expeditionary joint forces.
Forward presence is not without risk, however, and we are committed
to making the investments necessary to assure mission effectiveness in
view of emergent threats. In short, we must remain ready to ``climb
into the ring'' with our opponents--and not only the ring defined by
us--and prevail.

THE CHALLENGE OF CURRENT READINESS

The standard by which we measure current readiness is the ability
of naval forces to confidently meet the challenges of an uncertain
world from the very first day of deployment. We will deploy and operate
ready to conduct combat operations with maximum effectiveness and
minimum risk.
Forward-deployed naval forces are prepared to do so. As reported
first in the latter part of the 1990s, the readiness of deployed forces
is being achieved more and more at the expense of the non-deployed
segment of our force structure. Non-deployed forces are operating below
satisfactory readiness levels, making it increasingly difficult to meet
operational standards and deployment requirements. Analysis of fleet
forces (figure 1) clearly illustrates the growing gap between deployed
and non-deployed Navy units in overall readiness during the last two
decades.

Figure 1

Many ships, including the Austin and Anchorage-class amphibious
ships, as well as our fleet command ships, are reaching the end of
their service lives. Such units often require unprogrammed repairs,
forcing us to divert funds to meet urgent maintenance requirements.
These actions, in turn, produce a maintenance backlog that is very
unhealthy, especially given the size of our Navy today.
Another important fact is that ships reaching service mid-life,
like the oldest of our Aegis cruisers, require modernization to be
operationally viable in future hostile situations. Funds to complete
this type of modernization have historically not competed successfully
against other recapitalization requirements.
Naval aviation, in particular, poses profound challenges. Our
aviation force now contains the oldest mix of type/model/series
aircraft in naval history, yet it is our aircraft that are routinely
employed in combat overseas. For the first time, our average aircraft
age exceeds the average age of combatant ships, leading to a
corresponding increase in the cost of operations and maintenance.
Global tasking has continually stressed our aviation force. As a
result, the F/A-18 has been flown well in excess of planned utilization
rates and more than 300 aircraft will require service life extensions
earlier than planned or budgeted. Similar situations apply to F-14s,
EA-6Bs, P-3Cs, SH-60s, and virtually every other aircraft in the fleet.
The single most influential factor in achieving near-term aviation
readiness is the health of our Flying Hour Program, which includes
fuel, consumable spare parts, and Aviation Depot Level Repairables
(AVDLRs). The cost of AVDLRs has risen an average of 13.8 percent per
year from fiscal year 1996-1999; the cost increases are driven
principally by age. Despite attempts to alleviate shortages in AVDLRs,
we continue to experience shortfalls. Shortages also exist in aviation
mission critical items such as targeting pods and repair equipment on
aircraft carriers.
The most effective manner in which to address the problems facing
naval aviation is to introduce new aircraft into the fleet as soon as
possible. Toward that end, the fiscal year 2002 amended budget takes
steps to increase the number of F-18 E/F aircraft. We are currently in
an age/cost spiral that can be best corrected by addressing these
modernization requirements.
Current readiness shortfalls facing our ships and aircraft would be
far worse were it not for aggressive action already taken. We
reprogrammed nearly $6.5 billion from other Navy programs to the
current readiness portion of the Navy baseline program for fiscal year
2002-2007, shoring up the Flying Hour Program, Ship Depot Maintenance,
Ship Operations, and Real Property Maintenance accounts. The fiscal
year 2002 amended defense budget will have a further positive impact
due to the substantial investment being made in bringing readiness
accounts to required levels. This budget puts us on course to correct
the under-investment in readiness.
the imperative of future readiness
The challenge of sustaining current readiness while investing in
key future capabilities has been a most difficult balancing act.
Current readiness has too often come at the expense of recapitalization
and modernization. As a result, modernization efforts have not kept
pace. Figure 2 shows the dramatic decline in authorized ships over the
past five decades.

Figure 2

Due to the level of investment in procurement during the 1990s, we
face a significant acquisition ``bow wave'' for ships and aircraft
today. I am on the record in stating that the Navy needs about $34
billion a year to meet procurement requirements--this is about $10
billion per year more than funded at present. We must buy 180-210
aircraft and nine ships a year to sustain the 1997 QDR force level of
4,200 aircraft and 310 ships.
We are procuring significantly less than that. We will procure just
six ships and 88 naval aircraft in fiscal year 2002. We cannot sustain
the Navy we have today with current funding levels, which would lead to
a 230 ship Navy over time.
The impact of the current low procurement rate goes beyond force
levels. It adversely affects the stability of our unique defense
industrial base. We are paying a premium in program cost today and
realizing substantial cost growth because of production inefficiencies
due to the lack of economies of scale. For the Navy, virtually every
procurement program of record is proceeding at a sub-optimum economic
order of quantity.
Still, we are making important investments in programs that will
comprise the core capability of our forces in the coming decades. DD-
21, CVNX, JSF, FA-18E/F, LPD-17 and the Virginia-class SSN present
compelling technological leaps in warfighting capability and
innovation.
The status of programs discussed below, as well as the associated
funding levels, is subject to change as a result of the ongoing
Quadrennial Defense Review. The Secretary of Defense will develop
funding guidelines beyond fiscal year 2002 when that review is
complete.
Program specifics include:

DD-21. The Zumwalt-class destroyer will provide sustained,
distributed, and precise firepower at long ranges to support
joint forces ashore by conducting precision attacks on land
targets while simultaneously engaging threats above and below
the sea. This program is central to our transformation effort,
including the introduction of Integrated Power Systems (IPS),
the Advanced Gun System (AGS), multi-function radar, and
reduced manning concepts. Additionally, DD-21 is another step
toward the creation of a more integrated Navy/Marine Corps
team. DD-21 will provide significantly enhanced fire support
for marines ashore. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget
provides continued RDT&E investment pending final contractor
down-select later this year.
CVNX. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget provides RDT&E and
advance procurement for the first CVNX, which will replace
U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2013 and sustain essential
carrier force levels. Principal design objectives for the CVNX
class include a significant reduction of total ownership costs
during the carrier's 50-year expected service life, reduced
manning, and introduction of a flexible infrastructure that
will facilitate the insertion of new warfighting capabilities
as they evolve.
JSF. The Joint Strike Fighter program will field a family of
tri-service, next-generation strike aircraft with an emphasis
on commonality, providing sustainable U.S. and allied
technological superiority at affordable prices. The fiscal year
2002 amended budget supports vigorous R&D investments required
to procure the initial variant in fiscal year 2006.
LPD-17. We are not requesting additional LPD-17 class ships
in the fiscal year 2002 budget, due in part to design and
production challenges with the lead ship. We remain fully
committed to the program, however, as it supports vital
littoral warfighting requirements and promises relief from
mounting costs of our aging amphibious ships. The 12 projected
LPD-17s will replace four older classes of ships and serve as
central elements of future Amphibious Ready Groups.
Virginia-class SSN. This class will sustain minimum essential
attack submarine force levels as the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-
class attack submarines leave the fleet. They are specifically
designed for multi-mission littoral and regional operations as
well as traditional open-ocean anti-submarine and anti-surface
missions. Equally important, flexibility is designed into these
ships to allow incorporation of new technologies. The fiscal
year 2002 amended budget procures one submarine per year and
continues RDT&E. This pace of procurement is not sufficient to
maintain our required attack submarine force level over the
long term.
F/A-18E/F. The F/A-18E/F will replace older F/A-18s and all
F-14s. There is extensive commonality of weapons systems,
avionics, and software between F/A-18 variants, and the
infrastructure supporting the Super Hornet builds upon existing
organizations. We strongly support the fiscal year 2002 amended
budget's procurement increase from 39 to 48 aircraft to take
advantage of economies of scale.

GROWING AND DEVELOPING SAILORS

Navy men and women are our most valuable resource and we must
provide them with the tools and leadership to excel. We are and will
continue to be in a ``War for Talent'' with other employers. To win
this war, we are focusing on recruiting the right people, reducing
attrition, and increasing reenlistments.
Improvements in compensation that you supported--bonuses, pay table
adjustments, retirement reforms, and better medical benefits--are
having the desired impact. The targeted pay raise and other initiatives
in the Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Amendment will reinforce these positive
trends.
The Navy met its overall recruiting and end-strength goals in
fiscal year 1999 and 2000, and we are on track for fiscal year 2001. We
are currently reenlisting nearly 60 percent of eligible Sailors who
reach the end of their first enlistments, compared with 47 percent in
1999. Sixty-seven percent of petty officers with 6-10 years of service
are reenlisting, compared with 60 percent 2 years ago. Annual attrition
rates for first term Sailors have fallen from over 14 percent to less
than 12 percent since 1998. Officer retention remains well below
steady-state goals, however, in every community except Naval Flight
Officers.
Better than anticipated manning in fiscal year 2001, the result of
long sought after improvements in recruiting and retention, has reduced
at-sea billet gaps and allowed our Navy to begin filling increased
requirements in areas such as anti-terrorism/force protection, aviation
maintenance, and environmental billets at sea. As a result, we are
requesting authorization in fiscal year 2002 to increase our end-
strength from 372,642 to 376,000. This additional end-strength will
lock-in gains we have made in improved at-sea manning and enhanced
readiness.
A major initiative aimed at further strengthening the professional
development of Sailors is the Revolution in Training that is getting
underway. This effort, which will unfold over the next 3 years, will
leverage distance learning technologies, the improved Navy information
exchange network, and a career-long training investment continuum to
fully realize the learning potential of our professional force. This
development is vital to the health of our manpower growth and
development concepts of the 21st century.
Looking ahead, two personnel issues concern me. First is the
erosion in Career Sea Pay, last updated in 1986. Redress of this
problem was authorized in the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) but not funded.
Second is the ITEMPO legislation contained in the fiscal year 2000
and 2001 NDAAs. Despite major progress made in mitigating time away
from home for our Sailors, this legislation has the potential to
significantly impact our force. Since October 2000, we have been
collecting fleet data to evaluate the potential cost of this program.
We will work closely with you in the months to come as the full impact
of this legislation becomes clear.
quality of service: a critical retention tool
A high Quality of Service--defined as a balanced combination of
Quality of Life and Quality of Work--is directly related to retaining
and motivating Sailors. While we have made gains in Quality of Life
programs, our Quality of Work requires substantial improvement in many
areas.
In previous testimony, I noted that a ``psychology of
deficiency''--the acceptance of sustained resource shortages as a
normal condition--has become ingrained in our operating forces. It
manifests itself in such things as substandard facilities and working
environments. Over time, our people have not only become accustomed to
poor facilities, many believe they will never improve.
Our Navy's shore infrastructure is in such condition because our
recapitalization cycle exceeds 160 years, our critical backlog of
maintenance and repair exceeds $2.75 billion, and our RPM funding is
significantly below the private industry average.
Meeting this challenge requires finding innovative ways to satisfy
infrastructure needs. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget makes modest
increases in RPM and military construction accounts that represent a
start in bringing our shore facilities up to standard. There is much
left to be done.

THE POWER OF ALIGNMENT

Navy-wide alignment is critical to ensuring our organizations,
systems, and processes deliver a combat-capable Navy ready to sail in
harm's way. To enhance communications and coordination, we reorganized
the Navy Staff so that a Deputy CNO is focused exclusively on Fleet
Readiness and Logistics, while another Deputy CNO is dedicated to
Warfare Requirements and Programs.
In the fleets, we have taken action to consolidate leadership
functions for naval aviation, surface, and subsurface forces. This will
enable us to accomplish our missions in a better organized and more
consistent manner around the world. Additionally, we are streamlining
our requirements and readiness reporting process and amplifying the
fleet voice in Washington decision-making, allowing us to more
accurately determine requirements, improve readiness, and maximize
investment effectiveness.
These actions are taken with the realization that we must, at every
level, ensure our Navy is functioning as effectively and efficiently as
possible. The Secretary of the Navy has made the incorporation of
better business practices a major tenet of his plan of action. I share
his enthusiasm for this cause. More accurate requirements forecasting,
enhanced stability in program execution, greater efficiency in system
design and production, and improved expenditure discipline in
infrastructure maintenance and renewal all promise the taxpayer a
fuller return on investment and our Navy a healthier future.

TRANSFORMING TO MEET 21ST CENTURY THREATS

Ensuring future readiness is not solely a matter of procurement. It
also requires substantial investment in Science and Technology accounts
to swiftly and effectively leverage emerging opportunities. Such
agility will be key to the success of our conceptual shift from
platform-centric warfare to an emphasis on networked, distributed
systems.
For the Navy, transformation is about achieving greater warfighting
capability per unit delivered to the CINC (Battle Group/Amphibious
Ready Group/Ship/Aircraft/ Submarine.) We are transforming in two ways:
by gaining capability through investment in critical technologies and
by experimenting with the application of those technologies in an
operational environment.
Enhanced capability will be achieved via prioritized investments
focusing on networks, sensors, weapons and platforms. Examples of Navy
investments key to the success of netted warfare include Information
Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21), Navy-Marine Corps Intranet,
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), F/A-18E/F Shared
Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP), Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infra-
Red targeting pod (ATFLIR), Naval Fires Network, Unmanned Airborne
Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), Unmanned
Undersea Vehicles (UUVs), Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
Radar, E-2C Radar Modernization Program (RMP), Acoustic Rapid COTS
Insertion (ARCI), Link-16, and Multi-function Information Distribution
System (MIDS) data links.
Also key to transforming the fleet to meet 21st century threats is
our serious commitment to fleet experimentation, spearheaded by the
Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport, Rhode Island. Our ongoing
series of Fleet Battle Experiments, working hand-in-hand with U.S.
Joint Forces Command's experimentation efforts, holds great promise for
doctrinal and programmatic development.
The result of these efforts will be a fleet that enhances
conventional and WMD deterrence, assures access, conducts precision
strike, gathers real-time intelligence, exercises joint command and
control, and exploits the priceless advantages of sea control. In
short, it will be a transformed Navy that continues its time-honored
service, on watch for America's security.

CONCLUSION

I thank the committee for your continued strong support of our
Navy, our sailors, and their families. Working together, I am confident
that we can meet the challenges of current and future readiness,
allowing the United States Navy to fulfill the missions fundamental to
a more stable and peaceful world.

Chairman Levin. Admiral Clark, thank you very much.
General Jones.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS

General Jones. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
Thank you very much for your kind thoughts and words with
regard to the families of marines who lost their lives and were
injured in the accident last night at New River, North
Carolina. Mr. Chairman, you correctly captured the sentiment
with regard to the dangerous missions that we entrust to our
men and women in uniform, and I will convey your words to their
families and to the Corps. Thank you, sir.
I would like to add parenthetically, although under the
backdrop of this tragedy, that I am pleased to report that thus
far this fiscal year is the safest recorded year for flight
mishaps in recorded Marine Corps aviation history, despite the
accident.
With regard to the 2002 budget and the 2001 supplemental
that is before you, many good things were done for our marines
and their families. Quality of life enhancements, pay and
entitlement, health, flying hours, military construction, force
protection issues, all received great attention and we are
profoundly grateful for this assistance.
I am happy to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the Marine
Corps is today a very stable culture. The proof of that is in
its recruiting successes and its retention efforts across the
board. Officer, staff, NCO, enlisted, 62 percent of the Marine
Corps budget is now consumed by manpower accounts, pay,
entitlements, health care and the like. This is good.
It also underscores what is not being done; despite the
fixes that we have made in readiness, and they have been
substantial, we are still going to continue to pay for it out
of deferred modernization and out of inattention to our
infrastructure recapitalization, which critically needs urgent
attention.
I have said before that the Marine Corps is expeditionary
by culture and transformational by design. I say that because
words are important. I would like to talk very briefly about
two sets of words. The first one is the words ``expeditionary''
versus ``deployability.'' When you talk about expeditionary
requirements for the Nation, you are talking about investment
in speed, and speed is expensive. Speed may get you there
quickly, but it will not do you any good if it is not
logistically sustainable.
So we talk about being able to get to different spots on
the globe quickly. I just would like to underscore the fact
that if you cannot sustain them once they are there it is not a
good investment.
Simply put, too much speed may not be logistically
sustainable. Put another way, the Nation does not need all of
its forces to get to spot X or Y on the globe at the same time,
nor can we afford it or lift it.
In 1973 we had an energy crisis and we pledged, or at least
it was attempted to pledge, that we would not be held hostage
to fossil fuels for our automobile industry, and we directed
and pledged ourselves to transformational processes whereby our
cars would become electric or solar-powered. Well, 27 or 28
years later, what we really did was modernize. We developed
fuel efficiencies, better, lighter cars, safer cars, though we
are still essentially dependent on fossil fuels.
So you may have transformational goals, but you may wind up
simply modernizing. So that is the second set of words that I
would mention. Transformation versus modernization needs to be
considered, how much of one you need in relation to the other.
You should consider transformation and modernization and
expeditionary capabilities versus simply deployable needs in
relation to how we use our forces. Since the end of World War
II we have deployed forces in response to burgeoning crises
over 300 times, we have actually mobilized follow-on forces six
times, and we have committed forces to major theater conflicts
three times. So the power of our engagement strategies, which
are not dependent on speed, but dependent on location and being
engaged and being present and shaping the environment and doing
things that are very important for our Nation and our
alliances, is very important.
So we need both transformation and modernization, but
perhaps not in the same amounts. We are likely to need more
modernization than transformation since transformation is
sometimes dependent on science and physics and programs that
may or may not come to pass.
The Marine Corps' transformation and modernization programs
are designed and on the books today to result in a convergence
path that will start coming to fruition in 2008. As an example,
I consider transformational programs for the Marine Corps to
include the V-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, the AAAV,
integrated logistics concepts which will revolutionize the way
we support our forward-deployed and based forces, information
operations, and naval precision fires.
As an example of the modernization process, I consider the
Lightweight 155, the LCAC, Landing Cushion Aircraft, SLEP
program, the acquisition of HIMARS, the AH-1T modernization,
the 120-millimeter mortar program, the M-4 service rifle, and
the Joint Tactical Radio, and the KC-130J to be examples of
needed modernization programs.
I believe that the American citizen of the future
generation expects that we will be the dominant Nation of
influence, so-called superpower, 50 years from now. I believe
we can do this if we understand that the purpose of our
investment in peacetime is so we do not have to fight wars, and
the way we used our forces in the last 50 years suggests
persuasively that we are successful at doing this.
We understand that national security is not an independent
investment and that such an investment is the anchor that
allows our Nation to be the Nation of global influence
economically, politically, diplomatically, culturally,
scientifically and technologically.
It is abundantly clear in my judgment that approximately
2.9 percent of our gross domestic product towards this goal is
insufficient. Whatever Congress decides the investment is, I
recommend that it be proportional and sustained over a gradual
period of time. I am truly excited by the prospect of working
with the Secretary of Defense, our Secretary of the Navy, the
DOD and senior military leaders to adopt better business
practices, which are critically needed, and much-needed
acquisition reforms. The Marine Corps is proud to be the
largest activity-based costing management program in the
Department of Defense currently.
Our budget request, designed with both transformation and
modernization in mind, balances the requirement for
expeditionary forces with that for simply deployable forces. It
has its convergence in 2008 and we can do that by sustaining
and supporting the programs that are currently a matter of
record. This is inclusive of base housing and modernization and
recapitalization of our infrastructure.
We have a path to success. We continue to develop our
foundational needs, such as the acquisition of Blount Island,
which in my judgment should be done by 2004--it is a national
asset and it is a national logistics gateway; enhancing and
achieving a 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift capability,
due to the predictable paucity of land-based operational
support bases in the 21st century. We should look at maritime
prepositioned ships of the future, to explore rapid sealift.
I would also caution that we pay a lot of attention to the
rise of encroachment issues, which are going to face all of us
in the foreseeable future.
The Secretary of Defense has said we should only replace
things if we have something better to replace them with. I
understand that, I agree with it, and we are already moving in
that direction.
The rapidly deployable force with staying power that some
has said is nonexistent in the military today in fact does
exist and it is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. It is both
expeditionary and it is deployable. It is being modernized and
will be transformed in part, maybe in whole, between now and
2008, and it exists today for the joint warfighter. It
possesses forcible entry capability, it is affordable, it is
scalable, it is forward-based or deployed, it is sustainable,
it is joint and interoperable, and it is combined arms-capable,
which is a goal that all true joint forces in the future must
seek to achieve.
A final thought, Mr. Chairman. It is an exciting time to be
a United States Marine. We look forward to our future while
learning from the past, and we look forward to your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

Prepared Statement by Gen. James L. Jones, Jr., USMC

Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the
committee; it is my pleasure to report to you on the state of your
Marine Corps. On behalf of all marines and their families, I want to
thank the committee for its continued support. Your efforts to increase
compensation and improve the quality of life of our young men and women
in uniform have been central to the health of your Marine Corps and are
deeply appreciated.

VISION

I believe the committee is well familiar with the nature of the
present international security landscape and the current state of our
forces, so I will begin simply by noting some of the ways in which
warfare has changed in the 21st century. In the 20th century, mass and
volume were the primary methods relied upon to win wars. In their
place, speed, stealth, precision, and sustainment have become the
emergent principles of modern warfare.
These four principles have application from the strategic to the
tactical levels. Furthermore, they are key with regard to how our
forces maneuver and employ weapons as well as to how they exchange
information and logistically sustain themselves. The Marine Corps'
vision, accordingly, is to inculcate these principles into our
doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support. One
indication of our commitment to do this, reflected in Marine Corps
Strategy 21, is our concerted aim to enhance the strategic agility,
operational reach, and tactical flexibility of our Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces. Speed, stealth, precision, and sustainment are integral to
each of these capabilities.
Indeed, we are revolutionizing our approach to operations with
these 21st century principles of war in mind. We are moving beyond the
traditional amphibious assault operations which we conducted in the
20th century. Our goal now is advanced, expeditionary operations from
land and sea to both deter and respond to crises.
The Corps has been our Nation's premier expeditionary force since
our landing at Nassau in the Bahamas, 225 years ago. Today, we have
worldwide responsiveness and the versatility to undertake missions
across the spectrum of operations. To marines, the term
``expeditionary'' connotes more than a given capability. For us, it is
a cultural mindset that conditions our marines to be able to rapidly
deploy with little advance warning and effectively operate with organic
logistical support in austere environments. This is the basis of the
Marine Corps' culture as well as an acknowledgement of the necessity to
do more with less and to be prepared to fight and win with only the
resources we bring with us, without the need to return to fixed bases
for refitting or retraining.
A prime example of these attributes is resident within our medium
weight Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Nearly 10 years ago, in
light of pressing manpower considerations, we deactivated our six
standing brigade command elements. Last year, we reestablished three
Marine Expeditionary Brigades by embedding their staffs within our
Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters. These units are now actively
operating. The 1st MEB recently participated in operation NATIVE FURY,
a humanitarian assistance mission in Kenya; 2d MEB has been integrated
into contingency plans for Europe and Latin America; and, 3d MEB has
conducted a maritime prepositioning shipping offload in Australia.
The versatility of the MEB is emblematic of the unique scalability
of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. In size and capability, these
brigades are midway between our Marine Expeditionary Units and our
Marine Expeditionary Forces. Furthermore, our MEBs can either deploy on
amphibious shipping or be airlifted into a theater of operations and
join up with Maritime Prepositioning Forces.
A special characteristic of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces is
that they consist of five integrated elements: command; ground combat;
aviation; logistics; and, supporting establishment. The MEB consists of
a regimental landing team, with organic infantry, artillery, and armor
elements, and in addition to a composite aircraft group with both
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, it also has a combat service
support group--whose supplies can sustain the MEB in full scale combat
for 30 days. Each of these elements reinforces the others. This
teamwork, built on training and experience, reaches across every
battlefield function, creating a unique degree of synergy that
distinguishes our units from others.
Ultimately, our vision of the future and our expeditionary culture,
along with our philosophy of maneuver warfare, come together in our
emerging capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Achieving
the full promise of that concept will hinge on our efforts to balance
the competing demands of near-term readiness and investment in
equipment modernization and infrastructure. This is no small task.
These over-arching concerns are interrelated and in the long-term we
cannot have one without the others.
In order to improve our near-term readiness, we have made
significant internal adjustments over the past 2 years. Through
reduction in attrition of our first term marines, internal management
efficiencies, outsourcing, and privatization, we will eventually return
approximately 4,000 marines to the operating forces. We are also
utilizing numerous best business practices to make our operations both
efficient and effective and now have the largest Activity-Based
Costing/Management program in the Department of Defense, if not all of
government. While these efforts have improved the efficient application
of fiscal and manpower resources, and directly supported our commitment
to personnel readiness in the operating forces, we are still assessing
the totality of our personnel requirement. Should a need for additional
personnel be determined, we are confident that commensurate funding and
our continued recruiting and retention successes will support any
required increase.
Despite such efficiencies, we are, regrettably, continuing to
maintain our near-term readiness at the expense of our modernization.
During the past decade, the Nation has consistently limited the
resources dedicated to its national security. Consequently, the
dramatic increases in operational requirements coupled with imposed
constraints have mandated a substantively reduced rate of investment in
equipment modernization and infrastructure. We are, in fact, at a point
where we can no longer fail to rectify these shortfalls. As a nation
with global responsibilities, we cannot ignore the critical importance
of readiness.
The fiscal year 2002 budget submitted by the President proposes
increased funding for military pay and entitlements, health care
benefits, flying hours, base and station utilities, depot maintenance,
strategic lift, essential base operating support costs, and force
protection requirements. The administration also provided increased
funding for one of our most underfunded areas--our infrastructure.
Additional funds provided in this budget will allow us to begin to
address badly needed family housing requirements at Camp Pendleton,
California, and bachelor enlisted quarters at various locations. These
are of great importance to our readiness. Nevertheless, I remain
concerned about the level of investment in our infrastructure and
equipment modernization. For example, the fiscal year 2002 budget does
not include increases for ground equipment modernization.

READINESS

We assess our readiness in terms of ``four pillars:'' marines and
their families; our infrastructure; our legacy equipment systems; and,
our transformation and modernization efforts. Each of these pillars
requires attention and resources in order to ensure your Corps is
prepared to serve our Nation's interests. I will discuss each of the
pillars and comment on what we are currently doing and what we want to
do with the support of this committee, beginning with the most
important part of the Marine Corps, its people.
Our Marines and Their Families
The Marine Corps has three major goals: making America's marines;
winning our Nation's battles; and, creating quality citizens. The fact
that people are the focus of two of these three goals exemplifies the
extent to which we recognize the special trust and confidence that the
Nation reposes in us for the care and welfare of the young men and
women in our charge.
Safety is central to the Corps' focus on people and it is a
critical component of maintaining our readiness. It is also a vital
element of the quality of life that we provide our marines and their
families. Along these lines, I am pleased to report that we have
significantly lowered our off-duty mishap rates. Moreover, we have had
notable success in aviation safety: our Class ``A'' flight mishap rate
is the lowest it has ever been at this point in the fiscal year. For
these trends to continue, it will take our unrelenting attention and we
are dedicated to maintaining our focus on this important issue.
One factor contributing to our safety challenge is that we are a
young force. The average age of our marines is 23, roughly 7 to 9 years
younger than the average age of the members of the other services. This
is part of the culture of the Corps inasmuch as our unique force
structure results in 68 percent of our marines being on their first
enlistment at any one time. The nature of our force structure requires
us to annually recruit 39,000 men and women into our enlisted ranks. To
fill this tremendous demand, our recruiters work tirelessly and have
consistently met our accession goals in quality and quantity for 6
consecutive years as of the end of June 2001.
Retention is as important as recruiting. We are proud that we are
meeting our retention goals across nearly all military occupational
specialties. Intangibles--such as the desire to serve the Nation, to
belong to a cohesive organization, and to experience leadership
responsibilities through service in the Corps--are a large part of the
reason we can retain the remarkable men and women who choose to remain
on Active Duty. Concrete evidence of this phenomena is seen in our
deployed units, which continually record the highest reenlistment rates
in the Corps. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRB) has been
an additional, powerful tool to meet our retention goals. The increases
for the SRB Program as well as the targeted pay raise initiative found
in the President's budget will go a long way toward assisting in
meeting our retention goals and helping take care of our marines and
their families. Retention success is also partly a consequence of the
investment we make in supporting our operational forces--to give our
marines what they need to do their jobs in the field when they are
deployed--as well as the funds we earmark for educating and training
our marines.
While we recruit marines, we retain families. As noted earlier, the
effectiveness of our marines is dependent, in large measure, on the
support they receive from their loved ones. Our families are indeed
vital to our readiness. Increased pay as well as improved housing and
health care directly influence our families' quality of life and, in
turn, bolster the readiness of our units. Your support of our families'
quality of life has contributed greatly to our retention success.
However, the rising costs of rent, utilities, and fuel require
continued annual increases in pay and Basic Allowance for Housing.
Furthermore, we need to provide and maintain those essential support
systems that benefit and protect marines and their families, especially
accessible and responsive health care. We are extremely thankful, Mr.
Chairman, for the recent enactment of much-needed improvements to the
TRICARE system for our Active Duty personnel and for our retired
veterans. The President's budget includes further improvements in this
area which we expect to make a significant difference in retention,
morale, and readiness.
Our Infrastructure
Beyond providing for our families, your support in allocating and
sustaining resources for our bases and stations has had a profound
impact on our readiness. Bases and stations are the launching pads and
recovery platforms for our deployed units and thus are integral parts
of our operating forces. Hence, we want to ensure that our posts
possess the infrastructure and ranges necessary to prepare our marines
for the wide variety of contingencies they can expect to confront.
Equally important, they are sanctuaries for many of our families.
Moreover, just as our bases and stations are vital to our current
readiness, the recapitalization of our infrastructure is as important
to our warfighting strength in the future as is modernization.
Thirty-five percent of our infrastructure is over 50 years old. Our
supporting infrastructure--water and sewage systems, bridges, and
roads--is antiquated and decaying. Though we slowed the growth of
backlog of maintenance and repair (BMAR) at our bases and stations to
approximately $650 million this fiscal year, it rises to $687 million
in fiscal year 2002 and averages approximately $660 million across the
remainder of the Future Years Defense Plan--far exceeding the goal of
$106 million set for fiscal year 2010.
Although the increases provided in the President's budget begin to
address this problem, I remain concerned. Prior to this budget, our
military construction replacement cycle exceeded 100 years compared to
a commercial industry standard of approximately 50 years. While this
budget allows us to attain an approximately 60 year cycle of military
construction replacement in fiscal year 2002, the average
recapitalization rate remains nearly 100 years across the balance of
the Future Years Defense Plan.
In more specific terms, approximately half of our family housing
units are inadequate, and we have a shortage of nearly 9,000 homes in
fiscal year 2001. The budget submitted by the administration allows us
to revitalize our current inventory and to accelerate the eradication
of substandard housing which is our first priority in this regard.
Additional funding for both base-housing construction and the
elimination of out-of-pocket housing costs for marines that live off-
base will allow us to reduce our family housing deficit by 20 percent
within 4 years.
On a separate note concerning our infrastructure, we are
increasingly finding that many forms of encroachment upon our bases and
stations threaten to degrade our readiness. When most of our bases and
stations were established, they were distant from civilian population
centers. Today, population growth and commercial development have not
merely reached our installations, they have enveloped them. There are
two major ramifications of this phenomenon. The first is that our bases
and stations often are the last remaining wilderness zones in otherwise
over-developed areas--which has meant that we have to balance our
training requirements with our increasing responsibilities as
environmental stewards. The second consequence is that we are now
obliged to routinely deal with a wide variety of complaints, mostly
regarding noise or flight patterns, from those citizens who have chosen
to live in close proximity to our bases and stations.
Such concerns about sea, land, and airspace utilization have
necessitated close coordination and frequent compromise with many
elements of the civilian sector. Accordingly, we work diligently to be
good neighbors and try to accommodate the demands of environmental
protection and concerns of adjoining communities without degrading
training and the mission effectiveness of our marines. Despite this
focus, encroachment issues have the potential to increasingly affect
readiness in the years ahead. We need your continued support to ensure
that the growing complexity and expense of encroachment issues do not
hamstring our efforts to conduct meaningful training in order to
provide for national security.
Our Legacy Equipment Systems
Our present and future readiness does not rest solely on the
investments we make in our personnel and infrastructure. We also must
consider the equipment we give our marines. This is no simple task. We
must apportion our allotted resources between maintaining the ability
to respond to crises and the requirement to lay the foundation for our
capacity to respond to the security challenges of the future.
As a consequence of the procurement pause of the 1990s, many of our
weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and support systems are approaching or
have already reached block obsolescence. In the last decade, we have
watched the size of our forces decline while the number of
contingencies has increased. Under these circumstances, our equipment
has been put under tremendous stress. We are devoting ever-increasing
amounts of time conducting preventive and corrective maintenance as
well as spending more and more money on spare parts to repair our
legacy equipment. The limited availability of spare parts has put
additional strain on these efforts. Our procurement programs seek to
address this concern, but we are acutely aware that the acquisition
process is often a slow enterprise. As a result, our legacy equipment
systems and our efforts to maintain them will remain central to the
readiness of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces until our modernization
programs replace those aging pieces of equipment.
This situation is particularly acute in our aviation combat
element. In fact, the majority of our primary rotary-wing airframes are
over 25 years old and in turn they are older than many of the marines
who fly aboard them. Another illustration of the advanced age of our
airframes is that our KC-130Fs are 19 years past planned retirement.
When our first KC-130F rolled off the assembly line, President Kennedy
was beginning his first year as the commander in chief. Likewise, our
CH-46Es and CH-53Ds are more than 30 years old, and the average age of
our CH-53Es is 12 years. Some of our younger pilots are flying the same
aircraft that their fathers flew.
The challenges associated with the failure of parts on older
aircraft, diminishing manufacturing sources, and long delays in parts
delivery all place demands on readiness. Since 1995, the direct
maintenance man-hours per hour of flight has increased by 16 percent
and our ``cannibalization'' rate has increased by 24 percent. During
the same time period, the full mission capable rate, though still
within acceptable parameters, decreased by almost 17 percent across the
force. While recent increases provided by the administration for
Program Related Engineering and Program Related Logistics (PRE/PRL) are
extremely helpful, modernization will ultimately relieve the strain
being placed on these older airframes, as it will do for our ground
combat and combat service support elements as well.

TRANSFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION

We recognize that we cannot know for certain what missions and
threats we will face in the future, and that, as a result, we need to
focus our efforts in such a way as to provide America with weapons
platforms that are flexible and robust enough to allow her marines to
excel across the wide spectrum of tasks and environments that they may
encounter. The Corps' efforts to enhance its capabilities can be
broadly described in terms of transformation and modernization. On one
hand, transformation programs are intended to achieve fundamental
advances in capabilities by exploiting leap-ahead technologies. On the
other hand, modernization programs represent more modest efforts to
yield incremental improvements to our equipment systems. Examples of
the transformational programs that the Marine Corps is pursuing are the
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, V-22 Osprey, Joint Strike Fighter,
Naval Precision Fires, and Integrated Logistics Capabilities. Key
modernization programs include the KC-130J, Lightweight 155mm Howitzer,
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, Medium Tactical Vehicle
Replacement, and amphibious shipping.
Transformational Programs
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The award winning Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle program is the Corps' highest ground
acquisition priority and promises to allow high-speed surface maneuver
from ship-to-shore as well as on land. Importantly, these vehicles will
be able to deploy to their objectives from over the visual horizon,
which will allow our ships to remain beyond the range of many threat
weapons and surveillance systems. This capability will help negate an
enemy's anti-access strategies and enable expeditionary operations from
the sea.
V-22 Osprey. The Osprey remains the Corps' premier near-term
aviation acquisition priority. Tiltrotor technology promises to
revolutionize aviation and the V-22 will radically increase our
strategic airlift, operational reach, and tactical flexibility. The
Osprey's superior range, speed, and payload will allow us to accomplish
combat missions and other operations from distances previously
unattainable and at faster response times than possible with other
airframes.
We are acutely aware of the challenges associated with the Osprey
but are gratified that the Review Panel, appointed by then-Secretary of
Defense William Cohen, concluded that tiltrotor technology is mature
and that the V-22 promises to become a true national asset. Though the
panel also determined the aircraft's reliability and maintainability
must be improved, it noted that the V-22 will provide the Marine Corps
with capabilities that cannot be provided by any single helicopter or
conventional aircraft. Indeed, the Panel's conclusions mirror those of
seven major cost and operational effectiveness analyses and the fact
that the tiltrotor XV-15 has been flying since 1977.
We are presently in the process of ensuring that the V-22 is
reliable, operationally suitable, and affordable--just as we did 40
years ago with each of the aircraft the Osprey is intended to replace.
Currently, 85 reliability and maintainability improvements have been
incorporated, or are on contract for incorporation, on the Osprey's
production line--out of the 120 identified. With time, diligence, the
close cooperation of our partners in industry, and with the support of
Congress, we can work through the present challenges confronting us and
achieve the tremendous operational capabilities offered by this
remarkable aircraft. We are hopeful that the program's needed changes
and improvements will be funded at the most economical rate of
production in the fiscal year 2003 budget.
As has always been the case, our actions will be guided by an
unyielding commitment to do what is right for our marines, their
families, and our Nation. In asking for your support, I assure you that
we will not compromise our integrity or jeopardize the safety of our
marines for any program.
Joint Strike Fighter. Another aviation transformational effort of
great importance is the Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter
is, first and foremost, a product of Congressional guidance from the
1980s. At the time, each service routinely produced a large number of
different, service-specific airframes. Congress, therefore, asked the
Department of Defense and industry to develop airframes that could be
used more commonly by each of the services. The Joint Strike Fighter is
the first step in that direction. The Short Takeoff and Vertical
Landing variant promises to combine the current basing flexibility of
the AV-8 Harrier with the multi-role capabilities, speed, and
maneuverability of the F/A-18 Hornet and will fulfill both the Marine
Corps' air-to-ground and air-to-air mission requirements. It will also
incorporate both stealth and standoff precision guided weapon
technology. Just as the Joint Strike Fighter has transformational
operational potential, it also holds remarkable promise for our
industrial base and our Nation's economy. Considering the fact that
many of our allies have expressed interest in becoming partners in the
program, this aircraft has the potential to bolster our defense
industrial base to a degree similar to that achieved by the F-16
Fighting Falcon over the past 25 years. There is no other tactical
aviation program with so much potential for satisfying national and
international requirements in the first half of this century. The JSF
program preserves our leadership role on the global stage in tactical
aviation.
Naval Precision Fires. Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities are
intrinsically linked to those of our partners, the U.S. Navy. One
illustration of this, among many, is that naval precision fires are an
essential dimension of our power projection capabilities. Yet, today
the available resources for naval fire support are inadequate. Efforts
to upgrade current naval surface fires capabilities are focused on
modifications to the existing Mark 45 gun mount as well as the
development of an advanced gun system, extended range guided munitions,
and the Land Attack Standard Missile. Taken together, these planned
enhancements will dramatically improve the range, responsiveness,
accuracy, and lethality of the naval surface fire support provided to
forces ashore.
Integrated Logistics Capabilities. We are also pioneering
Integrated Logistics Capabilities to transform our combat service
support. In this effort, we are analyzing with the help of academia the
manner in which military logistics can be altered to make our supply
chain more responsive and better integrated with the operating forces.
Tangible savings have already been realized by consolidating selected
unit supply responsibilities at the retail level and we are looking to
further reengineer our methodologies. With the use of new technologies
and practices, proven in the private sector, the Corps will, in
essence, create a ``new order'' for its logistics enterprise and
undertake the revolutionary changes necessary to ensure that it
continues to be the premier fighting force in the world.
Modernization Programs
KC-130J. Replacement of our aging KC-130 fleet with KC-130J
aircraft is necessary to ensure the viability and deployability of
Marine Corps Tactical Air and Assault Support well into the 21st
century. The KC-130J's performance features include increased cruise
airspeed, night vision compatible interior and exterior lighting,
enhanced rapid ground refueling capability, digital avionics, and
powerful propulsion systems. These strengths promise lower life-cycle
expenses and eliminate the need for costly KC-130F/R Service Life
Extension Programs. With the KC-130J, our aerial refueling fleet will
be ready to support the tremendous increase in capabilities that the
Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter promise to provide for our Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces.
Lightweight 155mm Howitzer. A number of ground weapon system
programs are also of great interest to us. The Lightweight 155mm
Howitzer is our first priority in this regard. The Lightweight 155 is a
joint Marine-Army program that meets or exceeds all the requirements of
the current M198 Howitzer while reducing the weight of an individual
artillery piece from 16,000 to 9,000 pounds. This lower weight allows
for tactical lift by both the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter and the V-
22. Moreover, the digitization of this platform will greatly reduce
response time and increase accuracy. I am pleased to note that the four
minor technical discrepancies--concerning the spade, spade latch,
recoil dampener, and optical sight--identified by the General
Accounting Office have each been corrected. The first Engineering
Manufacturing Development guns have passed all contractor testing and
been accepted by the Department of Defense for subsequent evaluation. A
production decision should be reached in September of next year.
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Also integral to our plans
to improve our fire support is the acquisition of the High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). This system is designed to be rapidly
deployable as a key part of our expeditionary operations. It will fire
both precision and area munitions, as well as extend our ground-based
fire support umbrella to 45 kilometers. HIMARS's tactical mobility,
small logistics footprint, and capacity to deliver heavy volume fires
against time-sensitive targets will, in conjunction with the
Lightweight 155, at last remedy the fire support shortfall we have
known for much of the last 2 decades.
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement. The Medium Tactical Vehicle
Replacement is at the heart of Combat Service Support modernization and
will provide our forces improved sustainment and permit maximum
flexibility in responding to crises. The vehicle's weight and height
allow it to be transported internally by the KC-130 Hercules aircraft
and externally by the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter. The Medium
Tactical Vehicle Replacement can readily negotiate terrain twice as
rough as our current vehicles can, and it has increased payload, speed,
and reliability.
Amphibious Shipping. Our military presence around the world is the
framework that enables the application of the other elements of our
National power--political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and
technological--to cultivate stability overseas. Yet in the 21st
century, our forward land-basing options are not likely to increase and
may even decline and, as a result, U.S. forces will rely less on large
fixed bases overseas to fulfill America's global responsibilities. It
is myopic, given the history of the 20th century, to think we can deter
or defeat aggression on the global playing field solely with
capabilities based in the United States. It has been proven many times
over that presence in the operating area will be essential to our
prosecution of a successful strategy. More specifically, it is going to
take a sea-based presence in the operating area, a formation of joint
assets that together project and sustain combat power ashore while
reducing or eliminating our landward footprint. In the future, U.S.
forces are going to increasingly deploy and sustain operations either
from our sea-bases or our homeland.
Despite the fact that the enduring requirements of global sea
control, strategic deterrence, naval forward presence, and maritime
power projection have not declined, the United States Navy's fleet of
ships has shrunk in number by 23 percent in the last decade. The
requirement for our amphibious shipping, which has been under-
resourced, remains the linchpin of the Corps' ability to influence the
international security landscape, project power, and protect the
Nation's interest during crises. Simply put, virtual presence amounts
to actual absence where global events are concerned. We cannot afford
absence, which will likely result in vacuums that could be filled by
those at odds with our National interests.
We are grateful for your support to replace four classes of older
ships with the new LPD 17 San Antonio amphibious ship class. The
delivery of these twelve ships to the fleet is programmed to be
complete at the end of the decade. However, we remain concerned about
schedule slippage in the LPD-17 program. Such delays are unacceptable
and must be avoided. Likewise, we should also be concerned with
replacing the LHD Wasp class ships. Considering the extended time-frame
for ship design, construction, and delivery we need to ensure now that
we are ready to replace the Wasp class when they reach the end of their
35 year service life starting in 2011.
Today's amphibious ship force structure, when the number of active
fleet vessels is combined with Reserve ships that can be mobilized, has
the capacity to lift nearly two and a half Marine Expeditionary Brigade
assault echelon equivalents. It has long been recognized that we
require an amphibious ship force structure capable of simultaneously
lifting the assault echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. I
strongly recommend that we commit to redress this shortfall as a matter
of urgent priority.
The leases of our current fleet of maritime prepositioning ships
(MPS) will expire in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2011. The
development of advanced maritime prepositioning capabilities will
significantly increase the strength and flexibility of our sea-based
expeditionary operations. The marriage of a modern amphibious fleet
with maritime prepositioning shipping capable of hosting at-sea arrival
and assembly of forces will eliminate the requirement for access to
secure ports and airfields, and give our Nation an unmatched
asymmetrical advantage in projecting power. The mobility and dispersion
inherent to this future sea-basing concept promises to provide
survivability far greater than that afforded by fixed land bases and
will give us a revolutionary power projection advantage for many
decades.
Convergence
Looking ahead, the programs we have planned will, with your
support, begin to converge in our operating forces in 2008. In the not
distant future, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, V-22 Osprey,
Joint Strike Fighter, KC-130J, Lightweight 155, High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System, Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement, Naval Surface Fire
Support, amphibious shipping, and a number of other smaller programs
will together dramatically transform our expeditionary capabilities. As
discussed earlier, these systems promise to embody speed, stealth,
precision, and sustainment as well as afford us modern agility,
mobility, and lethality. But, we cannot stop here. We must work
together with the Navy and our defense industrial base to exploit other
opportunities to advance our capabilities in the future.
Continuous transformation and modernization are key to our long-
term national interest; without them, we will fail to keep pace with
change. The Marine Corps has an institutional tradition of such
innovation and is expeditionary by nature, while being transformational
by design. We view transformation as an evolutionary process, not a
singular event.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

People, not systems, are the fundamental component of the Corps.
Just as we are continually striving to evolve our doctrine, equipment,
and supporting establishment so that we can better win our Nation's
battles, we are also constantly moving forward to improve how we train
and educate our marines.
We believe the old adage, ``you fight the way you train.'' Because
of this, our training exercises are becoming ever more Joint and
Combined in order to provide our marines with the experience that they
will need when they are called upon to respond to crises--because there
is no doubt that they will work alongside our sister services and
partners from other nations in such circumstances. Moreover, we
recognize that while our first duty is to be ready to win our Nation's
battles, we are increasingly called on to execute missions at the lower
end of the spectrum of operations. Accordingly, our exercise scenarios
emphasize both conventional warfighting missions as well as operations
other than war.
Experience in tandem with education is the best foundation for
dealing with both difficulty and fortuity. Accordingly, we are not only
focused on training our marines, but on educating them as well. We have
expanded our distance learning programs to ensure that greater numbers
of marines have the opportunity for education, not merely those who
attend resident courses. In light of this, we are adjusting
administrative policies to accommodate family concerns--such as spouses
with careers or children with exceptional needs--when selecting
officers to attend our various schools that require a change in duty
station. We have instituted a ``year-out program'' for our junior
officers and SNCOs, within the corporate world, think-tanks, and
Congress. This will widen perspectives and provide valuable experiences
which will bolster our marines capacity to innovate and adapt in the
years to come.

OUR MARINE WARRIOR CULTURE

At the very heart of the Corps and its relationship to each marine
is our service culture. The Marine Corps is sui generis--that is, we
have a nature that is distinct from all others. This goes beyond the
unique characteristics of our expeditionary Marine Air-Ground Task
Forces which are always prepared to be deployed overseas. It, in fact,
pertains to our warrior ethos. From the individual marine to our
institution as a whole, our model is the thinking and stoic warrior who
fights more intelligently than his enemy and is inured to hardship and
challenges.
Our commitment to maintaining our warrior culture is illustrated by
our recently instituted martial arts program. We have developed a
discipline unique to the Corps and are in the process of training every
marine in its ways. This program seeks to promote both physical prowess
and mental discipline. Successive levels of achievement are rewarded
with different colored belts reflecting a combination of demonstrated
character, judgment, and physical skill. This training will benefit
marines in the missions we face; especially in peacekeeping and
peacemaking operations where physical stamina and mental discipline are
often vital. At its heart, our martial arts training is fundamentally
concerned with mentoring our young men and women to understand that the
keys to mission accomplishment often are a matter of using
intelligence, strength, and self-control to influence circumstances,
rather than always resorting to the application of deadly force. In
this regard, our martial arts training supports our pursuit of non-
lethal alternatives.
Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, each of America's Armed Services
has a different set of responsibilities, separate operating roles, and
institutional structures that give every service a culture that is
distinct from the others. Indeed, such cultural diversity should be
considered a force multiplier. Consequently, ``one-size fits all''
policies are not often the best solutions in the Department of Defense,
despite the importance of our on-going work to be fully joint in the
conduct of operations. It is important to understand how the
differences between the services may sometimes require separate and
service-specific means of accomplishing universal goals such as
promoting the quality of life of our people.
The recently enacted PERSTEMPO Program is an example of a
requirement that is likely to impact each of the services differently.
The 2001 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that any service
member deployed more than 400 days in 2 years receive $100 for each
additional deployment day. While the larger services may be capable of
managing the restriction placed on deployments and the additional costs
associated with this requirement, the policy runs counter to the Corps'
rotationally deployed, expeditionary force identity.
Our young men and women join the Corps to make a difference, to
challenge themselves, and are prepared to deploy in service of our
country. The testament to this is our success in recruiting and
retention: the ``acid-test'' of any service culture. Our young marines
and their families understand that our forward presence and
expeditionary deployments are the core expression of our warrior
culture. It is why they are marines. In turn, though the PERSTEMPO
Program may be appropriate for the other services, its present
construct does not comport with the Corps' culture and missions. The
policy may in fact have the unintended consequences of having a
profoundly deleterious effect on our cohesion, capabilities, training,
and budget. As a consequence we are now conducting a study to analyze
how we can better manage our personnel tempo and still meet our
operational requirements while remaining true to our culture and our
fiscal constraints.

CONCLUSION

One of the clearest indicators that people are our first priority
is that approximately 60 percent of the Marine Corps budget is allotted
to funding manpower programs. Yet, this fact also emphasizes the
relative state of the other pillars of readiness, especially
transformation and modernization; which have been underfunded for most
of the past decade. The Marine Corps has long prided itself on being
able to do more with less. Nothing reflects this more clearly than the
fact that the Corps provides 20 percent of our Nation's expeditionary
ground and aviation combat force for 6 percent of the Department of
Defense budget.
Just as the other services have pursued plans to reorganize from a
Cold War posture to one that matches the post-Cold War world, the
Corps, too, has adapted itself to the challenges and opportunities that
have emerged during the last 10 years. I want to underscore that the
Marine Corps intends to remain our Nation's premier expeditionary
combined arms force with modernized sustainment capabilities. That
identity is central to who we are as marines.
With that firmly in mind, the Corps has carefully plotted a course
for the future. Indeed, if the programs we have currently planned are
properly funded, we will see a convergence of transformation and
modernization capabilities in our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
starting in 2008 that will revolutionize our expeditionary operations.
While our Nation's current strategy and force structure may change,
it is clear that a sustained increase in resources will yield the
operational strength, flexibility, and resilience we envision in both
the short and the long-term. With regard to the Marine Corps, an
increased investment of approximately $1.8 to $2 billion a year
sustained for the next 8 to 10 years--a modest step that is less than 1
percent of what is allotted to the overarching national security
budget--will permit us to achieve our vision and deliver a Marine
Corps, in partnership with the U.S. Navy, which will be capable of
defending America's global national security interests in the 21st
Century. Such an investment addresses our warfighting readiness
requirements, accelerates the pace of our transformation and
modernization, and recapitalizes our infrastructure. The fiscal year
2002 plus-ups provided by the administration during budget wrap-up
reduced our unfunded requirements by approximately $400 million. With
your consistent support we can achieve our goals and provide our Nation
with a Marine Corps that will be well on the road to dramatically
transformed expeditionary capabilities.

Chairman Levin. General Jones, thank you so much.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of
the committee: I am honored to appear before you today for the
first time as Secretary of the Air Force and to be in the
company of my fellow service secretaries and the distinguished
flag officers who lead the world's finest military team.
I, too, would like to pause and say something special about
Mike Ryan. He is certainly a class act. In fact, besides being
a superb military officer, I find that he is a man for all
seasons, and I commend him to you, sir.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will make just a
short opening statement, as will General Ryan, and we will
request our written statement and the Air Force 2001 posture
statement be included in the record.
Mr. Chairman, America is an aerospace Nation. During the
last 100 years our country has harnessed and developed
aerospace power to accomplish many impressive feats, including
revolutionizing the nature of warfare, changing the face of
transportation and the conduct of global trade, and enabling
mankind to open doors to a new universe of discovery in space.
Those accomplishments, Mr. Chairman, form the legacy of the
twentieth century.
In the 100 years to come, aerospace power, properly guided
and nourished, will further transform the interactions among
nations for the benefit of our own citizens. With its
attributes of speed, range, stealth and precision, our Nation's
outstanding Air Force will continue its current global
reconnaissance and strike superiority and the greatest
deterrent power that capability brings with it.
The President's fiscal year 2002 budget supports critical
needs for our 21st Century Air Force. It places a special and
very welcome emphasis on people and readiness, areas of
immediate concern to our forces. The current quadrennial review
process and the analysis the Secretary of Defense is leading in
the Department of Defense will address our strategy, force
structure, and efficient management of our resources for the
longer term.
As these intellectual efforts reach their conclusions, my
Air Force colleagues and I will be prepared to consider and
orchestrate the role of military aerospace power in the joint
and combined operations of the future.
We also are striving for efficiency. We recognize that we
cannot just keep coming back and asking for more money, but we
are looking for things we can do to free up resources so that
we can in fact devote those resources to modernization and
transformation where it makes sense to do so.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Senator Warner and members of
your committee for your tremendous support that has enabled our
Air Force to become without question the world's finest. We did
not get here on our own.
I look forward to your questions and advice and the
dialogue we will conduct together in the months and years to
come. Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Roche and
General Ryan follows:]

Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. James G. Roche and Gen. Michael E.
Ryan, USAF

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has and
will continue to focus on aggressive transformation to the extent our
budget allows. This fiscal year 2002 budget shores up some of our most
critical people and readiness concerns and allows us to remain the
world's most respected aerospace force.
During the last 100 years, U.S. air and space competence has
revolutionized the conduct of warfare, providing near-instantaneous
global reconnaissance and strike capability across the full spectrum of
engagement, from combat operations to humanitarian aid. This competence
has contributed to our ability to deter wars, as well as our ability to
win them. However, in this century, we find that rogue nations, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the rapid spread of
information technology, have the potential to threaten our National
interests. This changing security environment presents us with both
unique challenges and opportunities.
The Department of Defense is in the midst of numerous studies and
analyses--the results of which will undoubtedly influence our future
aerospace strategy. We must develop a force structure that, when teamed
in joint or combined operations, will be effective in maintaining the
peace and preserving freedom. We must also deepen and enrich the bonds
of trust with the men and women who serve in the Air Force in order to
attract and retain the very best individuals. We must continue to
reform our policies, practices, and processes to make our Service more
effective and efficient. Finally, we must pay special attention to the
shrinking industrial base and evaluate ways to improve our current
acquisition processes to ensure innovative future capabilities for the
Nation.
We respectfully submit this testimony to recount our
accomplishments during the past year and outline our plans for the
future. Without the steadfast support of the President and Congress,
our past successes would not have been possible. With your continuing
support, we will build upon those successes.

Air Force Posture Statement--Overview

As we transition to the new century, even the new millennium, we
will use this posture statement to reflect on what the Air Force
accomplished during 2000, where we want to go in the future, and how we
plan to get there.
We're a service emerging from a decade of continuous
transformation. During this period, we have molded and transformed
aerospace power into a crucial component of joint operations. We
defined ourselves with ``integrity first, service before self, and
excellence in all we do'' and developed ourselves to be ``fast,
flexible, and decisive.''
It was also a time that took a heavy toll on our people and our
systems. Therefore, we are developing new initiatives in our People,
Readiness, and Modernization programs. If we are to continue to protect
America's interests with aerospace power, we must implement these
initiatives.

PEOPLE

The state of the economy has exerted considerable pressure on our
ability to retain and recruit the right people. Frankly, it is
difficult to compete with the financial compensation available in the
private sector. Consequently, taking care of our people is our top
priority. Taking care of people starts with their professional lives,
so that they are satisfied with the work they do and know they're
accomplishing something important. It also, of course, means providing
them attractive compensation, benefits, housing, and facilities that
show we value their efforts and care about their families.

READINESS

Our dominance of the full spectrum of operations tends to
overshadow what has happened to our readiness. Responding across this
full spectrum of operations necessitates we have a certain number of
units ready to deploy in the first 30 days of conflict. This is the
basis of our readiness requirement of 92 percent. Since 1996, our
worldwide combat force readiness rates have decreased 23 percentage
points to a rate of 68 percent in April 2001. Furthermore, our overall
Air Force readiness is lower than any time since June 1987. We are
capable of winning today; however, we are concerned about these trends
in readiness indicators. A major factor in the decline is the
increasing age of our aircraft. For example, our flying hours have
remained relatively constant over the past 5 years, but their cost has
increased by over 45 percent after inflation. Older aircraft are simply
more difficult to maintain as mechanical failures become less
predictable, repairs become more complicated, and parts become harder
to come by and more expensive. But, even with these contributing
factors, we had the best year in our history for aviation safety, a
clear measure of our people's professionalism.

MODERNIZATION

Today, the average age of our aircraft is almost 22 years old. Even
if we execute every modernization program on our books--which amounts
to procuring about 100 aircraft per year in the near future--our
aircraft average age continues to rise, reaching nearly 30 years old by
2020. In order to level off this increasing trend, we would have to
procure about 150 aircraft per year. To actually reduce the average age
of our aircraft, we would need to procure about 170 aircraft per year.
Similarly, where as industry replaces or totally renovates their
facilities on a 50-year cycle, competing priorities have resulted in a
150-year facilities recapitalization rate. We are in a position where
we can only address the most urgent repair issues, while our backlog of
real property maintenance continues to grow. We are working to slow
down the aging of our fleet and infrastructure, but the climbing costs
of operations and maintenance, as well as competing modernization
effectiveness goals, continue to prevent that from happening.
Consequently, we do not have the procurement funding to recapitalize
our fleet and facilities to the extent that we would like.
However, even with these challenges, we have molded and transformed
aerospace power into a crucial component of joint operations. Because
of this, we have expanded our vision for the future. Our new Vision
2020--Global Vigilance, Reach and Power captures the philosophy that
transformed us into a ``force of choice'' for rapid expeditionary
operations. Our strategic plan institutionalizes this vision by linking
the capabilities we need in the future with what we do best--our core
competencies.
Core Competencies
Aerospace Superiority--The ability to control what moves
through air and space . . . ensures freedom of action.
Information Superiority--The ability to control and exploit
information to our Nation's advantage . . . ensures decision
dominance.
Global Attack--The ability to engage adversary targets
anywhere, anytime . . . holds any adversary at risk.
Precision Engagement--The ability to deliver desired effects
with minimal risk and collateral damage . . . denies the enemy
sanctuary.
Rapid Global Mobility--The ability to rapidly position forces
anywhere in the world . . . ensures unprecedented
responsiveness.
Agile Combat Support--The ability to sustain flexible and
efficient combat operations . . . is the foundation of success.

Nothing illustrates our culture of transformation better than the
Expeditionary Aerospace Force--the ``EAF.'' In October 1999, the heavy
demand for aerospace power drove us to restructure our forces so we
could inject some stability and predictability into the lives of our
people. By December 2000, we had completed the first full rotation
cycle of the EAF. In the span of less than 2 years, we succeeded in
restructuring ourselves into a more sustainable, flexible, and
responsive force. We now give the commanders in chief (CINCs)
expeditionary aerospace packages that are tailored and trained-to-task
to meet their full mission requirements.
In 2000, we were involved in the full spectrum of operations--from
famines, fires, and hurricanes to major contingency operations. Yet,
the diversity of these missions didn't stifle us; it stimulated our
creativity. We're already light and lean, so now we're pushing the
envelope with technologies that will revolutionize the way we deliver
aerospace power for the Nation. We are developing directed energy
weapons capable of effects at the speed of light; unmanned aerial
vehicles that reduce the risk to our people while giving us greater
capability at a lower cost; space technologies that radically increase
the effectiveness of our aerospace operations; and aircraft like the F-
22 that are more survivable and lethal than our current fighters. We
don't wait until we're forced to improve--innovation and adaptation are
our heritage.
Our creativity also extends to how we conduct business inside our
organization. We are realizing significant cost efficiencies by
benchmarking the best in commercial and government business practices
and adapting them to our unique environment. We are leveraging
technology by integrating our people, operations, and oversight into a
globally-connected, enterprise-wide, and secure information network. We
are conducting manpower and program competitions to take advantage of
the best opportunities for outsourcing and privatization. We're
improving the way we plan, program, acquire, and protect our air,
space, and information systems. Our reinvention teams have saved more
than $30 billion during the last decade. Of course better business
practices aren't a choice; they're necessary to maximize the returns on
our Nation's investment.
This posture statement will give you a good idea about where we've
been, where we're going, and what's necessary to remain the world's
best aerospace force. Aerospace power is America's asymmetric
advantage, and we're determined to make sure America keeps it.

America's Air Force in 2000

In 2000, we participated in the full spectrum of military
operations--from deterrence and combat contingency operations to
humanitarian aid and disaster assistance. Across this spectrum, it was
Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power that was essential for assuring U.S.
national security and international stability. We provided global
vigilance using our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets; force protection measures; and deterrence missions. Our
mobility assets and pre-positioned munitions contributed to our global
reach. Finally, we displayed global power in Iraq and the Balkans with
our unmatched capability to create precise military effects when called
upon or threatened. These three facets of aerospace power are
interdependent, collectively providing rapid aerospace dominance for
America. Perhaps most importantly, all these accomplishments were
against the backdrop of a pivotal transformation in the way we
structure our forces to support expeditionary operations. This chapter
will describe these efforts during the past year.

THE EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE FORCE

This year we completed our organizational transformation to an
Expeditionary Aerospace Force--the EAF--a groundbreaking approach to
organizing aerospace capability. Given the demand for aerospace forces
over the past 10 years, we designed a capability-based force structure
to ensure that on-call, rotational forces can effectively meet both our
steady-state and ``pop-up'' commitments, while giving our people more
predictability and stability in their deployment schedules. We began
implementing the initiative in October 1999, and successfully completed
the first full rotation of our ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces--the
AEFs--in December 2000.
The EAF includes both deployable and non-deployable warfighting and
support forces. Our deployable AEFs are 10 packages of aerospace power.
They provide us with the rotational base required to conduct multiple,
concurrent small-scale contingencies, immediate crises, and ``pop-up''
engagements. These AEFs must be fully resourced to provide the full
spectrum of aerospace power capabilities required by the warfighting
CINCs. Our AEF Prime forces include those operational capabilities not
organically assigned to the AEFs. They comprise our nuclear alert,
regional command and control, and space operation forces, without which
we could not meet our steady-state and contingency commitments. The
AEFs are deployed and sustained by a robust mobility force called EAF
Mobility. EAF Mobility is the Nation's fastest system to transport the
most urgent cargo, from troops and equipment to humanitarian aid.
Underlying the AEFs, AEF Prime, and EAF Mobility is EAF Foundation--the
acquisition, medical, depot, training, and infrastructure resources
needed to keep the other parts of the EAF operating.
The EAF offers predictability for commanders to reconstitute,
train, and organize their assigned forces to better meet their upcoming
contingency requirements. Two AEFs are on-call every 3 months within
the full-rotation period of 15 months. Additionally, two Aerospace
Expeditionary Wings (AEW) supplement these AEFs, alternating on-call
duties every 120 days for ``pop-up'' conflicts. Two AEFs and one AEW
represent about 20 percent of our combat forces, which equates to the
maximum commitment the Air Force can maintain indefinitely without
adversely impacting training or readiness. If tasked beyond this level,
we would conduct surge operations as required. Upon completion of
large-scale operations, the EAF would then reconstitute before
beginning a new rotational cycle. From now on, we will use the EAF to
provide Joint Force Commanders trained-to-task, capability-based
packages to meet their specific requirements.
AEFs offer many operational advantages:

An AEF is fast--our goal is to deploy one AEF, or
about 120 aircraft and 10,000 airmen, within 48 hours, and we
strive to provide up to 5 AEFs in 15 days.
An AEF is light and lean--our global command and
control infrastructure allows high-fidelity operational support
in near real-time from the continental U.S. This enables a
``reachback'' capability that helps minimize the deployment of
supporting equipment and personnel and simplifies force
protection.
An AEF is lethal--it is capable of striking more than
200 targets per day.
An AEF is flexible--we provide a tailored, trained-to-
task, strategically relevant force that rapidly projects power
anywhere in the world.

Lessons learned from the first AEF rotation are improving the
force's expeditionary structure and concepts of operations. For
example, our low density/high demand (LD/HD) platforms, such as the
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft, have been strained by supporting continuous operations--
deploying up to five times more frequently than other forces. As a
short-term remedy, we stood-up another AWACS squadron (without
procuring additional aircraft) to better align the squadrons with the
AEF rotation. For the long-term, instead of procuring more LD/HD
platforms, we are developing transformational solutions to perform
these missions more effectively, while providing more persistence over
the target area. For example, we are exploring the transition of the U-
2 and other over-tasked ISR missions to unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), common wide-body (multi-radar) aircraft, and/or space-based
assets. These future capabilities should arrest some of the operations
tempo issues facing our most critical LD/HD assets.
The success of the EAF depends on the vital contributions of all
the components of the Total Force--active, guard, Reserve, civilians,
and contractors. The stability of the 15-month cycle has allowed the
Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard to meet (or even exceed) their
programmed 10 percent tasking to the EAF. Our Reserve components
currently provide the EAF about 7 percent of its expeditionary combat
support, 20 percent of its combat forces, 33 percent of its air
refueling assets, and 44 percent of its intratheater airlift.

AEROSPACE OPERATIONS

Aerospace power can bring a rapid halt to human suffering or
attacking forces. Our presence in struggling regions of the world, like
East Timor and Mozambique, brings help where it is needed, builds
goodwill, improves international relations, and provides valuable real-
world training. Alternatively, we can create military effects against
our adversaries, like we have done in the Balkans and Southwest Asia.
Our aerospace forces have the flexibility and agility for
simultaneous engagement across the full spectrum of military
operations. We are prepared to maintain regional stability, protect
national interests, and help win America's wars whenever called. The
following are a few of the operations in which we participated this
year.
Operation Stabilise
When the province of East Timor attempted to break away from
Indonesia, the resulting conflict caused thousands of residents to flee
their homes. The U.N. relied on our airlift to deliver the manpower and
supplies to stabilize the region. Intertheater airlift, provided by C-
5s, C-141s, and C-17s, transported 1,580 Thai peacekeepers to the
region. Intratheater C-130H aircraft from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, flew
over 600 hours transporting more than 1,800 personnel and 1,250 tons of
combat support equipment and humanitarian aid to Dili and Komorro in
East Timor.
Operation Atlas Response
In March 2000, flooding devastated Mozambique, driving hundreds of
thousands of people from their homes. We responded as part of Joint
Task Force Atlas Response, flying more than 600 sorties that delivered
970 tons of crucial supplies. Crews flying C-130s and C-17s transported
nearly 2,000 non-governmental relief workers to Maputo, Mozambique's
capital city, and Beira, the country's second largest city. Rescue and
special operations crews played a key role ensuring supplies were
distributed properly.
Balkan Operations
In 2000, we conducted 16 percent, or about 2,000 of the 12,000
combat sorties flown in the Balkans in support of the Kosovo Forces
(KFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR). Yet this statistic
significantly understates our contribution to these Balkan operations.
Our fighter, tanker, command and control (C\2\), ISR, and airlift
aircraft; C\2\ facilities; combat search and rescue forces; special
operations units; UAVs; and space-based resources were indispensable to
the performance of all joint and coalition operations.
United States Wildfire Relief
Our people played a pivotal role fighting the worst wildfires to
ravage the western United States in 50 years. In 48 airlift missions,
we transported 330 tons of cargo and over 5,900 Army, Marine, and
civilian firefighters to Idaho, Montana, and California. Three Air
National Guard and one Reserve C-130 aircraft, equipped with the
Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS), flew 870 missions and
dropped almost 2.3 million gallons of fire suppressant across 19 states
within a 6-month period.
Southwest Asian Operations
During 2000, we maintained a continuous presence of 8,000 airmen in
Southwest Asia in support of Operations Northern Watch and Southern
Watch. Our aerospace superiority assets (including air, space, and
information systems) produced an environment that permitted more than
23,000 coalition combat sorties without a single combat loss. Of these
sorties, 63 percent, or 14,500, were flown by the Air Force. We
responded to Iraqi no-fly zone violations and air defense threats with
precision-guided munitions (PGMs), destroying a significant portion of
Iraq's anti-aircraft artillery systems, threat radars, and command
centers.
Northeast Asian Operations
As the Nation marks the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, we
continue to maintain a significant presence in South Korea and Japan,
and conduct joint and combined exercises with the host nations. Cope
Thunder, executed in early 2000, provided realistic training for
aircrews, operations and logistics personnel, and selected C\2\
operators by exercising complex combat operations across the Pacific
Theater. We also participated in exercise Ulchi Focus Lens, the world's
largest annual joint and combined computer simulation war game
conducted with the Republic of Korea's national mobilization exercise
``Ulchi.''

DETERRENCE

America deters potential aggression by maintaining the ability and
resolve to use overwhelming force against any adversary. We maintain
this posture through our expeditionary, rapid global mobility, nuclear,
and space forces. The bomber, with its unique strengths of flexible
payload, global range, and in-flight retargeting or recall, is the
cornerstone of our conventional and nuclear force projection
capability. Additionally, the land-based intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) provides a quick-reaction and highly reliable force with
a mission capable rate above 99 percent.

COUNTER-NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

The potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against
America and its allies is one of the most complex threats facing the
DOD. Our balanced response to the proliferation of WMD, as outlined in
our recently completed Air Force Counter-Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical (NBC) Operations Doctrine document, integrates the four
pillars of counterproliferation--proliferation prevention, counterforce
strategies, active defense efforts, and passive defense measures.
Proliferation prevention restricts the spread of NBC weapons through
political and diplomatic efforts, such as export controls and treaty
agreements, but may also include denial operations when directed by the
National Command Authorities. Counterforce operations include attacking
an adversary's NBC weapons and their associated production,
transportation, and storage facilities prior to their use. Active
defense focuses on intercepting conventional and unconventional NBC
delivery systems before they reach friendly forces. Finally, passive
defense measures, including force protection, protect our people from
the effects of an NBC attack and enable sustained aerospace combat
operations.
Our counter-NBC operational readiness initiative sets Air Force-
wide standards for readiness, identifies shortfalls, and develops
capabilities to effectively cope with NBC attacks. This initiative
includes our recently developed counter-NBC roadmap and chemical
warfare concept of operations (CW CONOPS). The roadmap is an innovative
investment strategy that cuts across all facets of Air Force plans and
programs to increase counterproliferation visibility. The CW CONOPS,
developed by our Pacific forces, is a plan to help us maintain high-
paced operations during NBC attacks on air bases.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection comprises the activities that prevent or mitigate
hostile actions against our people and resources when they are not
directly engaged with the enemy. In 2000, our force protection
personnel made 41 vulnerability assessments that were used to improve
our physical security, the safeguarding of our food and water supplies,
and our ability to respond to WMD incidents both at home and abroad. We
developed a surface-to-air missile (SAM) footprint mapping capability,
which couples site-specific topography with the effective range of
hand-held SAMs, to direct security forces to probable threat locations.
We have also instilled a force protection mindset in our people by
incorporating force protection into the curriculum at all levels of
professional military education and as part of Warrior Week during
basic training. Protecting our people remains a top priority at all
command levels.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND NETWORK DEFENSE

Information assurance (IA) and computer network defense are the
strategy and means to deliver crucial information securely to the
warfighter. We are in a daily battle for information superiority. Our
air tasking orders, flying schedules, maintenance and logistics
records, C\2\, and other operational functions are carried over our
networks, making them a key target for potential adversaries. In 2000,
we developed a plan to integrate operations, people, technology, and
oversight through an enterprise-wide, network-centric concept. This
plan includes operations and information protection; automated and
dynamic detection and response; consolidated situational awareness and
decision support; and IA in deployed and classified environments. For
example, we monitor and evaluate network anomalies detected by our
automated security incident measurement system (ASIMS). This system
recognizes the latest hacking techniques to ensure early warning of
attempted penetrations into our systems.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

Our air-breathing and space-based ISR assets combine to provide
America global vigilance by exploiting the high ground and actively
monitoring the entire globe for emerging threats and treaty compliance.
They provide an integrated capability to collect, process, and
disseminate accurate and timely information that allows our decision-
makers to rapidly analyze and respond to changing global conditions,
and enables us to obtain and maintain decision dominance. In 2000, our
ISR assets monitored Iraqi compliance with U.N. sanctions as part of
Operations Northern and Southern Watch and were key to providing
critical real-time decision-making information to NATO leaders in the
Balkans.

COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

We are actively supporting the National Drug Control Strategy. Our
AWACS and other ISR assets, with tanker support, detect suspected drug
traffickers in the South American source zone and monitor their
activities through the Caribbean transit zone to their arrival and
apprehension in the United States. Air National Guard forces conduct
the majority of our counter-drug missions, employing an impressive
variety of capabilities from intelligence and airlift to ground-based
radar and fighter interception. The Guard's domestic counter-drug
operations focused on state and Federal law enforcement support,
interdiction, eradication, and drug demand reduction. The Reserve was
also an important participant, flying patrol missions, and providing
mobile training teams, intelligence, and linguists. In 2000, the
Reserve provided 68 personnel, flew 105 missions, and conducted 15
mobile training team deployments in support of worldwide counter-drug
operations.
Our civilian auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol (CAP), joined the Nation's
counter-drug program in 1986, partnering directly with U.S. Customs and
the Drug Enforcement Administration. Since then it has flown thousands
of hours a year in support of counter-drug efforts. During 2000, the
CAP efforts prevented approximately $3 billion worth of narcotics from
entering the U.S.--a great all-volunteer accomplishment. The active,
Guard, Reserve, and CAP are crucial partners in the Nation's ``war on
drugs.''

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Cooperative foreign relationships are crucial to building
multinational coalitions, securing international access, and sustaining
our commercial defense industry. In 2000, we managed more than 3,800
contracts for sales of aircraft, spare parts, munitions, and training
valued at over $103 billion. These contracts included sales of over 240
F-16s to the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Israel, and several other
countries. Through the foreign military sales and international
military education and training programs, we trained approximately
4,600 international students in warfighting and professional military
education.
Our international armament cooperation program co-developed and
fielded interoperable weapon systems that effectively leveraged DOD
resources by cost-sharing, employing foreign technical expertise, and
securing larger economies of scale (reducing the cost per unit). Under
this program, we have reached more than 360 agreements with our allies
and coalition partners involving research and development, production,
equipment loans, and scientific and technical information exchanges.

SAFETY

The safety of our people is a principal concern in all our
operations. A combination of increased funding for aircraft
improvements and the use of operational risk management yielded
positive results in several safety categories. We had the lowest flight
mishap rate in our history--1.08 major mishaps per 100,000 hours of
flight time. On the ground, we had our second lowest annual number of
off-duty fatalities, with 50 (24 percent below our 10 year average of
65), and on-duty fatalities, with 6.
We continue to build on this success with innovative safety tools
such as bird avoidance warning systems; an automated system to expedite
mishap collection methods that supports operations and acquisition
decision making; and a quality assurance system that ensures fleet-wide
flight safety deficiencies are rapidly corrected.

CONCLUSION

In 2000, we honored our tradition of operational excellence--firmly
establishing our position as the National Command Authorities' frequent
choice for fast, flexible, and precise military response. We also have
done something difficult for many large organizations--we overcame the
inertia of the status quo, improving both how we operate and the
quality of life for our people. We are now an Expeditionary Aerospace
Force--organizationally transformed to sustain America's aerospace
advantage. Through global vigilance, reach, and power, we wield the
unprecedented ability to observe events around the globe, rapidly reach
out to influence them, and if necessary, bring to bear the force needed
to secure our National objectives.
In this chapter we recounted some of our activities during the past
year. In the next chapter we will move from the present to the future.
Specifically, the discussion will turn to our understanding of the type
of capabilities we must pursue to successfully contend with the future
security environment.

America's Future Air Force

The history of the Air Force is marked by an unshakable dedication
to the promise and potential of aerospace power as envisioned by our
early pioneers. This enduring commitment has kept us on the cutting
edge through continual organizational, operational, and technological
transformation. We no longer narrowly focus on one overarching
adversary, but rather on full-spectrum employment of the Total Force
whenever our Nation calls. In the new strategic environment, we
integrate air, space, and information to dominate the entire vertical
realm. Indeed, we have transformed ourselves from a forward-based,
organizationally stovepiped force structure to a forward-deploying,
integrated expeditionary force structure. Moreover, we accomplished
this through a steady, well-planned process of continuous innovation.
Given the increasing complexity of warfare and an ever-changing
adversary, expeditionary aerospace power offers an expanded range of
strategic and operational options across the entire spectrum of
engagement. Our commitment to technologies such as stealth, precision
standoff weapons, and information warfare offers America new strategic
options with less risk. This continuous transformation will preserve
the Nation's vital role in world leadership and the ability to defend
its interests around the globe.

THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Today's security environment is unique in American history. We do
not have a ``peer competitor,'' nor are we likely to see one in the
near future. At the same time, we face a number of uncertainties and
potential challenges that threaten America's security and interests.
These threats include regional hegemonies, asymmetric and transnational
threats, and crises that may require intervention for humanitarian
purposes.
A hostile power, for example, may attempt to dominate a region by
intimidating our allies or pursuing interests contrary to our own. Such
a power may use anti-access strategies that attempt to deny our ability
to deploy stabilizing military force. Today, we see many potential
adversaries developing theater ballistic missiles and other anti-access
capabilities to achieve this goal. Renegade actors may use asymmetric
means such as terrorism, information warfare, or weapons of mass
destruction to radically enhance their disruptive capabilities at a
relatively low cost. We experienced such a tragedy in 1996 when 19
deployed airmen were killed during the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi
Arabia. Other transnational or small-scale contingencies, including
ethnic conflicts, international criminal activity, or insurgencies, may
threaten our interests or the safety of our citizens (e.g., illicit
drug activity in Latin America). Non-state actors and criminal
organizations will continue to threaten American interests through
sophisticated technical means or by physical attack. Crises that can
spill over state borders that require humanitarian assistance, such as
environmental disasters, will persist. We recently responded to the
floods in Africa and the earthquakes in India.
Space is an area where threats might emerge in the coming decade.
Some of our potential adversaries have the ability to improve both
their offensive and defensive military capabilities with commercially
available space and information technologies. At the same time, they
may try to neutralize our space assets, especially as space becomes
more vital to our military, civil, and commercial interests.
Ultimately, any national-level response is predicated on the
ability to rapidly adapt military capabilities and operational concepts
to precisely achieve the desired objectives. We demonstrated this
ability during Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, and we will be
even more formidable in the future. Should deterrence fail, aerospace
power is a force of choice for rapid response with minimum risk to U.S.
personnel and non-combatants.

OUR VISION

Our vision, America's Air Force: Global Vigilance, Reach, and
Power--Vision 2020, published in June 2000, provides a template for the
ongoing transformation of the Air Force and aerospace power into the
21st century. Our vision underscores that people--our Total Force--are
the foundation of the Air Force. We describe an aerospace domain best
exploited by an integrated air, space, and information force. We
present our forces in capability-based packages, called Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each built upon the pillars of aerospace
expertise, our core competencies--Aerospace Superiority, Information
Superiority, Global Attack, Precision Engagement, Rapid Global
Mobility, and Agile Combat Support. In the end, our vision focuses us
on our mission: To defend the United States and protect its interests
through aerospace power.

OUR STRATEGIC PLAN

We believe that aerospace power will be, indeed must be,
increasingly called upon as the Nation's military instrument of choice
in an uncertain world. No other option is as fast, flexible, or
necessary to the execution of joint operations. The Air Force Strategic
Plan is the broad framework to institutionalize our vision. It
anticipates the future security environment and provides guidance on
major force modernization and investment strategies by identifying
fourteen critical future capabilities based upon the Air Force core
competencies and support areas. It is our roadmap to the future.

THE TOTAL FORCE

Our Total Force builds on a foundation of high standards and strong
cooperation among our active, Reserve, Guard, civilian and contractor
personnel. Simply stated, we could not perform our mission without the
combined contributions of all components. On any given day, members of
the Guard and Reserve work side-by-side with their Active Duty
counterparts. Today, our Guard and Reserve assets account for 38
percent of our fighter force, 60 percent of our air refueling
capability, 71 percent of our intratheater airlift, and significant
portions of our rescue and support resources. The Reserve is the sole
provider of unique capabilities such as aerial spray, space shuttle
helicopter rescue support, and hurricane hunting, while the Guard
provides 100 percent of our homeland air defense capability.
Additionally, the Guard and Reserve have an increasing presence in the
bomber force and in space, intelligence, and information systems. Guard
and Reserve units provide essential support for training new pilots,
manning radar and regional control centers, performing flight check
functions at our depots, and conducting space operations. Equally
important, our civilian members and contractors provide specialized
administrative, technical, and managerial expertise that complement the
functions performed by uniformed members. Without these combined
skills, we could not operate as an expeditionary force. In the future,
we will foster an even closer and more interdependent partnership
between all of our components through new organizational structures and
more interactive and flexible career patterns.

AEROSPACE INTEGRATION

Our domain stretches from the earth's surface to the far reaches of
our satellites' orbits in a seamless operational medium. However, even
with the best aircraft and spacecraft optimized for their respective
environments, the aerospace effects we create hinge on our people and
their ability to rapidly and continuously integrate our air, space, and
information systems. Accordingly, we have modified our command
organizations to take full advantage of the resulting synergy.
In September 2000, for example, we designated the Aerospace
Operations Center (AOC) as a ``weapon system'' of the future. This hub
of advanced networks will gather and fuse the full range of information
in real-time--from the strategic to the tactical level--giving Joint
Force Component Commanders actionable knowledge to rapidly employ their
forces in the battlespace.
Effectively employing integrated aerospace power requires
commanders who exploit the entire aerospace continuum, both on a
regional and global scale. This new paradigm of employment must be
instilled in the minds of airmen at all levels of Air Force
professional military education. To help achieve this end, we created
an Aerospace Basic Course for newly commissioned officers to ensure
they understand the different elements of aerospace power. Similarly,
our Developing Aerospace Leaders initiative is determining the best way
to cultivate the skills needed to lead in a dynamic, changing
environment. We are infusing air, space, and information operators into
all key command and training courses to expand their breadth of
experience and core knowledge. Finally, our Space Warfare Center
established a space aggressor squadron to increase the awareness of
threats from space-capable adversaries and improve our ability to
defend against them.

EVOLVING THE FULL-SPECTRUM EAF

Providing the flexibility needed for full-spectrum operations
requires continued efforts to round out the capabilities of our AEFs to
make them virtually interchangeable. Currently, our 10 AEFs are not
equal in capability. For example, only three of the ten AEFs are
equipped with long-range, precision standoff strike capabilities, and
only nine have an F-16CJ squadron for suppression of enemy air
defenses.
As the EAF continues to mature and technologies advance, we will
expand the capabilities each AEF can provide. We will enlarge the
battlespace an AEF can control; enhance our ability to do real-time,
adaptive targeting; and dramatically increase the number of targets an
AEF can engage in a day. Finally, we will improve our expeditionary
combat support capabilities--effective, responsive logistics are the
key to sustaining expeditionary forces and operating from austere
locations.

OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The changing security environment requires us to change the way we
plan and operate. Aerospace power's ability to perform effects-based
operations (i.e., focusing on achieving desired effects versus creating
target lists) means we can support the joint force commander in ways
unimaginable only a few years ago. Our ongoing transformation enables
our long-range, standoff, all-weather precision, and stealth
capabilities to rapidly counter any adversary's attempt to deny us
access to a theater.
This global strike capability, combined with responsive logistics,
will then help to achieve the rapid halt of human suffering or
threatening forces. Lastly, the massing of joint firepower at the time
and location of our choosing will create the conditions that permit the
safe deployment and employment of our joint forces. Once deployed, our
force protection measures will provide defense against asymmetric
threats. Through long-range stealth, precision standoff weaponry, and
information operations, we are able to project substantial effects
without subjecting our forces to substantial risk. Aerospace power's
inherent versatility and precision form a large part of this tremendous
capability, giving our leaders unprecedented strategic initiative and
flexibility now and in future operations. Aerospace power is the
Nation's asymmetric advantage.

HOMELAND SECURITY

The Air Force has always contributed to homeland defense by
deterring aggressors, intercepting intruders, and providing ballistic
missile warning. However, defending our homeland has assumed new and
daunting dimensions with the increased threat of terrorism, the spread
of information warfare techniques, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Our traditional defenses are often incomplete against
these unconventional threats.
We are significant supporters of a multi-layered missile defense
system incorporating space-based elements that provide effective,
affordable, global protection against a wide range of threats. Future
space capabilities like the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) will
greatly enhance our ability to track and engage ballistic missiles,
while space-based radar technologies (if transitioned into deployed
systems) will track fixed and mobile ballistic missile launchers. The
Airborne Laser (ABL) will engage boost-phase ballistic missiles, while
the F-22, working with advanced ISR systems, will defend against cruise
missiles. The Air Force expects to be a principal player in any future
missile defense system.
The Total Force brings a variety of capabilities to the defense of
our homeland. The Air National Guard is positioned to ensure the air
defense of the Nation while providing critical resources like airlift,
command and control, and disaster preparedness response forces to other
lead agencies and the Joint Forces Civil Support Teams. Our Air Force
Medical Service is acquiring a variety of modular packages that can be
used to support civilian authorities requesting our assistance at home
or abroad. The Small Portable Expeditionary Aeromedical Rapid Response
or ``SPEARR'' teams deploy ten highly trained specialists within 2
hours of notification with the capability to provide a broad scope of
care, including initial disaster medical assessment, emergency surgery,
critical care, and patient transport preparation. In February 2001, we
participated in a 3-day bioterrorism exercise, Alamo Alert, in San
Antonio, Texas. This tabletop exercise explored city, county, state,
and Federal responses to the release of a biological agent. We will use
the lessons learned from this exercise to merge the disaster response
plans of different agencies so they will work together more
effectively. Developing a robust homeland defense strategy is critical
to the Nation. The Air Force stands ready today, as in the past, to
contribute our special capabilities, as well as develop new
technologies that can aid civil authorities in combating any threat or
attack to our homeland.

URBAN OPERATIONS

By 2015, half the world's 7.2 billion people will live in urban
centers. The growing migration to cities means an increased likelihood
that military targets will be in close proximity to non-combatants. We
must, therefore, place special emphasis on producing precise,
predictable effects with minimal collateral damage to surrounding
structures. Advances in target identification and precision weapons
delivery have propelled us from committing multiple aircraft for each
target during World War II (e.g., 1,000 B-17 sorties dropped 9,000
bombs to destroy one target in 1943) to utilizing a single aircraft to
neutralize multiple targets during Operation Allied Force (e.g., one B-
2 with 16 bombs hit 16 different targets in 1999). We are pioneering a
new class of non-kinetic weapons that will create the desired effects
without death and physical destruction. Large-scale conflicts will
always include some degree of devastation, but non-kinetic weaponry and
precision effects provide expanded options for our Nation's leaders
across the entire spectrum of conflict. Precision effects also offer
the potential to significantly reduce the duration of a conflict by
concentrating our force on high-value military targets. This minimizes
collateral damage, unintended consequences, and the accompanying
pressures such problems bring to coalition cohesion.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITMENT

Our commitment to a strong science and technology (S&T) program is
fundamental to maintaining aerospace dominance in the 21st century. We
continue to invest in a broad and balanced set of technologies derived
from basic research, applied research, and advanced technology
development on a continuum of maturity levels from short- to long-term.
This time-scaled approach keeps emerging capabilities in the pipeline
and fosters revolutionary developments.
The Air Force S&T community is working closely with operators and
strategic planners to explicitly link research activities with our core
competencies, critical future capabilities, and future concepts of
operation. This effort has produced S&T goals in the areas of time
sensitive targeting; improved command, control, and information
systems; survivability (defensive efforts); lethality and
neutralization (offensive efforts); and improved power generation,
propulsion, and vehicles. In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2001
National Defense Authorization Act, we are also conducting a major
review of our S&T program to identify both short-term objectives and
long-range challenges.
No matter how strong our commitment to S&T, however, our efforts
will be jeopardized if we don't protect our developing technologies. We
are taking aggressive measures to safeguard existing and emerging
technologies from compromise that would degrade combat effectiveness,
shorten the expected combat life of a system, or stall program
development.

CONCLUSION

We have adapted to the new strategic environment by incorporating
new technologies, operational concepts, and organizational structures--
the definition of transformation. For the good of the Nation, we cannot
afford to stop with the transformation we have already achieved. Given
the increasing complexity of warfare and the access potential
adversaries have to new technologies, we now need to move ahead even
more quickly. If we emphasize those force elements that have the
flexibility to respond to the new strategic challenge, we can realize
order of magnitude increases in capability. For example, America can
support the full spectrum of operations at lower cost in dollars and
manpower by emphasizing stealth, precision standoff weapons, and
information technologies that mark a qualitative shift in military
operations. Those same forces have relevance across the entire spectrum
of conflict. If we exploit the aerospace capabilities that have emerged
since our current war plans were established, we may not be faced with
having to shrink from our responsibilities as a global power.
Capitalizing on America's asymmetric advantage--aerospace power--we can
expand America's strategic options at less risk. However, there's a
bill for this tremendous capability. We must fully fund our aerospace
power force--the force that gives America a capability that is truly
unique among nations.

Roadmap to the Future

In order to remain the world's preeminent aerospace force, we must
continue our transformation and work through the financial hurdles
before us. A strong economy has made retaining and recruiting an all-
volunteer force extremely difficult, but we have taken significant
steps to reduce the downward trends. The increasing cost of readiness
(including operations and maintenance) is consuming the funds required
to modernize our systems and our infrastructure. We have developed a
responsible, time-phased plan to modernize our force without
sacrificing readiness or capability goals. However, even if the plan is
approved after Secretary Rumsfeld's review, we do not have the
modernization funds to fully execute it. Finally, through constant
innovation and adaptation, we are linking emerging technologies with
our future concepts of operation in order to evolve our aerospace
capabilities while providing the Nation the most effective return on
its investments. Taking care of our people, improving readiness, and
procuring upgraded and new, integrated systems are crucial to ensuring
we can deliver rapid aerospace dominance well into the 21st century.

PEOPLE

Force structure drawdowns and a high demand for U.S. military
presence around the globe have had a significant impact on our Total
Force--active, Reserve, Guard, civilians, and contractors. Last year,
at any given time, an average of 13,000 Total Force members were
deployed around the world. Another 76,000 people were stationed
overseas on permanent assignment. Retaining our military people is the
first step in maintaining our combat capability and readiness, and will
help alleviate many of our current recruiting and training problems. We
need help to ensure our civilian work force is properly sized and
shaped. We also continue to address the quality of life and quality of
service concerns of all our people by creating better living and
working environments for them. Finally, we are developing leaders who
understand the full spectrum of expeditionary and integrated operations
and the importance of giving every member an equal opportunity to serve
and succeed. All of these actions are crucial to sustaining the
foundation of our force--Air Force people.
Retention
We are unique among the Services in that we are a retention-based
force. We depend on retaining highly trained and skilled people to
sustain our readiness posture for rapid global deployment. By meeting
retention goals, we can reduce our current recruiting and training
requirements, and build and maintain our technical expertise. However,
we expect the economic climate will continue to make retaining our
skilled enlisted and officer personnel difficult over the next several
years. About 7 out of every 10 enlisted airmen will make a reenlistment
decision between now and 2004. Exit surveys show the availability of
civilian jobs as the primary reason our people decide to separate from
the Air Force. To retain these people, we must continue to improve
compensation; not only in terms of pay, but also by reimbursing the
out-of-pocket expenses incurred during frequent moves, deployments, and
other temporary duty. The viability of the all-volunteer force depends
on military service remaining a competitive career option. We will
continue to retain our people through quality of life initiatives.
In 2000, we held two retention summits chartered to identify the
reasons people decide to leave the Air Force and to develop solutions
to retain them. From the summit, we produced and are implementing 19
initiatives to improve retention, including establishing career
assistance advisors at our bases to maximize the benefits of
performance feedback sessions and provide selective reenlistment
program counseling.
With respect to officer retention, we closely monitor the officer
cumulative continuation rate (CCR), or the percentage of officers
entering their 4th year of service (6 years for pilots and navigators)
who will complete their 11th year of service given existing retention
patterns. In fiscal year 2000, the pilot CCR dropped to 45 percent from
the high of 87 percent in fiscal year 1995. Non-rated operations and
mission support officer retention rates have also dropped over the past
2 years. In fact, retention rates have decreased for several high-tech
specialties--developmental engineers, scientists, communication
officers, and acquisition managers are in high demand. Conversely,
navigator and air battle manager rates improved in fiscal year 2000,
rising to 69 percent and 51 percent from last year's rates of 62
percent and 45 percent, respectively.
We aggressively use bonuses to retain our members. For example, a
flexible aviation continuation pay (ACP) program is integral to our
multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. Under a provision of the Fiscal
Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), we began offering
ACP payments through 25 years of aviation service at up to $25,000 per
year, and expanded eligibility to pilots below the rank of brigadier
general. This resulted in a substantial increase in additional years of
service commitment. The fiscal year 2001 ACP program includes two
enhancements for first-time eligible pilots: the up-front lump sum
payment cap was raised from $100,000 to $150,000 and up-front payment
options were expanded. These changes were made to enhance the
attractiveness of longer-term agreements.
Seventy-six percent of our enlisted skills are now targeted with
reenlistment bonuses, and we are considering bonuses for some non-rated
line officer categories. The need to widen our bonus footprint, coupled
with current below-goal retention rates, is strong evidence that the
basic pay structure is too low. The addition of the officer and
enlisted critical skills retention bonus of up to $200,000 during a
career, which was authorized in the fiscal year 2001 NDAA, should help
retain those people with skill sets in high demand by the civilian
sector. We have also targeted our enlisted members with those crucial
skills by increasing special duty assignment pay to $600 per month.
Our Guard and Reserve have also taken steps to address retention
problems by authorizing special pay and enlistment bonuses for critical
enlisted specialties, ACP for active Guard and Reserve pilots, and
special salary rates for full-time Reserve component military
technicians. Implementation of the EAF concept will also help alleviate
some of their retention challenges by providing advanced deployment
notice to civilian employers.
Recruiting
We missed our enlisted recruiting goal only twice since the
inception of the all-volunteer force in 1973: fiscal year 1979 and
fiscal year 1999. In fiscal year 2000, we waged an all-out ``war'' to
recruit America's best--and won. We exceeded our enlisted recruiting
goal of 34,000 by almost 400 without lowering our standards. We still
require 99 percent of our recruits to have high school diplomas, and
nearly 73 percent of our recruits score in the top half of all scores
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. In addition, we brought 848
prior-service members back on Active Duty, compared to 601 in fiscal
year 1999 and 196 in fiscal year 1998.
Successful recruiting means enlisting airmen whose aptitudes match
the technical requirements we need. Although we met our overall
recruiting goals in fiscal year 2000, we fell about 1,500 short of our
goal of 12,428 recruits with mechanical aptitudes. In response, we are
developing a targeted program to highlight the many opportunities we
offer to mechanics, as well as a ``prep school'' to increase the number
of airmen qualified to attend courses in areas such as jet engine
repair and avionics maintenance. These efforts are paying off--through
the first 4 months of fiscal year 2001 we have met or exceeded our
monthly goal for mechanically skilled recruits.
As with our retention efforts, we are using bonuses to improve
recruiting. An increase in the enlistment bonus to $20,000 for our
hard-to-fill critical skills positions proved successful--68 percent of
our bonus-eligible recruits selected a 6-year initial enlistment in
fiscal year 2000. We also introduced a $5,000 ``kicker'' to encourage
new recruits to enlist during our most difficult recruiting months:
February, March, April, and May.
Additionally, we held a comprehensive review of our recruiting and
accessions processes. One of the most important initiatives that came
out of this review was to increase our recruiter force. Therefore, we
augmented our permanent recruiters with temporary duty personnel for
periods of 120 days. This action resulted in an extra 1,100 recruits
during the spring and summer of 2000. We increased the number of
recruiter authorizations from 1,209 to 1,450 in fiscal year 2000, and
we project 1,650 recruiter authorizations by the end of 2001. The
Active Duty drawdown has also created an additional recruiting
challenge for our Guard and Reserve components. As a result, the Air
Force Reserve is increasing its recruiting force in fiscal year 2001 by
50 recruiters (to 564), and the Air National Guard is adding 65
recruiters (to 413) over the next 3 years.
Officer recruiting is not immune to the economic factors affecting
enlisted recruiting. As of March 2001, the Reserve Officer Training
Corps (ROTC) anticipates shortfalls of 400 officers in fiscal year 2002
and 280 in fiscal year 2003 (against a yearly goal of 2,000). We are
considering several initiatives to attract more candidates, including
offering cadets contracts after their freshman year rather than waiting
until the end of their sophomore year, as well as recommending
legislation to permit an officer accession bonus and to increase
enlisted commissioning opportunities. In fiscal year 2000, we achieved
97 percent of our line officer accession target, even though fiscal
year 2000 production was 5 percent above fiscal year 1999 and 21
percent greater than fiscal year 1998.
Recruiting health-care professionals has also been challenging.
Many medical, dental, nurse, and biomedical specialties are critically
short. For example, only 80 percent of our clinical pharmacy positions
are filled. In 2001, for the first time, we will be offering a $10,000
accession bonus to pharmacists who enter Active Duty.
Finally, we launched a multi-faceted marketing campaign, including
television and movie theater advertising. Our ads depict the teamwork,
dedication, and technological sophistication that characterize the Air
Force. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard also launched a
national campaign that includes television, radio, and outdoor
advertisements.
Civilian Workforce Shaping
In 1989, approximately 17 percent of our civilians were in their
first 5 years of service. Today, that figure is less than 10 percent.
In the next 5 years, more than 40 percent of our civilian career
workforce will be eligible for optional or early retirement.
Compounding this problem, the downsizing of the past decade has skewed
the mix of civilian workforce skills. While we are meeting mission
needs today, without the proper civilian force shaping tools, we risk
not being ready to meet tomorrow's challenges.
We have developed several initiatives to address our civilian
workforce concerns. These initiatives include finding new ways to
attract and recruit civilian employees; developing streamlined,
flexible, and expedited hiring processes; supporting pay flexibility to
better align salaries with those of private industry; and increasing
the availability of student loan repayment programs.
We also realize that we must renew the mid-level civilian workforce
to meet the demands of an increasingly technical force. We will
accomplish this through job proficiency training, leadership
development, academic courses, and retraining. Further, we believe that
funding civilian tuition assistance programs, as we do for our military
people, and having the flexibility to pay for job licenses and
certifications, will help our shaping efforts.
However, we must also use separation management tools to create
vacancies so the civilian work force is continuously refreshed with new
talent and contains the right skills mix. These tools include pay
comparability, and extending special voluntary separation incentive pay
(VSIP) and voluntary early retirement authority (VERA) for workforce
restructuring. We also need an incentive to provide employees the
option to offset all or part of the early retirement penalty to their
annuity through a lump-sum payment to the civil service retirement and
disability fund.
Quality of Life
For the first time in 5 years, we are adding manpower and workplace
environment to our core quality of life priorities. Updated wartime
planning factors and real-world operations validated our increased
manpower requirements. Meeting our existing mission requirements with
our current end strength is wearing out our people. We need to increase
our end strength by 12,000 personnel above our fiscal year 2000 level,
primarily in the combat, combat support, low density/high demand, and
high-tempo areas.
A good quality of life is central to attracting and retaining our
people. The fiscal year 2001 NDAA provided a 3.7 percent pay raise,
one-half percent above private sector wage growth, and a targeted pay
raise for our mid-level enlisted members ranging from $32 to $58 per
month. While these are positive developments, military pay,
particularly for mid-grade NCOs and officers, remains below comparable
private sector salaries. In fiscal year 2001, our members' out-of-
pocket housing expenses will be reduced from 18.9 percent to 15
percent, but at significant cost to our budget. A goal of zero out-of-
pocket housing costs by fiscal year 2005, as directed by the former
Secretary of Defense, will be difficult to fund within current
projections. To help reduce out-of-pocket moving expenses, the NDAA
equalized dislocation allowances for our lower ranking enlisted force,
and authorized advanced payment of temporary lodging expenses and a pet
quarantine reimbursement up to $275.
Providing our people with safe, affordable accommodations improves
their quality of life and, in turn, increases retention. Our dormitory
master plan will build or replace dormitory rooms throughout the Air
Force. We continue to pursue a private room policy for our airmen.
Currently, 86 percent of our unaccompanied airmen housed on base have a
private room with a shared bath. We also plan to replace, improve, or
privatize over 10,000 family housing units. In addition, ensuring our
members have adequate officer and enlisted visiting quarters and
temporary lodging facilities remains a high priority. Constructing and
maintaining sufficient numbers of on-base facilities yields significant
savings in moving and travel costs while aiding force protection.
Another important component of quality of life is health care. The
year 2000 was a milestone year for our health-care program, with many
changes taking effect in 2001. TRICARE was expanded to include 1.4
million Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, retirees, and their family
members beginning in October 2001. By enrolling in Part B Medicare,
they can now visit any civilian health-care provider and have TRICARE
pay most, if not all, of what Medicare does not cover. Other
legislation extends TRICARE Prime Remote to immediate Active Duty
family members stationed in remote areas (i.e., areas not within 50
miles of a military treatment facility); eliminates TRICARE co-payments
for Active Duty family members; establishes chiropractic care for
Active Duty members; reduces the TRICARE catastrophic cap to $3,000 per
year; and improves claims processing.
Enhancing community and family programs is crucial to retention
since 62 percent of our force is married. This year we created the
Community Action Information Board (CAIB) to bring together senior
leaders to review and resolve individual, family, and installation
community issues impacting our readiness and quality of life. We
recognize the economic benefits our members and their families receive
from youth programs, family support centers, fitness centers, libraries
and other recreational programs which support and enhance the sense of
community. We also continue to support the commissary benefit as an
important non-pay entitlement.
Even with the EAF, our tempo can make educational pursuits
difficult. Our learning resource centers and distance learning
initiatives address this situation by offering deployed personnel
education and testing opportunities through CD-ROM and interactive
television. We support lengthening the Montgomery GI Bill contribution
period from 1 to 2 years in order to ease the financial burdens of new
airmen. Additionally, we have joined with the other Services, the
Department of Labor, and civilian licensing and certification agencies
to promote the recognition of military training as creditable towards
civilian licensing requirements.
Training
Training the world's best Air Force is challenging in today's
rigorous, expeditionary environment. Recruits face a demanding basic
training course, and newly commissioned officers and selected civilians
attend the Aerospace Basic Course to establish a fundamental knowledge
of aerospace power and the profession of arms. However, lower enlisted
retention rates are increasing our training burden. Fewer experienced
trainers are available to train entry-level personnel. Additionally,
the increased number of accessions (due to lower retention) stress our
training facilities and personnel. During accession surge periods, our
technical training centers operate at over 100 percent capacity by
triple-bunking students in two-person dorm rooms. Despite these
challenges, our technical training schools are meeting their mission.
By increasing our use of technology and streamlining training
processes, we are producing fully qualified apprentices. Recognizing
training as a continuous process, we are using emerging technologies to
establish a training management system capable of documenting and
delivering the right training throughout a member's career.
Equal Opportunity
We strive to build and maintain an environment that is free from
unlawful discrimination and harassment and reflects the rich diversity
of our Nation. Equal opportunity, diversity, and fair and equitable
treatment of our people have evolved from law to a strategic readiness
imperative. Ensuring that every airman is given equal access and equal
opportunity to achieve his or her full potential is vital to our
readiness equation. Creating and sustaining an environment where
individuals are respected and valued is key to mission performance and
force sustainment. These issues require constant attention and support.
Accordingly, we are committed to attracting, recruiting, hiring,
accessing, developing, managing, rewarding, and retaining a diverse and
high-quality Air Force that reflects all segments of American society.

READINESS

Total Air Force readiness has declined 23 percentage points since
1996. We attribute this decay to the problems associated with
supporting the oldest aircraft fleet in Air Force history; the
inability to retain an experienced workforce; and constrained resources
and spare parts. With recent financial assistance from the
administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress,
we are turning our spare parts problems around. However, as our
fighter, ISR, combat search and rescue, mobility, and tanker aircraft
continue to age, they need more frequent and substantial repairs,
driving up readiness costs. This, in turn, reduces the number of
aircraft available for missions and creates higher demands on the
remaining fleet. Reversing this trend will take additional funding and
a concerted recapitalization effort. In addition, the maintenance tasks
and materiel growth inherent in supporting our aging aircraft fleet
have increased our depot workload. Limited depot infrastructure
investment over the past decade, coupled with constrained funding, adds
to our already significant challenges in meeting readiness
requirements. We are also experiencing infrastructure shortfalls in our
facilities (i.e., bases), vehicles and support equipment, and
communications infrastructure. However, our environmental program
remains on track. Overall, we are committed to improving readiness, but
it must be in concert with our people, infrastructure, and
modernization programs.

SPARE PARTS

Sufficient inventories of weapon system spare parts are crucial to
mission readiness. Lack of spares puts a severe strain on the entire
combat support system, creating increased workload for our logistics
personnel and reducing the number of mission-capable aircraft available
to our operational forces. When our logistics system suffers parts
shortages, maintenance personnel must either cannibalize parts from
other equipment or aircraft to serve immediate needs, or accept
degraded readiness while they wait out long-delivery times for
backordered parts.
Recent improvements in spare parts funding are turning this
situation around. Through internal funding realignment, the
administration, OSD and congressional plus-ups, we were able to spend
an additional $2 billion for spare parts over the past 2 years. This
helped replenish inventories drained during Operation Allied Force.
During the summer 2000 program review, the DOD fully supported our
efforts to fill shortfalls in the spare-parts pipeline which were
impacting operational requirements. Additional administration and OSD
support for fiscal year 2002 includes full funding of the flying hour
program and our airlift readiness spares packages, and increased
funding to reduce the spares repair backlog.
One of our greatest readiness challenges is managing the
consequences of an unprecedented older aircraft fleet. Today, the
average aircraft is approximately 22 years old. Even with currently
programmed procurements, this figure will continue to rise, reaching
nearly 30 within the next 15 years. Buying spare parts for aging
aircraft is similar to buying them for aging vehicles. The older the
vehicle, the more expensive the part due to obsolescence and a reduced
vendor base. Maintaining an aging fleet with more expensive spare parts
is one of the costs reflected in the increasing cost per flying hour.
Over the past 5 years, our flying hours required for training and
readiness have remained relatively constant, but the cost of executing
our flying hour program has risen over 45 percent.
Facility Infrastructure
Our available resources do not cover the maintenance requirements
of our facilities. Presently, we are able to sustain only day-to-day
recurring maintenance and periodic system repairs on our real property,
creating a backlog of required maintenance. The replacement or
renovation of existing real property is now on a cycle exceeding 150
years, compared with the industry standard of 50 years. Military
construction has also been reduced drastically since the mid-1980s
(from the high of about $1.8 billion in fiscal year 1986 to the current
$596 million in fiscal year 2001).
Reductions in Air Force manpower and force structure have also left
us with too much infrastructure. As a result, we are required to spend
scarce resources on unneeded facilities while struggling to maintain
acceptable operational readiness levels. We must be allowed to close
unnecessary installations and then reinvest the savings in Real
Property Maintenance (RPM), base-operating support, family housing, and
military construction.
Vehicles and Support Equipment
Over the past 8 years, the vehicle replacement program has been
significantly underfunded. This situation has created approximately
$552 million in deferred vehicle requirements for more than 27,000
special-purpose, construction, tactical, and material-handling
vehicles. While our major commands are pursuing temporary solutions,
like general-purpose vehicle leasing, refurbishment programs, and
reducing excess vehicle requirements wherever possible, failure to
replace aging vehicles will directly impact our combat capability.
Our support equipment program is only 58 percent funded. This
follows an historical trend of inadequate funding. We have about $134
million in deferred funding for maintenance stands, aircraft de-icing
trucks, munitions-handling equipment, military working dogs, and
Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon equipment used to erect bare bases.
Missions in the Balkans and Southwest Asia have exacerbated equipment
shortfalls. Addressing this funding gap will improve our readiness.
Communications Infrastructure
Information technology (IT) advancements over the past decade have
revolutionized aerospace power. From desktop computing to near-
instantaneous worldwide access to information, our communications
technologies enable information dominance and create ``actionable
knowledge'' for our commanders. The ability of forward-deployed
commanders to rapidly and reliably reach back to a large number of
combat support capabilities at home base, streamlines expeditionary
operations by reducing airlift requirements and the size of our
deployed footprint. A vital piece of our ``infostructure'' is our
global information grid, an interconnected, network-centric information
environment that provides information on-demand to our policymakers,
warfighters, and supporting personnel. This infostructure gives us the
means to meet our future information requirements.
Environmental Cleanup
Our environmental program stands on four main pillars:
environmental compliance, pollution prevention, environmental
restoration, and resource conservation. The goal at our active
installations is to have cleanup remedies in place for all our high-
risk sites by 2007 and for all sites by 2014.
The environmental program for our closed and closing bases focuses
on expedient cleanups that stress public health, responsible
environmental stewardship, and the transfer of property for
redevelopment. We continue to streamline processes, reduce costs, and
promote community participation in decision-making. We are on target to
complete all of our environmental cleanups by 2005, except for
McClellan AFB, CA, which is targeted for 2015. Still, we require
continuing investment to ensure properties are ready for permanent
transfer to civil authorities.

MODERNIZATION

Our modernization plan includes retiring the C-141 and procuring
the C-17, buying our future air superiority fighters, considering
tanker replacements, upgrading conventional bombers and precision-
guided munitions (PGMs), and developing new C\2\ and ISR systems. An
important step in achieving these priorities involves sustaining and
modernizing relevant, capable space forces, with emphasis on the
development of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the Global
Positioning System (GPS), the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV),
and secure communication satellites. We must also upgrade our space
launch ranges and satellite control network. The next several pages
describe our modernization programs aligned under each of our core
competencies.
Aerospace Superiority
Aerospace superiority is the ability to control the entire vertical
dimension, from the surface of the Earth to the highest orbiting
satellite, so the joint force has freedom from attack and freedom to
attack. Aerospace superiority is the crucial first step in achieving
rapid aerospace dominance. In the 21st century, aerospace superiority
depends on strike and defensive platforms, such as F-22 and the
Airborne Laser (ABL), and ISR platforms, such as Global Hawk and SBIRS,
seamlessly integrated through real-time information sharing and
appropriate space control measures.
The F-22, with its revolutionary combination of stealth,
supercruise (i.e., supersonic-cruise without afterburner),
maneuverability, and integrated avionics, will dominate the skies. The
F-22's advanced capabilities will allow it to penetrate an adversary's
airspace even if anti-access assets are in place, destroying the most
critical air defense capabilities, thus permitting follow-on forces
freedom of movement.
Additionally, the F-22 will serve as the enabling platform for the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and other systems engaging enemy ground
targets. In 2000, during continued envelope expansion flight testing,
the F-22 successfully launched an Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
Missile (AMRAAM) and an AIM-9 infrared-guided missile from its internal
side weapons bay, and began testing Block 3.0 avionics software.
The F-22 has successfully met all congressionally mandated criteria
necessary to enter low-rate initial production (LRIP) following Defense
Acquisition Board approval. Entering operational service in 2005, this
leap in technology is crucial to preserving the Nation's most important
military advantage for future warfighters: the capability to rapidly
obtain and maintain aerospace dominance.
The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a transformational boost-phase
intercept weapon system that will contribute significantly to the
missile defense architecture. In January 2000, we began modifying a
Boeing 747 to become the first of two ABL prototypes. This prototype
successfully completed critical design review in April 2000. With the
modifications completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001, ABL
is progressing toward a demonstration against a theater ballistic
missile. This revolutionary capability will bring equally revolutionary
changes in warfighting.
The Space Based Laser (SBL) has the potential to provide continuous
boost-phase intercept for ballistic missile defense. To pursue this
capability, the SBL integrated flight experiment (IFX) project will
determine the feasibility and utility of this approach, focusing on
risk reduction, the sustainment of critical technologies, and system
architecture studies. The program is currently making excellent
progress in high-energy laser beam control; acquisition, tracking and
pointing technologies; and overall systems integration.
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) significantly improves on
the missile warning capability of the 1993 Talon Shield upgrade to the
Defense Support Program (DSP) missile detection and warning network of
satellites. DSP has provided strategic missile warning for North
America for nearly 30 years. Beginning in 1993, the DSP project
upgraded processing techniques to provide a theater missile warning
capability that includes timely and accurate detection and tracking of
tactical ballistic missiles and other theater threats. SBIRS
significantly improves on the missile warning capability of Talon
Shield by consolidating the Nation's infrared detection systems into a
single architecture, meeting our security requirements for missile
warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
characterization.
SBIRS High, SBIRS Low, and DSP, and will operate through a
consolidated ground segment. DSP currently employs satellites to
provide early detection and warning of missile launches and nuclear
explosions to the National Command Authorities. The last three DSP
satellites will be placed into orbit between fiscal year 2001 and
fiscal year 2003, and subsequently operated from the new SBIRS mission
control station. The SBIRS High component, currently in engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD), is on track for the first delivery of
a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensor in fiscal year 2002 and the
first launch of a satellite into geosynchronous orbit (GEO) in fiscal
year 2005. The SBIRS Low component, now in the program definition/risk
reduction phase, consists of low earth orbiting (LEO) satellites with
the first launch planned for 2006. We are working hand-in-hand with the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office to make the SBIRS program a success.
In total, we will operate 2 SBIRS HEO, 4 GEO, and between 20 and 30 LEO
satellites.
Miniature Satellites
On July 19, 2000, the Air Force Research Laboratory launched
MightySat II, a test satellite weighing only 266 pounds. The MightySat
series of experiments are designed to quickly and inexpensively
explore, demonstrate, and transition space technologies from the
drawing board to operational use. MightySat II demonstrates advanced
technologies for hyperspectral remote sensing and on-board processing
that could eventually help military commanders detect and identify
hidden targets. The MightySat series are building blocks for more
advanced satellite concepts, such as TechSat-21. This concept will
employ three micro-satellites flying in formation to act as an
integrated ``virtual'' satellite, enabling revolutionary remote sensing
capabilities such as ground moving target identification.
Assured Access to Space
Achieving and maintaining superiority throughout the entire
aerospace continuum requires an operational space launch and maneuver
capability that can deploy to orbit with the same speed and flexibility
as our other aerospace forces. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) will soon replace the current Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch
vehicles to ensure America's spacelift capability until 2020. It
consists of two independent launch systems: the Boeing Delta IV and
Lockheed Martin Atlas V. The first EELV launch is scheduled for 2002.
Our EELV partnership strategy with industry will meet military,
government, and commercial spacelift requirements at 25 percent to 50
percent lower cost than current systems. In the future, we envision
reusable launch vehicles that will provide launch on demand, high
sortie rates, reduced operations costs, and increased operational
flexibility in support of space mission areas.
Space Control
We are committed to exploring innovative ways of modernizing space-
based technologies. Utilizing residual resources from the midcourse
space experiment (MSX) satellite, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
transitioned this advanced concept technology demonstration into a
space-based space surveillance sensor. The Space Based Visible (SBV)
sensor provides critical positional data on orbiting objects to ensure
battlespace awareness.
During the past year, we activated the first-ever space control
unit--the 76th Space Control Squadron at Peterson AFB, Colorado. The
76th SPCS is an offensive and defensive counterspace technology unit
responsible for exploring emerging space control capabilities,
including concepts of counter-communications and counter-surveillance/
reconnaissance, and the development of a satellite attack, threat
detection, and reporting architecture.
Combat Search and Rescue
Combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces, identified by DOD as low
density/high demand (LD/HD) assets, recover downed combat aircrews and
other isolated people from hostile territory and return them to
friendly control. The age of our CSAR platforms, and their lack of
compatibility with our advances in strike, C\2\, ISR, communications
and other systems, jeopardize our ability to fulfill our operational
commitments beginning in 2010. For example, the A-10 aircraft does not
have the latest airborne receivers required to perform the on-scene
command role during combat rescue missions. In 2010, our HH-60s (search
and rescue helicopters) will reach the end of their service life and
require either a service life extension program (SLEP) or replacement.
Our near-term enhancements include equipping HH-60Gs with over-the-
horizon data receivers and improved defensive systems. We are also
improving our CSAR force structure by converting 10 WC-130Hs (weather
observation aircraft) into HC-130s (rescue/tanker transports) and
transferring eight HH-60s and five HC-130s from the Reserve to the
active force. We have established the new combat rescue officer (CRO)
career specialty to improve the leadership of the CSAR mission area.
The first CRO commanded pararescue squadron will stand up in May 2001.
Information Superiority
Information superiority, like aerospace superiority, means our
information systems are free from attack while we have freedom to
attack an adversary's information systems. Information superiority
enables us to provide tailored, accurate targeting information from a
sensor to a shooter within minutes. It assures U.S. and allied forces
have a clear picture of the battlespace and can operate freely in the
information domain while denying the enemy the same. Information
superiority includes the ability to gain, exploit, attack, and defend
information. Integral elements include capabilities in information-in-
warfare (e.g., ISR, weather, communications) and information warfare
(e.g., electronic warfare, psychological operations, computer network
attack and defense).
Command and Control
Our operational and tactical command and control (C\2\) airborne
platforms and ground systems organize and direct ISR efforts and
tactical forces to successfully apply combat power. Our C\2\ assets
include the aerospace operations center (AOC) with its decentralized
component control reporting centers (CRC), the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS), and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS).
As the primary element of the Theater Air Control System (TACS),
the AOC is responsible for planning, executing, and assessing the full
range of aerospace operations. By fusing the data from a vast array of
C\2\ and sensor systems, the AOC creates a comprehensive awareness of
the battlespace so the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) can
task and execute the most complex aerospace operations across the
entire spectrum of conflict.
Especially significant among these operations are time sensitive
targeting, which provides rapid reaction to the threat, and theater
battle management, which blends C\2\, rapid intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination with positive control of airspace and the
tasking of combat forces to coordinate the entire air battle with joint
and coalition partners and component commanders. We have recently
designated the AOC as a ``weapon system'' and are working on efforts to
standardize its capabilities. Our continued efforts in equipment
baselining, personnel training, and documentation are the precursors to
a full AOC system modernization effort. The emergence of the AOC as a
fully developed, standardized weapon system will revolutionize the
operational level of warfare.
The CRC is the JFACC's ground tactical execution node for C\2\ and
battle management. It provides wide-area surveillance, theater air
defense, identification, data link management, and air battle
execution. The current system was developed in the 1970s and must be
replaced. The CRC replacement, the Battle Control System, will exceed
year 2010 requirements for time sensitive targeting, open system
architecture, small deployment footprint, remote operations, multi-
sensor fusion, and AEF responsiveness.
The Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) is an
integrated, automated C\2\ and decision support tool that offers the
senior aerospace commander and subordinate staffs a single point of
access to real- or near-real-time information necessary for the
execution of higher headquarters taskings. TBMCS will support a full
range of functions including threat assessment, target selection,
mission execution, battle damage assessment, resource management, time
sensitive target identification and prosecution, and defensive
planning.
Communication
Information superiority, and by extension, all our core
competencies depend on the availability of a robust, worldwide
communications capability. Unfortunately, our military satellite
communication (MILSATCOM) systems can not fully keep up with the growth
of theater requirements. Over the next 10 years, our need for secure
communications is expected to increase 15-fold over current capacity,
while wideband requirements are projected to soar to 20 times the
current capacity. In an environment of extremely high worldwide demand
and competition, commercial providers simply cannot supply us with the
protected bandwidth, security, or coverage necessary to fully support
military operations.
MILSATCOM systems, notably the Defense Satellite Communications
System (DSCS) and the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System
(MILSTAR), support contingency and ongoing operations. The first DSCS
SLEP satellite, launched in January 2000, provides users a 200 percent
increase in military wideband communications capacity compared to
legacy DSCS III satellites. It also increases the overall reliability
of the military wideband constellation. Early in 2001, the MILSTAR
constellation received a third operational satellite, to provide jam-
resistant communications for tactical operations. Furthermore, a
complete modernization of protected communications (advanced extremely
high frequency) and wideband communications (advanced wideband) is
underway. These are positive steps toward ensuring space superiority
and information superiority today and in the future.
While the long-haul communications provided by satellites is
crucial to operations, transporting information to in-garrison and
deployed units is equally vital. Theater deployable communications
provide lightweight multiband satellite terminals that allow our
deployed forces to reach back on the Global Command and Control System-
Air Force (GCCS-AF) via the Combat Information Transport System--our
high-capacity fiber-optic backbone. This capability allows combat
forces to quickly deploy with a smaller support structure. We are also
implementing innovative emerging technologies to maximize bandwidth
availability. This is especially critical given the commercial
expansion into the frequency spectrum used by the military.
Information Warfare
We have fielded eight information warfare flights (IWF) to date,
providing combatant commanders with full-spectrum information warfare
(IW) planning for offensive, defensive, kinetic, and non-kinetic
applications. We plan to field at least one additional IWF to support
U.S. Special Operations Command. Each IWF integrates offensive
counterinformation, defensive counterinformation, and information-in-
warfare functions to gain, exploit, attack, and defend both information
and information systems. We recognize the potency of psychological
operations and, therefore, include it in our strategic planning as part
of our IW capabilities.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Currently, our limited numbers of airborne ISR systems are in
extremely high demand. The RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2, and Predator UAV
were indispensable during Operation Allied Force, providing real-time
PGM target data, threat warning, and battle damage assessment. UAV
systems, such as Global Hawk and Predator, promise to expand our ISR
collection capability while reducing the need to place our people in
harm's way.
Global Hawk successfully completed a military utility assessment
and is poised to move forward as a formal Air Force acquisition program
with the delivery of production vehicles in fiscal year 2003. The
Predator continued to demonstrate impressive expandability with the
integration of a laser illuminator for PGMs and the recent successful
launch of a Hellfire-C missile against a ground target. Additionally,
we are nearing completion of a major upgrade to the U-2's sensors,
cockpit, defensive, and power systems.
Space-Based Radar Capability
We are evolving information superiority assets into space. New
sources and methods of space-based ISR are being explored to provide
nearly continuous overflight of enemy targets to complement airborne
and ground-based sensor platforms. We are partnering with other
Services, agencies, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to
develop a roadmap for future space-based radar (SBR) capabilities. SBR
is a pioneering approach to providing near-continuous, worldwide
surveillance that would complement JSTARS and other ground moving
target indication and imagery systems. SBR capability would skip a
generation of sensor technology to provide precision weapons data and a
nearly continuous deep, denied-area look at ground moving targets.
Furthermore, as a space-based asset, SBR would not be limited by
overflight restrictions, basing issues, lengthy personnel deployments,
crew fatigue, or terrain masking. From a collection perspective, SBR
would move us to the ultimate high-ground.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
The JSTARS provides battle management, C\2\, and ground moving-
target detection. We are replacing the on-board computers with
commercial-off-the-shelf equipment by 2005 under the JSTARS Computer
Replacement Program (CRP). The CRP is the foundation of all JSTARS
communications and sensor upgrades, and should reduce life-cycle costs
and minimize the number of obsolete parts. However, due to fiscal
constraints, we are enhancing only 2/3 of the fleet with the capacity
to simultaneously transmit voice and data through beyond-line-of-sight
satellite communications by 2005. Finally, the multi-platform Radar
Technology Insertion Program (RTIP) will replace the current JSTARS
radar with an advanced electronically scanned array radar that has five
to ten times the air-to-ground surveillance capability, reduces target
revisit times, improves moving-target track capability, and enhances
radar resolution.
Airborne Warning and Control System
The AWACS remains the premier air battle management and wide-area
surveillance platform in the world. Still, aging aircraft issues,
obsolete technologies, and the proliferation of advanced adversary
systems necessitate several upgrade programs. An improved radar system
will become operational this year, with fully upgraded capability
slated for fiscal year 2005. The next computer and display upgrade will
replace the 1970 vintage processors with an open architecture system.
Finally, a satellite communications access program will provide
improved connectivity with regional and national C\2\ centers.
Global Access, Navigation, and Safety
In 1996, we began the most comprehensive avionics modernization
effort in our history--the Global Access, Navigation, and Safety (GANS)
program. It comprises an unparalleled avionics procurement and
installation effort to update the navigation and safety equipment in
our aircraft and in many ground systems. GANS includes the Joint
Precision Approach and Landing System; the Air Traffic Control and
Landing System; modernization of our Global Air Traffic Management
(GATM) capabilities; and updated avionics to include navigation,
safety, and installation of Global Positioning System (GPS) capability.
In May 2000, GPS selective availability was turned off, thereby
providing the same accuracy to civil and military users. This increased
accuracy will significantly enhance the capabilities of systems using
GPS. In 2000, we built a strategic GANS implementation plan to
synchronize our efforts with those of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). In the future, GANS will define the operational requirements
for upgrading all our ground and air traffic management systems to
preserve unimpeded worldwide operations within domestic and
international airspace systems.
We project that more than 99 percent of our aircraft will complete
the congressionally mandated GPS upgrade by the 2005 deadline.
Additionally, through our GPS Modernization/Navigation Warfare (NavWar)
Program, we began development of navigation warfare upgrades that will
be fielded in GPS ground and space segments beginning in fiscal year
2003. These and future upgrades will allow us to better protect the
ability of American and allied forces to employ GPS on the battlefield
while denying it to our adversaries and minimizing potential impacts to
civilian users.
Precision Engagement
Operation Allied Force demonstrated the need to strike targets in
adverse weather conditions with precision. Our new generation of guided
weapons couples GPS with an inertial navigation system to put bombs
precisely on targets, day or night, in nearly all weather conditions.
Weapons with this capability, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM), Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM), and Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) are
among our high-priority precision engagement programs.
JASSM is a precise, stealthy, standoff missile that will enable us
to destroy heavily defended, hardened, fixed, and relocatable targets.
As a result of acquisition reform initiatives, JASSM will be delivered
below the objective unit price of $400K, after a development period
that will be 35 percent shorter than comparable missile programs. JASSM
is currently undergoing flight tests with production deliveries
scheduled to begin in 2003.
JSOW is an accurate, adverse-weather, unpowered, glide munition. We
are currently procuring two variants, the AGM-154A and AGM-154B, which
are capable of destroying soft and armored targets at ranges of up to
40 nautical miles.
JDAM employs GPS guidance, incorporated in a tail kit, to deliver
general-purpose or penetration warheads in adverse weather with near
precision. We will use JDAM on multiple platforms to destroy high-
priority, fixed, and relocatable targets. The first operational use of
a 2,000-pound JDAM was from a B-2 during the first night of Operation
Allied Force.
We are currently developing a MK-82 (500-pound) JDAM--a small bomb
that will multiply kills per sortie by increasing the number of PGMs
that can be carried. For example, the same B-2 that carried up to 16
2,000-pound JDAMs in Operation Allied Force will now be able to carry
up to 80 500-pound JDAMs. This 500-pound JDAM capability, planned for
initial deployment in fiscal year 2004, is the first step in the Air
Force's transition to miniature munitions.
WCMD has an inertial-guided tail kit that enables us to accurately
deliver the Combined Effects Munition, Sensor Fuzed Weapon, and the
Gator Mine Dispenser from medium to high altitude in adverse weather.
WCMD-equipped weapons became operational in late 2000.
In summary, munitions recapitalization is one of our top
priorities. A decade of high operations tempo has depleted our large
Cold War Reserve munition stockpiles. Acquisition of JDAM, JASSM, JSOW,
and WCMD will increase PGM capabilities over the next few years;
however, shortages of legacy munitions and consumable munitions items
(e.g., bomb bodies, rockets, chaff, flares, training ammunition, and
practice bombs) will continue to hamper training and operations.
Global Attack
Global Attack is the ability to engage targets anywhere, anytime.
Global attack programs include the development of the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF), improvements to our legacy fighters, and the
modernization of the B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers with PGM capabilities.
Additionally, modernization of strategic platforms such as the
Minuteman III, the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and the Advanced Cruise
Missile ensures the viability of two legs of the nuclear triad.
Joint Strike Fighter
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program will develop and field an
affordable, lethal, survivable, and highly common family of stealthy,
next-generation, multi-role, strike-fighter aircraft for the Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps, and our allies. It will provide a 24-hour, adverse-
weather, precision-engagement capability not provided by our legacy
systems. The JSF would help us limit our aging fleet problems. With a
set of fully validated and affordable joint operational requirements in
place, the competing contractors are completing the concept
demonstration phase. The EMD phase is expected to begin in the fall of
2001. Partner countries will share the cost of JSF development,
including the United Kingdom, which signed an agreement in January to
contribute $2 billion to the program. Several parallel negotiations are
underway with other potential international partners.
Legacy Fighter Modernization
Our legacy fighters, including the F-15, F-16, and A-10, provide a
potent mix of air-to-air and air-to-surface capability. The recent
addition of GPS-guided PGMs on the F-117 gave it an adverse-weather
capability. However, these aging platforms are growing more expensive
to maintain and operate, and their combat effectiveness is expected to
eventually decline as projected surface-to-air and air-to-air threats
appear. The introduction of the stealthy F-22 and JSF will maintain
America's technological advantage, ensuring the ability to defeat
emerging threats while replacing aging force structure with modern
combat systems.
One of our Guard and Reserve's top modernization priorities is
incorporating precision targeting pods into their F-16 aircraft. From
1998 through 2000, we outfitted all of our Reserve units and selected
Guard units with Litening II pods. This acquisition gave the Guard and
Reserve's F-16s a critical precision strike capability while moving
them closer to the configuration of the active F-16 force. Beginning in
fiscal year 2001, the Guard will join with the active force in
procuring the Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP). Collaborative programs
between our active and Reserve components increase our overall
procurement flexibility and close the gap in combat capability.
Bomber Modernization
Our bomber modernization efforts will continue to increase the
lethality and survivability of our bomber force by enhancing precision
strike and electronic combat capabilities. We are applying the lessons
learned from Operation Allied Force by enhancing the flexible targeting
and electronic connectivity of the B-2 using electronic data-link and
UHF satellite communications. We are committed to integrating the MK-82
500-pound JDAM into the B-2, enabling it to strike up to 80 targets per
sortie. Further, we are fielding the MK-84 2,000-pound JDAM on the B-1
and developing the capacity for both the B-1 and the B-52 to deliver
JSOW, JASSM, and WCMD. Communications, avionics, situational awareness,
electronic countermeasures, and defensive system upgrades would also
improve bomber effectiveness.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Ongoing modernization of the Minuteman III (MM III)
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force and a clear policy
decision regarding the future of the Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM are crucial
to the viability of ICBMs through 2020. For example, we could dismantle
our PK ICBMs and then retrofit up to 350 MM IIIs with warheads
currently on PKs to avoid a costly life-extension program on the
Minuteman system. This replacement effort would ensure that our newest
warhead, with the most modern safety features, remains part of the ICBM
force. However, continued delays in START II Treaty ratification, and
the resultant delay in a PK deactivation decision, make it difficult to
implement this program and are causing increased maintenance challenges
that could eventually cause degradation of our ICBM force.
Rapid Global Mobility
Rapid Global Mobility ensures the Nation has the global reach to
respond quickly and decisively anywhere in the world. As the number of
forward-deployed forces has declined, the need for immediate response
to overseas events has risen. Airlift and tanker aircraft give the
United States the ability to rapidly reach out and influence events
around the world. Yet, some of these platforms are reaching the end of
their service life. To prepare for the future, the Mobility
Requirements Study (MRS-05) and Tanker Requirements Study (TRS-05) were
commissioned to determine long-term military airlift and aerial
refueling requirements. MRS-05 ascertained the mobility requirements to
support the Nation's military needs with moderate risk. Additionally,
the TRS-05, baselined from MRS-05, will inform our decision-makers on
the number of tankers needed to carry out future military operations.
The KC-135 fleet now averages about 40 years old, and operations and
support costs are escalating as structural fatigue, corrosion, systems
supportability, and technical obsolescence take their toll. The KC-135
Economic Service Life (ESL) Study was completed in December 2000. This
study provided specific KC-135 milestones, as well as information on
projected sustainment costs and operational availability. In fiscal
year 2001, using the KC-135 ESL study and TRS-05 as baselines, an
aerial refueling analysis of alternatives will examine options and
timing for replacing the aging KC-135.
The procurement of the full complement of C-17s and the continued
modernization of the C-5, C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 fleets will enhance
the viability of our mobility forces. Extensive efforts to modernize
the C-5's avionics and propulsion systems should keep this aging
platform operational for the future.
Modernization of the C-130 fleet (for intratheater airlift) is
proceeding with a two-pronged approach. We are procuring new C-130Js to
replace 150 of our most worn-out 1960s-era C-130E combat delivery
aircraft. The C-130J provides increased range, performance, and cargo
capacity compared with the current C-130E/Hs. The remainder of our C-
130 fleet will undergo an avionics modernization program (AMP)
modification. AMP includes state-of-the-art avionics that will
eliminate the need for a navigator and will increase reliability,
maintainability, and sustainability. The C-130 AMP modification will
make the aircraft compliant with GATM standards and navigational safety
requirements.
The Air Force has begun a large aircraft infrared countermeasures
(LAIRCM) initiative to counter increasingly prolific man-portable air
defense systems (MANPADS). LAIRCM will use state-of-the-art technology
to provide active defenses for airlift- and tanker-sized aircraft
against widely deployed shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
LAIRCM will build on existing systems designed for helicopters and
small, fixed-wing aircraft. It will add new missile warning and
tracking systems to locate and direct a laser at an incoming missile.
Operational capability is expected on the first C-17s in fiscal year
2004. Additional airlift and tanker aircraft will be outfitted with
this system in the near future.
Rapid Global Mobility is dependent upon the Tunner 60K mobility
aircraft loader. It is essential for expediting onload and offload and
maximizing throughput at any location. The next generation small loader
(NGSL), a replacement for existing 25K loaders and wide-body elevator
loaders, will provide the versatility to load wide-body commercial
aircraft and support mobility operations at forward bases.
Integrated Flight Management Modernization
Air Mobility Command's (AMC) Mobility 2000 (M2K) program is a
comprehensive systems integration and C\2\ architecture modernization
initiative to increase the efficiency and responsiveness of airlift and
air refueling operations. M2K will revolutionize AMC's C\2\ data flow
and connectivity, data processing, database management, and information
display capabilities. By leveraging GATM system installation and
digital datalink technologies, AMC will realize near-real-time global,
end-to-end data connectivity between the Tanker Airlift Control Center
and all AMC mission aircraft. The implementation of M2K programs began
in 2000 and will continue into 2006.
Spacelift Range Modernization
The Spacelift Range System (SLRS) modernization program is
replacing aging and non-supportable equipment; using automation to
improve reliability and efficiency; reducing the cost of operations;
and standardizing equipment on the eastern and western launch ranges.
To date, the completion of new downrange satellite communication links,
a new fiber-optic network, and new range scheduling systems are
providing government and commercial users more flexibility at the
spacelift ranges. The congressionally directed National Launch
Capabilities Study concluded that once completed, the SLRS
modernization program, coupled with the EELV program, would meet the
future launch demands of national security, civil, and commercial
payloads.
The White House-led Interagency Working Group on the future
utilization of U.S. space launch bases and ranges developed a strategic
direction for the spacelift ranges. The Air Force was instrumental in
shaping that strategic direction as well as the findings and
conclusions contained in the Group's report. Through this effort, we
have been expanding and formalizing partnerships with states,
spaceports, and the Departments of Transportation and Commerce to
better consider the spacelift requirements for civil and commercial
launches while ensuring our capability to meet national security
requirements now and in the future. At the same time, we are examining
options for the use of non-Federal funding to improve the space launch
ranges.
CV-22
The CV-22 is our designation for the special operations variant of
the V-22 Osprey--a vertical/short-takeoff and landing airplane designed
for long-range, rapid penetration of denied areas in adverse weather
and low visibility. With twice the range and speed of a conventional
helicopter and its state-of-the-art avionics system, the CV-22 will be
able to complete most of its missions under the cover of darkness
without being detected. We will use the CV-22 to infiltrate,
exfiltrate, and resupply special operations forces and to augment
personnel recovery forces when needed. The CV-22 is currently in the
EMD phase with two test vehicles designated for flight tests through
2003.
Agile Combat Support
The goal of Agile Combat Support (ACS) is to improve the
responsiveness, deployability, and sustainability of combat aerospace
forces. Our four basic objectives are to become more rapidly
deployable; develop a more responsive planning and execution
capability; improve agile combat support C\2\; and develop an agile,
responsive, and survivable sustainment capability. We are making gains
in the process of right-sizing deployment teams so they are postured
better for expeditionary needs. We have developed expeditionary site
planning tools that help tailor our deployment capability based on
assets prepositioned in the forward theater. We are gradually
introducing bare base assets and other types of support equipment into
our inventory. We've invested in infrastructure and prepositioning to
improve the reception and beddown capabilities of our bomber forward-
operating locations. We have fielded an integrated deployment system at
all of our wings that improves the responsiveness of our deployment
process. Our information technologies, such as the virtual logistics
suite hosted on the Air Force Portal, will help provide real-time
situational awareness for ACS command and control.
Through efforts like our logistics review and logistics
transformation initiatives, we are reengineering our processes to
achieve an agile, effective, well-integrated logistics chain that is
responsive to EAF requirements. These are all examples of initiatives
that will help achieve our four ACS objectives; however, our ACS
capability must be improved even more to fully support our EAF vision.
For example, we need to fix readiness shortfalls in key logistics
resources including people, skills, spares, munitions, bare base
assets, and vehicles. We need to improve our capability to rapidly
develop deployment and sustainment plans for fast-breaking
contingencies. Finally, we are making enhancements to our ACS command
and control capability to make it more responsive, better integrated,
and sufficiently robust to support EAF needs. These agile combat
support initiatives are crucial to sustaining current and future combat
operations.
Aircrew Training Requirements
We are actively updating the way we train. The Joint Primary
Aircraft Training System (JPATS), including the T-6A aircraft, will
replace the Air Force T-37 and the Navy T-34 primary trainers and their
associated ground-based training systems beginning in June 2001 at
Moody AFB, GA. We will continue to upgrade the T-38 advanced trainer
aircraft with new avionics representative of current fighter systems
while modernizing the propulsion system to improve engine reliability,
safety, efficiency, and performance. Finally, we are making significant
strides in developing simulated environments that produce training
effects comparable to authentic environments. Our groundbreaking
distributed mission training (DMT) system seamlessly links aircrew
training devices at diverse locations, allowing aircrews to train as
they fight.
Ranges
Ranges provide the critical airspace we need to test and train on
our weapon systems. As modern aircraft continue to fly faster and
deliver munitions from a greater distance, our ranges and associated
test and training systems must evolve to meet our changing needs. We
will balance our need to test and train with our responsibilities to
the public and the environment. We are completing modifications to our
range and airspace structure that will significantly enhance local
training for our forces at Mountain Home AFB, ID, Dyess AFB, TX, and
Barksdale AFB, LA. We are also working to further advance the
integration of space and information operations into our ranges. This
includes capitalizing on a common infrastructure across the test and
training spectrum.
innovation and adaptation
We have a proud heritage of innovation and adaptation. We are
carefully linking emerging technologies with our future concepts of
operation to evolve our aerospace core capabilities while providing the
Nation the most effective return on its investments.
Experimentation and Wargames
We conduct experiments and wargames to evaluate near- and far-term
aerospace capabilities and operational concepts. Joint Expeditionary
Force Experiment (JEFX) 2000, conducted at various locations throughout
the U.S. in September, focused on ways to integrate support functions
into expeditionary operations and technologies to conduct time
sensitive targeting. The wargame Global Engagement (GE) is held every
other year to explore the potential capabilities of joint aerospace
power and alternative force structures 10 to 15 years into the future.
In June 2000, GE-V explored operational concepts and alternative force
structures designed to deny and degrade an adversary's strategic
decision-making ability and accelerate the transition from halt to win.
GE-V also demonstrated aerospace power's unique capability to ensure
access to operational areas where the enemy employs robust anti-access
strategies. We are currently conducting a year-long analysis of GE-V in
areas such as time sensitive targeting, space control, information
operations, and forward logistics support. During odd-numbered years,
we conduct an aerospace future capabilities wargame that takes a longer
view, striving to shape our decisions and strategic direction by
testing alternative concepts, systems, and force structures that may
appear 20 to 25 years into the future. These wargames have produced new
aerospace concepts, such as standoff warfare and reach-forward C\2\
capability, which continue to mature through follow-up analysis and
subsequent wargames.
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
Advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) marry new
operational concepts with mature technologies in order to meet
warfighter needs in 2 to 4 years at a reduced cost. The high altitude
UAV ACTD, Global Hawk, which has successfully transitioned to a formal
acquisition program, is targeted for accelerated production and is
expected to provide a follow-on capability for the U-2. The Miniature
Air Launched Decoy (MALD), another ACTD system scheduled to enter
production in fiscal year 2001, will augment our electronic warfare
capability to protect valuable strike packages.
Battlelabs
Since their inception in 1997, the battlelabs have developed over
100 initiatives, including the application of commercial scheduling
software for the Air Force Satellite Control Network,
telecommunications firewalls for base phone systems, and the use of
speech recognition to reduce mission planning time. The recently
commissioned Air Mobility Battlelab joined the ranks of the Air
Expeditionary Force Battlelab, Command and Control Battlelab, Force
Protection Battlelab, Information Warfare Battlelab, Space Battlelab,
and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battlelab, with a charter to rapidly
identify and assess innovative operational and logistics concepts.
Joint Test and Evaluation
The Air Force plans to remain at the forefront of the joint test
and evaluation (JT&E) process. JT&E programs are a means to bring two
or more of the Services together to evaluate systems interoperability
under realistic conditions. We are the lead service on five JT&Es in
the areas of close air support; joint command, control, ISR sensor
management techniques; cruise missile defense capability; GPS
vulnerabilities; and electronic warfare in joint operations.
Conclusion
Our future hinges on continued advances in people, readiness, and
modernization programs. Retention and recruitment of people will stay
challenging in the near-term, but we will remain focused on the quality
of life of our members. Similarly, we are concerned about readiness,
but until we solve our aging aircraft troubles, improving our readiness
will remain difficult. We believe we have developed a sound
recapitalization plan to address our aging aircraft problem, but if the
plan is approved, we would require additional funding to execute it.
Modernization brings increased readiness, along with new technologies
and enhanced capabilities. We will continue to innovate and adapt our
revolutionary advances in space technology, directed energy, and
unmanned aerial vehicles, to name only a few. Our efforts span the
gamut of the world's most diverse, flexible, and powerfully integrated
aerospace force. We must balance and fund our people, readiness, and
modernization programs to ensure aerospace power for America well into
the future.

REFORMING BUSINESS PRACTICES

The budget constraints of the past decade have forced us to take a
hard look at our business practices. We have undertaken aggressive
efforts to realize cost efficiencies by benchmarking the best business
and management practices, whether in government or industry, and then
adapting them to our unique environment. During the past year, we made
significant progress in improving how we do business in everything from
competitive sourcing of personnel positions to the flow of information
within the Air Force Headquarters.

LEVERAGING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

We made some tremendous progress in 2000 in the way we plan for,
acquire, and protect our information technology (IT). We started by
creating the position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Business and Information Management to centralize IT
decision-making and implement an Air Force-wide process to assess our
IT investments in preparation for future budgeting efforts.
Driving our IT efforts is our ``One Air Force, One Network''
strategy, a multi-layered approach to integrating operations, people,
technology, and oversight through an enterprise-wide, network-centric
concept. Included in this strategy is the establishment of the Air
Force Portal, the consolidation of our servers, and improvements in
information assurance (IA). The Air Force Portal will provide all our
members with a platform-independent, single logon capability to meet
practically all their information needs. Currently, network-based
access allows our members to logon anywhere in the world, supporting
over 75 applications. The migration of most of our critical databases
is planned for the near future.
In 2000, we saw the initial consolidation of our servers improve
the utilization of our computer resources. We have created teams of
experts at central sites and reduced our exposure to outside threats.
Our goal is to have one base from each major command completed by
August 2001 and all bases by September 2002. Our strategy advances IA
through standardized practices and procedures; integrated network
operations and information protection; automated and dynamic detection
and response; consolidated situational awareness and decision support;
and enhancements for deployed and classified environments. We are
committed to IA as our top information warfare priority for long-term
investment.
Finally, our Global Combat Support System-Air Force (GCSS-AF) is
key to integrating our critical combat support information systems and
processes across functional areas. GCSS-AF incorporates the Air Force
Portal, allowing customer specific access while permitting the
customization of information within our business information systems.
Together, GCSS-AF and the Air Force Portal will provide the warfighter,
supporting elements, and other Air Force members with timely and
accurate data and the capability to transform this data into meaningful
information. Seamlessly incorporating combat support into war planning
allows military planners to improve their course of action development,
analysis, and collaborative planning; and it measurably streamlines our
business processes.

COMPETITIVE SOURCING

Our public/private manpower competitions are a defense reform
initiative success story. In 2000, we began new competition studies
impacting 2,895 positions, as required by Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-76. The A-76 circular calls for the review of
government functions meeting specified criteria, and competition with
private-sector firms to determine the most efficient and cost-effective
method to perform the work. In 2000, we concluded 30 competitions that
covered 5,534 positions. These competitions resulted in 46 percent of
the work being contracted, and the remainder being performed by the
most efficient government organization. Both results yielded
significant cost savings. As of April 2001, we have completed 48
percent of the A-76 competitions targeted by the 1997 QDR and the
Defense Reform Initiative. Our annual top-to-bottom review of our
manpower authorizations identified an additional 3,491 positions as
eligible for competition.

PRIVATIZATION

Utilities
Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #49 directed the
privatization of all utility systems by September 30, 2003, except
those needed for unique mission or security reasons, or when
privatization is uneconomical. This included two interim milestones:
determining the feasibility of privatizing each system by September 30,
2000, and releasing all requests for proposals by September 30, 2001.
Currently, we have completed the first milestone by determining whether
or not to pursue privatization for each system (i.e., water,
wastewater, electrical, and natural gas). This evaluation resulted in
434 systems becoming candidates for privatization. We continue to
assess our options, and are now preparing the requests for proposal
that are required to meet the second milestone.
Housing
The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act provided legislation to
privatize military family housing. Privatization efforts are underway
to meet the goal of eliminating inadequate military family housing
units by the year 2010. We have awarded 4 of 9 pilot projects to
privatize 6,280 housing units. During fiscal year 2001-04, we plan to
privatize over 21,000 housing units at 22 additional installations. Our
privatization efforts are part of our overall housing revitalization
program outlined in our Family Housing Master Plan.

ACQUISITION REFORM

Today's environment demands continuous acquisition reform. We have
consistently led the way with new acquisition initiatives, or
``Lightning Bolts,'' and reinvention teams, which succeeded in saving
more than $30 billion during the last decade. Today, we are
institutionalizing acquisition reform through new initiatives, such as
the use of cost as an independent variable and reduction of total
ownership cost, which improve acquisition affordability. In addition,
we've recently developed an acquisition cycle-time reduction initiative
known as the warfighter rapid acquisition process. This initiative has
the potential to speed up the development and deployment of innovative
solutions to warfighter requirements by 2 to 5 years. Our motto of
``faster and smarter'' continues to guide us as we build upon the
successful efforts of the past.

PARTNERSHIP WITH INDUSTRY

We have consistently counted on industry to deliver superior
products at reasonable prices. Now, we are institutionalizing
partnering between industry and the warfighter. Initiatives such as
teaming on proposals (TOPS) and total system program responsibility
(TSPR) allow us to establish these partnerships early in the
acquisition process. Integrated product teams extend this relationship
throughout the acquisition life cycle. The process of alternative
dispute resolution is now a part of all major acquisition projects,
reducing the threat of expensive claims. We are reaching out to
industry to maintain robust, rewarding, and healthy relationships. In
our partnerships with industry, we are also developing a blueprint for
defense reform that will guide future reform initiatives throughout the
government. This blueprint was unveiled in February 2001. We will
continue to look for new areas in which we can improve our partnership.

PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM REFORM

We are reengineering the Air Force Resource Allocation Process
(AFRAP) to better link strategic planning, requirements generation,
programming and budgeting, while providing a consistent focus on
capabilities throughout the process. This new process will have a more
rigorous and consistent analytical underpinning than earlier methods.
We are planning to give our major commands an explicit slice of total
obligation authority with the flexibility to program funds to best meet
their own priorities. We believe this approach will improve the
accountability and visibility of our resource requirements during the
DOD and congressional review and funding processes.

FINANCIAL REFORM

We continue to make progress toward achieving auditable financial
statements as required by the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act. An Air
Force integrated process team is resolving issues related to the
reduction of erroneous or unsupported obligations. This, in turn, will
enable us to achieve an auditable statement of budgetary resources. We
are making efforts to validate at least four of our crucial inputs that
provide the foundation for unqualified audit opinions on Air Force
financial statements. All these efforts will provide better financial
information for Air Force commanders and managers.

LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

The Defense Planning Guidance, DOD Logistics Strategic Plan, and
Defense Reform Initiative Directive #54 (Logistics Transformation) all
identified a requirement for the services to modernize their logistics
programs. Accordingly, we initiated a logistics transformation effort
designed to improve overall combat capability. Through improved supply
chain management practices, this effort gives the warfighter a complete
picture of the enterprise's supply, maintenance, and sustainment
support activities affecting readiness. Reengineered logistical support
concepts will directly support warfighter readiness with a tailored
sustainment strategy for a downsized, but expeditionary force
structure, that is within the budgets currently projected across the
FYDP.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE STRATEGY

Over the past year, we conducted a comprehensive review of our
depot maintenance strategy to ensure our capability is properly sized
for both wartime and peacetime utilization. Our current depot posture
and future planning has been influenced by the downsizing of our
operational force; the reduction of our organic infrastructure; a more
active and robust private sector; the introduction of new technologies;
and recent depot legislation changes. This review reaffirmed that depot
maintenance is a critical element of our overall warfighting
capability. Our recent experience in support of Operation Allied Force
once again proved the wisdom of having a ready and controlled source of
depot maintenance. As a result, our depot strategy will ensure we
possess an organic ``core'' capability sized to support potential
military operations. In addition, we recognize the need to efficiently
utilize our organic facilities during peacetime. To that end, our
depots are allowed to pursue repair workload beyond their ``core''
requirements that is awarded through public/private competitions when
doing so would increase their ``core'' production efficiencies or offer
a ``best value'' source of repair.

CONCLUSION

In a time when the Air Force was asked to do more with less, we
succeeded in reinventing our business approaches to capitalize both on
the inherent strengths of our enterprise and the best practices found
in the private sector. We are at the forefront of apportioning
positions between military and civil service functions and those that
can be accomplished by contract personnel. We are becoming
interconnected with a single, Air Force-wide network that puts crucial
information at everyone's fingertips. We are reforming the acquisition
process and partnering with industry, not only delivering products
faster but assuring superior quality as well. In the last decade, our
better business practices have saved billions of dollars, allowing us
to revolutionize the application of aerospace power.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

From the beginning of powered flight almost 100 years ago to the
space-related operations we conduct today, we have demonstrated that we
are an innovative and adaptive force. We were born of change and it
remains a part of our nature. We will continue exploring new
technologies and operational concepts to identify those that offer
potential for evolutionary or revolutionary increases in capability.
Our success as an aerospace force is founded on recruiting the
finest men and women available and then retaining them. We must size,
shape and operate the force to best meet the needs of our Nation.
Through the structure of our ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, we
provide the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) with trained-to-task forces,
while adding predictability and stability to the lives of our airmen.
We owe our people the education, equipment, and training to perform the
missions we ask them to do. Finally, to keep our aerospace advantage,
we must modernize and replace our worn out, aging, and increasingly
difficult to maintain systems and infrastructure.
In a world that is globally-connected, national security and
international stability are vital foundations of America's prosperity.
Ensuring security and stability requires global vigilance, reach, and
power--global vigilance to anticipate and deter threats, strategic
reach to curb crises, and overwhelming power to prevail in conflicts
and win America's wars. We are postured to provide balanced aerospace
capabilities across the full spectrum of military operations, but in
order to maintain America's aerospace advantage we must recapitalize
our force.

Chairman Levin. Secretary Roche, thank you.
General Ryan.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL E. RYAN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES AIR FORCE

General Ryan. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished
members of the committee: Before we get started, I would like
to thank my fellow chiefs for all their service and support,
flying in close formation through the years, and these service
secretaries for their commitment to serve. I also want to thank
members of the committee for all you have done for the men and
women in uniform over the 4 years I have had the privilege of
serving as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
During that time we have seen a drop in readiness that has
concerned us all. With your help, we have been able to arrest
the decline, but much more needs to be done to regain our edge
across the board. Consequently, this budget submission for the
Air Force has a great emphasis on people and readiness.
We still need your help in attracting the highest quality
individuals to serve in our military. I am happy to say this
year we are making our recruiting goals, both in terms of
quality and numbers. Our major challenge is retaining our best
and brightest to stay with us for a career. Your help over the
past years on pay, retirement, health care, etcetera, has been
much appreciated.
Quality of life issues are terribly important to attracting
and retaining great people, but also so is quality of service.
Quality of service addresses the need to assure we give our
airmen the proper tools to do the tough jobs we ask of them in
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, in No Fly Zone enforcement where
combat occurs daily. The same is true in the Balkans and in
Korea. Quality of service is not just about the equipment with
which we operate, but the ranges, hangars, buildings and shops
in which we ask these dedicated individuals to do their work.
We all know quality begets quality and we have underfunded
our modernization of our capital equipment and our
infrastructure for too long. The average age of an Air Force
aircraft is 22 years and continues to climb. We must turn this
aging problem around.
In summary, I look forward to working with Secretary Roche
and all of you as we complete the quadrennial defense review
and address the budget issues before us. I know together we can
make a great difference as we continue to rebuild our military
to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and I look forward
to your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Ryan.
We are going to have a 6-minute first round.
Senator Inhofe. Could I have a question, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. Do we intend to have more rounds?
Chairman Levin. Yes. For our first round we will use the 6-
minute rule and then, depending on how many people are still
here and how much time we have left, we will decide on how long
the question period will be for the second and any successive
rounds.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. I want to ask each of you for the record to
give us your list of unfunded requirements for 2002. I am not
going to ask you here, but I am going to ask each of you to
submit that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Army

UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Army's fiscal year
2002 resource posture. Clearly, the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget
represents a balanced program that will allow the Army to remain
trained and ready. I am pleased to note significant increases in a
number of key areas--soldier pay and housing, base operations, real
property, and science and technology. These will improve quality of
life for our soldiers and their families, slow deterioration of our
aging infrastructure, and advance Army Transformation.
However, there is still much to be done. To stem the critical
decline in our facilities, the Army has assumed some risk in our
operating accounts. We will mitigate this risk in the year of
execution. Additional resources will allow us to accelerate
recapitalization of our counterattack corps, restore necessary OPTEMPO
funding and begin stabilization of our infrastructure.
The following list outlines these and other fiscal year 2002 Army
shortfalls.

FISCAL YEAR 2002 ARMY SHORTFALLS
[in millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortfall Cum
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPTEMPO......................................... 300.0 300.0
Antiterrorism/Force Protection.................. 306.0 606.0
SRM/RPM......................................... 287.7 893.7
Reserve Component Duty Training Pay............. 100.0 993.7
Reserve Component Full Time Support............. 76.4 1,070.1
Recapitalization................................ 566.2 1,636.3
Objective Force Development..................... 43.1 1,679.4
Interim Brigade Combat Teams.................... 93.6 1,773.0
Second Destination Transportation............... 70.7 1,843.7
Ammo Stockpile Management....................... 81.4 1,925.1
Current Force Modernization..................... 1,969.0 3,894.1
Test and Evaluation............................. 193.8 4,087.9
Infrastructure Support and Information 449.1 4,537.0
Technology.....................................
CTC/Training Range Modernization................ 493.1 5,030.1
Initial Entry Training.......................... 32.6 5,062.7
Mission Oriented Readiness...................... 259.9 5,322.6
Sustainment Systems Technical Support........... 68.4 5,391.0
Depot Maintenance............................... 194.4 5,585.4
Education, Transition, and Other People Programs 137.6 5,723.0
Spares/War Reserve Secondary Items.............. 675.0 6,398.0
Homeland Security (Weapons of Mass Destruction). 19.6 6,417.6
Army Family Housing............................. 353.0 6,770.6
Maintenance and Repair Backlog.................. 2,778.5 9,549.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Navy/Marine Corps
The Navy's list of unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2002 is
provided in the following tables.

Air Force
The following are the Air Force's fiscal year 2002 unfunded
priorities:

Chairman Levin. We do not know to what extent Congress is
going to be able to accommodate the budget amendment for the
year 2002. The Budget Committee and other committees are going
to be involved in that as well as us. But the larger question I
want to ask you about has to do with future year funding, and
that has to do with whether or not you are putting together a
longer term strategy which our fiscal situation can support.
So let me start with the service secretaries and ask each
of you this question. Do you expect that after the completion
of the QDR you will be proposing a fiscal year 2003 budget
which will require additional funding above the level that you
are requesting for the year 2002, or are you planning to make
offsetting reductions in lower priority programs or in business
practice savings which would finance a new strategy at or below
the funding levels that you are requesting for the year 2002?
So we will start with you, Secretary White, as to what is
your current expectation relative to the 2003 request following
the QDR, just your best estimate at this point.
Secretary White. Well, Senator, it is difficult to predict.
If the QDR process dictates or the Secretary decides that force
structure changes will be a part of that, then obviously if the
force gets smaller as a part of the QDR process that will
create a different funding requirement going forward. If the
force stays the same, we will make every attempt to offset the
additional requirements above the levels we are looking at now
with business efficiencies that we will hope to employ during
the 2003 year and get sorted out over the next few months as we
continue to work this.
So it is difficult to see exactly where that balance is
going to come out short of the final decisions on the strategy
review. But if it were to stay the same, I think that we will
look toward at least this level of funding next year net of
business practice improvements that we could make.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary England.
Secretary England. Senator, I think it would be a
combination, and that is my best estimate at this point. If you
look at our recapitalization rate, as the CNO commented, at our
present rate we will go down to about 240 ships. I do not know
what the outcome of the QDR will be, but I doubt it will be
that low in terms of our naval services. After all, we are a
forward-deployed force, a rotational force, so we are always
around the world. Therefore I would expect that we would not be
that low. So we will need additional resources.
Our airplanes are also very old. We do need to recapitalize
the airplanes. At the same time, we do anticipate that we will
have better efficiency, we will indeed save money as we go
forward through business practices. So I would expect that we
will save money, but we will also have some additional needs.
So I do not see that our request will be lower this year, but
hopefully it will not be as much as if we did not take action
in terms of better business practices.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Roche.
Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, the 2002 budget does a lot
to help us get well in maintenance and people-related things,
but it does not do all that we need. We cannot live with the
procurement holiday in airplanes that has existed for the last
8 or so years, where we have just had insufficient purchases of
airplanes. Our planes age increasingly. The costs--the time to
put a tanker through a logistics center now is over a year
because these planes are failing in ways that we did not
anticipate because they are just getting old.
So we will need more money. At the same time, we have an
obligation to look for offsets, to look for ways to do things
more efficiently, put in better business practices. But some of
these things will make pain for certain areas and we will have
to work that out, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
I want to talk to you about an additional round or rounds
of base closures. Let me start with you, General Ryan, and go
down and ask each of our service chiefs and our service
secretaries this question: Do you agree with the President and
Secretary Rumsfeld that we have unneeded bases and that we
should have another round of base closures to eliminate the
excess infrastructure and to free up resources for
modernization or for other higher priorities? General?
General Ryan. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Could you be a little more fulsome? Why do
you believe that? Give us an estimate as well of the
significant savings here.
General Ryan. Over the past 4 years we have continued to
ask for a base closure. The Air Force is overbased for the
force structure we have today. We think that we can save
significant amounts of money in the out years with a base
closure. But sir, during the years that you do the base
closures you actually have to invest to be able to save in the
future.
We have out of the past rounds of savings of base closures
had extensive savings, calculated in the $4 billion to $5
billion a year amount over these years today, the last base
closure being in the mid-nineties. So we emphatically support
base closure.
Chairman Levin. Now I will have to ask each of our other
witnesses to be much shorter because my time is up. If you
could just give us now a short answer to that question.
Secretary Roche. Yes.
General Jones. Sir, yes, I support it. I support the
Secretary's findings on that. But as the smallest service with
the smallest bases, I have the least to offer.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. I have always believed that one of the
fundamental principles we should follow is that we should not
pay a nickel for a structure we do not need. Then, having said
that, I would say we are already in our major naval bases very
consolidated. I think that the potential savings would be in
the area of support structure.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary England.
Secretary England. I would support the comments of the CNO.
We definitely as we go forward, depending on what our future
force is, we do have to size it appropriately because we cannot
afford to carry extra infrastructure.
Chairman Levin. General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. The Army has excess capacity that we have
carried and we believe that a BRAC would help adjust that.
Chairman Levin. Secretary White.
Secretary White. I agree with the chief. I think we have
excess infrastructure and we have to do something about it.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
I will lead off with an Army question. It really goes to
operational, but we have before us today a great deal of
concern about the future of NATO, the future of NATO expansion,
our participation in NATO. General Shinseki, I remember
visiting you in Bosnia when you were the commander of our
forces over there, and throughout the Bosnia-Kosovo chapter it
seems to me that the United States shouldered equally with our
allies the burdens and the risks of those operations.
But today's headline says: ``U.S. Offers Aid to Macedonia
Effort: Rumsfeld Limits Role to Logistics of Rebel
Disarmament.'' Logistics. Is there something behind this that
is not in the headline, because we are constantly concerned
about the European defense initiative and their desire to go
off and establish their own force structure, which I believe is
somewhat redundant and in competition with NATO? This may feed
into their arguments that they should establish their own force
structure because we decline to take on and share equally the
burdens and the risks of military operations.
I will lead off with the Secretary. You start and then I
will invite the General, who had hands-on experience over there
for many years.
Secretary White. Senator, I am unaware of any change coming
from the Secretary or even a part of the QDR discussions to
date that would indicate any less emphasis on our commitment to
NATO. We have been the leader of that alliance since its
founding and we have actively participated and provided the
leadership in Kosovo and Bosnia, and I think we will sustain
that in the future. I defer to the chief.
Senator Warner. Chief.
General Shinseki. Senator Warner, I apologize, I am not as
quick with the morning headlines and I had not read that
article. I am not aware of any changes. Our leadership both as
a global leader and inside of NATO has been consistent.
Senator Warner. I should hope so, and I would hope that
does not indicate that we are going to say we will opt for just
logistics and leave the risk fighting to others.
Yesterday I had a chance to visit my National Guard group
in Virginia and I was astonished to learn that the Army
indicates what level of technical assistance the Army should
supply and yet only 50 percent of the commitments from the
regular Army are flowing to the Guard in terms of manpower. I
will provide this chart to you.
But the point is that our Guard in Virginia are very
proudly working up to go in to be a contingent in Bosnia to
take on those duties. Other States' Guards are right alongside
the regular forces. Yet back home in their duties, which are
quite diverse as the Guard in training up and working up, they
seem to have--and this is nationwide, it was related to me--all
50 States are roughly only receiving from the Department of the
Army about half the trained personnel full-time that they need.
Mr. Secretary, have you had an opportunity to address that
question? If not, I will give you a month or 2 to work on it
and then I will be back.
Secretary White. Clearly, the integration of Reserve
components and their stepping up the missions that in the past
have been taken almost exclusively by active forces indicates
that we are one Army, and we have to sustain and resource on
that basis and they deserve the support of the Department in
accomplishing this.
Senator Warner. I would like to come back to you in about
30 days and get an update on that.
Chief, do you care to add?
General Shinseki. I am not familiar with the chart,
Senator, but I would be very happy to review it and provide
some detailed responses.
[The information referred to follows:]

Active Component Support the Reserve Component
I share your concerns about the levels of full-time support manning
in our Reserve components. The numbers on the chart you provided
indicate the current levels of manning for Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)
and military technicians (MILTECH) of the Virginia Army National Guard.
The matching of Reserve component requirements to resources is an issue
that the Army has pursued for several years. In regard to the chart, it
is correct that the Virginia Army National Guard is near 50 percent of
their required strength with AGR and MILTECH. This is similar in the
Army National Guard in other states and in the Army Reserve. We have
sought, along with the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve, to
obtain budgetary increases to permit the manning of approved
requirements.
As such, the Army seeks to incrementally increase Army National
Guard full-time support at a rate of 794 AGR personnel in fiscal year
2002 and 724 AGR personnel per year from fiscal year 2003 through
fiscal year 2011, with a final increment of 188 in fiscal year 2012.
For the Army National Guard MILTECH, the Army seeks an increase of 487
per year from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2010, with a final
increment of 208 in fiscal year 2011.
For the Army Reserve, the Army seeks an increase of 482 in fiscal
year 2002 and an annual increase requirement of 300 AGR for fiscal year
2003 through fiscal year 2010, with a final increment of 273 in fiscal
year 2011. The requested MILTECH increase for the Army Reserve is 250
personnel per year from fiscal year 2002 through 2008, with a final
increment of 146 in fiscal year 2009. I am including a table that shows
these increases.
Full-time support has been the number one integrated priority list
item with Joint Forces Command for the last 2 years. During fiscal year
2001, we were successful in obtaining funding for the first increment
of the AGR and MILTECH ramp-up to meet required levels.

General Shinseki. I am not sure what the 50 percent means.
Senator Warner. Well, you provide regular Army personnel to
the Guard units all across America.
General Shinseki. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Warner. You also have prescribed, that is the
Department of the Army, how many regular Army should be given
to Virginia, Maryland, Arizona, and so forth. I am told that
you are only providing half of the needed personnel that your
own tables of organization state that should be supplied.
General Shinseki. We are providing 5,000 officers and NCOs
under the title that mandates----
Senator Warner. We will go into it together, but I am going
to be very, very persistent on this. We will address this issue
in the current authorization bill before the Senate.
General Shinseki. We are meeting the obligation of the
5,000, Senator. So I need to see what the 50 percent
represents.
Senator Warner. Now to the Navy and, of course, the
question of shipbuilding. Mr. Secretary, you and I have talked
extensively on this. You touched on it in your opening
testimony this morning together with our distinguished Chief of
Naval Operations. The curve is going down to where you are at
313 ships. As we talked about this morning, it is going to drop
below 300 because we are simply not building enough ships. We
are looking for innovative ways to finance. There used to be
the old long lead, the early procurement. We have had a dozen
different names.
Mr. Secretary, what progress are you making with the Office
of Management and Budget towards establishing a new type of
funding whereby you can better husband that limited amount of
money each year that you allocate to shipbuilding and do it in
a manner that hopefully will produce a greater number of ships
as the pipeline grows?
Secretary England. Senator, we are not having those
discussions in detail with OMB at the moment. We are having
discussions within the Navy because this is a problem within
the Navy. If we do anything in terms of advance appropriations
or whatever, it commits us to a strategy of each year funding
at some significant level.
I will tell you that--and I will let the CNO speak after me
on this issue, but I believe he and I do agree we definitely
need to increase the rate and we need to do this at some
sustained level. It is part of the business practice
improvements that we can put in place.
Senator Warner. But are you working on that the best you
can?
Secretary England. We are definitely working to do that,
sir.
Senator Warner. General Jones, a question on Vieques. This
committee follows this issue very, very carefully. I have spent
a considerable amount of my time on this issue, as have my
other colleagues, particularly my colleague from Oklahoma,
Senator Inhofe, who during my years as chairman devoted much of
his time to this issue. I know the Department of the Navy, both
Navy and Marine Corps service chiefs, are looking for
alternatives. I think we accept the assumption that we will not
likely find anything that will meet the excellent standards
that Vieques has provided the Navy for 50 years, and that is a
piece of property owned by the United States Navy, I hasten to
remind all.
But nevertheless, our President has indicated a policy
decision, which I presume that you are trying to salute and
march off to fulfil. But it brings to mind that we are going to
have to look at the funding for Roosevelt Roads, which is an
ancillary base. In my recollection, when I was in your seat,
Secretary England, that base was largely justified by the
periodic use of the ranges at Vieques.
What is likely to be your recommendation with regard to
Roosevelt Roads as we work our way through this problem on
Vieques? If you want to lead off, Mr. Secretary, then let your
two service chiefs respond.
Secretary England. Let me just refer this to Admiral Clark
because he has detail on that subject. I will just let Admiral
Clark respond to that, sir.
Admiral Clark. Well, this really falls in the category of
the previous question about support structure and facilities
and whether we need it or not. We absolutely need Roosevelt
Roads if we are in Vieques and if we are not in Vieques it
raises the question about how we put the whole structure
together to train, organize, develop, and deploy a task force.
It costs us between $200 and $300 million a year to keep
that going. The Secretary has laid out the requirement for a
group to reevaluate alternatives. We have had discussions on
this. My posture is if I do not need the structure to get the
task done, my recommendation would be to not be supporting that
kind of investment.
But we have to put together the posture we are going to use
and the actual tactics, techniques, and procedures to develop
and deploy these forces.
Senator Warner. General Jones.
General Jones. Sir, I agree with the CNO.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to you gentlemen for your outstanding and in some
senses unsettling testimony. I thank you for it. The chairman
expressed at the beginning a thought that I want to associate
myself with, which is that we are facing some real resource
constraints here, which are unfortunate, because the projected
surpluses were so significant and remain, notwithstanding the
economic slowdown. So that some of us--I do not say this in a
partisan way--regret the amount of money that we have committed
for the tax cut program because it puts us in a bind in meeting
and fulfilling our committee's responsibility to meet the needs
of the military.
But I do think that is our responsibility and we as a
committee on a bipartisan basis should go ahead and try to do
that and then see if at other points along the way in this
process we can figure out where to get the money and how to do
it, because we are dealing here with a fundamental
constitutional responsibility to provide for the common
defense, as Senator Warner said.
While I appreciate the significant increase that the
administration has recommended for defense, as I said to
Secretary Rumsfeld last week, and I say with even more force
today having heard your testimony, because you are on the line,
we are not giving you enough. We have to find a way to do that.
As I look at the numbers in the various budgets, in the
Army budget in real terms procurement and research and
development (R&D) seem to be, by my calculation, down because
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 was transferred from the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) to the Army, adding
$714 million in procurement and $107 million in R&D to the Army
number. So procurement actually may be down by $500 million and
R&D may be down by $600 million.
In the Navy budget, procurement is down by $1.9 billion;
family housing is down by $100 million in the Air Force budget.
Most troublingly, the R&D picture is not getting better. It is
down again this year, and it is only at 2.1 percent of the Air
Force total obligational authority, which is well under the 3
percent that DOD has set as a goal.
The supplemental appropriations bill is on the floor now. I
am going to be joining with Senator McCain and two others to
introduce two amendments that would increase funding for the
Department of Defense, one by $2.74 billion, the other by $846
million. These are largely driven by what we understand to be
requests, quite justifiable, that the service chiefs have made
for supplemental funding.
I hope we can convince our colleagues to take first steps
in the direction of giving you what you need. Maybe I should
start there as an example. For instance, one of the items that
we are adding is procurement of ammunition for the Army at the
rate of $14 million. I know it would be hard for you, based on
the generality, to indicate, but I wonder, General Shinseki, if
you could tell us what you would do with that $14 million for
procurement for ammunition for the Army?
General Shinseki. Well, Senator, we traditionally have an
unfunded requirement for ammunition, because the ammunition
statement is against a war to be determined at a future date.
We procure about a billion dollars in ammunition every year.
Until recently, we carried over the Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) about a $9.5 billion critical war reserve
shortfall--against which we programmed $2 billion.
So we have reduced that shortfall. But that shortfall is
one that we have carried and I think we have addressed in terms
of our available dollars and suitable risk for requirements
that are to be determined in the near future.
There are stockpiles that we do maintain. When we are
unable to use them, those ammunition stockpiles, in a timely
manner, they outlive their shelf life. We then have to go
through the process of demilitarization, which we spend about
$100 million a year doing. So it is a balance of getting it
right.
Senator Lieberman. So that is the purpose that Congress
should appropriate an additional $14 million for ammunition?
That is the purpose for which you would use it?
General Shinseki. I have a priority list of the kinds of
ammunitions, probably mostly in the precision arena, but I will
provide that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Procurement of Ammunition

The Army would spend the additional $14 million procuring 135,000
Modular Artillery Charge Systems, as the most pressing unfunded
ammunition requirement. These new modular propellant charges are
critical to support both war reserves and training.
The Modular Artillery Charge System, a replacement system for 155
millimeter propelling charges, offers simplified logistics compared to
traditional bag propellant systems. Simplified logistics directly
support Transformation, reducing the logistics footprint and making the
Army more agile and lethal.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Admiral Clark, Navy procurement, by my calculation, at
$24.6 billion is down by $1.9 billion. Am I reading that right?
Admiral Clark. I do not have the exact numbers in front of
me, Senator, but you probably are. Last year I testified before
the Readiness Committee about the level of investment we had to
have in acquisition to sustain the Navy that we needed and I
suggested it was somewhere in the neighborhood of $34 billion a
year. There is a delta----
Senator Lieberman. Again, excuse me, but on that basis I
accept your number. You are the Chief. We are at $24.6 billion?
Admiral Clark. That is correct.
Senator Lieberman. So we are almost $10 billion below that.
Admiral Clark. I am on the record, I have been, that we
have to do something on the acquisition accounts. That is the
point I tried to get forward in my statement. If you compare
the 2001 and 2002 and try to analyze the difference,
fundamentally you will see that we purchased an aircraft
carrier in 2001 and that creates a spike.
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
Admiral Clark. This is the point, though, that I have tried
to make with regard to the requirement to better partner with
industry, that industry cannot size itself properly. We have
unique industrial bases that support the defense structure of
the United States and with this sine-cosine curve kind of
investment structure it is not the economic way to go at it.
Senator Lieberman. General Ryan, let me ask you about that
number for research and development, which concerns me, and I
would guess it concerns you. How can we get to the future Air
Force that I know you want with research and development
funding at that level?
General Ryan. Our S&T funding, science and technology
funding, in the current budget that we presented for Air Force
is up to 2 percent of our total TOA this year, which is up from
last year's budget we presented. This committee and others
helped us increase the funding for our S&T up to approximately
$1.5 billion last year. We submitted a budget this year at $1.4
billion as we prioritized.
But I agree with you, we must not eat our seed corn and S&T
is the essence of our future readiness.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you all.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I hope that we will be able to
work in this committee on a bipartisan basis to respond to the
statement of need from the secretaries and the chiefs and then
be advocates for them through our authorization bill. I thank
you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I had an experience yesterday I thought I would share with
this committee. I was flying my plane from Oklahoma to
Washington and I had with me a guy named Charles Savett, who is
one of the most highly decorated pilots from the Vietnam era,
having flown 288 missions. Senator Warner, what he told me, he
said: You can argue with the war; it was highly controversial,
but when they were in combat, he said, the one thing we had the
assurance of is that everything we were using was better than
what they were using--the F-100, the F-105's, F-4's. You can
say the same thing for the Navy; the A-4's and A-6's were all
better than the equipment that was being flown by the
adversaries at that time.
I think most of the American people probably believe that
is still true today. But it is not true today if you look at
our air to air vehicles. One of the things I like to do each
year, as I have for the last 15 years, is go to the air show
over there and see what the competition is doing and see what
is on the market that the Chinese and other potential
adversaries are buying. Air to air vehicles, the F-15 is the
best that we have, and they have the SU-27's that are on the
market today. Air to ground, the F-16's that we have, compared
to the SU-30s that they are using right now in many areas, are
inferior in terms of range, in terms of detectable range, which
means they can detect us before we can detect them.
So we do not have the best of everything right now. Look at
the double digit SAM's that are out there on the market today
that are putting the lives of our pilots in danger because they
are able to reach them now. This was not the case before. They
have this type of equipment.
General Shinseki, look at the artillery right now, the
Paladin. I have the chart that shows that the British, the
Russians, the Africans, and the Germans, if you use as a
comparison the rate of fire and the range, are better than we
are right now in terms of the Paladin. This is the case for the
Crusader, of course.
I know that we are looking at different forces and how we
are going to change the force structure, but in terms of rate
of fire and range we are already inferior today to what is on
the market and anyone is able to buy.
So let me just real quickly try to--first of all, General
Ryan, do you agree with my assessment of where we are
competitively with our modernization program?
General Ryan. Absolutely, sir. I think the equipment that
is being produced worldwide surpasses our current equipment.
What makes us good is the fact that we have great people
operating that equipment.
Senator Inhofe. Well, then you are looking at--the obvious
answer to this, to certainly the first part, the deficiencies
that I was outlining, is the F-22. You have been very
outspoken, both of you have been, on the necessity of that F-
22. As it is right now, are 339 aircraft enough to meet the Air
Force's needs?
General Ryan. We have used 339 as a number that would fit
underneath the caps that we had imposed coming out of the last
QDR, Quadrennial Defense Review. We are relooking at the number
this year. That does not recapitalize all of our F-15 air to
air fleet and falls far short of that.
We also believe that the aircraft has some capability in
the future to be used as replacements for things like the F-15E
and the 117.
So to answer your question, I think, built in numbers, the
F-22 will be a great addition, not just to the air to air
fleet, but our air to surface capability also.
Senator Inhofe. Good, good.
Secretary Roche, I will just ask for a real quick response
on this. The administration's budget proposal includes $922
million in assumed savings from management reform initiatives,
including $140 million in depot maintenance savings if Congress
approves a waiver of the 50-50. We are not talking about the
national security waiver. We are just talking about the waiver.
We have been asking for the analysis of that. Do you have
that?
Secretary Roche. What we would like to do, Senator, is to
come back to you with a definition of ``capacity.'' That would
trigger only if our ALC's were at 100 percent capacity. That is
the only reason that would trigger.
Senator Inhofe. How would you define ``capacity'' in coming
to that conclusion?
Secretary Roche. We would like not to play games as we
define ``capacity.'' Right now our view is that which exists
today on one shift--no special games.
Senator Inhofe. For instance, if you had three ALC's right
now operating at 100 percent capacity at only one shift a day,
if you had two shifts they would be at 50 percent capacity; is
that correct?
Secretary Roche. If that was the definition, yes. In fact,
at one of the ALC's I know that they do weekend shifts and that
they contract out that weekend shift, and that has worked very
well, and that is at Warner Robins. It has worked out very,
very nicely.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Shinseki, getting back to the Crusader, I wanted to
get this in before this first round expires for me. One
Crusader has the firepower of three Paladins, but when you get
into sustained fire or after the first 3 minutes it is about
ten times. Can we continue to be in the inferior position that
we are today and, if not, what is there out there other than
the Crusader that would take care of that problem, that
deficiency?
General Shinseki. Well, Senator, coming out of Desert Storm
we realized that in terms of artillery we were carrying
significant risk. We were outgunned, outranged, and outmassed
by other formations. The reason we did not pay a big price to
that difference, which I would categorize as risk, was the
failure on the other side to be able to employ their artillery
the way we would have.
So coming out of Desert Storm, we added to that risk. Not
only were we outgunned, outmassed, and outranged, but we took
25 percent of our artillery systems and retired them in order
to husband those resources for future capabilities. But we went
beyond that. We also retired 25 percent of our direct fire
systems, our tanks and our Bradleys, and reduced by 25 percent
the number of platforms inside each battalion.
We invested those monies in future capabilities that
ultimately became known as Crusader and directed our efforts at
digitization to give us better situational awareness so we
could fight our systems in an integrated fashion.
We are on the verge of fielding Crusader, and Crusader is
an important aspect of filling that risk we have incurred.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
I know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I have one last
question, just yes or no. General Jones, if I wrote this down
right, I do not think it was in your submitted statement, but I
think you said that you agreed with Secretary Rumsfeld that we
should only replace things when we have something better to
replace them with. Is that an accurate----
General Jones. That is correct, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with this, Secretary England?
Secretary England. Yes, I do. I think that is definitely
the case for our weapons systems, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Does that include Vieques?
Secretary England. No, sir, it does not.
Senator Inhofe. General Jones, do you think that includes
Vieques?
General Jones. The requirement for training----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
General Jones.--does not take a back seat to programs.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Without objection, I will ask that a statement by Senator
Thurmond be inserted into the record and let me read the order
here that I will be calling on senators. We have really an
extraordinary attendance here this morning, which is a real
tribute to you all and to the issues that we grapple with. But
next will be Senator Reed and then Senator Allard, Senator
Cleland, Senator Collins, Senator Carnahan, Senator Bunning,
Senator Sessions. Senator Akaka is here now. After Senator
Bunning would be Senator Akaka, and then Senator Sessions and
then Senator Roberts.
That is the present order. Now, some may leave and some may
come and switch for that matter, but that is where we now
stand.
Senator Reed.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Thank you Mr. Chairman:
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our Service Secretaries to
this, their first official hearing before the committee. We have great
expectations on their ability to bring about change in our Armed Forces
and look forward to working with them as they take up the challenges of
their office. I also want to extend a welcome to our senior military
chiefs. All of them are well known to this committee and are highly
respected for their distinguished service to our Nation.
Mr. Chairman, I have been a member of the Armed Services Committee
almost 42 years. During these years, I have witnessed the many positive
changes that have transformed our Armed Forces into the world's most
powerful and professional forces. Despite this achievement, the
military services must be prepared to meet the challenges of the new
threats posed by international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction'
and missile proliferation. Therefore, I fully support the
transformation plans for each service.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the President's budget amendment, although
less than many of us had hoped for, is a good start to provide for the
transformation of our Armed Forces. With this amendment, defense will
realize an increase of more than $38 billion over the fiscal year 2001
defense budget. More importantly, the increase will provide real
benefits in terms of improved family housing, readiness, and research
and development. It will also provide robust funding for a National
Missile Defense program which I consider the most urgent requirement
for our Nation's security.
Mr. Chairman, despite all the positive aspects of this budget, I
believe it does not adequately fund the modernization and
transformation of our Armed Forces. It is still short of meeting the
standard of revitalizing our infrastructure every 67 years. It will not
close the pay gap between the private sector and the military. More
importantly, it assumes almost $1 billion in savings or efficiencies
that are not going to be realized.
The coming months and years will challenge the expertise and will
power of each of our witnesses as they struggle to prepare our forces
to fight in an environment that is new to all of us. I believe we are
fortunate to have men of their caliber in the key positions which they
occupy. They have my support, and I expect that they will have the
bipartisan support of this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by associating myself with Senator Lieberman's
remarks. I believe that the mutual dilemma we all have, both
the members of this committee, the service chiefs, and the
service secretaries, is that the budget Congress passed did not
explicitly or adequately address the needs of the Department of
Defense. Those needs were secondary to the tax cut.
The very legitimate and compelling demands you make today
are not able easily to match with resources since they have
already been committed. So the budget we are looking at may be
enough to keep you going, but it is not enough to get you
ahead. That is the dilemma that we all have to face going
forward.
Having said that, let me, if I may, ask more detailed
questions. Admiral Clark, I understand that in this budget
there is $110 million set aside for the SSGN conversion. Have
you made a decision as to the number of boats that would be
converted? If not, when will that decision be made? Also, could
you roughly describe how the funding would be used, $110
million?
Admiral Clark. I sure can, Senator. Question number one: A
definite decision as to the total numbers. We put--frankly,
this was something Secretary England and I worked together on
in doing what we thought was the best we could do for the
procurement accounts as we closed this down and made
recommendations on the amended budget, that the money put in
there would do advanced planning and design work and would take
care of two Tridents and that as we continue to examine the
program in the course of the next year that we could
potentially pick up two more.
So that was our thinking. How the money will be spent
specifically, design, planning work.
Senator Reed. In your conversion, will you try to make
these submarines outside the accounting rules of START II,
which I assume is a more expensive proposition?
Admiral Clark. That is an issue that has to be dealt with,
whether they will be START accountable or not, and that is not
a decision that I get to make. The final bill will of course be
dependent upon that, and that decision is not made yet.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Secretary White and General Shinseki, the budget briefings
on the Army budget suggest that there might be a significant
deterioration in the momentum for transformation, given your
other demands. In fact, if one looks forward, there is a real
danger that, because of budget concerns rather than strategic
concerns, the Army would be forced to cut back its force
structure.
Could you elaborate on those concerns or the pace of
transformation, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary White. Well, first of all, Senator, in the fiscal
year 2002 budget, we have made funding the S&T effort to
support Transformation a priority. We have fully funded that
and gotten support, both from Congress in the past and from the
Secretary as we go forward. So we are going to maintain the
momentum of bringing on both the Interim Brigades and the
Objective Force as we have laid it out.
Where we have taken the shortfall is in the sustainment of
the Legacy Force, as it is called, the existing force in the
modernization and the recapitalization of that.
The second part of the question, having to do with force
structure, is a decision that will be made as a part of
decisions on the strategy and where that is headed, and the
Secretary has not made those decisions yet and we will just
have to wait and see how that comes out.
Senator Reed. General Shinseki, do you have any comment?
General Shinseki. I would only add, in agreement with the
Secretary, that if you think of the three efforts that we have
described--Army Transformation as being this interim effort,
Interim Brigade Combat Teams, we have funded that requirement.
We have also funded aggressively our investments in S&T for
that future Objective Force capability.
In terms of the Legacy Force, the current force that we
have today, that is going to be the force that we go to war
with for the next 10 years. We have said we need to do
something about recapitalization of those systems, as well as
taking care of our infrastructure in terms of revitalization.
Given the profile of where Army soldiers serve today in my
opening statement, nothing has changed in the last 10 years
about where we find Army soldiers deployed. The requirement for
the structure to support those deployments is real and if the
strategy changes, of course, that is subject to review.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Allard.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am concerned about whether we are going to have the
capacity and the flexibility to support our intelligence and
communications requirements over the next 5 to 10 years. This
budget that has been proposed--are we addressing the shortfalls
in the satellite intelligence and communications infrastructure
that we have had in this budget? Please elaborate a little
further about whether you think we will be meeting those needs
in 5 to 10 years down the road.
I would like to address that question to General Ryan.
General Ryan. Senator Allard, quite honestly, the appetite
for communications, particularly secure communications, is
huge. Trying to keep up with that demand has put a great strain
on our capability both in space and terrestrially, quite
honestly, to modernize at a rate that the demand is out there
for. So no, we are struggling with communications. I think all
of us are.
Senator Allard. Are we at least beginning to address that
issue in this budget?
General Ryan. Yes, sir. We have funding for our satellite
constellations for communications, which is probably not
completely adequate, but it is good funding considering the
budget levels that we are at.
Senator Allard. The military services must transform into a
force that is more flexible and more joint and more capable of
providing military power to the President that is relevant in
today's job. I would like to hear from each one of the chiefs
just a comment on that, on how your service is responding to
that requirement. We will start maybe with General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. Senator, I would use the Army's efforts
over the last 2 years to begin transformation of what it has
described as the force we carried forward or inherited from the
Cold War designs that we applied and look forward to the 21st
century and, if I could use the term, see constant whitewater.
We have begun the process of adjusting our thinking about how
we organize, how we describe our doctrinal responsibilities, to
accommodate where we are headed there.
I think that what we have described is a relevant force for
the future and a way to get there, labeled the three vectors in
Army transformation: an Interim Brigade Combat Team concept
that, applied to today's Legacy Force, gives us capabilities
out for the next 10 years as we have the time to design that
future force we were describing.
As I indicated earlier, we have applied resources against
all three of those efforts. The initiative in most need of
support right now is the Legacy Force initiative in terms of
recapitalization and we believe that is where we have put as
much energy as we could in this budget.
Senator Allard. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir. Well, we oftentimes talk about
stealth--about transformation in terms of platforms. Excuse me
for saying ``stealth.'' I was thinking about the
characteristics I want to describe.
I think that when I look at my Navy, I have 60 to 70
percent of the hull forms that I am going to have 15 to 20
years from now. So is the Navy going to be the same 15 to 20
years from now? Well, it is nothing today like it was even 10
years ago. So when I talk about transformation I talk about the
characteristics. It is stealth, it is lethality, precision, it
is about command and control, superior knowledge, and with that
for us it is network-centric warfare, investing in the channels
that--by the way, General Ryan talks about the insatiable
appetite. It is about a different way of fighting the war and
it is about being smarter than the enemy and it is about having
that edge that Senator Inhofe talked about, and it is about
speed of response and reach.
In every area, I can give you programs that we are
investing in for the future. That is the way we are
transforming our Navy. It involves DD-21, it involves JSF, it
involves programs that we cannot talk about in an open hearing,
that allow us to take it to the enemy.
Senator Allard. General Jones.
General Jones. Senator, it is an exciting period to be in
because it really is crossing the bridge between the 20th
century and the 21st century. The 20th century force structure
was based on mass and volume. As the CNO pointed out, the 21st
century forces will have characteristics of speed, not only in
being able to get to where we need to get to, but also speed in
decisionmaking. It will be stealthier; there will be much more
precision involved in these forces. It will be more lethal, as
the CNO pointed out.
I think if we do it right they will also be sustainable
from greater distances. I think that piece of it is equally
important, if not more so, than the others. We will get into
some asymmetric advantages that will, as a result of our world
leadership in technology and the development of those
technologies, allow us to move away from this mass and volume
twentieth century characteristic to perhaps a smaller force,
but one that is certainly much more capable and will have
tremendous aspects of cohesion and will be able to delegate
down to unbelievable levels of responsibility tremendous
missions. The captains of tomorrow are going to be excited
about serving in this force if we do it right.
Senator Allard. General Ryan.
General Ryan. Sir, I think you hit on it in your previous
question also and that is that, though we will have some
excellent capabilities in the future and all of the services
are I think tending toward stealthy, long-range rapidly
deployable and sustainable forces, what will pull that together
for us will be our ability to command and control the force, to
have the knowledge, the vigilance and knowledge of what is
going on in a particular area to apply the force properly.
That is a function of a new way of doing business, reaching
back to many, many different pieces of our military capability
for analysis and bringing it forward to make it actionable. I
think that is where the revolution in military affairs is
headed.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX CLELAND

Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. I am
fascinated about this discussion here at the end of Senator
Allard's question about the whole concept of transformation. I
agree with General Ryan that the whole military is going
through this transformation.
Over the holidays and the Fourth of July break, I had the
pleasure of reading General Wesley Clark's book ``Waging Modern
War.'' How we go to war now is so different than even going to
war in terms of Desert Storm. The emphasis on massive air and
sealift, the ability to respond quickly, flexibility, the use
of precision weapons, massive amounts of air power, the ability
to deploy the Apaches and so forth and take it to the enemy
from a long range point of view, on the ground and in the air.
Wow, what an exciting time to be a young officer in the
American military. But I am afraid that this budget that I
review grossly underfunds our ability to do that. The budget
does not procure enough ships to sustain a 300-ship fleet. It
does not procure enough aircraft to halt the aging problem that
adds to flying hour costs and safety concerns. It does not even
procure enough precision guided munitions to address the
shortfall in our Reserves. That is simply unacceptable.
Many say that we simply have deferred the procurement
decisions until the next budget, after the defense review. That
is all fine and good, except that the outcome of the strategic
review is not going to change the fact that we need adequate
numbers of ships to meet worldwide commitments and we will need
safe aircraft for our young men and women to fly. We will need
an adequate stockpile of precision munitions to be ready when
necessary to protect our vital interests.
These things have been deferred. They have been deferred in
some measure so that we can accelerate on a range of missile
defense programs that have not yet been proven to work and that
raise significant issues regarding our international
commitments under the ABM and other treaties. An extra $2.2
billion by some accounts has actually been allocated in this
budget to the $6 billion that is already going to these
programs.
By ``these programs'' I mean the missile defense programs.
No one has come to Congress with a threat briefing, classified
or otherwise, that justifies accelerating these unproven
programs by literally billions of dollars. I cannot in good
conscience support it when I know of many legitimate defense
requirements which you have articulated here and those I have
mentioned above that do require urgent attention.
One of those decisions about our future military has to do
with the B-1 bomber decision, Secretary Roche. Just some
questions. You have been kind enough to spend some time with me
and other members of this panel with regard to this decision. I
look forward to seeing you down at Warner Robins on August 8
and we will review some of these decisions in more detail.
But I would like to ask you, do you have in your mind any
concept of what will happen to the Guard personnel when the
bombers are removed from Georgia, Kansas, and Idaho? Any
thoughts about that at this point?
Secretary Roche. The Guard issues, Senator, I think are
principally in Georgia and in Kansas. Our goal is to not do any
harm to the Guard, but to do good for the B-1 fleet by
modernizing and by transforming them without having to come
back and ask for more money. We would like to try to integrate
and look for ways to use the Guard. For instance, we would like
to consider an associate squadron for the Joint STARS. We would
like to consider Warner Robins for some of the other things
that are coming along. The same with Kansas. In terms of
Kansas, we would like to work with the Guard there to find out
what is best.
As I pointed out to Senator Roberts, there is an engine
remanufacturing facility that is run at the base which is
really quite superb and there is no reason for it to go away.
We are trying to both be efficient and to have a better
fighting force with the B-1 bomber and consistent with our
long-range standoff aircraft, which now we see as a good
strategy that we feel very comfortable being able to discuss
with you, sir.
Senator Cleland. As you evolve the strategy, Mr. Secretary,
continue to keep in mind not only the great investment in terms
of hardware and software in these bases that maintain the B-1,
but the great service of the Air Guard as well.
General Ryan, were the expenditures on precision guided
munitions during the Kosovo air campaign higher or lower than
projected at the outset of the campaign?
General Ryan. I have to say that there was no projection
stated on the length of the campaign. There were those who
opined that the campaign would only last 2 or 3 days and
Milosevic would roll over and it would be over. There were
others who said it is going to go on for a while. Seventy eight
days into the operation, it was called off, with Milosevic
rolling.
The expenditure of precision weapons in that engagement was
very, very large. What offset it somewhat was our bomber fleet
that went in using smart airplanes with dumb bombs and doing
great damage to some facilities and infrastructure that the
Serbs were using during that time. So it is hard to say whether
the amount of precision munitions used was within a calculation
because there was no calculation base, but we certainly used a
lot of them and fell short in our inventories, and we are still
short in our inventories.
Senator Cleland. That was my next question: Are we still
short of precision weapons?
General Ryan. Yes, sir.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
Admiral Clark, thank you very much for your service and
thank you for the conversion of two Trident submarines to more
unconventional forces and use. Of course, the Navy I am sure
would like to have the money to do four of these. What are some
of the advantages that you see in the conversion of maybe a
total of four Tridents to the mission that you have
articulated?
Admiral Clark. Well, not only will an SSGN Trident give us
the ability to do massive long-range strike, but I look at this
as a space-weight-volume issue for future transformations. We
get real sensitive real quick here, Senator, but if we look at
future systems that are possible where space and weight and
cube are going to be required, I see the potential of this
platform to be significant. I would be happy to talk to you
about this in a closed forum.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Senator Collins.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
important to note for the record that the Department inherited
serious shortfalls in virtually every account, making it very
difficult for the new administration to correct all of these
deficiencies in a single year. As a result, we have some very
serious problems to solve.
Admiral Clark, you testified this morning that we need to
build nine ships a year to sustain the QDR level. Similarly, a
senior DOD official recently told me that it would take between
$11 and $12 billion per year just to sustain, not to grow but
just to sustain, the current naval force structure, So we have
a long way to go to recapitalize our naval force structure.
In that regard, Secretary England and Admiral Clark, I want
to get comments from both of you on three issues that offer the
promise of helping the Navy recapitalize the fleet in the most
economical way possible. The first is greater use of multi-year
procurements; the second is more of a focus on life cycle
costs; and the third is an exploration of the use of advanced
appropriations.
I want to first comment on multi-year procurements and get
you to respond to that. I may have to go to the other two
issues in a subsequent round. This committee took the
initiative last year in extending the Navy's authority to
procure DDG-51 Aegis destroyers at a rate of three ships per
year through fiscal year 2005. The Navy has previously
testified that using the multi-year procurement approach has
saved more than a billion dollars compared to annual
procurements of the same ships and that multi-year procurements
have introduced a degree of industrial base stability.
So my question to Mr. Secretary and Admiral Clark: Congress
has provided the Navy with clear legal authority and
encouragement to buy as many as 12 DDGs over the next 4 fiscal
years at a rate of 3 per year through a follow-on multi-year
procurement. Would you agree that sustaining the 3-ship DDG-51
procurement rate at a minimum would serve both the Navy's
interests and be the most economical way from the taxpayers'
and budget perspective of starting to recapitalize our fleet?
Secretary England?
Secretary England. Senator, an additional DDG-51 was put in
the 2002 budget so we could exercise that option, which is a
very good price as part of that other ship that was on the
multi-year. So we did exercise that to get three of them this
year in the 2002 budget. I would certainly agree that multi-
year is an approach that provides stability for the industry
and also provides economy of scale for the Navy. So certainly
we would look to partner and to continue to do that in the
future.
So certainly I would hope that we are going to be able to
continue to do that.
Senator Collins. It essentially allows you to buy three
ships for the price of two if it is carried out and executed
effectively and, given the huge shortfall that we face in
shipbuilding, it seems to be an approach that is extremely
economical and helps us resolve the underlying problem of the
declining number of ships.
Secretary England. Definitely. Any way that saves money for
us, we can utilize that money in other procurements or for
additional ships. Certainly we look favorably upon that. So
definitely we are interested in multi-year and continuing to do
that, Senator.
Senator Collins. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. Well, here I am, Senator, sitting in uniform
and wanting more ships, and so we talk about three a year. I
sure am happy to sign up for--I said I need nine. Three a year
would be great.
The point on multi-year, I want to reinforce the
Secretary's comments, Senator. One of the things I am most
pleased about in this budget, the amended budget, is that we
were able to pick up that extra DDG. I believe that this is
consistent in what I was trying to get to in my initial
comments. This is the kind of partnering that we have to do
with industry. The reason we save money is because industry can
now project the work force it needs and get its industrial
plant lined up the way it needs to.
This is the kind of thing that we have to do. Secretary
England also made the point that we have to commit to, I
believe, a more consistent investment posture across the years
to help in that partnership.
Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, I would now like to go on
to the issue of total ownership costs or life cycle costs. The
Navy has testified on several occasions that the key to
reducing total life cycle costs while continuing to provide
combat capability to our naval forces is to invest in research
and development for our future naval platforms. Would you
please elaborate on the research and development investments
that are included in the fiscal year 2002 budget amendment that
could reduce total ownership costs associated with current and
future naval platforms?
Admiral Clark. Well, of course the biggest area in our--
there are two areas that are affected here principally. It is
the investment in reducing life cycle costs that are part of
the DD-21 R&D effort, and obviously a major cost associated
with any combat system is the manpower associated with it. So a
principal piece of that is the reduction in manpower.
The second thing I would--actually, there are at least
three. The second thing is the R&D in the Joint Strike Fighter,
and that is all about reliability and maintainability. I
believe that is--for all of the things that JSF will bring to
us in the future, the ability to reduce life cycle costs
because of the specifications laid on for reliability and
maintainability are to me among the most significant.
Then the third piece that I would talk about is an effort
we have in S&T, and that S&T work is specifically about hull
forms and potential new ship types that will allow us and lead
us to lower life cycle costs.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Carnahan.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN

Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ryan, my home State of Missouri is the proud home
of the 131st Fighter Wing, recognized as the best F-15 wing in
the United States Air Force. This honor reflects the new
concept of total force because the 131st is a National Guard
unit. Whether they are patrolling the dangerous skies of Iraq
or bringing disaster relief to Honduras, these Reserve
components are serving alongside our Active Duty personnel. I
certainly hope the budget suitably addresses the needs of our
Reserve components as well as our active components.
I was wondering if you would elaborate on our Reserve
components' contribution to the U.S. air superiority missions
abroad.
General Ryan. Senator, we in the Air Force integrate our
Guard and Reserve Forces in with our Active-Duty Forces in as
seamless a way as possible. We ask our Guard and Reserve Forces
to share our operations tempo, not just with air superiority,
but across-the-board into the support areas. It is not unusual
to go to, say, Incirlik, Turkey, and find the National Guard
flying air superiority missions intermixed with our Active Duty
flying support missions. It is that way across our Air Force.
So we are very, very proud of the ability to integrate our
forces and we are very, very dependent upon our Guard and
Reserve Forces for our OPTEMPO and our readiness.
Senator Carnahan. Following up on that dependency, I might
ask Secretary Roche the next question. The F-15 Guard units
have identified an engine upgrade as the most pressing need.
Does the fiscal year 2002 defense budget suitably address our
shortfalls and are there plans to use F-16 engine parts to
provide for the F-15 inventory?
Secretary Roche. Senator, I am not familiar with that
particular issue. If General Ryan is, I would ask him to
answer. If not, we will get back to you for the record, ma'am.
General Ryan. I will take it for the record, too, ma'am, if
that is okay.
[The information referred to follows:]

The current ANG F-15 fleet consists of mostly A and B models:

- The training unit at Klamath Falls has 12 C/Ds, 6 Bs.
- All other units have 108 A/Bs (99-As/9-Bs).
- All aircraft have the PW F-100-100 engine.

The ANG F-15 modernization priorities do not include an engine
upgrade for the A/B models. The annual prioritization process listed an
advanced Interrogator Friend/Foe as the #1 priority. The list is
developed at the unit level and approved through the Director of the
ANG.
The active duty F-15 modernization program includes engine upgrades
for the C/D models. The current funding plan includes continued engine
upgrades although budget reductions have decreased the rate at which
the engines are being upgraded. The fiscal year 2002 budget does not
have sufficient funds to address the C/D shortfall. Higher budget
priorities continue to pressure the remaining funding. The engine
upgrades are listed on the active duty unfunded priority list submitted
to Congress on 6 July by CSAF.
The ANG will inherit the upgraded engines as the active C/D models
migrate to the ANG inventory. There is a single engine Systems Program
Office (SPO), making repair an engine type issue, not an aircraft
origin issue. The 220E upgrade kit works in both the F-15 and F-16 and
the kits are bought without designation as F-15 or F-16.
The ANG units have an ever-increasing requirement to modernize the
subsystems of the F-15 to maintain the level of combat capability
required by the AEF. Upgrading the engines is reviewed annually and
prioritized.
- The cost of upgrading the entire fleet is approximately
$500M.
- Partial upgrades create major logistics challenges as all six
combat coded F-15 units contribute to the AEF #9 force.

Senator Carnahan. I might ask you as well, Secretary Roche,
that during the first 9 weeks of the Kosovo operation our B-2's
flew 45 sorties out of Whiteman Air Force Base and in this time
they destroyed 90 percent of their targets on their first
strike. I think the B-2, all of us can say, certainly has a
very successful track record.
Would you comment on the administration's commitment to B-2
upgrades?
Secretary Roche. Yes, ma'am. I spent 18 years of my life
cleared to level 4 on the B-2 and it is a superb airplane. We
are committed to upgrading it. The first upgrade we want to go
to is JDAMS, which will take it up to 80 weapons per flight.
These will be precise and can be used to get close to a target
because of the B-2's stealth. In certain conditions we may need
F-22's to be around to make sure no one shoots it down.
Then the next step past that is what is called the small
precise weapon, the small diameter bomb. There we can get up to
numbers in excess of 300 per airplane, so that we take a fleet
of 21 aircraft and the lethality of those 21 aircraft will grow
dramatically over the next 10 to 15 years.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Then a final question here of General Shinseki. I believe
it is important to be able to treat our soldiers on the
battlefield in the event of a chemical or biological attack,
and the Army has sought to procure chemically and biologically
protective shelters that are specially designed, rapidly
deployable, mobile medical aid stations. I was wondering if you
would be able to comment on our preparedness to treat military
forces on a contaminated battlefield.
General Shinseki. Well, Senator, this is one of the areas
that we constantly train to and the procurement of this kind of
equipment reflects what we learned out of that training, that
we need capabilities we do not have. If you would like, I would
be happy to provide for the record specifically what that
program buy is about in terms of those specific shelters.
For all the services, but particularly for the Army,
operating in a contaminated environment is a key part of our
training programs.
Senator Carnahan. Do you feel that there are any
improvements that need to be made at this time?
General Shinseki. I think we have made in investments what
we have declared as important. We have go-to-war stocks in
terms of chemical equipment set aside for go to war, as well as
chemical equipment that we use for training. The program buy
information for these particular shelters, I think probably
would provide you a better answer for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters (CBPS)
The Army trains with the assumption that we will fight on a
contaminated battlefield and will require the capability to treat
casualties on that battlefield. The CBPS is a critical component of
that capability. Although the Army is currently the only Service with a
requirement for the system, the CBPS is funded through the Joint
Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense Program and a Defense-wide
appropriation. The CBPS is the primary collective protection shelter
used for echelon I and II medical treatment facilities and forward
surgical teams. The system provides a rapidly deployable mobile medical
treatment capability to treat casualties in a nuclear, biological,
chemical environment. It is mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicle and is fully operational by a crew of four within 20
minutes. This capability does not exist in the field today.
The CBPS contract was first awarded in February 1996, and the Army
has exercised several options under the contract to maintain
production. There are 33 systems currently located at Pine Bluff
Arsenal and at the contractor's facility. An additional 80 systems are
currently under contract, and we plan to field the first 122 CBPS
systems in the very near future. The Army also plans to complete a type
classification standard decision in September 2001 and exercise another
option under the contract in January 2002.

Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Senator Bunning.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING

Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I sit here in amazement because of the questions coming
from one side and the other. For 8 solid years the defense
budget declined. How many military personnel here were at this
table, any of them, during the last 8 years? [A show of hands.]
General Ryan. 4 of the last.
General Shinseki. The last 2.
Senator Bunning. Did you make the point that you were a
little short in your budgets before this committee at that
time?
General Ryan. Yes, sir.
General Shinseki. In testimony last fall before this
committee, as I recall, the Army's statement of needs on
finance requirements----
Senator Bunning. What about the ones in the prior 8 years?
How much more are you now receiving in your military budgets
than you were in the last 8 years? Take 1993, 1994, 1995.
General Ryan. I can partially answer that.
Senator Bunning. Thank you.
General Ryan. 1996 was the bottom-out year of the drawdown
of our forces and the budgets from 1996, 1997 were fairly
level. I have to tell you that we----
Senator Bunning. Only because Congress in their wisdom put
more money back into the request that came from Pennsylvania
Avenue.
General Ryan. We did get substantial help from Congress
during those years to shore up our budgets.
Senator Bunning. I just want that to be in the record.
General Shinseki, you brought up the fact that we were
technologically inferior during the Gulf War. Is that an
accurate statement?
General Shinseki. I was referring specifically to the
capabilities of the adversary's artillery systems.
Senator Bunning. Just the artillery? General Ryan, what
about the military aircraft?
General Ryan. During the Kosovo conflict we were able to,
quite honestly, overwhelm a smaller force. What we were unable
to do and lost two airplanes because of is coming to grips with
how to defend against the surface to air missile threats that
were in that area.
Senator Bunning. Even with stealth?
General Ryan. Even with stealth. In fact, we lost one
stealth aircraft. It was a lucky shot, but we lost a stealth
aircraft.
Senator Bunning. It was just a barrage that brought down
that aircraft?
General Ryan. I would like to answer that question in a
closed form, sir.
Senator Bunning. OK. I have to go to the base closures.
Someone mentioned the fact that there was $4 billion plus
saved. Where did the money go? General Ryan, it is your
statement.
General Ryan. We have continued to put most of our emphasis
into people and into readiness accounts. That is where I would
say most of our investment from any savings we have had through
the years, particularly over the past 4 years, that is where we
put our money and our emphasis, at the expense of our
infrastructure and modernization of our force.
Senator Bunning. Secretary Roche, you are also a base
closure advocate. Where would you say the savings have gone
over the last two base closures?
Secretary Roche. Senator, clearly at this stage of base
closing you put up a lot in the front in order to save over a
very long period of time, so you have investment in the
beginning and then you have recurring savings over the long
term, which are cost avoidance. I believe that if those bases
had not been closed then the kinds of monies that we would have
left over for maintenance, for modernization, for our people,
would be under significantly greater stress.
Senator Bunning. All the civilian personnel that are for
base closures, would you bring before me or this committee the
savings that have gone on from the two prior BRAC's that we
have had? Because I am having a terrible time finding any of
the money that we saved by the first two BRAC's.
Secretary Roche. Their costs avoided, sir? We would be glad
to.
Senator Bunning. No, no. I want to see the actual dollars
that now you are spending for something else. In other words,
if there is $4.5 billion saved in the first two BRAC's, and you
said that in a passing way and I do not know if you were really
meaning exactly $4.5 billion, I would like to see it so that I
can be informed.
I do not think there is one person here, sitting up here at
the table, that actually knows anything about the exact dollars
being saved by the first two BRAC closings.
[The information referred to follows:]
Navy Response
As of the end of fiscal year 2001, the Department of the Navy will
achieve a projected net savings of $5.8 billion as a result of two
rounds of Base Realignment and Closure. Beginning in fiscal year 2002,
we will save an additional $2.6 billion each year. These net savings
estimates have been validated by several independent sources.
Army Response
base realignment and closure (brac) savings
The Army will realize $945 million in annual savings with the
closure and disposal of all BRAC properties. Savings represent
reductions in personnel and infrastructure operating costs. The Army
realizes the majority of these savings when the closure and realignment
actions are complete. The remainder of the savings occurs when the
properties are disposed. BRAC actions resulted in $945 million in
savings in the Army's operating accounts in fiscal year 2001, while the
Army is spending $288 million in this final year of BRAC
implementation. The Army has $1.1 billion in remaining environmental
liabilities after fiscal year 2001, which will be paid from a little
more than 1 year of savings.
The savings resulting from closing and realigning installations are
real. The BRAC savings have been recognized by the Congressional Budget
Office and audited by the General Accounting Office and the Army Audit
Agency. After closing 112 installations and realigning 27 others, the
Army has reduced base operations and sustainment, restoration, and
modernization costs and eliminated 16,462 civilian positions. The $945
million in savings each year are now spent on readiness, modernization,
and remaining infrastructure. Spending these cost avoidance dollars for
priority programs rather than unneeded infrastructure presents an
opportunity for the Army to operate more efficiently within the
available top line obligation authority.

Secretary Roche. Sir, we will be glad to. In the Air Force
it is cost avoidance principally. Since money is fungible, it
is hard to find where a specific dollar went. But it is costs
we do not have to pay in the long run.
Senator Bunning. We cannot make up in 2 years or 3 years
what took place in the last 9 years.
Secretary Roche. That is absolutely correct, Senator.
Senator Bunning. So we have to do it on a gradual basis.
You will get my cooperation to do it on a gradual basis. I am
not going to blow the budget out of the water just to take care
of future needs 20 years down the pike. But I will support
increases and gradual increases in the DOD authorization and
the budget to make sure that we are ready to fight a war if we
have to.
Secretary Roche. Thank you, sir.
Senator Bunning. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome all the witnesses here before us
this morning and tell you that I am particularly interested in
the readiness of our troops. A multitude of issues impact
readiness, from adequate funding to addressing concerns about
encroachment as it pertains to training ranges and facilities.
I am looking forward to working with my colleagues and with you
on these.
Secretary England, I want to tell you that I agree with
your four strategic areas--that is, combat capability, people,
technology, and business practices--and wanted to particularly
ask you about this question that we discussed already. But to
bring me up to date, what is the current status of the
situation involving the Navy's decision to stop training at
Vieques, and are alternative training sites available?
Secretary England. Senator, there is a request coming in to
Congress to change the law that requires a referendum in
November. So we are asking, because we feel that is bad public
policy, not to have that election in November. In the meantime,
we have funded the Center for Naval Analysis to stand up the
group to look at alternative sites.
In addition, it is not just a site issue, which is why I
answered no to Senator Inhofe, because the real issue is one of
adequate training for our sailors and marines. So they will
look at the total issue of what is the training that we are
trying to accomplish, what is the best way to accomplish that
training, and then what are the facilities required to support
that.
I was pleased, by the way, with General Jones' answer to
that question because he said training does not take a back
seat, and I agree with that. The question is, what is the best
way to do it? So that is what this group will be doing, and
that group is now being stood up and people named to that
panel. So that is where we are at present, sir.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, your prepared statement
refers to the difficulty of sustaining current readiness while
investing in key future capabilities. In your testimony, you
refer to the $6.5 billion that has been reprogrammed from Navy
programs to the current readiness portion of the Navy baseline
in the program for fiscal year 2002 to 2007. This action has
been characterized as putting the Navy on course to correct the
underinvestment in readiness.
My question to you is, do you have any additional thoughts
regarding this issue that this committee should consider?
Admiral Clark. When I came here, Senator, last year for my
confirmation hearing, we talked about the issue of readiness
and it was my number one priority. I said as the CNO that that
is where I was going to put my priority, that failing to do it
was taking it out on the backs of our sailors and I was not
going to do that.
I do not have final decision authority on this. I make
recommendations. I am extraordinarily pleased with the steps
that we are taking in this budget. It is the right thing to do.
When we fail to do it, what we end up doing is that we have to
reprogram or take action in an execution year to fix a bill
that we have to pay, current readiness, in order to deploy the
forces. That has an extraordinarily corrosive impact on all of
the people that are affected in this process.
Here is what I have learned since I came here for my
confirmation hearing in all sorts of analysis. This is
happening because of the age of the force. We have proven to
ourselves that the demand for spares on our aircraft, for
example, not the dollar amount, the demand for spare parts, is
going up 9 percent a year, spares alone. This is costing us
between 13 and 15 percent a year. The costs are spiraling out
of control.
So when we got down to the amended budget, we were really
happy that we were able to put additional F-18's back in the
budget. The only way out of this is to buy our way out in terms
of getting rid of these airplanes that are costing us a fortune
to operate. So that is what I have learned in the past year. I
now have data to back up what I was experiencing in the fleet
when I came into this job.
I am convinced that the challenge here is the balance. We
cannot short the current readiness accounts or our people to
pay for it. At the same time, we have to figure out how--and
this is why I am so much in support of Secretary England's
initiative about real reform. We have to know exactly where
every dollar is going and we have to not only pay the current
readiness bills, because that is why the Nation has a Navy, to
be out there, but also to do something significant to turn
around this problem.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General Jones, I took note of your concern regarding the
aging infrastructure that is being indicated here and the
backlog in maintenance and repair. I share your concern,
especially as it pertains to family housing and encroachment.
It is important to continue discussions with the community
regarding encroachment and to do what is necessary to be
environmental stewards.
I am particularly interested in your assessment that the
PERSTEMPO program enacted in last year's defense authorization
act does not comport with the mission and culture of the Marine
Corps. Could you further elaborate on this assessment and
provide comment as to what alternatives the Marine Corps is
examining to address this issue?
General Jones. Thank you, sir. We are fully tracking our
PERSTEMPO per DOD guidance and will report to Congress as
required. To our way of thinking, the high PERSTEMPO per diem
equates to paying premiums for doing what we do as normal
operations in deployments in support of our national mission.
As I have said before in previous testimony, 68 percent of the
Marine Corps is always on its first enlistment. That means we
have a young force, average age is 24 years or younger.
We are able to recruit people, young men and women of great
courage and character, to do these types of missions, and they
come into our ranks to do those kinds of things, and we do not
disappoint them. It is a matter of fact and record that the
highest reenlistment rates in the Marine Corps are in our
deployable or deployed units.
So satisfying the expectation of this very young force with
the idea that they are going to do something important for the
Nation in pursuit of our national objectives and in support of
really a historically proven record over the last 50 or 60
years that being forward engaged is good for the Nation across
a whole broad spectrum of interest items.
We feel that it is a question of capable and good
management and leadership of the force. To have a policy that
compels us to pay money to do what we naturally want to do does
not seem to be, at least at first glance, something that we--it
should be something that we look at.
For example, it is not just limited to operations. People
who go on temporary additional duty from headquarters, people
that train on our bases, have a clock that starts counting with
every day they spend away from their domicile, be it a BEQ or
bachelor quarters or married quarters.
We will know more later on this summer about the fiscal
impact of this. But I think we need to come back to Congress,
and I propose to do that, with some greater facts and figures
to show exactly what the impact of that legislation will be. My
personal judgment is it will be significant.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I will submit additional
questions that I have for the record.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Roberts.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS

Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ryan, thank you for your courtesies and a job well
done. As the Air Force has moved from a stationary military
fighting force to an expeditionary force, you have piloted, if
I can use that term, the Air Force in outstanding fashion. We
owe you a great debt of thanks. You do an outstanding job, and
we like you as well. I like Mike.
General Ryan. Thanks.
Senator Roberts. I want to thank you all for your candor.
We have asked for candor in the past. The Senator from Kentucky
sort of alluded to that in a different kind of question. As a
result, we have all experienced a time frame where we have
understood our military has been stressed, drained, and in some
cases hollow. But most of all, we appreciate your coming with
your candor.
As a result, we have passed significant pay raises. We
fixed the retirement system. We have done a lot with health
care. We are doing a lot with emergency supplemental funds. So
thank you all for the job that you are doing.
General Jones, my heart goes out, as a member of the Marine
Corps family, to the families of the three marines that lost
their lives in protecting our Nation's 911 force in readiness.
I appreciate your comments and the comments of our
distinguished chairman.
Now it is time to move to the B-1. Secretary Roche, you
remember the old days when Bob Dornan was known as ``B-1 Bob''?
Secretary Roche. Yes, I have met the gentleman.
Senator Roberts. Well, now you have B-1 Max, B-1 Larry, B-1
Mike, B-1 Zell, B-1 Sam, and B-1 Pat. It is my hope in
discussing this with the distinguished chairman and the ranking
member and the subcommittee members that we are going to have a
hearing on this in the immediate future in the Strategic
Subcommittee with the Emerging Threats and Capabilities and the
Airland Subcommittees invited to take part. So we will welcome
you at that particular time.
The Senators from Kansas and Georgia and Idaho, however,
are being painted, and I am upset about this, as only
interested in the B-1, and I have a statement I am going to
read here, ``because of the loss of the platforms and the jobs
in their respective states.'' That is not it.
I am interested in ensuring that the men and women of the
United States military, active, Guard, and Reserve, that serve
in the State of Kansas or Georgia or any other place are not
jerked and assets are moved only when it makes sense and when
it is part of an overall plan.
For the past 3 years, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee, a new subcommittee by the grace of our ranking
member and our former chairman--and I chaired that subcommittee
until recently--has looked closely at military transformation
and the very real need to align our forces to the threats we
are most likely to face. I am a strong believer in
transformation.
Secretary Roche, thank you for coming this morning to visit
with me about this. I am all in favor of your efficiency
initiatives. I know you will do a great job. You have started
something called the Business Initiative Council or Committee.
It is called ``BIC''. That is the new acronym. I am all for
that. I want to thank you for coming up.
But I also feel strongly that any effort to make any
significant changes to our force structure and our weapons
systems must be well thought out and part of an overall plan.
Part of my frustration--and I shared it with you--is that this
B-1B move was done quickly, quietly, with zero consultation,
more stealth by the way, than any B-1 or B-2 has, and not part
of any defense-wide strategy. I know you do not agree with
that, but that is my take.
I do not think we should let arbitrary actions made in
isolation from the rest of DOD impact on the transformation I
believe to be vital to our future defense strategy. Now, I see
placards frequently touting the Air Force Active and Guard as
one team. Senator Carnahan just asked General Ryan about that.
This action to pull the B-1B away from the Guard and place them
only in Active Duty military bases speaks louder than any
placard.
If I were a member of the Kansas Guard--and I just was out
on the flight line yesterday when Lieutenant General Whirly
took time to come out and explain the administration's
position--of the Georgia Air National Guard who spent years of
blood, sweat and tears maintaining the high state of readiness
of their B-1B units, only to see them transferred--I originally
had ``jerked away''; I have now changed that to
``transferred''--to active forces, I would question the
commitment of the active Air Force to the Guard.
They are not doing that, by the way. They are standing tall
and they are standing at parade rest and saying: We will do the
mission.
Finally, from my understanding the mission capable rate of
the B-1B is low because of the lack of funding for support for
the aircraft. As the congressionally-mandated study showed,
given the proper funding and support, the mission capable rate
of the B-1B is very good. If the same lack of funding and
support was provided to any of the Air Force's other bombers,
what would happen to the mission capable rate of that platform?
I have about six questions here that I am going to submit
for the record. I am going to skip over those. Some of them are
a little argumentative. Some are meant to produce some
meaningful dialogue, which I am sure that we will have. I want
to cut to the chase.
Congressman T. Hart and Senator Brownback and I yesterday
in Wichita at McConnell Air Force Base, home of the proud 184th
Bomber Wing, said the first thing we need to do is to delay
this. We cannot do this in 10 weeks. You cannot jerk people
around that way.
You agreed with that as of this morning and said that you
are going to go back to the Secretary of Defense and indicate
we are not going to do it until 2002. That means not 10 weeks.
At least there would be 16 months. In the 16 months--and I want
to clarify that--it would at least give us an opportunity to
compare this with the QDR, with another GAO study requested by
Senator Cleland, let us scrub the numbers that are in dispute,
let us try to not start a sheep and cattle war between the
National Guard and the active duty folks, and that we would
have sort of a time out and we could arm-wrestle over the
future of our long-term strike capability, whether it is B-2 or
B-1 or B-52 or the future bomber that we talked about.
But I do not think that is going to be the case. I got a
report of your statement that in 2 months time as of 1 October,
to use a Dodge City term, we are going to head them up and move
them out. I do not want to head them up and move them out. I
want at least a little time to present our case to you, sir.
So I want a clarification. Do we have 16 months or do we
have 2 months and we take the gloves off?
Secretary Roche. Senator, thank you. First of all, the
Secretary of Defense has apologized for how this was unveiled.
On the part of the Department of the Air Force, I apologize as
well. We never intended for it to come out the way it did. We
thought we would have time to consult and we failed to make our
case strongly enough at that time. So that is our
responsibility.
Second, Senator, we do not want to do anything draconian to
people and, therefore, it would be our intent to ask the
Secretary's permission to be able to use all of 2002 to do this
in a sensible manner.
Third, this is not something against the Guard. This is
something for the B-1 force. The B-1 force was designed in an
era of nuclear weapons. It was designed at a time when you
spread bombers around the country because you were afraid of
SLBM's being fired from our shores, attacking the bomber leg of
the triad.
It is time now to try to be more efficient and to make this
force a usable force. It is $2 billion behind as it stands in
maintenance and modifications. I view this as a force that has
low capability rates, very, very high cannibalization rates,
because it is just not as relevant as it should be, and I wish
to make it relevant.
I do not see the kind of money necessary to be able to make
the whole fleet relevant and meet our other needs, our
purchases of C-17's, F-22's, etcetera. Therefore, we proposed a
way to save part of the force and to make it very relevant for
the next 30 years. That was what was going on.
With regard to the Guard members, we would like to engage
with the Guard in Kansas and Georgia to look for alternative
missions for them, such things as associate squadrons. We would
like to have a dialogue on the MILCON on those two bases that
was associated with the B-1 to see how much of it would be
useful for the base in large, because we see those bases going
on.
We hope we will be permitted to do the kind of thinking and
discussions with you in the intervening period and not be
restrained from doing that so that we can work with you, make
our case, and, as I promised you this morning, when I have
looked at the numbers and have asked for them recently, the
comparisons between mission capability rates and flying hours
are very, very close. We understand that the Guard in Georgia
has a different analysis and we respect those folks. They are
part of one Air Force. We will go over their numbers and I have
promised you that we will set up a session with your folks,
with the Guard, our people, and I am sure we are going to come
back to the fact that we do not have an auditable set of books
and that how you allocate overhead is going to be the clear
issue.
But we have nothing to hide. We would be glad to share
this. But the intent was to take the investment made in B-1s
and to make it a useful investment and not one that is not. We
do not see our ability to come back and just ask you for more
and more money on top of what our other needs are, sir.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Could I
have 1 additional minute? I apologize for asking this.
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Senator Roberts. Well, I do not apologize. I am just going
to ask for a minute.
Chairman Levin. In that case you cannot have it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. Welcome to the minority. [Laughter.]
I appreciate all that. We went over that as of this
morning. Again, I want to thank you for taking your time out.
We want the B-1 to be relevant. How on earth could anybody
say that it should not be relevant as part of the B-52, B-1, B-
2? As we go through this, I am looking for the future strategic
bomber that everybody knows we are going to have to have. I do
not even see it on the table yet, but we need to talk about
that.
I am for consolidation if it works. But basically what you
have done is you have said we are not going to--we are going to
give it to the two active duty bases because that is the only
mission they have, and you did not want to go down the road,
despite everybody saying yes on a BRAC, you did not want to
take that step that might lead to a BRAC. I am being very
candid about it.
But the two military installations that are run by the Air
National Guard do it better. Now, I know we are going to have
some argument about the numbers. I just have some more numbers
here in regard to the allegations that you have made. We need
to compare apples to apples, and I think we will do that.
But basically now you have told me that over the period of
time we will have an opportunity to make our case, and I really
appreciate that and we can do so in hearings and hopefully the
hearings will take place in a couple of weeks. On behalf of the
warfighters in Georgia and Kansas, we are not going to simply
jerk them away as of the 1st of October; is that correct?
Secretary Roche. That is correct, sir.
Senator Roberts. Thank you.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Secretary England, relative to Vieques, is the Defense
Department going to be submitting a legislative proposal to
Congress to change the current law that requires a referendum
on the continuation of live fire training on the Vieques
training range?
Secretary England. Yes sir, they are.
Chairman Levin. When will that be submitted?
Secretary England. Sir, I hope it is any day now. I thought
it would have happened by this time.
Chairman Levin. Is that going to recommend that the
referendum be cancelled?
Secretary England. Yes, sir, it will recommend--it would
say to delete that part of the legislation that now says have a
referendum. It will delete that language.
Chairman Levin. What progress are you making to identify
alternative training sites?
Secretary England. We are standing up the outside group and
naming those people right now, Senator.
Chairman Levin. But your cancellation recommendation--and I
emphasize it is only that--is not contingent upon your finding
another site?
Secretary England. No, sir. Our feeling is that we will be
able to find another site, other techniques. Again, this is not
site-specific. It is how do we achieve the level of training
that we require. So that could be a combination of sites,
technology. So it is not to look for a one for one replacement
for Vieques.
Chairman Levin. Have you identified that alternative
approach?
Secretary England. No, sir, we have not. We are working at
that. We do have preliminary findings from CNA that indicates a
combination of other sites that would be appropriate, sir. So
there have been previous studies that indicate there are
alternatives.
Chairman Levin. But until that alternative approach is
identified, you are not making your recommendation that the
referendum be cancelled contingent upon the identification of
an alternative approach?
Secretary England. No, sir. The recommendation is made
really because in our view, at least my view and I think some
other people's view, it is just poor public policy to have
people voting on actions important to our sailors and marines.
We would much rather make those decisions in the Department of
the Navy and the DOD and with consultation with Congress than
have people vote on those decisions, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is your proposal going to say that you will
end training in May of 2003?
Secretary England. Yes sir, it will.
Chairman Levin. Admiral Clark, let me ask you about
Vieques. Were you consulted on the decision to ask Congress to
cancel the referendum before that recommendation was made?
Admiral Clark. I think, Senator, there were discussions for
several months and before Secretary England arrived with regard
to this issue. With regard to the specifics of going to
Congress with this, I would say that the discussion was more
about the desirability of having a referendum. I would tell you
that I represented my case in those discussions that I thought
the referendum itself--and I am a military guy, not the policy
guy--but that I thought that it was bad public policy.
Chairman Levin. That was before the recommendation was made
to have a referendum?
Admiral Clark. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. But I am talking about----
Admiral Clark. No, sir.
Chairman Levin. Oh, you did not make that before the
recommendation to have the referendum last year?
Admiral Clark. No sir, that is not what I am talking about.
Chairman Levin. So it was the current----
Admiral Clark. I am talking about currently in this
calendar year, after the new administration arrived.
Chairman Levin. But before there was actually a decision
made, apparently, to come to Congress to recommend cancellation
of that referendum, were you consulted at that time? This year
were you consulted before, that Congress was going to be asked
to cancel the referendum?
Admiral Clark. I was not told that--I characterize it the
same way. We had discussions about potential courses of
actions. I was not told before the decision was announced that
this was going to happen.
Chairman Levin. Were you surprised by it?
Admiral Clark. I was not surprised that this was the
conclusion of the administration.
Chairman Levin. What were you surprised by?
Admiral Clark. Was I surprised by which piece of it?
Chairman Levin. By the fact that you were not notified that
the request was going to be coming to Congress?
Admiral Clark. I had discussions with both Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz and Secretary England. On this particular, when
Secretary England made the decision, he did not come and we did
not talk about it until after he made the decision and then he
informed us.
Chairman Levin. General Jones, were you consulted?
General Jones. My answer echoes the CNOs because I was at
the same meetings.
Chairman Levin. To the service secretaries here, Secretary
Rumsfeld has assigned all three of you, I guess, to sit on a
new board of directors to manage the business affairs of the
Department of Defense. The Secretary has testified that the
Department should be able to save $15 billion a year through
improved business practices. In the past, the Department has
tried to save money by contracting out commercial functions to
the private sector, but the Department has never provided the
management attention needed to ensure that savings are actually
realized when it contracts for the services from the private
sector.
A series of reviews by the Inspector General and the
General Accounting Office have revealed that the Department has
failed to compete requirements for the delivery of services and
has barely begun to implement requirements for performance-
based services contracting.
At a more fundamental level, the Department of Defense has
no centralized management structure for service contracts, has
never conducted a comprehensive spending analysis of its
service contracts, has made little effort to leverage its
buying power, improve the performance of its service
contractors, rationalize its suppliers base, or otherwise
ensure that its service contract dollars are well spent.
Do you believe that the Department should be able to
achieve significant savings by instituting better commercial
practices for the management of the $50 billion service
contract budget? Secretary White?
Secretary White. Yes, I do. It is done all the time in the
business world. Outsourcing of non-core functions is a way of
life. You do not stay in business if you spend a lot of time on
non-core activities, and I see no reason why we should not be
able to do the same thing in the Department. That is our
intent.
Chairman Levin. Secretary England.
Secretary England. I would agree. I think Secretary White
summed it up very well, sir.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Roche.
Secretary Roche. In general I agree. We have some examples
in the case of having total maintenance on the 117, where we
have absolutely measurable dollars that we can point to. But
with regard to the BIC, it is not just contracting out. There
are a lot of things we are probably doing that create our own
inefficiencies, where we are laundering our own laundry back
and forth, we would like to eliminate. We would like to find
areas where we are asking each other for work that simply does
not have to be done or duplicating sets of meetings--a series
of things to get smarter, better, faster, and to get the
decisionmaking down at lower levels and empower people to do
this in a better way.
Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A little bit of good news every now and then, not that we
have not had good news here today. But Senator Levin and I have
been in this Senate for 23 years and we have gone through many
military operations by our Nation and each of us in our own
respective lives have been involved with the military in other
ways long before we came to the Senate.
But this is the booklet that is being given to a private
first class, who happens to be my executive secretary's son, as
he embarks on a mission to the Bosnia-Kosovo region. I have
never seen a better prepared document. It is carefully written
so that a, in his case, private first class can read it and
learn the history of the region going way back to the 1300s and
exactly what each soldier is expected to do in the performance
of his or her duties in the platoon, in the company, in the
regiment, and the other nations that are involved.
I just wish to commend those, presumably in the Department
of the Army and indeed maybe throughout the Defense Department,
who are preparing our men and women in both the active and the
Guard as they embark into that region of the world to better
understand why they are going and to some extent, depending on
their assignments, putting their safety at risk in the cause of
freedom.
So this is very, very well done, and I commend the
Department of Defense and the military departments for their
preparation of their people as they deploy.
To the Air Force Department, Mr. Secretary and Chief. I do
not like to use the personal pronoun ``I'', but I will go ahead
and do it anyway. Last year I included $200 million in the
defense authorization bill to accelerate the development of
unmanned combat aircraft. I have been joined by a number on
this committee. We are moving in that direction.
General Ryan, I do not want as a heritage, you being a
proud aviator of many years, to be too strong an advocate today
of moving toward unmanned cockpits, but I believe that is the
direction that this country has to go in. You have some of the
leading programs in this area, and I wonder if you might lead
off with your own enthusiastic support of this concept.
It is not going to totally, in any way I think, threaten or
abridge or otherwise limit the number of manned cockpits in the
future, but a certain percentage of our warfighting equipment
in my judgment should be unmanned or remotely controlled, so to
speak, or both. Your own views about those programs and what
you see as the future for them?
General Ryan. Yes sir. First of all, I do not think pilots
across our Air Force in leadership positions have any hatred
for unmanned aerial vehicles. In fact, if you look at our
inventories, we have gone that way in almost every munition we
have. Almost every one of our munitions is a standoff munition.
It in itself is an unmanned aerial vehicle, whether it is an
AMRAAM or an air-to-air missile or an air-to-surface missile,
things that give us standoff, where we do not have to put
people in harm's way. It is just most of those do not come
back; they go one way.
We are now working very hard on technologies that would
allow us to do it, to use these vehicles, where they are
reusable. Predator is a very good example. We used Predator
first in combat in Bosnia and it went to places that I as the
commander over there did not want to send----
Senator Warner. I remember seeing those operations. I went
on the actual sites and watched them go and return.
General Ryan. Yes, sir.
Global Hawk is another capability. We are building a UCAV
now to look at the applications of unmanned aerial vehicles in
a direct combat mode, where we would have the vehicle dispense
munitions or high energy capabilities that would disenable
military capabilities of the other side. So we are very much
into this and I see nothing but increased involvement in these
kinds of activities.
Senator Warner. I thank you.
Secretary Roche.
Secretary Roche. Senator, the Secretary of Defense is very
much supporting our increasing the amount of money we are going
to put into unmanned vehicles. They are not substitutes for
piloted vehicles; they are complements. We will run into in
time--it is a bandwidth problem, the communications problem
raised earlier by one of your colleagues, because when you put
sensors in you want to remote everything back and you are using
a lot of bandwidth.
So we know we are stressing this, but the state of digital
technology is such that we feel these vehicles have a high
reliability and can be very useful and can complement us very
well.
Senator Warner. But I think that they have a mission in
land warfare, General Jones. Do you agree with me?
General Jones. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. You are moving along. You have some
excellent research and development going on in the Marine
Corps. We want to compliment you particularly; you are on the
cutting edge of all the military services as it comes down to
the weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and
chemical. You are spearheading that research and development
within the Corps.
But back to the unmanned, you support that?
General Jones. Absolutely. Our warfighting lab at Quantico
is doing extraordinarily good work in support of the
requirements of our ground warfighters. As I said, the future
lieutenants and captains are going to have an incredible array
of information that is going to come in. They will be able to
look over the next hill with great precision. This is exciting
stuff.
Senator Warner. Admiral.
Admiral Clark. Absolutely, Senator. In fact, I predict that
some day they will be flying from aircraft carriers.
Senator Warner. I hope I am around.
General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. Likewise, Senator. We have dedicated a
good bit of our look in science and technology toward the
robotics arena as well. Even with a system like Crusader, we
have the crew separated from the weapons system's ability to
deliver fires. I mean, whether it is 3 feet, 30 meters, or 3
miles, control over a weapons system that delivers like the
Crusader does is a matter of distance, and we are working on
those technologies.
Senator Warner. I make an observation for the Department of
the Navy--I thank you, General--that in my judgment, Mr.
Secretary, we have had a very good discussion on BRAC today,
but our information for the committee indicates that the
Department of the Navy has not sufficiently funded--as a matter
of fact, we look at $90 million in deficit financing--BRAC
funding for installations that have been the subject of closure
in past legislation of BRAC and awaiting transfer to the
communities.
Now, that hiatus period is very difficult for those
communities to deal with the loss of the military, frankly
payroll, and the awaiting of a follow-on substitute in the
private sector. Would you examine that?
Secretary England. Yes, I will, sir. I understand it is the
case. I do not have those specifics, but I will take that for
the record and get back with you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

The Base Realignment and Closure account has been buffeted by
budget reductions from the Navy, through the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and Congress in the last few years, primarily due to the
expectations that prior year unexpended balances could be used to fund
current requirements. Because of competing budget needs, the Navy was
unable to fully fund the fiscal year 2002 budget requirement. There are
significant shortfalls in our ability to accomplish the work agreed to
in state and federal cleanup agreements and, at our current funding
levels, turnover of some bases will be delayed by 8 to 10 years. In
addition, the Navy will miss the opportunity of good business decisions
to transfer significant parcels of land to local communities through
Early Transfer Authority.

Senator Warner. Our chairman asked I think very penetrating
questions about the Vieques situation and indeed he and I
collaborated on deciding when we would address that issue. I
think we jointly decided we would wait until this hearing today
rather than take the initiative as did the House of
Representatives in a special hearing.
You are advocating coming up with language canceling the
referendum. That was the position taken by the previous
administration, endorsed by Congress, enacted into law with
Congress and the President's signature.
Chairman Levin. Not the cancellation.
Senator Warner. No, no, but the referendum was a part of a
thought-out process of Congress and the executive branch.
My question to you is very simple: What do we get in return
if we cancel that referendum? It is something that is being
demanded by the present governor of Puerto Rico, but it was
agreed to by her immediate predecessor. The United States is
caught in the switches politically between one governor, who
worked with our President and Congress to get a framework
solution, and the next governor comes right along and
absolutely abdicates any responsibility with regard to the law
of the land.
So what do we get in return?
Secretary England. Sir, I think what we get in return--
first of all, there are no ``good alternatives'' here. This is
a contentious issue. The situation that we have today is the
one we have to deal with.
What we get in return is we do not allow other people to
vote on the policies affecting our naval services. In my
judgment and I think in the judgment of other people, it is
very bad policy to have someone vote on issues that affect our
sailors and marines. I think that is a very bad message to send
around the world and around the country.
Senator Warner. I think you have made that point clear. But
let me ask you the following: Have we any assurance from this
governor for the balance of the life, which goes to 2003--and
that remains part of the legislation, does it not?
Secretary England. Yes, it does.
Senator Warner.--that she will work to help enforce such
security as is needed to enable us to carry forward the use of
that range during that period of time? Because, frankly, before
this Senator accedes to a change in the legislation I want to
know what we are getting in return. Is this governor going to
work with us to have the security so that the range can be
utilized to balance, or are we going to stop that?
Secretary England. It is my understanding, Senator, that
the governor will indeed uphold the law. The last time we were
in Vieques we did have much better security at the site, much
better than we had previous times. That occurred after the
announcement we were going to leave, so I viewed that as a
positive sign. I was hopeful that would occur. It did occur.
While we had some disruptions the last time, it was
significantly less than we had the prior time.
My expectation is that we will probably continue to have
some disruption, but hopefully at a lower level. It is
important that we stay, however, until May of 2003.
Senator Warner. I agree with that.
Secretary England. Because we do need the time to develop
an alternative. As you recall, my rationale was the worst
possible situation was to have to leave early for whatever
circumstances.
Senator Warner. I have to move on. We are in agreement on
that, but I am going to press to figure out what we get in
return if we are canceling this referendum, because I am not
ready to concede that we would have lost that referendum. We
put $40 million out there to work with the people of that small
area of Vieques and I am not so sure that we could not prevail.
But it looks as if that option may well be removed in the
future by Congress.
But I want to finish up with the following question. This
committee will--and I will be working with our chairman and may
well during the course of this year be revisiting Goldwater-
Nichols. For those that are watching this hearing, that was
framework legislation adopted by our committee many years ago
that kept in balance what I view as the responsibilities of the
uniformed military and the responsibility of the civilian
secretaries of the services and of defense in the management of
the Department.
Now, clearly from the earliest times in our Republic it has
been civilian control over the military and it should always be
that way. But we want to assure that the uniformed services
have the opportunity to make known their views, to have those
views carefully considered as you evolve through the decisions
that are being made.
Quite frankly, I am going to ask you, in the context of the
current QDR--and a lot of communications come to this committee
from the Department. I have the highest respect for Don
Rumsfeld. He and I have had parallel careers for many, many
years. We go way back. I think that he has put together, along
with the President, one of the finest teams I have ever seen of
civilian managers, and three of the great ones are here before
this committee today.
But at the same time, in this QDR process, I am going to
ask each chief, do you feel that your views are, first, given
an adequate opportunity to be expressed and, second, are being
taken into consideration, because this QDR process will be a
foundation block for the 2003 budget which could represent a
significant change of direction in the management and the
future of our Armed Forces?
General Ryan.
General Ryan. Yes, sir, I believe that our inputs were
taken and we had the opportunity in developing the terms of
reference for the QDR and our participation is substantial in
the review process we are going through now.
Senator Warner. General Jones.
General Jones. I concur with General Ryan. I do think that
it would be a worthwhile discussion to have to examine the
Goldwater-Nichols from the standpoint of other unintended
consequences as a result of the legislation. But in the context
of the QDR, I have absolutely been consulted and participated
fully.
Senator Warner. Admiral Clark.
Admiral Clark. Senator, we have been consulted, I have been
consulted, we collectively, extensively. We are spending hours
and hours on the QDR process. The end product will determine
the extent to which we have affected the process.
I would like to align myself with the comments of General
Jones regarding Goldwater-Nichols and follow-on discussions
that you might have. I am convinced there are areas that need
to be pursued.
Senator Warner. General Shinseki.
General Shinseki. Likewise, I think it would be a good
opportunity to relook Goldwater-Nichols. With regard to the QDR
strategy, for the last 6 to 7 weeks I think all the members at
this table have been involved, really sometimes several times a
day, in discussions about that strategy. The output of that was
the terms of reference for the QDR, which is currently under
way, and our ability to bring, at least in the case of the
Army, about the important contributions of land power,
discussions about the relevance of warfighting and what
principles apply, and discussions about risk and how we see
risk and think about it, not as an academic exercise, but for
us operationally it is about mission success and the ability to
execute those missions without exorbitant cost.
Senator Warner. I thank the witnesses.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for being here today and for the
opportunity to receive your reports and respond to them. In my
limited time with the Armed Services Committee thus far, I have
come to believe that the United States military has legitimate
and pressing needs that include, among other things, better
pay, housing, health care, and training areas. I have also come
to believe that the Pentagon's accounting system does not work
very well. Some might suggest it is broken. As Senator Byrd has
indicated on more than one occasion, a simple audit cannot be
done to explain where the money is being spent.
What I would like to know is, if we are spending more
money, that it is going towards the things that we need most,
our highest priorities. So I look forward to the findings of
Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review and learning what broad
missions the Secretary believes the military should prepare for
if it is not going to be a two-war concept, a two-war strategy.
I am also anxious to learn what steps are being taken in
the development of a missile defense system which could cost a
considerable amount of money by anybody's terms, money that can
be spent certainly on domestic and international terrorism as
well as fully funding already existing defense programs.
So my question for the chiefs today is, as we are looking
at phasing out a two-war requirement as a strategy, what do we
do to replace that with? If the two-war strategy is no longer
needed, no longer fundable, what do we replace that with? What
will the strategy be for the branches in the years ahead?
General Ryan, we will start with you and perhaps we could
go down to the other chiefs.
General Ryan. Yes, sir. Part of our Quadrennial Defense
Review is addressing that very question. It is not so much a
two-war strategy as it is a force structuring mechanism to
determine the depth of forces you need across all of the
services. So we are struggling with that issue right now.
What we did in the previous QDR was to take the two major
regional contingencies or two major theater wars and use that
as a force sizing mechanism for the amount of capability that
you need, the depth, and then assumed that all of the other
activities that we do are lesser included cases of those two.
This particular strategic review and QDR, we are not using
that as the construct. We are using a different look at being
able to continue to do in critical areas of the world, our
ability to halt aggression and also fight major regional
contingencies at the same time, a major regional contingency,
at the same time doing humanitarian operations, etcetera. So it
is a completely different look at how we force structure.
We are not through with that work yet, but that is the
direction in which it is headed.
Senator Ben Nelson. But if the two-war strategy or two-
theater strategy is the base now from which all other force
structure questions might arise and that is being phased out,
then is there something that takes its place? Or is it just
that it might be some strategy for protection, some for
defense, some for offense? Do we have anything that comes back,
or is that what we will find out when we get the review?
General Ryan. Well, we have set in general the terms of the
force construct. That is, to be able to protect the capability
to win in a major theater, one major theater war, while in
other vital areas being able to repel attacks, while at the
same time doing a series of smaller or lesser scale
contingencies.
That replaces the two. Then what you do is you go through
the exercise, which we are in the middle of now, of putting
forces against doing that all at the same time, and that
becomes the substitute for the two major regional
contingencies. It is not a strategy. It is a force sizing
mechanism.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Jones.
General Jones. Senator, this is an extraordinarily complex
issue and it is one that is uniquely faced by our Nation
because we have global responsibilities that, frankly, no one
else does at this point. Warfighting is obviously the most
pressing requirement to be able to make sure that you have
sufficiency in your force structure and capabilities and the
right systems and the right programs to guarantee that, as
people have said, it will not be a fair fight, that we will win
overwhelmingly and convincingly.
Coupled with all of this in the process is the ability to
examine the sufficiency that is required to do all the other
things that we do in executing our unique role as leaders:
engaging with other militaries, providing the bases for
peaceful economic cooperation in various parts of the world,
teaching by the fabulous example of our armed people in uniform
in our employed forces, land-based, sea-based, whatever, that
subordination of the military to civilian authority is a good
thing and how you do that.
We attract other militaries to sit around conference tables
with us who want to try to be like us or want to have an
association with us on a permanent and long-term basis. That
takes a certain amount of robustness that is calculated into
the force structure or force sizing mechanism where we have to
respond to real threats or be able to.
Then there is the problem of trying to figure out what you
do in the near term, which is obviously more pressing, versus
the difficult-to-define far term. You can use the case of
Desert Shield-Desert Storm as a force that was built and put
together when the Soviet Union was dominant and we were
building a force to react to the Soviet threat, and we wound up
using it for something dramatically different.
So this is all rolled into the QDR. We are working our way
through that to whether it is one major theater war or one plus
several lesser contingencies or two. The force structure
implications do not necessarily mean less forces. These are
tough issues and you have to go beyond the warfighting to talk
about what the force will look like on a day to day basis
because of how we use it. You need sufficiency, you need
rotational forces that routinely deploy, have to be refreshed.
So it is a big issue.
Admiral Clark. Senator, in the past, frankly, one of the
problems with the two MTW strategy was that the force structure
that fit that did not fit the world we were living in. We had
these forces that we tagged as low density, high demand, and
that is because we were engaged in a lot of areas where there
was not a major theater war going on, but we had forces
committed for peacekeeping, for any kind of activity. The fact
is that once the force is committed the commander has to know
what is going on, he has to collect intelligence, and these are
the kind of resources that did not match.
For the Navy, I see this unfolding and what we have to do
as a Nation is answer the question, what do you want us, the
Navy, to do? The answer in QDR 1997 was clearly that in the
post-Cold War era we had moved a significant portion of our
force back to the continental United States instead of being
based overseas and the whole posture was set up so that
Presidents in the past asked the question, where are the
carriers? Do you want the carrier battle group and this kind of
capability to be there in a month or do you want it to be there
in 72 hours? The answer was in 72 hours, and our force
structure has been sized in order to give the President those
kind of options.
So General Ryan has laid this out. Clearly, this posture
will be able to deal with additional contingency, smaller scale
things, and be postured and the force structure put together
correctly to be able to do that, instead of believing that two
MTW's gives you the ability to do any and all lesser included
offenses.
I believe that the challenge for us then is to size how
many of those we are talking about, and that work is going on,
and what is reasonable and whatever the opportunity costs, and
we are working toward that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Shinseki. Senator, a key element of the current QDR
that does not get enough attention is an assumption that says
plan on strategic surprise. I think that is a key point here,
that if you try to get it perfect you are probably going to be
wrong, and if you are confident that your perfection in
prediction is exactly right you could be wrong by a wide
margin.
I think for all of us, as we have participated in this
exercise, it is to accept that assumption and then to lay out
the requirements for as much flexibility as we can provide in
the formations we can afford, so that we can accommodate that
kind of reality, a strategic surprise.
For an Army that is likely to go to war in the foreseeable
portion of this century, we would like to go to war with the
best and the biggest Air Force we can afford. We would like to
go to war with the best and the biggest Navy we can afford. We
certainly want to bring to this joint equation here of Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force the best Army that we can afford.
That is part of our deliberations.
Our contributions have been about warfighting and about why
decisive warfighting is a key element of discussion and why
risk and the way we treat risk operationally is important. I
think we have been able to bring those contributions to the
debate.
Our Army today is the best Army in the world, but we have
to do something about it. I think all the chiefs have laid out
programs to describe their particular perspectives, but we are
the ninth largest army in the world. We do not have to be
necessarily any bigger, but we better be the best on the day we
have to go, because seven of the eight ahead of us are
potential adversaries.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all let me echo, everything good and glittering
that was stated about General Ryan. I would like to have it all
attributed to me, but I do not want to take the time right now
to do it if that is all right, General Ryan.
General Ryan. Thank you, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I was very disturbed, Secretary England, by
your answer to my last round of questioning. The statement that
was attributed to Don Rumsfeld by General Jones, which was that
we should only replace things when we have something better to
replace them with, I asked if that should include training
ranges. As I understand it you said that should apply to
weapons, but not to ranges. Is that accurate?
Secretary England. No, sir. I believe you said does that
apply to Vieques and I said no, it did not.
Senator Inhofe. Does it apply to ranges?
Secretary England. Pardon me, sir. I thought you said does
it apply to Vieques, and I said no to that question because the
issue in my mind is not Vieques. The issue is one of adequate
training and it is not necessary, at least in my mind, that we
have Vieques. The issue and the question is what is the best
way to train our men and women. So it is a broader question.
Senator Inhofe. I do want to use up all my time on your
answer here. It was not an accurate interpretation of your
response that this should not, does not apply to training
ranges, just to weapons systems? That is not what you said?
Secretary England. No, sir. Again, I do not want this to be
just a Vieques issue. This needs to be an issue of training and
not just specifically Vieques. So it definitely applies to
training. Training is as important as our weapons systems. I
certainly recognize that, and that is the whole objective in my
approach, is to make sure we will have adequate training in the
future. So that is the whole approach, is to make sure we have
the same objective. We come at it from a different way,
Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I would suggest that we have five
dead American soldiers today as a result of not being able to
use the Vieques range for integrated training. It happened on
March 12 in the Udari Range in Kuwait. Do you have any concern
about that?
Secretary England. Sir, for my understanding that is not
the case. Those personnel did train at Vieques.
Senator Inhofe. But not live fire training. It was inert.
Secretary England. That is correct, sir. But they did do
their training at Vieques. My understanding is that the
findings of that do not relate that to Vieques. So I would not
agree with that finding, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Let me read from the report of that
accident that took place on March 12 of this year:
``Discrepancies were noted in the deployment certification
message''--and this would have been 5 months before--with
regard to amphibious warfare CAS--that is close air support; it
is a submission of amphibious warfare. ``Some of those comments
regarded the lack of live fire training that was available
during the strike missions.''
Later on it says: ``The commander and the deputy commander
stated that they actively sought close air support
opportunities whenever possible, but the limiting factor was
range availability.`` They were talking about Vieques.
Secretary England. I do not believe, however, sir, there is
a relationship between those comments and the specific accident
that occurred.
Senator Inhofe. That is on the accident report of March 12.
Secretary England. Yes sir, but it does not relate directly
to the situation that occurred.
Senator, I indicated I would be happy to come discuss this
subject with you. I am happy to do that, sir. I do believe
there is a chain of logic here that is logical and reasonable
and in the best interests of our naval services. Otherwise I
would not take this position. The last thing I want to do is
put our men and women in harm's way. Certainly there is no way
that I would ever endorse doing that without adequate training.
The issue here again is to make absolutely certain for some
period of time until we can find an alternative that we do have
Vieques available to us. That is the risk that in my view has
to be addressed. I believe that is a substantial risk that we
face, and that is not being able to use Vieques in the near
term, and we do need it for a limited period of time. So this
approach is to buy us time to get an alternative. I am
convinced this is the best----
Senator Inhofe. I understand that, Secretary England. But
you are using my entire 6 minutes on this one justification and
I do not agree with it. I believe that live fire training is
very, very valuable and it trains much better than inert. I
think this report clearly states that they had sought live fire
training and were not able to get live fire training.
Let me ask Admiral Clark and General Jones--there are no
two more brilliant military minds in America today,
particularly in this rather confined subject. Do you consider
the live fire aspect of training to give a better, more
qualified job or qualified training than using inert?
Admiral Clark. I believe that a principle we pursue
constantly is train the way we intend to fight, and the more
real you can make it the better.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General Ryan--General Jones.
General Jones. I agree with that.
Senator Inhofe. I was very disturbed. This is the first
time I heard, during the course of this meeting, Secretary
England, that you are now talking about putting together
another group and they are going to go out and look again. We
have already had the Pace-Fallon report, which studied all
sites known at that time as alternative sites for unified
training. We had the Rush report which had retired admirals and
a retired general doing the same thing. Both reports came back
and said there is no alternative that can be found out there
for this quality.
But now we are talking about lowering the standards, Mr.
Chairman, lowering the standards of this training so that it is
no longer unified training. I can remember being out on the
U.S.S. Kennedy and the U.S.S. Eisenhower before their East
Coast deployments to the Persian Gulf, and it happened by
coincidence even though it was both in a confined period of
time, that the F-18 pilots told me in a gathering out there on
those aircraft carriers, they said--they used the football
analogy, and you have heard me state it several times privately
and in these meetings, that you can have the very best people
out there and you can have the very best football players, you
can have the very best quarterbacks, the very best halfbacks.
You let me group train over here and let another group train
over here and you have your quarterbacks over here, never
scrimmaging together, and the day of the big game comes and
they lose.
It is the unified training. Now I understand you are saying
that you are going to consider a combination of other sites and
get away from that unified training.
Before you answer that, let me ask the two experts here. In
the unified aspect of this training, primarily three functions
take place. You have a marine expeditionary landing, you have
live Navy fire, and you have the F-14s and the F-18s up
dropping live ammunition. Is it not accurate for me to come to
the conclusion that the unified training is much more valuable
and does a better job of training than having them do it in all
different areas, such as is now being suggested?
Admiral Clark. Whether it is your conclusion or anybody
else, the reality is that the integration of multiple
disciplines is the graduate level exercise and is what our
advantage has been, and that is the kind of training that we
like to bring people to. All of our certifications seek to
maximize that kind of training before we deploy them.
Senator Inhofe. General Jones.
General Jones. I agree with the CNO. I would just go on to
say that I hope that in our search for an alternative solution
that we will continue to hold to that standard; that is
obviously the best thing to be able to do for us, and
everything else is not as good.
Senator Inhofe. Let me just address this third thing, with
the indulgence of the chair. I think it is important. Secretary
England, I agree with you that it is very bad policy to have a
referendum. But if you had the choice of having a referendum of
self-determination or having a bunch of law-breaking,
trespassing political activists kick us off of the land that we
own, which is the worse policy?
Secretary England. I do not believe that is the choice,
Senator, and I would like to first address your first issue
that you brought up, because the Pace-Fallon report and the
Rush report indeed concluded that there was no direct
replacement for Vieques, one for one replacement. Those reports
were the basis of a further study that was conducted by the
Center of Naval Analysis and they concluded that, while there
was not a direct replacement for Vieques, there was a
replacement in terms of a combination of bases that would give
an equivalent level of training. They recognized that we had to
do some changes to some of the bases, but they were existing
bases.
So in my judgment there was a foundation to go forward.
This decision was not made without any consideration of
potential alternatives. So there is a foundation, and they will
now use the prior studies that they have done to go forward and
look for, to build upon those studies to see if we cannot
develop those alternatives previously identified.
So I believe that, while there were earlier reports, there
are also later reports that built upon those, that indicate
there are opportunities for alternatives.
Senator Inhofe. One last thing. I do not like the idea of
the referendum, but we can win the referendum. This notion that
is coming out of the White House that we cannot do it, or
wherever this came from--I am not sure where this came from,
Mr. Secretary. You and I have had many private conversations.
We will have more, and I do not want this to be a personal
thing because I certainly have the highest regard for you and
your abilities. I think you are doing a great job in here.
Frankly, I think you were put in a terrible, awkward
situation. I do not envy you at all. But as far as the
referendum is concerned, there is a difference here. We are
talking about Vieques, which is a municipality of the big
island of Puerto Rico. There are 9,300 people on there, of
which there are 6,400 voters on that island.
Those people do not like, as a general rule, the
politicians and the people who are coming over and protesting
on their land from Puerto Rico. We had an election with three
different parties running for election, all of them seeing who
could be the meanest to the Navy in order to get elected
governor, and the one won who was.
Now we have a situation. I have in my office petitions
signed by 2700 registered voters with their social security
numbers, their addresses, their telephone numbers, people who
live on Vieques, not only supporting the Navy, but wanting to
secede from Puerto Rico. Now, with that base we can win the
referendum and then just hope we never have another referendum
again.
Secretary England. If we have one, I hope you are right,
Senator. On the other hand, there are over 2,000 people on that
island who are suing the Navy.
Senator Inhofe. Well, wait a minute now. Let us talk about
trial lawyers going around getting people to sign things
saying, if we are able to get a large judgment here would you
like to participate in the judgment? That is essentially who
those 2,000 people are, and you know it and I know it.
Secretary England. Well, it is not clear to me that you
will win this election. If you look at all the past results,
the indicators are we will not, and if we do not it is a
significant embarrassment.
Senator Inhofe. I think we have covered that enough. I
would just ask for your full support in helping to win the
referendum.
Secretary England. If we have a referendum, we will
definitely try to win that referendum. I have made that
commitment to you before, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Secretary England. I repeat that commitment.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Senator Warner. If I might indulge a minute----
Chairman Levin. It might be useful to see if any of the
names might be on both lists. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. I would like to say that in the past few
days--I mentioned I had been working in my State. I have
visited two ranges in Virginia where there is live firing of
artillery and tanks. One of them is at Quantico not more than
25 miles from where we are sitting right here. Am I not
correct, General Jones?
General Jones. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Senator Warner. The other, General Shinseki, is right down
there in Blackstone, Virginia, which is the biggest training
center on the East Coast, really.
Senator Inhofe. I trained on that range.
Senator Warner. So we have that going home, and nobody
around here is going to have a referendum down in Virginia as
long as I am Senator.
Chairman Levin. I have a couple more questions on Vieques.
I think we appropriated $40 million that the Navy was to use
for economic development down there and a very small amount of
that has been used so far. Assuming the referendum goes
forward, do you plan on spending all of that money?
Secretary England. Senator, I do not know if we will spend
all of it, but what we have done so far is spend $3 million for
other agencies for health and environmental type issues. We
have $5 million obligated for small business development and
for apprenticeship programs, and on Thursday I will review the
detailed schedule of all the activities, the activities with a
spend plan, to make sure we are spending the money wisely.
It does include, for example, reimbursement for fishermen
who cannot fish on the days that we use the range, etcetera.
There are a wide range of activities on the island. People are
working diligently to schedule those activities in terms of
both time and money. I will have that available on Thursday and
then I am pleased to make that available to this committee. So
we are working that very hard, sir.
Chairman Levin. Assuming the referendum goes forward or
otherwise, you do plan on spending most of that money; is that
correct?
Secretary England. Sir, I would expect that would be the
case. I do not know if in the time between now and November we
can spend it all wisely, but we will definitely have a plan to
spend it.
Chairman Levin. Well, let us know, if you would, within a
week just exactly what your plans are.
Secretary England. Yes, I will.
[The information referred to follows:]

Of the $40 million authorized and appropriated, $3 million has
already been transferred to other Federal agencies ($1.6 million to
Department of Health and Human Services; and $1.4 million to Department
of Interior) for health studies and land management. Of the remaining
$37 million, the Navy has released $5 million for apprenticeship
training and economic development. We are still considering how to
spend the rest of the money, but the focus will be on improving health
care, economic development, and educational assistance.

Chairman Levin. There was a provision in this referendum
requirement that if the CNO and the Commandant jointly submit a
certification that the range is no longer needed for training,
then the requirement for a referendum shall cease to be
effective on the date on which the certification is submitted.
Are you prepared, either of you, to sign that certification
at this time?
Secretary England. I hope not.
Admiral Clark. No, I am not.
Chairman Levin. That was addressed to them.
Secretary England. I am sorry, sir.
Admiral Clark. No, I am not, and I testified on a prior
occasion that when the subject came up--and you asked if I was
consulted--I raised this issue during the consultations, that
for the referendum to be set aside, lacking some other action,
the Commandant and I would have to so certify and that I could
not do so, and it was said--the comment to me was that they
would not ask me to do so.
Chairman Levin. General?
General Jones. The same answer, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, the question then arises about 2003.
Are either you, Admiral Clark, or you, General Jones, prepared
to tell us that there will be a satisfactory alternative that
meets the standards that you have set out by the end of 2003?
Can you tell us that today, that that will occur?
Admiral Clark. In answering your question, Mr. Chairman, I
would say we have to define ``satisfactory.'' I am given
guidance about the level I am supposed to deploy the battle
groups and the amphibious ready groups, and it is a Charlie 2
rating. The CNA study is based upon the plan that Admiral Bill
Fallon put together when he was the Second Fleet commander to
pull various pieces together, and we did in fact do that during
the time that we were not conducting training on Vieques.
That gets us to a low C-2 level. So if you define
''satisfactory`` as low C-2, well, then I would tell you that
we can do that today. If you ask me if that is where I think I
ought to have our forces when we deploy, I would tell you, no,
of course, I want them to be in the highest state of readiness
they can be. I do not know where that place is today.
Recall, when you asked me to----
Chairman Levin. You do not know whether that will be
achievable by 2003?
Admiral Clark. I do not know how to do that today, and that
has to be discovered. If you recall our discussion----
Chairman Levin. Are you able to tell us--excuse me,
Admiral, for interrupting--that will be discovered by the year
2003?
Admiral Clark. No, I cannot.
Chairman Levin. General Jones, can you tell us that that
level of training will be discovered, that alternative
discovered, by the year 2003? Can you tell us that today?
General Jones. I cannot.
Chairman Levin. Secretary England, how can you then tell us
that it will be discovered by the year 2003 if your experts
here cannot tell us that.
Secretary England. Again, sir, I have to go back and rely
on the earlier CNA studies that indicated there were
alternatives, a combination of bases that would include live
fire testing, so that it would give us an equivalent level.
That with hopefully additional technology, that we will be able
to do it.
It does buy us a considerable period of time. I mean, 2003
is a reasonable time in which to look at alternatives and
develop it. So we do have to rely on the fact that we are going
to put the best people together on this problem, look at the
best set of alternatives, look at technology, and come out with
the best answer.
Chairman Levin. Base it on a hope, in your words, on a
hope.
Secretary England. Well, I believe that is a better
opportunity for us----
Chairman Levin. I understand, but----
Secretary England. --than the other side.
Chairman Levin. --it is still a hope.
Secretary England. Well, it is an expectation, sir. It is
based on facts and information.
Chairman Levin. I guess the last question on Vieques I have
has to do with the governor. Have you received the governor's
assurance that, assuming your proposal that you are going to
make in the next few days passes, she will use her best efforts
to provide non-disrupted training through the year 2003? Have
you received that assurance from the current governor?
Secretary England. Senator, I believe the only thing she
can do is enforce the law. So she can provide security for our
facilities. She obviously just cannot keep people from showing
up on the island, but she can provide security for the forces.
My belief is she will do that, but I will confirm that with
her, sir.
Chairman Levin. I am not asking about your belief, though.
I am asking about whether or not she has given you assurances
that she will use her best efforts to provide undisrupted
training through 2003.
Secretary England. The governor has told me that she will
indeed uphold the law.
Chairman Levin. Do you understand that to mean she would
use her best efforts to provide--is that what you understand
that to mean? I do not want to use some words that are not----
Secretary England. I am trying also to understand, sir. I
am trying to make this clear. I think what she would do is
provide security, so she will uphold the law in terms of trying
to keep trespassers off the Navy property during the times of
our testing.
Chairman Levin. Would she withdraw the lawsuit?
Secretary England. I do not know, sir.
Chairman Levin. Have we asked?
Secretary England. No, sir, we have not.
Chairman Levin. Are you going to?
Secretary England. I have had preliminary discussions with
the governor. They were, I would say, very preliminary, get
acquainted, basically understand each other's position. We have
not gone beyond that, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Well, Mr. Chairman, those were very good
questions and it goes to the heart of the one that I earlier
asked: What do we get in return?
I assure you, Mr. Secretary, this committee, if this
language comes up, we will all be back in this room and we are
going to go over these questions and they will be tougher. I
for one am going to petition the chair to bring that governor
up here, because I do not think I want you to answer this
question, but I know the answer. If she indicates to you that
she will uphold the law, has she done that in the period of
time between her election and now? I do not think so.
Secretary England. Well, she did the last time, sir. My
impression is the last time she did indeed put considerable
forces in Vieques to uphold the law. So my understanding is
that she did do that during the last training session.
Senator Warner. Well, I would ask you to go back and talk
with your commanders, because I have information that the
United States military departments are spending a great deal of
money in security down there and all types of things. That
money is being diverted from readiness and other desperate
needs in your department that are going down there to enforce
the law of the United States of America, which Puerto Rico
accedes to.
Secretary England. We definitely augment what she does,
sir. There is no question about that.
Senator Warner. Just an observation, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee. My analysis of the R&D programs
across the board for the military departments--correct me if I
am wrong, but in the past the Pentagon-sponsored R&D programs
certainly made our country the world's undisputed superpower.
The fiscal year 2002 research and development account actually
decreases when compared to the 2001 appropriated amount.
Now, time has run out here this morning, but I would have
you supply the answer to the record as to what your opinion is
with regard to R&D. R&D is the thing that keeps us on the
cutting edge.
[The information referred to follows:]
Research and Development Accounts
army response
The Army expects significant science and technology advances that
will enhance our Objective Force capabilities, and we have focused
investments in these areas. The Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget
submission has less funding for science and technology than what was
appropriated in fiscal year 2001. However, a comparison of the Fiscal
Year 2002 President's Budget submission show a 22 percent increase in
real growth. The Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget submission
requests $1,579 million for advanced technology research and
development, which is an increase of $285 million over the $1,294
million requested in fiscal year 2001. The Army's commitment to
maintaining this investment in research and development is critical for
our successful transformation to the Objective Force.
navy response
The fiscal year 2002 budget provides a very robust RDT&E program,
and satisfies our highest priority research and development needs. As
compared to the fiscal year 2002 estimates in the Fiscal Year 2001
President's Budget Future Year's Defense Plan, the Navy's RDT&E has
increased by more than $1.9 billion. The increase provides additional
funding for a number of programs, including DD-21, CVN(X), Virginia
class submarine, SH-60R, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, and Science
and Technology efforts.
air force response
The Air Force Readiness portion of the overall R&D budget changes
from $8.6 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $8.5 billion in fiscal year
2002, a net reduction of $0.1 billion.
This $0.1 billion reduction is primarily attributed to a
combination of one-time congressional actions in fiscal year 2001 ($+.5
billion), and various fiscal year 2002 programmatic changes, the most
significant being the transfer of the Space Based Laser, Airborne
Laser, and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low programs to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) ($-.6 billion).

Senator Warner. Lastly, we have not said much this morning
about our CINC structure. For those watching this hearing, we
have worldwide the commanders who rely on you to prepare the
forces by way of equipment, readiness, and the training such
that they can use those forces as a deterrent and then, if
necessary, actual combatants.
Now, it is interesting. The quarterly readiness reports to
Congress identify a number, around 90, of CINC-identified
readiness-related deficiencies. About 30 of these deficiencies
are listed as category 1 deficiencies, which entails
significant warfighting risk to the execution of our national
military strategy. That is risk beginning on the battlefield to
the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, and then to
the conclusion of the political decisionmakers to employ those
forces.
Most of the specific deficiencies have been reported for
the past several years and have not as yet been effectively
addressed. Does this budget provide the necessary resources to
address these CINC-identified readiness deficiencies? Again, I
will ask that for the record, given the time, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
CINC-Identified Readiness Deficiencies
army response
The Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget submission provides the
resources necessary to address CINC-identified deficiencies at an
acceptable level of risk. The Army will continue to use the Department
of Defense's Joint Monthly Readiness Review process to provide the
appropriate level of visibility to these programs. This review examines
each program to make recommendations to senior level officials as the
level of risk that can be accepted and still meet the requirements to
execute our National Military Strategy.
navy response
Three of the six CINC Class ``A'' readiness deficiencies that
require Navy funding have been adequately funded in the fiscal year
2002 budget. However, while additional resources wee applied in the
fiscal year 2002 budget for preferred munitions, engine maintenance
backlogs, and aviation spares, these deficiencies were not funded at
levels necessary to eliminate the identified shortfalls.
air force response
The CINC-identified deficiencies are addressed at an acceptable
level of risk in the Amended Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget. Air
Force components of each Unified Command are constantly assessing
requirements to insure we are aware of CINC's warfighting priorities.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
I want to thank all of our witnesses this morning. It has
been a long hearing. There are a number of things that have
been requested for the record already. Senator Warner also
raised the question of Goldwater-Nichols. With his agreement on
this since he raised it, I think it would be useful that we ask
them for what suggested changes they might make. We made
reference to a number of them, and that they supply those for
the record.
There was a question that I thought you raised very
appropriately and, since a number of our witnesses said that
there were a number of other areas in Goldwater-Nichols that
they would make some suggested changes to, that we ask them for
the record to submit those changes. So we would ask each of you
to do that within a week or so.
[The information referred to follows:]

Army Response

Note: All the changes relating to Internal Department of
the Army would have to be replicated by parallel changes in the
provisions of Title 10 relating to the headquarters of the
other military departments. One of the purposes of Act was to
align the Military Departments in this regard, and it is
unlikely that Congress would make changes in the Department of
the Army without making the same changes in the other Military
Departments.

Navy Response
The Goldwater-Nichols Act has significantly benefited the
Department in numerous ways, including clearly setting forth the
responsibilities of the Secretary. I do not presently have any
recommendations to change this defense legislation. However, a part of
our effort to improve and transform the Department, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I will also be
examining the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to see whether any
future improvements would be beneficial. The Department would also
welcome the opportunity to participate in any effort by the committee
to review the Act.

Marine Corps Response

Air Force Response

Senator Levin. Also, the shortfall list, if you could do
that within a week or so. Senator Warner and others have made
other requests for items for the record. We will keep the
record open 24 hours for additional requests.
We want to thank all of our witnesses. Again, General Ryan,
if this turns out to be--I will not add any word there after
that, either ``thankfully'' or ``regrettably''--the last
hearing of ours that you attend, we all again want to just give
you one big thank you for a career and a lifetime of service.
Senator Warner. Your family, too.
General Ryan. Thank you, sir. It is an honor to serve.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
1. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, the Fiscal Year 2000 and 2001
Defense Authorizations required the services, commencing on 1 October
2000, to track the ``deployment'' of service members on an individual
basis. It also required that members be paid a per diem allowance of
$100 per day (effective 1 October 2001) if their cumulative days of
deployment exceed 401 days out of the preceding 730 days.
What has the Navy done to implement this program, what challenges
or unintended consequences has the Navy encountered in the process and
what possible measures do you suggest to address these challenges and/
or consequences?
Admiral Clark. In direct compliance with the legislation, the Navy
has inaugurated its Individual Personnel Tempo (ITEMPO) Program and is
actively tracking the `deployments' of sailors on an individual basis.
In keeping with the spirit and intent of the legislation, the Navy has
and is continuing to pursue more equitable and efficient ways to
utilize individual members' time away from home and to lessen the
impact of attendant high deployment pay on Navy budgets while
continuing to meet our broad spectrum of global commitments. Battle
group/unit operational employment schedules for fiscal year 2002 and
beyond, for example, are being structured to reflect more time in
homeport between major deployments and underway periods. Communities
with historically high operational tempo, such as the Seabees and
Military Sealift Command, are undergoing fundamental review and
restructuring to better comply with the intent of legislation.
Similarly, the personnel assignment process has been revamped to more
effectively identify and assign personnel to critical sea duty billets
to preclude ITEMPO `busts'. Additionally, maintenance availability for
major combatants and support vessels are being evaluated with an eye to
better sequencing and locating these within homeports to minimize
ITEMPO consequences.
At the same time we move to comply with the intent of the
legislation, however, our efforts are exposing a range of unintended
consequences which have significant potential to negatively impact our
service members and our operational readiness. Operational schedule
adjustments instituted to reduce overall deployed days will translate
into some global naval forward presence and capability gaps in critical
theatres. Similarly, desired adjustments to maintenance availabilities
may create contractual conflicts and scheduling issues. While more
restrictive personnel assignment policies threaten to reduce the
overall distributable inventory and severely limit the options of our
personnel vis-a-vis requisite career path requirements and family
geographic and financial stability. In essence, it has become clear
that the comprehensive consequences of ITEMPO implementation are not
yet adequately understood.
The Navy fully supports the underlying premise of ITEMPO
legislation; however, with just 9 months of individual ITEMPO related
data on file and with current Navy cost estimates indicating up to $160
million per year in attendant ITEMPO costs, Navy believes it would be
prudent to seek legislative relief which extends for 2 years the
effective date of implementation of payments to allow more time to
gather data and conduct detailed analysis. In so doing the full
spectrum of unintended consequences could be better understood and
requisite effective measures taken to mitigate them.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
2. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England and Admiral Clark, the
administration's draft plans for expanded intercontinental-range
ballistic missile defense include looking to sea-based defenses. The
Navy seems split over this matter, with some advocating a greater Navy
role in missile defenses, other than the Navy Area Defense and Navy
Theater Defense programs, and others who are concerned over the impact
this new mission would have on the number of ships available to the
fleet for conventional missions.
What are your views of the impact that using Navy ships for
intercontinental-range ballistic missile defense testing or deployment
would have on the availability of ships for existing missions?
Secretary England and Admiral Clark. In February, the Secretary of
Defense signed out a joint Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and
Navy study on how the Navy could supplement the initial land based
missile defense site. While this conceptual study indicated that
layered defenses, including forward positioned sea-based interceptors
and radars could provide operational benefits to an initial land-based
defense system, no policy decisions were made to determine the size,
deployment or employment of a Naval capability in defense of
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Since the Navy still has not been assigned a Ballistic Missile
Defense system role, it remains focused on the Area and Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) mission development.
The Navy's top priority in missile defense is to get Navy Area to
sea onboard Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers in Fiscal Year 2004.
Testing of the SPY radar and Aegis computer programs is ongoing at sea
using the LINEBACKER ships (U.S.S. Port Royal and U.S.S. Lake Erie). In
addition, extensive land based testing of the SM-2 Block IVA missile
and vertical launch systems are ongoing at the White Sands Missile
Range. Following the land and sea based testing this year, the Navy
expects to conduct final system integration at sea during live missile
firings in fiscal year 2003-2004.

3. Senator Kennedy. General Jones, for months now, we have been
asking ourselves what to do with the V-22 Osprey program. Since
December of last year, the program has undergone a Mishap Investigation
Report and JAG Manual Report for the December accident that claimed the
lives of four marines; the Blue Ribbon Panel Review; and a DOD
Inspector General investigation to determine if maintenance records
have been falsified--according to the preliminary results of this
investigation, it seems that they were.
The administration requested 12 V-22s in its final Fiscal Year 2002
Defense Budget. This number of V-22s is said to be the minimum
sustainable rate of production for this aircraft. Yet, to my knowledge,
procurement funding provided in fiscal year 2001 for 11 V-22s has not
yet been released.
There are many changes that have been recommended for the V-22
program, including those needed to address design and manufacturing
problems which resulted in the chaffing of wires and hydraulic lines in
the nacelles, safety reporting problems where the program manager
didn't know about flight problems that had been detected during
operational test and evaluation, and the most disturbing to me--the
lack of thorough testing of the NATOPS operations manual. As you may
recall, in the December tragedy, this manual instructed that the pilots
push the illuminated Primary Flight Control System reset button, but,
when they did, the pressed button started an unanticipated, software-
related, chain of events that likely resulted in the deadly crash of a
potentially air worthy aircraft. This emergency procedure was included
in the NATOPS manual, but was never tested and verified in the V-22
simulators.
Will the V-22 program complete the further development and changes
necessary to improve the program's safety and reliability record before
procurement funding for the 12 fiscal year 2002 aircraft is released?
If not, then these aircraft will have to go through the same
modifications that will have to be performed on the 8 Ospreys already
manufactured, and the 11 Ospreys from fiscal year 2001.
Does the Navy or Marine Corps know how much these modifications
will cost? Has the Navy or Marine Corps provided funds for these
necessary modifications in the fiscal year 2002 budget or any future
years budgets?
General Jones. No. All developmental changes to improve the safety
and reliability of the V-22 will not be completed before the release of
fiscal year 2002 funding. However, the aircraft procured in fiscal year
2002 will not be delivered until fiscal year 2004. This should allow
time for changes to the aircraft production lines before this lot is
produced. In any event, all required modifications to these aircraft
will occur before delivery to the fleet. The V-22 program is
continuously incorporating changes to improve the aircraft's safety and
reliability performance. This process of identifying improvements and
incorporating changes has been ongoing and will continue throughout the
life of the program.
We will not know the total cost of the modifications until we have
ascertained exactly what they are. However, the fiscal year 2001 and
fiscal year 2002 budgets (as well as outyear planning) reflect funding
to design, develop, test and install corrective actions in the aircraft
already delivered as well as those planned to be procured.

4. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, will the V-22 program
complete the further development and changes necessary to improve the
program's safety and reliability record before procurement funding for
the 12 fiscal year 2002 aircraft is released?
If not, then these aircraft will have to go through the same
modifications that will have to be performed on the 8 Ospreys already
manufactured, and the 11 Ospreys from fiscal year 2001.
Secretary England. No, all developmental changes to improve the
safety and reliability of the V-22 will not be completed before the
release of fiscal year 2002 funding. However, the aircraft procured in
fiscal year 2002 will not be delivered until fiscal year 2004. This
should allow time for changes to the aircraft production lines before
this lot is produced. In any event, all required modifications to these
aircraft will occur before delivery to the fleet. The V-22 program is
continuously incorporating changes to improve the aircraft's safety and
reliability performance. This process of identifying improvements and
incorporating changes has been ongoing and will continue throughout the
life of the program.

5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, does the Navy or Marine
Corps know how much these modifications will cost? Has the Navy or
Marine Corps provided funds for these necessary modifications in the
fiscal year 2002 budget or any future years budgets?
Secretary England. We will not know the total cost of the
modifications until we have ascertained exactly what they are. However,
the fiscal year 2001 and 2002 budgets (as well as out year planning)
reflect funding to design, develop, test, and install corrective
actions in the aircraft already delivered as well as those planned to
be procured.

outsourcing and commercialization
6. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Roche, the Air Force has been in the
forefront of public-private competition and contracting out. The DOD
budget request plans to save millions of dollars with more competition
and outsourcing and further commercialization efforts. While I believe
that competition is a great way to ensure that the Department of
Defense is getting the best value for the taxpayers, it seems that many
involved in these efforts have forgotten that competition for work can
go both ways.
Are you planning to offer Federal Government employees the
opportunity to compete for workload that is done both in-house and
outside the government to achieve the most savings and efficiency for
the government?
Secretary Roche. It has long been the policy of the Federal
Government to obtain commercial services from the private sector when
it is cost effective to do so. Once it has been determined that
government performance of a commercial activity is not required, an A-
76 cost comparison may be performed to determine the most cost
effective method of performance--in-house or contract.
Normally, contracted activities are not re-competed between the
private sector and an in-house government workforce because it has
already been determined that government performance is not necessary.
However, current OMB, DOD, and Air Force policy provides for contracted
workload to be converted to in-house performance if it can be
demonstrated, via A-76 cost comparison, that the government can operate
the activity on an ongoing basis at a lower cost than a qualified
commercial source. Today, many of our A-76 cost comparisons include
currently contracted workload as part of the total competition. If the
cost comparison demonstrates that in-house performance is more
economical, the previously contracted portion can be converted to in-
house performance.

dd-21
7. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, several of us on the
committee are very supportive of the DD-21 program. This ship is the
next-generation destroyer for the Navy and is the only near-term
solution for shore-fire support for the Marine Corps and the Army.
Earlier this summer, the Navy delayed the selection of the winning
team, which will design and build the DD-21. This decision was made, in
part, due to a new study, ordered by Under Secretary Aldridge, which is
to examine the future shipbuilding program.
Because no future years defense program was submitted with the
final fiscal year 2002 defense budget request, we don't know when--or
if--DD-21 procurement funding will be forthcoming. The fiscal year 2002
budget only requests research and development funding to keep the
program alive.
What is the status of Under Secretary Aldridge's study?
Secretary England. I will have to refer you to the Department of
Defense on the details of the Shipbuilding Review and the process used
to perform it. However, the Navy supported the Office of the Secretary
of Defense-led effort with operational and acquisition subject matter
experts as required. It is the Navy's understanding that the results of
the study will be incorporated as part of the overall Quadrennial
Defense Review.

8. Senator Kennedy. General Jones, is there another means of
providing for the Marine Corps shore-fire support requirements other
than DD-21?
General Jones. No other system is currently under development that
will fully satisfy the Marine Corps' requirements for all-weather,
precision and volume naval surface fires at the required ranges.
The 155mm Advanced Gun System, with a family of precision-guided
and ballistic ammunition, is being designed specifically for DD-21 as a
means to provide both precision and volume fires for expeditionary
maneuver forces. Additionally, the Advanced Land Attack Missile, with a
family of general use and specialty warheads, will provide responsive
fires out to the ranges required to support a vertically lifted Ship-
to-Objective Maneuver force. The capabilities provided by the DD-21 and
its associated systems remain vital to realizing the full potential of
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and the conduct of expeditionary
operations and sustained operations ashore in a fluid, non-linear
battlespace.

9. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, do you support the DD-21?
Secretary England. Yes, the Navy supports the DD-21 and remains
committed to the objectives of the program. This position was
reiterated by Under Secretary Pirie in his May 31, 2001, letter
temporarily placing the source selection on hold, ``While the
objectives of the DD-21 program remain valid, it is prudent to afford
the Department of the Navy an opportunity to consider if a change in
program strategy is warranted based upon the outcome of the respective
defense strategy studies.''

10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, when will the Department of
the Navy be making a decision to pick the winning team for the DD-21?
Secretary England. The source selection decision for the DD-21
program will not be made until the Department of the Navy has
determined if a change in program strategy is warranted based upon the
outcome of the ongoing defense strategy studies, specifically the
Department of Defense QDR, Strategic studies and the Future
Shipbuilding Program Study.

11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, will you encourage
Secretary Rumsfeld to keep the program as you go through the
Quadrennial Defense Review?
Secretary England. The Navy remains committed to the objectives of
the DD-21 program. As you are aware, DD-21 source selection was delayed
by the Navy pending the results of several on going defense strategy
reviews, specifically the Office of Secretary of Defense's Strategic
Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and Future Shipbuilding Program
study. The Navy is working closely with the Department of Defense on
these force structure reviews and is an active advocate for all our
future acquisition programs, including DD-21.

unexploded ordnance (uxo)
12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary White and General Shinseki, the
financial and technical problems of cleaning up unexploded ordnance at
all of the Army's bases--open, active, inactive, closing and closed--
continues. In Massachusetts, the Army is currently having to remove UXO
to keep their contents from further contaminating the sole-source
aquifer under the Upper Cape. What resources has the Army invested in
both ongoing UXO cleanup efforts and in research and development
programs to find better and more effective ways of removing UXO?
Secretary White and General Shinseki. In our ongoing UXO cleanup
efforts, we are investing nearly $79.4 million. Of this, we are
executing $53 million as DOD's Executive Agent for Formerly Used
Defense Sites, which is a DOD-funded program.
In the last 2 fiscal years, we invested approximately $19 million
in our research, development, and technology programs to find better
and more effective ways of identifying, discriminating, and addressing
unexploded ordnance and buried munitions. Next fiscal year, we have
programmed an expenditure of approximately $15.3 million in research
and development programs.
We are currently conducting a complete inventory of our ranges.
When complete, the inventory will assist us in developing the scope of
munition-related issues at our ranges.

13. Senator Kennedy. General Jones, the Pentagon estimates that
personnel living in off-base housing currently pay about 15 percent
out-of-pocket for housing costs. The goal for next year is to raise the
basic allowance for housing to reduce out-of-pocket expenses to about
11.3 percent for the approximately 750,000 service members living off-
base. But, it is my understanding that there are areas where military
families currently pay much more than the 15 percent out-of-pocket
expenses to meet housing costs. For example, military personnel
stationed in Southern California and living in off-base housing have
felt the impact of the rapidly rising energy costs and pay well above
the current 15 percent out-of-pocket goal.
What steps are being taken by the Marine Corps to reduce this
expense or mitigate this burden?
General Jones. The 15 percent out-of-pocket cost is a national
average. Some marines will pay more than 15 percent while others will
pay less. This is not a regional issue and servicemembers in southern
California are not different from anywhere else we have marines
stationed. Although the Office of the Secretary of Defense establishes
BAH rates and updates them on a periodic basis, they do so with Service
involvement and the involvement of local commanders. In the particular
case of Southern California, throughout the fall of 2000 when the
current BAH rates were being developed, it was forecast that the
utility portion of the BAH for southern California would continue to
rise into 2001. Instead of using measured utility costs in 2000, costs
were forecast by comparing the growth in utility costs from June 1999
with May-July 2000 and then doubling that rate of growth then applying
this inflated estimate to the 2001 rates. The actual cost of
electricity in southern California has still not yet risen to the
inflated level applied to the 2001 BAH rates.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
armored security vehicle (asv)
14. Senator Landrieu. General Shinseki, I've been reading in daily
periodicals that the Army intends to terminate the Armored Security
Vehicle (ASV) program at the end of fiscal year 2002. The ASV was
developed for use in operations other than war to protect military
police (MP) units from weapons up to .50 caliber armor piercing
ammunition and 12 lb. landmines. What is the rationale for that
decision?
General Shinseki. The Army does not have plans to terminate the ASV
program at the end of fiscal year 2002.

15. Senator Landrieu. General Shinseki, is there an Interim Armored
Vehicle (IAV) variant for the ASV programmed for MP units? If so, what
is this vehicle, when will they be issued to the MPs, what are its
capabilities, and what will it cost compared to an ASV?
General Shinseki. There is no IAV variant for the ASV programmed
for MP units. The IAVs are fielded to the Interim Brigades and not
individual MP units. The current plan is to continue to field the ASV
to MP units. Therefore, no cost analysis has been performed concerning
the use of an IAV in the MP role.

16. Senator Landrieu. General Shinseki, what is your plan for
providing vehicles for this mission, if ASV is terminated and there is
no IAV equivalent?
General Shinseki. If the Army were placed in a position where a
substitute vehicle would be required for the ASV, the UpArmored High-
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) would be used. The
UpArmored HMMWV is already in use in MP units.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
17. Senator Reed. General Jones, your statement refers to the AAAV
as a transformational program ``intended to achieve a fundamental
advance in capabilities by exploiting leap-ahead technology.'' Could
you please elaborate? What is the difference between transformational
technologies and modernization for the Marine Corps?
General Jones. To the Marine Corps, transformation is a continuing
process that spans decades of innovation and experimentation with the
implementation of new systems, operational and organizational concepts.
It involves the development of new operational concepts, refinement of
enabling capabilities through experimentation, and the development of
new organizations, tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies as
necessary to turn these concepts into warfighting capabilities.
Modernization, as used by the Marine Corps, explicitly means
reshaping the Marine Corps capabilities to meet the future through the
selective acquisition of new equipment that will enable the execution
of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in support of emerging joint
warfighting concepts. Modernization leads to increases in capability.
Since it is part of an on-going process of Marine Corps combat
development, there is not a requirement for a major shift in the way
the Marine Corps trains, organizes, and equips operating forces implied
in the term ``transformation''. Modernization is more than simply
replacing worn out equipment; rather, effective modernization is our
means of opportunistically implementing new technologies in order to
enable new concepts and increased warfighting capability.
In this sense, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is
more than simply a replacement for the 1970s technology of the
venerable AAV7A1 that has served the Marine Corps for over 30 years.
The AAAV will join the MV-22 and LCAC as an integral component of the
amphibious triad that will enable Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in the
21st century. With an eightfold increase in speed and a range of
greater than three times its predecessor, the AAAV will allow
immediate, high-speed surface maneuver of marine infantry units as they
emerge from ships located over the visual horizon 25 nautical miles and
beyond. Projection of these forces will be conducted in a manner that
exploits the intervening sea and land terrain to achieve surprise and
rapidly penetrate weak points in the enemy's littoral defenses to seize
operational objectives. For the first time in the history of naval
warfare, maneuver ashore in a single, seamless stroke will be possible
thereby providing both ships and landing forces sufficient sea space
for maneuver, surprise, and force protection during power projection
operations.
The result is a truly transformational operational capability
stemming from a convergence of various modernization programs that,
when joined, result in a truly revolutionary gain in warfighting
capability.
long range power projection
18. Senator Reed. Secretary Roche, as recently demonstrated, long-
range power projection remains critical to U.S. national security. What
are your plans to modernize the U.S. long-range bomber force? Does the
fiscal year 2002 budget request begin this modernization process?
Secretary Roche. The fiscal year 2002 budget request continues the
modernization process via aircraft modifications outlined in the Air
Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers. The Air Force established time
phased modernization plans--near, mid, and long term modernization
initiatives--for the B-52, B-1, and B-2. The purpose of a time phased
plan was to outline a program to improve the combat capability of the
bomber platforms through integration of precision, gravity and standoff
weapons, avionics, computers, communications suites, and
maintainability upgrades. The modernization plan will improve bomber
fleet lethality, survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness.

space commission recommendations
19. Senator Reed. All secretaries and chiefs, could you each
discuss your views of the Secretary's (SECDEF) decision to implement
the recommendations of the Space Commission? How will this initiative
effect the Services' roles in this area?
Secretary White and General Shinseki. The Commission released its
report containing 10 major recommendations in January 2001. The Army
concurred with many of the Commission's recommendations, but presented
comments about three of the recommendations as outlined below.
The first comment centered on the designation of the Air Force as
executive agent (EA) for space. Without a clearly defined description
of the responsibilities and authority delegated to the Air Force, it is
difficult to assess specific Army impacts. The Army requires additional
clarification on issues such as Army role in assisting the EA in
maintaining the space program plan; Army responsibilities for
developing and funding Service-unique space systems and capabilities;
Army authorities with respect to maintaining their own space
requirements determination process; the Services' authority for their
unique doctrine, strategy, education, training, and operations; the EA-
Army relationship with respect to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Committee (JROC) requirements process; the Services' right to appeal EA
decisions to the Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence,
and Information or any subordinate oversight bodies; and the cost of
implementing the Commission's recommendations. The Army anticipates
having an opportunity to review and comment on the draft of Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) charter to the Air Force that would
describe its responsibilities as the space EA and acquisition executive
(AE).
A second comment centered on the creation of an Under Secretary of
the Air Force (USECAF) and assignment of responsibilities as the
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and designation as the
Air Force AE for space. The report is not clear as to the disposition
of the other Services' program executive officers as related to such
areas as space control, force enhancement, and force application.
Without an EA charter, and without further clarification, the value of
assigning the EA duties to a Service instead of a Joint or Defense
organization is not clear. Designating the USECAF as the Air Force AE
for space would provide a single agency within the Air Force for
integrating space funding and acquisition. Again, the Army is seeking
an opportunity to review and comment on OSD's draft charter to the Air
Force.
A third comment centered on the importance of maintaining the
independence of the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) efforts.
The Space Commission recommended that the NSSA report to the USECAF.
The Army proposes that the existing architecture review process, to
include the National Security Space Senior Steering Group and the JROC
review process, be maintained. The Army looks forward to working with
the Air Force on this subject during the development of the Space
Architect memorandum of understanding.
Secretary England and Admiral Clark. The Navy concurs with the
recommendations of the Space Commission. We see the report as an
opportunity and we look forward to an active role in the implementation
of the recommendations to better enable joint land, air, and maritime
warfighting using space assets. Space systems are critical to naval
warfighting and network centric operations, so it is imperative for
Navy to continue to participate--with the Air Force as Executive
Agent--as a joint partner in the requirements, science and technology,
research and development, acquisition, and operations processes for
space systems.
A Naval Review Panel on Space, sponsored by the Under Secretary of
the Navy, is currently meeting to help us focus on and address several
key areas. These include: the maintenance of an effective naval space
cadre of both military and civilian personnel to participate throughout
the National Security space organization; strong space science and
technology/research and development within Navy to continue to provide
innovative space solutions as recommended by the Space Commission; the
education of our naval warfighters in all facets of space systems;
strategic joint partnerships with other space stakeholders; and the
identification of any space-related missions for which Navy may be
uniquely qualified.
General Jones. The Marine Corps enthusiastically concurs with, and
is actively engaged in supporting the decision of the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) to implement the recommendations of the Space
Commission. The Commission was faced with a balkanized landscape of
less than optimally coordinated national security space efforts that
lacked a coherent vision. Lack of adherence to military principles of
organization had been the fault of the conceptual restriction of space
to an information medium. The Commission recognized that the
technology-enabled threats and opportunities ``in, to, through, and
from space'' demanded change. The SECDEF's implementation will now lead
to the establishment of singular leadership, unity of effort, and
advocacy for this all-important environment, one that could eventually
evolve into a warfighting Area of Responsibility (AOR).
The Secretary's decision to implement fundamental changes comes
none-too-soon, and the DOD has an arduous task ahead. Our space-borne
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems, not to
mention our military and civil space communications-navigation assets,
are extremely vulnerable. For example, the asymmetric anti-satellite
(ASAT) threat from less Information Technology (IT)-dependent potential
adversaries must be addressed immediately. As the Commission observed,
without a superior space protection operational capability and other
space control measures, the U.S. could suffer a space version of Pearl
Harbor. This could very well occur without the simple pre-space era
industrial capacity to effectively compensate for lost military
platforms.
Our national dependency on precious few information nodes in space
has many causes. These include our military cultural euphoria with IT
convenience, a naive confidence in our invincibility atop the strategic
high ground, and reluctance within the public and private sectors to
bear the cost of space system swivability and robustness in the post-
Cold War era. But, given sufficient resources and institutional
motivation, the new priority of space in DOD may enable us to
effectively respond in time.
For Marine Corps warfighters the potential for improved space-
enabled terrestrial battlefield capabilities is more hopeful than ever
before. When the Marine Corps vision for national security space was
briefed to the Commission we reminded the members that the Marine
Corps' 23rd Commandant, Gen. Wallace M. Greene, was one of the Defense
Department's first space visionaries. As early as 1963 he proposed
rapid expeditionary Marine Corps power projection using the space
medium, including the sub-orbital, hypersonic transport of small units
to crisis hot spots anywhere on earth. Even today, the technical
challenges of General Greene's vision remain great, but the new DOD
emphasis could lead to the earlier realization of many other advanced
capabilities.
The Commission also recognized that the need for a Space Force,
Corps, or Service might emerge in the future. Since the Air Force has
been designated the Executive Agent (EA) for space it should rightfully
receive the exclusive Title X responsibility for raising such forces.
It is noteworthy that the Air Force has been managing approximately 85
percent of the DOD's military space programs to date. Furthermore, the
Air Force already has over 40,000 military and civilians serving in
space-related duties, and those positions and personnel will now begin
to be managed as a professional space cadre. With its assumption of EA
responsibilities, the Air Force will also take under its programmatic
cognizance major Navy and Army space programs, as well as the United
States' greatest ISR success legacy, the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO). In coming years Air Force ``space forces'' can expect to remain
terrestrially based, with systems and weapons remaining robotic or
remotely controlled, and primarily operating in support of soldier,
sailor, airman, and marine terrestrial warfighters.
However, technology and future crises may bring surprises, and the
need for routine manned military space flight and operations in space
could emerge. For General Greene's vision of expeditionary marine
transport, our Service's environmental connection to space appears
secure. But it is the Air Force that will have the charter and
responsibility to develop space transport, space warfighting, and other
advanced space capabilities; awesome tasks that could change the
character and identity of a large fraction of that Service. The history
of the emergence of the Air Force from the Army Air Corps should be
carefully studied in this regard, and further sensible evolution should
not be hindered.
Our military cultural decision to ride the IT bandwagon is a two-
edged sword. The cost of global, speed-of-light information
dissemination and communications is that USMC terrestrial warfighting
victory across the spectrum of conflict will largely hinge on our
Nation's ability to exploit and defend assets in the unusually exposed
space medium. Therefore, with a small contingent of qualified Marine
Corps space professionals, we must increase our influence over space
operational and programmatic processes in the future through strategic
personnel assignments. The critical nodes in which we are aggressively
seeking increased participation are the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) (legacy ISR acquisition programs and operations), United States
Space Command (USSSPACECOM) (space warfighting operations), Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC) (Joint and multi-user space acquisition
programs), the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) (the joint
space concepts development and requirements arbitrator for the JROC),
and the Joint Staff.
Our cadre's core qualifications will continue to be rooted in the
superb educational foundation provided by the Naval Postgraduate
School, and could include U.S. Army and Air Force space cadre
qualification curriculums in the future. Marines are already assigned
to a few of the key nodes noted above, but that participation will now
increase, in concert with a larger network identity that operates off
of a single, coherent, requirements-based USMC vision. The objective is
to have acquisition qualified space cadre marines managing or
functioning within all the nodes, particularly in Joint programs at the
NRO and AFSPC, to help guarantee the relevance of future weapons, C\4\,
ISR, and other capabilities for USMC warfighters.
It is worth noting that some have questioned the weight that should
be assigned to Marine Corps positions on space. Admittedly, of all the
services, the Marine Corps space cadre is the smallest, and with the
exception of some C4 terminal procurements and a modest experimentation
budget, we have no programmatic stake in the approximately $20B per
year that constitutes U.S. national security space. But our Service's
space-related warfighter requirement equities are exactly equal.
Arguments based on the preservation of Service Total Obligation
Authority (TOA) in space programs appear to run counter to the SECDEF's
aims for improved national defense through focused purpose and
efficiency. Fortunately, the Corps' programmatically neutral broker-
warfighter perspective was heard, and we believe it had a useful
influence on the outcome.
In summary, the Marine Corps is elevating the priority of space
unilaterally. It is up to us to recognize the importance of national
security space expertise and commit ourselves to long-term Joint
influence during its emergence as a warfighting medium.
Secretary Roche and General Ryan. The changes described by the
Space Commission and directed by the Secretary will help create a
stronger center of advocacy for national security space missions and
resources and build the critical mass of space professionals within the
Air Force and in the Nation's national security space programs.
Implementing the changes directed by the Secretary will strengthen Air
Force space management and organization, consolidate the Department's
space activities, and provide a focal point for the Department's
interaction with the commercial, civil, intelligence, and international
space communities.

black hawk production
20. Senator Reed. Secretary White and General Shinseki, the Army
has cut the number of Black Hawks procured in fiscal year 2002 from 16
to 12. Could you tell us why this decision was made and the impact it
will have? What plans do you have to ensure the much-needed
modernization of the Guard units?
Secretary White and General Shinseki. In the fiscal year 2001
President's Budget, the Army allocated sufficient funds to procure nine
UH-60s in fiscal year 2002. The Army has funded the procurement of 12
UH-60s in the fiscal year 2002 President's Budget submission. This
increase is an indication of the Army's commitment to provide as many
Black Hawks as possible to the fill the revised aviation force
structure, including the Army National Guard force structure, within
current Total Obligation Authority.
The Army plans to continue to procure Black Hawks to facilitate the
full modernization of the Reserve components. We have identified an
unfunded requirement for an additional 10 Black Hawks in fiscal year
2002 to accelerate modernization of the Army National Guard.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
space command organization
21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, how quickly should we
anticipate changes in the organization of Space Command? For each of
you, how will you ensure the missile defense programs BMDO is devolving
to the Services will be integrated and interoperable?
Secretary Roche. The changes described by the Space Commission and
directed by the Secretary will help create a stronger center of
advocacy for national security space missions and resources and build
the critical mass of space professionals in the Nation's national
security space programs. Implementing the changes directed by the
Secretary will strengthen Air Force space management and organization,
consolidate the Department's space activities, and provide a focal
point for the Department's interaction with the commercial, civil,
intelligence, and international space communities.
Within the Air Force, the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is
planning to transfer from Air Force Material Command (AFMC) to Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC) on or about 1 October 2001. This is part of
AFSPC's effort to develop a comprehensive approach for managing and
organizing Air Force space activities from research and development
through acquisition to operations. Further, the practice of dual-
hatting CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD with the Commander of Air Force Space
Command will end and a separate four-star will be assigned as Commander
of Air Force Space Command.

22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jones, you are on record as
calling the Blount Island complex a national asset. What is the mission
of the Blount Island complex? What efforts have been made by you and/or
the civilian leadership within DOD and the Navy to fund the purchase of
this facility?
General Jones. The mission of the Blount Island Complex focuses on
attainment, maintenance, and sustainment of all requirements in support
of the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS). Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) Maintenance Cycle operations conducted at
Blount Island are vital to maintaining the readiness and continued
capability of the MPF program. Blount Island is recognized by DOD, the
Joint Staff and the commanders in chief (CINCs) as a vital national
strategic asset, through its role in support of the MPF program. Since
1986, the MPF Maintenance Cycle for prepositioned equipment and
supplies has been conducted at Blount Island. Blount Island is part of
the Strategic Enabler entitled ``Strategic Mobility'', and is an asset,
which is critical to the worldwide application of U.S. military power
and our military strategy, under the strategic concepts outlined in the
National Military Strategy of Forward Presence and Crisis Response.
Under these concepts, the MPF program provides rapid and efficient
strategic deployment options through strategic siting around the globe
for the geographic and combatant CINCs. This enables MPF to be
especially responsive to regional crises and disaster relief. With
regards to the purchase of Blount Island, we appreciate the support of
Congress in funding the first phase of this acquisition and are well
underway in executing it.
I have included the second phase within the FYDP and am continuing
to work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) to move it forward in the program. I did submit the
project as my number 1 priority for consideration as OSD made final
adjustments to the fiscal year 2002 budget. However, their guidance for
these final adjustments precluded new footprints, to include Blount
Island. That said, I am committed to pursuing earlier programming
during the next budget cycle.

potential alternatives to vieques
23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary England, what is your target
date to decide on an alternative to Vieques? What alternatives are you
considering?
Secretary England. I have a November 6, 2001 deadline to report to
the President with alternatives to Vieques, however, there is no
specific decision date as yet. I will make a decision as soon as I have
all the relevant information, and will review any alternative location
or combination of locations that enables the Navy to effectively meet
our challenging and demanding training requirements in support of Fleet
readiness.

24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary England, why is the Navy not
taking advantage of the availability of increased dollars to purchase
new T-6 training aircraft, especially in view of recent loss of two
more Naval aviators in the old T-34 at Pensacola?
Secretary England. The T-34C is a safe and reliable aircraft that
has sufficient service life remaining and can satisfy Navy requirements
for several more years. Navy conducted a prioritized review of Navy
programs including Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
procurement profiles. In this review all options were investigated,
including maintaining T-34C in service longer than previously
envisioned. JPATS procurement was deferred to fund more urgent
competing priorities. JPATS procurement will resume in the future to
take better advantage of service life remaining on the T-34.
The T-34C has an excellent safety record. Over the last 20 years,
the mishap rate for the T-34C in the Training Command has been 0.66
mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. The average overall Navy/Marine Corps
mishap rate was 2.8 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours for the same
period.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
25. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, Secretary White, and
Secretary Roche, the Department of Defense has established 2010 as the
goal for improving the quality of military family housing. The budget
amendment proposes a $400 million increase in the family housing
account to facilitate the achievement of this goal, but focuses the
funding on the housing privatization.
Do you believe that housing privatization is the most appropriate
method for improving the military family housing stock?
Secretary England. DOD is using a three-pronged approach to
eliminating its inadequate housing stock. First, Basic Allowance for
Housing is being raised to zero out of pocket by fiscal year 2005 in
order to eliminate the economic inequities between community and
military family housing. Second, the Navy is entering into Public
Private Ventures (PPV) where feasible. Third, where PPV is not
feasible, the Navy is using Family Housing, Navy appropriated funds to
eliminate inadequate housing units.
The Navy was first in DOD to implement PPV in 1996 and will soon
privatize additional existing Family Housing units. Having just awarded
several PPVs, there is no long-term history on the success of the
executing phase of PPVs, property management (Navy awards typically
range from 20 to 50 year programs).
PPV Housing has as its primary advantage the ability to accelerate
inadequate home elimination by leveraging funds with the private
sector. Accordingly, PPV is playing a large role in the Navy's Family
Housing program. It is important though that the use of PPV be
considered as one of several tools available to improve Navy housing
standards. However, due to the long term impact, all housing options
should be assessed on their ability to meet each installation's unique
housing needs. The Navy accomplishes this by assessing all housing
construction, including PPV feasibility assessments, annually on an
installation-by-installation basis through the Shore Installations
Programming Board (SIPB). The SIPB is comprised of the Fleets and Chief
of Naval Operations Ashore Readiness Division. Its charter is to
consider regional PPV opportunities while promoting decisions that take
both the short and long term PPV impact into account. In some instances
it has been determined that PPV is not feasible. This is due to several
unique factors which include but are not limited to anti-terrorism
force protection concerns (housing is not severable from the
installation), existing commercial activity studies, available number
of housing units, lack of regional opportunity to partner with other
installations, or a poor private sector environment (low growth, high
vacancy rates, etc.).
Additionally, the Navy is conducting a Family Housing Functionality
Assessment (FA) that should be completed October 2001. This FA is
expected to assist in the decision making process by identifying
alternatives to traditional family housing asset management; namely, a
property management prototype, commercial activity, and PPV.
Current Navy guidance is to use PPV where feasible. The use of PPV
quotas though has the potential to introduce long-term risk for short-
term objectives as each installation's unique housing requirements may
not receive full consideration.
Secretary White. Yes, privatization of our family housing inventory
remains a key factor in helping the Army achieve its goal to provide
quality housing and improve the well being of soldiers and their
families. The Army has an aggressive privatization program utilizing
the Military Housing Privatization Initiative Act that Congress granted
in 1996 and extended until December 2004. These authorities allow the
Services to leverage appropriated family housing funds and assets to
attract private-sector capital and expertise to operate, manage,
maintain, improve, and construct new housing. By the end of 2005,
approximately 62 percent (67,842 units) of the worldwide end-state
inventory of 109,355 units is planned for privatization.
Secretary Roche. Given the limited MILCON budget for revitalizing
59,000 housing units, and the need to upgrade these units by the OSD
goal of 2010, privatizing 27,000 housing units is the most appropriate
method to achieve this goal. On average, the Air Force is leveraging
its assets by greater than five to one using privatization.

26. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, Secretary Roche, and
General Shinseki, under the current funding profile, will your service
achieve the 2010 goal for family housing improvement?
Secretary England. Yes. The Navy's current Master Plan eliminates
currently identified inadequate homes by fiscal year 2009.
Secretary Roche. Our Family Housing Master Plan provides our
corporate Air Force strategy to meet the 2010 goal. While we have
worked hard to provide an integrated plan which concentrates on fixing
our worst housing first, we recognize the realities of budget
shortfalls. Recognizing ongoing QDR discussions, the administration has
yet to establish our future funding levels beyond fiscal year 2002.
However, we are committed to find a solution to revitalize, divest
through privatization or demolish inadequate housing by 2010. This
commitment will guide our revision to our Family Housing Master Plan in
2002.
General Shinseki. Using a mix of traditional military construction
and privatization, the Army is able to allocate sufficient resources to
eliminate all inadequate Army family housing by 2010.

27. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, Secretary Roche, and
Secretary White, one of Secretary Rumsfeld's more significant goals is
to fund facility replacement on a 67-year standard, rather than the
almost 200-year cycle under prior funding programs. Although this
standard is still short of the industry standard of 57 years, it will
significantly increase the readiness of our military installations.
Will the current budget request support the 67-year replacement
standard? If not, what are the funding requirements or other
initiatives that will allow you to reach the standard?
Secretary England. The Navy's amended fiscal year 2002 budget
request supports a 113-year recapitalization rate. While still short of
the 67-year standard this is a substantial improvement over the
previous rate of over 160 years that existed prior to the amended
budget. The facility replacement program will require nearly $600M
additional recapitalization funds in fiscal year 2002 to meet the 67-
year standard.
Infrastructure reduction initiatives to assist in reaching this
standard include planning efforts to identify true requirements,
consolidation of facilities where feasible and demolition of aging and
excess facilities. Key to consistently achieving the long-range
recapitalization goal will be successful implementation of the Defense
Department's Efficient Facilities Initiative to realign and reduce base
infrastructure.
Secretary Roche. No. It would take a fiscal year 2002 add of about
$1 billion to achieve a 67-year replacement cycle investment rate.
However, the AF has had to take risk in the infrastructure accounts
over the last decade and has a backlog of deteriorated facilities. An
additional $1.7B/year is required to buyout this backlog by 2010.
Secretary White. In fiscal year 2002, the budget request does not
support the 67-year replacement standard. An additional $526 million in
fiscal year 2002 is needed to get the total inventory replaced in 67
years. Other initiatives that help the Army reach the 67-year standard
include privatization of housing and utilities, leasing facilities to
the private sector (i.e., the hospital at Fort Sam Houston), and
elimination of excess facilities.

european restationing plan
28. Senator Thurmond. General Shinseki, European Army units
continue to be stationed in World War II facilities that limit mission
capability, complicate training, drain repair and maintenance
resources, and are extremely costly to renovate. To correct this
situation the Army is reviewing alternatives to the current stationing
plan.
What is the status of the European restationing plan and what is
the anticipated cost?
Does this budget provide any funding to initiate the relocation
effort? If not, when do you anticipate funding will be available for
this transition?
General Shinseki. United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) initiated
the Efficient Basing-East program to enhance readiness and improve
soldier well being through the restationing of a brigade combat team
from numerous small installations to the Grafenwoehr area. The goal is
to gain efficiency by improving command and control, providing improved
training at lesser cost, reducing the USAREUR footprint and operating
cost, enhancing force protection, reducing personnel tempo and
operational tempo, and reducing manpower overhead and long-term costs
by eliminating small, costly, and inefficient installations.
USAREUR continues to develop this initiative in terms of costs and
phasing. Current identified costs total $477.7 million for fiscal year
2003 to fiscal year 2007 for construction, planning and design, Army
family housing, and design of other support facilities, i.e., schools,
medical facilities, commissaries, post exchanges, etc. If allowed to
reprogram identified funding, the net additional cost to USAREUR would
be reduced to approximately $200.2 million.
The Commander in Chief Europe has approved the plan, and the Army
is evaluating this initiative along with other military construction
projects. The draft 2002 Presidential Budget Future Years Defense
Program contains seven projects totaling $68 million for the
restationing. If approved, the initiative will be presented to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress with the intent of
gathering full support.

sustainment, restoration, and modernization backlog
29. Senator Thurmond. General Shinseki, although the overall
funding request for the Army increased by more than $6.5 billion over
fiscal year 2001, the Army reduced the number of tank miles funded by
the budget from 800 to 730 miles--reduction of $300 million. I
understand this was done to support facility stabilization.
Despite this significant adjustment, what is the Army's current
backlog for real property maintenance? ,
General Shinseki. In fiscal year 2002, the current unfunded backlog
to bring our facilities to a C-1 level is $17.8 billion. The increased
level of sustainment funding in fiscal year 2002 needs to continue into
the outyears to prevent the backlog from growing.

30. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, in 1999, your predecessor
reported that the Navy was experiencing critical skills shortfalls
resulting in more than 13,000 gapped billets. Since that time,
Congress--working with the Department of Defense--has supported a
series of personnel initiatives such as increased pay and health care.
How have these initiatives improved your gapped billets problem?
Admiral Clark. The At-Sea Enlisted Gap has been reduced from 13,000
in 1993 to less than 5,000 today. This success has resulted from strong
leadership combined with the significant pay raises and bold
compensation initiatives enacted by Congress in the last 2 years. With
the help of Congress, we reinvigorated efforts to retain every eligible
sailor by offering new or enhanced officer continuation pays and
enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, and increases in base pay. We improved
advancement opportunities by gradually increasing the number of sailors
in the top six pay grades. We also expanded E4 and E6 High Year Tenure
gates and concentrated efforts on reducing attrition. Recruiting and
retention successes have allowed us to execute total Navy end strength
approaching the 1-percent statutory flexibility above our fiscal year
2001 authorized strength. This has decreased the Gap and improved
battlegroup readiness by getting more sailors with the right training
to their ships earlier in the pre-deployment cycle. Manning for our
fiscal year 2001 battlegroup deployers has been as much as 3-4 percent
greater than our fiscal year 2000 deployers across the entire
deployment cycle. We are deploying at 98-101 percent manning with as
many as 250-360 fewer billet gaps per battlegroup.

31. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, I understand that the Navy has
a $5.0 billion backlog in the repair and maintenance of its facilities.
Despite this backlog, the funding requested for real property
maintenance increases less than $90.0 million over the fiscal year 2001
appropriation.
How do you explain such a small increase in the real property
maintenance account when the overall Department request for facility
sustainment and base operations increased by more than approximately
$3.0 billion?
Admiral Clark. Due to funding priorities, sustainment, restoration
and modernization (SRM) and base operating support funding have been
programmed to minimally adequate sustainment levels in fiscal year
2002. While the SRM increase request is only $90 million, the fiscal
year 2002 MILCON funding request represents an increase of $130 million
from the fiscal year 2001 request. Therefore, the total requested
increase in facility investment for the Navy is $220 million.
The current backlog in facilities repair and maintenance (BMAR) is
over $5.0 billion with the critical portion being $2.6 billion. The
Navy is in transition from the BMAR metric to the Facility Sustainment
Model and the Installation Readiness Reporting System (IRRS) to improve
the identification of facility repair and maintenance investment
requirements.

32. Senator Thurmond. General Jones, both you and General Krulak
have always made the point that the Marine Corps equipment was showing
its age and causing additional work for our marines and cost to our
taxpayers. Despite these problems, your budget funds depot maintenance
at only 78 percent of requirement. How do you explain the low level of
funding for Depot Maintenance and what will be the cumulative effect of
this funding shortfall?
General Jones. The Marine Corps must fund a balanced program within
the resources we have available. In the past we have funded near-term
readiness at the expense of modernization. We can no longer continue
this trend. Modernization has now become a readiness issue. We have
realized that we must accept some measured risk in the short term in
order to modernize our force. The Ground Depot Maintenance Program is
funded at 78 percent of the executable requirement in fiscal year 2002.
This level of funding will not impact the near term readiness of the
operating forces. The $14 million Depot Maintenance Shortfall on the
fiscal year 2002 Unfunded Priority List would fund us to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense prescribed goal of 90 percent, but it is not
critical to near term readiness.

33. Senator Thurmond. General Jones, the Marine Corps will not
recover from the accumulated effect of the procurement holiday which
lasted from 1992 to 1999 until well beyond fiscal year 2007.
What is the trade-off of this delay in terms of additional funding
for repair parts and maintenance of your aging equipment?
General Jones. The Marine Corps has experienced a rise in the
average cost to maintain spare parts for our major end items. That is,
the cost per repair has increased. As the Marine Corps faces virtual
block obsolescence for many repair parts, we are required to spend more
time and money to maintain aging equipment and weapons systems. As
ground equipment has continued to age, and because the Marine Corps has
yet to reap the benefits of modernization efforts, funding required for
consumable and reparable spare parts has continued to grow.
The Marine Corps has begun initiatives to modernize our aging
equipment. For example, we are now fielding the Medium Tactical Vehicle
Replacement and the HMMWV A2, as well as rebuilding our Assault
Amphibious Vehicle. As we continue to modernize equipment we expect the
cost of maintaining spares to begin to decline.

new ship construction
34. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, the Navy's budget request
reflects a goal for the construction of new ships of 8 to 10 per year.
The budget we are considering builds six new ships.
What is the objective of the goal of building 8 to 10 ships
annually?
When will you make up the shortfall in this year's ship
construction program?
Secretary England. The objective of the goal of building 8 to 10
ships annually is to sustain a battle force capable of addressing all
likely joint and combined warfighting requirements, overseas presence,
and support to contingency operations. The foundation supporting the
goal is the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and additional requirements
articulated in the 30-year shipbuilding plan report provided to
Congress in June 2000.
Until we know the results of the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review
and the Secretary of Defense's strategic review, I cannot comment on
the extent of the shortfall. Currently, the Navy is limited to
procuring six ships per year due to fiscal constraints and competing
demands for Navy Total Obligation Authority. In order to build 8 to 10
ships per year, the Navy requires approximately $3 billion to $5
billion more in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy funding.

35. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, because the Marine Corps
has been flying the CH-46 Helicopter since the 1960s, it is critical to
the safety of our marines to find a replacement for the aging
workhorse.
Now that the V-22 program has been delayed for who knows how long,
are there any alternatives or interim fixes for the CH-46?
Secretary England. There have been seventeen Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analyses (COEs) conducted by a diverse series of trusted
institutions to determine the most suitable replacement for the CH-46.
The V-22 was a very consistent first choice with no clear second choice
among the widest possible variety of potential alternatives to replace
the CH-46. Each analysis showed that the MV-22 Osprey is the most
operationally effective choice and the most cost effective (affordable)
choice for the Marine Corps. They revealed that no other options or
combination of platforms could provide the balance achieved with the V-
22. Other alternatives including mixes or `silver bullets' offer no
real advantage in cost savings or avoidance given the requirement. The
bottom line is the V-22 is significantly more capable and cost
effective than any alternative. The V-22 is the only alternative that
meets the requirement.
Based on current utilization rates, the service life of the CH-46E
does not need to be extended to compensate for the delay of the MV-22.
The only interim improvement in place for the CH-46E is the Engine
Reliability Improvement Program (ERIP). This ERIP will ensure the
health and reliability of the CH-46 at a cost of $200 million. The
Engine Reliability Improvement Program is fully funded, and thanks to
Congressional support, we were able to start it 1 year early (in this
fiscal year). However, ERIP was procured based on a projected
retirement schedule of the CH-46. As the delay of the MV-22 becomes
more definitive, Marine Aviation will have to examine how many more
ERIP kits the Marine Corps will need to procure. The current ERIP cost
estimates are $1.3M per aircraft (then year dollars). Although the CH-
46 will endure a delay in the introduction of the V-22, the cost of
ownership of the CH-46E will likely continue to rise. Over the past 7
years, flight hour costs and maintenance man-hours-per-flight-hour have
increased by approximately 30 percent (in constant fiscal year 2000
dollars).

transformation funding
36. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, the Army's Transformation is
critical not only to the Army, but also to the Nation's future.
Does the fiscal year 2002 budget fully support your Transformation
goals? If not, what changes would you propose?
Secretary White. The fiscal year 2002 budget generates sustainable
momentum for Army Transformation, although not at optimal levels. We
invested in Objective Force research, development, testing, and
evaluation to set the stage for modernization of equipment; continued
fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams; and funded modernization of
key Legacy Force systems to enhance force capabilities. We made a
number of tradeoffs to ensure a well-balanced Army program and will
continue to evaluate competing requirements in our efforts to
transform.

rc modernization
37. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, historically, the
modernization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve relied on the
cascading of equipment from the active component.
How does this budget request support the modernization of the
Reserve components?
Secretary White. This budget focuses on selective upgrades and
modernization of key organizations while rebuilding and maintaining
existing capabilities in others. Reserve component units that are
paired with active component units will be selectively modernized,
recapitalized, or rebuilt to attain full interoperability and
compatibility with their active component teammates, ensuring current
and near-term readiness.

training ranges
38. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roche, one of the concerns I have
is that our training ranges are not providing the challenges that our
pilots will meet in future combat. For example, the pilots of Shaw Air
Force Base training at Poinsett Bombing Range engage emitters that
represent 1960s technology rather than the modern systems that our
pilots will face over almost any hostile nation.
How does your budget support the upgrading of training ranges in
general? Regarding the Poinsett bombing range in South Carolina, I
would appreciate it if you answer it for the record.
Secretary Roche. Although many technological advances in surface-
to-air threats have occurred over the past 40 years, recent conflicts
have been against countries which have possessed predominately 1960s
and 1970s vintage air defense systems. This fact highlights the need to
train against these older systems; however, we cannot count on future
adversaries employing older, less sophisticated threat systems. Combat
readiness/survivability training for our aircrews must include
proficiency training against modern, sophisticated threats.
In general, we have ongoing programs that our fiscal year 2002
budget supports to modernize our existing range electronic warfare
threat emitters, weapon scoring systems, and air-to-air combat training
systems, and targets through upgrades and procurement of additional
items. Our fiscal year 2002 budget also supports modernization of an
aging range electronics and telecommunications infrastructure and
invests in the development of a new Advanced Threat Emitter System
intended to provide simulation of modern threat capabilities,
densities, and mobility for combat training. Poinsett Range in
particular is scheduled to receive high-fidelity HARM targets to
support training of the F-16s at Shaw AFB. Our fiscal year 2002 budget
also provides for installation of a Joint Advanced Weapons Scoring
System at Poinsett to score practice and inert munitions dropped on the
range. Additionally, eight older Mini-Multiple Threat Emitter Systems,
are slated for upgrade at Poinsett Range by fiscal year 2004 as part of
an ongoing modernization program for this particular emitter system.

39. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roche, what is the total number of
B-52 aircraft in the Air Force's inventory, and what is the number B-
52s required to support both the conventional and SIOP missions?
If the number on hand is greater than required, why are they in the
inventory?
Secretary Roche. [Deleted.]

40. Senator Thurmond. General Ryan, I understand that the average
readiness of your combat squadrons is running at approximately 69
percent against a readiness requirement of 92 percent. What are the
major causes of this low level of readiness?
Assuming no major changes as a result of the QDR, when will you be
able to achieve your readiness requirements at the current funding
level?
General Ryan. As of 15 July 01, the overall readiness, measured by
percentage of units C-2 or better, of our major operational units is
down 22 percentage points while Active Duty stateside combat air force
units are down 40 percentage points since 1996. The major causes for
the decline are past underfunding (particularly of spare parts), the
aging aircraft fleet, a less experienced workforce due to declines in
retention, and past years of higher TEMPO.
Our looming backorders caused by past underfunding continue to have
a negative effect on readiness. These negative effects include lower
mission capable rates, higher cannibalization rates, and added work
hours for our people. Older aircraft are subject to organic problems,
which are often discovered only after an aircraft ages. As these age-
related problems surface, it's possible that they will affect large
portions of the fleet. Moreover, older aircraft require more manpower
and resources to keep them ready to fight in the future.
Our overall retention rate is also a major cause for the decline in
AF readiness. The Air Force failed to achieve our first-term, second-
term, and career re-enlistment goals for the past 3 years (fiscal year
1998-2000). Although, we are encouraged by the recent upturn in first-
term re-enlistment rates, we continue to remain below our second-term
and career re-enlistment goals. Retention challenges also exist for our
mid-grade officer corps, not only for our pilots but also for many of
our non-rated line officers.
Past years of higher TEMPO has also contributed to the decline in
overall readiness. Although, we have seen a significant drop in TEMPO
recently, our people are still deploying over three times more often
than in 1989 despite the fact that the drawdown reduced the size of the
Active-Duty Force to approximately 60 percent of its former size. This
TEMPO exacerbates the negative retention trend because it places a
greater burden on those who are forward deployed and those who remain
at home. Additionally, the sustained TEMPO not only takes a toll on our
people but also on our equipment as we conduct split operations.
Because our current readiness is the result of several years of
sustained underfunding, poor retention, TEMPO, and aging systems, it
will require several years of substantial and sustained investment to
recover readiness.

41. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roche, the Air Force's current
backlog in maintenance and repair of facilities is in excess of $4.0
billion and is expected to grow to $5.6 billion by the end of the
fiscal year. Despite this significant backlog, the Air Force funded
real property maintenance at less than 1 percent of plant replacement
value.
What was the basis for the low level of funding for RPM? How long
will it take for the Air Force to make up the ever increasing backlog
in real property maintenance?
Secretary Roche. The Air Force topline supported the priorities of
readiness, recruitment and retention, modernization, flying hour and
utility cost increases. Unfortunately, the plus up from the recent
amended budget was not enough to address facility O&M shortfalls.
If facility sustainment requirements were fully funded, our
facility restoration and modernization requirements would be an
additional $1.2 billion per year to buy down the backlog by 2010. This
funding would be in addition to a MILCON funded to meet the 67-year
facility replacement standard and would allow the Air Force to buy down
the backlog.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
okinawa incident
42. Senator Smith. Secretary England and Secretary Roche, the July
9th New York Times had an article on this latest incident in Okinawa
involving a U.S. servicemember and a rape charge, I recognize the
importance of Japan in the U.S. security framework in the Pacific and
as a partner in missile defense research. However, I have concerns
about turning over U.S. servicemembers to the Japanese Government for
prosecution. The article states that the Japanese judicial system
permits interrogation without a lawyer present and with an interpreter
chosen by the police, which it says is ``standard Japanese procedure,''
U.S. demands that a U.S. appointed interpreter be present and a defense
attorney were rejected. When did the U.S. cede the rights of these
service members to a foreign judicial system and can this be revisited
at any point, since it appears that their civil rights under the UCMJ
are being violated?
Secretary England. Under general international law, a country may
exercise criminal jurisdiction over anyone found within its borders.
For instance, a nation is not obliged to give any different treatment
to a foreign tourist accused of a crime than it would give to one of
its own citizens. Unless, that is, it has agreed by treaty to provide
special treatment to the foreign national.
One of the functions of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is to
recognize that military personnel invited into a country have special
status and are therefore entitled to special treatment under the SOFA.
One of the ways host countries typically recognize this status is to
grant to the United States the right to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over U.S. service members who commit crimes within the
host nation. However, in a number of agreements host nations have
reserved the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in certain types
of cases, such as where there is an allegation of a very serious
offense committed against someone who is not part of the U.S. force or
civilian component. The United States seeks to secure the greatest
latitude possible for bringing service members accused of crimes in
foreign countries back under its jurisdiction.
In those cases where the host country retains the right to
prosecute, the United States seeks, through the SOFA, to secure for the
accused service member as many due process rights as possible. The
United States then augments those safeguards by providing lawyers,
translators and trial observers to the accused service member without
charge.
The Navy will always seek the same procedural rights for U.S.
service members facing trial in a foreign country that they are
entitled to under the UCMJ and the Constitution. That may not always be
possible given the sovereign status of the host nation within its
borders. But, we will in all cases demand that U.S. service members be
afforded an investigation and trial that are open to observation by
U.S. representatives and are objectively fair.
Secretary Roche. Under general international law, a country may
exercise criminal jurisdiction over anyone found within its borders.
For instance, a nation is not obliged to give any different treatment
to a foreign tourist accused of a crime than it would give to one of
its own citizens. Unless, that is, it has agreed by treaty to provide
special treatment to the foreign national.
One of the functions of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is to
recognize that military personnel invited into a country have special
status and are therefore entitled to special treatment under the SOFA.
One of the ways host countries typically recognize this status is to
grant to the United States the right to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over U.S. service members who commit crimes within the
host nation. However, in a number of agreements host nations have
Reserved the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in certain types
of cases, such as where there is an allegation of a very serious
offense committed against someone who is not part of the U.S. force or
civilian component. The United States seeks to secure the greatest
latitude possible for bringing service members accused of crimes in
foreign countries back under its jurisdiction.
In those cases where the host country retains the right to
prosecute, the United States seeks, through the SOFA, to secure for the
accused service member as many due process rights as possible. The
United States then augments those safeguards by providing lawyers,
translators and trial observers to the accused service member without
charge.
The Air Force will always seek the same procedural rights for U.S.
service members facing trial in a foreign country that they are
entitled to under the UCMJ and the Constitution. That may not always be
possible given the sovereign status of the host nation within its
borders. But, we will in all cases demand that U.S. service members be
afforded an investigation and trial that are open to observation by
U.S. representatives and are objectively fair.

43. Senator Smith. Secretary England, I'm concerned about an
organization affiliated with CINCPAC called the ``Asia-Pacific Center
for Security Studies''--based in Hawaii. A retired Marine Lieutenant
General, Hank Stackpole, who runs this organization, told a conference
in Australia that the Bush administration's missile defense program
would be destabilizing. Here's the quotation: ``I don't believe, in my
own personal view, that it is worth the effort to go ahead and create a
space war field. . . . What rogue states are going to build ICBM that
are easily targeted when you can do, you've heard the old argument,
suit-case nuclear device somewhere in downtown New York.'' First, he's
comparing apples and oranges--we have to worry about ICBM and suitcase
nokes--but second, I'm concerned about an organization which is
affiliated with PACOM that is undermining the president on missile
defense. I would recommend that PACOM end its affiliation with this
organization.
Would you care to comment?
Secretary England. Modeled after the George C. Marshall European
Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies was established to build on the strong bilateral relationships
between the United States Pacific Command and the Armed Forces of the
nations in the Asia-Pacific region. The relationship between the Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies and United States Pacific Command
is an issue for the Secretary of Defense.

44. Senator Smith. Secretary England, when the U.S. accidentally
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the U.S. agreed to pay for
refurbishment of the Embassy. On April 1, when the Chinese pilot
crashed into the Navy EP-3 and forced an emergency landing on Hainan
Island, we had to pay for a Russian transport to carry our aircraft
back to the States.
Is there any reason why the Navy did not ask the Chinese Government
to pay for the damage it did to our aircraft over international waters?
Secretary England. The U.S. Government did not request compensation
for damage to the U.S. aircraft, nor did it address the issue of
damages to the Chinese aircraft involved in the incident as raised by
the People's Republic of China. Further questions regarding these
matters should be referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

submarine force level
45. Senator Smith. Secretary England, the Director of Undersea
Warfare for the Navy volunteered that the submarine force wasn't able
to ``do some of the national-level missions that we're asked to do.''
He commented this spring that submarines have been pulled off those
missions to go off and do other work.
Reportedly, strategic intelligence tasking has doubled in the past
10 years, while the number of attack subs in the fleet have declined by
40 percent--what is the solution to this problem?
Secretary England. The solution is two-fold. First, we must ensure
our submarines are employed efficiently and effectively to carry out as
many operational requirements as possible with existing resources.
Second, we must preserve and acquire the right number of submarines in
order to build up our SSN force structure.
In the area of submarine employment practices, the interdeployment
training cycle and maintenance periods have been reduced, deployment
duration has been increased to 6 months for all submarine deployments,
and our ships and crews are operating at maximum operating tempos. We
are also proceeding with plans to homeport three submarines in Guam
starting in 2002 to increase their availability for Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions in that theater. The
submarine force providers are operating the forces as efficiently as
possible. Further reductions in training time or deferrals of
maintenance to increase operational time would have a significant
negative impact on submarine force material and personnel readiness.
The remaining option, if we are to fulfill all of the current and
projected ISR mission requirements for submarines, is to increase force
size. Increasing submarine force structure in the near and mid-term can
be done by refueling existing SSNs otherwise scheduled for early
inactivation and by converting SSBNs to SSGNs to boost the overall
force structure and free SSNs to perform more intelligence missions. In
the President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Proposal, we recommend new
funding to begin converting SSBNs and to refuel one of the five SSNs
scheduled for inactivation. For the long-term, fixing submarine force
structure shortfalls can be done only by increasing the Virginia Class
SSN build-rate to 2-3 per year as soon as possible.

46. Senator Smith. Secretary England, if the Navy can't meet U.S.
intelligence requirements, what price are we paying in terms of
readiness and isn't good intelligence one of the most important
missions of all, and one that should never be underfunded?
Secretary England. Understanding the price paid in terms of
national or military readiness is complicated by the fact that we
cannot assess what we don't know--i.e. what we have failed to hear or
see due to a lack of submarine presence for intelligence collection.
The best that can be done is to address examples, invariably highly
classified examples, of situations where the submarine was the only
``sensor'' that was able to identify ad evaluate significant actions or
capabilities of a potential adversary--even when all other intelligence
collectors identified nothing. In the 1999 Attack Submarine Study,
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions were
assessed by the Geographic CINCs as the highest priority missions for
SSNs. In that study, the CINCs assessed the impact of not executing
both current and future missions by articulating, at a classified
level, detailed consequences of not executing specific missions.
Because of submarines' long dwell time and ability to collect
intelligence covertly from close-in, the impact of unfilled submarine
intelligence missions could include missed intelligence tippers for the
National Command Authority, lost cueing for national sensors, or missed
opportunities to observe and evaluate adversaries' tactics and
operating patterns. Although intangible by nature, all of these
intelligence ``gaps'' degrade, to varying degrees, our Nation's
national security and readiness.
I heartily agree that intelligence requirements should not be
underfunded. At the same time, I must guide the Navy within the budget
limitations and with careful consideration of the resources required to
support all of the Navy's missions and operational requirements.

47. Senator Smith. Secretary England, the U.S. and Russia signed a
new bilateral maritime agreement recently ostensibly to facilitate
trade between our Nations--I would like to know whether the Navy was
consulted on this agreement? Can you explain why Puget Sound was left
off the list of naval facilities that would have required advance
notification for Russian merchant vessels? (given we know the Russians
use ``merchant'' vessels for espionage and especially since Puget Sound
was the site of the 1997 lasing incident involving the Russian, the
Kapitan Mann-which caused eye damage to both the American and Canadian
pilots).
Secretary England. The Navy vetted the proposed bilateral maritime
agreement with Russia through the Interagency. In the process, the Navy
provided input to the Joint Staff in order to formulate a Department of
Defense position for the U.S. negotiating team. Puget Sound was removed
from the port security list in 1991. The Navy has continuously
expressed concern in the interagency process over that removal.

48. Senator Smith. Secretary England, General Jones, and Admiral
Clark, when we recently met, we discussed a myriad of subjects. During
the meeting you mentioned that you have been told that there is an
approximate 25 percent excess in the military's infrastructure.
In light of such an estimate and given the President's desire to
withdraw from the island of Vieques by 2003, can we justify a continued
presence on mainland Puerto Rico?
Can you promise me that you will give serious consideration to
closing Fort Buchanan and Naval Station Roosevelt Roads if the primary
reason for their existence was to support operations on Vieques?
Secretary England. The architecture and structure of Naval Station
Roosevelt Roads has been built up over the years to support training in
the Puerto Rico operating areas. Without that training, and coupled
with our need to effectively use tight resources, the issue of whether
the Navy will maintain a presence on mainland Puerto Rico, and to what
degree is a question that will require careful examination. We have
stated that the Navy will conduct this examination during the course of
our resource decision-making.
General Jones. The issue of closing facilities in Puerto Rico is
outside my purview as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. While Marine
Corps forces utilize the training facilities on Vieques, the Marine
Corps does not own or operate any facilities in Puerto Rico. For this
reason, the issue of continued facilities presence in Puerto Rico is
better directed to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff
of the Army and their Service Secretary, all of whom have facilities
responsibilities in Puerto Rico in the form of Fort Buchanan and Naval
Station Roosevelt Roads. Additionally, the Commander in Chief of
Southern Command is a significant tenant at Fort Buchanan and his
operations in the Southern Command Area of Responsibility must be taken
into account when analyzing future facilities requirements in Puerto
Rico.
Admiral Clark. Bases are part of the overall structure that
supports our combat capabilities. This ``support of combat capability''
is the value-added measurement that must be applied to all our Defense
infrastructures. Naval Station Roosevelt Roads supports various
missions related to the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility,
including Vieques. Any decisions regarding the value of this base must
include an objective review of the contribution to combat capability
(in this case training) that the base makes. This method of measuring
value, the contribution to ``support of combat capability'', will be
continually applied to our infrastructure, and I will certainly apply
this criteria in any future assessments of the need for Naval Station
Roosevelt Roads.
The Army will have to address the Fort Buchanan portion of this
question. With respect to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads (NSRR), the
mission of the base is to support training in the Puerto Rico operating
area, to support U.S. Southern Command presence and outreach into South
America, and support multi-agency drug interdiction efforts. Should
training on the Vieques inner range cease, valuable training may
continue to take place in the unencumbered sea and air space of the
larger Puerto Rico operating area, in addition to continuation of the
U.S. Southern Command and drug interdiction missions. The Navy will
conduct an examination to determine the extent of training to be
performed in the Puerto Rico operating area and the required Navy
presence at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.

49. Senator Smith. General Jones, what is the current status of the
MPF(E) initiative? What are its funding shortfalls and timeline for
completion of the third and final ship?
General Jones. The first MPF(E) ship, the USNS Harry L. Martin, is
assigned to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (MPSRON 1) in the
Mediterranean.
Conversion of the USNS Stockham, MPF(E) ship two, was recently
completed by NASSCO, San Diego, CA. The naming ceremony for the USNS
Stockham occurred 06 July 01 at Blount Island Command (BIC),
Jacksonville, FL. The USNS Stockham will complete load out in July 2001
and join MPSRON 2 in Diego Garcia.
We reached a major milestone and averted a work stoppage with our
last MPF(E) ship to be fielded, the USNS Wheat/GTS Bazilaya. The new
projected delivery date is late November 2001. Military Sealift Command
(MSC) negotiated a contract modification (firm, fixed price vice cost
plus contract) with Bender Shipbuilding (Mobile, AL) and additional
funding of $11 million was provided from the National Defense Sealift
Fund (NDSF) for the USNS Wheat/GTS Bazilaya conversion.

abaya policy
50. Senator Smith. Secretary Roche, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld,
along with four of my colleagues, including Senator Collins on this
committee, asking for an explanation of the DOD policy which requires
female service members to don an abaya--which is standard wear for
Muslim women, but is not a Saudi mandate--either for State Department
female employees or for tourists. I have yet to receive an answer, but
I have had a lot of women and men who have since voiced their outrage
over this policy--arguing that it isn't justifiable under any
rationale--including force protection. An Air Force officer first went
public about this, since her private efforts to reverse this Muslim
garb edict were ignored for years--can you look into this and let me
know when my letter will be answered substantively?
Secretary Roche. As of 20 July, letters relating to this issue were
in General Shelton's office awaiting approval. We have assurances from
his staff that the letters will be forwarded to the concerned Senators
shortly.

rogue nuclear threat
51. Senator Smith. Secretary Roche, an article from the Jerusalem
Post (July 9) claims Iran will have a nuclear bomb by 2005, and that
the Iranian Shahab-3 will be capable of reaching any point in Israel.
The Iranians are believed to be already in possession of chemical and
biological weapons of mass destruction. The arms control lobby says
we're exaggerating the threat from ``rogue'' states--but what about the
threat to U.S. forces deployed near rogue states--e.g. in Korea, in
Japan, in Guam, in Europe, etc.--and the threat to our close allies,
such as Israel? If the Iranians are to become nuclear-capable, how
would that transform our debate over missile defenses and the ABM
Treaty? Are we going to wait for the surprise results of an Iranian
test, as we witnessed with India (to the surprise and dismay of our
intelligence community)--and then launch a crash program for deployment
of missile defenses?
Secretary Roche. No ``crash'' program is necessary to protect U.S.
troops and allies near rogue states that may be developing Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD). We have a robust capability and are developing
additional capability against missile attack. The U.S. has currently
fielded the Patriot missile defense system in areas close to rogue
states to protect our troops and Allies. Additional Patriot systems are
available in the U.S. to field worldwide if a new threat is perceived.
We also have the capability to attack suspected sites of WMD launchers
by using airpower and special operations units. In addition to these
capabilities, the U.S. is developing additional layers of missile
defense. Systems such as the Army's THAAD, Navy Theater Wide and the
Air Force's Airborne Laser will further strengthen our ability to deal
with future threats. All of these systems are designed for use in a
theater and have been judged to be compliant with the ABM treaty, which
only addresses missile defenses within the U.S.
acquisition reform
52. Senator Smith. Secretary Roche, in his testimony before this
committee on January, 11, 2001, the SECDEF pledged to undertake a
wholesale reorganization of the acquisition process to reduce the time
it takes to field new systems, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, and I quote,
``The U.S. military needs to get on a new path that will permit the
rapid introduction of advanced technology that can materially increase
military effectiveness and decrease the cost of operating and
maintaining those forces''. In previous communications with me you
stated that the Air Force is fully committed to the expeditious
development, procurement, and implementation of new technologies to
``own the night'' such as the Integrated Panoramic Night Vision Goggle.
As you stated in your letter to me dated January 23, 2001, ``Increasing
our warfighters nightfield of view from 40 degrees to 100 degrees adds
a combat dimension not present in current night vision devices''.
Do you agree with the SECDEF that we need to fundamentally reform
the acquisition process in order to accelerate the development and
delivery of key technologies? Can you provide the committee with your
plan to accelerate the delivery of the Integrated Panoramic Night
Vision Goggle, and how your funding reflects your accelerated efforts.
Secretary Roche. Yes, and we are working aggressively to improve
our acquisition processes. We are embracing evolutionary and spiral
development, experimenting with new ways to quickly fund and deliver
promising technologies, and streamlining the requirements-writing
process.
Delivering the Integrated Panoramic Night Vision Goggle to the
field is not a question of process, but funding. Currently, estimated
costs of $11.3M RDT&E to fund flight test and ejection testing and
$82.7M Procurement across the FYDP are needed to field a baseline
quantity of 2,200 units. There is no specific funding for this effort
in the Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget. However the program is
currently competing with other Air Force requirements for fiscal year
2002 funding through one of our acquisition reform initiatives, the
Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program Process.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum
transformation funding
53. Senator Santorum. Secretary White, last year, the Army
terminated or restructured seven programs to pay for the Army's
Transformation initiative. The Army believed these terminations and
restructurings were necessary because the Office of the Secretary of
Defense was unable to provide additional funds to support transforming
the Army. Congress then restored several of these programs because of
existing Army requirements. What assurance can you provide that the
Army's Transformation initiative is fully funded in the Fiscal Year
2002 Budget Amendment? If the Transformation effort is not fully
funded, what are some of the trade-offs or choices that the Army will
have to consider to see that this effort is adequately funded?
Secretary White. The fiscal year 2002 budget generates sustainable
momentum for Army Transformation, although not at optimal levels. We
invested in Objective Force research, development, testing, and
evaluation to set the stage for modernization of equipment; continued
fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams; and funded modernization of
key Legacy Force systems to enhance force capabilities. We made a
number of tradeoffs to ensure a well-balanced Army program and will
continue to evaluate competing requirements in our efforts to
transform.
grizzly
54. Senator Santorum. General Shinseki, the Army's Grizzly is a
Military Load Class 70 complex obstacle-breaching vehicle that
integrates advanced countermine and counter-obstacle capabilities into
a single survivable system. The Grizzly incorporates a full-width mine
clearing blade, a power driven arm for obstacle reduction and digging
and a commander's control station (crew compartment) on a refurbished
M1 tank chassis. The Grizzly will be capable of breaching other types
of natural and man-made, simple and complex obstacles, creating a lane
for vehicles to follow. The Grizzly is designed to provide our maneuver
forces with mobility support (i.e., counter-obstacle breaching) for
decisive operations.
The fiscal year 2001 Army budget request included decisions to
restructure or ``divest'' a number of programs in order to provide some
of the resources to support its Transformation to achieve the ambitious
deployment goals outlined in the October 1999 Army Vision. Grizzly was
one of the programs that was terminated. Prior to this action being
taken, the Grizzly breacher was scheduled to be fielded in 2004.
Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized $108
million in funding to restore the program. The committee did so because
it believes that critical mobility systems like the Grizzly must be
continued to correct critical operational shortfalls for deployed
forces. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided only $15 million
in research and development funding for fiscal year 2001. In the end,
only $15 million in funding was provided for Grizzly.
If the Grizzly breacher is not fielded, the Army will have to rely
on the M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV), an armored vehicle which
consists of a basic M60A1 tank with a hydraulically operated debris
blade, a 165mm turret-mounted demolition gun, a retractable boom, and a
winch. The CEV was placed in service in 1965 with a total of 291
vehicles. During Operation Desert Storm the CEV proved unable to
maneuver with the heavy force due to the inability of the M60 chassis
and power train to keep pace with the M1A1.
What is the level of support requested for fiscal year 2002 for the
Grizzly breacher? If the Grizzly breacher is not fielded, how does the
Army intend to meet its requirements for decisive operations? What are
the costs associated with sustaining the CEV?
General Shinseki. The Grizzly program is not funded in the Fiscal
Year 2002 President's Budget.
For the Legacy and Interim Forces, the Army will continue using the
current deliberate breaching tactics of sequentially orchestrating
multiple systems with soldiers on the ground to affect a breach in
support of mounted operations. Deliberate breaching operations are
resource and time intensive. Current systems used in support of
breaching operations include the Armored Combat Earthmover for
breaching craters and ditches, the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge for
breaching ditches, the Armored Battalion Countermine Set used to proof
lanes in minefields, the Mine Clearing Line Charge used to breach
minefields, the bangalore torpedo used to clear mines, and dismounted
soldiers employed to reduce wire obstacles and to reduce other
obstacles with explosives. For the Objective Force, Future Combat
System concepts are under development. These will ensure we meet our
requirements for decisive operations.
There are no sustainment costs for the CEV, the vehicle was retired
from service in 1998. However, 14 vehicles remain in the inventory.
Four of these vehicles were converted into special purpose, remotely
controlled, mine clearing vehicles in the Balkans. The remaining 10
vehicles are located at Anniston Army Depot and are cannibalized for
spare parts to support the four operational mine clearing vehicles.
We do not have fiscal year 2001 cost data for these vehicles.
However, historical fiscal year 2000 data show sustainment costs at
$533,948. This cost was based on a total operational tempo of 560 miles
for the four operating mine clearing vehicles.

55. Senator Santorum. Secretary England, the T-6A Joint Primary
Aircraft Training System (JPATS) turboprop is designed as a dedicated
training aircraft possessing jet-like handling characteristics.
Replacing the Air Force's T-37 and the Navy's T-34C aircraft, the T-6A
will offer better performance and significant improvements in training
effectiveness, safety, cockpit accommodations and operational
capabilities. Powered by a PT6A-68 turboprop engine with a four-blade
propeller, it features a stepped-tandem, cockpit configuration, with
the instructor's rear seat raised slightly to improve visibility from
the' rear cockpit; modern avionics; and improved egress systems.
Briefing materials provided by the Navy note that the Service had
originally intended to purchase 24 JPATS aircraft. Last year, the Navy
purchased 24 trainers to continue modernizing its inventory of training
aircraft. However, this year it appears that the Navy has not requested
funds to purchase any JPATS aircraft in fiscal year 2002.
Please explain this decision and please note the impact on the
industrial base, which ramped up from producing 12 JPATS for fiscal
year 2000 to 24 JPATS for fiscal year 2001. That is, what will be
impact on the JPATS producer if no additional aircraft are purchased in
fiscal year 2002? How is the Navy planning to fill the 24-aircraft gap?
Secretary England. The T-34C is a safe and reliable aircraft and
has sufficient service life remaining to satisfy Navy requirements for
several more years. The Navy conducted a prioritized review of Navy
programs including the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
procurement profiles. In this review all options were investigated,
including maintaining the T-34C in service longer than previously
envisioned. JPATS procurement was deferred to fund more urgent
competing priorities and take better advantage of the service life
remaining on the T-34C.
Previously, the procurement profile would have resulted in a
production rate in excess of economic order quantity. While this was a
boon to industry in the short run, the end of the Air Force buy in
fiscal year 2007 would have resulted in a Navy buy (of 24) far below
minimum sustaining rate and at a premium cost to the Navy. By deferring
the Navy buy to post Air Force procurement, we optimize the remaining
life on the T-34C and allow the Navy to commence procurement at an
economic order quantity in the future. This would provide industry with
long-term steady state production and minimize the near-term fiscal
year 2002 quantity reduction impact.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
56. Senator Roberts. General Jones, your statement refers to the
differences between the terms transformation and modernization. Please
explain for the committee the basic differences between these two terms
as they relate to the Marine Corps.
General Jones. Unlike the other services that have undergone a
major restructuring in response to the changing strategic and
operational landscapes of the post Cold War world, the Marine Corps has
been assigned a role and organized, trained, and equipped as an
expeditionary force in readiness that is as relevant today as it was in
1952 when Congress established in law the role of the Marine Corps. The
Marine Corps has neither had to downsize nor reshape itself as a result
of the Cold War. Instead, the Marine Corps has continued to follow a
plan for developing additional capabilities needed to hone its ability
to conduct its assigned role against the changing threat in the 21st
century.
Absent a change of role as a result of the end of the Cold War, the
Marine Corps has sought to modernize its forces through selective
acquisition of new equipment that takes advantage of emerging
technologies such as precision weapons, information technology, new
engines, stealth technology, etc. In some cases, such as the Light
Weight 155mm Howitzer, the intent is to replace existing equipment that
is past its service life. In other cases--such as the MV-22 and AAAV--
the ideas for the technologies were developed during the 1980s to
enable new operational concepts while the technologies to build the
equipment have not been sufficiently developed until 20 years later. In
this sense, modernization through the addition of new equipment that
will provide a major increase in the depth and speed that the Marine
Corps can carry out its assigned role as an inherently naval
expeditionary force will result in potentially revolutionary increased
capabilities but without a major restructuring and transformational
change in the operating forces of the Marine Corps.
Accordingly, modernization as used by the Marine Corps explicitly
means reshaping the Marine Corps capabilities to meet the future
through the selective acquisition of new equipment that will enable the
execution of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in support of emerging
joint warfighting concepts. Modernization does lead to quantum
increases in capability; however, because it is part of an on-going
process of Marine Corps combat development there is no requirement for
a major shift in the way the Service trains, organizes, and equips
Marine Corps operating forces that is implicit in the term
transformation.
To the Marine Corps, transformation is a continuing process that
spans decades of innovation and experimentation with the implementation
of new systems, operational and organizational concepts. It involves
the development of new operational concepts, refinement of enabling
capabilities through experimentation, and the development of new
organizations, tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies as
necessary to turn these concepts into warfighting capabilities.

57. Senator Roberts. General Jones, your statement highlights
concerns you have regarding the 2001 congressionally-mandated PERSTEMPO
program. Could you please comment on some of your concerns and
recommended solutions?
General Jones. The Marine Corps understands the intent of the
PERSTEMPO legislation, is fully complying by actively tracking and
managing the PERSTEMPO of our marines, and will report to Congress as
required. However, we have several concerns: The high-deployment per
diem payment equates to paying premiums for doing what we do as normal
operations and deployments in support of the nation. PERSTEMPO
requirements put our commanders on the horns of a dilemma by causing
them to make decisions they wouldn't ordinarily make: Use scarce
Operations and Maintenance funds to pay per diem, or; break the
continuity and cohesion of units to avoid putting some marines over the
400 day threshold, or; reduce the amount of necessary re-deployment
training so that individuals will not break the 400-day threshold
during the deployment. We ask that Congress recognize that the
PERSTEMPO legislation is a new requirement and the full impact is not
known at this time. We need time to fully assess the impact and
possible unintended adverse consequences and implement any necessary
corrective actions. The Marine Corps recommends delaying the
requirement to begin paying the high-deployment per diem payments, for
those exceeding the 400 day threshold, until 1 October 2003. This delay
allows the Services the time to use the tools we have devised to manage
PERSTEMPO before we are required to start the payments. Using our
tools, we will be able to reduce PERSTEMPO to the least possible amount
and have time to budget for the PERSTEMPO per diem that we must pay.

58. Senator Roberts. General Jones, your statement highlights the
Marine Corps' efforts to move beyond traditional amphibious assault to
advanced expeditionary operations from land and from sea. Please
explain what expeditionary means as applied to the Marine Corps.
General Jones. To the Marine Corps, expeditionary implies an ethos
and state of mind. It defines both a constant state of readiness for
deployment as well as a required preparation to adapt to a wide range
of missions and warfighting conditions. As a naval service, the Marine
Corps is specifically tailored to serve as part of a seabased
operation. However, the same qualities that make it readily adaptable
to a variety of seabased missions make it a force of choice for a
number of expeditionary missions that are not necessarily seabased in
nature.
The Marine Corps is expeditionary by culture and transformational
by design. Its organizational paradigm has been proven fundamentally
sound and relevant, providing templates to forge innovation for the
future. Each Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is an integrated
combined-arms team, modular and scalable to meet the unique
requirements of the specific mission, including leading or enabling
joint and coalition operations. The objective is to develop the
capability to use the sea both as maneuver space and sanctuary for
reach back to integrated long-range precision fires, network centric
command and control, adaptive integrated seabased logistic support, and
assembly of follow-on forces.
At the same time, the Marine Corps is capable of expeditionary
operations that are not seabased. Historically, marines have been a
force of choice for a variety of expeditionary missions that have not
been seabased such as sustained support of the United Nations efforts
in Somalia, and aviation support of joint operations over Bosnia and
Kosovo from an expeditionary airbase at Aviano, Italy. During Desert
Storm, marine expeditionary forces were among the first on the ground
in Saudi Arabia through maritime prepositioning in support of an
expeditionary operation that was hosted by a friendly nation rather
than conducted from a seabase.
As the Marine Corps modernizes with the addition of the AAAV and
MV-22 it will have certain inherent capabilities for power projection
that will enable even greater reach for Marine Corps operating forces
operating either from the seabase or from intermediate staging bases
ashore. This expanded reach will permit forcible entry operations over
a much greater range of shoreline making it less predictable and
vulnerable than traditional amphibious assaults against established
defenses. At the same time, the addition of the MV-22 will provide an
extraordinary extension in the range that marine expeditionary forces
will be able to be projected from either sea or land bases in order to
pursue the range of humanitarian and crisis response missions that U.S.
military forces are required to conduct in addition to more traditional
forcible entry operations.

59. Senator Roberts. General Jones, how does the Marine Corps
define its amphibious lift requirement? To what extent is this
requirement being met today? Is this requirement being re-examined as
part of the ongoing defense review?
General Jones. The naval warfighting requirement, the capability
the Marine Corps strives to provide to our Nation, remains at 3.0
Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons. The long standing
requirement for an amphibious force structure plan that supports lift
for 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons, as stated in the
Department of the Navy's 1990 Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC
Air Support Requirements Study, the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study,
and reemphasized in congressional testimony and the Secretary of
Defense's 26 June 2000 Report On Naval Vessel Force Structure
Requirements, remains a priority requirement.
To determine amphibious ship requirements in this context, a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade is measured by the five fingerprints of lift
consisting of troops, square feet for vehicles, cubic feet for cargo,
vertical take off and landing spots, and landing craft air cushioned
spots. Today's active amphibious fleet is capable of lifting the
following Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon equivalents:
Troops--2.72; Vehicle square feet--2.1; Cargo cubic feet--3.71;
Vertical Take Off and Landing spots--3.25; and Landing Craft Air
Cushioned spots--3.5. Shortfalls in active amphibious ships remain an
area of concern.
Naval amphibious ships combined with embarked marines provide
forward presence and flexible crisis response forces for employment in
support of foreign policy objectives. These forces provide the most
formidable amphibious forcible entry capability in the world.
Amphibious lift requirements are formulated to support the National
military strategy, satisfy combat surge requirements, and can also be
tailored to meet real world day-to-day commitments. Although this
particular requirement is not being examined as part of the ongoing
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Marine Corps, expeditionary by nature
and transformational by design, continuously reexamines requirements to
ensure validity.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard
out-of-pocket expenses
60. Senator Allard. Secretary Roche, Secretary White, and General
Shinseki, I have long been concerned on the high out of pocket expenses
of military personnel living off post in the Colorado Springs area and
now outside of Buckley Air Force Base. The reduction of out of pocket
expenses for military personnel living offpost is long over due. Can
you comment on your efforts to meet the goal of reducing or eliminating
these costs and increasing the availability of housing on these
installations?
Secretary Roche. In 2000, the Secretary of Defense directed that
BAH would pay for 100 percent of the median out-of-pocket expenses by
2005. BAH is being transitioned over the next few years to avoid any
sizable changes to allowances. 2000 BAH rates were set at 18.9 percent
out-of-pocket, 2001 is 15 percent, 2002 will be 11.3 percent, 2003--7.5
percent, 2004--3.5 percent, and 2005--0 percent.
The Air Force, along with DOD, is on track to meet the milestones
of this reduction plan to decrease out-of-pocket expense. However,
these improvements generate large DOD bills: $486 million for fiscal
year 2002, $614 million for fiscal year 2003, $635 million for fiscal
year 2004, and $718 million for fiscal year 2005. Continued
congressional support is needed to pay for housing allowance reform and
process improvements.
Our Family Housing Master Plan (FHMP) identifies locations where
there is not a sufficient supply of affordable and adequate units in
the local community. The FHMP identifies a future requirement to
construct 80 additional units at Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs and
201 units for Buckley AFB in Denver. Consistent with this plan, our
fiscal year 2002 program includes a privatization project to construct
201 units for Buckley AFB.
Secretary White and General Shinseki. The Army has been on a
campaign to reduce out-of-pocket expenses. We have concentrated our
efforts on the largest areas where out-of-pocket expenses occur: basic
pay, housing, medical care, and permanent change of station (PCS)
moves. With the help of Congress, we have been able to obtain pay
raises at a rate higher than the National employment cost index through
2006.
The Secretary of Defense established a goal to eliminate out-of-
pocket housing expenses by fiscal year 2005 through increases to the
basic allowance for housing. This initiative should increase off-post
housing available to soldiers in the local community. At Fort Carson,
the housing privatization contractor is constructing an additional 840
housing units on post to meet the housing needs of soldiers assigned
there.
The Army has achieved substantial improvements to health care that
our soldiers and their families receive. TRICARE Remote, elimination
and reduction of co-pays, and reduction of pharmacy costs will help
eliminate soldier out-of-pocket expenditures. Healthcare improvement is
an ongoing process, and we will continue to adjust to meet the needs of
an ever-changing world.
A multi-service working group is reviewing ways to reduce out-of-
pocket expenses related to PCS moves. The working group is reviewing
ways to streamline the moving process, introduce cost efficiencies, and
improve entitlements for service members during and after their move.

force structure
61. Senator Allard. General Ryan and General Shinseki, we often
hear reports that the PERSTEMPO and the OPTEMPO are high and that the
services are having difficulty maintaining them with the current force
structure. An increased reliance on the Reserve components has had a
positive effect, but they too are suffering from a high OPTEMPO. At the
readiness hearing last September, the service chiefs implied that the
Quadrennial Defense Review would likely return a recommendation to
increase the size of our force structure, particularly in the Army. Yet
in the fiscal year 2002 budget, all services maintain the same number
of troops. How are you going to reduce the negative effects of a high
PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO now and in future years?
General Ryan. The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) construct
addresses high PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO by spreading deployment
requirements over a larger Total Force pool and making deployments more
predictable for our airmen and their families. Ten Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) and two Aerospace Expeditionary Wings
(AEWs) represent the core of the EAF's deployable combat power and
forward presence capability. Employing a rotational cycle allows us to
manage the force better by making more Air Force people available for
deployments and determining when, where, and how to focus contingency
OPTEMPO relief. We are also reviewing and ``rightsizing'' the number
and type of airmen we deploy in support of contingency deployments. The
AEF schedule further helps us identify shortfalls in the current force
and make appropriate changes to our investment strategies. We are
exploring options to reduce the tempo for Low Density/High Demand (LD/
HD) assets, standoff precision weapons capability, and Suppression of
Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) capabilities, but the bottom line is there are
no quick fixes.
We have also taken steps to ensure we have sufficient personnel to
support future OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO demands by addressing our total
end-strength. The Air Force's programmed-end strength was reduced from
357,000 in fiscal year 2001 to 352,200 in fiscal year 2002. We are no
longer attempting to achieve this reduced end strength and have added
back 6,600 billets in pursuit of a new fiscal year 2002 programmed end
strength of 358,800. In addition to adequate manpower, we continue to
focus on other quality of life issues which address the effects of
PERSTEMPO by providing improved family support, better working
conditions, and improved compensation.
General Shinseki. Please allow me this opportunity to define the
terms PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO, and deployment tempo or DEPTEMPO. OPTEMPO is
the annual operating miles or hours for major equipment or systems in
battalion-level or equivalent organizations. PERSTEMPO is the number of
days an individual soldier is engaged in official duties at a location
or under circumstances that make it infeasible to spend off-duty time
in his or her normal residence. DEPTEMPO is the average number of days
spent away from barracks or quarters for training or operational
deployments. DEPTEMPO is measured as the number of days a unit would
have to deploy as a whole.
That said, I can best answer your question from a DEPTEMPO
perspective. The Army has studied DEPTEMPO and associated readiness
issues and implemented several initiatives to improve the readiness of
the force, mitigate the impacts of deployments, and improve the well
being of our soldiers and their families.
The Army manning initiative has significantly improved the
personnel readiness of our combat divisions. We have manned these units
to 100 percent of their authorized personnel to ensure they have the
resources to execute and sustain the full range of missions they might
be assigned. Fully manning the divisions has reduced personnel
turbulence and increased unit readiness.
We have implemented a corps alignment policy that tasks one corps
at a time to support both Bosnia and Kosovo? allowing the other corps
to focus on collective training requirements and quality of life. We
believe this policy can provide additional leader focus and
predictability to both deploying and non-deploying units.
The Army has increased the use of our Reserve component for
overseas deployments to distribute mission load, mitigate active force
shortfalls, and reduce active component DEPTEMPO. At the same time, our
Reserve component soldiers have developed valuable mission experience.
We have studied the frequency, deployment, and recovery for our Reserve
components. We are adapting our model for mobilization, training, and
deployment for contingency operations to reduce the impact on soldiers,
families, and employers.
The Army has implemented a deployment policy that limits
operational employment to 179 days. Where appropriate, based on
specific mission requirements, we have reduced deployment lengths to as
low as 120 and even 90 days. We are implementing PERSTEMPO legislation
directed by the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 2000
and 2001 that requires general officer involvement in decisions to
deploy soldiers for greater than 182 days over a moving 365-day window.
Additionally, the Army also implemented a PERSTEMPO tracking and
management system and a stabilization policy that prevents soldiers
from back to back deployments. The Army also designs and announces
deployment schedules to ensure deployments are spread throughout the
force and to offer a greater degree of predictability of deployments.
We continue to study ways to reduce soldier time away from home.

departure area control group operations at peterson air force base
62. Senator Allard. General Shinseki, in your written statement,
you state the budget meets the Army's strategic mobility goal of fiscal
year 2003. Does this include the Army's requirement for a building at
Peterson Air Force Base to support the Departure Area Control Group
operations? It is my understanding that building has been slipped to
fiscal year 2004. Please explain.
General Shinseki. The budget does not include the building at
Peterson Air Force Base to support the Departure Area Control Group
operations. During the fiscal year 2002 program review and subsequent
discussions, U.S. Army Forces Command requested that funds programmed
for the Departure Area Control Group building be reprioritized and
reallocated to support the Sabre Hall project at Fort Stewart. The
funds were subsequently reallocated with the understanding that since
there is no funding for the Army Strategic Mobility Program in fiscal
year 2004, the Departure Area Control Group building would compete
within the Army's normal installation infrastructure program, until
such time as funding becomes available. The project may also be
considered in a planned follow-on program to the Army Strategic
Mobility Program in support of Army Transformation, which will be the
Army Power Projection Program.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
63. Senator Collins. General Jones, you recently testified to the
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that ``the future of
naval precision fires is represented by the Zumwalt class DD-21 Land-
Attack Destroyer and the development of an Extended Range Guided
Munition.'' Further, General Nyland testified before our Seapower
Subcommittee that the Marine Corps, at present, lacks organic fire
support capabilities. General Nyland highlighted the need and
requirement for the Advanced Gun System currently scheduled to deploy
on DD-21, which would help to address this sustained fire support
shortfall. He went on to state that, ``I am confident that the top-down
strategy review will reveal, given the state of the world and the
potential for future conflict, that DD-21s validity and value will be
certain to be characterized as a necessity and a relevant element of
the future security.'' Taken together, these planned enhancements will
dramatically improve the range, responsiveness, accuracy, and lethality
of the Naval Surface Fire Support provided to forces ashore. General
Jones, would you agree that the attributes and technologies, such as
the Advanced Gun System, Extended Range Guided Munitions, and Land
Attack Standard Missile, currently scheduled to deploy on DD-21 will
make significant strides in addressing this critical fires support
shortfall?
How key is the DD-21 program to transforming our naval surface
fires capabilities?
General Jones. The attributes and technologies being developed for
DD-21 are vital for meeting the Marine Corps' Naval Surface Fire
Support (NSFS) requirements. The Navy has recognized the current
deficiency in NSFS and has embarked upon a two-phased program to
eventually satisfy the requirements of the Marine Corps.
Near-term programs such as the 5''/62 gun, Extended Range Guided
Munition and Land Attack Standard Missile will provide an enhanced NSFS
capability, but will not meet all of the range and lethality
requirements for supporting the Marine Air Ground Task Force in future
expeditionary operations. These systems will enhance the fires support
capability of the Navy in the near-term, but will also provide a means
by which to leverage technological development to reduce the
developmental costs of far-term. Specifically, the technological
developments supporting the 5-inch Extended Range Guided Munition
program will directly benefit the 155mm Long Range Land Attack
Projectile under development for the Advanced Gun System for DD-21.
In the far-term, the 155mm Advanced Gun System, with a family of
precision-guided and ballistic ammunition, and the Advanced Land Attack
Missile, with a family of general use and specialty warheads, will
fully meet these requirements. The capabilities provided by the DD-21
and its associated systems remain vital to realizing the full potential
of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and the conduct of expeditionary
operations and sustained operations ashore in a fluid, non-linear
battlespace.

objective crew served weapon
64. Senator Collins. Secretary White and General Shinseki, the
Objective Crew Served Weapon (OCSW) is a perfect example of leap-ahead
technology to support Army Transformation. The advanced materials from
which it is made, and the increased lethality and survivability that
come from this weapon should push it to the forefront of
Transformation, yet it has taken a back seat to other work. As
Secretary, can we expect you to press forward on this weapon system and
ensure that our fighting men and women have the best possible
equipment? General Shinseki, would you care to add any comments on this
program?
Secretary White. I agree that the OCSW has great potential to
provide our soldiers with a lighter, more lethal weapon system that has
leap-ahead characteristics. Rather than saying that this program has
taken a back seat, I would say that more work needs to be done before
the Army can commit to full development and fielding. The Army has
applied lessons learned from the Objective Individual Combat System.
Among those lessons are ensuring that the system is sufficiently mature
before transferring it from the science and technology base to a
program manager and addressing important issues, such as affordability,
reliability, and manufacturability. Once these issues have been
resolved, the Army will have confidence that OCSW is ready for
transition to system development and demonstration and follow-on
procurement. The Army shares your desire to get OCSW in soldiers' hands
as soon as possible.
General Shinseki. I agree with Secretary White that OSCW, when
successfully developed and fielded, will provide leap-ahead
capabilities. I would add that OCSW will greatly enhance the lethality
and survivability of dismounted warriors. It also has potential as an
armament for vehicles. OCSW's ability to engage targets in defilade at
extended range offers the Army warfighting capabilities that we need.

65. Senator Collins. Secretary England, we have discussed the P-3
aircraft as an integral part of our current war plans, patrol and
reconnaissance programs before, and the fact that the average age of
the P-3 platform is roughly 25 years old. While aircraft avionics
upgrades have kept the plane relevant and viable in today's threat
environment, the airframe itself is reaching the end of its useful
service life. I am aware that an ongoing service life assessment
program is studying this airframe fatigue life issue and that there is
an ongoing Analysis of Alternatives underway to look at the Multi-
Mission Aircraft as a follow-on to the P-3 program.
What will the fiscal year 2002 budget amendment allow us to do to
further extend the life of our current P-3 aircraft and/or further
identify a follow-on program to meet this critical patrol and
reconnaissance Navy mission?
Secretary England. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget contains
$53.8 million of Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation funding
to conduct the next phase of the planned acquisition (Component
Advanced Development) for the P-3 replacement aircraft. Contracts will
be signed with one or more contractors to further refine concepts
proposed late in 2000. The Navy plans to continue work on analyses
supporting development of acquisition documentation, performance
specifications, and acquisition planning required by current directives
and law.

66. Senator Collins. Secretary England, do you agree that the
Department needs to actively pursue and apply resources in the near-
term to ensure that we can continue the P-3 reconnaissance operations
without impacting readiness, as these aging aircraft reach the end of
their useful service life?
Secretary England. The Navy agrees that the capability provided by
P-3 aircraft is a core capability it intends to leverage in the future.
The Navy is actively pursuing alternative funding options that minimize
impact on readiness within budgetary constraints.

[Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton,
Warner, Smith, Inhofe, Allard, Sessions, and Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; and Peter K. Levine,
general counsel.
Majority staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswait,
Richard W. Fieldhouse, and Terence P. Szuplat, professional
staff members.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
Republican staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
director for the minority; L. David Cherington and Scott W.
Stucky, minority counsels; Brian R. Green and Mary Alice A.
Hayward, professional staff members.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer Key, Thomas C. Moore,
and Jennifer L. Naccari.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A.
Contostavlos and William K. Sutey, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Brady
King, assistant to Senator Dayton; Wayne Glass, assistant to
Senator Bingaman; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator
Smith; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M.
Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and
Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning everybody. The committee meets
this morning to receive testimony on ballistic missile defense
policies and programs in the proposed fiscal year 2002 amended
budget from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the
Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lt.
Gen. Ron Kadish. I welcome you both to the committee this
morning.
We are 2 days away from the first attempted intercept test
in over a year of a missile defense system intended to address
the possibility of a limited long-range missile attack from a
nation such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. All of us hope that
Saturday's test will be successful. However, the future of a
research program will not hinge on the success or failure of
any one test. Learning whether or not a system can be developed
and understanding the true costs will take many tests over many
years. But there is a more fundamental uncertainty than the
outcome of Saturday's test or future tests. Would a National
Missile Defense system that is unilaterally deployed conflict
with a treaty to produce a destabilizing response from other
countries and increase the threat of proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction? Further, would that response increase the
possibility that the unimaginable horrors of a nuclear attack
would be reigned upon us as a result of breaching the treaty?
Would such a system make the United States, in other words,
more secure or less secure? Is it worth risking those reactions
to a unilateral deployment, particularly given the fact that
we're told by the intelligence community that a ballistic
missile is the least likely means of delivering a weapon of
mass destruction and that a truck, a ship, or a suitcase would
be more reliable, less costly, and have no return address?
These fundamental policy questions will be the focus of later
hearings.
Today we will try to understand the budget request for
missile defense programs that the administration has presented
for fiscal year 2002. The administration is proposing a large
increase for missile defense--a $3 billion or 57 percent
increase over the current fiscal year--while proposing to
decrease investments in other critical areas of the defense
budget, such as procurement, science and technology, and even
some readiness areas. Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee 2
weeks ago that the ``taxpayers have a right to demand that we
spend their money wisely.'' Well, a 57 percent increase is a
huge amount for any program to absorb and spend wisely and
efficiently in a single year. The administration proposes to
spend $8 billion on missile defense in fiscal year 2002 but the
Pentagon has not provided Congress the details of how it
intends to spend that $8 billion. General Kadish briefed the
committee 3 weeks ago on his recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense. Two weeks ago Secretary Rumsfeld told us that the
actual details of the R&D budget for missile defense are still
in a state of flux. The administration's plans for missile
defense for fiscal year 2002 have been harder to zero in on
than a target in a missile defense test.
The purpose of today's hearing is to attempt to get
specific details on activities proposed in this budget request
and clear answers to critical questions. Among the questions is
whether any proposed activities in the administration's fiscal
year 2002 budget request for missile defense would be in
conflict with the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. General
Kadish addressed this very question in a briefing to the
committee 3 weeks ago. He said that if all of his
recommendations for missile defense were implemented, there
would be no conflict with the ABM Treaty in fiscal year 2002.
We have put the question of possible violations of the treaty
in fiscal year 2002 to Secretary Rumsfeld twice in recent
hearings. Secretary Rumsfeld first told the committee 3 weeks
ago that ``I don't think the 2002 budget is a problem in that
regard.'' He then told the committee 2 weeks ago that ``we
don't know for sure.'' On July 2, I sent a letter to Secretary
Rumsfeld asking the following question: ``Are their any
activities proposed to be carried out with the funding you are
requesting for missile defense in fiscal year 2002 that would
not be in compliance with the ABM Treaty and, if carried out,
either would cause a violation of the treaty or would cause the
United States to give notice under the provisions of the treaty
that we would withdraw from the treaty?'' I've yet to receive
an answer to my July 2 letter.
This morning the press reports that the administration has
informed our allies that our missile defense research and
development activities will conflict with the ABM Treaty in a
matter of months, not years. That is exactly the question that
I've been asking the administration for weeks without getting
an answer. If press reports are true, Congress will need to
decide within months whether to fund research and development
activities that conflict with the ABM Treaty. The consequences
of such funding and the responsibility that goes with it are
serious. Secretary Wolfowitz will, I am sure, tell us if the
reports in the papers are true and that we have informed our
allies and Russia that ``these tests will come into conflict
with the ABM Treaty in months, not years.''
The President alone has the right to withdraw from a
treaty, but Congress has the heavy responsibility of
determining whether or not to appropriate the funds for
activities that conflict with a treaty. Knowing the
consequences of the budget actions requested of us is
essential, not just for those who are concerned about whether a
treaty violation would leave America less secure. It is also
essential for those who are concerned about the huge 1-year
increase in funding for missile defense given other pressing
defense needs.
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
examined the article this morning. I think the only detail that
I could determine was in the Washington Post and the Secretary
I think has verified it, that emanated from briefings on
Capitol Hill yesterday and it's sort of a gathering of
fragmentary reports that there is not a single press release in
place. So, I hope we give our witnesses this morning, whom I
welcome with you, the benefit of the doubt and we should
hopefully receive the testimony today. I've reviewed Secretary
Wolfowitz's statement, the complete and accurate statement by
the administration that was made yesterday. But you and I have
been engaged here some 23 years in this committee, in all types
of reviews, of this issue of missile defense and it's been a
long and arduous uphill climb. In that period of time, we have
now reached, I think, clarity that all agree on here in the
United States as well as abroad. There is a threat.
It is absolutely the duty of any president of the United
States to step up and prepare our Nation to defend itself
against this threat. That's precisely what President Bush is
doing in my judgment. I think that we should as a Congress give
him the opportunity to, in a statesman-like manner, prepare to
lead this Nation and hopefully our allies in a course of action
to defend this country against what we clearly see now are
actual threats.
Secretary Wolfowitz in his opening statement refers to the
attack in the Gulf War where we, the United States, sustained
the largest number of casualties as a consequence of a SCUD
attack during that conflict. I, together with Senators Inouye,
Stevens, and Nunn, were in Tel Aviv one night during the war
when a SCUD hit Tel Aviv. The following day we went out and saw
the devastating damage inflicted upon the nation of Israel.
Although we had our PAC system in there at the time, and I
think that system was effective to a degree, it was defenseless
and we as a Nation are just as defenseless 10 years after those
attacks. Now, the PAC-3 has been upgraded, but there's still a
growing threat. We accept that and so now I think the President
has properly outlined what he intends to do. He did that
initially on May 1, 2001 and I quote him: ``Today the sun comes
up on a vastly different world. The wall is gone and so is the
Soviet Union. Today's Russia is not our enemy. Yet this is
still a dangerous world--a less certain, a less predictable
one.''
More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have
nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons.
Some already have developed a ballistic missile technology that
would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long
distances. We need new concepts of deterrence to rely on both
offensive and defensive forces. We need a new framework that
allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different
threats of today's world. That is simply a responsible
statement by the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces as he
is so designated under our Constitution. He is the chief
architect, not Congress, of foreign policy. Quite true, we have
the power of the purse. But I plead with my colleagues, let us
form a partnership with the President to move forward. Let us
recognize that he has the constitutional responsibility to lead
and see where and how we can best support him.
I think it's far too early to get tangled up in the small
details of the lawyers trying to determine whether this does or
does not comply with the ABM Treaty. As far as I know, the
President has made good faith efforts in consultation with our
allies. He has had preliminary discussions with Russia. This
system which defends us against only perhaps as many as a dozen
missiles is not a threat to the awesome--and I repeat,
awesome--inventory of missiles that Russia has today in an
operational status. I'm confident that if we, Congress, show
our support to our President, he will eventually be able to
work through the consultative process and eventually the
negotiating process with Russia such that a hopeful new
framework can be reached to replace the aging 1972 ABM Treaty
and that we can go forward in such a way as to look at a far
broader spectrum of technical options to defend this country
and, in all probability share to some extent that technology
with our allies and possibly with Russia. Russia should
recognize that it is also threatened and threatened by systems
in existence today with shorter ranges whereas our principal
threat here at home are from the longer range missiles. I
believe our President will succeed and I just hope that
Congress will act as a full partner and be supportive to let
him take the initiatives as the Constitution clearly empowers
him, and we hopefully will give him that support so that he can
be successful.
Now, I will just put the balance of my statement in the
record.
[The prepared statement by Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
today. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, welcome, and I look
forward with interest to hearing your testimony.
The effort to develop and deploy missile defenses that will protect
our Nation, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed
overseas, and our allies and friends has been a long and arduous one.
There have been many setbacks and many interruptions along the way.
This year, that effort may hang in the balance.
President Bush has proposed a bold new approach--to depart from the
past and to restructure the strategic environment. ``We need a new
framework,'' the President said on May 1 on this year, ``that allows us
to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's
world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old
ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to
the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from
addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising
technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our
interests or in the interests of world peace.''
I agree with every word of that. I remain firm in my conviction
that the deployment of effective missile defenses as soon as
technologically possible is critical to the security of this nation. We
have no higher responsibility than to protect our Nation, our troops,
and our allies from the threats posed by the most lethal military
weapons ever invented and the missiles which deliver these weapons.
Today, the international situation is far different than in 1972
when the ABT Treaty was signed and missile defense for our Nation was
banned.
Our treaty partner, the Soviet Union, is no more. Our relationship
with Russia is still evolving, but clearly we cannot remain mired in
the notion that our two great nations are implacable enemies. Far from
a world in which two giants embraced each other in a death grip, today,
many nations, some of them unstable, unpredictable and hostile to the
United States, either have or are seeking to acquire ballistic
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, or both.
Yet today, despite these greatly changed circumstances in the
world, our Nation remains completely defenseless against attack by even
a single ballistic missile. Our friends and allies do not have the
capability to defend themselves against short, medium, and intermediate
range ballistic missile threats.
Many in Congress have long recognized the critical need for missile
defenses. I was a cosponsor of Cochran bill, which was finally enacted
into law despite the strong opposition of the Clinton administration.
That act--which is now the law of the land--states that ``it is the
policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically
possible an effective National Missile Defense system. . .'' against
limited missile attacks. The decision to deploy has been made.
President Bush has made that decision and Congress has already endorsed
it. What we are now debating is ``when'' and ``how'' to deploy-not
``if.''
We will today, I believe, hear many of the specifics in the BMDO
program proposal that will help answer the questions of when and how.
The lateness with which our committee has received the defense budget
is a matter of concern, and time is short. I understand that the BMD
program is intended to provide a flexible path forward. At the same
time, in our oversight capacity, we need to have a clear sense of
program content and structure to determine whether the BMDO budget
proposal will support the goal of deploying effective missile defense
systems as soon as technologically possible.
While the BMD program is vitally important, it is bound up in wider
policy considerations, some of which I have already noted.
Consequently, part of the path forward must involve continued
consultation with our allies and Russia. I commend the President for
reaching out to allies and friends, and to Russia, to build a new
foundation of security based on openness and trust and to move beyond
the confines of Cold War relationships.
To those who would argue that deployment of missile defenses is too
dangerous and destabilizing I would say this: given American leadership
a chance. If the United States leads, there is every reason to believe
that Russia and our allies will respect American determination to move
forward and work with us to build a safer world. But if congress
undermines this effort, we will surely cede to others the right to
dictate American vulnerability and that of our allies to missile
threats from rogue nations.
I am looking forward to the discussion with Secretary Wolfowitz
today about the complex policy issues, ranging from arms control, to
deterrence policy, to our relationships with Russia, Europe, and our
Asian friends and allies, that all relate to our efforts to defend our
homeland, allies, and forces abroad from missile attack. Not all of the
Department's answers, particularly with respect to the arms control
implications of the BMDO program about which we will hear today, have
been entirely clear or consistent. I anticipate that any confusion that
has been created by this lack of consistency will be addressed today.
Thank you again, Senator Levin, for your courtesy.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Secretary Wolfowitz.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members
of the committee, before I get into my testimony I'd like to
thank you particularly but also the ranking member and the
entire committee and your hard-working staffs for moving so
quickly with our nominees. I know you held hearings when you
weren't even officially organized yet to do so, and I know you
moved, I think 15 of our nominees to the floor. We desperately
need them. I hope the full Senate will act with the expedition
that you did, but I sincerely thank you and everyone who
participated in that. There are more coming. We need help.
I also appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on
this very important subject. General Kadish and I are here to
try to answer in as much detail as we possibly can your
questions and your concerns and to describe the program and to
address those issues that you've raised--very important issues
about where we are heading with respect to the treaty. But let
me begin with a broader sketch.
Imagine, if you will, the following scenario. A rogue state
with a vastly inferior military but armed with ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction commits an act of
aggression against a neighboring country. As President Bush
sends forces into the theater to respond, the country's
genocidal dictator threatens our allies and deployed forces
with a ballistic missile attack. Almost without warning,
missiles rain down on our troops and pound into densely
populated residential neighborhoods of allied capitals. Panic
breaks out. Sirens wail as rescue crews in protective gear
search the rubble for bodies and rush the injured to hospitals.
Reporters mumbling through their gas masks attempt to describe
the destruction as pictures of the carnage are instantaneously
broadcast around the world.
Mr. Chairman, that scene is not science fiction. It is not
a future conflict scenario dreamed up by creative Pentagon
planners. It is a description of events that took place 10
years ago during the Persian Gulf War--events that Senator
Warner personally witnessed in Tel Aviv. I too have a vivid
recollection of those events. When Saddam Hussein was launching
SCUD missiles against Israel, I was sent there with Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to help persuade Israel
not to get drawn further into that war. We saw children walking
to school carrying gas masks in gaily decorated boxes--no doubt
to try to distract them from the possibility of facing mass
destruction. They were awfully young to be thinking about the
unthinkable. With those missiles, Saddam Hussein terrorized a
generation of Israeli children and almost succeeded in changing
the entire strategic course of the Gulf War.
This year is the tenth anniversary of the first U.S. combat
casualties from a ballistic missile attack. In the waning days
of Operation Desert Storm, a single SCUD missile hit a U.S.
military barrack in Dhahran, killing 28 of our soldiers and
wounding 99, 13 of them from a single small town in
Pennsylvania called Greensburg. For American forces, it was the
worst single engagement of the Gulf War. For 13 families in
Greensburg, it was the worst day of their lives. Today, 10
years later, it is appropriate to ask: How much better able are
we to meet a threat that was already real and serious 10 years
ago--and has become even more so today? The answer, sadly, is
not much better.
Today our capacity to shoot down a SCUD missile is not much
improved from 1991, when we deployed--as Senator Warner
correctly recalled--on an emergency basis the PAC-2 missiles to
Israel and to Saudi Arabia and other countries.
We are still a year or 2 away from initial deployment of
the PAC-3, our answer to the SCUD, and let me add, a very
effective answer, and General Kadish will be talking about that
technology in a few minutes. But we are still many years from
full deployment. Today, our forces in the Persian Gulf and
Korea, and the civilian populations they defend, have almost no
means of protection against North Korean ballistic missiles
armed with both chemical and conventional warheads. With no
defenses, an attack by North Korea could result in tens or even
hundreds of thousands of casualties.
Mr. Chairman, we underestimated the ballistic missile
threat 10 years ago and today, a decade later, we are in danger
of underestimating it still. The time has come to lift our
heads from the sand and deal with unpleasant but indisputable
facts. The short-range missile threat to our friends, our
allies, and our deployed forces arrived a decade ago. The
intermediate-range missile threat is here now and the long-
range threat to American cities is just over the horizon--a
matter of years, not decades, away--and our people and our
territory are defenseless. Why? The answer to that last
question has four letters: A-B-M-T--the ABM Treaty.
For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously
the challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have
not adequately funded it. We have not believed in it, and we
have given the ABM Treaty priority over it. That is not how
this country behaves when we are serious about a problem. It's
not how we put a man on the moon in 10 years. It's not how we
developed the Polaris program or intercontinental ballistic
missiles in even less time. The time to get serious is long
past. The number of countries pursuing nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing
advanced conventional weapons and ballistic missiles is
growing.
Consider these facts. In 1972, we knew of only five
countries that had nuclear weapons. Today, we know of 12 with
nuclear weapons programs. In 1972, we knew of a total of nine
countries that had ballistic missiles. Today, we know of 28. In
just the last 5 years, more than 1,000 of those missiles of all
ranges have been produced. Those are just the cases that we
know of. There are dangerous capabilities being developed at
this very moment that we do not know about and which we may not
know about for years--perhaps only after they are deployed. For
example, in 1998 North Korea surprised the world with its
launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan with a previously
unknown and unanticipated third stage. The intelligence
community tells us that this launch demonstrated a North Korean
capability to deliver a small payload to the United States.
North Korea is now developing the Taepo Dong 2 missile, which
will be able to strike even deeper into U.S. territory and
carry an even larger weapons payload. If we do not build
defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers will soon
have, or may already have, the ability to strike U.S. and
allied cities with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
They might not even have to use the weapons in their possession
to affect our behavior and achieve their ends.
While we have been debating the existence of the threat for
nearly a decade, other countries have been busily acquiring,
developing, and proliferating missile technology. We can afford
to debate the threat no longer. We are in a race against time
and we are starting behind. Thanks in no small part to the
constraints of the ABM Treaty, we have wasted the better part
of a decade. We cannot afford to waste another one.
President Bush has declared his intention to develop and
deploy defenses capable of protecting the American people, our
friends, our allies, and forces around the world from limited
ballistic missile attack. The 2002 amended budget requests $8.3
billion for missile defense.
We have designed a program to develop and deploy as soon as
is appropriate, and General Kadish will be describing it in
more detail. Developing a proper layered defense will take
time. It requires aggressive exploration of key technologies,
particularly those that have been constrained in the past by
the ABM Treaty. So, we plan to build it incrementally,
deploying capabilities as the technology is proven ready, and
then adding new ones over time as they become mature.
We have not yet chosen a systems architecture to deploy. We
are not in a position to do so because so many promising
technologies were not pursued in the past.
In order to accelerate the program, we must first broaden
the search for effective technologies before we can move
forward toward deployment. We must dust off technologies that
were shelved, consider new ones, and bring them all into the
development and testing process. To do this we have designed a
flexible and strengthened research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) program to examine the widest possible range
of promising technologies and basing modes, including land,
air, sea, and space-based capabilities that had previously been
disregarded or inadequately explored.
Notwithstanding the delays of the past decade, the
capability to defend America is within our grasp. A great deal
of work was done. The technology of 2001 is not the technology
of 1981, or, for that matter, 1991.
Today, ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem of
invention. It is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge
we are up to and General Kadish will describe in a few minutes
how to go about it. Before he does, Mr. Chairman, let me
address the very important questions about the ABM Treaty and
try as best as I can to answer your very pertinent questions.
Our program is designed to develop, as I said, the most
capable possible defense for our country, our allies, and our
deployed forces at the earliest feasible time. That means it
must at some point, and increasingly over time, encounter the
constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We will not conduct
tests solely for the purpose of exceeding the constraints of
the treaty, but neither have we designed our program to avoid
doing so.
However, this administration does not intend to violate the
ABM Treaty. We intend to move beyond it. We are working to do
so on two parallel tracks: First, we are pursuing the
accelerated research, development, and testing program that I
have described. Second, we are engaged in discussions with
Russia on a new security framework--one that would reflect the
fact that the Cold War is long over and that the U.S. and
Russia are not enemies. We are moving forward on both of these
tracks simultaneously, and we feel the prospects for success in
both cases are promising.
Mr. Chairman, we have begun a dialogue with Russia on how
to build a new security relationship, one whose foundation does
not rest on the prospect of the mutual annihilation of our
respective populations that was the basis of the old U.S.-
Soviet relationship. That is not a healthy basis for U.S.-
Russian relations in the 21st century.
On his recent visit to Europe, President Bush had good
discussions with President Putin, and Secretary Rumsfeld had an
unexpectedly productive dialogue at NATO last month with
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Indeed, after their
meeting, Minister Ivanov declared his agreement with Secretary
Rumsfeld, and I'm quoting from the Russian Defense Minister,
``there are not only more threats facing us now in the 21st
century, but they are multifaceted--much more so than in the
past.''
Our discussions with Russia are ongoing, and we have no
reason to believe they will fail. The question of whether we
will violate the ABM Treaty in 2002 presumes they will fail.
But there is no reason to assume that and if we succeed, the
ABM Treaty will no longer be an obstacle to protecting the
American people, our allies, or our deployed forces from a
ballistic missile attack.
We hope and expect to have reached an understanding with
Russia by the time our development program bumps up against the
constraints of the treaty. We would prefer a cooperative
outcome, and we are optimistic that such an outcome is
possible. But we must achieve release from the constraints of
the treaty.
If we all agree that a cooperative outcome is the
preferable one, I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that it is
important also for Congress to demonstrate the same resolve as
President Bush that we are going to proceed with development of
defenses to protect our people, our friends and allies, and our
forces around the world--defenses that cannot, by the wildest
stretch of the imagination, be considered a threat to Russia or
to Russia's broader interests. Conversely, if we give Russia
the mistaken impression that, by insisting on adherence to the
ABM Treaty, they can exercise a veto over our development of
missile defenses, the unintended consequence could be to rule
out, and certainly make a cooperative solution more difficult
and perhaps leave the President no choice but to withdraw from
the treaty unilaterally.
As I stated earlier, as the program develops and the
various testing activities mature, one or more of those will
inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions and limitations.
Such an event is likely to occur in months rather than in
years.
Mr. Chairman, this is the reason it has been difficult and
remains still somewhat difficult to answer your questions with
precision, but we're trying today to get as much precision as
we possibly can. It is not possible to know with certainty
whether that will occur in the coming year. This uncertainty is
in part the result of the inevitable uncertainty of all
research and development programs. You learn from your tests.
You proceed from your tests. Your program gets altered
depending on the results of your test. But the uncertainty also
reflects legal uncertainties. Many of the early issues that we
will encounter inevitably involve legal complexities; legal
ambiguities. These we will fully resolve through the treaty
Compliance Review Group and the established procedure for
addressing those issues.
In the interest, Mr. Chairman, of trying to give you more
precision about where we see those issues coming in the next
fiscal year, let me give you what I believe are the most
important examples.
For example, the test bed currently scheduled to begin
construction in April 2002 is designed to permit the testing of
a ground-based midcourse capability under realistic operational
conditions. There will also be opportunities, while we are
testing the Aegis midcourse system, to test the ability of
Aegis ship-based radars to track long-range ballistic missiles
and there will also be opportunities in the coming fiscal year,
if the program proceeds as planned, to combine the data from
radars used in midcourse tests with the radars used to track
short-range missiles. Will these tests exceed the limits of the
treaty? In each case, you will be able to find lawyers who can
argue on all three sides of the coin, but we have an
established system for resolving these difficult issues and
what I can tell you is this: by the time a planned development
activity encounters ABM Treaty constraints, we fully hope and
intend to have reached an understanding with Russia. We would
expect to identify any such issue 6 months in advance of its
occurrence. At that point, we will either have reached an
understanding with Russia, in which case the question would be
moot, or we would be left with two far from optimal choices:
either to allow an obsolete treaty to prevent us from doing
everything we can to defend America, or to withdraw from the
treaty unilaterally, which we have every legal right to do.
However, even in the latter circumstance, we should
continue our efforts to reach an understanding with Russia. But
our goal is to reach an understanding with Russia well before
that time. Such an understanding is in both countries'
interest. The end of the Cold War has fundamentally transformed
our relationship. We ask for your support as we continue to
work towards that cooperative solution. I can assure you that
the President will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to
conduct the proper notifications as we go forward.
Let me conclude with a few words about the new deterrence
framework. We are optimistic about the prospects of reaching an
understanding with Russia because the Cold War is over. The
Soviet Union is gone. Russia is not our enemy. We are no longer
locked in a posture of Cold War ideological antagonism. Yet,
the ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War relationship that is no
longer relevant in the 21st century.
The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that--
defenses. They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter
those who would threaten us or our friends with a ballistic
missile attack. Russia is not such a country. Americans do not
lie awake at night worrying about a massive Russian first
strike, the way they worried about a Soviet first strike during
the Cold War.
Our missile defenses will be of no threat to Russia. Their
purpose will be to protect against limited missile attacks that
are now possible from an increasing number of sources--but not
conceivably against the thousands of missiles in Russia's
arsenal. Further, they will be just one part of a larger 21st
century deterrence framework.
Just as we intend to build layered defenses to deal with
missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of
layered deterrence which can deter and dissuade a variety of
emerging threats at different stages. Just as America's
overwhelming naval power discourages adversaries from investing
in competing navies, we should develop capabilities that, by
their very existence, discourage adversaries from investing in
other hostile capabilities. Missile defense is one example
where we hope to achieve exactly that. It has received
significant attention because it is new--but it is just one
element of a new deterrence framework that includes several
mutually-reinforcing layers of deterrence, including diplomacy,
arms control, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and
smaller but effective offensive nuclear forces.
Having said what the program aims to do, let me say,
briefly, what the program is not. It is not an effort to build
an impenetrable shield around the United States. This is not
Star Wars. We have a much more limited objective to deploy
effective defenses against limited missile attack. It is not a
threat to anyone and will be a problem only for those states
that wish to threaten our people, our allies, or our deployed
forces with ballistic missiles.
Very importantly, Mr. Chairman, it will not undermine arms
control or spark an arms race. If anything, I believe building
effective defenses will reduce the value of ballistic missiles
and remove incentives for their development and proliferation.
Since they will have virtually no effect on Russia's
capabilities, there is no incentive for Russia to spend scarce
resources to try to overcome them. China is already engaged in
a rapid modernization of its missile capabilities, and will
continue this modernization whether or not we build defenses.
But, in fact, both the Russians and the Chinese, and I think
this is very important, will be able to see that we are
reducing our offensive nuclear forces substantially and there
is no need for them to build up theirs. In this budget proposal
alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident, and B-1 reductions, we will
be reducing START-countable warheads by well over a thousand.
We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what Russia
decides to do, but we believe it is in their best interest, and
we think sooner rather than later, they will recognize that it
is in their best interest to follow the same path.
This is not a ``scarecrow'' defense. We intend to build and
deploy defenses that will grow more and more effective over
time. The more capable, the better. But defenses don't have to
be perfect to save lives and reduce casualties. No defense is
100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions we spend on
counterterrorism, and should be spending on counterterrorism,
we did not stop terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers or on
our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or on the World Trade
Center. Yet no one would suggest that we stop spending money on
counterterrorism because we have no perfect defense. Moreover,
defenses don't need to be 100 percent effective to make a
significant contribution to deterrence.
I've heard some astronomical figures attached to this
program, Mr. Chairman. But we are not planning to spend
hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. The money we
propose to spend is comparable to other major defense
development programs, and comparable to other elements of our
security strategy. We are proposing $8.3 billion for missile
defense in 2002. That is still a large amount, but the
consequences of failure could be larger still.
Finally, I do not believe it diverts attention and
resources from other more pressing threats. Some have argued
that we should not spend any money on missile defense, because
the real threat comes from terrorists using suitcase bombs.
There is no question that terrorist threat is a real one, and
we should be addressing it. But we shouldn't lock our front
door because a burglar might break through the window. We
should address both problems.
As we move forward with accelerated testing and
development, there are going to be test failures. There isn't a
single major technological development in human history that
didn't proceed with a process of trial and error, including
many of our most successful weapons systems.
Let me just mention six. The Corona satellite program,
which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites,
suffered 11 straight test failures at the beginning of the
program. The Thor Able and Thor Agena launch programs failed
four out of five times. The Atlas Agena failed five out of
eight times. The Scout launches failed four out of six times.
The Vanguard program failed 11 of its first 14 tries. The
Polaris failed in 66 out of 123 test flights. Yet, from these
failures and from the successes came some of the most effective
capabilities we have ever fielded. Failure is how we learn. If
a program never suffers test failures, it probably means we're
not pushing the envelope hard enough.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began. This threat is
not fictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. It won't
disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears. This
is not a partisan issue. We do not know whether the President
who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of striking
Los Angeles, Detroit, or New York with nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat. But we
do know that individual will be an American. That is how we
must proceed--not as Republicans or Democrats, but as
Americans. Let future generations who look back at this period
see statesmen who rose above party lines to make sure that
America and its allies and its deployed forces were protected
against this real emerging threat.
Thank you very much for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz
introduction
Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity to testify on the administration's 2002 budget
request for Ballistic Missile Defense.
Imagine, if you will, the following scenario: A rogue state with a
vastly inferior military, but armed with ballistic missiles and weapons
of mass destruction, commits an act of aggression against a neighboring
country. As President Bush sends U.S. forces into theater to respond,
the country's genocidal dictator threatens our allies and deployed
forces with a ballistic missile attack. Suddenly, almost without
warning, missiles rain down on our troops, and pound into the densely
populated residential neighborhoods of allied capitals. Panic breaks
out. Sirens wail, as rescue crews in protective gear race to search the
rubble for bodies and rush the injured to hospitals. Reporters,
mumbling through their gas masks, attempt to describe the destruction,
as pictures of the carnage are instantaneously broadcast across the
world.
Mr. Chairman, the scene I have described is not science fiction. It
is not a future conflict scenario dreamed up by creative Pentagon
planners. It is a description of events that took place 10 years ago--
during the Persian Gulf War.
I have a particularly vivid recollection of those events. When
Saddam Hussein was launching SCUD missiles against Israel, I was sent
there with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to help
persuade Israel not to get drawn further into the war, as Saddam
Hussein was seeking to do. We saw children walking to school carrying
gas masks in gaily decorated boxes--no doubt to try to distract them
from the possibility of facing mass destruction. They were awfully
young to have to think about the unthinkable. With those missiles,
Saddam Hussein terrorized a generation of Israeli children, and almost
succeeded in changing the entire strategic course of the Gulf War.
This year marks the 10th anniversary of the first U.S. combat
casualties from a ballistic missile attack. In the waning days of
Desert Storm, a single SCUD missile hit a U.S. military barracks in
Dhahran, killing 28 of our soldiers and wounding 99. Thirteen of those
killed came from a single small town in Pennsylvania called Greensburg.
For American forces, it was the single worst engagement of the Gulf
War. For 13 families in Greensburg, it was the single worst day of
their lives.
Today, 10 years later, it is appropriate to ask how much better
able are we to meet a threat that was already real and serious 10 years
ago--and has become even more so today? The answer, sadly, is hardly
any better. Despite this tragic experience, here we are, a decade
later, still virtually not yet able to defend against ballistic missile
attacks, even from relatively primitive SCUD ballistic missiles.
Today, our capacity to shoot down a SCUD missile is not much
improved from 1991. We are still a year or 2 away from initial
deployment of the PAC-3--our answer to the SCUD, and an effective one--
and many years from full deployment. Today our forces in the Persian
Gulf and Korea--and the civilian populations they defend--have almost
no means of protection against North Korean ballistic missiles armed
with both chemical and conventional warheads. With no missile defenses,
an attack by North Korea could result in tens or even hundreds of
thousands of casualties.
To those who wonder why so many of the regimes hostile to the
United States--many of them desperately poor--are investing such
enormous sums of money to acquire ballistic missiles, I suggest this
possible answer: They know we don't have any defenses.
It cannot have escaped their notice that the only weapons that
really permitted Saddam Hussein to make American forces bleed during
the Gulf War--the only weapons that allowed him to take the war into
the territory of his adversaries and murder innocent women and
children--were ballistic missiles.
We underestimated the ballistic missile threat 10 years ago--and
today, a decade later, we are underestimating it still.
Mr. Chairman, the time has come to lift our heads from the sand and
deal with some unpleasant but indisputable facts: The short-range
missile threat to our friends, allies, and deployed forces arrived a
decade ago; the intermediate-range missile threat is now here; and the
long-range threat to American cities is just over the horizon--a matter
of years, not decades, away--and our people and territory are
defenseless.
Why? The answer has four letters: A-B-M-T.
For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously the
challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have not
adequately funded it, we have not believed in it, and we have given the
ABM Treaty priority over it. That is not how America behaves when we
are serious about a problem. It is not how we put a man on the moon in
just 10 years. It is not how we developed the Polaris program or
intercontinental ballistic missiles in even less time.
The time to get serious is long past. Today, the number of
countries pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is growing.
The number of countries pursuing advanced conventional weapons is
growing. The number of countries pursuing ballistic missile technology
is growing. The number of missiles on the face of the earth is growing.
Consider these facts:

In 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed, the number of
countries pursuing biological weapons was unknown; today there
are at least 13;
In 1972, 10 countries had known chemical weapons
programs; today there are 16 (4 countries ended theirs, but 10
more jumped in to replace them);
In 1972, we knew of only 5 countries that had nuclear
weapons programs; today we know of 12;
In 1972, we knew of a total of 9 countries that had
ballistic missiles; today we know of 28, and in just the last 5
years more than 1,000 missiles of all ranges have been
produced; and
Those are only the cases that we know of. There are
dangerous capabilities being developed at this very moment that
we do not know about, and which we may not know about for
years--perhaps only after they are deployed.

For example, in 1998 North Korea surprised the world with its
launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan, with a previously unknown
third stage. The intelligence community tells us this launch
demonstrated a North Korean capability to deliver a small payload to
the United States. North Korea is currently developing the Taepo Dong 2
missile, which will be able to strike even deeper into U.S. territory
and carry an even larger weapons payload.
Other unfriendly regimes, like Iran, Syria, and Libya, are also
developing missiles of increasing range and sophistication. A number of
these countries are less than 5 years away from being able to deploy
such capabilities. These regimes are collaborating with each other,
sharing technology and know-how.
The countries pursuing these capabilities are doing so because they
believe they will enhance their power and influence; because they
believe that if they can hold the American people at risk, they can
prevent us from projecting force to stop acts of aggression, and deter
us from defending our interests around the world.
If we do not build defenses against these weapons now, hostile
powers will soon have--or may already have--the ability to strike U.S.
and allied cities with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. They
will have the power to hold our people hostage to blackmail and terror.
They may secure, in their estimation, the capability to prevent us from
forming international coalitions to challenge their acts of aggression
and force us into a truly isolationist posture. They would not even
have to use the weapons in their possession to affect our behavior and
achieve their ends.
But we cannot be sure they would not use these weapons in a crisis.
If Saddam Hussein had the ability to strike a Western capital with a
nuclear weapon, would he really be deterred by the prospect of a U.S.
nuclear strike that would kill millions of Iraqis? Is he that concerned
about his people? Would we really want our only option in such a crisis
to be destroying Baghdad and its people? A policy of intentional
vulnerability is not a strategy to deal with the dangers of this new
century.
While we have been debating the existence of the threat for nearly
a decade, other countries have been busily acquiring, developing and
proliferating missile technology. We can afford to debate the threat no
longer. We are in a race against time--and we are starting from behind.
Thanks in no small part to the constraints of the antiquated ABM
Treaty, we have wasted the better part of a decade. We cannot afford to
waste another one.
development and testing
President Bush has declared his intention to develop and deploy
defenses capable of protecting the American people, our friends, allies
and forces around the world from limited ballistic missile attack. The
2002 amended budget requests $8.3 billion for missile defense.
We intend to develop defenses, capable of defending against limited
missile attacks from a rogue state or from an accidental or
unauthorized launch. We intend to develop layered defenses, capable of
intercepting missiles of any range at every stage of flight--boost,
midcourse, and terminal.
We have designed a program to develop and deploy as soon as is
appropriate. Developing a proper layered defense will take time. It
requires more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly
those that have been constrained by the ABM Treaty. So we plan to build
incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology is proven
ready, and then adding new capabilities over time as they become
mature.
We have designed the program so that, in an emergency, we might, if
appropriate, deploy test assets to defend against a rapidly emerging
threat. This has been done a number of times before with other military
capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. But barring such an
emergency, we need to consider the operational deployment of test
assets very carefully--because such deployments can be disruptive, and
can set back normal development programs.
However, we have not yet chosen a systems architecture to deploy.
We are not in a position to do so because so many promising
technologies were not pursued in the past. The program we inherited was
designed not for maximum effectiveness, but to remain within the
constraints of the ABM Treaty. As a result, development and testing
programs for defense against long-range threats were limited to ground-
based components--ignoring air, sea and space-based capabilities with
enormous potential.
In order to accelerate the program, we must first broaden the
search for effective technologies before we can move forward toward
deployment. We must dust off technologies that were shelved, consider
new ones, and bring them all into the development and testing process.
To do this, we have designed a flexible and strengthened research,
development, testing and evaluation program to examine the widest
possible range of promising technologies, of which there are many. We
will expand our program to add tests of technologies and basing modes,
including land, air, sea, and space-based capabilities that had been
previously disregarded or inadequately explored.
Notwithstanding the delays of the past decade, the capability to
defend America is within our grasp. The technology of 2001 is not the
technology of 1981, or, for that matter, 1991--the year we suffered our
first losses to a ballistic missile attack by a rogue state.
Today, ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem of
invention--it is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge we are
up to.
abm treaty
Our program is designed to develop the most capable possible
defense for our country, our allies and our deployed forces at the
earliest feasible time. That means it will at some point--and
increasingly over time--encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM
Treaty. We will not conduct tests solely for the purpose of exceeding
the constraints of treaty--but neither will we design our program to
avoid doing so.
However, this administration does not intend to violate the ABM
Treaty; we intend to move beyond it. We are working to do so on two
parallel tracks: First, we are pursuing the accelerated research,
development and testing program I have described. Second, we are
engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework that
reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and
Russia are not enemies. We are moving forward on both of these tracks
simultaneously, and we feel the prospects for success in both cases are
promising.
We have begun a dialogue with Russia on how we can build a new
security relationship whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of
the mutual annihilation of our respective populations that was the
basis of the old U.S.-Soviet relations. That is not a healthy basis for
U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century.
On his recent visit to Europe, President Bush had a good discussion
with President Putin, and Secretary Rumsfeld had a productive dialogue
at NATO last month with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Indeed,
after their meeting, Minister Ivanov declared his agreement with
Secretary Rumsfeld that ``there are not only more threats facing us now
in the 21st century, but they are multifaceted, much more so than they
were in the past.''
Our discussions with Russia are ongoing, and we have no reason to
believe that they will fail. The question of whether we will violate
the ABM Treaty in 2002 presumes they will fail. But there is no reason
to assume we will fail; and if we succeed, the ABM Treaty will no
longer be an obstacle to protecting the American people, our allies and
deployed forces from ballistic missile attack.
We hope and expect to have reached an understanding with Russia by
the time our development program bumps up against the constraints of
the ABM Treaty. But President Bush has also made clear that a 30-year-
old treaty designed to preserve the nuclear balance of terror during
the Cold War must not be allowed to prevent us from taking steps to
protect our people, our forces, and our allies. We would prefer a
cooperative outcome, and we are optimistic that such an outcome is
possible. But we must achieve release from the constraints of the ABM
Treaty.
If we all agree that a cooperative outcome is preferable, then it
is important that Congress demonstrate the same resolve as the
President to proceed with development of defenses to protect our
people, our friends and allies, and our forces around the world--
defenses that cannot, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, be
considered a threat to Russia or its security.
If, conversely, we give Russia the mistaken impression that, by
insisting on adherence to the ABM Treaty, they can exercise a veto over
our development of missile defenses, the unintended consequence could
be to rule out a cooperative solution and leave the President no choice
but to walk away from the treaty unilaterally.
As I stated earlier, the current planned testing program is not
designed with the constraints of the ABM Treaty in mind; neither has it
been designed for the purpose of exceeding those constraints. However,
as the program develops and the various testing activities mature, one
or more aspects will inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions and
limitations. Such an event is likely to occur in months rather than in
years. It is not possible to know with certainty whether it will occur
in the coming year. This uncertainty is in part the result of
inevitable uncertainty of all research and development programs. Many
of the early issues will involve legal complexities, which we will
fully resolve through the treaty Compliance Review Group.
For example, the test bed currently scheduled to begin construction
in April 2002 is designed to permit the testing of a ground-based
midcourse capability under realistic operational conditions. There will
also be opportunities, while we are testing the Aegis midcourse system,
to test the ability of Aegis ship-based radars to track long-range
ballistic missiles. There will also be opportunities to combine the
data from radars used in midcourse tests with the radars used to track
short-range missiles. Will these tests exceed the limits of the treaty?
In each case, there will be those who argue on all three sides of the
coin. We have an established system for resolving these difficult
issues.
What I can tell you is this: by the time a planned development
activity encounters ABM Treaty constraints, we fully hope and intend to
have reached an understanding with Russia. We would expect to identify
such issues 6 months in advance. We will either have reached an
understanding with Russia, in which case the question would be moot, or
we would be left with two less than optimal choices: to allow an
obsolete treaty to prevent us from defending America, or to withdraw
from the treaty unilaterally, which we have every legal right to do.
However, even in the latter circumstance, we should continue our
efforts to reach an understanding with Russia. But our goal is to reach
an understanding with Russia well before that time. Such an
understanding is in both countries' interests. The end of the Cold War
has fundamentally transformed our relationship. We ask for your support
as we continue to work towards a cooperative solution. I can assure you
that the President will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to
conduct the proper notifications as we go forward.
new deterrence framework
We are optimistic about the prospects of reaching an understanding
with Russia, because reaching a new security framework is in both of
our nations' interests. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union is gone.
Russia is not our enemy. We are no longer locked in a posture of Cold
War ideological antagonism. Yet the ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War
relationship that is no longer relevant to the 21st century.
The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that--defenses.
They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would
threaten us with ballistic missile attack. We do not consider Russia
such a country. Americans do not lie awake at night worrying about a
massive Russian first strike, the way they worried about a Soviet first
strike during the Cold War.
Our missile defenses will be no threat to Russia. Their purpose
will be to protect against limited missile attacks from an increasing
number of possible sources--but not against the thousand of missiles in
Russia's arsenal.
Further, they will be just one part of the larger, 21st century
deterrence framework we are working to build. During the Cold War, our
aim was to deter one adversary from using an arsenal of existing
weapons against us. In the 21st century, our challenge is not only to
deter multiple potential adversaries from using existing weapons, but
to dissuade them from developing dangerous new capabilities in the
first place.
This requires a different approach to deterrence. Just as we intend
to build ``layered defenses'' to deal with missile threats at different
stages, we also need a strategy of ``layered deterrence'' in which we
develop a mix of capabilities--both offensive and defensive--which can
deter and dissuade a variety of emerging threats at different stages.
Such a strategy would aim to dissuade countries from pursuing
dangerous capabilities in the first place, by developing and deploying
U.S. capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete; to
discourage them from investing further in existing dangerous
capabilities that have emerged, but are not yet a significant threat;
and to deter them from using dangerous capabilities once they have
emerged to threaten us all, with the threat of devastating response.
Just as America's overwhelming naval power discourages potential
adversaries from investing in building competing navies to threaten
freedom of the seas--because, in the end, they would spend a fortune
and not accomplish their strategic objectives--we should develop a
range of new capabilities that, by their very existence, dissuade and
discourage potential adversaries from investing in other hostile
capabilities.
Missile defense is one example. It has received significant
attention because it is new--but it is just one element of a new
deterrence framework that includes several mutually-reinforcing layers
of deterrence, including diplomacy, arms control, counterterrorism,
counterproliferation and smaller but effective offensive nuclear
forces.
what the program is not
We have discussed what the program is; we must also discuss what
the program is not.

It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield
around the United States. This is not Star Wars. We have a much
more limited objective to deploy effective defenses against
limited missile attack. Indeed the change in the threat--from
the thousands of missiles in the Soviet arsenal to handfuls of
limited missile attacks--makes deployment of effective defenses
more realistic than ever before.
It is not a threat to anyone, and will be a problem
only for those rogue states that wish to threaten our people,
our allies or our deployed forces, with ballistic missile
attacks.
It will not undermine arms control or spark an arms
race. If anything, building effective defenses will reduce the
value of ballistic missiles, and thus remove incentives for
their development and proliferation. Since they will have
virtually no effect on Russia's capabilities, there is no
incentive for Russia to spend scarce resources to try to
overcome them. China is already engaged in a rapid
modernization of its missile capabilities, and will continue
this modernization whether or not we build missile defenses. To
the contrary, the Russians and the Chinese will be able to see
that we are reducing our offensive nuclear forces substantially
and there is no need for them to build up theirs. In this
budget proposal alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident, and B-1
reductions, we will be reducing START-countable warheads by
over 1,000. We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what
Russia decides to do, but we believe it is in their best
interest to follow the same path.
It is not a ``scarecrow'' defense. We intend to build
and deploy effective defenses at the earliest possible moment.
Those defenses will grow more and more effective over time, as
we deploy an increasingly sophisticated mix of capabilities
that provide ``layered defenses'' against all ranges of
missiles at all stages of flight. The more capable the better,
but the defenses don't have to be perfect to save lives and
reduce casualties. As imperfect as the PAC-2 system was during
the Gulf War, there wasn't a single ally or commander who
didn't clamor for more.
Will our defenses be 100 percent effective? Mr. Chairman, no
defense is 100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions
we spend on counterterrorism, we failed to stop terrorist
attacks on the Khobar Towers, our embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, or the World Trade Center. Yet I know of no one who
has suggested that we stop spending money on counterterrorism
because we have no perfect defense. Moreover, defenses won't
need to be 100 percent effective to make a significant
contribution to deterrence.
It will not cost the taxpayers hundreds of billions of
dollars. The money we propose to spend on missile defense is
comparable to other major defense development programs, and
comparable to other elements of our security strategy. We are
proposing $8.3 billion for missile defense in 2002. That is
still a large amount, but the consequences of the failure could
be enormous.
It does not divert attention and resources from other,
more pressing threats. Some have argued that we should not
spend money on missile defense, because the real threat comes
from terrorists using suitcase bombs. That is like arguing that
you should not lock your front door because a burglar can break
in through your window. Both threats are real--but for the last
decade, work on countering the terrorist threat has proceeded
aggressively, while work on ballistic missile defense has been
hamstrung by an obsolete theory. We are correcting that.

As we move forward with accelerated testing and development, Mr.
Chairman, there will certainly be bumps along the way. We expect there
to be test failures. There is not a single major technological
development in human history that did not begin with a process of trial
and error and many of our most successful weapons developments have
been marked by testing failures:

The Corona satellite program, which produced the first
overhead reconnaissance satellites, suffered 11 straight test
failures.
The Thor Able and Thor Agena launch programs failed 4
out of 5 times.
The Atlas Agena launches failed 5 out of 8 times.
The Scout launches failed 4 out of 6 times.
The Vanguard program failed 11 of its first 14 tries.
The Polaris failed in 66 out of 123 flights.

Mr. Chairman, from these failures came some of the most effective
capabilities ever fielded. Failure is how we learn. If a program never
suffers test failures, it means someone is not taking enough risks and
pushing the envelope. Intelligent risk taking is critical to any
advanced development program--and it will be critical to the
development of effective ballistic missile defenses.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began. This threat is not
fictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. It is not going to
disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears.

If there were a war in Korea tomorrow, our best
intelligence estimates are that North Korean missiles would
wreak havoc on population centers and our deployed forces in
South Korea, even if armed only with conventional weapons, and
North Korea now poses a significant threat to Japan as well.
We know that it is a matter of time before Iran
develops nuclear weapons, and may soon have the capacity to
strike Israel and some NATO allies.

Think about what kind of hearings we would be having 3 or 4 years
from now if Iran demonstrates intermediate-range capability to strike
Israel or U.S. troops deployed in the Gulf--or if North Korea
demonstrates the capability to strike the U.S. with long-range nuclear
missiles. I, for one, don't want to have to come before this committee
and explain why we ignored the coming threat, and didn't do everything
we could to meet it.
This is not a partisan issue. We do not now know whether the
President who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of
striking Los Angeles, Detroit or New York with nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat. But we do know
that individual will be an American. That is how we too must proceed--
not as Republicans, or Democrats, but as Americans.
Let future generations who look back at this period not see
partisan bickering, but statesmen who rose above party lines to make
sure America and its allies and deployed forces were protected against
this real emerging threat.
Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Wolfowitz.
General Kadish.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR,
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

General Kadish. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. It's a pleasure to appear before you today and to
present the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2002 Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) program and budget. To allow more time
for your questions, I request that the prepared statement that
I forwarded to the committee be entered into the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
General Kadish. The fundamental objective of the BMD
program is to develop the capability to defend the forces and
territories of the United States, its allies, and friends from
all classes of ballistic missiles. The Department will develop
and deploy promising technologies and concepts in order to
build and sustain an effective, reliable, and affordable
missile defense system. The research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) program is designed to enhance system
effectiveness over time by developing layered defenses that
employ complementary sensors and weapons to engage threats in
the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight and to
deploy that capability incrementally.
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have
developed a research, development, and test program that
focuses on missile defense as a single integrated ballistic
missile defense, no longer differentiating between theater and
National Missile Defense. This revised structure involves three
basic thrusts. First, the new Ballistic Missile Defense program
will build on the technical progress we have made to date by
providing the funding required to develop and test elements of
the previous program.
Second, the new program will pursue a broad range of
activities in order to aggressively evaluate and develop
technologies for the integration of land, sea, air, or space-
based platforms to counter ballistic missiles in all phases of
their flight. The new program will not cut corners. Rather, it
is designed to pursue a parallel development path to improve
the likelihood of achieving an effective, layered missile
defense.
Third, the new testing program will incorporate a larger
number of tests than in the past. They will employ more
realistic scenarios and countermeasures. This will allow us to
achieve greater confidence in our planning and development.
Through this robust testing, we may discover opportunities to
accelerate elements of the program based on their performance
and increase the overall capability and credibility of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System. This approach is designed to
enable contingency use of the demonstrated ballistic missile
defense capabilities if directed.
The goal of the BMD System is a layered defense that
provides multiple engagement opportunities along the entire
flight path of a ballistic missile. Over the next 3 to 5 years,
we will pursue parallel technical paths to reduce schedule and
cost risk in the individual RDT&E efforts. We will explore and
demonstrate kinetic and directed energy kill mechanisms for
potential sea-, ground-, air-, and potentially space-based
operations to engage threat missiles in the boost, midcourse,
and terminal phases of flight. In parallel, sensor suites and
battle management and command and control will be developed to
form the backbone of this system.
Before I proceed to describe the new program in detail, I
would like to make clear what this program does not do. It does
not define a specific architecture yet. It does not commit to a
procurement program for a full, layered defense. There is no
commitment to specific dates for production and deployment
other than for lower tier terminal defense elements. It is not
a rush to deploy untested systems. It is not a step back to an
unfocused research program. It is not a minor change to our
previous program. Rather, this is a bold move to develop an
effective, integrated layered defense against ballistic
missiles of all ranges.
The new program is a major change in our approach to
developing ballistic missile defense. The previous National
Missile Defense program, for example, was a high-risk
production and development deployment program dependent for its
success on an RDT&E effort that was somewhat underfunded but
charged with developing a system that would operate at the
outset with near perfection. It was based on rigid military
requirements. The new program is built around a fully-funded,
rigorous RDT&E effort designed to demonstrate increasing
capability over time through a robust, realistic testing
program.
The objective of the new program is a layered defense to
protect the United States, its allies, friends, and deployed
forces against ballistic missiles of all ranges, and we will
pursue this objective in the following way: First, we are
recommending an acquisition approach that is evolutionary--one
that will allow us to field systems incrementally once they are
proven through robust testing. Because of uncertainties in the
development program, the evolutionary approach is implemented
in 2-year planning blocks. This allows us to adjust rapidly to
change in the development performance of our sub-systems and
allows us to build on our successes over time without the
inherent difficulties of date certain expectations.
Second, rather than committing to a single architecture as
we have done in the past, we will deploy over time different
combinations of sensors and weapons consistent with our
national strategic objectives.
We have designed the program so that, in an emergency and
if directed, we might quickly deploy test assets to defend
against a rapidly growing threat. This has been done before
with other military capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in
Kosovo. But barring such an emergency, we do not intend to
deploy assets until they are ready because such emergency
deployments are disruptive and can set back normal development
programs by years.
The technical and operational challenges of intercepting
ballistic missiles are unprecedented. While these challenges
are significant, our testing accomplishments to date tell us
they are not insurmountable. Given the threats we expect to
face, there is a premium on fielding highly reliable and
effective systems.
Reliability will be realized, in part, through redundancy
in our system. Effectiveness is partly a function of the number
of opportunities the system provides to intercept an in-flight
missile and how early and often those opportunities occur in
the missile's flight. Because we need redundancy, we determined
that whatever BMD Systems we deploy, they should allow multiple
engagement opportunities in the boost, in the midcourse, and
terminal phases of a ballistic missile's flight.
The boost phase is that part of flight when the ballistic
missile's rocket motors are ignited and propel the entire
missile system towards space. It lasts roughly 3 to 5 minutes
for long-range missiles and as little as 1 to 2 minutes for
short-range missiles.
When the missile boosters are spent, the missile continues
its ascent into what we call the midcourse part of flight,
which lasts nominally 20 minutes for long-range missiles. In
this stage of flight, a ballistic missile releases its payload
warhead, submunitions, and/or penetration aids in space. The
missile enters what we call the terminal phase when the missile
or elements of its payload reenter the atmosphere. This is a
very short phase, lasting from a few minutes to less than a
minute.
We are presented with unique opportunities and challenges
when engaging a threat missile in each of these phases. The
layered defense, or defense-in-depth approach, will increase
the chances that the missile and its payload will be destroyed.
Intercepting a missile in boost phase, for example, results
in the defense of any target that the missile might be aimed at
and can destroy a missile regardless of its design range. A
midcourse intercept capability provides wide coverage of
regions, while a terminal defense protects a localized area.
Intercepting a missile near its launch point is always
preferable to intercepting the same missile closer to its
target. When we add shot opportunities in the midcourse and
terminal phases of flight to boost phase opportunities, we
increase significantly the probability we will be successful.
Another advantage of the layered approach is that it
complicates an adversary's plans. Countermeasures, for example,
will always be a challenge for the defense. But because
countermeasures have to be tailored to the specific phase of
the missile's flight, layered defenses pose major challenges to
an aggressor.
The fiscal year 2002 program speeds development of
established technologies, enables robust testing and evaluation
of systems that are more mature, and explores new missile
defense concepts and technologies. We plan to pursue multiple,
parallel development paths to reduce the risk inherent in
ballistic missile defense engineering with RDT&E initiatives in
each of the boost, midcourse, and terminal defense segments of
the overall system.
We do not want to be in a position, in other words, where
we discover a fundamental design flaw in our kill vehicle or in
our only sea-based booster that might be under development.
That would amount to a single point failure that could cost us
years in developing effective missile defenses. We must be
agile in our engineering approaches to keep the program on
track and affordable.
This robust RDT&E program aims to demonstrate what does and
does not work. These activities showing the greatest promise
will receive greater resource emphasis. Our progress will
inform an annual high level decisionmaking process that will
steer the BMD program in the most promising direction, taking
into account optimal approaches and the most reliable
information on costs that we can get. This process will allow
us to make informed decisions regarding research, production,
and any deployment.
This RDT&E approach will also minimize possible disruptive
effects that the introduction of new technologies, development
challenges, or changes in the threat otherwise could have on
any Ballistic Missile Defense program and allow us to keep
pressing forward along the most promising paths. We will pursue
enough paths so that the scaling back of any one effort will
not undermine progress in other areas and that technological
advances we make even in failed efforts will be put to good
use. This represents the best approach for pursuing promising
capabilities that will allow us to get out in front and pace a
dynamic ballistic missile threat.
Now I'd like to discuss the fiscal year 2002 budget and how
it helps to implement this aggressive program. As I've said, we
propose to invest in previous efforts as well as newer
activities in order to set up multiple paths for solving this
difficult technical challenge.
The amended budget adds $2.54 billion to our program for a
total of nearly $8.3 billion DOD-wide and just over $7 billion
with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDOs) RDT&E
program.
In the terminal defense segment we have $968 million, an
increase of $212 million over fiscal year 2001 enacted funding.
In the midcourse, for both ground- and sea-based
approaches, we have $3.9 billion, an increase of $1.4 billion,
and in boost we have $685 million, an increase of $313 million
over the fiscal year 2001 enacted funding.
In fiscal year 2002, we are requesting $496 million for our
sensors activities, which represents an increase of $221
million over the fiscal year 2001 enacted funding.
For integration of these segments in the overall Ballistic
Missile Defense System, we have $780 million, which is an
increase of $253 million for test infrastructure and
countermeasures.
These funds will enable us to improve the more mature BMD
activities, begin development of the much needed BMD test bed,
and undertake new concept development activities and
experiments.
In the terminal defense segment, we will continue
investment in two of our most mature programs, THAAD and Arrow.
We have added resources to accelerate the acquisition of a
THAAD radar and buy more test missiles. This will allow us to
capitalize on any early flight test successes should our
disciplined development program prove effective in the test
program. The U.S-Israeli Arrow Program initiated deployments of
its first battery this year. Next year, there will be
additional flight-testing of the Arrow system, and we will
invest in additional production capacity for the Arrow missile.
Patriot and Navy Area are approaching procurement and
deployment decisions. For this reason, and in compliance with
our program philosophy to have BMDO do research, development,
test and evaluation and the services do procurement, and to
support the services' air defense mission, the Department is
transferring to respective services the responsibility for the
execution and management of these three programs: Patriot 3,
Navy Area, and the Medium Extended Air Defense System--MEADS.
The transfer of these systems will maintain internal focus,
consistency, and the interdependence of both BMDO and the
services.
In the midcourse segment we will continue to make
improvements to counter the long-range ICBM threat, and to
expand the ballistic missile defense test bed. The test bed is
a central part of this program. It will provide an
operationally realistic environment to test system elements and
integration and to prove our construction, transportation, and
logistics concepts. Over time, the test bed will expand to
include weapons and sensor capabilities, to improve overall
missile defense capabilities as they are made available. We
will also proceed toward the development of a sea-based
midcourse capability against long-range missile threats. Under
the new BMDO program, we will continue the Navy Theater Wide
Aegis LEAP Intercept, or ALI program, to counter short-range
threats.
In the boost defense segment, we will explore directed
energy and kinetic energy options leading to experiments and
demonstrations in the 2003 to 2005 timeframe. We are
considering a sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed,
high-acceleration booster coupled with a boost-phase kill
vehicle. This activity will simultaneously support a proof-of-
concept space-based experiment somewhere after 2004 using a
space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle.
We will continue the airborne laser development and plan a
lethal demonstration in the 2003 to 2004 timeframe. We will
also continue space-based laser risk reduction as we work
towards an integrated flight experiment early in the next
decade. The Department will consolidate program and management
responsibility for the airborne laser and the space-based laser
within BMDO.
The sensors program element funds two key efforts: the
SBIRS-Low, which was transferred from the Air Force to BMDO,
and the Russian-American observation satellites cooperative
research project with Russia.
Mr. Chairman, we have an aggressive RDT&E program designed
to enhance system effectiveness over time by developing layered
defenses that employ complementary sensors and weapons to
engage threat targets in the boost, midcourse, and terminal
phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.
Along the way, there will be successes and there will be
failures. We will learn from both and make significant progress
in developing a layered Ballistic Missile Defense System.
Mr. Chairman, I have a short film, if the equipment works,
to demonstrate the fact that we have achieved the ability, at
least in the demonstration phase in some of our programs, to
hit an incoming warhead very accurately. If I might, I would
like to walk you through the low altitude, the medium altitude,
and in the space realm that we are testing on Saturday, and the
successes that we have had. Now, to be sure, we have had
failures, but I want to show you the continuity of hitting
warheads directly with hit-to-kill technology and how that has
developed over the past few years.
Chairman Levin. About how long will it take?
General Kadish. 3\1/2\ minutes.
Chairman Levin. That is fine. Thank you. [Video.]
[Copy of video retained in committee files.]
General Kadish. We will start out with this, a target
launch for our Patriot 3. You can see the Patriot 3. This is in
the atmosphere, hit-to-kill. There are no explosives on Patriot
for theater ballistic missile (TBM) intercepts. You can see the
Patriot maneuvering to get in the position to very accurately
intercept a TBM warhead that is coming in, a short-range
missile. Towards the terminal, you will see white smoke and you
will see that hit. That is a direct hit, hit-to-kill, in the
atmosphere with the Patriot.
The Patriot has missed only once in our test program, and
we have had nine flights.
Now we move to THAAD, which is higher up in the atmosphere
and into space. That was the target launch, THAAD missile
taking off. To stay on the range, it has to do a maneuver, but
it is very high acceleration. This program is now in
development to fix some of the problems we had with it. You can
see it climbing into altitude to intercept the warhead in outer
space. Here is a depiction of the target, and the THAAD you can
see maneuvering to hit it very accurately. There were no
explosives. That is pure kinetic energy, hit-to-kill, body-to-
body impact on the program.
That was high enough so that you could see this particular
intercept from Albuquerque from over White Sands.
This is another view of it in more real-time.
Now an example of what we are going to try to do on
Saturday. The first time we did a National Missile Defense or
long-range missile defense intercept, this is the last frame
that THAAD saw before it intercepted. You can see the image of
that warhead getting bigger in the sights of that intercept
vehicle.
This is a target launch out of Vandenberg into the South
Pacific, 5,000 miles away. It occurred in October 1999, the
first time we tried this. You can see the ranges are getting
longer. This is the rise of the target into outer space. This
is the interceptor at Kwajalein. Now, the intercept takes place
over 140 miles into space, and you can see in a minute the two
bodies coming together, from an infrared sensor.
This is a more real-time look at it from a better
perspective. That is the warhead in there coming together.
Now, to be sure, we have major difficulties in making this
type of technology work and work reliably and effectively. That
is what this test program is designed to do, especially in the
midcourse. We have had many failures in this process. However,
it is an engineering challenge at this time.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a
pleasure to appear before you today to present the Department of
Defense's Fiscal Year 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense program and
budget.
The fundamental objective of the BMD program is to develop the
capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States,
its allies, and friends against all classes of ballistic missile
threats. The Department will develop technologies and deploy systems
promising an effective, reliable, and affordable missile defense
system. The RDT&E program is designed to develop effective systems over
time by developing layered defenses that employ complementary sensors
and weapons to engage threat targets in the boost, midcourse, and
terminal phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have developed a
research, development and test program that focuses on missile defense
as a single integrated BMD System, no longer differentiating between
theater and National Missile Defense. This revised structure involves
three basic thrusts. First, the new BMD program will build on the
technical progress we have made to date by providing the funding
required to develop and test selective elements of the current program
fully.
Second, the new program will pursue a broad range of activities in
order to aggressively evaluate and develop technologies for the
integration of land-, sea-,
air-, or space-based platforms to counter ballistic missiles in all
phases of their flight. The new program will not cut corners. Rather,
it is designed to pursue parallel development paths to improve the
likelihood of achieving an effective, layered missile defense.
Third, the new testing program will incorporate a larger number of
tests than in the past. They will employ more realistic scenarios and
countermeasures. This will allow us to achieve greater confidence in
our planning and development. Through this robust testing activity, we
may discover opportunities to accelerate elements of the program based
on their performance, and increase the overall credibility and
capability of BMD Systems. This approach is designed to enable
contingency use of the demonstrated BMD capabilities, if directed.
The goal of the BMD System is a layered defense that provides
multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path of a
ballistic missile. Over the next 3 to 5 years we will pursue parallel
technical paths to reduce schedule and cost risk in the individual
RDT&E efforts. We will explore and demonstrate kinetic and directed
energy kill mechanisms for potential sea-, ground-, air-, and space-
based operations to engage threat missiles in the boost, midcourse, and
terminal phases of flight. In parallel, sensor suites and battle
management and command and control (BMC\2\) will be developed to form
the backbone of the BMD System.
But before I proceed to describe the new program in detail, I would
like to make clear what this program does not do. It does not define a
specific architecture. It does not commit to a procurement program for
a full, layered defense. There is no commitment to specific dates for
production and deployment other than for the lower tier terminal
defense elements. It is not a rush to deploy untested systems; it is
not a step back to an unfocused research program; and it is not a minor
change to our previous program. Rather this program is a bold move to
develop an effective, integrated layered defense that can be deployed
as soon as possible against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
The new program is a major change in our approach to developing
ballistic missile defense. The previous National Missile Defense
Program, for example, was a high risk production and deployment program
dependent for its success on an RDT&E effort that was underfunded but
charged with developing a system that would operate at the outset with
near perfection; and it was based on rigid military requirements. The
new program is built around a fully-funded, rigorous RDT&E effort
designed to demonstrate increasing capability over time through a
robust, realistic testing program.
The objective of the new program is a layered defense to protect
the United States, allies, friends, and deployed forces against
ballistic missiles of all ranges. We will pursue this objective in the
following way: First, we are recommending a broad, flexible approach to
RDT&E that allows us to explore multiple development paths and to
reinforce success based on the best technological approaches and the
most advantageous basing modes in order to hedge against the inherent
uncertainty of the ballistic missile defense challenge. Second, we are
recommending an acquisition approach that is evolutionary, one that
will allow us to field systems incrementally once they are proven
through realistic testing. Third, rather than committing to a single
architecture as we have done in the past, we will deploy over time
different combinations of sensors and weapons consistent with our
national strategic objectives.
We have designed the program so that, in an emergency and if
directed, we might quickly deploy test assets to defend against a
rapidly emerging threat. This has been done before with other military
capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. But barring such an
emergency, as the Deputy Secretary has stated, we do not intend to
deploy test assets until they are ready because such emergency
deployments are disruptive, and can set back normal development
programs by years.
layered defense--effective against countermeasures
The technical and operational challenges of intercepting ballistic
missiles are unprecedented. While these challenges are significant, our
testing accomplishments to date tell us that they are not
insurmountable. Given the threats we expect to face, there is a premium
on fielding a highly reliable and effective system. Reliability will be
realized, in part, through redundancy in our system. Effectiveness is
partly a function of the number of opportunities the system provides to
intercept an in-flight missile and how early and how often those
opportunities occur in the missile's flight. Because we need
redundancy, we determined that whatever BMD Systems we deploy, they
should allow multiple engagement opportunities in the boost, midcourse,
and terminal phases of a ballistic missile's flight.
The boost phase is that part of flight when the ballistic missile's
rocket motors are ignited and propel the entire missile system towards
space. It lasts roughly 3 to 5 minutes for a long-range missile and as
little as 1 to 2 minutes for a short-range missile. When the missile
boosters are spent, the missile continues its ascent into what we call
the midcourse part of flight (which lasts nominally 20 minutes for a
long-range missile). In this stage of flight, a ballistic missile
releases its payload warhead(s), submunitions, and/or penetration aids
it carried into space. The missile enters what we call the terminal
phase when the missile or the elements of its payload, for example, its
warheads, reenter the atmosphere. This is a very short phase, lasting
from a few minutes to less than a minute.
There are opportunities and challenges to engage a threat missile
in each of these phases. The layered defense, or defense-in-depth,
approach will increase the chances that the missile and its payload
will be destroyed.
Intercepting a missile in the boost phase, for example, results in
the defense of any target that the missile might be aimed at and can
destroy a missile regardless of its design range. A midcourse intercept
capability provides wide coverage of a region or regions, while a
terminal defense protects a localized area. Intercepting a missile near
its launch point is always preferable to intercepting that same missile
closer to its target. When we add shot opportunities in the midcourse
and terminal phases of flight to boost phase opportunities, we increase
significantly the probability that we will be successful.
Another advantage of the layered approach is that it complicates an
adversary's plans. Countermeasures, for example, will always be a
challenge for the defense. But because countermeasures have to be
tailored to the specific phase of a missile's flight, layered defenses
pose major challenges to an aggressor.
rdt&e activities
The Fiscal Year 2002 Program speeds development of established
technologies, enables robust testing and evaluation of systems that are
more mature, and explores new missile defense concepts and
technologies. I will address some of these activities in a moment. We
plan to pursue multiple, parallel development paths to reduce the risk
inherent in BMD engineering, with initiatives in each of the Boost,
Midcourse, and Terminal Defense Segments of the BMD System. As part of
our risk reduction activity, we will explore different technologies and
paths. We will also pursue technologies that may be useful across
multiple segments and employ multiple technologies to avoid single
point failures in each segment.
We do not want to be in a situation, for example, to discover a
fundamental design problem in our only Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
(EKV), or in our only sea-based booster under development. That would
amount to a single point failure that could cost us years in developing
effective missile defenses, not to mention leaving America and our
allies unnecessarily exposed. We must be agile in our engineering
approaches to keep the BMD program on track and affordable.
This robust RDT&E program aims to demonstrate what does and does
not work. Those activities showing the greatest promise will receive
greater resource emphasis. Our progress will inform an annual high-
level decisionmaking process that will steer the BMD program in the
most promising direction, taking into account optimal approaches and
the most reliable information on costs, allowing informed research,
production, and deployment decisions.
This RDT&E approach also will minimize possible disruptive effects
that the introduction of new technologies, development challenges, or
changes in the threat otherwise could have on the BMD program and allow
us to keep pressing forward along the most promising paths. We will
pursue enough paths so that the scaling back of one effort will not
undermine progress in other areas and the technological advances we
make even in failed efforts will be put to good use. This represents
the best approach for pursuing promising capabilities that will allow
us to get out in front and pace a dynamic ballistic missile threat.
The business of missile defense requires coping with a number of
technological, developmental, acquisition, and threat uncertainties.
For this reason, I cannot tell you today exactly what the system will
look like 15, 10, or even 5 years from now. This system will take shape
over time. We do not intend to lock ourselves into a highly stylized
architecture based on either known technologies or hoped for advances
in technology that will take a decade or more to complete. We intend to
go beyond the conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process.
We have adopted a capability-based approach, which recognizes that
changes will occur along two separate axes. On the one axis, the threat
will evolve and change over time based on the emergence of new
technologies, continued proliferation of missiles worldwide, and
operational and technical adjustments by adversaries (including the
introduction of countermeasures) to defeat our BMD System. On the other
axis lie changes we will experience. These include improving
technologies, incremental system enhancements, evolving views of system
affordability, and out-year decisions expanding coverage, potentially
including the territory and populations of our allies and friends.
The BMD System will feature a uniform battle management and command
and control network and leverage, where possible, other Department
communication channels to integrate elements of the BMD System. Because
the system must act within minutes or even seconds to counter ballistic
missiles, the information we receive on threats must be accurately
received, interpreted, and acted upon rapidly. The information network
must be seamless and allow information to be passed quickly and
reliably among all the elements of the system.
Mobility in our sensor and interceptor platforms and the capability
to do boost phase and/or midcourse phase intercept must be central
features in our architecture if we are to provide effective territorial
protection at home and abroad. Placing sensors forward, or closer to
the target missile launch point, either on land, at sea, in the air, or
in space, will expand the battle space, improve discrimination of the
target complex, and increase engagement opportunities. We will develop
complementary elements in different combinations in order to afford the
system a high degree of synergism and effectiveness.
Specific system choices and timelines will take shape over the next
few years through our capability-based, block approach. We will
increase our capability over time through an evolutionary process as
our technologies mature and are proven through testing. The block
approach allows us to put our best, most capable technologies ``in
play'' sooner than would otherwise be possible. We have organized the
program with the aim of developing militarily useful capabilities in
biannual blocks, starting as early as the 2004-2006 timeframe. These
block capabilities could be deployed on an interim basis to meet an
emergent threat, as an upgrade to an already deployed system, or to
discourage a potential adversary from improving its ballistic missile
capabilities.
Consequently, the CINCs and military services will be involved
throughout the development process so that with each block we move
steadily forward towards systems with ever increasing military utility
that complement other operational capabilities and that minimize life
cycle cost.
testing
We have restructured the BMD program to facilitate success through
rigorous, robust, and realistic testing. To ensure rigor our BMD
testing philosophy recognizes that we must have an integrated, phased
test program that comprehensively covers all aspects of testing; and
our budget submission reflects our investment in the requisite test
infrastructure to support this. To enable more robust testing we will
invest in additional test articles and targets. The test bed we propose
constructing will enhance our ability to test the full range of missile
defense capabilities in realistic configurations and scenarios. Let me
describe our approach to testing and discuss broadly what we are
undertaking in fiscal year 2002.
Our BMD developmental testing entails conceptual prototype
development, assesses the attainment of technical performance
parameters, generates data on risk, supports risk mitigation, and
provides empirical data to validate models and simulations. Testing of
systems, subsystems, and components, especially early in the
developmental cycle, helps us to achieve two fundamental objectives:
(1) determine performance capabilities, and (2) identify potential
design problems to support timely changes. Later testing will
demonstrate the broad range of effectiveness and suitability of missile
defenses in increasingly realistic environments.
Our test philosophy is to add, step-by-step over time, complexity
such as countermeasures and operations in increasingly stressful
environments. This approach allows us to make timely assessments of the
most critical design risk areas. It is a walk-before-you-run, learn-as-
you-go development approach. These testing activities provide critical
information that reduces developmental risk and improves our confidence
that a capability under development is progressing as intended.
Given the number of technical challenges shared among the many
elements of the BMD System, we will conduct a number of program-wide
tests, experiments, and measurement projects each year to achieve our
program-wide objectives. System interoperability and critical
measurements flight tests and ground experiments will be conducted to
support development of BMD System operating concepts, reduce
development risks, and assess BMD System integration and
interoperability. Program-wide collection and measurement needs will be
met by phenomenology measurements, countermeasure characterizations,
and analysis of lethality, kill assessment, and discrimination.
International cooperative test and evaluation activities could become
an important part of our program.
Each test range currently in use is equipped with precision
instrumentation sensors (radar and optical), telemetry capabilities,
and flight and range safety systems. Additionally, BMDO deploys mobile
airborne sensors. Core supporting ranges include both short- and long-
range test facilities with multiple launch sites, primarily in New
Mexico and over the Pacific Ocean. These collection capabilities are a
critical part of our program. In fiscal year 2002, we will be engaged
in a number of activities to develop and upgrade the test range
infrastructure we require.
The new program will feature range improvements for boost segment
and system level testing, and will allow us to increase the tempo of
our testing operations. Existing ground facilities will be upgraded for
testing of Boost Segment elements, advanced sensors, counter-
countermeasures, and nuclear weapons effects. Airborne instrumentation
platforms will be upgraded, and modeling and simulation software having
system-level and program-wide application will be developed.
Ground test facility development and enhancement will help us to
improve sensor testing, strengthen our end-to-end test capability, and
undertake tests using scenarios we cannot duplicate in our flight-
testing, such as nuclear weapons effects testing. Facilities for
program-wide interoperability ground tests must be upgraded to be
capable of both analyzing yesterday's flight test data and predicting
tomorrow's expected system performance.
With our more robust test program we will increase the number of
tests and add tests of different technologies and basing modes. To meet
the challenges of missile defense development we must upgrade our
capabilities to test with flexibility over greater distances. Test
scenarios must accommodate multiple intercepts occurring nearly
simultaneously at realistic intercept geometries. Upgrades will be
required in our launch facilities, flight hardware, and range tracking
and collection assets.
In fiscal year 2002 we will develop an inventory of targets and
initiate procurement of additional test hardware to support a more
aggressive test program. We must have quicker reaction in our targets
program in order to accommodate changes in threat knowledge and to
incorporate countermeasures. The BMD program will fund development of
new threat-credible ballistic missile targets and countermeasures for
all defense segment development activities, risk reduction flights, and
comprehensive target system support, to include direct target costs and
launch operations.
Challenges we face in this area include development of new targets
for boost segment testing, proper incorporation of countermeasures, and
overcoming a dwindling supply of target hardware, particularly hardware
incorporating countermeasures. The objective is to ensure an adequate
supply of target boosters, reentry vehicles, and countermeasures to
prevent major delays in development schedules resulting from a shortage
of these major target components. We need to be able to test more and
more often, and this requires that we have the test articles on hand
and ready for use. Larger quantities of hardware also will help us
overcome lengthy delays caused by, for example, a pre-launch problem
with a target booster.
As I mentioned earlier, we will increase testing of alternative
technologies, especially in the medium and high-risk areas of
development. We must be hardware rich if we are to have a robust
testing program and if we are to avoid single point failures in any of
our development efforts.
Among the challenges that faced the previous NMD program was
overcoming flight test restrictions on trajectories, impact areas, and
debris in space in order to test overall system performance limits. The
range we have been using between Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California and Kwajalein Missile Range, while useful for developmental
testing, lacks realism for tests of BMD interceptors and sensors.
The amended budget request contributes significantly to the
development of a BMD test bed, which will be used initially to prove
out the midcourse capabilities. That test bed will expand test
boundaries and develop and enhance test infrastructure and will provide
for more operationally realistic testing. Over time the test bed will
expand to include weapons and sensor capabilities to improve all
missile defense capabilities as they are made available.
The integrated test bed will be oriented in the Pacific region and
extend many hundreds of miles from the Marshall Islands in the South
Pacific to Alaska. It will allow more realistic flight-testing of
capabilities in the Boost, Midcourse, and Terminal Defense Segments.
The new test bed would make use of early warning radars at Beale
Air Force Base and Cobra Dane at Shemya Island, and use the Kodiak
Launch Facility in Alaska to launch targets and interceptors. The test
bed would continue our practice of integrating early warning cueing
information from Defense Support Program satellites and leveraging a
battle management system operated out of Colorado Springs, Colorado.
The test bed also will include up to five ground-based silos at Fort
Greely, Alaska. We anticipate a prototype ground support capability, to
include launch facilities, sensors, and networked communications, will
be developed in fiscal year 2002 and built in fiscal year 2003. We will
initiate construction of an interceptor integration facility in fiscal
year 2002 to support a wide range of interceptor needs for testing.
This test bed will allow us to test more than one missile defense
segment at a time and exploit multiple shot opportunities so that we
can demonstrate the viability of the layered defense concept. The test
bed will provide a realistic environment to test different missile
defense capabilities under varying and stressing conditions. It will
also help us prove out construction, transportation, and logistics
concepts we will need to clarify as we execute deployment decisions.
If directed, the BMD test bed also could provide a basis for a
contingency defensive capability if the security environment warrants.
bmd program management
We must deviate from the standard acquisition process and recognize
the unprecedented technical challenges we are facing. We do not have
major defense acquisition programs in the fiscal year 2002 budget. We
do not have program activities with traditional fixed milestones and
clearly marked phases showing the road to production.
The new approach to BMD development features more streamlined,
flexible management through comprehensive and iterative reviews. We
will establish yearly decision points to determine the status of the
available technologies and concept evaluations in order to be in a
position to accelerate, modify, truncate, or terminate our efforts in a
particular area. This comprehensive annual review process will also
help us make decisions to shape the evolving systems and allocate
resources to optimally support them. This decision process will allow
for: (1) more complete understanding of current technologies and the
evolving capabilities; (2) evaluation of innovative concepts; (3)
development of competing technologies to reduce cost, schedule, and
performance risks; and (4) better estimation of complete costs for
making informed decisions concerning system capability, production, and
deployment. We believe that full annual evaluations of our program
activities and demonstrated technical achievements will build
confidence for decision makers.
This program is designed to seek opportunities to provide the most
effective and efficient missile defense by exploiting advances in
technology as they emerge and by making timely decisions to direct
individual development activities. We will make adjustments as we learn
what we can and cannot do technically and as we make the tough calls on
selecting among the promising technologies to create the best mix of
missile defense capabilities across the threat missile flight envelope.
As missile defense capabilities mature, we envision transferring
the individual elements to the military department for production and
procurement as part of a standard acquisition program. This approach
will ensure that the military department can operate these capabilities
effectively and reliably.
program elements and activities
To manage and account for program resources, BMDO plans a
configuration of nine Program Elements (PE): BMD System; Terminal,
Midcourse, and Boost Defense Segments; Sensors; Technology; Pentagon
Reservation Maintenance Reserve Fund; Small Business Innovative
Research; and Headquarters Management. This PE structure supports the
revised BMD program goals by aligning activities and funding with the
program's internal technical focus. It also provides the flexibility to
mitigate, through internal adjustment, unforeseen consequences and
risks in budget and schedule. The following table illustrates the PE
structure.

Program Element Descriptions
BMD System

The BMD System Program Element allocates the resources required for
the overarching conduct and integration of the multi-layered BMD
System. The BMD System PE comprises five primary projects: Battle
Management, Command and Control (BMC\2\); Communications; Targets and
Countermeasures; System Engineering and Integration (SE&I); and Test
and Evaluation (T&E). System-level activities involve integrating the
Boost, Midcourse, Terminal, and Sensors segments into a single and
congruous missile defense system; this PE also includes management
efforts to preserve and promote architectural consistency,
interoperability, and integration of PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area
systems within the overarching BMD mission. Our amended request of $780
million for these activities represents an increase of $253 million
over fiscal year 2001 enacted funding, and $251 million over the
initial fiscal year 2002 budget submission.
Our evolutionary acquisition process will increase the BMD System
capabilities over time in 2 year increments. Each BMD System block will
comprise multiple weapon and sensor elements. The BMC\2\ and
Communications project funding is for developing and integrating the
command and control and communications for the BMD System. The BMC\2\
project includes the development and allocation of BMC\2\
specifications to ensure the weapons and sensor system products are
fully interoperable with each other and with external systems,
providing optimum flexibility to the warfighter. To this end, a
Ballistic Missile Defense Integration Center will be established at
BMDO's Joint National Test Facility.
The Communications project consolidates and refines BMD System-wide
communication systems to allow components to exchange data and to
permit command and control orders to be transmitted to the weapons and
sensor systems.
The Targets and Countermeasures project funding provides threat-
credible ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and target system
support. This project will provide new target and countermeasure
development, risk reduction flights, and target characterization.
As the central engineering component within BMDO, the Systems
Engineering and Integration (SE&I) project provides the overall system
engineering development and integration of the BMD System. The SE&I
mission is to define and manage the layered BMD System, providing the
collaborative, layered, and detailed systems engineering and
integration required across the entire spectrum of BMD warfighter
capabilities.
Lastly, the Test and Evaluation project provides consolidated
system-wide Test and Evaluation capabilities and resources required to
allow for cohesive facilitation, management, and execution of test
activities. Test and Evaluation efforts include the development,
operation, maintenance, and modernization of the BMD program-wide Test
and Evaluation infrastructure. The T&E program also addresses
crosscutting issues related to BMD System lethality, discrimination,
and other T&E derived mission critical functions. Finally, the T&E
program conducts system integration tests for the entire BMD System and
will validate performance of each block. Test & Evaluation activities
are grouped in terms of Program Wide Test & Evaluation; Test Support of
facilities, ranges, sensors, and test instrumentation; modeling and
simulation; and facilities, siting, and environmental efforts.
Terminal Defense Segment

The Terminal Defense Segment (TDS) allocates resources to support
development and selective upgrades of defensive capabilities that
engage and negate ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their
trajectory. The primary projects under this PE are the Theater High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Israeli Arrow
Deployability Program (ADP). Related activities include the Israeli
Test Bed (ITB), Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP), and studies
via the Israeli Systems Architecture and Integration (ISA&I) effort
that assess the Arrow performance relative to both existing and
emerging threats. Our amended request of $988 million represents an
increase of $212 million over fiscal year 2001 enacted funding, and an
increase of $224 million over the initial fiscal year 2002 budget
submission. Note: The PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area programs are funded
within their respective service accounts.
The mission of the THAAD System is to defend against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles at significant distances from the
intended target and at high altitudes. THAAD will protect U.S. and
allied Armed Forces, broadly dispersed assets, and population centers
against missile attacks. This evolutionary program is structured to
demonstrate capability in Block 2004, with planned improvements based
on upgraded seekers, ground support equipment, and discrimination
software. Current efforts are addressing component and system
performance, producibility, and supportability. A robust ground-testing
program will precede flight testing, currently planned for fiscal year
2004. The budget adds resources to accelerate acquisition of a THAAD
radar and to buy more test missiles in order to capitalize on early
flight test successes should our disciplined development program prove
effective. The Arrow Weapon System (AWS) (developed jointly by the U.S.
and Israel) provides Israel a capability to defend against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles and helps ensure U.S. freedom of action
in future contingencies. Arrow also provides protection against
ballistic missile attacks for U.S. forces deployed in the region. The
successful Arrow intercept test on September 14, 2000, resulted in
Israel declaring the system operational in October 2000. The Arrow
Deployability Program (ADP) also supports Israel's acquisition of a
third Arrow battery and Arrow's interoperability with U.S. TMD systems.
Interoperability will be achieved via a common communication
architecture utilizing the Link-16. An interoperability test was
completed in January 2001 using the Theater Missile Defense System
Exerciser (TMDSE) that validated that the Arrow Weapon System is
interoperable and can exchange surveillance and missile track cueing
data with U.S. Patriot and Aegis missile defense systems. The Arrow
System Improvement Program (ASIP) will include both technical
cooperation to improve the performance of the AWS and a cooperative
test and evaluation program to validate the improved AWS performance.
We added $20 million in our amended budget specifically for additional
flight testing and development of additional production capacity for
the Arrow missile.
Equally important to the integrated BMD System are the lower tier
programs that are being transferred to the military departments. We
have had significant success with the PAC-3, and interceptor missiles
will be delivered to training battalions this year. PAC-3 system will
provide critical operational capability to defend our forward-deployed
forces, allies, and friends. The system is designed to counter enemy
defense suppression tactics that may include tactical ballistic
missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft employing advanced
countermeasures and low radar cross-section. The PAC-3 technology has a
proven record of hit-to-kill success. We are now 7-for-8 in body-to-
body intercepts against ballistic missile targets. PAC-3 missile
technology also accomplished 4-for-4 body-to-body intercepts against
cruise missiles and air-breathing threats. Recent successes included
multiple simultaneous engagements of both short-range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles using PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors.
Although the Navy Area Program has experienced technical, cost and
schedule challenges we are now at a point where we can execute a
rigorous set of flight tests and likely achieve a capability in the
middle of this decade. A fly-by test is anticipated for early 2002, to
be followed by a series of intercept flight-tests. At-sea testing is
expected to begin in late 2002/early 2003. Navy Area has been
positioned to undertake initial at-sea tests using, Aegis
``LINEBACKER'' ships.
With the German Parliament funding recently made available to
continue the trilateral MEADS activity, that program is about to embark
on a 3-year risk reduction effort. MEADS will use the PAC-3, which has
already begun production, as its interceptor. Once deployed, MEADS will
improve tactical mobility and strategic deployability over comparable
missile systems and provide robust, 360-degree protection for
maneuvering forces and other critical forward-deployed assets against
short- and medium-range missiles.
These systems have been in development for many years and Patriot
and Navy Area are approaching procurement and deployment decisions. For
this reason, and in compliance with our program philosophy to have BMDO
do RDT&E and the military departments do procurement, and to support
the military departments' air defense mission, the Department is
transferring to the respective services the responsibility for
execution and management of PAC-3, Navy Area, and MEADS.
Midcourse Defense Segment

The Midcourse Defense Segment (MDS) develops increasingly robust
capabilities for countering ballistic missiles in the midcourse stage
of flight. The MDS will develop and test multiple technologies to
provide credible capabilities against this threat to operate in this
segment of flight. The MDS program of work is divided into multiple
elements including Ground-Based Midcourse System, and Sea-Based
Midcourse System, the successors to the National Missile Defense and
Navy Theater Wide programs, segment Systems Engineering and
Integration, and segment Test and Evaluation. Our amended request of
$3,941 million represents an increase of $1,455 million over fiscal
year 2001 enacted funds, and an increase of $1,237 million over the
fiscal year 2002 initial budget submission.
Under the previous BMD program, we had under development only one
system that could provide a midcourse intercept capability for
defeating ICBMs. We made significant progress in the National Missile
Defense (NMD) program and brought system development to the point where
an independent review team led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch
concluded that, despite some challenges, the technical capability was
in hand to develop and field the limited system to meet the projected
threat. We were pursuing a highly concurrent development and production
program focused on a 2005 deployment. While the NMD testing program
experienced delays in development and testing, our analysis last year
showed that ground and flight tests to date have demonstrated about 93
percent of the system's critical engagement functions and have shown
the ability to integrate the system elements.
The revised Ground-Based Midcourse System has three objectives: (1)
to develop and demonstrate an integrated system capable of countering
known and expected threats; (2) to provide an integrated test bed that
provides realistic tests and reliable data for further system
development; and (3) to create a development path allowing for an early
capability based on success in testing. During its initial phase, the
program will develop an integrated system, further demonstrate a ``hit-
to-kill'' capability, and prepare for the RDT&E test bed capability and
subsequent blocks. Each block will develop capability against
increasing threat complexity.
Within the MDS, the bulk of the resources are designed to build and
sustain an operationally realistic test architecture that represents
the envisioned operational capability. We plan to have an RDT&E ground-
based test bed available in the 2004-2006 time frame. As designed, this
test bed will expand to enhance overall test infrastructure and system
maturation, although its initial development will occur within the
midcourse segment. Over time the test bed will expand to include
weapons and sensor capabilities from throughout the BMD System when
they become available.
The test bed will consist of up to five ground-based silos with an
upgraded Cobra Dane radar; associated command and control and launch
facilities; other sensors; and networked communications to support
robust testing with credible targets, scenarios, and countermeasures.
This project includes four flight tests in fiscal year 2002. Moreover,
upon availability, the test bed could incorporate air launched targets,
thereby providing geographically realistic scenarios and improving
overall testing realism. Throughout, enhancements will be made to both
the Fort Greely and Kodiak Island test facilities, improving both
target and interceptor launch capabilities.
This approach might provide a near-term option to employ the test
facilities--radars, C\2\, and interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and
Kodiak--in an operational mode. Its use in this mode could provide an
interim capability to meet an emergent threat. This interim capability
could subsequently be upgraded through technical improvements, replaced
by deployment of production-quality radars, C\2\, and interceptors as
described below or supplemented with a Sea-Based Midcourse System,
described below.
The Sea-Based Midcourse System is intended to intercept hostile
missiles in the ascent phase of midcourse flight, which when
accompanied by a ground-based system, provides a complete midcourse
layer. By engaging missiles in early ascent, sea-based systems also
offer the opportunity to reduce the overall BMD System's susceptibility
to countermeasures. The Sea-Based Midcourse System will build upon
technologies in the existing Aegis Weapon System and the Standard
Missile infrastructures and will be used against short and medium-range
threats. Funding in fiscal year 2002 offers the ability to continue
testing and enables a potential contingency sea-based midcourse
capability that can grant limited defense to U.S. and allied deployed
forces as an element of the BMD System Block 2004. To support this
effort five flight tests of the sea-based midcourse system are planned
in fiscal year 2002. Funding also begins concept development and risk
reduction work for advanced capability blocks to include more robust
capability against intermediate and long-range threats to complement
ground-based midcourse capabilities later this decade.
The United States and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding in
August 1999 to conduct a 2-year cooperative project to conduct systems
engineering and to design four advanced missile components for possible
integration into an improved version of the SM-3 interceptor. This
project leverages the established and demonstrated industrial and
engineering strengths of Japan and allows a significant degree of cost-
sharing.
Other segment activities include Systems Engineering and
Integration (SE&I), Test and Evaluation (T&E), and Program Operations.
SE&I funding will allow for further risk reduction activities and
counter-countermeasure development and will begin a complementary kill
vehicle development which could be common to both ground- and sea-based
interceptors. T&E funding starts a new target booster development that
will allow for testing against more realistic targets.
Boost Defense Segment

The mission of the Boost Defense Segment (BDS) is to define and
develop boost phase intercept (BPI) missile defense capabilities. Our
amended request of $685 million for the Boost Defense Program
represents an increase of $313 million over the fiscal year 2001
enacted funding, and an increase of $384 million over the initial
fiscal year 2002 budget submission.
The capabilities defined and developed in the BDS will
progressively reduce the ``safe havens'' available to a hostile state.
A ``safe haven,'' is formed by geographic and time constraints
associated with BPI. It is the region of a state from which it can
launch a missile safely out of range of a potential boost phase
intercept. To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, quick reaction
times, high confidence decisionmaking, and multiple engagement
capabilities are needed. The development of higher power lasers and
faster interceptor capabilities are required to reduce the size of safe
havens, whereas development of viable space-based systems could
potentially eliminate them entirely. Thus, resources have been
allocated to develop both kinetic and directed energy capabilities in
an effort to provide options for multiple engagement opportunities and
basing modes to address a variety of timing and geographic constraints.
Successful BDS operational concepts could be fully integrated with
midcourse and terminal elements in the overall BMD System. In
accordance with the overall BMD acquisition strategy, BDS will employ
multiple paths and acquisition methodologies to deliver initial
capability blocks as soon as practical, and upgrade the initial
capabilities over time. From information gained following this
approach, BMDO will evaluate the most promising projects to provide a
basis for an architecture decision between 2003 and 2005.
There are four principal objectives for the BDS. First, it will
seek to demonstrate and make available the Airborne Laser (ABL) for a
contingency capability in Block 2004 with a path to an initial
capability in Block 2008. Second, it will define and evolve space-based
and sea-based kinetic energy Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) concepts in
the next 2 to 4 years, supporting a product line development decision
in 2003-2005. This effort will include concept definition, risk
reduction activities, and proof-of-concept demonstrations. For example,
the sea-based boost program is considering a high-speed, high-
acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill vehicle. This same
booster will be evaluated (with a different kill vehicle) for sea-based
midcourse roles. Third, the BDS will execute a proof-of-concept Space-
Based Interceptor Experiment (SBX). Fourth, the BDS will also continue
Space-Based Laser (SBL) risk reduction on a path to a proof-of-concept
SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL-IFX) in 2012. At appropriate
times, BMDO will insert mature system concepts and technologies into
product line development and deployment. Planned tests within the Boost
Segment include a ground test of the ABL project and a ground test of
the Sea-Based Boost concept in 2002.
Kinetic Energy Concepts
Little has been done in this area in recent years. We intend to
address operational concept development and technical risk reduction to
produce experiments and systems to deliver demonstrations in the 2003-
2006 timeframe. Kinetic boost phase intercept is a challenge because
the threat missile must be detected and confirmed within a few seconds
of launch. It then becomes a race between an accelerating ballistic
missile and the interceptor in which the threat missile has had a head
start. Another technical challenge is designing a kill vehicle that can
detect and track the target following missile-staging events and then
impact the missile in the presence of a brilliant plume.
The money requested in fiscal year 2002 will allow us to begin risk
reduction activities to resolve critical technological risks associated
with candidate boost systems and the development of a concept of
operations through war-gaming and other planning activities. We are
considering a sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed, high-
acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill vehicle. This activity
will simultaneously support a proof-of-concept Space-Based Experiment
(SBX) using a space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle.
Directed-Energy Capabilities
The two primary programs in this area are the Airborne Laser (ABL)
and Space-Based Laser, now transferred to BMDO. The Air Force ABL
program has been focused on short- and medium-range threats. We are
taking deliberate steps to prepare ABL for a strategic defense role as
well. With onboard sensors, each ABL aircraft will conduct long-range,
wide-area surveillance of regions from which threat missiles might
launch. The fiscal year 2002 budget request will allow us to conduct an
initial flight test of ABL and plan for a lethal demonstration in 2003.
The budget request will enable BMDO to continue SBL risk reduction
work. Near-term SBL activity will focus on ground-based efforts to
develop and demonstrate the component and subsystem technologies
required for an operational space-based laser system and the design and
development of an Integrated Flight Experiment vehicle that is
scheduled to be tested in space in 2012. The SBL project builds on many
years of previous development and is based on prudent reduction of
technical risk as early as possible in the design process.
Sensors

Sensors developed in this segment will have multi-mission
capabilities intended to enhance detection of and provide critical
tracking information for ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
This PE funds the Block 2010 SBIRS-Low sensor satellite constellation,
and the Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) Program, as
well as emergent technologies and test and evaluation activities. In
addition, resources are provided to further concept development and
risk reduction efforts. Our amended budget request of $496 million
represents an increase of $221 million over the fiscal year 2001
enacted funding, and an increase of $113 million over the initial
fiscal year 2002 budget submission.
SBIRS-Low (transferred from the Air Force) will incorporate new
technologies to enhance detection; improve reporting of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Sea-Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM) and tactical ballistic missiles; and provide critical
midcourse tracking and discrimination data for BMD. SBIRS-Low, in
conjunction with SBIRS-High (developed by the Air Force), form the
SBIRS system, which will consist of satellites in Geosynchronous Orbits
(GEO), Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO) and Low Earth Orbits (LEO) and an
integrated centralized ground station serving all SBIRS space elements
and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.
The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) Program is an
innovative U.S.-Russian space-based remote sensor research and
development program addressing ballistic missile defense and national
security directives. This program engages Russian developers of early
warning satellites in the joint definition and execution of aircraft
and space experiments.
Technology

The Technology Segment will develop components, subsystems and new
concepts needed to keep pace with the evolving ballistic missile
threat. The primary focus of the Technology Segment is the development
of sensors and weapons for future platforms that can complement today's
missile defense capabilities. Investments will maintain a balance
between providing improvements in current acquisition programs and
demonstrating the enabling technology for new concepts. Our amended
request of $113 million represents a decrease of $74 million relative
to the fiscal year 2001 enacted funding (and congressional adds), and a
$41 million increase over the initial fiscal year 2002 budget
submission.
The technology program is divided into four thrust areas: (1)
terminal missile defense, (2) midcourse counter-countermeasures, (3)
boost phase intercepts, and (4) global defense. Specific projects
include the development of a doppler radar to be used in a missile
seeker, the demonstration of active and interactive midcourse
discrimination techniques, the design and development of miniature kill
vehicles for boost and midcourse application, and the development and/
or testing of space relay mirrors for laser tracking systems. In
addition to thrust area projects, investments are made in technology at
the component level to improve the state-of-the-art in radars, infrared
sensors, lasers, optics, propulsion, wide band gap materials, and
photonic devices.
In closing, the Ballistic Missile Defense System Strategy balances
significant engineering, management, schedule and cost challenges. It
also provides for a robust RDT&E program with rigorous testing. Your
support will be critical to our success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions
you and the members of the committee might have.

Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
The issue that this Nation is going to have to face is not
whether North Korea is trying to develop missile capability,
but whether our response to that will make us less secure or
more secure. That is the issue.
The moral obligation that the President has and that
Congress has is to make us more secure. If it comes down to the
breach of a treaty, which leads to a Russian and Chinese
response to increase the number of weapons they otherwise would
have and to increase the amount of nuclear material on Russian
soil particularly, and speed up the development of a nuclear
program in China, this could lead to the greater possibility
that terrorists could get their hands on a nuclear weapon. This
increases the terrorist threat because of the greater access to
nuclear material, the greater number of nuclear weapons in this
world. If that is the response--and that very well could be the
response--we then have a new arms race on our hands, a new Cold
War on our hands and a greater proliferation threat on our
hands.
This is the reason for the original ABM Treaty. Countries
are going to respond. As one of the experts put it back then,
one side's quest for safety can heighten the other side's
insecurity. That is the issue. Is our quest for safety in this
particular way going to increase Russian and Chinese
insecurity? You hope it does not. We would all hope it does
not. You say it should not. We would all feel it should not.
But the question is, will it?
Does that mean we give anybody a veto? Of course not.
Nobody has a veto. But does that mean that the response of
other countries, nuclear powers with the capability of
increasing their capability, MIRVing their weapons, of
transferring countermeasures and decoys to other countries and
developing themselves--is that response relevant to what we do?
It seems to me it surely is relevant. If it comes down to a
unilateral deployment in violation of a treaty, we need to
weigh that response and decide whether or not we will be left
more or less secure by a unilateral deployment.
That is a particularly difficult question, it seems to me,
in light of the fact that we have been informed over and over
again by our intelligence sources that the more likely means of
delivery of a weapon of mass destruction is not a missile. It
is not a ballistic missile. It is a truck or a suitcase or a
ship. Do we then take action to defend unilaterally in
violation of a treaty against the least likely means of
delivery with the likelihood of increasing a proliferation
threat when there is another means of delivery more likely,
cheaper, more accurate, stealthier?
Those are the questions which this administration I believe
has not given adequate attention to. We will be spending a lot
of time on those questions at a later hearing. Obviously, today
people will comment on that, and you already have.
What I want to focus on today with my time has to do with
the testing, which is now being requested, the budgeting that
you are requesting.
For the first time we are told in your statement that the
tests or activities that you are seeking funding for are likely
to bump up against the ABM Treaty in months rather than years.
Now, as my good friend Senator Warner said in his opening
statement, when the press reported that this morning, we were
wondering whether that was just sort of snippets from various
comments put together by the press. Well, it is not. What we
have here this morning for the first time is the administration
telling us that, if we fund this budget request, the likelihood
is that this treaty will be violated in months not years.
We have been told that our allies and the Russians have
been informed of that recently. That is what the press was told
yesterday. That is what we have been told, that the Russians
and the allies have been informed that the activities that
would be budgeted for 2002 are likely to bump up against and be
in conflict with the ABM Treaty in months not years.
Now, we were told by General Kadish just 3 weeks ago that
there would be no treaty violation in 2002 based on the
recommendations that he had made. We were briefed on that, and
that is what you told us, General, 3 weeks ago.
Something has changed in the last 3 weeks.
You obviously hope that these tests proceed well. You want
them to proceed well, these tests that we budget. Therefore, if
it is likely that they will bump up against the treaty in
months not years, that means that you are telling us that if we
adopt this budget that you have requested, that this treaty, if
not amended--everybody hopes there will be an amendment, but if
it is not amended with the Russians--that this treaty would be
violated unless we withdrew from it during fiscal year 2002. Is
that correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. There is a very important measure of
difference. I used in my testimony the phrase ``bump up.'' I
think in the talking points we used with our allies, we used
the phrase ``encounter.'' I noticed the newspaper uses the
phrase ``conflict,'' and that is a very different--that
presumes you have already made the legal judgment.
As I tried to lay out very clearly in my testimony, at this
early stage, the legal issues are just loaded with ambiguities.
The central ones in the examples I mentioned have to do with
the question of whether the development of a test bed, which
would clearly be legal under the treaty, becomes illegal if you
harbor the intention or the plan or the possibility of turning
that test bed into an operational capability. It is going to
take a great deal of legal argument to decide what the answer
is to that.
The other issues that I described involve issues
essentially of testing non-ABM radars in so-called ABM modes or
essentially issues that were argued throughout the period of
the treaty because we had one interpretation and the Russians
had another. The lawyers are going to have to come up with some
definitive judgments as to which of those interpretations
apply.
We are in a gray area, Mr. Chairman, and that is why I use
a fuzzy phrase like ``bump up'' rather than a very clear-cut
phrase like ``conflict.'' As I said in my testimony, if we come
to a judgment that it conflicts and we have not yet revised the
ABM Treaty, then we either can withdraw from the ABM Treaty,
not violate it--we are not going to violate it. We are legally
allowed under the treaty to give 6 months' notice of
withdrawal--or we can scale back our program and take out some
tests that would otherwise be useful or stop doing something
that would give us both the test and operational capability.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, I must tell you the
administration handed out a document to the press yesterday.
The press asked us to comment on it. Can we give them a copy of
this?
I am just going to read this. This is what the press
quoted. You can say there is a big difference between conflict
and bump up against. OK. The administration said conflict in
this document. The document is titled, ``The Administration's
Principal Themes on Missile Defense: Questions and Answers.''
It says, ``Moreover and again as we have told both allies and
the Russians, while we do not know precisely when our programs
will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the
timing is likely to be measured in months not years.'' Those
are your words. Those are the administration's words. Now you
are telling us you did not mean conflict, you mean bump up.
You cannot tell us whether there is anything in this budget
which, if everything works well, would lead to activities which
conflict with the ABM Treaty? You do not know?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I can tell you--and I have identified
them--that there are activities in this budget that will raise
issues of treaty interpretation, and we have not yet come to a
resolution of those issues.
Chairman Levin. You have a Compliance Review Group, do you
not?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Which is working on these issues as we
speak.
Chairman Levin. Have they decided whether they would
conflict or not?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not believe they have.
Chairman Levin. When will we know that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. At least 6 months before we proceed
with these.
Chairman Levin. We are not going to know that before you
are asking us to vote on this budget, whether your own
Compliance Review Group thinks that the activities that you are
asking us to fund are in conflict with the ABM Treaty, which
could lead to all kinds of ramifications for the world? We are
not going to have that assessment from your Compliance Review
Group before you are asking us to approve a budget? Is that
what you are telling us this morning?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am telling you, Mr. Chairman, that
we do not have that assessment now. We will get it as soon as
we can, and we will certainly get it well in advance of 6
months of the event.
Chairman Levin. The whole purpose of that group, by the
way, is to tell us whether or not an activity violates a
treaty. A pretty significant judgment. You are proceeding
without it, and you are asking us to proceed without it. I hope
we do not.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I opened the comments that I provided at
this hearing with the statement that it is really my belief
that Congress will work constructively as a partner in a calm
manner to achieve the necessary defenses that this Nation must
have.
Now, I also point out that we are going to talk about
different interpretations of different statements, but clearly
on page 7, your last sentence, ``I can assure you that the
President will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to
conduct the proper notifications as we go forward''--in other
words, time and time again our President has indicated that he
is going to follow a path of consultation, then negotiation. I
think that should be sufficient reassurance to Congress that we
can work as full partners.
Now, much was said rather loosely about unilateral
withdrawal. I think the President had no alternative but to lay
down very clearly the threat against this country, his
determination as the constitutional leader to deal with that
threat technologically, to the extent that we can, but at the
same time, leave no doubt that if consultations and subsequent
negotiations do not result in a framework, we have no
alternative but to exercise the right under the treaty to
withdraw.
Otherwise, it is my judgment--and I ask the question to
you, Secretary Wolfowitz--we put squarely in the hands of the
Russians a veto. Am I not correct in that assumption?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe that is what we would be
doing and then we would, in effect, be making the judgment that
the kinds of dangers Chairman Levin has talked about and which
I believe are very manageable are much more serious than what I
believe the rather unmanageable proliferation of missile
threats in the hands of rogue nations.
Senator Warner. Now, this phrase that within months we
will--whatever you want to use--bump up or challenge the ABM
Treaty--all during that period, our President will be
conducting consultations and negotiations, will he not,
Secretary Wolfowitz?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We expect those negotiations and
discussions to be intensifying significantly in the coming
months.
Senator Warner. Correct. In good faith, he is manifesting
not only to our country but to the world that he is trying to
work within the treaty framework to seek a resolution of the
differences.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is absolutely right. We are also
demonstrating in a number of ways, including most importantly
with the way we are bringing down our offensive forces, that we
are no longer enemies with Russia and that we need to move
beyond the old thinking that put the focus on being able to
annihilate one another within 30 minutes of warning. That is
old. I understand we lived with that kind of thinking for so
long. There are vestiges of it certainly even in this country.
It is rife in Russia, but I think we can move beyond it.
Senator Warner. I think that case is made very clearly.
Another observation in my judgment, and I say this with
great deference to this institution which I have been
privileged to serve these almost 23 years. I really believe
Congress will reach down into its own wisdom and find a common
basis to support our President. But should somehow we fail to
do so or should we turn up the rhetoric and heat it up, does
that not hinder our President in those negotiations?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think, Senator, you are absolutely
right. The entire record of negotiating with almost every
country and certainly with Russians and the former Soviet Union
suggests that the most effective way to reach agreement is to
demonstrate some determination to move forward on our own.
Senator Warner. If we can move as partners, it is more
likely that he will succeed.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely. I think partnership and
solidarity between the executive and legislative branches on
this issue is crucial.
Senator Warner. Now, the law of the land was stated by
Congress in the Cochran legislation. There were 97 yea votes to
3 negative votes on that piece of legislation. It is very clear
that it gives the President, this President--it was enacted and
signed by the previous President--the clear authority to move
within the technological framework of milestones. In any way
can anyone point to where the President has breached that law?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe he is in full compliance
with both the letter and the spirit of it.
Senator Warner. I agree with that.
Now, General Kadish, let us assume for the moment that we
are able to work through a satisfactory revision of the
framework of the ABM Treaty. Your program under 2002 is
consistent with the Cochran bill, namely that we will pace
ourselves in accordance with technology?
General Kadish. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. I think it is important, General Kadish,
that we also address the question of the limited defense which
we use in terms of the intercontinental ballistic missiles.
That is what we are endeavoring to do to defend ourselves
against the hopefully less than a dozen that attack us.
Assuming this system becomes effective, I do not see how it
poses a threat to Russia. Their arsenal could crush that system
like an ant. Am I not correct?
General Kadish. The system certainly would have inherent
limitations against long-range missiles.
Senator Warner. The question simply is this. If we are able
to bring into being technologically this limited defense, the
Russian inventory today could overwhelm it in a matter of
hours. Am I not correct?
General Kadish. That is correct.
Senator Warner. It does not pose a threat. Do you see that
it poses any threat to Russia to induce them to go into an arms
race again?
General Kadish. It is not designed against thousands of
nuclear warheads.
Senator Warner. It would be overwhelmed.
General Kadish. So, it would be overwhelmed, as could any
defenses in the history of mankind could eventually be
overwhelmed.
Senator Warner. Now, again, the word ``limit'' is applied
to the intercontinental system, but when we get down to the
smaller systems, particularly those systems we hope to have in
the architecture to defend our forward deployed troops, those
systems could interdict more than the few missiles. Am I not
correct?
General Kadish. That is correct. Our intention would be to
have enough inventory to have a robust protection of our
deployed forces.
Senator Warner. I think some clarity has to be made as we
move along because the fundamental concept is limited and that
is the main target that we are dealing with under the ABM
Treaty. But there will be more missiles involved in that
system.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, I thank you for
your testimony today. I think this is a very important day and
discussion on a most significant and difficult issue. I do
think that you have moved us forward today by speaking directly
about this new approach to a ballistic missile defense. I for
one find it helpful.
I hope that the aim that you described, Secretary
Wolfowitz, of ultimately having bipartisan support here in
Congress is realized because this is a very important question
of national security we are discussing. Traditionally we have
found ways not to divide on partisan lines on exactly this kind
of question. That goal will be greatly assisted if the
administration speaks with more clarity and consistency on this
question than it has up until this time. I would like to feel
that the statements that you have made today, which I have
found at least personally to be helpful and clear, whether one
agrees with them or disagrees with them, whether one is
reassured by them or alarmed by them, will set a standard for
what will follow.
Words are very important here, as Senator Levin's questions
illuminated. I think it is very important that everyone in the
administration use the same language, be on the same program,
and that will help us to find the common ground that we ought
to be able to find on this critical issue.
I implore you to spend as much time as necessary in
speaking directly to the members of this committee in closed
and open session, and to members of the relevant House
committees so we can find that common ground that is ultimately
going to be in the interest of our country.
The prevailing law here--and we are, after all, a Nation of
laws--is the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I was an
original cosponsor of this proposal with Senator Cochran and
others. I think it is important for us to go back to it because
it is important for our allies and others around the world to
understand this, that in this law, the United States committed
to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective
National Missile Defense system capable of defending the
territory of the United States against limited--limited--
ballistic missile attack.
So the question then, according to this law, is not whether
we will build a ballistic missile defense, but how and when we
will do it.
These are serious questions that involve matters of
international treaty and international security. I think you
have spoken directly to this today, and I appreciate it. I for
one will not shy away from supporting authorization and
appropriation that might necessitate a withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty if I am convinced that it is necessary to do so for the
protection of our national security and that the administration
has made every possible effort to negotiate the appropriate
modifications of the ABM Treaty with the Russians and that
effort has failed.
I think your directness has helped us to move forward here
into difficult territory, but it is important territory. I urge
you to hold the line on the position you have taken as we begin
to negotiate and discuss more specifically how we can achieve a
bipartisan agreement on this critical question.
The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 had in it what I
would consider to be two qualifications or conditions. The
first is that the deployment of the National Missile Defense
would be subject to the annual authorization of appropriations
and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile
Defense.
I have taken that to mean that we in Congress and members
of whatever administration was in office at the time would have
to make a judgment about priorities. How much are we prepared
to invest in NMD or BMD now as compared to other national
security needs?
I want to ask you to go into a little more detail in
answering a question that you touched on in your opening
statement. The Bush administration's proposed defense budget
for fiscal year 2002 goes up overall 7 percent after inflation.
The budget proposal for the Ballistic Missile Defense Office
goes up 57 percent after inflation. We have seen in hearings
that this committee has held that, notwithstanding the 7
percent overall increase, there are serious cuts in weapons
procurement. Procurement for the Navy, for instance, is down as
we rapidly head toward less than a 300-ship Navy. Basic
research and development for the Air Force, for instance, is
down, and certain elements of readiness and training are less
than they have been in the past.
So, my question is, can you respond to that qualifier or
condition in the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 that the
administration has its priorities right here and that the
reductions in funding that are part of the overall budget, as
compared to the dramatic increase in the National Missile
Defense budget, are justified?
Secretary Wolfowitz. A couple of points, if I might. First,
on your original comment, if there has been any lack of clarity
in what people say--and I also address this to the chairman--it
is not because of a lack of desire to achieve clarity. It is
because these issues are murky. As I said, there are
technological uncertainties and there are legal uncertainties.
We are trying--and my statement represents another part of that
effort--to be as clear and direct as we possibly can.
We have never for a minute hidden the fact that we have
directed General Kadish to develop a program that is not in any
way constrained by the treaty, not to go out of his way to look
for opportunities to violate the treaty at its earliest
possible time, but also not to foreswear something that makes
developmental or deployment sense because it would conflict
with the treaty. That has been a whole new revision in the way
BMDO has done its work. It has flushed new ideas and new issues
on the table, and we are trying to be as clear as we possibly
can with Congress.
I agree these are important issues and we will continue to
do that. I appreciate the effort of bipartisanship, but we have
never made a secret of the fact that the President fully
intends to deploy a defense of the United States. Of course,
that is what the National Missile Defense Act calls for as
well. It should be no secret to anyone that article I of the
treaty explicitly prohibits such defense of American territory.
So, we are on a collision course, and trying to determine
the exact point of collision or the closest point of approach.
But no one is pretending that what we are doing is consistent
with that treaty. We have to either withdraw from it or replace
it.
The question about priorities is a crucial one, we have
been wrestling hard with it. I would challenge the notion that
we have increased missile defense at the expense of everything
else. I am sorry the numbers are not as fresh in my mind as I
would like, but we have I think approximately a $22 or $23
billion real increase in defense spending this year over the
2001 budget, and I believe of that, roughly 10 percent of that
increase is in missile defense. We have weighed that against
many other priorities. We have invested even more heavily in
improved flying hours, improved base maintenance, not to
mention increased health care costs, in which there is a $5
billion real increase. The largest single portion of that $23
billion increase is essentially going to welfare and training
of our troops which is the first priority. There is a $7
billion increase in research and development over and beyond
the $2.4 billion that we are adding to missile defense.
Yes, Senator, I really do believe that is an appropriate
allocation. As I said in my opening statement, our current
schedule for deploying PAC-3 is woefully inadequate. It has to
be accelerated. On the current schedule, it will not be until
the year 2007 that we complete the planned deployment, and that
is not nearly as thick as it ought to be in places like Korea.
So, we are accelerating theater missile defense, as well as
longer-range missile defense, and we will continue to weigh
those priorities very carefully as we look in the 2003 budget
where we really have to address the fundamental issues of force
structure--how large the Navy should be, for example--as you
mentioned in your comments just now. What Secretary Rumsfeld is
trying mightily to do with a very intensive approach to the
quadrennial defense review is to flush up as much as possible
the tradeoffs so that he, the President, and ultimately
Congress can make sensible decisions about what we are funding
and what we are not funding and where those tradeoffs lie. But
I really do believe this is a very important priority for our
country.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time is up.
I would just say finally that it seems to me that you and
General Kadish have laid out the administration's plans
regarding missile defense with clarity and directness today.
That is an important step in this very significant debate. I
just urge you again to not only work as hard as you can with
the Russians to see whether we can achieve a modification in
the treaty to allow the testing program that the administration
wants to carry out or something like it, but that you work as
hard as you possibly can with members of both parties in
Congress to see if we can find a way to go forward on this
critical national security matter without having party
identification divide us. I think that weakens the overall
effort and it is worth really reaching as far as possible to
avoid that result. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman has made reference to the National
Missile Defense Act, and we will make part of the record at
this point the entire act, including section 3, which was not
referred to, which is the policy of the United States to seek
continued negotiated reductions in nuclear forces of Russia.
The statement by President Clinton when he signed that
Missile Defense Act on July 23, 1999, will also be made part of
the record, including his words that our missile defense policy
must take into account our arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation objectives.
I do not know if that was the second condition that Senator
Lieberman was going to refer to, but his time ran out. We will
make both of those documents part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, General Kadish, I appreciate the visual that
you brought with you today and the way you explained it. I wish
all of the American people could be here watching this.
I said to Senator Smith, because he was a little late in
getting here, Secretary Wolfowitz, that your opening statement
I believe was the most passionate, accurate, and superb opening
statement I have heard in the 15 years that I have served in
the House and the Senate. I thank you very much for that.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. I know it came from your heart.
I want to ask four quick questions that should just take a
minute to answer. The reason I want to ask these questions is
we sit around the table here and we are with Senators and we
are with top military leaders and with negotiators and experts.
But there are a lot of people who are not here today, and those
are the people, a lot of whom are in Oklahoma. There are some
basic questions that I think need to be brought to their
attention, questions we know the answer to but they do not. But
they are performing one important thing, and that is they are
paying for all this fun that we are having. So, I would like
just to pose four quick questions and then I want to get into
something here.
The first is, does the United States currently have the
ability to defend the 50 States against an incoming missile?
Very simply asked.
Secretary Wolfowitz. None at all, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Does article I of the ABM Treaty not
explicitly prohibit the United States from defending our
territory, the 50 States, against missile attack?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, it does.
Senator Inhofe. Does article V not prohibit the
development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based missiles?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, it does, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Now the other question. The three of us
have something in common. We are not attorneys. So, let me ask
you the question that is asked of me quite often because I have
not heard a good answer yet. Why is it we are sitting around
spending so much time talking about the violation or the
amending of a treaty that was between two countries, one of
which no longer exists today?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am not a lawyer, so I will not get
into legal issues. I know the President has made a judgment
that rather than to get into those legal issues--and I know
there are lawyers who would argue that the treaty lapsed with
the demise of the Soviet Union--that it is a very important
fact in the relationship between the United States and Russia.
In fact--I will try to keep this answer short, but my
impression from discussions that I had in May in Moscow, when
the President sent Steve Hadley and I there and from the
discussions that Secretary Rumsfeld has had with his Russian
counterpart, is that the ABM Treaty is important more because
it is a tie to the United States that they badly want to
preserve, rather than because of its exact content. I think
that is the spirit in which we are trying to replace it.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Let me just share with you--there are two areas of this
whole debate that I have found most offensive. One is the
argument about the suitcase and the terrorist threat. It is a
very real threat. It is there. There is no one in this hall
today who is more sensitive to that than I am being from
Oklahoma, being from an area where I was moments after the
largest domestic terrorist attack in the history of this
country, and seeing what happened to the Murrah Federal Office
Building and seeing the parts of bodies stuck to the walls and
people I knew intimately with loved ones that were never found.
To think that the explosive power of that was about 1 ton
of TNT, and yet those nuclear warheads that we talk about, in
most cases the smallest ones are about a kiloton, 1,000 times
the explosive power that devastated the Murrah Federal Office
Building and killed 168 Oklahomans. When you put that in
perspective, it changes the whole thought I think around this
subject in terms of defending ourselves.
The other thing that I have found offensive is this
discussion today of the treaty. It is a treaty that could be
argued is not there, but let us assume that that treaty is in
some degree of effect. It was put together at a time in our
history that we three are all old enough to remember even
though I did not agree with it at the time, but there was a
pretty smart guy named Henry Kissinger who did. He felt that we
did have two super powers and that perhaps this mutual assured
destruction made some sense at that time.
But Henry Kissinger himself has said--and I have used his
words on the floor of the Senate many times--this is not 1972.
There are not two superpowers. In fact, the threat that is
facing America today because of its proliferation and its lack
of identity is greater in my opinion than it was at that time.
He said, ``It is nuts to make a virtue out of our
vulnerability.'' Here is the guy who was the architect of the
ABM Treaty of 1972. As you have both so accurately pointed out,
along with some others, that is not true today.
So, with that treaty as a major discussion, in the last few
seconds here I want to just throw out a few things to at least
get into this meeting the real sense of threat that faces this
country. I agree with George Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence, who before this committee said that we are very
likely in the most threatened position today that we have been
in the history of our Nation.
Remember the movie that we saw recently that is out right
now, ``Thirteen Days,'' talking about the Cuban missile crisis
of the 1960s. We have the same defenses today that we had back
then. People really are not aware of this.
We had something happen in 1996 in the straits off of
Taiwan. Trying to intimidate their elections, the Chinese were
firing missiles. Their second highest military authority said
that we are not concerned about America getting involved
because they would rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei.
We recall that just 2 years after that, the Minister of
Defense of China, Chi Hou Tun, said war with America is
inevitable.
You look at all of these and as you pointed out in your
opening statement, Secretary Wolfowitz, the three-stage
rocket--that was August 31, 1998--was a rocket from North Korea
that has the capability of hitting the United States of
America. Only 7 days before that, we had a letter, dated August
24, 1998, that said that it would be 5 to 10 years before that
threat would be there.
We know that when they talked, during the last
administration, about how far out this threat was, later on
they said, well, that is an indigenous developed missile. We
are not talking about that anymore. We are talking about
countries that we know have the ability to fire a rocket to hit
us and we have no defense for that. We know that they are
trading technology and assistance with countries like Iraq,
Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan. We know specifically that Iraq is
trading technology and systems with North Korea. We know that
Saddam Hussein said at the end of the war, if we had waited 10
years to go into Kuwait, we would not have had to worry about
America because we would have had a missile that could have
reached them. Here it is now 10 years later.
So, my question is, what is your current comfort level?
Secretary Wolfowitz. My comfort level is very low, or my
discomfort level is very high. I should have said that in
partial answer to Senator Lieberman's previous question on the
relative priorities: if you go back to the Gulf War, we over-
estimated virtually every Iraqi capability except this one.
Ballistic missiles were the only area in which Saddam Hussein
was much more capable than we thought he would be.
We know if there were a war in Korea this year that the
ballistic missile threat from North Korea would be one of the
most serious threats we would face. One of the decisions
Secretary Rumsfeld made was to stop talking about this
difference between national and theater because many of these
capabilities apply across the board. Just as North Korea is
seeking to extend the range, it is also true that our ability
to defend across the board in a Korean conflict would be
crucial.
The airborne laser, for example, which would be a clear
violation of the ABM Treaty, if it is successful, can shoot
down short-range missiles as well as long-range missiles in
boost phase. When you do an analysis of what would make the
greatest difference for a theater missile defense on the Korean
peninsula, I believe the analyses conclude the most important
effective advance would be airborne lasers.
So, I think we are sitting here already very vulnerable to
short-range missiles, increasingly vulnerable to intermediate-
range missiles, and as you said, Senator, it is only a matter
of time and not 15 years but 5 or less before those countries
acquire the capability to reach the United States, and not just
a limited piece of the United States.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. Thank you all for
appearing today.
General Kadish, you mentioned an interesting point that in
the history of warfare, there has been no defense system that
was 100 percent perfect. Is it your opinion that this National
Missile Defense system that is seeking to be deployed will not
be 100 percent perfect in defense?
General Kadish. We will make it as good as we can make it,
Senator.
Senator Cleland. No, no. The question is, is it not true
that this system that we are going to spend billions on to
perfect and test will not be 100 percent effective?
General Kadish. I do not think I could answer that question
the way it is stated because 100 percent against what amount of
threat? Although you could be overwhelmed at some point, these
systems can be very effective against a certain number of
threats.
Senator Cleland. All it takes is one nuclear warhead to
ruin our day.
Now, is it not true? You just said it yourself. In the
history of warfare, there was no defense system that could not
be overwhelmed. So, is it not true the deployment of this
National Missile Defense system will not be 100 percent
effective? There is no such thing out there as 100 percent
security that we are going to get from that in terms of
incoming missiles? Is that not true?
General Kadish. That is true, but it is true for all the
weapons systems we have in all our services.
Senator Cleland. Now, is it not also true that over the
last 29 years since 1972, the inauguration of the ABM Treaty,
that the combination of our deterrence and our treaty
obligations, particularly in terms of the ABM Treaty, has been
100 percent effective? We have not had an incoming missile in
terms of the United States territory. Is that not true?
General Kadish. That is true.
Senator Cleland. It does seem to me that this is part of
the crux of this argument here. Are we going to shift from a
system that has been reliable for 30 years, a combination of
deterrence and treaty obligations, particularly with Russia, to
something here that actually is not going to be 100 percent
effective and may, indeed, destabilize, as the chairman has
indicated, our relationships not only with Russia, but with
China and cause the Russians to MIRV their warheads, cause the
Chinese to build more missiles and actually destabilize our
relationship with our allies?
Secretary Wolfowitz, in all honesty, your comment about
bumping up against the ABM Treaty but not inhaling--[Laughter.]
That is strange credibility.
So, that is where I get off the boat. I happen to be a big
supporter of theater missile defense. There is a distinction
between theater missile defense and a National Missile Defense
system. Theater missile defense is allowed under the law. All
this testing we saw, General Kadish, that you pointed out, was
that not allowable under the ABM Treaty?
General Kadish. Yes, it was.
Senator Cleland. Well, we could continue to test and do
those kind of things that we need to do. As a matter of fact, I
am a strong supporter of the Arrow missile defense program with
the Israelis, the THAAD missile high altitude intercept, the
Patriot-3. Those are theater missile defense programs that can
protect our troops and can be moved from time to time against
whatever rogue nation we choose to target it against.
This deployment of a National Missile Defense system is
actually illegal under the ABM Treaty, and I think if we throw
out the ABM Treaty here, we are throwing out the baby with the
bath water. That is where I get off the boat.
Let me just say I also think that it compromises other
aspects of our defense. I just finished reading ``Waging Modern
War.'' It is a book about the whole Balkan war. We used
precision weapons to a degree unheard of in modern warfare, and
yet the Chief of Staff of the Air Force sat right at that table
2 days ago, and when I asked him if we had replenished our
stockpile of precision munitions, he said no. Yet, we are going
to spend $2.2 billion extra here on some National Missile
Defense system in an effort to deploy it when it is not quite
ready for prime time and we cannot even replenish the stockpile
of precision munitions that do work. I am greatly concerned
that we are putting the cart before the horse here.
I will say that the chief sat here and talked about $30
billion in unfunded requirements that are not being met. I
would say to you that increasing National Missile Defense
funding by some 57 percent more than last year is a little bit
out of line with what we are trying to do in other aspects of
our military.
I think, quite frankly, the real threat, as the chairman
has indicated and as others have indicated and intelligence
analysts have indicated, is not so much from a missile with a
return address, but from a terrorist attack somewhere. Look at
the most recent attack. It was on the U.S.S. Cole, sitting dead
in the water and vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
So, I think we have to rethink our priorities here. The
Defense Department's own reports call the deployment of this
National Missile Defense program into great question.
Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the report. It took 8 months
to get this out of the Pentagon. I would like to have it
entered into the record, along with an article, ``Pentagon
Report Reveals Flaws in Missile Defense.'' I ask that this
report be included in the record.
Chairman Levin. Both will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator Cleland. Why are we in such a hurry to spend an
additional $3 billion on National Missile Defense? It is termed
National Missile Defense in the law. I can find no good reason
to justify the increase. I think it is unconscionable when our
servicemen and women are flying aircraft that are 18 to 22
years of age. It is unconscionable when American pilots flying
foreign-built fighters defeat those flying our own equipment in
90 percent of training engagements. That is one reason why I am
so big on the F-22. It is unconscionable when we are procuring
ships at a rate that will erode our Navy to a level of ships
well below that which is reasonable to meet our requirements,
and it is unconscionable when 70 percent of our Army's major
combat systems are more than halfway through their projected
service lives.
I just state quite sincerely that I was as much for a
theater missile defense as anyone and the technology involved
in it. But in a fiscal environment that precludes us from
meeting our legitimate bread and butter needs, in a global
security environment that presents us with a multitude of
potential threats more imminent than missiles not yet off the
drawing board, I cannot look the taxpayers of this country and
of my state in the eye and tell them that this is a worthy
expenditure of their money. I am convinced that this NMD effort
is something we need to take a strong look at and that Congress
ought to use the power of the purse in rejecting this increase.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to thank both the Secretary and
the General for their clarity and straightforwardness in
answering questions and discussing our National Missile Defense
and all theater missile defenses and for the notification of
Russia and our allies that we intend to go forward with this
defense system. The first priority in the Constitution is
national defense, and things certainly have changed since 1972
and we are now in the year 2001 and spending money to defend
the United States of America from intercontinental ballistic
missiles ought to be the top priority that we have. I
congratulate you on making that decision and doing what is
necessary to defend the majority of our American people.
General Kadish, are you positive the technology is there to
build this system?
General Kadish. I guess the way I would answer that is that
at this point for the technologies we are pursuing, there are
no inventions required to do it. It is a matter of very
difficult engineering activities. Then as we pursue some of the
additional ideas that might come out of this new process,
because of treaty issues and other activities we did not
explore very much, there may be some new technologies that
could be applied. So, it is an engineering challenge rather
than an invention challenge for the types of systems that we
are looking at very early in this process.
Senator Bunning. Secretary Wolfowitz, I just came back from
Seoul, Korea. There are about 45 million people in the greater
Seoul area. The North Koreans have just moved up their
conventional artillery 10 miles behind the 38th parallel. Not
only do we face the nuclear threat out of North Korea but a
conventional weapons threat. Do we have anything possible in
our systems right now if North Korea decided to pull the
trigger on the conventional weapons? Could we defend ourselves
and our 35,000 to 38,000, depending on what time of the year it
is, American troops that are there?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Against conventional ballistic
missiles, our capability is negligible.
I would like to make this also an answer to some of Senator
Cleland's comments before. The theater missile threat, as you
were describing it, is very real and very urgent. There are
hundreds of those North Korean conventionally armed missiles.
Some may have chemical weapons on them.
Frankly, I do believe, particularly when we are talking
about conventional missiles, if you can take out 50 percent of
them, that is a heck of a lot better than 0. During the Gulf
War with the PAC-2, which was a lot less than 50 percent, there
was not a single ally or a single commander who did not clamor
for more.
We are adding a substantial amount of money. I believe it
is on the order--and General Kadish can correct me--of $1.5
billion, Senator Cleland, in this increase goes exclusively for
theater missile defense.
Another large part of what we are doing is dual capable. I
bring up, as I said before, the airborne laser, which when it
starts to shoot down missiles will be a clear violation of the
ABM Treaty, whether those missiles are heading for Los Angeles
or heading for Seoul, because it shoots them down in the boost
phase when it cannot tell the difference, unless we are going
to start putting software in to tell it you can only shoot down
missiles of a certain limited boost capability.
That threat is very real. I agree strongly with Senator
Cleland on the urgency of dealing with the theater missile
threat, but what I would also urge all of your colleagues to
consider is that the more serious we are across the board, the
more our capability will be across the board. By pursuing
defenses against long-range missiles, we develop technologies
that are also useful against shorter-range missiles and vice
versa. Frankly, if it has taken us more than 10 years to field
PAC-3, I have to conclude we have not yet been serious as a
country. It is time to be serious.
Senator Bunning. In other words, the money we are devoting
to the upgrade of not only theater missile defense but National
Missile Defense is a priority that should be at the top of the
list not down the list.
Secretary Wolfowitz. In fact, every theater commander will
tell you that is his biggest vulnerability. Again, I believe
strongly in investing in ships and aircraft, and I wish we had
more money to spend on them. But in a war in Korea, many of our
air bases could be rendered completely useless, many of our
ships would be sunk by a ballistic missile attack. It is a
critical deficiency in our military capability in both that
theater and in the Persian Gulf.
Senator Bunning. I suggest that everybody on the Armed
Services Committee that has not been to the 38th parallel can
look just 10 miles north and see the encampment and the
batteries that have been moved in place that expose 45 million
people to, my God, who knows what, whether there is nuclear or
whether--if it is just conventional warheads on those, we would
have a slaughter that would shock not only our own people in
the United States, but would put in jeopardy all of the 35,000
or 38,000 U.S. service people that are there to defend and help
defend and enforce the 1953 cease-fire that was put in force.
So, I want to thank you for going forward with this and
make it as fast and quick as possible.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
By the way, the increasing range of North Korean missiles
means that it is not just South Korean facilities that are at
risk. Everything in Japan----
Senator Bunning. No. I am just talking about those bases.
The other ones are capable of reaching the United States of
America.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bunning.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary, General Kadish.
This morning's testimony, together with other positions of
the administration with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) and others, raises great concerns because I
believe what is happening is there is conscious rejection of
arms control as a central tenet of American foreign policy, and
by that I mean an endeavor, through bilateral and multilateral
agreements, not just to limit weapons, but to create a stable
strategic structure. I know the Secretary has indicated that
you intend to talk to the Russians, but the definite insistence
that, regardless of the result of those discussions, you will
proceed with these plans, suggests that that is less than an
invitation to negotiations and more of a demand for
acquiescence, which is very difficult to achieve in the
international arena.
What I have heard this morning I would sum up as the four
noes. No specifics with respect to a deployable system. No cost
estimates with respect to the life cycle of a deployable
system. No agreement with our allies, both our old allies and
our newfound allies, and most emphatically, no ABM.
Now, let me turn to some specific issues. Mr. Secretary,
you have several times referred to the reduction of our
missiles as part of this new framework, making specific
reference to Peacekeeper. Yesterday we had the opportunity in
the Strategic Subcommittee to discuss these issues with Admiral
Mies and General Blaisdell and Admiral Dwyer. You have budgeted
$5 million to acquire some equipment to begin the preparation
for the reduction and elimination of the Peacekeeper.
We are told that is less than a third of what is necessary.
There is absolutely no provision going forward that we were
shown to suggest that you have budgeted the approximately $500
million necessary to actually retire the Peacekeeper missile.
So, your words today do not seem to be supported by your budget
proposals in this budget and looking forward to 2003. Is that
accurate?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to get the details,
Senator, because you are asking me something I am not
completely certain about, but I believe the remaining funds
would be coming in 2003 and possibly future years, although I
assumed we would be finished in 2003. You do not have a 2003
budget request yet. You have an old 2003 budget that did not
plan for Peacekeeper in or Peacekeeper out.
Senator Reed. I understand that, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz. The clear intent is to retire
Peacekeeper.
Senator Reed. Well, if that is your clear intent, then you
are grossly underfunding the first preliminary step in terms of
acquiring equipment to do that, and you apparently have not
made any provisions, at least not to the awareness of Strategic
Command, to fund the approximately $500 million that will be
necessary to do that.
Again, when not just the Senate but the world looks at our
words and then looks at our budget, if there is a
discontinuity, then I think they will tend to look more at the
budget than our words.
General Kadish, the proposed budget dedicates funds to
something called space-based kinetic. Is it right to assume
this is a Brilliant Pebbles type system? If so, I have some
specific questions. Are you planning to ultimately deploy a
space-based interceptor system if the technology works?
General Kadish. The line also includes sea-based kinetic as
well. So, this is an effort to define how we can do boost phase
kinetic energy intercepts as a hedge against the directed
energy that we have in that area, namely the airborne laser.
There has been very little work done on that in the last few
years.
The situation we face with kinetic energy boost phase
interceptors, terrestrially based, is that you have to catch an
accelerating missile with another accelerating missile that is
launched many minutes after the first one. Overtaking and
intercepting an accelerating missile is a very tough challenge.
So, we are going to explore that area with the monies involved.
We have an additional effort to look at an experiment doing
the same from space because you are in a better position to do
that, and that has some legacy back to Brilliant Pebbles but it
is not a major effort at the beginning to look at that as part
of our architecture other than to do the early experiments.
Senator Reed. But if these experiments prove to be
effective, there is a possibility that you could propose to
deploy a system of satellites in order to acquire these targets
and essentially put in a space-based system. Is that correct?
General Kadish. That would just be one of the many hundreds
of decisions that have to be made about how the architecture
develops in an incremental way. That is certainly not imminent
in our program right now.
Senator Reed. It is not imminent, but we have heard
repeatedly in the discussions, both your responses and my
colleagues', that Russia, China, no one has anything to fear
with the proposals that we are talking about today in this
budget. Yet, you are beginning to do research which could
create a space-based interceptor system, which unlike the
airborne laser needs to be closely proximate to the threat
area, and could effectively interdict Russian or Chinese
missiles. Is that correct?
General Kadish. Well, Senator, if my memory serves me, we
got $5 million out of a $7 billion budget to look at that
effort.
Senator Reed. General, you know I will not quibble with you
on the dollars, but essentially you are beginning to
investigate possibilities that could, in fact, raise legitimate
concerns from a technical point with both the Russians and the
Chinese. Is that fair?
General Kadish. I am not sure exactly what their concerns
would be.
Senator Reed. Let me put it this way. If Russia had a
system in space that was capable of intercepting our
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) when they left our
launch pad, would you be concerned?
General Kadish. I am always paranoid about those types of
things. That is what you pay me for. [Laughter.]
I guess it is a strategic framework issue, and maybe the
Secretary should answer that from a policy----
Senator Reed. My time has expired, but if--Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Yes.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would say, Senator, that we are
years away from anything of that kind. Whether it is in space
in Russian altitudes or in space over Iranian altitudes or
Iraqi altitudes, for example, would make all the difference in
the world. But we are just years away from that. As the General
said, it is a very small piece of the program. But I think it
is important to try to understand what the technological
possibilities are.
We are looking for a relationship with Russia where we are
not threatening one another. We have already moved
significantly in that direction. We have a much longer way to
go.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, if I may, but if you would
throw off an ABM Treaty, this research could--there is no
constraint on deploying a system such as this if it proves out
technically. Is that correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Unless we came to some different
agreement with the Russians that constrained it, or unless we
decided politically to constrain it because it was a matter of
concern, or unless we limited it in a way that made it clear to
the Russians that it was not a matter of concern. We could
perhaps do it cooperatively because we are both vulnerable to
those kinds of attacks.
We are talking about something that is at least 10 years
away from even being something that you could talk about
concretely. By that time, I would hope the U.S.-Russian
relationship is genuinely transformed and then, in fact, we
could talk about whether those capabilities could be mutually
beneficial if deployed in the right way or the right numbers.
Lord knows neither of us want to be vulnerable to an
accidental attack by the other side. If you asked me, would I
feel threatened if the Russians had a limited capability to
shoot down an accidentally launched American ICBM, I would feel
much more comfortable if they had that capability than if they
are primed, as they are today, to launch on warning. They
nearly launched a few years ago when they saw a Norwegian
weather rocket. I would feel so much safer if they had some
ability to defend against a limited attack than if they sit
there thinking that launch on warning is the answer.
So, I am not trying to be contentious. We are miles down
the road. We are trying to develop a relationship with the
Russians where we are talking regularly and frequently about
where we are heading in our defense programs across the board
from a perspective of essentially common interests, which I
think are growing.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, my colleagues have been very
kind, but let me say it is not just a question of how far down
the road we are going. It is what roads we are taking. I think
this is a critical issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish for I think a ringing
call to reality to face the fact that the world has changed and
we have different threats. Jim Inhofe referred to Henry
Kissinger. I believe one of the statements I heard him make was
that he never heard of a country whose policy it was to keep
itself vulnerable to attack when we have the ability to defend
ourselves from attack.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you served on a commission to examine
this, a bipartisan commission when President Clinton was in
office. Would you tell us how many people served on that
commission, the makeup of it, and what your conclusion was?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In fact, it was known as the Rumsfeld
Commission because Don Rumsfeld--I guess he was already
Secretary Rumsfeld by that time--was the chairman of the
commission. There were nine of us, five Republicans, four
Democrats. Very diverse points of view. I felt honored to be
included among those people.
Senator Sessions. The commission rendered a unanimous
report, did it not?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It did, and I think that surprised all
of us. We came in there with very diverse points of view. Our
mandate was--let me emphasize--not to assess how to deal with
this problem. It was to assess what the problem was. If we had
been asked to recommend how to deal with it, you would have
probably had 11 different solutions from our nine members. But
on assessing what the threat was, we came to a degree of
unanimity that surprised me and I think surprised everyone. It
happened because the more we dug into the facts, the more
astonished we were at how rapidly this ballistic missile
technology had proliferated, how much the various bad actors
were cooperating with one another, sharing technology with one
another, and how aggressively this had all moved forward.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think you found that in 1972 nine
nations had ballistic missiles and now we have 29 nations with
ballistic missiles. Those things I think are important.
As to what is unconscionable, I think it is unconscionable
for us to have the President of the United States handcuffed in
the ability to take strong action around the world because in
doing so, he might subject the American people to a missile
attack. It is that fundamental to me.
Now, with regard to the Soviet Union, which is gone, and
the now existing Russia, it is my great hope and belief that we
can reach a peaceful partnership between those two countries
and that we can move forward carefully to expand that
friendship in a way that we cannot even imagine today. Nothing
would be better for the world, and I think we have every reason
to believe that is possible.
But is it not true that we have a treaty with Russia, the
ABM Treaty--presumably it is still a treaty--and that agreement
does not impact any of the other nations around the world who
have these ballistic missiles? It does not bind them. Is that
right?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct, although some of them
feel it should bind us, but it does not bind them.
Senator Sessions. So, what we are saying is this agreement
we have with Russia over how we are going to conduct our
bilateral relations beginning in 1972 is now a major detriment
to our ability to protect ourselves from North Korea or some
other nation that may decide to attack us with a ballistic
missile.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Or from even a limited accidental
attack.
Senator Sessions. It might come from one of the Russian
missiles.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It could.
Senator Sessions. So, to me we are in a new world here. We
are holding on to this relic of the Cold War, this agreement
between the United States and a nation that no longer exists,
the Soviet Union, and we are denying ourselves the ability to
prepare a defense against attack by missiles from any other
country in the world. Is that fair to say?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is pretty accurate.
Senator Sessions. Are you familiar with the 1999
legislation, Secretary Wolfowitz, that the Senate passed 97 to
3 to move forward with a National Missile Defense, to deploy it
as soon as we are technologically able to do so?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, I am.
Senator Sessions. I know the chairman mentioned that
President Clinton, when he signed it, made a statement that did
not make any reference to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty or
not. But that language is not a part of the law of the United
States, is it?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am not a lawyer. I will not try to
practice without a license. But I think not.
Senator Sessions. I think not also. I am a poor lawyer and
I do not think that a piece of legislation can be changed by a
statement made at the time the President signed it if it is not
made a part of that legislation. So, that is not a factor here.
Secretary Wolfowitz, is it your view that it is now time in
this post-Cold War period for us to reassess how we are going
to defend America, what the threats are to America? Do you
consider it your challenge to analyze this situation and move
us into a new period to deal with the changed threats to
America? Is that what the President has directed you to do?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, Senator, but can I also make a
bipartisan appeal? I think it is much broader than just
rethinking those threats and developing the abilities to defend
against them. It is also a matter of rethinking the whole
relationship with Russia.
I think General Kadish was a little nonplussed at the
question of how we would feel about a Russian ability to shoot
down an American ICBM. I do not mean to suggest that my good
colleague here is mired in the Cold War, but frankly I think we
need to think about an era in which, if the Russians have a
capability to shoot down an accidentally launched American
missile, we will understand that to be in our interest just as
it is in their interests if we are not vulnerable to their
accidental attack. If we could pass an agreement that abolished
all ballistic missiles in the world, we would probably be a lot
better off. We cannot do that, but let us move away from the
mind-set that said stability rests on the ability of Moscow and
Washington to push a button and be absolutely sure within 30
minutes they had annihilated the other country. It is
absolutely appalling.
Senator Cleland said it worked 100 percent. It worked 100
percent for a limited amount of time. I lived through the 1962
Cuban missile crisis, old enough to be pretty darned scared. I
do not think it is the greatest system in the world, but a big
change in thinking is necessary to get beyond it.
Again, I am going to pick on General Kadish because he is
here and he is useful. The fact that somebody as forward
thinking as my colleague here has a little bit of trouble
thinking that way, imagine the mental changes, the intellectual
changes we are asking of the Russians who in many ways are much
more mired in the Cold War than anyone you could find in this
country.
But let us think beyond not just in terms of defenses, but
in terms of our whole relationship with Russia. It is a
different country. It is a brand new country. It will never be
the threat to the United States that the Soviet Union was, and
frankly I think it can be a real partner because if you look
around the world at real stability, which in my view is not the
stability that comes from mutual annihilation, it is the
stability that comes from a stable Europe. It is the stability
that comes from a stable Northeast Asia. It is the stability
that comes from a stable Persian Gulf. Those three critical
parts of the world are right around the border of Russia. They
are not interested--they should not be. Sometimes they act
contrary to their interests, I think. We need to try to talk
them out of that. But Russia's interests are served by
stability in those regions just as ours are served. We ought to
be aiming at a relationship that is based on that kind of
interest in mutual stability, not the interest in mutual
annihilation.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thank you for that wonderful
response. I think you are right and I think your concern that
we need to be able to defend ourselves from other threats
around the world that are growing and becoming more
sophisticated is legitimate. I thank you for having the courage
to articulate a new vision for America's defenses. Thank you
very much.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I share with the President and with your
administration, being newly arrived in Washington, in our
responsibilities in January of this year. So, from the outset,
I have thought that the administration's request for the
broadest possible latitude in developing its plans and the
budget were appropriate and I think they have been supported by
Congress with, among other things, what I am told was an
unprecedented provision in the budget resolution that permitted
the Secretary of Defense, subsequent to the adoption of that
resolution, and the chairman of the two budget committees to
put in what had not been contemplated until that time. So, I
think Congress has been responsive and supportive.
I would say that my own view is, before today's testimony,
that there has been a reprehensible lack of detail and even at
times candor about these enormously consequential decisions
that you are making and we are being asked to concur with. I
support entirely what Chairman Levin recounted in terms of the
difficulty of obtaining accurate information. I noted that you,
Mr. Secretary, respectfully had a different perspective, which
is understandable, from the chairman in your response to
Senator Lieberman.
I would just go back again and say that if you reviewed the
prepared testimony of the Secretary on June 21 and June 28 of
this year and his response to questions posed here, to hear
this now, 2 weeks later, it has either been a great
intellectual leap forward or it has been a matter of, I think,
difficulty for this committee to obtain the information that I
would believe I and others are entitled to in order to carry
forward our responsibilities.
I would just say, again from my own personal experience, I
have learned more information about your intentions by watching
and reading the independent news reports than I have from any
hearing in this room or even in closed session and executive
session. I think that is antithetical in terms of what you are
talking about here in terms of a collaboration and a
partnership.
I think it would be one thing to ask for that kind of
latitude and ambiguity if what you were discussing or proposing
is the continuation of essentially the previous and generally
accepted military and diplomatic strategy rather than what is
in this case a very dramatic and even radical departure from
both prior military theory and strategy, as well as what is
contemplated to be an abrupt rupture of a longstanding
international arms control agreement.
I would say today's testimony is the first real specificity
and I certainly trust the veracity that has been forthcoming
and I commend you for that. I think perhaps now on the basis of
this--and I would certainly second what the chairman, Senator
Lieberman, and others have said in urging you to make this the
new hallmark and trademark of this relationship, that perhaps
this committee and Congress can now begin to engage in the same
process that the administration claims it is pursuing with its
allies and its former adversaries--that is a discussion and a
debate about the merits and the demerits of these momentous
decisions.
I recall the very distinguished former chairman of this
committee, the Senator from Virginia, noted the word
``partnership'' between Congress and the administration, and I
think that is appropriate to ask for. In my business and
professional experience, the partnership requires that I know
who or what my partner really is and that I will be consulted
and informed rather than engaged in an intellectual game of
hide and seek where words are often more intended to evade and
even to mislead than to inform and then finally being told what
the administration has already decided it is going to do and
asked to concur with that under the guise of partnership and
patriotism.
I would also like to say to you in partial response to some
observations that have been made by other members of this
committee that I do not think there is anybody on this
committee or anybody in Congress or in this administration or I
believe in former administrations who does not want to make
this country safer and more secure, who does not want to reduce
the chance of nuclear war and annihilation anywhere and
everywhere in this world. But I think we can admit that we need
to have an honest debate and even disagreement about how best
to achieve those conditions. I hope we can proceed on that
basis.
I guess I would ask, Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you
said that this system will not undermine arms control or spark
an arms race. If anything, defenses will reduce the value of
ballistic missiles and thus remove incentives for their
development and proliferation. Are you willing to acknowledge
that that constitutes at least a significant departure from
previously established U.S. military theory and strategy?
I recall that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Shalikashvili said words to the effect that any
new defensive system creates a new wave of offensive systems
and technology. You referred to the former Soviet Union,
Russia, and our hope for a new relationship there. But as you
yourself have noted, sir, this world is in a constant state of
flux. Is it reasonable to assume that setting up this kind of
multi-layered defense system is not going to spawn worldwide an
attempt to develop offensive systems of greater ability to
evade and destroy?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Before I answer that question, let me
just address very briefly the concern you stated at the outset.
I really do not believe in intellectual games of hide and seek.
I do not believe I have ever practiced them in my dealings with
Congress.
Senator Dayton. When I referred to you, sir, I am speaking
in general terms.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, I understand what you are
saying, and I am understanding the desire of this committee and
the whole Congress to be as well informed as possible on these
crucial issues. We will do our level best to give you that
information.
One of the reasons that some of these independent news
reports tell you things that we have not told you is because
sometimes they know things that we do not know and some of
those things are not true. You get a contractor who has a gleam
in his eye about some way that General Kadish can help keep him
going, and before you know it, there is a story in some
newspaper that says we are actively considering or maybe even
have decided. We have to be a lot more careful before we come
up with something that is actually a program. Even when we have
a program, as we have tried to explain, programs change,
especially development programs, in the course of testing.
So, as far as I am aware, there has been no effort to
conceal. There has been a genuine difficulty in absorbing a lot
of change, a lot of facts in a really relatively short period
of time. As you alluded to, Senator, this is not the only issue
on which we have been having to scramble hard. So, I appreciate
your indulgence, and I hope that you will take this testimony
today as a significant measure of trying to respond to those
concerns. Quite honestly, I would acknowledge that I think the
mere scheduling of this hearing has flushed a lot more
information up in our system to higher levels, and that has
been useful.
On the question you raised about defenses spawning a new
arms race, at the risk of picking a fight with an even higher
ranking general, or at least an intellectual argument, I think
that thinking is a vestige of the Cold War. There is no reason
for the Russians to start taking their scarce resources and
investing them in new nuclear systems because we build a very
limited capability to shoot down an accidental launch or a
North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile. I do not honestly
believe they will. I think they might come and ask us for some
relief from some of the arms control restrictions that are
going to end up costing them money because their security
problems are above all economic security problems.
But you have to take each of these things I think in very
specific context. I used in my testimony the example of what
American naval supremacy--in fact, you could go back further
and say Anglo-American naval supremacy--has done to piracy.
People, except in fairly remote parts of the world, do not
invest in big pirate fleets because they cannot succeed. In
fact, very few countries invest in big navies because they
cannot challenge us. So, the effect of our improving missile
defense capability I think will be to discourage countries from
following the path of North Korea and Iran and maybe even
discourage North Korea and Iran from investing so heavily in
those capabilities.
You have to take it case by case. You have to look
carefully. But I really do believe that it is a nontrivial fact
that this is the one capability where Iraq did better than
expected in the Gulf War. It is the one Achilles' heal of the
American military. The reason these countries are putting so
much money into ballistic missile capabilities, conventional
and non-conventional, has to be because they cannot beat us any
other way, and they see this as a vulnerability. I think it is
a vulnerability we should close.
Senator Dayton. I thank you again for your specificity and
candor and the diligence you are putting into this. You have an
enormous responsibility and we want to share that with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
Senator Allard.
Let me, before you start, indicate where we are. We have
two votes that are now scheduled. The first vote began just a
few minutes ago. After Senator Allard, we have Senator Nelson
for the first round. There may be other Senators who come for
their first round, and the question is how do we proceed to our
second and third rounds?
One possibility, because there is a huge amount of material
here which we have not yet proceeded to discuss--I guess the
possibility that I want to talk to Senator Warner about is that
given the fact that we have a subcommittee meeting this
afternoon and that we have much material to cover, that after
everybody concludes their first round here--we will call on
Senator Allard in a moment because he can get his questions in
before the first vote is over. I am not sure that Senator
Nelson will be able to do that--that we then adjourn this
hearing until next Tuesday where we had an open slot and we
pick up at that point. It is either that or we go after lunch,
which would create a conflict I think with the subcommittee,
which we would like to avoid.
So, this is no way to consult on this publicly, but we do
not have much choice.
Senator Warner. I am just wondering. If I were to go vote
right now and Senator Allard used the time for his questions,
then you and I each have a follow-on round, I think we could
almost continuously use the time between now and, say, 1:30 and
conclude this hearing. I am prepared to do that.
Chairman Levin. Is that agreeable with you, that you stay
here until 1:30 if we are able to conclude by then? If I make
an assessment that we can conclude--I would like to talk to
other members of the committee, but assuming that we reach that
assessment, are you able to stay that late?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, I will be a little late to
something else, but this is more important.
Chairman Levin. You can do that.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. We have received an enormous amount of
information today, and given the importance of this subject, I
think I would be better prepared, others perhaps as well, to
come back next Tuesday and ask a follow-up round of questions.
Chairman Levin. I think I am going to proceed that way for
this reason, and I hate to do it, given Senator Warner's
suggestion, which is somewhat different. But we did not have
your testimony until this morning. We expect it 48 hours in
advance under our rules. You were asked about that at your
confirmation. This is a hugely important subject. Given the
fact that we have this problem now and that we need time to
digest that testimony, I think what we will do is after
everyone's first round here now, we will adjourn this until
next Tuesday, if that is an agreeable time with the ranking
member. If that is not an agreeable time, we will pick this up
at another date which is agreeable with the ranking member.
There is just too much material here to squeeze in this way.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, we accept your perfect right
to schedule for next Tuesday, but I would like that you and I
at least have the opportunity--I have purposely withheld one or
two observations until I could have the benefit of hearing all
colleagues comment on this. So, I do have some concluding
remarks about what I think has been an extraordinarily
successful hearing.
Chairman Levin. We will do that. After everybody's first
round here today, you and I will then take a few minutes to
wind up today. We will then adjourn until next Tuesday, at
least tentatively, at the same time. We will now call upon
Senator Allard.
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Chairman, does that mean that I
would go ahead and do mine next Tuesday or whenever it is set?
Chairman Levin. No. If you can squeeze it in today,
definitely. Anybody who has not had a first round today will
have an opportunity today to do their first round.
Senator Ben Nelson. Come back after the two votes?
Chairman Levin. After the two votes, absolutely.
Senator Ben Nelson. OK, thank you.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to commend the panel on their great
presentation today. I have watched the presentation by General
Kadish in the past where he showed the technology, that we do
have the capability to use a missile to hit another missile
during flight. I think that is phenomenal technology and every
time I see that, I am continually amazed. It demonstrates to me
that we are clearly on the way technologically to being able to
even apply that kind of technology to longer-range missiles,
and I am confident that we are moving in the right direction
technologically and showing that that can technologically be
done.
The other thing that particularly amazes me is that the
argument is made that somehow or other we are perpetuating a
nuclear arms race because we are just responding to what other
nations are doing throughout the world. I was struck by your
statement that we now have some 28 countries that have
ballistic missiles. We have some 12 countries that are
developing the ability to have a nuclear program.
Yet, when we come forward and this administration comes
forward with a proposal that says that we are going to move
from strictly an offensive posture established during the Cold
War and we are going to begin to look more closely at a truly
defensive way of protecting ourselves and that even when the
administration has said, look, we are willing to even step
ahead of any treaty that we have signed and reduce our nuclear
warhead capability below what is being called for in any other
treaties that we have signed, that somehow or other we are
accused of moving towards some kind of an arms race.
From what I see out of this administration, there is a
definite commitment to bring about world peace. I commend the
President for reaching out to our allies. He has really just
started that process. I think he has a long ways to go, but I
think it will work and I think it is the right thing to do. I
think that we need to move ahead with our own technology, and I
am impressed with what the panel has presented to this
committee here today.
Senator Levin, chairman of the committee here, had raised
concerns that the ballistic missile budget before us had not
been fully vetted, in other words, had not been looked at as to
whether it was complying with the treaties and the review
process. But I understand that the BMDO budgets have never been
fully vetted when they have been submitted to Congress. In
fact, they have never been fully vetted even after they have
passed Congress. I am told, for example, that the Compliance
Review Group certified your last long-range missile defense
test on June 30, 2000, and the test took place on June 8, 2000.
So, the question I have is, does the process to determine
the compliance of program activities during the budget cycle
differ significantly from the process used in past years? In
other words, you are using the same budget process as far as
the vetting process as we have ever done in that past. We have
not deviated from that, have we?
General Kadish. No, Senator. We are using the same
compliance review process, but that will be adjusted somewhat I
think to ensure that we put more attention than we have in the
past on that, given the Secretary's interest in this subject.
Senator Allard. Which shows again a commitment I think by
the administration to try and comply and work with our allies.
I want to follow that up with another question. Is it not
true that compliance certification usually comes in only a
matter of days to months prior to the test event?
General Kadish. That has been true in the past because
there is so much analysis that goes into those compliance
reviews of testing activities. So, many times we do not know
exactly the final configuration of the test until days
beforehand or weeks beforehand. We are trying to improve that,
but that is just a fact of life. Therefore, the final
compliance certification tends to follow those decisions in the
program. So, we have had that situation I think in the past few
tests that we have done.
Senator Allard. Were you going to comment, Secretary
Wolfowitz?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, my first comment, Senator, is
you have just informed me of something rather significant that
I did not know about before that we certified a test after it
had been conducted. So, obviously, there is more I have to
understand about this arcane process than I knew before I came
here. Obviously, we have to make it work in a way that gets
information on these legal judgments to the President and to
Congress in a more timely way than that particular example
suggests, but at this moment I cannot tell you how we are going
to do that exactly.
Senator Allard. According to my information, it was a week
before.
My understanding is that I have a vote on the floor. I am
the only one here in the committee, so I am going to put it in
recess so I do not miss my vote. Then when I return, I will
finish my question period. I will put the committee in recess.
[Recess.]
I would like to go ahead and call the Armed Services
Committee back to order. When you are at the first of the
alphabet and you get a chance to vote first, sometimes there is
an advantage. So, I was the last to leave and first to arrive.
I will continue to use my time to question the panelists, I
would like to move forward with my questioning by addressing
this to General Kadish.
In your testimony, you spoke about a significant effort to
improve your testing capabilities in the Pacific. As I recall,
the realism of your testing program has been criticized
considerably not only by individuals like Mr. Coyle, who is the
former Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, but also
by groups like the Union of Concerned Scientists and even some
Members of Congress.
In fact, Mr. Coyle made the following recommendations in
his NMD DRR report, ``Current test range limitations need to be
removed to adequately test the NMD system. Target trajectories
or radar surrogate locations need to be changed.'' It goes on
to say that ``flight testing artificialities must be
eliminated. Multiple engagements must be accomplished. This
type of engagement should have flown in integrated flight tests
before OT&E.''
The Union of Concerned Scientists stated that testing
should be conducted--and I quote them--``under realistic
conditions.''
The GAO had cited in their May 20, 2000 report--and I quote
that report--``A number of test limitations affect the ability
to test, analyze, and evaluate system performance.''
Now, it seems to me that the test bed you are proposing
should go a long way towards answering the criticism that I
have just mentioned. In fact, it seems that it is a much better
way to test the systems we are trying to develop. Could you
comment on the advantages of the test bed that you are
proposing?
General Kadish. You are exactly right, Senator. In fact,
all of those recommendations have been, in one way or another,
incorporated into this test bed idea because the best way to
test against a long-range missile threat in a midcourse type
system, whether it is ground-based or, for that matter, sea-
based, is to do it the way you plan to operate.
This test bed in the Pacific, with elements at Fort Greely
and Kodiak, Alaska, and at Kwajalein and Vandenberg, and other
elements, does exactly that. To the best of our ability, it
replicates an operationally realistic test arrangement. That
gives us many more geometries to test against. It gives us much
more flexibility and realism to test the communications and
command and control, as well as reliability and maintainability
of the systems. It provides us with a lot more information than
we had planned to get. But it is expensive.
Senator Allard. Now, as I had mentioned in some of my
remarks earlier, the President has proposed a new strategic
framework that relies on a mix of offensive nuclear forces,
missile defenses, and nonproliferation efforts. I wondered if
the panel would elucidate again what you see as the fundamental
differences between deterrence during the Cold War and the 21st
century challenge.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I guess the heart of it comes down to
who it is you are trying to deter and what you are trying to
deter them from doing.
While there were many other concerns that we had during the
Cold War, I think our whole nuclear posture, the whole
structure of arms control during the Cold War was driven by the
fact that there were 23 Soviet divisions, heavy divisions, in
eastern Germany. There were some 100, more or less, divisions
backing them up all the way to the Urals. They had operational
plans to, in the event of war, move within a matter of a few
weeks to the English Channel. We on the other side went from
planning to deal with that with tactical nuclear weapons to
planning to deal with it with increasing levels of long-range
nuclear weapons, and the Soviets responded in kind. So, we had
a hair trigger situation built on a major military
confrontation in the heart of Europe.
What we have today is something very different. The
relationship with Russia is just completely transformed. It
bears no similarity to the old Soviet Union, and I would submit
not only are we not enemies, but as I said to one of your
colleagues earlier, I believe we have a real interest in mutual
stability, but it is not the mutual stability that comes from
mutual annihilation. It is the mutual stability that comes from
stability in Europe, stability in East Asia, and stability in
the Persian Gulf.
The people we are trying to deter are a number of countries
whose hostility in the United States and hostility to its
friends has been made abundantly clear. What they are really
trying to do, as exemplified in some ways by the Gulf War, is
find ways to keep us from applying our unquestioned
conventional superiority to protect our friends and allies from
threats from those countries.
If you imagine what the Gulf War crisis would have been if
Saddam Hussein had had the capability to threaten Tokyo and
Paris and London with nuclear armed ballistic missiles or, even
worse, if he could have threatened Washington with nuclear
armed ballistic missiles, maybe we would have gone ahead in
just the same way that we proceeded. I question that. I
question even more whether our allies would have proceeded in
that way.
So, what we are trying to do is add to the obvious,
enormous offensive nuclear capability we have relative to any
of those small countries and to the impressive conventional
capability that we have an ability to protect against limited
attacks and to deny them, as much as we possibly can, that
option of blackmailing us or blackmailing our friends.
In this framework, I think the larger efforts of
nonproliferation and counterproliferation loom much larger as
well. The Soviet Union's capabilities were almost entirely
indigenous, although we did make a big effort to make sure that
they did not get help from our friends and allies. In the case
of these countries, they all depend on a great deal of help
from other places, and we cannot cut off all of it. We cannot
stop North Korea from cooperating with Iraq. But we can try to
prevent France and Japan from cooperating with Iraq or North
Korea. So, that has to be another major piece of preventing
these threats from emerging.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank both of you, Mr. Secretary
and General Kadish, for being here today. I appreciate the
opportunity to learn more about missile defense and some of the
other issues that are extremely important to national defense.
I have a lot of questions about missile defense, but
personally I think it is important to say that we should never
say no to missile defense outright. There are some who say
absolutely yes and there are some who say absolutely no. I want
it clear that I am saying maybe. Maybe not because I do not
think there is a legitimate threat. I think there is a
legitimate concern from the so-called rogue nations, that they
might launch toward us. I think there is a legitimate concern
about accidental launch. I think these are certainly things
that we do need to take into account.
But I want to be assured that sufficient research has been
done and is being done so that we can determine if missile
defense is even possible and how likely it is that it is going
to work because it is a cost-benefit analysis in many respects.
It is certainly a personal safety and humankind safety issue as
well.
But what we are being asked to do is to consider it in
terms of the overall budget for defense and how it might relate
to taking money away from other threats that are very likely.
Biological warfare is clearly very possible or chemical warfare
or even another weapon of mass destruction being delivered
through another mechanism.
So, I want to make sure that what we do is based on sound
science and that our cost-benefit analysis is thorough.
I have asked the Secretary if he could give me some idea of
a percentage of success that we might be able to evaluate to
determine whether or not missile defense is possible, whether
it truly is the kind of security that we would want it to be if
we are going to spend that kind of money.
I have heard the argument that at least it is a scarecrow.
I come from an agricultural state, and I know my Nebraska
farmers would not put a scarecrow out that did not scare crows
and they would not call it a scarecrow if it did not scare
crows. They would want to know how much that scarecrow costs
before they invested in it and whether on a cost-benefit basis
it was going to be worthwhile.
What I am leading up to is that I want to make sure that we
have done everything that we can in this arena because I am
worried that we are inching our way toward deployment before I
have received answers to my questions. I think whether it is a
runaway train that is heading down the track or whether it is
boiling a lobster slowly or whatever it is, I think there is a
decision made that we are going to have it and we are going to
have it regardless. I hope that is not the case, but everything
that I hear, everything that I see would almost lead me to that
conclusion.
I do not want to be a cynic. I hope that we are being asked
to pursue this honestly and sincerely, as I am attempting to
do, because I have not concluded that we ought not to deploy
it. But I have not concluded either that there is such a thing
as a true missile defense. I know we can call it that, but will
it be a defense? Will it really work the way we want it to work
and how will it fit into our other defense needs and our
defense requirements? Those are my questions. They are very
simple.
I know that we have tried to arrange schedules to get
together where I could talk to you privately and I hope we are
able to do that because I do not simply want to talk about it
in the public forum. I want to talk about it in every way and
explore every avenue that I can.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, first of all, I would be eager
to get together with you privately and talk at whatever length
is useful.
Let me just, therefore, sort of summarize by saying we have
no intention of deploying things that do not work.
Senator Ben Nelson. Maybe you can give me what the
definition of ``work'' is. What does it have to do to work?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me give you an example which I
think is germane. It is not with respect to defense against
longer-range missiles, but we are getting ready to deploy the
PAC-3 as a defense against shorter-range missiles. Up to what
range, General?
General Kadish. In tens of kilometers, 20, 30 kilometers.
Senator Ben Nelson. More for the theater defense.
General Kadish. Oh, the range of the incoming. They are
short-range missiles up to 600 kilometers.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, the theater defense----
Secretary Wolfowitz. We are getting ready to deploy
finally.
Senator Ben Nelson. I really do not have a problem with
that at all.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It does work, but it did not work 4
years ago and 5 years ago, and we are actually investing
significant additional amounts in that program because it does
work.
If you look at the defenses against longer-range systems,
what this program represents is a certain stepping back to
explore what does and does not work and to research much more
aggressively things that we set aside maybe for other reasons,
but I think largely because they raised ABM Treaty issues. We
will try and learn from research and development which of those
potentially promising technologies work and which ones do not.
When we have decided which ones work, we will come up with
sustainable notions of what they can do and what they cannot
do.
For example, the airborne laser, which we have referred to
many times in this hearing--if it works as we hope it may work,
that still then leaves the issue about how much to invest in it
because its geographical range is intrinsically limited.
So, we definitely are going to take this step by step and
every one of those steps will be up here for thorough scrutiny
and appropriation and authorization. So, the intention is
certainly not to throw money at things that do not provide us
real capability.
Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I would not suggest that we would
or that you would advocate that either.
My time has expired. Maybe you can clarify for me what the
installation--maybe during the next round of questions, you can
help me understand a definition of deployment. As we work on
the definition of what works and what percentage of success it
has to have for us to be able to say it works, maybe you can
help me understand the steps of deployment because I must admit
that I would see the installation in Alaska as steps 1, 2, 3,
some incremental steps, of deployment. But maybe I do not
understand the word.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not know if we have time.
Senator Ben Nelson. We can do it the next round.
Chairman Levin. We are going to pick this up Tuesday, and
that is the type of question which we are going to be focusing
on, those kinds of technical questions at the Tuesday hearing.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, that is such a key question.
I think we really ought to take just a minute or 2. I will
yield a minute or 2 of my time.
Chairman Levin. It will take many more minutes to answer
it, but fire away.
Senator Warner. I think it is important. The Senator raises
a key question and a lot of people want to know because I look
at the Missile Defense Act of 1999, and it is clear that we are
not going to do anything until it is technologically feasible.
There are 97 votes behind that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Excuse me. That is what I am referring
to because I am in favor of research and development to get the
technology to the point where we can say it works. But I am
worried that we have not defined what ``works'' is yet, and I
certainly do not have any understanding of what deployment is
when it starts. I think I will know when it is over, but I will
not know when it started. That is what worries me.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me try a quick answer. If it needs
correction, I will ask General Kadish to correct. If it just
needs elaboration, then we will keep the elaboration until next
week.
The Alaskan system is a complicated issue because what we
are trying to develop there is a uniquely realistic test bed
for exploring the land-based midcourse intercept system. It
would be hard to improve on it I think as a way of finding out
as well as possible how that kind of system would work. In
fact, it will do it so well that at some point we might say,
gosh, this works as well as we expected or maybe even better
than we expected. If at that same time country orange--let us
not be too specific--came out with a primitive ballistic
missile threat to the western United States, we would say,
well, we have a primitive capability to shoot down that
primitive missile.
Senator Ben Nelson. So, is it part of development? Is it
part of the technological development to comply with the vote,
the 97 vote?
Secretary Wolfowitz. But that is not the capability we are
aiming at. That would be sort of an emergency departure. What
we would really anticipate is if we say, gosh, it works and we
are not in an emergency state, we would take that information
that it works, develop a real architecture that makes maximum
use of that capability, and then come here with a full-fledged,
long-term program for deployment of that full-up capability.
Senator Ben Nelson. It might be in the range of development
at this point in time or research or something, not deployment.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is the way I would consider it,
Senator. But it has a little bit of dual potential.
The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS), which is one of the most spectacular technological
developments of the last decade--it has this ability to track
vehicles moving on the ground with amazing precision--was still
in the development phase when the Gulf War broke out. Someone
said, gee, it is just developmental, but we can use anything
that might possibly work. So, we sent it to the Gulf. It turned
out it worked amazingly well. We tracked the one major Iraqi
attack on Khafgi. These aircraft in the air saw three large
armor formations converging on one place and we were able to
destroy them from the air. So, it certainly proved its worth.
People will also tell you that it set back the long-term
development of the JSTARS program by some significant amount of
time because it is disruptive to do that. So, you do it in an
emergency. You do not do it according to a plan.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
We will now turn to Senator Warner for his remaining
questions and wrap-up. Then I will do the same.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I think we have had an excellent hearing. The
intensity of the debate I think is constructive. We have made a
solid foundation for the Senate, indeed, I think for Congress
eventually, to make a decision. It is my personal judgment that
we move forward, that we had a positive sequence of exchanges
today on the whole and that you move forward toward the goal of
defending this country. We have a long way to go, but I commend
both of you.
I am going to just ask some very basic questions here
because so many people are going to look at this hearing in
many parts of the United States, and some of it is a little
complicated. I recognize that, and I am just going to ask some
basic questions.
First, General Kadish, I am confident that our President,
if not hindered by Congress, will be able to achieve a new
framework with Russia. That is just my own personal conviction.
Now, on that assumption that we resolve that this new
framework will enable us to go ahead with these various options
which the treaty has precluded our country from doing for 30
years in its various formulations of trying to meet this
threat, if we are able to go ahead, would we not then be able
to get a system that is more effective and achieve it in less
time?
General Kadish. I believe that to be the case, Senator.
Senator Warner. So do I, and I have often said that, for
decades, around here that that treaty has acted--well, it was
designed for the purpose of not letting the United States--it
was the intent of the treaty not to let us build any defenses.
So, once we resolve this new framework, then we can go ahead
and it will be more effective.
Now, much has been said about the suitcase bomb, and this
is a chart that the Joint Chiefs have provided the committee.
[The information referred to follows:]

Quite accurately, my colleague points out that the suitcase
bomb sort of falls in the middle spectrum of threats. In other
words, it is more likely that someone would bring a suitcase
bomb than the intercontinental exchange of an accidental or a
rogue firing of a missile.
But at the same time, the other axis of the chart clearly
shows that the damage done by a suitcase bomb is but a small
fraction of the damage that potentially could be done by an
intercontinental ballistic missile. Am I not correct in that,
General Kadish?
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Could you give us some possible multiple of
the damage? Would it be 10 or 100 times more damaging? Say that
the North Koreans did send that missile on to a major city in
California or Hawaii or the Chinese who had some bellicose
statements about firing a missile against California at one
time. Suppose that did happen and it had a nuclear warhead.
What is the multiple of damage that that missile would create
as opposed to the suitcase bomb? These are just rough
estimates. I realize it is speculation.
General Kadish. To speculate a little bit, probably 15
times.
Senator Warner. 15 times as great.
General Kadish. I would say 14 to 15 times.
Senator Warner. Now, also in the case of the suitcase bomb,
it is in the category quite properly of a terrorist weapon.
Secretary Wolfowitz, as I have sat here these many years, we,
the United States, have put in place as best we can
technologically and by other means by the expenditure of
literally billions of dollars every resource we can to prevent
that suitcase bomb. Take, for example, the intelligence. That
is the first and it has proven to be the most successful way to
interdict that suitcase bomb.
But in sharp contrast to the accidental firing of a missile
where we have not yet been able to devise a defense, we have in
place significant defenses and deterrence for the suitcase
bomb. Am I not correct? We have expended enormous sums of
dollars.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct, and we should do so.
I think we should continue to aggressively pursue every
reasonable avenue in that direction. As you are implying,
Senator, in the case of an accidental missile launch, we have
not only not pursued it aggressively, we have allowed our hands
to be tied behind our backs.
Senator Warner. We have covered that ground very clearly.
Now, you pointed out I think quite clearly that the
accidental firing could be an accident here by the United
States of America in our arsenal. I regret to have to point out
that we have seen two very significant military accidents here
in a little over 12 months: one, the Russian submarine which I
think the public should understand was the very top of their
technology, a modern submarine. We have every reason to know
that their crews are the finest trained among their Armed
Forces. Yet, they lost that submarine with all hands. The full
accident report is yet to be known. But it happened.
In stark contrast, one of our own submarines with one of
the finest trained crews that we have was brought to the
surface negligently, in my judgment, and created a loss of
life.
There is a clear example of how the military itself, both
sides, Russia and the United States, is subject to accidents
happening. I do not know what clearer proof we need that
accidents can happen.
If we were to accidentally fire a missile, your comment was
we would want to have Russia be able to interdict that missile
with a system which presumably we might be able to help them
with in building rather than have it cause severe damage. Am I
not correct in that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Correct.
Senator Warner. We cannot, under the current framework of
the ABM Treaty and the current provisions, share that
technology should our President and successive presidents so
desire. Am I not correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe that is correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. I know it to be correct. So, I think there
is another example of the reason why we should move forward and
change this framework.
Lastly, the reductions in the levels of our own inventory
of nuclear weapons. That has been a subject that has been
discussed by our President. It is his intention at an
appropriate time. To the extent that you can inform the Senate
in public hearing, is that to be an integral part of the
negotiations with Russia in the ABM framework of negotiations?
Is it independent? What is the likely timing of a decision?
Again, is it linked to the ABM or could our President
independently make that decision?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think, Senator, we are still in a
discovery mode. We have already made some decisions, as I
pointed out, three quite significant ones in this year's budget
that were done without relation to any requirement to negotiate
with the Russians or see how our forces compare with the
Russians.
But in his meetings in Genoa later this month with
President Putin, I would hope one of the points President Bush
makes is that we are already doing this kind of thing. We are
not trying to threaten Russia and we would encourage Russia to
take as many economies as she can in her forces. It just does
not make sense to have unnecessary nuclear capabilities.
But we are trying to proceed with more precision, as
rapidly as possible, to come up with a structure for what is a
truly required, long-term nuclear posture in an era when Russia
is no longer an enemy. I think that is going to come in stages.
I think it will be part of this framework of discussions with
the Russians. Some will be formal negotiations, some will be
other kinds of things.
In fact, I think a major goal of what we would like to
achieve with the Russians is the kind of dialogue and
transparency that we take for granted with allies. We do not
have treaties with Britain and France to regulate the nuclear
balance between our two countries. Russia is not yet at the
level of being a member of NATO, but we have very important
common interests. We think that with openness and with showing
them what we have in mind and where we are going, that we can
encourage them in a positive direction with us.
Senator Warner. Lastly, you are one of the most seasoned
and experienced members of this administration with regard to
Russia. You were recently there. Do you share my view of
optimism that our President can work out a framework agreement?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do very strongly because I think so
strongly that it is in the interests of both Russia and the
United States. I really think we are in a new era. I understand
for everyone, myself included, there are a lot of thoughts that
come from the Cold War that you have to extract from your
brain, but the faster we can do that, the further we can go
with that. That is I think really building mutual security for
the future.
Senator Warner. That is a very sound note on which to
conclude my participation. I thank both of you.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
I think everybody wants to make this world safer. We all
start with that. There is no argument that North Korea is
seeking that capability. The only real question here is whether
or not our response to it, if it is unilateral and if it
results in a Russian and Chinese response to maintain a lot of
additional nuclear weapons on Russian soil, nuclear material,
which then makes the proliferation of it, the theft of it more
likely by terrorists, surely that is going to make us less
safe, not more safe. If China speeds up their activities, works
on countermeasures, decoys, sells them to others, we have then
helped to unleash an arms race, which will make us less secure,
not more secure.
So, the question is not whether there is a threat that is
emerging over here. The question is whether the response to
that threat will make us more secure or less secure. That is a
very significant issue. The issue is not whether there is a
threat which is emerging, which North Korea is working on, it
is what is the best way to respond to that threat in a way
which makes us more secure.
That is our moral obligation. That is the moral obligation
of the President and the moral obligation of Congress, to make
us more secure and not to respond to the least likely threat,
which is the attack with a ballistic missile from North Korea,
and increase the likelihood of terrorist threats from a
different direction as a result.
That, it seems to me, is what requires a great deal of
analysis. It is not good enough to simply say there is a threat
without asking yourselves: is there a way to respond to that
threat which makes us more secure rather than less secure?
Would a unilateral response, if we cannot get a modification of
the treaty with Russia, precipitate some actions by Russia or
China, including not just the increased likelihood of
proliferation, but also the countermeasures and the decoys
which can be then created by them in order to overcome such a
threat and then be transferred to others as a result?
I could not agree with you more about getting out of Cold
War thinking, by the way. I think everybody agrees with that,
but I hope that you will firmly keep in your minds what was
known back then, which is still true. It was known in the
1970s, is known now, and will always be the case that when one
country seeks unilaterally to achieve its own safety, it can
increase the insecurity in another country. That is not our
intent. I could not agree with you more. That is not your
intent.
But you have to consider the Russian and Chinese view. Do
not give them a veto. No one is going to give them a veto, but
at least consider why it is that they do not agree with you.
Why is it that they feel less secure if we deploy a limited
defense? You have to consider it and I hope you will consider
it.
The problem is you have made a decision. You are going to
deploy without consideration of why it is that those other guys
out there will feel less secure by that unilateral deployment.
That is the challenge.
I wish you had gone about this in a very different way,
frankly, I wish you had started with the argument, hey, let us
move together to a different structure based on defenses. The
world will be better off. Then try to persuade people, rather
than the statement, the declaration, we are going to do it,
like it or not. We hope you like it. Because it is more likely
you are going to precipitate a negative response by taking that
approach than you would by the persuasive approach, which is,
hey, does it not make more sense for us to have defenses rather
than to continue the same form of deterrence?
Deterrence has worked. I think you would agree with that.
Deterrence is important. You are not aiming to end deterrence.
It has worked with North Korea, by the way. Has it not?
Secretary Wolfowitz. A combination of different things,
yes.
Chairman Levin. Yes, but deterrence has worked with North
Korea.
All those missiles that North Korea now has have not been
used. There are probably a number of reasons, but I will tell
you one good reason. It would amount to their suicide if they
used them. We have been told by our intelligence people that
the number one goal of the North Korean regime is survival.
That is the number one goal we have been told. That being the
case, for them to launch a missile at us, which may or may not
work, which would lead to their immediate destruction, runs
counter to their number one goal, which is the survival of
their regime.
In addition, we have been told on this threat spectrum,
that there are other means of delivery of a weapon of mass
destruction, not just a truck bomb, but a nuclear weapon,
biological, chemical weapon, not just with a suitcase, but with
a truck and with a ship. I take it, General, that a nuclear
weapon that is delivered by truck of the same size as a nuclear
weapon delivered by a ballistic missile would have the same
damage. Is that a fair statement? The same size nuclear weapon.
General Kadish. The same size nuclear weapon. It would be a
little harder to deliver by truck I think, though.
Chairman Levin. It may be a little harder, but if it were
deliverable by truck, would that be about the same damage?
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. How about two trucks and three trucks?
General Kadish. Scales.
Chairman Levin. So, in addition to being concerned about
the response and why other countries respond to this unilateral
approach of ours, there is this other factor, which is that in
pursuing that road, we are ignoring the fact that it is much
easier, cheaper, more accurate for them to deliver a weapon of
mass destruction with another means. No return address, which
does not lead necessarily to their own destruction if we do not
know where it came from.
Those are critical policy questions. Now, we have many
technical questions as well, and we are going to get into those
next time. But I just want to ask a few questions and then wrap
it up.
General Kadish, 3 weeks ago you told us there was nothing
in your recommendations which, if implemented, would violate
the ABM Treaty in 2002. Is that still true in your judgment?
General Kadish. No, it is not, Senator.
Chairman Levin. What has changed since you testified
before?
General Kadish. At the time we talked about this, I believe
I said at the time that the program was not fully approved and
that the Compliance Review Process was ongoing and could change
things a lot.
Chairman Levin. What has changed?
General Kadish. What has changed is that the definition of
the program in getting into the compliance review, which is a
lengthy process to some degree, pointed out events that were
potentially more near-term that the Secretary described. So,
this process is ongoing and it will yield the types of
decisions that you are talking about.
Chairman Levin. Now, we need to know precisely. If
everything goes well in this program in 2002, what are those
events which would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty? If
everything that goes well that is in your budget request, what
specific activities are in conflict with the ABM Treaty?
General Kadish. That is a living list, and I think
Secretary Wolfowitz has outlined a couple of them in his
testimony already.
Chairman Levin. He did not say they would in 2002.
General Kadish. That is right.
Chairman Levin. I am asking you if everything goes well in
2002, give me the specific activities in your budget which
would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty. Just give me one,
two, and three.
General Kadish. That is not my responsibility to determine
whether they are in compliance.
Chairman Levin. OK. Secretary Wolfowitz, what activities in
your budget request will be in conflict with the ABM Treaty in
2002 if all those activities in the budget go well?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Again, that is also not my
responsibility. It is a legal determination that goes through
the treaty compliance----
Chairman Levin. You have not asked your lawyers yet.
Secretary Wolfowitz. The lawyers are working on these
issues. What I have outlined in my testimony, Senator, are, as
best we can identify them, the most significant issues that are
coming. I am sorry I do not have the same version of the
testimony that you have, but as I said, as the program
develops, we have some issues coming.
The first issue is the test bed currently scheduled to
begin construction in April 2002, designed to permit the
testing of a ground-based midcourse capability under realistic
operational conditions.
Chairman Levin. Are you saying that is in conflict with the
ABM Treaty?
Secretary Wolfowitz. No. I am saying that raises an issue
about ABM Treaty interpretation.
Chairman Levin. You do not care what the answer to the
issue is?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Of course I care but I do not know the
answer.
Chairman Levin. When will we find out? When will you find
out?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not know.
Chairman Levin. If you care, why is it in your budget
before you know?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Because we are trying to do two things
at once, and we have to. I mean, we need to proceed.
I have listed the other two major examples in my testimony.
Chairman Levin. But you are not able to say now, without
this board giving us a decision, whether or not those
activities are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. Is that
correct? Is that your testimony today?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. I just want to end with this one comment.
Clarity is important and I think at least there is a little
greater clarity today than there has been. But I have to tell
you, we are a long way from there. Just on policy issues, we
are a long way from there because just yesterday--just think
about this. We have an issue here which is so significant to
the world. Everybody is involved in this issue. Just about
every country cares about this issue. We get visits from the
British. We get visits from other allies in Europe. They come
and visit us. This is the issue we talk about.
Yesterday the administration hands out a document which
says that ``while we do not know precisely when our programs
will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the
timing is likely to be measured in months not years.'' That is
just yesterday.
Today you tell us that one or more aspects will inevitably
bump up against the treaty. Such an event is likely to occur--
that is, the bump up--in months rather than years.
Now, this is not splitting hairs because you also testified
today that there is a difference between bumping up and in
conflict with. That is your testimony. So, yesterday the
administration hands out a document which uses the word in
``conflict'' with ABM. Today the administration testifies that
it will bump up in months, or likely to bump up in months
instead of years.
We have a long way to go before there is just clarity, and
clarity, it seems to me, is the basis for a solution--hopefully
a bipartisan solution--because that has to be the goal of
everybody, but then ultimately a solution not just between
Congress and the administration, but ultimately a solution that
hopefully will allow us to move together with our allies, who
are very skeptical of this, and hopefully with the Russians
towards a new kind of structure because that is everybody's
goal I think, to try to move together towards a new kind of
structure where defenses have a role.
That is the reason that we are doing the testing. We want
to see if we can come up with something that is operationally
effective, cost effective, and which will make us more secure.
That is everybody's goal.
I think this has been a helpful hearing. I agree with
Senator Warner. I also feel, though, that it is important that
we spend this time, and I hope you feel it is useful as well
for us, for Congress, being asked to fund these programs, as
well as for the country and for the world, that we really
explore what roads we are walking down at what speed with what
advantages, what disadvantages, with what risks, and what
gains.
We hope that your recovery is complete so that when we see
you next Tuesday, you will be out of that temporary interim
cast.
Senator Warner. I would like to say a word here. I thank
you, my colleague.
First, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that our
committee proceed to try and declassify that testimony that
General Kadish provided this committee which has been the
subject of discussion as to what you did say. It seems to me
there are sufficient caveats in here that you properly placed
about taking certain steps with lawyers and others before
proceeding.
Chairman Levin. I would very much like that, as a matter of
fact. What I have said here, however, I want to assure my good
colleague was approved. I think it is important, though,
however, that we try to declassify General Kadish's entire
testimony.
Senator Warner. Lastly, Mr. Chairman, we have had a lot of
discussion today about unilateralism and the term has been used
by a number of Senators. I think I would like to just clarify
my own view on a very important point.
First, the treaty explicitly provides for that. Am I not
correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Warner. So, it is not a matter of breaking the law.
The treaty gives a president that option.
Chairman Levin. Do you mean to withdraw? I am sorry.
Senator Warner. Yes. I mean it is explicit. It is not
something that we would just do. It is in the treaty. Those who
wrote the treaty--and I happen to have been around at the time
it was written--envisioned a problem could arise some day and
it would be in the national interest, and the commander in
chief, our President, would have to make that decision. So, it
is in the treaty.
Second--and this is my own view. Having come to know our
President and having formed a great respect for him, I am
confident that if after a clear and credible program of, first,
consultation with allies and then negotiations with Russia, if
he were of the mind that that was the only alternative to go to
that provision of the treaty, that he would come to Congress,
particularly when I predict that Congress will be a full
partner in each step of the way, and consult with Congress
before he would take that action under the treaty. He would not
simply be raising the telephone and calling the leadership and
say, I am going to do this tomorrow morning. He would go
through a period of consultation.
Would you share that view with me?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe so, yes, Senator.
Senator Warner. I think that should be known by the people
following this.
Chairman Levin. Well, it also should be known that we will
give you a chance. It is great to hear that he is going to
consult, but the President said he is going to withdraw if he
cannot get modification. I mean, he has already said that. We
always welcome consultation, but the consultation needs to come
before decisions, not after.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, this is part of the
consultation.
Senator Warner. I think he had to say that in fairness to
the Russians to know the full----
Chairman Levin. He said that to the American people, not
just to the Russians.
Senator Warner. Well, the Russians know it. It is in the
treaty, and he simply says, I have to protect this Nation and I
want to do it through a new framework.
Chairman Levin. What is in the treaty is the power to
withdraw. The President has told the American people he is
going to deploy, and if he does not get an agreement to modify,
he is withdrawing.
So, I welcome consultation but again, the consultation, to
be real, needs to be real. It has to come before decisions, not
after decisions.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, can I make one quick
response?
Chairman Levin. Yes, absolutely.
Secretary Wolfowitz. There is a great deal in what you said
that I guess we will discuss at length on Tuesday. I agree with
you. All these choices are a matter of balancing risks, and you
and I may assess the risks differently. Maybe if we discuss
them more, we will come to convergence on that.
But I think we would absolutely agree that the way to
minimize most of the risks that you are concerned about is to
come to some kind of cooperative approach with the Russians. I
do not think there is any argument on that question.
On that question, I think I would implore you and everybody
in Congress to think about the fact that I think the record
shows consistently that our success in getting that kind of
cooperative outcome depends on having some momentum. The ABM
Treaty itself would never have come into being if the United
States had not shown some determination through some extremely
difficult votes up here, one of which in fact succeeded on a
tie vote, as I recall, to move ahead with the so-called
Safeguard system. That is what brought the old Soviets to the
negotiating table.
We went through a very difficult period a few years ago
with a completely different country, that is, Russia, over the
subject of NATO enlargement. It was difficult, but I think if
you look at it from 20/20 hindsight now a couple of years
later, I think even the Russians are beginning to realize that
bringing Poland into NATO is no threat to Russia and has
actually improved relations between Poland and Russia.
Chairman Levin. We never had a treaty with Russia that we
would not enlarge NATO.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Each case is different, but what I am
saying is if the Clinton administration brought the Russians
around I think in that process to a framework, not an
agreement, but a framework of understanding that actually did
include a formal agreement between Russia and NATO, that was
part of the enlargement of NATO process, I think what you need
to achieve a cooperative approach is both a willingness to
cooperate and some determination to move forward. I think that
is the combination that the President is looking for.
Chairman Levin. A lot of determination to move forward,
plenty of momentum in the billions that we put into test
programs, a lot of momentum that everyone has supported. We
have supported the research and development programs. So, there
is a lot of momentum in that.
But I think we will pick this up next Tuesday at 9:30. Let
me just make this clear to everybody. There have been a number
of people who have not had a chance to have their first round.
We will start with questions instead of opening statements,
except if the ranking member and I want to make a brief opening
statement at the beginning. But other than that, we will not
have opening statements from you. We will go directly to
questions. I want to hold open the possibility that if there is
time, that we consider additional witnesses on the technical
side, which we want to get to at some point anyway.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, they may wish, upon
examination of today's lengthy record, to make some brief
opening statement.
Chairman Levin. We would have to keep it very limited,
otherwise we are going to run into the same kind of problem. We
would welcome corrections, clarifications.
Senator Warner. That gives them the chance.
Chairman Levin. They may be very long in that case, though.
[Laughter.]
We will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was recessed, to
reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, July 17, 2001.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
Lieberman, Cleland, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Allard,
Sessions, Collins, and Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
Professional staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswait
and Richard W. Fieldhouse.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
Republican staff director, Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
director for the minority, and Scott W. Stucky, minority
counsel.
Professional staff members present: Brian R. Green and Cord
A. Sterling.
Staff assistants present: Kristi M. Freddo, Thomas C.
Moore, and Jennifer L. Naccari.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to
Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton;
Christopher J. Paul and Dan Twining, assistants to Senator
McCain; J. Mark Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M.
Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Kristina Fauser, assistant to Senator
Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order. The
committee meets this morning to continue our hearing from last
Thursday with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and General Ron
Kadish on the Defense Department's missile defense programs in
the fiscal year 2002 amended budget request.
General Kadish, before we begin, I want to congratulate the
BMDO team that was involved in last Saturday night's successful
intercept test. That test, as you pointed out, is just one of
many tests that are needed to determine whether an operation of
a successful system is feasible, but it is an important test,
and we congratulate you for it.
Protecting and defending the American people must be our
goal in all that we do. In my judgment, we should be mighty
cautious before ripping up an arms control treaty in order to
meet the highly unlikely threat of North Korea using a missile
against us.
Unlikely, because they could use a truck more cheaply and
with greater accuracy, and without a return address. Unlikely,
because if they launched a missile against us, it would lead to
their immediate destruction. We are told that regime survival
is their number one goal, so in order to meet a highly unlikely
threat, if you rip up an arms control treaty and you start a
new kind of arms competition or cold war with Russia and China,
America could be less secure.
Protecting and defending America from that state of affairs
must also be one of our goals. No one I know of is willing to
give Russia or anyone else a veto over our actions, but Russian
reaction to a unilateral breach of an arms control agreement is
relevant to our security and could leave us a lot less secure.
That is an issue that Congress hopefully will grapple with.
Long before the administration submitted this budget request
that is before us, it notified the world that it would rip up
the ABM Treaty if Russia refused to modify it. Congress will
hopefully find a more moderate course than that. Senator
Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you
and I have been here many years together, and I rarely
challenge you on an opening statement, but I really believe
that the terminology, ``ripping up'', is not supported by the
record of our President. I have talked with him one-on-one
several times, and I feel he is pursuing first a course of
orderly consultation with our allies.
He has had some initial discussions--perhaps they could be
classified as preliminary negotiations--with the President of
Russia on the subject of the treaty. He is due to meet with him
again. I feel very strongly that he is pursuing an orderly
process consistent with the ABM Treaty at this point in time,
and that we in Congress should give our President a chance in
his role as commander in chief and chief architect of not only
foreign policy but of those policies that relate to the Armed
Services and our weapons programs, and hopefully we can work
with him and structure a partnership.
To the extent that Congress backs a President, it is more
likely that President can succeed throughout history. I
remember very well, when I was Secretary of the Navy, the early
negotiations on the ABM Treaty, the presentation, the action by
the Senate and Congress, and they were narrow margins, but
nevertheless, President Nixon did succeed in negotiating that
document and signing it. Treaties are the law of the land, and
I find our President is doing the best he can.
I join my distinguished colleague, General Kadish, in
saluting you and many others in the program for the test over
the weekend. I note very carefully the observations by the
Secretary of Defense, yourself and others, putting into
proportional balance the significance of this test, but making
clear that it is but a step in a long process. It is not the
decisive one, but certainly we are pleased that it did add a
constructive step forward in this program, and that it is
subject to the evaluation of the vast quantity of test analysis
that has to be done with this particular test. We will have to
await all of that analysis, but it looks like it is a step
forward.
I am hopeful that we can work out the partnership with the
President. I think we are making good progress. I would like to
bring a matter to the attention of my colleagues here today.
During last Thursday's hearing there was a concern expressed
that the President was asking Congress to vote for a ballistic
missile defense budget request even though all the programs in
that budget request had not gone through, ``the compliance
review process,'' which to an extent determines whether the
activities are compliant or noncompliant with the ABM.
In the many years I have been here there has never been
total clarity among the lawyers on this subject. The issue of
judging compliance is often subject to a conscientious
difference of opinion of lawyers, but we do our best in the
compliance process.
This concern here in the committee was picked up and
properly, I think, reported in the press. I just wanted to go
back and point out the following. I think it is important to
note for the record that the process this administration is
following is consistent with the steps taken by the BMDO office
for many years. I hope you can assert that in your testimony,
General.
I point to our distinguished former chairman, now ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Strategic, Senator Allard, who
pointed out last Thursday that the BMD programs had never been
fully vetted through the compliance review process either when
the BMDO budget is submitted to Congress or when Congress has
approved the BMDO budgets.
You, Senator, noted an excellent example on Thursday. The
certification that last year's integrated flight test under the
Clinton administration, test number 5, was compliant with the
ABM Treaty. That was issued on June 30, 2000, the compliance
analysis. The test took place on July 8, just 8 days later,
clearly indicating that the test had to start the preparations
long before the compliance letter was in hand.
In fact, most of the time the Compliance Review Group
continues to review test plans as these tests are refined,
until shortly before the test is conducted. In other words,
every time we voted, that is, Congress, on a BMDO budget in
past years, we have voted without full knowledge that each of
the test activities contained in the BMDO budget request would
be ABM-Treaty compliant.
Therefore, it seems to me we are following a consistent
pattern. That pattern may be changed under this administration.
Perhaps Secretary Wolfowitz wants to attest to that this
morning, or others, but I just point that out.
So I welcome you, Mr. Secretary, once again, and General,
and I am going to strive as best I can to see that Congress
gives our President every opportunity to discharge his
constitutional responsibilities with regard to this treaty.
Hopefully Congress will form a partnership in the near future,
because I must say that this particular piece of legislation
that the Armed Services Committee is entrusted each year to
prepare, the annual authorization bill, is a crossroads at
which these issues will be met, and we have had an
authorization bill for 30-plus years now.
I am absolutely desirous, as is the President, to have
another one this year, but these issues have to be, with due
respect to my colleagues who have different views, worked out
ahead of time. Otherwise this bill could be held up, or stalled
on the Senate floor, and this bill covers the entire Armed
Services of the United States, in all aspects. The missile
defense portion of the bill, the authorization, is a vital part
of it. Hopefully we can reconcile such differences as we may
have before the time of a markup in this committee and, indeed,
debate on the floor, such that this bill can be passed by the
Senate eventually.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Again, Secretary Wolfowitz, we are very anxious to mark up
this budget, but we need the justification material, which is
not yet in from two of the services. We have been very
impatiently awaiting that material. It is essential for our
markup, because we absolutely share the goal that Senator
Warner just set forth of trying to mark up our bill as quickly
as possible so we can get an authorization bill to the floor.
Secretary Wolfowitz, do you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I
know you want to get to questions. I do not have an extended
opening statement, but let me just make a brief comment about
events that have taken place since we met last week. Last
Saturday we conducted a successful test intercept of an
intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean, and
General Kadish has a short film clip of that intercept. It is
very short. I would ask your indulgence to show it to the
committee.
Chairman Levin. We would be happy to see it.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR,
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

General Kadish. If you could roll it, this will show the
interceptor in the Kwajalein Islands. The intercept kill
vehicle is on top of the silo. You will see the shroud remove
itself on launch. This prototype booster accelerates rather
rapidly. It is not the booster that we intend to ultimately
use, but it is only for the test program at this point. You can
see the booster climbing for altitude with the kill vehicle
attached, and this year we did get separation of the kill
vehicle, which is very encouraging.
The booster goes through a series of maneuvers. It is a
rather short, but important set of maneuvers that make sure it
stays on the test range. If we had a longer trajectory to test,
we would not necessarily have to do these types of maneuvers to
dissipate the energy and they are characteristic of solid state
boosters. So you can see it maneuvering, almost changing
direction a number of times in order to stay on the particular
test range. That is one of those maneuvers.
Senator Warner. You might talk a little bit about the
guidance it is receiving, and where that comes from.
General Kadish. The ground gives it. It has autonomous
guidance, but it gets at least one update from the ground to
tell it where to go in space, and then the kill vehicle, after
it launches, will take an immediate set of star shots in order
to confirm its position, and then get ground up-dates from the
same communications system that the booster did, so the whole
idea here is the booster gets the kill vehicle in position to
be separated and launched over the target complex, and that is
a major part of the integrated part of the system.
The altitude of the intercept is about 140 miles, 220
kilometers, and you will see this next series of different
phenomenology that confirmed the actual intercept. This is an
infrared picture, and a series of infrared pictures all showing
that the impact of the hit-to-kill on the warhead was
successful.
We lost all telemetry at the same time we were expected to
lose it in a successful intercept, and so we are very confident
that we hit very accurately. This is a radar trace, the
interceptor coming through, and you can see the debris that
resulted from the intercept picked up by the radar, and this is
the final shot.
So it built our confidence, but there is a long way to go
in the test program, and we hopefully will be here over the
next year showing many more of these types of successes.
That is all I have.
Chairman Levin. General, just before Secretary Wolfowitz
begins, you made a comment that after the test it would be a
number of weeks or months before you had the final analysis of
the test results. Could you just briefly tell us, is there
anything we should expect, other than what we have seen, that
it was a successful hit?
General Kadish. Each test has a number of objectives we are
after, all the way from whether the communications system works
properly, to the radar traces, and we compare that to the truth
data that we get from other sensors on the test range, and in
that process we may discover that there was an anomaly with one
of the elements that did not quite work properly, and we have
backups to make sure the tests come out successfully at certain
points, so what we want to do is compare that truth data to the
actual telemetry data to see if there were any anomalies, and
that takes us a number of weeks to accomplish.
So right now, the initial data indicate we had a fairly
good test.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you. That successful test is
another step forward on the long road to developing and
deploying effective defenses to protect the American people
from limited ballistic missile attacks, but it is an important
step. It underscores the point General Kadish and I made to
this committee last week that missile defense is no longer a
problem of invention, it is a challenge of engineering, and it
is a challenge America is up to.
To build on the success of this test, we will need
successive tests that push the envelope even further, that are
even more operationally realistic, and we need to begin testing
the many promising technologies which were not pursued in the
past, but which have enormous potential to enhance our
security.
This inevitably means our testing and development program
will eventually encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM
Treaty. We are seeking to build defenses to defend the American
people. The treaty's very purpose is to prohibit us from
developing such defenses. If we are to build on this weekend's
accomplishments, we must move beyond the ABM Treaty.
We are working to do so on two parallel tracks, first with
a robust research development and testing program and, second,
through discussions with Russia on a new security framework
that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over, and that the
U.S. and Russia are not enemies.
To succeed, we need Congress' help in both areas. First, we
need your support to fully fund the President's budget request
for development and testing of missile defense. The ability to
defend the American people from ballistic missile attack is
clearly within our grasp, but we cannot do so unless the
President has Congress' support to expand and accelerate the
testing and development program.
This weekend's test shows the potential for success. Let us
not fail because we did not adequately fund the necessary
testing, or because we artificially restricted the exploration
of every possible technology.
Second, we need your support for President Bush's efforts
to achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile
defense. The President is working to build a new security
relationship between the U.S. and Russia, one whose foundation
does not rest on the prospect of the mutual annihilation of our
respective populations. He will meet with President Putin
shortly in Genoa, and he has invited Putin to his ranch in
Crawford, Texas, and he has accepted an invitation to visit
President Putin in Russia.
Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell are engaged in
discussion with their Russian counterparts as well, so a very
important dialogue is underway. We are optimistic about the
prospects for reaching an understanding with Russia, but
Congress can have a significant impact on the outcome of those
discussions. If Congress shows the same resolve as the
President to proceed seriously with development and testing of
defenses to protect our people, our friends and allies, and our
forces around the world, it will significantly enhance the
prospects for a cooperative outcome.
Conversely, I would urge Congress not to give the Russians
the mistaken impression that they can somehow exercise a veto
over our development of missile defenses. The unintended
consequence of such action could be to rule out a cooperative
solution, and leave the President no choice but to walk away
from the treaty unilaterally, an outcome that none of us surely
wants.
As we proceed with robust testing, we will work to achieve
an understanding with Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty. We
have established a process that will identify issues raised by
our program at the earliest possible moment. The Department's
ABM compliance review group has been directed to identify ABM
Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for
new development or treaty events. That process is already
underway.
The Secretary and I will be informed of whether the planned
test bed, the use of Aegis systems in future integrated flight
tests, or the concurrent operation of ABM and air defense
radars in next February's test, are significant treaty
problems. I have attached to my testimony fact sheets prepared
by the Ballistic Missile Defense Office on each of these three
cases, and I would like to submit them for the record.
Chairman Levin. They will be made a part of the record.
Secretary Wolfowitz. This process will permit us to take
them into account as early as possible as we pursue our
negotiations with Russia on a new strategic framework. We will
keep Congress informed as the process unfolds, but if we agree
that cooperation in setting aside the constraints of the ABM
Treaty is preferable to unilateral withdrawal from the treaty,
then we need Congress' full support for missile defense
research and testing.
We look forward to working with the committee to build on
this weekend's successful test, and to ensure that we can
defend the American people, our friends and allies, and our
deployed forces, from limited ballistic missile attacks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz
Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the committee, I don't
have an extended opening statement today, but allow me to make a brief
comment about events that have taken place since we met last week.
Last Saturday we conducted a successful test intercept of an
intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean. This
successful test is another step forward on the long road to developing
and deploying effective defenses to protect the American people from
limited ballistic missile attacks. But it is an important step. It
underscores the point General Kadish and I made to the committee last
week: that missile defense is no longer a problem of invention--it is a
challenge of engineering. It is a challenge America is up to.
To build on the success of this test, we will need successive tests
that push the envelope even further, that are even more operationally
realistic, and to begin testing the many promising technologies which
were not pursued in the past, but which have enormous potential to
enhance our security.
This inevitably means that our testing and development program will
eventually encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We are
seeking to build defenses to defend the American people. The ABM
Treaty's very purpose is to prohibit us from developing such defenses.
If we are to build on this weekend's accomplishments, we must move
beyond the ABM Treaty. We are working to do so on two parallel tracks:
First, with a robust research, development and testing program; and
second, through discussions with Russia on a new security framework
that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and
Russia are not enemies.
To succeed we need your help in both areas:
First, we need Congress's support to fully fund the President's
budget request for further development and testing of missile defense.
The ability to defend the American people from ballistic missile attack
is clearly within our grasp. But we cannot do so unless the President
has Congress' support to expand and accelerate the testing and
development program. This weekend's test shows the potential for
success is there. Let us not fail because we did not adequately fund
the necessary testing, or because we artificially restricted the
exploration of every possible technology.
Second, we need Congress' support for President Bush's efforts to
achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile defense. The
President is working to build a new security relationship between the
U.S. and Russia whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of the
mutual annihilation of our respective populations. He will meet with
President Putin shortly in Genoa, he has invited President Putin to his
ranch in Crawford, Texas, and has accepted an invitation visit
President Putin in Russia. Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell are
engaged in discussions with their Russian counterparts as well.
So an important dialogue is underway, and we are optimistic about
the prospects for reaching an understanding with Russia.
But Congress can have a significant impact on the outcome of those
discussions. If Congress shows the same resolve as the President to
proceed seriously with development and testing of defenses to protect
our people, our friends and allies, and our forces around the world, it
will significantly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome.
Conversely, Congress should not give Russia the mistaken impression
that they can somehow exercise a veto over our development of missile
defenses.
The unintended consequence of such action could be to rule out a
cooperative solution, and leave the President no choice but to walk
away from the treaty unilaterally--an outcome none of us surely wants.
As we proceed with robust testing, we will work to achieve an
understanding with Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty. We have
established a process that will identify issues raised by our program
at the earliest possible moment.
The Department's ABM Compliance Review Group has been directed to
identify ABM Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the
plans for new development or treaty events. That process is already
underway.
The Secretary and I will be informed of whether the planned test
bed, use of Aegis systems in future Integrated Flight Tests, or
concurrent operation of ABM and air defense radars in next February's
tests are significant treaty problems (I have fact sheets prepared by
BMDO on each of these cases which I would like to submit for the
record). This process will permit us to take them into account as early
as possible as we pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new
strategic framework. We will keep Congress informed as the process
unfolds.
But if we agree that cooperation in setting aside the constraints
of the ABM Treaty is preferable to a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty, then we need Congress' full support for missile defense
research and testing.
We look forward to working with the committee to build on this
weekend's successful test, and to ensure that we can defend the
American people, our friends and allies, and our deployed forces, from
limited ballistic missile attacks.
Thank you.
AEGIS SPY-1 TRACKING A STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE
plans and purpose
Plans to use an Aegis SPY-1 radar to track long-range
ballistic missiles are currently under development and are only
at a preliminary stage.
The most likely near-term scenario is for an
unmodified Aegis SPY-1 radar to track an outgoing target
immediately after its launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base
during an ABM intercept attempt at Kwajalein Missile Range.
This test would provide initial data for assessing the
basic capability of the Aegis SPY-1 radar to track long-range
targets that will assist in formulating Aegis development
options.

The Aegis SPY-1 radar may be connected to the
test's command, control and data communications
backbone.
The SPY-1 radar, however, would likely not
contribute to the data used to complete the intercept
(i.e., it will not help guide the interceptor).

Future (and currently unprogrammed) plans might
include an Aegis SPY-1 radar:

Collecting intercept data at the ABM test
range during ABM testing.
Providing real-time data to the U.S. strategic
early warning system.
Providing data to assist an Integrated Flight
Test intercept attempt.
The Aegis SPY-1 radar might also participate
in testing at the Missile Defense System Test Bed using
targets with various ranges and velocities.

We eventually expect to integrate a modified, more
capable version of the Aegis SPY-1 radar into tests of our
boost and ascent phase elements.
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TEST II (SIT II) COMBINING DATA FROM ABM AND NON-
ABM RADARS
plans and purpose
We will conduct a short-range missile defense test
beginning next February.

Three targets will be tracked by two Aegis
SPY-1 radars, a Patriot PAC-3 radar and the THAAD UOES
radar.
An ABM radar located at Kwajalein Missile
Range will also track each target, but will not
communicate with any of the other radars.
During the flight test of at least one target
missile, a Patriot PAC-3 missile system will attempt an
intercept.

The ABM radar will obtain data supporting all U.S. TMD
programs. This is critical information as to how both our
interceptor and the threat targets behave, as well as unique
information measuring the lethality of the intercepts. Using
the ABM radar will significantly improve the quality of the
information gained from the test.
THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TEST BED
plans and purpose
Test Bed as a Whole. Allows overall system performance
testing to occur using more realistic threat trajectories and
allowing more complex engagement scenarios.
Launchers.

Construction at Fort Greely, AK (5 silos) will
be in the spring or early summer next year. Once
complete, the five silos will allow tests of
operational command and control, communications, and
the capability of the long haul communications network;
rehearsal of maintenance and upkeep processes; and
assessment of the adverse effects of Arctic conditions
at a potential operational site.
The two Kodiak, AK launcher silos to be
constructed in the spring/summer of 2003 will allow
higher closing velocities, more realistic test
geometries, and multiple engagements.

Radars. At least three large phased-array radars will
be part of the Missile Defense System Test Bed: Cobra Dane
(Shemya, AK), Beale, CA, and a new X-Band in the mid-Pacific.

Cobra Dane currently collects data on
ballistic missile launches from Russia and also has the
mission of early warning and space track. An upgraded
Cobra Dane radar will provide enhanced early warning
and may have some ABM radar capability.

Initial upgrades are software
modifications like those ongoing for the Beale,
CA early warning radar. No changes to the
radar's hardware are currently planned.
Boeing is investigating what
additional upgrades to Cobra Dane might be
appropriate, and when. Possibilities range from
mere software upgrades to significant physical
modifications. We will know our options this
fall.
In any operational system, we
anticipate that the X-Band radar at Shemya
would be required to provide needed
discrimination, even with all possible upgrades
to Cobra Dane.

Beale software modifications will not raise
ABM Treaty issues before fiscal year 2004.
Current plans contemplate constructing an X-
Band radar in the mid-Pacific in fiscal year 2006.

In-Flight Interceptor Communications Systems (IFICS)
to be constructed next spring/summer may raise ABM Treaty
issues depending on whether they are determined to be
subcomponents of an ABM radar.

Chairman Levin. General Kadish, do you have an opening
statement?
General Kadish. No.
Chairman Levin. At last week's hearing, I said we would
first call on members who were able to come to the hearing but
were not able to participate. So I will first recognize those
committee members who attended last Thursday's hearing but did
not have a first 6-minute round of questioning. We will then
follow our normal early bird order of recognition, and begin a
new 6-minute round of questioning.
Under that announcement which I made last week, I would
first call upon Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
add my word of welcome to Secretary Wolfowitz and General
Kadish, and also to your staff people who are here. National
missile defense is among the most important issues that is
facing Congress and the American people today. As Vice Admiral
Dennis McGinn said recently at the Naval War College,
``Whatever money we spend on national missile defense against
ballistic missile threat to this Nation is a high opportunity
cost, and we should do it very, very carefully.''
Today's hearing is an effort by this committee to study the
issue very carefully, and I commend the chairman and members of
this committee for their dedication shown in ensuring that
Congress does a job before committing great amounts of scarce
funds to an expanded program.
Let us remember that we are designing a system to meet
future as well as present threats. The system may not be fully
deployed until the year 2010 or 2020. We need to consider
whether the major threats faced 10, 20, or even 30 years down
the road will be delivered in a way that a missile defense
program protects us, or will our missile defense system be the
defensive equivalent of France's Maginot Line, something our
adversaries will be able to easily evade? This is a much more
difficult question, and one which argues for more caution in
our current approach to setting priorities for defense
spending.
I would ask the Chairman to place my full statement in the
record, and if it pleases the Chairman, I will proceed with
questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be made part of the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Thank you Mr. Chairman. National missile defense is among the most
important issues facing Congress and the American people.
As Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn said recently at the Naval War
College, ``whatever money we spend on national missile defense against
a ballistic missile threat to this Nation is a high opportunity cost
and we should do it very, very carefully.''
Today's hearing is an effort by this committee to study this issue
very, very carefully. I commend the Chairman for his dedication to
ensuring that Congress does its job before committing great amounts of
scarce funds to an expanded program. We heard testimony this week from
the service chiefs and secretaries that they need more money in fiscal
year 2003 and beyond to provide for basic procurement and operations.
We cannot afford to do everything. Basic decisions must be made
concerning what is a reasonable financial commitment to make, to deter,
or prevent a realistic threat.
The Pentagon's acquisition chief, Edward Aidridge, Jr., has said
that ``we are not sure we know what the answer is [for providing
missile defense].'' We need to know more accurately the response to
that question before proceeding with a crash program involving billions
of dollars.
If our approach is, as some have suggested, ``test through
failure,'' that sounds like we will try anything, go anywhere, spend no
matter what, until we find something that works some of the time. That
sounds like a prescription for waste: a waste of time and a waste of
money.
Rather than trying everything at once, it may make more sense to
build slowly, test by test, a defense system that works against the
most likely threats. Make it simple, effective and efficient. What we
have now is a little of this, a some of that, and a lot of money.
Let us also remember that we are designing a system to meet future
as well as present threats. The system may not be fully deployed until
the year 2010 or 2020. We need to consider whether the major threats we
face 10 or 20 or even 30 years down the road will be delivered in a way
that a missile defense program protects us or will our missile defense
system be the defensive equivalent of France's Maginot Line--something
our adversaries will be able easily to evade. This is a much more
difficult question and one which argues for more caution in our current
approach to setting priorities for defense spending.
I thank the Chairman once again for his leadership in this area. I
look forward to this morning's discussion.

Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Rumsfeld has
decided that a mid-course system alone is not sufficient to
provide global protection, but many boost-phase systems such as
an airborne or space laser will only be able to destroy an ICBM
booster. The warhead is built to survive reentry, and could not
be affected by a laser.
Are you concerned about knocking out a booster to prevent
the warhead from hitting U.S. territory, only to send that
warhead falling on some other territory, such as Canada, Japan,
or Europe, where we have American troops and allies present?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I am more concerned at the
moment that we do not have the capability at all. I would like
to develop it. When we develop it, we will also have much more
knowledge about exactly the kind of question you raise.
I think it is almost certain that a missile launched by a
hostile country will do much more damage if it hits the place
that it is aimed at than if it is knocked off-course somewhere
along the way, and I would prefer to knock it off-course as
early as possible so that the problems that you are raising
arise for the country that launches the missile, not for our
friends or our allies, and certainly not for ourselves, but it
is a valid question. It is one that one would have to look at
in the operational context of a successful capability, and we
are unfortunately a long way from that capability.
To give you a for instance, during the Gulf War, when we
were subjected to ballistic missile attack and our friend,
Israel, was subjected to ballistic missile attack, our pilots
flying over Western Iraq watched missiles rising from the
launch pad with big, bright signatures, but no capability to
shoot them down. If one of those missiles had had a chemical
warhead on it, I would have much preferred to have it land in
Iraq than to land on Israel or Saudi Arabia.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, one of the criticisms of the
old national missile defense schedule was that it required a
deployment decision to be made before any operational testing.
The BMDO has stated that the focus of missile defense is no
longer on deployment, but on testing. Does the new plan put off
a deployment decision until after all the developmental testing
is complete and operational tests have begun?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I will let General Kadish answer that
question.
General Kadish. There are no procurement or deployment
activities in the current program, but there are decision
points to offer it to the Secretary and others to decide
whether we have enough information to proceed with a
procurement and deployment program. Right now that is not part
of the plan, and our intention at this point is to test as
robustly and rapidly as we can all the systems that are under
development so that we can be in a position to actually provide
that information to the decisionmakers.
Senator Akaka. General, I would like to mention and discuss
countermeasures. In space, a warhead and simple decoy, such as
a traffic cone, look the same. Is that correct?
General Kadish. They theoretically can be made to look the
same, but you have to define look, and what visible or IR
spectrum. There is a number of ways that you would want to look
at them in the spectrums we deal with.
Senator Akaka. It is my understanding that the flight test
on Saturday used a single balloon decoy. How many decoys are
you planning to use in future tests? If it is just a few
decoys, is this a realistic test, when an enemy could use
multiple cheap decoys, such as a simple traffic cone to deceive
us?
General Kadish. The countermeasure and the decoy problems
will be addressed as we build our test to be more complex in
these areas, and ultimately I am hoping that we have--I could
not give you the exact number of decoys, but a lot of decoys,
and see how the system performs.
In fact, in the world of development, we would like to
actually test what we call the edge of the envelope, so that we
can actually break the system and find out how many decoys you
can have or not have, and that would be my intention, if we can
afford to do that in the long run. But again, that is the issue
of having a layered system, because countermeasures that work
in the midcourse, like the tests that we did on Saturday, do
not work in boost phase, and those that work potentially in
boost phase do not work in midcourse, so having a layered
system greatly complicates the countermeasure problem for our
adversary, and it simplifies it for us to a large degree.
That does not mean that we would not aggressively pursue
overcoming midcourse countermeasures, but it certainly would
help us to have a layered system.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for extending this hearing on this most important subject.
The committee is tasked with the responsibility of
authorizing funds for our Nation's defense programs. As we
address this year's defense budget, we will need to address
some fundamental questions that I believe concern the American
people. First, are we spending the available defense funds in a
way that maximizes our national defense? We need to strike the
right balance.
The President has requested a huge increase in missile
defense, but his requests for readiness are modest. We are
actually cutting funds for nonmissile defense science research.
Even if one supports the concept of missile defense, we all
need to ask, at what cost, and what other defense priorities
will be sacrificed, and second, we need to make sure our budget
is geared toward addressing the most imminent and realistic
threats to the United States.
I believe the average American is genuinely and
appropriately concerned about the possibilities of a terrorist
attack with a deadly virus, or some other devastating lethal
attack. Of course, we must also address the serious threat of
an accidental missile launch, or a missile attack by a rogue
nation. Again, the difficulty is striking the right balance. I
hope that this hearing will bring us closer to answering these
questions. I am encouraged by the successful results of last
weekend's flight test, but I believe that we must remain
cautious in our enthusiasm.
As General Kadish commented on Saturday night, this success
was only one step on the journey. We have a long road ahead in
all of the missile defense activities that we have ahead of us.
I hope that today, General Kadish and Secretary Wolfowitz will
be able to help us as we proceed along that road.
My first question is to General Kadish. I understand your
organization intends to accelerate its testing schedule with
close to two dozen flight tests before the 2004 deployment
date. Are you at all concerned that this schedule is so
condensed that you may not have sufficient time between each of
the tests to evaluate the performance of the system's
components, and what primary factors will you be reviewing to
measure the success of this program?
General Kadish. Well, Senator, that is a good question.
Whenever we accelerate tests of this magnitude, the
intercontinental ranges--I think you saw how complex it was on
Saturday. When we decide to increase the number of tests, we
will also at the same time put in the management practices to
deal with that acceleration, and so to some degree having a lot
of time between tests gives us the luxury of having a lot of
time to do data reduction and data analysis. As we squeeze that
time between tests, we have to make the management changes as
well as invest in some equipment to do the data analysis
quicker.
In addition to that, as we have more experience with our
tests, doing high ops tempo testing, we will be looking at
finer grain type elements of the system, and we should be able
to reduce that data quicker. So I am confident that, as we
increase the number, we will not lose any of our fidelity of
analysis, but we will be able to accelerate that as well, and
if we cannot, we are going to look very carefully at slowing
the test program down, but I do not think we should slow down
the test program based on our ability to analyze data.
Senator Carnahan. Secretary Wolfowitz, legal discussions on
missile defense have recently focused on two important
documents, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the 1999
Cochran-Inouye National Missile Defense Act. At the last
hearing, we learned that the President has requested funds for
missile defense programs that may violate the ABM Treaty. Would
you once again explain how missile defense development proposed
in the President's defense budget might bump up against our
commitment to the ABM Treaty?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would point out that this is not the
first budget that has done that. One budget actually includes
money that the Clinton administration asked for to begin the
construction of a radar in Shemya, Alaska which is, I think,
the consensus of virtually all lawyers, and that is a hard
consensus to find, that would have been, or would be a
violation of the ABM Treaty.
In the 2002 budget, as best we can determine, there are
three events that raise questions about the treaty. I discussed
them in some detail in my last testimony, and they are
addressed in the attachments to this testimony.
Each of the three, the test bed at Fort Greely, Alaska and
the two test events of non-ABM radars, and some of our missile
shots, raise issues under the treaty that we still do not have
full review by the lawyers as to whether they are compliant or
not compliant. They are in the gray zone on the boundaries of
the treaty, and therefore one cannot say with clarity whether
they violate the treaty or not.
Senator Carnahan. Before leaving the treaty, the United
States would have to announce its intention to do so at least 6
months in advance. Is the administration prepared to make this
announcement if it is determined that the U.S. missile defense
policies compete with the treaty's provisions?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think the President has made
that decision. It is certain we will comply with the treaty,
and that if we were to do something in violation of the treaty,
we would only do it after withdrawing, and withdrawal, as you
correctly point out, requires 6 months notification.
But as I have said, and I have said it repeatedly, our goal
is to get to a situation where we can move forward
cooperatively with the Russians beyond the constraints of the
treaty, and not to find ourselves in a situation where we are
forced either to constrain our program and limit our ability to
protect the American people or, alternatively, to withdraw from
the treaty unilaterally.
We would like to find a cooperative approach with the
Russians, and Senator, I am optimistic we can do so.
Senator Carnahan. One final question. The 1999 Cochran-
Inouye National Missile Defense Act mandated a dual-track
approach toward national missile defense. First, it authorizes
as soon as technologically possible deployment of a national
missile defense system capable of defending the territory of
the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks
with funding subject to the annual authorization, and
appropriations, and the annual appropriation of funds for
national missile defense, and second, the law authorizes that
the United States continue negotiating reductions in Russian
nuclear forces.
Does your budget request seek funds for programs designed
to address more than a limited ballistic missile attack? In
other words, do you feel that you need additional statutory
authority to plan and design and build the layered missile
defense that you have proposed?
Secretary Wolfowitz. All we are seeking in the missile
defense area this year is the money we are requesting under the
authorization, but on the other side of that act, the Cochran-
Inouye Act, the part you referred to about negotiated
reductions, that is part of the framework of issues we are
discussing with the Russians. We are pursuing further
reductions in nuclear forces, but we are also, in fact,
reducing our nuclear forces in areas where we think we have
systems that we do not need in this year's budget.
We are proposing to remove four Tridents, some 30 B-1s, and
some 50 Peacekeeper missiles, and I believe at least for the
Peacekeeper missile reduction we would require congressional
authorization.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan. We will now
begin our next round.
Secretary Wolfowitz, the administration has expressed an
interest in the option of having an early emergency deployment
capability focused on having a small number of test
interceptors and linking them to an upgraded radar that already
exists at Shemya called Cobra Dane, and this is something
General Kadish mentioned in his briefing to the committee on
June 13.
My questions are relative to Fort Greely. As well as being
part of a test bed, do you intend that Fort Greely have
operational capability, even if primitive, or rudimentary?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is too early to make that
determination, Senator. It would depend, I think really and
principally on two things: first, how the tests proceed, what
operational capability we think we could acquire, and we will
not know that until we have done further testing, and then
second, the question of where we are with respect to potential
threats.
It is envisioned much more as a kind of rudimentary
emergency capability that one would have available if two
conditions are met, if the testing and development goes well,
and if the threat proceeds rapidly. If the threat does not
proceed rapidly, or if the testing does not go well, then we
could not turn into an operational capability, but the
philosophy is here, since we need a much more operationally
realistic test bed, let us do it in a way that makes that
investment convertible to operational capability if and when we
decide to go forward.
Chairman Levin. When would you expect the earliest date for
that convertibility to an operational capability?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I had better let General Kadish make
the prediction about dates.
Chairman Levin. Well, if all the tests go well, it would
have that capability, and I want to know at what point would it
have that capability?
General Kadish. Well, I think the clearest declaration of a
capability, if it was directed, would be when we actually had
that physical assets on site.
Chairman Levin. When would that be?
General Kadish. At this point, the planning is ongoing, but
sometime in the calendar year 2004 to 2006, and I put a 2-year
window in there because of the nature of the uncertainty that
we have.
Chairman Levin. You want this test bed at Fort Greely to
have an operational capability, is that correct? You want that
option?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, and a very rudimentary one, and I
think it is worth emphasizing, Senator, if we did not have a
treaty issue, the Russians would look at that and they would
laugh. This is not something that should make any Russian
planner stay awake at night for even a single minute.
Chairman Levin. I do not think they are laughing about what
you are proposing. From what I gather, they are not laughing at
all, unless you think that is just----
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is because of the larger treaty
issues, but what I am trying to emphasize is, this capability
we are talking about at Fort Greely may disturb a North Korean
planner, but it is not in any way a capability that threatens
Russian missiles at all.
Chairman Levin. But they do view it as a serious possible
violation of a treaty, is that correct, with broader
implications? Is that a fair statement, that they view it that
way?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is a fair statement, and I am
trying to make a distinction which I think is a relevant one
between the broader implications of the treaty, which we take
very seriously, and the actual military implications of this
deployment, which are quite modest.
Chairman Levin. I want to be really clear, though, on one
point. You do intend now that the Fort Greely activity have as
soon as possible an operational capability, albeit rudimentary.
That is your current intent, is that correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Not necessarily.
Chairman Levin. Well, you do intend that the tests work
well, and the threat from North Korea is here and now.
Secretary Wolfowitz. The General said 4 to 6 years. There
are some people--and I cannot say I am quite this optimistic.
There are people who think the North Korean regime might
collapse within that time frame.
Chairman Levin. But that is not where you are coming from.
You believe the North Korean threat is basically here and now,
is that not correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think it is moving along rapidly,
yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. You do want the tests to succeed, is that
not correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. Given those two facts, what you believe and
what you hope, is it not a fair statement to say that you want
the Fort Greely activity to have the operational capability,
albeit rudimentary, as soon as possible? Is that not a fair
statement?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is a fair statement. I am
not a lawyer. I do not know what intent means.
Chairman Levin. Your intent.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would like that development to give
us an option for a rudimentary operational capability.
Chairman Levin. To give it to us as quickly as possible.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Levin. So then you are going to have your review
group tell us whether or not, since that is your intent for
that activity, that activity then would violate--yes or no, we
do not know yet--the ABM Treaty, and we are going to have a
compliance review group decision on that issue, I assume, when?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Soon.
Chairman Levin. Within weeks?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I hope within weeks, yes.
Chairman Levin. Now, is it correct that no test
interceptors would be launched from Fort Greely?
General Kadish. That is our current state of planning right
now because of safety considerations. However, I am going to
ask our people to look hard at that particular issue over time.
Chairman Levin. My time is up.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General, again, I think the opening
statements by both clearly are a step forward in this debate,
and a constructive and positive step forward, and I
congratulate you.
I have gone back and listened to you carefully, then reread
your testimony with regard to the caption, ``we need Congress'
support for President Bush's effort to achieve an understanding
with Russia on ballistic missile defense.'' To me, that clearly
indicates the course which the President is pursuing, namely,
consultation, negotiations, and working toward an
understanding.
We have also used a term, a new strategic framework.
Now, let us go back to the treaty itself. Those two generic
terms that you use, understanding, and new strategic framework,
they do not preclude, I presume, the option of a series of
amendments to the treaty, is that correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think we preclude anything at
this point, Senator.
Senator Warner. So that is still an open option, and I
refer to the President's statement, to offer Russia amendments.
I am reading from the speech he gave down at the University of
South Carolina. To make this possible, we will offer Russia the
necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty. You have not at this
time ruled out as a possibility for either the understanding or
the new strategic framework an amended treaty.
Secretary Wolfowitz. As I said, Senator, I do not think we
have ruled out anything.
Senator Warner. But we are coming to this question of
ripping up the treaty. It seems to me the option of amending it
is on the table.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is, Senator.
Senator Warner. It is?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
Senator Warner. I just wanted to spell that out, because we
are moving, as the Senator said, on two tracks, the track the
President is doing, consultation and negotiation with Russia,
and at the same time the track under the 2002 budget of testing
and the like. This committee in its authorization bill will be
the first station at which this issue stops, as to whether or
not we can obtain from Congress the support that you expressed
a request for on behalf of the President to work as a partner.
I am hopeful we can clarify these things, and I think you have
moved forward today in that clarification.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I would hope that whatever
understanding we reach with the Russians goes beyond the old
notion that we have to stay awake at night worrying about small
changes in the nuclear posture of either side. We do not do it
with the countries with whom we are clearly and openly friends,
and that is the relationship we would like to get into with
Russia.
Senator Warner. I know there are some who desire, and I
fully appreciate that, completely taking the treaty and
agreement with Russia, to drop it and start over with an
entirely new framework. But at this point in time, to allay
fears that we are trying to rip it up, you say the amending
process--which could achieve that and go beyond it--amendments
could clearly take us beyond the ABM Treaty. Amendments can be
very broad in their scope--but that option is on the table.
Secretary Wolfowitz. As I said, I do not think the
President has ruled out anything.
Senator Warner. If for some reason these negotiations with
Russia do not meet the goals that the President has laid down,
he would come back to Congress, would he not, in the
consultative process?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I am certain we will be consulting
closely with Congress throughout the coming months.
Senator Warner. So that would be, again, a partnership with
Congress.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe it must be, Senator.
Senator Warner. That is very reassuring.
Now, I raise this question of the amendments because it is
my understanding that President Putin has indicated Russia is
now open to revising though not abandoning the ABM Treaty. Is
that a correct statement?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I have heard different statements. I
think that is correct, Senator, yes.
Senator Warner. I think that lends great hope to the
negotiations thus far, preliminary though they may be, with
Russia producing fruitful comments.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is the indication we have
gotten from comments we have heard directly from him, and
comments he has made to other people, and even some comments he
has made in public.
Senator Warner. Can you also address the issue of the
process we are undertaking with Russia? The process does not
provide a basis for other nations in the world to say that they
should begin to suddenly augment, precipitously, their
strategic systems and build more, because these other notions
perceive we are going through a process that makes the world
more unstable than stable.
Clearly, if we reach a new framework agreement with Russia,
that should send a message to the world that it would be a more
stable situation, and would not provide a basis for them moving
out unilaterally in their own security interests and
substantially augmenting their missile capability. Was that a
correct assumption?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is correct, Senator, and
as far as those countries, the small number of what some have
referred to as the walking wounded that pursue these ballistic
missile offensive capabilities because they think it will
secure advantage, I would think this demonstration of our
ability to move forward on missile defense and to move forward
cooperatively with the Russians might help to begin to
discourage them from those investments, and that would also
make the world a more stable place.
Senator Warner. So clearly, a part of the case that the
President is making in his consultations and negotiations is to
ensure that the defenses will increase rather than detract from
global security.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Warner. General Kadish, the proposed budget request
includes a greatly expanded test bed that will enhance test
realism and allow for a larger number of tests. The expanded
test bed will allow the BMDO office to implement many of the
recommendations made by former Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, Philip Coyle. He is due to appear before this
committee shortly. Those tests will help meet the demands of
some BMD critics that BMD programs be thoroughly tested prior
to deployment to assure operational effectiveness. Do you
generally agree with my opening statement on this question?
General Kadish. Yes, Senator.
Senator Warner. What would be the impact on the test
program should Congress elect to cut the BMD budget by, say, a
billion, or $2 billion?
General Kadish. Well, we would have to reevaluate what type
of testing we would be able to accomplish, and obviously, it
would be less. The ability to prove our systems, our models and
simulations, hinges on a robust testing program in addition to
making it more operationally representative.
Senator Warner. Such failure to authorize the President's
request would go contrary to what Philip Coyle projected, would
it not?
General Kadish. In my view, yes.
Senator Warner. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary and General, welcome back. I wanted to come back
to some of the items we discussed last week. Last week, I said
that I thought the program you laid before us for missile
defense was generally consistent with the National Missile
Defense Act of 1999, which was adopted with support, I believe,
of 97 Members of the Senate, but I expressed my concern about
the availability of resources generally to the Pentagon. I am
worried about your capacity to carry out this program in a way
that does not affect other priority items in the Department.
I did note, Secretary Wolfowitz, and perhaps you did, too,
that Bill Kristol and Bob Kagan have an article in this week's
Weekly Standard in which they call upon you and Secretary
Rumsfeld to resign in protest over the failure of the
administration, and particularly the folks at OMB, to
adequately fund defense priorities. It is an editorial worth
reading for the details, if not the ultimate recommendation.
[Laughter.]
I presume you have no intention to resign.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not want to get into a discussion
of that, but no, I have no plans to resign.
Senator Lieberman. You have been very consistent about
that. Thank you.
I do think, in seriousness, we have to keep coming back to
this, and again I express the hope that I have expressed
earlier that this committee on a bipartisan basis will provide
adequate levels of funding for the Pentagon generally.
I want to come to a direct question about Russia and ask
you to speak a little bit more on it. Last week when you were
here, you expressed not only a commitment to attempt to
negotiate modifications in the ABM Treaty consistent with the
Ballistic Missile Defense program you and General Kadish
outlined, but I thought you expressed a certain degree of
optimism about the ability to reach those modifications with
the Russians. To some extent, you have done that this morning.
After the hearing last week, in response to your testimony,
there was an interview with the minister of defense in Russia,
Ivanov, and I guess at best, as I read the interview, I would
describe his frame of mind as puzzled by the optimism expressed
here, and at worst, I would say he disagreed with it.
Of course today we see on the front page of the papers Mr.
Putin and Mr. Jiang embracing in friendship, and one of the
items that draws them together is their opposition to our
missile defense initiative, and even agitated by what has
pleased and delighted us here, which is the successful test on
Saturday.
So why are you optimistic about our ability to negotiate
the necessary modifications with the Russians on the ABM Treaty
to allow this program to go forward?
Secretary Wolfowitz. If I might very briefly, before I
answer that, in opening you talked about the balance among
different things, and I would just like to point out that our
adversaries, the countries we worry most about, are investing
heavily in the offensive capability. It is the one Iraqi
capability we underestimated during the gulf war. It is in many
ways one of the biggest weaknesses in our overall defense
posture, and I think our adversaries have discovered it.
I think we have done a careful job of balancing, but it is
a very big increase. It may not be as big as Bill Kristol or
Bob Kagan would like it. Frankly, it is not as big as I would
like, but it is the largest in 15 years, and it is a 7-percent
real increase. It is substantial.
To come now to your main question, my reasons for optimism
rest most fundamentally on the fact that I think we have a
fundamentally different relationship with Russia, but we have
not yet gotten to the point of really developing that or
elaborating it in ways that I think are important.
I think their concerns about the ABM Treaty rest very
heavily on broader political significance of the treaty, as I
think--and I do not want to put words in the chairman's mouth,
but it seems to me that was one of the points he was making
when I said that from a military point of view, from a Russian
military planner's point of view what we are doing is
insignificant.
I think what they are looking for is a framework of
relations with the United States, and I hope it is one that
addresses the real security needs of this era. I do not think
the Russians have to lay awake at night worrying about our
attacking them with nuclear missiles, and I do not think we
need to waste a lot of time worrying about them attacking us. I
think what we have is very substantial common interests in
mutual stability in Europe, and mutual stability in Asia, and I
must say, I take with a certain amount of salt the agreement
with the Chinese.
I do not object to it. I think good relations between
Russia and China contribute to stability in Asia, but I do not
think the Russians have discounted the possibility that China
could be a problem for them. I think working together on
stabilizing those critical areas of the world is where the
cornerstone of strategic stability is today, if I might use
that phrase. It is not in the old pattern of mutual
annihilation, and I think when they see that we are not only
saying things, we are doing them, we are bringing down our
offensive nuclear forces, we are not waiting for protracted
years and years of negotiations in Geneva before we remove a
single warhead, that our whole posture is one that they should
be comfortable with, and I think as we deepen those discussions
we will begin to make some progress.
I think the fact that they have shown great interest not
just in traditional arms control negotiations between the
foreign ministry and the State Department, but very serious
interest in discussions between Defense Minister Ivanov and
Secretary Rumsfeld suggests to me that they are viewing this in
a broad context of security.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The opening
sentence of our chairman has, I think, kind of set the tone for
one thing we all agree with, and that is, if I recall him
right, he said protecting and defending the American people is
our number 1 objective. Do you consider that to be our number 1
objective?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is why we are all serving in the
Defense Department, and I think it is what everyone on this
committee agrees with.
Senator Inhofe. I think we all do, and it is significant.
When you look at the threats that are out there--I notice that
Senator Roberts is not here, but there is a new subcommittee
that he chaired on the new types of threats, emerging threats,
and yet the one that we are facing right now is one that is
really not emerging, it is here. It is one that we have been
dealing with for a long time.
I would like to just briefly respond to a couple of the
arguments you keep hearing against moving forward with our
missile defense system, one being that we might precipitate an
arms race. I would suggest, and I want to say this for the
record, I think there is already an arms race as far as China
is concerned. We do not know the exact number, but China has
made a very large purchase of approximately 240 SU-27s and SU-
30 vehicles that are air-to-air and air-to-ground superior to
anything that we have.
They currently, it is my understanding, have purchased some
of the rapid-fire artillery systems and platforms that are
better than our Paladin is, and they are spending a very large
percentage of their money on this arms race.
But there is something else that I think is significant to
bring out, and that is, could it not be argued that by having a
missile defense system not only are you defending yourself, but
you are also allowing us to reduce our nuclear weapons.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is certainly true we can do both at
the same time, Senator. That is fundamental, and I do think to
some degree if we were to think about very low levels of
offensive forces it would be, frankly, impossible to
contemplate, if we did not have a security that we have some
ability to defend against limited missile attacks.
But I think the main point is, there is plenty of room to
bring down our offensive forces. We are doing so. That ought to
be a strong signal, particularly to Russia and to anyone else
who thinks about it, that there is absolutely no reason to
respond to a limited American missile defense capability by
building up their offensive nuclear forces.
Senator Inhofe. I guess what I am saying, and let me make
sure it is clear, is that if we had a system in place to defend
ourselves against an incoming missile, would that not allow us
to reduce our nuclear capability in terms of offensive weapons?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In some circumstances it might. The
reason I am hesitating, Senator, is I do not think in any case
we would want to do that in the foreseeable future. I mean, one
could imagine a world of complete disarmament, and that might
be a wonderful world, but in the foreseeable future, I do not
think we would----
Senator Inhofe. I am not suggesting that.
Secretary Wolfowitz. We would not want to give up our
deterrent capability, and these calculations of how one
substitutes for another are complicated.
Senator Inhofe. As far as one substituting for another, the
argument we always hear is the suitcase threat, the terrorist
threat. We know that is a very real threat, but I think it is
important for the record to reflect that we are currently--
maybe not through the Department of Defense--we are currently
addressing this threat, the suitcase threat, and in the case of
the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal Office
Building, that was a pickup truck.
We have gone back, and we have been doing it right here in
Washington to see what could be done, what could be placed to
keep something like this from happening again, so we are doing
that very actively, and I think it is important to talk about
that. I was likening it to an insurance policy. There is a risk
out there, so you insure your house. That does not mean you do
not insure your car, and so we need to do both, and I think it
is very significant that we talk in those terms.
Secretary Wolfowitz. If I might, Senator, on that point, I
think they are both serious threats, and we need to work on
protecting ourselves from both.
What is different about the two as far as I can see is that
number one, we have some capability to defend against that
terrorist threat. We have intercepted people at the border. We
have counterintelligence means to disrupt terrorist cells. We
work on it constantly.
We do not have any means of protecting this country from a
ballistic missile attack, not a single one, and second we have
no treaty that prohibits us from protecting ourselves against
terrorist attack. I cannot imagine signing one, and I think we
need to think about that in thinking about the anachronism of
this treaty that had a purpose during the Cold War, but I think
has long since outlived that military purpose.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. That is a very good
answer.
Just for a minute, could you describe some of the
advantages of a sea-based system, and then we can kind of go
into how we might be able to move toward that.
Secretary Wolfowitz. You always have to qualify these
things by if it works, but if it worked, if we could develop
the capability to intercept from the sea, I think there are at
least three benefits that you get from it. I am sorry, I
started to say advantages, but I think one needs to get away
from the mind set that one system is better than another
system.
In fact, one of the advantages of developing sea-based
capability allows you to introduce another method of
interception, another point at which you can intercept, another
complication for any attacker, and so the more different things
that work, the better off you are.
Number two, by being mobile and deployable you could locate
it in a crisis situation closer to wherever the relevant threat
is, and that, one could imagine, could be useful.
Finally, because it is mobile and could be located in a
crisis situation, depending on where the crisis is, it might
provide you with boost intercept capability, and I think of all
the phases at which you would like to be able to intercept for
reasons I said to Senator Akaka, boost phase is the place I
would most like to be able to get things.
Senator Inhofe. I think you made that very clear. My time
has expired. I did want to ask, if there is anything you would
like to suggest to us? This is our fourth test. I believe the
first one was successful. We had a couple that were not, and
you have not really talked too much about what we are going to
do next time, where do we go from here. Is there anything you
want to share with us that you have not already?
General Kadish. Well, Senator, I think we are going to go--
--
Senator Inhofe. Maybe more sophisticated decoys?
General Kadish. A lot will depend on the internal data
analyses to see if we want to proceed and replicate the same
tests, and then we will be looking at complicating it, but
those decisions will be taken over the next month and a half.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in a recent commentary in the Washington
Post, you stated two of the most important conditions for
success in building and deploying a missile defense system. I
guess I would like to ask if you would agree that these would
represent two of those important conditions for success. One,
prove the technology before deployment, and second, that we
reach agreements with Russia and other nations that ensure the
defenses will increase rather than detract from global
stability.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, certainly I agree with the
general proposition that you want to prove technology before
you deploy. As General Kadish has said, there is always the
judgment to be applied as to what level of demonstration you
require to achieve a certain level of capability, but clearly
there is no point in deploying things that do not work.
Second, I think the way you said it was reaching agreements
with other nations to ensure that missile defense increases
stability rather than decreases it. In that general way, I
think I would agree, but I would certainly point out I do not
expect to get Iraq or Iran or North Korea to agree to our
deployment of ballistic missile defense.
I think some of the stability we would hope to achieve in
the world is precisely from demonstrating to them that their
large investments in their offensive missile capabilities will
come to naught.
Senator Dayton. Regarding Russia, and the pact we have with
them, in your testimony today you indicate one of the possible
violators of the ABM Treaty would be the systems integration
test, which is scheduled for next February, and the treaty
requires the 6-month notification if we are going to
unilaterally withdraw from it.
So if I do the arithmetic, that says to me that if you
determine through what your outlined procedure is today that
this test will violate the ABM next February, by next month,
August, the administration will have to notify Russia and the
world of its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Is that
the kind of timetable we are looking at here, respectively?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe these are a series of tests
that we will be conducting. I do not believe we are going to
have--if there were a determination that this is a treaty
problem, I imagine we would just wait a little while. Is that
the plan, General?
General Kadish. Yes, sir.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is a series that begins next
February. It is a series that raises issues. I do not think we
consider that if it is a treaty issue, that we would proceed
with that particular test, and force the issue by next
February.
Senator Dayton. There is another reference to the missile
defense test bed, the construction beginning next spring, as
another possible violation of the treaty, which again is going
to require a 6-month notification, that would require that
notification occur sometime in the fall. I guess without
quibbling over a particular month or another, it seems that
this reflects the kind of very accelerated timetable that this
testing is proceeding under as it relates to the ABM Treaty,
and I guess that leads into my question.
You reference the President's intention to meet with
President Putin this week and have reciprocating visits, which
I think is commendable. You also talked in your testimony last
week about moving beyond the ABM Treaty and setting up this new
agreement that reflects the new strategic framework.
In the history of arms control negotiations and agreements,
I am not aware of any major agreement that has proceeded on the
kind of accelerated timetable that this would require. I guess
I am wondering, are you aware of such a timetable such as this
having been met in the past, and if not, what makes you think
it can be achieved this time?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, the history of arms control
agreements are mostly these protracted negotiations between two
heavily armed, essentially hostile adversaries, the United
States and the Soviet Union, and you are right, those
negotiations took forever. I participated in a lot of them, and
it was reminiscent of root canal work, and we are certainly not
going to reach an agreement early if we approach it in that
way. But the premise on which we are proceeding is that Russia
is not the Soviet Union.
This is not a potential adversary. It is, in fact, a
country that we would like to bring into closer partnership
with us. It is a potential friend, maybe even a potential ally,
and I think that is the way we want to move forward.
I must say that if someone envisions a negotiation like the
old ones with the Soviet Union, and that we will not in any way
encounter constraints to the ABM Treaty during the time of a
protracted negotiation like that, I think, Senator, that really
is giving the Russians a veto over our program, and that is the
dilemma we are caught in here.
I think everyone agrees we need to move forward in missile
defense. We do not want to give the Russians a veto. I think
everyone agrees also we would like to achieve a cooperative
outcome, and I think that forces a fairly rapid schedule.
I would emphasize, too, though I hope this is not where we
end up, that even in the worst case if we say these are
important things we have to proceed with them. If we do not yet
have an agreement but we need to withdraw, that certainly
should not be the end of negotiations. In fact, most of the
negotiations that you refer to did not begin from a treaty.
They began from an American program. In fact, the ABM Treaty
itself grew out of a vote in this body to move forward with a
Safeguard ABM system.
Senator Dayton. I would agree with you, Mr. Secretary, that
we certainly do not want to give Russia a veto. On the other
hand, what seemed to be an agreement that the improvement, or
at least the retention of global stability is the sine qua non
in this arrangement, so as you say, you are in a delicate
situation. It would seem that if the actions diplomatically of
this administration are such that they cause Russia to respond
adversarially, rather than cooperatively, that would seriously
undermine even the military's intent of this undertaking.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is a fair point, Senator, but we
are doing more than trying to achieve an agreement with the
Russians. We are doing a lot of things that they can observe,
and I think ought to discourage them from any kind of
precipitous or dangerous reaction. I come back to what I think
is really very fundamental, and that is the reductions in our
own offensive nuclear forces.
We are already taking some without any protracted
negotiations. We did not even negotiate a week to remove 50
MIRV'd MX missiles from our force, nor to remove four Trident
submarines, with nearly 800 nuclear warheads. We are taking
more than 1,000 nuclear warheads out of our force with this
budget alone, and it did not take a week of negotiations with
the Russians.
I mean, you go back 10 years, when the previous President
Bush, and I believe it was September--I think it was even
September 27 of 1991--announced that we were going to make
major reductions in both our tactical nuclear forces and our
strategic nuclear forces, and that we hoped the Russians would
reciprocate, within 10 days and no negotiations. No first-class
tickets to Geneva, not even any coach tickets to Geneva, yet
within 10 days President Yeltsin and President Gorbachev, who
was still the president at the time, responded positively.
We did more arms control in those 10 days than in 20 years
of negotiating with the old Soviet Union, so I think it really
is a different era, and we have a different view of Russia. I
hope they realize that we have a different view of them, and I
hope they have a different view of the United States.
Senator Dayton. That is a very good point, sir, and I wish
you success with that undertaking.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With regard to
the treaty, I do salute you and the President and others for
the consistent message you have sent to the world that we want
to work and be responsive and listen and cooperate, but we do
have a primary responsibility, which is to defend the United
States from missile attack, which you just noted we have no
defense for whatsoever.
We also know that more and more nations are developing a
missile attack system with the capability of reaching the
United States, and I am glad, Secretary Wolfowitz, that you are
there, having served on the bipartisan commission that
evaluated this problem and reached the conclusion that we did
need to deploy a national missile defense system, before you
became Assistant Secretary of Defense.
One of the objections that has been raised is that there
has been this huge increase in spending on national missile
defense. There has been a 56-percent increase in spending for
ballistic missile defense. I believe that refers primarily to
going from President Clinton's $5 billion that he planned to
spend on ballistic missile defense to $8 billion that this
administration proposes in its new budget.
I would like to talk about those numbers a little bit.
Under the numbers as I calculate them, President Bush in his
defense budget, including the supplemental this year, has
proposed a $38 billion increase in defense over the last year's
budget, and that is a significant increase for sure, but it
does show that the $3 billion increase that is alleged here is
not as big as some would say.
I would like to ask a little further, General Kadish, of
the $3-billion increase from $5 billion to $8 billion that is
being proposed here. A lot of that is involved with other
missile systems that many on this committee strongly support,
like the Patriot and the THAAD, the theater missile defense
that has been going on for years.
Can you tell us pretty much where the numbers come out
there, how much of that $3 billion is not in ballistic missile
defense, but in the theater and the Patriot-type missiles that
all of us agree need to be built?
General Kadish. Senator, I would like to get you the exact
figures for the record, but as I recall, all but about $800
million to $1 billion of it is in the theater, or dual-use type
of systems, but I would like to be precise and answer the
question for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

In the previous construct of shorter-range theater missile defense
and longer-range missile defense, the following budgets are requested.
All funds are requested in BMDO's budget except where noted. Programs
marked with an asterisk are split evenly between the two categories as
their efforts apply to both.

FISCAL YEAR 2002 AMENDED BUDGET REQUEST
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short and Medium
Range Long Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patriot Advanced Capability -3.... \1\ 784 .................
Medium Extended Air Defense System \1\ 74 .................
Navy Area......................... \2\ 395 .................
Ground Based Terminal (THAAD)..... 923 .................
Arrow............................. 66 .................
Ground Based Midcourse............ 3,285 .................
Sea-Based Midcourse (NTW)......... 596 60
Space-Based Kinetic Boost......... 105 .................
Airborne Laser *.................. 205 205
Space-Based Laser project *....... 85 85
SBIRS-L *......................... 210 210
Advanced Technology *............. 56 57
International programs *.......... 38 37
Systems Engineering *............. 410 411
-------------------------------------
Total........................... 3,842 4,455
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In Army budget.
\2\ In Navy budget.

Senator Sessions. So we are really talking about, in terms
of ballistic missile defense, no more than half of the $3
billion, maybe less, actually going into the development of a
Ballistic Missile Defense program.
General Kadish. Under the old definitions, that is heading
in the right direction. We are trying to define this as a
system now, a layered system.
Senator Sessions. I know you see it correctly as one system
and not a series of systems, but many here say, well, we
approved theater, we approved Patriot, but we do not approve
ballistic. When you look at those numbers, that is not much,
when you take $1.5 billion out of the $30 billion increase
President Bush has proposed, we are talking about 5 percent or
less of his increase going to missile defense, and that is not
reckless spending, in my view. Am I far wrong from that,
Secretary Wolfowitz? Do you see it that way?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I see it that way, and we can try to
get you precise numbers.
I do know that just the PAC-3 increase alone is $750
million, the Navy area-wide is $396 million, so that is $1.3
billion that is exclusively for shorter-range systems. We are
trying to get away from this national and theater, but there is
shorter-range and longer-range.
I think to understand precisely what General Kadish said a
few minutes ago, there is a large chunk of it that is
applicable to short, intermediate, and long-range. You can
improve better radars, you have Airborne Lasers, there are a
whole variety of things that will intercept missiles of a
variety of ranges, so I think it is probably roughly correct
that there is between $1 and $2 billion that is exclusively for
shorter-range, including two programs I mentioned, and between
$1 and $2 billion that is exclusively for longer range, and the
rest is dual applicable. I can get you the exact numbers.
Senator Sessions. That would represent less than 1 percent
of the total defense budget of $300-plus billion.
Secretary Wolfowitz. $1 billion would be one-third of 1
percent.
Senator Sessions. As you had concluded, the President and
Secretary of Defense, and really the President announced it
during the campaign, that he considered having a national
defense system to be a national priority.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is, Senator, and it is a defense
priority. The threats that we are talking about, if they were
effective and we had no ability to cope with them, could render
all of the rest of our investment in defense capabilities
useless, and that is why hostile countries, I think, are
investing so much money in their own offensive capabilities.
Senator Sessions. So hostile countries are investing in
attack missiles, missiles that eventually, as they improve
them, can reach the United States, and oddly, they are the ones
that are opposed to us building a national missile defense, and
our allies, Israel and Taiwan and Japan and other countries,
are very interested and supportive, or at least are interested
and generally supportive of what we are doing, is that not
correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think you find, Senator, the closer
they are to the threat, the more supportive they are.
Senator Sessions. Well, I am not surprised that nations
like some of our adversaries would be opposed to this, because
we would be denying them a capability of intimidation and even
attack that they presently think they can have in the years to
come.
My time is up. I just would like to say that I thank you
for the courage to confront this issue openly and talk about it
plainly, and to recognize that the treaty does contemplate
completely that we would not have a national missile defense
system. There is no need to try gimmicks to get around it. Let
us confront it. Let us work with the Russians and our European
allies and others, and see if we cannot improve, and establish
a way to get around that, and build what we need to build for
America.
Thank you for your work.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want
to thank the Secretary and the General for being here today and
to extend my congratulations on a successful test.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your take on the Russia-
China agreement that was just announced during the last day or
so regarding either the ABM Treaty or an ABM Treaty. Is there
any authority for them to do that, for Russia to do this under
the existing treaty, to add unilaterally, or is this a separate
treaty arrangement without regard to our treaty with the former
Soviet Union and others?
I guess the question really is, is this sort of a tacit or
de facto veto of what we are attempting to do with the missile
defense system as it relates to our treaty with the former
Soviet Union, which is in question, and finally, were we aware
that this was going to this treaty, or that this agreement, if
not a treaty, between Russia and China was imminent?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, we were definitely aware they
were likely to sign a treaty of friendship during this meeting.
I have to confess I have not yet seen it, and I do not know
that we have the exact text of what they have signed.
Senator Ben Nelson. But it is outside of the agreement that
we have with the former Soviet Union which is in question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, I think it has no direct bearing
on the ABM Treaty. I think what it does indicate is, at least
if one thinks about what the Russians are doing here, first of
all, they have a 12,000 mile border with China, and they have
good reason to try to have good relations with that country.
Second, we know that in relationships like this, countries
try to use their relationship with another country to try to
get some leverage in another negotiation, and this clearly is
intended to get some leverage with us, and we know outside of
that arrangement, and frankly much more disturbing, that the
Russians are selling a number of military systems to China that
some day I think they may come to regret.
There is no direct connection to the ABM Treaty, and I
think we can reach the kind of understanding we are hoping to
reach with the Russians consistent with their having a treaty
of friendship with China.
Senator Ben Nelson. So you do not see this as a de facto
veto of our efforts to move forward without regard to an
agreement with Russia.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think it is a veto. I think
it probably is, among other things, intended by the Russians to
give them more negotiating leverage, but it certainly does not
give them a veto.
Senator Ben Nelson. At least it may be in part sending a
message.
Secretary Wolfowitz. It may be, yes.
Senator Ben Nelson. I want to thank you for your patience,
or at least your appearance of patience. When I keep trying to
bore in on some definitional things so I know whether we are
moving from development to deployment, I am really trying to
figure out whether there is a difference, or if it is a matter
of shades of gray.
I get a little concerned when we begin to lump all defense
systems together--theater as well as intercontinental--as
layered, because I am not sure where one shade of gray begins
and the other ends. Maybe that is the fair way to do it, but it
is a harder way for a person such as myself to analyze where we
are, and I was taken by General Kadish's comment that there is
a long road ahead.
At least on a road, if I am looking at a map, I know from
point A to point B the points in between. I cannot determine
for myself right now the points in between from development to
deployment. Sometimes I think we are definitionally encumbered
here, and it makes it more difficult for somebody such as
myself. Is it a definitional difference, or is there a real
difference?
I need to know whether Fort Greely is a test bed becoming
an operational facility, not whether the decision has been made
to do that, but is it a very short step? Is it a very short
shade of gray difference from being a test bed to an
operational entity? That is what I am really trying to get my
arms around as we go through this.
I applaud the test. I think it was exceptional that it was
successful, but I am still concerned about not knowing the
difference between development and deployment.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, we can come to the treaty part
of it, or try to, if you like, in a minute, but I think the
important thing, when we are engaged in a weapons system
development for us, and the General can elaborate on this,
there is a very important difference between the development
stage and the deployment stage, and there are very important
hurdles you have to cross to get to the point of a deployment.
When you do a deployment you have multiyear plans for how
you are going to spend the money and what the total system is
going to look like at the end, whereas when you are doing
development, by definition, you are feeling your way. You do
one test to see where you go with the next test.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is that correct? Excuse me. Is that
pretty much where we are right now with this missile defense
system?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It is, but I think if I take an
example from a different arena, maybe you will realize that it
is not an effort to be obscure that is causing the obscurity
here.
We had a system in development called Joint Surveillance
and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which gave us this
remarkable ability to track moving vehicles on the ground, and
we had no deployment plans for it. It was not far enough along.
It had not been proven out.
Then suddenly, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and we needed
emergency capability to track vehicles on the ground, and the
decision was made that even though JSTARS had not met the
requirements that we would normally impose to do a multiyear
procurement to send it to a war, we sent it to a war, and it
had a great deal of operational capability.
Senator Ben Nelson. In a theater layer.
Secretary Wolfowitz. What we are talking about in Alaska is
something like that. It is a test bed. It will be used to
improve our knowledge of how the system works, but it is a test
bed designed with the thought in mind that if it works as well
as we hope it will work, it could have a rudimentary
operational capability.
Senator Ben Nelson. So the theater capability we are
looking at right now from this test bed could develop into
intercontinental capacity, is that fair to say?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would put it just slightly
differently, but I think the idea is the same, that this
developmental capability could become, with very little
modification, an operational capability.
Senator Ben Nelson. My time has expired. Thank you very
much. I appreciate you both being here.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. First of all, I would like to ask that my
opening statement be put into the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bunning follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jim Bunning
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before
us again. I would like to begin by congratulating you on a successful
test this last weekend.
The defense of our Nation from all kinds of threats is the most
important responsibility of government. Ballistic missiles, and the
weapons they carry, contain a threat of destruction so terrible that
ballistic missile defense must be our first priority in protecting this
Nation.
During the 1980s when President Reagan wanted to deploy
intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe, many resisted,
believing that it would be provocative to the Soviet Union. The result,
as we all know, was that we were able to convince the Soviets to remove
all of their intermediate range missiles, in exchange for removing
ours.
The world is very different today than it was then. Russia is not
our enemy, and we are not proposing to deploy an offensive system, as
President Reagan did. We are going to deploy a defensive system, that
will protect our citizens from the threat of a rogue nation or of an
accidental launch.
Our missile defense system will not threaten the Russian's
strategic capabilities. Once they know that to be true, they will
accept our program, and perhaps wish to work with us to establish their
own. The only people who should be upset by our defensive shield, are
those who might one day wish to threaten us with their missiles.
It is important to remember that arms control treaties exist
because they improve the security of both parties to that treaty. When
the strategic situation changes, as it has since the end of the Cold
War, and those treaties hinder security rather than strengthen it, then
they serve no further purpose. This is clearly the case with the ABM
Treaty.
Gentlemen, I realize that we have a long way to go to protect our
country from this threat, but we will never get there unless we
continue to press forward.

Senator Bunning. I congratulate you, General and Mr.
Secretary, for the successful test that we had last Saturday.
It is a step in the right direction, obviously. To succeed is
better than failing, and to move one step forward in the
missile defense program is very important at this point in
time.
A question for Secretary Wolfowitz. Russia is actually
located a lot closer to a large number of countries that are
developing ballistic missile technology. They are closer than
we are. It would seem to me that the threat to their nation is
at least as great as the threat to ours. If that is the case,
then it would seem to be in their national interest to develop
national missile defense also. Do you feel that a limited
national missile defense is in Russia's national interest, as
well as ours?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do absolutely, Senator, and if you
will indulge me for a minute, we had talks with the Russians 9
years ago. In the summer of 1992 Dennis Ross led a delegation
to Moscow and met with Foreign Minister Mamyedov. One of the
things they addressed specifically was the situation of the
threat of third countries to both of us, and the impression our
people had at the time was that there was a great deal of
Russian interest in the possible danger to themselves from
these capabilities, and at one point in the discussions, the
subject came up.
The Russian side said, well, what would you Americans do if
you had a missile defense capability in space and one of these
third countries launched a missile at us, and the American side
said, well, if we could, we would shoot it down, and this was
the moment at which people were falling asleep in this hot
room, and they suddenly woke up. The Russians were, I think,
quite surprised, pleasantly surprised that in this new world we
would see a threat to them from third countries as something we
would like to help them defend against.
We talk about a new strategic framework with Russia. We do
not just mean amendments to the ABM Treaty, we mean a different
kind of approach to the whole subject. I think it would
include, Senator, along the lines of your question, every
effort to work cooperatively on improving missile defenses,
because it is not in the interest of the United States--and let
me repeat this--it is not in the interest of the United States
or Russia to be vulnerable to limited missile attack from any
direction. I do not believe it is in the interest of Russia for
the United States to be vulnerable to limited missile attack. I
believe that we have more to do working together to cooperate
in dealing with that than in trying to work around the edges of
a 1972 treaty between two hostile adversaries.
Senator Bunning. I would like to follow up. Would you
characterize the fiscal year 2002 testing program as being the
first step in developing a missile defense system that is more
concerned about being successful than being in compliance with
an outdated treaty from 1972 which does not take into account
modern threats?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think this is the first time that
the Secretary of Defense--and General Kadish I guess should be
the witness here--when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, I
want you to develop the best possible development program to
move as rapidly as we can to explore these technologies and be
in a position to deploy. Do not worry about the ABM Treaty. If
there are ABM Treaty issues, you through your compliance review
group will bring them to me, but I will resolve them. I think
that was the first time you had that guidance, is that not
correct, General?
General Kadish. Certainly during my tenure, yes.
Senator Bunning. Let me ask the General a follow-up, then.
The Clinton administration designed its ballistic missile
program around the goal of ensuring compliance with the ABM
Treaty. As a result, it only pursued technologies that would
not violate the treaty, rather than pursuing technologies that
had the best chance of working.
Unlike the previous administration, I actually want to see
a missile defense system that works. The current RDT&E program
pursues a number of different technologies that the previous
administration did not. Do you believe that the structure of
the current program provides the most likely chance of
developing a system, or a group of systems that can actually
defend the American people?
General Kadish. I do, Senator, and that is the basic thrust
of the multilayered system approach, because we have to
consider mobile systems, sea-based and others, in order to
achieve that, which do have treaty implications.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, in fairness, the last
administration did submit in its last budget a request for
money for the Shemya radar, which, as a matter of fact, would
have been a violation of the ABM Treaty. They were prepared at
least in that area to move forward, but I think constrained the
program artificially with a variety of technologies that
General Kadish is pursuing that I think were kept off of the
table because of their treaty implications.
Senator Bunning. One last question. It is about the ground-
based interceptors and radars in Alaska. Please, please explain
to me--and I know you have tried to explain to many others--the
advantage gained for the program by that placement. I mean, is
it specifically to counter North Korea, or is it specifically
to develop and test the technology?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me try, since I am not the
technician, and then the technician can correct it, but as I
have understood the explanations, and it made sense to me, in
order to move beyond kind of rudimentary capability that was
demonstrated in the test Saturday night that you saw the film
strip on, in order to begin to introduce the sort of real-world
complications that I think Senator Akaka referred to with
multiple decoys and multiple angles, longer ranges, in other
words, in order to be more realistic, you need a different test
bed, a more dispersed test bed.
Alaska allows us that geometry. It also puts it in a place
where that test bed will ultimately begin to be the basis of an
operational capability, and it is a philosophy of, if we are
going to spend this much money on a test bed, let us have it be
in a place where it could also become operational, rather than
deliberately put it somewhere where it cannot be operational,
and then have to reproduce that whole expenditure somewhere
else.
General Kadish. I would agree wholeheartedly with that.
That is exactly why we chose to do it this way. Instead of
building it twice, we build it once, basically.
Senator Bunning. My time has expired. I want to thank you
both for your straightforward answers, and Godspeed.
Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, are you on track for
deploying a national missile defense system by 2004?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I am not sure what on-track
means, and you may not have been here when General Kadish
explained, with this test bed in Alaska, if things worked well
we would have expect to have in the time frame 2004 to 2006
some rudimentary capability to set up an operational system,
but it is rudimentary. It is not something I would call a
national missile defense system. It is not a long-term
procurement.
Senator Cleland. Will that violate the ABM Treaty?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That would surely violate the ABM
Treaty.
Senator Cleland. How much will that system cost?
Secretary Wolfowitz. What is the test bed, General?
General Kadish. The test bed itself, or a larger system?
Senator Cleland. How much will this system, this
rudimentary system deployed between 2004 and 2006, that
violates the ABM Treaty, how much will it cost?
General Kadish. I would like to be precise for the record,
but as I remember the number, the physical emplacement of the
test bed is about $750 million out of the budget for the
development program.
[The information referred to follows:]

The 2004 RDT&E test bed provides a development test bed consisting
of an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska as a surrogate for the
planned Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) capability, initial In-
Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS), and Battle Management
Command Control and Communications (BMC\3\) capability, five silos,
Command Launch Equipment (CLE), and software upgrades. Up to five
ground-based interceptors using the Payload Launch Vehicle Plus (PLV+)
booster, which is comprised of the current test configuration booster
plus a Minuteman (MM) II first stage, could be installed expeditiously
to provide a contingency defense if needed in the fiscal year 2004 to
2006 timeframe.
In fiscal year 2002, BMDO is developing the test bed with RDT&E
funding exclusively.

Total fiscal year 2002 = $786.485 million

Major Fiscal Year 2002 Test Bed Activities include:

Initiate development of five PLV+ interceptors
($305.444 million)
Initiate upgrades to Cobra Dane radar ($55.000
million)
Execute test program ($98.500 million)
Initiate Kodiak Island target/interceptor launch
facility modifications ($21.700 million)
Kwajalein Missile Range upgrades ($6.000 million)
Accelerate BMC\3\ development and installation
($17.020 million)
Initiate facility construction activities at Fort
Greely ($273.121 million)
Efforts to mitigate community impacts at Fort Greely
($9.700 million)

Senator Cleland. I am not talking about the development
program. I am talking about the total system here that you are
going to deploy that will violate the ABM Treaty, that you are
going to deploy this rudimentary system between 2004 and 2006.
You cannot tell me it is going to cost just $750 million.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, that is why it is a very
rudimentary capability. If you wanted to turn it into a full
national missile defense capability, it would be more money,
more time, and a whole different set of decisions.
Senator Cleland. We are spending $3 billion just to test
out this rudimentary system here. Next year, it will be more
money, and the year after that. I mean, what is the total cost
of the system, to deploy it, that will violate the ABM Treaty?
Do you know?
General Kadish. I would have to get the actual number. I do
not know off the top of my head, but the number was in 2002 not
the total cost, nor the life cycle, nor any of the other ways
we defined it that I just referred to.
Senator Cleland. It seems like before we walk down this
road here over the next 4 or 5 years, we ought to have a sense
of the total cost of the system. Can either one of you share
that with us?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We will get you something for the
record, Senator.
Senator Cleland. You do not know now?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not know the outyear cost.
Senator Cleland. Well, I think the costs are obvious. As to
the fall-out from what this effort will do in violating the ABM
Treaty, the fall-out has already produced an amazing picture.
We have driven the Russians and the Chinese into the arms
of one another. According to the New York Times the Russians
and the Chinese joined to oppose a missile shield for the U.S.,
and one Russian commentator pointed out that it was, ``an act
of friendship against America''.
It was a chilling picture for me, because the last act of
friendship between Russia and China against America they got
involved with, I was a part of. It was called the Vietnam War,
and I almost got killed by a Russian 122 millimeter rocket in
1968, and so this is a chilling photograph for me. I think it
should be chilling for all of us to understand the impact of
what we are doing here. We have a cost associated with this
effort, and this is just phase 1, if you might want to indicate
it, of that cost.
Politically, I think it makes the world less secure, and it
is painfully obvious what the Russians are going to do. Two
years ago I sat in a meeting with Senator Levin and Senator
Lugar, one of the authors of the Nunn-Lugar program which this
administration is underfunding by over $100 million, I might
add, and sat in the presence of the former director of the
Russian rocket forces, and 2 years ago he told us that if you
deploy a national missile defense system, we will not build
more rockets, we will just MIRV our warheads. We will go from 8
warheads per missile to 12.
I think that makes the world less secure. It is painfully
obvious that the Chinese, not only with this friendship pact
with the Russians, but they are going to go on their own and
build more missiles. It seems to me that makes the world less
secure, so I think there is a price exacted here, whatever the
actual total in dollars to us.
Now, in testimony last Thursday, General Kadish stated that
your missile defense proposal has no milestones by which to
measure progress. At the Frontier Institute last Friday,
Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``We do not have a proposed
architecture. All we have is a series of very interesting
research and development and testing programs''.
In fiscal year 2001, the entire Department of Defense
budget is $9 billion for basic research and development, $9
billion for basic research and development in all of DOD. You
are now proposing to spend $8 billion on missile defense
research and development alone. How can you, Mr. Secretary,
justify spending $8 billion on missile defense if you have no
milestones, requirements, or architecture in mind? If you do
not know where you are going, how can you know what it will
cost?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is the essence of
development programs. We are not setting up an architecture
until we know what we can do. We do not think we should spend
enormous amounts of money on architectures until the technology
has been proven. We are pursuing a great deal of research and
development, and we think the total in this year's budget is
$47 billion, of which this is a very important piece.
I do not know if you were in the room when the subject was
discussed. A good deal of that $8 billion you referred to is
either exclusively theater missile defense or dual use, theater
and long-range missile defense. The portion that is exclusively
for long-range missile defense is a very small fraction of that
$8 billion, and I think a very necessary fraction.
General Kadish. Senator, I might add that when we referred
to specific major defense procurement milestones, it is true we
do not have those right now, but that does not mean that we do
not have plans, and we are developing criteria to move forward
on a very disciplined way on a development program. We do and
will have those. How they lead to specific procurement and
deployment milestones, however is yet to be determined.
Senator Cleland. My time is up, but the Chiefs have
identified some $32 billion in unfunded requirements, and part
of that is still making up the precision weapons inventory that
we expended more on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would first
of all like to thank the Ranking Republican, Senator Warner,
for his comments at the start of the hearing, and I would also
like to congratulate General Kadish and everyone who was
involved on what appears to be a very successful Saturday
evening.
I know you were all under a great deal of pressure, and I
can think back 2 years ago where you had a failure due to a
fogging over of the optical system from the cooling equipment.
It seems to me you learned something from that, and the last
failure we had here, where you had a failure of a system we
have been using over and over. It just proved to us again we
are dealing with a machine, and even the best designed machines
sometimes surprise you.
As you indicated in your comments, this is a long journey.
It is step-by-step, but at least I am pleased that we completed
the steps still standing up, and I think that if this had been
a failure we probably would have had a great deal more
attendance at this committee meeting today, so I want to
congratulate you on where you stepped forward this last
weekend.
During Thursday's hearing, I had a question regarding the
test, and the ABM compliance review, and I stated that the
compliance review group certified a test on June 30, 2000, and
I believe I made a misstatement in that I said the test itself
took place on June 8 of 2000. I want to correct that for the
record, because the certification actually took place on June
30, with the test taking place on July 8, and so then I want to
restate my question for the record.
Does the process to determine the compliance of program
activities during this budget cycle differ significantly from
the process used in past years?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe it does, Senator, in that in
past years they would assess events, and frequently sort of go
down to the wire back and forth with the developers, and the
fundamental premise was, if anything was ultimately decided to
violate the ABM Treaty, they would not do it.
Since then we have told General Kadish to proceed
differently, to proceed with the most aggressive possible
development, and that means we have asked them to surface
compliance issues much earlier in the process. So we are trying
now to change the process so instead of last-minute
determinations we get notification well in advance of 6 months
of the actual event.
Senator Allard. So in other words, have we deviated from
the same budget process as the compliance vetting procedures,
as we have done in the past?
Secretary Wolfowitz. No, we have not.
Senator Allard. That is the question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. No. We are applying the same
compliance standards. We are just trying to apply them much
earlier, because we realize that we are consciously in a zone
where we----
Senator Allard. You are bringing it up appropriately for
discussion.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Correct.
Senator Allard. But then your fiscal year budget for 1999,
and the fiscal year budget for the year 2000 budget request,
that was not certified by the compliance review group before
the President submitted it, was it?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not believe any of the previous
budgets were, and the budget for last year included an event
that I do not think anybody disputes would be a treaty-
violating event, and that would have been the construction of
the radar in Shemya in Alaska, which we decided not to proceed
with.
Senator Allard. Thank you. It has been suggested that
because the Department of Defense cannot say for certain now
whether the testing activities you plan are compliant with the
ABM Treaty the Senate cannot approve the budget, but my
understanding is that compliance determinations are almost
never made well in advance of a test or other activity, and
that it is virtually impossible to do so because the plans
often change right up to the time of the test.
Now, my question is, is that a fair description,
characterization of the process?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, that is a fair description of
the process, and obviously if you get within the 6-month limit
and you are under the treaty, it is law and we will follow it,
and therefore, if at the last minute we discover a compliance
problem we will fix the event to comply, but we have simply for
the first time now tried to make sure the compliance process
surfaces these problems earlier, and as I pointed out, and I do
not mind repeating it, last year's budget included events that
would have been judged to be noncompliant, and there was never
an issue about that.
Senator Allard. General Kadish, your organization prepared
information for another Senator not on this committee regarding
compliance determinations for various tests that have occurred
over the years, and I would like to highlight some of those for
the record.
For example, you conducted integrated flight test 1, or
IFT-1, which was the first test of the exoatmospheric kill
vehicle, on January 16, 1997, but compliance was not certified
until December 20, 1996.
Another example, you pointed out the technical critical
measurements program, or TCMP flight 2A, was not certified
until September 14--I mean, February 14, 1996, just 8 days
before it occurred.
Also, the risk reduction flight test 1 for what was then
the National Missile Defense Program was certified 3 days
before it occurred in 1997, and then a second risk reduction
flight was certified just 2 days before it was conducted a
month later.
Another example is the test of the NMD prototype radar was
not certified until August 31, 1998, less than 3 weeks before
it occurred.
The first test of the Navy theater-wide missile was
certified November 2, 1999, for a November 20 flight. The IFT
number 3 for the national missile defense system, which was the
first successful intercept attempt, was certified on September
28, 1999, just 4 days before the test.
The IFT 4 was certified 12 days before the test took place
on January 18, 2000.
The certification IFT 5 was issued 8 days before that test
last summer, but the certification actually had to be modified
on July 7, the day before the test, because of changes in the
test plan.
Is it not the case that the certification for Saturday
night's test was also modified 1 day before, on Friday, July
13, because of changes in the test plan, and I would like to
follow that first question up with a second question. It seems,
then, it is not unusual at all to be uncertain about whether a
planned test activity conflicts with the ABM Treaty until
shortly before the test occurs. Would you agree with that?
General Kadish. I would agree with that, Senator. Under the
process we have been using, and I believe those dates are
correct, I would have to check them in detail, but even the
Saturday's flight had a modification, as you pointed out.
[The information follows:]

The first Navy Theater Wide Control Test Vehicle Test was certified
September 3, 1997, for a September 26, 1997, flight.
IFT 4 was certified 12 days before the test took place on January
18, 2000, and was modified on January 14, 2000, because of changes in
the test plan.

Senator Allard. I hope I have stated those situations
correctly. If for some reason we disagree, let me know, and I
will correct it for the record.
I want to thank you for the response, Mr. Chairman. I see
my time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kadish,
congratulations on your successful intercept over the weekend.
Mr. Secretary, if I could pursue for a moment a response
you gave to Senator Allard with respect to compliance
immediately prior to a test event. You said that if at that
late period it was noncompliant, in your words you would fix
the event to comply. Is that your approach to all of these
potential tests going forward, that you would endeavor to fix
the event to comply in all cases?
Secretary Wolfowitz. If you are under the ABM Treaty you
have no choice, and in fact, frankly, it is not the right way
to go about optimally pursuing a development program. It means
that you come up with something you say may be the optimal test
program, and the lawyers say, whoops, it does not comply, and
you have to drop it. That is why we are trying to alert the
senior decisionmakers early, and well in advance of 6 months
before the event, if we think we see something that will
definitely raise a compliance issue. But once you are within
that 6-month window, if you are still within the treaty, then
you have no choice.
Senator Reed. You could fix the test to comply, you could
violate the treaty, or you could simply postpone the test for 6
months plus a day. Those to me are the three options.
Secretary Wolfowitz. We have ruled out violating the
treaty.
Senator Reed. So as we go forward, the real choice you will
have when these events are scheduled and you discover they are
noncompliant, or you think they are noncompliant, is to fix it
or to postpone the event, or announce you are withdrawing from
the treaty.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is correct.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
General Kadish, last year I understand the Defense
Department canceled the Navy theater-wide block 1 program in
order to pursue the more capable block 2 variant. I gather the
decision was driven not only by technical shortcomings with
block 1, but because the planned quantity of 40 block 1 ships
and Navy block 1 missiles was insufficient. The proposed budget
we are discussing today asked for $410 million in the 2002
budget for Navy theater-wide, yet this effort is apparently
focused once again on deploying a block 1 version of the
system. Could you explain the funding? Will it go to block 1
and, if so, why, since there apparently was a decision
previously to step away from that system.
General Kadish. Well, Senator Reed, to the best of my
knowledge there was no formal decision to step away from Navy
theater block 1. There was an analysis that we did under the
approach of where we were trying to do procurement and
development at the same time, that it might be more economical
and beneficial to go beyond block 1 in that framework.
Now, under this layered approach that we are pursuing for
these classes of missiles, the development of the block 1 and
the completion of the intercept program that underlies that is
certainly a viable part of our development program, and we want
to aggressively pursue that. It does not mean that we will
actually procure these types of systems. It depends on the
development program and the results of the test.
Senator Reed. But you are pursuing block one for the
potential deployment, for a potential deployment?
General Kadish. To the degree that the Aegis interceptor
program represents a block 1, we are, and I know I cut that
fine, but that is an important distinction.
Senator Reed. That is not only fine, that is metaphysical,
I guess. Is it fair to say, though, that there were technical
questions raised about the capability of the system, and also a
question raised about the availability of sufficient platforms
that could force you to seriously reevaluate block 1 last year
that now you are aggressively moving toward a block 1 potential
deployment?
General Kadish. Both of those cases we are pursuing are
test programs, and what I am saying is, the decision to pursue
that from a procurement program will not be taken until we get
sufficient test data.
Senator Reed. Let me move to the THAAD system, which is a
system, I believe, that has great potential, and I am strongly
supportive of. It is a fundamentally sound system, I believe,
but it is plagued by tests which some people ascribe to a
mentality that puts the schedule ahead of really looking at
quality control and important fundamentals.
Last year, I understand the Defense Department considered
accelerating THAAD but decided not to, since it felt the
program was at a prudent pace, with acceptable technical risk.
Again, the proposed budget adds $224 million to THAAD's program
for 2002 for program acceleration. Once again, are we in a
situation where experience told us to slow down, but politics
are telling us to speed up?
General Kadish. No, Senator. In that particular case the
money to ``accelerate THAAD'' is designed to buy more test
hardware early on and take a risk that we will be successful.
We do not intend to change the structure of our current
program from a very risk-handling approach, where we are very
deliberate on ground tests and on redesign of THAAD, but
instead provide the money to more aggressively test the
program, and take the idea that should it be successful we
would have test assets to actually put in an emergency
situation, and thereby accelerate that capability if we should
deem it capable. There is no intent to speed up or eliminate or
cut corners in that program, and that is something that I am
going to watch very carefully that we do not do across a broad
spectrum. We cannot afford it.
Senator Reed. SBIRS-Low is being transferred from the Air
Force responsibility to your responsibility. The current
estimate of life cycle cost, about $20 billion or so. That is
an estimate, and also you have indicated how critical it is to
your national missile defense plans. Do you have a good idea at
this point of how much SBIRS-Low will cost?
General Kadish. We have a generalized estimate, as you
point out, that varies to some degree up to $20 billion. I
think we have to get through the next few years of the
competition and design activity to really nail that down, and
so I think we are 18 months to 2 years out from really
understanding what the long-term cost will be, and then it
would only be an estimate, based on where we are.
Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary. Thank you, General.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Mr. Secretary, you testified that the
administration is pursuing two parallel tracks, that first you
are pursuing an accelerated research and development and
testing program, and second, the administration is engaged in
discussions with Russia on a new security framework. If the
Senate were to significantly reduce the money in this budget
for missile defense, what would be the impact on the
President's attempts to achieve a new strategic framework with
Russia? Would it lessen the chances of success in your
judgment?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I think it would lessen it
substantially, because I do think our ability to reach an
understanding with Russia is going to depend in considerable
part on their sense that we are moving forward. We are ready to
move forward together. We would like to do it in a way that is
cooperative, but if they feel that if they drag their feet we
will not move forward at all, they might well prefer to drag
their feet.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, Senator Inhofe raised a common criticism of
missile defense that I want to pursue further with you. Critics
of missile defense repeatedly contend that the United States
faces a far greater threat from the so-called suitcase
terrorist than from ballistic missile attacks from a rogue
nation.
It is my understanding that last year the United States
spent about $11 billion on counterterrorism programs, and that
this is about twice the amount that was dedicated to pursuing
missile defense. Is the administration continuing a significant
investment in counterterrorism programs while continuing the
accelerated research and development of missile defense?
In other words, is this not a false choice, and in fact we
are pursuing aggressively counterterrorism measures while
pursuing the research for our missile defense?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think it is, Senator, and I do not
have a sufficiently good crystal ball to say which is the more
likely one, and frankly, I have spoken to a lot of intelligence
analysts. I do not think their crystal balls are perfect,
either.
I do know that the countries hostile to the United States
are investing a lot of money in both efforts, and probably, if
you look at their budgets, they are investing more in ballistic
missiles, just because it is an expensive program. I think they
understand that it is one of our weaknesses. It is, as I said,
the one Iraqi capability we underestimated during the Gulf War,
but I think it is a false choice.
I think we have to pursue efforts in both directions, but I
think before you came I was pointing out that these are both
threats. They should both be taken seriously, but when I think
about it, what is different about the two is, number one, we
have some capability against the terrorist threat today. We
intercepted people coming in from Canada during the Millennium
event. We have aggressive counterintelligence programs that
disrupt efforts when we can.
It is not 100 percent perfect, or we would not have had the
Cole catastrophe, but we are actively engaged in--we have some
ability to protect ourselves. We have no ability to protect
ourselves against ballistic missiles.
Second, and this is the reason we have no ability, or part
of the reason we have no ability to protect against ballistic
missiles, we have a treaty prohibiting us from doing so. There
is no treaty prohibiting us from working against terrorist
attacks, and we would never contemplate signing them.
Senator Collins. General, I would like to switch gears and
ask you a couple of questions about the Arrow weapons system
which is being developed jointly by the United States and
Israel, and would provide Israel with a capability to defend
against short to medium-range ballistic missiles.
Last year, Congress provided $95.2 million for the Arrow
program. Could you tell me what you propose for funding for the
Arrow this year, and whether or not you will be supporting the
Arrow system improvement plan which Congress initiated last
year?
General Kadish. In the fiscal year 2002 budget, if I recall
the numbers correctly, we complete the purchase of the Arrow
third battery and finish our commitment there, and I think the
dollars associated with that and interoperability type
activities amount to somewhere around $50 million.
We have also proposed a $20-million addition over and above
those activities for further allocation to either the ASIP
program or the improvement program, or for other activities
that might be deemed beneficial, so we have added basically $20
million to our commitment for 2002.
Senator Collins. It is my understanding that there is also
cooperation underway with Israel in examining the possibility
of an intercept in the boost phase over the course of the last
several years, and that Israel has proposed a new joint boost
phase launcher intercept program. Do you have a judgment of the
feasibility of the Israeli program, and does your office intend
to work with Israel on the boost phase launcher intercept
program?
General Kadish. We have been in discussions with Israel
over that particular effort, and I believe, if I am not
mistaken, we have sent a report to Congress, I think last year,
over the feasibility assessments that we put together for that,
and I can provide that for the record, if you like.
[The information follows:]
Report to Congressional Defense Committees On Joint U.S.-Israel Boost
Phase Intercept-Attack Operations Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles--15
April 2000
i. introduction
Purpose
This report responds to the request set out in the Senate report to
accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
S. Report No. 106-50, page 226. The Senate Armed Services Committee
requested that the Secretary of Defense study the feasibility and
benefits of a joint U.S.-Israel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) boost
phase intercept (BPI)-attack operations (AO) program. This report
summarizes the potential opportunities and pitfalls in establishing
such a program. The committee report language is shown below.
The committee is aware that BMDO and the government of Israel have
examined options for boost-phase intercept (BPI) of ballistic missiles,
and the possibility of a joint U.S.-Israeli program using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) to defeat ballistic missiles in the boost-phase
or missile launchers following the launch of a missile. The committee
understands that to date there is no agreement between the two
governments on the potential merits of the options considered, nor has
agreement been reached on a joint program.
Believing that the ability to defeat ballistic missiles before and
during their launch phase could significantly enhance the security of
the United States and its allies, the committee directs the Secretary
of Defense to study the technical and operational feasibility of such a
joint program, and determine if the missile defense benefits would
justify initiating a joint U.S.-Israel BPI-attack operations program
employing UAVs. The study shall include an assessment of whether a BPI-
attack operations program can be developed that supports U.S. and
Israeli requirements, whether the United States would support a program
that is oriented primarily or exclusively toward satisfying Israeli
requirements, and whether DOD supports an attack operations UAV system
that does not include BPI capabilities. The committee directs the
Secretary to submit a report on these matters to the congressional
defense committees not later than February 15, 2000.
Background
[Deleted.]
ii. systems description
[Deleted.]
uav bpi
[Deleted.]
FIGURE 1. UAV Boost Phase Intercept.
[Deleted.]
FIGURE 2.
[Deleted.]
iii. program assessment
The assessments responding to the congressional report language are
detailed in the next sections.

1. Technical Feasibility Assessment.
2. Operational Feasibility Assessment.
3. Missile Defense Benefits Assessment.
4. U.S. and Israeli Requirements Compliance.
5. U.S. Support for Program Oriented Primarily or Exclusively to
Israeli Requirements.
6. DOD Support for an Attack Operations UAV That Does Not Include
BPI Capabilities.

1. Technical Feasibility Assessment
UAV BPI
2. Operational Feasibility Assessment
[Deleted.]
weapon control and battle management
[Deleted.]
3. Missile Defense Benefits Assessment
4. U.S. and Israel UAV BPI-Attack Operations Requirements
Compliance
[Deleted.]
5. U.S. Support for Program Oriented Primarily or Exclusively to
Israeli Requirements
[Deleted.]
6. DOD Support for an Attack Operations UA that does Not Include
BPI Capabilities
[Deleted.]
iv. non-proliferation and policy concerns
[Deleted.]
v. summary
[Deleted.]

We will continue those discussions, but I think subject to
the Secretary's further comments, that will be basically a
fiscal year 2003 decision as we deliberate through those budget
issues.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary, and General Kadish. We are glad to see you here.
I think, as maybe the members of the committee know,
General Kadish was the commanding officer at Hanscom AFB in
Massachusetts. He had some very important responsibilities in
the areas of intelligence, advanced research, a whole wide
range of areas, and has many, many friends up there. He did an
outstanding job. Mr. Secretary, you are fortunate to have the
General.
I want to get back to the point about where we are and
where we are going. We want to congratulate you on the success
of the test last Saturday. We all understand we still have a
long way to go, but that is an important benchmark. We all take
pride, I certainly do, in the work that is being done on
theater defense. That has been impressive. We followed that. I
have closely, obviously, because Raytheon is in my own State of
Massachusetts, and we are always interested in the progress, as
well as some of the problems that they have up there.
But I want to get back to the question of where we are and
where we are going, and where we have been in terms of research
and get some idea now about how we are going to make judgments
about the research program.
We had the Secretary of Defense, on June 28, appear before
the committee to present the 2002 budget, and when asked about
the details on ballistic missiles, he said he had not been
briefed on the BMD proposal, and he had not made any
decisions--this was the end of June. We are now into mid-July--
been briefed about it, and had not made any decisions about it,
even though we now have been provided with the budget
information, we are told. It is for a proposed program. The
actual content of the program will be decided later.
Now, this is the Secretary of Defense before the committee
as recently as 3 weeks ago.
So now we have your own response to others about the fact
that a lot of this is going to be in-theater defense, and
others on ballistic defense, and General Kadish's statement
today, he said, I cannot tell you today exactly what the
ballistic missile system will look like, even 5 years from now.
Well, he says, he continues here, evidently--and General
Kadish, you also said at a press conference last Friday that
you have internal plans that you are working on at the present
time that are spelling out how these resources are going to be
made. What have we spent, what has DOD spent during the whole
``Star Wars'' on ballistic missile defense, $35, $40 billion,
some have estimated to $60 billion, roughly? General, do you
know? Well, if it is not that figure, are we in the ball park?
General Kadish. About $5 billion a year, on average.
Senator Kennedy. Well, $45 or $50 billion has now been
expended on this to date. We are not starting over here. We
have spent $45 or $50 billion. I think we want to disabuse
ourselves that we are suddenly starting fresh now with all of
this. The DOD has already spent $45 or $50 billion to date on
this.
Now you are asking for $8 billion more, and even though you
have spent $45 or $50 billion, evidently you are not able to
give the committee a clear idea of why we would expect that
this would be either more effective than what has been spent in
the past, other than I hear that maybe we are looking along
some different areas, or different lines.
Secretary Wolfowitz. If I might, Senator, what we spent in
the past has already produced results. I would complain that it
has not produced results as fast as I think this country might
have in the past been capable of. We produced Polaris
submarines in 5 years with a crash effort. We got to the moon
in 10 years with a crash effort. I would say this has not been
a crash effort, but it has produced important results.
You referred to one of the most important ones a few
minutes ago, which is our ability now, finally, 10 years after
the Gulf War, to have hit-to-kill capability against a
primitive SCUD missile. I would have thought, given the fact
that Saddam Hussein almost brought Israel into that war and had
success in killing Americans with SCUD missiles, that we might
have moved faster, but we have moved, and this budget includes
a substantial amount of money, $857 million, to accelerate the
acquisition and deployment of that PAC-3 system which would
protect us in the Persian Gulf, and could protect allies.
Senator Kennedy. I am talking about the other, the PAC-3. I
have been a strong supporter, many of us have been, in terms of
the theater missile. We are trying to ask, in terms of outer
space, the ballistic missile defense, the amounts we are going
to be spending on this, and quite frankly, for every
technology, for the most part we have seen countertechnologies,
and serious questions with all the billions we spent on the
Stealth technology, whether that is really going to work any
more because of new breakthroughs in radar in terms of it.
I do not want to spend much of my time here now going and
thinking in terms of technology that has developed that there
have not been countertechnologies that have been developed. The
moon example is not really clear, because that is a different
situation, but to come back to this question, we have spent the
$45 billion.
We want to have, again, some idea as to how the $8 billion
is going to be expended, because we heard testimony by the
Secretary of Defense before the committee 3 weeks ago where he
indicated that he was not prepared to give that to us. My
question is, which has been repeated by others here, and
perhaps we are going to get the same answers, can you give us
any more indication or assurance that it is going to be any
more successful, and what it is going to be, and what the time
lines are going to be in terms of expenditures?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, the Secretary has been
briefed in detail. We have submitted detail, and I was trying
to explain in my previous response that detail includes a great
deal of money on systems like PAC-3, $857 million on PAC-3
alone that have now been demonstrated to be successful.
I think before you came, Senator, we showed a film strip of
the successful test Saturday night, and believe me, I would not
say that that test demonstrates a capability, but it certainly
demonstrates a very big advance in what we can do, and you do
not get to this kind of very successful, I mean, very demanding
technological challenge overnight. I think the record shows we
are making serious progress, demonstrable progress on shorter-
range missiles and I think we clearly are within reach of doing
something with long-range systems, so yes, we can give you
great detail on the plan for that expenditure, and I think it
is a very convincing story that General Kadish and his team put
together.
Senator Kennedy. Well, my time is up, but you are going to
give us, then, how that $8 billion is going to be expended?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Has it been made available to
the committee?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe it is.
Senator Kennedy. The $8 billion, how you are going to spend
that $8 billion?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The General says at the end of this
week.
[The information referred to follows:]

The fiscal year 2002 amended budget submission has been submitted
to Congress and provides detailed program plans for the full fiscal
year 2002 program.

Senator Kennedy. It has not been, then, you have not given
it to the committee.
Secretary Wolfowitz. My understanding is we will be
submitting it at the end of this week.
Chairman Levin. Which means you have not yet given it to
the committee.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes. I apologize.
Chairman Levin. At this time, I request unanimous consent
that Senator Landrieu's statement be made a part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

Thank you Mr. Chairman: I would like to thank you for calling this
important hearing to review the National Missile Defense Program. I
would also like to take this opportunity to welcome and thank Secretary
Wolfowitz and General Kadish for appearing here today.
As we all know, the impassioned dispute over U.S. national missile
defense has dominated press coverage around the world almost daily over
the last few months. Secretary Wolfowitz has worked tirelessly since
taking office on the difficult but important task of selling missile
defense, not only to the Russians and Chinese, but to our allies as
well.
Unfortunately, we all know that the threat of a missile attack from
a rogue nation is credible and the proliferation of missile technology
continues as we sit here today. As long as this remains the case, it is
our responsibility to devise an effective defense system and a policy
that provides the American people with a sufficient level of
protection. Adm. Richard Mies, the Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Strategic Command uses an interesting analogy which I find quite
appropriate. To have an effective military, you need both a sword and a
shield. A soldier without a shield is defenseless and a soldier without
a sword lacks the ability to take action against his enemies. If either
is too big, it prevents the soldier from maximizing use of the other.
The trick is to balance both the shield and sword in an equitable
manner.
We are faced with that very task when it comes to missile defense.
While no rogue nation possesses the capability today, we know that
several states are actively pursuing development or acquisition of
ballistic missile technology. There is mounting and credible evidence
that, in the future, national missile defense is a capability this
country will be forced to acquire. However, it is important to develop,
test and deploy a valid, credible system. If the shield is made of
paper, it's worse than having no shield at all because it gives false
confidence with potentially disastrous consequences.
Across the political spectrum there is debate over the need for
missile defense, the impact on the ABM Treaty, our relationship with
Russia, our allies and other countries and on the amount that should be
invested on missile defense. There are strong opinions on all aspects
of this tremendously complicated issue. Senator Sam Nunn, a man I have
a great deal of respect for, has commented on this debate saying,
``It's time to get the theology out of it and the technology into it.''
I couldn't agree more. When you look at the National Missile
Defense Deployment Readiness Review, one fact is undisputable.
Regardless of politics or ideology, the one thing the national missile
defense program and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization need is
TIME. Time to develop, test and evaluate this technically complex
system. Time to negotiate with the Russians. Time to consult with our
allies and address their concerns. No matter how bad we want the
system, or how much money we throw at it, time is still required.
It's clear that money must be spent on this program, and I support
that. It is equally clear that there are other threats and pressing
needs facing our military, indeed facing our country, today. Given the
limited resources available, it would be unwise to invest all of them,
or even the majority of them, on national missile defense. It's a time
for tough choices. Those choices will significantly impact the
readiness, posture and capability of our military forces for years to
come. They will affect the size and strength of both our sword and
shield. The administration amended it's defense budget request adding
$18.4 billion which I wholly support. That budget includes spending an
additional $3 billion on missile defense which needs further review
based on developing technology and its implications on ABM Treaty
negotiations.
It's important that the American People have the confidence that
their tax dollars are properly spent. With that in mind, I look forward
to hearing Secretary Wolfowitz' and General Kadish's testimony here
today. I know it will be insightful and help this committee make those
tough choices.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this important hearing.

Chairman Levin. First, about your statements, General, that
your predecessors did not have the same instructions that you
did relative to ABM. I just want to read General Lyles'
testimony, when he said there is nothing we would do
differently.
The question from Senator Robb was, ``If you did not have
an ABM Treaty, are there things you would be doing, or could be
doing less expensively now?'' General Lyles: ``In all honesty,
Senator Robb, there is nothing we would be doing differently.''
Do you disagree with General Lyles?
General Kadish. No.
Chairman Levin. General Ralston said, I would like to add,
as I understand it, and as General Lyles has said, there is
nothing today in the Antiballistic Missile Treaty that is
constraining what we are doing in our National Missile Defense
Program, or our theater missile defense program. Do you
disagree with that?
General Kadish. No, Senator.
Chairman Levin. So this is really the first time we may be
facing that issue, and the difference, of course, between what
President Clinton did last year and what you are doing this
year is that President Clinton never made the decision that if
you could not modify the treaty, that he would walk away from
it.
That decision was never made by President Clinton. He said
there would be four factors which he would consider before
making that decision, whereas this President, this
administration has said ``if Russia refuses the changes we
propose, we will give prompt notice under the provisions of the
treaty that we can no longer be a party to it.'' That is a huge
difference.
Senator Warner. Can you give a citation to what you just
read?
Chairman Levin. That is the Citadel speech, September 1999,
Governor Bush, then a candidate.
``If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give
prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no
longer be a party to it.'' This is a totally different set of
circumstances from what it was in the previous administration,
which said, we might give notice, we might not, we are going to
look at four factors, including whether or not we are more
secure by pulling out of that treaty, including the effect on
arms reductions, including the cost-effectiveness, including
the operational effectiveness. All factors would go into it.
You have given us three sheets of paper with the outline of
the three activities which you apparently indicate could bump
up against the ABM Treaty this year. One is called the missile
defense system test bed, the other one, Aegis, Spy-1 tracking
and strategic missile, the other one is System Integration Test
II.
First of all, we will make those three documents a part of
the record, but my question is this to either one of you. Could
you identify on those three sheets of paper which of those
activities will in a matter of months, not years, likely
conflict with the ABM Treaty's limits, since you have now
informed us that in a matter of months, not years, it is likely
the activities that are in the budget request for 2002 will
conflict with, as the administration said last Wednesday,
``bump up against'' the treaty? Can you just identify for us on
these three sheets now which of these specific activities are
likely to either conflict with or bump up against the treaty
under your budget request?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, we identified all three of
these because all three of them have the potential of raising
serious ABM Treaty compliance problems.
Chairman Levin. Can you just identify, for instance, in the
test bed document, some of these--a lot of this you say is not
likely to happen inside these documents.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is why we need a compliance
review.
Chairman Levin. I know, but will you do this for the
record? Since there is a lot in these documents, which you say
do not see any compliance problem, it is hard for me to sort
out which will and which will not, and this is a specific
question, and you can do it for the record. On these three
sheets of paper, which of these activities will, in all
likelihood, if you are funded in 2002 as requested, conflict
with or bump up against the ABM Treaty? That is my question for
the record.
Secretary Wolfowitz. We will work with your staff to make
sure we have the correct question and we will answer it for the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]

All three activities (the Missile Defense System Test Bed, Aegis
SPY-1 tracking a strategic ballistic missile, and Systems Integration
Test II (SIT II) combining data from ABM and non-ABM radars) could
conflict with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. A compliance
assessment is underway within the Department to determine whether these
activities would violate the treaty. That said, the administration has
made clear that it will not violate the treaty, and the activities of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, like all DOD activities,
will be conducted in compliance with U.S. arms control obligations.
Therefore, the ABM Treaty will not be violated if the missile defense
program is funded as requested.

Chairman Levin. Will you also be giving us the compliance
review group's results promptly after you receive them?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I will do my best.
Chairman Levin. What would constrain you? There is no
treaty that prohibits you from doing that.
Secretary Wolfowitz. These are advisory opinions from the
Secretary of Defense's lawyers to the Secretary of Defense, and
I assume we will share them with you.
Chairman Levin. Let us know, would you, promptly, if you
are not going to promptly share those with us.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you said today that the developmental
activity at Fort Greely could be made an operational capability
with little modification. What specific modifications would be
needed to convert Fort Greely from a developmental or test
capability to a rudimentary operational capability?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think I will let General Kadish
answer that.
General Kadish. We still have a lot of planning to do to
implement this test bed and the ongoing activities in the
coming months, and certainly through 2002, we would probably be
in a better position to answer that when we do exactly the
configuration we want to test and to put that together.
But I guess I would answer in a general way that if we have
a test activity that represents an operationally realistic
configuration where everything is hooked up right and that we
could launch out of Fort Greely if we wanted to test a
particular segment and it was safe enough. Then by definition
you have a capability there to launch and then if you have
confidence in the system based on all the other testing you are
going to do to actually use it in combat, that would be a
decision that would have to be taken by the Department.
Chairman Levin. But the question was not the decision, but
what specific modifications would need to be made to convert
Ft. Greely from your proposed developmental test facility to a
rudimentary operational capability.
General Kadish. I guess the answer to that is we don't know
in detail what those would be, but in general it would be
command and control activities to uniformed people to actually
do the combat alert type of activities. So over time we will
define exactly what that is. I can't tell you specifically
today what it would be.
Chairman Levin. My time is up. Thank you. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to defer my time
to our colleague and then I will follow back in sequence with
my wrap-up. But I would like to make one unanimous consent
request, that Secretary Wolfowitz provide for the record
statements that President Bush made subsequent to his September
24, 1999 Citadel speech to which our chairman referred. At that
time he stated if Russia refuses to accept changes to the ABM
Treaty, as we've proposed we will give prompt notice of our
intention to withdraw, under article 15 of the treaty. I think
he has made a series of statements about the framework that he
is hoping to achieve and I think those statements should be
examined in parallel with his statement at the Citadel. So will
you provide that for the record?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We will do that, Senator.
Senator Warner. It can be put in the record at this
juncture. I will yield my time to Senator Allard.
[The information referred to follows:]

May 23, 2000

National Press Club

Washington, DC

Senator Allard. I thank Senator Warner for yielding. I
would like to pursue this issue on the THAAD radar and direct
my question to General Kadish. I understand the THAAD radar was
present at Kwajalein this weekend when you conducted your
missile defense test. Did that radar participate in the test?
General Kadish. No, it did not, Senator.
Senator Allard. Since you've identified the THAAD as part
of the terminal defense element of your overall ballistic
missile defense system, isn't it potentially useful to have at
least the THAAD radar or the BMC-3 participate in tests like
the one conducted this weekend?
General Kadish. Eventually it would be, Senator.
Senator Allard. Is such participation permitted by the ABM
Treaty?
General Kadish. At this time, it is not and I believe one
of the situations that has been provided by the Secretary's
testimony of using our X-band radar at Kwajalein to do a
theater-level test, which is the opposite of what you're
describing, is in fact on the table for treaty compliance
issues. So concurrent use of these assets is an issue with the
treaty.
In regard to the THAAD, we haven't at this point in time
done sufficient planning, although we have for use of the GBRP
such that we would want to propose using the THAAD in these
types of tests. Our intent over time and certainly over the
next year is to plan in detail how we would exploit those types
of resources.
Senator Allard. I'm further told that several years ago the
THAAD radar was at Kwajalein for testing when an operational
ICBM test was conducted and I'm told that the THAAD test
manager saw this as a wonderful opportunity to characterize the
performance of the THAAD radar but that his proposal to do so
set off a minor panic in the Pentagon because this would have
violated the ABM Treaty. Is this an example of the kind of
opportunity you have to forego because of the constraints of
the ABM Treaty?
General Kadish. Without the constraints or thinking about
the constraints we would be able to exploit that, and that is
our intent at this point in time.
Senator Allard. I would like to pursue the ABM Treaty and
security issues. We have heard from several colleagues about
their concerns that U.S. missile defenses will spur the
proliferation of missile and weapon/missile defense
technologies and lead to the build-up of offensive forces that
would reduce U.S. security. Since concerns are based in part on
a belief that the ABM Treaty has inhibited the growth of these
forces, or such concerns based on that, how many warheads did
the Soviet Union have in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was signed?
Do you know that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would be dredging up my memory. I
don't believe they had substantially MIRVed their force at that
time, thousands less than they do today, that's for certain.
Senator Allard. Then when we looked at it 10 years later,
do you have any idea how many warheads the Soviet Union had and
if you can't give me a specific figure, was it dramatically
increased, moderately increased?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think dramatically increased
throughout the seventies, Senator. We can get you those exact
numbers for the record, obviously.
[The information referred to follows:]

When the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union had 2,081
strategic missile (e.g., ICBM and SLBM) warheads. By 1982, the Soviet
inventory had grown to 8,555 warheads.

Senator Allard. So in your view, did the ABM Treaty
accomplish its goal of preventing or slowing down the Soviet
offensive buildup?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't know if that was its goal. It
certainly didn't accomplish it if that was the goal.
Senator Allard. Since 1972 how many nations have ballistic
missile capabilities?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe we now estimate--let me get
it exactly.
Senator Allard. I think it was 28 or 29 now that I
remember.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
Senator Allard. Yes. How many nations have or are seeking
to have ballistic missile capabilities today?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Beyond the ones that already have it?
Senator Allard. Yes, of the 28.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to get you that for the
record. I think they are, in experimental programs there are
quite a few.
[The information referred to follows:]

At present, 28 countries have ballistic missile capability, either
through purchase (17 countries), or through indigenous development
programs (11 countries). Six countries, all with indigenous capability,
are developing longer range (MRBM, IRBM, or ICBM) systems.

Senator Allard. I think it would help us to better
understand what's happened worldwide and the dynamics out there
if you could describe the ongoing Chinese strategic
modernization. In your view is this modernization effort a
response to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense programs?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely not. It's been underway for
some time and I think it has its own dynamic partly motivated
by growing Chinese military budgets, partly motivated by, I
think, their growing sense of their position in Asia. If I
might say in answer to your previous question, it's my own
personal sense that one of the reasons that countries like Iraq
and Iran and North Korea are investing so much in ballistic
missile defenses is precisely because they realize that they
can't match us in other areas of military capability and I am
sorry to bore you, but as I've said repeatedly, this is the one
Iraqi capability that proved in the Gulf War to be more serious
than what we had estimated it to be.
I think they're investing, not in spite of the ABM Treaty,
but to some extent because of the ABM Treaty.
Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz, I'm going to ask for
your view on Russian security. Would Russian security be
enhanced by proliferating missile and WMD technologies?
Secretary Wolfowitz. No, it wouldn't, and again a point
that I think was observed in an important way earlier, I think
Russian security would be enhanced if they could reduce their
vulnerability to limited missile attack. I also think our
security will be enhanced if they can reduce their
vulnerability and I think the same goes for the United States.
We are in a different era. It is not an era where it is our
goal to keep Russia vulnerable and it shouldn't be their goal
to keep us vulnerable.
Senator Allard. Also, as we all know, MAD, or mutually-
assured destruction, was the only means by which we deterred
the Soviet Union from missile attack against the United States.
While mutually-assured destruction worked in a bipolar world,
today the world has changed and is a more chaotic and dangerous
place and that is why we must have an updated approach, I
believe, to deterrence, both offensively and defensively. I
believe that Admiral Mies said it best on July 11 in front of
the Strategic Subcommittee when he said: ``Missile defense
would not be a replacement for an assured retaliatory response,
but rather an added dimension to complement our existing
deterrent capabilities and an insurance policy against a small-
scale ballistic missile attack. It would also serve as an
element of our strategy to dissuade countries from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.''
My question: will the concept of mutually-assured
destruction remain a part of the administration's deterrent
strategy?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I've never been fond of the mutually-
assured destruction term, but yes, certainly nuclear deterrence
will remain part of our deterrent strategy but the reliance
exclusively on retaliation as our deterrent is something we're
trying to move away from. Retaliation is always, I think, going
to be a part of deterrence, the potential of retaliation.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired again.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator Allard, thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, following up on your exchange with the Chairman, as
I understood it, the concept of Alaska becoming operational
comes to fruition when you replace the testing crew with
operational personnel. Was that your answer to the Chairman's
question?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to refer back to General
Kadish, but what I hear General Kadish saying is that I think
it is essentially, if everything worked well experimentally, it
would be essentially a software change to turn it into an
operational capability. It's a little more than just changing
the mental intent. There would have to be definitely command
and control changes, probably some communications changes, but
I think it is what you would call in the area of software.
Senator Bill Nelson. In terms of Alaska and the treaty, is
that when, in your opinion, the treaty would be abrogated and
up until that point with regard to the Alaska facility it would
not?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't think I need to be a lawyer to
say that if we crossed that line and turned it into operational
capability that would be a violation of the treaty.
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, I understand. My question is up
to that point.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is where you get into questions
of intent and verification and what can and can't be verified
by national technical means and, it isn't simply that lawyers
have a way of making problems complicated, this is a genuinely
complicated problem because in the, what is it now, 29 years
since the treaty was signed, we have had a lengthy, tedious
record of going over these issues with the Russians. You have
to look at that record. You have to examine it. You have to
weigh American positions, Russian positions. We are in a
difficult zone and so I'm hoping that when the lawyers look at
this they will give us at least some more clarity than I have
right now.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, thank you. General, I want to
congratulate you on your test over the weekend. I would like to
see you be very successful as you proceed with the various
tests. By reading the press I get the impression that you're
going to have these tests scheduled quite frequently, and I am
a little bit concerned that we might be sacrificing some of our
success in the future with the number of tests. Would you
comment on that, and the frequency of those tests?
General Kadish. I think our goal has always been in the
test program to test frequently and often and move rapidly
through our development program, because we built a whole
series of technical milestones and specifications we want to
check out. So the sooner we get it done, not only does the
technology develop, but we save a lot of money, even though
these tests are expensive.
So it is not our intent to test without the discipline
required to do testing. I think that is the basic thrust of
your question.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I share the congratulations
to General Kadish on his success, but I sort of worry that
people have to understand, I think, that if a program never
suffers from test failures, then it's probably been too
conservative a program. If you look at the history of our
developments, the satellite program which put satellites in
orbit suffered 11 straight test failures in its initial
testing. The Polaris, which is one of our most successful
systems, failed 66 out of 123 flights. I have a number of other
examples in my testimony.
A successful development program has to include testing
failures, so I would like to see them pushing aggressively and
if and when they fail, I may not show you the film strip of it,
but I do think they will be learning things.
Senator Bill Nelson. Hopefully the successful testing of a
man-rated system does not occasion all of those failures,
although we have seen those in the past, unfortunately, for
example with the space shuttle.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Obviously when you get to the point of
putting people's lives at risk with a test, you have to go up
to a higher standard and even then, as you point out, you can
have a failure.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, under that theory, then, why did
we wait over a year after the last one for this test to occur?
General Kadish. We are dealing with prototype hardware and
over time we expect and intend and are working very hard at
making this hardware more like the system we want to actually
use and so it's going to get better.
But basically in the last 3 years to do four tests and to
have two successes out of four is a major achievement. But we
learn from our failures and the reason why it took us a year to
come to this point is because we took the two failures that we
had and learned from those and went back and took the time to
fix everything.
Those types of failures we experienced, unfortunately from
my point of view, were more related to quality problems, if you
will, process problems and not the fundamental design and
hardware. So in order to wring those types of process problems
out, you have to put more discipline in the program and make
sure that people do the right thing and in fact are rewarded
for telling us when there is something wrong and that took us
time.
Once we are confident we have those processes in place,
which I have right now, then I expect that we will be able to
do things more rapidly without those types of problems
occurring.
Senator Bill Nelson. What was the reason for the failure a
year ago?
General Kadish. The reason for the failure a year ago, we
believe, was a circuit card that failed, that did not send the
right signal to the kill vehicle to separate from the booster,
and the reasons for those types of failures have to do with
foreign object damage, those types of things.
Senator Bill Nelson. It was a failure that had nothing to
do with the actual design of the new system of the kill vehicle
to home in on the target?
General Kadish. Correct.
Senator Bill Nelson. So why did it take a year for what
would normally be a pedestrian kind of failure? For what you
are trying to test, why would it take a year?
General Kadish. Because it indicated that it was a failure
in something that we did not expect because as you correctly
point out, it actually worked on all the other flights and it
is something we know how to do. That indicated to us that we
needed to go back and look at every piece of the hardware in
the test program and not leave any stone unturned and make sure
that the smallest detail in our program was looked at to ensure
the type of discipline I talked about earlier. That took time
and we took the time to do that.
Now that we have gone through that and have adjusted
people's expectation to this rigorous way of doing it, it is my
opinion we can move faster in our test program, especially
given if you have successes, you want to turn up the complexity
and the challenge, as Secretary Wolfowitz points out, to test
the edges of the envelope, or you may fail doing such.
Senator Bill Nelson. When is the next test scheduled?
General Kadish. Our next test is currently scheduled for
the end of October, early November time frame of this year.
Senator Bill Nelson. The next one after that?
General Kadish. It will be in the February time frame.
Senator Bill Nelson. You feel comfortable with that kind of
interval to build on either the success or failure of each of
those tests?
General Kadish. That is correct, and when you have a
success and you analyze the data that supports that and find
that there are minor or no glitches, it gives you even more
confidence in your next test schedule.
Senator Bill Nelson. When in this regime of testing is your
first major full up with many different targets that are not
actual targets, that are decoys; when does that occur?
General Kadish. We haven't taken the decision of how we are
going to add complexities to the test in final detail yet, so I
think that will occur in the next couple of months. But
certainly over the next 18 months we are going to be adding
complexity, but it won't be until we've built the full test bed
capability where we will have the ability to put more targets
in flight almost simultaneously rather than just one and fire
more interceptors than just one and then put more decoys in to
get the different geometries that will convince ourselves as
well as our critics that we have an operationally viable
system. So that's why the test bed is so important to us.
Senator Warner. Senator, I have to interrupt. We have just
a few minutes left. The Chairman suggested that we now adjourn
the hearing and you can come back and resume your questioning.
Would that be inconvenient?
Senator Bill Nelson. Oh, we have a vote? I'm sorry, I did
not know that, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner. These are good questions and I am
listening.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I just conclude by
asking one simple question? When do you expect that full up
test bed onto your present regime?
General Kadish. Between fiscal year 2004 and 2006.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner. We will stand in adjournment. [Recess.]
Chairman Levin. We will be back in session. Let me ask this
question of both of you. It has to do with when that test bed
becomes operational. You said, Mr. Secretary, you hope, it is
your intent and your hope, that it become operational as
quickly as possible. It is your hope--I guess everybody's
hope--that the tests succeed. It is also, it seems to me then,
the question comes back as to what is the change which would
need to be made to make that an operational system. General
Kadish said before that there are some changes that would need
to be made. You characterize those as software changes, I
believe, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That's my understanding from hearing
the General speaking. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Is that a difficult thing to do--to make
those software changes? Does that have to be tested or is it
something that we assume could be done quite readily?
General Kadish. Well, I hesitate to say it's only a
software change because those things are monumental in our
business but the issue is that I wouldn't expect the changes to
be difficult to implement. However, in keeping with the
philosophy of making sure we test like we use it in this test
bed, we would have to, at some point, start testing those
command relationships and making sure when you turn the switch,
the right thing happens. So, what I said earlier about having
detailed plans to do that, I would expect us to start thinking
about how to do that over the next year to 18 months and even
beyond that and that plans will change over time based on what
we discover. So, that's why its difficult for me to say
precisely right now exactly what it will take to turn it
operational.
Chairman Levin. But it will take that?
General Kadish. It will at least take that.
Chairman Levin. It's our intent to have that tested so that
it is ready when the other elements of an operational system
are ready to go as well.
General Kadish. Well, again, this is where it gets
imprecise because if you recall, last year, Senator, we were
doing things concurrently and you questioned me very closely on
why the high risk on a concurrent program. This program doesn't
have that now. We wait to make that decision--to actually
produce the system that we intend to deploy based on more
concrete test data and performance of the program. So, at some
point over the next 3 to 4 years I would expect, based on the
progress of our test bed testing, to take to the Secretary and
the decisionmakers options every year as to whether or not we
want to start one of those concurrent programs. In that regard,
we would use what we know in the test bed and that test bed
capability then could provide only an interim capability on our
way to a larger system.
Chairman Levin. But the interim system, which has been
called a rudimentary capability, is that the way you're using
it basically?
General Kadish. That's the best term we've come up with to
date.
Chairman Levin. But the words rudimentary or primitive or
interim all are intended----
General Kadish. Not the final system.
Chairman Levin. But they're all intended to describe a
system which has operational capability and is intended to have
minimum or modest operational capability. Is that accurate?
General Kadish. That's one of the things it would do. Yes.
There are two primary functions--test bed first and then the
residual capability it gives you.
Chairman Levin. But that residual capability, that
operational capability is one of the purposes here. Is that not
correct?
General Kadish. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. You've said, Mr. Secretary, that it is your
intent that that be achieved as quickly as possible. Is that
correct? I just want to be real clear here.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
Chairman Levin. I want to talk about the Cobra Dane radar
for a few minutes. In your point paper that was provided to
this committee, you said that an upgraded Cobra Dane radar,
``may have some ABM radar capability.'' But in any operational
system we anticipate that a new X-band radar Shemya would be
required to provide needed discrimination even with all
possible upgrades to Cobra Dane. So, are you then saying that
Cobra Dane will provide that contingency capability as early as
2004?
General Kadish. If I understand the question, I believe the
answer will be yes because it's an early warning radar and it
only functions as an early warning radar. One of the issues is
the countermeasure problem for any midcourse system that we
need X-band for. So, the capability is very basic and as we've
been describing it, rudimentary.
Chairman Levin. But Cobra Dane will provide useful
contingency capability?
General Kadish. That's what our belief is today.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, this is a bit unrelated to
the series of questions that I want to keep pursuing here but I
have been troubled by it because a number of times in the last
few hearings, I think at least twice, it has been stated that
you are on a commission that concluded that we needed to deploy
a national missile defense system. You have not said that that
was not accurate.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That is not what the commission
concluded.
Chairman Levin. I think it would have been useful for you
when that statement is made as it has been repeatedly here for
you to say when it's your turn to respond to the question that
in fact that is not what the commission recommended. I would
just ask you in the future that you clarify.
Secretary Wolfowitz. That's a fair point, Senator.
Chairman Levin. In your statement today, Mr. Secretary, on
page 3 at the top, you make the following statement. Well,
first let me go to the bottom of page 2. ``The Department's ABM
compliance review group has been directed to identify ABM
Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for
new development of treaty events. That process is already under
way.'' When did that begin?
Secretary Wolfowitz. This new procedure, I think, was
instituted by Under Secretary Aldridge within the last week or
2.
Chairman Levin. Then at the top of the next page you say
the following: ``The Secretary and I will be informed of
whether the planned test bed use of Aegis systems in future
integrated flight tests or concurrent operation of ABM and air
defense radars in next February's tests are significant treaty
violations.'' Then you made reference to those three fact
sheets that are made part of the record. You say here, you're
going to be informed as to whether they are significant treaty
violations. Are you going to distinguish between significant
treaty problems and just treaty problems? Is that word
significant supposed to tell us that you will say that if it's
a treaty problem or a treaty violation in your judgment or the
judgment of that compliance review group that then there's
going to be another test. Is it a significant violation?
Secretary Wolfowitz. It doesn't say significant violation.
It's significant problem and I have to read in the mind of the
authors who gave me the phrase. I think what it means is if
it's a prospective violation, it is a significant problem. If
you can't guarantee because of the way these things change and
alter over time that there are no treaty problems, but it
certainly better mean it's what I took it to mean that if
there's any serious prospect of a violation that this is going
to surface early.
Chairman Levin. That a violation is a violation. You're not
trying to distinguish between a serious and a non-serious
violation?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Not at all.
Chairman Levin. Alright. The next sentence, which I found
to be a really interesting sentence, I must tell you. ``This
process will permit us to take them,'' and I assume that is
referring to the treaty problems?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
Chairman Levin. ``Into account as early as possible as we
pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new strategic
framework.'' What do you mean by take into account?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I mean that it becomes part of the
considerations that the Secretary and the President have to
make. In their discussions with the Russians, it becomes
something we have to take into account in our consultations
with you and other members of Congress. It becomes something we
have to take into account in moving forward with the program.
There are different ways to go with these issues depending on
the character they raise and so, there's not a--until you see
the forum in which the issue specifically arises, it's hard to
say exactly which way you'll go with it.
Chairman Levin. See, what I'm struggling with is whether or
not the administration, the President, has decided that if
modifications cannot be agreed to with Russia, the decision has
already been made to withdraw from the treaty. That's what I'm
trying to figure out. Has it?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think there is a decision that at
some point, and I'm not sure--I think the point is a crucial
question--that at some point if we can't get modifications that
allow us to proceed with missile defense, we will withdraw from
the treaty. The question is at what point and I don't think
there's been a decision about what point.
Chairman Levin. To that point, even if all of this testing
worked out this year may not come this year?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I guess the most I can say is this
phrase that there seems to be an agreement with the
administration that we're talking about months and not years. I
mean, I think you yourself would say at some point you would
withdraw from the treaty.
Chairman Levin. I might. Not would. That's the whole
difference. You just put your finger right on it.
Secretary Wolfowitz. OK.
Chairman Levin. I read this before and Senator Warner very
appropriately asked for later comments to the administration
that if Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give
prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no
longer be a party to it. What you're telling us is that it may
or may not be the situation now because it may not be such
prompt notice. Now you're saying that at some point. That's
fine with me, by the way, because that begins to show a little
complexity in how to approach a--probably the most significant
security decision we're going to make, which is if we can't
modify the treaty, whether we're going to, in fact, withdraw
from it. What I'm trying to see is whether or not there are in
fact the beginnings of flexibility, that opening to considering
the ramifications of withdrawal.
The impact on our security of withdrawal from a treaty is a
factor to be considered. I was glad to hear you answer Senator
Warner's question about if, in fact, the modifications cannot
be agreed to whether you would come back to Congress in a
consultative process and your answer was yes. That, to me,
means that what you do in that circumstance is subject to
consultation. That, to me, means you have not made a final
decision; that no matter what the circumstances are; no matter
what the fallout out is; no matter what the reaction is; no
matter what the actions which we would then expect from Russia
and China are; no matter what anything, that you're going to
promptly withdraw from the treaty. Instead, if you're going to
be consulting with us, and I would welcome that, I gotta tell
you, before you make the decision that you're going to
withdraw, I view that as progress. I don't want to look to see
something that isn't there but I took a little bit of heart
from your answer to Senator Warner's question because it's
different. It's a different kind of a spirit to say that if
Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will consult with
Congress and come back to you as to what then, what actions,
we're going to do. If those actions are already decided, if
you've already decided that if Russia doesn't agree to the
changes that you're then going to give prompt notice under the
provisions of the treaty that you're withdrawing from it, that
puts us in a very different position. So, you can comment on
that or not.
Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me say a great deal of complexity
has been added to the President's position since the Citadel
speech that you quoted that from and even last year in May when
he made his statement about a new approach to nuclear weapons
and deterrence talked in quite elaboration about the importance
of a new approach to offensive retaliatory forces as well. I
mean, that already is a very major layer of complexity added to
what we're trying to present. When we talk about a new
framework with Russia, we're talking about something that
actually goes beyond missile defense and beyond nuclear weapons
and to incorporate a much broader view of security and one that
I think is appropriate to this era. So, we are very much trying
to take a lot of people's views into account.
Certainly, Congress is our ally but certainly also the
Russians and I do think that--I made a comment earlier which I
think you may have taken as dismissive that I didn't think this
rudimentary capability in Alaska would keep a Russian military
planner awake even for a minute. I don't believe it would. But
I in no way mean to dismiss the importance of the ABM Treaty as
something that unfortunately became the centerpiece of U.S.-
Soviet relations. We'd like to have a different centerpiece for
U.S.-Russian relations and that's what we're working on
constructing. It's going to take work and we need to work with
Congress in doing it.
Chairman Levin. Well, that's more than welcome but the
complexity, again, that I'm referring to, the layer of
complexity that I'm referring to, is the question of whether to
withdraw. The question that I'm trying to figure out the answer
to is whether or not that decision has been made to promptly
withdraw from this treaty in the event--or just a decision made
to withdraw from this treaty--in the event that the
modifications cannot be made. If, in fact, there's true
consultation that is going to take place on that question
before the decision is made, that puts us in one situation. If,
in fact, the decision has been made that there's going to be a
prompt withdrawal, in the event modifications cannot be
achieved, that seems to me to put us in a different situation
in looking at your budget request. So, I guess I'll try the
question again. Is it your judgment that the decision has been
made in the event modifications cannot be achieved to promptly
withdraw from the ABM Treaty?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I think we are at the point, as the
phrase is said, that it's a matter of months, not years, before
we reach that point. Now, does that----
Chairman Levin. Reach the point of deciding whether or
reach the point of withdrawing?
Secretary Wolfowitz. Reach the point of deciding that we
would have to.
Chairman Levin. Reach the point of deciding later on? You
have not now decided? Look, to me this is a very important
little conversation we're having here. I don't know; I can't
speak for others, but to me it's a very important conversation.
It is not something which is splitting hairs. It is something
which goes to the heart of a very important issue because we
have a responsibility, as do you, to defend this country, the
security, and to protect and defend America. We want to, it
seems to me, make sure we don't create a greater problem by
addressing the problem over here in a North Korean threat and
create a bigger problem with a larger number of nuclear weapons
on Russian or Chinese soil. The response can leave us less
secure if we don't do this right. I think most of us would like
to see a new framework. I really believe we'd like to see a new
cooperative framework. There's no difference in that regard.
The question is how best to achieve it and whether it's best to
achieve it by telling Russia we're going to withdraw if there's
no modification, or to tell Russia we may withdraw if there's
no modification, depending on how we perceive our security
circumstances at the moment that we think we have something
that might be workable. Those are very different issues and
very different ways to phrase an approach. So, I don't want to,
unless you'd like to comment further on what I just said, I'll
just go on to a couple other questions and then turn it over to
Senator Warner. Do you want to add anything.
Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't think I can add.
Chairman Levin. In the statement which was given to the
media last Wednesday the following sentence appears. The
administration made this following statement: ``As we have
informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts
will conflict with the ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of
months, not years.'' When was Russia informed that we expect
our RDT&E efforts to conflict with the ABM Treaty limitations
in a matter of months? When did we notify them?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I'm not sure, Senator. I'll have to
get that for the record.
Chairman Levin. I'd appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]

During frequent high-level discussions throughout 2001 we informed
the Russians that in pursuing the best options available for defense of
our territory, our allies, and our friends, we would come into conflict
with the ABM Treaty. We further communicated that we did not intend to
conduct tests solely designed to exceed treaty constraints, but neither
could we design tests that conformed to the treaty and still build the
most effective missile defense system.

Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Wolfowitz, I listened very carefully to your response to
Senator Reed and your responses to his question about a
violation of a treaty, the ABM Treaty, were very succinct, very
clear and consistent with what you have said in 2 days of
testimony but tightly packaged in one response. I wrote it down
as best I could quickly. You simply said, we will not violate
the ABM Treaty, isn't that correct?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. Fine. To me that puts to one side very many
concerns of others and, second, you indicated that you would
further consult with Congress, if the option--well, let me put
it this way. It would be my hope that at some point in time
this statement could somehow be embraced by the administration.
I've just sort of put it together. That the United States will
continue its consultations with our allies, negotiations with
Russia, and indeed I support the President having indicated
that withdrawal is an option, that he is commander in chief of
our forces and he must consider should he be unable to
structure a new framework and/or the option as we discussed
earlier of amendments. But that in his final decision he would
have further consultation as necessary he deems with allies and
with Congress before exercising the treaty provision of
withdrawal. Now, it would be my hope that somehow words could
be crafted along those lines. I'll just leave it at that.
Further to General Kadish, a legitimate concern has been
made that we, the United States, prove the technology before
deployment and I guess I have been around weapons system about
as long as anybody up here in Congress--30 years plus. Clearly,
a deployment decision of a new weapons system or new defense
against a weapon would only be done after the full test
evaluation, all the various steps and benchmarks were taken.
Then it's certified to the Secretary of Defense. Am I not
correct in that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That's the way we normally do our
major procurement programs. However, there is precedent and I
think it's embedded in some of our thinking here, that we may
want to take decisions a little bit earlier and take some risk
in this. No defense system is ever perfect even if it's fully
operationally tested. So, we may want to do some things
concurrently that would advance the capability with a little
bit of risk.
Senator Warner. I don't think that's any significant
departure, in my judgment, from what we have done because I
think there's several concerns that one, we would be foolishly
throwing money at the system were we to deploy it without
having gone through the normal sequence of benchmarks prior to
certification that the system can be employed and that we would
take it without pursuing which I fervently believe our
President will do, consultation with allies, negotiations with
Russia and the like. All of these things. So, I think the
testimony today has gone a long way to clearly lay a foundation
of fact that this administration is proceeding in a prudent
manner with regard to reaching at some future point in time a
deployment decision. It has met my satisfaction. I hope it has
met those of others.
Mr. Chairman, I will submit a series of questions for the
record. We are way over our time estimates here and you and I
have other commitments with regard to several questions on the
treaty itself and the necessity. I just think the general
public fully understands that this treaty constrains the United
States from developing missile defenses cooperatively with
other allies and indeed Russia. Am I not correct on that?
Secretary Wolfowitz. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Warner. That's such a fundamental proposition
because I think basically the world wants to see a greater
framework of security against the threat of these missiles and
that at some point in time our President, not unlike what
President Ronald Reagan did, would offer to share technology
and to allow this greater security to not only benefit the
United States and our allies but Russia and indeed some others.
So, I think those fundamentals have to be pointed out in very
simple, plain, good old fashioned American English language. I
intend to do just that but I commend both of you today. I think
this hearing has been a very significant step forward in
meeting the challenge of legitimate concerns of others with
regard to what this administration is doing to protect our
fundamental security against an overgrowing threat of missile
technology. I'm glad that you said today very clearly, Mr.
Secretary, that unless we come to grips with a defense against
the threats of missiles, whether they're ballistic or
intermediate, it renders almost useless the entire inventory of
weapons that we now have and seriously impairs the ability of
our Nation to help other nations when their security could be
challenged by a common enemy. Because a threat against our
Nation, should we employ forces to save another nation, could
be seriously put in jeopardy if we were threatened with
retaliation by some nation against us should do that by use of
this missile.
We also have to understand that many nations are putting
their limited resources behind acquiring this capability
because those limited resources do not enable them to have the
conventional forces and other forces to promulgate their
foreign policy even though that foreign policy may be
antithetical to our own. This is a very simple, less costly
means by which to enter the world of politics in foreign policy
and we've got to prepare ourselves to defend against it.
I thank both of you.
Chairman Levin. General Kadish, today I guess, you prepared
these three sheets for us, or the Department prepared these
three sheets for us, and they're now part of the record. When
you told the committee on June 13 that none of the recommended
activities would cause a violation of the ABM Treaty in fiscal
year 2002, were any of these activities on these three sheets
included in the recommendations at that time?
General Kadish. I think they're all being developed and
subject to the normal look by those in compliance review. As I
stated and in qualifying that it was all subject to the
compliance process.
Chairman Levin. Have there been any changes in your
proposed activities since June 13.
General Kadish. Oh yes, Senator. Lots of changes.
Chairman Levin. Since June 13?
General Kadish. Yes, sir and that is part of the problem we
have is that there's always changes to this process and as
stated earlier in the hearing it wasn't until Friday, the 13th,
that we got a modification to our latest test. So, that is why
it is so difficult for us to be precise, at least for me to be
precise, on this because planning at very low levels in our
organization on the construction projects could change a date
by months. That has treaty significance.
Chairman Levin. You gave us a booklet on June 13 laying out
what your program was and what I would appreciate your doing
for the record is telling us in what specific ways these three
sheets differ from that presentation which you made to us on
June 13.
General Kadish. We will attempt to do that.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, might I also ask unanimous
consent that I have obtained clearance, security clearance, on
the June 13 testimony which further amplifies General Kadish's
reply to your questions and the questions of others. I would
ask unanimous consent that that be placed in today's record. I
presume this would be an appropriate juncture.
Chairman Levin. It would be. It would be very helpful, as a
matter of fact. I appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]

The June 13 booklet was provided to provide information about the
status of the program, not to provide information related to treaty
issues. The fact sheets provided on July 17 set forth information
related more specifically to treaty issues. From June 13 to July 17,
the planning the testing and development program continued, decisions
were made and the fact sheets document some of those decisions. The
fact sheets are attached.

Chairman Levin. First, let me say relative to Senator's
Warner's comments about a formulation of a position that I
commended to you. It's something I've been urging for quite
some time, which is that the President, rather than saying he's
going to withdraw from the treaty if modifications are not
agreed to, state that he's going to consider the option to
withdraw in that event. It's a very significant statement and
it's significantly better, I believe, both in terms of trying
to obtain an agreement but also in terms of working with
Congress. This is really what the position has been of Congress
for some time, at least in the Senate. Senator Warner, then
Senator Cohen, Senator Nunn and I talked about getting
ourselves in a position to have capability so that a president
could determine whether or not to withdraw based on the nature
of the threat, based on whether or not overall we'd be more
secure with a withdrawal, based on operational effectiveness,
based on impact on arms reductions, based on cost
effectiveness.
Those factors were put into a bill that the four of us
worked on in the mid-1990s so that the President would be in a
position to decide whether or not to exercise the treaty
provision relative to withdrawal. In that formulation that
Senator Warner just made about the President stating that if
modifications were not available, and were not achievable, that
then he would consider that option, it seems to me is
consistent with the position that we have wanted each President
to be in since we've started down the road of research and
development of a missile defense.
In terms of wanting another framework, I think everyone of
us would like to see a new framework. But we also would like to
see a new framework in place before the old one is destroyed
unilaterally--before it's torn down. That is going to take some
real effort and it's worth trying for but it's very different
from saying we're going to tear down the old before we have a
new one--to say we would like to get to a new one and here's
why. That's a matter of persuading folks that it is in their
interest and our interest to be able to defend against that
rogue state or that accidental launch. Both of those are
useful. But it also means that we don't want to do it in a way
which could put us in a less secure position. That would
actually add to our insecurity because of the unilateral action
which then precipitates a response on the part of Russia and
China to overcome what they consider to be a threat to their
security. We may not understand why it's a threat to their
security but if they feel that way, they're going to act.
They're going to respond if they feel threatened by our
unilateral action. We should at least factor that into our
thinking--not be stymied by it, not give anyone a veto--just be
aware of what that response is and consider whether or not,
given what the likely response might be, we would be left in a
more or less secure position.
Thank you. You both have been very helpful. These have been
long hearings, but helpful hearings. We will keep the record
open for 24 hours for those of our colleagues that have
additional questions. There is material you're going to be
submitting for the record. We stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

ALLIES, RUSSIA AND CHINA

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, the administration released
a paper during the week of July 9, 2001 that stated that it had
``informed our allies and Russia'' of its expectation that the
ballistic missile program will ``conflict'' with the ABM Treaty in
months, not years.
What exactly has the administration told our allies and Russia?
When did you tell them?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We have informed them on several occasions
that in pursuing the best options available for defense of our
territory, our allies, and our friends, we will come into conflict with
the ABM Treaty in months, not years. We communicated that we do not
intend to conduct tests solely designed to exceed Treaty constraints,
nor do we intend to design tests to conform to, or stay within the
confines of the Treaty.
Additionally, we have told them that we hope and expect to have
reached an understanding with Russia by the time our development
program bumps up against the constraints of the ABM Treaty, and that we
would prefer a cooperative outcome. In this context, we have told our
friends and allies that we intend to continue our consultations with
them as our discussions with Russia proceed.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, what, if anything, has the
administration told China?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We have communicated the same information to
China.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, did the administration tell
these nations that you do not plan on modifying the ABM Treaty, but
rather to move away from it in the hope of a new framework?
Secretary Wolfowitz. We have informed these nations that we plan to
move beyond the constraints of the 1972 ABM Treaty--which the President
has called ``an artifact of the Cold War confrontation'' that prevents
us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against
new threats and that perpetuates an adversarial relationship with
Russia.

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, has the administration
considered, or ruled out, the option of deploying long-range
interceptor missiles in NATO or other allied nations? If so, has the
administration discussed such an option with our allies?
Secretary Wolfowitz. As the President has stated, missile defenses
will be designed to protect the United States, deployed forces, and its
friends and allies. To accomplish this mission, the Department of
Defense is exploring a wide range of technologies and basing modes that
could contribute to an effective missile defense program. Therefore, we
have not ruled out the possibility of needing to deploy interceptors on
allied territory, though no decisions have been made. Over the past
several months we have been involved in an intense dialogue with our
allies and friends on missile defense issues. In these discussions, a
number of allies have expressed interest in participating in U.S.
missile defense plans. We expect these discussions to continue and
expand.

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

5. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, your prepared statement from
July 12 stated: ``We hope and expect to have reached an understanding
with Russia by the time our development program bumps up against the
constraints of the ABM Treaty.''
Why do you expect to have reached agreement with Russia within this
near term period, which you described elsewhere in your statement as
``in months rather than in years''? Are there any indications from the
Russians that they are willing to reach agreement on a new strategic
framework, or to amend the ABM Treaty?
Secretary Wolfowitz. My reason for optimism is that I think we have
a fundamentally different relationship with Russia than we had with the
Soviet Union. I do not think that the Russians have to lay awake nights
worrying about our attacking them with nuclear missiles, nor do we need
to worry about the Russians attacking us. What the Russians are looking
for is a new framework of relations that addresses the real security
needs of this era. Both the United States and Russia have a very
substantial common interest in maintaining stability in Europe and
Asia. Working together on stabilizing those critical areas of the world
is the cornerstone of strategic stability today. I believe that as we
deepen our strategic framework discussions with the Russians--which are
well underway--we will begin to make some progress.

6. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, what is the U.S. proposing
for a strategic framework with Russia on the following elements:
offensive nuclear forces, defensive forces, threat reduction and
nonproliferation?
Secretary Wolfowitz. President Bush has called for the development
of a new strategic relationship with Russia based on openness, mutual
confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, which recognize the
fundamental changes in the international security environment.
In the missile defense area, we are prepared to examine a range of
cooperative activities with Russia such as the sharing of early warning
information, sensor technology, and expansion of our existing U.S.-
Russia Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) Exercise. With regard to offensive
nuclear forces, we see the new framework including substantial
reductions in offensive nuclear forces
In the threat reduction area, we are prepared to assist in
deactivating additional nuclear warheads, destroying strategic delivery
systems, and improving accountability, storage and transport security
for deactivated warheads. With regard to nonproliferation, the U.S. and
Russia could establish a defense-to-defense dialogue on proliferation
concerns and the challenges to regional and global security posed by
the acquisition of longer-range missiles and WMD in regions of
instability. We could also work together in areas of shared
proliferation concern to identify approaches that can reduce the risks
of instability.

LEGAL BASIS FOR R&D FUNDING OF A MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT

7. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Defense Department
budget proposal for fiscal year 2002 requests research and development
funding to construct five missile silos at Fort Greely, Alaska for NMD
interceptor test missiles. Section 2353 of Title 10, U.S. Code,
prohibits the use of research and development funding for ``new
construction,'' and the five proposed silos are clearly ``new
construction.'' The Department has not requested, and Congress has not
approved, military construction funds specifically for building these
new silos at Fort Greely.
What is the legal authority for requesting research and development
funding for this new construction?
Section 2802 of Title 10, U.S. Code, states that military
construction projects require an authorization in law. They also
require an appropriation. If you are seeking neither of these required
elements for military construction funds for construction at Fort
Greely, would the construction you propose conflict with the law?
General Kadish. The construction at Fort Greely, Alaska will be a
portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense System Test Bed. Section 2353
of Title 10, United States Code authorizes construction and acquisition
of research, developmental or test facilities needed for the
performance of a research or development contract using Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, provided that the
facilities constructed do not have ``general utility.'' Because some of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System Test Bed facilities to be improved
or constructed may have general utility, the Department of Defense has
proposed new legislation to establish that RDT&E funds may lawfully be
used for the purpose of constructing the Ballistic Missile Defense
System Test Bed.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is proceeding in fiscal
year 2001 with site preparation work for the portion of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System Test Bed located at Fort Greely, Alaska using
the authorization and appropriations of the Fiscal Year 2001 National
Defense Authorization Act and Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction
Appropriations Act. The Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization
Act provided project authorization at unspecified worldwide locations
in the amount of $451,135,000. It also provided an authorization of
appropriations for such military construction projects at unspecified
worldwide locations in the amount of $85,095,000. The Fiscal Year 2001
Military Construction Appropriations Act provided a lump sum
appropriation for ``Military Construction, Defense-Wide,'' of which the
table in the accompanying conference report indicates $85,095,000 was
intended for ``NMD Initial Deployment Facilities (Phase I).'' It is
critical to the initial deployment of a ballistic missile defense
system for the United States that the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization provides for robust testing in an environment that
resembles as closely as possible a realistic, operational environment.
The construction of the Test Bed facility at Fort Greely is consistent
with and is a necessary and prudent intermediate step toward the
ultimate construction of an initial deployment facility at Fort Greely.
Such activities comport with both the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction
Appropriations Act.

KODIAK AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORT GREELY

8. Senator Levin. General Kadish, you have indicated that you
intend to launch test interceptors from Kodiak Island, but not Fort
Greely, yet you propose putting test missile silos at both Kodiak
Island and Fort Greely.
Would it be possible to just use Kodiak, and put as many test silos
(and other assets) there as you are proposing to put at Kodiak and
Greely combined? Why couldn't such test assets placed at Kodiak have
just as much ``residual operational capability'' as those you plan to
place at Fort Greely?
General Kadish. First, it is important to note that Kodiak could
not provide as effective a missile defense as Fort Greely because the
Kodiak silos would be ineffective against select and specific
trajectories. Thus, Kodiak could not provide the same ``residual
operational capability.''
As a launch site within a test bed, Kodiak has advantages, but even
then, unlike Fort Greely, it could not allow for proving out and
testing of operations in a realistic arctic environment. Silo
construction, silo and interceptor maintenance procedures, system
acceptance and turnover, training development, and system operations
would all be different at Kodiak.
Kodiak has insufficient space for five silos, and there would be no
room for growth should such a decision be taken. In addition, since
Kodiak is not Federal land, it cannot assure the same force protection
and physical security as Fort Greely. Site-specific facility designs
have not been started, and environmental requirements are not complete
for Kodiak, while they are approaching completion for Fort Greely.
Finally, it would be duplicative and wasteful to build the required
communications and battle management infrastructure at both Fort Greely
and Kodiak. These elements will be needed at Fort Greely for any
operational system, so it would be cost prohibitive to construct test
versions at Kodiak, as well.

9. Senator Levin. General Kadish, is there anything you can do with
a silo at Fort Greely that is impossible to do with a silo at Kodiak?
General Kadish. Yes, Fort Greely can provide for proving out and
testing of operations in a realistic arctic environment, while Kodiak
cannot. Silo construction, silo and interceptor maintenance procedures,
system acceptance and turnover, training development, and system
operations would all be different at Kodiak.
In addition, since Kodiak is not Federal land, it cannot assure the
same force protection and physical security as Fort Greely. Site-
specific facility designs have not been started, and environmental
requirements are not complete for Kodiak.

TEST MISSILES FOR LONG TERM TESTING

10. Senator Levin. General Kadish, you propose to build five test
silos at Fort Greely and place test interceptors in them on a long-term
basis for logistics and maintenance testing, to make sure electronics
work, and that you understand everything you want to know about the
missiles. There would be test missiles, rather than fully developed,
tested and operationally deployed missiles. Is it typical for a missile
test program like this to build 5 test missiles just to store them in
silos and never fire them?
General Kadish. Although this is not a typical program, it is
typical to build missiles for long-term storage testing in projected
deployment climates as part of shelf-life reliability assessment
programs. It is also typical to test missiles in the full range of
expected deployment climates. In order to verify the functionality of a
complex system such as this, and to launch and engage several missiles
simultaneously, multiple silos are required. The test bed requires five
silos to simulate a maximum Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense
salvo. Five silos are also a reasonable sample to construct, load, and
observe interceptors in an arctic environment.

11. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do we do such testing now at
either Vandenberg Air Force Base or at the launch site at Kwajalein,
where we have test silos for missile launches?
General Kadish. No. The target missile and ground-based interceptor
launched from existing ranges are put in place a few weeks prior to the
scheduled test execution date.

12. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do we now do this sort of thing
anywhere else, where we basically deploy these missiles permanently
just to test them for logistics and maintenance issues, knowing that
they are not operational missiles?
General Kadish. Yes, we typically employ test missiles for
logistical and interface verification purposes. For example, this
testing approach was used for the Hawk missile system. A battery of
Hawk missiles along with all complete operational support equipment was
emplaced at Redstone Arsenal for the purpose of testing. All changes to
the system and first article testing were performed on the battery of
Hawk missiles.
The test bed missiles will not be operational and will be built to
test out the interface and functionality of the ground based mid-course
system, which is very complex. The missile along with functional Launch
Site Components, Command Launch Equipment, and Environmental Control
Systems will be stored for a period of years in the environment
expected during deployment and sustainment. These missiles will
eventually be removed from the silos at Fort Greely and taken to a test
range for Live Fire Testing. This approach adds realism to the
Reliability Test Program.

13. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do we do this sort of permanent
testing deployment with any operational missiles; as opposed to
developmental or surrogate test missiles, where we place them in silos
or launchers for long periods for the exclusive purpose of testing them
in logistics and maintenance issues?
General Kadish. No, it is not typical to permanently deploy
operational missiles in a testing deployment. We do, however, conduct
testing deployments and simulations for our ICBM forces at Vandenberg
AFB and at their operational bases.
However, it is not unusual to construct and deploy permanent
testing facilities when developing missile programs. For example, the
U.S. ICBM program constructed permanent silos and support facilities
for each type of ICBM developed. These facilities allowed the proving
out of logistical, maintenance, and operational procedures prior to the
system's deployment and construction of operational facilities. Many of
these facilities remain in use to support the Follow-on Operational
Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) of our current ICBM force.
Testing of operational ICBMs does occur at the operational base as
well. Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman (SELM) exercises isolated
10 missiles from the operational wing for a period of approximately 1
month. During these exercises, the Minuteman ICBMs are put through a
series of ground tests and then given orders to launch. The missiles
are safed to prevent the firing of the motors. These end-to-end tests
help provide confidence in the force.
Yes, we typically employ test missiles for logistical and interface
verification purposes. For example, this testing approach was used for
the Hawk missile system. A battery of Hawk missiles along with all
complete operational support equipment was emplaced at Redstone Arsenal
for the purpose of testing. All changes to the system and first article
testing were performed on the battery of Hawk missiles.

14. Senator Levin. General Kadish, how much funding is proposed in
the fiscal year 2002 budget request for building the silos at Fort
Greely?
General Kadish. Of the $273.121 million programmed for the
Ballistic Missile Defense test bed facilities construction, $168.645
million is programmed for the Ground Based Interceptor. $20.911 million
of this amount is allocated to prepare Fort Greely for the five missile
silos.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR FORT GREELY

15. Senator Levin. General Kadish, has an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) been prepared in accordance with the requirements of
the National Environmental Protection Act for the construction of the
five proposed test silos and placement of interceptor missiles at Fort
Greely?
General Kadish. Yes. The National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was final December 15, 2000.
One of the five alternative locations analyzed in the EIS for the
construction of up to 100 NMD missile silos and placement of up to one
hundred missiles was Fort Greely, AK. The Fort Greely portion of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System test bed proposal is essentially a
down-scoped version of the deployment proposal analyzed in the NMD
Deployment EIS. Accordingly, the environmental consequences associated
with the Fort Greely portion of the test bed proposal are not expected
to differ materially from those already analyzed in that EIS, but are
anticipated to be reduced in scope and intensity.

16. Senator Levin. General Kadish, if so, when was it completed and
issued?
General Kadish. December 15, 2000.

17. Senator Levin. General Kadish, if so, please provide the
committee with the relevant portions of the EIS that deal with the
specific proposal to build five test silos and emplace test missiles at
Fort Greely.
General Kadish. Relevant portions of sections 2, 3, and 4 are
provided that analyze activities of like kind at Fort Greely.
(Information retained in committee files.)

18. Senator Levin. General Kadish, has a Record of Decision been
issued for this specific proposal to build five test silos and emplace
five interceptor missiles in these silos? If so, please provide the
committee with the relevant portions of the Record of Decision
pertaining to this specific proposal.
General Kadish. No Record of Decision has been issued for the
specific proposal to construct five test silos and emplace five
interceptor missiles in these silos. BMDO would issue a Record of
Decision before it awards a contract to begin test bed site preparation
work. The relevant portions of a Record of Decision pertaining to this
specific proposal would be provided to the committee upon its issue.
NOTE: A Record of Decision dated August 10, 2001 was signed and
published in the August 15, 2001 Federal Register. Contract award date
was August 18, 2001.

19. Senator Levin. General Kadish, was there a ``Finding of No
Significant Impact'' for this specific construction proposal?
General Kadish. No. A ``Finding of No Significant Impact'' (FONSI)
would not be issued for this specific construction proposal. In
accordance with the implementing regulations of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a FONSI is issued in conjunction with
an environmental assessment (EA) process, to document no significant
impacts were identified for activities analyzed in the EA process. The
NEPA process that analyzed the NMD activities at Fort Greely was an
environmental impact statement (EIS).

COBRA DANE RADAR UPGRADE

20. Senator Levin. General Kadish, how much funding is included in
the fiscal year 2002 budget to upgrade the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya?
Precisely what activities are funded? According to your proposal, when
would upgrade begin and when would it be completed?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 budget contains $55.0 million
to begin the Cobra Dane radar upgrades on Shemya Island, AK. The effort
would begin in fiscal year 2002 and be completed in fiscal year 2004.
Boeing, the Prime Contractor, would upgrade the existing data
processor, modify Midcourse Defense Segment software to accommodate L-
Band system radar inputs (from Cobra Dane), provide for a SATCOM link
to the BMC\3\ node at Fort Greely, and provide final integration and
testing. In addition, the fiscal year 2002 construction requirements
are $44.566 million for facilities and power requirements upgrades at
Eareckson Air Station.

21. Senator Levin. General Kadish, what is the missile defense test
purpose for this proposed radar upgrade, and what would it do that the
existing test range capability does not do?
General Kadish. The test approaches being considered include flying
air-launched targets into the Cobra Dane's field of view. The air-
launched targets provide realistic target opportunities for Cobra Dane
and would allow interplay between the radar and BMC\3\. The use of
Cobra Dane in such operationally representative test scenarios would
provide test data that are relevant to evaluating system development
concepts and performance against a wider range of test parameters.
Additionally, employing Cobra Dane in the BMD test scenarios would
allow the radar to utilize legacy capabilities against targets of
opportunity. Existing prototype and surrogate radars at Kwajalein and
Hawaii cannot provide for such realistic tests on realistic geometries.

22. Senator Levin. General Kadish, can the Cobra Dane radar, either
now or after the proposed upgrade, see target missiles launched from
Vandenberg Air Force Base or from Kodiak, Alaska?
General Kadish. No. None of the planned upgrades will change Cobra
Dane's field of view to the point where it will detect targets launched
from Vandenberg or Kodiak along their customary trajectories. Note that
Cobra Dane is in the architecture as a surrogate for a forward deployed
early warning radar. Shemya's geographic relationship to Vandenberg
clearly precludes this function for Vandenberg launched targets. Cobra
DaneS's primary utility will involve air- or other mobile-launched
targets.

23. Senator Levin. General Kadish, General Franklin told committee
staff that the upgraded Cobra Dane radar would be able to look westward
over the Pacific to track a Long-Range Air Launched Target that is
under development. Do you have fiscal year 2002 funding proposed for
development of an ICBM-class air launched target? If so, how much?
General Kadish. A specific request for funding of an Air Launched
Target in fiscal year 2002 was not made. A study is currently underway
to look at development of an increased target launch capability
(payload and range). In fiscal year 2002, $10 million has been
requested for this study.

24. Senator Levin. General Kadish, when do you plan on first using
this target in a test with the Cobra Dane radar?
General Kadish. The use of the Long-Range Air Launched Target is
part of a study to improve testing. The planned use will be determined
based on the results of that study.

25. Senator Levin. General Kadish, what will this target's range be
during this test?
General Kadish. The desired target performance parameters will be a
product of the study.

26. Senator Levin. General Kadish, since that target does not yet
exist, and it may turn out not to be a long-range target, why is the
Department requesting funding in fiscal year 2002 to upgrade the Cobra
Dane radar?
General Kadish. The funding requested for the Cobra Dane radar in
fiscal year 2002 will only initiate hardware and software upgrades. The
Cobra Dane upgrade would assist in development of both the X-Band and
upgraded early warning radar (UEWR) systems, which would be used in an
operational ground-based midcourse defense. The Cobra Dane upgrades
will also allow the BMD program to learn earlier about how such a radar
and BMC\3\ interoperate. In addition, the short construction window at
Shemya means that the time required to install and test the planned
upgrades to the Cobra Dane radar and supporting facilities will require
more than a single construction season to complete. It is therefore
prudent to begin this activity as soon as possible.

27. Senator Levin. General Kadish, would the proposed Cobra Dane
radar upgrade make sense if you did not build the five interceptor
silos at Fort Greely? What is the connection between the upgrade of the
Cobra Dane radar and building five silos at Fort Greely that will never
launch test missiles?
General Kadish. Yes, the proposed Cobra Dane upgrades make sense
even without the five planned silos at Fort Greely. Both the Cobra Dane
radar and the five Fort Greely silos are part of the overall test bed
architecture that is intended to allow more robust and realistic
testing of the ground-based midcourse element of the BMD System.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Max Cleland

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

28. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, according to the briefing you
presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 13 June, the
earliest, ``high risk'' deployment for the various missile defense
systems under consideration are 2009 for Airborne Laser, 2010 for sea-
based systems, and 2006 for a ground-based system designed to intercept
missiles in mid-course. The only system whose earliest, high-risk
deployment was claimed to be 2004 is the ground-based system designed
to intercept missiles in the missile's terminal phase. Is this correct?
I define the term ``high risk'' to mean that these programs have a
probability for success that is lower than what is generally acceptable
for defense programs, and that rushing these programs is likely to lead
to expenditures and blind alleys that might be avoided with a more
deliberate research and testing schedule. Is that correct?
General Kadish. You are correct regarding our planned fielding
dates for the Airborne Laser, the Sea-based system and the Ground-based
portion of the Mid-course segment. However, all of our programs have
been restructured to support an earlier contingency capability in the
2004 timeframe.
By its very nature, building a ballistic missile defense is an
extremely complex undertaking and is inherently high-risk. The ABL,
Sea-based Mid-course, Ground-based Mid-course systems are all high-risk
ventures in the traditional sense because they are all truly ``state of
the art'' efforts. The Ballistic Missile Defense Program is as complex
as any in our Nation's history. However, we intend our highly rigorous
testing and risk-reduction efforts to prevent us from entering ``blind
alleys.'' We are dedicated to these testing and risk-reduction efforts
and confident they will serve their intended purpose.

ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

29. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, are you aware that the
military services have identified $32.4 billion in requirements that
are not funded in the administration's fiscal year 2002 budget
amendment? In light of these very tangible unfunded requirements, how
do you justify asking for an additional $3 billion for missile defense
when Saturday's test indicates that the current program, as funded last
year and programmed for the next several years, is making progress?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The priority the Department places on missile
defense reflects the current administration's understanding of the
growing threat the United States faces from short-, medium-, and long-
range ballistic missiles. While we are just beginning to field systems
to reliably counter the shorter-range threats, there is still much work
to be done before we will be in a position to deploy capabilities to
protect U.S. and allied cities and troops against the emerging longer-
range threats from rogue states, whose leaderships may use these
offensive capabilities for purposes of terror, coercion, or aggression.
While we currently have deployed many systems to counter threats
from the land, sea, and air, and we have initiatives and operations to
take care of numerous other defense needs, today we have no capability
against longer-range threats against the American population. Nor do we
currently have a capability to defeat the medium- and intermediate
threats that could threaten our troops and allied and friendly cities
this decade. Much like the threat we expect to face, the Ballistic
Missile Defense System we are endeavoring to deploy is unprecedented.
The administration will pursue a robust missile defense research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program to acquire the
capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon
as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our
friends and allies. The proposed missile defense funding for fiscal
year 2002 represents our commitment to developing a rigorous test
program, which will be essential to our ability to determine which
technologies and basing modes will be most effective against what by
all measures is a very dynamic threat. Early deployed capabilities may
be expected to provide more protection than we currently have.
Missile defense technologies have been under development for years.
Many of the technologies required to build an effective BMD System are
in hand and are improving year by year. The challenge before missile
defense developers is in engineering the system. We will increase our
knowledge of system capabilities over time through our RDT&E
activities, and especially our testing program. These activities will
give us a sound understanding of the technological and engineering
possibilities inherent in the system we intend to deploy.

BUDGET/ARCHITECTURE

30. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, in testimony last
Thursday, General Kadish stated that your missile defense proposal has
no milestones by which to measure progress. At the Frontier Institute
last Friday, Secretary Rumsfeld said that: ``We don't have a proposed
[missile defense] architecture. All we have is a series of . . . very
interesting research and development and testing programs . . .'' In
fiscal year 2001, the entire Department of Defense spent $9 billion on
all basic research and development alone. How can you justify spending
$8 billion on missile defense if you have no milestones, requirements,
or architecture in mind? If you don't know what you are going to do,
how can you know what it will cost?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The Ballistic Missile Defense program includes
funding for research, development, testing and procurement. Procurement
activity and funding will be transferred to the Service responsible for
the acquisition, and these pro rams--namely PAC-3 and Navy Area
Defense--have traditional milestones. The remaining missile defense
activity, which encompasses a significant majority of the funding, is
for research, development, and testing, and is directed by the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. There are no procurement
activities in the current BMDO program, but there are decision points.
The goal of the program is to have sufficient information at these
decision points to determine whether we should proceed with procurement
and deployment of particular systems. At this point, our plan is to
test as robustly and rapidly as possible all systems under development
so we can provide the necessary information to decisionmakers.
Therefore, although there is no architecture, per se, there are
distinct points at which we will measure progress.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

31. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, what specific missile
defense-related activities will take place in Alaska in fiscal year
2001?
Has the Compliance Review Group or the DOD General Counsel ruled on
whether each of these actions violate the ABM Treaty?
Were there any dissenting opinions expressed by the legal experts
consulted on the legality of the preparations that you intend to carry
out this year?
Are there any missile defense plans outside of Alaska in fiscal
year 2001 which raise significant compliance issues with respect to the
ABM Treaty? If so, please give us the views of the Compliance Review
Group and General Counsel as well as any dissenting views on each such
plan. Will you assure us that there will be no violations of the ABM
Treaty during the remainder of fiscal year 2001? During fiscal year
2002?
Secretary Wolfowitz. In fiscal year 2001, BMDO is scheduled to
begin site preparation activities, which will include clearing,
excavating and grading the site at Ft. Greely, AK.
In accordance with the procedures set forth in DOD Directive
2060.1, the General Counsel for the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization reviewed the planned activities and determined that they
did not reasonably raise any issue of compliance with the ABM Treaty.
As permitted under the Directive, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics was informed of this
determination.
No. The determination was based on the plain language of the
relevant Treaty documents. Furthermore, the determination was well
within the prior consensus of the legal community established during
consideration of when construction of the Shemya radar would be
considered to first violate the ABM Treaty.
There are no missile defense plans outside of Alaska in fiscal year
2001 which raise significant issues with respect to the ABM Treaty. The
Secretary of Defense has assured Congress that the Department will
comply with the law.

32. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, is prep work on a missile test
facility at Alaska being contracted for this year? What funds are to be
used for this work? For what purpose were these funds authorized and
appropriated?
General Kadish. Yes, work for the test bed is intended to be
contracted in fiscal year 2001. BMDO notified Congress on 16 July 2001
of its intent to solicit a proposal and subsequently anticipates award
of a construction contract for initial site preparation of a test bed
at Fort Greely, Alaska, using the authority and appropriations provided
in the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction (MILCON) Authorization
and Appropriations Acts.
Congress authorized the Department of Defense Agencies to carry out
a $451.135 million MILCON project, for which Congress appropriated
$85.095 million in fiscal year 2001 for the National Missile Defense
(NMD) Initial Deployment Facilities, Phase I.
The test bed is essentially a limited portion of the Fiscal Year
2001 NMD MILCON project, sized appropriately for a testing, not
operational, mission. The site preparation work planned for Fort Greely
in fiscal year 2001 will be a small portion of the same work authorized
for the GBI site construction work. The site preparation contract is
not expected to exceed $9.0 million.
NOTE: The contract to begin site preparation work was awarded on
August 18, 2001.

33. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, the proposal to build
interceptor silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, is part of a proposed
expansion of the BMD test infrastructure. (a) Exactly what would those
silos be for, and (b) what would they add to the test infrastructure
that either doesn't exist elsewhere or could not exist elsewhere? (c)
How much funding is proposed in the budget request for building the
silos at Fort Greely? (About $200 million) That sounds like a lot of
money to spend in a single year on construction. (d) Given the short
construction season in Alaska (I understand it's about 8 weeks), how do
you plan to spend that much money in a single year, from a ``standing
start?''
General Kadish. The elements of the test bed at Fort Greely would
allow us to test interceptors and associated command launch equipment
in an operationally realistic environment. Operational aspects that
will be tested include Battle Management, Command, Control, and
Communications throughout the system, from radars and sensors in
various parts of the world all the way to the silos, including critical
digital message timing. Operations in an Arctic environment, such as
silo construction, silo and interceptor maintenance procedures and
planning and rehearsal for system acceptance and turnover, can be
developed and tested in no other location, not even Kodiak.
The test bed requires five silos to simulate a maximum Ground-Based
Midcourse Missile Defense salvo. Five silos are also a reasonable
number to construct, load, and observe interceptors in an arctic
environment. Other factors that were considered arise from the fact
that Fort Greely is optimally suited to be a future deployment
location. Because of this, environmental requirements and site specific
facility plans are complete; enough land is available, both for the
initial five silos and for a future expansion if authorized; and
Federal ownership provides force protection and physical security.
Of the $273.121 million programmed for the test bed facilities
construction, $168.645 million is programmed for the Ground Based
Interceptor. $20.911 million of this amount is allocated for the five
missile silos at Fort Greely. The construction season for central
Alaska is from approximately April through October. This totals about
28-32 weeks per year depending on weather delays. The first year's
expenses include mobilization costs, procurement by the contractor for
long lead items, and the costs for foundation work and enclosing the
facilities. After enclosure of facilities, some inside work can
continue into the winter season. It is anticipated and planned that all
requested funds will be obligated during the fiscal year.

34. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, your testimony from last week
indicated that a test bed activity consisting of five test interceptors
in silos at Fort Greely linked to an upgraded Cobra Dane radar could
provide an emergency operational capability for limited missile
defense. When does a test bed activity become an operational capability
and what needs to happen to change its status? What is the difference
between the two? What can a test facility do that an operational
facility cannot do and vice versa? At what point would either activity
conflict with the ABM Treaty?
General Kadish. The interceptors in silos at Fort Greely will be
used to conduct realistic ground testing and gain experience working
with a variety of different aspects of missile defense, including
integration of critical system interfaces, maintenance, security, and
construction. These crucial aspects of developing our capability will
not include operational command and control (C\2\) linked to the
National Command Authority, but rather a test command and control
configured for safety. The test bed could not become an operational
capability until the operational C\2\ infrastructure, which is part of
the National Command Authority, is put into place and direction is
given to make the site operational. The test facility will only launch
interceptors from Kodiak and only after significant preparation. An
emergency operational capability would be able to launch interceptors
from Fort Greely if needed. Although ABM Treaty issues are not within
my purview, I understand that the compliance questions have not yet
been resolved.

35. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, if Fort Greely is intended as
a test bed site, is it correct that no test interceptors would be
launched from Fort Greely, but instead the missiles would be stored
there in silos, and that interceptor test launches would instead be
conducted from Kodiak Island? Under what conditions, if any, would you
launch interceptors from Fort Greely?
General Kadish. It is true that current plans call for test
interceptors to be launched only from Kodiak Island. It would be
desirable to be able to launch test missiles from Fort Greely.
Investigations into the safety and environmental issues involved with
future test launches from Fort Greely are ongoing. Under current plans,
interceptors would be launched from Fort Greely only in an emergency.

36. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, at the outset of this
administration's defense review, we in Congress were assured that major
defense program changes would be deferred until after the completion of
the strategic review. That review is still ongoing. Notwithstanding
congressional support for the previous administration's program of
missile defense research and development, adding $3 billion to that
program is, by any definition, a major defense program change. Why has
this administration selectively chosen to accelerate missile defense
programs in violation of your own previously established guideline?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The Department initiated several major reviews
at the outset of the administration. The defense strategy review is
ongoing, and most major defense program changes will await the outcome
of that review. The Department also initiated a missile defense review,
which is completed, and the results briefed to Congress. Missile
defense is one of the Administration's top priorities, and it was
important to implement the results of the review as soon as possible.
The budget increase request for missile defense was part of this
implementation.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

37. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, you have stated in your
testimony that there are no milestones or other elements of major
defense acquisition program architecture by which we can measure
progress with the new missile defense approach you have proposed, but
you have also indicated that you have ``internal plans'' that provide
detail on the specific things for which the money is being requested.
Provide for the record, and in as much detail as is available, the
internal plans for spending the money you are asking for in the fiscal
year 2002 budget request.
General Kadish. The Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission has
been delivered to Congress with additional program details. BMDO will
monitor the development of our systems through disciplined, internal
engineering and program management processes. The only change we are
proposing is how the Department oversees our progress. In lieu of the
formal Milestone review, which occurs at intervals often spanning
several years, the Department is planning to review BMD at a senior
level in a formal process on an annual basis. These incremental steps
allow technologies that are proven successful to continue to mature or
be accelerated and those that do not prove successful to be slowed or
terminated.
At an oversight level, a senior executive council, chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, will provide BMDO guidance and direction.
The top-down oversight will enable BMDO to carry out our new approach
with shorter lines of communication and authority. BMDO will have the
flexibility to adjust program priorities and will support major annual
reviews with the oversight council to refresh policy and strategic
framework for program direction. During these annual reviews, the
oversight council will make executive level decisions to deploy,
accelerate, truncate or modify capabilities or elements of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System, major programming decisions, and
execution year adjustments. The review process will help make decisions
to shape the evolving systems and allocate resources to optimally
support missile defense. Congress will have insight into detailed
spending plans through the budget submissions provided by the
Department.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT READINESS REVIEW

38. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, many theater missile defense
programs that were funded under BMDO last year have been broken out to
the services in this budget request. Provide for the record the exact
amount of money that was authorized and appropriated for Patriot,
Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and Navy Area Wide program in the
fiscal year 2001 Appropriations Act. Provide also the dollar amount of
BMDO funding that you expect will have been spent, obligated, or
otherwise committed for each of these programs as of 30 September 2001.
General Kadish. The appropriated and authorized funding is the same
and is as follows:

[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expected
Obligation Rate
\1\ (Percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDT&E:
PAC-3................................ 81.016 99
Theater High Altitude Area Defense... 549.945 97
Navy Area Program.................... 274.234 96

Procurement:
PAC-3................................ 365.457 70
Theater High Altitude Area Defense... 0.000
Navy Area Program.................... 0.000

MILCON:
PAC-3................................ 0.000
Theater High Altitude Area Defense... 0.000
Navy Area Program.................... 0.000

--------------------------------
Total:
PAC-3.............................. 446.473 N/A
Theater High Altitude Area Defense. 549.945 N/A
Navy Area Program.................. 274.234 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Obligation rates apply to the current program funding which differs
from the authorized/appropriated funding position.

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE READINESS REVIEW

39. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, the National Missile Defense
Deployment Readiness Review is critical of the current program.
Specifically, it notes problems in situations with ``phantom tracks''
where interceptors were accidentally launched despite operator's
attempts to override the system. It also indicates flight tests to date
have been ``dumbed down'' by reducing the number of decoys and
utilizing canned scenarios. Despite this, the system has met deployment
readiness criteria. Specifically, ``it has not achieved two intercepts
nor demonstrated integrated system performance with a successful
intercept.'' What steps are being taken to address the concerns
expressed in this report?
General Kadish. The NMD Deployment Readiness Review evaluated the
previous administration's National Missile Defense program, not the
Ballistic Missile Defense program that is currently planned. The
previous administration's plan was to undertake development and testing
for three years, review the results and then determine whether to
deploy over a three year period. The Deployment Readiness Review
documented whether the previous administration's program had met its
stated criteria supporting a decision to deploy. In contrast, the
planned approach is a research, development, testing and evaluation
effort that will allow more robust testing, including software testing.
It appears that the question is in fact referring to the DOT&E
Report incident to the DRR process, which raised several valid points
about testing which would be applicable to the current program. BMDO
has taken several steps to address those concerns. The Battle
Management Command, Control, and Communications (BMC\3\) software
accurately correlates sensor data with good covariance estimates;
however, duplicate tracks may temporarily be created in the system
track file due to real-world sensor uncertainty in reporting their
track data covariance estimates to BMC\3\. The BMC\3\ software
correlation process automatically recognizes and purges these temporary
duplicate tracks within a few sensor-reporting cycles. It does not
become "confused" as to which target cluster(s) to engage, since
engagements are only planned against stable system tracks. This
reported problem was a development maturity issue identified during
earlier testing, and it has since been corrected.
Testing has not been simplified in order to guarantee success.
Rather, we are ensuring that we know how to walk before we begin to
run. Flight testing up to this point, as well as tests for the
foreseeable future, has been designed to prove that hit-to-kill can
work. Once we have confidence in the hit-to-kill approach, we will add
more realistic countermeasures and employ more complex testing
scenarios. Much of this testing is envisioned to be done with the
proposed missile defense test bed, as laid out in the fiscal year 2002
budget request.
At the time of the Deployment Readiness Review (DRR), we had
achieved only one intercept, and that one intercept did not demonstrate
a fully integrated system test, as originally planned; however, the one
intercept demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of hit-to-kill
technology. Also, in each flight test, we have met many of our test
objectives and this has added to the understanding of how the system
will perform. At DRR, ground and flight tests had demonstrated about 93
percent of the critical engagement functions and had shown the ability
to integrate these elements. The failures that occurred in Integrated
Flight Test (IFT)-4 and IFT-5 reflect problems in basic engineering and
fabrication rather than underlying NMD technology or design.

40. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, when do you expect system
maturation and test evaluation to arrive at a point where we need to
commit to system deployment in a way which would violate the ABM Treaty
as it is written today?
General Kadish. Months, not years.

ABM TREATY VIOLATION

41. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, there has been much
discussion before this committee on the subject of ABM Treaty violation
and the fiscal year 2002 budget. We keep hearing different things from
different witnesses. Can you definitively state that the missile
defense program for fiscal year 2002, to include the test plan and
proposed range expansion to Alaska, will not violate the ABM Treaty? If
not, when can you provide this committee with that information?
General Kadish. It is not known at this time whether the referred
to activities are consistent with the ABM Treaty. We will inform
Congress when a final recommendation by the ABM Treaty Compliance
Review Group has been approved by the appropriate decision maker. The
United States will comply with all of its international treaty
obligations, including those imposed by the ABM Treaty while it remains
in force.

AIRBORNE LASER

42. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, most missile defense experts,
while possessing varying degrees of confidence in the Airborne Laser
system's viability, agree that the concept of Boost-Phase Intercept
holds great promise from a political and technical standpoint. Can you
please update us on the status of the Airborne Laser program and where
it is going?
General Kadish. The concept of boost-phase intercept does hold
great promise. In a layered approach to ballistic missile defense, the
capability to destroy ballistic missiles early in their flight profile
will be a very important capability. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program
has made a lot of progress over the last calendar year. Some examples
include ``first light'' from laser module # 1, which achieved a power
output of 111 percent of design specification. Major structural
modifications to the 747-400F aircraft were completed in Wichita,
Kansas, including attaching the 14,000 pound turret to the aircraft.
This culminates the largest structural modification ever undertaken to
a commercial aircraft. The integration and test checkout facility for
the beam control/fire control system was opened in Sunnyvale CA; and
developing the software and hardware that will comprise the BMC\4\I
system will continue. Next year's activities will include flight
testing of the airframe with the turret installed, laser integration in
the system integration laboratory at Edwards AFB, and continuing to
populate the beam control/fire control integration and test checkout
facility with hardware. It is expected that ABL will allow the United
States to counter missiles of all ranges in the boost and ascent phase.

SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT

43. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, the proposed fiscal year 2002
budget includes provisions to expand the range complex by building
facilities, to include missile silos used to store test interceptors,
at a site in Alaska which has been proposed as the location for the NMD
system when ultimately deployed. We've also been told that storing
these test vehicles in silos would provide the United States with an
``emergency capability'' even before system deployment. Is this true?
If so, does it violate the ABM Treaty?
General Kadish. The program includes plans to construct test silos
at Fort Greely, Alaska that will contain test interceptors to support
testing activities. Should the United States face an emerging threat,
it will have the option to take steps necessary to give the test site
some operational capability on an emergency basis to provide a very
limited defense capability. The process of reviewing the ABM Treaty
compliance of these activities has not been completed. The United
States will not take any action that will violate the ABM Treaty while
it remains in force.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

AIRBORNE LASER

44. Senator Reed. Secretary Wolfowitz, at the hearings we held, you
stated twice that the Airborne Laser program is a clear violation of
the ABM Treaty. My understanding is that unless the Airborne Laser
system is tested against a strategic ballistic missile target, it would
not constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty since it is a theater
ballistic missile defense system. I gather that the Compliance Review
Group at DOD has reviewed the program previously, but had not conducted
a final compliance review because the technology was not mature enough
to render a compliance determination.
Has the Department changed its position on whether the Airborne
Laser system would comply with the ABM Treaty, and has it reached a
final determination on compliance of the ABL system? Is it the
Department's determination that the ABL system would violate the ABM
Treaty even if not tested against a strategic missile target?
General Kadish. The Air Force has briefed the ABL program to the
DOD Compliance Review Group (CRG) on a regular basis. While no final
determination of treaty compliance for ABL has yet been made by the
CRG, nor have they determined at what point the ABL program might bump
up against the ABM Treaty, they have determined that no formal
compliance certification under DOD Directive 2060.1 has yet been
required.

45. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the Program Manager for the ABL
program recently briefed committee staff on the program and said that
the program remains a TMD program designed and intended to defeat
theater ballistic missiles. Has the Department changed the program's
objectives recently away from a TMD mission?
General Kadish. Yes, the Department has broadened the objectives
for the ABL Program to address longer range missiles. We have not, yet,
changed the performance specifications of the baseline ABL program.
Rather we are investigating its capability against other BMD threats in
addition to theater ballistic missiles to determine if changes should
be made to the baseline program.

46. Senator Reed. Secretary Wolfowitz, is the current lethal shoot
down test currently planned for fiscal year 2003 going to be against a
theater missile target or a long-range missile target?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The current ABL baseline program plan is to
test against a theater missile target at the end of calendar year 2003.
The baseline test plan is being reviewed for possible inclusion of
other BMD threats.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

47. Senator Reed. General Kadish, at the hearing, we discussed the
Space-Based Kinetic initiative proposed in the fiscal year 2002 budget
request. At the hearing you indicated that the program is funded at
roughly $4 million for fiscal year 2002. A recent newspaper article
suggested it may be a much higher figure. Please provide for the record
the amount of funding proposed for fiscal year 2002, and a description
of what the funding is intended to accomplish during fiscal year 2002.
Is there a plan to deploy such a system, and if so what is the
estimated cost and deployment date? What would be the system's intended
capability?
General Kadish. Within the Fiscal Year 2002 Amended President's
budget request is $20 million for space-based, kinetic energy boost
phase intercept (BPI) activities: $15 million to support space-based
BPI concept definition and operations concepts, and $5 million for the
design and hardware requirement definition for a space-based kinetic
energy experiment. These efforts are specifically aimed at advancing
the state of the art for space-based BPI applications. Alternative
platforms for space-based interceptors will be conceptualized and
evaluated during concept definition to determine system and platform
trade-space. In parallel, this element will be supported by modeling
and simulation. Experimentation and phenomenology data collection
activities conducted within the segment integration line of this
program element (PE 0603883C) will provide validation for the models
and simulations used.
There are no plans at present to deploy such a system. The specific
ballistic missile defense architecture and deployment timelines are as
yet undefined, but will take shape over the next few years. As new
ideas (such as a space-based kinetic energy BPI concept) mature, they
will be integrated into the BMD System if they increase the capability
to respond to the evolving threat, and if they are effective within the
overall system, technical risk, potential deployment schedule, and
cost.

SPACE-BASED KINETIC INTERCEPTOR

48. Senator Reed. General Kadish, at the hearing I asked if you
would think it beneficial for Russia to have a space-based kinetic
interceptor program capable of shooting down U.S. long-range missiles.
Your answer indicated that you thought it could be useful if Russia had
a space-based kinetic interceptor capability to defeat an accidentally
launched U.S. missile. I would like to know what your view would be if
Russia had the capability to intercept all U.S. long-range ballistic
missiles, rather than just an accidentally launched missile. Do you
think such a capability would be good for our security, or would that
cause you concern that our deterrent capability is reduced?
General Kadish. Senator, you've asked me to comment on a
hypothetical question that does not fall within my purview. As the
Department of Defense official in charge of being the materiel
developer for our missile defense program, it is not for me to comment
on the strategic implications of various hypothetical Russian missile
defense deployments.

DEVIATION FROM STANDARD ACQUISITION PROCESS

49. Senator Reed. General Kadish, in your prepared statement you
stated that: ``We must deviate from the standard acquisition process
and recognize the unprecedented technological challenges we are facing.
We do not have major defense acquisition programs in the fiscal year
2002 budget. We do not have program activities with traditional fixed
milestones and clearly marked phases showing the road to production.''
But it is just these ``traditional acquisition processes and clearly
marked phases'' that have made the U.S. military the best in the world,
bar none. If the F-22 fighter were being developed without these
traditional processes, there would be no way to determine what stage it
was in its testing, when it would be deployed, and how much it would
cost, or even what it was being designed to do. Without these
traditional processes how do you expect oversight organizations both
within and outside the Pentagon, including Congress, to do their jobs
in the missile defense area?
General Kadish. The Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission has
been delivered to Congress with additional program details. BMDO will
monitor the development of our systems through disciplined, internal
engineering and program management processes. The only change we are
proposing is how the Department oversees our progress. In lieu of the
formal Milestone review, which occurs at intervals often spanning
several years, the Department is planning to review BMD at a senior
level in a formal process on an annual basis. These incremental steps
allow technologies that are proven successful to continue to mature or
be accelerated and those that do not prove successful to be slowed or
terminated.
At an oversight level, a senior executive council, chaired by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, will provide BMDO guidance and direction.
The top-down oversight will enable BMDO to carry out our new approach
with shorter lines of communication and authority. BMDO will have the
flexibility to adjust program priorities and will support major annual
reviews with the oversight council to refresh policy and strategic
framework for program direction. During these annual reviews, the
oversight council will make executive level decisions to deploy,
accelerate, truncate or modify capabilities or elements of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System, major programming decisions, and
execution year adjustments. The review process will help make decisions
to shape the evolving systems and allocate resources to optimally
support missile defense. Congress will have insight into detailed
spending plans through the budget submissions provided by the
Department.

50. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how will we know the taxpayers
are getting their money's worth for missile defense, or that the
programs you are pursuing will work effectively?
General Kadish. Let me start with the second question. The programs
we have pursued for a number of years now are bearing fruit. The PAC-3,
for example, designed to intercept short-range missiles like the Scud,
will be fielded this fall. It will work. Other important systems are
maturing--the technology is at hand, and we're working hard on
engineering and reliability. Any future deployments made from the
programs we are pursuing will be done with an initial early capability
and grown to be more and more effective over time in a layered system
of defenses.
Will it be worth the money? That must be measured by the cost of
not having a defense, by the cost of devastation of an American city or
two. We have national defenses against terrorism, but nothing against
missiles targeted at American soil. We have air defenses for our
deployed troops, but woefully little to protect them from ballistic
missiles, such as the one that killed 28 and wounded another 99 service
members 10 years ago.
As major defense programs go, the expenditures are in line with, or
less than, programs of comparable impact. The entire BMD budget request
this year is about 2\1/2\ percent of the DOD request and fills a gap
where no previous effective capability existed against missiles. In so
doing, it will strengthen both deterrence and defense as one important
part of our national security fabric.

CAPABILITIES-BASED DEVELOPMENT

51. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you stated last week in your
prepared statement that you ``intend to go beyond the conventional
build-to-requirements acquisition process . . . [and have] adopted a
capability-based approach.''
Requirements serve an important role in the defense business. They
define, among other things, how much time and money to spend on a
program. Development programs come to a successful conclusion once
their performance requirements are met and the required number of units
are bought. With no requirements, how do you know you are spending the
correct amount?
General Kadish. Given the considerable technical challenges of our
mission, a traditional acquisition process that includes rigid,
predetermined user requirements does not provide the requisite
flexibility to build missile defenses efficiently. For this reason,
capability-based acquisition is appropriate for this program.
Nevertheless, while it is correct that we intend to go beyond the
conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process, BMDO will
conduct a structured acquisition process. In fact, we do have
requirements in the form of system development objectives and goals,
which can and will be adjusted based upon the results of research,
experimentation, and testing. These standards differ from the
conventional process in that they will evolve in parallel with
capabilities, allowing us to significantly reduce schedule and cost
risk.
We successfully followed this approach in our early ICBM programs,
when progress was paced by the evolution of our technological and
engineering maturity. As needed and possible, those capabilities were
enhanced. In accordance with our Block acquisition approach, BMDO and
the Department will conduct rigorous annual reviews of all program
activities to ensure that we proceed steadily towards an architecture
that will maximize defensive capabilities. At these recurrent decision
points, systems will be evaluated on the basis of technological
maturity, mission requirements, technology readiness levels, cost,
resource availability, and schedule. Throughout, the CINCs and Service
Users will be involved in the development process so that, with each
block, we move steadily forward towards a system with ever-increasing
military utility that incorporates complementary operational
capabilities and minimizes life cycle cost.

52. Senator Reed. General Kadish, it sounds like your proposed
approach is something like ``we'll see what we can build and then say
that level of capability is our requirement.'' If so, doesn't that turn
the normal definition of a ``requirement'' on its head? How can you
judge whether your programs are successful or not if there is no
standard for measuring success?
General Kadish. While it is correct that we intend to go beyond the
conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process, BMDO will
conduct a structured acquisition process. In fact, we do have
requirements in the form of system development objectives and goals
that can and will be adjusted based upon the results of research,
experimentation, and testing. These standards differ from the
conventional process in that they will evolve in parallel with
capabilities, allowing us to significantly reduce schedule and cost
risk.
We successfully followed this approach in our early ICBM programs,
when progress was paced by the evolution of our technological and
engineering maturity. As needed and possible, those capabilities were
enhanced. In accordance with our Block acquisition approach, BMDO and
the Department will conduct rigorous annual reviews of all program
activities to ensure that we proceed steadily towards an architecture
that will maximize defensive capabilities. At these recurrent decision
points, programs will be evaluated on the basis of technological
maturity, mission requirements, technology readiness levels, cost,
resource availability, and schedule. Throughout, the CINCs and Service
Users will be instrumental in the development process so that with each
block we move steadily forward towards a system with ever-increasing
military utility that incorporates complementary operational
capabilities and minimizes life cycle cost.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

53. Senator Reed. General Kadish, So far, the proposal for missile
defense has been described only in general terms. Given the far-
reaching nature of the proposed restructuring of the missile defense
program, one would expect you have a detailed implementation plan to
achieve the program's objectives, including schedule, milestones,
technical objectives, test program and cost estimate. We need this
implementation plan to do our work in marking up the fiscal year 2002
budget request. When will you deliver this plan to the committee?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget submission has
been submitted to Congress that provides detailed program plans for the
full fiscal year 2002 program.

54. Senator Reed. General Kadish, at a press conference on June 13
you said that you have ``internal plans that [you] are going to work
to.''
When will you submit those internal plans to the committee?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget submission has
been submitted to Congress that provides detailed program plans for the
full fiscal year 2002 program.

uncertainty in program
55. Senator Reed. General Kadish, in your prepared statement for
the first BMDO hearing you stated: ``I cannot tell you today exactly
what the [ballistic missile defense] system will look like even 5 years
from now.''
We have been researching missile defense technologies for decades,
and have spent tens of billions of dollars on them, but this comment
seems to be suggesting that we have to start again as if we have not
learned from all that effort.
For what time frame can you tell us what the system will look like?
General Kadish. Our evolutionary approach focuses on developing a
single integrated BMD System that will change over time, depending on
the threat, operational need, and technological maturity. We have
learned a great deal from past efforts and will continue to build on
our technical progress. However, by not committing to a single
architecture, as we have in the past, we can explore multiple
development paths and take advantage of the best technological
approaches and most advantageous basing modes. This approach also
provides the opportunity to deliver capabilities incrementally, in
increasingly enhanced blocks, rather than wait for the ultimate
architecture. We have organized the program with the aim of delivering
militarily useful capabilities in biennial blocks, starting as early as
the 2004-2006 time frame. Therefore, the composition and capability of
the BMD System will evolve based upon selection of proven technology,
demonstrated successes, and opportunities and need for incremental
employment, and, of course, affordability. While we cannot tell you
what the final composition of the BMD System will look like, system
choices and timelines will take shape over the next few years, and the
evolution of the system will be defined though our capability-based,
block approach.

56. Senator Reed. General Kadish, if you have no clear idea of
where you are heading over 5 years, how can you be sure that you are
funding the correct activities?
General Kadish. Our fundamental objective is to develop the
capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States,
its Allies, and friends against all classes of ballistic missile
threats. What we do not know, at this point, the most promising
developmental paths. Our evolutionary strategy is to fund a broad range
of activities and parallel development paths to improve the likelihood
of achieving an effective, layered missile defense. To ensure that we
are funding the right activities, we are putting in place a stringent
engineering approach to aggressively develop and evaluate technologies
and concepts and a new rigorous test program incorporating a larger
number of tests and employing more realistic scenarios and
countermeasures. This robust engineering and test activity will provide
the technical basis for decisions to accelerate, continue, truncate, or
terminate activities.

57. Senator Reed. General Kadish, what would be the basis of any
future decisions to adjust funding between different programs?
General Kadish. Decisions will be based on thorough analysis of
risks, technical progress, performance, and affordability.

PENTAGON REVIEW

58. Senator Reed. General Kadish, has the fiscal year 2002 proposal
for ballistic missile defense been looked at by the military services
as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review?
General Kadish. The Department initiated several major reviews of
strategy and forces at the outset of the administration. The ongoing
Quadrennial Defense Review reflects the decisions made as a result of
these initial assessments. Among these was a missile defense review,
which has been completed, and the results have been briefed to
Congress. Missile defense is one of the top priorities for the
administration, and it was important to implement the results of the
review as soon as possible. The Services played a role in the budget
review process for missile defense.

59. Senator Reed. General Kadish, given the focus the proposal has
on testing, has it been reviewed by the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation organization?
General Kadish. The Department budget process combines numerous
budget proposals into the overall budget for the fiscal year in concert
with Departmental guidance. These budget proposals are provided to the
Comptroller for consolidation into the Departmental budget. The
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation organization reviews the
justification materials that accompany the budget submission.

60. Senator Reed. General Kadish, if not, why? When will DOT&E
review the testing plan?
General Kadish. DOT&E is provided an opportunity to review and
comment on all major revisions to MDA test programs. They also approve
all operational test planning as documented in the Test and Evaluation
Master Plans (TEMPs).

CONSOLIDATION OF FUNDING LINES

61. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you propose to establish six
major pots with $7 billion of research and development money and to do
annual reviews each November to determine what technologies are proving
successful. The idea, as I understand it, is that you could accelerate,
truncate, deploy or slow down specific programs after each review. Are
you proposing to be able to transfer funds within these pots without
requiring a specific authorization from Congress, or at a minimum a
reprogramming request?
General Kadish. The question focuses on the proposed November
department review process of the BMD program. Our idea is that BMDO
will make annual recommendations to the OSD senior leadership on
program plans and budgets in November in order to finalize the
President's Budget position submitted to Congress in the following 2
months. BMDO and the Department, just like every year, will propose an
allocation of funds to support our priorities, which may include
program acceleration, truncation, or deployment. Once funds are
appropriated, BMDO will have the ability to reallocate funds across
projects within a Program Element, consistent with the Department's
current operating procedures. Current procedures also limit transfers
to only $3.999 million between Program Elements for RDT&E; for
transfers greater than this, we would coordinate with OSD and Congress,
as necessary.

AIRBORNE LASER

62. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the Airborne Laser has great
potential as a boost phase intercept program, but it is technically
challenging, as most revolutionary concepts are. The proposed $196
million plus-up in fiscal year 2002 almost doubles the ABL funding
level. What is the new funding to be used for? Will any of this funding
be used for EMD? What changes in program schedule would result if this
additional funding is or is not made available?
General Kadish. Fiscal year 2002 funds continue execution of the
Airborne Laser Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction Program. This
includes completing fabrication, integration, and testing of the key
ABL segments: battle management, beam control fire control, and laser.
It also provides for preparation of facilities and support equipment at
Edwards AFB, CA. The Fiscal Year 2002 ABL budget reflects funding for
increased (1) spares, (2) contractor test manning, (3) test assets, and
(4) government test support in order to correct program shortfalls and
to reduce technical and schedule risk during ABL integration and
testing.
In regards to funding used for EMD, the budget includes $10 million
to initiate purchase of long lead optics for the first full-power ABL
aircraft. The $10 million is needed to meet congressional direction in
the fiscal year 2001 authorization act to maintain the ability to meet
a fiscal year 2008 IOC. In addition, the program will conduct risk
reduction efforts on technologies for application in the full power
ABL. None of the fiscal year 2002 funds will be used for EMD design
efforts or purchase of an aircraft.
Without full funding in fiscal year 2002, the ABL PDRR program
execution will increase in schedule and technical risk. The program
will be forced to reduce spares, test assets, and test manning. Given
such circumstances, the test schedule will likely face delays.

63. Senator Reed. General Kadish, can the new funding be spent
efficiently in 1 year without increasing program risk? Why or why not?
General Kadish. Yes, the program can efficiently spend the
requested funding. Fiscal year 2002 funding of $410 million is
comparable to the fiscal year 2001 funding of $386 million, including
the Fiscal Year 2001 Emergency Supplemental. The new funds allow us to
buy spares off the current ABL fabrication lines. Additional manning
for the test team will come from the existing design teams. The lean
funding for the ABL program in the fiscal year 2001 President's budget
would have forced us to shut down ABL fabrication lines and reassign
ABL design teams. The fiscal year 2002 President's budget bridges this
funding gap.

64. Senator Reed. General Kadish, since the ABL laser must fit into
a 747 aircraft, the size and weight of the laser system are critical,
and must be kept below a certain limit. How does the current estimated
weight of the test system compare to the operational system weight
limit?
General Kadish. The prototype weapons system engineered in the
Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction phase of development is currently
projected to weigh 174,194 pounds. The current target weight the
program office has set is 180,000 pounds for the operational system at
design completion.

65. Senator Reed. General Kadish, if the laser system exceeds the
weight limit, will you reduce the number of laser modules to
compensate? Would the system be effective with less laser power?
General Kadish. For the operational system, the design will be
optimized to provide the warfighter with optimum system performance and
effectiveness. The ABL program maintains a database of weight reduction
and aircraft-performance enhancement concepts that will be explored
during the EMD design. Reducing the number of laser modules would not
be the first consideration.

66. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how are you addressing potential
countermeasures to the Airborne Laser? What are the most important
potential countermeasures that the department has examined thus far,
and by what numerical amount would these countermeasures reduce ABL
performance, if deployed?
General Kadish. The AF has established a Directed Energy
Countermeasures Assessment Team managed and operated separately from
the ABL Program office, which is exploring all possible countermeasures
identified within the Defense community. The details regarding their
efforts are classified. BMDO is also funding a significant counter-
countermeasures effort to comprehensively explore realistic
countermeasures, across all phases of a missile trajectory, that could
be employed by adversaries attempting to defeat the BMD System.

67. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the Airborne Laser is designed to
rupture the fuel and/or oxidizer chambers of a ballistic missile,
thereby causing early termination of the missile's boost phase. What
test activities has the department conducted, or does the department
have planned, to determine whether or not the warhead carried by a
missile will still detonate after an ABL engagement?
General Kadish. The Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction test
program focuses on demonstrating the concept of tracking and destroying
a ballistic missile in the boost phase. The weapon system's primary
objective is to prevent a missile warhead from hitting its designated
target. There are other modeling and simulation efforts underway within
the BMDO Test directorate to examine boost phase lethality and debris
and warhead shortfall stemming from missile defense engagements. ABL is
participating in those efforts.

SBIRS-LOW SATELLITE SYSTEM

68. Senator Reed. General Kadish, SBIRS-Low is a satellite program
being developed primarily to contribute to the National Missile Defense
Program. Your proposed fiscal year 2002 budget would transfer SBIRS-Low
from the Air Force to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
General Kadish, in your testimony last week, you stated that SBIRS-Low
will ``enhance detection . . . and provide critical mid-course tracking
and discrimination data for ballistic missile defense.'' You have
indicated that current life cycle cost estimates for SBIRS-Low
currently range as high as $20 billion or so. I understand there is a
study on SBIRS-Low going on now, led by BMDO. What is the purpose of
the study, and what results seem to be emerging? Do you plan on
providing the results of this study to Congress?
General Kadish. The purpose of the study is to comply with the
Deputy Secretary of Defense direction from Program Decision Memorandum
(PDM-1), dated 22 Aug 2000. PDM-1 directs BMDO to ``. . . provide to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense . . . a comprehensive study of cost-
effectiveness issues concerning the contributions of SBIRS Low to
defense missions, with the primary emphasis on NMD.'' The objective of
the study is to estimate the military utility and total cost of SBIRS
Low as a basis for future Department decisions and determine the cost-
effectiveness of selected alternatives to SBIRS Low.
New analysis conducted in fiscal year 2001 for the SBIRS Low PDM
study involved assessing the military utility of SBIRS Low and/or
terrestrial radar alternatives in support of national missile defense.
With the directed focus on NMD the study relies on summarizing past
analyses to show the military utility of SBIRS Low to the former
Theater Missile Defense mission area and Missile Warning, Battle Space
Characterization and Technical Intelligence mission areas. Since the
inception of the SBIRS Low PDM Study, the Secretary of Defense directed
BMDO to develop a research, development and test program that focuses
on missile defense as a single integrated Ballistic Missile Defense
System, no longer differentiating between NMD and TMD. The new analysis
performed for the study analyzes military utility with respect to what
is now known as the Ground-based Midcourse element of the BMD System.
The preliminary results emerging from the SBIRS Low PDM Study
support the need for SBIRS Low capability within the legacy NMD
architecture and are consistent with the many studies performed by BMDO
over the last decade. Results show that SBIRS Low will provide critical
precision cueing and midcourse tracking and prevent threat complexes
from overwhelming system radars with countermeasures. In addition to
providing the BMD System a robust solution against complex threats, it
provides significant added value to the ancillary missions: Missile
Warning, Battlespace Characterization, and Technical Intelligence.
The study will be provided to the Deputy Secretary upon conclusion
and will be made available to Congress with his approval.

69. Senator Reed. General Kadish, why do you propose to accelerate
SBIRS Low now, before the study is completed and the results are
reviewed?
General Kadish. The emerging SBIRS Low PDM study results are
consistent with the many studies performed by BMDO over the last
decade-SBIRS Low satellites are essential for supporting a robust
missile defense capability against the evolving threat. It is necessary
to accelerate the program now, because sophisticated threat
countermeasures are expected to be such that, by the time SBIRS Low
constellation is fielded, performance of a radar-only defense will be
below that needed to counter the threat. The proposed schedule for
SBIRS Low development is capable of addressing over time an evolving
advanced threat. SBIRS Low will provide multiple engagement
opportunities and complicate the adversary's plans with a layered
surveillance capability. SBIRS Low is also expected to be capable of
handling a larger number of reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and
associated objects that could otherwise overwhelm existing radar
sensors.
The program plan focuses on accelerating the early risk reduction
activities to preserve an option to speed up the deployment of the
satellite constellation. The program will be reviewed annually to
assess program needs and progress. Review of options to accelerate
SBIRS Low deployment will take place annually.

70. Senator Reed. General Kadish, would the proposed acceleration
of SBIRS Low allow for adequate testing of the basic satellite
performance prior to committing to buy a large number of satellites?
General Kadish. Based on our revised acquisition strategy and
associated risk reduction activities, the proposed acceleration of
SBIRS Low allows for adequate testing of satellite performance prior to
committing to purchase a large number of satellites. It also allows for
evolutionary block upgrades as necessary and feasible. These risk
reduction activities will allow the SBIRS Low program to address design
issues earlier, allow more design schedule recovery time, provide for
higher confidence in source selection, and achieve the proposed
development schedule. A description of risk reduction activities
follows:
The SBIRS Low Program has developed a robust Ground Demonstration
Program (GDP), in which contractors use simulations and hardware-in-
the-loop testing to reduce risk during the design process and on-orbit
test period. The GDP has supported engineering trades at the beginning
of the Program Definition and Risk Reduction Phase and will continue to
provide lessons learned during the satellite design process. When the
initial satellites are launched, they will be electronically networked
with simulated satellites in the GDP to further enhance the fidelity of
test results prior to additional launches.
The SBIRS Low Program added an Engineering Model Sensor Package
with the acceleration of the program. The Engineering Model Sensor
Package will allow contractors to test an integrated SBIRS Low sensor
prior to development of the satellite qualification unit and the final
operational satellite design.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will review the SBIRS
Low Risk Reduction program results at the annual BMD System review,
while facilitating the build-up for production of the SBIRS Low
constellation. The robust risk reduction program aims to demonstrate
what does and does not work within the hardware and software designs.
The annual BMD high-level decision review will steer the program in the
most promising direction based on data generated by risk reduction
activities and contractor progress.

71. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much funding would be
committed to satellite purchases prior to the first operational test
results?
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 APB includes $46.881 million
to start the satellite buys for testing purposes. The Department has
not addressed fiscal year 2003-2007 requirements.

NAVY AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM

72. Senator Reed. General Kadish, just last year, about $120
million had to be added to the Navy Area Defense System across the next
2 years to cover program cost growth during the research and
development phase. Despite this, the First Unit Equipped date for the
program has slipped from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004.
Just last week, the Secretary of the Navy sent a letter to Congress
stating that the average procurement unit cost for the Navy Area
program was expected to exceed the planned value by more than 25
percent. Recent news reports suggest an additional program delay. The
proposed budget adds a further $98 million to the Navy Area program to
fix R&D problems, and I understand from the Secretary of the Navy's
letter that significantly more will be needed in the outyears to cover
program cost growth. How much cost growth do you expect in the program
over the next 6 years--the time frame of the Future Years Defense
Program?
General Kadish. The Secretary of the Navy notified congressional
members on July 13, 2001 that unit costs for the Navy Area TBMD Program
have exceeded the Acquisition Program Baseline values by more than 25
percent. The exact amount is still pending given uncertainties related
to the DOD Strategy Review and fiscal year 2003 budget development
process.

73. Senator Reed. General Kadish, what are the reasons for the
significant cost growth in both procurement, and research and
development costs?
General Kadish. Research and development cost growth has been
driven by technical integration issues associated with the SM-2 BLK IVA
missile's increased cost for target procurements and restructuring of
test and evaluation events. SM-2 Block IVA technical issues in the area
of software integration and hardware/software integration within the
guidance section have required adjustments to the program schedule.
Schedule adjustments impact other parts of the program, including key
missile/ship integration activities, test ship certification, and
extension of the Developmental Testing/Operational Testing (DT/OT) test
program, all of which add additional cost.
Increased target costs are attributable to contract overruns for
DT/OT testing at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), in addition to
increased estimates for at-sea Short-Ranged Air Launched Targets. The
restructuring of Test and Evaluation execution phases at WSMR and for
at-sea DT/OT has resulted in increased costs for test execution and
range charges.
Procurement cost growth has been driven by a number of factors.
These factors include: higher unit cost estimates due to a flatter
learning curve based on Long Lead Material/Low Rate Initial Production
proposal; changes in assumptions for Value Engineering Change Proposal
(VECP) phase-in/costs; and higher estimates for spares, canisters, and
production support. Decreases in near-term production due to higher
missile costs and budgetary constraints have affected vendor stability
and increased risk to the industrial base. Additionally, common
component costs have increased based on fiscal year 2001 contract
awards.

74. Senator Reed. General Kadish, given the excellent prospects for
the PAC-3 program, and the high interest our allies have in purchasing
PAC-3 batteries, what is the relative military contribution of the Navy
Area program to our theater ballistic missile defense posture?
General Kadish. The Navy Area and PAC-3 provide two different but
complementary and essential capabilities for defense against short-to-
medium range ballistic missiles. Conclusions of the Navy Area Theater
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)/Patriot PAC-3 Report to Congress of 24
May 2001 were that the PAC-3 interceptor does not meet Navy Area
performance requirements.
If PAC-3 is not pre-deployed, the Navy Area-equipped ship could
protect an asset such as a port or coastal airfields from ballistic
missile threats and Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) threats while U.S. forces,
including other missile defense assets, are arriving in theater. Navy
Area could also be used alone to provide littoral defense as well as
fleet protection. Navy Area assets would provide great flexibility and
quick response to regions that do not have forward-deployed ground-
based missile defense systems. In addition, the Navy Area Block IVA
missile maintains AAW requirements of the SM2 Block IV against advanced
anti-ship cruise missile threats.
The PAC-3, when forward deployed, can be used alone to provide
point defense of collocated assets. But when used together, both the
PAC-3 and the Navy Area can provide a defense in depth that neither
could provide alone. These complementary capabilities could appeal to
other nations for the same reason. The Navy Area capability might be
particularly attractive to those nations already possessing an Aegis
capability.

NAVY THEATER WIDE VS. ICBMS?

75. Senator Reed. General Kadish, currently, the Navy Theater-Wide
program is being designed to defend against theater ballistic missiles,
rather than ICBMs. Do you plan on testing the Navy Theater-Wide system
against ICBMs? If so, when?
General Kadish. The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program is being
integrated into the Mid-Course Segment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System as the Sea Based Mid-Course (SBMC) element to defeat medium to
long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse ascent phase of the exo-
atmospheric battlespace. A concept definition phase will be initiated
in fiscal year 2002 to focus on a more robust SBMC system with a
desired deployment in the fiscal year 2008-2010 time frame. Given the
early stages of the concept definition study, specific test objectives
have not yet been defined.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

76. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, I asked you about the
international consequence of using an Airborne Laser, specifically of
disabling a missile booster with a nuclear warhead which would then
lead it to fall someplace, other than the United States, and
potentially land on an ally or neutral party. You stated that we do not
have the capability, at this time, for the airborne or space laser, and
that you would rather work on that before worrying about consequences
of that capability. A boost phase intercept has very little time to
intercept a fast moving target. By the time we detect and launch an
interceptor against a missile launched by, for example, North Korea or
Iraq that missile will likely be over another country's territory.
There is nothing to prevent an adversary from arming its warhead at
launch rather than in the descent phase so we must be prepared for the
consequences of knocking down a missile with an armed warhead.
If the U.S. policy is to convince our allies and the international
community that the layered BMD approach will serve all our interests,
how can that be reconciled with the very real consequence of dropping
warheads on them after they are deflected from their original
trajectory?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The Airborne Laser is part of our proposed
system of layered missile defense. The benefit of a layered missile
defense is that it increases the probability of hitting the target
missile and its warhead, as there are multiple opportunities for
engagement. An increased probability of hitting the target missile and
its warhead serves all our interests.

77. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, there have been several
comments about the U.S. NMD program not being a threat to Russia's
thousands of nuclear warheads. While it is true that Russia has
thousands of warheads, the real question is the number of missiles that
Russia believes are reliable. How many do Russian planners consider
effective on any given day? How many do they believe would survive the
theoretical U.S. first strike? When all the missile silos, stored
submarines, mobile units and warheads are subtracted from the total
number, how many are left?
Secretary Wolfowitz. [Deleted.]

78. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, you have stated that you do
not believe that Russia would increase its missiles or MIRV warheads in
response to a limited American capability. Do you have the same
assessment for China? Is it our intelligence assessment that China will
not increase its missiles or warheads if the U.S. deploys a limited
capability?
Secretary Wolfowitz. [Deleted.]

79. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, you have outlined a very
aggressive test plan for the next few years. You stated that you plan
on performing 12 tests over the course of the next 2 years. Do you have
the personnel to prepare and carry out these tests, perform the
analysis, and other research and development for which you are
responsible?
General Kadish. Yes. We had expected the load on program and staff
personnel, particularly test and engineering, to become much greater
and have budgeted for, and already started, adding additional personnel
to accommodate the extra load over this time period. I am comfortable
that our organization can support this test plan.

80. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, an alternative to mid-course
missile defense is a re-entry, or terminal phase system. A terminal
phase system waits until a warhead and countermeasures have re-entered
the atmosphere and decoys will begin acting differently depending on
the type of decoy being used. For example, balloon decoys may begin
slowing down relative to the warhead at 250km, while a traffic cone may
not until 50 or 60km. What requirements have you defined for the
proposed re-entry system? At what altitude do you expect it to work?
How large an area do you expect it to cover? How much time will it have
to track and home in on the warhead?
General Kadish. You are correct that a characteristic of terminal
defense systems is that they can take advantage of atmospheric slow-
down (which begins at about 100 km altitude) of intentional and
unintentional penetration aids to assist the discrimination process to
identify the lethal warhead in the presence of decoys and debris. Each
of our terminal defense systems has different requirements, depending
on the specific threats they are engaging. The THAAD system, for
example, is an area defense system that counters short-, medium-, and
long-range theater ballistic missiles. Therefore, it operates in both
the mid- to high-endo- and exo-atmosphere to defend a large area on the
ground. This allows THAAD to time its engagement to take advantage of
the very phenomenon you mentioned, but to also intercept at higher
altitudes that would be more effective in the presence of other
counter-measures. PAC-3, Navy Area, and MEADS, are limited area defense
systems that defend critical assets from short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. Engagements by these systems occur in the low endo-
atmospheric regime. Their effectiveness is also enhanced by atmospheric
strip out. Speaking very broadly, Lower Tier systems such as PAC-3
could defend a city, while an Upper Tier system such as THAAD could
defend a medium sized state. Tracking is a function of warning time
provided by sensors not on the interceptor, with more obviously being
better. Homing is done by the interceptor and is a function of optimum
intercept altitude.

81. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, you testified before the House
Armed Services Committee on June 14, 2001, that advances in lightweight
structures have enabled a lighter and smaller kill vehicle. This allows
costs of the kill vehicle to be kept low while increasing lethality.
However, such gains may be lost to a boost phase missile defense system
that requires a kill vehicle to maneuver and accelerate to reach an
ICBM after its launch. Such diverting capability will require
considerable fuel, which will increase the kill vehicle weight and
volume. How will a larger and more massive kill vehicle affect plans
for a ship-based boost phase system for ICBM threats?
General Kadish. There are many factors that affect the size and
mass of the kill vehicle. For boost phase interceptors, the two most
important factors are: (1) the ability to predict where the hostile
booster is going; and (2) the need to be able to accelerate the kill
vehicle quickly from side-to-side if the target maneuvers.
The first factor requires that we have a lot of fuel on board the
KV to take out any errors we might have in predicting where the threat
missile will be when we intercept it. This may require having more than
half again as much fuel for the divert and attitude control system as
we need for coasting targets.
Studies have shown that to counter a maneuvering boosting
capability, we may require twice the acceleration that we currently
need in our mid-course kill vehicles for coasting targets.
Intercepting during the boost phase does have its advantages as
well. Since the burning missile is much brighter than a reentry vehicle
coasting in space, we will need far less sensitive missile seekers to
find it during boost.
Our investments in kill vehicle technology since 1986 have been
focused on developing and testing lightweight, high performance
seekers, high strength, light weight composite structures, and high
performance divert and attitude control systems. These advances have
enabled an order of magnitude weight reduction in the kill vehicles
since the early 1980s. We will draw on this extensive technology base
to help us solve this engineering problem.
Our plans for risk reduction in the boost phase include extending
the kill vehicle technology base in flexible, high performance divert
systems and integrated passive and active seeker systems. We believe
this will provide the necessary engineering capability to make boost
phase kinetic energy intercepts a reality.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

COMPLIANCE REVIEW GROUP

82. Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz, according to testimony
from the Chairman of the Compliance Review Group before the
Governmental Affairs Committee, ``the Military Services and Defense
Agencies must seek compliance approval before taking any action that
would reasonably raise a compliance issue.'' So, by definition,
activities that are evaluated by the Compliance Review Group have some
sort of substantive compliance question at stake. Do you agree?
Secretary Wolfowitz. I agree.

COMPLIANCE REVIEW, TESTS AND CONGRESS

83. Senator Allard. General Kadish, THAAD is a particularly
interesting example, because it is one in which a compliance
determination was made ahead of time, at the insistence of Congress,
although there was no attempt to withhold funding pending the outcome
of the review, as some seem to be suggesting now.
The Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Authorization Bill required the
administration to report to Congress on whether THAAD was compliant
with the ABM Treaty because of its potential to have capabilities to
counter strategic ballistic missiles. That report was sent to Congress
on January 14, 1994, and concluded that THAAD, as its design was then
understood, in fact would not comply with the ABM Treaty, and,
according to testimony from General O'Neill, then Director of BMDO,
``would have to be treated as an ABM system,'' and of course an illegal
one since it is a mobile system. Later that year, the Senate passed a
Defense Authorization bill that funded THAAD. In January of 1995, THAAD
was cleared for initial flight testing, but on the condition that its
ability to accept cueing data from space-based sensors be crippled.
Finally, in September of 1996, the Clinton administration declared that
THAAD was fully compliant, even with cueing software, because as more
became known about the system, it became clear that the initial
determination was wrong, and THAAD really didn't have ABM capabilities
after all.
Thus--In the fall of 1993, the Senate funded a system whose
compliance with the ABM Treaty was at the time questionable.
In the fall of 1994, the Senate funded a system which had been
determined not to be compliant with the ABM Treaty, and continued that
funding in subsequent years, until finally the system was declared
compliant.
I also point out that last year's authorization bill authorized
$85.1 million for National Missile Defense Initial Deployment
Facilities--which some of the expenditures are for the construction of
an X-band radar at Shemya, Alaska, which is an activity which will
clearly come into conflict or bump-up against the ABM Treaty.
So, would I be wrong in concluding that far from being some
extraordinary departure from normal practice, uncertainty about the
compliance of these testing activities is the way we have always done
business, and necessarily so, given the nature of a test program?
General Kadish. That is correct. The compliance approval for any
particular activity cannot be completed until all relevant plans are
complete. On several occasions, that has meant that the compliance
approval was completed weeks, or even days, prior to the activity.

OTHER THREATS

84. Senator Allard. General Kadish, some have argued that missile
defense does not defend against other means of delivering a WMD payload
to the U.S., such as a terrorist using a suitcase or car bomb. However,
I know we are spending billions of dollars to combat terrorism which I
do not believe will protect us from a ballistic missile attack. Thus,
does this mean we shouldn't do either.
Can you please comment on this as well as discuss not only the
Department's efforts, but also the Government's efforts as a whole to
combat against this form of attack against the United States?
General Kadish. The United States must be prepared to defend itself
against the full spectrum of threats--from conventional attack to
terrorism. To combat terrorism, the DOD engages in intelligence
collection and maintains force protection measures, the capability to
preempt or otherwise counter terrorism, and units to assist with
consequence management. DOD and other Federal agencies have undertaken
a significant, integrated effort to develop effective policies on
counterterrorism and establish mechanisms that enable the United States
to preempt and deter terrorism against American citizens and U.S.
interests around the world. Unfortunately, some terrorists succeed in
accomplishing their objective. Even under those circumstances, the
United States has aggressively pursued a policy that seeks to bring
these terrorists to justice and has been successful in bringing a
number to the United States for trial and convictions.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

85. Senator Allard. General Kadish, the U.S. has or is developing
substantial defensive capabilities to deal with the threats posed by
chemical and biological weapons and WMD terrorism. Do we have defensive
capabilities that we have developed in response to the threat of
chemical weapons?
General Kadish. We place a high priority on protecting our forces
against chemical agents and have developed and continue to modernize
our defenses against these weapons. The objective of our Chemical and
Biological (CB) Defense Program is to enable our forces to survive,
fight. and win in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment. Joint and Service-unique programs support the framework of
CB defense: Contamination Avoidance (detection) and NBC Battle
Management (reconnaissance and warning), Force Protection (individual,
collective and medical support), and Decontamination. These
capabilities combined with sound doctrine and realistic training are
fundamental to our success.
Contamination avoidance capabilities are designed to detect,
identify and confirm the presence of chemical hazards. Examples are
chemical agent alarms, sensors, and NBC reconnaissance vehicles.
Currently we are fielding the Joint Warning and Reporting Network that
will enhance our NBC Battle Management capability by providing chemical
hazard area predictions to the warfighting commander. Individual and
collective protection capabilities allow forces to operate safely while
in a chemical environment. These include the eye/respiratory protective
masks, and battlefield protective suits. Collective protection
capabilities include tentage and shelter systems as well as filtration
systems on ships and vehicles. Decontamination capabilities allow the
sustainment of operations in a contaminated environment. These
capabilities include personnel decontamination kits, and combat
equipment, vehicles, and aircraft decontamination systems and
decontamination solutions. Additionally, integral to our chemical
defensive capability are medical countermeasures designed to enable the
individual warfighter to survive, fight and win in a chemical
environment. These countermeasures include pre- and post-chemical
exposure measures such as the nerve agent antidote and treatment
procedures for chemical casualties. All of these capabilities
integrated together are essential to avoid contamination. and to
sustain operational tempo on an asymmetric battlefield.

86. Senator Allard. General Kadish, has there been a ``chemical
weapons arms race'' in response the U.S. development of defenses to
chemical weapons threats?
General Kadish. We view the proliferation of chemical and other
weapons of mass destruction by nation states and transnational groups
as a means to counter U.S. conventional superiority rather than as a
response to enhanced U.S. defense against such weapons. Potential
adversaries recognize their inability to fight and win a conventional
war against the U.S. and therefore have pursued asymmetric methods such
as chemical weapons to support their objectives. These weapons are also
seen by nations as ways to complicate the U.S. regional presence, or
influence U.S. decision making during a crisis. Other motivations for
pursuing these weapons include enhanced prestige, intimidation or
deterrence of regional adversaries, and the relatively low cost of
these weapons. This strategy also applies to terrorist groups intent on
inflicting a large number of casualties if they do not fear political
or military retaliation.

87. Senator Allard. General Kadish, is the U.S. developing
defensive capabilities in response to threats posed by biological
weapons?
General Kadish. We place a high priority on protecting our forces
against biological agents and have developed and continue to modernize
our defenses against these weapons. The objective of our Chemical and
Biological (CB) Defense Program is to enable our forces to survive,
fight, and win in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment. Biological agents are different than chemical agents. It
is difficult to detect a biological attack and the onset of symptoms
may not occur until days after the attack. Therefore, biological
defense is especially challenging and is receiving increased attention.
Our Joint and Service-unique programs support the framework of CB
defense: Contamination Avoidance (detection) and NBC Battle Management
(reconnaissance and warning), Force Protection (individual, collective
and medical support), and Decontamination. These capabilities combined
with sound doctrine and realistic training are fundamental to our
success.
Contamination avoidance capabilities are designed to detect,
identify and confirm the presence of biological hazards. Examples are
the U.S. Army's mobile Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS)
units and fixed site biological detection systems such as Portal
Shield. Essential to the identification of biological agents is the
laboratory confirmation of samples and this is provided by the U.S.
Army's deployable Theater Medical Laboratory unit as well as other
medical laboratories in the United States and overseas. The Joint
Warning and Reporting Network will enhance our NBC Battle Management
capability by providing biological hazard area predictions to the
warfighting commander. Individual and collective protection
capabilities allow forces to operate safely while in a biological
environment. Examples of individual protection capabilities include the
eye/respiratory protective masks. Collective protection capabilities
include and shelter systems as well as filtration systems on ships and
vehicles. Critical to the defense against biological agents are medical
countermeasures. We have fielded and are developing more medical
countermeasures that will improve individual protection, treatment, and
diagnoses. These include vaccines that enable forces to be immunized
against potential biological agents and antibiotics that may be used
for treatment following a biological attack.

88. Senator Allard. General Kadish, has there been a ``biological
weapons arms race'' in response to the U.S. development of defenses to
biological weapons threats?
General Kadish. We view the proliferation of biological weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction by nation states and transnational
groups as a means to counter U.S. conventional superiority rather than
as a response to enhanced U.S. defense against such weapons. Potential
adversaries recognize their inability to fight and win a conventional
war against the U.S. and therefore have pursued asymmetric methods such
as biological weapons to support their objectives. These weapons are
also seen by nations as ways to complicate the U.S. regional presence,
or influence U.S. decision making during a crisis. Other motivations
for pursuing these weapons include enhanced prestige, intimidation or
deterrence of regional adversaries, and the relatively low cost of
these weapons. This strategy also applies to terrorist groups intent on
inflicting a large number of casualties if they do not fear political
or military retaliation.

89. Senator Allard. General Kadish, do we have, and are we
developing, capabilities to defend against WMD terrorism?
General Kadish. The WMD terrorist threat is one of the most
difficult and pervasive challenges. To ensure a comprehensive approach
to combating this threat to U.S. forces, DOD has organized a strong and
aggressive antiterrorism/force protection program. The Department has
persisted in making improvements, such as identifying and correcting
antiterrorism vulnerabilities to ensure there is a reduction in risk to
our personnel and property and implementing enhancements in planning,
training, assessing, and equipping. Further, the Department is
providing guidance and direction to assist the field commanders in
developing and implementing antiterrorism programs.

90. Senator Allard. General Kadish, has there been an increase in
terrorist efforts--a ``terrorist arms race''--as a result of U.S.
efforts to prevent and defend itself against terrorist threats?
General Kadish. [Deleted.]

ALLIES

91. Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz, I have a hypothetical,
what if an ally, Poland for example, comes to the United States to ask
for our assistance in developing a missile defense system to combat a
long-range ICBM threat. Can we share with them our ABM technologies to
help them defend their territory against this long-range ICBM?
Secretary Wolfowitz. The ABM Treaty prohibits both transferring ABM
systems or their components to other States and providing to other
States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for
the construction of ABM systems and their components. All responses to
requests to share ABM-related technologies with another State must be
reviewed to assure that they are consistent with those obligations.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

FISCAL YEAR 2002 BUDGET

92. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, Secretary Wolfowitz answered
my question regarding what is the breakout of costs between theater and
national missile defense in the fiscal year 2002 budget by stating,
``About one to two billion for long range systems, one to two million
for short range systems, and the rest for dual use technologies.'' With
greater fidelity, what is the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's
(BMDO) budget for short range, long range and dual use technologies/
programs for fiscal years 2001 and 2002? Also, similarly delineate the
fiscal year 2001 supplemental request for BMDO.
General Kadish. The fiscal year 2001 supplemental request of $153
million for Airborne Laser is to support the existing baseline Air
Force program. The Department-wide fiscal year 2002 amended budget
requests $8.3 billion total for missile defense. This information is
based on the Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission, which has been
submitted to Congress.
In the previous construct of shorter-range missile defense and
longer-range missile defense, the following budgets are requested. All
funds are requested in BMDO's budget except where noted. Programs
marked with an asterisk are split evenly between the two categories as
their efforts apply to both.

[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short & Medium Range Long Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patriot Advanced Capability-3............................. \1\ 784 .........................
Medium Extended Air Defense System........................ \1\ 74 .........................
Navy Area................................................. \2\ 395 .........................
Ground Based Terminal (THAAD)............................. 923 .........................
Arrow..................................................... 66 .........................
Ground Based Midcourse.................................... ......................... 3,285
Sea-Based Midcourse (NTW)................................. 596 60
Space-Based Kinetic Boost................................. ......................... 105
Airborne Laser *.......................................... 205 205
Space-Based Laser project *............................... 85 85
SBIRS-L *................................................. 210 210
Advanced Technology *..................................... 56 57
International programs *.................................. 38 37
Systems Engineering *..................................... 410 411
-----------------------------------------------------
Total................................................... 3,842 4,455
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In Army budget.
\2\ In Navy budget.

93. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, why did BMDO eliminate
THAAD's Fiscal Year 2006-2007 procurement line and move funds from
THAAD's EMD line in fiscal year 2002.
General Kadish. All THAAD funding has been designated as RDT&E to
comply with the overarching BMD System acquisition approach. Funding
levels for THAAD have been increased in fiscal year 2002 by $210
million. In accordance with BMDO's restructured management process, it
is BMDO's intent to transfer management of mature programs at the
procurement stage to the Services. BMDO expects THAAD to be a mature
program in fiscal year 2006-2007, at which time procurement
responsibilities would be transferred to the U.S. Army. To facilitate
the program transition to the U.S. Army, BMDO will allocate at the
appropriate time ``transition to procurement'' funding to initiate low-
rate production provided that development and testing prove successful.

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

94. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, THAAD funds were lumped with
other programs in a BMDO Dem/Val line. There is no indication of how
much RDT&E belongs to THAAD. What are the details of the restructured
funds?
General Kadish. The R-2 for the Terminal Defense Segment
(PE0603881C) provided in the Fiscal Year 2002 Amended President's
Budget Submission includes an R-2A exhibit for the THAAD program. This
exhibit breaks out in detail the Fiscal Year 2002 Planned Program. No
funding has been cut from the THAAD program. Funding was consolidated
into a uniform budget and does account for funding for EMD and the
transfer to production in later years.

95. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, what is BMDO's level of
support under PBD 816 for PAC-3 in the out years? I am concerned about
funding all ten Army Patriot Battalions and feel the Department has an
inherent responsibility to support all ten battalions, not just the
Army.
General Kadish. The Department is still undergoing its Quadrennial
Defense Review process. The QDR will address force structure issues
such as the number of Patriot Battalions. PBD 816 transferred all
funding to the Army so that they could assess their total warfighting
capability and affordability constraints. The Department's intent with
regard to PBD 816 is to transfer $3B in PAC-3 procurement from BMDO to
the Army. However, final PAC-3 funding is subject to the QDR and
subsequent DOD guidance over the FYDP.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

TECHNOLOGY

96. Senator Collins. General Kadish, some defense experts are
questioning the technology that is available today and in the near-term
that would be available to contribute to the development of a robust,
layered BMD System. You have addressed some of the program elements and
activities in your written testimony, but I would ask that you
elaborate on some of the promising technologies which could lead to a
robust, layered missile defense system, and tell us in what time-frame
these technologies could be deployed? Further, can you briefly discuss
how your proposed capabilities-driven approach, vice requirements-
driven, will benefit the overall goal of a robust, layered missile
defense system?
General Kadish. We are exploring multiple technologies that will
enhance current capabilities or form the foundation for the development
of new missile defense capabilities. Currently, we have funded a number
of concept definition and risk-reduction efforts intended to support
this approach. Although we have not yet developed comprehensive
schedules showing deployment time frames, as BMD technologies emerge
and mature and we progress in our development activities, we will
further define schedules and make overall architecture decisions
consistent with our Block acquisition approach.
Given the considerable technical challenges of our mission and the
dynamic nature of the threat, a traditional acquisition process that
includes rigid, predetermined user requirements does not provide the
requisite flexibility to build missile defenses efficiently. For this
reason, capability-based acquisition is appropriate for this program.
BMDO will conduct a structured acquisition process, applying
requirements in the form of technological objectives and goals that can
and will be adjusted based upon the results of research,
experimentation, and testing. These standards differ from the
conventional build-to-requirements process in that they will evolve in
parallel with capabilities, allowing us to significantly reduce
schedule and cost risk.
We successfully followed this approach in our early ICBM programs,
when progress was paced by the evolution of our technological and
engineering maturity. As needed and possible, those capabilities were
enhanced. In accordance with our Block acquisition approach, BMDO and
the Department will conduct rigorous annual reviews of all program
activities to ensure that we proceed steadily towards an architecture
that will maximize defensive capabilities. At these decision points,
programs will be evaluated on the basis of technological maturity,
mission requirements, technology readiness levels, cost, resource
availability, and schedule. Throughout the CINCs and Service Users will
be instrumental in the development process so that, with each block, we
move steadily forward towards a system with ever-increasing military
utility that incorporates complementary operational capabilities and
that minimizes life cycle cost.

97. Senator Collins. General Kadish, in your written testimony you
briefly describe the boost phase intercept. Would you describe in more
detail the advantages of intercepting a missile during its boost phase?
Further, is it fair to say that the Airborne Laser program is the most
mature boost-phase intercept system currently under development?
General Kadish. Interception in boost phase has many advantages. It
precludes the deployment of countermeasures, such as decoys, in later
phases of flight. The payload falls short of its intended target
presenting the attacker with the possibility the warhead, potentially
carrying nuclear, biological or chemical agents, will fall on his
territory. Also, the missile is easily identified by its bright exhaust
plume. Furthermore, the area that can be defended is the entire
operational area of the threat missile--potentially global for the
intercept of an ICBM. Finally, any intercept in boost phase lessens the
load for other elements in the layered BMD System.
The ABL program is the most mature boost-phase intercept system
currently under development.

98. Senator Collins. General Kadish, if the Airborne Laser is close
enough to the missile being launched, will it have the capability to
destroy both long-range and short-range missiles? For example, will it
be able to destroy short-range North Korean Scud missiles, as well as
the long-range Taepo Dong 2 missile under development in North Korea?
General Kadish. ABL is designed to kill ballistic missiles at a
range of several hundred kilometers while the missile is boosting. The
specific range depends on the details of the construction of the
missile and the altitude at which booster burn out occurs. Specifics on
ABL capabilities (range, power requirements) against certain missiles,
such as the Taepo Dong 2, are classified.

99. Senator Collins. General Kadish, for the past several years,
this committee and both bodies of Congress have voted to authorize and
appropriate funding for the Airborne Laser, yet it has not been
certified as compliant with the ABM Treaty, is that correct?
General Kadish. That is correct.

100. Senator Collins. General Kadish, in your written testimony you
briefly discuss sea-based boost-phase defense. Would you further
elaborate on the benefits of sea-based missile defenses? Further, do
you intend to pursue development of sea-based defenses against a long-
range missile attack on the United States?
General Kadish. Sea-based missile defenses are complementary to
land-based and airborne missile defense platforms. Sea-based defense
offers several key advantages:

Ships may already be forward deployed in the theater,
monitoring missile launches. This real-time reaction to a
hostile missile launch is necessary to destroy the missile as
close to the launch site as possible.
While territorial waters are a concern, ships can
maneuver without being encumbered by land-based host nation
restrictions or, in the case of airborne platforms, obtaining
host agreements from foreign countries for temporary basing,
maintenance, and re-supply.
For specific periods of time, they can be
operationally ready 24 hours a day; aircraft would be stressed
to provide such a capability over a long period of time.
Deployment of a contingency Sea-based Midcourse may be
done more rapidly with an existing fleet of Aegis-equipped
cruisers.

It is our intent to develop the Sea-Based Midcourse System to
intercept and destroy medium to long-range ballistic missiles in the
midcourse ascent phase of the exo-atmospheric battlespace.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2002

----------

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Cleland, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe,
Allard, Sessions, and Bunning.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Anita R.
Raiford, deputy chief clerk.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, deputy
staff director for the minority; Brian R. Green, professional
staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Thomas C. Moore, Jennifer L.
Naccari, and Michele A. Traficante.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A.
Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; J. Mark Powers, and John A.
Bonsell, assistants to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier, III,
assistant to Senator Santorum; Douglas Flanders and Charles
Cogar, assistants to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator
Bunning.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets this morning to continue to receive testimony on
ballistic missile defense policies and programs from three
individuals with extensive experience in foreign and defense
policy. I want to welcome to the committee Samuel Berger,
Chairman of Stonebridge International and former Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs; Philip Coyle,
Senior Advisor at the Center for Defense Information and former
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Department
of Defense; and Richard Perle, Resident Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute and former Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy.
This is the committee's third hearing on missile defense
policies and programs in the proposed fiscal year 2002 amended
budget request. Over the last 2 weeks, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Director of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization, Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF,
have presented the administration's proposal for an
``aggressive'' research and development program for ballistic
missile defense, costing $8 billion in fiscal year 2002 alone,
a 57 percent increase in spending on missile defense over the
current fiscal year.
Despite the unfortunate absence of specific details on how
the administration would spend that $8 billion in the next
fiscal year (details we have been promised by the end of the
week), our hearings have helped to shed some light on the
administration's plans for a national missile defense system.
We learned that one or more aspects of this research and
development program could either, ``conflict with the ABM
Treaty,'' as we heard Wednesday of last week from Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, or, ``bump up against,''
ABM Treaty restrictions, as we heard Thursday of last week,
also from Secretary Wolfowitz, ``within months rather than
years.''
Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a somewhat different
slant this week when he said he did not want to say ``months.''
It certainly is not going to be years before we would, in his
words, ``hit the wall of that treaty.'' We learned that there
are three specific activities for which funds are requested for
fiscal year 2002 that would likely conflict or bump up against
the treaty.
We learned the administration would like the Fort Greely
and Shemya Island test bed to, ``give us the option for
rudimentary operational capability,'' as quickly as possible.
In other words, a major purpose of the Fort Greely and Shemya
activities is to provide a rudimentary operational capability.
The test bed is but one of two purposes for which these sites
will be used.
Finally, I was heartened to see the beginnings of a spirit
of flexibility in how the administration would approach the
sensitive issue of the ABM Treaty. In the event that
modifications to that treaty cannot be achieved with Russia,
Senator Warner asked on Tuesday whether, ``if for some reason
these negotiations with Russia do not meet the goals that the
President has laid down, whether he would come back to Congress
in a consultative process.''
Secretary Wolfowitz responded, ``we will be consulting
closely with Congress throughout the coming months.'' Senator
Warner continued by stating that he hoped that the President
``would have further consultation as necessary with Congress
before exercising the treaty provision of withdrawal.''
I also believe that consultation is critical before such a
momentous shift is made. Drawing on their wealth of experience,
today our witnesses can help us better understand the
consequences of the administration's budget actions. The
critical question is whether testing in violation of the ABM
Treaty or deploying a national missile defense system, if done
unilaterally by withdrawing from the ABM Treaty without a new
arrangement to replace it, would leave America more or less
secure.
Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming our three witnesses, who I have known for a very long
time. They bring to the hearing corporate knowledge of foreign
affairs that goes back many decades. Mr. Berger, you certainly
earned a place in history by serving President Clinton very
loyally. I also feel you set new parameters for consultation
with Congress. Many times the President, through you, invited
Members down to work with him, particularly in the troublesome
period of Bosnia and Kosovo, and I value those consultations
and respect them, and I thank you for those meetings.
Mr. Perle, you are an icon, who needs no further
elaboration from me. Mr. Coyle, while I do not know you that
well, I studied many times your pragmatic and objective
assessments of those serious issues, particularly relating to
the subject before us today. So I welcome you all.
We awakened this morning to find that our distinguished
Majority Leader Daschle made some fairly troublesome
statements, in my judgment, with regard to our President.
President Bush is making a conscientious effort to consult with
our allies and to initiate preliminary negotiations with Russia
on the subject before us today, and that is missile defense.
It seems to me in my 23 years in the Senate, as I have
observed colleagues in the Senate, they have always at least
given the President, irrespective of party, some latitude as
they undertake their primary function under the Constitution,
that is, to be the chief architect of our foreign policy and
security issues. I would hope during the course of the next 24
hours that somehow this rhetoric from Majority Leader Daschle
can be resolved.
Also, in this hearing room we have had some pretty tough
criticism directed at our President. While I believe our
hearings have been very productive and a major step forward in
seeking to better understand the necessity for our country to
look at a new relationship with Russia, and to move forward
with a series of options to explore the full parameters of how
we construct a missile defense system, we too have been
pockmarked here and there with some pretty tough criticism.
Even in this morning's paper there seems to be some very
interesting and constructive comments by Russian President
Putin, toward the actions of our President. I remain very
confident that our President can forge a mutually acceptable
new framework, and to allow this country and, indeed, others to
proceed toward the necessity for missile defense.
Mr. Chairman, I am anxious, as you are, to proceed. I would
note, however, that Secretary Wolfowitz, as you stated to
General Kadish in our last hearing, did a remarkable job of
testifying for 2 consecutive days. These sessions were in
excess of 4 hours, and we covered, I think, the basics for this
committee and the Senate as a whole. It was excellent. I thank
the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner, and a
very warm welcome to you, Sandy. It is great to see you again.
Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL R. BERGER, CHAIRMAN, STONEBRIDGE
INTERNATIONAL, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. Berger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator
Warner, for those kind words. Members of the committee, I thank
you for the invitation to appear today on one of the most
consequential national security issues our Nation faces. These
are difficult issues, and they need full discussion among
people of varying perspectives conducted with goodwill and with
a shared interest in advancing the security of the United
States.
Mr. Chairman, the issue is not whether to protect America,
but how best to protect America. There is an emerging threat
from proliferation of long-range missiles. Missile defense may
be an appropriate part of our response, but how we get there
matters. We must pursue a strategy that advances our security
interest, not just with tunnel vision, but also with peripheral
vision.
That is why I find the missile defense that Secretary
Wolfowitz sketched out over the past several days troubling. It
requests congressional support for activities the
administration says are likely to ``bump up against'' the ABM
Treaty ``within months.''
To me, that means either we will be constrained by or
withdrawing from the treaty in the absence of an agreement with
the Russians in a very short timeframe. It is a schedule that
key experts tell us is not necessary to vigorously pursue a
range of missile defense technologies. It means we could incur
serious cost and risks before we know what threat our system is
designed to target, whether the system is likely to work
against that threat, the cost and tradeoffs involved (including
within the defense budget), and the overall consequences for
our national security. It is as if the objective is to put the
most pressure on the treaty and collapse the time frame for
negotiations.
The Bush administration's focus, in my judgment, is at this
stage too narrow. The issue is, how do we enhance the overall
security of the American people in a world with complex and
diverse threats and overlapping security equities. The
administration is correct to give serious weight to the
emerging threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
But we must also give serious weight to former adversaries
still armed with nuclear weapons, in particular Russia, whose
actions can affect our security; to allies whose solidarity
with us is a strategic asset and whose cooperation to build any
missile defense system is highly desirable if not necessary; to
bountiful but not unlimited budgetary resources; and to a
multitude of threats--some old, some new--which impose the
obligation to establish priorities and balance.
I welcome Secretary Powell's statement last week that we
intend to make a serious effort with the Russians to modify the
current ABM Treaty and seek a new strategic framework as the
President has discussed. But the game plan outlined by the
Pentagon last week proceeds on a timetable that makes it
impossible for any such negotiations to succeed.
Indeed, we may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy,
leading almost inevitably to a breach or unilateral abrogation
which, at the very least, is premature. In the past 6 months, I
have heard a number of different objectives articulated for our
missile defense program. But there is little detail regarding
the capabilities and architecture that would be required to
accomplish these objectives. Each would have different
potential consequences for the Russian deterrent.
How can we expect to negotiate modifications to the ABM
Treaty or a change in decades of strategic policy with the
Russians in a matter of months when the purpose, architecture,
and scope of our missile defense system are all undefined? This
is a collision course to unilateral breach or abrogation sooner
rather than later.
Is that necessary? Mr. Coyle will speak to the view he has
expressed that testing a range of technologies which would
require modifications to the ABM Treaty is, ``many years
away.'' I welcome the successful flight test conducted last
weekend. But the ABM Treaty is not constraining vigorous
pursuit of a range of technologies.
Why not unilaterally abrogate the treaty? Does it matter?
Let me address these questions: No other country can ever
have a veto over U.S. security requirements. But that does not
end the argument. For in calculating our national interest, we
need to include reasonably foreseeable consequences of our
actions.
What are the risks and costs, particularly from what would
be seen as a precipitous withdrawal from the treaty?
First, as President Bush has said, Russia is no longer our
enemy, but it is also true that a cycle of instability,
uncertainty, danger, and paranoia is still possible. In very
recent years, we have been through crises in the Balkans, the
Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere in which the
United States and Russia have been at tense, fast-moving,
confusing, and contentious moments of crisis. Even with the end
of the Cold War, our two countries still harbor distrust,
burdens of history, fierce national pride, and large nuclear
arsenals. Uncertainty about each other's capabilities and
intentions still can be dangerous. Agreed constraints,
transparency, and verification of our nuclear capabilities are
important; we erode this as we move away from agreed rules.
Second, while changes in the ABM Treaty may be warranted,
agreed constraints on defenses are not obsolete. The purpose of
the ABM Treaty was to decrease each side's sense of
vulnerability to preemption or coercion, and therefore, to keep
their nuclear guns in the holster, and not on a hair trigger.
While the political context has changed, the strategic dynamic
changes more slowly. Without the ABM Treaty, or a modification
thereof, the Russians have said--and there is risk in ignoring
this--that they will act in ways they believe will decrease
their vulnerability, not just to U.S. attack--which is, of
course, hard to conceive--but to U.S. coercion, which for the
Russians is not hard to conceive. In the context of what is
seen as a precipitous abrogation by us, unfortunately they
would have sympathy from much of the world. There are steps
which are not beyond their means, including withdrawing from
the START and INF Treaties, adding warheads to strategic
missiles, and redeploying tactical nuclear weapons at sea, or
on NATO's periphery. These all would take us back down the path
of instability in a dangerous world.
Again, none of this is to suggest that Russia should have a
trump card. It does mean to me, however, that the path to
unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, particularly without a
serious effort at modification, is not without risk that must
be part of our calculation of our national interest.
In this respect, I agree with Henry Kissinger.
``Unilaterally American decisions,'' he recently wrote,
``should be a last resort. The most powerful country in the
world should not adopt unilateralism until the possibilities of
agreement have been fully explored.''
There are other essential questions that need to be
clarified if we are to move forward in a way that looks at our
security interests broadly, not narrowly.
First, what will be the effect of missile defense on
stability in Asia? We acknowledge that this system we seek to
build could defeat China's small nuclear deterrent. Our answer
seems to be: they are going to build up anyway. I think that is
a strange posture for the United States which would be in
effect, legitimizing and perhaps accelerating China's strategic
modernization. What impact will that have on the intertwined
Asian nuclear dynamic, on India's nuclear program, and
Pakistan's? On the calculations across the Korean peninsula? On
the sense of vulnerability, and the incipient nuclear debate,
in Japan? This all must be part of the equation as we decide to
move forward.
Second, are we looking at weapons of mass destruction
through the wrong end of the telescope? There is a significant
possibility that the United States will be attacked by a
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon over the next decade.
But I agree with the former chairman of this committee, Sam
Nunn, who recently wrote, ``the clear and present danger is not
from North Korean missiles that could hit America in a few
years . . . the likeliest nuclear attack against the United
States would come from a warhead in the belly of a ship or the
back of a truck.''
The obvious response to this argument is that it is not
either/or. We should build a missile defense to bolster
deterrents and provide insurance in case deterrence fails and
do more to protect ourselves against other threats, including
the more probable attacks in the United States. But, in fact,
as the members of this committee know, in the real world, we
cannot avoid choices, setting priorities, and allocating
resources.
Missile defense appears to be the central strategic
imperative of the Bush administration, with virtually
everything else subordinated to it. The allies, Russia, Asia,
the merits of arms control, other defense modernization needs,
other WMD threats, and cooperation with the Russians through a
fully funded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to
control nuclear materials seem to have been forgotten. The
essential job of the administration and Congress is to strike
the right balance.
Let me briefly suggest how I propose we should go forward.
First, we should continue to pursue actively a range of
potential missile defense technologies and define the scope of
the threat, but not engage in a 2-minute drill that is likely
to put us on a collision course with the ABM Treaty and most of
the rest of the world in the next few months.
Second, with greater clarity on the scope of the system, we
should press for an agreement with the Russians on new
defensive constraints, and engage in real consultations with
the allies.
Third, we should vigorously fund our theater missile
defense programs, which are needed on today's battlefield and
need not conflict with the ABM Treaty.
Fourth, we must see the issue before us as WMD defense, not
simply national missile defense. To the extent the American
people think about this in bed at night, I believe their
greatest fears relate to a terrorist attack: toxic chemicals
placed in the water supply or an anthrax attack that could
swiftly sweep across the country or a nuclear device in a
truck. There is far more we must do to fight virulent anti-
American terrorists who are seeking these weapons and to
protect our critical infrastructure.
Fifth, we can reduce offensive nuclear arsenals to levels
commensurate with today's needs, either bilaterally or
unilaterally verified through existing strategic arms accords,
which still have great value for our security.
Sixth, we must address the needs and requirements of
tomorrow's military across-the-board, as Secretary Rumsfeld's
current defense review will require, for we need a strong
defense and the right defense, and that will require adequate
resources and difficult choices.
Seventh, we should resume serious negotiations with the
North Koreans to stop their missile program--the front edge of
the threat. I do not know whether a verifiable, acceptable
agreement is possible. I do know that the missile testing
moratorium we negotiated in 1999 has slowed their program and
that we will never find out what is possible if we do not
reengage in a serious way at a serious level.
Mr. Chairman, our first obligation is to protect America.
But America's national security interests are not one-
dimensional. I hope the United States will fashion a course
that provides that protection with wide-angle vision.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Samuel R. Berger

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I thank you for the
invitation to appear today on one of the most consequential national
security issues our Nation faces. These are difficult issues, and they
need full discussion among people of varying perspectives, conducted
with good will and with a shared interest in advancing the security of
the United States.
Mr. Chairman, the issue is not whether to protect America but how
best to protect America. There is an emerging threat from proliferation
of long-range missiles. Missile defense may be an appropriate part of
our response. But how we get there matters. We must pursue a strategy
that advances our overall security interests, not just with tunnel
vision but also peripheral vision.
That is why I find the missile defense outline that the
administration sketched out to this committee over the past several
days troubling. It requests congressional support for activities the
administration says are likely to ``bump up against'' the ABM Treaty
``within months.'' To me, that means either we will be constrained by
or withdrawing from the treaty in the absence of an agreement in a very
short timeframe. It is a schedule that key experts tell us is not
necessary to vigorously pursue a range of missile defense technologies.
It means we could incur serious costs and risks before we know what
threat our system is designed to target, whether the system is likely
to work against that threat, the cost and tradeoffs involved--including
within the defense budget--and the overall consequences for our
national security.
It's as if the objective is to put the most pressure on the treaty
and collapse the timeframe for negotiations.
The Bush administration's focus appears, at this stage, too narrow.
The issue is: how do we enhance the overall security of the American
people in a world with complex and diverse threats and overlapping
security equities. The administration is correct to give serious weight
to the emerging threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
But we must also give serious weight to former adversaries still armed
with nuclear weapons, in particular Russia, whose actions can affect
our security; to allies whose solidarity with us is a strategic asset
and whose cooperation to build any missile defense is highly desirable
if not necessary; to bountiful but not unlimited budgetary resources;
and to a multitude of threats-some old, some new-which impose the
obligation to establish priorities and balance.
I welcome Secretary Powell's statement last week that we intend to
make a serious effort with the Russians to modify the current ABM
Treaty and seek a new strategic framework as the President has
discussed. But the game plan outlined by the Pentagon last week
proceeds on a timetable that makes any such negotiation virtually
impossible to succeed.
Indeed, we may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading
almost inevitably to breach or unilateral abrogation which, at the very
least, is premature. In the past 6 months, I have heard a number of
different objectives articulated for our missile defense program. But
there is little detail regarding the capabilities and architecture that
would be required to accomplish these objectives. Each would have
different potential consequences for the Russian deterrent.
How can we expect to negotiate modifications to the ABM Treaty with
the Russians in a matter of months when the purpose, architecture and
scope of the system are undefined? This is a collision course to
unilateral breach or abrogation sooner rather than later.
Is that necessary? Mr. Coyle will speak to the view he has
expressed that testing a range of technologies which would require
modifications to the ABM Treaty is ``many years away.'' I welcome the
successful flight test conducted last weekend. But the ABM Treaty is
not constraining vigorous pursuit of a range of technologies.
Why not unilaterally abrogate? Does it matter?
First, let me be clear. No other country ever can have a veto over
U.S. security requirements. But that doesn't end the argument. For in
calculating our national interest, we need to include reasonably
foreseeable consequences of our actions.
What are the risks and costs, particularly from what would be seen
as a precipitous withdrawal from the treaty?
First, as President Bush has said, Russia no longer is our enemy,
but it also is true that a cycle of instability, uncertainty, danger
and paranoia still is possible. In very recent years, we've been
through crises in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Gulf and elsewhere
in which the U.S. and Russia have been at tense, fast moving,
confusing, and contentious moments of crises. Even with the end of the
Cold War, our two countries still harbor distrust, burdens of history,
fierce national pride and large nuclear arsenals. Uncertainty about
each other's capabilities and intentions still can be dangerous. Agreed
constraints, transparency and verification of our nuclear capabilities
are important; we erode this as we move away from agreed rules.
Second, while changes in the ABM Treaty may be warranted, agreed
constraints on defenses are not obsolete. The purpose of the ABM Treaty
was to decrease each side's sense of vulnerability to preemption and
coercion and, therefore, to keep their nuclear guns in the holster, not
on a hair trigger. While the political context has changed, the
strategic dynamic changes more slowly. Without the ABM Treaty, or a
modification thereof, the Russians have said--and there is risk in
ignoring this--that they will act in ways they believe will decrease
their vulnerability, not just to U.S. attack--which, of course, is hard
to conceive--but of U.S. coercion, which for the Russians is not hard
to conceive. In the context of what is seen as a precipitous abrogation
by us, unfortunately they would have sympathy from much of the world.
There are steps which are not beyond their means, including withdrawing
from the START and INF Treaties, adding warheads to strategic missiles,
or redeploying tactical nuclear weapons at sea or on NATO's periphery.
These all take us back down the path of instability in a dangerous
world.
Again, none of this is to suggest that Russia should have a trump
card. It does mean to me, however, that the path to unilateral
abrogation of the ABM Treaty, particularly without a serious effort at
modification, is not without risks that must be part of one calculation
of our national interest.
In this respect, I agree with Henry Kissinger. ``Unilateral
American decisions,'' he recently wrote, ``should be a last resort; the
most powerful country in the world should not adopt unilateralism until
the possibilities of agreement have been fully explored.''
There are other essential questions that need to be clarified if we
are to move forward in a way that looks at our security interests
broadly, not narrowly.
First, what will be the effect of missile defense on stability in
Asia? We acknowledge that the system we seek to build could defeat
China's small nuclear deterrent. Our answer seems to be: they're going
to build up anyway. That is a strange posture for the U.S.: in effect,
legitimizing and perhaps accelerating China's strategic modernization.
What impact will that have on the intertwined Asian nuclear dynamic? On
India's nuclear programs, and Pakistan's? On calculations across the
Korea Peninsula? On the sense of vulnerability, and the incipient
nuclear debate, in Japan? This must all be part of the equation as we
decide how to move forward.
Second, are we looking at the weapons of mass destruction threat
through the wrong end of the telescope? There is a significant
possibility that the United States will be attacked by a nuclear,
chemical or biological weapon over the next 10 years. But I agree with
the former chairman of this committee, Sam Nunn: ``The clear and
present danger,'' he recently wrote, ``is not from North Korean
missiles that could hit America in a few years . . . The likeliest
nuclear attack against the United States would come from a warhead in
the belly of a ship or the back of a truck.''
The obvious response to this argument is that it is not either/or.
We should build a missile defense to bolster deterrence and provide
insurance in case deterrence fails and do more to protect ourselves
against other threats, including more probable attacks in the U.S. But,
in fact, in the real world, we cannot avoid choices, setting
priorities, and allocating resources. Missile defense appears to be the
central strategic imperative of the Bush administration, with virtually
everything else subordinated to it: the allies, Russia, Asia, the
merits of arms control, other defense modernization needs, other WMD
threats, including cooperation with the Russians through a fully-funded
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to control nuclear
materials, now inadequately protected in Russia and in quantities that
could build 60,000 nuclear weapons.
The essential job of the administration and Congress is to strike
the right balance.
Let me suggest how I think we should proceed going forward:

First, we should continue to pursue actively a range
of potential missile defense technologies and define the scope
of the threat, but not engage in a ``2-minute drill'' that is
likely to put us on a collision with the ABM Treaty and most of
the world in the next few months.
Second, with greater clarity on the scope of the
system, we should press for agreement with the Russians on new
defensive constraints and engage in real consultation with
allies.
Third, we should vigorously fund our theater missile
defense programs, which are needed on today's battlefield and
need not conflict with the ABM Treaty.
Fourth, we must see the issues before us as WMD
defense, not simply national missile defense. To the extent the
American people think about this in bed at night, I believe
their greatest fears relate to terrorist attack: toxic
chemicals placed in the water supply or an anthrax attack that
could quickly sweep across the country or a nuclear device in a
truck. There is far more we must do to fight virulent anti-
American terrorists who are seeking these weapons and to
protect our critical infrastructure.
Fifth, we can reduce offensive nuclear arsenals to
levels commensurate with today's needs, either bilaterally or
unilaterally, verified through existing strategic arms accords
which still have great value for our security.
Sixth, we must address the needs and requirements of
tomorrow's military across-the-board, as Secretary Rumsfeld's
current defense review will require, for we need a strong
defense and the right defense, and that will require adequate
resources and difficult choices.
Seventh, we should resume serious negotiations with
the North Koreans to stop their missile program--the front edge
of the threat. I don't know whether a verifiable, acceptable
agreement is possible. I do know that the missile testing
moratorium we negotiated in 1999 has slowed their program and
that we'll never find out what's possible if we don't reengage
in a serious way at a serious level.

Mr. Chairman, our first obligation is to protect America. But
America's national security interests are not one-dimensional. I hope
the United States will fashion a course that provides that protection
with wide-angle vision.
Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Berger.
Mr. Coyle.

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP E. COYLE, SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR
DEFENSE INFORMATION, FORMER DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Coyle. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
appreciate this opportunity to discuss the National Missile
Defense (NMD) Program. NMD is the most difficult program the
Department of Defense has attempted. This is as true today as
it has been for the 30 years that national missile defense has
been on the American political scene. While the technology that
might be used for NMD has changed over the years, the overall
difficulty at each stage in the development of new technology
has not.
Some have compared the difficulty of NMD with the Manhattan
Project, but a difference is that NMD is being developed
without either the urgency of the threat or the constituency of
wartime emergency.
The NMD program or, rather, a portion of it, which is now
being called the mid-course defense segment, has begun to
demonstrate considerable progress. The battle management
command and control and communications system has progressed
well. The X-band radar performance looks promising, and an
initial systems integration capability has been demonstrated,
although achieving full system of systems interoperability is
recognized as one of the most challenging aspects of NMD
development.
There are many limitations in the test program so far, but
notwithstanding the limitations in the testing program and
failures of important components in all of the first four
flight intercept tests, including the two that achieved
intercept, the program has demonstrated considerable progress.
To address the limitations in the testing program, while I
was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I made over 50
recommendations to enhance NMD testing. These recommendations
included more realistic flight engagements, tests with simple
countermeasures beyond those planned, tests with simple
tumbling re-entry vehicles (RVs), and tests with multiple
simultaneous engagements. BMDO is now implementing many of
those recommendations. For example, I recommended that the
program develop more realistic engagement geometries, either
with launches of interceptors or targets from the Kodiak launch
complex in Kodiak, Alaska, and BMDO has recently announced that
they will be implementing this recommendation.
Developmental tests in a complex program, especially those
conducted very early, contain many limitations and
artificialities, some driven by the need for specific early
design data, and some driven by test range safety
considerations. Also, the program was never structured to
produce operationally realistic test results early.
Accordingly, it was not realistic to expect that early test
results could have supported a full deployment decision in the
Clinton administration, even if all of the tests had been
unambiguously successful, which they were not.
Similarly, the early test results to date, including the
latest flight-intercept tests last Saturday, do not yet justify
a Bush administration decision to deploy an operational system
in Alaska. The Bush administration is proposing a very
aggressive new testing program. Such a test program, with many
activities conducted in parallel, will be necessary if
deployment of even a primitive operational capability is
expected this decade.
For example, four or five tests per year of the midcourse
defense segment could complete in 4 or 5 years the 20 or so
developmental tests needed before realistic operational testing
could begin. This would assume that all 20 tests were
successful and that no tests needed to be repeated because of
setbacks, surprises, or failures.
The midcourse defense segment of the Clinton administration
is the farthest along, technically, and will be a necessary
part of any layered system. Also, the Bush administration has
emphasized mobile land-based, sea-based, airborne, and space-
based approaches to these segments, whereas the Clinton
administration was focused on a fixed land-based mid-course
system.
This array of options and the declared intention to also
defend our friends and allies around the world has produced
confusion about what we will actually try to build, since all
of these options are probably not affordable. Each of the
approaches to NMD has its strengths and weaknesses. Mid-course
NMD provides national coverage in a relatively cost-effective
way, but has been lambasted by scientists for its inability to
discriminate decoys and countermeasures.
Boost-phase NMD avoids the problem with countermeasures and
decoys, but requires interceptors to be very close to enemy
territory, and confronts the operators with breathtakingly
short reaction times. The sensing radars and satellites must
begin to discriminate and characterize the enemy missiles
within seconds, and intercept must occur within 3 or 4 minutes,
possibly within 120 seconds in some scenarios.
A boost-phase system must be essentially computer-operated
and autonomous, with no time for consultation with the
President, the National Security Advisor, or the Secretary of
Defense. Also, boost-phase systems can be vulnerable to certain
countermeasures and tactics themselves.
Terminal-phase systems have the advantage of atmospheric
stripping, that is, using the atmosphere to strip out lighter
objects, decoys, and chaff that are designed to conceal the
desired target. However, the effects of the atmosphere on
decoys are observable only during the last 60 seconds or so of
flight and, once again, there are countermeasures an enemy
could use.
In general, regardless of which phase of NMD you are
talking about, the systems must achieve reliability,
availability, and effectiveness levels that are rarely, if
ever, achieved by military systems and, when parsed out into
various components and subsystems, the required reliability of
those components and subsystems becomes exceedingly high.
There is nothing wrong with testing the program the
Department has been pursuing, so long as the desired results
match the desired pace of acquisition decisions to support
deployment. However, a more aggressive testing program with
parallel paths and activities will be necessary to achieve an
effective operational capability by 2005 or even for several
years thereafter. This means a test program that is structured
to anticipate and absorb setbacks that inevitably occur.
I am pleased that the NMD program is developing test plans
that move in this direction. However, the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) is obsolete, and much work must be done just
to develop detailed test plans and a TEMP which cover the
administration's newest research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) program for NMD. As these plans are
developed, continued interaction with the operational test and
evaluation organizations will be essential. I recommend that
this committee follow these developments closely and encourage
BMDO and the NMD program offices to improve the frequency and
candor of their interactions with these operational test
experts.
Considering a layered system, I would expect that each
segment, boost phase, mid-course, and terminal, could each
require 25 or 30 tests before they get to realistic operational
testing, bringing the total for the full system to over 100
tests.
Mr. Chairman, deployment means the fielding of an
operational system with some military utility that is effective
under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and
countermeasures, possibly without adequate prior knowledge of
the target cluster composition, timing, trajectory, or
direction, and one operated by military personnel at all times
of the day and night and in all weather. Such a capability is
yet to be shown practicable for NMD. These operational
considerations will become an increasingly important part of
test and simulation over the coming years.
Mr. Chairman, in my prepared testimony, I also discuss the
relationship between NMD and the ABM Treaty, NMD and
deterrence, and the importance of greater priority on Theater
Missile Defense (TMD). I will skip those sections in the
interest of time and just proceed to my conclusion.
The technical and political challenges for NMD are such
that careful oversight will be required by this committee for
many years, probably decades, to come. To demonstrate an
effective operational capability, the service test
organizations who work together jointly on NMD provide an
essential operational perspective. This operational perspective
is vital for any military system, but particularly so for NMD
because of its complexity.
Working with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the service
operational test agencies provide valuable insights to the NMD
program office, to the services and OSD leadership, and to
Congress. The early involvement of the operational test
community can help avoid setbacks and delays and help solve
problems early that will be much more difficult and expensive
to fix later.
The early involvement of the operational test community
will be key to NMD systems that really work in realistic combat
environments. I am confident that the future and ultimate
success of NMD will depend on the OT&E community. It is through
the operational test community that you will know whether
Theater Missile Defenses can reliably protect our sons and
daughters serving in the military overseas.
It is through the operational test community that you will
know what kind of protection an NMD system can provide from
unauthorized or accidental launches, ICBM launches from Russia
or China, as well as intentional launches from States of
concern, and it is through the operational test community that
NMD and Theater Missile Defense as well has its best chance for
success.
Throughout, the DOD operational test community will require
the encouragement and the steadfast support of this committee
and Congress. I urge this committee and Congress to require the
assessments of the operational test agencies in congressional
reviews of the progress of NMD.
Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to take your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Coyle follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Philip E. Coyle

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.
From 1994 to 2001, I was an Assistant Secretary of Defense and the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, in the Department of
Defense. During those 6\1/2\ years, I became the longest-serving
Director in the 18-year history of the office. I have spent more than
40 years in defense testing, including testing of the warheads of the
original Safeguard ABM system in Nevada and Alaska more than 30 years
ago. Currently, I am serving as a Senior Advisor to the Center for
Defense Information.
NMD is the most difficult program the Department of Defense has
attempted, more difficult than the F-22 Raptor, the Land Attack
Destroyer (DD-21), or the Abrams M1A2 tank complete with battlefield
digitization. This is as true today as it has been for the 30 years
that national missile defense has been on the American political scene.
While the technology that might be used for NMD has changed over the
years, the overall difficulty at each stage in the development of new
technology has not. Some have compared the difficulty of NMD with the
Manhattan Project, but a difference is that NMD is being developed
without either the urgency of the threat or the constituency of a
wartime emergency. In fact, one question that has dogged NMD is who
exactly is the enemy? Is it North Korea? Is it Iran, Iraq, or Libya? Is
it China or Russia? Or is it all those countries at once?
You requested that today's testimony focus on the impact of the
test results to date on technology maturity and deployment schedules.
You also indicated I should address the relationship between NMD and
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, NMD and deterrence, and NMD
and Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and the current proposals to design,
test, and deploy an effective missile defense system. Throughout my
testimony, you will hear my conviction about the value of early and
close coupling of the operational test perspective during the whole
life cycle of a major system such as NMD, and especially during
development. First, I will discuss the progress so far.

PROGRESS SO FAR

The NMD program--or rather what is now being called the Midcourse
Defense Segment--has begun to demonstrate considerable progress toward
its defined goals. The Battle Management Command, Control, and
Communications (BMC\3\) system has progressed well. Potential X-Band
Radar performance looks promising, as reflected in the performance of
the Ground Based Radar-Prototype (GBR-P). An initial systems
integration capability has been demonstrated, although achieving full
system-of-systems interoperability is recognized as one of the most
challenging aspects of NMD development.
The ability to hit a target reentry vehicle (RV) in a direct hit-
to-kill collision was demonstrated in the first flight intercept in
October 1999. However, in that test, operationally representative
sensors did not provide initial interceptor targeting instructions, as
would be the case in an operational system. Instead, for test purposes,
a Global Positioning System (GPS) signal from the target RV served to
first aim the interceptor. We were not able to repeat such a successful
intercept in the next two flight intercept tests due to failures of
systems we would have liked to have been able to take for granted, i.e.
failure of a cooling system in the second flight intercept test, and
failure of rocket stage separation and of the decoy to deploy in the
third test. The fourth test, conducted just last Saturday, also
achieved a hit-to-kill and was essentially a successful repeat of the
two previous tests that did not go as well. Like the previous two
tests, this latest test was an early test with necessary test
limitations. Notwithstanding the limitations in the testing program and
failures of important components in all of the first four flight
intercept tests, the program has demonstrated considerable progress.

TESTING LIMITATIONS

In these early tests, the engagement conditions are different from
an operational situation. The target, launched from Vandenberg AFB in
California, is seen immediately by the early warning radar also in
California, so early warning is not an issue. These early tests all
have used a single large balloon as a decoy; more realistic tests later
will use more representational decoys. The prototype X-band radar at
Kwajalein is not forward-based in relation to the interceptor as it
would be in many operational scenarios. As a result, either a C-band
radar beacon or GPS has been used in the tests so far to provide target
track information. These and other limitations will need to be phased
out as the NMD program moves forward.

TEST RECOMMENDATIONS

In the correspondence with the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO), my former office has made over 50 recommendations
to enhance the NMD testing program. These recommendations also were
stated in my August 11, 2000, deployment readiness review (DRR) report,
my testimony last September before the House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, and in my Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Report. These
recommendations include more realistic flight engagements, tests with
simple countermeasures beyond those planned, tests with simple tumbling
RVs, and tests with multiple simultaneous engagements. BMDO is now
implementing many of those recommendations. For example, I recommended
that the program develop more realistic engagement geometries either
with launches of interceptors or targets from the Kodiak Launch Complex
in Kodiak, Alaska. BMDO has recently announced that they will be
implementing this recommendation.
Because of the nature of strategic ballistic missile defense, it is
impractical to conduct full, operationally realistic intercept flight-
testing across the wide spectrum of possible scenarios. The program
must therefore augment its flight-testing with various types of
simulations. Overall, NMD testing is comprised of interrelated ground
hardware and software-in-the-loop testing, intercept and non-intercept
flight-testing, computer and laboratory simulations, and man-in-the-
loop command and control exercises.
Unfortunately, all of these simulations have failed to develop as
expected. This, coupled with flight test delays, has placed a
significant limitation on the ability to assess the technological
feasibility of NMD.
The testing program has been designed to learn as much as possible
from each test. Accordingly, the tests so far have all been planned
with backup systems so that if one portion of a test fails, the rest of
the test objectives might still be met.
Developmental tests in a complex program, especially those
conducted very early, contain many limitations and artificialities,
some driven by the need for specific early design data and some driven
by test range safety considerations. Also, the program was never
structured to produce operationally realistic test results this early.
Accordingly, it was not realistic to expect such early test results
could have supported a full deployment decision in the Clinton
administration, even if all of the tests had been unambiguously
successful, which they were not. Similarly, the early test results to
date, including the latest flight intercept test last Saturday, do not
yet justify a Bush administration decision to deploy an operational
system in Alaska. The Bush administration is proposing a very
aggressive new testing program. Such a test program, with many
activities conducted in parallel, will be necessary if deployment of
even a primitive operational capability is expected this decade. For
example, four or five tests per year of the Mid-course Defense Segment
could complete in 4 or 5 years, the twenty or so developmental tests
needed before realistic operational testing could begin. This assumes
that all twenty tests are successful and that no tests need to be
repeated because of set-backs, surprises, or failures.
In a way, the NMD program has been set back during the last 6
months. While the Bush administration has not yet said exactly what its
system--or system-of-systems will be, in policy statements the
administration has emphasized layered defenses with new emphasis on
boost- and terminal-phase defenses. However, the Midcourse Defense
Segment of the Clinton administration is the farthest along
technically, and will be a necessary part of any layered system. Also,
the Bush administration has emphasized mobile land-based, sea-based,
airborne, and space-based approaches to these segments, whereas the
Clinton administration was focused on a fixed, land-based midcourse
system. This array of options, and the declared intention also to
defend our friends and allies around the world, has produced confusion
about what we will actually try to build since all of these options are
probably not affordable.
In addition, during the last 6 months, NMD fell another 6 months
further behind in its planned testing. Three tests of the new two-stage
booster which were to all have taken pIace by now have slipped about 6
months, with the first of these now scheduled for next month. Also the
fourth flight-intercept test, so-called IFT-6, just conducted, was to
have taken place many months ago. Since my testimony before the House
last September, the latest flight-intercept test had slipped 6 months,
as have the three booster vehicle tests. This tendency for NMD tests to
suffer significant delays, which has been a characteristic of the NMD
program for several years now, will need to change if satisfactory
overall progress is to be realized.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Each of the approaches to NMD has its strengths and weaknesses.
Midcourse NMD provides national coverage in a relatively cost-effective
way, but has been lambasted by scientists for its inability to
discriminate decoys and countermeasures. Boost-phase NMD avoids the
problem with countermeasures and decoys, but requires the interceptors
to be very close to enemy territory and confronts the operators with
breathtakingly short reaction times. The sensing radars and satellites
must begin to discriminate and characterize the enemy missiles within
seconds, and intercept must occur within 3 or 4 minutes, possibly
within 120 seconds in some scenarios. A boost-phase system must be
essentially computer operated and autonomous, with no time for
consultation with the President, the National Security Advisor or the
Secretary of Defense. Also, boost-phase systems can be vulnerable to
certain countermeasures and tactics as well. Terminal-phase systems
have the advantage of atmospheric stripping, that is, using the
atmosphere to strip out lighter objects, decoys and chaff that are
designed to conceal the desired target. However, the effects of the
atmosphere on decoys are observable only during the last 60 to 90
seconds of flight, and once again there are countermeasures an enemy
could use.
Taken together in a layered system, all these segments could be
better than any one segment alone, provided that they worked together
and that failures in one part of a layered system didn't lead to
failures in another. The more complicated the overall system, the
greater the cost and the demands on reliability and availability.
In general, NMD systems must achieve reliability, availability and
effectiveness levels that are rarely if ever achieved by military
systems, and when parsed out to the various components and subsystems,
the required reliability of those components and subsystems becomes
exceedingly high.
For the sake of comparison, in Iraq and in Kosovo, the enemy air
defense systems have had zero effectiveness against U.S. aircraft.
Using a combination of stealth, jamming and tactics, we have prevented
these enemy air defense systems from having any real capability against
U.S. targets. While conventional air defense is not the same thing as
missile defense, the comparison does illustrate the challenge.
Midcourse NMD is analogous to a golfer trying to hit a hole in one
when the hole is going 15,000 miles per hour. With decoys, midcourse
NMD is analogous to trying to hit a hole in one when the hole is going
15,000 miles per hour, and the green is covered with flags and other
holes that look similar to the real hole.
Boost-phase NMD is analogous to trying to hit your golf partner's
drive out of the air with a drive of your own. Your reactions must be
quick, and your drive has to be very fast to catch up.
In terminal-phase NMD, your golf perspective flips and is analogous
to being the hole. But now you are trying to prevent another golfer's
drive from landing anywhere on the green, where the green is as big as
the United States.
Such analogies may seem exaggerated, but they really aren't. For
example, to take just one component of both boost-phase and midcourse
systems, it is difficult for us to visualize how the infrared seeker on
the kill vehicle ``sees.'' With human sight and human brains we may get
clues about which is the real target, clues the kill vehicle doesn't
get. On the kill vehicle, the IR seeker sees in only one color--you
could think of it as a particular shade of red--and it sees through a
narrow field of view, like a soda straw. Sometime try telling what's
going on by watching black and white television through a soda straw
with one eye closed and without sound. Then you'll begin to see how
difficult discrimination is for NMD seeker systems.

FUTURE TEST PLANNING

Recently, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has said that
the focus of the NMD program is going to be on testing, not deployment,
a development I applaud. This new emphasis could help correct what has
been a chronic problem, namely, that test results were not likely to be
available soon enough to support a recommendation for early deployment
anyway. This is because the planned testing program continues to run
behind schedule, because the test content has not yet addressed
important operational questions, and because ground-test facilities for
assessment and training are considerably behind schedule.
NMD developmental testing needs to be augmented to prepare for
realistic operational situations in the IOT&E phase, and will need to
be very aggressive to keep pace with the recently proposed plans to
achieve early operational capability with test assets in Alaska. The
testing schedule, including supporting modeling and simulation,
continues to slip while plans for deployment have not. Important parts
of the test program have slipped a year and a half in the two and a
half years since the NMD program was restructured in January 1999.
Thus, the program is behind in both the demonstrated level of technical
accomplishment and in schedule. Additionally, the content of individual
tests has been diminished and is providing less information than
originally planned.
While in the Pentagon, I expressed concern that the NMD program had
not planned nor funded any intercept tests until IOT&E with realistic
operational features such as multiple simultaneous engagements, long-
range intercepts, realistic engagement geometries, and countermeasures
other than simple balloons. I am pleased that BMDO has accepted many of
my recommendations and is changing the flight-test matrix to include
such tests. While it may not be practical or affordable to do all these
things in developmental testing, selected stressing operational
requirements should be included in developmental tests that precede
IOT&E to help ensure sufficient capability for deployment. For example,
the current C-band transponder tracking and identification system,
justified by gaps in radar coverage and range safety considerations, is
being used to provide target track information to the system in current
tests. This practice should be phased out prior to IOT&E. This will
ensure that the end-to-end system will support early target tracking
and interceptor launch.
There is nothing wrong with the limited testing program the
Department has been pursuing so long as the achieved results match the
desired pace of acquisition decisions to support deployment. However, a
more aggressive testing program, with parallel paths and activities,
will be necessary to achieve an effective operational capability by
fiscal year 2005 or even for several years thereafter. This means a
test program that is structured to anticipate and absorb setbacks that
inevitably occur. I am pleased that the NMD program is developing test
plans that move in this direction. However, the Test and Evaluation
Master Plan (TEMP) is obsolete, and much work must be done just to
develop detailed test plans and a TEMP which covers the
administration's newest RDT&E program for NMD. As these test plans are
developed, continued interaction with the Operational Test and
Evaluation organizations will be essential. I recommend that this
Committee follow these developments closely, and encourage BMDO and the
NMDO Program Offices to improve the frequency and candor of their
interactions with these operational test experts.
The time and resource demands that would be required for a program
of this type would be substantial. As documented in the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) report on the budgetary and technical implications
of the NMD program,\1\ the Safeguard missile program conducted 165
flight tests. The Safeguard program was an early version of NMD.
Similarly, the Polaris program conducted 125 flight tests, and the
Minuteman program conducted 101 flight tests. It is apparent from these
test schedules that an extensive amount of work was done in parallel
from one flight test to another. Failures that occurred were accepted,
and the programs moved forward with parallel activities as flight-
testing continued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CBO Papers, Budgetary and Technical Implications of the
administration's Plan for National Missile Defense, April 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rocket science has progressed in the past 35 years, and I am not
suggesting that a hundred or more NMD flight tests will be necessary
for each segment of a layered NMD defense. However, I would expect that
each segment--boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal--could each require
25 or 30 tests, bringing the total for the full system to over 100
tests. Also, the technology in the current NMD program is more
sophisticated than in those early missile programs, and we should be
prepared for inevitable setbacks.
As in any weapons development program, the NMD acquisition and
construction schedules need to be linked to capability achievements
demonstrated in a robust test program, not to schedule per se. This
approach can support an aggressive acquisition schedule if the test
program has the capacity to deal with setbacks. On three separate
occasions, independent panels chaired by Larry Welch (General, USAF
Retired) have recommended an event-driven, not schedule-driven,
program. In the long run, an event-driven program will take less time
and cost less money than a program that must regularly be re-baselined
due to the realities of very challenging technical and operational
goals.
Aggressive flight-testing, coupled with comprehensive hardware-in-
the-loop and simulation programs, will be essential for NMD.
Additionally, the program will have to adopt a parallel test approach
that can absorb occasionally disappointing test results that do not
achieve their objectives in order to have any chance of achieving a
deployment of operationally effective systems this decade. As noted by
CBO, the Navy's Polaris program successfully took such an approach 30
years ago.
Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with some
military utility that is effective under realistic combat conditions,
against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly without
adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster composition, timing,
trajectory or direction, and when operated by military personnel at all
times of the day or night and in all weather. Such a capability is yet
to be shown to be practicable for NMD. These operational considerations
will become an increasingly important part of test and simulation plans
over the coming years.
My work in the DOD, and more than 30 years experience at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, has given me a perspective I'd like to
share with the committee on the ABM Treaty, the role of deterrence, and
the nature of the current threat.

NMD AND THE ABM TREATY

Currently, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty restricts
conduct of flight-testing to the declared test ranges of Kwajalein
Missile Range and White Sands Missile Range. In particular, with
targets launched from Vandenberg toward Kwajalein, the targets are
moving away from the early warning radar at Beale AFB, near Sacramento.
In this geometry, early warning is not realistically tested. However,
under the ABM Treaty, this can be relatively easily remedied by the
declaration of other ranges as test ranges. Recently, BMDO has
announced a plan to develop new test facilities in Kodiak and at Fort
Greely, Alaska. This will support alternative Ground-Based Interceptor
launches from more operationally representative locations. These
additional launch sites would expand the test envelope beyond that
currently available, as recommended by my former office and the Welch
panel, to validate system simulations over a broader range of the
operating regimes
The treaty also currently precludes use of a surrogate radar in the
NMD mode to skin track the incoming target RV during testing and to
support creation of the Weapon Task Plan that first aims the
interceptor. This necessitates the use of a non-operationally realistic
beacon transponder or GPS on the RV for midcourse tracking during
intercept testing.
Since additional test ranges can be established under the ABM
Treaty, the treaty is not now an obstacle to proper development and
testing of a National Missile Defense system. Development of an
effective NMD network, even one with only a limited capability to
intercept and destroy long-range missiles, will take a decade or more.
This is for simple technical and budgetary reasons. In the near-term,
the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing.
Development and testing of fixed-site, midcourse missile defense is
permitted under the ABM Treaty. The Pentagon, in fact, has been
developing and testing technologies necessary for such a system for at
least a decade in compliance with the treaty. Most flight-testing is
done at the Army's Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean, a test
site that is specifically permitted under the ABM Treaty.
Eventually, intercepts will be attempted at greater distances from
Kwajalein to demonstrate more realistic engagements, but this also will
be permissible under the ABM Treaty. More importantly, a midcourse
missile defense system will need to demonstrate that it can
discriminate decoys, countermeasures, and rocket debris from the real
target, the re-entry vehicle. This will take many tests paced by time,
money and other resources, again not by the ABM Treaty.
At the point where the program is ready to move from developmental
work to true operational testing, more realistic tests of NMD--using
real soldiers and mimicking battlefield or attack conditions--would be
required, and these tests likely would require modifications to the ABM
Treaty. But there is plenty of time to consider this, as such real-
world testing is many years away.
What about boost-phase missile defense? While the ABM Treaty
prohibits the development and testing of mobile NMD systems, there is
plenty of work on boost-phase systems that not only could be, but also,
in any case, must be, done before running afoul of the treaty.
Boost-phase interceptors could be launched from Navy ships or from
land. Either way the interceptors must be close enough to the enemy
launch site that the interceptors can catch up before the enemy missile
has traveled too far and deployed its payload. The process of detection
and classification of an incoming missile must begin within seconds of
its launch, and intercept must occur within only a few minutes.
Consequently, a boost-phase system would need to be essentially
autonomous, commanded by computers.
Naturally, any administration would want extensive testing of such
a system to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the command and
control computer network. But, again, the ABM Treaty would not be an
obstacle. Testing can be done at various U.S. testing centers,
including Kwajalein and the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
Boost-phase systems, whether on land or aboard ship, would also
require very fast rockets and high acceleration maneuvering--more so
than midcourse systems. Such new rockets would take years to develop
and test. The interceptor rocket for midcourse NMD has been under
development and testing for many years, and within accepted
interpretations of the ABM Treaty. Similarly, still-faster rockets for
a boost-phase NMD could be tested in the same way.
With respect to the Airborne Laser and the Space Based Laser, each
has its own special challenges that have little to do with the ABM
Treaty. In the case of the Airborne Laser, there are important
operational considerations. A Boeing 747 aircraft loaded with heavy
laser apparatus, and flying close to an enemy, makes an inviting
target. To permit the 747 to stand back from the forward edge of
battle, the airborne laser needs very high power to damage its targets
through the atmosphere. Development of such lasers is ongoing at
contractor and government test facilities in full compliance with the
ABM Treaty.
As for the Space Based Laser, the current prototype is too heavy to
be launched into space by existing U.S. boosters. Perhaps it can be
made lighter and more powerful, but this will take time--at least a
dozen years. The ABM Treaty is not currently an issue here.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for NMD right now is building
realistic simulators to model how all the elements of a system, from
launcher to interceptor to radar to command and control networks, might
work together. As I noted, the NMD program is years behind in this
arena, but not because of the ABM Treaty. The problem is a
technological one.
The United States faces a very complex and difficult set of
expensive NMD development problems--problems that abrogating the ABM
Treaty will not overcome. Rather than focusing on the red herring of
the ABM Treaty, the NMD program would do better to concentrate on
crafting long-term, affordable approaches to technology development.

NMD AND DETERRENCE

Unfortunately, to justify the possible near-term abrogation of the
ABM Treaty, the Bush administration has been talking down the value of
traditional nuclear deterrence. This simply is not necessary in making
a case for development of NMD, and is potentially harmful to global
strategic stability.
In talking down deterrence, the administration has suggested that
nuclear deterrence is obsolete and that the United States wouldn't drop
a nuclear bomb on, say, Pyongyang, even if North Korea attacked the
U.S. homeland with weapons of mass destruction first. The
administration also has coupled plans for reducing the U.S. nuclear
stockpile with an increased effort on National Missile Defense.
The administration is saying, in effect, that as we reduce our
nuclear stockpile, we become more vulnerable and thus must have NMD.
The general idea is that our nuclear deterrent stockpile will become
too small to be effective, and we won't have the resolve to use it
anyway, so NMD can fill the gap.
Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent takes steady
determination. Adversaries must believe that U.S. nuclear weapons work,
and that U.S. leaders have the will to use them if so attacked. This
explains why it is so difficult for nuclear powers to adopt a no first
use policy. While no nuclear power has the intention of striking first
with nuclear weapons, saying so officially begs questions about the
resolve necessary to maintain deterrence.
The Bush administration, on the other hand, is flipping traditional
deterrence theory upside down. Administration officials are saying that
U.S. nuclear deterrence policy is to turn the other cheek. They are
acknowledging a lack of resolve to use nuclear weapons no matter what,
and are suggesting instead that the answer is to absorb enemy missile
attacks with NMD.
The trouble with this approach is that it leaves us empty-handed.
Pentagon briefings for National Missile Defense show a flawless
Plexiglas dome covering the United States. We imagine that incoming
enemy missiles would bounce off it like hail off a windshield.
Unfortunately, such a missile shield--even under the Bush
administration concept for a layered system--is a practical
impossibility.
Recognizing this technical problem, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld has noted that missile defense doesn't have to be perfect, and
that if it worked only part of the time it would still be worth it.
This makes little sense. It is hard to believe that an adversary who is
not afraid of nuclear retaliation would refrain from shooting missiles
at the United States simply because of a missile shield that only works
part time. It is also hard to believe that any U.S. president would be
comfortable in taking action that might provoke a missile attack
knowing that one or more of the weapons might well hit its target.
Giving up deterrence for an unpredictable defense leaves the United
States holding the bag. As former Secretary of State George Shultz put
it in the days of President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative, such propositions for intercontinental missile defense are
nothing more than the sleeves in our vest. If we give up deterrence for
nothing, we invite conflict around the globe, and encourage rather than
deter first use of nuclear weapons by rogue nations.
In addition to inviting U.S. enemies to test our resolve, the
rejection of deterrence policy in favor of national missile defense
places U.S. arms control proponents in a devilish dilemma. On the one
hand, they would like to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, and
nuclear deterrence too. On the other hand, they see missile defense as
dangerously destabilizing, and sure to cause Russia, China and other
nations to build up their own nuclear stockpiles simply to beat our
missile defense.
Also, pursuit of national missile defense threatens the very
sensible proposal by many serious scholars of global security to take
nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. Why would Russia or China agree
to take their nuclear weapons off alert if they thought that quick
surprise was the best counter to a U.S. attempt at missile defense?
The danger with talking down deterrence is that some may listen and
change their behavior accordingly.
As Secretary Rumsfeld put it at the Munich Conference on European
Security Policy last February, ``We know from history that weakness is
provocative. That it entices people into adventures they would
otherwise avoid.'' With those words, the Secretary was trying to
justify national missile defense. But those words also justify a
believable nuclear deterrent.

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE REAL AND PRESENT THREAT

Amidst all the political and technical turmoil surrounding NMD, the
U.S. military today faces a real enemy threat that, for the past 10
years, we unfortunately have failed to seriously address. Not something
hypothetical that could possibly arise in the future, but a real danger
to our military forces and capabilities that we have already
experienced and have failed to handle. That danger is attack against
U.S. troops overseas from short-range ballistic missiles.
A few months ago we observed the tenth anniversary of the first
lethal Scud attack against U S. troops. In that attack, 28 U.S.
soldiers were killed and more than 100 were wounded. Yet, today, a
decade after the Persian Gulf War, American troops overseas remain in
serious peril from short-range ballistic missiles. The United States
has soldiers stationed in the Persian Gulf or in Korea who are
potential targets of enemy short-range missile attacks.
It is unusual for the United States to be so far behind a real
military danger. Our military is sometimes accused of ``fighting the
last war,'' of not preparing for the future. Scuds, unfortunately, are
a threat from the last war we still need to fight.
In fact, both the Army and the Navy have tactical missile defense
development programs that are making progress toward dealing with this
vulnerability. These systems are called ``area'' or ``lower tier'' for
countering short-range attacks, and ``theater'' or ``upper tier''
defense systems for intermediate-range attacks. These promising short-
to intermediate-range systems are technically and politically distinct
from NMD, which is intended to defend against missiles of
intercontinental range.
However, the debate about National Missile Defense has drowned out
the most urgent missile defense need, namely, defending our troops on
the battlefield. The debate also has affected priorities inside the
Pentagon. As currently scheduled, realistic operational tests of our
short-range missile defense systems won't take place for many years.
The theater defense systems have field deployment schedules after the
deployment dates now being proposed for NMD, even though the theater
missile threat is much more imminent.
Whether we can successfully develop NMD technology is debatable. By
contrast, the technology needed for area and theater missile defense is
much more straightforward, and the lessons learned from working on
shorter-range defenses could usefully be applied to an NMD network.
Nevertheless, at the current pace, we are still years away from
realistic operational demonstrations of area and theater missile
defense systems, and the complex command and control, interoperability,
and reliability standards they must achieve to be effective.
As I noted, the administration has begun to describe missile
defense in new ways, and administration officials have emphasized the
importance of defending our friends and allies. Equally important,
however, is defending our own troops overseas, something about which we
have heard little.
The area and theater missile defense systems have been set back by
the pressures to push NMD. The shorter-range systems could be further
ahead today if they had not been delayed by the distractions and the
budgetary priorities of NMD. Because shorter-range attacks are the real
threats our troops overseas face every day, shorter-range defensive
systems should be getting more urgent priority.
I would recommend that this Committee in exercising its oversight
over NMD, consider as well the question of TMD as a separate issue, and
one deserving of more attention.
The Pentagon's recent decision in PBD 816 to transfer the Army and
Navy area and theater missile defense systems out of BMDO and back to
the Army and Navy is a positive step. Assuming the area and theater
defense programs are adequately funded, this will enable the services
to move forward on area and theater missile defense undistracted by NMD
issues.

CONCLUSION

The technical and political challenges for NMD are such that
careful oversight will be required by this Committee for many years--
probably decades--to come. To demonstrate an effective operational
capability, the Service Test Organizations, who working together
jointly on NMD, provide an essential operational perspective. This
operational perspective is vital for any military system, but
particularly so for NMD because of its complexity. Working with the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation in OSD, the Service
Operational Test Agencies provide valuable insights to the NMD Program
Office, to Service and OSD leadership, and to Congress. The early
involvement of the operational test community can help avoid setbacks
and delays, and help solve problems early that will be much more
difficult and expensive to fix later. The early involvement of the
operational test community will be key to NMD systems that really work
in realistic combat environments. I am confident that the future and
ultimate success of NMD will depend on the OT&E community. It is
through the operational test community that you will know whether
theater missile defenses can reliably protect our sons and daughters
serving in the military overseas. It is through the operational test
community that you will know what kind of protection an NMD system can
provide against unauthorized or accidental ICBM launches from Russia or
China as well as intentional launches from states of concern. It is
through the operational test community that NMD--and TMD as well--has
its best chance for success. Throughout, the DOD operational test
community will require the encouragement and the steadfast support of
this committee and Congress. I urge this committee and Congress to
require the assessments of the operational test agencies in
congressional reviews of the progress of NMD.
Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions you or the
members of the committee may have.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Perle.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Mr. Perle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for including
me in these hearings. In complex issues of this sort, there is
no substitute for thorough discussion, and you and your
colleagues have done well to devote time and serious attention
to this issue.
The issue before you is one that I have followed since the
spring of 1969, when I came to Washington to work for Senator
Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson. I had met Scoop in the course of
assessing the debate over missile defense for a small committee
headed by Dean Acheson, Karl Nitze, and Albert Wohlstetter.
These three distinguished Americans believed that it was
dangerous for the United States to remain vulnerable to a
missile attack, and they formed a committee to develop the
argument for ballistic missile defense.
At the time, we were deep in the Cold War. Suspicion,
hostility, and fear dominated the relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union. We observed the heavy-
mechanized Warsaw Pact divisions arrayed along the Iron Curtain
and devised the means to deter them. Outnumbered in Europe, we
relied on nuclear weapons to achieve a military balance.
The situation then required us to calculate the nuclear
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union to a
degree of arithmetic precision that included the provision--I
had one as a young staffer--of a calculator that permitted you
to estimate how much of our nuclear deterrent would survive in
the face of a massive Soviet attack, depending on the accuracy
of their weapons and whether they were air or ground-based and
the like. We spent our time doing those calculations.
We were forced to consider whether enough of our nuclear
deterrent would be able to survive a massive Soviet strike, and
retaliate with force sufficient to deter, and since many of
these scenarios that preoccupied our military planners began
with a nonnuclear war in the center of Europe, the control of
escalation was fundamental to our strategy.
In those circumstances, the argument was made first by
American strategists and scientists and eventually by Soviet
officials that the deployment of a missile defense by the
United States would threaten the Soviet ability to destroy us
in a retaliatory attack if we should launch a massive nuclear
strike against them. Thus, it was argued, any American missile
defense would inevitably be countered by a buildup of Soviet
missiles and bombers. An effort to defend ourselves would
simply stimulate an arms race as the Soviets sought to
neutralize our defense by expanding their offense.
That was the core argument against missile defenses, and it
was made in the context of a bitter, deadly cold war between
two nuclear superpowers with fundamentally different
philosophies and interests. I remember well the debate about
the Safeguard Missile Defense System in 1969 and 1970. Much of
it took place before this very committee, and in 1970 the
Senate, by a single vote, approved going forward with the
Safeguard system.
Armed with the authority to begin building defenses, the
Nixon administration, led by Henry Kissinger, negotiated a
treaty with the Soviet Union essentially banning the deployment
of missile defenses. Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty, together
with an interim agreement on offensive weapons, sought to
freeze the growth of offensive missile forces and to fix the
balance between offense and defense. The ABM Treaty marked the
acceptance of the view that a legally binding arrangement was
necessary to achieve stability in the nuclear balance between
hostile powers.
Parenthetically, in the end, the Soviets found ways to
significantly expand their nuclear force, with the result that
the two agreements of 1972 largely failed to achieve their
underlying intended purpose.
When the ABM Treaty was before the Senate, it was approved
overwhelmingly. There was either one vote against it, or two. I
know Senator Buckley from New York voted against it, and
possibly Senator Hollings.
A number of Senators who had misgivings about whether the
treaty would lock us into a set of constraints that might later
prove unwise were reassured by a key provision in the treaty,
the right of either side to withdraw 180 days after giving
notice, and I call this to your attention, Mr. Chairman,
because if we now find it impossible to exercise that right to
withdraw, which was understood at the time the treaty was
approved as essential flexibility to respond to historical
change, it raises a question about whether any withdrawal
provision offers any real protection when history changes.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, you might well ask, why is he
boring us with this ancient history, and the answer is that
much current thinking about missile defense, and especially
about the ABM Treaty, is mired in ancient history, the history
and the context of the Cold War, and one could not have found a
better illustration of that than the arguments we just heard
from Sandy Berger.
Today, the United States stands naked before its enemies,
unable to intercept even a single ballistic missile aimed by
accident or design at our territory. Many Americans are shocked
to learn that this condition of abject vulnerability has been
the freely chosen policy of the government of the United
States, and is widely, if superficially, supported by many of
our allies.
It is, Mr. Chairman, a legacy of the Cold War. Frozen in
that Cold War like a fly in amber are those who oppose missile
defense because it is inconsistent with the ABM Treaty,
believing that our exposure to attack by ballistic missiles
actually makes us safer. Therefore, they argue, the
vulnerability that developed during the Cold War should
continue to be a permanent feature of American policy,
enshrined forever in the ABM Treaty, or some minor modification
of it, operating on an autopilot set during the Cold War.
The opponents of missile defense argue that a
technologically serious defense, even if limited, would
precipitate an arms race because other nuclear powers,
especially Russia, would build additional missiles to overwhelm
any defense we might deploy. You heard that argument from Sandy
Berger.
Perhaps this is why, according to talking points prepared
for official U.S.-Russian meetings, American officials in the
last administration sought to assure the Russians that even if
the United States built a modest, ground-based defense, Russia
would still be able to incinerate the United States after a
massive American nuclear strike. It is hard to imagine a mind
set more reflective of the Cold War than that, yet this is the
logic that animates the idea that the ABM Treaty is the
cornerstone of strategic stability.
The idea of the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of stability is
simply anachronistic and dangerous. How can a treaty that was
the cornerstone of stability in 1972, at the height of the Cold
War, still constitute a cornerstone in 2001, with the Cold War
over and the Soviet Union dissolved? After all, there is almost
nothing in common between the geopolitical situation in the
middle of the Cold War and the situation we face today. That is
why Henry Kissinger, who managed the negotiations that resulted
in the ABM Treaty, has wisely and convincingly argued that it
no longer serves American interests.
Far from assuring stability, the Cold War doctrine that we
must seek safety through voluntary vulnerability is dangerously
ill-conceived. Consider the core of the argument, that the
Russians would build more nuclear weapons if we were to build a
defense against ballistic missiles. Since we have no defense at
all today, a nuclear force consisting of even one missile could
do catastrophic harm to Los Angeles, Washington, or New York. A
handful would mean destruction beyond imagination.
Now, suppose we were to deploy a defense capable of
countering not one, or a handful, but a few hundred incoming
warheads. With such a defense, we might no longer be
vulnerable, as we are today, to such nuclear powers as, say,
Britain, or France, each of which has offensive nuclear
weapons.
Would the British feel compelled to build more nuclear
weapons to overpower our defense, if our defense robbed them of
their deterrent capability? Of course not. They do not regard
the United States as an enemy. It is the political context, not
the weapons themselves, that determines whether and to what
extent any particular military capability is threatening, and
whether agreements banning it are a source of stability.
Now that the Cold War is over, should Russia regard us as
an enemy? We are more likely to send Mr. Putin a check than a
massive barrage of missiles with nuclear warheads. We have
sought in countless ways to work with, not against, the
Russians. It is unimaginable that we would launch thousands of
nuclear weapons against Russia and hope to benefit thereby, and
that would be true even if we had a defense that would knock
down every missile that might be launched in retaliation.
Would it make sense for Mr. Putin to respond to an American
defense against North Korea or Saddam Hussein, or some unknown
threat? Unless you believe history has stopped, it is simply a
matter of time before a country hostile to the United States
acquires a ballistic missile capable of reaching our territory
and a warhead capable of inflicting mass destruction, and it
almost does not matter exactly when or exactly who, because
unless we are prepared to wait until that threat has already
emerged, we have to begin at some point to build a defense that
we all understand will take a long time to achieve.
Would it make sense for Mr. Putin to respond to an American
defense against North Korea or Saddam Hussein by building more
missiles? Is the Russian economy such that a vast investment in
new weapons aimed at the United States would benefit his
country? It is sometimes said in response, and there was a
glimmer of this argument in what Sandy had to say, that it is
perceptions, not reality that counts. If the Russians or the
Chinese perceive the United States as a threat, and, therefore,
regard any antimissile system it may build as a danger to them,
shouldn't the United States stand down?
This seems to me a particularly unwise line of argument. In
psychiatry, it would lead to humoring paranoids, and Sandy
referred to paranoia, by accepting their paranoia and acting to
accommodate baseless fears. In science, it would mean the
abandonment of rigor and discipline, pretending instead of
proving, and in international politics, it would mean
nurturing, rather than finding ways to correct false,
dangerous, and even self-fulfilling ideas.
The Cold War is over, but we will not realize the full
benefit of its passing until everyone involved behaves
accordingly, abandoning the fears and apprehensions of half a
century of conflict and the ideas about security that flowed
from and were reflected in that long, dark conflict.
By clinging to the idea that the security of others is
diminished if the United States is protected against missile
attack, some Americans, and a number of European leaders,
perhaps unwittingly, and certainly ironically, are perpetuating
the anxiety of the Cold War. By arguing that the Russians or
the Chinese or others are right to feel threatened by our
defense, we are perpetuating the psychology of the Cold War.
Sandy Berger said, and I think I am quoting, for the
Russians, U.S. coercion is not hard to conceive. I cannot
imagine a less prudent argument to put in the mind of Mr.
Putin, or, perhaps more to the point, in the minds of his
critics and detractors, legitimizing the notion that Russia is
right to fear an American missile defense because U.S. coercion
is not hard to conceive.
We should be responding to those fears and those
apprehensions by developing a new policy with Russia and by
assuring the Russians in convincing ways that they need not
fear coercion from the United States, rather than accepting the
premise, and adjusting our self-defense capability to reflect
that.
We should proceed to develop and employ defenses against
the Saddam Husseins of this world, and we must explain,
explain, and explain again to President Putin that such a
defense does not diminish the security of his country, and we
should be prepared to reduce sharply the size of our nuclear
offensive forces both because the end of the Cold War enables
us safely to do that, and because it will lend credibility to
our new approach to Russia.
Mr. Chairman, some opponents of a robust missile defense,
including, for example, French President Chirac, argue that
such a defense would encourage the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, and we heard some of that in Sandy Berger's testimony,
too, yet the opposite is far more likely.
Imagine, if you will, the sharp rise in tension between
India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. Suppose the United States could dispatch an
Aegis cruiser to the region with instructions to intercept any
ballistic missile fired by either side. Such a capability in
American hands would be highly stabilizing, reducing the
likelihood of a conflict, discouraging the use of offensive
missiles, and reassuring to both sides.
Other nations, like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are
actively trying to acquire missiles capable of attacking the
United States. They believe that acquiring even a single
missile will catapult them into a select class of states
capable of inflicting massive damage on the United States.
They are well aware of Sandy Berger's suggestion that a
truck with a bomb in it, or a ship with a bomb in it, could do
great destruction, and yet they are investing massively, with
only limited resources, not to acquire trucks, not to acquire
ships in which they could assert a nuclear weapon, but to
acquire ballistic missiles with ranges capable of reaching the
United States. They have declared what they consider to be
important. They have judged where they think their potential
advantage to coerce and to attack may lie.
They believe that acquiring a single missile will catapult
them into a select class of states capable of inflicting
massive damage on the United States and, given time and money,
a single missile or even several is not beyond their reach.
We can debate endlessly exactly when they emerge with it,
but suppose that we were to construct a defense that could
intercept all the warheads and decoys carried by 100 or 200
enemy missiles, that a Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jung Il would
need that number to be confident that he could land a missile
on New York, or Chicago, or an allied capital. In that case,
even a determined adversary might well throw up his hands and
conclude that such a missile force is beyond his reach.
By having no defense at all, we set the bar so low that it
is an encouragement to the Saddam Husseins of the world. The
hurdle they have to overcome is as small as it could possibly
be, and our purpose should be to raise that barrier, to raise
that hurdle.
The best way to protect against a missile attack is to
discourage our adversaries from investing in the missiles in
the first place, and there can be no more powerful disincentive
than to have the shield that guarantees that their hugely
expensive programs will fail. Based on our most advanced
technology, it is that shield, not an outdated treaty, that
will protect us best.
Sandy Berger put some emphasis on negotiating with Russia,
and I infer from what he had in mind that he is thinking in
terms of preserving, perhaps amending, but preserving the ABM
Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I think we would be wise to put the ABM
Treaty behind us, even if we had no plan or desire to build a
ballistic missile defense, because as long as that treaty is
regarded, as it is in some places today, as fundamental to the
security of Russia and the United States, it continues the
context of the Cold War. There is no other way to understand
it.
Unless you take seriously the prospect of a massive
American missile attack on Russia, or a massive Russian missile
attack on the United States, the regulation of the offense-
defense relationship, which is what the ABM Treaty is all
about, makes no sense, and when we say to the Russians we want
to renegotiate the legal right we both enjoy to build defenses
as well as offenses, we are saying to them that it is necessary
to have such a structure in order to ensure that neither of us
launches a nuclear attack on the other.
Until we break decisively with the history of the Cold War
and the institutions that reflected that history, the Cold War
will carry on. I think that is true of the relationship on
offensive forces as well, which is why I believe we should
reduce our forces unilaterally to the levels that we think
appropriate, and without concern that doing so will make us
vulnerable to an attack from Russia, because I do not believe
there is evidence that we need be concerned about a massive
nuclear attack from Russia. But there is a great deal of
evidence that we need to be concerned about the Saddam Husseins
of the world, those who are active today and those who will be
active tomorrow, because it is simply a matter of time.
Let me conclude with one last point, and I read Phil
Coyle's testimony, which has deterrence theory in it in
addition to comment on testing, and he is obviously concerned
that by building defenses we may appear to be abandoning or
diminishing the importance of nuclear deterrence, of the threat
to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The point I want to make is
a moral one.
During the Cold War, none of us liked the fact that we
based our security on the threat to destroy millions of people
if we should come under attack, but we contented ourselves with
that morally difficult policy by persuading ourselves that we
had no choice, that defense was neither technically feasible
nor practically feasible because it would precipitate the arms
race that we have been talking about.
But today we have a choice. We no longer need to depend
exclusively on the threat to use nuclear weapons in
retaliation, nuclear weapons that might be aimed against us by
a Saddam Hussein. If deterrence alone is to be the means by
which we defend, it would require us in response to destroy
women and children in Baghdad who would have no say in the
decision by Saddam Hussein to launch a monstrous attack, or the
attack from Saddam might be on another country, on a country
friendly to the United States.
Can we justify holding hostage a hapless civilian
population when we have the alternative of building a defense,
and my answer to that is no. I hope the committee will consider
that, in time, basing our security on the threat to destroy
millions of civilians is not a tenable policy when we have
alternatives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Richard N. Perle

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to
appear before the committee today. The issue before you is one I have
followed since the Spring of 1969 when I came to Washington to work for
Scoop Jackson. I had met Scoop in the course of assessing the debate
over missile defense for a small committee headed by Dean Acheson, Paul
Nitze, and Albert Wohlstetter.
These three distinguished Americans believed that it was dangerous
for the United States to remain vulnerable to a missile attack and they
formed a committee to develop the argument for a ballistic missile
defense.
At the time, we were deep in the Cold War. Suspicion, hostility and
fear dominated the relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union. We observed the heavy mechanized Warsaw Pact divisions
arrayed along the Iron Curtain and devised the means to deter them.
Outnumbered in Europe, we relied on nuclear weapons to achieve a
military balance.
The situation then required us to calculate the nuclear balance
between the United States and the Soviet Union. We were forced to
consider whether enough of our nuclear deterrent would be able to
survive a massive Soviet strike and retaliate with force sufficient to
deter. Since many of the scenarios that preoccupied our military
planners began with a non-nuclear war in the center of Europe, the
control of escalation was fundamental to our strategy.
In those circumstances, the argument was made first by American
strategists and scientists and, eventually, by Soviet officials, that
the deployment of a missile defense by the United States would threaten
the Soviet ability to destroy us in a retaliatory attack if we should
launch a massive nuclear strike against them. Thus, it was argued, any
American missile defense would inevitably be countered by a build-up of
Soviet missiles and bombers. An effort to defend ourselves would simply
stimulate an arms race as the Soviets sought to neutralize our defense
by expanding their offense. That was the core argument against missile
defenses and it was made in the context of a bitter, deadly cold war
between two nuclear powers with fundamentally different philosophies
and interests.
I remember well the debate about the Safeguard missile defense
system in 1969 and 1970. Much of it took place before this very
Committee. In the end, in 1970, the Senate, by a single vote, approved
going forward with the Safeguard defense system.
Armed with the authority to begin building defenses, the Nixon
administration, led by Henry Kissinger, negotiated a treaty with the
Soviet Union essentially banning the deployment of missile defenses.
Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty, together with an interim agreement on
offensive weapons, sought to freeze the growth of offensive missile
forces and to fix the balance between offense and defense.
The ABM Treaty marked acceptance of the view that a legally-binding
arrangement was necessary to achieve stability in the nuclear balance
between hostile powers. (In the end the Soviets found ways
significantly to expand its offensive forces with the result that the
two agreements of 1972 largely failed to achieve their intended
purpose.)
When the ABM Treaty was before the Senate it was approved
overwhelmingly. A number of Senators who has misgivings about whether
the treaty would lock us in to a set of constraints that might later
prove unwise were reassured by a key provision in the treaty: the right
of either side to withdraw 180 days after giving notice.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, you might well ask: why is he boring
us with this ancient history?
The answer is that much current thinking about missile defense--and
especially about the ABM Treaty--is mired in ancient history, the
history--and context--of the Cold War.
Today the United States stands naked before its enemies, unable to
intercept even a single ballistic missile aimed, by accident or design,
at our territory. Many Americans are shocked to learn that this
condition of abject vulnerability has been the freely chosen policy of
the government of the United States, and is widely--if superficially--
supported by many of our allies. It is a legacy of the Cold War.
Frozen in the Cold War like a fly in amber, those who oppose
missile defense because it is inconsistent with the ABM Treaty believe
our exposure to attack by ballistic missiles actually makes us safer.
Therefore, they argue, the vulnerability that developed during the Cold
War should continue--a permanent feature of American policy, enshrined
forever in the ABM Treaty or some minor modification of it.
Operating on an autopilot set during the Cold War, the opponents of
a missile defense argue that a technologically serious defense, even if
limited, would precipitate an arms race because other nuclear powers,
especially Russia, would build additional missiles to overwhelm any
defense we might deploy.
Perhaps this is why (according to talking points prepared for
official U.S.-Russian meetings) American officials in the last
administration sought to assure the Russians that even if the United
States built a modest ground-based defense, Russia would still be able
to incinerate the United States after a massive American nuclear
strike. It is hard to imagine a mind-set more reflective of the Cold
War than that. Yet this is the logic that animates the idea that the
ABM is the ``cornerstone'' of strategic stability.
The idea of the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of stability is simply
anachronistic--and dangerous. How can a treaty that was the cornerstone
of stability in 1972 still constitute a cornerstone in the year 2001?
After all, there is almost nothing in common between the geopolitical
situation in the middle of the Cold War and the situation today. That
is why Henry Kissinger, who managed the negotiations that resulted in
the ABM Treaty, has argued wisely and convincingly that it no longer
serves American interests.
Far from assuring ``stability,'' the Cold War doctrine that we must
seek safety through voluntary vulnerability is dangerously ill-
conceived. Consider the core of the argument, that the Russians would
build more nuclear weapons if we were to build a defense against
ballistic missiles.
Since we have no defense, a nuclear force consisting of even one
missile could do catastrophic harm to Los Angeles or Washington or New
York. A handful would mean destruction beyond imagination. Now, suppose
we were to deploy a defense capable of countering not one or a handful,
but a few hundred incoming warheads. With such a defense, we might no
longer be vulnerable--as we are today--to such nuclear powers as, say,
Britain or France. Would the British feel compelled to build more
nuclear weapons to overpower our defense? Of course not. They don't
regard the United States as an enemy. It is the political context, not
the weapons themselves, that determine whether, and to what extent, any
particular military capability is threatening--and whether agreements
banning it are a source of stability.
Now that the Cold War is over, should Russia regard us as an enemy?
We are more likely to send Mr. Putin a check than a massive barrage of
missiles with nuclear warheads. We have sought in countless ways to
work with, not against, the Russians. It is unimaginable that we would
launch thousands of nuclear weapons against Russia and hope to benefit
thereby. That would be true even if we had a defense that would knock
down every missile that might be launched in retaliation.
Would it make sense for Mr. Putin to respond to an American defense
against North Korea or Saddam Hussein by building more missiles? Is the
Russian economy such that a vast investment in new weapons, aimed at
the United States, would benefit his country? It is sometimes said in
response that it is perceptions, not reality, that counts. If the
Russians or the Chinese perceive the United States as a threat and
therefore regard any anti-missile system it may build as a danger,
shouldn't the United Sates stand down?
This seems to me a particularly unwise line of argument. In
psychiatry it would lead to humoring paranoids by accepting their
paranoia and acting to accommodate baseless fears. In science, it would
mean the abandonment of rigor and discipline, pretending instead of
proving. In international politics, it would mean nurturing rather than
finding ways to correct false and dangerous and even self-fulfilling
ideas.
The Cold War is over; but we will not realize the full benefit of
its passing until everyone involved behaves accordingly, abandoning the
fears and apprehensions of half a century of conflict and the ideas
about security that flowed from, and were reflected in, that long, dark
conflict.
By clinging to the idea that the security of others is diminished
if the United States is protected against missile attack, some
Americans and a number of European leaders, perhaps unwittingly, and
certainly ironically, are perpetuating the anxiety of the Cold War.
That is a climate we must now transcend.
We should proceed to develop and deploy defenses against the Saddam
Hussein's of this world and we must explain, explain and explain again
to President Putin that such a defense does not diminish the security
of his country. We should be prepared to reduce sharply the size of our
nuclear offensive forces both because the end of the Cold War enables
us safely to do that and because it will lend credibility to our new
approach to Russia.
Mr. Chairman, some opponents of a robust missile defense, including
President Chirac, argue that such a defense would encourage the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Yet the opposite is far more likely. Imagine a sharp rise in
tension between India and Pakistan. Both countries have nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. Suppose the United States could dispatch an
Aegis cruiser to the region with instructions to intercept any
ballistic missile fired by either side. Such a capability in American
hands would be highly stabilizing, reducing the likelihood of conflict,
discouraging the use of offensive missiles, and reassuring to both
sides.
Other nations, like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are actively
trying to acquire missiles capable of attacking the United States. They
believe that acquiring even a single missile will catapult them into a
select class of states capable of inflicting massive damage on the
United States. Given time and money, a single missile, or even several,
is not beyond their reach. But suppose that we were to construct a
defense that could intercept all the warheads and decoys carried by 100
or 200 enemy missiles. A Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jung Il would need
that number to be confident he could land a missile on New York or
Chicago or an allied capital. In that case, even a determined adversary
might well throw up his hands and conclude that such a missile force is
beyond his reach.
The best way to protect against a missile attack is to discourage
our adversaries from investing in the missiles in the first place.
There can be no more powerful disincentive than to have a shield that
guarantees their hugely expensive programs will fail. It is that
shield, based on our most advanced technology--not an outdated treaty--
that will protect us best.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We are now going to give the witnesses an opportunity to
respond to each other. Mr. Perle, your testimony was not
presented in advance, as the rules require. The other two
witnesses did present their testimony in advance so that we had
an opportunity to read them. You had an opportunity to read the
other statements, so we are going to give each of you an
opportunity to respond to the other's comments for a few
minutes, and then begin our first round of questions.
Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, I would make a few observations,
because I think I would really like to engage with this
committee. First of all, I suspect we all might object to the
proposition that something over 30 is, ipso facto, obsolete.
That would include most of us.
But putting aside that comment, I find it, first of all,
rather startling that Mr. Perle takes objection to my saying
that the Russians could believe that our attempt, or could see
our attempt, to build a system, the definition of which they do
not know, with very little opportunity to engage, as an
opportunity to gain unilateral advantage, and be concerned
about the context of not that we are going to launch a nuclear
strike against them, but what do we do in a crisis if we had
that capability.
We have been toe-to-toe quite recently. I find it ironic
that he would take objection to that, and say that is
responsible and yet in a sense say to Saddam Hussein and Kim
Jong Il and the rogue-state leaders that their threat of
coercion against us will work. That is, we do not have the will
to respond either preemptively or otherwise to a rogue state
that threatens to wipe out an American city with a long-range
nuclear weapon.
He is saying, essentially, do not believe that we will use
these things for deterrence. He is saying our deterrence will
not work, to Saddam Hussein. I think that is equally unwise.
The fact of the matter is, I cannot believe any President,
faced with the statement by Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il that
he is threatening Los Angeles would not preemptively eliminate
the source of that threat, and I think we should be very
careful in saying that deterrence does not work against rogue
states, because the very statement of that lowers our security.
Second of all, I think again what Mr. Perle has
demonstrated is a single-minded view of our national security,
and essentially said at the end let us just get rid of the
treaty. That is the objective.
Well, to me the objective is, let us enhance our security,
and it seems to me that while we do have a rogue-state missile
threat, we need to deal with it. The first line of defense is
deterrence. There may be desire for an insurance policy, a
value in an insurance policy in the nature of a defensive
system.
How we go about that matters, and if we say right now, as I
hear the administration saying, and I certainly hear Mr. Perle
saying, we are going to do that without regard to what you
think, we are going to just abrogate the ABM Treaty, or as the
administration says, we are going, in the next 6 months, to be
at a point where we either are bumping up against the treaty,
or abrogate it, I think we cannot ignore the potential that
there will be consequences and that there will be consequences
in a number of different respects.
The Russians, in that situation, not knowing, because we
have not told them what the purpose and scope of this defensive
system is, I think quite possibly will respond in various ways,
including eroding the framework of arms control, which gives us
verification, transparency, and predictability.
I believe if our allies see us proceeding in this way
without regard to trying to reach some sort of a strategic
framework, as the President has said, they will think that our
objective is getting rid of treaties, not enhancing our
security. I do not think they will support us, and under those
circumstances I do not know how we deploy a system.
I think in general, if you look only at one dimension here,
the answer is self-evident. I think we ought to try to figure
out how we get this apple if we need it without upsetting the
entire apple cart in the process of doing that.
I think you heard from Mr. Perle in perhaps slightly more
pure form than you heard it from Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz what the objective is here, which is, the principal
objective is, get rid of the treaty, and my judgment is, let us
proceed here in a way that looks across the range of our
interests and tries to maximize our security and not put us in
a collision course with the world.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Coyle, do you have any
comments for a couple of moments before we begin our round of
questioning?
Mr. Coyle. Just a brief one, Mr. Chairman. If I thought we
knew how to build a national missile defense system that would
work, in realistic operational situations, I would agree with
Mr. Perle in his remarks about deterrence, but as I noted in
the longer version of my statement, Pentagon briefings on
national missile defense show a flawless plexiglass dome
covering the United States. We imagine that incoming enemy
missiles would bounce of it like hail off a windshield.
Unfortunately, such a missile shield, even under the Bush
administration concept for a layered system, is a practical
impossibility.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Perle, do you have a couple of moments
of rebuttal?
Mr. Perle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Sandy Berger is
right to observe that there have been some difficult situations
with the Russians in the post-Cold War period. We have been
toe-to-toe recently, he said. I do not believe that our nuclear
arsenal had any bearing on the way in which those issues were
dealt with. Whether we are talking about differences over
Kosovo or differences about Chechnya or other differences, I
simply do not believe that the nuclear arsenals of either
nation are relevant to the way we conduct our relationship.
Sandy Berger says of my argument that our deterrent will
not work with Saddam Hussein. He is saying to Saddam Hussein
that our deterrence will not work. Sandy Berger is saying that
you can count on Saddam to be deterred by our deterrent, and I
frankly do not want to count on the rational judgment of a man
who has used poison gas against his own people, who has
murdered his own closest associates, and whose stability and
rationality cannot be assumed, because when we discover that
deterrence did not work it will be too late. This applies, as
well, to an accident. After the accident, it will be too late.
I am sure that Mr. Coyle will tell us that there are no
foolproof systems. There are no absolute systems. There is
reason to be concerned about how safe nuclear arsenals are over
the long term, particularly in the deteriorating circumstances
of the former Soviet Union, so it seems to me simple prudence
that you do not bet the life of an American city, you do not
bet the lives of millions of Americans, on the theoretical
confidence that you will deter a Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jong
Il, or some other individual who may possess the means to
attack us who we do not even know today. Unless you believe
that for the foreseeable future there is no danger, it makes
sense to begin the process of a prudent insurance.
Now, Sandy says if we just abrogate the treaty we cannot
ignore the consequences, and I agree with that. Of course we
cannot ignore the consequences. We also cannot ignore the
consequences of continuing the treaty, of continuing the Cold
War relationship, which is the context for that treaty, and he
has suggested the Russians will respond, or may respond by
eroding arms control.
I am not quite sure what that means. I think what he meant
to say is, they may respond by holding on to more nuclear
weapons than they would otherwise have, or that they might
respond by building new nuclear weapons. I tried to address
that issue in my testimony, and it is up to you to judge
whether that would be a rational and sustainable decision by
Mr. Putin, whether he would conclude that it is in Russia's
best interest to invest further in nuclear weapons because we
had deployed a defense against the Saddam Husseins of the
world.
He said further, our allies will not support us. In the
recent weeks of this debate, I have met with any number of
allied officials, dozens, and I have been encouraged by the way
in which, as they listen to the argument, as this committee is
listening to the argument, they have come to adjust their view,
which in some cases was, indeed, an expression of opposition,
and it is much less opposition today, and if we continue this
argument in a careful and deliberate and rational way, I am
convinced most of our allies will support us, but we have to do
what is best for our own security. We are not going to take a
vote among our allies and have our policy determined by them.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. I think we can have a 10-minute
round here. We have three witnesses, and I think that would
work all right. I did not consult with my colleague on that,
but let us try a 10-minute round of questions here.
Senator Warner. I am just wondering about the schedules of
our colleagues. I simply would like to have a 6-minute round.
Chairman Levin. We will do that. We will have 6-minute
rounds.
Senator Warner. We could perhaps go to a second round.
Chairman Levin. We will have a second round, if necessary.
Mr. Coyle, your written testimony says that development of
an effective NMD network, even one with only a limited
capability to intercept, will take a decade or more. This is
for simple technical and budgetary reasons. In the near term,
the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing. Now, we
have been given testimony that is somewhat different from that,
which is that there are constraints.
Secretary Wolfowitz told us the following: that we designed
a program to develop and deploy as soon as is appropriate.
Developing a proper layered defense will take time. It requires
a more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly
those that have been constrained by the ABM Treaty, so the
administration is arguing that the ABM Treaty constrains
testing in the near term. You have indicated that it does not.
I would like you to comment on that.
Also, have you read the three pages given to us by
Secretary Wolfowitz, one page for each of the three possible
technology testing, which could bump up or conflict with the
ABM Treaty within months, and if you would comment particularly
on the test bed situation, as to whether or not that is
necessary, does it add something? If so, does that not
conflict, in a few months, with the ABM Treaty, and then how
does that then fit with your statement that in the near term
the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing?
Mr. Coyle. Perhaps I could give a general answer first and
then go to the specifics. We have been testing for years, in
full compliance with the ABM Treaty, national missile defenses,
and there are many tests still to be done. For example, the
tests that are being done so far, the intercepts occur very
close to Kwajalein.
Obviously, you would want to do tests where the intercepts
really were at mid-course, which they have not been so far, but
that is something you can do under the ABM Treaty now, just
like the tests we have already been doing.
Also, as many scientists have pointed out, you would want
to do tests with different kinds of countermeasures, different
kinds of decoys, but again that is something that you can do
right now from Kwajalein or Vandenberg or Kodiak, if that turns
out to be a new test site, as well.
Similarly, you would want to do tests at different ranges,
different trajectories, but all of those things take time and
money, and there is nothing about them that requires new
freedoms from the ABM Treaty.
With respect to boost-phase missile defenses, it is true
that the treaty prohibits mobile defenses, such as from a ship,
but we already know that the Navy missiles that they have now
are too slow for boost-phase defense. They need to be twice as
fast, so those new rockets would have to be developed and
tested, something we have to do now at Kwajalein, White Sands,
or other places. We already know that the radars on those ships
are not suitable for NMD-class engagements, so new radars have
to be built. Again, that would take time and money. So that is
again why I said what I said.
Chairman Levin. If you would just focus, because of time
constraints, on the test results at Fort Greely now.
Mr. Coyle. With respect to Fort Greely, my understanding is
the administration does not intend to launch from Fort Greely
for test purposes because of nearby populations of caribou and
the like, so the things you might do there are store missiles
that you would launch from Kodiak. I suppose there is nothing
wrong with that, but that is not much of a test purpose. You
could just as well store them at Kodiak, and it might be safer
than hauling them from the middle of a very large state like
Alaska down to Kodiak.
Fort Greely is the place where the Army has had its cold-
regions test center, and it gets miserably cold there in the
winter. I suppose an argument could be made also that you could
learn something about operating a potential operational site at
Fort Greely by having equipment there, because things that work
in the rest of the world do not work at Fort Greely.
But again, there are many things that need to be done
first, long before we would get to those kinds of issues.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Perle, you have said whether or not the
ABM constrains this testing or not, that we should withdraw
from the ABM Treaty, is that accurate?
Mr. Perle. Yes, Senator. Can I just say one thing on the
testing?
Chairman Levin. If you do not mind, because of time
constraints, do you then disagree with Mr. Kissinger's comment
that unilateral American decisions should be a last resort?
Mr. Perle. No. I think we should have and are having a
dialogue with the Russians.
Chairman Levin. You do believe, then, that the most
powerful country, as he puts it, should not adopt unilateralism
until the possibilities of an agreement have been fully
explored? Do you agree with that?
Mr. Perle. Yes. I think as a general rule, that sounds----
Chairman Levin. No, as a specific rule here, relative to
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, do you agree that the most
powerful country in the world should not adopt unilateralism
until the possibilities of agreement have been fully explored?
Do you agree to that statement relative to withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty?
Mr. Perle. No. Stated that way, I do not agree with it.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Berger, on the question of Shemya,
which in the last budget we had put some money in for Shemya,
if we had deployed that radar at Shemya, there would have been
a clear violation of the ABM Treaty at some point.
The point has been made that we did that without a
compliance review group deciding anything, we did other testing
without a compliance review group telling us that a particular
test would be in compliance, and in the case of Shemya, we
actually put money in which, if obligated at a certain point,
at least, along the construction curve would have violated the
ABM Treaty. What is the difference between what this budget
request is asking for, if any, and what we did in the last year
of the Clinton administration relative to Shemya?
Mr. Berger. I think the context is entirely different, Mr.
Chairman. The context of last year's budget request, which did
include money for Shemya which we did not actually spend, meant
we were embarked upon a testing program that was consistent
with the treaty: we had a discrete, specific architecture for a
treaty, we were engaged in negotiations with the Russians, and
had amendments on the table, including amendments to START III,
so that is one context.
In this context, the administration has told you that their
intent is to bump up against the treaty in the next several
months, that as someone said in the New York Times today, a
senior administration official, we do not want to have formal
restrictions on development testing and deployment, similar to
what Mr. Perle has said, so the context is different.
You have an administration that is putting you on notice
that their intent is, essentially, to bump up against this
treaty in the next several months unless the Russians agree to
some new strategic framework in that period of time, so I think
the context here is entirely different between where we were a
year ago, a testing program consistent with the treaty, in the
context of an ongoing negotiation and specific architecture,
and an administration which seems in my judgment to be heading
toward the horizon for abrogation unless, in the next few
months, we can replace 50 years of strategic policy with a new
strategic framework. I do not think that is enough time.
I actually believe, if I could add one thing, Mr. Chairman,
it may be possible to reach a deal with President Putin. I
agree with Senator Warner. I do not think it is at all
inconceivable that the Russians would agree to changes in the
ABM system that would accommodate a more robust testing
program, or that would in other ways accommodate some of what
we want to do.
But I do not believe that in the absence of telling them
what we intend to do, what the architecture is, with some
people, Mr. Perle writing in the Wall Street Journal saying we
should have a residual capacity against the Russians in a
defensive system without knowing what the architecture is, and
saying in February, March, we are basically going to be between
a rock and a hard place, I just think we are not creating
enough space here, and it is in that context that I say to Mr.
Perle that I think the allies are going to be deeply troubled.
If they see us acting here in a prudent, responsible way,
as the President has suggested, trying to move to a new
strategic framework, I applaud them for that, but that is not
going to happen overnight. I think over time it is conceivable
they will come around.
If they see that our objective is abrogation, and that our
testing regime is neither necessary, as Mr. Coyle said, in
terms of aggressive pursuit of a range of technologies, and is
designed in a sense to create this kind of confrontation and
create this collision as soon as possible, I think we are going
to be isolated in the world. I think that matters.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman and witnesses, I think we have
had another good day of hearing our witnesses come forth and
share their views. I have certain agreements with each of you
and certain disagreements, so I will start with my long-time
friend, Mr. Perle.
I thoroughly benefitted by your historical references as to
how this whole concept of the ABM Treaty evolved. You were here
in this building, and I was across the river in that period of
time, and we were young and vigorous in those days. We do
respect the framework and the concept of our elders, and I
think that the withdrawal clause was put in there for a
purpose; to enable both sides to have essential flexibility in
the face of change.
I think, Mr. Berger, you underestimate how much change has
really taken place since May 1972, and ironically I was there,
primarily for other purposes, but as a part of that delegation
which took place in Moscow in May 1972. I remember it very
well.
But let me start with how I disagree with each of our
witnesses to some extent.
Mr. Perle, I am of the frame of mind that the ABM Treaty in
a sense has outlived its justifications and foundations, but I
also believe that you have to deal with Congress as the chief
executive. As Congress moves toward a new framework of
understandings with Russia given Congress as a partner, and
that a number of our colleagues have strong views, contrary to
those of the President, we should thoroughly explore first a
two-step process:
Step 1, to see whether or not we can conceive of a series
of amendments to the ABM Treaty which, in effect, would give us
a new framework, almost in the nature of a substitute amendment
which is a phrase we use frequently on the Senate floor. I
think that that is within the realm of possibility of our
President to negotiate the new framework and somehow leave some
vestiges of the ABM Treaty in place. This would address the
difficulty so many nations have understanding on the heels of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty why our country has not
consistently gone ahead with the old framework.
So keep an open mind. Eventually I think our President can
show Russia the advantages of having an entirely new framework,
but I do believe amendments can accommodate the near-term
objectives of our President as he devises essential new steps
in an architecture which I strongly support. We will take it a
step at a time. That is my view.
Mr. Berger, I think you have very carefully analyzed the
relationships between the United States and the former Soviet
Union, today Russia, but we cannot be unmindful of the fact
that a lot of nations are hell-bent on trying to acquire one or
more of these weapons for whatever purpose they wish.
We dwell on my good friend and former chairman's views
about the threat of one single weapon in the suitcase, and we
are expending enormous sums of money, primarily in
intelligence, to intercept those types of threats, but we are
not spending commensurate funds to give us the essential
ability to stop one or two missiles fired against the United
States.
We have seen here recently two events involving the finest-
trained military people. In Russia, they lost their submarine.
We all know that their finest go into the submarine force. No
dollars are spared in terms of safety, training, and capability
in modern submarines, and then we saw gross negligence by the
commanding officer of a submarine in Hawaii, when that
submarine surfaced and caused the loss of life of innocent
people.
Mistakes happen in the military. Mistakes can happen with
the aging forces in Russia today--its missile forces which they
can no longer economically support in the numbers they have.
Accidents happen with our military as well. So we have to
prepare ourselves against that type of situation.
I hope, Mr. Berger, in the course of your remarks this
morning you can allay any concerns I have in listening to you
that you might advocate a preemptive nuclear first strike
against these countries that threaten us with their ballistic
missiles, as opposed to putting a defensive system in to
interdict that missile. Preemptive strikes by a superpower like
ours against a small nation of helpless people, I just hope you
will correct that in the course of the morning, I will move on
to another subject, which is directly related to this.
We wake up this morning, to hear Russian President Putin
advocating that he wants to join NATO. Now, it may be just
jocular rhetoric on his part as he goes off to meet with our
President, but that is something that has been discussed from
time to time in your administration and others. What is your
assessment? I will lead off with you, Mr. Berger. What is your
assessment of his comments this morning, because if he were to
join NATO, it seems to me we could very quickly reach an
accommodation with regard to missile defense, because it is in
the common interests of Russia as well as the United States.
Mr. Berger. I think that is a long way off in the future,
at the very least.
Senator Warner. I certainly would not advocate it at this
point in time. I think it would be the demise of NATO.
Mr. Berger. Let me say I certainly agree, and the Clinton
administration was never accused of underestimating the change
in Russia over the last 8 years. I certainly agree that there
is a new Russia, new leadership, new democracy, but in fact it
is in part because of their crumbling offense, the fact that
they cannot put their subs out on deployment, they cannot
deploy their strategic aircraft, that a defensive system that
we do not define for them in a system without rules, is going
to cause them concern.
I do not think that concern is a trump card. I do not think
that we ask their permission. We certainly did not as we were
proceeding with our system, but I do think that we have to look
smartly at how they could respond to decrease what they already
see, as they lose confidence in their deterrent and as they see
an increasing vulnerability from their own economic----
Senator Warner. Excuse me, under my time constraints, I
would like to have Mr. Perle address that.
Mr. Berger raises the question which I think we have to
respond to, the timetable that the Bush administration has put
down to achieve a new framework is so unrealistic that it
raises a credible inference that their subliminal intention is
to just trash the treaty from the beginning. I think our
testimony here from Mr. Wolfowitz went a long way to dispel any
basis for that assertion, but nevertheless, you have spent many
years in the negotiating field.
Go back to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) weapons in
Europe. We took in the 1980s a very assertive stance, quickly
told them what we were going to do, and while our allies
objected initially, eventually that unfolded successfully.
Mr. Perle. Senator, I think this is unlike the issues, the
arms control issues of the Cold War, where every detail was
important, where we wanted to cross every T and dot every I,
and the difference is, we are talking about a whole new
conceptual relationship between the United States and Russia.
It is not a question of the details, it is a question of the
concept.
Sandy Berger wants to stick with the old concept. He does
not like the idea of replacing 50 years of strategic policy in
a few months' time, but that was 50 years of policy during the
Cold War. The Cold War is over.
It is rather more akin to demobilization after a world war,
and so I do not think we need protracted negotiations to say to
the Russians, unless you can conceive of an American, a
massive--and we are talking thousands of weapons, nuclear
attack on Russia, you do not need to be concerned about the
very limited defense we have in mind. I frankly find it hard to
imagine how a Russian across the table could say we would be
concerned about a defense against a modest number of ballistic
missiles that might be aimed at you.
How could they justify that concern, and if they cannot,
and I believe they cannot, then we should put this treaty
behind us, and without regret. It served a useful purpose
during the Cold War. It now prevents us from mounting a modest
defense against a Saddam Hussein or against an accident.
On balance, and I think the chairman put the question
exactly right at the outset, are we better off with the treaty,
or are we safer with or without it? On balance, the threat of
an accident or a rogue state is much greater than the
likelihood of a nuclear war, deliberate, massive nuclear war
between the United States and Russia.
Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, can I add one comment to that?
Senator Warner. I am going to defer to the chairman. I
think we had best stick to our time.
Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
three of you for excellent testimony this morning.
I want to pick up on a question Senator Warner raised, and
it goes to the heart of the changing strategic relationship
between Russia and the United States, which is in many ways the
premise, or it is certainly the reassuring context that the
administration and others who support development of a national
missile defense put forward, which is that the Cold War is
over. Russia and the United States are no longer enemies,
therefore, why is Russia concerned about our development of a
missile defense?
I must say in that regard that, although this is not the
first time this has been discussed, I took President Putin's
comment at the press conference--I believe it was in Moscow
yesterday--about his own interest in altering the strategic
framework and in having Russia be considered for membership in
NATO as a significant statement, and it is one that I hope on
which the administration will engage him.
I hope President Bush will pick President Putin up in their
discussions in Europe this weekend, because if, in fact--and
look, NATO was created, as I understand its history, for two
reasons. One, obviously, was in response to the Warsaw Pact, as
the centerpiece of a Cold War confrontation. The other, which
is so often ignored, but at which NATO has been extraordinarily
historically successful, is to form an institution in which
historic enmities within Europe could be reconciled.
I mean, after all, we were talking about, this is a post-
Second World War institution in which previous enemies in the
Second World War, Germany, France, Britain, came together and
have formed an alliance over the years.
We have already begun to work with Russia, I think quite
constructively, in the Balkans, so I do not think there should
be any inherent reason not to commence with such discussions.
They have another salutary effect. There are qualifications
for membership in NATO. Some of them go to military
comparability and preparedness. Obviously, Russia is in a much
better position than some of the other nations we have taken in
to meet that standard, and the others go to proof of the
vibrancy or reality of democracy, which is an important
additional guarantee to the people of Russia, who have suffered
for too long under communism.
So I hope we will engage President Putin on this. I think
it is a great thing to happen now, as we begin to talk to him
about missile defense and modifications, or even abandonment of
the ABM Treaty, because what better way than to say, President
Putin, history has changed, the Cold War is over, we are no
longer enemies, so much so that we are prepared to begin a
process which may lead to your admission in to NATO, where you
will generally be our ally.
My question is this. Just very briefly, I have been saying
at these hearings, and I think the National Missile Defense Act
of 1999, which passed the Senate 97 to 3, committed the United
States to a policy of developing a national missile defense
against limited attack as soon as it is technologically
feasible, so to me the question is not whether we are going to
have a missile defense, but when.
I also think, in truth, that the adoption of that act put
us on another course, which was to have a missile defense
obviously at some point requires either the comprehensive
modification or abandonment of the ABM Treaty. You cannot have
both, and, therefore, I think the question about ABM is not
whether it will be altered, but when and how, and those are the
questions that I want to ask particularly Mr. Berger.
Mr. Perle, I was troubled in this regard to read a
statement in the New York Times today from Condoleezza Rice,
President Bush's National Security Advisor. The reporter said,
first, the White House has no interest in detailed talks about
permissible testing and deployments--this is on missile
defense--and then, ``this is not about lining in, lining out
the ABM Treaty to try to get a little bit of flexibility to do
this test or that test.''
I presume she is talking about a broader alteration, but
if, in fact, we are going to violate the ABM Treaty soon, as I
think Mr. Berger is saying this morning, modifications are
necessary or we are going to have to totally withdraw and
precipitate a crisis, so I would ask the two of you two
questions, Mr. Berger and Mr. Perle.
First, listening to Mr. Coyle particularly, who thinks we
are not in any danger in the near term of violating the ABM
Treaty, speaking generally and simplistically, to the extent
that the two of you understand the administration's program
here, when do you think we are going to violate the ABM Treaty,
which would require us to pull out? Second, perhaps covered in
the last round, why not modify the ABM Treaty if, in fact,
there is going to be a violation soon, rather than forcing what
may be very difficult, which is a major reorganization of the
geopolitical strategic architecture between Russia and the
United States?
Mr. Berger. Let me try to answer both of those questions as
concisely as I can. I think what Mr. Coyle is saying is that we
need not violate the ABM Treaty any time soon to have an
aggressive program with respect to a range of technologies.
Now, as I see it, as I read what the administration is
putting forward, they have said they are going to bump up
against the treaty in several months, and there are three ways
in which that could happen. One is they have said there is
going to be a PAC-3 test sometime in February. Now, if that is
tested against a strategic missile, that would be a violation.
Second of all, they said they are going to use Aegis
radars. Depending on how that happens, that could raise a
treaty issue on the test track. We have a right to additional
test sites under the treaty when we notify the Russians of
that. We do not have a right to do that inconsistent of the
treaty. That is, if we are doing it as an operational base.
So they have raised a series of--they have designed a test
plan that they have said will bump up against the treaty, and
depending on at least how those three tests go, could cross the
line. I think what Mr. Coyle is saying--and I do not want to
speak for him--is we want to be very aggressive in going
against a range of technologies without bumping up for the time
being.
On the second question, why not modify, we tried. We
designed an architecture which BMDO and the Pentagon said was
the fastest, most mature, most affordable way to meet the
threat before us, which was the rogue state threat against the
United States, and as Mr. Coyle has said, we made a good deal
of progress in moving toward that system.
At the same time, we went to the Russians with a specific
architecture and specific modifications. In the last 3 weeks,
Senator Lieberman, I have heard four different rationales. We
should have a system to defend ourselves against the United
States, against rogue-state threats. That is what we were
doing.
Second, we should have a system that should protect us and
the Europeans and our friends against long-range ballistic
threats. That is a different system. I do not know whether the
Europeans are volunteering to pay for their portion of that. I
have not heard that yet.
Third, we should have a system that does all of that plus
enables us to deal with an unauthorized or accidental launch
from Russia. That is a different system. Unless we know which
SS-18 is going to accidentally launch, that is a different
footprint.
Others say we need a 360-degree system that can defend us
against anything from anywhere.
We are going to the Russians at this point saying, we
cannot tell you what we are going to do. We cannot really tell
you why we are going to do it. We cannot really tell you what
we are asking you to do in the way of modifications. Just let
us out of this treaty and trust us.
I think that we have a better chance of doing what
President Bush has said, which is negotiating a new strategic
framework, if we give ourselves more room, and what Mr. Coyle
is telling us is that we can do that without prejudice to the
development of a range of technologies.
Mr. Perle. Senator, the ABM Treaty says we cannot have a
defense, and what it permits is insignificant. The question, it
seems to me, before the country is do we want to continue to
live with that prohibition? Do we want to try to open enough
freedom to take the next step for the next few months, or do we
want to deal with the fundamental underlying conceptual
question of whether we are right to prohibit defenses on the
theory that we are somehow going to be safer if those defenses
are to be prohibited?
What I put before the committee is an admittedly radical
proposal. It is to recognize the way in which the world has
changed, and not cling to this anachronism, and we would be
clinging to the anachronism if we tried to deal with these
small details in a way that would buy us some time.
The whole idea of buying some time implies that this treaty
is serving our interest, and therefore we should preserve it
for as long as we can. I think it is no longer serving our
interest. It is contrary to our interest, and the sooner we
exercise the right that was agreed upon in 1972 that we can
withdraw, the better, and it has the added benefit that it will
put the U.S.-Russian relationship in a new and much healthier
context than the one that produced that treaty and has led some
people to cling to it.
It is significant that in Russia the proponents of the
treaty are the opponents of real change in the relationship
between the United States and Russia. I am going to Moscow on
the weekend to participate in the discussion, as I did last
year, and I can tell you that the reformers, the most ardent
reformers in Russia are the people who are most anxious to be
rid of the Cold War context, and they are not in the least
concerned about abandoning the ABM Treaty.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Berger, you are quoted, I guess in the International
Herald Tribune on Friday, July 13, of this year, saying,
``China does not have the capability to be a destabilizing
force in Asia, nor is there much evidence that it intends to do
so.''
Right now, with some 209 M-11 missiles, with the building
of the destroyers, the submarines, with the upgrading of their
platforms, with the recent purchase that--the number has not
been confirmed, but around 240 SU-27s and SU-30s, which are
state-of-the-art, and are actually better and more
sophisticated than our F-15s and F-16s, and their air power
conservatively estimated to be 3 to 1 over Taiwan, do you not
believe that that military buildup is a destabilizing force on
Taiwan?
Mr. Berger. I think the sentence before the one you read,
Senator--I have not seen how that was edited by the Herald
Tribune--said that after several, a period of declining
military budgets, the Chinese have increased their defense
budgets. They are modernizing. These are things we need to be
concerned about and to watch carefully. That was the context.
Senator Inhofe. So they could be a destabilizing force?
Mr. Berger. I think at this point, I do not see them having
the capability to launch a successful attack against Vietnam or
against Korea. I think Taiwan is a unique and very difficult
set of problems, but my view is, we should be dealing with that
in a very deliberate way.
Senator Inhofe. Back during the Clinton administration,
when you had the position of National Security Advisor, we went
through an event that I know you were involved in, where we
were all a little bit embarrassed after our intelligence had
said that it would be somewhere around 5 years before North
Korea would have the multiple stage rocket capability--I
actually have a letter dated August 24, 1998, that stated
that--then on August 31, they fired a three-stage missile
capable of reaching the United States of America.
It is also well-known that North Korea is selling--not just
trading its technology but selling systems to Iraq and Iran.
Can you sit here today and say that there are currently no
weapons of mass destruction and ICBM threats to the United
States from rogue nations today?
Mr. Berger. I am troubled, very troubled by the Korean
program, which is why, Senator, we did several things. We
negotiated a missile test moratorium to stop their testing,
number 1, in 1991. That moratorium holds still today. Number 2,
we initiated discussions----
Senator Inhofe. Let me interrupt you on that, because your
recommendation number 7 in your opening statement was, and I
wrote it down here, ``negotiate with North Korea to stop the
missile threat.'' You essentially did that, and it is my
understanding that there is strong evidence of testing that is
taking place since that agreement was made.
Mr. Berger. I do not know. You have greater access at this
point to classified information than I do, Senator. I am not
aware of any long-range testing by the Koreans since that
moratorium. I think that is something we would know about and
read on the front page of the New York Times.
We also, at the very end of the Clinton administration,
began a conversation with the North Koreans about stopping
their exports to states in the Middle East and elsewhere, and
about ending their program. We did not have enough time to
satisfy ourselves that we could reach an agreement that would
reach our standard in terms of verification and otherwise, but
I think we have an obligation to see whether we can negotiate
away the threat in a verifiable way.
Senator Inhofe. This is chewing up my time rapidly, so I
think your statement is that you feel comfortable in
negotiating with North Korea to stop the missile threat. You
have enough confidence in them.
Mr. Berger. I do not think that is the only thing: Trust,
but verify.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Perle, do you have any comments to make
about either of those two things? First of all, can we sit here
today and assume that there is no threat from a rogue nation
today, in light of this trading of technology and systems with
North Korea?
Mr. Perle. No, I do not think we can make that assumption.
There is a great deal we simply do not know, and we have to
assume that we could be surprised.
Senator Inhofe. Do you totally trust the North Koreans to
agree to stop their missile threat?
Mr. Perle. I do not trust the North Koreans at all.
Senator Inhofe. On the missile, the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Berger. I would say I agree with that statement.
Senator Inhofe. On the ABM Treaty of 1972, this was back
when, as we have said before, the Soviet Union was our enemy.
Is Russia our enemy today?
Mr. Berger. Senator, I find it somewhat ironic to hear
myself cast here as the defender of old things, since Mr. Perle
spent most of the last 8 years saying we had an overly romantic
view of Russia. The fact is, a lot has changed, and Russia is
not our enemy. The Soviet Union does not exist. The Cold War
does not exist. We promoted NATO in large measure----
Senator Inhofe. They are our ally.
Mr. Berger. They are not our ally, but they are not our
enemy, but that does not mean that they do not have a gigantic
nuclear arsenal, and that they are still not a strategic
dynamic, and there is still not danger and uncertainty.
Senator Inhofe. Just a yes or no, do you think it could be
argued, logically, that--and we want a missile defense system
that will protect us but also our allies, and also Russia--it
could be to their benefit for us to have this?
Mr. Berger. I argued that to President Putin face-to-face.
I said to President Putin, I think you ought to make these
changes because I think it is in Russia's interest to have this
system proceed in the context of arms control and in the
context of constraints, not unbounded by constraints.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Berger, you said in your opening
statement also that you agree with Henry Kissinger, and then
you went on to talk about it. I would ask you also if you agree
with another statement Henry Kissinger made.
Henry Kissinger, having been the architect of the 1972 ABM
Treaty, felt at that time, and frankly I did not agree with him
at that time, but many people did, that mutually assured
destruction (MAD) was the right thing to do.
Since that time, that very architect has said he is very
much opposed to its application today because of the changing
world, the proliferation we have been talking about, and he
said, ``It is nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.''
Do you agree with Henry Kissinger on that statement?
Mr. Berger. First of all, Senator, I do not know anybody
saying we should abandon deterrence with respect to Russia,
unless someone is saying we should build this system as a
system designed against the Russian arsenal. No one is saying
we should walk away from deterrence of mutual destruction. They
are saying, do it at a lower level.
What I am saying, and I think Henry Kissinger and I
disagree on a number of aspects of this, what he is saying is
big nations like the United States do not preemptively withdraw
from treaties without demonstrating to the world that they have
tried to make the changes that are necessary.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I have
just one yes or no question for Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Coyle, you said, and I believe national missile defense
is being developed without the urgency of a threat. Don't you
believe that, with the buildup that we are seeing in China, and
with the comments that were made back when the demonstrations
were taking place off the Taiwan Strait, and the comment was
made that America would rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei,
and when their defense minister said war with America is
inevitable, would you not throw that into a category of urgency
of a threat?
Mr. Coyle. Senator, I find it hard to believe that North
Korea would be so reckless as to attack----
Senator Inhofe. No, I am talking about China now. This is
China.
Mr. Coyle. I would make the same comment. I find it hard to
believe that China would try to attack the U.S. homeland
tomorrow, whereas I can certainly imagine North Korea or China
firing short-range missiles, and the sense of my testimony was
I believe the short-range missile threat is much more urgent.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Perle, you premised a great deal of your testimony on
the assertion, repeatedly, that the Cold War is over, and in a
very obvious sense you are absolutely right, describing the
conflict, the competition between the United States, the Soviet
Union, China, and the Communist Bloc.
But the Cold War is also a shorthand for a strategic
situation where two nations have antithetical interests,
commercial and ideological. They both have weapons of mass
destruction that inhibits their use of conventional forces, and
at the time that you are talking about the demise of the Cold
War, you are also talking about the inability of nations
acquiring these weapons, in effect, creating at least the
dynamics of a Cold War in the future, i.e., two nations with
antagonistic interests and nuclear weapons.
In that sense, and I guess it goes back to the point that
has been made by others, is there any way that we can step away
from mutual assured destruction, ultimately, as a strategic
concept?
Mr. Perle. I think that ultimately we will, of course,
reserve the right and the capability to respond with nuclear
weapons under certain circumstances. I think the circumstances
are becoming much narrower than they once were.
We always preserve the right to use nuclear weapons to deal
with a conventional attack in the center of Europe, for
example. I no longer think that that makes sense. I believe
that at the end of the day the role of nuclear weapons will be
solely as a last resort, a response if nuclear weapons are used
against us, and in all other contingencies we will have to find
nonnuclear ways of protecting our interest and the interests of
our allies.
Where I think the world is fundamentally different now is
that we cannot be sure that there will not be a missile fired
by accident. We could not be sure before, but we did not have a
ready response, and second there are countries and individuals
who I believe it is imprudent to assume will be deterred in the
way that we were able to deter the Soviet Union.
I do not want to bet on the stability of a Saddam Hussein
or a Kim Jong Il if they are in possession of a missile that
can reach our territory with a warhead of mass destruction. I
think we are in immediate jeopardy, and it is going to take,
everyone agrees it is going to take, many years before we have
a highly competent defense. They will argue that very
effectively. It may take 30 years, and the second or third
generation, before we have a defense that we can be completely
confident about. We have to start somewhere.
Senator Reed. I think we all agree we have started. The
question is where are we going, what path, and how fast we are
going, and without being facetious, but it seems that some of
your foundation is psychoanalytical. You are looking into the
mind, if not the soul, of these people, and concluding that
they are irrational, whereas Joseph Stalin was reasonably
rational, and others who are rather unseemly characters were
rational, and essentially that is one of the great issues here,
the rationality of our foes.
Let me say something else, too, that in your concluding
paragraph you say the best way to protect against a missile
attack is to keep our adversaries from investing in the
missiles in the first place. One of the problems I have with
that is, our adversaries have their own adversaries.
It would seem to me that the Indians and the Pakistanis are
not developing nuclear weapons and missiles because they want
to attack New York. It is because they are concerned about
their border, the Iraqis, the Iranians, and as a result, if the
premise is this national missile system is going to dissuade
rogue states, or even developing states from developing
missiles, I think that is an erroneous presumption.
Mr. Perle. That is not my assumption at all. There are
going to be additional nuclear powers. We do not worry about
the British or French nuclear capabilities, and I do not worry
about the Indian nuclear capability. I do not think India is
going to attack the United States. I do worry about Saddam
Hussein. I do worry about Kim Jong Il.
Senator Reed. So this comes down, essentially your
presumption is that you just feel that they are irrational,
that they will sacrifice themselves and their regime in a
conflict or a contest with the United States.
Mr. Perle. I do not know whether they will or not, but I do
not think you can rule that out. That is the difference. You
can take the position that you are prepared to take that risk.
Let us not have a defense and we will hope that neither Saddam
Hussein, or Kim Jong Il, nor someone else in the future does
something that we would consider totally irrational and launch
an attack on the United States. That is a risk that I do not
think we need to take, and given the catastrophic nature of
getting that wrong, I want to err on the side of prudence and
be able to intercept that missile.
To repeat, this applies to an accident as well. There are
no guarantees there will not be an accident.
Senator Reed. A quick comment in response. The accident,
there is also a possible consequence of our abandoning the ABM
Treaty in that the Chinese, or perhaps even the Russians,
decide they had to increase their alert status and for the
Chinese to put warheads on their missiles, which ironically
increases the chance of a dangerous accidental launch, but let
me also go to Mr. Coyle for a quick question.
It seems to me, as we go down here, we could find ourselves
in a race between the offense and the defense, between our
limited defensive shield and the capability of Iran or Iraq or
North Korea to take offensive weapons and make them more
effective than our defense, and in that way do you have any
comment about who wins the offense or defense? You have looked
at these systems.
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, Senator Reed. It is a classic comment,
really, certainly not original with me, that in such matters as
we are discussing here today, the offense always has the
advantage. The United States being an open society, the defense
trade journals will publish details of the work that we are
doing on missile defenses, and an adversary will have insights
about how to build countermeasures and decoys that could be
very difficult for us to deal with.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Bunning.
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Berger, in your opening statement you say that we
should take into account the reaction of the Chinese when we
assess the risks and costs of developing missile defense for
our citizens. Well, as Jim Inhofe has said, for years now over
our strong objectives, the Chinese have been providing
ballistic missile technology to many rogue nations, nations
like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan that are the source
of this missile threat to the United States.
If the Chinese had not been providing this technology to
these nations, we probably would not be here talking about this
today. We would likely have no missile threat to us, at least
not right now. Do you think that the Chinese should have
thought about the risks and costs of giving missile technology
to other countries like North Korea?
The risks and costs to the Chinese turn out to be that we
are forced to develop a system to protect ourselves. They may
not like it, but they have made their bed and now they are
going to have to sleep in it. Do you think that we should
ignore the threats that have been created as a result of the
Chinese proliferation, that we should let the Chinese, through
third countries, create a threat to us and then not respond to
that threat because they may not like it?
Mr. Berger. I do not think it is a question at all of what
they like, Senator Bunning. I think that the Chinese
proliferation has been something that has been a serious
problem. We spent a considerable amount of time in the Clinton
administration trying to get greater constraint on Chinese
proliferation practices. We made substantial progress in the
nuclear area. We have made less progress in the missile area,
and there is no question that the Chinese, among others, have
added to the capability of the North Koreans and others.
My point is simply this, that we cannot ignore, in
assessing the overall consequences of this, what effect it will
have in Asia. We are basically saying that we are acknowledging
that this system will defeat the Chinese deterrent. Some are
even suggesting that is part of its purpose, but we are saying
the answer. The administration has said as well, we will just
say, ``Fine, the Chinese can build up.''
I find that actually to be a strange posture for the United
States to be in a sense acquiescent to the buildup, and the
only point I am trying to make here is that we have to assess
as part of this overall equation, and it may lead ultimately to
the conclusion that the best part of wisdom is going forward
with a robust national missile defense.
But the part of the equation is, what does it unleash in
China or in Asia? What does China do? What do Pakistan and
India do as a result?
Senator Bunning. I think we understand that. I think
because of the fact of the Chinese intervention in the creation
of third countries and their proliferation, that we have
reacted to that.
Let me ask you some other questions. I understand that you
were at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson. You represented the
Chinese government, is that correct?
Mr. Berger. That is not correct. I was at the law firm,
along with my distinguished friend, Senator Warner, of Hogan &
Hartson for about 15 years, but I did not represent the Chinese
Government.
Senator Bunning. Someone at the firm did.
Mr. Berger. I do not know. There are 860 lawyers at that
law firm, sir.
Senator Bunning. That is a lot of lawyers.
Mr. Berger. It sure is.
Senator Bunning. God help us all. [Laughter.]
You do not have an ongoing relationship with that law firm?
Mr. Berger. I have my own firm now. They are a client of my
firm, but I do not have any kind of----
Senator Bunning. You do not have any relationship with the
Government of China?
Mr. Berger. I do not.
Senator Bunning. In your prepared statement, you indicated
that negotiations with Russia to modify the ABM Treaty would be
difficult if we did not know the purpose and the architecture
of the system. The purpose of the system is to protect our
citizens against a limited ballistic missile attack. The reason
that we do not have a defined architecture, as the
administration has repeatedly explained, is because we do not
know what will work the most effectively.
The way to find that out is to conduct a rigorous testing
program. That is what the administration is doing. Don't you
think that it is irresponsible not to be sure we have the best
system available to protect our citizens?
Mr. Berger. Senator, the Pentagon and the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization said to us repeatedly during the 1990s
that the most effective, fastest, affordable way to deal with
the threat, I think all of us are saying, is the most immediate
threat. That is the rogue state missile threat against the
United States, to which the best response was a land-based,
mid-course, limited system.
Senator Bunning. But that was considering we were going to
use the ABM Treaty, and it would still be in effect forever.
Mr. Berger. No, that was inconsistent with the ABM Treaty,
which is why we went to the Russians to seek to modify it, and
why we reserved the right ultimately to decide to stay within
it, but now we have a situation where we have blurred what we
are doing here. Are we still focused on rogue state threats to
the United States? Are we focused now on covering Europe?
Senator Bunning. No. I think we are focused on protecting
the citizens of the United States, primarily.
Mr. Berger. I agree with that, Senator. That should be our
only overriding and single-minded concern.
Senator Bunning. I think that is the Bush administration's
overriding concern. I cannot help what is being said in the
press by other people.
Mr. Berger. But what I am saying, Senator, is that
acknowledging that, which I agree is not only a moral but in a
sense a constitutional and patriotic responsibility, does not
predetermine how you do that, and in doing that we cannot only
look through the prism of saying, how do we get this system up,
we also have to say, are the allies going to support us,
because we need their participation in building the system.
Senator Bunning. The allies and/or Russia and/or any other
country have no veto power over us protecting our citizens.
Mr. Berger. Senator, now, Mr. Coyle knows more about this
than I do, but most of the systems that I have seen require
radars and other activities on European soil, and so we
cannot--we do not ask their permission to do what we need to
do, but the fact of the matter is, we would need to build and
expand radar for the system we were designing in England and
Greenland, and therefore we need to proceed in a way here that
maintains some degree of consensus. If we are seen as pushing
pell-mell when it is not necessary to abrogate----
Senator Bunning. We can debate about how necessary it is.
Mr. Berger. The last thing, I agree we should be engaged in
an aggressive effort to look at other technologies. One of the
things I said to President Putin when I saw him was, you talked
about boost-phased sea-based systems. They could be of benefit
to you. Why shouldn't we develop them? Why shouldn't we change
the ABM Treaty?
Senator Bunning. My time has expired. I thank you for your
comments. Mr. Putin's comments in the paper were very
constructive today.
Mr. Berger. I agree, and that is why I think it is possible
to do this if we do it in the right way.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much to all of our
panelists today. Let me just say, Mr. Berger, thank you very
much for articulating what I think is the strategic question
before us, and that is, are we going to pursue a WMD capability
as our number 1 priority, or an NMD capability as our number 1
priority? I think that really is the question.
WMD, weapons of mass destruction, I think that is the great
threat to the country. Every intelligence briefing I have been
in for every one of the last 5 years that I have been here
indicates the great threat to the country is not from some
missile attack from some nation with a return address where you
have to have a third-stage rocket or a nuclear missile, or a
biological or chemical weapon, that is not the delivery system
that is most likely to come our way. It is a WMD threat,
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, chemical,
coming from a terrorist threat, backpack, truck, or whatever.
That seems to be the way military installations have been
attacked in recent years, the most recent being the U.S.S.
Cole.
Now, I think that that is right on target, and so I think
our number 1 priority should be defending against WMD, not so
much NMD.
Now, in terms of treaties, I think that Mr. Coyle is
correct, from what I understand, and being a strong advocate of
the theater missile defense and research therein, namely
supporting the Arrow missile defense system research and
development, which is a very successful system with the
Israelis going on, the third generation of Patriots, the
Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), high altitude
intercept program, all of that is consistent with the theater
missile defense, and can be targeted to a Saddam Hussein or
some rogue state.
What bothers me is the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. We
seem to be throwing the baby out with the bath water and
triggering other things. About 3 days ago, I saw a chilling
photograph on the front page of the New York Times. It shows
the price that we are paying politically for pursuing pell-
mell, as you say, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty to put
together an NMD system that, at best, cannot be deployed for
another 10 years; at best, is not the plexiglass shield that we
are led to believe and; at best, is not the maximally effective
against anybody who wants to put some decoys out there and
attack either our forces or this country.
The chilling photograph I saw as a result of our pell-mell
efforts to abrogate the ABM Treaty and pursue this NMD quest
was the President of Russia and the President of China
embracing in a friendship pact. The last time Russia and China
got together in a friendship pact was when Mao Tse Tung and
Stalin got together, and a few months later the Korean War
broke out.
A few years later, the Vietnam War broke out, all with the
support of Russia and China working together against the United
States. That is a strategic concern I have. That is the price
we are paying for this pell-mell pursuit, as you mentioned, on
NMD, which I think is not necessary.
Let me ask you, Mr. Berger, if you do not agree with this
statement. It is a statement by Mr. Ivo Dadler of the Brookings
Institution, quoted in today's New York Times. ``Treaties that
place limits on the testing and deployment of defensive systems
provide predictability to all sides about the future strategic
environment, and it is that predictability that will enable
Russia to avoid worst-case assumptions and to continue to
reduce its nuclear arsenal significantly. It is wrong to equate
arms control treaties with the Cold War. Treaties are an
instrument for reducing tensions among states in a Cold War,
and for avoiding a return to the Cold War.'' Is that something
you would agree with?
Mr. Berger. Yes, I do, Senator.
Senator Cleland. Let me just say, would you also not agree
with the German official quoted in the New York Times today
about the impact of the ABM Treaty on our allies, particularly
our NATO allies, with whom we just fought the Balkan War? The
German official is quoted as saying, ``If the ABM Treaty is
changed, it should be a negotiated solution between the United
States, the Russians, and the Europeans, namely Germany. Our
concern is that there is a framework that has served us well,
and that we should only do away with it, with the old
framework, if we have a better one.''
Mr. Berger. I do not believe that we ever should rule out
unilateral action. I do not. I agree with my colleagues up here
that the Russians do not have a veto, but I do think that
agreed constraints on defense are not obsolete. They do provide
predictability. They are likely to diminish the chance that the
consequences of our proceeding will solve one problem--that is,
the rogue state problem--and aggravate another problem, and
that is the tension and uncertainty.
Senator Cleland. Is it not true that for a number of years
with the Arrow missile system, with the upgrade of the Patriot,
with the THAAD, high-altitude intercept, we have been pursuing
at a reasonable pace theater-based antimissile technology to
defend our troops and our allies in a theater, in a region?
Isn't that true?
Mr. Berger. Yes, and in 1993, when the Clinton
administration came into office, one of the things that came
out of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) with Secretary Aspin was to
reorient our programs to focus on TMD, and all of those
programs that you mentioned are complaint with the ABM Treaty,
as we learned in the Gulf War.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Coyle, I was concerned today about
another piece in the New York Times, where one senior officer
in the Pentagon says, missile defense is their number 1
priority, namely, the administration's. He said we have to find
a way to deemphasize conventional programs to pay for strategic
defense.
That is the thing that bothers me, that you have a 57
percent plus-up, of $8 billion for so-called missile defense,
which at best in 10 years will give us only a rudimentary
system that is not the plexiglass shield that is contemplated.
At the same time, our Service Chiefs have testified we have $30
billion in unfunded requirements, we have 75 percent of the
United States Army's equipment more than half of its life gone,
we have the average age of American aircraft 18 to 20 years of
age, and we have a Navy under 300 ships.
It does not seem to me to be very smart for us to put this
pell-mell pursuit of some National Missile Defense Program,
which at best will not provide the security that we think it is
going to provide, and does, at worst, mitigate against our
relations with potential adversaries now, Russia and China who
have embraced each other, in each other's arms, so I am very
concerned.
Mr. Coyle, you mentioned the Manhattan Project. I
understand we have already spent about two or three times the
amount of money on missile defense and research as we spent on
the Manhattan Project.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this important hearing. I also want to thank the three
witnesses for taking time to be here, and Mr. Chairman, at
today's hearing I would just observe that this is the third
hearing in 7 days on missile defense. I am very glad to see
that protecting the United States and its allies and friends
from incoming missiles is a high priority for the committee.
I look at the number of full committee hearings we have had
this year, and 25 percent of our full committee hearings have
been regarding missile defense, and that is why I am glad we
are focusing on this critical need and threat, and look forward
to working with my colleagues to ensure that we address the
needs of missile defense.
Mr. Chairman, I too have a small piece of information that
concerns some of what my colleague from Georgia just mentioned
with respect to Russia and China. President Putin stated in a
news conference just yesterday that: ``As for a possible
response, a joint reply of Russia and China to a U.S.
withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, each state itself decides
what it is to do and how. It is possible in theory, but in
practice Russia plans no joint actions with other states in
this sphere, including China.''
Now, Mr. Coyle, last week you wrote an op-ed piece for the
Washington Post titled, ``The ABM Ambush,'' in which you made
some interesting claims. That piece opened with the following
sentence, and I will quote: ``Despite claims by some in the
Bush administration, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty is not an
obstacle to proper development and testing of a national
missile defense system.''
That claim is certainly at odds with statements made by
both Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, who
testified earlier this week in this committee. They said they
had already identified at least three development and testing
activities in the coming months which, in their words, ``have
the potential of raising serious ABM Treaty compliance
problems.''
They also pointed out that the compliance determinations
are not simple matters, and, in fact, Secretary Wolfowitz said,
``this is a genuinely complicated problem, because in the, what
is it now, 29 years since the treaty was signed, we have had a
lengthy, and I would actually say, tedious, record of going
over these issues with the Russians. You have to look at that
record. You have to examine it. You have to weigh American
positions and Russian positions. We are in a very difficult
zone.''
Mr. Coyle, in February of this year the Office of
Operational Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense
issued the operational test and evaluation report. Your office
made some very detailed recommendations and conclusions, and so
my question is, when you were the head of OT&E, did your office
conduct studies or analysis concerning ABM Treaty compliance?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, Senator Allard, we did. We looked at
the question of how these various tests would be done, and with
respect to the work at Fort Greely that is being proposed by
the administration, if the administration wants to turn Fort
Greely into a test site for NMD, the treaty permits the
administration to declare Fort Greely as a test site. As I said
earlier, it has already been a place where the Army has done
cold-weather testing. So if they want to do more testing, but
specifically on NMD, that is something that the treaty would
permit.
Senator Allard. Department of Defense directive 2060.1
prescribes procedures for compliance review of DOD activities.
What role in assessing compliance does that directive provide
for the Director of Operational Testing in the Pentagon?
Mr. Coyle. It does not provide a role for the DOT&E.
Senator Allard. Did every one of the 50 activities go
through your compliance review group?
Mr. Coyle. No. We were looking at ways to improve testing.
For example, I supported and recommended the initiative which
the Bush administration is now taking to add testing
capabilities at Kodiak.
Senator Allard. In testimony before a Governmental Affairs
Subcommittee, the head of the Defense Department's compliance
review group was asked numerous questions like the one I just
asked you regarding the compliance of various potential testing
activities for both theater and national missile defense, and
he said, ``we cannot make judgments on questions like that
until we see the actual system design.'' So, if the head of
DOD's compliance review efforts cannot make those assessments,
how are you able to assert what is and is not a treaty obstacle
to our missile defense plans?
Mr. Coyle. So far, I have not seen anything proposed that
would come into conflict with the ABM Treaty any time soon. For
example, we have just been talking about the Fort Greely work.
A different example is the PAC-3 test, which Mr. Berger brought
up a little while ago. That is a test of a short-range missile
system. Tactical missiles are not governed by the ABM Treaty,
and if the Department of Defense wants to do short-range tests,
that is something we do all the time.
Senator Allard. Are you aware of the administration's
statements that the United States will not violate the treaty?
Mr. Coyle. Yes.
Senator Allard. Then on the test-bed restructure, hasn't
the program been restructured significantly since your tenure
at the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation at the
Department of Defense?
Mr. Coyle. It is beginning to be restructured. General
Kadish has proposed a much faster rate of testing, something
which I testified would be necessary in my testimony before the
House last fall. General Kadish has talked about doing four or
five tests per segment per year for each of the segments of
national missile defense, maybe a test every month. I do not
know whether they will be able to sustain that kind of a test
rate, but they are proposing it. They have not yet developed
test plans, nor reviewed those test plans with my former
office, something I hope they will do.
Senator Allard. The expanded test bed will provide an
opportunity for more realistic intercept and target
trajectories during testing. Do you believe this is consistent
with your recommendations to improve the missile defense test
program?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, I do.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. What is it about the
present test, Mr. Coyle, from Vandenberg to Kwajalein, that
does not break the ABM Treaty?
Mr. Coyle. Kwajalein is an accepted test site, along with
White Sands, under the ABM Treaty. While the treaty allows for
the test sites to be established, the Russians could establish
new test sites and so could we; Kwajalein is already a
permitted test site under the ABM Treaty, and so the tests we
have been doing there for years, and I expect we will continue
to do there for years, are permitted.
Senator Bill Nelson. So a similar test could be done at
Fort Greely and it not break the ABM?
Mr. Coyle. Yes. The United States would have to declare
that that was going to be a new test site, but that is all they
would have to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. You mentioned Kodiak Island testing.
That would not break the treaty. Can you repeat that, please?
Mr. Coyle. Yes. Once again, the administration would have
to declare that Kodiak was to become a new test site in
addition to Kwajalein and White Sands, but they could do that.
As I said, it is something I would support, because it produces
more realistic engagements than the current geometry.
Senator Bill Nelson. In Mr. Perle's testimony he mentioned
that, as we look at a conflict between India and Pakistan, the
Aegis system could be deployed off the coast that could knock
down an ICBM launched from one to the other. Is the current
technology of the Aegis system able to do that?
Mr. Coyle. No, sir. The standard missiles that are on the
Aegis destroyers and cruisers are not capable for NMD-class
engagements, nor are the radars. The Aegis radar is a wonderful
radar for ship defense, but it is not capable of NMD
engagements.
Senator Bill Nelson. Would the testing of such a system
break the treaty?
Mr. Coyle. I suppose you could find lawyers who could argue
that. It could be, but for example, you could take an Aegis
destroyer today and go down off the coast of Florida and look
at missile launches there and get the same data, where you were
launching satellites, or whatever. So you would have to go out
of your way to do it, and I am not sure it would prove much if
you did.
Senator Bill Nelson. But to develop a system that would
knock down a missile from an Aegis platform, you are saying
that that would violate the treaty?
Mr. Coyle. Yes. The treaty prohibits mobile systems, and a
defense system on a Navy ship would be a violation of the
treaty, but we are not at that point yet. We do not have either
the rockets or the radar we need for that.
Senator Bill Nelson. In your opinion, how long down the
road would that occur before the treaty were to be abrogated?
Mr. Coyle. I would not be surprised if it took 10 years for
a ship-based defense to be built. You are talking about
developing a new missile that is twice as fast as the existing
missile. That would take many years, as it has for the mid-
course missile. You are talking about a new radar that would
also require extensive modifications to a ship, or perhaps a
new ship or ships, and all of these things would take time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask you about the descent
phase, which you referred to as terminal. Tell me something
about the development of a system that would be effective in
the terminal phase of an ICBM's trajectory.
Mr. Coyle. Tactical systems like PAC-3 and THAAD are coming
along quite well, and they are effective. They have not been
through realistic operational tests yet, so they still have a
ways to go. There are many years before they will be ready to
be fully deployed, but they are effective in defending
themselves, defending an area of troops, or a battery that they
are trying to defend.
The difficulty with extending that technology to national
missile defense is now you are trying to defend a very large
area, and these theater systems are not capable of doing that.
They are good at defending the troops they are trying to
defend, but they do not yet have the technology to defend an
area, say, the size of the United States.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want you to know how appreciative I
am of this discussion. This has been quite illuminating to me.
We have talked about Russia's reaction. What would be, in your
opinion, China's reaction, as we proceed with robust research
and development, whether it did or did not break the treaty? I
would like to hear your differing opinions on that, Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. I think China has a strategic modernization
program. They have about 18 or 20 strategic missiles. There is
a program that they are planning. I think one would expect
probably an acceleration of that program, and that could
trigger consequences all through Asia.
That to me again is not, ipso facto, a statement that we
should not do this, but it seems to me we ignore that chain of
consequences at our risk. That is part of the overall equation.
If the incipient nuclear debate in Japan winds up over 10
years, as we have nuclear buildups throughout Asia, changing
the fundamental direction of Japan with respect to nuclear
weapons, I am not sure that we will have been better off in the
end, and so I think it is a factor that we have to know more
about, this committee I think should inquire about, and is part
of the equation.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Perle.
Mr. Perle. Senator, I think we probably have the capacity
today to destroy the Chinese deterrent in a first strike, if we
chose to do so, and that is a situation that they have
tolerated I assume because they reason that we are unlikely to
do that, or at least it is sufficiently unlikely so that they
do not want to make a huge effort to deal with it.
I think we must be very careful about slipping into the
idea that because we had a Cold War with the Soviet Union, and
because we have differences with the Chinese, we are going to
have another cold war with the Chinese to which all of the
rules and history of the Cold War between the United States and
the Soviet Union will now apply. I see no reason to expect a
Cold War with China.
We will have our differences. I think we will be able to
resolve those differences, and if at the end of the day there
is a Cold War with China, it will have to be the responsibility
of the Chinese. We should take no actions that would cause that
Cold War, or that situation to occur between us.
Senator Bill Nelson. I want to get Mr. Coyle's response to
the question as well, but let me just say, on that note, it
seems to me that in a common-sense way, Mr. Chairman, of
approaching this whole thing so that you do not make a decision
that you are going to break the treaty, but rather, recognizing
the sensitivities of our relations with others, as Mr. Perle
has suggested, with regard to the Chinese; that you work with
them, showing them how it is in their interest that we continue
a robust research and development program of missile defense.
That eliminates a lot of the problem, as long as you are
working along with people.
I would like Mr. Coyle's response.
Mr. Coyle. I have been very interested to see that some
members of the Bush administration have said that they are
interested first and foremost in an aggressive testing program,
and testing, not deployment. This is an emphasis which I
applaud, and I think, if they follow that emphasis, the issues
with the ABM Treaty will become moot.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On that subject,
Mr. Coyle and Secretary Berger, this Congress has spoken. As
Senator Lieberman said, we voted 97 to 3 to deploy a system as
soon as technologically feasible. The President signed it, I
suppose, with National Security Adviser Berger's advice, and
that committed us on a course that seems to me, in all honesty,
of suggesting that we have to do something about this treaty.
The whole purpose of this treaty was to prohibit a national
missile defense from being built by the United States. The
first clause of the first article says, each party undertakes
not to deploy an ABM system for a defense of the territory of
its country, and not to provide a base for a defense, and not
to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region,
even, except as provided in Article III of the treaty.
So, we are really looking at something here that was a
treaty between two nations, one of which no longer exists, the
Soviet Union, and we are facing threats now from 29 nations
that have ballistic missiles. So I just think that the honest,
direct approach is to create a new form of relationship in the
world, including a statement about Russia joining NATO--what a
comment that was.
I mean, we do have an opportunity for new relationships in
the world, but we must not allow this Nation and this President
to be intimidated from carrying out his duties to protect our
Nation by threat of some rogue nation with a few missiles that
could reach our country and kill, perhaps, millions of people.
That, to me, is basically where we are, and I am somewhat
frustrated, I have to say.
The President is negotiating daily. He is negotiating with
the Russians and the Europeans daily and consistently. He is
making progress in that negotiation, and we have the former
National Security Adviser and others in this Congress
undermining his ability to negotiate. They appear to think that
we do not want to fund this program, we do not have to fund it,
but I think we ought not to undermine the President's ability
to have the freedom to do what we voted 97 to 3 to do.
I think it is a big issue for America, and I think this is
the right thing for this country to do, and I believe we have
to be careful on this committee how we conduct ourselves, that
we do not tie the hands of the President of the United States.
You have been there, Mr. Berger, that it is difficult to
work out negotiations. You say negotiate, but if you argue the
position of the Russians here on this floor, then how can you
negotiate effectively? I would ask you to respond to that.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I hardly believe that I am arguing for
the position of the Russians. The only country I care about is
the United States. I was invited to testify. I am giving you my
best assessment here. I do not think it is any more
irresponsible for me to offer my view of how best to do this
than it is for Mr. Perle to say we are going to abrogate the
treaty no matter what the Russians think. President Bush
probably swallowed that pretty hard in terms of going into a
negotiation with the Russians. If we are going to present them
with a fait accompli, I do not know how we create a new
relationship.
All I am saying, Senator, is let us take the time to see
whether we can do this, to create a new relationship, a new
strategic relationship, and not do it on a schedule, which Mr.
Coyle says is not necessary. That makes that much more
difficult to do.
I applaud the President's efforts to negotiate this with
President Putin, and I hope he succeeds.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Coyle, in June, in Defense Monitor,
you wrote a number of articles about this question. You
question the threat the United States faces, and you wrote,
``One question that has dogged NMD is exactly who is the enemy?
Is it North Korea? Is it China? Is it Iran, Iraq, or Libya? Is
it Russia? Is it all these countries?''
A year and a half ago, North Korea was emphasized as a
threat, but thanks in good measure to fine diplomatic efforts
of former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, North Korea no
longer seems to be the same threat as before.
That reflects your observations and thoughts, but you are
not privy to intelligence information, and you do not consider
yourself an intelligence expert, do you, Mr. Coyle?
Mr. Coyle. No, sir. I think the best way to answer your
question is in personal terms. I have a son who serves overseas
in the military. I am a heck of a lot more concerned about his
danger, being attacked by short-range missiles, than I am
concerned about the United States, say, Los Angeles being
attacked, where I have recently moved. That is my point.
Senator Sessions. I understand that, but let me read you
what the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet,
said in a committee hearing over a year ago: ``Over the next 15
years, however, our cities will face ballistic missile threats
from a wide variety of actors, North Korea, possibly Iran,
possibly Iraq, and in some of these cases this is because of
indigenous technological development and in other cases because
of direct foreign assistance, and while the missile arsenals of
these countries will be fewer in number, constrained to smaller
payloads and less reliable than those of the Russians and
Chinese, they still pose the lethal and less-predictable
threat. North Korea already has tested a space-launched
vehicle, the Taepo Dong I, which could theoretically convert
into an ICBM capable of delivering a small biological or
chemical weapon to the United States already.'' He goes on to
say, ``moreover, North Korea has the ability to test its Taepo
Dong II this year. This missile may be capable of delivering a
nuclear payload to the United States. Most analysts believe
that Iran, following the North Korean pattern, could test an
ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United States
in the next 5 years. Given that Iraqi missile developments are
continuing, we--that is the CIA--think that it, too, could
develop an ICBM, especially with foreign assistance, sometime
in the next decade.''
There was a commission--you were not on the Rumsfeld
Commission, I know--a bipartisan commission reviewed this
subject and they said the threat could be, would be real by
2005, so that is the basis, I think, of where we are.
My time has expired. I believe that we do have a threat, we
do have a commitment to deal with it, the President is working
with our allies, he is working with the Russians. I believe he
is going to be successful, but at any rate, we have an
opportunity and a responsibility to defend this Nation from
missile attack, we have the technological capability of doing
so, and we need to get busy about deploying it before we are
vulnerable.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
First, on the question of the National Missile Defense Act,
which has been raised both by Senator Sessions and Senator
Lieberman, is it not true, Mr. Berger, that there are two
provisions in that act, one of which has been referred to this
morning, which is the intent to deploy as soon as
technologically feasible, but another provision that it is also
the policy of the United States to negotiate further reductions
in nuclear weapons with Russia, is that not correct?
Mr. Berger. That is correct, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Is it not correct that if we unilaterally
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, that it is possible that the
Russian response will be not to reduce or dismantle their
weapons, not to carry out START II, not to negotiate START III,
but to maintain the number of nuclear weapons they have and,
indeed, MIRV some of their weapons? Is that not true?
Mr. Berger. I think that is also true, particularly if we
seem to be doing it in a precipitous way.
Chairman Levin. So there are a number of provisions of
those acts, not just the one that has been referred to here
this morning, but the other provision, which could be in
conflict with the policy of the United States to deploy a
national missile defense system when technologically feasible.
Mr. Berger. When the President signed that, he made it
clear that his deployment decision would be based on his
evaluation of four factors: cost, threat, technology, and the
overall security effect on the United States.
Chairman Levin. The next question goes to Mr. Coyle. How
much operational capability do the five test interceptors
provide at Fort Greely? Let me put it another way to you: The
administration proposes to build five test silos at Fort Greely
and place NMD interceptors in them by 2004. They plan to link
the five test missiles to an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in
Shemya to provide a rudimentary operational capability to shoot
down a North Korean missile.
First of all, could you do the testing with one silo
instead of five, if that was the major purpose?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. So when you say that they could declare it
as a test site, they have already told us--and this is Mr.
Wolfowitz--that it is his intention to have the option, as he
put it, to have a rudimentary operational capability at Fort
Greely as soon as possible. That is the option that they want
as soon as possible. Is that something different from just
declaring it as a test site? Is it inconsistent with declaring
it as a test site? Is it a second purpose? How would you define
that?
Mr. Coyle. If the purpose of having a test site there is to
give soldiers training, that would be a fine thing, I suppose.
If the purpose is to learn about the effect of the very cold
weather at Fort Greely, that would certainly be a worthwhile
thing to do. But they do not plan to actually launch missiles
from those silos for test purposes--the missiles are going to
be launched from Kodiak or Kwajalein, as I understand it. Since
they do not plan to launch any missiles from those five silos
for test purposes, they will not play much of a test role. You
can question whether or not the investment in five silos is
needed to give them the experience working with cold weather. I
think you can do that equally well with just one silo.
Chairman Levin. Have you heard or read Mr. Wolfowitz's
testimony that it is their intention that they have the option
as soon as possible to have a limited operational capability at
Fort Greely?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, I have.
Chairman Levin. Is that a different purpose from a test
site?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, it is.
Chairman Levin. Is that permitted under the ABM Treaty?
Mr. Coyle. Under my understanding, it would not be.
Chairman Levin. So this, then, comes down to a question
that if a principal purpose is an operational capability as
soon as possible, which may, indeed, conflict with the ABM
Treaty. Is that true?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, it would be a new deployment site.
Chairman Levin. He did not quite say that. He said, to give
us the option to do that as soon as possible, I do not want to
put words in his mouth. That is what the compliance review
group, I guess, will look at, as to what the purpose of that
site is, but you said this morning that if they declared it as
a test site, that is fine. It may not be worth the money in
terms of that additional value it gives them, but that that
would be consistent with the treaty if they declare it as a
test site.
If they declare it as both a test site, but a site which
would also give them the option as soon as possible to have a
limited operational capability, then what is your understanding
of the treaty connection?
Mr. Coyle. If the declaration were that this is a new
operational site, that would be in conflict with the treaty.
Chairman Levin. Now, Mr. Berger, do you have any comments
on that in particular?
Mr. Berger. I think it is very important, the line of
questioning you are pursuing, because while we do not know that
the plan of the administration is to--they are not going to
violate the treaty. They have said that. But, of course,
withdrawal is not inconsistent with violation, so the question
is, is this test plan going to cross that line, and it seems to
me in three respects there are questions that this committee
needs answers to.
The treaty says you cannot deploy an ABM system for defense
of territory or its country, and not provide a base for such a
system, so there is the first question of what is the nontest
purpose of what is happening in Alaska.
Second of all, while I agree with Mr. Coyle that if the
PAC-3 test is against a short-range missile, that is not a
violation. If the PAC-3 test is against a strategic missile, or
if the Aegis cruiser is used in a test, in an ABM mode, those
would be a violation.
Now, it does not say that on the fact sheets, but Mr.
Wolfowitz has told us that they are going to bump up against
the treaty in February. That, it seems to me, leaves an
important area for clarification. That is, is it the plan of
this administration to engage in activities in this fiscal year
which in fact will cross the line of the treaty? I think this
committee and the American people have a right to know the
answer to that question.
Chairman Levin. Much of our three hearings are aimed at
getting an answer to that question. As a matter of fact, I have
asked the Secretary of Defense exactly that question in a
letter to which we do not yet have a response, but that is a
critical question, because it is not just the administration
which must make a judgment as to whether or not it wishes to
abrogate the treaty, giving notice, of course. That is a part
of the treaty, to give notice to pull out of the treaty, but
nonetheless, it must make that judgment.
Whether or not the value of these tests marginally give
them anything, whether they want to do that or need to do this
testing early, leaving themselves very little time to negotiate
what they say they want to negotiate with the Russians, putting
themselves in a time box which is very severe in terms of a new
agreement, whether they want to do that, whether they need to
do that, whether the marginal gain in terms of testing
outweighs the loss of time which is necessary to negotiate, or
might be necessary to negotiate particularly a whole new
structure. Putting aside modifications to the ABM Treaty, that
is a judgment which the administration must make in the first
instance, whether or not to give notice of withdrawal, and
whether or not what it is asking for in this budget will, in
fact, put them in a position where they are, through their
testing program, conflicting with the treaty.
However, we have a responsibility of whether to fund that
after we figure out what they are doing. After they notify us
what their intent is, we, as a Congress, have the
responsibility to decide whether or not we are safer with such
a withdrawal from the treaty, a unilateral withdrawal if that
is what it takes.
Now, Mr. Perle takes the position you ought to withdraw
anyway. Your position is pretty clear. It is a radical
proposal, as you have suggested and self-described it, but
nonetheless it is very clear. Whether or not these tests bump
up against the treaty is not relevant to you. You believe we
ought to withdraw from the treaty as a relic of the Cold War in
any event.
By the way, I happen to agree with you, the Cold War is
over, but that also means that we should deal with Russia on a
different basis than we used to deal with the old Soviet Union,
and you say you cannot imagine anybody sitting across the table
from you in Russia who could possibly have any problem with
these tests. I think we ought to be listening to what they are
saying.
Why is it that they are disturbed by these tests? I am not
saying give them a veto. God knows, we are not going to do
that. We are not going to give anyone a veto, but we sure as
heck ought to consider, at least, what their reaction is, and
whether or not, given what they tell us their reaction is going
to be--whether we think it is logical or not, given what they
tell us their reaction is going to be or may be, the same with
the Chinese, whether we are more secure with or without pulling
out of the treaty. I think that is the overarching question
which we all have to address.
My time is up.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have
kept our panel a little longer than we anticipated so I will be
brief in hopes we can wrap up here. I think we've had a good
session, a very good session. I'm going to try and ask two
questions--one to you, Mr. Coyle, and one to each of our
distinguished foreign-policy experts in hopes that maybe some
others who are trying to follow this debate can get a better
grasp on it.
I introduced you, or at least gave you my view, that you
have a reputation for being pragmatic and objective, Mr. Coyle.
I continue to believe that. Now, supposing there wasn't an ABM
Treaty right now and that it had expired this year. Would you
advise the President as to how to redesign the previous efforts
by previous administrations--not only Clinton--but Bush before
it, and so forth. Would you advise them how to redesign the
architecture of a missile defense system to meet the threat of
limited missile attack? Would you move out into space?
Throughout the long time that I've been on this committee, 23
years, I've dealt with this issue, and time and time again I've
put the question to people such as yourself: If there were no
constraints of the ABM Treaty, would you do something
differently? I've always believed that we could. If we had full
authority to devise an architecture, particularly to defend
against unlimited attack, we could utilize space, we could
utilize mobility, we could utilize other aspects of our
technology to move more swiftly with a greater likelihood of
success perhaps at less cost to the American people. My
question is simply, if there were not the constraints of the
treaty, would you be advising the President to do something
different today, not unlike the architecture that was laid out
here with the direction of the BMDO, Lt. Gen. Kadish, here in
the past week or two?
Mr. Coyle. I believe I understand, Senator Warner. I
understand the logic behind the layered defense. It does give
you three bites at the apple. If you miss the missile in the
boost phase, you have the mid-course and terminal phases left.
I also believe that the United States could have the technology
to do boost-phase defenses from ships, and under the ABM Treaty
that would be a mobile system and mobile systems are not
permitted.
The technology for boost-phase defenses from ships is much
farther ahead than the airborne laser or the space-based laser
in my view. The space-based laser is too heavy to even be
lifted into orbit by any boosters that the United States has
and the airborne laser has a very long way to go in development
also. But ship-based defenses for the boost phase, I think,
could become practicable. It may take a decade; it may be many
years away, but I think it could become practicable.
Senator Warner. But had we not had the ABM Treaty, we may
well have done the research, development, and testing on that
ability a decade ago and now be in a position where we could
consider the deployment of such systems. My question to you is
that there has been serious constraints by this treaty for
decades and as a consequence we've labored along within the
lawyers' framework of what we can and cannot do. I'm asking you
to put the treaty to one side. I'm not suggesting by this
question that you just trash it and shred it and tear it up--
phrases that have been used in this hearing, unfortunately--but
simply that it didn't exist. Or I might rephrase it: Suppose
there was the opportunity for this President to say I can go
and set up amendments to the ABM Treaty that would enable us to
do other things. Would you recommend that he do some other
things now prohibited by ABM Treaty within the framework of a
series of amendments?
Mr. Coyle. Not for the foreseeable future. If the Navy
wants to build higher velocity missiles for ships for boost-
phase defenses, that's something they can do at White Sands, as
they do now when they do standard missile tests. So, there's a
lot of work that can be done on new missiles for Navy boost-
phase defenses. If the Navy wants to build high-power X-band
radars for ships that work on the seas, that's something else
they can do, but that's not bumping up against the ABM Treaty
either. I'm not trying to say that there isn't any conceivable
thing that might ever occur that couldn't cause a problem with
the ABM Treaty. Obviously, mobile defenses themselves are a
problem with the ABM Treaty, but there is so much work that
needs to be done, whether you talk about ship-based defenses or
other defenses.
Senator Warner. I understand it's a lot of work, but
somebody has to start at some point in time to explore other
options, other architectures, than the one that we have
prodigiously followed for decades in the United States, in my
judgment. That's the initiative that this President is taking
and it raises legitimate debate as to whether or not those
architectures come up against the ABM Treaty. My question to
you is could we not devise a framework of amendments to the
treaty to accommodate the parameters of moving out into such
architectures that you and other experts indicate should be
explored if we're trying to pursue a defense against a limited
attack.
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. My answer would be, yes, I believe we
could devise such amendments and there is plenty of time to do
that.
Senator Warner. Now, to both of our other experts here. Mr.
Berger, I've followed very carefully in the years that you were
National Security Advisor to President Clinton the efforts to
negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty. The record is clear,
for whatever reason, you didn't succeed, but I think you made
an honest effort. I frankly think that the fact that our
President had finally pointed out that there is a withdrawal
clause and that he as President could at some point and time be
forced to utilize that clause unless we can work out amendments
to the treaty and/or a new framework might have been the tactic
that is beginning to bring President Putin, in my judgment,
around to an open discussion with the President on the
parameters of either amendments or a new framework.
I'll start with you, Mr. Perle, since you feel so strongly.
I think the option to not try and keep the ABM Treaty in
existence is not preferable. I still think a two-step process
is a wise one. I say that because, again, I have had the
responsibility either as chairman or ranking member to get a
bill through for the Armed Services Committee and that is a
mighty train to drive through the floor of the Senate, and the
appropriations likewise are difficult. I think it is extremely
important that we do get an authorization bill this year, that
it not be side-tracked by a continuing debate on this issue,
and that we do, as a Congress, support our President in his
initiatives with the funding and the authorization necessary
for him to explore a new architecture and at the same time
continue his negotiations with Russia. So, that's why I suggest
a two-step process. But it seems to me it's in President
Putin's interest to pursue that two-step process for the
following reason. I'm beginning to admire him even though,
incidentally, gentlemen, he has not yet met one single member
of Congress and that puzzles me. I was with the first
delegation that met Mr. Gorbachev led by Robert Byrd and the
second delegation to meet Mr. Yeltsin led by Robert Dole. But
anyway, Mr. Gephardt, who had considerable standing in this
Congress, was not able to meet President Putin a few weeks ago,
nor has anyone else. But in any event, I think he's an
interesting man and he is trying to do his best with a country
that is suffering economically and suffering in many other
ways. It would be devastating, not only from a military
standpoint but from an image standpoint, for the United States
to withdraw from a treaty to which he attaches so much
significance. I have to believe that our President, in pointing
that out has done it properly thus far and that gives
considerable leverage to these options whereby we can devise a
framework of changes to the treaty to enable us to pursue such
architecture as he and his advisors deem necessary. Do you
share that view, Mr. Perle?
Mr. Perle. Yes, I think on serious reflection, the treaty
does nothing to enhance President Putin's security and he would
be well-advised to work with us in getting it behind us because
it also puts the Cold War behind us.
Could I just add, Senator, the question you asked at the
end, of course, prompts the reflection that if the ABM Treaty
didn't exist today, would anyone propose that the United States
and Russia negotiate anything that looked like the ABM Treaty?
Of course, the answer is, nobody would propose that. So, we're
dealing with a legacy. We're dealing with an historical legacy.
Second, because we have spent a great deal of time in the
latter part of this hearing on the question of testing and
where the program is today and where it might go, we have tied
our hands from 1972 until the present.
People who might have had ideas about approaches to missile
defense that were outside the treaty were unable to do anything
effective with those ideas. Companies that might have had
scientists within them who had ideas knew that they couldn't
get funded to produce programs that would violate the ABM
Treaty. There was just an exchange with Senator Nelson about a
ship-based system. You can take a narrow legal perspective and
say, well, you could do research for years before you encounter
the limitations of the treaty but I don't believe anyone is
going to make a significant investment in a system that
violates the terms of the treaty until the treaty is clarified
one way or another. So, we're not going to build a sea-based
system until the treaty obstacle to a sea-based system has been
eliminated, and we are not going to look at the other new
architecture that you are talking about until the treaty issue
is resolved. It prevents us from applying our minds and our
talent, our scientific talent, from solving technical problems.
So, it isn't a question of how much can you do before you bump
up against the treaty. No one invests in a business that is
prohibited by regulation from operating and no one's going to
invest in new approaches to missile defense until the treaty is
clarified, and by clarified, I mean the obstacles within it are
removed. So, if we want to put our technical genius to work, we
have to deal with the treaty now and not pretend we can get
started now and only deal with the treaty when we bump up
against it, as we have heard today.
Senator Warner. Mr. Berger, I commend your efforts to try
and negotiate changes to the treaty. Let's talk about whether
or not it would be in Russia's interest, quite apart from ours
and their military considerations, to be faced with the fact
that the United States, an acknowledged superpower, would
withdraw from that instrument. It really relegates Russia to a
second-class status, which we do not wish to do. We do not wish
to embarrass that country and our President has said that many
times. They're not our enemy. We have a number of programs with
Russia today to help them in different ways, particularly with
the struggle to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. So, I think there is much at stake here, but you
never put on the table that we might have to withdraw. I think
this President has, and I think it's been to his benefit.
Mr. Berger. Senator, first all, I think we can't rule out
that possibility. I do think that it will, if we do it, as I
said several times here, preemptively walk into the room, and
say, sometime in the next several months, this is where we are
going to be.
Senator Warner. Yesterday Mr. Wolfowitz said in response to
questions from me that there would be consultations with
Congress.
Mr. Berger. As you've said to me many times Senator, there
are consultations and there are consultations when the shoe is
on the other foot. But I would say that we should be exploring
other technologies and I've made the argument to President
Putin, for example, that sea-based, boost-phase defense is
something that may be very much in their interest. In fact, he
has spoken favorably about boost-phase defense. So, I don't
believe that it is inconceivable at all that we could work out
a new arrangement. What I think would be very damaging in the
context of the end of the Cold War, as Mr. Perle has talked
about, is to say we're withdrawing. We're not going to tell you
what this new strategic framework is. We have no amendments on
the table. We've not put one on the table with respect to the
ABM Treaty. First, we want to withdraw, and then we'll sit down
and talk about what comes next. I don't think that's an
effective way to get a strategy framework, a new strategic
framework that President Bush seeks.
Senator Warner. I thank all the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, I really
don't believe that if we had to withdraw from this treaty we
would be relegating them to second-class status. I just don't
believe that. I think what we need to be doing is moving to a
higher period of relationship between the two countries. I
spent 2 weeks there in 1993 visiting with the Russian people
and they are wonderful, talented people. I think somehow we can
develop a new, positive relationship, not focusing on a relic
of the old Cold War. One of the things that I would want to
note here is in the ABM Treaty itself. Article 1 says each
party undertakes not to deploy an ABM system for defense of its
territory. Then, I think it is healthy that we begin to make
clear what it prohibited explicitly in it. In Article V it says
each party undertakes not to develop tests or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based. Now, Secretary Wolfowitz has
indicated that he believes, and it certainly makes sense to me,
that we need a layered, comprehensive system, one system of
defense against missile attack, that many of the component
parts could serve all of our system. Wouldn't you agree, Mr.
Coyle, that we would be constrained in developing that kind of
system under this treaty?
Mr. Coyle. Eventually, yes.
Senator Sessions. You say eventually. Let me ask about an
additional word in Article 5. Article 1 says we will not deploy
a system. Article 5 says we will not develop, test, or deploy a
sea-based, air-based, or mobile system. Doesn't that go
further? Doesn't that even, perhaps, prohibit research?
Mr. Coyle. No, it doesn't, sir. I certainly was not a
negotiator of the treaty, so I can't speak first-hand about
this but I've talked to people who were involved in the
negotiations first-hand. They point out that the ABM Treaty
permits both countries to have a missile defense system, not a
missile defense system of its entire territory but a missile
defense such as we deployed briefly in North Dakota and the
Russians around Moscow. It was understood under the
negotiations that both countries would--we have decided not to
keep the system that we deployed--but if both countries wanted
to keep that kind of a missile defense system, it was
understood that they would need to continue to develop and
improve and test that system. So testing a missile defense
system was expected to take place.
Senator Sessions. What about a sea-based, air-based, or
space-based system that seems to be pretty explicit. I'm sure
they argued over every word. Now, Mr. Perle, were you there or
do you have an opinion on that?
Mr. Perle. I do. I was very much involved in the hearings
that examined that treaty, and the simple answer is, we cannot
test a space-based, a sea-based, or a land mobile-based system,
period. We can't do it. Now, you can try to find ways around it
by testing components that do not in and of themselves
constitute elements of a system, and the question you have to
ask is whether a furtive approach of that kind can ever be made
to work and can ever be the basis on which we're prepared to
commit serious resources to a development program. I don't
think we can and don't think we should. I think it's very
misleading when Mr. Coyle says ``eventually,'' because you
don't start developing a system you know you cannot deploy
under the terms of the treaty. So eventually is today.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I don't want to impose on your time
but could I just say something? First of all, we have been
working on a system for the last 5 years. The land-based mid-
course system which is prohibited by the treaty and which would
require either amendment to the treaty or withdrawal from the
treaty and we've spent billions of dollars doing it. So, of
course, you can do that. Second of all----
Senator Session. Wait a minute. Let me get that straight.
You're saying that we are now in violation of the treaty?
Mr. Berger. No, I'm saying that we have been developing and
testing a land-based limited mid-course system consistent with
the treaty and that we can't deploy it unless there's a change
in the treaty or we withdraw. So, it defies the kind of
economic-business model that Mr. Perle was talking about.
Second of all, we can research the other technologies, and I
think again Mr. Coyle has said that there's a lot of work we
can do before we bump up against the treaty to give ourselves
time to go to the Russians and say, let's talk about a sea-
based system.
Senator Sessions. But the treaty says we can't develop.
Where it says develop, test, or deploy, presumably that is an
upward trend test. We know what test means. Develop it seems to
me to mean no serious research.
Mr. Berger. No, it does not, sir. The research is
specifically permitted on sea-based and on other systems. We
are doing research on sea-based systems and as I understand Mr.
Coyle, if I read his remarks, there's a lot more research we
need to do. If we went to the stage that we had to test, that
would require a modification of the treaty, but that's not
February or March.
Mr. Perle. I think there is a potential for some real
misunderstanding in these statements. It is true that the
previous administration did work on a system which, if deployed
in certain locations, would require an amendment to the treaty.
Mr. Berger. We assumed it would.
Mr. Perle. It was a land-based system and they essentially
made a bet. I don't think they were ever serious about this, to
be blunt. But if you give them the benefit of the doubt and
assume they were serious about it, if they had another 16 years
maybe they would have gotten around to deploying something, but
they assumed that they would be able to go to the Russians and
say, look, we're going to have 100 interceptors, which we're
entitled to have. Under the treaty, we could have those at
ground force. How about letting us have them someplace else.
That was the extent to which they ran into the treaty and I
believe they selected that program because there was such a
modest modification to the treaty that they assumed the
Russians would readily agree to that.
Mr. Berger. Excuse me, I'm sorry. We have gone 3 hours and
15 minutes without getting gratuitous. I guess that must be the
limit. We selected that system because BMDO and the Pentagon
said that that was the fastest, most affordable, most mature
system to get to a system that would be effective against the
threat we faced which was the rogue state threat, and I don't
think we should get into motivations, Mr. Perle.
Mr. Perle. Set the motivations aside. When you get to any
sort of ambitious system like a sea-based system, a space-based
system, or a mobile system, you cannot do what Sandy Berger
suggested could be done in the other case where the only change
to the treaty would have been permission to deploy 100
interceptors in one location rather than another location and
that was a trivial change in the whole program over many years
and not just this administration. It was true under the Bush
administration as well. The whole program of ballistic missile
defense has been conducted within the suffocating constraints
of the ABM Treaty, which as you rightly observe, begins by
saying neither side will protect its national territory. That
is the treaty we're talking about. That is the artifact of the
Cold War and we can talk all week about how to work around, how
to amend, how to revise, how to negotiate. At the end of the
day, you're talking about taking a treaty that prohibits
defense and revising it so that it permits defense. The
straightforward, honest approach is to say the treaty no longer
serves our security interests, and go on to negotiate something
entirely different with the Russians, which is a security
arrangement for the future.
Senator Sessions. I think that is precisely correct and I
think that is what Condoleezza Rice and the President have
concluded. I would just mention in Article 6, I read that as a
clear prohibition of theater missile defense if it any way
could be utilized to knock down incoming ballistic missiles. It
prohibits capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory and not to test these
missiles in the ABM mode. Then it goes on to say, in
subparagraph b, we commit not to deploy in the future radars
for early warning of strategic ballistic attack except at
locations along the periphery of our national territory. So,
wouldn't that complicate both our desire to integrate in a
layered approach theater missile defense and our radar systems
that might be necessary? Wouldn't we be running into the treaty
on those two issues also?
Mr. Berger. Senator, I'm sure Mr. Perle would have a
slightly different take on this but all of the theater missile
systems can proceed unencumbered. Our understanding with the
Russians----
Senator Sessions. But not in an ABM mode.
Mr. Berger. Not in an ABM mode. That is correct. We have an
understanding with the Russians. If they're tested against a
missile that is proceeding at more than 5 kilometers per second
or has a range of more than 3,500 kilometers, that's a
ballistic missile. That's the demarcation between theater
missile defense and ABM and I think all of our TMD programs are
proceeding unencumbered by the treaty. I think the one concern
I have about the new approach is whether we lose focus on
getting the TMD systems done, up, and ready as Mr. Coyle has
said, and getting to the end zone on a deployable system that
can deal with missile threats rather than running all over the
field trying to discover what is possible to do before focusing
on what we need to do.
Mr. Perle. Senator, could I comment on that? The reference
from Mr. Berger was to a proposed understanding with the
Russians on the line of demarcation between permitted and
prohibited test of systems that are in fact theater defense
systems. The administration proposed but has never submitted to
the Senate as an amendment to the treaty, a proposal that we
limit the speed of an interceptor, not to 5 kilometers, but to
3 kilometers. That unfortunately is too slow for an effective
theater defense. It was a terrible mistake to propose that, in
my view, but happily, it has no legal status and the new
administration is free to proceed in any way it wishes with
respect to this.
Let me tell you what the difference is between 3 kilometers
a second and 5 kilometers a second. At 3 kilometers a second, a
sea-based system, theater system, if we deployed it off the
coast of Italy, say in the vicinity of the waters of Rome,
could defend our forces in the field in central Italy. Roughly,
I think it's 70 or 80 kilometers either side of Rome, at 5
kilometers per second, that same system, other things being
equal, could defend most of western Europe. So, the last
administration, in an effort which I thought at the time was
unnecessary, in an effort to strengthen the ABM Treaty to which
it remained committed until it's last day in office, we all
understand that, in an effort to strengthen that treaty,
burdened our theater missile defense programs with technical
and physical restrictions that make it very difficult to
justify them. That's the simple truth, and one of the first
things we should do is say to the Russians, we no longer think
that 3 kilometers per second is an appropriate limitation and
therefore we intend to explore sea-based systems at
accelerations higher than that because that will give us the
potential for a serious defense that can be of significant use
to our troops in the field and to our allies.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Just for what
it's worth, Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, who was the previous head of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said the following
in response to a question from Senator Robb in 1998: Senator
Robb asked ``If you did not have an ABM Treaty, are there
things you be doing or could be doing less expensively now?''
Lt. Gen. Lyles said ``In all honesty, Senator Robb, there's
nothing that we would be doing differently. General Ralston has
said there is nothing today in the Antiballistic Missile Treaty
that is constraining what we are doing in our national defense
program or our theater missile defense program.'' Now, will we
at some point bump up against an ABM Treaty, a program, a
National Missile Defense Program? The answer is yes. As a
matter of fact, the one that was proposed by President Clinton
and if deployed would have bumped up against the treaty, put
money in there to develop it, and indeed again on the
deployment of it subject to those four conditions which Mr.
Berger has laid out for us today.
But what we're facing now is a very different question.
Everyone points out that the Cold War is over. It seems to me
that that is a given. The Cold War is over. We're grateful for
it. Now the question is how do we get from an old structure to
a new structure. What you're suggesting, Mr. Perle, we just
simply destroy the old structure. Just simply say it's over.
We're pulling out of the ABM Treaty which was the keystone to
the old structure. Just yank out that keystone, the arch
collapses, and now let's build a new arch. I don't think that's
any way to treat someone who takes a treaty as seriously as the
Russians take this treaty. I happen to fully agree with what
Senator Warner said when he said it would be devastating for us
to withdraw from a treaty to which President Putin places such
great importance. That is not something we should do very
readily. We should be exhausting, it seems to me, the
possibilities of negotiating a new structure before we reach
that conclusion. Does that mean we'll never reach that
conclusion? No. We could reach that conclusion, but if you're
serious about the Cold War being over and if you're serious
about really renegotiating with Russia, you don't put a
deadline of months on those negotiations and say then we're
pulling out of a treaty which has been so important if we don't
succeed within that period of months. Now, what gets me is that
we've taken that position for a relatively small gain. In terms
of testing, I think what Mr. Coyle has told us is that the
testing advantages of what is being proposed for Fort Greely,
first of all, could be achieved as I understand what he said at
Kodiak, is that correct?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Number 2, those testing advantages wherever
they take place are marginal gains, what you could do with one
silo are small testing gains in terms of the whole scheme of
things. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Coyle?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. All right, so that if there's an advantage
to negotiating a new structure, and it seems to me there surely
is if we're serious that the Cold War is over and that we no
longer treat Russia as an adversary. If we're really serious
about that and really want to understand why is it that they
would like a new structure in place before the old one is
destroyed, why is that important to them? If we really want to
negotiate something new with them, then we don't put down the
ultimatum of months, particularly when the advantage from a
testing perspective can be gained somewhere else.
Now, with respect to Kodiak. Assuming you want the
advantages, which are very costly but nonetheless, if you want
those testing advantages, you can do them somewhere else and
you can do them without bumping up against the ABM Treaty or
conflicting with the ABM Treaty the way it was phrased last
Wednesday. You can do it without conflicting with the ABM
Treaty. What conflicts with the ABM Treaty, and I want to be
real clear on this, Mr. Coyle, is not what they are proposing
in terms of test. As I understand it, if they declare that as
part of a test bed, that does not conflict with the ABM Treaty
whether it's in Fort Greeley or whether it's at Kodiak. Is that
correct?
Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. What is the problem and what does bump up
against the ABM Treaty, isn't that robust additional testing?
But if they declare or if it is their intent that that
development be in addition to a test site a rudimentary
operational capability, that is where the conflict comes in. So
I want to ask Mr. Coyle this question about that rudimentary
operational capability. I want you to judge for us the
operational capability of that system, that test bed at Fort
Greeley. Would you expect it to be effective in shooting down
an operational long-range missile?
Mr. Coyle. If it only had five interceptors and if it
didn't have the capability to deal with decoys and
countermeasures which so far we haven't demonstrated any
capability to handle, it would not be effective.
Chairman Levin. Then it seems to me that we all have to
weigh whether or not it is advantageous to enter into a new
relationship with Russia, to try to negotiate that new
relationship. But whether or not in order to get an operational
capability at Fort Greely, which we've just heard is described
because it doesn't have those capabilities that Mr. Coyle
described, which would be ineffective. In the rush to gain an
ineffective capability, we constrain ourselves to months of
negotiations with a country for whom this treaty is a very
serious matter, has been a keystone in that arch, that
structure. As a matter of fact, it has been for us too as well.
Secretary Baker even said that, by the way, after the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
So, we have a treaty which has been a keystone in an arch
of a security arrangement, the removal of which would cause
great problems for someone who is no longer an enemy, doing
that for no testing advantage because we can declare that as a
test site and do all the testing we want, assuming it's worth
the money. We can do all the testing we want there to gain an
ineffective rudimentary operational capability, whether or not
doing that makes us more or less secure. That's what it comes
down to. It's a very significant issue that everyone's
grappling with. People reach different conclusions on it, but
we all start with the same goal, I hope, and that is to make
America more secure by that kind of an action. That's the only
question. Are we more or less secure? Would our doing that
unilaterally, would saying we're pulling out of this treaty, it
no longer serves a purpose in our mind, goodbye, sayonara to
that kind of a security arrangement. If we do that
unilaterally, will we be precipitating a reaction in Russia and
China, particularly which maybe from your perspective, Mr.
Perle, isn't the way they should react. You can't understand
why they would react that way. But if they in fact would react
that way because they feel less secure by our unilateral action
and because of the response that they would take to make
themselves secure even though Richard Perle doesn't understand
it, whether or not that reaction will leave us and the world
less secure. It is a major issue.
I would hope that the President would consult not just with
our allies and with the Russians and with Congress but with the
best minds that he can find of all different persuasions on
this issue before he makes this judgment because it is a
judgment which would have huge implications for the future. We
all agree that North Korea is trying to achieve a capability
that we do not want them to have. We would like to have a
defense against it, if we could do it without creating a
greater threat to ourselves. At least, I'll say that that's
where I'm at. I'd love to have a defense against a North Korean
missile if I could have it operationally effective and take
away whatever leverage that it gets them. But I don't, in that
process, want to create a greater danger to ourselves, and we
have to weigh all those dangers. That's the broader picture
which Mr. Berger talked about as he opened up this discussion
today.
It's been a long morning for all of you and I would like to
ask Mr. Coyle, for the record, to do the following. I don't
know that we went into great detail on those three pages which
Secretary Wolfowitz gave to us. I gather you did not see those
until today. Is that correct?
Mr. Coyle. In exactly the form they're in, no. But I had
read about them in other ways.
Chairman Levin. I would like you to take a look at them in
the exact form in which we received them and made them part of
the record, and to then analyze for us how they might bump
against or conflict with the ABM Treaty, in your judgment. I
would offer to each of our other witnesses an opportunity to
comment on the same question if you wish and with that we will
bring this hearing to a close.
[The information referred to follows:]

Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson

1. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, in his testimony, Philip Coyle
said that a missile defense system is a matter of cost and workability.
Isn't he right?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

2. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, Secretary Rumsfeld said missile
defense is a ``scarecrow'' which would serve as a deterrent to
potential aggressors. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has said missile
defense is not a scarecrow. Who is right?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

3. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, how workable does a missile
defense system have to be to be an effective deterrent?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

4. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, how would you advise the
Secretary and President to prioritize their financial resources in
terms of the potential threat of a rogue states launching a missile at
the U.S. and our allies versus the threat of weapons of mass
destruction?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

5. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, shouldn't we continue to pursue
development of a national missile defense system first before pushing
toward deployment of a system still being tested? If the threat level
increased, I have no doubt that we would be able to speed up our
development phase as was the case during the Gulf War with the Patriot
system.
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

6. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, at what point would you recommend
we move to deployment of a land-based missile defense system?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

7. Senator Collins. Mr. Berger, during your tenure as National
Security Advisor, the Clinton administration engaged in discussions
with Russia on revising the ABM Treaty to permit the United States to
deploy a national missile defense system. President Bush has said that
he would also like to reach an agreement with Russia that would pave
the way for deployment of a system to defend the United States against
missile attack. I assume you support President Bush's efforts to reach
such an accommodation with Russia, is that correct?
Mr. Berger. I support a mutual agreement to amend the ABM Treaty in
ways that would enable us to pursue a limited national missile defense.

8. Senator Collins. Mr. Perle, we have heard many opponents of
missile defense warn that if the United States withdraws from the ABM
Treaty to deploy a missile defense system, the Russians and Chinese
might build up their nuclear forces and an arms race would ensue. Then
the Russians and Chinese dutifully threaten just such an outcome, and
those same critics point to those threats as confirmation of their
theory. It becomes sort of an echo chamber in which the threats are
bounced back and forth between the Russians and domestic opponents of
missile defense. How seriously should we take such threats, or are
these discussions simply rhetoric to slow down the progress the United
States makes on developing a robust, layered missile defense system?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

9. Senator Collins. Mr. Perle, would it not be in the interest of
Russia and China to make these threats knowing that missile defense
critics will themselves dutifully echo them in their efforts to prevent
deployment of a robust, layered missile defense system?
[The information was not provided in time for printing of this
hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

[Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.]