    [Senate Hearing 107-355]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1416

    AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
       OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
    DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
      STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                                UNIFIED COMMANDS
                       MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT
                       SERVICE SECRETARIES/SERVICE CHIEFS
                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

                                   ----------

                MARCH 22, 27; JUNE 28; JULY 10, 12, 17, 19, 2001

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                  2002--Part 1

     UNIFIED COMMANDS  b   MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT  b   SERVICE
           SECRETARIES/SERVICE CHIEFS  b   BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

                                                     S. Hrg. 107-355, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1416

    AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
       OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
    DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
      STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                                UNIFIED COMMANDS
                       MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT
                       SERVICE SECRETARIES/SERVICE CHIEFS
                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

                                   __________

                MARCH 22, 27; JUNE 28; JULY 10, 12, 17, 19, 2001

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    STROM THURMOND, South Carolina       CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    BOB SMITH, New Hampshire             ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania          MAX CLELAND, Georgia
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               BILL NELSON, Florida
    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    JIM BUNNING, Kentucky                JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
                                         MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

                          Les Brownlee, Staff Director

                David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN WARNER, Virginia
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico            JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

                         David S. Lyles, Staff Director

                    Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
         Unified Commanders on Their Military Strategy and Operational
                                  Requirements
                                 march 22, 2001

                                                                       Page

    Ralston, Gen. Joseph W., USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. European
      Command, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe......................     4
    Franks, Gen. Tommy R., USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central
      Command........................................................    32

        Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and
                            Operational Requirements
                                 march 27, 2001

    Blair, Adm. Dennis C., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
      Pacific Command................................................    78
    Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Commander in Chief, United States
      Southern Command...............................................    98
    Schwartz, Gen. Thomas A., USA, Commander, United States Forces
      Korea; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined
      Forces Command.................................................   107

                       Military Posture/Budget Amendment
                                 june 28, 2001

    Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense; Accompanied by
      Dr. Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)...   179
    Shelton, Gen. Henry H., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
      Staff..........................................................   189

                Secretaries and Chiefs of the Military Services
                                 july 10, 2001

    White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army.....................   261
    Shinseki, Gen. Eric K., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army..   270
    England, Hon. Gordon R., Secretary of the Navy...................   271
    Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............   274
    Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps..   282
    Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force.................   293
    Ryan, Gen. Michael E., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
      Force..........................................................   322

                Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
                                 july 12, 2001

    Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense.............   436
    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile
      Defense Organization...........................................   449

                Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
                                 july 17, 2001

    Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense.............   586
    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile
      Defense Organization...........................................   586

                Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs
                                 july 19, 2001

    Berger, Hon. Samuel R., Chairman, Stonebridge International,
      Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs   686
    Coyle, Hon. Philip E., Senior Adviser, Center for Defense
      Information, Former Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
      Department of Defense..........................................   692
    Perle, Hon. Richard N., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
      Institute, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Policy..................................   703

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

         UNIFIED COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL
                                  REQUIREMENTS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:49 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, Smith, Inhofe,
    Levin, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Carnahan.
        Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
    director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; and Scott W.
    Stucky, general counsel.
        Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell,
    Charles W. Alsup, John R. Barnes, Edward H. Edens IV, Gary M.
    Hall, George W. Lauffer, Thomas L. MacKenzie, Joseph T. Sixeas,
    Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
        Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director for the minority; Richard D. DeBobes, minority
    counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Richard
    W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene,
    professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel;
    and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Shekinah Z.
    Hill, and Suzanne K.L. Ross.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul
    and Dan Twining, assistants to Senator McCain; George M.
    Bernier, III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
    McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
    Senator Collins; David S. Young, assistant to Senator Bunning;
    Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.)
    Wright and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M.
    Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Sheila Murphy and Eric Pierce, assistants
    to Senator Ben Nelson; and Larry Smar, assistant to Senator
    Carnahan.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. The hearing will come to order. As you are
    well aware, we are having a vote in the Senate, and as a
    consequence many of our colleagues are in transit from the
    Senate floor back to the committee.
        The committee meets this morning for the first of a series
    of hearings on the status and requirements of our regional
    commands. Today we have two of our most distinguished regional
    commanders, Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, Commander in Chief,
    U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;
    and Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central
    Command.
        Clearly, you individually and those in your commands are on
    the very forefront of the risks that our men and women of the
    Armed Forces take the world over, but particularly in your two
    areas. You represent the finest troops that this country has
    ever produced, and they are not only carrying out faithfully
    the orders of the Commander in Chief, but doing so in keeping
    with the finest traditions of our U.S. military.
        We rely on your unique perspectives as we here in Congress
    strive to fulfill our constitutional responsibilities as a co-
    equal branch of Government in providing for those troops and
    their families.
        As we meet this morning, the largest contingency operations
    the U.S. military is engaged in around the world are in the
    Central Command and the European Command. Over 20,000 U.S.
    troops are stationed in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey and,
    indeed, the waters surrounding them, to enforce the no-fly
    zones over Northern and Southern Iraq and to help provide for
    the defense of Kuwait.
        In Bosnia, we have entered our fifth year of peacekeeping
    duties with over 5,000 U.S. troops participating in NATO's
    Stability Force (SFOR) operation, 4,600 of whom are in the
    Bosnia region. I know there are plans to somewhat reduce those
    forces in keeping with the objectives of the President. I
    support the President in this, and we look forward to your
    comments. I think we are doing it in a very orderly way, in
    consultation with our allies, and in no way in derogation of
    our commitment as a full partner to NATO in this and all other
    responsibilities that we collectively face with that historic
    treaty organization.
        In Kosovo, almost 6,000 U.S. troops participate in NATO's
    Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation, 5,500 of whom are in-country.
    With the rising tension in neighboring Macedonia, I am
    increasingly concerned, as we all are, about the safety of our
    troops in the Balkans, particularly those stationed in Kosovo
    and near Macedonia. If we are not careful, those troops and
    other NATO troops could be drawn into the conflict more than
    they are today. We will hear from you, General Ralston, on this
    developing situation.
        This past year has also seen its share of tragedy,
    particularly in the Central Command's area of operation. The
    devastating terrorist attack of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of
    Aden on October 12 last year, and the training accident in
    Kuwait just a week or so ago, brings home to all Americans the
    very real dangers our men and women in uniform face every day.
    There are enormous risks in carrying out their missions in the
    cause of freedom.
        The U.S.S. Cole tragedy also highlighted the growing
    terrorist threat facing our Nation and our military forward-
    deployed units, and the need for additional force protection
    measures to protect our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
    General Franks, we look to you to provide the committee with an
    update of the steps you have taken since the U.S.S. Cole
    attack, and the views that you have for the future as to that
    force protection enhancement within your area of
    responsibility. We would also like you to reexamine the
    engagement policy which led our forces into that region, and
    the necessity to continue that engagement policy, but I presume
    under somewhat different conditions. We welcome your testimony.
        Before we begin, I would like to enter into the record at
    this time statements by Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Jim
    Bunning.
        [The prepared statements of Senator Thurmond and Senator
    Bunning follow:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Ralston and General Franks, I want to join the Chairman and
    the members of this committee in welcoming you.
        Mr. Chairman, General Ralston and General Franks represent regions
    of the world in which the United States has a vital interest and has
    expended huge resources to secure peace and stability. Yet, more than
    10 years after the end of the Cold War and the devastation in the
    desert of Iraq, our forces are deployed on commitments that appear to
    have no ending in the very same regions. In hindsight, we should have
    taken a different approach to the situations in the Balkans and Iraq. I
    hope that both our witnesses will focus on the future and on how we can
    end the cycle of violence in these regions. More importantly, I hope
    they will give us their perspective on how we can minimize the impact
    of the commitments in Kosovo and Southwest Asia on our troops and the
    readiness of our Armed Forces.
        Mr. Chairman, I am also very interested in the quality of life of
    our forces stationed in Europe and those deployed to the Persian Gulf
    region. In particular, after the U.S.S. Cole incident, I would like to
    hear the witnesses' views on force protection and the terrorist threat
    facing our military personnel.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony and again want to
    thank General Ralston and General Franks and the soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines they represent for their dedication and
    professionalism.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                                     ______

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Jim Bunning

        General Ralston and General Franks, thank you for coming before
    this committee today. We appreciate your service to this country.
        Like my other colleagues, I applaud our men and women in uniform.
    They are indeed the best in the world. However, I have concerns about
    our military being stretched too thin and stressed, and participating
    in areas of the world where I believe we may have no national security
    interest. I fear that this is affecting our military's readiness and
    operations, as well as the safety and morale of our troops.
        I've expressed my frustration before about our military's chain of
    command system. It is tough to get the truth and expertise that we need
    on these issues because of the chain of command.
        We know the President is the Commander in Chief. Whatever his
    policy is, you have to salute and come over here and do it. I
    understand that. But it makes it very frustrating for us because we
    need to hear your expertise. Because you are the experts and the ones
    directly involved in these operations.
        This committee is trying to work with you to be helpful. If we
    don't get candid answers from you all, then we simply can't do our
    jobs. Therefore, you can't do your job the way you'd like to do it, and
    neither can our troops.
        So we would appreciate candor. We don't want your candor as soon as
    you retire and put on a suit. I'm always amazed how those who retire
    from the military, as soon as they put on a suit, say, ``Now let me
    tell you how it really is.''

        Chairman Warner. Now, Senator Levin will be forthcoming. I
    think in the need of time we have to get underway. Do you all
    have a preference as to who would like to proceed?
        General Franks. I will defer to General Ralston.
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        General Ralston.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
        U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

        General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
    opportunity to appear before the committee today, along with my
    colleague, General Franks. I would like to submit my statement
    for the record----
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        General Ralston.--and then spend a few moments here on oral
    testimony, if I may.
        I would draw your attention to the poster board that we
    have over here and just--I know you know this, Mr. Chairman,
    but for some of our other people that are watching here,
    sometimes I feel that the U.S. European Command Area of
    Responsibility (EUCOM AOR) may be misnamed, because it includes
    a lot more than Europe. It stretches, as you see, from the
    northern part of Norway to the end of South Africa. It includes
    the Middle East countries of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. It
    includes all of Africa that you see there in green on that map.

        Mr. Chairman, that encompasses 91 countries, and we have a
    little over 100,000 troops that are forward-based in the EUCOM
    theater to engage with these 91 countries.
        Now, I might add that that is 8 percent of our uniformed
    Active Duty military. I do not believe that is too big of a
    price to pay for engagement with those 91 countries.
        I would also add that those troops, being forward-based in
    Europe, as you can see on the map, are that much closer to
    General Franks' AOR should he need help there for redeployment.
        I have some operations that I would like to talk about that
    are ongoing within the EUCOM AOR, and I would like to start
    with Operation Northern Watch, and if I could talk for a few
    minutes about this, and then, Mr. Chairman, as I understand
    later on perhaps we could have an opportunity go into closed
    session where we could talk about this in more detail.
        Chairman Warner. You are correct. We can do that in 222
    Russell.
        General Ralston. First of all, as you can see, in Operation
    Northern Watch I support General Franks in his operation
    overall in Iraq, and what I am talking about here is just the
    northern part of that, which is the no-fly zone north of the
    36th parallel.

        I thought it might be useful to show a typical mission. We
    take off out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. You fly to the
    east for about an hour. You form up where those little circles
    are in different orbits, with a rather large force, about 40-
    some airplanes. There are tankers, there are Airborne Warning
    and Control System (AWACS), there are F-15s, F-16s, EA-6Bs for
    defense suppression, there are reconnaissance airplanes, there
    are U.K. aircraft, there are Turkish aircraft that are involved
    in this. We then go into northern Iraq. A typical mission may
    be 3 hours long, and then another hour back home.
        Now, this is all done in support of our national policy,
    and what I am about to say is in no way intended to say that we
    have it wrong, or that we cannot support it, but I also want to
    get the facts on the record.
        Let me give you an example of last year. In 2000 we flew in
    the north about 7,500 sorties. Now, this is not without risk,
    Mr. Chairman. I know you know that, but over 250 times last
    year our people were fired at that we know of.
        We responded over 60 times. That is more than once a week,
    and I might add that we are flying a lot of single-engine
    aircraft over northern Iraq. We have been doing that for a long
    time, and if the law of averages caught up with us, we should
    have had engine failure by now.
        We willingly accept that risk, but I just want to point out
    to the committee that it is not a risk-free operation that our
    men and women are carrying out in Operation Northern Watch.
        Next I would like to talk about Bosnia for a moment. We
    have had an operation ongoing, a NATO operation in Bosnia.
    Sometimes people do not realize the progress that has been
    made. In 1996, when we went into Bosnia, as you see on the blue
    bar on that chart we had 60,000 forces that went into Bosnia.
    Those forces depicted in red are the U.S. forces. That was
    20,000. We were 33 percent of the force in 1996.

        Based on the improved conditions on the ground, and in
    consultation with our NATO allies, we were able to draw that
    force down, and as you notice today, we are just right at
    20,000. The U.S. has just a tad over 4,000. We are about 20
    percent of the force. I got approval from NATO, supported by
    the administration, just in the last couple of weeks, to make a
    further reduction in those forces. I think here in a few months
    we will be down to probably 3,500 Americans. We will be about
    18 percent of the force.
        So I think that chart dramatically shows the progress that
    we are making in terms of not only the conditions on the ground
    that allowed that, but in the drawdown of the forces.
        Let me talk for a moment about Kosovo.
        Chairman Warner. Before you leave that subject, is it your
    professional judgment that that force level, be it ours or the
    combined force levels, is still essential to reach the goals
    that the United Nations and ourselves and our allies have set?
    That is where we fall into problems here. We put our troops
    somewhere, and then we are distracted, or go look at other
    situations. That situation in Bosnia has quieted down, it is
    not on the front pages. Who is looking to determine whether
    that level, indeed, is still necessary?
        General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, every 6 months we do a
    review, in conjunction with our allies in NATO, and you are
    correct. It is my judgment that--well, first of all, the
    situation on the ground has improved dramatically since 1995.
        Chairman Warner. Basically no conflict.
        General Ralston. The reason that there is no conflict there
    today is because we have had those forces there. I do not want
    to keep forces there any longer than necessary, but at the same
    time, we need to keep forces there in order to keep that safe
    and secure environment.
        Now, on a military aspect we have made enormous progress.
    In fairness, I must also tell you that economically,
    politically, we still have a ways to go, and we need to
    continue to keep that pressure on, but I would not recommend
    back to NATO, nor to the administration, nor to the Congress of
    the United States, that we do something that I do not believe
    is militarily sound. I fully support this force level, this
    reduction. We will continue to look for ways to bring that
    down, to ease the burden, but at the same time, we have a
    mission to carry out, and I want to make sure that we can do
    that.
        Chairman Warner. What you are saying is that ethnic
    tensions that gave rise to that conflict are still there with
    such force and effect that if you pulled out the troops there
    would be a war tomorrow.
        General Ralston. Well, it is my professional judgment that
    if we precipitously pulled out the troops right now, that
    conflict would start again. Whether it is tomorrow or next
    week, people can debate.
        With regard to Kosovo, let me show you a similar chart
    here. In 1999, when our forces went into Kosovo, we had about
    47,000 troops from 39 nations, by the way. Sometimes people
    erroneously think that the United States is pulling the bulk of
    this effort, but you can see there, 39 nations went together
    with 47,000 troops. We had about 7,000 Americans.

        Today, overall we have about 42,000 troops in the Kosovo
    force. About 37,000 of those are in Kosovo itself, and another
    approximately 5,000 are in Macedonia. The U.S. contribution is
    about 5,500 people inside of Kosovo, and that varies between 13
    and 14 percent of the force, so my message here is, this is not
    a U.S. operation. The U.S. troops are represented in the red
    that is on there, and the other nations, the other 38 nations
    are carrying the bulk of the operation that is there.
        Next, please. There has been a lot of interest in the press
    in the past few days on Macedonia. Let me talk about that, if I
    might for a moment, in open session here, and perhaps we can go
    into more detail in the closed session. Let me have the big map
    first. This is Kosovo right here.

        Chairman Warner. The problem with that is that this is
    being transcribed for use by many others.
        General Ralston. Let me talk to colors. The country in
    orange is Macedonia, that is what we are talking about.
        Now, if you would come down to the southeast there, in
    Greece, at the top of that border, you will see Thessaloniki.
    Point out Thessaloniki, right there. That is where all of our
    supplies going into Kosovo come into that port. They then go
    overland, up through the orange country of Macedonia, into
    Kosovo, which is right at that point, right there.
        Now, as I said before, we have about 5,000 of the KFOR
    forces, mostly supply troops, mostly logistics troops that are
    in Macedonia. One of the things that is of concern when we have
    the instability there is our supply route, so I have
    recommended to NATO, and NATO is looking at alternate ways of
    making sure that we can supply our forces that are in Kosovo.
        One way to do that is through Albania. Another way is
    through Montenegro. Another way is through southern Serbia, as
    our relationships with Belgrade have improved, and we are doing
    the prudent planning now that would allow us to have
    alternative supply routes.
        The problem in Macedonia itself--let me go to the next
    chart. On this same map, you see where Kosovo is there, and
    notice the area in blue that goes into southern Serbia and down
    into Macedonia. Those areas in blue are those areas in Serbia
    and in Macedonia where there is a majority Albanian population.
    Even in Serbia, that area in blue, they have greater than 50
    percent Albanian population there. In Macedonia itself you have
    about a 65-35 split. About 65 percent of the population is
    Slavik, about 35 percent is Albanian.

        The Government of Macedonia is a democratically elected
    Government, and it is a coalition Government, including members
    of the Albanian population. We have encouraged the Macedonian
    Government to give political access and economic opportunity to
    the minority Albanian citizens that are there.
        The extremists that you hear about in the paper, right now
    I believe this is not something to be alarmed about. It is
    something always of concern when you have potential violence,
    but we believe that there are approximately 100 extremist
    Albanians that are involved in the hostilities.
        My advice to NATO has been that we need to condemn
    extremism wherever it comes from, and in this particular case
    from the Albanian extremists. We need to encourage the
    Macedonian Government to give political access to all their
    citizens, and I do believe that we can bilaterally, the nations
    can help the Government of Macedonia. They can help them
    diplomatically, politically, economically, and we in NATO and
    in the Kosovo force need to do our part inside Kosovo to make
    sure that there are not armed extremists coming from Kosovo
    into Macedonia. We can talk more about that in detail in the
    closed session.
        Chairman Warner. The Secretary-General said he needed 1,400
    additional troops. Now, could you speak to your military
    judgment as to that request, and most specifically, how it
    would affect the U.S. and our U.S. response? As a participant
    we wish to bear our share of the burdens and the risks in this
    operation.
        General Ralston. Yes, sir. Unfortunately, if I could say
    this, when the Secretary-General made his comments it was in a
    news conference that was associated with Macedonia. In fact,
    the two battalions that we asked for several weeks ago are to
    replace some Portuguese troops that are leaving. They have not
    left yet, but two companies to do that, and for some of the
    activities there.
        Now, some of the nations have come forward and said that
    they will provide additional troops to back-fill. My judgment
    right now is, we do not need additional American forces. I
    think we are carrying our proper share of that at this time,
    and I think we are going to be OK.
        Now, what we have done, we have taken forces out of that
    37,000 that are in Kosovo, and we have moved more forces down
    to the border to do a more effective job of patrolling the
    border.
        Mr. Chairman, I would also like to point out that this is
    an enormously difficult border to police. It is very
    mountainous terrain. It is wooded. There are trails that have
    gone back and forth across for centuries. The people there do
    not know there is a border there. I mean, they have brothers
    and sisters and uncles and aunts that live on either side of
    that. They have traded back and forth for centuries, and so it
    is enormously difficult to seal that border. I think that would
    be a mistake for us to set that as the goal, or the mission.
        Now, we can do, I think, a good job of making sure that
    there are not armed extremists that are going back and forth,
    and that is what we should be concentrating on from a NATO
    perspective on our side of the border.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to spend a moment talking about
    Africa. We have significant problems in Africa in terms of
    economic, political, humanitarian issues. We are working with
    many of the countries in Africa to address this. We have just
    recently trained two battalions of the Nigerian Army for their
    further employment in Sierra Leone. We are about to undertake
    training a Ghana battalion in Ghana, and a Senegalese battalion
    in Senegal, and then the plan is to go back and train some
    additional Nigerian battalions.
        This is, I think, a proper role for us to try to help the
    African nations deal with the problems that they have there. I
    do not want anyone on the committee to be surprised if you hear
    that we have American soldiers in Ghana, or Senegal, or
    Nigeria. What they are there doing are training the local
    battalions for their employment in support of the United
    Nations in Sierra Leone.
        Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, there are two issues that I
    have worked hard with the Pentagon in terms of resources for
    the EUCOM area, and only two issues. I had two major budget
    issues that I worked with them, and that was for real property
    maintenance and for military construction in the European
    theater.
        Mr. Chairman, I know you know this, but 10 years ago we had
    about 360,000 troops in Europe, and we drew them down to just a
    little over 100,000. Now, it was a proper decision back in 1991
    to not spend money on military construction and real property
    maintenance until we knew what we were going to keep in Europe.
        Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, we went for the better part of
    a decade without any military construction or real property
    maintenance, and as a result, the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines that are living and working in EUCOM are in
    facilities that I am not very proud of. Here are some pictures,
    for example, of barracks problems that we have in EUCOM. Next
    slide, please.

        Military family housing is a problem. Let me outline the
    standards that we have for our military housing, and I believe
    the American people would understand this. If you have a family
    that is big enough that entitles you to a three-bedroom
    apartment, we believe that you ought to have two bathrooms for
    that apartment. We believe you ought to have a stove and a
    refrigerator in the kitchen, and we believe you ought to have a
    washer and a dryer in that apartment.

        Many of these are three-story walkup apartments. We have
    young mothers that have two or three young children. For her to
    wash the clothes she has to go down three or four flights of
    stairs to the basement. What does she do with the young
    children while she is doing that? She has to carry them along
    with the laundry downstairs to do that.
        I do not believe that is asking too much for these
    standards, and I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, even with these
    very modest standards, 69 percent of our Army families in
    Europe are living in conditions that do not meet those
    standards of a washer and a dryer, a stove and a refrigerator,
    and two bathrooms.
        Mr. Chairman, when I worked this with the Pentagon, I
    briefed the Joint Chiefs, I briefed the Defense Resources
    Board, I talked to the Secretary of Defense, and I believe that
    I have a sympathetic ear. I do not know what will be in the
    budget when it comes over. I have not seen that, but if it
    comes over the way that I hope that it does, I would encourage
    the support of the committee.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today.
        [The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, it is my
    privilege to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United States
    European Command (USEUCOM), to discuss the posture of U.S. Forces.
    First, however, I want to make a few comments about the area in
    question.
        The U.S. European Command encompasses American military activities
    in over 13 million square miles of the globe and includes 91 sovereign
    nations. It stretches from the northern tip of Norway to South Africa,
    and from the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and Africa, to parts of the
    Middle East and out beyond the Black Sea.
        I began my tenure in the U.S. European Command last May. Since my
    arrival, our men and women have continued to carry out a multitude of
    operational commitments throughout Europe, Africa, the Levant, the
    waters of the Mediterranean, the skies over Iraq, and throughout the
    Balkans in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
    commitments to our regional friends and allies, and our national
    interests. Additionally, there are new opportunities in this theater--
    opportunities that properly approached will further strengthen the
    international position of the United States. These opportunities
    include working with African allies to improve their peacekeeping
    capabilities, engagement with Russia and the countries of the Caucasus
    region, U.S. influence on the evolving European defense posture and the
    future of NATO, and the enhancement of important and vital interests to
    the economic and national security of the United States. Our forward
    presence in Europe, engagement programs in Africa and Eastern Europe,
    and the ability to deploy and respond quickly and effectively
    throughout the region contributes to the preservation of stability
    throughout much of the area of responsibility (AOR).
        While success should be acknowledged, we must exercise continued
    vigilance by pursuing modernization to meet ongoing requirements, as
    well as develop future forces to take advantage of key strategic
    opportunities as they arise. Inadequate funding for, and attention to,
    critical readiness and modernization issues will jeopardize the careful
    balance between USEUCOM's missions and available resources. Like
    operation and maintenance (O&M) dollars, modernization funding must
    also be balanced to ensure resources remain proportionate to mission
    requirements. American military personnel positioned overseas and going
    about the business of the Nation every day have proven time and again
    that they are our greatest national resource. Like every national
    asset, they require care and cultivation to ensure they maintain the
    capability edge over any potential adversary. Addressing critical
    quality of life, military construction (MILCON), real property
    maintenance (RPM), and modernization needs is central toward
    maintaining this edge.
        During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many
    programs. I should note, however, that the programs I will discuss, and
    their associated funding levels may change as a result of the
    Secretary's strategy review that will guide future decisions on
    military spending. The administration will determine final 2002 and
    out-year funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask that
    you consider my comments in that light.

          A CHANGING AND CHALLENGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--READINESS

        Readiness of USEUCOM assigned forces is my top priority. It is the
    cornerstone of our ability to respond to crises and it enhances our
    strategy of engagement. Most of our activities relate to readiness
    because they demonstrate and enhance our capability to deter potential
    adversaries, while reassuring our friends. Such activities require
    ready forces and exercise our ability to meet commitments and promote
    joint and multinational interoperability. Taken together these
    activities can serve to help shape the international environment by
    incorporating other nations and improving our multinational expertise
    in the region; they improve our ability to respond unilaterally or in
    concert with other nations; and they prepare us now for the uncertain
    regional requirements of the future.
        Thanks to the support of Congress, forces assigned to this theater
    are ready and well supported in their current operations. The command's
    forces are fully engaged and continue to rely upon augmentation and
    Reserve Forces to carry out our many diverse missions. Dedicated young
    men and women valiantly executing a wide variety of operations to
    support our national strategy make up the heart of our theater
    readiness. Over the last year, we demonstrated our readiness by
    supporting air operations over Northern Iraq, NATO-led peacekeeping
    operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian relief operations in
    Mozambique, and training of Sub-Saharan African troops to support
    United Nations (UN) operations in Sierra Leone.

                                 JOINT TRAINING

        Training is a primary pillar of readiness and an inherent
    responsibility of being in command. For USEUCOM, readiness training has
    increasingly become part of our Theater Engagement Plan. However, over
    the past 2 years efforts to cope with rapidly shrinking training and
    training-dependent budgets, such as strategic lift, have resulted in
    several cancelled and restructured exercises. These cancellations have
    frustrated our efforts to provide high-quality readiness training to
    meet theater engagement needs.
        Our challenge is to support a proper mix of readiness and theater
    engagement training within resource constraints. The U.S. European
    Command has met its congressional mandates for Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercise-related operations and personnel tempo
    (OPTEMPO-PERSTEMPO) reductions. Additionally, strategic lift funding
    cuts during this fiscal year may force cancellation of continental U.S.
    (CONUS)-based participation by active, Reserve, and National Guard
    forces in various training and engagement exercises. In a worst case
    scenario, these cuts may also reduce training and engagement in Israel
    and Nigeria, and result in cancellation of half of the Joint Combined
    Exchange Training (JCET) activities in Africa.
        After taking a hard look at our training program for potential
    improvements in quality, effectiveness, and efficiency, we began
    implementation of a 3-year transition plan to take USEUCOM from a
    training program focused on events, to one focused on readiness and
    theater engagement objectives. This revised program will exploit
    opportunities within the total program, resulting in fewer, but higher
    quality CJCS-sponsored exercises. I do not anticipate that this
    transformation of USEUCOM's part of the CJCS exercises in fiscal year
    2002 and beyond will result in a significantly less costly program. A
    requirements-based, objectives-driven exercise program will, however,
    provide higher quality training and engagement at a size and cost that
    is appropriate to, and justified by, our National Security Strategy.

                                   ENGAGEMENT

        Side-by-side with readiness activities are the other exercises,
    operations, and training which focus primarily on assisting and
    supporting other nations in the region to develop effective democratic
    political and military systems.
        To help guide Congress in its decision-making, many of you have
    traveled to the European theater and have witnessed efforts to extend
    contacts beyond Western Europe through engagement. Over the past
    several years this process has helped to positively shape our security
    environment. I believe this approach is key to continued long-term
    peace, security, and prosperity as USEUCOM works along side, and in
    active cooperation with, a number of governmental and non-governmental
    organizations.

                                FORWARD PRESENCE

        America's permanently stationed forces in Europe number just over
    100,000 troops--down from well over 300,000 during the Cold War. The
    current force level represents a 65 percent reduction from 1990. In my
    opinion, this must be considered the minimum level needed to execute
    our current National Security Strategy, meet NATO requirements, and
    provide support and staging for U.S. based forces that in time of need
    would flow into or through the theater.
        Key to our engagement efforts are our forward-deployed and forward-
    based forces, which continue to make significant contributions in
    protecting U.S. national interests. In peacetime, forward presence of
    naval, land, and air assets provides unparalleled access to countries
    in transition. In crises, the forward presence of our forces enables a
    rapid transition from engagement to response. Forward presence is a
    critical enabler for USEUCOM activities.
        Continued forward presence is vital to implementing our current
    strategy, as our forces are able to respond more quickly--demonstrated
    through a number of deployments last year to the Balkans, Southwest
    Asia, and Africa. Surrendering this forward position would seriously
    degrade our ability to engage in peacetime or deploy in the event of
    armed conflict. The General Accounting Office (GAO) traveled through
    the AOR recently to discuss issues related to forward basing. Their
    report is due for release this spring and I believe we presented solid
    evidence of the benefits of forward basing.

                  DEFENSE COOPERATION AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

        Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance programs are vital
    components of Departments of State and Defense initiatives supporting
    the development of interoperable defensive capabilities, the transfer
    of defense articles and services, and the international military
    training of foreign military and civilian personnel. Through the medium
    of 38, and soon to be 40, Offices of Defense Cooperation, we are in
    partnership with U.S. embassies throughout the theater conducting
    primary military engagement in support of American foreign policy
    goals.
        Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA) promotes vital security
    interests through enhanced cooperation among key defense industries,
    and between DOD and West European Ministries of Defense. DCA encourages
    the development of interoperability on the ``drawing board'' and
    inherently strengthens U.S.-European military and political
    relationships.
        Likewise, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of $4.7 billion in fiscal
    year 2000 to Europe demonstrates the continued primacy for U.S.
    security interests of trans-Atlantic defense relationships. FMS
    encourages interoperability between U.S. and European forces, maintains
    a strong U.S. presence in the development and implementation of the
    Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), and helps modernize the
    militaries of new friends and partners in ways critical to our security
    interests. We in Europe work closely with the Defense Security
    Cooperation Agency and the Services to ensure that U.S. European
    Command priorities are reflected.
        Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides irreplaceable resources
    for our friends and allies, without which U.S. influence over the
    dynamic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and key African
    partners would be affected. The program provides access to U.S.
    expertise in defense restructuring and management, and enables
    participants to acquire U.S. military goods, services and training. The
    new NATO members and the stronger aspirants for membership provide
    excellent examples of the value of this program.

                 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

        I cannot overemphasize the importance of International Military
    Education and Training (IMET) as an integral component of long-term
    beneficial change in foreign militaries, as foreign military and
    civilian leaders encounter first hand the American civil-military
    culture. The priorities of the program are professional development,
    the role of the military in a democratic society (under the Expanded
    IMET initiative, or E-IMET), and English language development. In
    fiscal year 2000, the program trained almost 1,500 military and
    civilian international students in U.S. military schools, with nearly
    550 officers attending professional schools--including senior and
    intermediate service schools. Under E-IMET, Mobile Education Teams
    (MET) traveled to 30 countries in the region last year providing
    instruction to over 2,000 civilian and military personnel in military
    justice and human rights, civil-military relations, health resources
    management and integration, defense resources management and budget
    planning, equal opportunity, and maritime counter-drug law enforcement.
    Student projections for this year match last year's numbers.

                             PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

        The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program continues to meet its goal
    of deepening interaction, extending stability in the East, providing
    consultation mechanisms for participants who feel threatened, assisting
    in the pursuit of democratic reforms, and preparing for possible NATO
    membership. The program has returned huge dividends for operations in
    Bosnia, with over 30 nations providing support and nearly one-third of
    the forces coming from non-NATO nations. The growth of the PfP program
    over the past 6 years has been dramatic and, in addition to real world
    operations, Partnership exercises provide superb training and equally
    important exchange opportunities.

                           JOINT CONTACT TEAM PROGRAM

        The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) has been one of USEUCOMs most
    successful engagement programs over the past 9 years. Through modest
    investments of money, personnel, and expertise, it has helped host
    nation militaries become familiar with the culture of the U.S.
    military, and through this process exposed to the best in American
    values and democratic ideals. By leveraging the expertise of America's
    Active and Reserve Forces, especially the unique capabilities of the
    Reserve component's (RC) State Partnership Program (SPP), JCTP has
    modeled and demonstrated the best practices of America's military
    force. It has thus helped host nation militaries move toward providing
    constructive roles to their developing democracies.
        The program's success is most evident in the three new NATO member
    countries. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic's needs have matured
    beyond familiarization and exposure--they are ready to ``graduate''
    from JCTP. Their needs must now be met with additional services and
    technical training properly administered under U.S. security assistance
    programs and plans are now being formulated to move beyond JCTP. Where
    possible, links to their SPP states will be maintained to facilitate
    this transition.
        This natural transition in the new NATO countries is the
    realization of USEUCOM's Theater Engagement Plan and is the eventual
    goal for all of the JCTP countries. This transition also allows the
    program to move, by close coordination with the U.S. Department of
    State, to new host nations requesting the unique engagement
    capabilities available through JCTP.

                           STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

        A key program in this important engagement effort is the Reserve
    Component's State Partnership Program. SPP grew out of JCTP and uses
    Reserve personnel from various National Guard and Reserve organizations
    to partner with defense ministries of Central and Eastern European
    countries. Last year was extremely successful as National Guard
    soldiers and airmen conducted dozens of events including 51 Minuteman
    Fellowships (MMFs), nine ``Guardex'' events, six PfP as well as several
    ``In the Spirit of Partnership for Peace'' exercises, executed more
    than 25 percent of all events for USEUCOM JCTP, facilitated civic
    leader visits, and conducted a number of engagement activities with the
    Russian Federation. The MMF program bridges gaps in other engagement
    programs and touches levels of society that other programs cannot
    reach. Through this program we were able to share with our partners our
    experience and expertise in education, economic development, disaster
    response, environmental topics, and numerous other subject areas.
        When delegations from Tennessee, Minnesota, Indiana, Alabama,
    Vermont, Illinois, Kansas, and California conducted civic leader visits
    to SPP counterpart countries, the long-term vision for SPP had been
    realized--moving beyond military-to-military contacts into other
    important elements of society. Through these activities, state civilian
    officials in the realms of education, commerce, agriculture, medical
    emergency services, and disaster response exchange their considerable
    knowledge and expertise with their partner-nation counterparts.

                                MARSHALL CENTER

        One of the most important and effective regional engagement
    activities within the U.S. European Command is the George C. Marshall
    European Center for Security Studies. The Marshall Center strengthens
    security and cooperative relationships among key nations within the
    theater. It serves as an essential institution for bilateral and
    multilateral communication and military and civilian exchanges
    throughout the region.
        This organization builds bridges between militaries that once
    stared at one another through the crosshairs of weapons of war. Under
    the auspices of the Marshall Center, the once-warring parties of Bosnia
    came together last year and agreed to slash military spending. Marshall
    Center graduates have served as peacekeepers in Bosnia and as far away
    as East Timor. Graduates from Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
    are now helping to integrate their militaries into NATO. Marshall
    Center programs have led a number of nations to the democratic
    restructuring of their defense planning and crisis management
    processes. Graduates from the Republic of Georgia wrote Tbilisi's
    recently announced national security strategy. Many Marshall Center
    graduates now serve as ambassadors, defense attaches, chiefs of
    defense, members of parliament, and advisors to presidents around the
    world. These graduates possess a deeper appreciation and respect the
    concepts of democracy as we understand them, and for human rights and
    the rule of law.
        The Marshall Center is at the forefront in reaching out actively
    and comprehensively to militaries and defense establishments to lower
    regional tensions, strengthening civil-military relations in developing
    nations, and addressing critical regional challenges. Open to leaders
    from over 47 countries, the Marshall Center is a pillar of America's
    efforts to shape the world in ways that reinforce and reflect our
    values and national security interests. It is therefore important that
    the Marshall Center remains fully resourced in order to continue its
    excellent work in support of American foreign policy objectives.

                    THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

        Drawing on the success of the Marshall Center, the Africa Center
    for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established in December 1999 and
    conducted its second seminar last July in Botswana. While it does not
    yet have a permanent location to call home, its rotating seminars
    provide a unique engagement vehicle in Sub-Saharan Africa. Both
    civilian and military senior defense officials of almost every African
    nation gather with U.S. and other friendly nation counterparts to
    examine and compare experiences on national security strategy, defense
    economics, and civil-military relations. They then validate their
    impressions in an end of session capstone exercise. Its forum of open,
    two-way discussion has enjoyed great success on the continent and
    builds and strengthens bilateral and multilateral relationships.

               NEAR EAST--SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

        In January a year ago the Secretary of Defense approved the
    establishment of the Near East--South Asia (NESA) Center under the
    management of the National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C.
    The purpose of the Center is to enhance regional stability by providing
    an inclusive, neutral institution where regional military, diplomatic,
    and national security professionals can broaden their understanding of
    the national strategy formulation process, examine regional security
    issues, improve their defense-related decision-making skills, and
    develop cooperative relationships with one another. Participation is
    open to military and official civilian representatives of all countries
    within the NESA region with which the U.S. Government maintains formal
    diplomatic relations. It is also open to non-NESA countries that have
    strategic interests in the NESA region. The inaugural two-day
    conference was held at NDU in November, and the first executive seminar
    will be held in Washington during May.

                       AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE

        The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is a Department of
    State training program designed to improve the capabilities of several
    African nations to conduct humanitarian crisis response and
    peacekeeping operations. ACRI-trained forces could be offered by their
    governments for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted by
    the Organization of African Unity, the UN, sub-regional African
    organizations, or any other multinational coalition. ACRI also works to
    shape the African environment by promoting professional and apolitical
    militaries, reinforcing respect for human rights, and providing a
    strong example of democratic civil-military relations. This UN-approved
    program of instruction combines U.S. and UN peacekeeping and
    humanitarian relief operations doctrine. Program instruction develops
    common standards for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations
    among the participating ACRI countries. Recently, the program was
    expanded to include brigade-level training focusing on the command,
    control, and logistical aspects of supporting a multinational brigade
    in the field.

                             OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF

        Last year USEUCOM was tasked to help train five Nigerian
    battalions, one Ghanaian battalion, and one Senegalese battalion in
    order to participate in UN operations in Sierra Leone, and more
    strategically, to support the professional development of the Nigerian
    military--an important force for regional stability. This operation is
    being conducted in fiscal year 2001 using State Department peacekeeping
    operations (PKO) funding as well as DOD resources made available under
    Presidential drawdown authority.
        To accomplish this mission, Special Operations Command, Europe
    (SOCEUR) was tasked to execute the mission with Army and Air Force
    units in support. Based on information provided by the SOCEUR-led
    Military Survey Team, a 10-week training program using U.S. instructors
    and an equipment support package was developed. Execution of the train-
    and-equip program was designed for three-phase completion, commencing
    last October, with mission accomplishment likely later this year. Upon
    completion of the training program, each battalion should be capable of
    operating and maintaining newly acquired equipment, conducting daylight
    company level attacks and conducting day and night defensive operations
    as a maneuver company under command and control of a battalion
    headquarters.
        We have now completed phase one of the three-phase program and our
    personnel have performed magnificently. However, interagency policy-
    level decisions must be made early enough in the process so funding and
    resources can be programmed to meet timelines and support requirements.
    Additionally, human rights vetting must be complete for all personnel
    to be trained, to include attached units, prior to the initiation of
    training. There must also be host nation agreement on the training
    program at every political and military level in order to assure
    mission success. Operation Focus Relief is not an operation without
    risk. However, with only 200+ U.S. personnel assigned in non-combatant
    roles, the dollar investment is minimal and the payoff great in that it
    is successfully training local forces to deal with regional problems.
    In this way, Operation Focus Relief is pioneering a new method of
    engagement.

                      KEY THEATER MISSIONS AND CHALLENGES

        Challenges in the USEUCOM AOR will continue as the U.S. works to
    strengthen and maintain the NATO structure, prepares forces to better
    respond to future conflict, shapes the international environment
    through engagement, executes contingency operations, and monitors
    potential future conflict areas. I have highlighted key challenges and
    continuing missions below to give an idea of the diversity of theater
    challenges and missions.

                         MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY

              ``The overall effectiveness of multinational operations is .
            . . dependent upon interoperability between organizations,
            processes, and technologies.''

                                                      Joint Vision 2020

        The U.S. European Command and America's allies and friends
    recognize that most military operations in the future, from
    peacekeeping and humanitarian relief to a major theater war, will
    typically be multinational in character. Success in multinational
    operations will depend on two factors: the capabilities of the national
    forces involved in the operation; and the degree to which these forces
    can be melded to create an effective force. These factors will demand a
    high level of interoperability and enhanced capabilities between the
    participating national forces.
        In this vein NATO has met and excelled at every challenge since the
    end of the Cold War precisely because of its ability to commit
    multinational forces structured to meet military threats to its
    members. NATO's greatest challenges today originate not externally, but
    from within. The growing asymmetry in technology between European and
    U.S. military forces is producing a serious imbalance in our military
    capabilities. Furthermore, Europe's shrinking defense industrial base
    and limitations in production of advanced military capabilities could
    lead to a future where only the U.S. has the ability to engage
    globally.
        The Defense Capabilities Initiative, launched in April 1999, is an
    effort by the European members of NATO to resolve glaring capabilities
    shortfalls between them and the U.S. as evidenced by past NATO
    exercises and Operation Allied Force in and over Kosovo. The
    Capabilities Initiative's two primary thrusts, improving national
    capabilities and exploring ways to pool capabilities, allow our allies
    and partners to enhance interoperability, take advantage of economies
    of scale, and afford participation by those countries that do not
    possess the resources to go it alone. The initiative specifically
    targets five capabilities: effective engagement; deployability and
    mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; sustainability
    and logistics; and communications/information systems. As Europeans
    work to improve their national and collective security, we have
    encouraged defense cooperation and procurement using the DCI roadmap
    and believe it mutually reinforces the needs of NATO and the European
    Union (EU).
        The DCI's success depends upon whether Europeans are willing to
    spend more, and more wisely, in narrowing the gap between their
    military technology and warfighting capability, and our own. Should
    Europe prove unable to engage in military operations at or near the
    level of U.S. capabilities, it may leave them vulnerable and limit the
    U.S. in some cases to unilateral action. Such a future undermines
    America's strategic vision and assumptions--diplomatically,
    economically, and militarily. Finite resources and domestic political
    realities dictate that unilateral action cannot be the future norm.
    Unilateral action endangers the historical link between the American
    and European peoples. While the issue of DCI is being worked at the
    highest levels in NATO, it is critically important that Congress work
    to engage their European counterparts on this issue. The U.S. must
    continue to engage with its European allies to help foster the
    necessary changes to enable Europe to remain a contributing strategic
    partner across the spectrum of potential operations. DCI is a crucial
    area on which the future of a strong Trans-Atlantic link may very well
    depend.

                  EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO SECURITY STRUCTURES

        The establishment of a common foreign policy, supported by a
    military capability, within the EU is one of the most important
    political-military issues facing Europe and the United States today.
    The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is worked hard,
    continuously, and at presidential and prime ministerial levels in every
    capital in Europe. If the military and political links that eventually
    define the relationship between NATO and the EU do not result in
    transparency, coordination, and a cooperative effort, it places at
    serious risk the future of the alliance. Indeed it is the form these
    permanent arrangements between the two will take, and assured EU access
    to NATO's planning capabilities, that are the most contentious and
    potentially destructive questions currently under debate.
        The recently completed Foreign Minister's meeting in Brussels was
    not able to reach agreement on these issues and will require much
    effort by the new administration. We believe that SHAPE headquarters
    can play a constructive and indispensable role by accomplishing the
    future military planning for both organizations, thereby negating the
    need for a duplicative headquarters solely to support the EU.
        The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO
    continues to evolve within U.S. redlines as the EU develops, through
    the ESDP, both capabilities and institutions for its security and
    defense aspirations. Even though the progress to date has generally met
    U.S. expectations, I would suggest that officials in Washington remain
    vigilant to ensure that ESDP remains relevant from a U.S. perspective.
    They should emphasize the requirement for Europeans to develop their
    capabilities, maintain NATO-EU linkages, and underscore the necessity
    for the inclusion of non-EU NATO members in emerging security and
    defense arrangements.
        Successful implementation of the European Security and Defense
    Policy within the European Union will require a concerted effort
    between the European members of NATO, EU members who are not in NATO,
    and Canada and the United States. This cooperation is essential to
    build the military and political links between NATO and the Union
    necessary to achieve a common strategic vision and make the needed
    improvements in technological capabilities.
        Last November witnessed positive developments in the Capabilities
    Commitment Conference. This effort has been a primary focus of the
    French during their 6 months as President of the EU last year. The
    planning scenarios used to determine capabilities and forces required
    for the ESDP Headline Goal Force have remained realistic. In this
    regard, the EU has commitments for a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up
    to 60,000 personnel, which is the minimum goal. The EU member countries
    placed a total of 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 warships
    at the EU's immediate disposal to support this RRF. If this force
    becomes reality it is sufficient to establish the EU as a significant
    military power.
        The military staff at SHAPE played a very constructive role in
    assisting the EU's interim military staff in the development of these
    goals. The Catalogue of Forces turned out to be impressive, with high-
    end capabilities that are fully in line with Europe's DCI efforts. My
    main apprehension regarding capabilities is that they remain compatible
    with NATO Force Goals once the EU force is established and that the
    Europeans follow through with the necessary financial commitments to
    correct identified capability shortfalls.
        In my role as the military commander of NATO's forces (SACEUR), I
    am fully engaged in providing advice and perspective as this issue
    evolves. In my estimation, if handled successfully by NATO HQ in
    Brussels and the European Union, the ESDP process will strengthen the
    security posture of the European continent. However, there are many
    complicated factors remaining before this capability is realized. The
    central issue, in my view, is the method by which a plan is developed
    and presented. When a potential conflict or crisis emerges the planning
    should be conducted by the SHAPE staff, with EU military augmentation.
    The Deputy SACEUR would then take the completed plan to the EU and I
    would send it to the NATO political authorities. If NATO elects not to
    involve itself, the EU could pick up the mission and deploy forces as
    required. If the process does not follow this model the EU will be
    unnecessarily creating large and redundant staffs and a real
    possibility of double counting and tasking existing NATO forces.
    Realization of ESDP largely hinges on the Europeans' willingness to
    make the necessary fiscal and political commitments. Any newly financed
    capabilities, however, must be in line with DCI--not duplicating but
    rather reinforcing alliance capabilities.

                        NATO ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION

        There are currently nine European nations that aspire to NATO
    membership. While the decision to expand the alliance is a political
    one and will ultimately be made in capitals across Europe and North
    America, an aspirant's military readiness will be scrutinized and is
    certainly part of the equation. Thus far, the nine aspirants have
    benefited from U.S.-funded defense assessments as well as from the NATO
    Membership Action Plan with its associated Partnership Goals. These
    mechanisms have provided a valuable roadmap toward reform and
    interoperability in the event that additional nations are offered NATO
    membership.
        As for the three newest members of the alliance--Poland, Hungary,
    and the Czech Republic--the Interagency Group estimated that a 10-year
    process would elapse before these nations fully transition from past
    Warsaw Pact doctrine, equipment, and organization to NATO
    interoperability. One should avoid any unrealistic expectations of full
    integration this early--only 3 years since the Madrid invitations.
    Nevertheless, they have made great progress. Each has performed well in
    both exercises and deployments, including the very demanding
    environments of Bosnia and Kosovo where they share the burden through a
    contribution of nearly 2,500 troops to the international effort.

                EUROPEAN REACTION TO MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT

        A number of potentially hostile nations are working to develop
    long-range missiles to coerce and threaten countries in North America
    and Europe. President Bush has stated that we will deploy missile
    defenses as soon as possible. These defenses, he has made clear, must
    protect not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also
    our friends and allies.
        NATO's Strategic Concept also recognizes that ``the Alliance's
    defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the
    proliferation of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and their
    means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work
    on missiles defenses.'' As the U.S. pursues this capability, I suggest
    it continues to consult our friends around the world. Open and frank
    discussions on this initiative between the U.S., NATO, and our other
    European allies, will further understanding and help avoid alienating
    our valued friends.
        The defenses envisaged will reinforce the credibility of U.S.
    security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. No one can
    reasonably argue that Europe would be more secure if the U.S. were less
    secure from a missile attack. An America able to defend itself from
    missile attacks is an America better able to defend Europe and common
    Western security interests. As consultations proceed with allies on
    missile defense, we realize they will continue to consider the
    appropriate role of missile defenses in their respective national
    security strategies for dealing with the changing international threat
    environment. In keeping with the fundamental principle of the alliance
    that the security of its members is indivisible, the United States is
    open to discussing possible cooperation with allies on longer-range
    ballistic missile defense, just as we have with our discussions and
    cooperation in the area of Theater Missile Defense.

                                FORCE PROTECTION

        Force Protection (FP) remains a top USEUCOM priority. We are
    exercising an aggressive Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) program
    providing clear AT/FP policy, measures, and tools to mitigate risk and
    maximize security for our personnel and their families. We have
    implemented a number of innovative AT/FP programs, examining the
    application of state-of-the-art technology to enhance access control
    and explosive detection, and are continuing our efforts to field mass
    notification systems throughout the theater. We are making progress,
    but resourcing continues to challenge our AT/FP Service priorities.
        U.S. European Command is in the staffing process of publishing a
    significantly updated AT/FP Operations Order (OPORD) 01-01 prescribing
    AT/FP standards and requirements. These new mandatory requirements
    encompass FP engineering design standards for new construction, major
    renovations, and existing facilities. USEUCOM has also instituted a
    comprehensive Installation AT/FP Program Manager course to train the
    unit FP officers in our AT construction and design standards. To date,
    we have established AT/FP responsibilities for DOD elements and
    personnel at 67 Chief of Mission locations throughout the USEUCOM AOR.
        Coupled with this, 137 AT/FP vulnerability assessments, including
    74 Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, have been
    undertaken over the past year. These assessments have identified AT/FP
    vulnerabilities and assisted commanders in addressing those
    deficiencies through the use of countermeasures, procedural changes,
    and resourcing--endeavoring to eliminate or mitigate their potential
    exploitation by terrorists.
        We have developed and fielded a web-based Vulnerability Assessment
    Management Program (VAMP). The VAMP captures results of vulnerability
    assessments, prioritizes AOR vulnerabilities, identifies deficiencies,
    and lists corrective actions needed or completed. VAMP is a management
    tool available to every commander and AT/FP officer from the theater
    down to the installation level and allows commanders and decision
    makers the ability to track and identify the actions taken or required
    to correct and/or mitigate vulnerabilities at specific installations
    throughout the AOR.
        We employ risk management and mission analysis processes in all
    deliberate, crisis, and contingency operational planning and exercises.
    Threat working groups and assessment tools, such as the VAMP, play a
    critical role in these processes. In light of recent events these
    processes are receiving additional scrutiny. Although we cannot
    eliminate all vulnerabilities, we continue to use risk management when
    deciding missions in this theater in order to reduce risk to our
    personnel--identifying vulnerabilities and resources required to reduce
    exploitable FP vulnerabilities.
        Our intelligence operations continually analyze and assess
    potential terrorist threats to U.S. installations, facilities and
    personnel. We use a variety of systems to disseminate intelligence
    within the command and provide routine and time-sensitive threat
    warning notifications. Our systems and procedures provide the ability
    to rapidly disseminate information regarding specific terrorist threats
    to units, installations and individuals throughout the AOR. In
    conjunction with our national intelligence agencies, we are exploring
    better methods of sharing and disseminating more accurate AT/FP
    prediction and tracking threat information. Recently, we initiated
    closer cooperation with the U.S. Central Command to share and maximize
    our efforts, including assets, analytical and database capabilities.
        While intelligence operations support for AT/FP in theater is good,
    we concur with the recent U.S.S. Cole Commission recommendation to
    reprioritize resources for collection and analysis, including human
    intelligence and signals intelligence, against terrorist threats, and
    to increase our national intelligence agencies counterintelligence
    resources dedicated to combating terrorism.

                                    BALKANS

        One of the greatest challenges to peace, stability, and democracy
    in Europe is the integration of the Balkans into the rest of Europe, a
    strategic objective the U.S. shares with NATO and the EU. Last year saw
    a watershed opportunity to overcoming that challenge--the toppling of
    Slobodan Milosevic and the election of Vojislav Kostunica as President
    of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It has been clear for a
    decade that only a change from dictatorship to democracy in Belgrade
    would set the conditions for a regional approach to the problems in the
    Balkans. This transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in the
    FRY should have a beneficial impact on the integration of the entire
    region into the west. President Kostunica still has much work to do in
    consolidating democratic gains. While the FRY has begun its re-
    integration into the western world, rapidly joining the UN, the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the
    Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, and establishing diplomatic
    relations with the U.S. and other key NATO allies, much remains to be
    done in the Balkans.
        Greater ethnic reconciliation in Bosnia and Kosovo is elusive and
    while recent voting in Serbia and Bosnia marked another milestone in
    the rule of law and movement toward democracy, it also reinforced some
    hard-line nationalist parties and their platforms. Additionally,
    despite the first democratic elections in Kosovo, where municipal
    voting saw moderates win, the province is still volatile.
        Security conditions permitting the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
    the region have not yet been fully realized. The status of Montenegro
    within the federation, a final settlement for Kosovo, and Serbia's
    future links with the Republika Srpska remain open issues whose
    resolution are required in order to bring stability and democracy to
    the Balkans. There is no short-term solution to the problems in the
    Balkans without developing a comprehensive, region wide, and long-term
    approach. The economics in the region are driving the turmoil and
    fractious nature of the ``peace.'' International involvement in the
    Balkans must include substantive initiatives that address the economic
    problems of the region. Without such initiatives, we cannot hope to
    forecast peace.
        Military forces, too, must continue to foster an environment in
    which peaceful actions are rewarded, but do it with fewer resources.
    This can be accomplished by leveraging existing national and allied
    exercises that occur across this theater and by executing them as much
    as possible in the Balkans. By conducting exercises in the Balkans, we
    show resolve in the regional policies, deter the outbreak of
    hostilities, and improve regional infrastructure leading to increased
    interaction among Balkan peoples.
        In Bosnia, force numbers have been reduced from 60,000 when the
    mission began, to just over 20,000 personnel. Of 34 nations
    contributing forces to this effort, 28 are European and their forces
    make up 80 percent of SFOR. The U.S. has successfully reduced its
    proportion of committed troops from 33 percent in 1996 to 20 percent
    today. The way ahead in Bosnia, including future force reductions,
    remains contingent upon the implementation of Dayton's various military
    and civil tasks. We are working within the administration to address
    possible ways to implement the civil tasks and set the conditions for
    additional NATO force reductions.
        The KFOR military effort is considerable and has not changed to any
    degree since last year. KFOR's strength remains at 37,000 deployed in
    Kosovo proper and an additional 4,400 supporting in the Former Yugoslav
    Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece, and Albania. This force is drawn
    from 39 nations, with 33 European countries deploying over 80 percent
    of the total. The U.S., with 5,500 troops in Kosovo, continues to
    provide 14 percent of the force. Europe as a whole has endeavored to
    live up to its personnel and financial commitments of support to Bosnia
    and Kosovo. The following charts indicate their specific levels of
    military troop support:

        The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) police force enjoys continued
    success. Current numbers indicate that 53 nations contribute 4,485
    officers. This number represents 95 percent of the UN goal of 4,718
    police officers. Additionally, the domestic police academy graduated
    its twelfth class on 3 February and has placed 3,128 multi-ethnic
    officers on the beat as a result. I can report the UN's policing plan
    is on target and the effort continues to put 300+ officer graduates on
    the street every month to work--and learn--alongside UNMIK's veteran
    contract officers.
        U.S. contributions to NATO are based on the North Atlantic Treaty
    signed on 4 April 1949. The annual U.S. funding commitment is an
    obligation to cover approximately one-quarter of the NATO funding
    requirements as set by consensus of the Military Budget Committee
    composed of representatives from each of the participating nations.
    Once funding is committed, the prestige and credibility of the United
    States is irrefutable and must be met. Consequently, a failure to
    provide adequate funding to meet this commitment forces the DOD to
    reprogram funds from other established mission-essential programs.
    Shortfalls in NATO funding have been chronic in the past and have only
    served to erode national programs. I encourage Congress to realize that
    full funding of our NATO commitment will ensure the full execution and
    realization of national programs, as well as the continued security and
    stability of Europe as afforded by NATO.
        In closing on the topic of the Balkans I do want to make one
    further comment, and that is in regards to the pursuit and eventual
    apprehension of Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). There are few
    higher priorities in the international community's efforts in the
    Balkans than bringing PIFWCs to justice regardless of what you might
    hear or read, but it is slow and dangerous work. American forces,
    working alongside their NATO counterparts, are fully committed and one
    day I am confident these indicted criminals will be delivered to the
    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the
    Hague. To date approximately 100 have been indicted and 71 delivered to
    the ICTY, killed during apprehension efforts, or have otherwise died.
    This process will continue until such time as justice is satisfied.

                            OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH

        The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Operation Northern Watch,
    consisting of forces from the U.S., Turkey, and the United Kingdom,
    continue to fly dangerous and complex missions in the enforcement of
    the No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Northern Iraq, and monitoring Iraqi
    compliance with applicable UN Security Council Resolutions.
        In the last few months, however, the situation in the zone has been
    further complicated by a dramatic increase in the number of
    international ``humanitarian flights'' into Iraq, as well as the
    introduction of domestic Iraqi flights into the NFZ. Coalition forces
    have taken appropriate measures to ensure that civilian aircraft will
    not be endangered by ONW activities. There is no guarantee of what
    actions Saddam Hussein might initiate; however, he has altered his
    primary strategy from open defiance of ONW presence, to eroding
    international support for applicable UN resolutions.

                                     RUSSIA

        U.S. and Russian soldiers execute common missions side by side
    against common threats in the Balkans. Our deployed forces have
    performed ably together and have developed positive and extremely
    important combined training and operational activities. In spite of 5
    years of operational cooperation and success however, our overall
    attempts to engage more broadly with Russia are mixed. Ideally, Russia
    will harmonize its security concerns with NATO, further strengthening
    stability in the region. A remilitarized or a failed Russia would lead
    to increased instability and danger not only to its neighbors, but to
    vital U.S. security interests as well. The U.S. supports favorable
    developments in Russia with its bilateral engagement efforts, as well
    as through its support for the stability, sovereignty, and economic
    development of the Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus' states.

                                    CAUCASUS

        The Caucasus region is vitally important to the United States for
    at least two major reasons: the impact on the emerging Russian national
    self-definition, and its capacity to fulfill European hydrocarbon
    energy deficits. Despite its remoteness from the U.S., the region will
    have a decisive impact on international political developments in the
    early 21st century.
        The importance of Caucasus oil and gas reserves, and the necessity
    of their supply to meet growing European energy needs, comes precisely
    at a time when Russia is still immersed in its yet to be completed
    social, political, and economic revolution. It also comes at a time
    when China is emerging as a major regional economic and political
    power, with vastly increased energy requirements. Despite this critical
    time, America has imposed on itself considerable constraints toward our
    policy and influence in this region.
        A key constraint to full American peaceful engagement in this
    region is Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. The Act
    prohibits government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan until such
    time as ``steps are taken'' to lift the economic embargo sponsored by
    Azerbaijan against Armenia, with the exception of counter-proliferation
    programs. The DOD applies an ``equal treatment'' policy toward Armenia
    to avoid compromising the U.S. position as mediator in the Nagorno-
    Karabakh conflict. Other subsequent legislation has opened up several
    narrow ``carve out'' areas to Section 907 for military and other
    engagement activities: democratization; counter-proliferation;
    humanitarian demining operations; and humanitarian assistance. While
    these niches have allowed us to initiate preliminary military contacts
    with Armenia and Azerbaijan, they are extremely narrow and do not allow
    USEUCOM to respond to both nations' enthusiastic desire for substantive
    engagement activities.
        Were it not for Section 907, Azerbaijan, based largely upon its
    geo-strategic position, pro-western economic, political, and military
    orientation, and its abundant energy resources, would be a very high
    priority for USEUCOM engagement efforts. A stable Azerbaijan is
    necessary not only for its vast energy deposits, but also to help
    forestall terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. U.S. policy has had the effect of frustrating Azerbaijan's
    pro-NATO policy and desires to expand its relationship with Europe and
    the U.S. I would ask you to take a hard look with the intent of
    modifying this legislation to afford the opportunity for our military
    to properly engage with our counterparts in this vitally important
    region of the world. Such an initiative would strengthen our ability to
    influence this region for the next generation and beyond.
        Armenia has also persistently and vocally pursued at the highest
    levels closer ties to the U.S. Armenia's motivation lies in its
    eagerness to balance its historic dependence and partnership with
    Russia, enlist the U.S. to mitigate historically hostile relations with
    Turkey, and attract potential economic development assistance and
    investment that Russia has not been able to provide. In particular,
    Armenia has asked for our advice on establishing a program of
    instruction for a national military senior service college and for help
    in establishing peacekeeping units that could participate in
    international efforts such as the Balkans. Due to Section 907, however,
    these are opportunities USEUCOM cannot exploit and we are limited in
    our efforts to assist these nations in sorting out mutual problems and
    their futures.
        Very briefly, our activity in the case of Georgia has continued to
    increase since being assigned to USEUCOM's area of responsibility 3
    years ago. Georgia will host its first large multinational NATO
    Partnership for Peace exercise with USEUCOM support in 2001, providing
    a good example of the kind of engagement opportunities we are missing
    in Azerbaijan and Armenia.

                                     AFRICA

        Africa is a complex, diverse, and often dangerous region of the
    world. Its countries are evolving into clusters of stability and
    instability, leading in some areas to promising economic growth and
    democratic government, and in others to stagnation and autocratic rule.
    A few are simply chaotic due to coups, civil wars, widespread
    corruption, or lack of an effective government. While this dynamic mix
    of political trends and institutions will continue for the foreseeable
    future, the administration seeks to bolster stability and democratic
    transformation through a policy of engaging with key partner states and
    regional ``success stories.'' We who watch Africa closely anticipate
    fewer African ``wars'' but an ever-increasing scope of conflict as
    failed states and the emerging transnational threats and humanitarian
    crises provide the conditions for instability. Unstable political
    environments, austere conditions, and asymmetrical threats where the
    enemy is not clearly defined, either by uniform or position on the
    battlefield, will characterize the operating environments.
        Small programs, such as our Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP),
    are key engagement initiatives in Africa that satisfy both DOD and
    State Department objectives. Small dollar amounts have yielded big
    dividends in terms of the U.S. military impact in Africa. With
    approximately $17 million for fiscal year 2001, USEUCOM will be able to
    complete more than 120 projects in roughly 50 African and Eurasian
    countries. Engagement through the African Center for Strategic Studies
    (ACSS), Near-East South Asian Center, African Crisis Response
    Initiative (ACRI), and the West African Training Cruise (WATC) are also
    helpful for promoting African stability. Joint Combined Engagement
    Training with African partners, in addition to giving our soldiers the
    chance to improve their capabilities to work in multiple environments,
    expose African soldiers to the U.S. military, challenging them to
    improve their professional skills. By leveraging the resources of
    programs such as these we seek to help shape the African environment in
    a positive way.

                               SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

        The portion of Sub-Saharan Africa in USEUCOM's area is an immense
    geographic area comprised of 37 countries and four primary sub-regions,
    each with significant environmental, cultural, political and economic
    differences. USEUCOM has identified its three principle objectives for
    military engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa: promote stability, democracy
    and a professional military; provide prompt response to humanitarian
    crisis; and ensure freedom of air and sea lines of communication. By
    applying resources against established objectives, the intent is to
    reinforce success and work to prevent crises before they occur. There
    are three critical issues preventing peace, stability, and economic
    development in the Sub-Saharan Africa region: the war in the Congo
    (DROC); the conflict in Sierra Leone; and the HIV/AIDS pandemic; all of
    which are unrestrained by boundaries or borders. Each is a contagion
    that threatens current and future stability throughout the continent.
        With the assassination of President Laurent Kabila on 16 January
    2001, the future situation in DROC is uncertain. Joseph Kabila, the
    late President's son, was sworn in as President on 26 January 2001.
    Within DROC there are military forces from six different nations
    participating in the conflict. The countries previously supporting the
    late President--Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia--have pledged continued
    support to the new government in its civil war. Additionally, the nine
    countries bordering DROC are significantly impacted socially and
    economically by the war to varying degrees. The sheer size, geographic
    location, vast mineral wealth, and economic potential in DROC guarantee
    that peace in the Congo is inextricably linked to stability throughout
    the region. The existing Lusaka Peace Accord is the best opportunity to
    resolve this conflict. President Joseph Kabila recently held a historic
    meeting with Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Washington in February
    where both sides pledged to renew efforts to implement the Lusaka Peace
    Accords. President Kabila also met with Secretary of State Colin Powell
    the same day. Within the limits of U.S. law and policy, U.S. European
    Command continues its limited engagement with all parties in an effort
    to demonstrate neutrality and urge support for the Accord and the UN
    Mission to the Congo.
        The situation in coastal West Africa continues to smolder and
    destabilize the sub-region. While centered in Sierra Leone, this
    conflict also involves Liberia, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, as well as
    the sixteen other members, directly or indirectly, that comprise the
    Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Through support of
    the UN's mission to Sierra Leone, support to British efforts, and
    training and equipping countries contributing to the ECOWAS Military
    Observers Group, USEUCOM works to contain the spread of this conflict,
    as well as create the conditions for future peace and stability in the
    region.
        Sub-Saharan Africa is the region most heavily infected with HIV in
    the world. The region accounts for two out of every three of the
    world's HIV infections, and represents over 80 percent of global HIV/
    AIDS deaths. The prevalence of HIV in Sub-Saharan militaries varies
    greatly, but it generally exceeds that of the civilian populace. Many
    militaries have infection rates as high as 20 to 50 percent of the
    force. As African militaries participate not only in conflicts but also
    in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations outside their
    borders, HIV follows. We are committed to working with African
    militaries to contain the spread of HIV/AIDS through education,
    awareness, and behavior modification.

                                  NORTH AFRICA

        The strategy in North Africa is anchored by bilateral relationships
    with what USEUCOM sees as two cornerstone countries--Morocco and
    Tunisia. Recent developments in Algeria have also prompted measured
    engagement activities with that country. Complementing these bilateral
    relationships is a developing regional approach to engagement in North
    Africa and the Mediterranean.
        There are three prime sources of tension in North Africa. The first
    is the Islamist insurgency in Algeria where the government's amnesty
    offers have persuaded moderate rebels to surrender, while security
    forces remain engaged in fighting hardliners. The behavior of both the
    military leadership and insurgents will be critical to the progress of
    political reform efforts and the environment for badly needed foreign
    investment. Complete restoration of civil order in the countryside will
    likely take years, and social tensions will exist long after the
    conflict. There is optimism, however, as it appears there is a general
    trend toward greater internal stability.
        The second key source of tension is Libya--long a source for
    concern as its leader, Muammar Qadhafi, continues to pursue the
    development of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery
    systems. Islamist opposition to Qadhafi has found limited popular
    support and has met with a strong effective response from Qadhafi's
    security forces.
        The third source of tension is the unresolved dispute in the
    Western Sahara. The King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, has initiated a series
    of measures to make the administration of the territory more positive,
    but the UN-sponsored process to hold a referendum on the final status
    of the territory remains bogged down over disagreements about the voter
    list. At times, this confrontation contributes to dangerous tensions
    between Morocco and Algeria.
        Africa will remain a challenging environment for the foreseeable
    future. USEUCOM will continue to pursue a program of active peacetime
    military engagement to shape the region and pursue our objectives with
    the aim of maintaining stability and preventing crises before they
    occur. Solutions to many of Africa's challenges are elusive, but
    USEUCOM is managing threats and capitalizing on opportunities where we
    can.

                       MODERNIZATION AND PERSONNEL ISSUES

        Several modernization and personnel issues are being addressed at
    USEUCOM and I want to highlight some of those that Congress might
    positively influence and support.

               ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION BENEFITS TO USEUCOM

        There is high probability that there will be repeated demands at
    the center of the spectrum of conflict, as well as the possibility of
    high intensity small-scale contingencies. Responding to this reality
    the Army has articulated a new vision for a strategically responsive
    and dominant force to effectively meet the full spectrum of future
    military operations. The Army's ``Transformation'' will occur in three
    phases, eventually resulting in the ``Objective Force.'' The Objective
    Force aims to be able to send a brigade anywhere in the world in 96
    hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. The two
    divisions in Europe must also meet this standard by resourcing the
    training, exercises and infrastructure that support strategic mobility.
    Only through proper resourcing of our two divisions will this Objective
    Force be able to provide the deployability, maneuverability, and
    lethality necessary to conduct operations throughout the full spectrum
    of conflict.
        Another key benefit for USEUCOM is the ability to rapidly move
    lighter vehicles between training areas and countries within this
    theater. As a potential force provider to other unified commands, most
    notably U.S. Central Command, future commanders will find that enhanced
    mobility of the Transformed Army also enhances deployability. The
    capability to deploy within a matter of hours to trouble spots in
    Africa and less developed countries of Eastern Europe offers a range of
    options that are simply unavailable today.
        As the Army transforms it will reduce the logistics tail
    considerably. By operating from a single family of vehicles,
    significant efficiencies will follow. Much of the larger and more
    demanding logistics support activities will occur outside the
    operational area, reducing the logistics footprint.
        Permanently stationed forces will be able to train effectively in
    the AOR, where many of the training activities of heavier forces will
    become increasingly problematic. Less noise and disruption of the local
    populations during movement to and from major training areas (MTAs)
    make it more likely that permission will be granted for maneuver
    training off MTAs. This will allow the widely dispersed units of the V
    Corps to greatly expand maneuver training, at a much-reduced cost.
        Similarly, the Air Force transition to the Expeditionary Air Force
    (EAF) concept has resulted in improved responsiveness in meeting the
    diverse needs of USEUCOM. Organized into multiple AEFs to support
    ongoing operations, Air Force personnel are now afforded predictable
    rotations. This new stability has improved morale, stabilized training,
    and assured necessary reconstitution time, thereby improving the combat
    readiness of all involved forces. USAFE forces are integral to the EAF.
    They provide, in addition to resident combat capability, the backbone
    that supports ongoing AEF operations over the Balkans and northern
    Iraq.

                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        An invaluable tool for the effective implementation of our
    engagement programs is Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces
    focus largely on their unique capability to organize and train
    indigenous forces in internal defense. By interacting with foreign
    military counterparts throughout the theater, SOF instills in host
    nation forces a sense of loyalty and professionalism that support
    democratic government and ideals. In the process, SOF gains valuable
    training and cultural experiences from these regional engagements. In
    fiscal year 2001, Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR) has
    scheduled 101 JCET initiatives in 52 countries. Special Operations
    Forces become USEUCOM's force of choice for engaging on the fringes of
    the theater in uncertain environments to open new doors and to shape
    the battlespace in preparation for possible contingency operations.

                               RESERVE COMPONENTS

        Total Force integration means conducting military operations that
    fully utilize the unique capabilities of the Reserve components (RC) of
    all Services. Reserve utilization requires a balanced and proportional
    approach that considers Service competencies and capabilities and
    matches those competencies to best support theater missions. The U.S.
    European Command's ability to undertake missions is growing
    increasingly dependent upon capabilities offered by the Reserves and
    the National Guard.
        In an effort to ease active component operational tempo the
    Services are increasing their use of Reserves in contingency operations
    in the Balkans. The 49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard)
    successfully completed a rotation as the command element of Multi-
    National Division (North) in Bosnia last October. Their performance was
    superb and I want to take this opportunity to publicly applaud the
    great job they did last year. The Navy Reserve contributory support to
    this AOR for Operations Joint Guardian, Joint/Deliberate Forge and
    Northern Watch has included filling 89 percent (237,600 workdays) of
    all Navy billet requirements as of July 2000. The Air Reserve component
    provides 60 percent of the total KC-135 tanker aircraft needed for
    Operation Deliberate Forge providing air-refueling support to NATO
    aircraft flying missions over the Balkans. At the end of last fiscal
    year there were 1,244 Guard and 2,775 Reserve members on Active Duty in
    support of the two operations in the Balkans. The reality is SFOR and
    KFOR stability operations will continue to require augmentation from
    the Reserve community for the foreseeable future, especially in the
    area of civil-military operations and peace support operations.
        Reserve components are an increasingly important asset for
    USEUCOM's operational activities, combined exercises, training,
    combined education, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance
    efforts. Reserve support to the theater, however, is not limitless.
    There are constraints that require a deliberate and well-thought-out
    balance of Reserve force functions in the total equation of
    requirements. The requirements of employers and families demand advance
    notice of deployment and training. Reserve Service members require
    predictability in order to manage business and personal affairs.
    Accessibility and volunteerism are factors that require reasonable
    lead-time to match and mobilize assets to the mission.
        The PERSTEMPO management legislation enacted in the fiscal year
    2000 National Defense Authorization Act will help provide standards and
    limits for all Service member deployments. While PERSTEMPO management
    provides stability and predictability for the Service member, it may
    increase personnel turbulence and cost due to an increased frequency of
    personnel rotations. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that increasing
    use of the RC has a negative impact on Service members' personal lives
    and may affect recruiting and retention goals.

                         COMBAT AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION

        To a large degree tactical aviation has shouldered much of the
    Nation's foreign policy when that policy called for the use of force. A
    decade ago Operation Desert Storm commenced with an unprecedented air
    assault against Iraq's military forces involving hundreds of U.S.
    aircraft flying tens of thousands of sorties around the clock. Since
    that time American aviators and aircraft have maintained the NFZ over
    Iraq, and since Operation Northern Watch was established have flown
    nearly 13,000 fighter sorties alone. More recently we have seen the use
    of our strike assets over the Balkans to stop the killing in Bosnia and
    to compel Milosevic to withdraw Yugoslav forces from Kosovo during
    Operation Allied Force. The demands of modern warfare for precision
    strike to maximize combat effectiveness while minimizing collateral
    damage clearly demonstrate the increased need for all-weather/all-
    target capability. The fact of the matter is, however, many of our
    tactical aircraft--F-18s, F-15s, F-16s, AV-8s, and A-10s--are aging and
    nearing the end of their service lives. Even the F-117 ``Stealth
    Fighter,'' thought by most to be a new system, has an average age of
    9.7 years and relies on dated technology. Currently, possible
    replacements--the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter, and F-18E/F--continue in
    development and are likely part of the administration's defense review.

                             AIRLIFT MODERNIZATION

        Systems modifications are required to keep our airlift aircraft
    viable, particularly for USEUCOM's fleet of C-130s. These airplanes,
    now approaching 30 years of age, are essential to the success of
    several USEUCOM mission areas. From support of USEUCOM army units,
    including combat airdrop and resupply, to execution of humanitarian
    relief operations, these aircraft are a critical ingredient in
    maintaining a force projection capability in both combat and during
    peacetime. It is almost a certainty that the missions and roles this
    aircraft fulfills will only be more crucial in the future.

                              AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

        The tremendous growth in air traffic and communication industries
    in Europe presents increasing challenges for air traffic control
    agencies, civil air carriers, and military aviation. Just as in the
    United States, the European air traffic system requires significant
    improvements to increase capacity and reduce delays. At the same time,
    expansion of communication technologies is pressuring a limited radio
    frequency spectrum. To address these challenges, European countries are
    mandating more efficient air traffic communications systems and
    avionics. The U.S. has many similar plans; however, Europe is leading
    worldwide implementation due to its current frequency and air traffic
    congestion. We have no choice but to equip our aircraft for flight in
    the airspaces of Europe as well as the rest of the world to allow
    access to perform our mission.

                 INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

        For the past several years, we have been living in a new
    operational environment for both conventional and support operations as
    technological advances change the way our potential adversaries and the
    U.S. military operate. At the same time, military forces have become
    the spearhead for several nation-building efforts. To meet these
    challenges, our intelligence collection and analytical efforts must
    constantly adapt to keep pace with the evolving intelligence demands
    associated with these new mission areas. Potential asymmetric attacks,
    including WMD, terrorism and information operations, may be directed
    not only at our deployed forces, but also at our critical
    infrastructures.

                        INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO USEUCOM

        National agency support, including overhead collection, analysis
    and reporting, is critical to supporting our operational forces and
    engagement strategies. While we continue to revalidate our commanders'
    intelligence requirements and economize our requirements on these
    national resources, there is no theater capability to complement
    national collection support.
        Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) capabilities are critical to
    meeting USEUCOM intelligence needs. In particular, the contributions of
    the Defense Attache System provide first-hand insights into the
    military-to-military relations in each country and timely reporting on
    crisis situations. The initiative to expand Defense Attache Office
    presence in Africa is important to our engagement programs. In
    addition, DIA is leading a defense intelligence community effort to
    meet future challenges. This effort includes improvements to the
    database to enhance future targeting capabilities, increased
    interoperability between national levels and tactical commanders, and
    an emphasis on new threats such as WMD and terrorism. The most
    significant of these is the emphasis on the workforce to ensure the
    intelligence workforce is capable of meeting these and other threats
    now and in the future. I am confident these initiatives will shape and
    improve defense intelligence support for the warfighter.
        USEUCOM relies heavily on National Security Agency (NSA) products
    and services. The actions undertaken by the Director of the NSA to
    transform the agency into an organization that will successfully
    respond to future threats of the Information Age are critical to
    ensuring the safety of our forces. Funding support for NSA's efforts
    will help mitigate trade-offs during NSA's transformation process,
    while ensuring the timely deployment of capabilities needed to exploit
    and defeat modern adversaries. Such funding will have the added benefit
    of meeting USEUCOM's needs now, and into the rapidly evolving future.
        The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) provides critical
    imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial information support and has
    repeatedly demonstrated its responsiveness to USEUCOM crisis
    operations. The need to precisely engage targets while minimizing
    collateral damage requires accurate and timely spatial and temporal
    intelligence. NIMA initiatives to develop a global geospatial
    foundation are critical in achieving our operational and engagement
    objectives. Additionally, NIMA's efforts to provide a critical IMINT
    tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) system are
    crucial in fully realizing the benefits of our next generation imaging
    satellites. The recent congressionally-directed NIMA Commission,
    however, concluded TPED is under-resourced overall, and the U.S. cannot
    expect to fully realize the promise of the next generation of IMINT
    satellites unless NIMA TPED is adequately funded.

                             INFORMATION DOMINANCE

        In conducting our missions and executing our responsibilities,
    USEUCOM commanders have an indispensable edge: We enjoy ``information
    dominance'' that comes from the interaction of superior intelligence
    and information infrastructures. However, that edge is perishable and
    is constantly threatened. The section addresses our health in both.
     command, control, communications, and computer systems infrastructure
        Europe's Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
    (C\4\) infrastructure needs improvement to be able to handle a major
    crisis. Many USEUCOM networks were built in the 1940s and 1950s to
    support low-bandwidth voice service, and are simply inadequate for
    evolving high bandwidth demands, such as worldwide command and control
    video conferences, live Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video feeds,
    electronic tasking orders for our air and land forces, theater-wide
    situational awareness, and full implementation of DOD's Global Combat
    Command and Control and Global Combat Support Systems. These systems
    are the foundation of USEUCOM's command and control capabilities.
        The theater's World War II-era infrastructures suffer weather-
    related degradation in copper cables still insulated with wrapped
    paper. Increased network loads and failure of critical components cause
    unacceptable system delays and outages. Many naval sites in particular
    are unable to meet the minimum requirements for the Navy/Marine Corps
    Intranet--their primary information service network. Furthermore,
    current infrastructure does not support Information Assurance (IA)
    measures, potentially allowing our collection, analysis, dissemination,
    and command and control functions to be jeopardized by hostile or
    inadvertent interference.
        We depend upon information services and network-centric command and
    control to enable smaller forward deployments, rapidly deployable joint
    task forces and task force component commands, shorter decision times,
    and improved force protection capabilities. This reliance makes
    targeting our networks an attractive option for adversaries unable to
    field conventional forces against us, and makes IA an absolute must if
    we are to maintain information superiority, and the integrity of our
    command and control.
        USEUCOM's satellite communications lack flexibility, and capacity
    is extremely limited. In the event of a major crisis in Southwest Asia,
    nearly all of our mission-essential communications could be preempted
    by the surge in bandwidth requirements from U.S. Central Command.
    Realistically, this infrastructure needs to be replaced with modern
    high-bandwidth capability, preferably within the next 5 to 7 years--a
    significant investment, but one that we can't afford not to make.

                   OTHER AREAS FOR INVESTMENT AND IMPROVEMENT

        Recent process improvements have enhanced coordination and
    prioritization of scarce intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) resources across numerous worldwide requirements. However,
    airborne collectors remain a ``low density--high demand'' asset. Our
    ability to penetrate denied and high-risk airspace is critical to
    deliver the real-time threat awareness to deployed forces in places
    like the Balkans, Northern Iraq, and the Levant. We need to ensure the
    development of these capabilities, including long dwell UAVs with both
    imagery and signals collection capabilities, stays on track in order to
    deliver necessary warning and force protection in threatening and
    uncertain environments.

                                   RESOURCES

        America's most precious military resource, servicemembers and their
    families, are our number one combat multiplier. The well-being of the
    family is one of our top theater priorities, and is inextricably linked
    to readiness, retention, and reinforcement of core values, healthy
    family life, high morale, and mission accomplishment.

                                QUALITY OF LIFE

        The quality of our housing, medical care, schools, religious
    services, public facilities, community services, and recreation
    activities in Europe should reflect the American standard of living--a
    value we have all pledged to defend. Our most important fiscal year
    2000 Quality of Life (QOL) objective was to analyze and quantify the
    impact QOL has on readiness and retention. We took ``expert testimony''
    from senior enlisted advisors and family members across the theater.
    Their conclusions paralleled previous evaluations, with family housing
    and barracks, spouse employment, childcare and health care, dependent
    education, and now the work environment consistently identified as
    lagging the farthest behind.

                            MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

        We have seen many positive results from increased congressional
    funding last year and we all applaud and are thankful for congressional
    efforts to ensure the readiness of our forward deployed forces and
    families. Of particular note, the recently added $25 million provided
    to the Army in Europe to plan and design their ``Efficient Basing
    Initiative'' is greatly appreciated, and will prove important as we
    work to revitalize our existing infrastructure. However, there is still
    a substantial amount of work to do to adequately provide for our
    servicemembers, civilians, and family members who deserve quality
    housing, workplace, and community facilities.
        Housing, both unaccompanied and family, has improved continuously
    for the last 3 years and the outlook is promising. The elimination of
    gang latrines and the renovation of the barracks and dormitories to
    DOD's 1+1 standard has been a major morale booster for our troops and
    our components are on track to meet the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
    requirement for fiscal year 2008. Military family housing throughout
    Europe as a whole remains old, however, and is well below contemporary
    standards, and in need of extensive repairs and modernization. Although
    our housing programs in Europe are generally on track to meet DPG
    requirements for fiscal year 2010, for the Air Force alone, military
    housing construction allocations of over $100 million per year for the
    next decade will be required to achieve minimum housing requirements.
    Quality housing for military members and their families continues to be
    a critical element in attracting and retaining the high caliber
    personnel who make our military forces the best in the world.
        With trends in housing and barracks positive, it is now essential
    to focus our attention on the quality of the infrastructure of our
    communities and work facilities in Europe. Sustaining, restoring, and
    modernizing facilities are critical to properly supporting the military
    mission within the theater. From runways for our aircraft to the work
    place for our troops, the infrastructure support for our operations and
    people has weakened over time. This failing infrastructure is due to
    almost a decade of placing MILCON and Real Property Maintenance funding
    at a lower priority than other needs. Significant investments need to
    be made over the next decade to enhance our warfighter's support
    infrastructure and demonstrate to our people that they are indeed our
    most valuable resource.
        USEUCOM is aggressively using all available funding sources,
    including the NATO Security Investment Program, Residual Value,
    Payment-in-Kind, and any additional funds provided by Congress, such as
    last year's Kosovo MILCON Supplemental Appropriation, to help reduce
    costs and meet escalating requirements. Additionally, some European
    base closures and consolidations will reduce future costs, enhance
    readiness, and increase effectiveness. Current ongoing efforts include
    the Army's proposed relocation of an entire brigade combat team
    currently spread across more than 13 sites, to the Grafenwoehr/Vilseck,
    Germany area. This consolidation will significantly improve command and
    control, enhance training opportunities and vastly improve quality of
    life for the troops and family members--while saving approximately $40
    million per year in infrastructure costs.
        With our continuing resolve to reduce the footprint while
    maintaining presence in our AOR, recapitalization has also become a
    critical issue. Progress is ongoing with the Naples Improvement
    Initiative nearly completed and construction efforts at Naval Air
    Station (NAS) Sigonella about to commence. These efforts will provide a
    significant improvement in both quality of life and service for sailors
    stationed in the European Southern Region.
        These and other initiatives are essential for posturing our forces
    to better perform their missions, both now and in the future. In the
    meantime, we will continue to endeavor to help ourselves first and work
    every opportunity for internal efficiencies through consolidation,
    privatization, and ensuring maximum benefit from available funding.

                              DEPENDENT EDUCATION

        With over half of USEUCOM servicemembers supporting families with
    children in school, the quality of DOD's dependent education programs
    ranks very high in determining QOL for our civilian personnel and
    servicemembers. As with many of our other QOL programs, lack of
    adequate infrastructure funding is the top concern. Since many of our
    schools are remote, program-based staffing is critical to provide a
    full range of educational opportunity for all students in music, art,
    and associated after school activities. We must take aggressive action
    to expand vocational, technical and school-to-work opportunities for
    our students. Finally, we must work toward establishing an 18:1
    student-teacher ratio for kindergarten and to provide a Talented and
    Gifted program for middle schools similar to what is currently
    available at our high schools.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The U.S. European Command, which I am proud and honored to command,
    is executing new and exciting missions everyday, while successfully
    maintaining its warfighting edge. USEUCOM has also been active and has
    indeed expanded its engagement efforts, working to influence the
    military evolution of NATO, PfP, and emerging European defense
    structures. Finally, USEUCOM has seized new opportunities involving
    Russia, the Caucasus, and Africa, and will continue to seek new
    openings to expand our relationships.
        Although our current posture is favorable and capable of meeting
    our national security interests, our infrastructure in particular is in
    need of upgrade and replenishment. Generally, significant increases in
    funding are necessary to maintain our readiness, continue current
    engagement efforts, and make the necessary investments to sustain our
    quality of life.
        Without bipartisan congressional support, USEUCOM would not have
    been able to realize the achievements accomplished over the past year.
    On behalf of all personnel in the USEUCOM theater, I want to thank the
    committee for its support.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General Ralston.
        General Franks.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

        General Franks. Mr. Chairman, first of all let me reinforce
    the point that you made earlier when you talked about the
    quality of the young people that we have serving today in the
    Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, our Special Operating Forces,
    our Coast Guard. In fact, they are the best that we have had,
    and that brings to my mind the fact that what I would like to
    do with the committee is express on the record our condolences
    in Central Command to the families and the loved ones of those
    young people who were lost last week in that training accident
    on the Udairi Range at Observation Post 10 in the state of
    Kuwait. Five Americans and a New Zealand Army officer were
    killed in this tragic accident, while they were in the
    performance of duties designed to increase the stability in a
    region that is inherently unstable.
        It reminds me of the fact that ours is a dangerous
    profession, and these young people do in fact go in harm's way
    as they do the mission. All of us are in their debt, and in
    Central Command we join friends and allies in saluting the
    courage and the patriotism, commitment, and sacrifice of these
    young people.
        Additionally, I would like to thank the Government of
    Kuwait, as well as others in the region, for the magnificent
    support that they provided with respect to this accident.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today
    before the committee to have an opportunity to talk about the
    central region, an area of vital importance to the United
    States of America, and what our activities are all about, what
    our interactions are, what are difficulties are, and what our
    needs are.
        As this committee certainly knows, in this region on a
    given day will be between 18,500 and perhaps as high as 25,000
    American personnel. Today we stand at a bit over 21,000
    Americans deployed in the region, 175 to 200 airframes involved
    in our operations there, and generally between 25 and 30 ships
    with a carrier battle group in the Northern Arabian Gulf.
        This region, as the committee knows, includes 25 countries,
    in an area about twice the size of the continental United
    States. Our forces around the clock, 365 days a year, are
    involved in enforcement of the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq, a
    security zone that extends from south to north, that being from
    the Kuwait or Saudi border up to the 33rd parallel about 180
    nautical miles, and our sailors, and marines, additionally
    serve in Marine Expeditionary Units as they are in the region
    about 6 months of each year interacting with forces there.
        Our maritime forces include, as I mentioned, a carrier
    battle group involved in maritime interception operations to
    ensure that the regime in Iraq is not afforded the unrestricted
    opportunity to smuggle gas oil using maritime routes in order
    to enhance Saddam Hussein's disposable income, which he has
    provided every evidence he will use to enhance his military
    position by building up and modernizing his conventional
    forces, his integrated air defense systems, as well as his
    weapons of mass destruction program.
        These people who serve in the central region are doing this
    every day, and I mentioned to the committee, Mr. Chairman, they
    do, in fact, go in harm's way. Witness the Khobar Towers
    incident, or witness the bombing of the Saudi Arabian National
    Guard facility several years ago, witness 12 October this past
    year, where 17 Americans, 17 sailors lost their lives in the
    Port of Aden in a terrorist incident.
        We ask a lot of these young people, we expect a lot of
    these young people, we owe them what we seek in Central
    Command, in fact all the military services to provide, and that
    is the appropriate balance of our resource levels to ensure
    appropriate force protection, to ensure appropriate policy-
    level decisions, to provide the benefit of experience from
    within the region to the policy level, as the policies are
    being formed by this administration, to ensure that we do the
    best things we can to work toward the assurance of maintaining
    access to this region of vital and enduring interest to the
    country.
        Mr. Chairman, I have asked that my prepared remarks be
    included in the record, and at this point I will stop the oral
    remarks and be pleased to entertain the committee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Gen. Tommy R. Franks, USA

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.
        U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR)
    includes 25 nations, extending from Egypt and Jordan to the Horn of
    Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and Central
    Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. Included are the waters of the
    Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf, with maritime
    chokepoints of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of
    Hormuz.
        The current National Security Strategy specifies that our core
    objectives in this vital region are to enhance U.S. security, promote
    democracy and human rights, and bolster American economic prosperity.
    To meet these goals, USCENTCOM promotes regional stability, ensures
    uninterrupted access to resources and markets, maintains freedom of
    navigation, protects U.S. citizens and property, and promotes the
    security of regional friends and allies.
        As we work with policymakers to define USCENTCOM's approach in the
    AOR, we address our objectives and goals in light of the political-
    military dynamics of the region. The Middle East Peace Negotiations
    (MEPN) and U.S. relationships with Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey
    influence our relations with Egypt, Jordan, and the states of the Gulf
    Cooperation Council (GCC). Pakistan is important to the U.S. because of
    regional tensions and its proximity and relationship to Afghanistan.
    U.S.-Pakistan relations continue to be influenced by these issues and
    by progress toward a return to civil, democratic government.
    Transnational issues including humanitarian disasters, refugees,
    international crime, drug smuggling and terrorism, and state-to-state
    conflicts such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia War, will continue to define our
    tasks in the Horn of Africa. Our relations with the Central Asian
    states will be influenced by their relationships with Russia, their
    concern about extremism generated from Afghanistan, and our efforts and
    commitments to help the Central Asian states in maintaining their
    independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through democratic
    and defense reform.
        Natural resource distribution will continue to influence regional
    dynamics. Control of water sources and uses downstream may heighten
    existing international tensions, particularly along the Nile, Tigris,
    Euphrates, and Jordan Rivers. Competing claims over the control and
    distribution of energy resources will continue to influence relations
    between states, particularly around the Caspian Sea.
        On a given day, USCENTCOM operates in the region with some 30 naval
    vessels, 175-200 military aircraft, and between 18,000 and 25,000
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, coast guardsmen, and marines. Activities
    range from missions such as Operation Southern Watch enforcement of the
    No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Southern Iraq, to Maritime Intercept Operations
    (MIO) in the northern Persian Gulf, to Security Assistance, to
    International Military Education and Training (IMET), to Joint and
    Combined Exercises, and Humanitarian Demining (HD). Our military men
    and women continue to do a remarkable job across the board in enhancing
    U.S. relationships in the region, in promoting stability, and in
    supporting diplomatic efforts aimed at securing America's vital and
    enduring national interests.
        There is, however, a price for America's visibility in pursuit of
    our interests. Some, opposed to the values for which our country
    stands, have determined to take direct and violent action against our
    presence in the region. The terrorist bombing of the Office of Program
    Management for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM SANG), the Khobar
    Towers bombing, the attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and
    last October's attack on U.S.S. Cole continue to demonstrate that our
    opponents are dedicated, determined, and resourceful. Our clear task is
    to remain resolutely committed to the principles we stand for while we
    provide the best possible protection for our people. Efforts to counter
    the terrorist threat are ongoing, but much remains to be done as our
    men and women in uniform daily go ``in harm's way.''
        I will now describe our AOR in greater detail, highlight our
    ongoing challenges and opportunities, and identify our essential
    requirements.

                                REGIONAL TRENDS

    Overview
        The Central Region is of vital interest to the United States.
    Sixty-eight percent of the world's proven oil reserves are found in the
    Gulf Region and 43 percent of the world's petroleum exports pass
    through the Strait of Hormuz. The developing energy sector of the
    Central Asian states, with the potential for discovery of additional
    oil reserves, further emphasizes the importance of the Central Region
    to America and the world.
        The words that best describe the AOR are ``diversity'' and
    ``volatility.'' The region is home to more than 500 million people,
    three of the world's major religions, at least 18 major ethnic groups,
    and national economies that produce annual per capita incomes varying
    from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of dollars.
        Portions of USCENTCOM's AOR are characterized by instability. We
    find social volatility due to pressures created as governments
    transition toward democracy, and we find additional social, economic
    and military stresses from humanitarian crises, the strains of resource
    depletion or overuse, religious or ethnic conflict, and military power
    imbalances. While national instability is not uncommon, the volatility
    of USCENTCOM's AOR is particularly significant because of its
    geographical and economic importance. The natural resources of Saudi
    Arabia, Kuwait and others have provided extraordinary opportunities for
    these nations, but also have given rise to a range of socio-economic
    problems and rivalries. States such as Egypt and Jordan have
    compensated to a large extent for their lack of mineral wealth through
    positive use of their human resources. Yet, there are nations in the
    region that have not generated the will, resources, or organization to
    move ahead. These factors will not be easily overcome, and portend
    potential regional challenges for the future.
    Iraq
        Ten years ago, American leadership produced a coalition that
    defeated Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Despite victory, we
    remain engaged in current operations in the Gulf because of Iraq's
    refusal to abide by the terms of a series of United Nations Security
    Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).
        In the past year, coalition forces flew more than 19,000 sorties in
    support of Operation Southern Watch (enforcement of the Southern Iraq
    NFZ), with almost 10,000 of those sorties in Iraqi airspace. The
    purpose of these missions in support of United Nations (UN) resolutions
    remains the protection of Iraqi civilians (Kurds in the north/Shia in
    the south) from Saddam Hussein and the prevention of Iraqi aggression
    against its neighbors. Our forces have been engaged by surface-to-air
    missiles or anti-aircraft fire more than 500 times during the period,
    and coalition forces have responded to these provocations on 38
    occasions. Enforcement of the NFZ will remain dangerous but necessary
    business as long as the Iraqi regime continues to threaten its
    neighbors and its own people. Similarly, our naval forces maintain
    continuous presence in the Persian Gulf, and have intercepted 610 ships
    in the past year in support of MIO, enforcing UN sanctions designed to
    limit Saddam Hussein's ability to smuggle oil out of Iraq. Iraqi oil
    smuggling provides uncontrolled revenues, which could be used to
    reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and rebuild his
    conventional forces. Sixty-five of these ships have been diverted to
    Gulf coalition partners where contraband oil has been confiscated and
    sold. Again, necessary but dangerous business.
        As allied forces continue to enforce the resolutions, Iraq has
    become more aggressive in attempts to circumvent them. As the second-
    largest producer of oil after Saudi Arabia, Iraq has attempted to
    manipulate the UN Oil-for-Food (O-F-F) program. Because of Saddam's
    obstruction, not all revenues and supplies intended for the direct
    relief of the Iraqi people under the O-F-F program have found their way
    to the population. Additionally, by halting and restarting crude oil
    exports of up to 2.3 million barrels per day, Iraq has attempted to
    establish leverage that it can use to end sanctions. Saddam's ability
    to circumvent UN sanctions leaves little incentive for him to accept
    UNSCR 1284 or permit the resumption of UN inspections. In the absence
    of inspectors and a long-term monitoring program, we cannot verify that
    Iraq is not continuing research, development and production of WMD and
    ballistic missiles.
        Despite the overwhelming defeat of Iraq's conventional military
    force, it remains a threat to its neighbors and has repeatedly
    demonstrated an ability to project force as evidenced by significant
    deployments to western Iraq in October and November/December 2000. Iraq
    continues to challenge coalition aircraft in the NFZs despite the
    effects of 10 years of sanctions on its air force and continued
    attrition of its air defense forces. Despite the degradation of Iraq's
    military capability, our regional partners do not yet possess the
    capability to deter Iraqi aggression without our assistance.
        Saddam is as secure now as at any time in the past decade. Iraqi
    participation in the 21-22 October 2000 Arab Summit and the 12-13
    November 2000 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) signals his
    attempt to reenter the Arab fold, and renewed contacts between Baghdad
    and a number of moderate Arab countries following the breakdown of the
    MEPN make the U.S. leadership role critical as we work to rebuild the
    Gulf War coalition. USCENTCOM operations and military-to-military
    relationships remain key to this effort.

                                      IRAN

        Iran's future is an enigma in the question of stability in the AOR.
    Since 1997, President Khatami has attempted to change the image of Iran
    by initiating diplomatic rapprochement with Europe and the Gulf States.
    Domestically, moderate legislators have the majority in the parliament
    and have attempted to reform the system by introducing greater
    transparency and accountability within government. However,
    conservative hard-liners have closed Iran's free press, blocked reform
    legislation, and intimidated and jailed moderate legislators and
    popular figures, effectively maintaining an atmosphere of social and
    political repression.
        Iran faces severe internal challenges including domestic political
    and economic problems, massive unemployment, and increasing drug use.
    While a majority of Iranians, especially the young, demand change, they
    find themselves virtually powerless. President Khatami has not
    succeeded in changing the system while Supreme Leader Khamenei and the
    ruling conservatives have clearly demonstrated that they will not
    accept change, nor will they share the principal elements of state
    power with an increasingly restless population.
        Meanwhile, Iran continues to improve its conventional and
    unconventional military capabilities. Tehran's ability to interdict the
    Strait of Hormuz with air, surface, and sub-surface naval units, as
    well as mines and missiles remains a concern. Additionally, Iran's
    asymmetrical capabilities are becoming more robust. These include high
    speed, fast attack patrol ships; anti-ship missiles; unmanned aerial
    vehicles (UAVs); and hardened facilities for surface-to-surface
    missiles and command and control. WMD programs and the Shahab-3/4
    Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) also continue to receive priority
    funding. Although President Khatami is attempting to change Iran's
    image, sustained hostility of conservative hard-liners is evident as we
    see continued support of terrorism aimed at derailing efforts for peace
    between Israel and the Palestinians.
        As Tehran deals with the stresses of a growing and increasingly
    discouraged population, internal political volatility could result in
    diplomatic, military, or asymmetric attacks on Iran's neighbors or
    American citizens and our interests. If we factor Iran's burgeoning WMD
    capability into this equation, the risks increase significantly and
    Iran becomes the greatest long-term threat in our AOR.
    Gulf States
        Increased revenues from high oil prices have benefited Gulf oil
    producers. This financial shot in the arm has reduced budget deficits
    and reactivated previously stalled infrastructure projects. However,
    socio-economic problems, such as increasing population, high
    unemployment, declining public services, and a depressed worldwide
    financial market, have focused the nations on the Arabian Peninsula on
    economic reforms that are intended to diversify and stimulate their
    economies.
        Regional stability was recently enhanced through the resolution of
    long-standing Saudi-Yemeni border and Kuwaiti-Saudi maritime boundary
    disputes. But, unresolved United Arab Emirates (UAE)-Iran and Bahrain-
    Qatar territorial disputes, and Kuwait-Iran maritime boundary disputes
    remain.
        The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence is of continuing concern
    in the Gulf region. This violence has increased internal pressures on
    moderate Arab governments who must balance responses to public opinion
    with the value placed on their relationships with the West. If the
    Peninsula states begin to distance themselves from the U.S., their
    inability to face the dual threats of Iran and Iraq will leave them
    vulnerable to intimidation by these aggressive powers.
    Northern Red Sea
        The Northern Red Sea sub-region (Egypt and Jordan) is on the front
    lines of the MEPN and has the most to gain or lose from the process.
    Peace would usher in the prospect of economic development, a stable
    financial environment, and social stability. Continued conflict
    encourages extremism, deters economic investment from outside the
    region, and inhibits tourism, a major source of income in both Egypt
    and Jordan. President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan have
    walked a fine line on the issue despite domestic difficulties, calls
    for breaking diplomatic relations with Israel, and for boycotts of
    Israeli and U.S. goods.
        Economically, Egypt's move toward privatization is hampered by
    concerns about unemployment and the expected economic downturn that
    would initially follow. As Egypt's major source of hard currency is
    tourism, its economy reacts dramatically to advances or setbacks in
    MEPN.
        Jordan suffers from water shortages, high unemployment, deficit
    spending, and a stagnant economy hampered by sanctions imposed on Iraq,
    Jordan's largest trading partner and its sole supplier of oil. Jordan's
    economic prospects are limited by the region's instability, magnified
    by the fact that 60 percent of the population of Jordan is Palestinian.
    King Abdullah has managed to support the Palestinian cause while
    maintaining ties with Israel, and dealing with the economic impact of
    sharing borders with Syria and Iraq.
    Central and South Asia
        Central Asia's primary security concern is the threat posed by
    religious extremism generated from the continuing conflict in
    Afghanistan. In response to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
    incursion in 1999, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan began developing new
    tactics and deployed military forces to critical defensive corridors in
    anticipation of renewed IMU activity. Consequently, and due to
    increased logistical and training support provided by the U.S., Turkey,
    Russia, and China, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan anticipated and
    effectively countered IMU infiltration into their territory in the
    summer and fall of 2000. But these countries, and the Central Asia
    region as a whole, will remain vulnerable to renewed IMU attacks in the
    coming spring and summer. USCENTCOM will continue to work with the
    militaries in Central Asia to enhance their abilities to secure their
    borders, build multilateral relationships through exercises, and
    support diplomatic efforts to enhance stability and nurture democracy.
        Pakistan remains key to achieving stability in South and Central
    Asia. Peace initiatives instituted by Pakistan and India have the
    potential to develop into meaningful dialogue and dramatically reduce
    tensions in the region, but both these nuclear states require
    encouragement to move forward. Pakistan perceives U.S. policy as
    ``tilting'' in favor of India, which complicates dialogue on the
    subcontinent. This perception is fueled by our limited military-to-
    military interaction with Pakistan coupled with the current moratorium
    on International Military Education and Training (IMET). Historically,
    the Pakistani military is one of the most influential forces within the
    country and USCENTCOM's relationships at the military level could
    create leverage to enhance stability in South Asia.
        Afghanistan remains a destabilizing influence in the region. In one
    way or another, all of Afghanistan's neighbors are affected by
    Afghanistan's internal war--either as a supporter of one side or the
    other, or by proximity to the chaos generated by the war.
        The military, economic and social stresses brought on by the Afghan
    conflict and the continuing tension between India and Pakistan impact
    each of the Central Asian governments and regional economies as well,
    and have prompted the Central Asian states to look for increased
    collective security opportunities. USCENTCOM has effective mil-to-mil
    programs with Khazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgystan, and is interested
    in beginning engagement with Tajikistan, a country key to the region
    because of its geostrategic location and close ties to Russia.
    Tajikistan has submitted paperwork to join the Partnership for Peace
    program, and the Department of State is actively working to obtain
    Cooperative Threat Reduction certification and IMET funding to support
    their request.
    Africa
        The 2\1/2\-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea appears to have
    ended with the 12 December 2000 peace agreement. With the deployment of
    the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), both
    countries have promised to uphold the principles of the peace
    agreement. As long as UN peacekeepers are present, renewed fighting is
    not expected. As these states implement the peace agreement, we will
    reopen military contacts and seek to build on relationships that
    provide balance and enhance regional stability.
        Other countries in the Horn of Africa are still suffering from the
    impact of a 5-year drought that places 20 million in need of aid, about
    10 million of whom are facing starvation. Despite donor fatigue, aid
    agencies remain responsive to this humanitarian disaster, and USCENTCOM
    will continue to assist with humanitarian programs in every way
    possible.
        Sudan continues to provide support and safe haven to transnational
    terrorists and opposition groups. President Bashir has been unable to
    end the civil war in southern Sudan, and factional fighting has caused
    the UN and other relief agencies to periodically suspend relief
    efforts.
        Despite Djiboutian efforts to revive a national Somali government,
    there is little prospect that Somalia will emerge as a coherent state
    in the near future. Djibouti itself will continue to face challenges as
    it struggles to deal with its own economic, political and social
    problems.
        Despite the continuing drought-induced humanitarian crisis
    described above, economic stagnation, and political turmoil, Kenya
    remains key to stability in East Africa and is an important friend for
    the United States. Kenya's apolitical Army remains a source of
    stability that will be important as Kenyans go to the polls in 2002 to
    elect their first new president in 23 years. The African Crisis
    Response Initiative (ACRI) will help that Army build capacity to
    respond to Kenya's needs.
    Terrorism
        The threat of terrorist activity remains high throughout the
    Central Region. Events such as the attack on U.S.S. Cole serve as
    constant reminders of this fact. Despite our counterterrorism successes
    over the past year, including the disruption of terrorist cells in
    Jordan and Kuwait, extremist groups continue to recruit, train, and
    conduct operations. One evolving trend that has helped terrorist
    organizations rebound from our counterterrorism successes is
    unprecedented cooperation between known and obscure groups. This
    cooperation includes moving people and materials, providing safe-havens
    and money, and training new recruits. The trend is especially
    disturbing as known organizations gain plausible deniability for
    operations, while the obscure groups achieve an increased capability
    from training and financial support.
        Terrorists' persistent interest in larger devices, more lethal
    tactics, and unconventional (chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear) weapons points to an even more significant problem in the
    future. In addition to the use of unconventional weapons, the potential
    for terrorists to regard unconventional targets (civilians and civilian
    infrastructure) as practical options for attack seems likely. As
    terrorist networks improve their ability to operate within the global
    communications environment, we see increased capability to support
    recruitment, conduct fund-raising, and direct sub-elements worldwide.
    The complex terrorist threat we face today is less predictable and
    potentially much more dangerous than we have seen in the past.
    Proliferation of WMD
        Russia, China and North Korea remain the primary external suppliers
    of WMD and missile-related technology to countries in the AOR, and some
    regional states with maturing WMD programs have joined the ranks of
    potential suppliers. As proliferation in the Central Region
    accelerates, coalition partners feel mounting pressure to offset the
    WMD threat with comparable weapons of their own.
        As mentioned previously, Iraq's WMD capabilities have been degraded
    but not eliminated. The reconstitution of key weapons programs may have
    begun, facilitated by the long absence of UN arms monitors. The 2+ year
    gap in the UN disarmament presence makes it difficult to verify the
    current status of biological, chemical and prohibited missile
    capabilities.
        Meanwhile, Iran continues to place a high priority on developing
    WMD, specifically chemical weapons (CW), ballistic missiles and
    possibly biological agents. Tehran is aggressively pursuing nuclear
    technology and is progressing in its development of a large-scale,
    self-supporting CW infrastructure. Additionally, they have pursued the
    development of the Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) to
    augment existing SCUD-B and SCUD-C systems. Two Shahab-3 flight tests
    were conducted in 2000 and, despite a failure on the last attempt, this
    system may now be available for use. Additional programs and
    capabilities can be expected in the future.
        In South Asia, the missile and nuclear race between Pakistan and
    India continues. Both states are developing and testing a variety of
    technologies capable of delivering nuclear devices out to ever-greater
    ranges. Although the Central Asian states neither produce nor store WMD
    on their territories, given the geopolitical situation, WMD could
    transit their borders. DOD's WMD Customs and Law Enforcement programs
    support nonproliferation efforts in Central Asia.
    Environmental Security (Water)
        Water will dominate the environmental factors that pose the
    greatest threat to regional stability. The combination of water
    scarcity, water contamination, the lack of equitable water-sharing
    agreements, population growth, and exponentially increasing demand for
    water will exacerbate an already challenging and volatile situation in
    the Central Region. While environmental factors can easily trigger
    conflict, cooperation on these issues can promote regional stability
    and contribute to the ongoing process of conflict resolution. As such,
    environmental security remains an important element in shaping a future
    made complex by competition over natural resources. USCENTCOM-sponsored
    environmental conferences will continue to provide a valuable forum for
    the region to discuss environmental issues.

                               PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

    Operational Activities
        The focus of our day-to-day operations in the Gulf region remains
    Iraq. Iraq's long-term intransigence and non-compliance with UNSCRs has
    resulted in continued NFZ operations in both northern and southern
    Iraq, and our naval forces continue to conduct maritime intercept
    operations to limit Iraq's ability to smuggle oil outside the Oil-for-
    Food Program. Additionally, we maintain a rotational ground task force
    in Kuwait to assist with initial defense of Kuwaiti should Iraq attempt
    aggression.
        USCENTCOM's Joint Task Force--Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) conducts NFZ
    enforcement, along with our UK partners, in order to monitor Iraqi
    compliance with UNSCR 688 and deter enhancement of Iraq's military
    capabilities in violation of demarches and UNSCR 949. Despite the
    resumption of both international civilian flights to Iraq and intra-
    Iraq flights, JTF-SWA remains capable of effectively enforcing the
    southern NFZ.
        One of the most visible examples of our commitment to the region is
    the presence of Naval Forces U.S. Central Command (NAVCENT) in Manama,
    Bahrain, the only component headquartered in our AOR. Operating with
    other coalition members, NAVCENT enforces UN sanctions against Iraq and
    protects our interests in the Gulf. Along with containing Iraq and
    ensuring freedom of navigation in shipping lanes critical to world
    commerce, NAVCENT operations serve as a constant reminder of U.S.
    commitment to stability in the Gulf region and Strait of Hormuz.
        Since the beginning of Operation Desert Shield (August 1990),
    Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) have resulted in the search of
    almost 13,000 ships bound for or departing from Iraq, with more than
    760 diversions. Support for MIO has been significant with ships from
    Kuwait, Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Italy,
    Australia, and the Netherlands, and boarding teams from Argentina and
    Poland having participated. Additionally, our naval units ensure
    freedom of navigation, execute maritime rescue missions, and conduct
    directed contingency operations.
        USCENTCOM provides ground presence in Kuwait with Operation Desert
    Spring (ODS). This ongoing operation, under the command and control of
    Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-Kuwait, is built around a mechanized
    infantry or tank battalion task force, an Apache helicopter company,
    and a Multiple Rocket Launch System (MLRS) battery. The units which
    rotate on 120-day tours come from both the active and Reserve
    components with a deployed strength of just over 2,500 personnel. This
    force level has been present in Kuwait since October 1999.
        These on-going operations promote stability in this volatile
    region, acting as a deterrent to potential crises. However, the
    destabilizing influence of Iraq, Iran and failed states such as
    Afghanistan and Somalia, require us also to maintain Operational Plans
    (OPLANs) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) to respond to a variety of
    crises when directed.
        Maintaining our ability to meet the command and control
    requirements of our OPLANs and CONPLANs is an important mission. This
    requirement is particularly significant, as USCENTCOM is responsible
    for a major theater warfighting mission in an AOR 7,000 miles away. In
    view of this, we have initiated the development of a Deployable Command
    Post (CP) that can be introduced into any country in the AOR early and
    increase strategic flexibility to respond across the full spectrum of
    operations. This CP is being designed to be deployable by air (C-5/C-
    17) and modular. Depending on the situation, it can range in size from
    the CINC's aircraft with a small operational staff to a full up
    headquarters with all the critical command nodes available.
        The USCENTCOM Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) provides direction and
    a common vision for our ``shaping'' of the security environment.
    Through theater engagement planning, we integrate the engagement
    activities of U.S. Central Command with those of other U.S. Government
    agencies, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations, and our
    friends and allies. The TEP draws resources from various agencies to
    include the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and
    the military services. We are working closely with the Joint Staff to
    streamline funding processes and to develop a framework to better align
    resources with missions.
        TEP engagement activities are divided into eight broad categories,
    including operations addressed above. Significant aspects of the
    remaining seven engagement categories are summarized below.
    Exercises and Combined Training
        The Joint and Combined Exercise Program is a key element of our
    current National Military Strategy, and is coordinated with other
    agencies' regional activities through the Theater Engagement Plan. The
    USCENTCOM exercise plan includes 10 major exercises and 80 smaller
    exercises for fiscal year 2001. Our aim is to maximize the use of in-
    theater forces, increase multilateral exercise and simulation
    opportunities, gain the greatest possible training benefit for our
    forces, and combine exercises whenever practicable. The program remains
    a cornerstone of our mil-to-mil relationships and serves to guarantee
    access and enhance coalition capabilities.
        In November of 2000, we executed Internal Look 01 (IL01), our
    premier battlestaff and coalition training exercise, by establishing a
    Contingency Forward Headquarters and simulating the execution of one of
    our principal plans. During the remainder of this year, we will execute
    several major sub-regional exercises. In May, Eagle Resolve, a senior-
    level symposium held in Bahrain, will be our principal mechanism for
    advancing the Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) among the GCC
    states. In early July, we will execute Regional Cooperation--formerly
    known as CENTRASBAT--a multinational peacekeeping command and staff
    exercise with various Central Asian, NATO and other Newly Independent
    States (NIS) at the Warrior Prep Center in Germany. In late July, we
    will execute the Golden Spear symposium in Kenya, bringing together the
    Ministers of Defense (MOD), Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) and Foreign
    Ministers of 10 East African nations to formulate regional strategies
    for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This fall, Bright Star
    will culminate our exercise program in Egypt when more than 35
    participating or observing nations and approximately 65,000 personnel
    take part in a coalition field training exercise.
    Combined Education and International Military Education and Training
            (IMET)
        The Combined Education and IMET programs are pivotal to sustaining
    U.S.--host nation bilateral military relationships. These programs are
    relatively low cost, high value investments that support U.S. national
    interests and help shape the security environment for the future. The
    programs afford military members of regional states, many of whom are
    destined to become senior leaders in their respective countries,
    opportunities to attend courses in our military institutions such as
    Command and Staff Colleges and Senior Service Schools. Combined
    Education and IMET support congressionally-mandated democratization
    initiatives by exposing regional military officers to the concepts of
    military professionalism, respect for human rights, and civilian
    control. Some 540 students from our AOR will attend U.S. military
    courses, schools, colleges, and training this year.
    Security Assistance
        In coordination with our ambassadors and country teams, we manage
    security assistance programs to help the countries in the AOR improve
    their military capabilities and interoperability. Foreign Military
    Sales (FMS) in the Central Region have accounted for a significant
    portion of America's worldwide sales--38 percent from 1990 through
    1999--while our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs have allowed
    us to assist AOR countries in meeting their legitimate self-defense
    needs and improving interoperability with U.S. forces.
        In the aftermath of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, a
    primary emphasis of countries in the region, particularly the countries
    of the Persian Gulf, was modernization of their armed forces through
    FMS and Direct Commercial Sales of U.S.-built equipment. Saudi Arabia
    is the largest FMS customer in the world, accounting for over $83
    billion in FMS thru fiscal year 2000. Combined with the other countries
    of the GCC, the total for this sub-region is over $94 billion through
    fiscal year 2000.
        Two significant security assistance highlights of this past year
    include:

             In March 2000, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a
            $6.4 billion commercial contract with Lockheed-Martin to
            purchase 80 F-16 Block 60 aircraft. Associated with this
            commercial sale is a projected $1.6 billion in FMS. FMS cases
            will include program support, pilot and maintenance training,
            and F-16 munitions, which include AMRAAM, AIM-9, HARM, Maverick
            and Harpoon missiles. Though the F-16 purchase was a Direct
            Commercial Sale, U.S. Government and industry worked closely
            together to bring this to fruition. As a result, the sale is a
            step toward enhanced strategic partnership.
             Similarly, the sale of ATACMS missiles to the
            Government of Bahrain was finalized on 15 December 2000, as the
            Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) continues to place emphasis on
            equipping and training their land and air forces with U.S.
            resources and making them more capable contributors to Gulf
            collective security.
    Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
        HA programs provide basic economic and social benefits for the
    civilian populations of developing countries in the region. These
    activities, in concert with a variety of State Department programs,
    focus on developing indigenous disaster response capabilities. We
    expect in the coming year to complete projects that include rudimentary
    construction and water well drilling, disaster preparedness
    assessments, transportation of DOD excess non-lethal property, and
    various other medical, dental, and veterinary projects in seven
    countries.
    Humanitarian Demining (HD)
        USCENTCOM currently provides HD training to Yemen, Oman, Djibouti,
    and Jordan. The purpose of this program is to train host nation
    military and civilian personnel in demining operations, with the
    ultimate goal of establishing local, self-sustaining capabilities. U.S.
    led demining training efforts have helped several countries to develop
    significant capabilities. Jordan, for example, is developing a regional
    response team that will be able to assist other regional partners in
    their own demining efforts--an important step which enhances multi-
    lateral relationships.

                                KEY REQUIREMENTS

        During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many
    programs. For fiscal year 2002, the President's budget includes funding
    to cover our most pressing priorities. I should note, however, that the
    programs I will discuss and the associated funding levels may change as
    a result of the Secretary's strategy review which will guide future
    decisions on military spending. The administration will determine final
    2002 and outyear funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask
    that you consider my comments in that light.
        USCENTCOM priority requirements are as follows:
    Strategic Lift
        With few permanently-stationed forces in the region, our vitally
    important power projection capability depends upon strategic lift and
    robust land and sea-based prepositioned assets. Our ability to deploy
    forces and equipment quickly remains the linchpin for conducting rapid
    response to contingencies in USCENTCOM's AOR. We must continue
    modernization and maintenance of our strategic deployment triad:
    airlift, sealift, and prepositioning.
        The accelerated retirement of the C-141 fleet and the significant
    challenges of maintaining readiness levels of the C-5 fleet make
    continued production of the C-17, progress toward C-5 modernization,
    and support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program critical to meet
    major theater war deployment timelines. Our requirements for strategic
    airlift combined with intratheater airlift are addressed in Mobility
    Requirements Study 05, which we support.
        The procurement of Large, Medium Speed Roll-on Roll-off (LMSR)
    ships is on track and will significantly enhance our lift capability.
    Under the current procurement plan, we will meet our force and
    sustainment deployment timelines with these LMSRs and Ready Reserve
    Fleet (RRF) assets by the end of fiscal year 2003.
        Prepositioning in the region, the third leg of the strategic
    deployment triad, helps mitigate our time-distance dilemma, ensures
    access, demonstrates our commitment to the region, and facilitates
    sustainment of forces until the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are
    established. I will expand on this later.
    Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C\4\I)
        USCENTCOM is responsible for executing a major theater war (MTW)
    plan without a headquarters located physically within the geographic
    AOR. As mentioned above, USCENTCOM requires a deployable command and
    control headquarters that provides the necessary flexibility to direct
    operations throughout the AOR during a crisis or armed conflict with
    assured 24-hour communications to the National Command Authorities
    (NCA), other Combatant Commands, the Services, USCENTCOM staff, our
    Component Commands, and deployed forces. We request the committee
    support our initiative to build this capability as provided for in our
    current funding plan.
        Additionally, the strategic environment in our AOR mandates a
    capable and reliable C\4\I infrastructure. The C\4\I infrastructure in
    place today is a mix of legacy equipment and modern components that
    have been assembled ad hoc as a contingency system. Intelligence,
    operations, and support systems increasingly rely on assured
    communications bandwidth. USCENTCOM must have a robust C\4\I
    infrastructure that supports these warfighting requirements. We will
    bring robust tactical communication systems into the AOR in wartime,
    but we need a joint theater C\4\I infrastructure to plug them into, one
    that takes advantage of fiberoptic cable and commercial satellite
    services that are now available in the Gulf states. Forces must
    maintain the ability to rapidly deploy to the theater, immediately
    access, and operate within our communications infrastructure and the
    global networks. Investing in our theater infrastructure will give us
    the tools we need to operate across the full spectrum.
    Full Dimensional Protection
        USCENTCOM focuses on full dimensional protection for forces and
    facilities around the clock. Protection begins with timely, high
    confidence early warning of terrorist planning and targeting. Recent
    intelligence community efforts to improve performance in this area
    through improved analysis and information sharing are steps in the
    right direction, but more needs to be done. We need a dedicated, long-
    term effort with access to all terrorist-related information, both
    intelligence and law enforcement, leveraged by state-of-the-art
    information technology tools, to get in front of the next attack.
    Timely warning will generate defensive and offensive options that we do
    not currently have. I view this as our most important initiative to
    protect forces and facilities. We must concurrently ensure that we are
    effectively postured in the event timely warning does not come.
    Improvements are needed in our ability to identify friend or foe (IFF),
    create standoff, and counter the delivery of explosives (direct or
    indirect) used against component forces and facilities. Approximately
    81 percent of USCENTCOM's funding for military construction projects is
    directed toward force protection requirements. I expect our funding
    requirements to increase in the near future as we finalize ongoing
    vulnerability assessments and increase our emphasis on elimination of
    force protection construction waivers.
        Successful execution of USCENTCOM OPLANs/CONPLANs also requires the
    capability to detect and characterize chemical, biological,
    radiological or potentially hazardous elements, as well as the ability
    to decontaminate fixed sites and provide collective protective measures
    in order to build and sustain forces within the AOR. We intend to
    retrofit existing structures and incorporate chemical/biological
    hardening into all new construction.
        Finally, integrated theater air and missile defense will remain a
    priority to provide robust and responsive defense of theater forces and
    critical assets against the full range of enemy Theater Ballistic
    Missiles (TBMs) and cruise missiles.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
        We have made progress in bringing shared situational awareness to
    our components and regional partners, but still have more work to do.
    USCENTCOM has teamed with national intelligence agencies, other
    Combatant Commands and components to devise a DOD-wide interoperability
    strategy employing a common set of analytical tools and security
    safeguards that will allow us to rapidly share information at multiple
    security levels and across echelons. USCENTCOM currently serves as the
    ``warfighter proving ground'' for several interoperability evaluations,
    having invested some $3 million in this effort in concert with the
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Battle Center, the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for C\3\I, and others.
        Synchronizing U.S. and coalition operations via a secure shared
    network is an essential USCENTCOM interoperability initiative. Our
    concept begins with hardware/software installations for the six GCC
    states plus Egypt and Jordan, to provide our partners with near-real
    time threat data and releasable operational information to support our
    contingency plans. While intelligence community and Commander in Chief
    (CINC) Initiative Funds have enabled us to make some initial progress,
    we will need congressional support to operationalize this capability as
    provided for in our current funding plan.
        Theater airborne ISR remains a critical enabler for effective
    regional indications and warning. Shortfalls in our current
    capabilities jeopardize our ability to obtain the warning necessary to
    execute our OPLANs. Solutions lie in fielding additional modernized
    airborne reconnaissance systems and next-generation long-dwell unmanned
    aerial vehicle (UAV) platforms. Such assets are necessary to fill early
    warning and mobile target collection gaps and provide a surge
    capability in the event of crisis.
        The health and status of national systems is also of concern to
    USCENTCOM. A robust national imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement
    and signature intelligence (MASINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT)
    systems architecture is essential to providing indications and warning
    and situational awareness to all echelons of command. We will continue
    to rely on these systems in tandem with the direct threat warning
    provided by our theater ISR assets. The current mix of platforms and
    sensors does not provide the full range of collection required for
    comprehensive threat warning and support to fast-paced combat
    operations. Continued congressional support for existing and planned
    national sensor platforms and upgrades, as provided for in our current
    out-year funding plan, is essential.
        MASINT provides key indications and warning, theater ballistic
    missile warning and battle damage assessment. However, the current lack
    of operational sensors and a formal architecture significantly reduces
    MASINT's ability to support military operations. MASINT has great
    potential and can provide tremendous support to the warfighter. Your
    continued support is needed for existing and planned operational
    sensors and associated architectures to make the system more capable.
        It is also essential that we maintain a robust tasking, processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) architecture. This remains a
    daunting challenge, as current limitations impede our ability to
    process, exploit and disseminate large imagery files and move this
    critical data through the ``last tactical mile'' to our components and
    their supporting units.
        Active duty intelligence personnel manning and systems support also
    remain challenges at USCENTCOM, given our high operating tempo. That
    said, our Reserve program is thriving. Reserve personnel have been
    integrated across all functional lines including systems,
    counterterrorism, analysis, imagery, targeting, and battle damage
    assessment. We would be unable to accomplish our missions and meet
    emerging requirements without this Reserve component contribution.
    Working with Regional Forces
        As I discussed earlier, key elements of our current national
    strategy include ensuring continued access for U.S. forces and
    enhancing the ability of regional states to provide for their own
    security in concert with us and with each other. To meet these
    objectives, USCENTCOM has developed a program that includes operations,
    exercises, security assistance, education, humanitarian demining, and
    military-to-military contacts.
        With few permanently-stationed forces in the AOR, a strong mil-to-
    mil program provides access to our friends and allies. Our engagement
    program provides not only training to our forces and those of our
    partners, it also provides an outstanding example of a successful,
    professional, and apolitical military to nations striving to build
    their own military traditions. Military-to-military interaction
    engenders trust and confidence and ultimately translates to greater
    security for our people. Our combined commitment to aligning resources
    with these programs will ensure success in achieving our national
    objectives.
    Prepositioning and Forward Presence
        Prepositioning in our AOR is the third leg of our strategic
    deployment triad. The Navy and Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning
    Force (MPF) program, comprised of Maritime Prepositioned Ship Squadrons
    (MPSRONS) 1, 2, and 3, maintains a high materiel readiness rate. It
    will become more robust when the MPF Enhancement (MPF(E)) Program,
    scheduled for completion in March 2002, is fully fielded. Each MPSRON
    will gain a fleet hospital, a Navy mobile construction battalion, an
    expeditionary airfield, and additional warfighting equipment. The
    MPSRON-1 Enhancement ship is already on station.
        The Army's prepositioning program, with a goal of placing a heavy
    division of equipment in the region, is advancing on schedule. The
    brigade set in Kuwait maintains high operational readiness and is
    exercised regularly. The prepositioned site in Qatar (Camp As Saliyah)
    houses the second brigade set and a division base set estimated to be
    completed before the end of fiscal year 2003. The afloat combat
    brigade, APS-3, is complete, and combat ready, and a second afloat
    brigade is planned to augment APS-3 with an equipment fill of 83
    percent of requirement in the near term. The Army is evaluating other
    actions which could lead to a fill of 92 percent of requirement.
        The Air Force Harvest Falcon bare-based materiel program is also a
    vital asset to meet our requirements, as these assets support the
    generation of Air Force combat sorties in the early stages of
    contingencies. Having these sets positioned in the AOR lets us avoid
    diverting critical strategic lift assets at the start of a conflict to
    the movement of bare-base materials, thereby delaying the arrival of
    warfighting elements. Currently, our on hand Harvest Falcon assets are
    45 percent mission capable.
    Transformation
        Our ability to shape the environment and influence the battlespace
    is linked to transformation efforts by the Services and members of the
    joint team. In particular, USCENTCOM supports the development of the
    doctrine, organization, and training that will enable joint, combined
    operations in the multinational setting. We support further development
    of a process for integrating coalition members into our transformation
    efforts.
        Across the board, USCENTCOM endorses Service efforts aimed at
    transformation of existing force structures to modernized, versatile,
    full spectrum forces. Of special importance to USCENTCOM is Army
    transformation, which will provide required adaptive, lethal, and
    survivable forces responsive to the diverse operating continuum in our
    AOR.
    Quality of Life
        Finally, the requirements identified above mean little without our
    most important resource, people. An essential component of force
    readiness is continued emphasis on improving the quality of life for
    service members and their families. I applaud the leadership shown by
    Congress with passage of the ``TRICARE For Life'' program for retirees
    and family members. I ask for your continued support to the Defense
    Health Program as we fully realize the ``TRICARE promise'' for our
    personnel and families stationed overseas and in remote locations.
    ``Taking care of our own'' through medical, pay, and other entitlement
    programs provides the Services a set of powerful recruitment and
    retention tools.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In the near-term, Saddam Hussein will continue to challenge our
    resolve as we rebuild and strengthen the Gulf coalition. In the long-
    term, Iran's moves toward regional hegemony could be of greater
    concern. The Central Region is as dynamic as it is volatile. Weapons of
    mass destruction, state-to-state conflict, terrorism, and general
    instability will continue to place special demands on our people and on
    our ingenuity.
        Interaction and cooperation with regional militaries will remain a
    vital ingredient in enhancing stability and security in this AOR. This
    interaction equals access and goes a long way toward building trust and
    confidence with our friends and allies. Our presence strengthens
    relations with our hosts and improves our ability to protect ourselves
    by eliminating suspicion, demystifying intent, opening the door to
    communication, and denying the closed environment in which terrorists
    thrive.
        The volatility of our region requires that USCENTCOM remain
    adaptable and agile. Without a large footprint in the region, we must
    be truly ``deployable.'' Responsive command, control, and
    communications during peace, crisis, and conflict will remain key to
    our ability to accomplish the mission. We have the finest soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, coast guardsmen, and marines in the world. Your
    steadfast, superb and visible support has made it so and you can count
    on them to do all we ask of them--and more.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        General Ralston, I am going to pick up on your last
    presentation about the need for the military construction in
    your area. I think that is a very important issue. It does not
    have the drama of conflict and all of the other things that
    come to the attention of people through media and otherwise,
    but it is just as important to give your troops the basic
    requirements of a quality of life which they deserve,
    commensurate with the onerous burdens of picking up here in the
    United States, moving overseas and adapting to the local
    economy. Often it is difficult for the wife to engage in other
    activities and care for the family if the income level of the
    family requires her to work.
        You and I understand those things through long years, and I
    am going to very much participate in trying to give you this
    support, but I have to tell you that that is but one part of
    the overall concern here in Congress of the United States, and
    certainly with this Senator on this committee. Another area of
    concern is a drifting attitude that I see with respect to NATO,
    brought along by this European Security and Defense Policy
    (ESDP).
        Yesterday, our committee had the pleasure of receiving the
    British Secretary of State for Defence, and we had a long
    discussion with him on that subject. I will speak for myself
    for the moment--there is a concern about further augmentation
    of U.S. spending and so forth with regard to NATO.
        Now, it may well be that we will have to do this by
    necessity, because the evolution of this new concept in NATO is
    going to take a long time. This is an emergency situation that
    has to be addressed, but I would be less than candid if I did
    not point out my concern, and I think of others, about this
    situation.
        I remember when I first came to the Senate some 23 years
    ago, the then-Majority Leader of the Senate, or he had just
    stepped down, he had an amendment, the Mansfield amendment, to
    bring our troops out of NATO. In the early years in my Senate
    career, time and time again we had to go to the floor of the
    Senate to gain the support of the whole Senate to do an orderly
    withdrawal of our forces, and not a precipitous one.
        I am not suggesting that that is going to happen here
    tomorrow, but nevertheless, that is a part of Senate history,
    and it could be brought up in an orderly way. Yesterday with
    the visit of our British colleague, one of our colleagues
    brought up the question of whether or not U.S. force levels in
    Europe need to be kept at the 100,000 figure that you
    mentioned, in view of the desire for this initiative within
    NATO. I think it is important to get this into the record every
    time we have the opportunity, through your appearance and
    others.
        General Ralston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me give a
    little bit of background on the European Security and Defense
    Identity (ESDI) and ESDP that we talk about. For years, we as
    Americans have asked the Europeans to do more to carry their
    own security, so I would like to be supportive of anything that
    improves the security posture of our European nations, and so
    therefore I want to be supportive of ESDI with the caveat that
    it should be done in a way that does not detract from the NATO
    alliance.
        Now, I think there is a way to do this. Let me give you
    what I think is the right way ahead, and then I will come back
    and talk about some of the downsides if we do not do that.
        There are four nations, Mr. Chairman, that are in the
    European Union that are not in NATO: Finland, Sweden, Austria,
    and Ireland. I think the proper way to do this is to bring
    those four nations' military planners to Supreme Headquarters
    Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) headquarters, where we have the 19
    NATO nations there, and in terms of operational planning,
    military planners will do what military planners always do.
    They will come up with military options. We will have option A,
    and option A will have a certain set of forces, and a certain
    risk factor, and a certain chance of success, and option B will
    have a different set of forces, and a different risk, and
    different chances of success, and option C, and once those
    options are designed, then they can be provided simultaneously
    to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Council.
        Now, the two political bodies will have the same set of
    plans, the same set of facts, and the two political bodies can
    then deliberate as to who should do this operation, should this
    be a NATO operation, or should it be a European Union
    operation, and the United States will be well-represented in
    that debate as it sits around the table in Brussels.
        Now, my concern is if we do not do it the way I have
    outlined, and instead the European Union sets up their own
    planning mechanism over here, that has three major downsides.
    First, it is wasteful of resources. The last thing that the
    European nations need to be doing is spending money on more
    jobs for generals in headquarters in Paris. That is money that
    needs to be going into the battalions and the squadrons and the
    ships, not in more headquarters.
        Second, if we do not do the planning the way I said, then
    the European Union will come up with options 1, 2, and 3, NATO
    will have A, B, and C, and when it gets to the two political
    bodies, there will be more confusion than normal in times of
    crisis. We do not need that.
        Third, the European Union, if they pick battalion X that
    they want on their operation, how do they know that battalion X
    is not assigned to a NATO plan, and a NATO operation?
        So if we do it the way that I said, where we bring the
    European Union planners that are not already part of NATO,
    those four nations to SHAPE, I think this can be well-managed,
    and I think it can, in fact, be an improvement, but we do not
    have those details ironed out yet, and that is something I am
    very concerned about. It is something that we need to keep
    pushing on, and I think we need to do it in the next few months
    to get that tied down the way that it should be.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you. So it is in the next few
    months that we will get some clarity to this situation.
        General Ralston. That is certainly my hope.
        Chairman Warner. I want to address an article which
    appeared on March 21 in the London Daily Telegraph, and I will
    give you a copy of it. Would you quickly pick up on the point
    they are trying to raise here. I think this record today should
    incorporate your testimony to strongly refute the principle
    they are trying to advocate.
        ``NATO's attempt to quell the growing conflict in the
    Balkans is being hampered by Americans' reluctance to risk
    casualties, alliance officials said yesterday.'' Now, that is
    attributing it to alliance officials, who I presume would be
    persons who work in the same command structure that you are
    working in, if there is credibility to this.
        The problem is not discussed openly, but British officers
    speak of ``body bag syndrome,'' as the major brake on NATO
    operations to stop infiltrations of Albanian extremists from
    Kosovo into Serbia and Macedonia.
        The U.S. forces may be highly motivated by fighters and
    superbly equipped, but there is frustration with the perception
    that American commanders are under the intense political
    pressure not to shed soldiers' blood. ``The body bag syndrome
    is a real problem now, said a senior European officer. It is
    not that the American soldier doesn't want to fight. The
    politicians won't let him.''
        The issue has become urgent, since ethnic Albanian rebels
    began to infiltrate both Yugoslavia and Macedonia late last
    year, using the American sector of Kosovo as a base of
    operations.
        Now, certainly, whether we are military field commanders
    like yourself, or those of us here at home in Congress, we have
    foremost in our mind the safety of our military in the
    forefronts of the world, and the same may be said of this
    article about your AOR, General Franks, but the Kosovo war was
    fought in a unique way, unprecedented with almost total
    dependence on air, as opposed to any ground elements. The
    planners devised that and essentially brought about the
    cessation of hostilities in that region, and I think it was a
    successful operation. That is my personal opinion.
        We were very proud of the fact that the performance of our
    military, under the command of the leadership of their senior
    officers, performed this mission with a minimum of casualties.
        Clearly it is my perception that our military is willing to
    accept the risks for which they chose this profession, and that
    they will follow the orders of the Commander in Chief, our
    President. Congress does not issue any orders, but we are very
    vocal, and a very important co-equal partner of the
    infrastructure supporting our troops, but I do not know that
    anything has emanated from Congress that would give rise to the
    accusation in this article.
        I know of no commands or orders given by the senior
    military commanders that give rise to it. To the contrary, I
    feel that our forward-deployed troops will accept those risks
    professionally associated with their mission, and if it results
    in casualties, it is highly regrettable, but that from time
    immemorial has been the role of those in uniform.
        Now, I would like to have your comment. I presume your
    views coincide with mine, but this is a fairly serious
    indictment that was raised in the British press, particularly
    at a time when we see requests coming in for additional troops.
    I think it is important that you speak out with clarity on this
    article, because while you may not be familiar with this
    article, you have heard this accusation before.
        General Ralston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did read the
    article, and I will tell you that I take strong exception to
    the sentiments expressed in that article. Soldiers that are in
    Kosovo today that are on the border are doing, in my judgment,
    a magnificent job.
        Chairman Warner. Incidentally, Senator Stevens and I and
    others were there just 3 weeks ago. We were on that very border
    where the fighting is taking place in the valley with you and
    our troops.
        General Ralston. Yes, sir, and Mr. Chairman, I very much
    appreciate the fact that so many members of the Senate took the
    time to go and look at that, and you saw those magnificent
    young soldiers up there. They were not afraid of anything, they
    were there to do their job.
        Just a couple of weeks ago, on the Macedonian border, we
    had a case where an American patrol was there. They were
    threatened by armed extremists, and they shot two of them. They
    followed the rules of engagement exactly as they should have,
    and they did that, but that is a risk that they take every
    night and every day. It could have been that the Albanian
    extremist fired the first shot, and shot our people. As it was,
    they protected themselves. They did the right thing.
        So I would take strong exception to the sentiments
    expressed in that article. Our people are there. We do not
    expect them to go do things that are irresponsible. There were
    some minefields on that border. When you are operating in
    minefields, you have to do that very carefully, and so we are
    going to make sure that our people are protected to the best
    extent that they can be, but they will willingly accept that
    risk, we will accept that risk, in order to carry out the
    mission.
        Chairman Warner. As commander, you are not asking of other
    military units to take any greater degree of risks than being
    assumed by our own troops.
        General Ralston. That is exactly right.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        General Franks. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Yes, General Franks.
        General Franks. If I might add to the same point, I also
    read the article, and I also take exception to it. It brings to
    my mind several things, not the least of which is a letter
    which I received from an Australian officer after last week's
    training accident in Kuwait.
        I published it on our web site for everyone to see, wherein
    the Australian officer talked about the sense of pride that he
    had had when he had been a member of that coalition force
    standing in Kuwait, had had the opportunity to work with
    coalition people, U.K., his own, New Zealand, Kuwaitis, a
    variety of other Gulf States, as in fact they had gone about
    their business, whether it be training, or whether it would be
    maritime intercept operations, or whether, in fact, it be
    Operation Southern Watch, where these young people fly in
    harm's way every day.
        I have not, sir, and I do not expect to see any reluctance
    whatsoever in the will of these young people from across the
    coalition wherein all of us serve to do what they are asked to
    do.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my
    welcome. I am sorry I was late. I was on the Senate floor. I
    have had a chance to chat frequently with both our witnesses
    and congratulate them on the terrific job that they and the
    forces under their command are doing.
        First, I want to talk to each of you about the no-fly
    zones. Each of you have a no-fly zone under your command, I
    believe. It is a very frustrating engagement, I think. So the
    question is whether or not flyers are at risk. From time to
    time when threatened they act to remove the threat, as they
    should. We are spending a tremendous amount of effort and money
    to maintain these no-fly zones.
        At the same time, we are told that the sanctioned regime is
    gradually becoming weaker. I guess my question for each of
    you--because one of you has the northern no-fly zone and one of
    you has the southern--is whether or not you see any daylight in
    terms of accomplishing a mission of removal, either through
    those no-fly zones, which obviously you have a different
    mission, or through some other means, removing the regime. If
    not, whether or not you believe that the maintenance of those
    no-fly zones is really accomplishing a useful purpose.
        Are we satisfied that, for instance, Saddam is not building
    up his forces on the ground in those no-fly zones? Do you feel
    that they are accomplishing their limited mission? Is it worth
    the risk, in your judgment, to our flyers to maintain those no-
    fly zones? Is it also worth the cost?
        Now, I know there are a lot of policy questions wrapped up
    into that, but I would like to get your judgment on this as
    professionals.
        General Ralston. OK, let me go first.
        You are right, Senator Levin, there are a lot of policy
    issues there, and what I try to do is to make sure that I can
    articulate as best I can to the Joint Staff, to the Secretary
    of Defense, and to the administration, not whether we should or
    should not be doing this, but what the military consequences
    are of doing it.
        Once again, as I said at the beginning, there is a risk
    that every time our pilots enter Iraq to enforce that no-fly
    zone, they willingly accept. We are, in fact, doing I think a
    very credible job of enforcing the no-fly zone, and do believe
    that it has a deterrent effect in terms of what the Iraqi
    military does, either to move in the north against the Kurdish
    citizens that are there, and I will let General Franks talk
    about the southern part.
        As the administration reviews their policy, only the
    President can ultimately make the decision as to whether the
    risk and whether the cost in terms of resources is worth what
    comes out on the positive side, and so I am not going to try to
    make a judgment here today. The administration is reviewing
    that, and what we are doing on the military side is carrying
    out whatever that policy happens to be.
        I do believe we have a responsibility to tell them, as I
    have told you this morning, what those risks are in terms of
    the chances of an American airman being downed over Iraq, but
    ultimately that has to be a policy decision.
        Senator Levin. General Franks.
        General Franks. Mr. Chairman, I would add to the comments
    of General Ralston by saying, my direct experience with the
    southern no-fly zone goes back about 4 years in the immediate
    past, 8 or 9 months in Central Command, and several years as
    the Army component commander before that, having supported
    Operation Southern Watch, and having observed the maritime
    interception operations.
        I agree with the observations that General Ralston made.
    That said, this is not a without-cost enterprise--both
    monetarily and in terms of the way we put our people at risk as
    we enforce this no-fly zone.
        As this committee knows, some 153,000 times our pilots have
    been in the southern no-fly zone, 153,000 times since 1992. If
    you go back just the past 12 months, we have put our young
    pilots and support crews in the southern no-fly zone 10,000
    times. We have had more than 500 occasions where our people
    have either been illuminated by radars, or engaged by surface-
    to-air missiles, or engaged by antiaircraft artillery fire.
        Senator Levin. Over what period of time was that?
        General Franks. Over the past year, sir.
        As I look at what has been accomplished, I look at the
    reason we engaged in these no-fly zone enforcement processes in
    the first place, and I am reminded of the Security Council
    resolutions which came about at the end of the Gulf War,
    provisions of which the Iraqi regime has not yet complied with.
        I look at occasions where the regime has threatened the
    Kurds in the north, Saddam's own people, the Shia in the south,
    his own people, and as recently as 7 years ago, massed large
    Republican Guard formations down in the vicinity of Kuwait
    again, in violation of the resolutions that came about at the
    end of the Gulf War.
        So, sir, as I look at what we have done, placing our troops
    in harm's way, I have to believe that the containment of the
    regime has had some positive effect.
        I will defer to the policy team, the State Department,
    Secretary Rumsfeld, Dr. Rice, the President, the Vice
    President, to review the risk-gain analysis with respect to our
    current policy. I believe, as General Ralston said, that
    process is ongoing. I have high confidence in that process, and
    I have had the opportunity to inform that process. I believe
    that a quality policy will emerge from it, and I believe that
    that policy will address the pillars upon which we should stand
    as we look back at the reasons why we are involved in this key
    region of the world.
        Senator Levin. Just one followup question, and then I will
    be done on this particular subject. This is on a very directly-
    related matter. Secretary Powell stated that the rules had been
    changed to enable a more effective response to Iraqi activities
    to develop weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
    them.
        Can either of you shed some light on the comment of
    Secretary Powell about rules being changed so we can more
    effectively respond to the efforts of Saddam to develop those
    weapons?
        General Franks. Senator Levin, I cannot talk directly to
    Secretary Powell's comment. I can tell you that the policy
    review that is ongoing is, in fact, reviewing what we have
    heretofore called the red line associated with weapons of mass
    destruction, and the means to deliver them along with the other
    issues that we have included in the policy in the past, and
    beyond that I am not sure how to comment.
        Senator Levin. You do not know about a change of rules yet?
        General Franks. No, Senator.
        Senator Levin. General Ralston?
        General Ralston. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        Senator Smith.
        Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, General Franks, General Ralston.
        I want to mention three areas that to some extent overlap
    both of your commands that are very troubling to me, and I
    think to the region, if you could just comment briefly on them.
        First, there are reports that Russia has agreed to supply
    some $7 billion worth of weapons to Iran over the next few
    years, specifically three kilo-class submarines that, to my
    knowledge, are the only submarines owned by a Gulf country. We
    also know that Iran is now interested in the SU-25 fighter
    aircraft, which, of course, would close the air power gap
    between Iran and its Gulf neighbors.
        Second, there are reports that the Chinese helped to
    upgrade the Iraqi air defense systems, and General Franks, you
    just talked quite at length in response to Senator Levin's
    question about our pilots in harm's way, so if you would
    comment on that point. Third, we received in Congress the
    recent report for the first half of 2000 that notes that China
    continues to send ``substantial assistance to Pakistan's
    missile defense program,'' not only Pakistan, but also Iran and
    Libya.
        There are some reports saying this proliferation is
    continuing despite the previous administration's lifting of
    U.S. sanctions against China based on a promise that Beijing
    would stop the sales.
        So in summary, we are seeing both Russia and China making
    decisions that severely impact, I think, not only the
    volatility of the region, but the safety of our forces in those
    regions.
        Let me just go back to each point, and if you would prefer
    to take the one in your area, that is fine. Let me go
    specifically now to the Chinese helping to upgrade the Iraqi
    systems. First of all, is that true?
        General Franks. Senator, it is true.
        Senator Smith. Second, can you characterize the increase of
    that effectiveness and how this might impact our forces as they
    go up in the no-fly zone?
        General Franks. Senator, I propose in closed session to
    give you some greater details, but for the purpose of open
    session, I would say that as we consider the threat our pilots
    face in the southern no-fly zone, the thing that gives us the
    biggest problem is the integrated air defense capability of the
    regime.
        That integrated air defense capability involves several
    factors. One is the command and control ability, that being the
    bunkers, the communications and so forth, where the leaders
    command and control the air defense operations. Another is the
    communications capability, and in this case that involves some
    fiber optic cable link, which is the point of your question.
        Senator Smith. A Chinese company.
        General Franks. Affirmative. Also involved are the weapons
    platforms themselves that are involved in the integrated air
    defense, and as we look at the threat it is always in our best
    interest to assure that it is not possible for the Iraqis to
    have early warning, and to have competent target-tracking
    radar, and to be able to move signals around southern Iraq
    which will cause their weapons platforms to effectively engage
    our air frames.
        That was the case, and so the part of this that relates
    directly to your question about the Chinese is this business of
    the communications architecture that supports this integrated
    air defense capability, specifically this business of fiber
    optics, and it was in that context that I answered your
    question. Yes, the Chinese were involved.
        Senator Smith. There have been press reports--and if you
    choose to go into this in closed session, that is OK--that the
    taking out of the Iraqi sites was based on the fact that we
    might injure Chinese technicians. Is there any truth to that?
        General Franks. Senator, what I will tell you is that that
    would never be a reason that would cause us to place our people
    in harm's way. I will give you the specifics in closed session,
    if I may, but I will tell you that at no time were our airmen
    subjected to increased risk as a result of these capabilities
    while we did not strike them.
        Senator Smith. To the best of your knowledge, was there any
    information about what the Chinese were doing in Iraq with
    their defenses during the Permanent Normal Trade Relations
    (PNTR) debate?
        General Franks. Sir, I cannot answer that question. I do
    not know.
        Senator Smith. Just let me know when my time has expired,
    Mr. Chairman.
        We move over to your area, General Ralston, on the arms
    proliferation, in terms of assistance to Pakistan, and how that
    might impact the relationship between India and Pakistan: What
    is your assessment of how that impacts volatility of the
    region?
        General Ralston. Senator Smith, let me make a comment and
    then defer to General Franks. Neither India or Pakistan are in
    my AOR----
        Senator Smith. I apologize.
        General Ralston.--so I am not the expert on that, but from
    my previous job as Vice Chairman----
        Senator Smith. Libya.
        General Ralston. Obviously, Libya is one that I do worry
    about. Yes, arms proliferation, weapons of mass destruction is
    certainly a topic that is of concern to me in EUCOM, and it is
    of concern to NATO. This is one of the issues that we have been
    pushing hard in NATO, that the European nations have to
    acknowledge the fact that there is a weapons of mass
    destruction threat, and that we need to be prepared to counter
    that.
        Senator Smith. General Franks, if you would just briefly
    comment on the India-Pakistan portion.
        General Franks. Sir, the comment that I would make would be
    that weapons of mass destruction, as General Ralston said, are
    obviously of great concern to us, and the proliferation of
    technologies associated with that, to include missile
    technologies, is a problem for us.
        We can talk about the specifics of weapons types and so
    forth, if we could, again sir, in closed session, but I will
    tell you that proliferation associated with the parties that
    you mentioned is, along with other parties, a continuing
    concern for us in the Central Region.
        Senator Smith. Last point, the Russians and the Chinese
    obviously in seemingly isolated ways are impacting both of
    these regions, the European Command and Central Command. Do we
    have any evidence of coordination of those efforts between the
    two countries?
        General Franks. Sir, I have no evidence of it.
        Senator Smith. General.
        General Ralston. Neither do I, Senator.
        Senator Smith. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Carnahan.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Franks, I have been struck by the breadth of our
    continuing operation to contain Saddam Hussein. The average
    American would probably be surprised to learn that coalition
    forces flew 20,000 sorties in the past year to control the no-
    fly zone in southern Iraq, and that our forces have been fired
    on 500 times with surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft
    fire. We should be quite proud of our dedicated forces
    participating in these potentially dangerous missions,
    stationed for long periods of time far away from home.
        You have stated that enforcement of the no-fly zone is
    necessary business to assure that Iraq does not threaten its
    neighbors and its own people. Since Saddam Hussein appears to
    have strengthened his grip on power, the United States and its
    coalition partners have no choice but to remain vigilant and
    maintain a strong presence in the region.
        Would you agree that more needs to be done to keep the
    American people informed of the threats posed by Saddam
    Hussein, and the importance of maintaining our military
    presence in the region?
        General Franks. Senator, that is my view, yes.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you. One other question. I share
    your concern that the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence
    could lead moderate Arab governments to distance themselves
    from the United States, but as you point out, these states rely
    on the U.S. presence in the region to deter intimidation by
    Iran and Iraq.
        Clearly, the self-interest of these moderate Arab states is
    essential in relieving the current tensions, and I believe they
    have an important role to play in urging a stop to the current
    violence, and a resumption of negotiations between Israel and
    the Palestinians. What communications have you had with the
    leaders of these countries to urge them to play a constructive
    role in ending the violence?
        General Franks. Senator, with respect to precisely that
    point, my interaction with the leaders in our region has not
    talked to, has not made suggestion as to what they could do in
    order to ease the Palestinian-Israeli problem. What we in
    Central Command do is, by way of constant visit and constant
    interaction, provide the opportunity for them to inform us of
    what they believe the issues to be, which we then work very
    closely with not only defense but also----
        Senator Carnahan. You are not being proactive in this
    respect?
        General Franks. In terms of the military side of our
    organization, no, ma'am. What we are doing is informing them of
    our own policy, assisting with consultations, providing advice
    within our own governmental construct, the new policy team, and
    taking the results of their ongoing consultations with each of
    the leaders out in this region.
        Senator Carnahan. General Ralston, I certainly applaud you
    for your focus on readiness in the European Command's forces,
    and you have stated it is one of your top priorities. Your
    testimony, however, includes many examples of cuts in training
    exercises throughout the theater.
        This brings me to a much broader subject. We are currently
    considering a budget that would significantly reduce revenues
    to the Government over the next decade, yet we are being asked
    to commit to this budget before the Department's review is
    completed, and before we have a firm idea of what our military
    needs are going to be.
        If the anticipated surpluses are not as large as we expect
    them to be, there will be calls for restraint in domestic
    spending, including defense spending. Do you have any concerns
    that, like in the past, the overall budget outlay could
    adversely impact our ability to fund important military needs?
        General Ralston. Yes, ma'am. First of all, I am not privy
    to the budget that will be coming over, so I cannot talk in
    detail to what that is. I do not know what is going to be in
    there.
        What I tried to point out in my statement is a statement of
    fact, what has happened in the past. All I can do is outline
    for the administration and for Congress what steps we would
    have to take in terms of cutting back on exercises, cutting
    back on deployments, and cutting back on training if our
    operation and maintenance budget is not funded at the proper
    level.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I have
    been in and out. We have two committee meetings at the same
    time.
        General Ralston, I do appreciate the fact that you did
    single out readiness. It is a crisis, not just in your area but
    all over. I chair the Readiness and Management Support
    Subcommittee. We had two hearings, one yesterday and one the
    day before. The one yesterday was on facilities, Mr. Chairman,
    and we had 14 witnesses from all ranks, and some Reserve and
    Guard components, most of them regular services. It is a crisis
    throughout here, in the United States, and I heard you mention,
    and I am very sensitive to the conditions that you showed us on
    your chart in your theater, but also the same thing is
    happening here. In fact, 67 percent of our facilities were
    rated C-3 or below, and that is all here in the United States.
    I applaud you for being concerned with doing something about
    that over there. We also must concentrate on doing it over here
    at the same time.
        You think about the retention problems that we are having
    and I do not think there is anything that contributes to that
    more than these kinds of deplorable conditions and quality of
    life, and so this is a problem.
        Now, second, I want to say, I really do appreciate the fact
    that you have come out and talked about Africa. During the
    whole situation in Kosovo, I was trying to get the point across
    that if you would take the countries of Burkina Faso, Sierra
    Leone, Cote D'Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Gabon, Rwanda, Burundi,
    Kinshasha, Congo-Brazzaville, in just those countries, for
    every one person who is ethnically cleansed in Kosovo, there
    are 100 persons ethnically cleansed in those West African and
    Central African countries.
        I applaud you for your interest and for bringing it out,
    and letting America know that there is a serious problem there,
    and that we are doing what we can to prevent such atrocities.
        General Franks, I was down in the Sinai, in that area down
    there. Quite often we talk about what is happening to our
    readiness as a result of deployment to places like Kosovo and
    Bosnia, and I am concerned about that, because from a ground
    logistics standpoint, if something should happen in the Persian
    Gulf, we would not be able to handle those without, I think,
    being totally dependent on Guard and Reserve. I was told that
    by the senior officer down there.
        But in areas like the Sinai, where we have troops, do you
    see any areas where you think that we might be able to reduce
    the number of troops for the benefit of an increased readiness?
        General Franks. Senator, as you know, and certainly as the
    committee knows, Central Command is a bit of an unusual command
    in that we really do not have assigned forces, and so the
    answer to your question honestly is, yes, sir, weekly and
    daily.
        We will change our force levels, and they will range
    generally between, as I mentioned, 18,500 up to perhaps 25-
    26,000, dependent on what particular contingency operation we
    may be running at a given point in time, or depending on
    whether we have a Marine Expeditionary Unit in our AOR at a
    point in time, and so, sir, what we do, literally, is we move
    up and down the force levels, depending on what the needs are
    in the AOR on a given day.
        Senator Inhofe. In the case of the U.S. troops, did they go
    through the Vieques training?
        General Franks. Vieques, yes, sir, they did.
        Senator Inhofe. But was it inert?
        General Franks. With inert, yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. With inert. What is your feeling about
    inert versus live ordnance?
        General Franks. Senator, as a matter of fact we also, in
    all of our training areas we will use sometimes inert only, and
    sometimes a combination of live, in this case Mark-82 bombs, or
    inert bombs, and so the preference is to use the live munitions
    when we can, and I think that is responsive to your question.
    But my experience has been that the other munitions also
    provide great training value.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, we had a hearing before my
    subcommittee 2 days ago on encroachment, and of course Vieques
    is the poster child for that kind of a problem.
        General Franks. Right.
        Senator Inhofe. All of them came forward and said that in
    the cases of the Marines, the Expeditionary Units, as well as
    the live Navy support fire, and the ability to use our pilots
    was absolutely necessary, and it did affect the quality of it.
    I want to get your perspective.
        General Franks. I agree with that. I think there is a place
    for both inert and live. Obviously, the most realistic training
    we get is with live munitions.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. Now, lastly, right after the U.S.S.
    Cole attack occurred, I went over there and tried to determine
    what I could from my perspective to determine what happened
    there. Every naval officer I talked to said that if they had
    had the option of refueling at sea, they would have done it,
    and this was without exception.
        You cannot say for sure whether it would not have happened,
    but it certainly would not have happened in Yemen, and Yemen
    was a terrorist code red at that time, and yet there were no
    choices.
        As you go along from the Mediterranean down through the
    Suez and the Red Sea and turn left and go up toward the Persian
    Gulf, everything has to refuel someplace. I came back with the
    opinion, and it was fortified by every Navy officer that I saw,
    that we should have that capacity out there somewhere, when you
    turn that corner up to the Arabian Sea.
        After that, we went back to a couple of the boneyards and
    we found two excellent oilers that could be deployed in a very
    short period of time. I am trying to get this done. What would
    be your feeling about trying to get some oiler capacity,
    refueling at sea capacity in that area?
        General Franks. Senator, I will give you a two-part answer.
    First off, I would always defer to the CNO, Adm. Vern Clark,
    and his determination within a given resource level of what he
    thinks is the appropriate mix.
        Now, having said that, from an operational perspective,
    increased operational flexibility is always good for a
    geographical commander, and I would say to you, we keep right
    now two U.S. and one U.K. oilers in the region, and we are able
    to use those by some repositioning in order to not put our
    people in harm's way unnecessarily, as you are aware, Senator,
    and also by paying very close attention to march rates against
    the global naval force presence policy. Which is to say, if you
    provide an extra day here and an extra day there in transit,
    then the speeds of transit are reduced and much less fuel is
    burned, and so, sir, I would end by saying that a combination
    of operational flexibility, and some flexibility in global
    naval forces presence, provides to us what we need to have in
    the CENTCOM AOR.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, yes, and my time has expired, but I
    do want to say that I have talked to Admiral Clark about it and
    others, but still recognize it gets down to a capacity that we
    do not have that we could have fairly inexpensively, so I would
    like to ask if you would spend some time talking about this
    with Admiral Clark.
        General Franks. I will, Senator, yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        General Franks. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I want to thank you. I was going
    to follow on that same line of questioning, because as soon as
    I heard about that tragic accident on that bombing range, the
    first thing that occurred to me was whether or not that
    accident could in some way be traced back to what we understand
    is a shrinking ability of the Navy to properly train the
    deploying units to that region to face the rigors of the combat
    in which the aviators, certainly, and to some extent others,
    are immediately injected, and you said, of course, the Truman
    got the inert training. Was it a full range of inert training,
    or was that even curtailed?
        General Franks. Sir, I cannot answer the question. I am not
    sure what the full breadth of the training they received in
    Vieques was, but I know that they were able to do close air
    support, and I know that they did use inert munitions as they
    did the training.
        Chairman Warner. What about the next carrier task force
    being deployed? What is the status of that training?
        General Franks. That training is not going to be done in
    Vieques, as I understand it, from information that I read this
    morning.
        Chairman Warner. That is my understanding also, so I think,
    Senator Inhofe, these are matters which you are going to have
    to bear down on in your Readiness and Management Support
    Subcommittee.
        Of course, we are also advised that there are shortfalls in
    shipmates on some of these deploying ships. I think it is a
    matter that this committee is going to have to look into with
    greater intensity.
        Do you think in any way that freak accident on the bombing
    range could be attributed to the inability of live fire
    training? He was off the Truman, was he not?
        General Franks. He was off Truman, affirmative.
        Mr. Chairman, as you and I discussed yesterday, I do not
    want to speculate on it. In terms of, as we pull the thread out
    of the ball of yarn and look to see whether we had the right
    level of training competencies, I would prefer to hold an
    opinion on that.
        Chairman Warner. I can fully understand that.
        Senator Carnahan, Senator Smith, and others talked about
    Iraq--indeed, Senator Levin raised in his opening questions
    Iraq, but there is another note of irony about this policy. I
    know it affects your military commanders a great deal. I
    remember from my own modest experience when I was a ground
    officer with a combat operation in Korea, our pilots were
    flying missions when the peace talks were taking place at
    Panmunjong, and they were saying, why am I taking this risk at
    the same time peace talks are taking place.
        To some extent, there are no peace talks taking place as
    far as I know on Iraq right now. I respectfully urge our
    President to convene the coalition of nations that brought
    about the cessation of hostilities in 1991 in the Gulf and say,
    now, look, if you have a better idea as to how to continue the
    containment of Saddam Hussein and limit the proliferation of
    his desire to use mass destruction weapons, then tell us what
    it is. If you have not got a better idea, then I guess the
    United States and Britain are just going to have to carry on as
    best we can see, and stop the criticism.
        But the other aspect of it is, we are facing an energy
    crisis in this Nation, whether it is in the California region,
    or we are told that on the east coast we are going to
    experience brownouts in the heat of the summer. Therefore we
    are looking for all possible sources of energy, and at the same
    time we are flying these missions in Iraq we are buying Iraqi
    oil to meet our own energy needs. Am I not correct about that,
    General Ralston?
        General Ralston. Yes, sir, you are correct.
        Chairman Warner. You have been in that combat situation as
    a young aviator. What does your aviator think about carrying
    out a high risk mission of containment at the same time the
    United States is buying the oil, as one of our colleagues, in a
    very colorful and I think factually correct way said it, we use
    that oil? Indirectly some of it could get into the very gas
    tank of the airplane flying the mission that bombs Iraq.
        How do we deal with that? When you sit down to talk with
    them, as I am sure you do, do your young pilots raise that
    issue with you?
        General Ralston. Yes, sir. Our young aviators that we have
    out there are well-educated, bright young men and women.
        Chairman Warner. Indeed they are.
        General Ralston. They also are very dedicated. If we tell
    them this is the mission that they are to go do, then they
    salute, and they go do that with great dedication.
        What they really need is to make sure that the
    administration and Congress and the American people are behind
    them. If they believe that, they will do anything that we ask
    them to do, and so that is why I think it is appropriate that
    the administration go through their policy review, and then
    whatever that policy is that comes out the other end, we should
    not be in the military the tail wagging the dog on this. We
    need a policy, and then tell us what it is, and tell us what
    our role is, and we will do that and the young men and women
    will respond admirably.
        Chairman Warner. Well, that is always the way it has been,
    but it has to be in the minds of those aviators that the very
    cars back home are using Iraqi petroleum.
        General Franks. I think, Mr. Chairman, and I know you are
    aware of this, but with this being a public hearing and on the
    record, I think my personal view is, the purchase of this
    percentage of Iraqi oil is entirely appropriate, because under
    the oil-for-food program, under the existing rules for the
    purchase of this petroleum, I think that what this does is send
    a signal that says that the purpose of our policy is not to
    punish the people of Iraq.
        The purpose of our policy is to assure that Saddam Hussein
    does not have an opportunity to put unencumbered money in his
    own pocket for the purpose of building his military
    organizations, and for the purpose of reconstituting his
    weapons of mass destruction.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say that, because I believe
    the young men and women who are involved in Operation Southern
    Watch, as well as this maritime intercept operation we have
    ongoing, are very much aware of that, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. If we ever experience the misfortune of a
    downed aviator, and he is marching or being dragged through the
    streets of Baghdad, stand by. I think a lot of the public have
    not focused on this. Some of our allies, including Turkey and
    Jordan, who are participating in getting some of those hard
    dollars into Saddam Hussein's pocket, are very valued allies.
    So at the same time we are asking our pilots to put their lives
    in danger, our policy in this region is fractured in so many
    different ways. The pilot's total dedication does not seem to
    me to be matched by the total dedication of those who bear the
    burden of trying to resolve this conflict, which has dragged on
    for over 10 years.
        General Franks. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. General Ralston, this problem that we are
    seeing in Macedonia, do you see other areas of the bordering
    nations, particularly around Kosovo, experiencing some
    destabilization--Montenegro, for example, as a consequence of
    their forthcoming elections--in the same way we are seeing in
    Macedonia?
        General Ralston. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. As you and I
    discussed, and as we heard in Greece when we were on our last
    trip, this area of the world has long been a clash between
    different civilizations, and it all comes to a head around the
    Balkans area, so clearly there is the potential for
    instability.
        One of the issues that I think the committee needs to think
    about, the election upcoming in Montenegro on April 22. I think
    it is going to be very significant, because it is in large part
    going to indicate whether the people of Montenegro want
    independence from Yugoslavia. If so, and if that proceeds, then
    that will start another series of questions. What about Kosovo?
    Should they be independent or not, and what about the Republic
    of Srpska in Bosnia, should they be independent or not?
        So it is, I think, a pretty profound event, that I know you
    are focused on. I am not so sure the American people are
    focused on this upcoming election on 22 April in Montenegro.
        Chairman Warner. I am glad you raise that, because again,
    it comes down to the risks in the deployment of our troops, the
    expenditures of this Nation, and it is still a very fragile
    situation.
        General Franks, missile defense is very much a part of our
    initiatives here in Congress and, indeed, certainly our
    President. How do you rate Iraq's current ability to employ
    ballistic missiles against U.S. forces and/or our allies in
    that region?
        Saddam Hussein has the authority, under the accords that
    were drawn up at the time that that conflict was terminated, to
    go ahead with the production of missiles with a range that
    presumably only ensured his ability to defend his country. That
    same technology can be used to extend the range of those
    missiles, in my judgment, in relatively simple ways.
        General Franks. Chairman Warner, I agree with exactly what
    you just said. We obviously have concern and should be
    concerned about missile development that is permitted to go on
    under the existing rules which allow for development as long as
    a range of 150 kilometers is not exceeded by those weapons. The
    issue for us is the possibility of doing solid propellant
    investigative work or scientific development of solid
    propellants which could perhaps at some point be used in
    weapons systems, missiles with much greater range. Sir, I share
    your concern.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, I see our colleague,
    Senator Nelson has joined us just as I was beginning to ask the
    second round, so Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Franks and General Ralston, first of all I want to
    commend the 125,000 men and women under your commands, the
    125,000 troops in harm's way for being so committed to peace in
    the world, and certainly to represent their country so
    admirably.
        Senator Inhofe, before I arrived, mentioned something about
    the deplorable conditions of housing, and I know, General
    Ralston, you also made reference to that. Senator Inhofe and I
    in a hearing earlier this week received a lot of information
    about the inadequate housing situation for our troops. I am
    concerned to hear most of the discussion was about here at home
    as opposed to in foreign locations, so I hope that we are able
    to do something to help correct that. If we want a family-
    friendly and a military-friendly environment, housing is
    certainly going to have to be part of that.
        My question here is, in the wake of the U.S.S. Cole tragedy
    as we have experienced concerns about the protection of our
    troops in foreign locations, with the ethnic extremism in
    Macedonia today, and the enormous border that you police, can
    you describe for us the steps that are being taken for security
    of our locations in that part of the world?
        General Ralston. Senator, if I may, that is an excellent
    question, and it is an issue that we spend a lot of time
    working, and I must tell you, I am probably more concerned
    about other areas than I am our troops that are in Kosovo,
    because in Kosovo they are focused on this every day. They are
    wearing their flak jackets and their helmets, and they are in
    patrols, and we constantly work on that issue. It is not risk-
    free, as we have mentioned before, but I think they do a good
    job on that.
        Sometimes we forget that our forces that are living in
    England and in Germany and in Italy are far more vulnerable to
    a terrorist act than we would like to think about. We have had
    to go through several actions in the past couple of months in
    the U.K. and in Germany and in Italy and in Turkey, and I could
    go on and on, Belgium, no place is immune from potential
    terrorist acts. The bigger challenge is, these places that for
    many years have been considered very safe places, it is like
    living in Virginia or Maryland, and all of a sudden we find
    that is not true, so how do you keep the people focused on
    that, and how do you make sure that you can deal with the
    resource implications here?
        In other words, if we were going to put the same level of
    security around our installations in Germany or in England as
    we are doing in Kosovo today, that is an enormous bill, and
    there are issues with host nation countries. How are we going
    to be able to do that?
        So I know General Franks spends a great deal of time on
    this, as we both do, looking at all of the various airfields
    and all of the various ports that we have where our airplanes
    fly into and our ships go to refuel, so it is an enormously
    difficult issue. We try to work it with good intelligence.
        It is less than perfect intelligence. I know that I
    probably get 15 messages a day from the intelligence community
    that say something is about to blow up in Europe. That is 450 a
    month, and you cannot disregard them. You have to look at every
    one of them, do the very best you can to say, is this real, or
    is this a false report, and how do you keep all the people down
    the line in the squadrons and in the battalions who get these
    same messages, how do you keep them focused that this is not
    somebody crying wolf?
        I do not have a solution to that. I am not complaining
    about it, but I am trying to at least make people be aware of
    what we are trying to deal with on a day-to-day basis.
        General Franks. Senator, if I could add to the same thing,
    I think one of the points General Ralston just made is a very
    important point, that point having to do with the specificity
    of intelligence.
        As we looked at the U.S.S. Cole attack, and as we thought
    our way through ways and places where we can close seams and
    provide better force protection for our people, I actually
    directed a bit of an inquiry into the issue of threat
    information received. Senator, I will tell you that in the 12
    months that preceded U.S.S. Cole, our headquarters received
    127,000 messages that indicated, as General Ralston mentioned,
    that there was the potential for difficulty associated with our
    forces in this region.
        To increase the specificity of this information, I will add
    to what General Ralston said, which is very important to us as
    we move through time. The business of bringing together
    agencies, improving our human intelligence capability,
    improving our ability to analyze the information we have, in my
    personal view, is a first major step, which our Defense
    Department is undertaking now, to move us in the direction of
    providing better force protection.
        Now, sir, knowing that that is not precisely the intent of
    your question, I will talk a little bit about the military
    construction that we have going on in our area. We have more
    than 20 projects underway, and the chairman would remember when
    General Tony Zinni, my predecessor, came before the committee
    after the U.S.S. Cole, at the chairman's request and at the
    request of Senator Levin. General Zinni talked about waivers
    for force protection, and we have, in fact, about 20 of those
    associated projects across our area of responsibility,
    associated in some cases with the stand-off that we are able to
    provide from our installations and so forth.
        So we have worked very hard, and the work did not begin
    with the U.S.S. Cole, and it did not begin with me. It has been
    ongoing for several years, to work our way through these places
    where we perceive that we have a problem. If you look at the
    money involved in this over the next 5 or 6 years, with the
    help from this committee, as well as from the other body, we
    have put about $150 million to this task.
        Now, interestingly, the host nations where we keep our
    forces, as the chairman rightly pointed out, in harm's way,
    have put about $350 million to this task. So it is this work
    that I believe we need to continue over time that talks to
    quality of life, certainly, but force protection is a major
    piece of our quality of life effort.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, General
    Ralston, about your comments on Montenegro. It seems to me from
    what I know of the history of Montenegro, Kosovo and Republika
    Srpska, and the other pieces of the Balkan puzzle, that we
    should differentiate between Montenegro and some of the other
    very complex areas.
        It was independent for many years, so it has a history, or
    had a history of independence. Its vote is coming up. It will
    probably be a close vote, but nonetheless it will be a
    democratic vote. I think we should, number one, in light of its
    history of independence and in light of the fact that it may,
    in fact, opt for independence, or some variety thereof in the
    near future, that it may not be wise for us to suggest that
    there would be an unraveling in Kosovo or Republika Srpska or
    other areas should that event occur.
        I am not an expert. I am far from it, on that history. But
    just from what I do know about it, I would simply say I think
    we should be a little cautious at least about kind of lumping
    some areas which have some different histories into one general
    commentary.
        I will leave it at that. I more than welcome your comment
    on it, though.
        General Ralston. Senator Levin, I think you are exactly
    right, and I did not intend to imply a value judgment on the
    outcome of that vote. That is for the people of Montenegro and
    the people of the FRY to decide. I was merely trying to make
    the point that those issues will be in the debate. Whether they
    should or should not, I agree. I am not trying to make a value
    judgment on what it should be, but it will start a debate on
    those issues, was my point.
        Senator Levin. But to help us in the debate, I think it
    would be probably useful to at least incorporate the fact that
    there are some differences in the histories of the areas. I am
    going to start doing some historical reading myself. I am
    really talking to myself more than to you, I think. I think it
    is important that we have at least the beginning of that
    historical background. I am again going to gain that for
    myself, in the event that that is what the people of Montenegro
    opt for.
        On Macedonia, we have a very complicated situation there,
    General Ralston. We have the Albanian extremists, the rebels
    there who seem to have burst on the scene fairly quickly. I
    think there probably was plenty of advanced warning of what was
    happening. Nonetheless, from kind of a press perspective, or
    our perspective, it seems to have come quite suddenly.
        In the Presevo Valley we have had a lot of attention
    focused on that problem, but now we have allowed the Yugoslav
    Army to enter a small area in that valley--apparently a 3-mile-
    wide ground safety zone on the border of Kosovo and Macedonia;
    agreed in principle to the entry of that army into a larger
    ground safety zone area; and then there's the question of what
    the limitations are on their presence, both the army and the
    special police, both in that narrower area into which they have
    been allowed, and into the border area.
        Basically, if you could give us a thumbnail sketch as to
    how the situation is unfolding, what the dangers are, and how
    you see us responding to those dangers.
        General Ralston. Yes, sir. Let me ask for the chart. Put
    the chart up with the ground security zone on it.

        While they are doing that, this ground security zone is a
    5-kilometer-wide ribbon, if you will, that goes around Kosovo.
        You can use that one, if they can see the green on it. The
    red probably shows up. The red area there is the ground
    security zone that goes around Kosovo, and as I say, this was
    instituted back in June 1999 as part of an agreement with the
    Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, and what it is, it was
    for the force protection of the KFOR forces.
        We did not want the then-FRY army bringing their tanks and
    their artillery and putting it right up on the border where
    they could threaten the KFOR forces with no warning, so we
    said, you cannot have heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, VJ army
    forces in that 5-kilometer-wide zone.
        Now, as we have gone through the democratic changes in
    Belgrade, starting last September and then again in December,
    with the parliamentary elections, and as the FRY and Serbia try
    to reenter the international community, the chances of the VJ
    army attacking KFOR have declined tremendously.
        The unintended consequence of this ground security zone,
    since we were not in there and the FRY military was not in
    there, was that the extremist elements set up camp in this free
    zone, if you will, and that was causing its own instability and
    its own threats.
        So the North Atlantic Council has made the decision, as you
    mentioned, that we will do a phased and conditioned return of
    this ground security zone back to the FRY. Phased means a piece
    at a time, and we started with the first piece, which is the
    piece just north of the Macedonian border. That was done on the
    13th of this month, 13 March.
        There were certain conditions that were agreed to by the
    FRY before they did that, and I will not take you through all
    of them, but basically it said, they will not bring tanks in
    there. They do not really need tanks in there to do that. They
    do not need self-propelled artillery and that kind of thing.
        That reentry went very smoothly. They cooperated very well.
    They showed us their plans. There were phase lines as they came
    across. They reported in. The very last one, right up against
    the border, we have checkpoints, where our soldiers and their
    soldiers meet so that we are not shooting across the border
    inadvertently, so all those procedures are in place.
        The North Atlantic Council is looking at the next phase of
    this, which will be most of the northern part of that, all the
    way around to the east border. That should happen, I would
    think, here in the next few days, and once again, if that goes
    well, then we will look at the more contentious area, which is
    over on the eastern border.
        There is still some work to do, because once again this is
    not just a military problem, this is a political and economic
    problem as well, and in those areas in blue on that map, where
    the ethnic Albanian majority have been denied political access
    and economic access for a number of years, that needs to be
    addressed by the Serbian authorities.
        But to summarize, I think the conditions in the so-called
    Covic Plan, which was the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, said
    that the Serbian authorities would, in fact, give political
    access and some economic opportunities to the Albanian
    citizens, and we would give the Serbs access back to the ground
    security zone. I think that is working well. I think that is
    the proper approach. We need to keep working through this.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe, we have some people who
    have traveled a long distance, and their message is directly
    germane to the line of questioning that you raised with our
    witnesses earlier, so at this point in time I recognize you to
    proceed as you desire.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Franks,
    earlier in this hearing I brought up the fact that you are
    responsible for the quality of training of those individuals
    who serve in the Persian Gulf many times in a combat
    environment, and from the East Coast deployments where our
    battle groups go, we have learned sometime ago that there is
    only one place where you can get the integrated live training
    to give them that degree of competency to carry out those
    missions.
        That is the island of Vieques and, because of the problems
    that have come up, starting about a year ago, we have been
    inhibited from having the freedom to carry on the live fire
    training on this island, on this land that is owned by the
    United States Navy.
        In fear that we would lose this, I took the time to go
    around the world, look at every possible alternative source,
    including Capa del Lata and Cape Rath and all the rest of them,
    and there is none. In fact, they are becoming fewer and fewer
    as each month goes by.
        For that reason, I have spent quite a bit of time in Puerto
    Rico, and then actually on the island of Vieques. A lot of
    people do not realize, Mr. Chairman, that Vieques is a
    municipality of Puerto Rico. It is not a separate system, it is
    a town, but it is an island.
        I had the occasion to go over to the island and actually
    visit with the citizens, and I did this, Mr. Chairman, for one
    very significant reason, and that is that I had heard all the
    opposition from the politicians on Puerto Rico, but I had not
    heard it from the citizens who were directly affected, who live
    on the island of Vieques.
        Let us keep in mind there are 9,300 residents in Vieques.
    Of that, there would be something less than 4,000 registered
    voters in Vieques. The way the law is currently structured, it
    is very likely that there could be a referendum as to whether
    or not they want the Navy to continue live fire. Obviously, if
    it turned out the wrong way, our presence and our activity on
    the whole island of Puerto Rico would be diminished.
        But I think it is very significant, Mr. Chairman, as I
    introduced you to the group out in the hall, to recognize that
    in my trips to Vieques, I have met with these citizens, only to
    find that the majority of the citizens on the island of Vieques
    that would be directly affected--not the politicians in Puerto
    Rico, but the citizens--like the Navy, by and large.
        They recognize that the Navy needed some improvement, they
    have improved the relationships, and they are satisfied with
    it. They recognize the economic benefit to the people of
    Vieques, and I invited them to come here to the United States,
    to Washington, so that we would be able to see what the real
    people on Vieques want.
        The leader of the delegation, Mr. Chairman, is Luis
    Sanchez. I met with these people on the island of Vieques.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I think it would be important if
    they came forward.
        Senator Inhofe. Would you come forward at this point. You
    have all of your petitions with you. If you would come forward
    to this side of the table so we can see you, as I saw you in
    Vieques. The second gentleman there is Luis Sanchez, who is the
    leader of the group, and these are all citizens.
        They are carrying with them, Mr. Chairman, over 1,700
    petitions, signatures of registered voters on the island of
    Vieques. On those, they have listed their names, addresses, and
    social security numbers and registrations of all 1,700. As you
    can see, this almost constitutes a majority of everyone who
    lives on the island of Vieques. I thought it was significant
    that, since I could not get anyone to listen to me back here on
    what the people of Vieques want, as opposed to the politicians
    on Puerto Rico, that they come forward and show this.
        If you just put those on the table there. I am not sure
    whether it would be in order or not, Mr. Chairman, I would
    defer to you on that, but if you would like to hear from any of
    them, or if you would like to ask questions of these
    individuals----
        Chairman Warner. Well, I think that you and I should first
    indicate that a copy of one of these petitions will be
    incorporated into today's record. This clearly indicates that
    there is a very substantial number of the citizens of Vieques
    who support the ongoing naval operations that existed when I
    was Secretary of the Navy, many years ago, 30-plus years ago.
    This training is so essential, as General Franks has recounted
    today, to preparing elements of the Navy and the Marine Corps
    for going into harm's way, that this is a clear manifestation
    of the desire of those people to work with the United States
    Government and particularly our military to resume that
    training as it was performed for many years.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I know that when you were
    Secretary of the Navy you had an appreciation for what was
    going on over there, but let me clarify. It is much more
    significant than just these individuals. 1,700-plus are
    supportive of the Navy. All of these people are signing a
    petition saying, if necessary, they would secede from Puerto
    Rico and become a separate entity and vote themselves out so
    that they would be able to do what has been taking place since
    1950, in terms of supporting the Navy, and offering us the kind
    of training that gives us the quality that we need in that war-
    torn region of the Persian Gulf.
        I think it would be significant, Mr. Chairman, if each one
    gave the recorder his name so that we would be able to properly
    enter them into the record.
        Chairman Warner. We will see that that is done.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Luis E. Sanchez
        Mr. Ralph Perez

        Now, Senator, I think what we are going to do, unless there
    are further comments from yourself or our other colleagues,
    Senator Levin and I are recommending that this committee stop
    this open portion of the hearing. We will resume a classified
    session in room 222 Russell immediately.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum

          ARMY TRANSFORMATION GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC LIFT

        1. Senator Santorum. General Ralston and General Franks, the Army
    has initiated a transformation process that is designed to result in a
    lighter, more deployable and mobile force. Recognizing the Army will
    provide you with the bulk of your ground force should military action
    be required in your theater of operations, what are your views of the
    Army Transformation goals and objectives? To what extent has the Army
    initiative addressed concerns you might have about strategic
    responsiveness? Do we have the strategic lift assets required to
    execute established deployment goals and objectives?
        General Ralston. There is high probability that, in the USEUCOM
    AOR, there will be repeated demands at the center of the spectrum of
    conflict, as well as the possibility of high intensity small-scale
    contingencies. USEUCOM has been engaged in 25 operations since October
    1996. The average number of operations per year has doubled since the
    years 1991-1995.
        Responding to this reality, the Army has articulated a new vision
    for a strategically responsive and dominant force to effectively meet
    the full spectrum of future military operations.
        A key benefit for USEUCOM is the ability to rapidly move lighter
    vehicles within the theater. As a potential force provider to other
    unified commands, most notably U.S. Central Command, future commanders
    will find that enhanced mobility of the Transformed Army also enhances
    deployability. The capability to deploy within a matter of hours to
    trouble spots in Africa and less developed countries of Eastern Europe
    offers a range of options that are simply unavailable today.
        The operations conducted by USEUCOM over the past decade have
    required the use of ground forces that are not necessarily structured
    or equipped for small scale contingency operations. The two divisions
    in Europe must meet this standard of responsiveness and strategic
    dominance by resourcing the training, exercises and infrastructure that
    support strategic mobility. Only through proper resourcing of our two
    divisions will this Objective Force be able to provide the
    deployability, maneuverability, and lethality necessary to conduct
    operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict.
        The current level of strategic lift assets is not adequate to meet
    the full range of requirements, primarily due to identified intra-
    theater lift joint requirements and to the consideration of missions
    additional to those directly supporting the two major theater war
    scenario. In accordance with Mobility Requirements Study 2005, DOD
    should develop a program to provide 54.5 MTM/D (Million Ton Miles per
    Day), the airlift capacity for a single major theater war while
    supporting other high priority airlift missions. The program should
    consider capabilities that could be provided by additional C-17s,
    additional services that could be provided by commercial operators, and
    sources that could be useful for missions of short duration.
        General Franks. I support any and all efforts by each of the
    services to increase the deployability and mobility of combat forces.
    Having few assigned forces within the CENTCOM AOR, I rely on the rapid
    deployment of forces to meet contingency requirements (as long as the
    U.S. Army keeps them modernized and sustainable). The faster lethal,
    survivable and sustainable ground forces deploy, the more likely it is
    that I can successfully protect and defend United States interests in
    the region. [Deleted].
        The Army's pre-positioning system gives CENTCOM adequate strategic
    responsiveness for responding to the region's major theater war
    threats. The Army transformation initiative will enhance my command's
    ability to meet smaller scale contingencies, especially if urban
    operations are required. CENTCOM however, has not participated in any
    qualitative analysis pertaining to future force structure and
    deployment platforms.
        All CENTCOM operation plans and concept plans are executable.
    However, risk within some of these plans remains high in the early
    phases, in the large part due to strategic airlift deficiencies. Given
    the distance to the CENTCOM AOR, the small number of assigned forces
    and still developing regional infrastructure, strategic lift is one of
    my concerns.

                          LAND FORCES MODERNIZATION

        2. Senator Santorum. General Ralston, the Army currently provides
    the bulk of our forces in the Balkans, where they are serving our
    Nation very well in difficult circumstances. These operations are
    clearly stressing the equipment we have in the region and there appears
    to be no relief in sight. What are your concerns regarding the
    modernization posture of the land forces you have at your disposal?
    Based on what you see in the land forces that are currently deployed,
    where would you focus modernization efforts to ensure that our forces
    have the best, most modern equipment available?
        General Ralston. Based on U.S. Army, Europe's (USAREUR) experience
    in the Balkans, the gap between the equipment in the active Army and
    the Reserve Army is widening, particularly the equipment in the War
    Reserve Stocks/Army Prepositioned Stockage (APS).
        To take some examples, Bradley fighters in the APS are older than
    Operation Desert Storm, there are shortages of Single-Channel Ground
    and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) radios and installation kits,
    fielding delays of rolling stocks, including Family of Medium Tactical
    Vehicles (FMTVs) and Light Medium Tactical Vehicles (LMTVs), as well as
    our 800-series trucks being over 40 years old. The bottom line is that
    when CONUS-based units come to theater, they train with obsolete APS/
    War Reserve equipment, and training suffers accordingly.

                TACTICAL MOBILITY OF WHEELED VEHICLES IN DESERT

        3. Senator Santorum. General Ralston, the Army is in the process of
    fielding an interim force that is designed to span a perceived near-
    term operational shortfall first recognized during the Persian Gulf
    War. To that end, the Army recently selected a vehicle to serve as the
    armored vehicle that will be used by interim brigade combat teams in
    operations from peacekeeping through full spectrum combat. There has
    been a lot of debate over wheels versus tracks for armored vehicles and
    I don't expect to conduct such a debate here. I am curious, however,
    about any lessons we may have learned in the Gulf about mobility
    tradeoffs between different vehicle types, especially in vehicles
    currently available in the world today. Put differently, what are your
    views about the tactical mobility of current generation wheeled
    vehicles in a desert environment?
        General Ralston. The Army's Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV)
    represents a good step forward towards properly equipping the lighter,
    more mobile, Army of the future. Wheeled vehicles have been used in the
    desert for years with excellent results. The Army's IAV will, in my
    estimation, enjoy the same excellent results as it becomes an integral
    piece of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).
        While there have been concerns about the IAV, primarily about the
    amount of protection (armor) and fire power provided in the new
    vehicle, I feel it is unfair to compare the IAV with traditional
    tracked-vehicle tanks, such as the M1A1 Abrams. The IAV was not
    designed to replace the M1, but rather to become an integral part of a
    more mobile, faster, lighter, IBCT. In other words, the IAV is more an
    augment to the foot soldier of Army's Infantry forces, rather than a
    replacement for the heavy armor of the Army's Cavalry forces.
        For a view of the issue from one who has a keen understanding of
    the desert environment as well as armored vehicles operating in combat,
    I recommend you ask General Franks, Commander in Chief Central Command,
    for his views.

                                READINESS LEVELS

        4. Senator Santorum. General Ralston and General Franks, in your
    respective AORs you are responsible for the continuing commitments of
    Operation Northern Watch (ONW) and Operation Southern Watch (OSW).
    These operations continue to require rotational deployments and large
    numbers of tactical aviation sorties flown by an aging fleet of
    tactical fighters. Do you see any indicators in your theaters that
    readiness levels of our tactical air forces are declining?
        General Ralston. The majority of forces provided to ONW are from an
    Air Expeditionary Force (AEF). The balance is comprised of U.S. Navy,
    Marine Corps, and coalition forces. For the past 6 months, the majority
    of tactical aircraft used in ONW came from outside of our AOR. There
    are no indicators that the tactical aircraft assigned to the AEF to
    support ONW from outside our AOR or our own organic tactical aircraft
    are suffering declining readiness levels. As you may know, the
    readiness indicators of many of our fighter aircraft have shown a
    recent increase as the funding for spare parts in fiscal year 1998,
    1999, and 2000 has begun to take effect.
        General Franks. The Services support Operation Southern Watch by
    deploying a wide variety of aircraft including tankers; theater
    airlifters; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms;
    combat search and rescue assets; and several types of fighter aircraft.
    At their current level of activity, U.S. air forces combine for over
    [deleted] sorties per year in support of Operation Southern Watch.
        These forces, whether land or carrier-based, arrive in my AOR fully
    combat ready. On a regular basis they demonstrate superb readiness
    levels by responding to hostile Iraqi actions with strikes on Iraqi air
    defenses in the Southern No-Fly Zone. [Deleted.] From what I have seen,
    the Services are doing an excellent job bringing trained and ready air
    forces to the fight, and I have no doubts about their preparedness to
    perform the missions for which they are responsible.

                         HIGH DEMAND/LOW DENSITY ASSETS

        5. Senator Santorum. General Ralston and General Franks, during
    Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, one of the newly coined terms was
    High Demand/Low Density assets. If these assets were so highly tasked
    in this small contingency, doesn't that indicate we do not have enough
    of these assets to execute the National Military Strategy?
        General Ralston. The term High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) was
    coined well before Operation Allied Force (OAF). In addition, it is my
    belief that OAF, from an air perspective, was not a small contingency.
    I believe that we do have the assets necessary to conduct the National
    Military Strategy--but that strategy says we will quit all operations
    around the world and devote all our assets to the two MTWs if we are
    required to fight two MTWs. During the Kosovo air operation we
    continued to support all our operations around the world--Operation
    Southern Watch, Operation Northern Watch, Korea, South America,
    peacetime training, etc.
        General Franks. Senator, every geographic Commander in Chief places
    tremendous value on HD/LD assets. They perform unique missions and
    yield great operational benefits. Any time combat operations are
    ongoing, they will be needed continuously.
        While General Ralston will undoubtedly give you the expert answers
    on Operation Allied Force, I would characterize it as more than a
    ``small'' contingency. Operation Allied Force placed virtually the
    entire burden of combat operations upon joint and combined air forces,
    causing them to fly sorties at relatively intense rates. Moreover, the
    allies considered it imperative to avoid collateral damage and minimize
    friendly losses, causing heavy use of HD/LD assets to gather
    intelligence and protect our aircraft. Given these factors, the call
    for HD/LD assets is understandable.
        Keep in mind also that Operation Northern Watch and Operation
    Southern Watch continued during Operation Allied Force, as well as
    other operations to monitor countries like North Korea. In other words,
    HD/LD assets performed global missions in addition to Operation Allied
    Force. Had another contingency arisen, the National Command Authorities
    could have diverted HD/LD assets from these other operations if mission
    priorities so dictated.
        The bottom line is that judging whether we have enough HD/LD assets
    is a complex question, and the Operation Allied Force case alone
    doesn't lead to a definitive conclusion. The Secretary of Defense and
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are better positioned to respond
    to the issue of resourcing the National Military Strategy, and may be
    better able to discuss HD/LD assets with you.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                  TRAINING, EQUIPMENT READINESS, AND RETENTION

        6. Senator Allard. General Franks, for several years now we have
    maintained a military presence in the Persian Gulf region. Units
    include naval forces enforcing sanctions, air forces enforcing the no-
    fly zones, and soldiers in Kuwait. How are these missions affecting the
    training and equipment readiness of the units involved? What is the
    effect on retention of personnel?
        General Franks. You are correct that the Services support
    operations in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf region with significant
    resources, including over [deleted] personnel, [deleted] aircraft, and
    [deleted] naval vessels on any given day. These forces arrive in my AOR
    fully combat ready and well-equipped to sustain operations as needed.
        My component commanders exploit every opportunity to provide
    quality training for deployed forces whenever possible, consistent with
    operational responsibilities. Some of that training, such as the land
    force training integral to Operation Desert Spring, includes
    opportunities for combined operations and live fires that deployed
    units do not always get at home. From what I have seen, the Services
    are doing an excellent job bringing trained and ready forces to the
    fight, and we do our best to keep them that way.
        If you need more information on what goes into training, equipping,
    and retaining our troops, the Service Chiefs are better positioned to
    address these issues.

                        MILITARY OPTIONS AGAINST SADDAM

        7. Senator Allard. General Franks, what military options are
    available to curtail Saddam's ability to circumvent UN sanctions? What
    military options are available to affect Saddam's efforts to research,
    develop, and produce weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
    missiles?
        General Franks. The options span the breadth of military
    capabilities from passive monitoring of Iraqi actions to applying
    combat forces using kinetic solutions against Iraqi sanction
    violations. Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch are
    ongoing efforts aimed at keeping Saddam from circumventing specific UN
    resolutions. Operation Desert Spring, which keeps a joint task force in
    Kuwait, exists as a hedge against Iraqi circumvention of other
    sanctions. Maritime Interception Operations in the Gulf deny
    international waters to Saddam's effort to circumvent UN sanctions.
    Other contingency plans exist that use various military capabilities to
    hinder any Iraqi circumvention or respond to violations.
        Saddam's knowledge of United States military intelligence
    capabilities has forced him to go to great lengths in concealing his
    ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development
    programs, driving up the costs of these efforts and slowing their
    progress. Additionally, Iraq remains dependent on foreign supply of
    some raw materials and advanced technology. Our military capability to
    interdict shipments of sensitive cargoes could potentially hamper Iraqi
    WMD and missile development even further. Our ability to target key
    research and production nodes, as demonstrated in Operation Desert Fox,
    can set back Baghdad's advanced weapons programs for limited periods.
    Ultimately, without an in-country disarmament regime, consisting of
    active and passive surveillance systems, routine and intrusive
    inspections, and export/import controls, Iraq is otherwise unhindered
    from reconstituting its unconventional weapons capabilities.

                     ARMY INTERIM FORCE AND OBJECTIVE FORCE

        8. Senator Allard. General Ralston and General Franks, in your
    statements, both of you mentioned a strong support for the
    transformation of our military. You specifically mentioned a support
    for Army Transformation. How do you see the Interim Force impacting
    your command? How do you see the Objective Force impacting your
    command?
        General Ralston. Interim capability is far better at meeting my
    small scale contingency (SSC) requirements than the current legacy
    ground formations. The interim formations are far more tactically
    mobile and considerably more lethal than light units--they can serve
    just as effectively as a deterrent in these environments and will not
    require near the logistics support of Legacy formations. Bottom line:
    interim is a win-win for the less than very high-end operations that I
    routinely conduct in my AOR.
        However, there exists a strategic gap between SSC mission
    requirements and the theater's force structure design. The heavy forces
    within the theater currently do not provide the optimal level of
    responsiveness required to support SSCs. A forward deployed Interim
    Brigade Combat Team/Interim Combat Regiment would greatly enhance
    CINCEUR's response options for SSCs and will address the risk inherent
    in the strategic gap created by the theater's current force structure
    until the Objective Force is fielded.
        Objective capability will provide many more options than are
    available to me today. I can deploy and employ these formations quicker
    and the situational understanding inherent in the Objective Force and
    its full integration within the joint force can reduce collateral
    effects associated with conflict. Further, by means of its introduction
    deeper into the battlespace (enemy rear) the objective capability will
    contribute to faster conflict resolution.
        General Franks. The Interim Force adds capability that did not
    exist before. The Interim Force increases the lethality and mobility of
    light forces which are more easily deployed and sustained than heavier
    forces. This type of force is well-suited for deployments over long
    distances into regions with still developing infrastructures, such as
    those in the United States Central Command's AOR. I envision the
    Interim Force having a potential in smaller scale contingencies,
    especially operations in urban areas.
        Overall the Objective Force supports our war plan requirements,
    though the transition to the Objective Force needs to be managed
    carefully. The major threats in the Central Region still possess a
    significant heavy ground capability. This threat, the short indications
    and warning available, and the significant distances that must be
    traveled requires an Army preposition system that can match trained
    forces to compatible pre-positioned equipment capable of surviving and
    defeating this heavy threat. The Objective Force must also validate
    that its enhanced reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
    capability increases the lethality and survivability of transformed
    Army units against tank heavy opponents.

                              INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

        9. Senator Allard. General Ralston and General Franks, what are
    your most significant shortfalls in the intelligence and communications
    infrastructure? Do you have sufficient satellite communications
    capability? What must we do to ensure we have the capacity and
    flexibility to support mission-essential communications in the next 5
    years? Ten years? Fifteen years?
        General Ralston. Our growing dependence upon information services
    and network-centric command and control to shorten decision times and
    improve force protection capabilities is fundamentally changing our
    intelligence and communications requirements. These changes will tax
    the ability of the intelligence community to rapidly adapt collections
    and analysis priorities to keep pace with the evolving requirements.
    They will also outstrip the capacity of the existing theater
    communications infrastructure.
        Theater intelligence production is augmented by national
    intelligence agency support that is critical to our operational forces
    and engagement strategies. The unique production support provided by
    national agencies places a tremendous demand on the communications
    architecture. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) efforts to
    provide a robust IMINT Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and
    Dissemination (TPED) system remains one of our greatest concerns. As
    the recent congressionally-directed NIMA Commission concluded, NIMA is
    under-resourced overall, and the U.S. cannot expect to fully realize
    the promise of the next generation of IMINT satellites unless NIMA TPED
    is adequately funded.
        In order to deliver the time-critical intelligence produced at the
    theater and national level, USEUCOM is dependent upon a Command,
    Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C\4\) infrastructure
    that is routed through networks built largely in the 1940s and 1950s to
    support low-bandwidth voice service. These problems are even worse
    south of the Alps and in the Balkans, while Africa suffers from a near
    total lack of communications infrastructure, with only pockets of
    development in countries like South Africa. These shortfalls force a
    heavy reliance on already limited satellite communication networks.
    This system is insufficient to meet current and evolving high bandwidth
    demands such as worldwide command and control video-conferences, live
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video feeds, electronic tasking orders
    for our air and land forces, and full implementation of DOD's Global
    Combat Command and Control and Global Combat Support Systems. These
    systems form the foundation of USEUCOM's command and control
    capabilities. Furthermore, current infrastructure does not support
    Information Assurance (IA) measures, potentially allowing our
    collection, analysis, dissemination, and command and control functions,
    to be jeopardized by hostile or inadvertent interference. Finally,
    USEUCOM's satellite communications lack flexibility and its capacity is
    extremely limited.
        This infrastructure needs to be replaced with modern high-bandwidth
    capability within the next 5 to 7 years if we are to realize the full
    potential of the ``information dominance'' that will come from the
    interaction of superior intelligence and information infrastructures.
        General Franks. With regard to the intelligence infrastructure,
    significant shortfalls include: shortages of airborne reconnaissance
    platforms and supporting systems; an intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) capability to locate, track, and target mobile
    missiles; inadequate number of imagery analysts, intelligence
    specialists, and systems maintenance personnel; incompatibilities
    between Service, Joint, and Coalition intelligence systems; lack of an
    end-to-end ISR information management system; and inadequate
    intelligence support to information operations. These have been
    identified as deficiencies via the Joint Monthly Readiness Review
    (JMRR) and ISR Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA)
    processes.
        Regarding communications infrastructure shortfalls and satellite
    communications, no, sir, I do not have sufficient satellite
    communications, nor do I have sufficient theater communications
    infrastructure for daily operations or to support a contingency. The
    lack of adequate communications infrastructure and capacity into and
    within the area of responsibility (AOR) severely limits the successful
    dissemination of mission-critical products to the warfighter. Fiber
    optic connectivity is expanding in some of the key AOR countries (e.g.,
    Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar), however,
    inadequate funding limits CENTCOM's ability to exploit this medium. So,
    I must rely on over-taxed military satellite communications incapable
    of providing the required increases in connectivity should a crisis in
    the CENTCOM AOR arise. Our theater and headquarters communications
    infrastructure is my number two priority item on my IPL and for good
    reason. We need the infrastructure to ensure we can selectively respond
    to the full spectrum of military options and sustain our forces to
    prepare for an uncertain future.
        In the next 5 years, assistance with increased funding to exploit
    available fiber and build an adequate C\4\ infrastructure in the AOR
    would reduce CENTCOM's over-dependence on satellite communications and
    improve reliability and redundancy for critical intelligence and
    command and control voice, data, and video connections. In the next 10
    to 15 years increased bandwidth and modern, reliable, and adequately
    provisioned networks will be critical as new ISR and C\2\ systems are
    fielded.
                                     ______

               Question Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

                              IMPORTANCE OF JSTARS

        10. Senator Lieberman. General Ralston and General Franks, for the
    last 3 years, Congress has added funds to continue procurement of the
    Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems' (JSTARS) aircraft
    moving the fleet size toward the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    (JROC) requirement of 19. Would you please give us your view of the
    importance of that system to the U.S. Central Command?
        General Ralston. The JSTARS' ability to acquire, monitor, target,
    and report ground force movement has proven crucial to supporting
    combat operations and maintaining situational awareness during high-
    intensity contingency operations in the USEUCOM AOR. JSTARS has
    deployed to USEUCOM three times over the past 6 years: 1995,
    Implementation Forces' (IFOR) move into Bosnia; 1996, Operation Joint
    Endeavor monitoring of the Dayton Peace agreement; and 1999, Operation
    Allied Force in Kosovo. Each of these deployments highlighted JSTARS'
    ability to provide near real time (NRT) indications and warning, force
    protection, situational awareness, airborne command and control, attack
    support, and intelligence collection to commanders. JSTARS' ability to
    incorporate data collected by other sources, and subsequently linked to
    the aircraft, to create fused analysis has been critical to the
    positive identification of the targets and movement it monitors. This
    was particularly important during the Operation Joint Endeavor
    deployment where the system monitored fixed garrisons and the movement
    of small groups of vehicles within civilian traffic. The adaptive use
    of crew and external sensor input via satellite communication has
    proven JSTARS' effectiveness in complex, high-intensity EUCOM
    contingency operations.
        General Franks. JSTARS provides an operational joint airborne
    command and control (C\2\) platform and tactical/operational
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. These
    capabilities provide JSTARS subscribers a terrestrial picture with
    excellent moving target fidelity and unparalleled air-to-ground
    battlespace C\2\ and surface situational awareness. Close air support,
    combat search and rescue, and moving target information distribution
    are evolving capabilities provided by JSTARS. Additionally, the Navy
    and Marine Corps have recently purchased ship-based receiving systems
    to monitor littoral operations which, if netted with the Army and Air
    Force systems, could produce an even keener operational surface picture
    and an enhanced air-land C\2\ structure in and around the Arabian Gulf.
        I strongly desire to validate the importance of JSTARS to U.S.
    CENTCOM with a deployment to the Arabian Gulf region. The last time
    JSTARS was in CENTCOM's AOR was in early 1998 during Operation Desert
    Thunder. The lack of available aircraft and difficulties obtaining
    diplomatic permissions have delayed efforts to deploy JSTARS into the
    CENTCOM AOR this year. Nevertheless, my air component continues to plan
    for a JSTARS deployment this fall.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                              CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. General Franks, there has been some
    discussion about the possibility of relocating U.S. Central Command
    headquarters from its current location at MacDill Air Force Base,
    Florida to an undetermined location within your Area of Responsibility
    in Southwest Asia. Given recent terrorist attacks, and the continuing
    threats in the region, this raises understandable concern regarding
    force protection for members of your headquarters and their families.
    At the same time there is understandable concern over the ``7,000-mile
    commute'' members of your command must endure when traveling to and
    from the area. What are your thoughts on the issue of your
    headquarters' location and moving it to Southwest Asia? What steps can
    be taken to mitigate the challenges of command and control from the
    United States and avoid increasing the risks to members of your command
    by increasing our physical presence in that region?
        General Franks. There are currently no plans to relocate the
    CENTCOM headquarters from Tampa to Southwest Asia. Ideally, any
    commander would want to be located in his AOR but the political
    situation and existing infrastructure in the region make this
    unfeasible for the foreseeable future.
        CENTCOM compensates for the separation from its AOR several ways.
    CENTCOM conducts day-to-day operations in the region through the
    command and control of four forward-deployed headquarters elements on
    the Arabian Peninsula. These are the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia,
    responsible for air operations in the southern no-fly zone; the
    Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, responsible for the ground defense of
    Kuwait; Special Operations Command Central (Forward), responsible for
    all of our Special Operational Forces in the northern Red Sea, Arabian
    Gulf, and Horn of Africa; and Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in
    Bahrain, responsible for all maritime operations in CENTCOM. NAVCENT is
    CENTCOM's only forward-deployed service component headquarters.
        This command and control structure has proven itself a capable and
    robust substitute for a forward-deployed CENTCOM headquarters.
    Technology is the enabler in this process by providing ever increasing
    ``reach back'' and even ``reach forward'' capability for communication
    between Tampa and our forward headquarters elements. My staff strives
    to employ the latest technology not only to move information swiftly
    but also to provide redundancy to work around the loss of key nodes or
    capabilities.
        Currently there are four fixed locations in the region that are
    designated as possible CENTCOM forward headquarters locations, should a
    crisis or contingency require moving my battlestaff to the AOR. All are
    on the Arabian Peninsula and access to these facilities is not
    guaranteed in time of crisis. Consequently, we are developing a
    capability to rapidly deploy the battlestaff along with an air-
    deployable command post that provides the same command and control
    capabilities I have in Tampa or at any established headquarters in the
    region. There are over 100 C-5 or C-17-capable runways throughout the
    region where we could fly in this deployable command post. The
    technology exists to do this right now; all we require is $10.1 million
    in funding.

        [Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND
                            OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, Smith, Inhofe,
    Santorum, Sessions, Collins, Levin, Kennedy, Cleland, Landrieu,
    Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and Dayton.
        Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
    director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; and Scott W.
    Stucky, general counsel.
        Majority staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV, Gary M.
    Hall, Carolyn M. Hanna, George W. Lauffer, Thomas L. MacKenzie,
    Joseph T. Sixeas, and Cord A. Sterling.
        Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director for the minority; Richard D. DeBobes, minority
    counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
    Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Kristi M. Freddo, Shekinah Z.
    Hill, and Suzanne K.L. Ross.
        Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining,
    assistant to Senator McCain; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to
    Senator Smith; J. Mark Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert
    Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
    Senator Collins; Menda S. Fife and Sharon L. Waxman, assistants
    to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, assistant to
    Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
    Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland;
    Jason Matthews, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; and Sheila Murphy and Eric Pierce,
    assistants to Senator Ben Nelson.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good morning. We hold our second series of
    hearings to receive testimony on the status and requirements of
    our regional commands. We do that in this committee each year.
    It provides us a basis of fact upon which we can then proceed
    to have our long and lengthy series of hearings on the
    authorization bill.
        Last Thursday, the committee heard from Gen. Joseph
    Ralston, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command; and Gen.
    Tommy R. Franks, Commander in Chief, Central Command. Today we
    are pleased to have Adm. Dennis C. Blair, United States Navy,
    Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Gen. Peter Pace,
    United States Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern
    Command; and Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, United States Army,
    Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces
    Command and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
        I would like to just focus on concerns that this Senator
    has with respect to issues in each of your AORs. In the Asia-
    Pacific region, China remains a growing concern. Each year
    there is another incremental set of facts that I think directly
    impacts on our planning here. First, our line of deterrence,
    our effort to work with our allies and friends in that region
    to maintain peace and tranquility, but we note that China will
    increase its defense budget by nearly 18 percent this year.
        I would hope, Admiral, in your testimony you can give us
    the baseline on which that 18 percent is predicated. Very often
    we see significant increases like that, but if you go back to
    the baseline, in real terms so to speak, there is not that
    much. But that is an issue which I have studied, and I would
    like to have your perspective on exactly what you believe the
    18 percent represents.
        This dramatic increase in spending, which will enable the
    further acquisition of many advanced weapons systems, I presume
    many coming from Russia, and the positioning of additional
    short-range ballistic missile launch sites within range of
    Taiwan are matters we have to take into consideration.
        At this point, I am going to do something that is unusual,
    but I have studied it several times, and I will provide each of
    the witnesses with a copy, and that is the Washington Post
    editorial of March 25, titled the Taiwan Arms Decision. In
    reading that, it comports generally with my approach and
    philosophy towards this issue.
        You have just returned, Admiral Blair, from a trip to
    China, South Korea, and Japan, and therefore your insights are
    of particular value.
        Under statute and law, the administration is to consult
    with Congress regarding the annual review of the Taiwan arms
    situation and their ability to defend themselves.
    Representatives of the Departments of Defense and State have
    come up and briefed. I can testify on this side. Yesterday I
    had a special briefing for members of the committee on that
    subject.
        The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains very volatile
    and extremely dangerous. Over the past year, while there
    appeared to be some approachment towards lessening the tensions
    between the north and the south, the fruits of that effort
    remain to be seen in my judgment because we view the actions,
    as well as the words, and the actions reflect that North Korea
    took no significant reduction in any of its massive number of
    troops deployed in that border region. Perhaps you will touch
    on that, General.
        In light of our relationship with South Korea, it is a very
    important one, critical to the overall posture of deterrence in
    the region of the Pacific, and we look forward to your update.
    37,000 U.S. troops--I think that is the number--are stationed
    in South Korea. Accompanying them are many families, and we
    have many industrialists and others from the United States. So,
    we should always be mindful that very significant numbers of
    our own population are right there within the range of weapons.
        Now, in SOUTHCOM, the situation in Colombia and its
    bordering nations is, of course, of great concern. We had an
    opportunity to visit last night with the senior staff, and we
    want to hear from you this morning with regard to your view of
    that situation down there. I take note that my distinguished
    colleague, the ranking member, traveled there with other
    Senators recently, as did our colleague, Senator McCain.
        We continue to support the efforts of the previous
    administration with regard to the $1.6 billion U.S. aid
    package. I say we. I speak for myself and I think the majority
    of this committee. But the precariousness of that situation,
    and particularly the spill-over effect on the adjoining
    nations, is of concern to us. We have our own military
    personnel there now in the position of training.
        These are just some of the issues, and we should have, I
    think, a very informative and profitable hearing from our
    distinguished witnesses this morning.
        If you will forgive my voice. It is not up to prime time,
    but I am still here in every respect. Thank you. At this time,
    without objection, I submit the opening statement of Senator
    Strom Thurmond.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

        Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Admiral Blair, General
    Schwartz, and General Pace to the second in the series of hearings with
    our regional and warfighting commanders. Our panel represents areas of
    the globe that are an ever increasing political and security challenge
    to the United States.
        In the Pacific, we are confronted by the two sleeping giants, India
    and China, optimistic peace talks between North and South Korea, and
    ethnic strife ready to explode in various parts of the region. In South
    America, the strife in Colombia is forcing the drug lords and their
    operations into neighboring countries threatening to spread our so-
    called war on drugs. Although the historical focus of our Nation has
    been toward Europe, in my judgment, the future lies in the Pacific and
    south of our borders. Today's witnesses are bringing a focus on their
    regions and effectively securing our vital national security and
    economic interests. They accomplish their missions despite quality of
    life challenges for their personnel and underfunding of vital readiness
    accounts.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
    group of commanders and thank them for their professionalism and
    distinguished service to our Nation. I would also like to assure them
    that the committee will take into consideration their requirements as
    we deliberate on the defense budget for fiscal year 2002 whenever it
    arrives.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me first join
    you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses here this morning.
    They have made great contributions in the past to our Nation's
    security, and their advice and commentary to us is indeed
    welcomed.
        At the outset, let me thank you, General Pace, for your
    assistance and your counsel and your hospitality as three
    colleagues of myself and the chairman of this committee and I
    went to Colombia not too many weeks ago. Senators Reed, Bill
    Nelson, Ben Nelson, and I made that visit. It was a very
    important one for us, and your participation contributed a
    great deal to that importance.
        This morning's hearing takes place as the administration
    continues to conduct a review of existing policies toward
    China, including potential arms sales to Taiwan, and existing
    policies which are being reviewed toward North Korea, Colombia,
    the Andes, and a number of other hot spots in the world.
        In recent weeks, President Bush has expressed support for
    Plan Colombia and for the peace process, but declined to have
    the United States represented at the peace negotiation table.
        In recent weeks, President Bush has expressed skepticism
    about the course of negotiations with North Korea, thereby
    weakening the position of the South Korean president in his
    negotiations with North Korea.
        In recent weeks, the President has characterized the United
    States and China as strategic competitors, quite a contrast to
    the prior characterization of his predecessor of our
    relationship with China as one of strategic partnership.
        There is an impression here and abroad that the
    administration appears to be backing away from U.S. engagement
    in a number of critical areas around the world, from the
    Balkans, to the Middle East, to the Korean Peninsula. If so, I
    am concerned that that disengagement could cause us to lose
    some opportunities to ease tensions in several regions of the
    world and, therefore, lose opportunities to make this country
    more secure.
        So, this is a very timely hearing. There is a huge number
    of issues to be reviewed with our witnesses. I look forward to
    their testimony this morning and the opportunity to ask them
    questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
        Unless other members of the committee have a comment, we
    will proceed to receive the testimony from our witnesses, and
    Admiral Blair, we will ask you to lead off.
        The full statement of all witnesses will be admitted to the
    record.

      STATEMENT OF ADM. DENNIS C. BLAIR, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                     UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Blair. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and other
    distinguished members of the committee, I need to begin by
    thanking all of you for the support that you have given to the
    men and women of the Pacific Command. They know you care and it
    comes through to them. Thank you very much.
        Our priorities in the Pacific Command are readiness,
    regional engagement, transformation of the Armed Forces, and
    resources.
        I must tell you readiness is a mixed picture. We have made
    progress in some areas in the past year; we have lost ground in
    others. We can do our job today, but I remain concerned for the
    future unless we address some of the structural readiness
    issues in operations and equipment, as well as sustainment,
    restoration, and modernization.
        I just returned, as the Chairman mentioned, from a trip to
    China, Korea, and Japan. With our forward-based and our
    forward-deployed forces, we reassure our friends, we are
    deterring our potential enemies, and we are making some
    progress on enhanced regional cooperation which will build a
    security structure which will posture us for the missions of
    the future, as well as those of the past.
        Third, transformation. Working with the Joint Forces
    Command, we are experimenting our way into the future in the
    Pacific Command using our existing exercise program, including
    our allies. Our concept for the future is called a joint
    mission force.
        Finally, resources. Our strategy for the Asia-Pacific
    region is built on a foundation of ready, balanced, forward-
    deployed forces with information networks that can enable them
    to move around the theater with confidence and a mobility
    system to get them there quickly. We need sustained funding and
    support for those forces and for the headquarters which direct
    them. It is important because this region is dynamic, because
    America has big security interests there, and our Armed Forces
    play a strong role in there.
        As far as the question that you raised, Mr. Chairman, on
    China, based on my recent trip there I can make a couple of
    points. We probably will want to discuss it further, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Please do. In particular, review the
    package that has come forward from Taiwan, the procedure by
    which it is to be reviewed, both by yourself and the
    administration, and the likely timetable of the announcement,
    to the extent you have knowledge of that.
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir.
        The requests for arms sales this year were delivered by the
    Taiwan Deputy Chief of the General Staff last fall, and it was
    an extensive list of equipment really across all three of their
    Armed Forces: Army, Air Force, and Navy.
        My role in the process is to evaluate sufficient defense
    for Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. We do a detailed military
    analysis of the balance of likely developments and trends, and
    then I submit that up the chain for the President to make the
    final decision on which arms should be made available based on
    my military input and other factors.
        That process is in progress right now. The rough deadline
    that we generally set for ourselves is next month, the month of
    April, that we generally reply. We are doing the work now to
    meet that deadline.
        Chairman Warner. When you use the word ``my,'' my
    understanding of that is that it is yourself, of course, as
    CINCPAC. But you take into consideration your senior Army
    commander, your senior Air Force commander. You have also a
    senior Navy commander and a senior Marine commander. So, it is
    a composite of the senior commanders of all of our forces in
    that region.
        Admiral Blair. It is a composite. We benefit from several
    assessments that have been made over the last couple of years
    in which teams have visited Taiwan, have talked with the
    Taiwanese. We have looked carefully at the intelligence and we
    have come to a judgment as to what is the state, both right at
    the moment and the trends in terms of Taiwan's sufficient
    defense, and what would make that defense sufficient.
        Over the long term, the most destabilizing parts of the
    Chinese buildup are their intermediate-range and short-range
    ballistic missiles, the CSS-6s and CSS-7s, of the type that
    were used in 1996 to fire in the waters north and south of
    Taiwan. I have told the Chinese directly on numerous visits,
    including the one last week, that the buildup of these
    missiles, which presently are weapons of destruction, not of
    military significance, but as their numbers increase and as
    their accuracy improves, become militarily significant, will
    force a response by the United States eventually in order to
    maintain that sufficient defense. That really is the most
    troubling aspect of the buildup.
        I talked to the Chinese about the 18 percent increase that
    you mentioned when I was there. I was told at many different
    levels, not simply Beijing, but the field commanders that that
    would largely go for personnel expenses, maintenance, and then
    a certain amount to acquisition. But they understand, as do all
    armed forces, that you need to compensate people beyond your
    conscript force in order to be effective under modern
    conditions, and they are putting some money to that. So, I do
    not translate that directly into weapons.
        They are having mixed success with the weapons that they
    are purchasing from the Russians. It is not just a case of
    having the systems themselves, but the entire logistical
    support, training, and integrating with the mother systems is
    difficult business. As I say, the People's Liberation Army is
    having mixed success in turning those into effective combat
    capability.
        So, my overall assessment, which is in my written
    statement, is that for the near term, the balance across the
    Straits is stable. There are certain trends that have to be
    addressed in order to keep it stable. I emphasized with the
    people I talked with in China that military means are not the
    best way to achieve the one China, which is Chinese policy,
    American policy, that the military side of this equation should
    be kept in the background. The things that will draw China and
    Taiwan are nonmilitary ties, commercial, financial,
    information, travel, those sorts of activities.
        The Chinese agree. They want a peaceful resolution as well,
    but they maintain the right to use force, and we maintain that
    resolution must be peaceful. That is where we are, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Do you wish to cover other areas of your
    area of responsibility (AOR)? I think it is important that you
    do.
        Admiral Blair. Why do I not wait for questions, sir, if
    that is all right with you.
        Chairman Warner. We will do just that then.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Blair follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Adm. Dennis C. Blair, USN

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and
    women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this
    opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific
    region.
        Having served as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
    (USCINCPAC) for over 2 years, I continue to believe, as we enter into
    this century, that a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
    region is very much in the interests of America, and the world.
    Alternatively, an uncertain Asia may present only crises and dangers.
    We base our power and influence on our values, our economic vibrancy,
    our desire to be a partner in this critical region, and the forward-
    stationed and forward-deployed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command
    (USPACOM).

                    DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

        Since I last testified before you, developments in the region have
    offered promise and continuing challenges.
    Japan
        Japan remains our most important ally in the Asia-Pacific. Although
    the economy is virtually stagnant, Japan remains the second largest
    economy in the world and continues to have a strong economic impact on
    the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts nearly 41,000 U.S. Armed Forces
    personnel and serves as a forward-deployed site for about 14,000
    additional U.S. naval personnel. Japan also contributes $4.86 billion
    in host-nation support, the most of any U.S. ally. These forward-
    stationed and forward-deployed forces are key for the United States to
    meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-
    Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of U.S.
    security interests in Asia, and it is fundamental to regional security
    and peaceful development.
        Over the past year, we made steady progress in strengthening our
    alliance with Japan. The two countries signed a new 5-year Special
    Measures Agreement (SMA) that will take effect on April 1, 2001. While
    the utilities cost-sharing levels are down slightly from the previous
    SMA, the new agreement provides for the same levels of labor cost-
    sharing and training relocation costs as those of the previous SMA.
        Over the past year, working groups took the first steps to
    implement the Defense Guidelines. In addition, Japan's Diet passed the
    final piece of Defense Guidelines-related legislation: a law
    authorizing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to conduct ship
    inspections to enforce UN sanctions. Now that a site for the
    replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been
    selected in northern Okinawa, detailed discussions have begun over the
    type and scale of the facility. U.S. and Japan ballistic missile
    defense cooperation continued on Navy Theater-Wide research.
        On February 9, 2001, U.S.S. Greenville collided with the fishing
    vessel Ehime Maru, resulting in the loss of the ship and nine lives,
    including students. The U.S. Government and Navy have apologized to the
    Government of Japan and the families of the victims, are evaluating the
    feasibility of raising the vessel, and will provide compensation to the
    victims. The Navy has convened a Court of Inquiry to examine the events
    contributing to the incident and accountability. The U.S. and Japan
    have a strong bilateral relationship whose enduring strength has
    benefited both sides for close to half a century. We believe we will be
    able to move forward from this tragedy in the interests of both nations
    and our peoples.
        The roles and capabilities of the JSDF are slowly evolving to meet
    future challenges. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force provided a
    45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan Heights UN
    Disengagement Observer Force. The JSDF has also worked closely with
    USPACOM components to restructure bilateral exercises to develop skills
    for humanitarian assistance, search-and-rescue, non-combatant
    evacuation, consequence management for chemical, biological, and
    nuclear incidents, and complex contingency operations that are likely
    to occur in the future. JSDF is sending observers to Team Challenge, a
    linked series of exercises addressing these missions and involving
    several Asia-Pacific nations. I am also encouraged by the increased
    attention that the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional armed
    forces--the Republic of Korea in particular.
        I remain deeply concerned about the Shinkampo private industrial
    waste incinerator abutting Naval Air Facility Atsugi. While dioxin
    levels have fallen significantly since Shinkampo completed the
    installation of bag house filters last May, construction has not
    started on a 100-meter smokestack that the Prime Minister of Japan
    committed to building by March 2001. This situation continues to be a
    serious health risk to our servicemembers and their families.
        We must solve individual local issues arising from our forces based
    in Japan. As important, however, is that the U.S. Pacific Command and
    the JSDF maintain the capability to defend Japan and build the
    capability to operate together in order to face the common regional
    challenges of the future--peace operations, noncombatant evacuation
    operations, humanitarian relief and dealing with transnational
    concerns. The Defense Guidelines show the way to the future for the
    U.S.-Japanese alliance and we must proceed in that direction.
    South and North Korea
        Last year, the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) began the
    commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. About 37,000
    U.S. troops remain stationed in the ROK to deter North Korean
    aggression.
        Political developments in Korea have been breathtaking, highlighted
    by the June 2000 summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and his North
    Korean counterpart Kim Jong-Il. Other North-South reconciliation
    activities included reunions between selected families separated by the
    war, increased aid, and agreements to increase economic links including
    a road and railway passing through the demilitarized zone.
        At the same time, North Korea's military training cycle in the
    winter and summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever, and the ongoing
    winter training cycle remains robust. North Korea continues to maintain
    60 percent of its forces within 100km of the DMZ.
        Given North Korea's continuing significant military capabilities,
    the Republic of Korea and the United States must maintain the deterrent
    power of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Any changes to the CFC
    posture must come through mutual and verifiable confidence-building
    measures that increase warning times for aggression.
        I remain concerned about the lack of frequency clearances granted
    by the ROK government to U.S. forces for planning and training. For
    example, there are no frequencies cleared to support UAV training on
    the peninsula. Likewise, we are currently limited to only 126 VHF/FM
    frequencies for planning purposes, far short of the over 1,000
    frequencies we would expect in an operational scenario. We will
    continue to work to resolve this deficiency.
        Whatever the future holds, it remains in the interests of both the
    Republic of Korea and the United States to have a continued U.S.
    forward presence on the Korean Peninsula. Recent developments have been
    encouraging. The recent renewal of our Status of Forces Agreement
    (SOFA), the conclusion of the No Gun Ri investigation, and the
    agreement on missile guidelines reflect the mature relationship between
    the United States and South Korea and provide a strong foundation for
    future cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. The Commander in Chief of
    U.S. Forces Korea has also proposed a Land Partnership Plan that, once
    enacted by Korea, will make U.S. force presence less burdensome while
    enhancing training and combined warfighting capability. We also will
    begin negotiations for a new Special Measures Agreement that we hope
    would increase South Korea's financial support for the stationing of
    U.S. troops in the country.
        The Republic of Korea increasingly contributes to meeting regional
    security challenges by contributing 419 troops to peacekeeping in East
    Timor, consulting and cooperating with the JSDF, participating in
    exercises such as RIMPAC (a major, multilateral naval exercise) and
    PACIFIC REACH (a submarine rescue exercise also involving naval forces
    from Japan, Singapore, and the United States), and participating as
    observers in Team Challenge.
    China
        During the past year, military developments in China have been
    mixed. A White Paper issued in February 2000 emphasized China's
    commitment to peacefully resolving its differences with Taiwan, but
    also specified conditions that could trigger the use of force against
    Taiwan. Chinese military spending increased, and Beijing continued to
    acquire advanced weapon systems from Russia.
        The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing and making
    organizational changes in all branches of service to strengthen
    homeland defense, expand regional influence and support sovereignty
    claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea. China continues to increase
    its modern combat aircraft inventory and improve air defenses,
    particularly across the Taiwan Strait. The PLA navy conducted sea
    trials for eventually fielding additional surface ships and submarines,
    continued testing of anti-ship missiles, and received its second modern
    Russian guided missile destroyer. PLA ground forces continued
    downsizing to reduce force structure and increase mobility. The PLA
    missile force continued testing and fielding of newer inter-continental
    and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and is building additional
    SRBM launch sites within range of Taiwan. China's exercise program,
    while extensive, was not explicitly threatening to Taiwan.
        Over the past year, we have reinitiated military relations with
    China on a realistic foundation. We have fashioned policies that offer
    China areas for productive relations, while ensuring that we can deal
    with a more confrontational posture, should it be necessary. We
    emphasize areas of mutual interest and encourage Chinese participation
    in regional security cooperation while maintaining that diplomacy, not
    armed force, should settle disputes.
        We have exchanged visits between senior PLA delegations and U.S.
    counterparts, and ships have conducted reciprocal port visits. PLA
    forces participated in a search-and-rescue exercise in the Special
    Administrative Region of Hong Kong, and four Chinese officials (two
    from the PLA and two from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) attended the
    Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. We have invited
    the PLA to participate in more multinational conferences on topics
    involving regional security cooperation than it has chosen to attend.
    We carefully vet our engagement in accordance with the National Defense
    Authorization Act.
        The Taiwan Armed Forces also continue their restructuring and force
    modernization. A civilian Defense Minister now oversees the Armed
    Forces. The Taiwan military relies heavily on the United States to
    modernize its forces. Through last year's arms sales, Taiwan's Armed
    Forces increased surveillance capabilities and modernized air-to-air,
    air-to-ground and air-to-surface weapons. Taiwan is looking forward in
    its modernization plans by improving a number of bases and
    infrastructure to support acquisition of future weapons.
        As Taiwan modernizes its Armed Forces to ensure a sufficient
    defense, training, inter-service interoperability, and logistics
    support become even more important. The Taiwan Armed Forces will have
    to put resources and attention into these areas to retain the
    qualitative edge.
        Based upon our assessments, I conclude that the changes in PLA and
    Taiwan military forces have not significantly altered the balance of
    power across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's military maintains a
    qualitative edge over the PLA, and the PLA still lacks the capability
    to invade and hold Taiwan. China maintains a quantitative edge in all
    branches of service, but does not have adequate power projection to
    quickly overcome Taiwan's more modern air force and inherent
    geographical advantages, which favor defense. Beijing's military
    forces, however, have the ability to inflict significant damage to
    Taiwan.
        We expect China to accelerate military modernization, but pressing
    economic and social issues will temper this effort. Military
    modernization will not decisively alter the military situation across
    the Strait in the next several years. The continuing buildup of Chinese
    ballistic missiles, combined with increases in accuracy, will
    increasingly pressure the sufficiency of Taiwan's defenses. The U.S.-
    China-Taiwan relationship will continue to be a critical factor in our
    regional engagement strategy.
    India
        U.S. military relations with India have been restricted since
    India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. Areas for military cooperation
    exist, however. Peacekeeping is the most promising. We have also agreed
    to discuss search-and-rescue, humanitarian assistance, and
    environmental security. The U.S. and India have also set up a working
    group to address counter-terrorism cooperation. The response to India's
    recent earthquake demonstrated the value of cooperation, both civilian
    and military. We are pursuing opportunities to build a foundation for
    closer relations. I believe a gradual strengthening of military
    interaction is in the interests of both countries. The more we work
    with India and Pakistan, the better we can defuse tensions by
    supporting productive relations between those two nuclear-armed
    countries.
    Insurgents and Communal Violence
        Beyond Kashmir, which remains a flash point of tension between
    India and Pakistan, insurgents and communal violence affect many states
    in the Asia-Pacific Region.
        Indonesia faces violent separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya
    (West Papua) and sectarian violence in the Maluku Islands and
    Kalimantan. Intense fighting on the Jaffna Peninsula between the Tamil
    Tigers and Sri Lankan Armed Forces continues without significant gains
    by either side. Nepal faces an increasingly troublesome Maoist
    insurgency. For much of the year, the Philippine Armed Forces have
    battled the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and operated against
    hostage takers, including the Abu Sayyaf, which took American Jeffrey
    Schilling hostage. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Philippines are
    still searching for the right combination of political, economic
    development, and military/police measures to effectively address these
    insurgencies and sectarian strife.
        In Fiji, a coup overthrew the democratically elected government,
    and the Solomon Islands have experienced separatist violence that
    caused a change in government and the evacuation of foreign nationals.
    Also, fighting among various ethnic groups on Burma's borders, much of
    it connected to illegal drug trafficking, has spilled into Thailand.
        Communal violence not only causes suffering and slows the
    political, social, and economic development of countries in the region;
    violence also fosters terrorism, causes refugees to migrate, and
    creates humanitarian disasters that spill across national borders.
    Indonesia
        Indonesia is still undergoing major political, social, and economic
    changes after 40 years of authoritarian rule.
        The Armed Forces of Indonesia, or TNI, began reforms in 1999 that
    they have yet to complete. The reforms call for the TNI to become a
    professional, modern armed force, focused on external defense and
    divorced from political practices. The number of TNI seats in
    parliament has been reduced and the police force separated from the
    TNI. However, elements of the TNI have been reluctant to continue
    reforms. The TNI remains a major political force, particularly on the
    local level, and retains the major role in internal security. It has
    not brought under control the militias in West Timor, resulting in the
    deaths of three UN workers and a continuing security threat to East
    Timor, nor has it yet brought to justice any of those who orchestrated
    or engaged on atrocities in East or West Timor. TNI reform is an
    important aspect of restoring order in Indonesia in a manner that
    promotes democratic development and regional security.
        Most interactions between U.S. and Indonesian Armed Forces have
    been suspended until there is credible progress toward accountability
    for East Timor human rights abuses and the return or resettlement of
    refugees. During the past year, limited interaction with the TNI
    involved a Navy humanitarian exercise and Indonesian Air Force
    observers at Exercise Cobra Gold. The objectives of interaction with
    the TNI are to favor reform and build capability for coalition
    operations.
        Under the protection of international peacekeepers, East Timor
    today is generally secure from the militias, but the work has just
    begun to establish a fully functioning society. Our Australian allies
    did a great job in leading this UN-mandated peace operation and remain
    the backbone of the security forces. The Philippines and Thailand have
    stepped forward to assume leadership of the peacekeeping forces since
    it became a UN operation. The U.S. Armed Forces continue to conduct
    operations in East Timor by providing liaison officers, engineers, and
    humanitarian assistance during ship visits.
    Philippines
        The Philippines experienced a peaceful transition of power from
    former President Estrada to former Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
    Arroyo (GMA). Throughout the period of the impeachment hearings and
    transfer of authority, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) acted
    with restraint and used constitutional precepts as guiding principles.
        Following the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
    in May 1999, the frequency and quality of interactions between U.S. and
    Philippine Armed Forces has also improved. The AFP has actively
    participated in initiatives to enhance regional cooperation and promote
    regional security. It deserves credit for taking a leading and
    responsible role in East Timor, contributing ground forces to the
    International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) coalition, providing the
    first force commander for the peacekeeping force of the UN Transition
    Authority for East Timor (UNTAET).
        The United States maintains its Mutual Defense Treaty with the
    Philippines, and our defense relations have steadily improved over the
    past year. The Defense Experts Exchange, a consultative group
    established between OSD and the Philippines Department of National
    Defense in 1999, has made progress in identifying the Philippines'
    national security and force structure needs. The talks address ways to
    help the Philippines increase readiness and become a more active
    contributor to regional security. Operations with, and assistance from,
    the United States cannot substitute for adequately funded Armed Forces,
    and the Philippines has not yet made the necessary investments.
        The Philippines continues to face significant internal security
    challenges from organizations such as the MILF, the Communist New
    People's Army (NPA) and the Abu Sayyaf Group. This past year, the
    United States initiated a $2 million program using Nonproliferation,
    Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) program funds to train and
    equip a counter-terrorist unit that will improve the AFP's capability
    to deal with hostage taking and other terrorist incidents.
    Thailand
        A strategic ally, strongly oriented to U.S. military training and
    equipment, Thailand aspires to adopt force modernization and
    ``jointness'' along U.S. models. Thailand consistently responds
    positively to U.S. requests for access, training, and transit. Thailand
    is one of the nations in Asia most committed to building regional
    approaches to future challenges--peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance,
    and transnational concerns. Exercise Cobra Gold in Thailand is
    developing into a multilateral training event to improve participating
    countries' capabilities to cooperate in peacekeeping and humanitarian
    missions.
        Thailand has taken a leading Southeast Asian regional role in
    support of peacekeeping by maintaining battalion strength forces in
    East Timor. The current military commander in East Timor is Thai LTG
    Boonsrang Niumpradit. We support humanitarian demining in Thailand and
    will transfer that program over to Thailand by fiscal year 2002. Joint
    Task Force Full Accounting Detachment-1 in Bangkok logistically anchors
    our POW/MIA recovery efforts throughout Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
        Within the last year, Thailand has requested U.S. assistance to the
    Royal Thai Army in combating drug traffic across the Burma-Thai border.
    U.S. Pacific Command is in the early stages of establishing a modest
    program of assistance against this common threat. Joint Interagency
    Task Force West (JIATF-WEST) is the standing task force for all
    counterdrug (CD) issues in the theater and has the lead to work
    training, equipment, and organizational coordination initiatives to
    assist the Thais with their CD mission.
    Australia
        This year marks the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty, and
    Australia remains America's closest ally in the Asia-Pacific region.
    Australian Armed Forces not only took the lead in East Timor
    operations, but they remain the largest part of the UN security force
    there. They also evacuated civilians and provided peace monitors in
    Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The Australian government has
    been active in promoting the return of democracy in Fiji and in
    promoting security and peaceful development throughout the archipelagic
    states of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australia has also
    constructively engaged in dialogue with China and North Korea to
    promote peace in Northeast Asia.
        In recognition of our special relationship, we have pursued an
    agreement to exempt qualified Australian firms from U.S. International
    Traffic in Arms Regulations controlling unclassified military
    technology.
        Australia recently completed an extensive Australia Defence 2000
    White Paper that clearly lays out its future defense requirements. The
    White Paper achieved broad national support and general bipartisan
    consensus through a unique consultation process that involved the
    public and all government agencies. The product is a plan to acquire
    the skills and equipment Australia will need to succeed across the full
    range of defense tasks, along with required funding.
    Singapore
        Completion of the deep draft pier at Changi Naval Base signifies
    Singapore's contribution and desire for continued U.S. presence in the
    region. Though not an ally, Singapore is a solid security partner in
    the Asia-Pacific region, a vocal proponent for U.S. access, and
    supports and hosts multilateral activities. Singapore hosted PACIFIC
    REACH, a multi-lateral submarine rescue exercise; participated in Cobra
    Gold and in numerous anti-piracy regional conferences; and is planning
    a regional Mine Counter-Mine exercise in May 2001.
        Singapore seeks greater interoperability with the U.S. Armed
    Forces. It views high technology and advanced hardware as a deterrent
    and is increasing its cooperation with the U.S. in joint
    experimentation. Singapore participates with the Extension of the
    Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
    and is active in other experiments such as the Joint Mission Force and
    Asia Pacific Area Network.
    POW/MIA Efforts in Southeast Asia
        Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues to make
    progress on achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans
    unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. JTF-FA
    conducted 10 joint field activities (JFAs) in fiscal year 2000--4 in
    Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. During these JFAs, the JTF-FA
    field teams investigated 219 cases and excavated 44 sites. JTF-FA will
    continue to maintain its robust pace of operations in fiscal year 2001,
    with 10 JFAs scheduled--4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia.
    Each JFA is about 30 days in duration.
        In calendar year 2000, 40 sets of remains previously recovered in
    JTF-FA operations were successfully identified and returned to their
    loved ones. As of January 31, 2001, Americans unaccounted for total
    1,900. In the same period, JTF-FA recovered and repatriated 24 remains
    we believe to be those of unaccounted-for Americans from Southeast Asia
    (17 from Vietnam and 7 from Laos).
        Achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans is a U.S.
    Pacific Command priority, and we will continue to devote the necessary
    personnel and resources to obtain the answers the POW/MIA families so
    richly deserve.

                        U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND PRIORITIES

        The challenges to security and peaceful development in the Asia-
    Pacific region require regional cooperation to address effectively.
    They include:

            --  Unresolved wars in Korea, across the Taiwan Strait, and in
            Kashmir that have flared, on occasion, but have been restrained
            for over 50 years.
            --  Conflicting territorial claims such as the Spratly Islands,
            the Kuril Islands, and the Senkaku Islands.
            --  Major powers--China, India, and Russia--that seek greater
            roles in regional security.
            --  Communal violence driven by separatist movements and
            historic grievances.
            --  Transnational concerns--including terrorism, illegal drug
            trafficking, piracy, and weapons proliferation.

        Our objective is an economically prosperous and interdependent
    region that shares dependable expectations of peaceful change. To
    achieve this objective, the strategy of the U.S. Pacific Command
    involves:

            --  Deterring aggression in Korea;
            --  Determining the future of Taiwan by peaceful means;
            --  Encouraging responsible development of growing powers;
            --  Developing multilateral capabilities to handle complex
            contingencies and transnational challenges;
            --  Planning for transition as security challenges evolve;
            --  Transforming our Armed Forces to increase their warfighting
            edge.

        The priorities for the U.S. Pacific Command in executing this
    strategy continue to be readiness, regional engagement, transformation,
    and resources.
    (1) Readiness
        During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many
    programs. I should note, however, that the programs I will discuss and
    the associated funding levels may change as a result of the Secretary's
    strategy review, which will guide future decisions on military
    spending. The administration will determine final 2002 and outyear
    funding levels only when the review is complete. I ask that you
    consider my comments in that light.
        U.S. Pacific Command forces must be fully ready to execute any
    assigned mission. Readiness revolves around people. If we are to
    recruit and retain the quality personnel that we need, service must be
    professionally rewarding to the members of our Armed Forces and must
    meet their personal and family needs. If we do not meet their basic
    professional and personal needs, they have many, often more lucrative,
    alternatives to a life of service to their Nation.
        Professionally and personally rewarding service involves confidence
    that financial compensation is fair, that educational opportunities are
    available to prepare for a world that values knowledge, and that
    healthcare is adequate. It also involves the provision and maintenance
    of suitable housing and facilities in which to live and work. It
    involves confidence that we fill personnel billets to match the tasking
    and that we are properly trained to conduct the full spectrum of
    operations expected of us. It involves having the resources to maintain
    equipment in a high state of readiness both during and between
    deployments, and adequate munitions to train and fight. It involves
    adequately protecting our forces on and off duty.
        Pay, Education, and Healthcare. First, let me thank you for all the
    positive quality of life initiatives in the Fiscal Year 2001 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The pay raise of 3.7 percent,
    targeted pay table reform for mid-grade non-commissioned officers,
    basic allowance for housing amendments, partial reimbursement for
    mandatory pet quarantine fees, impact aid to help civilian schools
    educate military dependents, and tuition assistance up to 100 percent
    for off-duty education are all outstanding efforts that servicemen and
    women appreciate. Also, thanks to your support, the performance of DOD
    schools is second to none, though we need help in funding operating
    expenses and maintaining infrastructure.
        We greatly appreciate the initiatives of the 106th Congress to
    enhance the TRICARE benefit and its coverage to include our retirees
    over the age of 65. This is the right thing to do--such quality of life
    enhancements favorably impact recruitment and retention and ultimately
    force readiness. Yet, challenges remain in establishing consistent,
    adequate funding of the healthcare benefit in a way that does not
    compromise other essential programs. We must ensure health services
    support functions organic to our operating forces, which are not in the
    Defense Health Program, receive adequate funding and attention within
    the Service POMs.
        Real Property Maintenance. Real property maintenance (RPM)
    continues to reveal the combined effects of aging facilities and under
    funding. The current and accumulating RPM backlog for U.S. Pacific
    Command components will amount to $7.1 billion over the next 5 years,
    assuming no fundamental changes emerge from the Secretary of Defense's
    ongoing strategy review. Funding intended for facilities repair and
    maintenance often goes to more immediate operational needs, and the
    backlog grows. The result is that our camps, posts, and stations across
    the U.S. Pacific Command are shabby and deteriorating. This shortfall
    in real property maintenance affects readiness, quality of life,
    retention, and force protection that we can no longer ignore. Our
    people deserve to live and work in a quality environment.
        Housing. Good top-rate housing that meets family housing goals of
    2010 remains one of my top quality of life concerns. Projects are
    underway, ranging from whole barracks renewals at Fort Richardson,
    Alaska, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to new family housing at Pearl
    Harbor and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
    (CINCPACFLT), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and Marine Forces Pacific
    (MARFORPAC) expect to meet the 2010 housing goal if funding continues
    at current levels for their programs. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)
    anticipates adequate housing for Hawaii by 2010 if their Residential
    Community Initiative is successful. However, housing in Alaska and
    Japan will remain inadequate until substantial MILCON funding is
    allocated to their revitalization programs. U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
    and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) also face shortages, forcing
    servicemembers to live off base in Korea and Japan, often in inadequate
    housing. Lack of available real estate acquisition for new housing is
    the biggest obstacle in Japan and Korea. When additional real estate is
    procured, we will need additional MILCON housing funding to meet
    requirements above what host nation-funded construction can provide in
    Japan and Korea.
        Munitions. Although we are beginning to procure additional
    munitions, because they have just recently entered full-rate
    production, or have yet to do so, a number of preferred munitions are
    available only in limited quantities and do not support training and
    operational requirements. Such already limited quantities have been
    drawn down as a result of expenditures in Kosovo and ongoing
    consumption in Operation Southern Watch and Operation Northern Watch.
    Alternative munitions will get the job done, but with greater combat
    risk and losses. Funding to further increase stock levels of preferred
    and precision munitions is a top priority.
        Force Protection. Before the terrorist bombing of the U.S.S. Cole,
    U.S. Pacific Command's Force Protection Program had expanded over the
    last year to include rear-area protection program during increased
    hostilities and critical infrastructure protection. The U.S.S. Cole
    bombing resulted in a command-wide, top-to-bottom review of our
    antiterrorism policies and procedures.
        Funding obtained through the Combating Terrorism Readiness
    Initiative Fund (CbT RIF) has helped with critical emergent
    requirements, but the U.S. Pacific Command still has $110 million in
    unfunded requirements. Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments
    (JSIVA) play a significant role in assessing our program and
    identifying requirements.
        Following the U.S.S. Cole bombing, the command began a full
    reassessment of vulnerabilities at ports and airfields not under U.S.
    control. Negotiating force protection memoranda of understanding with
    foreign countries is an ongoing process to ensure clearly delineated
    responsibilities.
        A major challenge is to prevent increased effort from becoming a
    bureaucratic drill rather than a routine way of operating. Instructions
    and checklists help, but they are not enough. Our commanders must think
    tactically about force protection. On every deployment, every exercise
    and even at home stations, we must ingrain force protection in the very
    fabric of our forces. Having said that, terrorists can choose their
    time and place of attack. That gives them an advantage. As long as we
    are engaged around the world, there will be further attacks. Our goal
    is to minimize the impact to our forces.
        Staffing, Training, and Operations. As we exploit information
    technology and revise our organizations, the character of combatant
    command headquarters is changing. Increasingly, headquarters staffs
    perform operational functions that forward forces used to do. As
    examples, my staff in Hawaii provided many logistics, communications,
    and intelligence support functions for our operations in East Timor
    that allowed us to keep the number of U.S. personnel in country to a
    minimum. This further reduced requirements for force protection and
    living support. Also, PACAF is establishing a Joint Air Operations
    Center at Hickam Air Force Base. This center will similarly perform
    many functions of the Joint Forces Air Component Coordinator, reducing
    the number of personnel that must forward deploy to conduct operations.
        As our headquarters staffs become more involved in supporting
    operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in addition to their
    administrative functions, we are finding our staffs working harder than
    before, even as they downsize. We have turned to the Reserve Components
    for help, and they have done a splendid job. But our shortfalls are
    growing, and we are just beginning to exploit the capability that
    information technology gives us to allow forward forces to reach back
    to staffs.
        Increasingly, the measure of staffs to deployed forces is shifting
    from ``tooth to tail'' toward ``brain to brawn.'' While the fiscal year
    2001 NDAA provides some relief from the fiscal year 1998 and fiscal
    year 2000 NDAAs, there is still a requirement for OSD designated
    activities to reduce personnel by 7.5 percent. These additional
    headquarters cuts will hinder our ability to provide effective
    management and oversight of command readiness and operations. It will
    be difficult to execute these reductions in a way that does not impact
    our operational readiness. In the U.S. Pacific Command our staffs are
    fully engaged in operations forward.
        We are experiencing shortfalls not only in available billets, but
    also in the funds needed to train, exercise, and operate our forces.
    Particular areas affecting readiness are funding for flight hours, ship
    depot maintenance, joint exercises, and Reserve support.
        The funds allocated to component flying hour programs (FHP) are
    increasing, but not fast enough to cover escalating costs. The rising
    costs of fuel and spare parts for aging aircraft appear to be driving
    the escalation. These costs may increase even faster in the years ahead
    as DOD aircraft and avionics fall further behind commercial standards.
    The Navy FHP is growing 15 percent annually. PACFLT is facing a $317
    million shortfall in fiscal year 2001. This figure includes a MARFORPAC
    shortfall of $94 million. Both PACFLT and MARFORPAC would exhaust their
    fiscal year 2001 FHP funding by August without reprogramming funds.
    USARPAC's and PACAF's programs also have shortfalls. The Services
    increasingly rely upon supplemental appropriations to avert the
    consequences of unprogrammed escalation in operation and maintenance
    program costs.
        PACFLT's ship depot maintenance program continues to be underfunded
    relative to the full requirement. Growing deferred maintenance backlogs
    have been kept in check largely through execution year supplemental
    funding from Congress. This affects battle group inter-deployment
    training readiness, which continues to decline as training resources
    are continually sacrificed to maintain deployed readiness. Forces enter
    training cycles at low state of readiness, fall to lower levels and
    then ``recover'' rapidly right before deployment. The resultant
    ``spikes'' in our readiness curves could become vulnerabilities if
    asked to respond to unforeseen contingencies.
        The ability of U.S. joint forces to fight in a seamless battle
    space and to conduct combined operations with our coalition partners
    will provide the greatest gains in U.S. warfighting capability over the
    coming decade. Joint training represents 5 percent of the operations
    tempo (OPTEMPO) of forces assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. Currently,
    we are well within the congressionally-mandated joint exercise man-days
    reduction directives. Our USPACOM-wide man-day reduction through fiscal
    year 2000 was 32 percent, 7 percent below the objective of 25 percent.
    Simultaneously, we have shaped a solid Joint Training Program. This
    program provides us confidence that our Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are
    ready to fight. Further fiscal reductions to the Joint Exercise Program
    put our JTF and joint warfighting readiness at risk. We need full
    funding of the currently planned minimum exercise program. This
    includes Service Incremental Funding and the Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT)
    provided through the Chairman's Exercise Program. Inflation of flying
    hour costs has increased exponentially over recent years, significantly
    eroding our STRATLIFT buying power. This impacts us greatly in USPACOM
    where STRATLIFT is our lifeblood due to our vast area of responsibility
    (AOR). We need full funding to ensure we get the right forces, to the
    right place, to exercise with the right joint and coalition partners,
    so we can indeed remain ready.
        Shortfalls also exist in funding designed to employ Reserve and
    National Guard personnel. U.S. Pacific Command's Reserve billets are
    based upon a single major theater war. Reservists' 2 week training
    period is sufficient for them to support one major exercise per year,
    which leaves the command short of personnel to support several other
    major exercises in the joint training plan. Defense plans include
    provisions for Reserve personnel to volunteer to support exercises, but
    funds are inadequate to accommodate the volunteers.
        Summary. Overall, the majority of readiness concerns of a year ago
    remain today. While making progress in some areas, we are declining in
    others. I continue to have no reservations about the U.S. Pacific
    Command's ability to do its job today. However, I do have doubts about
    its ability to do so in the future unless we make more progress in
    addressing structural readiness issues.
    (2) Regional Engagement
        While readiness prepares us to respond, through regional engagement
    we shape the region to promote security and peaceful development.
    Current circumstances provide the opportunity and the necessity to
    develop more mature security arrangements among the nations of the
    region. Opportunities derive from dynamic regional security
    developments and a new generation of leaders willing to reexamine what
    policies are genuinely in their national interest. Necessity derives
    from strong nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalry, and historic
    grievances that drive desires to settle old scores prevalent throughout
    the region. Steady and focused efforts ensure the region develops in
    ways favorable to American interests.
        Engagement is a process to achieve national objectives, not an end
    in itself. Our efforts improves the ability of regional partners to
    defend themselves, deters potential aggressors, strengthens security
    alliances and partnerships, increases regional readiness for combined
    operations, promotes access for American forces to facilities in the
    region, and promotes security arrangements better suited to the
    challenges of the 21st century.
        Enhanced Regional Cooperation. Over the past year, the U.S. Pacific
    Command has worked closely with the Joint Staff, Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, and the interagency community to develop enhanced
    regional cooperation. The objectives of enhancing regional cooperation
    have been to improve regional readiness for combined operations and to
    expand the set of states in the region that share dependable
    expectations of peaceful change.
        Transnational concerns affect all states in the region in varying
    degrees. Many of the states in the region contribute armed forces and
    police to UN peacekeeping operations. Terrorism, weapons proliferation,
    illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, piracy, and other
    transnational criminal activities represent problems that require
    regional cooperation. Some of this is police work and some of it is
    military work. Different countries organize differently. Since
    adversaries operate freely without regard for borders, seeking support,
    bases of operation, and weak points to attack throughout our region,
    the only way to win against them is international cooperation.
        By developing capabilities to work effectively as coalitions in
    complex contingencies (such as East Timor); as partners in countering
    terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and piracy; in managing the
    consequences of chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks, natural
    disasters and accidents; in evacuating citizens caught in the path of
    violence; in search-and-rescue of mariners in distress; and in
    providing humanitarian assistance, the armed forces of the region
    improve their readiness to contribute to combined operations. Working
    side-by-side on these missions builds confidence and trust among the
    participants as it improves operational capabilities. It provides a way
    for states that want to exert more influence in the region to do so in
    constructive ways that contribute to regional security. It provides the
    United States with competent coalition partners so that our Armed
    Forces need not shoulder the entire load.
        The U.S. Pacific Command's efforts to enhance regional security
    include expanding dialogue among the armed forces of the region,
    developing standard procedures and training staffs to use them, and
    exercising to hone our capabilities and learn where to improve.
        In addition to my visits around the region and those of my
    component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command sponsors a wide range of
    activities to promote regional security dialogue. The Asia-Pacific
    Center for Security Studies (APCSS--see Appendix A) brings together
    military officers from around the region at the colonel/brigadier level
    and government officials of equivalent grades for a 12-week course.
    APCSS also conducts a 1-week course for more senior officers and
    officials, and hosts about five conferences each year. The U.S. Pacific
    Command also hosts annual conferences on military operational law and
    logistics, and for the past 3 years has held a conference for Chiefs of
    Defense from around the region. These conferences have been very
    effective in promoting military cooperation against common threats.
        At the Chiefs' conference, we also demonstrated our new Asia-
    Pacific Area Network (APAN). APAN is a non-secure web portal, which
    provides an internet-based communications and collaboration ability for
    the armed forces of the region and civilian organizations that
    participate in complex contingencies to share sensitive, but
    unclassified, information. On it, we have begun web-based collaboration
    by posting standard procedures for combined operations. These web pages
    have mechanisms so that anyone can suggest improvements. Like many
    things on the web, no government signs up to use these procedures, but
    they are available for those who need them. Web-based planning and
    distributed simulations are also possible to add new, affordable means
    to build regional capacity. Additionally, the APAN concept provides a
    simple and economical means to provide a networking of institutions and
    training centers with this new form of collaboration and information
    exchange. These networks will be the building blocks for Asia-Pacific
    Security Communities that were previously unaffordable.
        We also have held Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)
    conferences to refine procedures, and conducted workshops to train
    staff officers from around the region as a cadre of Asia-Pacific
    military planners ready to reinforce a multinational force
    headquarters. We rely on lessons learned in East Timor and other
    peacekeeping operations to improve the region's capability to conduct
    combined operations. In November, the Philippines hosted an MPAT Staff
    Planning workshop attended by 18 nations, non-governmental
    organizations, and UN representatives. Many armed forces in the region
    want to improve their abilities to work together, and use APAN to
    continue their MPAT dialogue between workshops.
        Team Challenge links bilateral exercises Cobra Gold with Thailand,
    Balikitan with the Philippines, and Tandem Thrust with Australia to
    address bilateral training objectives and to improve the readiness of
    regional armed forces to contribute to multilateral operations. This
    year Singapore will participate and other nations, such as Japan and
    Korea, will observe with an eye toward participating in future years.
    In Team Challenge we will exercise elements from the full spectrum of
    missions that our combined forces may be called upon to do together,
    from complex contingencies to humanitarian assistance.
        These are examples of efforts to enhance regional security
    cooperation. As we progress, we find many requirements to coordinate
    better on logistics, intelligence and other aspects of our operations,
    and take steps such as developing a coalition-wide area network
    (successfully employed in RIMPAC, our multinational naval exercise).
    With cooperation from the nations of the region, and the initiative
    that my staff and my components have demonstrated, enhanced regional
    cooperation and security communities have grown from a concept to a
    substantial approach for promoting security and peaceful development
    over the past year.
        The reactions to the U.S. Pacific Command's efforts have been
    largely positive, with some reservations. Some allies have expressed
    concern that multinational efforts will dilute the quality of our
    bilateral relations. For enhanced regional cooperation to succeed, we
    must strengthen our traditional bilateral relations, focusing our
    efforts on capabilities to pursue common interests, and then reach out
    to other nations in the region. The Team Challenge planning efforts
    have demonstrated our commitment to meeting bilateral training
    objectives and enhancing them with skills required for coalition
    operations.
        Other nations have expressed concerns that this is a precursor to
    the United States reducing its involvement in the region. Quite the
    contrary! By improving our capabilities to work together, the nations
    of this critical region can more effectively address the broad range of
    security challenges that none can solve alone.
        Also, some nations fear that it is a scheme for containing China.
    Instead, it is a way to encourage China to contribute to regional
    security in constructive ways. We welcome the fact that China has sent
    15 police officers as part of the CIVPOL contingent to East Timor. We
    would welcome greater Chinese involvement in peacekeeping such as they
    provided in Cambodia in 1994. The last class at APCSS included two
    Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officers and two officials from the
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They learned that many nations in the
    region share American security concerns and that cooperation in many
    areas is in China's interest. The way ahead in U.S. Pacific Command's
    relations with the PLA is, with the support of other armed forces, to
    encourage cooperation in areas where our Nations genuinely share mutual
    interests, while maintaining that disputes must be resolved peacefully.
    As with many nations in the region, we must work to transform PLA
    leadership mindsets from measuring differences in military power to
    measuring progress in regional security.
        The $10 million in Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) funds
    provided by Congress in fiscal year 2000 and $24.6 million provided in
    fiscal year 2001 have been essential to the initiatives to enhance
    regional cooperation. The dollars we invest in these regional
    activities pay huge dividends in U.S. security.
        Currently, U.S. Pacific Command interactions with armed forces of
    14 of the 43 nations in the region are restricted in some form. Some of
    these restrictions are in the U.S. interest. Others, I question. I
    encourage the close review of restrictions to ensure we have drawn the
    lines at the right places. The objective is to build relationships and
    influence for the long term as we exact penalties in the short term.
        Foreign Military Officer Education (FMOE). One area where I would
    recommend eliminating restrictions is in foreign military officer
    education. The experience of American officers who have attended
    foreign military colleges provides an unparalleled understanding of how
    foreign armed forces see their role and approach operations. Similarly,
    foreign officers who attend American military colleges develop an
    understanding of the value of professional armed forces, removed from
    politics and subordinate to civilian government authority. They come to
    appreciate that reliance on force to resolve internal disputes, rather
    than political accommodation and economic development, stokes the fires
    of rebellion and drives away investments needed for national growth.
    They also acquire a deeper appreciation of America's interest in
    maintaining international security so all may prosper. The contacts
    they develop with Americans and officers from their region establish a
    network for dialogue and become particularly valuable as they assume
    leadership roles within their armed forces.
        International Military Education and Training (IMET). We should
    also examine restrictions on many aspects of our IMET program.
    Education is a long-term investment and the IMET program, a main source
    of funding for FMOE, is our primary tool in this effort. I believe
    unrestricted IMET programs are fundamentally in the national interest.
    Some say military education is a reward for countries that behave
    according to international standards. On the contrary, military
    education is a valuable tool we use to gain influence with foreign
    militaries. Military training--teaching tactical skills and equipment
    maintenance--should be carefully tailored and controlled. However,
    military education--study at command and staff colleges--introduces the
    ideals of democracy, civilian control of the military, and respect for
    human rights, and should be available to all. Many reform-minded, pro-
    U.S. military leaders in the Asia-Pacific region today are IMET
    graduates who strongly advocate a continued U.S. presence and
    engagement in Asia.
        IMET is a modest, long-term investment to help build a secure,
    peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. Following a declining trend,
    with your help U.S. Pacific Command's funding for IMET is now on the
    right path. In fiscal year 2000 we received $6.659 million for 17
    countries, and in fiscal year 2001 our budget is about $7.2 million for
    19 countries. Further increases would yield real benefits to U.S.
    security.
        UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. U.S. ratification of the UN
    Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is another action that would
    enhance regional security cooperation. Many Asia-Pacific countries
    assert excessive maritime claims that challenge navigation rights. Over
    the past few years, parties disputing territory in the South China Sea
    have shifted their approach from occupying reefs to negotiating over a
    Code of Conduct. In this and other disputes, the U.S. position is that
    agreements should be in accordance with UNCLOS. Ratification will
    strengthen our hand in demanding compliance with UNCLOS requirements
    and in countering excessive maritime claims.
        Summary. We have continued to make significant progress this year
    in better structuring our engagement programs in the Asia-Pacific
    region to advance U.S. interests. Through continued emphasis on
    education, dialogue, standard procedures, staff training, improved
    communications, exercises and coordination on matters of common
    interest, we will continue to expand the set of nations in the Asia-
    Pacific region that share dependable expectations of peaceful change.
    We will enhance regional cooperation and access of U.S. forces to
    facilities in the region, strengthen alliances and security
    partnerships, and deter aggression.
    (3) Transformation
        Transformation involves changes in operational concepts and
    organizational schemes that take advantage of technology to provide
    decisive advantages in warfare. The Armed Forces of the United States
    are committed to leading that change in the 21st century. At U.S.
    Pacific Command, our transformation strategy is based on two parallel
    initiatives--technology insertion efforts such as the Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program run out of OSD and the Joint
    Experimentation program that is led by U.S. Joint Forces Command.
        Since I last spoke with you, U.S. Pacific Command has been rewarded
    for its aggressive pursuit of ACTDs with 3 fiscal year 2001 new start
    ACTDs and a fourth ACTD-like project, bringing the total number of
    ACTDs we are involved in today to 13.
        The Tactical Missile Systems-Penetrator ACTD will provide a
    penetrator weapon designed to deal with specific high threat targets in
    Korea within 3 years. The Coalition Theater Logistics ACTD will provide
    vital logistics command and control capabilities for coalition forces
    operating in campaigns similar to that in East Timor. The Hunter
    Standoff Killer Team ACTD will provide vital joint C\4\I capabilities
    to engage time critical targets and massed armor. The Coalition Rear
    Area Security Operations Command and Control (CRASOC\2\) is an ACTD-
    like project in that it will have streamlined management and early
    operator involvement. CRASOC\2\ will develop force protection C\4\I
    capabilities to improve coordination between U.S. security forces and
    host nation police and military agencies for improved protection of our
    forces stationed overseas.
        The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program is serving
    U.S. Pacific Command well. We need such programs designed to get
    advanced technology rapidly into the field for evaluation and
    experimentation.
        The pace of joint experimentation in the U.S. Pacific Command has
    increased since I last testified before you. Over the past year, U.S.
    Pacific Command has supported U.S. Joint Forces Command in the Unified
    Vision and Millennium Challenge series of experiments and planning
    conferences. We participated in Joint Warrior Interoperability
    Demonstration (JWID) 2000 as a primary demonstration site and the
    Combined Task Force Commander's headquarters in the Pacific Scenario.
    We have agreed to team, as host CINC, with the Joint Staff and U.S.
    Marine Corps in the execution of JWID 2002-2003 and have already
    stepped forward to influence the C\4\ISR interoperability challenges
    that will be addressed. We continue efforts to develop joint
    interoperability at the tactical level through the Expanding the
    Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD. With the support of U.S. Joint Forces
    Command and the Services, we have made significant progress in
    developing the Joint Mission Force (JMF) concept into a capability.
        A Joint Mission Force is a seamless Joint/Combined Pacific Theater
    response force capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions
    from a complex contingency through humanitarian assistance and of
    serving as the leading edge of a major war. This force will execute
    operations more effectively, rapidly, and efficiently than we can
    today. This transformation effort has moved from its infancy into
    wargames and exercises that enhance our ability to rapidly form and
    deploy a Joint Task Force. We have identified the top 10 challenges to
    more effective Joint Task Force operations and have made significant
    progress in developing procedures to address them. We also have
    incorporated JMF and other mature experimentation into our exercise
    program.
        We have concentrated our efforts over the past year on the
    improvements we need to establish a relevant, common operational
    picture and communicate tasking and information among the headquarters
    of components of a Joint Task Force. Our JMF Command and Control
    exercise program, or C\2\X, is identifying clear requirements to enable
    a JTF and assess where specific deficiencies exist, with the intent of
    fixing deficiencies by 2003. We are receiving strong support from the
    Services in rectifying these deficiencies that are basic to our joint
    warfighting capability. The greatest gains in warfighting capability
    that we will see over the coming decade will come from our ability to
    eliminate seams in the battlespace and let all units assigned to a
    Joint Task Force exploit their full potential. We have received
    significant financial and staff support from U.S. Joint Forces Command
    in taking the JMF concept from its infancy to a near-term capability.
    By including our allies and close security partners in our wargames, we
    ensure that our JMF efforts are in harmony with our other efforts to
    improve regional readiness for combined operations.
        Australia, Japan, Korea, and Singapore all have the technological
    resources to work with the United States in developing advanced warfare
    capabilities. We share information on our efforts with these countries,
    and work together to improve coalition interoperability at the high end
    of military technology.
        Some have expressed concerns that by strengthening coalition
    capabilities and working with potential adversaries on skills required
    for peacekeeping operations and complex contingencies, we are
    jeopardizing our warfighting edge. The reverse is true. We are
    continuing to widen the gap in warfighting capabilities between the
    United States, its allies and partners, and potential adversaries. As
    we experiment, we improve our readiness, enhance regional cooperation,
    and transform our forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
        Indeed, U.S. Pacific Command's priorities of readiness, regional
    engagement, and transformation are not wholly distinct activities. Let
    me try to bring this idea alive by describing a visionary Western
    Pacific deployment of a carrier battle group (CVBG) on its way to the
    Arabian Gulf.
        During workups, the battle group acts as the Navy component of a
    joint task force under a realistic exercise scenario. The battle group
    maintains a common operating picture with a JTF commander's
    headquarters and subordinate Service components. During that time, it
    experiments with a new C\4\ system being developed by the Army--for
    example a new version of the Coalition Wide Area Network--holding
    common operational picture checks with brigade headquarters in
    Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines.

            --  As the battle group approaches Japan, it forms a two-
            carrier task force, and conducts an area access exercise
            involving Japanese and ROK forces in both coalition and
            opposition force roles. The battle group joins the Japanese
            Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
            --  It then integrates into the Korean area air defense and
            conducts experiments integrating joint and combined fires,
            including live ordnance fire on ranges.
            --  The task force then transits from Korea down to the South
            China Sea.
            --  It exercises operational deception, employing information
            from national technical means to evaluate effectiveness.
            --  It conducts Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) exercises, working
            the seams between CVBG and area ASW in littoral regions,
            developing new concepts and establishing C\4\SIR requirements.
            --  It exercises area air and missile defense with an Air Force
            component out of Okinawa and Guam, working Air Tasking Order
            improvements and experiments with information operations, and
            routinely operating with Global Hawk to hone new joint
            concepts.
            --  The transit culminates with a dissimilar air engagement
            exercise with Singapore and port calls in South East Asia.
            During the port calls, battle group officers hold seminars with
            counterparts in host countries to improve coalition
            interoperability at the tactical level.

        All of this could be done in 10-14 days. What would we have
    accomplished?

            --  Increased readiness of all forces involved, to respond to
            contingencies;
            --  Conducted regional engagement that both reassured allies,
            and deterred those who would use aggression to impose their
            will;
            --  Made progress in transforming the way we operate, both to
            take advantage of emerging technology and to address emerging
            challenges.

        This vignette illustrates that readiness, regional engagement, and
    the transformation of our Armed Forces are not distinct efforts,
    accomplished by separate organizations at separate times. We do them
    together, with operational units. If we experiment and adapt, we are
    increasing our readiness, while we make the evolutionary changes in
    technology and concepts which will lead to the transformation of
    warfighting. If we do them with our allies and security partners, we
    have the most effective kind of military engagement.
        Transforming our Armed Forces to maintain their leading edge and
    interoperability with coalition partners is essential to protecting
    American security interests in the 21st century. Several members of
    Congress have been active in pushing us to pursue this program, and we
    need your continued support and leadership.
    (4) Resources
        The U.S. Pacific Command's ability to execute its strategy rests on
    its ability to command ready, forward-deployed and forward-stationed
    forces, to move them where they need to be in the theater, and to
    reinforce them in the event of a major war. Ultimately this depends on
    the resources Congress and the American taxpayers provide us. In this
    section, I will discuss resources in several key areas that are
    important to the Pacific Command's strategy.
    Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C\4\)
            Capabilities
        Information technology is changing every aspect of warfare in an
    evolutionary way and warfare as a whole in a revolutionary way. From my
    perspective, C\4\ support fits into three main categories: (1) an end-
    to-end infrastructure; (2) the capability to integrate and process data
    into usable information and make it available when needed; and (3) the
    protection of information.
        First, the end-to-end enterprise enhances the ability to command
    and control forces and consists of a space segment, a downlink
    capability, and the ground segment.
        The U.S. Pacific Command's vast area of operations, covering 52
    percent of the earth's surface, requires forces to rely heavily on
    strategic satellite communications (SATCOM). Since my testimony to you
    last year, we've made great strides in many of the SATCOM programs. For
    example, we accelerated the Advanced Extremely High Frequency program
    to compensate for a Milstar launch failure; agreed to launch a third
    Wideband Gapfiller System satellite to complete global coverage as the
    Defense Satellite Communications System constellation replacement; and
    scheduled the launches of the three Milstar satellites. The challenge
    is to keep these critical satellite programs on track.
        As I also stated last year, my Joint Task Force commanders and
    deployed units must have access to the strategic defense information
    infrastructure, the Global Information Grid, or GIG. This capability is
    critical to providing them with vital command, control, and
    intelligence information. I strongly supported the DOD Teleport
    program, as did many of my fellow CINCs, and I am now satisfied that
    this program is on course.
        Advances in the space segment and downlink capability provide
    little value if we cannot push the information out to the user. The
    base, post, camp, and station infrastructures must keep pace. Since we
    still have antiquated cable plants, network wiring, and end-user
    equipment, we must attack this ground infrastructure as aggressively as
    we have the space segment. The recent decision that injected
    significant funding into the U.S. Army's European and Pacific theaters
    is a tremendous boost in our fight to keep pace with technology, and I
    applaud your and OSD's efforts in directing that funding to us.
    However, requirements go beyond the U.S. Army. The U.S. Air Force,
    Navy, and Marine Corps are also encountering the same problems and
    require much-needed funding support if we are to modernize entire
    theaters. While single-Service efforts significantly help in the
    modernization battle, we realize maximum payoffs when we collectively
    raise all Services to the same capability level.
        Not to be overlooked in the end-to-end infrastructure is the
    frequency spectrum. We must proceed cautiously with the sell-off of DOD
    frequencies since that loss directly translates into potential
    operational risks. Once we sell them, they are forever unavailable for
    military use.
        The second C\4\ category involves converting data into useful
    information that will optimize synchronous planning and execution, and
    improve decision support. At the heart of this requirement is
    interoperability and accessibility. Interoperability allows all parties
    to share the same capabilities and information, while accessibility
    allows them to get the information they require when and where they
    need it.
        The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is the backbone of the
    joint and combined command and control capability. Yet, Service
    variants of GCCS are not fully interoperable with the joint version.
    For example, the GCCS Integrated Imagery and Intelligence application
    being developed for the joint version of GCCS is falling behind, while
    the Services continue to modernize their individual intelligence
    applications. To fix this, we must mandate new C\4\ systems be joint
    `from cradle to grave.'
        There are also GCCS incompatibilities in combined operations; for
    example, GCCS-Joint and GCCS-Korea. These two systems share some common
    operational picture data, but do not share information via files, e-
    mail, and other web service tools. Obstacles to combined
    interoperability lie in information release restrictions. Our allies
    understandably restrict release of their classified information.
    Likewise, we want to control release of U.S. classified information. To
    achieve effective combined interoperability, we must develop much more
    capable security procedures and sophisticated tools to allow
    information exchange while protecting our national and allied data.
        Technology is changing the way the warfighter prepares, trains, and
    executes the mission. We must develop a mindset promoting innovation
    and technology insertion. It is through continued support of Advanced
    Concept Technology Demonstrations, experimentation programs, and
    exercises with our coalition partners, that we find ways to improve
    interoperability and enhance capabilities. We must put more emphasis on
    acquisition by adaptation, put proven prototypes into a joint field
    environment, and mature them through a tight spiral development cycle.
    Information is power, and a fully interoperable atmosphere allows us to
    collaborate with coalition partners, share operational pictures,
    increase the speed of command, and ultimately, win the day.
        Obviously, sharing information among Services, sub-unified
    commands, and coalition partners is a complex security challenge. That
    leads me to the third category, information assurance (IA). How do we
    provide access to, and share information with, Asia-Pacific countries
    while protecting U.S. and coalition-sensitive data from potential
    adversaries?
        To improve IA in the U.S. Pacific Command, we are taking several
    measures. We are evaluating the Automated Intrusion Detection
    Environment. Our Theater C\4\ISR Coordination Center is building a
    theater IA common operational picture (COP) (similar to the COP we use
    in the command and control arena) and tracking intrusion attempts and
    methods. We also are working closely with the Defense Information
    Systems Agency on an improved configuration that will provide full
    coverage of external connections to our Pacific networks.
        Yes, we can improve IA in the theater; however, to do so requires a
    heavy investment in people and additional hardware. The payback is not
    always as easily recognizable as with the production of new airplanes,
    ships, or tanks. You cannot touch and feel information protection, but
    a loss of critical or time-sensitive information or a denial of service
    can be far more detrimental to national security than a single weapon
    system. I request your continued support as we implement IA into our
    daily operations.
        As you can see, C\4\ is a major concern in the Pacific and my top
    resource priority. While we have made great strides recently in
    addressing satellite communications shortfalls, we still have a long
    way to go. We must now focus on modernizing the ground infrastructures
    and ensuring the protection of our networks and the information that
    traverses them.
    Intelligence
        Intelligence is essential to monitor potential adversary
    developments and preparations so that we can train our forces for the
    threats that they face and move them into position in a timely fashion.
    Shortages of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) assets--U-2s, RC-135s, EP-3s, significantly impact USPACOM's
    readiness ratings. These shortfalls diminish our situational awareness,
    early indications and warning (I&W), and deep knowledge of the
    capabilities, plans, and intentions of key theaters in our area of
    responsibility. Although Joint Staff-planned allocation of airborne
    reconnaissance assets is adequate for routine operations in the Pacific
    Theater, we do not have the surge capability to monitor crises or
    cyclical increases of potential adversary activities. Other chronic
    shortfalls in high priority intelligence include linguists, tactical
    signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems, intelligence specialists, and
    intelligence interoperability.
        The core of intelligence analysis and dissemination in the theater
    is the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC), located near Pearl
    Harbor. JICPAC's operational efficiency and impact suffers because
    almost 100 JICPAC personnel must work in a revamped hangar at Hickam
    AFB, due to space limitations in the main JICPAC facility. These split-
    based operations cost almost $300,000 per year for the separate
    facility, as well as lost time and efficiency. In addition, JICPAC's
    building, in a vulnerable location near a major highway, presents a
    serious force protection issue. At the same time, the Kunia Regional
    SIGINT Operations Center (RSOC) occupies an aging facility, built in
    1945, renovated for cryptologic operations in 1979, and then updated
    throughout the last 20 years. Collocating the RSOC with the new JICPAC
    facility on an intelligence ``campus'' would improve intelligence
    exchange, analytical dialogue, and efficiencies in infrastructure.
        Advances in global telecommunications technology continue to place
    enormous pressure on the need to modernize both national and tactical
    cryptologic capabilities. USPACOM supports the National Security
    Agency/Central Security Service's (NSA/CSS's) strategic transformation
    actions and changes undertaken in the last year. NSA must transform to
    address the global net, but warfighters' knowledge of adversary
    battlefield communications will also continue to be a high USPACOM
    priority. NSA must be funded to continue modernizing tactical SIGINT
    collection capabilities, operations of the RSOC and accompanying land-
    based collection architecture, addressing ELINT collection shortfalls,
    and operations of the Information Operations Technology Center (IOTC).
        Specifically, NSA needs more capable, joint tactical cryptologic
    systems. Rapid advances in widely available communication technology
    have rendered obsolete much of the current inventory of tactical
    cryptologic systems. At the same time, the Services' R&D funding has
    declined. NSA and the Services must continue to aggressively pursue
    standards and common architectures, such as the Joint Tactical SIGINT
    Architecture.
        Increased HUMINT capabilities are critical to support collection
    against strategic and operational requirements in the Pacific.
    Improvements are needed to enhance collection against key USPACOM
    indications and warning requirements and hard-target organizations and
    countries. Continuing investment in theater-based HUMINT resources,
    specifically computers and communications capabilities, is essential to
    improve collection against hard targets. Any further Defense HUMINT
    Service (DHS) reductions will adversely impact USPACOM-based U.S.
    Defense Attache Offices (USDAOs), field operating bases, and DHS
    support to key USPACOM collection requirements and contingency
    operations. The USDAO system, in particular, already is experiencing
    serious resource constraints in the USPACOM AOR.
        The Nation's future imagery and geo-spatial architecture will
    deliver unmatched capability, including enhanced imagery collection
    provided by unmanned aerial vehicles and the future imagery
    architecture. However, USPACOM warfighters will not reap the full
    benefits of this capability without full tasking, processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) investment. A robust TPED
    architecture is essential to ensure that dynamically tasked national,
    airborne, and commercial imagery and geo-spatial products connect the
    sensors to the analysts and, ultimately, to the tactical consumers.
    Services and agencies must institutionalize the need to properly
    program resources that incorporate TPED capabilities. Progress is
    occurring and CINC interests are being addressed. However, we will work
    to identify outyear funds to meet substantial portions of Senior
    Warfighting Forum priority requirements. Specifically, the Services
    must work with National Imagery and Mapping Agency to fund the
    capabilities needed to make Joint Vision 2010/2020 a reality. These
    include required technical enhancements to theater digital
    infrastructure, advanced analytical exploitation tools, and improved
    imagery analyst training (especially for advanced sensor products).
        Asian linguist deficiencies are acute and a documented USPACOM
    readiness concern. Despite additional student slots at the Defense
    Language Institute, there are recurring and persistent shortages of
    Asian linguists to meet Operation Plan (OPLAN) and Contingency Plan
    (CONPLAN) requirements. Also, resources for low-density linguists in
    support of probable Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) continue
    to be problematic. Service recruiting and retention shortfalls, coupled
    with the inherent difficulty of Asian languages and the longer training
    periods required, aggravate these deficiencies.
    Mobility Infrastructure and Strategic Lift
        With congressional and Service support, we have made solid progress
    in correcting deficiencies in our mobility infrastructure. A total of
    15 MILCON projects are either in work or programmed through fiscal year
    2004. We will apply supplemental MILCON funding for fiscal year 2001 to
    critical en route and currently unfunded infrastructure projects, such
    as those at Wake Island.
        We support the fiscal year 2001 MILCON language that would restore
    MILCON contingency funding. While we are making headway with some near-
    term MILCON projects, sustained funding is still required. The
    continued appropriation of resources is absolutely essential to
    maintain an upward trend and complete the necessary repairs of our
    aging mobility infrastructure.
        In addition to a well-maintained mobility infrastructure,
    contingency throughput in our theater largely depends on strategic
    lift. As identified in the recently released Mobility Requirements
    Study 2005 (MRS-05), there are ``areas where improvements are needed in
    mobility programs. . . An airlift fleet of 49.7 million-ton-miles per
    day, (the previous established level), is not adequate to meet the full
    range of requirements.'' I fully support the MRS-05 recommendation that
    ``DOD should develop a program to provide [additional] airlift
    capacity.''
    Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4)
        A key logistics and sustainment shortfall remains in Army
    Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) in Korea. Sustainment shortfalls limit
    ability to reconstitute the force and sustain missions, resulting in
    increased risk. Major end item shortages include M1A1/A2 tanks, MLRS,
    HEMTT fuelers, and some chemical defense equipment. Equipment shortages
    currently total about $450 million. Lack of repair parts and major
    assemblies within the APS-4 sustainment stockpile will directly impact
    the ability to return battle-damaged equipment to the fight. The Army's
    current plans are to cascade additional equipment into the APS-4
    sustainment stocks over the next couple of years, thus reducing this
    shortfall.
    Infrastructure in Japan and Korea
        The Host Nation-Funded Construction (HNFC) programs in Japan and
    Korea provide almost $1 billion annually in new construction to support
    U.S. Forces. However, the United States must fund the initial project
    planning and design (P&D) effort. For fiscal year 2001, the U.S. Army
    Corps of Engineers allocated $20.5 million for the HNFC program. This
    is a return on investment of 46:1. Continued congressional support for
    the planning and design funding is critical.
        One provision of the latest Special Measures Agreement is that
    Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) funds can no longer be
    used for ``revenue producing'' projects. Examples of projects
    disallowed in the fiscal year 2001 program were Army and Air Force
    Exchange Service warehouses, exchanges, commissaries, and gymnasiums.
    The effect of this provision is that additional MILCON funding will be
    required for the Services, Defense Logistics Agency, Army and Air Force
    Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, Defense Commissary Agency, and DOD
    schools to support quality of life initiatives for our servicemembers
    in Japan. We will need strong congressional support for these MILCON
    projects when programmed. There has not been a MILCON project completed
    in Japan since 1989.
    New Headquarters Building
        I would like to offer my thanks again for your support for the new
    U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters building. We held the groundbreaking
    ceremony in February and are on track to provide a facility designed to
    support the 21st century.
    Security Assistance
        Security assistance funding in the Pacific theater is an important
    component of my theater engagement strategy.
        Foreign Military Financing (FMF). For fiscal year 2001, two U.S.
    Pacific Command countries will each receive about $2 million in FMF:
    Mongolia, to increase its border security capabilities; and the
    Philippines, for critical aircraft and patrol boat spare parts. State
    Department has allocated FMF for East Timor, as those funds meet
    legislative requirements.
        Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC). The Asia-
    Pacific region needs better capabilities to respond collectively when
    the United Nations or the nations of the region determine that an
    international response is required. Approximately $2.2 million in
    fiscal year 2001 EIPC funds have been requested for five Pacific
    Command countries, to either enhance existing or establish new
    peacekeeping operation (PKO) training centers. These well-spent dollars
    are helping our neighbors share the PKO burden around the world.
        Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Program
    (NADR), and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). NADR
    funding has helped the Philippines improve its ability to deal with
    terrorists, and, in combination with DOD OHDACA money, has done much to
    reduce the threat of unexploded ordnance in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos,
    and Vietnam. Anticipated fiscal year 2001 funding will expand demining
    operations in those countries.
        These security assistance programs, along with IMET, are crucial to
    our continued engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and I request your
    continued support in their funding.
    Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
            (COE)
        Since its beginning in 1994, the Center of Excellence in Disaster
    Management and Humanitarian Assistance has bridged the gap between
    civil and military activities related to humanitarian emergencies.
    Historically an annual increase to DOD appropriations has funded the
    COE. Collaborating the resources and strengths of governmental and non-
    governmental organizations, the Center of Excellence has participated
    in relief efforts following floods in Vietnam and Venezuela,
    earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan, and population displacement in Kosovo
    and East Timor. The Center's approach to response, education and
    training, research, and consulting for disaster relief has become the
    model for successful interaction between the military and private
    humanitarian organizations.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In summary, Asia-Pacific issues are growing in importance on the
    American security agenda. Our people are the foundation for everything
    that we do, and providing professionally rewarding service must be our
    first concern. Next must be our strategy, and ensuring that we have the
    capability to sustain our forward basing, support increasingly
    information-rich operations, and the mobility to move our forces across
    this vast theater and across the globe. The coming year will continue
    to present challenges for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
    We neglect developments in the region at our peril, but with sustained
    attention we can help build a region which will support American
    interests over the long term.

                                   APPENDIX A

    Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
        The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a regional
    studies, conference, and research center in Honolulu. Established in
    September 1995 as a preventive defense and confidence-building measure,
    its mission is to enhance cooperation and build relationships through
    mutual understanding and study of comprehensive security issues among
    military and civilian representatives of the United States and other
    Asia-Pacific nations. The cornerstone of the Center's program is the
    College of Security Studies, which provides a forum where future
    military and government civilian leaders from the region can explore
    pressing security issues at the national policy level within a
    multilateral setting of mutual respect and transparency to build trust
    and encourage openness. Central to the College's effectiveness are the
    relationships forged between participants that bridge cultures and
    nationalities. Full and unobstructed participation by all nations in
    the region, to include such countries as Indonesia and Cambodia, is
    essential to achieving this. Complementing the College is a robust
    conference and seminar program that brings together current leaders
    from the region to examine topical regional security concerns,
    including peacekeeping, arms proliferation and the role of nuclear
    weapons in the region, and energy and water security.
        The Center directly serves to further our regional engagement goals
    in several ways. First, it serves as a resource for identifying and
    communicating emerging regional security issues, within the constraints
    of non-attribution. Second, the Center functions as an extremely
    effective ``unofficial'' engagement tool to continue critical dialog in
    cases where official mil-to-mil relations are curtailed. Recent
    conferences and regional travel involving contact with, or
    participation by, prominent representatives from China highlight this
    role. Additionally, the Center frequently coordinates or hosts
    conferences addressing topical issues of interest to the U.S. Pacific
    Command or the region. Finally, the Center serves as a forum for
    articulating U.S. defense policy to representatives from the region.
    Authorization to waive certain expenses as an incentive for
    participation, and expanded authority to accept domestic and foreign
    donations to help defray costs are crucial to the continued success of
    the Center.

        Chairman Warner. Now, General Pace.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED
                        STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        General Pace. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is
    really an honor to have this opportunity to appear before you
    this morning, and thank you very much for that.
        I would like to reserve most of the time available to
    answer your questions so we can get to the meat of what you
    want to know about, sir.
        I would like to mention two things up front.
        First is to thank you, sir, and the very strong bipartisan
    support of this committee that has enabled your Armed Forces to
    be as strong as we are to do what we do. Visits such as that
    led by Senator Levin and the members of his delegation and
    Senator McCain and the members of his delegation are very
    tangible evidence of the concern and leadership of our Congress
    and this Senate and this committee, and we very much appreciate
    that.
        Second, sir, it is my great honor for the last 6 months to
    be the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command. The
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen with
    whom I serve are absolutely first class, sir. They are
    wonderful young men and women. It is a distinct honor to serve
    with them. I would just like to highlight before this
    committee, sir, that your Armed Forces in this Nation are
    extremely well-served by the young folks who volunteer today.
        With that, sir, I would like to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Pace follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Gen. Peter Pace, USMC

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for this opportunity to present my assessment of security in Latin
    America and the Caribbean. I would also like to thank the Members of
    Congress and particularly this committee for your outstanding support
    to the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). I appreciate your
    interest in USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) and the support
    you have consistently provided to our mission with partner nations in
    this theater.
        Since assuming command of USSOUTHCOM 6 months ago, I have traveled
    to 21 of the 32 countries and 3 of the 14 separate territories in my
    assigned AOR, visiting many of the Andean Ridge nations several times.
    I have met key military and civilian leaders in the region, and I have
    worked to ensure Southern Command's plans and initiatives are well-
    coordinated with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, and other U.S. government agencies. My visits to our
    neighboring nations have provided important insights to the region and
    its leaders, as well as to specific challenges and opportunities.
        In this statement, I will provide the committee our strategic
    assessment of the AOR, highlighting the most serious transnational
    threats that challenge the growth of democracy in several countries.
    Next, I will detail our progress in resetting the theater architecture
    in the post-Panama era, followed by an overview of our engagement
    efforts and most important requirements. I will conclude by presenting
    my priorities for the way ahead.

                              STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

        U.S. Southern Command's AOR includes all of Central and South
    America, the Caribbean, and surrounding waters, totaling more than 15.6
    million square miles. The AOR is divided into four sub-regions: the
    Caribbean, Central America, Andean Ridge, and the Southern Cone. Total
    population in the AOR exceeds 404 million people. Twenty-five languages
    are spoken, and the people practice 10 different religions. The theater
    is a diverse region, rich in natural resources with largely untapped
    industrial potential. Today, the per capita Gross Domestic Product
    (GDP) ranges from a low of about $1,300 to a high of $25,000.
        The United States has strong economic, cultural, and security ties
    to Latin America and the Caribbean. More than 39 percent of our trade
    is conducted within the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, 49 cents out
    of every dollar spent in Latin America is spent on imported goods and
    services from the U.S. Latin America and the Caribbean supply more oil
    to the U.S. than all Middle East countries combined. In addition to our
    strong economic ties, we share an increasingly strong cultural bond.
    Today, one of every eight Americans is of Hispanic origin, and that
    ratio is projected to increase to one in four by 2050.
        Except for Cuba, all nations in the USSOUTHCOM AOR have some form
    of democratically elected government and free market economy. During
    the past 20 years, we have seen a positive trend as nations adopted
    democratic principles and institutions, subordinated their military to
    civilian leadership, instituted the rule of law, and promoted respect
    for human rights. However, democracies have not matured or flourished
    equally in the region. Some countries are struggling to complete the
    full transition to democratic rule. In other countries, democracy
    itself is at risk as failing economies, deteriorating security, and
    endemic corruption undermine institutions and public support.
        Although several age-old border disputes still provide ample
    opportunity for disagreement between neighbors, this region does not
    have an arms race or a ``shooting'' war between nations. In fact, the
    region spends less per capita on arms than any area of the world.
    Today, democracies in this AOR generally maintain open and amicable
    relations with each other and reject armed conflict between nations.

                                    THREATS

        The greatest threats to democracy, regional stability, and
    prosperity in Latin America and the Caribbean are illegal migration,
    arms trafficking, crime and corruption, and illegal drug trafficking.
    Collectively, these transnational threats destabilize fragile
    democracies by corrupting public institutions, promoting criminal
    activity, undermining legitimate economies, and disrupting social
    order.
        Illegal Migration. Illegal migration is a potential problem in our
    AOR. The ongoing violence in Colombia associated with fighting between
    illegally armed groups is expected to displace Colombian refugees
    across the international borders of neighboring nations. Panama and
    Venezuela have already reported displaced Colombian refugees inside
    their sovereign territory. Several countries that share porous borders
    with Colombia will remain vulnerable to illegal migration and
    incursions by armed insurgents and paramilitaries, resulting in
    political and social instability.
        Arms Trafficking. The illegal trafficking of arms poses a serious
    threat to the national security of several nations. In our AOR, the
    breakup of the drug cartels in the early 1990s resulted in smaller,
    more adaptable drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that have formed a
    symbiotic relationship with the insurgents and paramilitaries. These
    illegal and violent groups receive significant financial support from
    the DTOs, which they use to procure weapons. The insurgents can afford
    anything available on the international arms market, possibly including
    man-portable air defense weapons systems (the possession of which we
    cannot confirm).
        Crime and Corruption. Local and international criminal
    organizations are an increasing threat to the security and stability of
    the region. Many nations in the AOR lack the organization and resources
    to effectively counter criminal activity within their borders. In some
    areas, criminal organizations are so pervasive that the governments
    cannot effectively protect their citizens.
        Although money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, and bribery of
    government officials are common criminal activities within many Latin
    American and Caribbean countries, the impact is regional, as evidenced
    by the recent kidnapping of oil workers in Ecuador. In calendar year
    2000, Colombia reported more than 3,000 kidnappings. Although criminal
    activity in the Caribbean has typically been less violent and
    characterized as local, we are seeing a proliferation of street gangs.
        Drug Trafficking. The illicit drug industry is a corrosive force
    that threatens the stability and rule of law in the Andean Region.
    Partner nation governments realize the importance of working together
    to develop regional approaches to counter the production and
    trafficking of illegal drugs. However, effective and sustainable
    counterdrug operations are beyond the capabilities of our partner
    nations' thinly stretched security forces. U.S. counterdrug assistance
    to security forces will help Colombia and other nations in the region
    develop more effective counterdrug capabilities while enhancing United
    States Government support to partner nation interdiction efforts.
        Drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable skill in
    adjusting their operations in response to our counterdrug efforts.
    These small but efficient organizations will change the place of
    production, transport routes, points of transshipment, and markets when
    eradication or interdiction programs achieve success. Many DTOs provide
    financial support to the insurgents and illegal self-defense groups to
    secure protection from counterdrug operations conducted by the Colombia
    National Police (CNP) and Colombian Military (COLMIL).
        We are encouraged by the success of cocaine eradication programs in
    Peru and Bolivia and by the initial results of Phase I of Plan
    Colombia. Unfortunately, reductions in Peru's and Bolivia's cultivation
    appear to have been offset by Colombia's increased coca cultivation in
    calendar year 2000. However, further assessment is required to
    determine the full impact of the intensive aerial eradication effort
    recently conducted by the Government of Colombia in the Putumayo
    Department.
        The illicit drug industry is also a growing threat to the U.S.
    homeland. According to the most recent interagency assessment, law
    enforcement and security forces detected 645 MT of cocaine
    hydrochloride (HCl) moving toward the United States from the source
    zone during 2000. The assessment also reports that 128 MT were
    interdicted, leaving the possibility that an estimated 517 MT were
    available for domestic consumption. According to the Office of the
    National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), nearly 17,000 Americans lost
    their lives last year to drug overdoses and drug related violence. In
    addition to this tragic loss of life, the direct and indirect costs of
    illegal drug use to the U.S. taxpayer exceeded $110 billion.

                              THEATER ARCHITECTURE

        The United States Southern Command, located in Miami but based in
    Panama until 1997, is responsible for planning, coordinating, and
    conducting all U.S. military activities in our AOR. We promote
    democracy and stability by working cooperatively with host nation
    security forces, responding to crises or contingencies such as the
    recent earthquakes in El Salvador, and supporting partner nation
    security forces and U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in reducing
    the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. To accomplish our
    mission, we have established the post-Panama theater architecture that
    includes our headquarters in Miami and component headquarters forward
    deployed in Puerto Rico.
        Puerto Rico has replaced Panama for forward basing headquarters in
    the region. United States Army South (USARSO) has completed its
    relocation to Fort Buchanan, where it draws heavily on the Puerto Rican
    Army and Air Force National Guardsmen and Reservists to accomplish its
    assigned missions. United States Navy South (USNAVSO) was activated
    last year and is collocated with Special Operations Command South
    (USSOCSO) at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.
        To compensate for the loss of the 8,500 ft. runway at Howard Air
    Force Base, the United States Government (USG) negotiated long-term
    agreements for the use of forward operating locations (FOLs) at Aruba-
    Curacao in the Netherland Antilles, Manta in Ecuador, and Comalapa in
    El Salvador. These locations provide us the capability to conduct
    sustained CD operations throughout the source and transit zones. U.S.
    detection, monitoring, and tracking (DM&T) operations from the FOLs
    improve our support to partner nation interdiction efforts. Thanks to
    the support of the U.S. Congress, funding has been provided for
    necessary operational and safety improvements for Manta and Aruba-
    Curacao and for construction design at Comalapa.
        The Aruba-Curacao FOL provides effective, rapid response DM&T
    operations in the northern source zone, which includes the Guajira
    Peninsula of Colombia and the Venezuelan border region, as well as a
    large part of the transit zone. The formal 10-year access agreement
    with the Kingdom of the Netherlands was signed on March 2, 2000, but
    awaits final parliamentary debates and ratification.
        The FOL at Manta extends our Airborne Early Warning aircraft
    coverage deep into the source zone. It is the only FOL from which
    aircraft can reach all of Peru, Colombia, and the drug producing areas
    of Bolivia. In January 2001, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court issued
    the favorable ruling that the November 1999 access agreement complies
    with the country's constitution. Construction at the Manta FOL is on
    schedule. We will begin operating AWACS aircraft from Manta in October
    of this year and all construction will be completed by June 2002.
        The Government of El Salvador offered the use of the Comalapa
    International Airport as an FOL for U.S. aircraft in Central America.
    Excellent relations between the U.S. and El Salvador, strengthened by
    years of solid military-to-military contact, helped produce favorable
    negotiations on the FOL agreement. This FOL extends the reach of our
    DM&T aircraft into the Eastern Pacific, Western Caribbean, and all of
    Central America.
        In addition to our headquarters in Miami and three component
    headquarters in Puerto Rico, USSOUTHCOM has permanently assigned
    headquarters in the following locations: our Air Force Component
    (United States Air Force South) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in
    Arizona; our Marine Corps Component (United States Marine Corps Forces
    South) in Miami, Florida; Joint Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E)
    in Key West, Florida, which plans, coordinates, and supervises the
    execution of our support to counterdrug operations in the transit and
    source zones; Joint Southern Surveillance & Reconnaissance Operations
    Center (JSSROC), collocated with JIATF-E in Key West, which receives,
    fuses, and disseminates the radar common operating picture from AWACS
    and ground based, aerostat, and ROTHR radar; and Joint Task Force Bravo
    (JTF-B) in Soto Cano, Honduras, which provides responsive helicopter
    support to USSOUTHCOM missions in Latin America and the Caribbean.
        Most of our post-Panama theater architecture is firmly in place,
    and we look forward to permanently anchoring our headquarters in CONUS,
    accomplishing necessary improvements at the FOL in Comalapa, and
    completing previously approved but temporarily suspended military
    construction projects in Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico.

                       STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY

        The United States Southern Command's military-to-military
    engagement with host nation forces seeks to build mutual trust and
    understanding that will engender regional stability and shared
    solutions to common problems. Our approach focuses on combined
    operations, exercises, training and education, security assistance, and
    humanitarian assistance programs. While maintaining strong bilateral
    relationships throughout the AOR, we promote regional cooperation and
    transparent operations among all our regional partners.
        Caribbean. The fiscal year 1997 Unified Command Plan assigned
    responsibility for U.S. military activities in the Caribbean, a region
    of more than 32 million people, to USSOUTHCOM. The countries and
    territories in this region, as a rule, have very small security forces
    that need modernization and training assistance. They are receptive to
    regional cooperation and are well represented in the Organization of
    American States (OAS) and Caribbean Nation Security Council (CANSEC).
    During calendar year 2000, USSOUTHCOM conducted medical readiness
    training exercises (MEDRETE) and New Horizon engineer exercises;
    assisted partner nation security force training and new equipment
    fielding; and hosted Tradewinds 2000, a multi-national exercise that
    fosters maritime and land-based forces cooperation in response to
    regional crises and drug trafficking. In addition, many of the
    countries hosted other regional events to improve partner nation
    capabilities. For example, in January 2001, Jamaica hosted a regional
    disaster preparedness seminar that included representatives from more
    than 20 countries throughout the AOR.
        Caribbean countries conduct operations and training with the United
    States Coast Guard that improve their capabilities to interdict illicit
    drug shipments through the transit zone. Most countries in the
    Caribbean have assisted U.S. efforts to interdict the flow of illicit
    drugs through the central and eastern Caribbean. One of our most
    successful efforts is Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT), a
    multi-agency international effort based in Nassau, Bahamas. The mission
    of OPBAT is to interdict the flow of cocaine and marijuana transiting
    through the Bahamas destined for the United States. OPBAT was
    established on July 12, 1990 by the TRIPART Agreement, a diplomatic
    engagement signed by the Governments of the Bahamas, the United
    Kingdom, and the United States. U.S. government agencies participating
    in OPBAT include DOS, DOD, USCG, and the U.S. Customs Service.
        Another prominent counterdrug operation in this region is
    Weedeater, which is conducted in the Eastern Caribbean. DOD provides
    helicopters for host nation law enforcement agencies and DEA to conduct
    marijuana eradication. The most recent Weedeater operation eradicated
    1,013,635 marijuana plants and seedlings with an estimated Miami street
    value in excess of $800 million. Total helicopter operating costs for
    this Weedeater were slightly more than $129,000.
        Central America. Four factors stimulate our engagement initiatives
    in this region. First, Central America, with more than 36 million
    people, is one of the least developed regions in our AOR. The military
    budgets of these nations cannot support large forces or large
    modernization efforts. Second, this region is vulnerable to natural
    disasters, as evidenced by Hurricane Mitch a few years ago, wildfires
    last year in Guatemala, and the recent earthquakes in El Salvador.
    Third, powerful criminal organizations, often fueled by drug related
    activities and money, challenge democratic institutions, and in many
    cases, exceed the capacity of the nations' security forces to provide
    protection to the population. Last, governments in this region are
    understandably sensitive to border disputes that have been ongoing for
    many years. Examples include the border disputes between Belize and
    Guatemala, between Honduras and Nicaragua, and the maritime
    disagreement concerning the Gulf of Fonseca. Last summer, USSOUTHCOM
    helped diffuse the Fonseca disagreement by providing Global Positioning
    Systems (GPS) and night vision goggles to Honduran and Nicaraguan
    military vessels to aid them in precise navigation.
        Military forces in this region range from none to very capable.
    Costa Rica and Panama now have only police forces, while El Salvador
    demonstrated a very professional and capable military force during
    recovery operations following the recent earthquakes. Nicaragua has a
    large inventory of mechanized equipment, but needs assistance in
    training and sustainment.
        Our engagement activities in Central America mirrored our efforts
    in other regions. Last year, we relied heavily on our New Horizons
    Exercise program to provide much needed assistance to several
    communities in Belize, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In total, our forces
    renovated 12 schools, drilled 12 water wells, and provided road and
    bridge improvements. We also conducted a total of 32 medical
    deployments that provided health and dental services to more than
    95,000 people. Medical teams on these deployments provided veterinary
    services as well.
        Peacekeeping operations and seminars are excellent vehicles to
    promote cooperation and interoperability between neighboring nations.
    This past year, we conducted several combined activities in Central
    America, including the Peacekeeping Operations--North (PKO-North)
    exercise, hosted by Honduras and attended by 20 nations. This exercise
    trained multinational staffs from Caribbean and Central American
    nations in peacekeeping operations.
        Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, El Salvador, and Panama
    have also participated in Central Skies counterdrug operations. In
    support of Central Skies, the United States provides transportation
    support to Central American country teams and host nation military and
    counterdrug law enforcement agencies. The most recent Central Skies
    operation in Costa Rica eradicated 385,563 marijuana plants with a
    Miami street value that exceeded $300 million. U.S. helicopter
    operations costs for this iteration of Central Skies was approximately
    $164,000.
        USSOUTHCOM has a long history of providing assistance to Central
    American nations following natural disasters. Last April, JTF-B from
    Soto Cano provided emergency assessment and fire fighting assistance to
    help Guatemalan forces extinguish nearly 250 wildfires. In November
    2000, Hurricane Keith hit the eastern coast of Belize. USSOUTHCOM
    provided humanitarian assistance to the Belize government in the form
    of emergency shelters, vehicles, disaster relief equipment, and medical
    supplies. In the most recent disaster in El Salvador, USSOUTHCOM
    provided emergency assistance that included the movement of 560
    personnel and 160 tons of supplies by JTF-B helicopters. USSOUTHCOM
    relief and sustainment efforts following the earthquakes will include
    several medical readiness training exercises, technical expertise, and
    humanitarian assistance supplies and equipment.
        Central America is key to U.S. counterdrug efforts. El Salvador
    agreed to allow the U.S. to use Comalapa International Airport as an
    FOL for counterdrug operations. This facility supports U.S. DM&T
    aircraft coverage in Central America, Eastern Pacific, and Western
    Caribbean. El Salvador's rapid agreement to our request for ramp space
    is reflective of the outstanding military to military relationship that
    has been nurtured over the years.
        Southern Cone. Harmonious relations among Southern Cone countries
    provide the necessary preconditions for increased defense cooperation,
    dialogue, and multilateral training exercises. Keeping pace with new
    training opportunities, Chile and Brazil have recently begun military
    modernization programs. In December 2000, the Chilean government made a
    formal decision to negotiate the possible purchase of F-16 aircraft
    with Lockheed Martin. Brazil has also initiated programs to modernize
    its Air Force and Navy. In some neighboring countries, budget
    constraints still limit military procurement and modernization.
        Argentina and Uruguay both participate routinely in United Nations
    peacekeeping operations. Last year, Argentina hosted the USSOUTHCOM
    annual CABANAS training program, a peacekeeping exercise that included
    military forces of seven other nations. Argentina and Chile each hosted
    phases of the UNITAS exercise, the largest multinational naval exercise
    in this hemisphere. In addition to nations from the USSOUTHCOM AOR,
    UNITAS 2000 included Canada and several European nations. This exercise
    is one of Southern Command's most important engagement tools and
    contributes significantly to regional cooperation in the Southern Cone.
        Andean Ridge. USSOUTHCOM operations in the Andean Ridge are the
    most diverse of any region. Recent activities have included
    humanitarian civic assistance, demining operations, training exercises,
    and extensive counterdrug operational support. Militaries in this
    region range from small and under-equipped to standing forces with
    considerable capabilities.
        One of USSOUTHCOM's most important and visible missions during
    fiscal year 2000 was Operation Fundamental Response in Venezuela.
    Following torrential flooding and mudslides that devastated Venezuela's
    northeastern coast, USSOUTHCOM performed life saving rescue, medical
    evacuation, and disaster relief operations. With Venezuela reporting an
    estimated 30,000 dead, USSOUTHCOM provided immediate rescue assistance,
    ultimately saving more than 5,500 lives and delivering 673 tons of food
    and water. U.S. forces, largely JTF-B aviation assets, Special
    Operations, and Reserves, produced more than 2.8 million gallons of
    potable water, flew more than 1,300 aircraft sorties, and distributed
    more than $650,000 worth of medical supplies. Total cost of USSOUTHCOM
    directed support to Venezuela was $8.25 million.
        In Ecuador, USSOUTHCOM has worked closely with the U.S. Ambassador
    and President Noboa's administration to provide assistance to Ecuador's
    military, particularly in the management of national crises. We have
    also worked closely with military leaders to improve Ecuador's
    capability for detecting and interdicting illegal drug traffic. As
    previously noted, Manta Air Base on the northwestern coast is a
    linchpin in resetting our AOR architecture and extending the reach of
    our DM&T aircraft coverage in the source zone.
        U.S. counterdrug support to Andean Ridge nations includes training
    and equipment for the riverine forces of both Peru and Colombia. The
    Joint Peruvian Riverine Training Center in Iquitos, Peru is the finest
    facility of its kind in the AOR. Peruvian and Colombian riverine units
    have significantly increased their capabilities during the past year.
        USSOUTHCOM has provided extensive support to the training of
    Colombia's Counternarcotics (CN) Brigade. The second CN battalion
    graduated from training in December 2000, and the third battalion is
    scheduled to complete training on May 24, 2001. To provide air mobile
    capability to the CN Brigade, USSOUTHCOM is supporting the Department
    of State (DoS) led effort to field Huey II and UH-60L helicopters to
    the Colombian Army and to assist in training the required aircrews.
        USSOUTHCOM is cooperating with the security forces of each Andean
    Ridge nation to build more effective counternarcotics capability.
    Bolivia, with perhaps fewer resources than any other country in the
    region, has achieved unprecedented success in eradicating illegal coca
    cultivation and aggressively interdicting drug trafficking
    organizations' (DTOs) movement of precursor chemicals. We have assisted
    Bolivia's military training effort with mobile training teams and
    facility construction. We are also assisting the Bolivian Army in
    renovating troop barracks to establish a permanent presence in the
    Chapare coca-growing region.

                                  REQUIREMENTS

        The United States Government has provided substantial support in
    military hardware, training, and services to Latin American and
    Caribbean countries. Each year, USSOUTHCOM executes engagement programs
    throughout this AOR, to include combined operations and training
    exercises, educational opportunities, mobile training teams, unit
    exchanges, humanitarian civic assistance, foreign military financing
    and sales, and counterdrug training and operations.
        USSOUTHCOM's exercise program is the engine for our Theater
    Engagement Plan. USSOUTHCOM will conduct 17 joint or combined exercises
    and 178 training deployments with partner nations this fiscal year. We
    conduct four different types of exercises and deployments. First, our
    operational exercises are based on USSOUTHCOM contingency plans and
    normally include only U.S. forces. The primary purpose of these
    exercises is to train the CINC's and the JTF's battlestaffs.
        Foreign military interaction (FMI) exercises are the core of
    USSOUTHCOM's engagement program. They are conducted throughout the AOR
    and are generally hosted by the many participating nations in the
    region. All of these exercises, which include Unitas, Tradewinds, PKO
    North and South, Cabanas, United Counterdrug, and Fuerza Allidas
    Humanitarians, are multilateral.
        New Horizons (NH) are the command's civic assistance exercises that
    focus on engineering and medical projects. Humanitarian and civic
    assistance (HCA) projects are embedded in these programs but can be
    conducted as stand alone deployments for training as well. USSOUTHCOM
    plans to conduct six NH exercises in fiscal year 2001. Planned sites
    include the Bahamas, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Guatemala, Honduras, and
    Paraguay.
        The fourth type of exercise is stand-alone training deployments.
    USSOUTHCOM will conduct a total of 178 stand-alone training deployments
    in fiscal year 2001. These deployments will include Joint Combined
    Exchange Training (JCET), Riverine Training Teams (RTT), and
    Counterdrug Training Support (CDTS). Included in the training total are
    66 stand-alone medical assistance deployments that predominantly
    support Central America and the Andean Ridge.
        In a typical year, USSOUTHCOM deploys more than 12,000
    servicemembers, the majority of which are National Guardsmen and
    Reservists, in support of the FMI and NH exercise programs. In fiscal
    year 1999, the U.S. Congress provided funding to expand the NH exercise
    concept. Funding has remained relatively constant for 2000 and 2001.
    These exercises have been very successful in providing schools, water
    wells, road and bridge improvements, and medical outreach programs to
    needy communities. NH exercises have the added benefit of providing
    U.S. forces with realistic training opportunities generally not
    available in the United States. In fiscal year 2000, USSOUTHCOM
    completed 98 HCA projects in 19 countries; 105 construction and repair
    projects are planned or fiscal year 2001. Scenarios for the seven FMI
    exercises conducted in fiscal year 2000 and the six planned for this
    year focus on peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, and counterdrug
    coordination.
        International Military Education and Training (IMET) and its
    companion program, Expanded IMET (EIMET) provide professional education
    opportunities to selected military and civilian candidates in our AOR
    on a grant basis. These programs are the backbone of our combined
    professionalization and military education. They provide funding for
    military and civilian personnel from our partner nations to attend
    professional development courses in United States military
    institutions. At only modest cost, these programs represent valued
    investments as many of the students go on to become senior leaders in
    their respective militaries and government agencies. In fiscal year
    2000, USSOUTHCOM received $9.89 million for IMET and trained 2684
    students, including 474 civilians. We invested roughly two-thirds of
    our IMET dollars in professional military education (PME), management,
    postgraduate courses, mobile education teams, and english language
    training. The remainder paid for technical assistance training
    throughout the AOR.
        With declining military budgets, most countries in the USSOUTHCOM
    AOR request military equipment through the Excess Defense Articles
    (EDA) program or Section 506 Emergency Drawdown Authority. Few
    countries are able to purchase new equipment in large quantities
    through the Foreign Military Sales Program. Although we have been very
    successful in assisting partner nations through EDA and Drawdown,
    transport costs and sustainment of the received equipment fall to the
    requesting country. Absent host nation funding and the availability of
    foreign military financing (FMF), we have not been able to help these
    nations build the maintenance programs to sustain the equipment. At its
    peak in 1991, the FMF program for Latin America was $220 million. Last
    year, the Caribbean received $3 million, while Latin America received
    only $450,000.

           COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C\4\I)

        As we reset our theater physical architecture in the post-Panama
    era, we are also enhancing our C\4\I architecture for fixed and mobile
    operations throughout the AOR. Because most of the countries in this
    theater are still maturing their C\4\ infrastructure, satellite
    communications are vitally important to our deployed forces, especially
    in time of crises. However, satellite communications are currently
    limited by available bandwidth.
        We have initiated several programs to increase our C\4\I
    effectiveness throughout a very large AOR. Programs like the
    Cooperating Nations Information Exchange (CNIES) and the
    Counternarcotics Command and Management System (CNCMS) have helped
    optimize satellite bandwidth. We have also initiated the Theater Signal
    Support Program, which is focused on streamlining and enhancing C\4\
    operational and maintenance support that was degraded by our exit from
    Panama.

                 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

        Our top readiness priorities for this AOR remain intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Although OSD and the Joint
    Staff have helped us a great deal in this area, we still have
    unresourced requirements in national, theater, and tactical collection
    and processing for signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence
    (HUMINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT).
        IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, and measurement and signals intelligence
    (MASINT) provide commanders at all echelons indications and warnings
    (I&W), situational awareness, battle damage assessments (BDA), and crop
    cultivation estimates. However, the current suite of national sensors
    and platforms meets only part of our requirement for a comprehensive
    intelligence and counterdrug picture in this AOR. USSOUTHCOM needs
    greater redundancy in ISR assets to mitigate risk during crises.
    Specifically, we need additional airborne quick-reaction ISR capability
    and the focus of a tactical military intelligence unit dedicated to
    this AOR. Funding support for planned and existing MASINT capabilities,
    plus an effective MASINT architecture, will significantly enhance the
    conduct of future operations.
        The USSOUTHCOM AOR is a mixture of legacy and 21st century
    technology systems. While we are making progress in transitioning to
    more sophisticated and more reliable systems, we still need significant
    support for three important activities: wide area surveillance for
    maritime and ground detection and monitoring; theater air surveillance,
    tracking, and sorting; and force protection against asymmetric threats.
    First, a real-time integrated wide area surveillance capability is
    required to track and monitor maritime and ground targets of interest,
    particularly in support of counterdrug operations in this theater. This
    system should be compatible with both manned and unmanned ISR
    platforms. Second, the theater air surveillance system will provide air
    space detection, sorting, monitoring, and management that will promote
    regional cooperation in support of theater engagement strategies.
    Third, asymmetric warfare challenges our best force protection measures
    and strategies. Sophisticated surveillance systems are needed to
    enhance force protection for our limited number of forward-deployed
    personnel in high threat areas.
        Our ability to execute effective operations is often hampered by
    restrictions on sharing data with our partner nations. We need to
    streamline sharing procedures that are currently used for time
    sensitive counterdrug information. Like other unified commands, we are
    developing information-sharing networks that will allow us to combat
    the drug trafficking problem more efficiently. The South American Net
    (SURNET), the Caribbean Information sharing Network (CISN), and the
    Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) are all ongoing
    initiatives that enable us to share certain types of counterdrug
    information expeditiously.
        We experience continuing shortages of intelligence personnel,
    especially qualified linguists and other SIGINT experts. A fully manned
    and functioning regional SIGINT operating center at Medina, Texas, is
    essential to support our AOR operations. We also face many difficulties
    in our efforts to maintain a robust tasking, processing, exploitation,
    and dissemination architecture (TPED). Due to persistent C\4\I
    shortfalls, these issues are expected to continue in the near term.

                             COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

        Congress appropriated significant funding last year to support
    President Pastrana's Plan Colombia. During the past several months,
    USSOUTHCOM has worked with the U.S. interagency to develop the plan and
    begin executing the support package. This program is on track and is
    increasing partner nation counterdrug capabilities. Although most of
    the supplemental funding was directed to Colombia, neighboring nations
    also received assistance.
        USSOUTHCOM is using the funds designated for military purposes to
    improve partner nation capabilities in counterdrug operations. We are
    lead for execution of DOD support and provide assistance to DoS as
    needed on military related programs. We have coordinated the intended
    use of the funding in the U.S. interagency process to ensure our
    actions complement other agencies' activities and comply with
    congressional law and OSD directives. U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia
    will significantly improve the COLMIL capability to successfully
    support eradication and interdiction operations. Although $180 million
    was also distributed in the aid package to Colombia's neighbors,
    several of these neighboring nations will need additional assistance in
    the form of both military and non-military programs to effectively
    challenge the illicit drug industry within their own borders. We also
    anticipate that nations in this region, particularly Colombia, will
    likely need international assistance to sustain these programs in the
    long term.

                                FORCE PROTECTION

        Force protection is Job #1. We are committed to providing the best
    possible protection measures to our forces in this theater. Since the
    terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole, we have conducted a comprehensive
    review of our force protection requirements and have focused our
    efforts on improving policies and procedures for deterring, disrupting,
    and mitigating terrorist attacks.
        Each of my Component Commanders has formed ``Red Teams'' to assess
    his force protection posture on a continuous basis. Throughout the AOR,
    we have intensified ongoing efforts to identify potential threats and
    the corresponding force protection measures to mitigate risk to these
    threats. We are also looking specifically for seams in our force
    protection posture that could be exploited. We have implemented a suite
    of preventive measures, such as limiting travel to known or suspected
    high-risk areas, to minimize exposure of DOD personnel.
        We have used the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund to
    resource emergent and unforeseen high priority requirements. However,
    we still require better access to enhanced national signals collection
    and processing, organic airborne reconnaissance capability, a military
    intelligence unit permanently assigned to this theater, and expanded
    human intelligence collection. Our components continue to work with
    host nation security forces, to include establishing U.S. controlled
    security zones when necessary, to ensure protection of our deployed
    aircraft, vessels, and personnel. Component Commanders tailor threat
    conditions and random antiterrorism measures based on their assessment
    of the threat for assigned and in-transit units.
        The U.S.S. Cole Commission recommendations address the diversity of
    threats that could potentially target U.S. personnel and interests in
    the USSOUTHCOM AOR. We continue to make good progress in hardening our
    headquarters, bases, and forward operating locations. Where we are
    unable to mitigate threats through physical or structural enhancements,
    we are addressing the risk with procedural modifications for our
    personnel.

                                    STRATEGY

        Our vision for this theater has not changed. These nations can
    become a ``community of stable, democratic, and prosperous nations
    served by professional, modern, and interoperable security forces that
    embrace democratic principles and human rights, that are subordinate to
    civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral
    responses to regional challenges.''
        Five objectives guide our engagement and security activities in
    this AOR:

             Promote and support stable democracies;
             Promote and support respect for human rights and
            adherence to the rule of law;
             Assist partner nations to modernize and train their
            security forces;
             Sustain and strengthen multilateral security
            cooperation; and
             Cooperate with regional forces to detect, monitor, and
            reduce the transit of illegal drugs.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Thanks to the hard work and vision of many U.S. Government
    agencies, we have been able to assist our neighbors, some gravely
    threatened by insurgencies, narcotics, and other transnational threats.
        Because of this committee's efforts and the strong bipartisan
    support in Congress for programs key to this hemisphere, we are making
    a positive difference in helping to strengthen democracy, promote
    prosperity, and foster regional security in Latin America and the
    Caribbean.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you.

        Chairman Warner. General Schwartz.

     STATEMENT OF GEN. THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
        STATES FORCES KOREA; COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS
                    COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

        General Schwartz. Sir, thank you very much for having me,
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and other committee members.
    Thanks a lot. I am glad to be here today.
        It is exciting to be in Korea. I have been there 15 months.
    It is an exciting time. Like you said, Senator Warner, things
    are changing at a rapid pace. Who would have predicted that the
    summit would have taken place like it did last year? Who would
    have predicted the amount of dialogue, the exchange, the
    cultural exchanges, all the things that are happening, the
    Nobel Peace Prize, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
    revision that we had, a big success in my opinion, the Nogun-Ri
    and the resolution of that very successfully? The list goes on
    and on. Who would have predicted? Almost nobody. Then the visit
    of Kim Jong-Il to the south and the next couple of months. Who
    would have predicted? I do not think anybody could say ``I knew
    positively that was going to take place.''
        But I can tell you one thing you could predict, that our
    forces over there stay trained and ready, the 37,000 you have
    there under my command, as well as those great Republic of
    Korea military. I am really high on them because when anybody
    from this committee comes, they look at them, they see them,
    they always comment to me. They say, ``Tom, they are good. Are
    they not? They are trained and ready. Are they not? They are
    well-spirited and have high morale. Do they not?'' Those are
    the kinds of things that are reinforcing about this alliance.
    We should be tremendously proud.
        That 2nd Infantry Division we have over there, in my
    opinion, is the most well-trained, fit-to-fight division in the
    world. I am proud of what they do and the pace they maintain,
    the things they do every day to stay trained and ready on that
    Demilitarized Zone. I know you, Senator Warner, and the other
    committee members are very proud.
        I think the key over there right now is our presence. We
    have been there for 50 years. We might be there for 50 more. We
    do not know. But I tell you, when the north looks south and
    they see 37,000, when they look south, and they see the 750,000
    South Koreans trained and ready, they know for sure one thing:
    they are not going to do anything. They know we are ready. They
    know we are together, and that has deterred war for 50 years.
    We are tremendously proud of that.
        We have to mix all of that readiness too with our quality
    of life and our infrastructure. We cannot just be trained and
    ready. We cannot just let Korea be a place we have been for 50
    years, 1 year at a time, and not look at the infrastructure and
    not look at the quality of life of those great soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines. So, I have looked at that, and I
    have talked to a lot of those great people. I am tremendously
    impressed with our soldiers.
        I tell you, Senator, the other day I had a stand-up in
    front of those soldiers, and I said, ``this is my third tour.
    Who has me beat?'' One of those great sergeants, E-5, stood up
    and said, ``Sir, I have been in 10 years. This is my fourth
    tour in Korea. I have you beat.''
        Then a staff sergeant E-6 stood up. He said, ``Sir, I am a
    staff sergeant E-6 in this great Army of ours. I have 12 years,
    and I have five tours in Korea. I have you beat.''
        I started to look around. I started to think, gosh, these
    young men and women are recycling in here. When I started to do
    some statistics on this thing, I realized that 17 percent of
    the Army is either getting ready to go in, is in Korea, or just
    came out of Korea.
        So, it does have a tremendous impact on our force and on
    the morale and on the reenlistment, and on the quality of life
    and decisions that these young people make every day when they
    sit down at the dinner table. They go back home after a tour in
    Korea, and they say to the family, should I stay or should I
    get out? So, Korea does have an impact. It matters. We have to
    care about what we do with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines over there, every year as we touch those great people.
        So, it is things like separate rations that we take away
    from them, that the spouse back home who loses $227 a month and
    is still cooking the same pot of spaghetti, even though he is
    serving for a year over in Korea, and she is saying to herself,
    ``Where is my $227?'' She is saying to herself, ``Where is my
    $4,000 that it equates to over a year? Where did that go?'' She
    is asking her spouse, ``how much is it costing you to live over
    there?'' They are saying about $4,000 to $6,000 out of their
    pocket, hidden costs. Senator, you and I discussed this a
    couple of times.
        There is a price to be paid by these young people when they
    serve their country overseas. We have to take a hard look at
    some of these things and make sure we are doing the right thing
    with respect to these people when they are sacrificing so much
    for us. So, I would lay that on the table.
        But I would like to make a comment, if I could, Mr.
    Chairman, about the transformation that the Army is doing right
    now under the great General Shinseki. He is creating a new
    force. He is shaping a force, an Army that is much different
    than we had before. I told him I am the first guy to stand up
    and say, I want one of your brigades. I want one of those light
    brigades. I want one of those wheeled brigades. I want its
    flexibility. I want its mobility. I do not just want it for the
    peninsula, but I want it for the region. I want it because it
    can do a lot of things I cannot do right now. So, I am an
    advocate of what we are creating there, and I am one of the
    first ones to sign up as a CINC and say, send it to me because
    we can certainly use it.
        A couple of my top priorities that I have in my statement
    are quite well outlined, but I would like to emphasize just a
    couple of them because I think they are important to lay on the
    table.
        One is we have to look hard at the command, control,
    communications, computers, and information (C\4\I) architecture
    that we have in Korea. If we are going to fight tonight like we
    do, we have a bunker system. We have hardened systems of
    command and control that were created over the last 30 and 40
    years, and we work hard to keep them fit to fight. But we have
    to keep putting the money into them to make sure they are hard,
    and to make sure they are redundant, and to make sure that they
    do for us what we need to do. So, I have some needs in that
    area that I laid out in my formal statement that I will submit.
        Also, I think we need some money for our battle simulation
    centers. The way we keep 37,000 people trained and ready, when
    96 percent of them change every year, is that we have three
    very robust exercises. We have the largest simulation exercise
    in the world called Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL). To run that battle
    simulation center, to run the Air Force simulation center,
    costs a lot of money. That cost is going up and up. So, I laid
    some dollars on the line there that we need to keep that going.
        I would just mention one other area, and it is called force
    protection. We are now in the second most densely populated
    country in the world, Korea, 45 million people in a peninsula
    the size of the State of Indiana. We have plopped ourselves
    down in 95 camps and stations all over that peninsula. Believe
    me, we did not have any thoughts when we plopped down about
    force protection, but we have a lot of thoughts about it today.
    We need some money and we need to put some effort into it. We
    need to do some consolidation of that effort as we see
    ourselves on that peninsula to make sure we are protecting our
    people, like we need to protect them all over the world. So, I
    would say that to you.
        But when you look across that peninsula, Senator Warner,
    and you look north, some people down south think, well, the
    security situation is changing and everything is OK and there
    is no threat. But I am telling you as a Commander in Chief,
    when I look north, I do not think the same thing. When I look
    north, I see an enemy that is bigger, better, closer, and
    deadlier. I can prove it.
        This guy puts 33 percent of his gross national product into
    his military. People are starving. His own figures say that
    250,000 starved last year. We think it is close to a million.
    Whatever the figure is, he puts more money into his military
    than any other nation Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-wise, 33
    percent. He has a military-first policy and he is getting
    better.
        Now, does he have the economy to sustain that great
    military? Yes. It is coming apart a little bit. It is coming
    down and we all know that. But the fact of the matter is he is
    very capable, bigger, better, closer, and deadlier and we have
    to keep our eye on it.
        This is a period of uncertainty like I said. Tremendous
    change, dramatic change. I think the danger during this period
    of time is miscalculation. We just have to keep ourselves
    trained and ready. We are doing that in the peninsula, and I am
    tremendously proud of those soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    marines.
        I am prepared to answer your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Schwartz follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, USA

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members, I am honored to
    appear before you as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command,
    Republic of Korea--United States Combined Forces Command (CFC); and
    Commander, United States Forces Korea. We want to first express our
    deep gratitude to Congress for the consistent support you provided our
    forces over the years. The more than 37,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines, and Department of Defense civilians of United States
    Forces Korea benefit every day from your support, which enables us to
    accomplish our vital mission. We welcome this opportunity to present
    the current security situation in the Korean theater of operations
    through five major categories: (1) Korean Peninsula Overview, (2) Post-
    Summit Korea: Perceptions vs. Reality, (3) North Korea, (4) The
    Republic of Korea and United States Alliance, and (5) Command
    Priorities.

                           KOREAN PENINSULA OVERVIEW

        The physical presence of U.S. ground, air, and naval forces in
    Korea and Japan contributes significantly to U.S. and northeast Asian
    interests. These contributions endure well into the future. As shown in
    the figure below, the vital U.S. national interests in the region are
    many, and the threats to those interests are great. However, the U.S.
    presence provides the military access in east Asia that allows and
    encourages economic security, and political stability.
        While the U.S. has made great strides in our ability to rapidly
    project power around the globe, there is still no substitute for some
    degree of forward presence when faced with limited warning times, and
    vast distances. Our presence in Korea provides the access necessary for
    defending the Republic of Korea today, and responding to regional
    threats in the future. It is physical, not virtual, U.S. presence that
    brings peace of mind to the democratic nations of the region, and
    provides tangible deterrence.

        The security offered by this presence is directly and indirectly
    responsible for the economic vitality and political stability of the
    region. The physical security has fostered the rapid expansion of the
    mutually reinforcing elements of democratization and market economies.
    The political and military stability resulting from U.S. involvement in
    northeast Asia provides the confidence necessary for foreign investment
    to flow into the region. The results are staggering. In the course of a
    single generation, Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore have
    risen respectively to numbers 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 in total trade with
    the U.S., and comprised over $425 billion in trade in 1999. Most of
    this would not have been possible without the direct security offered
    by the U.S. presence. It is the U.S. presence that will allow this
    regional prosperity, so critical to the global economy, to flourish in
    the future.

                   POST-SUMMIT KOREA: PERCEPTIONS VS. REALITY

        In June of last year, the world witnessed the historic meeting
    between President Kim Dae-Jung and Chairman Kim Jong-Il. This
    remarkable event, the centerpiece of a great deal of diplomatic
    activity on the Korean peninsula, touched off a wave of reconciliation
    euphoria in South Korea and generated the public perception that peace
    was just around the corner. However, the situation's reality is far
    from the perception.
        The pace of diplomatic activity is indeed staggering. Both before
    and since the summit, the North Korean government has greatly expanded
    its diplomatic outreach to a number of countries. Three reunions of
    families separated since the war have occurred since August 2000.
    Athletes from both sides marched together under a single flag during
    the opening ceremonies of the Sydney Olympics. North Korea's second
    most powerful official, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok met with President
    Clinton in October. U.S. Secretary of State Albright reciprocated by
    visiting Pyongyang later that month. Since the summit, the two Koreas
    have conducted multiple ministerial and working level economic talks,
    and the first ever meeting between the two defense ministers. The two
    sides have agreed to restore the Seoul-Sinuiju railway through the
    Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), create an economic development zone in the
    North Korean town of Kaesong, and conduct sports and cultural
    exchanges.
        Despite this welcome increase in direct North-South dialogue, the
    military threat from North Korea continues to improve. The perception
    of a peaceful peninsula differs from reality. North Korea has yet to
    discuss or implement any meaningful military confidence building
    measures beyond agreement of the opening of a railroad corridor through
    the DMZ. The North has focused thus far on obtaining significant
    foreign aid in exchange for political and humanitarian gestures. As
    recently as December 2000, the North threatened to halt the entire
    reconciliation process, including family reunions, unless the South
    immediately provided 500,000 kilowatts of electrical power, to be
    followed by up to 2 million kilowatts. It subsequently resumed the
    exchanges even though it did not receive the power.
        The gap between reduced political tensions and the current North
    Korean military capacity and capability in certain areas concerns us.
    If the North Korean regime is serious about reconciliation, it is the
    time now for it to reduce the military threat and reciprocate to the
    peaceful gestures from other nations. North Korea should begin now to
    reduce military capabilities, both conventional and weapons of mass
    destruction.

                                  NORTH KOREA

        Despite the perception of political and humanitarian change, the
    reality is that there is as yet no permanent ``peace dividend.'' North
    Korea still poses a major threat to stability and security in the
    region and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Kim
    Jong-Il stubbornly adheres to his ``military first'' policy, pouring
    huge amounts of his budget resources into the military, at the expense
    of the civil sector, as he continues his military buildup. As a result,
    his military forces are bigger, better, closer, and deadlier since last
    year's testimony. We define this dangerous military threat in simple
    terms as capability and intent.
        Capability: Bigger and better. The military is the overwhelming
    power and dominant presence in North Korea. Its ability to strike South
    Korea without warning and to employ nonconventional weapons and systems
    continues to grow bigger and get better. The North Korean People's
    Army, which includes the Army, Navy, and Air Force, numbers over 1.2
    million, making it the fifth largest Active-Duty Force in the world.
    Limited military production continues in aircraft and artillery systems
    with renewed manufacturing efforts in missiles, submarines, and armored
    vehicles.
        The ground force alone numbers 1 million active-duty soldiers and
    ranks third in the world. The North Korean Air Force has over 1,700
    aircraft. The Navy has more than 800 ships, including the largest
    submarine fleet in the world. There are an additional 6 million
    Reserves supporting the Active-Duty Force. In total, over 25 percent of
    its population is under arms, with all able-bodied children and adults
    receiving military training every year--although admittedly in a
    country where ``the quest for food'' is a daily reality for the average
    citizen and the vast majority of people lack adequate food, clean
    water, heat, clothing, or access to even basic medical care.
        Recent force improvements include forward repositioning key
    offensive units, emplacing anti-tank barriers in the forward area,
    establishing combat positions along major routes between Pyongyang and
    the Demilitarized Zone, improving coastal defense forces in the forward
    area, constructing missile support facilities, and procuring air
    defense weapons and fighter aircraft. Applying lessons from U.S.
    operations in Europe and Southwest Asia, the North Koreans also
    modified key facility defenses, dispersed forces, and improved
    camouflage, concealment, and deception measures.
        Training levels over the past 2 years have been record-breaking,
    with the focus on improving the readiness of major offensive forces.
    Immediately following the June 2000 summit, the North Korean People's
    Army training cycle in the summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever
    recorded. It was preceded by the most ambitious winter training cycle
    for the past 10 years. High levels of training continue as we speak to
    you today.
        Capability: Closer. As big as they are, North Korea continues to
    position forces into the area just north of the DMZ--in a position to
    threaten Combined Forces Command and all of Seoul with little warning.
    Seventy percent of their active force, including approximately 700,000
    troops, over 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is postured
    within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. This percentage continues to
    rise despite the June 2000 summit. Most of this force in the forward
    area is protected in over 4,000 underground facilities, out of over
    11,000 nationwide. From their current locations, these forces can
    attack with minimal preparations or warning. The protracted southward
    deployment follows a tactic of ``creeping normalcy''--a significant
    movement over a period of many years that would attract too much
    international attention if accomplished over weeks or months.
        The North fields a total artillery force of over 12,000 systems.
    Without moving any pieces, Pyongyang could sustain up to 500,000 rounds
    per hour against Combined Forces Command defenses, and Seoul, for
    several hours. This artillery force includes 500 new long-range systems
    deployed over the past decade; however, most dangerous is the
    accelerated deployment over the past 2 years of large numbers of long-
    range 240 mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170 mm self-propelled
    guns to hardened sites located along the DMZ. Current training
    continues to improve their capabilities.
        Capability: Deadlier. To keep Combined Forces Command off balance
    and offset the conventional military technological superiority of the
    United States and Republic of Korea, the North's leadership has
    developed substantial asymmetrical capabilities in ballistic missiles,
    special operations forces, and weapons of mass destruction. The North's
    asymmetric forces are dangerous, receive an outsized portion of the
    military budget, and are well trained. Improvements continue in each
    area.
        The North's progress on its ballistic missile program indicates it
    remains a top priority. Over the past year, North Korea upheld its
    moratorium on flight-testing missiles. However, they continue to make
    enhancements in their missile capabilities. Their ballistic missile
    inventory includes over 500 SCUDs of various types that can threaten
    the entire peninsula. They continue to produce and deploy medium-range
    No Dongs capable of striking Japan and our U.S. bases there. Pyongyang
    is developing multi-stage missiles aiming to field systems capable of
    striking the continental United States. They have tested the 2,000-
    kilometer range Taepo Dong 1 and continue significant work on the 5,000
    plus kilometer Taepo Dong 2. North Korea also threatens American
    interests through the proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities--
    missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers, and
    underground facility expertise--to other countries of concern. North
    Korea has reportedly sold at least 450 missiles to Iran, Iraq, Syria,
    Pakistan, and others.
        At the tip of the spear are North Korea's special operations
    forces--the largest in the world. They consist of over 100,000
    personnel and are significant force multipliers. During wartime, these
    forces, which Kim Jong-Il would use as an asymmetrical capability from
    a ground, air, and naval perspective, would fight on two fronts,
    simultaneously attacking both our forward and rear forces. They
    continue to train year around in these skills, and just completed a
    robust training period last month.
        North Korea also possesses weapons of mass destruction. A large
    number of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our military
    forces and civilian population centers. We assess North Korea to have
    large chemical stockpiles and is self-sufficient in the production of
    chemical components for first generation chemical agents.
        Additionally, North Korea has the capability to develop, produce,
    and weaponize biological warfare agents. They could deploy both
    chemical and biological warheads on missiles.
        Finally, we continue to be concerned with the potential nuclear
    threat from North Korea. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea
    may have produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two
    nuclear weapons.
        Intent: The Kim Jong-Il regime maintains a ``military-first''
    orientation. The army is North Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and
    consumer, the central unifying structure in the country, and the main
    source of power and control for the ruling clique--the ``pillar of the
    revolution.'' North Korean state-run media pronouncements continue to
    insist on unification under Kim Jong-Il's leadership. In an
    unprecedented interview with ROK news media executives on August 12,
    2000, Kim Jong-Il stated, ``In relations with foreign countries, we
    gain strength from military power, and my power comes from military
    power,'' thus openly stating his belief that military power is his
    security imperative and the cornerstone of his philosophy. This
    ``military first'' policy was reiterated in the North Korean leader's
    New Year's editorial on 1 January this year. Maintaining a large and
    credible military force does a number of things: It provides
    deterrence, defense, an offensive threat, and gives the regime leverage
    in international negotiations.
        The North Korean economy is in ruins. Let's take a look at some
    stark numbers: a decline in Gross National Product (GNP) by 55 percent
    from 1990 to 1998, down to about $12 billion; a foreign debt
    approaching the same figure; foreign trade at only 10 percent of GNP;
    per capita income of less than $600; many factories closed, with those
    remaining open in operation at less than 20 percent of capacity; daily
    grain rations for common people at between 100 and 200 grams (one-half
    to one bowl); estimates of the number of deaths from hunger and disease
    in the last 5 years ranging from several hundred thousand to three
    million--despite foreign aid of over $1.6 billion since 1995. The
    result of this past winter's harsh weather--the worst in over 2
    decades--will likely be thousands of deaths, serious injuries, and
    major illnesses among the general populace.
        In the face of this human tragedy, North Korea continues to invest
    25 to 33 percent of their GNP annually in the military (as compared to
    3 percent in the U.S.). Top priority for the nation's scarce economic
    resources are the military related industries. For additional hard
    currency infusion, the North Korean regime continues to export weapons
    and engage in state sponsored international crime to include narcotics
    trafficking, and counterfeiting U.S. currency.
        Without major fundamental economic reforms, the North will continue
    to rely on charity to avert complete economic collapse. Absent a
    sustainable economic turnaround, the North faces the potential for huge
    humanitarian disaster. The North Korean leadership appears to recognize
    its dire economic circumstance. The economic and human weakness brought
    by natural disaster and the failure of state planning likely prompted
    the diplomatic offensive that we are seeing from the North Korean
    regime. However, until North Korea undertakes meaningful confidence
    building measures, it will be necessary for the United States and our
    allies to remain vigilant against the threat posed by North Korea's
    sizable military machine.
        Conclusion: While the growing inter-Korean dialogue evident over
    the past year gives cause for hope, the tense security situation on the
    Korean peninsula is unpredictable and serious, and will so remain for
    the foreseeable future. The North Korean military remains the main
    element of national power and source of leverage that Kim Jong-Il
    possesses to advance his interests. Despite North Korea's continuing
    interests in foreign aid and economic reform, the Kim regime continues
    to field far more conventional military force than any conceivable
    sense of self-defense would warrant. We and our allies in the Pacific
    must encourage tangible military confidence building measures that are
    verifiable and reciprocal. The measures taken so far (economic,
    diplomatic, and cultural) are first steps, but tangible military
    measures are key to reducing the risk of conflict. Throughout this
    process and into the future, the unequalled ROK-US alliance will remain
    vigilant, trained, and ready to fight and win decisively!

                THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND UNITED STATES ALLIANCE

        The Republic of Korea and United States alliance remains the best
    in the world. It is an alliance built on mutual trust, respect, a
    common set of values, and commitment to the defense of freedom of South
    Korea. Our combined forces can fight and win today if called upon. Our
    power, might, and daily readiness are unparalleled. Unquestionably, our
    South Korean partners are professional war fighters. They can mobilize
    over 4.5 million servicemembers and can bring 54 divisions to the
    fight. Our combined war fighting assets include over 1,500 strike
    aircraft that can launch over 1,000 daily sorties, over 1,000 rotary
    aircraft, more than 5,000 tracked vehicles, 3,000 tanks, and over 250
    combat ships to include 4 or more carrier battle groups. If necessary,
    this unequalled combined combat power and might can defeat a North
    Korean attack and destroy its military and regime. It is this power and
    might that strengthens our deterrence mission and ultimately provides
    regional security.
        Our continuing cooperation and understanding is a success story in
    many ways. It is institutionalized in our Mutual Defense Treaty and in
    our Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings. Four
    alliance areas deserve particular note: alliance successes, military
    procurement, defense burdensharing, and a brief discussion of command
    initiatives that will shape our alliance.
        Alliance successes: Overall, our alliance is stronger because of
    U.S.-South Korean cooperation to conclude three significant issues in
    the past year. Most notably, we successfully revised our Status of
    Forces Agreement, which safeguards the rights of our servicemembers
    while better respecting the laws, customs, and culture of the Republic
    of Korea. Second, both nations concluded a cooperative investigation on
    the tragic events that occurred 50 years ago at the Korean village of
    Nogun-Ri. Here again, this issue has been resolved in a manner that is
    consistent with an alliance based on democratic ideals and an honest
    quest for truth and accountability. Finally, South Korea, in
    consultation with the U.S., established a policy of developing
    operational missiles with a range of no more than 300 kilometers and a
    payload of 500 kilograms, which are the Missile Control Technology
    Regime limits.
        Military Procurement: The Defense White Paper 2000, published by
    the Ministry of National Defense, addresses aggressive modernization
    goals for the South Korean forces. United States Forces Korea
    wholeheartedly supports these efforts and feels that they will set the
    conditions for an autonomous South Korean military in the future.
    Modernization and improvements are being made in many key areas through
    indigenous production, co-production, and procurement through Foreign
    Military Sales. South Korea continues to demonstrate overwhelming
    preference for U.S. military equipment. South Korean military purchases
    from the U.S. as a percentage of total foreign procurement has ranged
    from 59.2 percent to 98.9 percent in the last 10 years. The decade
    average is 78.6 percent.
        Last year the South Korean military purchased Multiple Launch
    Rocket Systems (MLRS), theater airborne collection systems, and weapons
    and electronics upgrades for their newest destroyers. Additionally, we
    are encouraged by the serious consideration that the Republic of Korea
    is devoting to purchase the F-15E strike fighter jet, the AH-64D Apache
    Longbow attack helicopter, and the Patriot (SAM-X) missile systems.
    These powerful systems are interoperable with U.S. systems and will
    ensure that military might can be brought to bear quickly and
    decisively, at a time when it may be required. Not only will these
    systems improve today's alliance combat power, they also contribute to
    the future regional security for Northeast Asia.
        There are three areas where the Republic of Korea must procure
    capabilities to support our combined combat readiness: (1) Command,
    control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C\4\I)
    interoperability; (2) Chemical and biological defense capabilities; and
    (3) Preferred munitions necessary for the early stages of the war plan.
        Defense Burdensharing: Of the four burdensharing categories in the
    2000 Report to Congress on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense,
    South Korea met the congressional goal in one. The Republic of Korea
    increased the number of peacekeepers in support of multinational
    military activities, primarily in East Timor. The Republic of Korea did
    not meet congressional targets in the three other areas: (1) cost
    sharing, (2) defense spending as percentage of Gross Domestic Product,
    and (3) foreign assistance. This is a downward trend from the previous
    year and must be reversed, as key U.S. congressional leadership has
    articulated.
        In the cost-sharing category for fiscal year 2000, the Republic of
    Korea paid $751 million out of $1.83 billion United States non-
    personnel stationing costs. This is a 41 percent contribution that fell
    short of the congressional 2000 goal of 75 percent. The U.S. and South
    Korea enter negotiations this year to adjust this level of cost sharing
    and sign a new Special Measures Agreement. The Republic of Korea must
    raise its present percentage of non-personnel stationing costs. The
    U.S. State Department concurs.
        South Korean defense spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic
    Product dropped from 3.2 to 2.8 percent between 1998 and 1999. The 1999
    value of 2.8 percent was below the U.S. defense investment of 3.2
    percent.
        South Korean outlays for foreign assistance failed to increase by
    10 percent between 1998 and 1999, and at 0.04 percent of Gross Domestic
    Product, they fell below the congressional goal of 1 percent.
        Command Initiatives: During this past year, we have developed a
    number of initiatives designed to better meet the needs and demands of
    our great alliance. The most important of these are support to the
    North-South transportation corridor, the ``good neighbor'' initiatives,
    environmental programs, and the Land Partnership Plan.
        The United Nations Command will continue to fully support President
    Kim Dae-Jung's reconciliation process and the development of a road/
    rail transportation corridor through the Demilitarized Zone. The
    command has already modified the 1953 Armistice Agreement to allow the
    Republic of Korea to coordinate construction issues on behalf of the
    Military Armistice Commission. Close cooperation between United Nations
    Command and the South Korean Ministry of National Defense has, and will
    continue to ensure sufficient levels of security in the Demilitarized
    Zone during demining, corridor construction, and future operation. As
    we work closely with North Korea over issues concerning access and
    commerce in this corridor, we will continue to insist that all actions,
    and all confidence-building measures, are both reciprocal and
    verifiable.
        During the summer of 2000 the command and the government of South
    Korea initiated comprehensive good neighbor initiatives in response to
    an alarming rise in ``anti-U.S. Forces Korea'' sentiment that turned
    violent in some situations. The program includes education programs for
    both U.S. servicemembers and the Korean public, public affairs programs
    to offer a balanced perspective to the Korean press, and increased
    interaction between U.S. servicemembers and local Korean military units
    and citizens. To educate and nurture an understanding between our
    servicemembers and South Korean citizens we began a bilingual quarterly
    newsletter jointly published by U.S. Forces Korea and the South Korean
    government, and posted on the Korean Defense Ministry's internet
    website. Still in its infancy, these initiatives have already paid
    dividends and will continue to do so into the future.
        Being good stewards of the environment in our host country is
    important to our mission and the alliance. We have accomplished much
    but there is more we will do. Future problem mitigation and
    environmental protection requires continuous funding from both the
    Republic of Korea and United States. Our investment in protecting the
    Korean environment is the responsible course that serves to strengthen
    our alliance.
        The final future initiative is the Land Partnership Plan begun in
    December 2000 with our Korean partners. This program seeks to improve
    the combined forces readiness posture, improve force protection,
    enhance public safety, stop training range encroachment, advance
    quality of life for U.S. forces, support South Korean economic growth,
    and posture our forces for cooperation well into the future. The
    combination of a robust and growing Korean economy, rising population,
    and very limited land on the Korean peninsula is placing extreme
    pressure on the command. Encroachment by farming and construction on
    training ranges and in safety zones around ammunition storage areas
    endangers the public and is lessening our ability to properly train.
    This initiative will reconfigure and protect training areas, and
    consolidate our forces around hub installations. Both nations stand to
    gain significantly from this effort, but the program requires strong
    support from the Korean government. U.S. Forces Korea must have access
    to small new purchases of rural land for consolidation before we can
    release large areas of valuable urban land and facilities.
    Additionally, both sides must approach the plan as an integrated whole,
    and not piecemeal the package, to maximize benefits.

                               COMMAND PRIORITIES

        During my comments today, I will discuss the status of programs and
    programmatic areas in which resource allocations are of significant
    concern to me. My intent is to discuss possible problem areas as they
    now appear. However, these program areas and their associated funding
    levels may change pending the outcome of the new administration's
    strategy and defense review which will guide future decisions on
    military spending. For fiscal year 2002, the President's budget
    includes funding to cover our most pressing priorities. I ask that you
    consider my comments in that light.
        Achieving our vision and accomplishing our missions requires us to
    prioritize scarce resources. Our command priorities are (1) War
    Fighting Readiness, (2) Support to War Plans, (3) Force Protection, (4)
    Future Force Development, and (5) Quality of Life.
        War Fighting Readiness: Our number one command priority of war
    fighting readiness consists of training, exercises, and headquarters
    operations:
        Training is the cornerstone of our combat capability and level of
    readiness. Our combined forces continue to remain trained and ready. We
    can fight and win! The North knows it. They fear our power and might.
    We are fully capable of decisively defeating North Korea and destroying
    the regime. However, the command faces significant training challenges
    ranging from training range encroachment to required modernization. We
    need to reverse problems in three specific areas: (1) Training area
    requirements, (2) Korea Training Center modernization, and (3)
    Realistic urban operations training facility.
        Our first concern is that our joint forces experience a lack of
    adequate training areas on the peninsula. The problem stems from
    training areas being widely dispersed, non-contiguous, often
    temporarily unavailable, and too small to support the range of our
    modern weapon systems. Current training areas also suffer from
    sustained civilian construction and farming encroachment. The Land
    Partnership Plan addresses this urgent problem by consolidating and
    protecting necessary training areas. The new Inchon International
    Airport scheduled for full operation in 2003 creates additional
    problems for airspace management. The Republic of Korea government must
    energize a realistic and near term program to improve their airspace
    management system. Failure to do so will increase the risk for both
    commercial airlines and military aircraft.
        The second long-term challenge is the support for our Korea
    Training Center, Synthetic Training Environment Vision. Currently, we
    have the ability to train a battalion task force in the live
    environment at the Center but only under manpower intensive, manually
    supported efforts. We need to increase training realism by modernizing
    range instrumentation. We are working with Department of the Army to
    fund this requirement.
        To squeeze the most benefit out of every training minute and
    dollar, we must infuse new training technologies. In the near term,
    full funding of our joint exercise program is critical to maintaining
    our current level of readiness. Currently, our vital simulation centers
    (Korea Battle and Korea Air Simulation Centers) are not fully funded
    which requires us to reprogram dollars from other programs to fund
    these readiness enablers. This is a less than ideal situation. Third,
    and finally, urban combat training is imperative for all forces in
    Korea as urbanization now dominates South Korea, the second most
    densely populated country in the world. We greatly appreciate the
    fiscal year 2001 military construction (MILCON) you provided and
    efforts are ongoing to construct our Combined Arms Collective (urban
    warfare) Training Facility. However, instrumentation for this critical
    project is not funded. To achieve the maximum training benefit from
    this facility, we need to install the prescribed instrumentation
    systems.
        The second component of war fighting readiness is exercises. Both
    the content and timing of our combined and joint exercises successfully
    posture this command to deter, defend, and decisively win a military
    engagement. Exercises equal deterrence! Because of the proximity of the
    threat, the complexity of this theater, and our high personnel
    turnover, we must conduct robust theater level exercises annually to
    maintain combat readiness. Each exercise is unique and focused on a
    different essential component of the combined war fight. The loss or
    reduction of dollars to support these exercises will weaken readiness
    and deterrence, and hamper our combined forces training to fight and
    win.
        Our vital Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise support is
    currently under-funded. Budget constraints have seriously impacted our
    joint and combined exercise program. The combination of the increasing
    cost of strategic lift, and a flat-line strategic lift budget, has
    degraded our exercise strategic lift capability. It would be unwise to
    let this continue over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
        We will try to maintain our major exercises, but we must not
    sacrifice realistic, quality training opportunities in the process.
    Again, we must monitor our cuts carefully because these exercises are
    not hypothetical--they are the exercising of real, ``go to war'' plans.
    Korea is the only theater in the world where real war plans drive all
    exercises.
        Finally, we need significant help with our headquarters operations.
    We anticipate needing additional funding in this area in order to
    conduct day-to-day operations in the headquarters for United Nations
    Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Eighth U.S.
    Army.
        Support to War Plans: The four principle categories of support to
    war plans are logistics; personnel; command, control, communications,
    computers, and intelligence (C\4\I); and intelligence capability.
    Although we have made great strides in recent years, all four
    categories require additional support.
        The distance between the northeast Asian theater and the U.S. make
    logistics support a healthy challenge to overcome. The task that is
    most vital to our success in Korea is the current readiness of our
    forward deployed forces. It is time to change the way Korea-based units
    are viewed in our logistics system. Instead of considering our forces
    as forward based or stationed, we must be considered ``forward
    deployed'' in much the same manner as forces in the Balkans. The
    proximity of the enemy and short warning times mandate our forces be
    ready to fight tonight. In order to ``fight tonight,'' our units must
    have the supplies and equipment necessary to defeat any attack. We will
    defeat any North Korean attack early, while our augmentation forces and
    supplies are overcoming the tyranny of distance from the United States.
    To accomplish this our forces must have a support priority equal to the
    highest priority of each of the four services. We intend to work
    through the services to improve this posture.
        Intra-theater sea and airlift form the cornerstones of our ability
    to integrate forces and provide responsive theater support during
    conflict. We fully support the Army's initiative to forward station
    Army watercraft close to northeast Asia. We also are avid supporters of
    Air Force programs that will ensure adequate availability of C-130 and
    C-17 aircraft for intra-theater lift during a crisis. The geography of
    the Korean Peninsula makes the effective use of theater-controlled air
    and sealift essential to our success.
        The limitations of airlift and sealift to rapidly move forces and
    supplies to Korea are a concern. We fully support the planned and
    continued modernization and maintenance of our Defense Department's
    strategic enroute infrastructure.
        The U.S. also needs to improve the strategic deployment triad: (1)
    For airlift, this means a robust acquisition program for the C-17,
    increased efforts to improve the reliability of the C-5, and strong
    support for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet; (2) For sealift, this means
    the completion of our Ready Reserve Force and Large, Medium Speed Roll-
    On, Roll-Off programs; and (3) For pre-positioning programs, this means
    100 percent fill of equipment and adequate sustainment for these
    programs for all services.
        Pre-positioning programs for equipment offer us the ability to
    reduce the strategic movement requirements early in any conflict. In
    Korea, our ability to defeat a North Korean attack is critically
    dependent upon the pre-positioning of key items of equipment and
    supplies. We primarily focus on the Army's brigade set of equipment and
    supplies, the pre-positioning of critical munitions and repair parts,
    and the location of assets critical to our ability to integrate and
    sustain forces early in the fight. Our pre-positioning programs focus
    on the initial 15 to 30 days of the campaign while the United States'
    strategic sustainment base gears up. We have shortages with regard to
    our stocks of preferred munitions, Air Force replacement parts,
    replacement ground combat systems, and the Army's pre-positioned
    Brigade set.
        Key logistics and sustainment shortfall remains in Army
    Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4). Sustainment shortfalls limit ability to
    reconstitute the force and sustain missions, resulting in increasing
    risk. Significant major end item shortages do exist. Lack of repair
    parts and major assemblies with the APS-4 sustainment stockpile will
    directly impact the ability to return battle-damaged equipment to the
    fight. The current funding stream does not adequately support
    sustainment shortfalls in APS-4. However, the Army's current plans are
    to cascade additional equipment into APS-4 sustainment stocks over the
    next couple of years, thus reducing the shortfall. We strongly support
    the services' requirements to improve our ability to sustain combat
    operations. Failure to support these requirements increases our risk.
        The second element of supporting our war plans is personnel. Our
    main challenge is the turnover of our people. In a theater with
    approximately 95 percent turnover per year, the small size of our joint
    staff is currently our major concern. We are manned at about 34 percent
    of our wartime staff requirements. In addition, new mission areas such
    as force protection, information assurance, information operations, and
    critical infrastructure protections are being established without any
    authorized billets. We cannot continue to handle new requirements
    without the manpower to do the job. This must change. Korea cannot go
    on at the 34 percent manning level.
        We are most concerned about our command and control systems. Today,
    severe deficiencies in command, control, communications, computers, and
    intelligence (C\4\I) functionality impairs our ability to execute the
    war plan. To achieve the information superiority that President Bush
    describes in A Blueprint for New Beginnings--A Responsible Budget for
    America's Priorities, we must pursue technologies that provide
    collaborative, interactive, real-time common operational understanding.
    This is best achieved by building a C\4\I architecture that embraces
    the principles of network-centric warfare while leveraging emerging
    space based capabilities and sensor to shooter technologies. We are
    also engaging Joint Forces Command to integrate ongoing C\4\I
    experimentation in our major peninsula exercises to help us stay on the
    forefront of emerging technology. We feel this relationship will put us
    in a solid position to integrate maturing technologies into our theater
    architecture.
        Pursuing leading edge technologies alone will not guarantee success
    in the future. Transitioning to modern technology requires an
    accompanying shift from the current analog processes that served us
    well during the Cold War to the digital processes needed to address
    regional threats in the information age. To begin this transition, we
    need to balance current readiness with the imperative to pursue C\4\I
    capabilities that ensure full functionality. As such, the vast majority
    of our anticipated fiscal year 2002 budget for C\4\I supports the
    minimum required to sustain current ``go-to-war'' systems while we
    expect to pursue this new vision over the Future Years Defense Plan.
    This includes maintaining the funding previously earmarked for Korea
    support through U.S. Army Forces Command and Army Signal Command.
        Our ``go-to-war'' command and control (C\2\) systems consist of the
    Global Command and Control System ((GCCS), both U.S.-only and combined
    versions), as well as a combined secure video teleconferencing (VTC)
    system. These combined systems are the Department of Defense's largest
    and most complex bilingual command and control systems and are
    absolutely imperative to commanding and controlling U.S. and South
    Korean forces. Over the last 5 years, U.S. Forces Korea has had to
    divert funds from other operations and maintenance programs to sustain
    these C\2\ systems. We can no longer afford to take this approach. Our
    funding shortfall is significant, but contains only what is required to
    maintain the status quo. We have deferred new growth and operational
    enhancements to the outyears.
        Any discussion of C\4\I must include two near term challenges--
    information assurance and spectrum availability. These capabilities are
    critical to protecting our investments in C\4\I. Our increasing use of
    information systems breeds a growing dependence. While this dependence
    does create opportunities for us to exploit adversary information and
    information systems, it does, however, expose our own vulnerabilities.
    We are pursuing a viable information assurance program to protect our
    information while defending our information systems, but we anticipate
    facing a severe funding shortfall with regard to our top down driven
    projects. However, this could change as a result of the defense
    strategy review.
        I share the same concerns as other CINCs regarding the upcoming
    plan to sell off major portions of the U.S. frequency spectrum. Today,
    we are hindered from fielding new systems as well as training as we
    will fight because of host nation spectrum access. We will soon be
    fielding the Apache Longbow attack helicopter in Korea but have not yet
    gained frequency approval for armistice training and operations due to
    conflicts with South Korean commercial telecommunications providers.
    Additionally, there are no available frequencies to support unmanned
    aerial vehicles during armistice, and only limited frequency approval
    for Joint STARS and Patriot air defense system. Further sell-off of
    additional spectrum in the U.S. will reverberate around the world and
    significantly impair on our ability to execute operations. I strongly
    urge great caution in this area.
        Enhancement to our intelligence capability is an absolute
    necessity. President Bush's articulation of the need for ``leap-ahead
    technologies for new . . . intelligence systems'' (A Blueprint for New
    Beginnings. . . ) hits the mark in Korea. Our top priority is to
    advance our intelligence backbone, the Pacific Command Automated Data
    Processing Server Site Korea (PASS-K) with 21st century technology.
    This is a General Defense Intelligence Budget Program (GDIP) that has
    operated with insufficient funding for over 5 years, and is now running
    on fumes. I fully support the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
    requests for funding to expedite long neglected modernization, and
    acquire next-generation improvements. Failure to do so risks degrading
    our already diminished indications and warning posture while hampering
    our collaboration with the entire joint intelligence community. This
    must be funded!
        We must improve our theater's intelligence systems' functionality.
    Our VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) satellite network provides us
    mobile communications, but is currently separated into three isolated
    networks. We intend to integrate the three into one network, while
    modernizing and upgrading in the process. This will improve capacity
    and reduce costs while providing much needed redundancy in this fragile
    system. However, we have a funding shortfall in this program.
        We need to leverage our capability to collaborate with the entire
    joint intelligence community off peninsula to perform rapid targeting,
    battle damage assessment, and threat analysis. We plan to install
    hardware and software onto the existing systems and networks to
    accomplish this essential requirement. This will facilitate the
    integration of U.S. Forces Korea collection efforts into national
    databases and threat assessments, seamlessly collaborating theater and
    national intelligence related to Korea. Without increasing our
    footprint in Korea, this will increase our accessibility to analysts at
    National Security Agency (NSA), DIA, and Joint Intelligence Center-
    Pacific Command. We need funding support for this effort.
        Finally, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
    assets must not dip below current levels in imagery intelligence and
    signals intelligence (SIGINT) . . . it must improve. Until the unmanned
    aerial vehicle proves itself reliable and affordable as a replacement
    for the U2, we must hold the number of U2 pilots we have and not let
    this precious high-demand, low-density asset decrease on peninsula. I
    also fully support the U.S. national intelligence community,
    particularly National Security Agency, requests for funding to improve
    ISR and SIGINT capabilities.
        Force Protection: The environment in Korea presents several unique
    challenges for the protection of our servicemembers, civilians, and
    family members. While our force protection posture continues to
    improve, United States Forces Korea has 95 installations across the
    peninsula, many quite small and remote. We have organized these 95
    installations into 12 ``enclaves'' for more centralized planning,
    execution, and coordination of resources and to provide a clear chain
    of command responsibility.
        During this past year, we have reviewed and updated the force
    protection plans for each of our enclaves. We are now taking the next
    step by exercising these plans, using likely terrorist scenarios, to
    continue to improve them. I have established a U.S. Forces Korea level
    ``Tiger Team'' to conduct an exercise at each of our enclaves during
    this fiscal year. Each exercise is preceded by a ``Red Team''
    assessment, which simulates a terrorist group attempting to penetrate
    and attack one of our installations. We have conducted four of these
    exercises thus far. We have shared the lessons learned from each of
    these with the joint community and all of our units as we continue to
    refine our force protection plans.
        We have identified four systemic force protection concerns within
    United States Forces Korea: lack of standoff, access to installations,
    off-post housing, and off-post activities.
        Our most resource intensive vulnerability is lack of standoff.
    Urban encroachment on our installations, decaying infrastructure, and
    the lack of available real estate for force protection modifications
    contribute to the vulnerabilities. In the short term we have used Joint
    Staff Combating Terrorism Initiative Funds to install blast walls and
    mylar coating in limited areas to protect our most critical facilities.
    Our Land Partnership Plan addresses some of our long-term weaknesses.
    This plan will shift many of our installations and training areas from
    urban centers to rural areas and allow us to move more of our people
    onto our installations.
        Access to our installations poses another significant challenge. We
    have taken positive steps to improve our access control through
    implementation of a fingerprint scanning identification system and
    reducing the number of non-U.S. Forces Korea persons who can be
    sponsored onto our facilities. The Army currently fully funds our
    contract security guard force that maintains installation access
    control and perimeter security without diverting soldiers to this task.
    Continued funding is vital.
        We are conducting a complete study of off-post housing and
    temporary lodging to assess our vulnerability and determine appropriate
    protection policies. Our long-term goal is to substantially reduce the
    number of personnel being housed off-post through increased
    construction of on-post quarters. In the near term we execute a very
    proactive force protection public awareness program for those living or
    traveling off post.
        We have routinely conducted force protection assessments for all
    high profile off-post activities and events. We have expanded risk
    assessments to assess our vulnerabilities with regard to the lower
    profile activities such as inter-camp bus routes and personnel
    attending college classes on local campuses. We continue to look for
    and implement innovative ways to mitigate our vulnerabilities and
    educate our personnel and their families on threat avoidance. We
    believe force protection funding shortfalls will be significant for
    fiscal year 2002, and we need your help to ensure our American
    personnel are properly protected.
        Future Force Development: As technology advances we must constantly
    seek innovative improvements to our capabilities through force
    development. We support the efforts of the research and development
    community, and would benefit most from improved intelligence analysis
    capability; ability to locate and track weapons of mass destruction;
    protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack; ability to
    defeat hard and deeply buried targets; and missile defense.
        We are excited about the Army's transformation concepts and I am
    pushing for the stationing of one Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in
    Korea to replace one existing brigade. This will provide the
    maneuverability and combat power necessary to operate in the
    mountainous and increasing urbanized terrain of Korea. It will also
    prepare us to refocus the Army's forward deployed forces in Korea to a
    regional role. The IBCT provides a rapidly deployable ground force to
    complement Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, and Marine
    Expeditionary Forces, and Navy Amphibious Ready Groups and Carrier
    Battle Groups as U.S. Forces Korea's role transitions to that of
    northeast Asia regional security.
        Quality of Life: Quality of life, our final command priority, is a
    basic element of overall readiness and is critical to our mission. As
    stated in President Bush's A Blueprint for New Beginnings. . ., ``we
    cannot honor our servicemen and woman and yet allow substandard housing
    and inadequate compensation levels to endure.'' The Korean peninsula
    faces shortfalls in both areas. The investment philosophy of ``50 years
    of presence in Korea . . . 1 year at a time'' has taken a severe toll
    on our housing, infrastructure, and morale. Personnel tempo is 365 days
    a year in this ``hardship tour'' area. Our servicemembers wake each day
    within artillery range of our adversary knowing he will be the one who
    decides if we go to war. Our intent is to make a Korean tour the
    assignment of choice for our military personnel by providing the best
    quality of life possible. Our goal is a quality of life that is
    comparable to other overseas assignments. This is clearly not the case
    today. A Korea assignment today involves the greatest loss of pay in
    the military, the highest command declination rate, the highest ``no
    show'' rate in the U.S. Army, and the poorest quality of life of any
    permanent change of station assignment in the military. We have a plan
    but we need help. To attack these problems, we need to address Pay and
    Morale, Housing and Infrastructure, and MILCON.
        Even with the great assistance we received from Congress last year,
    we continue to face grim conditions regarding housing and
    infrastructure throughout this command. Nearly 40 percent of the
    servicemembers in U.S. Forces Korea live in inadequate quarters.
    Overcrowded facilities force us to billet many unaccompanied personnel
    off-post, increasing their personal risk and cost of living.
    Unaccompanied housing and dining facilities suffer from rapid
    deterioration and excessive wear through overcrowding and lack of real
    property maintenance and repair (RPM) funding. Some military personnel
    still live in quonset huts and Vietnam-era pre-fabricated buildings.
    However, if funded, by 2008 the barracks will be upgraded to an
    acceptable standard. Fifteen percent of all buildings in the command
    are between 40 and 80 years old and 32 percent are classified as
    temporary buildings. In 1999 and 2000 alone, the command suffered 295
    electrical power and 467 water supply outages from decaying
    infrastructure.
        The lack of adequate family housing is the most serious quality of
    life issue we face in Korea. It contributes to high personnel
    turbulence and discontinuity, degrades morale and productivity,
    resulting in high assignment declinations and retention problems for
    our services. Indeed, Korea's uniqueness as a yearlong unaccompanied
    tour has been purchased at a price. We provide government owned and
    leased housing for 1,987 personnel--less than 10 percent of our married
    servicemembers--compared to more than 70 percent in Europe and Japan.
    Our goal is to increase the command-sponsored rate for Korea.
        The solution is to raise the quality of life for personnel that
    serve in Korea, and we have a plan. This current plan includes new
    construction and leasing local housing units. We intend to apply more
    than half of this cost from our host nation construction funding to
    build 4,200 of the 6,300 units needed over the next 20 years, but we
    will need your help to fund family housing construction. In addition,
    we need leased housing (800 units authorized by Title 10 now, and add
    an additional 2,000 units to expand the command sponsored population).
    This year's ``New Housing Project'' budget includes 60 new units at
    Camp Humphreys. This project must not be cut. A total of 6,300 units
    across the peninsula are required.
        Congressional funding that you provided last year has enabled us to
    improve water distribution systems at Kunsan and Osan Air Bases, and
    improve existing barracks at Camp Carroll, Camp Hovey, and Camp Page.
    Nevertheless, chronic under-funding of military construction (MILCON)
    funding for Korea during the past 15 years and the interruption of
    MILCON dollars for our command between 1991 and 1994 has limited our
    ability to give our servicemembers the quality of life they deserve. We
    desperately need to execute a comprehensive construction program and
    begin to eliminate the unacceptable living and working conditions in
    aging facilities that U.S. forces in Korea face every day.
        Aging facilities are also more costly to maintain. Under funding of
    RPM exacerbates an already serious problem with troop housing, dining
    facilities, work areas, and infrastructure. We hope to receive
    additional funding that will allow us to keep the doors open to our
    facilities and make emergency repairs only. It will still leave us
    short of our total requirement.
        Finally, utilities costs are soaring. This is an area where
    increasing costs can no longer be absorbed. Oil costs are up 60
    percent. Electricity is up 5 percent and scheduled to go up 15 percent
    more. Because of these increased energy costs, we anticipate needing
    additional funds.
        In summary, we work our command priorities through a balanced
    readiness approach--carefully addressing combat readiness,
    infrastructure, and quality of life with limited resources. Our ability
    to fight and win decisively is tied to proper balance in all of these
    essential areas. Overall, our top priorities for fiscal year 2002 are
    as follows: (1) C\4\I architecture modernization and protection, (2)
    Combat readiness: air and ground battle simulation centers, (3) Anti-
    terrorism and force protection, (4) Environmental protection and damage
    mitigation, (5) Real property maintenance, and (6) Family housing.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We would like to leave you with five thoughts:
        First, we want to emphasize that the support of Congress and the
    American people is vitally important to our future in Korea. We thank
    you for all you have done. However, we must also ensure that our
    resolve is consistent and visible so that North Korea, or any other
    potential adversary, cannot misinterpret it. We have an investment of
    over 50 years in this region. I believe we should continue to build on
    it to guarantee the stability that is so important to the people of
    Korea, northeast Asia, and to our own national interests. We urge
    committee members to come to Korea and see first-hand the importance of
    the American military presence and the strength and vitality of the
    United States--Republic of Korea alliance.
        Second, the North Korean military continues to increase its
    nonconventional threat and conduct large-scale training exercises in
    spite of severe economic problems and a perception of a thawing
    relationship between North and South Korea. North Korea's continued
    growth in military capability and the intent implied, amounts to a
    continued significant threat. Now, more than ever, the strength of the
    Republic of Korea--United States alliance, built on a foundation of
    teamwork and combined training, provides both nations with a powerful
    deterrent as well as the readiness to fight and win. Make no mistake;
    there is no ``peace dividend'' yet in the Korean theater at this time.
    The North Korean threat to peace and stability in northeast Asia will
    not fundamentally diminish until the North engages in tangible military
    confidence building measures, both now and in the future, that are
    verifiable and reciprocal.
        Third, this is the second year of commemorations recognizing the
    significance of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, viewed by many
    of our veterans as the ``forgotten war.'' We are committed to honoring
    the brave veterans living and dead and hope you can join us in Korea
    for these commemorations to remember their sacrifice.
        Fourth, now and in the future, the U.S. and northeast Asian nations
    cannot secure their interests and economic prosperity without credible,
    rapidly-deployable, air/land/sea forces in Korea. Presence is security,
    commitment to friends, and access into the region. As the only presence
    on the mainland of east Asia, U.S. forces in Korea will play a vital
    role in the future peace and stability of the region.
        Finally, you can be justifiably proud of all the exceptional things
    the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Defense Department
    civilians continue to do with great spirit and conviction. They remain
    our most valuable asset. They sacrifice for our Nation every day. This
    is why we remain so firm that we owe all those who faithfully serve
    proper resources for training, a quality infrastructure, and an
    adequate quality of life. Again, thank you for this opportunity to
    share our thoughts with you.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        We will have a 6-minute round of questioning for each
    member.
        I am going to lead right off, General Schwartz. During the
    course of President Bush's campaign, he addressed the serious
    problems associated with retention of our middle grade officer
    corps and senior enlisted. One of the root problems was over-
    deployment. While you speak with great pride as to the number
    of times that you and your subordinates have served in Korea,
    nonetheless, President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld and the team
    have to look to determine whether or not there are areas of the
    world in which we can reduce the U.S. presence which, in turn,
    hopefully will reduce the number of deployments. In our
    judgment--at least mine--the last administration was over-
    deployed with our Armed Forces and underfunded.
        Now, is your AOR one in which the Bush team can look at and
    determine, based on your recommendations, that there is a basis
    for a reduction of the total number of personnel which, in
    turn, would reflect Army-wide fewer deployments?
        General Schwartz. I think my answer to that, Senator
    Warner, would be this. With the current situation like it is,
    with the threat as we see it, with the words that I used,
    ``bigger, better, closer, deadlier,'' I would not recommend any
    cut or reduction of force in the Korean peninsula at this time.
    If, however, in the future we go down the path of
    reconciliation, if we go down the path of confidence-building
    measures that are verifiable and reciprocal, and we see that
    the north takes the actions--not the words, as you indicated in
    your opening statement, but the actions--to reduce the tension
    and to reduce the threat, then there could be a concomitant
    reduction of troops. But until we reach that period of time, I
    would not recommend to do so.
        Chairman Warner. You were present before this committee
    last year and have rejoined us this year. Is your AOR in your
    judgment subject to greater tensions and threat or about the
    same as last year?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I have to tell you the threat has
    gotten identifiably better in those areas that I talked about,
    and I can be more specific in a closed session. But the threat
    is better than we saw it last year. They are training at a
    higher level.
        Chairman Warner. When you say it is better, in other words,
    it places a more serious threat to our forces and those of
    South Korea.
        General Schwartz. Right, sir. I think the threat is more
    serious today than it was last year when I testified.
        Chairman Warner. Let us start off with your AOR, Admiral
    Blair. What about the threat condition last year when you
    appeared before this committee versus this year?
        Admiral Blair. Sir, the concerns that you have about the
    strain on our people of operations I think are more true of
    other theaters than of the Pacific Command. I would, in fact,
    point to the East Timor operation as an operation in which we
    were able to come up with some very creative ways of working
    within an international coalition in order not to have large
    deployments of U.S. forces.
        Right now we have 12 on-the-ground personnel in Dili, East
    Timor. That is down from about 500 last year. The rest of our
    presence is visits by Navy ships and often embarked Marine
    units. For instance, we have the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group
    with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit making a visit
    during its regularly scheduled deployment.
        So, we are taking advantage of the deployment capability we
    have within the force to get the job done. All of our ships are
    within their personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) limits, and the same
    is basically true for the other services.
        Chairman Warner. Do you feel that within your AOR there
    could be some reduction in deployments, thereby reflecting on
    lessening the overall stress in the Navy on deployments and
    hopefully improving retention?
        Admiral Blair. I do not think the PERSTEMPO is a factor in
    retention in the Pacific theater. I think we are in good
    balance, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Returning again to the work that you
    perform--and it is a very valuable contribution to this most
    difficult decision that is facing our President with regard to
    how to structure this year's arms package for Taiwan--did you
    have consultations with our allies and friends, other nations
    in this region, and are their thoughts factored in? Because if
    we had the misfortune of an outbreak of hostilities requiring
    the presence or enhancement of U.S. forces to, hopefully,
    either stabilize or prevent it or, indeed, confront this
    problem, it would impact the entire region. Therefore, I think
    consultation with our allies should be a factor to be taken
    into consideration as we structure this package. All I need to
    know is procedurally, have you and your subordinates done that?
        Admiral Blair. We did not have specific discussions on the
    particular Taiwanese request this year. It is something that we
    discuss in general terms with allies, but there is not a
    procedure for a specific consultation with them.
        We do have specific consultations with the Taiwanese
    delegation itself. It comes to Washington to present the
    requests, along with rationale, and then it visits my
    headquarters in an unofficial capacity also to discuss it.
        Chairman Warner. As you look at the relations between China
    and Taiwan and compare those relationships today with 1 year
    ago, do you believe the tensions are about the same or higher?
        Admiral Blair. About the same, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Now, as you look at the military situation
    with a trend in China of putting in place specific
    installations, missiles foremost, they are predicated
    presumably solely for the balance of military power between
    China and Taiwan. Given that I think I understood you to say
    that that trend is increasing on behalf of China and therefore
    places upon Taiwan the need to enhance its own defenses, will
    the arms packages now being constructed in your judgment result
    in a balancing of this trend brought about by the initiatives
    in China?
        Admiral Blair. My recommendation is to take the actions
    necessary to maintain that balance, and I believe that balance
    is well attainable under current conditions. There have been
    improvements in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as I said.
    It is a mixed picture as far as the advanced weaponry goes.
    There have also been improvements in the Taiwanese Armed Forces
    as they also bring new systems on line. So, what you are
    talking about is the balance here, and that is the way my
    staff, my components, and I evaluate it.
        Chairman Warner. But in simple language, given the trend of
    increases you see on the behalf of China in its defense,
    increased spending, and the placement of missiles, that balance
    will no longer be present unless there is an enhancement of the
    arms package to Taiwan. Is that correct?
        Admiral Blair. There has to be an enhancement of Taiwan's
    capability through a combination of what they buy from us, what
    they manufacture from us, and what they buy from others.
        Chairman Warner. To bring that back in balance again.
        Admiral Blair. To maintain the balance.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. General Pace, one of the conclusions that
    Senators Reed, Ben Nelson, Bill Nelson, and I reached following
    our visit to Colombia was that--and here I am quoting--``the
    continued strengthening, modernization, and professionalization
    of the Colombian military is the best hope for weakening the
    narcotraffickers' strangle-hold on Colombian society, advancing
    the rule of law to protect the rights of all Colombians, and
    ending the massive violations of human rights in Colombia.''
    Would you agree with that?
        General Pace. Sir, I agree with that 100 percent.
        Senator Levin. Could you tell us, General, about your views
    as to how serious you believe the Colombian army leadership is
    to end the cooperation between the Colombian army units in the
    field and the paramilitaries?
        General Pace. Senator, thank you.
        I am convinced that the senior leadership is dedicated to
    do that. I have been to Colombia seven times, sir. I have had
    the pleasure of meeting, on various occasions, with President
    Pastrana; on almost every occasion, Minister of Defense
    Ramirez; and on every occasion, General Tapias, who is their
    chairman, and the service chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air
    Force. We have had discussions. We have visited field units. We
    have talked both about human rights violations and about
    collusion with the paramilitary.
        The Army of Colombia initially attacked the problem that
    they had with human rights. They have embedded in their
    training program human rights training. As an example of the
    success they have had there, 2 years ago about 60 percent of
    the accusations of human rights abuse inside Colombia were
    against the Colombian military. This past year, just under 2
    percent of all accusations of human rights abuse was against
    the Colombian military. The Colombian military's standing
    within the public has raised from number 10 in public opinion
    polls to number 1. So, the Colombian military has, in fact,
    taken on the human rights responsibilities that they have with
    vigor.
        They have now turned that same focus onto collusion with
    the paramilitary.
        Senator Levin. In an attempt to end it.
        General Pace. Correct, sir. The leadership understands that
    it has been going on. They understand that it is unacceptable.
    They have undertaken to train their units in that regard, and
    in fact they have specifically said that they view the
    paramilitaries and, in their words, the ``illegal self-defense
    forces,'' to be the largest long-term threat to the survival of
    their democracy. Colombia uses the term illegal self-defense
    forces, because they think the use of paramilitary gives the
    organizations too much credibility.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Blair, on the question of Chinese military
    spending, I understand there has been about a 17 percent hike
    in military spending in China. But most experts have previously
    concluded that China put economic development above military
    modernization. I am wondering whether in your view the hike in
    military spending means that the Chinese leadership has changed
    its priorities.
        Admiral Blair. No, Senator, I do not believe it does. It is
    interesting. The Chinese proudly announced a 17.7 percent
    increase, and when I asked 17.7 percent of what, the answers
    got a little vague. Chinese military budget accounting is
    evolving, to put it charitably, opaque to put it more
    realistically. There are various items off budget, and clearly
    the claims that they make of an overall spending of on the
    order of less than $20 billion just does not make any sense.
        That being said, I do not believe that the fundamental
    priorities of the Chinese Government have changed. The Chinese
    officers that I talked to clearly feel underfunded. They feel
    that they are not being given the resources that they need, and
    the government leaders, according to the most careful estimates
    that I have, are keeping them underfunded.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral, this goes to both you and General Schwartz. It has
    to do with the Perry recommendations, the two-track policy
    approach that he recommended relative to North Korea. I
    understand that he worked carefully with your command, General
    Schwartz, and I believe also with the Pacific Command before
    those recommendations were made. It is my understanding that
    his recommendations had the full support of both commands. Is
    that correct? I could ask either or both of you.
        Admiral Blair. I can start because I was there, Senator
    Levin, when Secretary Perry was doing his study. The
    fundamental pieces of what he recommended, that we must
    maintain the deterrent capability, that we must consult closely
    with both Japan and Korea, and that we should pursue a policy
    of offering Korea a balanced set of incentives to stop the
    behavior that was dangerous to its neighbors and to us in
    return for relief with their diplomatic and economic isolation
    was certainly something that we supported.
        General Schwartz. I think I add, sir, that the Perry
    process was a comprehensive review, and it went across the
    Agreed Framework of the missile moratorium. Certainly from what
    I hear from the administration right now that same
    comprehensive review is taking place, looking at everything
    that is in place and reviewing what we had done in the past and
    trying to make recommendations to move forward. So, I think it
    is a starting point certainly for all of us. As I testified
    last year, I think the Perry process took us a long way towards
    where we find ourselves on the peninsula at this time in terms
    of negotiation and even the summit that we have had and some of
    the historic things that have taken place in the last year.
        Senator Levin. Did he work carefully with your command
    before making those recommendations?
        General Schwartz. Sir, he did. In fact, I was almost
    flabbergasted at the amount of time that he spent on the
    peninsula talking to us and working with us in developing his
    recommendations.
        Senator Levin. Did the recommendations have the support of
    your command?
        General Schwartz. Yes, sir, they did.
        Senator Levin. On the question of the Framework Agreement,
    it has kept North Korea from producing enough plutonium for
    dozens of nuclear weapons. Are we better off militarily if
    North Korea does not have those additional weapons, does not
    produce that additional plutonium? Does that leave us better
    off?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I do not think there is any doubt
    about it. If they are not producing fissile material, they are
    not then able to produce the nuclear weapons that we are so
    concerned about. So, when we have an agreement like the Agreed
    Framework and it freezes that capability, at least at two
    locations, like it has, that is beneficial. There is no doubt.
        Senator Levin. Just a quick brief answer, if I can, from
    each of you. As the CINCs, can you tell us whether or not you
    are participating in the strategy review that is going on now
    in the Defense Department? Can you just tell us if you have an
    active role now in that strategy review?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I will give you an example for
    Korea. Ambassador Hubbard is there right now with a team that
    is the policy formulation team for this current administration.
    It's on the peninsula for the next 3 or 4 days, briefing some
    draft recommendations, getting feedback from us, as well as the
    Koreans, then moving on to Japan. So, that process is active
    and taking place on the peninsula.
        Senator Levin. Admiral, are you actively involved in that
    review?
        Admiral Blair. Are you talking about the review of North
    Korean policy?
        Senator Levin. No, generally.
        Admiral Blair. The overall strategy review. Yes, sir, I am
    involved in the overall strategy review.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        General Pace. Sir, Secretary Rumsfeld gave me a draft last
    night and asked me to be prepared to discuss it with him
    tonight.
        Senator Levin. Great. Thanks.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Schwartz, you used in your opening statement the
    term ``well-trained, fit-to-fight.'' I have visited you in
    different incarnations that you have had, and one thing I have
    noticed is you are able to get fitness programs squeezed out of
    nothing. Are you satisfied with your quality of life and your
    fitness program there?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I am not, to be honest with you. I
    am looking hard at the fitness programs. I am looking hard at
    the quality of life, and I am trying to articulate some of our
    needs. I have done so in my formal statement, and I am doing so
    as I make visits around to Congress and the Senators. So, I am
    trying to articulate a better effort in that regard.
        We are trained and ready, but when we look at the
    infrastructure and we look at the quality of life aspects of
    Korea, 50 years, 1 year at a time, there is a lot of work that
    needs to be done to get that theater and that peninsula up to
    speed.
        Senator Inhofe. When you talk about when you look up north
    the threat that is up there, I know that right now they are
    reviewing a lot of this new equipment that we are talking
    about, such as the Crusader, but do you see a real need for a
    high rate of fire artillery piece in terms of reducing the
    threat that you are facing?
        General Schwartz. Senator Inhofe, I do. One of the
    imbalances we have on the peninsula is artillery. The
    capability of the North Koreans--they have the world's largest
    stockpile of multiple rocket launchers. They have the world's
    largest artillery force for such a small nation. I am very
    concerned about that capability, and anything we can do in the
    south to offset that to bring that into balance with respect to
    the Crusader or any other artillery systems, I would be in
    favor of.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, because we are right now deficient
    compared to them in the rapid fire realm.
        General Pace, this is not consistent with what we are
    supposed to be asking at this hearing, but because of something
    else that is going on right now and because of the Pace-Fallon
    report that you were involved in, I would just like to ask you
    the question. As far as Vieques is concerned, I made an effort
    to see all of the possible alternative sites and came back
    satisfied that there is none.
        But just recently the two sites in Nevis came up. Since
    they were not on my list to go see, I would like to ask if you
    remember why they were or were not alternatives for this type
    of integrated training.
        General Pace. Sir, Admiral Fallon and I looked at that
    early on in our deliberations for the report we provided. It
    did not make the final cut because it lies in the path of a
    very heavily trafficked civil aircraft area.
        Senator Inhofe. So, neither one of those made your list to
    examine.
        General Pace. That is correct.
        Senator Inhofe. Admiral Blair, when Senator Warner talked
    about how you would assess the threat today relative to 5 years
    ago, you thought for a while and said, about the same. I think
    your answer is probably accurate, but it is very serious. It
    was 5 years ago, as I recall, when China was putting on its
    show there in the Taiwan Straits. I think at that time it was
    to influence the elections. That is when one of the high
    officials said we are not concerned about America intervening
    because they would rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei.
        Then more recently, when they made the statement that war
    with America is inevitable--now, these are things that have
    been happening over the last 5 years.
        Then just a few months ago, when you met privately with
    some of the Chinese generals in Beijing and informed them that
    the United States stands ready to defend Taiwan in the event of
    Chinese attack, according to one official, he dismissed your
    statement as a laughable bluster.
        Now, in light of the buildup that is going on there, we
    talked about the budget. We have not talked about the fact that
    they are buying an unknown number of SU-27s, SU-30s, things
    that are as good or better than those things that we have right
    now. Even though you assess the threat the same today, I did
    not want that answer to imply that, for some reason, it is not
    that serious.
        Admiral Blair. Sir, no, I was answering the question about
    there is a relative threat today.
        I read that same newspaper article, and I do not know what
    the hell they were talking about. When I talk to Chinese
    officials and tell them that we can take care of our
    responsibilities there, they do not dismiss it one bit. In
    fact, quite the contrary.
        Senator Inhofe. In your opening statement, you talked about
    readiness and some of your problems. In terms of readiness, I
    would like to ask both of the Generals to respond in the same
    way. What is the nature of your readiness problems for the RPM
    accounts, quality of life, which I always consider to be a
    readiness issue, not a personnel issue, force structure? What
    are your readiness problems, General Pace and then General
    Schwartz?
        General Pace. Sir, in my area of responsibility, I have
    very few troops actually assigned to me. I get all troops
    deployed to me from the Joint Forces Command under the
    authority of the Secretary. So, I am very fortunate in that the
    troops who come to work in the SOUTHCOM AOR are, in fact, fully
    trained and ready to perform.
        Senator Inhofe. You do not have the problem.
        General Pace. So, I do not have readiness problems. That is
    right, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. General Schwartz.
        General Schwartz. I think I would comment on it just to
    reinforce a couple that I started my opening statement with.
    Some of the readiness concerns that I have, of course, are in
    the C\4\I area, command and control and the protection of our
    command and control facilities in terms of hardening and in
    terms of the fiber optics we need. I would say that was number
    one.
        The upgrading of our battle simulation center so we can
    have the robust exercises that we have, and the sustainment of
    dollars to conduct those exercises is very important to us.
        The force protection effort, as I indicated, is
    tremendously important because we found ourselves all over that
    peninsula and we find ourselves in a situation now where we
    have not been able to take the force protection measures that
    we are confident that we need to take for the future. So, we
    will need some dollars to fix some of that.
        Then, of course, I would just maybe end with this, the RPM,
    the real property maintenance account. We have a tremendous
    need for dollars to fix some of the things that are 30- and 40-
    years-old that we just have not been able to fix. Those dollars
    are in the millions, and we just need to get our hands around
    that and some money to fix some of the things.
        Senator Inhofe. By the very nature of an RPM account, that
    is something that should be done immediately. Yet, you do have
    a great need there, just as the other CINCs do that we have
    talked to. That seems to be consistent.
        General Schwartz. Yes, sir. There is no doubt.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        General Pace. Senator, if I may, I answered your question
    based on the troops and equipment that deploys to my AOR. To be
    more complete in my answer, I can give you a very thorough
    answer about ISR in the closed session.
        Senator Inhofe. Very good. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Schwartz, I noticed that you are originally from
    St. Paul, Minnesota, and your distinguished service greatly
    enhances your native State. So, thank you.
        General Schwartz. Thank you very much.
        Senator Dayton. You spoke briefly and you mentioned that
    you had discussed this at greater length with the Chairman
    about the treatment of our service men and women who are
    deployed, as well as their families who are left behind. I had
    the very sad duty last week to go to Fort Bragg to attend the
    memorial service for an Army Ranger, Sergeant Troy Westburg
    from Minnesota, who was deployed to Kuwait, his first overseas
    tour of service, and 1 month later was returned home to his
    family with the loss of his life. So, it underscored to me the
    sacrifices that these men and women are prepared to make and
    are sometimes called upon to make are very real. For their
    families, the separation over that period of time at best is a
    hardship and at worst is a lifelong tragedy.
        So, I wonder if you could elaborate on your brief comment
    about how the rations and other ways in which these families
    are subjected to what you would consider unfair, undue hardship
    financially and otherwise and what can we do, what should we do
    to remediate that?
        General Schwartz. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate
    the opportunity to comment on that.
        The separation is tough. It is long. It is hard. When you
    look into the eyes of these great people, you can see the hurt.
    There is a hurt there. They serve and they are willing to do
    that. That is what they signed up for. There is tremendous
    opportunity on that peninsula for them to train and do the
    things that they love. So, there is a hurt but there is also a
    love of what they do.
        But if you just look on the hurt side and the quality of
    life side, we need to improve the barracks situation over
    there. We need to improve the quality of life over there in
    terms of the facilities that we have, dining facilities and
    gyms. So, we need to pick up on that.
        But when you get into the individual soldier, sailor,
    airman, and marine, I think there are a couple of things we can
    do. We can look at this whole issue of separate rations, which
    I commented on, because when they deploy to that theater and
    they leave that family and that spouse behind, that is a big
    hurt. That is about a $4,000 a year hurt that she or he has
    when they are deployed away from home for a year. So, we need
    to take a hard look at that and see if we are doing the right
    thing there and see if we can provide the means to give it back
    to them, or at least not take it away.
        The second thing is--and I have talked several times about
    this--we ought to look seriously about a tax exclusion for
    these folks because when they are deployed in other areas of
    the world, when they are deployed to the Balkans, when they are
    deployed to Kuwait, we give these great soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines a tax exclusion. It is a tremendous boost
    in morale. It is a tremendous vote of confidence for their
    sacrifice when they are deployed away from home. It helps that
    family back home. It helps that soldier say, this is not
    hurting me as much when I am gone for a year, and it kind of
    covers some of those hidden expenses.
        I have been doing some surveys about those hidden expenses,
    and they are anywhere from $4,000 to $6,000 out of each
    servicemember's pocket per year. Plus the separate rations
    hurt. When you add that all together, you are starting to talk
    about $10,000 to $12,000 that a servicemember has to pay to
    serve away from home. So, there are some things that we need to
    do and take a hard look at to try to help them when they are
    repetitively going back to a theater like Korea.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, sir.
        If you have any specifics on that, being a freshman member
    of this committee, you can help educate me and also additional
    remedies. I would appreciate if you would send those to me.
    Thank you.
        General Schwartz. Thank you, sir. We will do. I will follow
    up on that.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you very much.
        General Pace, you mentioned Colombia. We have had a couple
    of briefings on that, including a meeting with the Defense
    Minister of Colombia. Some of the comments that he made struck
    a note in my memory bank. He referred to the light at the end
    of the tunnel in the situation there. Your testimony, sir,
    refers to the increased paramilitary activity, kidnappings, and
    the like which seems, given our involvement in what some might
    view as the domestic affairs of that country, would be almost a
    natural follow-on to what we are doing.
        I understand that these policies are made by civilian
    authorities, but from a military standpoint, how do you view
    realistically the situation there?
        As a corollary to that, I appreciate that in your prepared
    remarks you referred to this illicit drug industry as a growing
    threat to the United States homeland which corroborates in my
    own view that one of, if not the greatest, threat to our
    national security is this flow of illicit drugs into this
    country and the devastating effect it is having on our cities,
    our youth, and the like.
        What, if anything, from a military standpoint could we do
    to increase the interdiction of these narcotics coming into
    this country to make the transport of them something that would
    be seen as so life-threatening that we would have a greater
    deterrence on those who are trafficking, it seems often without
    impunity?
        General Pace. Senator, thank you very much. I will try to
    give you the Reader's Digest version of the answer to both
    those very important questions.
        With regard to the situation, sir, President Pastrana's
    Plan Colombia, which we are supporting through the bipartisan
    support of our Congress, has 10 very distinct parts, one of
    which is the military piece. The other nine are such things as
    revamping the judiciary, improving the schools, improving the
    health, building roads, alternative crop development, and all
    the kinds of things that will actually be the make or break
    part of the plan and will determine whether or not it is
    successful in the future. But to get there, the military and
    police are providing a secure environment, which allows the
    other nine parts to take place and is very important.
        Today, the combined capabilities of the Colombian military
    and Colombian police is not sufficient to provide security for
    the entire country. They can, in fact, do set-piece battles and
    win. They can go to a particular part of the country, take
    control of it, and sustain that control, but they are not large
    enough to be able to provide security for the entire country.
        As a result of that, the military support that we are
    providing in the form of assisting them to train their
    counternarcotics brigade and assisting them through our State
    Department to obtain helicopters and to marry up the
    helicopters with the counternarcotics brigade is, in fact,
    helping them very much.
        The plan by President Pastrana to increase the size of his
    military by 10,000 a year, each year for the next several years
    will, in fact, go a long way toward allowing him to have the
    size force and the professional size force to be able to
    provide the security he needs.
        So, from my perspective, the plan as laid out, if
    aggressively pursued, can in fact reach the goal for which it
    is intended, sir.
        To your second question, sir, as far as threat to the
    homeland, sir, I consider drugs to be a weapon of mass
    destruction. It is a threat to our homeland. If I had $1 to
    spend, I would spend it on demand reduction. The second place I
    would spend money is in the source zone we are helping right
    now, and the third place I would spend money would be in the
    transit zone. The reason I put it in that priority is that is
    where I believe our efforts will provide the most success in
    the long term. It is very difficult, once it is produced and it
    begins its transit to the United States, through the eastern
    Pacific, up through Central America, through the Caribbean, up
    through the islands, to chase those arrows once they have left
    the bow to try to catch them in flight or determine where they
    are going to land.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        We will now hear from Senator Smith.
        Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Blair, I was reading excerpts of some remarks you
    made recently in a speech regarding the concept of security
    communities. Some of what you say makes sense. A couple of
    things concern me. Let me just briefly pull out a couple of
    lines and then ask for your comment.
        The prevalent way of thinking about international relations
    throughout Asia and the Pacific is in balance of power.
        You go on to say that is the world of Bismarck in 19th
    century Europe. An alternative approach, offering the prospect
    of a brighter future in Asia and better suited to the concerns
    of the 21st century is one in which states cooperate in areas
    of shared interest, such as peaceful development, diplomacy
    promotion, and the use of negotiation. In essence, it would be
    preferable to promote security communities as opposed to the
    old balance of power.
        Then you go on to say the problem is not force structure.
    It's zero sum balance of power mindsets and ambiguous
    intentions, fueled by ethnic and religious zeal, et cetera.
        Then you say here part of the answer lies in developing
    regional, multilateral approaches to common security
    challenges. The most effective method is to develop policy
    coordination, including combined military cooperation, on a
    particular regional security military issue or a series of
    related security issues.
        I understand where you are coming from in terms of trying
    to relax tensions and work together in a community sense, a
    security community. But combined military cooperation, if you
    were to move that to a region such as the Taiwan Straits and
    try to come up with a common security community, how would you
    do that in such a region as that?
        My understanding of the military cooperation with China is
    it is a one-way street. We give and they give nothing. So, I am
    very concerned about that particular statement as to how it may
    apply to China in your region of AOR.
        Admiral Blair. Sir, I think in our relationship with China,
    we have areas in which our interests coincide and we have areas
    in which we are at odds. Clearly, Taiwan is the area where we
    are most at odds because they reserve the right to use force
    and we reserve the right for them not to use force.
        On the other hand, there are many areas in which the
    interests of the two countries run parallel: resolving the
    Korean Peninsula situation peacefully without conflict,
    ensuring that southeast Asia is a region which is secure and
    developing peacefully, the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf,
    on which China is becoming dependent, and many other allies of
    the United States of that region are dependent on,
    transnational issues such as narcotics. General Pace was
    talking about narcotics coming up from Colombia. There is also
    a flow from the Golden Triangle through southern China out to
    all countries in the region. It is affecting China. It is
    affecting other countries in southeast Asia. Part of it comes
    to the United States. Terrorism, which is a threat to both of
    our countries.
        In addition, virtually all of those areas that I have
    talked about are areas that are not just in China's and the
    United States' interest. They are in the interest of the other
    countries in the region. North Korea is the interest of all of
    the countries in the region. Transnational issues are in the
    interest of all. Southeast Asian stability is in the interest
    of all.
        So, I believe that in those areas, the United States,
    China, and other countries can cooperate, including military
    cooperation on things like peacekeeping, disaster relief,
    basically the non-warfighting military cooperative areas. I
    think we can develop areas in which we can productively work
    together and stand a better chance of isolating the holdovers
    from past conflicts, such as the Korean standoff, such as the
    Taiwan Strait standoff. So, I think it offers a way for China
    to develop constructively and for the United States and other
    countries to make that same approach.
        Senator Smith. Did you make any recommendations to
    Secretary Rumsfeld on Taiwan arms sales?
        Admiral Blair. I did.
        Senator Smith. I assume you choose to keep those private at
    this point.
        Admiral Blair. I would rather let the decision process play
    out, sir.
        Senator Smith. All right.
        Again, in the Taiwan Straits and looking at any possibility
    of what you call a security community, we have reports, at
    least from Taiwanese newspapers, about the Chinese using the
    Russian-made Sunburn missile in the region. The most
    significant purpose of that missile is to take out an aircraft
    carrier, to ``kill it'' is the exact term that they use. That
    sends to me a pretty clear message from the Chinese that they
    are intent on countering the U.S. Seventh Fleet's presence in
    the Taiwan Straits. With all due respect, I do not see how
    there can be shared or combined military cooperation with a
    country that is basically threatening our entire Seventh Fleet
    carrier force out there.
        What are we doing now to be able to protect our forces from
    any possible attack from a Sunburn missile, especially the
    several thousand men and women who would be on an aircraft
    carrier? What countermeasures are we taking to that missile
    being introduced into the region?
        Admiral Blair. The Seventh Fleet, in conjunction with the
    other forces that I can bring to bear, can ensure that China
    would not be successful in aggression against Taiwan should the
    decision be made to commit our forces. So, when you look at the
    whole picture, China right now cannot be successful in
    aggressing and, therefore, coercing Taiwan. That is the job
    that we have.
        As I mentioned, I think we should not have Taiwan define
    the entire U.S.-Chinese relationship. It should not define the
    entire military relationship. It certainly should not define
    the entire national relationship, which includes economic
    cooperation and all of the changes that information technology
    and generational change are bringing to China. So, I do not
    think that a military confrontation between the United States
    and China is inevitable, and I believe that we should pursue
    policies which makes it less likely rather than more likely.
        Senator Smith. My time is expired. If you want to say it in
    closed session fine, but I just want to ask, are our carriers
    in the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits threatened by
    Sunburn missiles?
        Admiral Blair. The carriers in the Taiwan Strait can carry
    out their jobs, Sunburn missiles or no Sunburn missiles.
        Senator Smith. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
        General Pace, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Ann
    Patterson, has indicated that spray planes in Colombia were
    shot at 122 times last year and American civilians are involved
    in flying those planes. Her assessment is that Americans are at
    risk in Colombia and that we will have Americans shot down.
        What is your view about the risk that Americans have in
    Colombia? Is it inevitable that Americans will be shot down?
        General Pace. Senator, thank you.
        The American civilians who are flying those aircraft are
    hired by our State Department to fly those airplanes. They are
    U.S. contractors who are flying the airplanes. They have, in
    fact, had at least 128 hits in the last year on these small
    airplanes that they fly. They continue to fly into the more
    difficult areas to reach. Where they have been spraying so far
    is in the flat areas. As they get into the more mountainous
    terrain where the folks on the ground can shoot at them not
    only straight up but from the sides, the environment in which
    they fly becomes more and more dangerous. It would not surprise
    me that over time that one of those aircraft will be shot down.
        Senator Kennedy. Well, if that happens, what are the
    procedures for search and rescue operations? Who is responsible
    for the Americans' safety?
        General Pace. Sir, those aircraft are flying in support of
    and as part of the Colombian National Police effort. The
    Colombian National Police have the search and rescue
    responsibilities. The helicopters that they use currently are
    manned both by Colombian pilots and by U.S. civilian contract
    pilots.
        Senator Kennedy. So, our military would not be involved in
    any of the search and rescues?
        General Pace. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Kennedy. Are the American civilians who are
    involved in flying these spray planes armed?
        General Pace. I do not know, sir. I can find out.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.] I defer to DOS for further information on this policy.

        Senator Kennedy. On the issue of collusion between the
    Colombian Armed Forces and the paramilitary, it is widely
    recognized that collusion between the two groups exists at the
    grassroots level, notwithstanding the efforts at the higher
    levels to address the problem. The State Department Human
    Rights Report states that in 2000 members of the security
    forces collaborated with the paramilitary groups that committed
    abuses, in some cases allowing such groups to pass through
    roadblocks, sharing information, or providing them with
    supplies and ammunition.
        Who is the highest ranking U.S. military person who has
    conveyed concerns about the links to the Colombian Government?
        General Pace. Sir, the highest ranking U.S. military
    officer who has conveyed that concern is me.
        Senator Kennedy. I know you made a brief reference earlier
    to Senator Levin. I know you have been there seven times, and I
    appreciate your earlier responses. Could you give us some idea
    about what the response was and what your own reaction is to
    it?
        General Pace. Sir, thank you.
        Sir, the response from President Pastrana, who broached the
    subject with me, Minister Ramirez, who broached the subject
    with me, General Tapias and all of his service commanders, who
    briefed me on it first, have all been of great concern. They
    recognize that they do have, at the lower levels, collusion
    with what we call the paramilitaries. They are determined to
    stamp out that collusion.
        As one indicator, I have been invited next week by General
    Tapias to go to sit down and debrief his senior staff, his
    service chiefs, and their senior staffs on my testimony in
    front of these committees so that they can better understand
    what issues are of importance to the United States Congress.
    Obviously, two of the issues I will talk to them about and
    debrief them on are human rights and collusion. So, they are
    very dedicated, sir, from the president on down, to stamping
    this out, just as in the past they focused on human rights
    violations and their record has improved dramatically.
        Senator Kennedy. Let me ask you this before I come to the
    human rights. Have the American military personnel on the
    ground in Colombia seen evidence of this collusion?
        General Pace. No, sir. We operate solely inside the
    training bases. We do not go out on operations, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Kennedy, could I interrupt just a
    minute? I have to absent myself to go up and introduce the new
    nominee for the General Counsel of the Department of State, a
    former Deputy Secretary of Defense. So, I will be back in just
    a few minutes.
        If you, Senator Sessions, would take the chair.
        Senator Kennedy. On the issues of human rights, I have
    appreciated the percentages and the population. As one who was
    around during the pacification in Vietnam, I remember we used
    to have a checklist too. A hamlet was pacified if they had a
    well. They had 10 different things. If they had a well, they
    had a school, they had employment, they had housing, they had
    the other, it was pacified. So, it took us a long time to
    realize that we ought to look at what has happened in the
    inflation of rice that is coming into that hamlet in terms of
    understanding of what was really happening in that area or
    region. We became much more sophisticated in terms of the
    evaluation. I am sure you will want to do that as well.
        When we talk about the human rights, I am sure you will
    want to know the kinds of charges that were made, what level of
    human rights charges were made, what has been dropped, or what
    has not been dropped on this. They have gone from the
    percentages. I would like to know who is doing the polls. We
    have all been through polls. I am sure you have your own
    intelligence people who are looking at it. I am sure you are
    appropriately skeptical, as you would be, in trying to make any
    judgment on any policy sort of question.
        My time is up. If you have any reaction to that.
        But then if I could, Mr. Chairman, ask if SOUTHCOM is
    preparing a report on Colombia's paramilitary groups and their
    links with drug traffickers. I would like to see if SOUTHCOM
    could do one for the committee, if that is possible. I suppose
    that request order for the committee ought to come through the
    chair, but I will ask that and I will talk to the chair and the
    ranking member.
        General Pace. Sir, we can do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Colombia has the most complex human rights environment in the Area
    of Responsibility (AOR) due to the symbiotic relationship between drug
    trafficking organizations (DTOs) and several illegal armed groups. We
    continue to see allegations that members of the Colombian Military
    (COLMIL) and National Police (CNP) maintain covert links to illegal
    self-defense forces, despite strong government and legal pressure to
    discontinue these ties.
        Illegal self-defense forces and insurgent groups are Colombia's
    worst human rights offenders. [Deleted.]
        In a concerted effort to improve its human rights record, the
    Colombian government has implemented the most aggressive human rights
    program in the hemisphere. Along these lines, the government and, in
    particular, the COLMIL, have made significant progress. During the
    1980s and early 1990s, about 60 percent of all reported accusations of
    human rights abuses were made against the security forces. In 2000, the
    number of accusations attributed to the security forces amounted to
    less than 2 percent, marking the fifth consecutive year in which
    accusations of human rights violations against the military have
    declined. This progress is a direct result of the effort made by
    Colombia's military leadership to change the culture of their
    institution. Specific measures have included educating their military
    on human rights standards, establishing a staff judge advocate corps,
    developing rules of engagement for the troops, and increasing the
    military's cooperation with civilian investigative and prosecutorial
    agencies.
        Civilian and military investigators pursue officers and soldiers
    accused of collusion. The military penal code that went into effect in
    August 2000 took human rights investigations out of the hands of field
    commanders and created a cadre of military prosecutors. The Colombian
    government has given civilian courts jurisdiction in cases not
    involving official duties. Punishments for security force members found
    guilty of collusion with illegal self-defense forces have ranged from
    administrative discipline to prison sentences.
        The COLMIL has declared a ``no tolerance'' policy against collusion
    by military members with self-defense forces and has successfully
    sought to condemn members linked to these groups and human rights
    violations. Reliable evidence on collaboration is limited, making it
    difficult to assess confidently the degree of collaboration within the
    COLMIL.
        USSOUTHCOM uses all source information to poll human rights abuses
    in Colombia: [Deleted.]

        General Pace. My human rights information, sir, came from
    Ambassador Patterson and her country team. I am parroting
    information I received in country from the U.S. embassy.
        Senator Kennedy. I would just say that in your own
    evaluation to know the types of charges, what the allegations
    are, and how they are being dismissed, what officers, if they
    are officers, or noncommissioned people, to give a complete
    picture I think is going to be called for as well.
        But I thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman, and I thank the Senator from Louisiana.
        Senator Sessions [presiding]. General Schwartz, I think it
    is my time to ask a few questions.
        With regard to Korea and the assignment of your fine
    soldiers there and the detriment and losses they incur in terms
    of income and their families--Senator Dayton I think mentioned
    it--where are we in getting that fixed? I think you are exactly
    correct. It is something that in terms of cost is not that
    great, but it strikes me as a real unfairness. It has to be a
    sore spot for the soldiers. Can we fix it and how close are we
    to getting it fixed?
        General Schwartz. Sir, let me say this. We are doing some
    of the things that we can do on our own. For example, we have
    just won a victory on the peninsula in terms of Korea being
    defined as a hardship tour. So, that allowed our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines to get up to as much as $150 a
    month this year that they did not get last year. That is a
    victory. They are tremendously excited about that. As I travel
    around the peninsula, all of them say to me, General Schwartz,
    thank you. It makes a difference. So, we have had some success
    ourselves.
        We are talking to the service chiefs about this separate
    ration issue and trying to articulate exactly the number of
    dollars that it would take for each service chief to chip in
    and try to pay that bill because it will have to come from the
    service chiefs. I am working that on my side.
        As far as the tax exclusion piece of it, I have seen many
    Members of the Senate and House and we are talking about that
    and the positive impact that it would have on the service
    people.
        So, I would tell you that we are moving, but we still have
    some work to do in terms of making it a reality.
        Senator Sessions. I hope you will keep us informed on it. I
    think this Congress would be ready to help you on that. It does
    strike me to be a significant matter.
        With regard to force protection in the 95 stations--you
    mean locations that you have troops in Korea--can those be
    consolidated? In the long run, would that be a cost-saver for
    our deployment in Korea?
        General Schwartz. Sir, thank you very much.
        Yes, they can be consolidated. I have started an initiative
    which I call the Land Partnership Plan, which we introduced
    this year for the first time. To give you an example of the
    magnitude of that effort, of the 95 I spoke of, 46 are major
    installations. We are going to reduce that, according to the
    plan, to 25 major installations. That is significant.
        We are cooperating with the South Koreans right now in that
    effort. We are moving it along, and I think it is going to be
    very successful. It is a 10-year plan. We have the ball
    rolling, and it looks like it is going to be a very successful
    one. We will save money in that effort, and we will improve the
    quality of life, and we will enhance the force protection
    effort for our servicemembers serving overseas. So, there are
    many benefits to that partnership plan that I am excited about.
        Senator Sessions. I think you are on the right track with
    that. I think that is what the President and the American
    people want to see. We want to see enhanced ability to do our
    job, and we like to do it in a way that saves money rather than
    costs us money. If in the short term it costs us some money, we
    are willing to put it up if in the long term we will receive a
    benefit.
        I do hope that we can reduce the number of personnel there.
    Every time we can, we can afford to do more for the ones who
    are there, you have fewer people away from their family, and it
    is less transfer of American wealth, it seems to me.
        So, I think you are on the right track and I hope that we
    can continue along that way. I believe you will have support
    here.
        General Schwartz. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sessions. General Pace, have you had prior
    experience with the drug effort prior to this assignment?
        General Pace. Sir, in a minimal way in my previous
    assignment as the Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces in the
    Atlantic. We had some detachments that deployed to Peru and to
    Colombia to assist with riverine training. We also had some
    detachments that deployed to the southern border of the United
    States to assist law enforcement agencies there in detecting
    and monitoring traffic coming across the border. But that is
    the extent of my involvement.
        Senator Sessions. As a Federal prosecutor, beginning in
    1975, on the Gulf Coast dealing oftentimes with smuggling cases
    from Colombia which was the main source country for cocaine--
    and remains so--I have seen and wrestled with that. I have seen
    a lot of plans that are going to fix the problem. Through
    interdiction we are going to stop it, or we are going to do it
    through focusing on the source countries.
        You correctly stated in your priority that demand reduction
    is number one. Demand reduction is a combination, in my view,
    of law enforcement and education and drug treatment and drug
    testing and things of that nature that do work in the United
    States.
        But I will just tell you--and I think I have expressed this
    to you before--we are not going to solve our drug problem by
    spraying the coca plant in Colombia. At one of our meetings in
    the Drug Caucus recently, I asked the DEA Director what his
    budget was. It was $1.3 billion, the same amount of money we
    are spending on Plan Colombia. Trust me, we will get a lot more
    anti-drug benefit from doubling DEA than we will for this Plan
    Colombia.
        Now, I supported Plan Colombia and expressed real concern
    about our full understanding of what it is about.
        So, I would like to ask you, again from what you understand
    the policy of the United States with regard to Colombia and
    Plan Colombia, if you would discuss with me what our goals are.
    How much of it is focused on drugs and how much of it is
    focused on helping Colombia reestablish a democratic society
    throughout its nation?
        General Pace. Sir, concerning the $1.3 billion supplemental
    last year, DOD has the responsibility to oversee about $250
    million. Of that $250 million, about $110 million to $120
    million is going to improving the capabilities of the three
    forward operating locations in Ecuador and El Salvador and in
    Aruba-Curacao so our airframes can fly so that they can do the
    detection and monitoring mission. The next large chunk of money
    is about $55 million that has gone into the support for the
    Colombian military, to assist them in improving their
    intelligence capability. The next level down then is the amount
    of money we are spending to train up a 3,000-man brigade, to
    assist them with some of the logistics and their maintenance,
    to assist in building the helicopter pads for the three groups
    of helicopters that are being bought by our State Department
    and sent down there. So, from the U.S. military standpoint,
    sir, the vast majority of the money is going into cement and
    into intelligence.
        Senator Sessions. I am just concerned. I will just restate
    my concern with this whole matter. Colombia is the oldest
    democracy in this hemisphere, I believe, except the United
    States, and it is 38 million people. They have been allies and
    friends of ours. They are a significant trading partner of the
    United States, and their nation is in jeopardy. Some of their
    best people are fleeing the country, are they not, a real
    emigration because of the terrorism and the attacks and the
    marxist guerillas taking over substantial portions of their
    country. We suggest the only way we can help them is to help
    them fight drugs.
        I think we need to be much more realistic about that. It
    would be a tragedy if we stand here and allow them to fall or
    be undermined or have the economy destroyed as a result of this
    guerilla effort.
        General Pace. Sir, I agree with you that this is a fight
    for democracy in Colombia to support that democracy. It is not
    an expectation of being able to wipe out coca. If you did wipe
    out every coca plant in the world, some other drug would be fed
    to the demand side, and I stand by and agree with you that the
    demand reduction is the most important.
        I have done a disservice to the State Department because I
    cannot speak to their numbers, but I do know that inside of
    their $1 billion plus of the $1.3 billion, that there are
    alternative crop developments and support for the other nine
    parts of Plan Colombia other than military that are the key to
    success.
        But I agree with you, sir, this is supporting our friends
    and neighbors, supporting a fellow democracy, while we also
    assist ourselves.
        Senator Sessions. We have a huge demilitarized zone for the
    FARC that allows them to operate without any attack, under
    complete protection. Now--I believe yesterday--the United
    States Ambassador to Colombia, Ann Patterson, has endorsed a
    proposal to grant Colombia's second largest rebel group a
    demilitarized enclave, another one, a second one, a 5,000-
    member National Liberation Army, another marxist group. Do you
    think that makes good sense militarily?
        General Pace. Sir, if I may give you an answer to that
    question in detail in closed session, I would appreciate the
    opportunity to do that.
        Senator Sessions. It does not make good sense to me. I hope
    that somehow we can reach a stage that we can help Colombia.
    They are a good nation and important to this hemisphere.
        Admiral Blair. Senator Sessions, may I just add one point
    to your discussion with General Schwartz earlier? I think it is
    important to note that both Korea and Japan provide support to
    the U.S. forces there to the tune of $5 billion, $4.5 billion
    from Japan in direct contributions, half a billion in direct
    contributions from Korea. So, it is a shared responsibility
    over there.
        Senator Sessions. We certainly do not want to destabilize
    that area and not be too rapid, but to the extent to which we
    could reduce our numbers, make life better for the ones who are
    there, it would be helpful.
        Senator Landrieu.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
        Generals, thank you for your service and for your testimony
    this morning. Let me just follow up because Senator Sessions
    and I have similar views about our operations and our focus on
    Latin America and Central America. Representing Alabama and
    Louisiana, they are neighbors right to our south, and so our
    attention is drawn quite naturally, if you will, to that
    particular area of the world. His expertise in this area I have
    come to respect in terms of his prosecutorial skills.
        I happen to agree that our Plan Colombia has to be much
    more comprehensive. It is not just a war against drugs, but it
    is a war for democracy, to help strengthen those nations. It is
    most certainly in our interest, the entire country, and
    particularly in the southern part of our Nation, because of the
    close proximity of Colombia.
        So, let me just ask you to follow up, General Pace. I know
    that you are only responsible for one part of this plan, but
    could you state one or two constructive either criticisms or
    changes you would make based on what you have seen in the last
    year or 2 that we could focus our attention on in terms of
    reaching the goals of Plan Colombia, anything that you could
    direct us? I know you have said some of that in your testimony
    already, but one or two things that you could suggest to us
    that we could do to perhaps reach the goals as outlined in Plan
    Colombia.
        General Pace. Yes, ma'am, thank you. Senator, one of the
    problems about Plan Colombia is that there will be spill-over.
    Just as when Peru and Bolivia in recent years were very
    aggressive in attacking their problem, as they were aggressive,
    the businessmen, who are interested in making money, moved from
    the point of resistance, Peru and Bolivia, into the point of
    least resistance, Colombia, and set up shop there. So, as
    Colombia becomes aggressive in their implementation of their
    plan, the businessmen will look for another place to set up
    shop.
        I think what we need to do collectively is to encourage the
    regional nations, the bordering nations especially with
    Colombia, to discuss with each other how best to handle the
    overall impact so that we do not continually have things
    seeping over borders. Then once they have had a chance to come
    up with regional solutions to regional problems, then we can be
    their partner in assisting them to attain those goals together.
        Senator Landrieu. So, a more regional approach, which is I
    think the way we originally started with Plan Colombia, but
    perhaps as it went through the process, it got somewhat watered
    down. So, we should, in your opinion, focus on strengthening
    the regional aspects of that plan so that we could increase our
    chances of success.
        General Pace. Last year there was about $180 million
    allocated inside the $1.3 billion that went to the region.
    About $110 million of that went to Bolivia. About $32 million
    was earmarked for Peru, and the rest went to about five or six
    other nations. As I said, I think now we are in a position, now
    that we have seen the beginning impacts of Plan Colombia, to
    have a much more robust dialogue with the other nations to
    determine how to have a better regional approach.
        Senator Landrieu. On another subject, each year through the
    budget cycle, we go through an annual debate over the needs of
    our CINCs and their battlefields and their theaters for
    surveillance. We talk a great deal about new technologies
    developing in that area. But currently we are bolstered by our
    JSTAR technology. General Pace and Admiral Blair, do you have
    enough access to these platforms? Are you having any difficulty
    with your surveillance? Are you getting adequate coverage in
    this regard?
        General Pace. Senator, thank you.
        I do not know that you will ever get a commander to sit in
    front of you and say he or she has all the intelligence they
    need. We always want more.
        I do believe that my requirements receive a fair hearing
    inside the decision process here in Washington and that I am
    allocated a fair share of those intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets that are available. I would like to give
    you a more complete answer in closed session, to be more
    definitive about the types of problems I have.
        The short answer is I do not have enough ISR, but it is not
    because of the system not being adequate or fair with me. It is
    just that across the board, we do not have enough national
    capability. Therefore, when you spread out what I need and what
    Tommy needs and what Denny needs and what the other CINCs need,
    there is just not enough to go around.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, and I will look forward to
    that closed session.
        Admiral Blair.
        Admiral Blair. The primary airborne assets that are used to
    keep track of what is going on in the theater are virtually all
    in the so-called high demand/low density category, which means
    that the Joint Staff and then the Secretary of Defense have to
    make priority decisions.
        We find in the Pacific theater that when there are no
    crises in other parts of the world, we can keep a pretty good
    eye on what we have to keep it on. When something is going on
    in other parts of the world that draws assets, an air war in
    Kosovo or heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf, then we are
    cut a little short with those assets that support General
    Schwartz and the rest of the theater that I keep an eye on.
        We have been able to take partial measures to compensate,
    but we are squeezed a little tight. We made this input
    internally. We need additional Rivet Joints, EP-3s, and similar
    systems.
        Senator Landrieu. I would like to help you with that.
        Just one final comment, Mr. Chairman, if I could. General
    Schwartz, I look forward to helping you in your efforts to
    build up our bases in Korea. I have tried to focus my time on
    this committee on the areas of retaining in terms of retention.
    As my good friend from Georgia says, we may recruit a soldier,
    but we retain a family. When you are talking about retention,
    the issues that you have so beautifully expressed this morning
    I think are very important and sometimes overlooked. The
    importance of housing and compensation and steady paychecks and
    predictable deployments I think have a great deal to do with
    the strengthening of our force. They are not soft issues.
    Sometimes we want to think there are hard issues and soft
    issues, but they are all important issues and they are all
    about building our force. So, I look forward to working with
    you.
        My time is up at this point, but I would like some specific
    numbers from you about what we are talking about in terms of
    investments because this Senator thinks that we should take a
    part of this surplus and invest in our military now. We do not
    have to wait for the strategic plan in many instances to
    understand what our housing and our maintenance and operation
    budgets and our MILCON budgets need. So, I am hoping that this
    committee can be forceful in getting some of that investment
    made sooner as opposed to later.
        General Schwartz. Thank you very much, ma'am, and I will
    make it a point to come by and brief you.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Our committee is fortunate to have two distinguished
    Senators, both with the name of Nelson, and our records show
    you arrived simultaneously this morning. [Laughter.]
        If you gentlemen would sort out between yourselves, based
    on seniority or any other formula you wish, as to who goes
    first and who goes second.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I am senior but I will defer.
        Chairman Warner. That is very gracious. I hope your
    colleague remembers that in the future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you, Senator Nelson.
        We appreciate very much the three of you being here today.
    It is good to see you and have the opportunity to visit with
    you. It is good to see General Pace who accompanied us and so
    very ably hosted us on our trip recently to Colombia. I
    appreciate very much every courtesy, as well as the opportunity
    to learn more about what is happening in that part of the
    world.
        One of the subjects that is getting more attention today
    than it has maybe rather recently, but has in the past flared
    up and raised questions, is the relationship between the
    Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, the
    tensions that continue to exist and are exerted. Admiral Blair,
    you may have already gotten into this before we arrived. I
    apologize for being late. I was on the Senate floor for the
    campaign finance reform matter, so I was delayed getting over
    here.
        But I guess the question I would have, having visited both
    Taiwan and mainland China, is what the threat level is to
    Taiwan from China at the present time, and what impact would
    the sale of certain military craft that is being sought by the
    Taiwanese have on U.S.-China relations?
        Admiral Blair. Sir, I am senior but I will yield to General
    Pace on that. [Laughter.]
        The current military state across the Strait, Senator, is
    that China is capable of causing damage to Taiwan. It is not
    capable of taking and holding Taiwan.
        The requests which Taiwan has made include strengthening of
    their fleet air defense. It is largely an antiquated system and
    the types of surface combatants they have asked for would allow
    their surface combatants to take part in both defense of naval
    forces and in a joint defense of other areas within Taiwan.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If we were to assist Taiwan by the sale
    of additional military hardware to them, what impact do you
    think that might have on U.S.-China relations?
        Admiral Blair. It really depends on the nature of the
    equipment that is sold to them. Those decisions are in process
    now. My input to it is based on what is necessary to maintain
    sufficient defense, which is the standard that we use. That
    recommendation is rolled in with the sort of considerations
    that you mentioned and then the President will be making a
    decision. So, that is in process right now and I have made my
    input.
        Senator Ben Nelson. The effort, though, would be to try to
    maintain some level of parity so that Taiwan may be able to
    maintain a position that would be sufficient to defend against
    whatever Chinese incursion might be threatened. Is that fair to
    say?
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. I would say ``balance'' is
    probably a better word than ``parity'' since you are talking
    about one side on the defense and the other side that would be
    committing the aggression. But our policy is that the defense
    will be sufficient; that is, that aggression will not succeed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. We would not want it to get out of
    balance if we can do something to help maintain that balance.
    Is that fair too?
        Admiral Blair. That is what our policy is.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That is our commitment.
        Admiral Blair. Right.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. I will defer to the Senator
    with more seniority. [Laughter.]
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Very well. The Senator from Florida,
    Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me follow up on that, Admiral. You refer to your input.
    What is your advice to the White House with regard to the sale
    of the more sophisticated systems to Taiwan?
        Chairman Warner. Senator, we intend to go into a closed
    session. I am going to propound a question much along those
    lines in a moment.
        The way I would suggest we phrase it is not the precise
    advice that this distinguished officer has given the President,
    which I think is of a confidential nature, but what are the
    various pros and cons of elements of the issues before the
    President and indeed before Congress, which does have a role in
    this. May I suggest we pursue that course in open session?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, but we are going
    to have to vote on that issue.
        Chairman Warner. That is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to be the best prepared that I
    possibly can and would like to have the advice of knowing the
    recommendations from the CINCs as we evaluate all the
    information and have to make our decision.
        Chairman Warner. Admiral, you may wish to pursue this.
        I am not going to take your time. I will yield back. But I
    am going to talk about the ship requests and the pros and cons
    of the Kidd class of cruisers versus a follow-on of the current
    production line. What are the pros and cons of those two? That
    is the way I am going to proceed with it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Chairman like to proceed and
    I will just defer to the Chairman?
        Chairman Warner. No. I am going to yield to you to go
    ahead. I was just giving you an example of ships as one area
    which I am going to probe.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What I want is the best of advice from
    many different quarters. So, do you want to proceed in
    executive session on this issue?
        Chairman Warner. No. I am going to proceed in open session.
    I gave you an example of how I am going to address the question
    as it relates to the different views as to two types of
    cruisers which they are looking at. So, you proceed with your
    line of questions, but I am just showing you how I am going to
    do mine.
        But I think the exact words that he transmits to the
    President of the United States are a matter of confidence.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I respect that. Then what I am going
    to do is I am just going to defer any of my questions on Taiwan
    and come back after you have.
        Let me mention just a couple other things. I noticed,
    General Schwartz, throughout your testimony, you keep coming
    back to intelligence and command and control. The more that I
    get into this from a standpoint as a member of this committee,
    as well as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, there
    are a bunch of heroes every day that we do not know anything
    about because terrorist acts are not being committed because of
    our intelligence. I certainly agree with your comments there.
        General Schwartz. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I think what we need to do is to
    commit whatever resources we have to, without blinking an eye,
    to see that we have sufficient intelligence to meet the
    terrorist threat around the world.
        General Pace, I would just say that I thoroughly enjoyed
    your hospitality going to Colombia with a number of the members
    of this committee. I had never thought of the sensitivity and
    appropriateness of the location of your headquarters where so
    many of the foreign leaders happen to come in and out of Miami,
    and as a result, you get another crack at them in order to
    visit with them in order to develop a personal relationship
    with them to carry out your duties. Would you care to comment
    on that?
        General Pace. Sir, thank you. That is exactly one of the
    great benefits of being in Miami, that it is a hub for
    transportation. We are about 15 minutes from the airport, so I
    am able to meet with the senior leadership of most of the
    countries who come through, who either come specifically for
    business in Miami because it is such a great Latin hub, or who
    continue to transit up to DC. But it works out extremely well
    from my perspective, sir.
        Thank you, both you and Senator Nelson, for going along
    with Senator Levin and Senator Reed. Your time in theater made
    a huge difference.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Schwartz, I am getting ready
    to go with the Intelligence Committee Chairman to Korea. You
    have heard the recent flap over whether or not--and this is a
    political issue. I do not need you to get into this, but
    whether or not we might have undercut the president of South
    Korea's attempts to reach out to North Korea. Do you have any
    comments in this area that you would share with us?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I think right now we are in a policy
    formulation stage with the current administration. So, we are
    waiting for that policy to be articulated to us. I mentioned
    earlier, before you got here, Ambassador Hubbard is in country
    right now with some effort to gather information, as well as
    propose some of the draft approach for the future. So, we are
    in the stage of a comprehensive review and policy formulation
    that I think will result in some real strategic guidance in the
    future.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I would be appreciative of that policy
    formulation being passed on when you formulate it.
        To what degree is the starvation continuing in North Korea?
        General Schwartz. Sir, I think nobody knows. One of the
    problems with North Korea is it is not open, it is not
    transparent. It is hard to get inside and really ascertain
    everything that is going on. They announced some figures of
    250,000, their own figures, that died of starvation in the last
    18 to 24 months. We have estimations up to a million that have
    died from starvation in the same period of time. The fact of
    the matter is it is serious, it is extensive, and it is
    continuing.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is there food from outside of North
    Korea that is getting in to try to help with the starvation?
        General Schwartz. Sir, there is. There is food coming in.
    Of course, the United States is providing food, Japan, the
    South Koreans, the Chinese. It is coming from all over the
    world.
        They are struggling, as best they can, to produce some of
    their own food products. One of the only factories that they
    have that runs day and night, 24 hours a day, because of their
    energy shortage, is their food factories. So, they are trying
    to produce their own, as well as take all the aid they can, and
    they are still coming up short.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. You can take another 2 minutes because I
    invaded your time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, no, I would be just as happy for
    you to proceed on your questions about Taiwan.
        Chairman Warner. Then we will have an opportunity for
    further questions.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. I think we have had very good testimony,
    Admiral Blair, with regard to the importance of this Taiwan
    arms package. We conduct this oversight this morning against
    our obligations in law which are quite clear in many respects,
    but left somewhat unclear in others, purposely so because there
    should never be any doubt about the United States' commitment
    to help Taiwan defend itself and, if necessary, come to its
    aid. I think you have been quite explicit and clear on that
    this morning.
        Second, to maintain the balance, you expressed the need to
    continue to find ways to cooperate with China. So, there is
    this balance.
        We are not here to discuss the question of independence.
    That is something our Nation has never stepped out on and I
    think quite properly because that issue is entirely left to the
    will of the people of Taiwan, together with the will of the
    people of mainland China, to resolve, hopefully in a peaceful
    way in the future sometime.
        But the right to defend itself is inherent in this review
    of the package of arms that comes before us, and at the core of
    that is the issue of the type of destroyers. I mentioned
    cruisers earlier. I meant destroyers. The options are the Kidd
    class, which are ships that were built on the old Spruance type
    hull, and they are in a status of inventory today where they
    can be brought back on line with some renewed outfitting and,
    therefore, made an integral part of the Taiwan navy in perhaps
    2 to 3 years, whereas the more recent production line of the
    Aegis Burke class would take a number of years.
        Why do you not give us, first, the technical analysis of
    the two classes of ships, their likely availability to be
    integrated into the Taiwanese navy, and the pros and cons, as
    you view them, from a military standpoint? I think this package
    should be decided on military principles, hopefully, as nearly
    as we can. Give us an evaluation because that, I think, will be
    at the heart of this, certainly for this particular Senator, as
    we review this. So, if you would give us that.
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. Before I do that, let me, if I
    may, talk a little bit about the consequences of a short-term
    military solution of the Taiwan issue which is basically
    reunification with China.
        I have looked at that hard and from the points of view of
    both China and of Taiwan, that is a lose-lose situation. Not
    only would there be military losses on both sides, there would
    be civilian suffering on both sides. There would be tremendous
    economic damage on both sides: on the Chinese side, the loss of
    foreign direct investment, the loss of foreign trade; on the
    Taiwanese side, the sorts of effects that we saw even in 1996
    when there was the near possibility of military action. Also,
    there would be secondary effects which always happen when
    conflict occurs, which you have spoken more eloquently about
    than any other Member of this Congress.
        Chairman Warner. We should make note of the fact that the
    Taiwanese people have invested a tremendous amount of their own
    resources in mainland China's industrial base. Am I not correct
    in that?
        Admiral Blair. There are 70,000 Taiwanese living in
    Shanghai as we speak.
        Chairman Warner. Also, they have invested in the industrial
    base very heavily.
        Admiral Blair. They are the single largest investor, and
    the trade across the Straits has been increasing since the
    current Taiwanese government came into office. So, all of the
    positive incentives are on the side of down-playing the
    military confrontation and emphasizing those things which would
    bring Taiwan and China together over time.
        Chairman Warner. When you say ``together,'' you mean some
    resolution between the wills of the people of the two nations,
    whatever that may be.
        Admiral Blair. However that may be negotiated. There are a
    large number of arrangements which could be worked out if there
    were trust, and today there is simply not trust on either side.
    The only way that I know to build the conditions for enduring
    security for Taiwan is long-term development of some sort of a
    political arrangement between Taiwan and China with the sorts
    of guarantees and assurances that Taiwan requires to feel safe,
    as well as to be safe.
        So, the great area that Taiwan, China, and the United
    States have in common is to emphasize those things which lead
    to a peaceful solution and to deemphasize those things which
    tend to raise tensions, bring confrontation, and exacerbate
    that sort of a situation. So, I think even while I am sitting
    here in my uniform talking about the military aspects of the
    situation, we need to keep in mind that this is a tool toward
    the larger end, which is security for Taiwan and a long-term
    development of China and long-term development of the United
    States.
        I really find that people want to classify everyone who is
    involved in this issue as either pro-China or pro-Taiwan. I am
    pro-American. I want to do what is best for the United States
    in this instance, and I think that is what we have to keep in
    mind. Certainly what is best for the United States is the long-
    term peaceful resolution of the issue between them.
        Chairman Warner. I think there is even a larger
    perspective. It would be enormously destabilizing to the entire
    region were there open conflict. So, it is not just the United
    States, but it is the region.
        Admiral Blair. It absolutely is. Just look at 1996, what
    the short-term shock waves were that went through Asia when the
    confrontation went up.
        So, we make our military evaluations, we carry out our
    responsibilities, but I think we have to remember our role in
    the overall policy and in the overall direction which is in the
    interest of both Taiwan and China.
        Now coming to the Aegis combatants versus the Kidds, the
    Kidds have about 12 to 15 years of service. That is plenty of
    useful life left. As you mentioned, they could come on line and
    actually be available in about 2 years. They would be equipped
    with a fleet air defense system called the New Threat Upgrade,
    or NTU.
        An Aegis combatant could take various configurations, but
    it would basically come on line about 2008-2009, and it would
    be equipped with some variant of the more capable Aegis weapons
    systems. The area in which the Aegis weapons system is more
    capable than the NTU system is in the volume of threats that it
    can handle and in some of the extreme profile missiles.
        There are two other things that you have to think about as
    you make the decision, Mr. Chairman. One is the ability of the
    Taiwan navy to absorb complicated systems. Either one of these
    would be the most capable surface combatant that the Taiwan
    navy had operated, and that is a consideration as far as
    logistics and manning and training.
        The second thing is major differences from a capabilities
    point of view. The Aegis system could eventually provide a
    platform on which the theater missile defense systems that the
    United States Navy is developing could be fielded. The NTU Kidd
    could not. So, the major capability difference in the two
    systems would be in its future upgrade potential. That is
    fundamentally the difference between those two systems.
        As I mentioned, the requirements of the Taiwan navy for
    fleet air defense are there today. It is not very robust right
    now, and it is something that is of concern to the Taiwanese
    navy.
        Chairman Warner. Now, let us once again look at the pros
    and cons because in my opening questions to you, my
    recollection is you clearly agreed with me that as China
    proceeds to install more and more missiles, the balance is
    slipping away and that this arms package should be viewed as
    restoring that balance of military capabilities of deterrence
    and defense for Taiwan.
        Now, given that trend of the putting in of the Chinese
    missiles--and it appears that it is going to go on for some
    period of time--will the Kidd class of ships right the balance
    for a period right now?
        Admiral Blair. No, Mr. Chairman, it will not. Right now we
    cannot sell a theater missile defense system to Taiwan because
    we have no theater missile defense systems to sell to them.
        Chairman Warner. I understand.
        Admiral Blair. They have the Patriot PAC-2 missiles, which
    is the most capable system we have. They are point defense
    systems.
        Chairman Warner. So, the Kidd class of ships will not bring
    about a balancing of the missile threat as perceived by Taiwan.
        Admiral Blair. That is correct, and neither will the Aegis.
        Chairman Warner. At this point in time.
        Admiral Blair. At this point.
        Chairman Warner. Because you have to bring in software and
    perhaps some modification to hardware and certainly an
    inventory of missiles to incorporate that into the Aegis
    system.
        Admiral Blair. We have to develop that, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. You have to develop it, and we do not have
    a really good time line as yet on the development of that. Am I
    not correct?
        Admiral Blair. That development program is underway and it
    is in the order of about 2008-2009 itself.
        Chairman Warner. Of that software and hardware to bring
    that system up for a theater missile.
        Admiral Blair. For the shorter range of the two Navy
    systems in development, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Do you want to have any amplification of
    that?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, for this new member
    of the committee, would you or one of your staff or perhaps one
    of the panel describe the difference between the Aegis and the
    Kidd class? What are the capabilities?
        Chairman Warner. The Aegis is interesting. When I was
    Secretary of the Navy, we began the development of Aegis. Aegis
    is a generic term with regard to an electronic system to engage
    various types of threats to a ship. It is in an evolution and
    expanding.
        Now, let us go back again. I think it is very clear because
    this is the sort of record that will be before the Senate, such
    that those Senators who wish to address it, by virtue of speech
    or otherwise, can have the benefit of it.
        We go back to the Spruance hull, which has been in
    inventory for many years in the Navy, and these Kidd class are
    on that hull. But you say that the system is primarily air
    defense and not missile defense. Not primarily, but that is the
    distinction. Am I not correct?
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. The Aegis class is also on a
    Spruance hull for the cruisers. For the destroyers, it is on a
    new hull.
        But the primary difference is that an Aegis system, which
    was originally designed against the Soviet threat, can handle a
    higher volume of incoming missiles at the same time than can
    the Kidd class NTU. So, it is primarily having to do with the
    volume of missiles arriving.
        As far as the performance of missiles that can be handled,
    they are roughly comparable. So, from the fleet air defense
    point of view, they would be virtually the same, that is, for
    handling anti-ship missiles against the fleet.
        The primary difference is that once the United States Navy
    does develop theater missile defense (TMD) programs, they will
    be based on the Aegis fire control system. Therefore, if Taiwan
    had Aegis platforms, they could be upgraded with missiles
    software and some hardware to TMD configuration.
        Chairman Warner. In the same way we are going to upgrade
    our own units.
        Admiral Blair. The same way we plan to upgrade our own,
    yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. But I think we have to go back again. We
    are talking about land-based mobile missiles which China is
    putting in right now.
        Admiral Blair. That is correct.
        Chairman Warner. I want to make it very clear in the
    record, that the Kidd class cannot engage those at the present
    time. Is that not correct?
        Admiral Blair. That is correct, and neither can the Aegis.
        Chairman Warner. Neither can the Aegis. It is the Burke
    class.
        Admiral Blair. Or the Ticonderoga class.
        Chairman Warner. Or the Ticonderoga class, which was the
    initial Aegis-type hull.
        Admiral Blair. Which is the cruiser level and the Burke is
    the destroyer level. Right now neither of those can engage the
    CSS-6s and CSS-7s, which is what China is deploying right now.
    They have about 300 of them that can range Taiwan.
        Chairman Warner. So, with the Kidd class, they can be
    introduced into the fleet and integrated into the Taiwan navy
    within, say, 24 to 30 months, somewhere in there.
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. For the hulls, including the upgraded
    system, we are looking at 2008, 2009, 2010, many years out.
        Admiral Blair. That is right. We have a building program
    going on in two yards. You put in the order. It will be 2008-
    2009 before it is available.
        Chairman Warner. Then you have to look at what is the
    threat facing Taiwan not only from the land-based missiles, but
    other threats that the Kidd class could engage and help deter.
    What would be the advantage of the Kidd class being integrated
    into the Taiwan navy now in, say, 24 to 30 months?
        Admiral Blair. It would be able to provide fleet air
    defense so that the Taiwanese navy would have air cover as it
    operated at sea out of range of land-based air, which it does
    not now have.
        Chairman Warner. Now, would that help bring into balance
    the disparity that we see between mainland China and Taiwan?
        Admiral Blair. That would increase the Taiwanese capability
    to engage other aircraft across the Strait which the Taiwanese
    navy has very little capability.
        Chairman Warner. So, the Kidd class does make a substantial
    contribution to add to the deterrence of the threats.
        Admiral Blair. That is correct, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. It gives their navy really a training base
    for that class of ships which they could profit from between
    now and, say, 2008-2009 timeframe so that if they took the Kidd
    class now, they would be better prepared to accept at a later
    date, either an exchange program or the addition of the
    upgraded Burke class.
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir. That is correct. It is the same
    propulsion system, for example, many of the same auxiliary
    systems, and so it would give them capability in complex
    surface combatant operation, which they do not have now.
        Chairman Warner. So, one of the options that is before the
    President would be to offer the Kidd class now with the
    understanding that it substantially enhances the naval element
    of deterrence, and it would provide a training base for a
    follow-on acquisition, if the threat persisted, for the
    upgraded Aegis system which would have the theater missile
    defense capability.
        Admiral Blair. Exactly correct, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I think we have pretty well put that
    record together. Do you wish to add to it, Senator?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Just to go back to the Admiral's
    statement of his two goals, the long-term guarantees for
    Taiwan. It sounds like that system would give long-term
    guarantee. But the other goal of the Admiral was a long-term
    peaceful resolution. Does it enhance that? That is the question
    that we have to answer.
        Admiral Blair. Sir, that is correct. As I mentioned, the
    lower the level of missiles on the Chinese side and responses
    on the Taiwanese side and counter-responses on the Chinese side
    and counter-responses on the Taiwanese side, I think the more
    conducive to a long-term resolution. So, restraint on the
    Chinese side would be a definite factor in doing that. If the
    Chinese continue to add 50 missiles a year and increase their
    accuracy, which has been their program in the past, then it
    does not take a detailed military analysis to tell you that at
    some point that makes a military difference and defense is not
    sufficient. It is that ratcheting up that I think does not
    serve the interests of either Taiwan or China, but it requires
    restraint by China, which has not been shown yet, which I have
    talked to them about and many other representatives of our
    Government have talked to them about frequently and I would
    hope we could see.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I?
        Chairman Warner. Go ahead.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is useful information to me
    because with the Intelligence Committee Chairman, I am going to
    Beijing as well. Are they, in fact, increasing their missiles
    50 a year?
        Admiral Blair. Yes, sir, they are right now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. At this present time.
        Admiral Blair. At this present time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Those are the ones you described as
    CSS-6s and 7s?
        Admiral Blair. 6s and 7s, right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are those air-breathing missiles or
    are they rockets?
        Admiral Blair. They are ballistic missiles. They go out of
    the atmosphere and come down.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, they are liquid-propelled, not
    air-breathing engines.
        Admiral Blair. Solid.
        Senator Bill Nelson. As opposed to air-breathing like
    cruise missiles.
        Admiral Blair. Yes, as opposed to cruise missiles which go
    a couple hundred feet. They are ballistic missiles.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What are the ranges of these 6s and
    7s?
        Admiral Blair. It is about 500-600 kilometers. They are on
    the longer range of the short range. They are like Scud Deltas,
    the kind that threaten General Schwartz's forces.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is very helpful information, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator.
        Senator Dayton, did you wish to participate in this
    colloquy?
        Senator Dayton. No, I will wait until the closed session.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. On the issue of the fixed-wing aircraft,
    Admiral, they wanted some P-3s. Did you talk about the fixed-
    wing package and what are the pros and cons of some of those
    requests?
        Admiral Blair. I would say Aegis and Kidds have been enough
    publicly discussed that I think it is fine to talk about them
    in open session. I would rather go to closed session to talk
    about some of the other aspects of the program.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. I just have one additional question of
    General Pace. It relates to the SOUTHCOM's engagement program.
    I have been a supporter of our engagement program with foreign
    militaries, particularly relative to activities on our part
    which would impart respect for human rights and the proper role
    of a military in a democratic society.
        So, I was very supportive of our effort last year to close
    the U.S. Army School of the Americas, but to reopen a different
    school with a different focus, which was to authorize the
    Secretary of Defense to establish the Western Hemisphere
    Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). I am wondering if
    you would describe for us the Southern Command theater's
    engagement program, tell us how the Western Hemisphere
    Institute for Security Cooperation fits into that.
        General Pace. Senator, thank you.
        One of the things that we are able to do is, through the
    support of Congress, to provide training and education
    opportunities for almost 2,500 officers per year from 31 of the
    32 countries in my area of responsibility. They go to various
    schools, our war colleges, our command and staff level schools.
    They also go to the WHINSEC where they are able to learn about
    planning, about logistics, et cetera.
        Embedded in that training, especially at the WHINSEC, are
    courses in human rights, in proper subordination of the
    military to civilian authority. In all of our exercises
    throughout the region, of which we conduct about 17 per year,
    either bilateral or multilateral, we take the opportunity
    through both demonstration and scenario development to train in
    subordination of the military to civilian rule.
        I have not had the opportunity, Senator, to visit WHINSEC
    yet, so I do not have a complete layout in my mind of the
    curriculum that they have, but I do know that they do, in fact,
    address human rights.
        Senator Levin. Could you familiarize yourself with that
    curriculum and then tell us how the two fit for the record?
        General Pace. Yes, sir. I will, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        U.S. Southern Command's engagement strategy incorporates promoting
    a culture of respect for human rights within the military and security
    forces of nations in our AOR. The human rights program focuses on
    strengthening respect for human rights through education, training,
    conferences, seminars, and subject matter expert exchanges.
        At the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, or
    WHINSEC, the human rights curriculum provides critical support to this
    program. Their human rights course is pass-fail and ensures each
    graduate gains a basic knowledge of human rights principles. In
    addition, all WHINSEC instructors are required to pass an intensive
    human rights course and to integrate human rights principles into every
    course. Students are therefore taught human rights in the context of
    different subjects.
        The curriculum developed by the WHINSEC human rights staff is
    unquestionably one of the most comprehensive offered in any military
    institution anywhere. It includes well-researched, in-depth, case
    studies based on historical events, which are used in advanced human
    rights training.
        The WHINSEC human rights staff also supports USSOUTHCOM strategy by
    traveling throughout the AOR to provide courses to larger groups of
    military officers and noncommissioned officers. Many of the students
    that attend WHINSEC advance to senior positions of leadership in their
    country's security forces. By incorporating respect for human rights as
    a central theme in their professional education, we effectively
    influence the culture of the security forces at large.
        WHINSEC's human rights curriculum is one of the most important
    tools available to USSOUTHCOM for strengthening respect for human
    rights by military and security forces in the area of responsibility.

        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Gentlemen, I want to cover some other subjects rather
    quickly so that the open record has reference to them.
        Panama is an ever-present concern to us, General Pace. We
    discussed that last night in our private meeting, and you gave
    me certain reassurances. There was concern at one time that
    mainland China was trying to gain a stronger foothold of
    influence in that region, and also the respective operation of
    the Panama Canal from a technical standpoint, and also the
    stability of the government down there, and any other aspect
    you wish to cover.
        General Pace. Sir, thank you.
        There is a Chinese company on each end of the Panama Canal.
    They provide port services. They in no way interfere with or
    are a part of the actual operation of the canal. So, unless a
    ship requires on-load or off-load at either end of the canal,
    they play no part at all in the day-to-day operation of the
    canal.
        The canal itself, under the commission that is being run by
    the Panama Government, is being run extremely efficiently. From
    an outsider's point of view, they have run that extremely well,
    and their plans to increase capacity in the future look very
    well laid out.
        As they will tell you and as I said to you yesterday, the
    greatest threat to the operation of the canal right now is the
    environmental impact on the watershed. As development takes
    place, silt and runoff----
        Chairman Warner. Are you talking about land development
    which removes the natural growth, and that results in a water
    runoff that impairs the operation of the canal because I think
    it takes--what did you say--500 million gallons of water to----
        General Pace. It takes 55 million gallons of water per ship
    per transit. There are 40 ships per day, give or take. So, you
    have a huge amount of fresh water being used every day that
    comes from those watersheds. The canal commission, rightfully
    so, is concerned that as they have development of what is
    currently vacant land, that the silting and the runoff will
    impact the ability of the country to collect the water it needs
    to run the canal.
        Chairman Warner. Now, the government and the stability and
    the relationships with that government.
        General Pace. Sir, we have excellent relationships with the
    government through the U.S. Ambassador. Minister of Security
    Contero is very friendly toward the United States. He has made
    possible such opportunities for us as assisting them in putting
    together a national command and control location, which they
    are building in the former Howard Air Force Base. So, as far as
    today's environment inside of the ministries with whom I do
    business, it is very friendly, sir, and looking to the future.
        Chairman Warner. Now, the forward operating locations for
    our air elements in the counternarcotics operation. Is that
    proceeding at a satisfactory rate?
        General Pace. For the most part, it is, sir. We're on
    track. At Manta in Ecuador, we will close that facility in
    about a week. The major part of the $60 million worth of
    upgrade to that facility will take place over the next 6
    months. That is on track.
        Chairman Warner. Last night you spoke about your own
    professional judgment with regard to the time line of the
    ability of Colombia to come to grips with this very serious
    problem. There were two aspects of it that impressed me, and
    that is your professional views as to the length of that time
    line. My recollection is you said about a decade, and we are
    barely into it at this time. Second, the impact on the adjacent
    countries and how the United States will be considering,
    independent of Plan Colombia, financial packages to help them
    stem any flowing into their nations of the current operations
    in Colombia.
        General Pace. Senator, my estimate, based on my discussions
    with the Colombian leadership, is that for the Colombian
    military to be large enough and well enough educated and
    trained, it will take about 3 to 5 years for them, in
    conjunction with the Colombian police, to provide security,
    inside of which then the other nine elements of Plan Colombia
    can take root. My estimate, again talking to government
    leaders, is that Plan Colombia itself overall will take about
    10 years to show the benefits of rebuilding the fabric of that
    democracy that has been destroyed by the drug traffickers.
        With regard to the spill-over and therefore the impact on
    the neighboring countries, yes, sir, regional solutions to the
    regional problem, properly supported by the U.S. Government, I
    think is the requirement.
        Chairman Warner. You might enumerate those countries
    presently under consideration for that assistance.
        General Pace. Sir, my recommendation would be primarily
    those that border Colombia, which include Panama, Ecuador,
    Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, if in fact we are able to
    have satisfactory accommodation with that particular
    government. We should not, however, completely overlook places
    like Paraguay, Uruguay, and other nations through which drugs
    transit to get to the sea to get to Europe.
        Chairman Warner. Part of our training involves the use of
    their helicopters, which we are going to supply. We are always
    concerned--and we saw the concerns manifested in the Kosovo
    operation--about hand-held small weapons that can interdict
    airborne platforms such as the helicopter. How serious is that
    threat? Do we have any indication that the insurgents will be
    trying to acquire on the open market in the world such weapons?
    How are we training to deal with that situation?
        General Pace. Sir, we take that threat very seriously. We
    presume that an entity that possesses hundreds of millions of
    dollars in illegal profits every year has the capacity to go on
    the open market and buy shoulder-held surface-to-air missiles.
    We have no intelligence to confirm that. Yet, we train to that
    probability. The configuration of the helicopters that the
    State Department is buying took into consideration the
    likelihood that they would operate in the same environment.
        Chairman Warner. So, they have the state-of-the-art
    equipment for defensive measures.
        General Pace. Sir, they do.
        Chairman Warner. Periodically Haiti should be examined.
    Give us an update on that. That posed in the past serious
    problems in this country.
        General Pace. Sir, Haiti is very much in the policy arena
    right now for me. I am prepared and have on the shelf ready to
    execute four exercises this year, which are called medical
    readiness exercises. Those medical readiness exercises will, in
    fact, go in and assist the population with their medical
    problems. But those are currently on hold pending a policy
    decision on government-to-government issues.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Reed, I am just doing wrap-up
    questions. I see you are present. Why do you not take your
    regular time at this time?
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, first let me welcome and
    commend General Pace, Admiral Blair, and General Schwartz and
    thank them for their service to the country and the fidelity of
    the great men and women they lead each and every day.
        I have been on the Senate floor and I understand many
    questions have been asked. I also understand that we are going
    into a closed session. So, Mr. Chairman, rather than taking
    some time now, I would simply yield back my time to you and
    then move forward.
        Chairman Warner. General Pace, the Vieques problem is a
    continuing one. We now have a carrier task force that is on the
    verge of deployment. It is my understanding that the previous
    one, the Truman task force, was only able to do inert. What is
    the status of this current task force and its ability to use
    those ranges in your judgment?
        General Pace. Sir, I need to defer to the Chief of Naval
    Operations for the train-up of his forces. I could restate my
    comment that I made before this committee when I was Commander
    of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Atlantic.
        Chairman Warner. Well, we know the essential nature of it.
        General Pace. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. The problems in your AOR, General
    Schwartz, from time to time of the attitude of South Korea
    toward the presence of our military and their families. Where
    does that situation rest today versus a year ago?
        General Schwartz. I think overall I would characterize the
    attitude of the South Koreans towards our military as very
    positive. The majority of the people, high into the 90s,
    respect the presence of and the deterrence value of U.S.
    servicemembers on the peninsula. There is no doubt about it.
    There is a small percentage of the people who do not understand
    our presence, who do not understand the war itself, how it
    originated, why we are there. Most of them are younger,
    college. They spend their summers protesting and they get a lot
    of visibility, but I would have to tell you the silent
    majority, the majority of the South Koreans, fully understand
    the deterrence value and the presence of U.S. servicemembers on
    the peninsula.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        General Pace. Senator, I apologize. May I give you just a
    little bit more information on Vieques? I would be remiss as a
    leader if I do not bring up one problem.
        Chairman Warner. All right.
        General Pace. It is a quality of life problem, sir, the
    quality of life for my very dedicated Army soldiers and
    families who have moved from Panama to Fort Buchanan. In the
    process of doing that, renovations were to be made. For
    understandable reasons, policy reasons, right now the
    construction money that was allocated to build an elementary
    school, $8 million last year, and the money to renovate
    housing, $25 million this year, has been held in abeyance. So,
    as we go through the policy debate, which I understand, the
    Army families there are being held hostage.
        Chairman Warner. We will take note of that, and thank you
    for bringing that up.
        Admiral Blair, you have India in your AOR. The Central
    Command has Pakistan, and when the Central Command commander
    was before this committee, he stated that the two of you work
    very closely together. Give us an update of that situation, the
    seriousness of it compared to last year and now, as well as the
    28 percent increase in military budget that India has
    announced, and any other aspects of that situation that you
    think is important that we learn.
        Admiral Blair. Sir, I think the developments on the Indian
    side have been quite positive since I last appeared before this
    committee. Although they have not signed the Comprehensive Test
    Ban Treaty and they are continuing to develop their nuclear
    weapons arsenal, I think they are working their way towards the
    principles of a high nuclear threshold and a good stewardship
    of those weapons.
        The earthquake that took place in Bhuj, India was a
    terrible human tragedy. The loss of life was on the order of
    20,000 to 30,000. On the other hand, the response to it was a
    real regional and, in fact, international effort, including
    supplies from Pakistan. A couple of flights of C-130 aircraft
    with relief supplies from Pakistan landed in India and off-
    loaded the supplies, and they were welcomed by India.
        The situation in the Kashmir itself, there continues to be
    casualties within Jammu/Kashmir, fire across the border. But
    there are intermittent contacts between India and Pakistan,
    looking at talking about the situation again after the
    disappointment following the Lahore Summit and the conflict in
    Siachen Glacier.
        So, on the Indian side, there are some positive
    developments, and it certainly does not seem to be any worse.
    General Franks and I both agree that the United States needs to
    maintain contact with both sides of southern Asia, both with
    Pakistan and with India, so we can exert the restraining
    influence on their interaction with each other and develop
    independent relationships. We do not want to shift our weight
    from Pakistan where it had traditionally been and put it all on
    India. We think we need a balance on both sides. I think we are
    taking steps to do that on the Indian side.
        Chairman Warner. Last question. I would like to have both
    Admiral Blair and General Schwartz comment on the status of the
    North Korean ballistic missile program. We will take it up in
    greater detail in closed session, but I would like to have your
    views, to the extent possible, here in open session. Why do you
    not lead off, General Schwartz?
        General Schwartz. Let me characterize it like this. It is
    still very aggressive. They are producing a certain number of
    missiles each year that we could talk about in closed session.
    But they are the number one proliferator of missiles in the
    world, and they are being very aggressive in that regard.
        Chairman Warner. They are selling them. What countries do
    we know now are actively engaged in negotiations?
        General Schwartz. We know Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria,
    Yemen, and Egypt are recipients of some of their missiles at
    this time.
        Chairman Warner. Admiral Blair.
        Admiral Blair. Sir, I would not add anything to what
    General Schwartz said except that the moratorium on testing
    missiles, which the North Koreans have undertaken to maintain
    as long as negotiations with the United States continue, has in
    fact continued. Although the North Koreans seem uniquely
    capable of selling missiles that have not been tested, and some
    fool countries seem uniquely capable of buying them even though
    they do not know if the damned things work or not, they have
    not in fact fired them since that time took place.
        Chairman Warner. Members of the committee, we are now in
    the process of Senate floor voting, three consecutive votes. I
    would suggest that we all go to the floor at this point in
    time, ask our witnesses to extend us the courtesy to do this
    most important function, and then we will resume next door in
    the Intelligence Committee hearing room for a closed session.
    My estimate would be it could be as long as 30 minutes before
    we return.
        Senator Levin. I have three quick questions.
        Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
        Senator Levin. Admiral, is it in our national security
    interest that that moratorium on flight testing on the part of
    North Korea continue?
        Admiral Blair. From the military point of view, it is
    certainly in our interest that it continue. As to the price we
    pay for it, that is for another to decide.
        Senator Levin. But militarily at least it is in our
    interest.
        Admiral Blair. Militarily, just as with the Agreed
    Framework, the less development of nuclear technology, the less
    missiles they test, the better from our point of view.
        Senator Levin. General Pace, on the unmanned aerial
    vehicles that are being used in Colombia by Department of State
    contractors, our report to the four of us who went there, who I
    have referred to before, indicated that the low cost and the
    low risk technology that is reflected in those UAVs should be
    assessed for expanded use for the detection of drug labs and
    other important missions such as border control and that
    Colombia offers an excellent area for such an assessment. Could
    you tell us very briefly in your view whether those UAVs have
    performed a useful function down there?
        General Pace. Sir, they performed a very useful function.
    We were delighted. Senator, they were a test bed. They were fed
    to us as an opportunity. As it happened, during the time they
    were there, we had some things going on in the region I can
    talk more about in closed session to which they were very
    useful. So, from my vantage point, not only for my
    responsibilities today but also as a military person who might
    need to employ them elsewhere in the world, very useful.
        Senator Levin. Would you like to see them continue there?
        General Pace. I would, yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        Any other questions from members? We will recess for a
    period of time, maybe up to 30 minutes, and then reconvene in
    the Intelligence Committee hearing room to continue our
    hearing.
        We have had an excellent session this morning. I commend
    each of you for your important contributions and look forward
    to the additional testimony in closed session. We are
    adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum

                             ARMED WHEELED VEHICLES

        1. Senator Santorum. General Schwartz, the Army is in the process
    of fielding an interim force that is designed to span a perceived near-
    term operational shortfall first recognized during the Persian Gulf
    War. To that end, the Army recently selected a wheeled vehicle to serve
    as the armored vehicle that will be used by interim brigade combat
    teams in operations from peacekeeping through full spectrum combat.
        There has been a lot of debate recently over wheels versus tracks
    for armored vehicles and I don't expect to conduct such a debate here.
    I am curious, however, about any lessons we may have learned in the
    past about mobility tradeoffs between different vehicle types. It seems
    likely that in the event of hostilities in your theater of operations
    that access to roads will be limited due to damage, debris, or
    refugees.
        While the new Army wheeled vehicles may be good for peacekeeping
    activities, do you have any concerns about the tactical mobility of
    wheeled vehicles in off-road environments in the Korean theater of
    operations? To what extent has the Army initiative addressed concerns
    you might have about strategic responsiveness? Do we have the strategic
    lift assets required to execute established deployment goals and
    objectives?
        General Schwartz. No. There are two primary reasons that these new
    vehicles improve our capabilities in Korea. First, there is a large
    amount of terrain and road/bridge limitations on the Korean peninsula
    that favors wheeled vehicles. Second, these vehicles will not operate
    in isolation but as part of tailored, combined arms units. The
    complementary nature of ``wheeled'' units with traditional ``heavy''
    units will increase our warfighting effectiveness. They will also
    reduce our logistical footprint, thus extending our operational reach.

                         HIGH DEMAND/LOW DENSITY ASSETS

        2. Senator Santorum. Admiral Blair, General Pace, and General
    Schwartz, during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, one of the newly
    coined terms was high demand/low density assets. If these assets were
    so highly tasked in this small contingency, doesn't that indicate we do
    not have enough of these assets to execute the national military
    strategy? What are the key high demand/low density assets in your area
    of responsibility?
        Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]
        General Pace. The availability of some high demand/low density (HD/
    LD) assets may be inadequate to satisfy multiple CINC requirements if
    surge operations are occurring in one or more theaters. With the
    national military strategy (NMS) currently under review, I must defer
    to the Joint Staff to provide a more detailed assessment of HD/LD
    availability to support the current or revised NMS.
        The key HD/LD assets that support our AOR are the [deleted].
        General Schwartz. [Deleted.]

                         DEMILITARIZED ZONE FOR THE ELN

        3. Senator Santorum. General Pace, one of the issues being
    considered by senior government officials of Colombia has been the
    creation of a demilitarized zone for members of the National Liberation
    Army (ELN). Do you see the creation of a demilitarized zone for the ELN
    as a positive or negative development in reducing the flow of narcotics
    into the United States and in achieving a lasting peace in Colombia?
        General Pace. The creation of the demilitarized zone for the ELN
    will not significantly reduce the flow of narcotics into the United
    States. The vast majority of coca is cultivated and transported outside
    the area under consideration. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                           STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

        4. Senator Allard. Admiral Blair or General Schwartz, I understand
    you recently revised your Status of Forces Agreement with Korea. What
    improvements did you make and what prompted the change?
        Admiral Blair. The force structure is correctly sized for our
    current mission but must be fully-manned and equipped to maintain it as
    an effective and ready force. The force structure plan details the
    number and type of forces. Fully manning the planned force structure is
    the problem. Increasing the force structure may compound the personnel
    shortage by placing a greater personnel demand on the under-manned
    critical specialties.
        In U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), shortages exist in several of
    our critical specialties, especially in our mid and senior level non-
    commissioned officers (E5-E9) which represent the bulk of our
    experience and enlisted leadership. For example, in our latest
    readiness assessments, USPACOM intelligence specialists (E5-E9) are
    only manned at 66 percent; aviation maintenance technicians (E5-E9) are
    manned at 70 percent; and communication specialists (E5-E9) are manned
    at 83 percent. Korean linguists manning specialty remains at 64
    percent. Additionally, rated pilot staff manning at Pacific Air Forces
    is at 81 percent with no projected increase in the near term.
        Personnel in these low density and high demand specialties cannot
    be replaced overnight. Length of training and the years required to
    gain valuable experience require time. Support of retention-related
    incentives is essential to the health of our forces and keeping the
    experienced personnel we have today. Recent pay increases have helped
    and need to continue, but support of infrastructure and readiness fixes
    also weigh in our members' quality of life, and their decision to stay
    in the Armed Forces. Where manning shortfalls are most severe,
    selective reenlistment bonuses should be considered as an option.
        In addition to manning considerations, headquarters reductions
    continue to impact our ability to be proactive and plan as the reduced
    staff manages an increasing number of critical programs required in
    support of national security and the NMS. As I testified, our staff is
    taking the lead on future capabilities such as the joint mission force,
    expanding the littoral battlespace, and the combatant headquarters of
    the future with CINC21. These capabilities suffer when our limited
    staffs are cut further.
        Within the Defense Department, we are minimizing the impact of our
    shortages with reliance on the outstanding capabilities of the Reserve
    components. This capability must be recognized and supported within and
    outside the Defense Department. The services and our components have
    made significant progress in correcting personnel problems, but
    maintaining Active and Reserve personnel accounts at appropriate levels
    in each skill area and grade is a challenge that will receive our
    continuous attention and emphasis.
        General Schwartz. Let me answer the second part of your question
    first. We felt we needed to revise the SOFA in order to address long-
    standing perceptions of the Korean people that the SOFA was unfair to
    them in several respects, especially in comparison to our SOFA with
    Japan. In 1995, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government raised about 20
    issues for discussion, headlined by their strong desire for pretrial
    custody of SOFA personnel accused of violating ROK law, similar to that
    in Japan. Former Secretary William Perry offered comparable treatment
    to Japan and our other allies on custody in exchange for certain
    assurances of fair treatment and a substantial reduction of issues.
    However, after considerable effort to reach agreement, negotiations on
    these issues stalled and were suspended by the two sides in 1997.
        After a technical review of the issues at the expert level in May
    1999, the Korean side attempted to restart negotiations with a
    compromise proposal. As it failed to fully address our concerns for the
    rights of accused persons and as our mutual failure to resolve these
    issues threatened to drive a wedge in the alliance, former Ambassador
    Stephen Bosworth and I asked our team to develop creative solutions for
    resolving the impasse. After a lot of hard work, a new U.S. proposal on
    custody and assurances was delivered to the Korean side in May 2000. In
    addition, the Korean side raised several other high priority issues,
    including environmental protection, labor rights of Korean employees of
    USFK, and plant quarantine. That led to a resumption of formal
    negotiations on 2 August 2000 and ultimate agreement for revision of
    the SOFA on 18 January 2001. The revisions were subsequently approved
    under the procedures of both governments and entered into force on 2
    April 2001.
        A number of significant changes were made. First, although under
    the previous agreement the U.S. was permitted to retain custody until
    the completion of all judicial proceedings, including appeals, the ROK
    may now receive custody upon indictment if it requests in any one of 12
    categories of serious cases. Such cases include murder, rape,
    kidnapping, arson, drug trafficking or manufacturing, robbery with a
    dangerous weapon, and also cases of assaults, drunk driving, or fleeing
    the scene of an accident that result in death. In very serious cases of
    murder or rape, if the Korean police arrest a SOFA accused in the act,
    in hot pursuit, or before he or she returns to military control, they
    may retain custody.
        However, our personnel will be protected by a very strong package
    of ``due process'' rights while in Korean pretrial custody and
    confinement, including the right to release on bail. A person subject
    to custody upon arrest (e.g., caught in the act for murder) may not be
    interrogated until BOTH a U.S. representative and a lawyer representing
    the accused is present. Statements taken without their presence are not
    admissible in court. Korean authorities may not question an accused in
    their custody after indictment, except about totally unrelated matters;
    even then, a U.S. representative must be present during the
    interrogation. Thus, our concerns about the real possibility of an
    involuntary confession during a custodial interrogation have been
    substantially alleviated.
        In addition, SOFA personnel will be entitled to a pretrial
    confinement hearing with a lawyer present and will not be confined by
    the ROK without a judge's determination that confinement is warranted
    because there is reasonable cause to believe (1) that he/she committed
    the offense; and (2) that he/she may flee, or (3) that he/she has
    destroyed or may destroy evidence, or (4) that he/she may cause harm to
    a victim, witness, or family member of a witness or victim. This is
    very similar to the due process procedures existing in U.S. law. The
    accused will also be protected from unfair violations of privacy while
    in pretrial confinement, especially during staged reenactments of the
    alleged offense.
        In the area of environmental protection, we added an Agreed Minute
    emphasizing the commitment of both governments to recognize the
    importance of environmental protection. The U.S. Government agreed to
    implement the SOFA consistent with the protection of the environment
    and public health and confirmed its policy to respect relevant ROK
    environmental laws. The ROK Government confirmed its policy to
    implement its environmental laws with regard for the health and safety
    of U.S. personnel. In short, we sought and obtained a mutual and
    aspirational agreement to protect the environment.
        The word ``respect'' is used intentionally here. The U.S. sees it
    as a goal to try to operate within relevant ROK environmental laws, as
    enforced and applied, to the best of its ability and within resource
    constraints. However, as an equal sovereign, the U.S. is not obligated
    to comply strictly with each and every ROK law or regulation.
        Basically, we all hope to live and work in a better environment.
    The real problem is that environmental cleanup (or restoration)
    requires a large commitment of resources. We could not commit to
    environmental restoration, except to the extent necessary to protect
    the public health, without the availability of funds. In addition, an
    agreement to restore the environment fully would be inconsistent with
    the basic trade-off in Article IV, SOFA. Under Article IV, when the
    U.S. returns facilities and areas to the ROK Government, the U.S. is
    not obligated to restore them to their original condition. In turn, the
    ROK Government is not obligated to compensate the U.S. for any
    improvements or structures left behind.
        In a separate, non-binding ``Memorandum of Special Understandings
    on Environmental Protection,'' we mutually agreed to cooperate on
    environmental governing standards (EGS), to share information and to
    provide for appropriate access to USFK facilities and areas and to
    consult on risks. In addition, the U.S. Government confirmed its policy
    to conduct environmental performance assessments and the ROK Government
    confirmed its policy to respond to outside contamination sources that
    endanger health. It was also agreed that the Environment Subcommittee
    and relevant SOFA Subcommittees would meet regularly to discuss
    environmental issues.
        The agreement is considered a statement of principles, similar to
    that declared by the U.S. and Japan in September 2000, not a binding
    international agreement. Most of these things are simply standard U.S.
    policy--things we have long tried hard to do. Our agreements in this
    area, the Agreed Minute clause and this separate agreement, are
    designed to be mutual--it is important that both governments do what
    they can to improve the environment.
        The SOFA Joint Committee must still agree on a means to provide
    ``appropriate access'' by ROK officials to U.S. facilities. We prefer
    ``joint visits'' at our option, rather than ``joint inspections,''
    especially on Article III facilities and areas where we have been
    granted exclusive use and full control by the ROK Government. We also
    plan to institutionalize procedures for the rapid notification,
    response, and remediation of new environmental incidents or spills. We
    are close to an agreement in these areas. However, while we agreed to
    remediate new incidents or spills, we did not agree to environmental
    restoration of existing facilities and areas upon their return to the
    ROK Government as that would be inconsistent with Article IV, SOFA.
        In a significant new agreement affecting preferential hiring of our
    Korean national employees, it was agreed in exchange for ``positive
    consideration'' of applications by family members of military personnel
    and the civilian component to accept employment on the Korean economy.
    This does not include dependents of invited contractors. Any of the
    eight employment status categories (E-1 thru E-8) that previously
    required a different visa status will be available to our family
    members as long as they meet the employment requirements for a position
    under Korean immigration law, whether full or part-time. Family members
    will not have to give up their SOFA A-3 visa; instead they may be
    granted permission to work as an additional activity while in Korea on
    that visa. However, Korean taxes must be paid on any income received.
        In another significant agreement affecting criminal jurisdiction,
    it was agreed that minor traffic offenses resulting in property damage
    only will no longer be reported as a crime as long as adequate private
    insurance is maintained as in case of a personally owned vehicle (POV)
    accident or if the matter can be settled under Article XXIII, Claims,
    as occurring in the course of official duty. The Claims process will be
    the ``efficient legal remedy'' for such accidents, without prejudice to
    the rights of the victim. In other words, the victim could still file a
    criminal complaint if not adequately compensated. Dependents are not
    included because the U.S. Government cannot act as an insurer of last
    resort under the Claims article for dependents. This should
    dramatically lower the statistics of so-called ``crimes'' committed by
    SOFA personnel.
        Also in the labor area, we streamlined and shortened the mediation
    procedures required under Article XVII, SOFA, before collective labor
    action or strikes may be taken. We agreed to use the ROK Labor
    Relations Commission for this purpose, while preserving the right of
    the Joint Committee to make the final decision on a dispute. We also
    preserved management's ability to downsize the labor force due to
    resource constraints or mission changes and agreed that Korean
    employees would not be terminated without ``just cause''.
        With respect to plant quarantine, we agreed in principle to accept
    ``joint inspections'' of animal and plant products brought into Korea
    to resupply the troops, under procedures yet to be established by the
    Joint Committee. However, we must retain the ability to bring in fresh
    fruits and vegetables without undue delay, even those on the ROK banned
    list. Negotiations continue in the SOFA Animal and Plant Health
    Inspection Subcommittee.
        As you may be aware, one of the greatest threats to readiness in
    Korea is the denial of access to required training areas due to urban
    development, the scarcity of arable land for agriculture and farming,
    and encroachments by private landowners, many of whom have not been
    fully compensated by the ROK Government for the use of their land by
    USFK as required by SOFA Article V. To better protect our facilities
    and areas from encroachment, the ROK Government has agreed to promptly
    initiate steps toward removing encroachments, including administrative
    measures acceptable to both sides. The U.S. is permitted to take
    necessary measures to properly manage and prevent encroachment to the
    extent possible, with ROK administrative support upon request. We
    further agreed to jointly survey existing facilities and areas and to
    provide a better accounting for the use being made of them.
        We also agreed to notify and consult with the ROK Government
    concerning planned modification or removal of indigenous buildings and
    concerning new construction or alterations that might affect the
    ability of local communities to provide relevant utilities and
    services, or may affect the public health and safety. This does not
    mean a veto, but consultation. Subsequent discussions regarding
    implementation of this provision indicate that the ROK Ministry of
    National Defense still insists that USFK should submit building plans
    to and obtain building permits from local governments, however, that is
    inconsistent with our agreement to consult at the central government
    level. We cannot be forced into the position of having to deal with
    each and every local government. It is the responsibility of the
    central government to elevate any concerns they may have to the
    government-to-government level.
        We also adopted a new procedure for the service of civil process
    upon SOFA personnel so that private lawsuits may be more readily
    settled in Korean courts, similar to that recently agreed in Germany.
        Finally, although not legally binding upon the two governments or
    the Joint Committee, the two chiefs of delegation signed a separate
    ``Record of Discussions'' regarding Korean access to our Non-
    Appropriated Fund Organizations (NAFO), our clubs and recreational
    facilities. The delegation chiefs reconfirmed the U.S. commitment that
    only qualified persons may use NAFO facilities, recommended that the
    SOFA Joint Committee conduct a review to determine who may use NAFO
    facilities, the conditions of that use, and the appropriate means of
    assuring compliance, and recommended revision of a 25 June 81 agreement
    regarding ``Membership in the USFK Club System'' by 31 Dec 2001. (The
    Joint Committee agreed to take up these tasks on 2 April 2001.)
        The delegation chiefs further recommended that the review should
    determine the appropriate number of Korean members who may participate
    in USFK clubs; the reasonable and effective measures, including Korean
    government officials' access to NAFO facilities to monitor the measures
    taken when formally requested and accorded, to prevent unauthorized use
    of NAFO facilities; and that it should address the issue of Korean
    citizen honorary memberships in NAFO golf clubs. The Korean side
    confirmed that it would permit Korean employees and Korean guests
    accompanied by USFK personnel to consume food and beverages on the
    premises of NAFO dining facilities (in other words, the Korean side
    opposes the concept of unescorted guests). Finally, the delegation
    chiefs recommended that the 1981 agreement be revised to accommodate
    these recommendations by 31 Dec 2001. If the Joint Committee is unable
    to do so, they recommended that the matter be resolved through
    diplomatic channels.
        Overall, we consider these changes to be balanced and positive.
    They reflect a maturing ROK-U.S. alliance. We are working hard with our
    ROK ally to implement them in good faith in order to preserve and
    maintain this great alliance.

                                   PERSONNEL

        5. Senator Allard. Admiral Blair or General Schwartz, in your
    written statement you mentioned a concern over a shortage of personnel.
    Can you handle this within the Defense Department? Do we need an
    increase in force structure?
        General Schwartz. In peacetime, we experience a 90 percent turnover
    every year. My recommendation would be to increase the number of
    accompanied tours to Korea and fund infrastructure improvements to make
    Korea a tour of choice. We need to man the force to meet our
    requirements, especially in forward deployed/assigned units. We also
    need to leverage reach back capabilities.
        [Deleted.]
        Each of these issues can be handled within the Department of
    Defense.

                                  INTELLIGENCE

        6. Senator Allard. Admiral Blair, General Pace, and General
    Schwartz, what is your most significant shortfall in the intelligence
    and communications infrastructure? Do you have sufficient satellite
    communications capability? What must we do to ensure we have the
    capacity and flexibility to support your communications requirements in
    the next 5 to 10 years?
        Admiral Blair. Senator, I appreciate you asking me this question.
    Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C\4\I)
    shortfalls have been my major concern in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)
    since I took command. Of particular concern is satellite service for
    the highly mobile maritime and ground forces and last mile network
    connectivity for the in-garrison commands. The tyranny of distance, as
    well as the lack of formal alliances in this theater increases my
    reliance on tactical satellite communications to support commanders.
    For example, my Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders are reliant on video
    teleconferencing and collaboration to enhance their situational
    awareness, synchronize missions, and accelerate command and control.
    This requires large satellite bandwidth. Last mile connectivity to in-
    garrison forces is just as important, and not to be overlooked. For
    force protection, I am especially interested in increasing classified
    network services throughout my AOR. We need to ensure this keeps pace
    with the rest of the communications infrastructure modernization. It
    has also become increasingly evident that we need to operate with our
    coalition partners. In USPACOM, we have an initiative called the
    Combined Operations Wide Area Network, or COWAN for short. This multi-
    purpose network will provide transport capability with enough
    flexibility to protect sensitive information within appropriate
    communities of interest.
        In addition, my Director of Intelligence, Rear Admiral LeVitre,
    identified shortfalls in intelligence support during her testimony to
    the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In the Pacific
    theater, our intelligence collection, production, and dissemination
    processes depend heavily on the availability of a reliable, robust
    communications infrastructure. Despite major advances in communication
    technologies, increased availability of high bandwidth transmission
    across the Pacific Ocean, and decreasing cost of long-haul
    communications, we are still short of bandwidth on the national
    networks. The relatively high cost of transoceanic communications in
    the Pacific theater AOR prevents planners from providing sufficient
    bandwidth on national network infrastructures, and currently programmed
    increases in available bandwidth fall far short of low-end requirements
    identified in past communications studies and surveys. As a result, we
    face a severe and worsening shortage of accessible communications
    bandwidth caused by the ever-increasing demand for online and
    interactive intelligence information in the form of imagery, video
    conferencing, online collaboration applications, intelligence data
    bases, Intelink web content, and other forms.
        We do not have sufficient satellite communications (SATCOM)
    capability. Since my theater is vastly separated by water, satellite
    communications are vital assets that link deployed tactical forces with
    online, interactive, and responsive intelligence and critical command
    and control information. Among the deficiencies are:

            (1) lack of readily available high-capacity transmission links;
            (2) limited satellite communications ground stations; and,
            (3) limited availability of high-cost mobile satellite
            terminals.

        We must find better ways of disseminating intelligence to our
    remotely stationed forces. Though existing programs (e.g., Trojan
    Spirit II, fielded in the Pacific theater at Joint Task Force commands,
    and the Global Broadcast System) will lessen the current shortfall, new
    satellite communications technologies are still needed to meet the
    ever-growing intelligence requirements at the lowest tactical level.
        [Deleted.]
        USPACOM is a dynamic and challenging theater whose AOR is of vital
    security interest to the United States. The command and control and
    intelligence missions are demanding and difficult. To succeed, there
    must be sustained investment in critical capabilities necessary to
    support a wide range of military operations in a vast, heterogeneous,
    and increasingly tense theater. The snapshot view of our communications
    infrastructure appears insufficient to support USPACOM plans,
    operations, and associated intelligence requirements. In response to
    the increasing information requirements, we must continue to invest in
    communications technology refreshments which improve our ability to
    manage our vast infrastructure more efficiently, increase remote
    operations, improve intelligence access to the tactical warfighter,
    significantly increase available communications bandwidth, and
    emphasize coalition connectivity and interoperability. We need
    releasable equipment, accreditation of public key infrastructure/
    technology that will facilitate virtual private network capability.
        [Deleted.]
        With the emphasis on unmanned vehicles, I see a great potential for
    putting communications relay packages on platforms such as Global Hawk
    to improve our capacity when there is an emergent requirement. However,
    equipment that use satellite services should evolve their usage to new
    formats that leverage satellite channel capacity. We have been
    successful in encouraging the use of demand assigned multiple access
    circuits, however there are still systems that demand the full
    [deleted] channel and unfortunately we have not always been able to
    support their missions.
        General Pace. [Deleted.]
        Our most significant shortfall in communications infrastructure is
    the lack of access to the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN).
    This shortfall impacts our ability to provide voice, data, and video to
    U.S. forces deployed throughout our AOR. Currently, we rely on
    commercial satellite services procured by the State Department's
    Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office to provide limited
    voice, data, and video capabilities. We are partnering with Defense
    Information Systems Agency (DISA) to extend the DISN into the SOUTHCOM
    AOR. This initiative will provide us a faster, more reliable, cost
    effective, and robust communications infrastructure.
        [Deleted.]
        We must continue to pursue new capabilities and systems that
    provide reliable and flexible communications services. Sustained
    support for promising initiatives, like the Advanced MILSATCOM Program,
    which is designed to satisfy military requirements for assured access,
    survivability, and flexible mobile-netted communications, will help us
    alleviate current shortfalls in meeting our most critical
    communications requirements.
        General Schwartz. USFK's most significant intelligence
    infrastructure shortfall is [deleted]. We have received unprogrammed,
    single year ``plus-ups,'' however, the money has been limited to
    current year dollars without sustainment. [Deleted.]
        Funding constraints have prevented multiyear planning, adequate
    staffing, and the timely introduction of emerging technologies. In
    fact, every year we maintain the status quo, we actually regress
    because we cannot keep pace with the rest of the [deleted].
        No, I do not have sufficient satellite communications capability.
        [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

                                CHINA AND TAIWAN

        7. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, the recent rhetoric between
    China and Taiwan seems to be at a high level. Can you further define
    the recent patterns of activity by China? Is the activity within normal
    limits or are you seeing signs of a major exercise or major operation?
        Admiral Blair. The People's Republic of China (PRC) appears to have
     adopted a more active forward defense of land and sea borders.
    People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces have identified operational
    weaknesses and are incrementally addressing them as they slowly
    transition to a more modern force. This modernization is important to
    the PLA not only in a Taiwan scenario, but also for any regional
    conflict involving the PRC. As a result, we are beginning to see the
    results of this modernization effort. Increased training levels and
    modernization make the execution of military options easier; however,
    there is no evidence to suggest that ongoing activity is in preparation
    for any near term specific military operation.

                       CHINA'S MISSILE TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS

        8. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, China has increased its exports
    of missile technology in recent years to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea,
    and Libya and now must be watched ``carefully'' to see if China's
    communist leaders abide by the terms of a non-assistance pledge they
    made last November. Do you have additional comments on China's missile
    technology exports?
        Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]

                               TAIWAN ARMS SALES

        9. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, China has recently launched a
    diplomatic offensive aimed at preventing the high-tech arms sales to
    Taiwan. Among other items, Taiwan has requested to buy four Arleigh
    Burke class destroyers. Understanding that there is a delicate balance
    to strike between supporting Taiwan's self-defense capability and
    maintaining relations with China, I am of the mind that the sale of
    these destroyers would meet the U.S. legal obligation to assist Taiwan
    in maintaining a self-defense capability in accordance with the Taiwan
    Relations Act of 1979. I would be interested in hearing your opinion on
    Taiwan's need for these systems and the pros and cons associated with
    the sale of these destroyers.
        Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]

                              HUMAN RIGHTS STATUS

        10. Senator Collins. General Pace, what is the status of human
    rights in the AOR? What is the status of human rights in Colombia?
        General Pace. I consider human rights to be a developing success
    story in the USSOUTHCOM AOR. Most of the nations in the AOR continue to
    implement legislation and create institutions to protect the human
    rights of their citizens. For example, the Dominican Republic
    established a school to teach human rights to their military troops,
    Colombia established an equivalent of our Staff Judge Advocate Corps,
    and virtually all the nations in the region cooperatively developed a
    human rights consensus document to establish standards of conduct,
    measures of effectiveness, and training criteria for military and
    police forces. While there is still much to be done, I am optimistic
    the nations in the region are addressing this important issue
    seriously.
        Colombia has the most visible ongoing human rights challenges and
    the most aggressive human rights program. We believe the Colombian
    government and, in particular, the Colombian military have made
    significant progress in their efforts to curtail human rights abuses.
    During the late 1980s and early 1990s, about 60 percent of all reported
    accusations of human rights abuses were made against the Colombian
    military. Last year, the number attributable to the military fell to
    less than 2 percent of all accusations. This progress is a direct
    result of leadership at the highest levels of the Colombian military
    taking an active role in changing the culture of their institution by
    educating their forces on human rights standards, establishing a staff
    judge advocate school to train their lawyers, establishing Rules of
    Engagement for the troops, investigating allegations, and dismissing
    those found guilty of committing human rights violations or collusion
    with the illegal self defense forces. Last year the Colombian military
    under the direction of Minister of Defense Ramirez dismissed 388
    officers suspected of human rights violations. The recent appointment
    of Gustavo Bell as the nation's Minister of Defense is another sign of
    the Colombian government's and military's commitment to
    institutionalize human rights standards and practices into everyday
    operations. Mr. Bell has been President Pastrana's point man for human
    rights reforms during the latter's administration and a strong advocate
    of change and evolution in the area of human rights. Mr. Bell's
    appointment as Minister of Defense serves to reinforce the Colombian
    government's commitment to human rights and should continue to build
    upon the significant progress demonstrated by Colombia in recent years.

                        OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN COLOMBIA

        11. Senator Collins. General Pace, what is the status of operations
    in southern Colombia, including the program to purchase UH-60s and UH-
    1H IIs for Colombia? What are the anticipated regional impacts and
    threat assessment as a result of implementation of military aspects of
    Plan Colombia?
        General Pace. [Deleted.]
        The Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
    (DoS/INL) has contracted with Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation for the
    procurement and delivery of 14 UH-60Ls. The first UH-60 aircraft are
    projected to arrive in Colombia in July 2001. All 14 aircraft should be
    in Colombia by December 2001. DoS/INL is negotiating with Bell
    Helicopter Textron Incorporated for the procurement and delivery of 20
    Huey IIs. The first Huey II aircraft is expected to arrive in Colombia
    by January 2002. All 20 Huey II aircraft are projected to be in
    Colombia by June 2002.
        The drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable skill in
    adapting their manufacturing procedures, production locations,
    transportation routes, and markets in response to interdiction efforts.
    That said, [deleted].

                             MISSILE PROLIFERATION

        12. Senator Collins. General Schwartz, recent reports indicate that
    North Korea has been a key source of missile-related technology,
    expertise, and equipment for the Iranians since the early 1990s. Due to
    extensive equipment and technical assistance from North Korea, Iran now
    can produce Scud missiles. Which technologies do you suspect North
    Korea is providing to our other key adversaries and what regions do you
    believe are seeking these technologies? What more can or should we be
    doing to prevent this proliferation?
        General Schwartz. [Deleted.]

                                AGREED FRAMEWORK

        13. Senator Collins. General Schwartz, in October 1994, the U.S.
    and North Korea entered into the Agreed Framework in an effort to
    control the potential development of nuclear weapons by North Korea.
    The heart of the Agreed Framework and the amending accords is a deal
    under which the United States will provide North Korea with a package
    of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits, in return North
    Korea will halt the operations and infrastructure of its nuclear
    program. What is your view on the extent to which the Framework's
    objectives have been satisfied thus far? What is your view on the
    prospect for ultimate success of the agreement?
        General Schwartz. We should measure the Agreed Framework against
    our nonproliferation objectives. The DPRK made two very significant
    nonproliferation agreements beyond the freezing of the facilities at
    Yongbyon and the canning of the known fuel rods. First, the DPRK agreed
    to permit at the conclusion of the light water reactor (LWR) supply
    contract ad hoc and routine inspections by the International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA) of facilities not subject to the freeze. Second,
    the DPRK agreed to come into full compliance with IAEA Safeguards
    Agreement before completion of the LWR project.
        Although the DPRK has, for the most part, lived up to the letter of
    the Agreed Framework and the agreement has achieved the near term
    objective of shutting down the Yongbyon facilities, implementation of
    the Agreed Framework is incomplete. To date these graphite moderated
    reactors remain frozen, and all known intact rods are canned, and under
    IAEA seal. For the LWRs to become operational the DPRK must be in full
    compliance with IAEA safeguards. No indication exists that North Korea
    is ready to accept the prerequisite level of transparency.
    Unfortunately, the potential and promise of the Agreed Framework have
    not yet been fully realized and the DPRK's long-term intentions are not
    clear.
        [Deleted.]

                       INFRASTRUCTURE AND QUALITY OF LIFE

        14. Senator Collins. General Schwartz, infrastructure and quality
    of life have been bill payers for readiness for a long time. However,
    despite this fact, the morale and dedication of our service men and
    woman are extraordinary. In your professional opinion, what steps can
    we take this year to make strides in attaining a balanced approach to
    ensure good training, good quality of life, and good infrastructure for
    our troops?
        General Schwartz. Achieving our vision and accomplishing our
    missions require us to prioritize scarce resources. To do this, we
    apply the concept of balanced readiness. Balanced readiness blends
    combat readiness--our ability to ``fight tonight''--with the categories
    of quality of life for servicemembers and their families, and the
    condition of the infrastructure. In fact, in terms of prioritizing
    military construction resources today, the quality of life and
    infrastructure categories of my balanced readiness concept are the most
    important. Our military construction (MILCON) command priorities, then,
    fall into three categories: (1) War Fighting Readiness, (2)
    Infrastructure, and (3) Quality of Life. My immediate concerns right
    now are quality of life issues.
        A Korean assignment today involves some of the poorest living and
    working conditions of any permanent change of station assignment in the
    military. Even with the great assistance we received from Congress last
    year, $138 million for quality of life construction, we continue to
    face grim conditions throughout this command. We cannot sacrifice cuts
    in one category to provide for in another category. My goal is to make
    a Korean assignment comparable to other Outside Continental United
    States (OCONUS) assignments. To do this we need the continued support
    of Congress.
        Over 50 percent of the servicemembers in U.S. Forces Korea live in
    inadequate quarters. These quarters are inadequately maintained due to
    lack of funding and are inadequate in terms of size. Quarters in Korea
    are very small and become very cramped when furnished to American
    standards. Overcrowded facilities force us to billet many unaccompanied
    personnel off-post in dense urban areas, creating force protection
    concerns. This practice not only increases their personal risk, it also
    imposes a high financial burden in terms of out of pocket, cost of
    living expenses.
        Family housing throughout the peninsula is inadequate as well. As
    with the barracks, the family housing on and off post in Korea is very
    small and becomes very cramped when furnished to American standards.
    Much of the housing in Korea is over 25 years old and many of the units
    have never been renovated. Only 9 percent of the Command serves an
    accompanied tour due to the lack of available housing on post. This
    continuous rotation of personnel every year has a dramatic impact on
    all services in Korea and seriously impacts force readiness for U.S.
    Forces Korea. Historically, funding for housing in Korea has been
    minimal. Since 1959, only $43 million has been targeted for family
    housing. We require $49 million, per year, over the next 10 years to
    match our host nation funded construction housing effort.
        Many of our soldiers along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) are still
    living and working in overcrowded and substandard Quonset and H-
    relocatable barracks that do not provide the minimum net square footage
    required by current Army standards. These substandard facilities have
    gang latrines and deteriorated heating systems, do not provide adequate
    security for soldiers' personal and military issue items, waste energy
    and are becoming structurally unsound.
        Furthermore, we cannot renovate these substandard barracks to meet
    current standards. These substandard conditions have a significant
    negative impact on the health, morale, and mission readiness of the
    soldiers and units they serve. We need 28 new UOQs at a cost of $49
    million per year over the next 10 years.
        We presently have 20 physical fitness centers that need to be
    replaced at a cost of $15 million per year over the next 10 years. We
    have 12 dining facilities that need immediate replacement at a cost of
    $14 million per year over the next 10 years. Replacing these
    unsatisfactory buildings will have an immediate effect on improving the
    quality of life for our servicemembers.
        We desperately need to execute a comprehensive construction program
    and begin to eliminate the unacceptable living and working conditions
    in aging facilities that U.S. forces in Korea face every day. Last year
    we received $76 million.
        Substandard infrastructure, living, and working conditions are not
    limited to the soldiers at the DMZ, but also exist at other Army, Air
    Force, and Navy installations throughout the Korean peninsula. The
    problems continue to grow worse. Chronic under-funding of sustainment,
    restoration, and modernization (SRM) funding for Korea during the past
    15 years and the interruption of MILCON dollars for our command between
    1991 and 1994 has limited our ability to give our servicemembers that
    quality of life they deserve. Aging facilities are also more costly to
    maintain.
        The extent of our water and electricity problem is best illustrated
    by the fact that in 1999 and 2000 alone, the command suffered 437
    electrical power and 515 water supply outages from decaying
    infrastructure. Currently, we can only afford emergency repairs, which
    is more costly in the long term than having a preventive maintenance
    program.
        Additionally, we are currently in the process of upgrading and
    improving sewer and water disposal systems in many of our installations
    and require support to complete these projects. To repair and upgrade
    these systems we require $29 million per year for 10 years for water,
    $60 million per year for 10 years for electric, and $61 million per
    year for 10 years for sewers. In fiscal year 2002, we anticipate $83.4
    million in fiscal year 2002 for real property maintenance. This funding
    will allow us to keep the doors open to our facilities and make
    emergency repairs only. It leaves us $194.0 million short of our total
    requirement of $274.4 million, which would allow the command to provide
    quality facilities and accomplish the routine maintenance required on a
    day-to-day basis. Thirty percent of all buildings in the command are
    between 40 and 80 years old and 32 percent are classified as temporary
    buildings.
        Being good stewards of the environment in our host country is
    important to our mission and the alliance, and a major subset of the
    infrastructure category. We have accomplished much but there is more we
    will do. Future problem mitigation and environmental protection
    requires continuous funding from both the Republic of Korea and U.S. We
    need an additional $43.6 million in the environmental operations and
    maintenance accounts for fiscal year 2002 and approximately $15 million
    in MILCON per year over the next 10 years for compliance cleanup,
    pollution prevention, wastewater treatment facilities, and
    conservation. Our investment in protecting the Korean environment is
    the responsible course of action that serves to strengthen our
    alliance.
        I want to emphasize that the support of Congress and the American
    people is vitally important to our future in Korea. We thank you for
    all you have done. Your MILCON support since 1995 has allowed us to
    upgrade or replace 126 facilities. We have an investment of over 50
    years in this region, but we cannot continue this investment 1 year at
    a time. The U.S. forces in Korea require a continued investment in
    basic readiness and quality of life.

                              READINESS ASSESSMENT

        15. Senator Collins. Admiral Blair, General Schwartz, and General
    Pace, recently, a senior officer expressed his concern to me that our
    current spending pattern is to rob our modernization account to pay for
    pressing readiness problems. He also described a disturbing pattern in
    which the Clinton administration deliberately under funded readiness
    accounts with the expectation of a supplemental fix for these pressing
    issues. While you have each addressed readiness issues separately in
    your testimony, what is your overall assessment of your respective
    command's readiness?
        Admiral Blair. As previously mentioned in my written testimony, the
    forces in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) are fully ready to execute any
    assigned mission. We continue to have no reservation about our ability
    to do our job today, but do have doubts about our ability to do so in
    the future unless we make progress in addressing structural readiness
    issues.
        Overall, the warfighting capabilities of U.S. Armed Forces have
    leveled out after recent declines, but there are many critical
    readiness areas that continue to cause concern. My issues are focused
    in eight areas: people; operations and maintenance funding; mobility
    infrastructure; sustainment restoration, and modernization; housing;
    Army prepositioned stocks; preferred munitions; and medical support.
        People. Readiness starts with people. First, I would like to
    express the appreciation of the men and women of the USPACOM for the
    pay and compensation measures taken this past year. I strongly applaud
    the funding in the fiscal year 2000 budget for a base pay increase,
    elimination of the REDUX retirement system, return to 50 percent base
    pay after 20 years of service, and pay table reform that rewards
    achievement more than longevity. These actions demonstrate the interest
    of our Nation in equitably and fairly compensating the men and women of
    the Armed Forces both on active duty and in retirement. I also very
    much endorse Congress's commitment to keep pay raises above the
    Employment Cost Index for the next several years to continue to ensure
    competitive compensation.
        Pay and retirement are not the only areas of concern. To attract
    and retain highly motivated, qualified people, we must continue to
    emphasize quality medical care, education, and housing while providing
    the opportunity to live in a secure and safe environment. We must
    increase our efforts to pursue improvements in TRICARE so customer
    satisfaction, particularly at military treatment facilities, meets the
    national standard. This is critical to taking care of our personnel and
    families. I appreciate the ongoing efforts in the area of dependent
    education; however, I must emphasize we need to continue our efforts so
    educational standards in Department of Defense schools offer programs
    and services that meet or exceed the national average. We should be
    especially attentive to revitalizing all housing assets. Current
    funding gaps and delays in privatization have endangered our goal to
    fix the housing problems by 2010.
        Operations and Maintenance Funding. The next most important
    component of readiness is funding for operations and maintenance. These
    funds provide spare parts, fuel for aircraft, ships, and tanks, funds
    to train, and upkeep for our bases. Here the news is not positive. The
    Pacific component commands gained only marginally from fiscal year 1999
    and 2000 Emergency/Readiness Supplemental Appropriations. Further, the
    funds provided were only sufficient to prevent further declines in
    readiness rather than assist in any measurable increase. Accordingly,
    the readiness of our component commands is not expected to reflect any
    significant increase this fiscal year from supplemental funding.
    Forward deployed forces and forces deploying to contingencies are at a
    high state of readiness. Non-deployed and rear area forces are at lower
    readiness. Camps, posts, and stations continue to deteriorate.
        Mobility Infrastructure. Of particular concern is the
    transportation infrastructure required to deploy forces across the
    Pacific in support of conflict in Korea or other operations. The
    problem centers on aging fuel systems in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and
    Japan, specifically, fuel hydrant distribution systems and storage
    tanks, which in many cases are nearly 50 years old and nearing the end
    of their useful service life. These existing systems are not only very
    costly to maintain, but their age reduces our capacity to speed
    strategic airlift across the Pacific. The continued appropriation of
    resources is absolutely essential to maintain this upward trend and
    complete the necessary repairs of our aging mobility infrastructure.
        Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM). SRM is showing
    the combined effects of aging facilities and cumulative underfunding.
    The result is a maintenance backlog that will continue to grow unless
    the Services can program more funds. These programs must reflect a
    commitment to having first-rate facilities that are on a par with the
    quality of our people and weapons systems. Our components require
    approximately $3.6 billion over the next 5 years to fix this backlog.
    This amount is above what is needed to maintain the status quo on our
    bases and infrastructure. The shortfall in SRM affects readiness,
    quality of life, retention, and force protection, and can no longer be
    ignored. Our people deserve to live and work in first-class buildings.
    We have not yet reached this standard.
        Housing. Safe, adequate, well-maintained housing remains one of my
    top quality of life concerns. In the Pacific area of responsibility,
    the latest assessment shows military family housing (MFP) units totaled
    79,471, with shortfalls of over 11,000 on the west coast and Hawaii,
    4,000 in Japan, and 2,650 in Korea. We are working hard to correct the
    housing problems with projects ranging from whole barracks renewals at
    Fort Richardson, Alaska, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to new family
    housing at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. However, much more
    remains to be done and I need your continued support for these very
    important programs which are vital to retaining the quality people that
    are the cornerstone of our military strength.
        Army Prepositioned Stocks. A key logistics and sustainment
    shortfall remains the Army Prepositioned Stocks 4 (APS-4) Brigade Set
    located in Korea. Army heavy forces deploying to fight on the Korean
    peninsula would fall in on this equipment. Although we are happy with
    the status of the Brigade Set, crucial shortages exist in sustainment
    stocks that impact our ability to replace combat losses. I fully
    support CINCUNC/CFC's requirement to have this set of equipment become
    a Korean version of the capability that exists in Kuwait to support
    Central Command.
        Preferred Munitions. Another logistics shortfall in USPACOM is
    preferred munitions. Operations in Kosovo severely depleted worldwide
    stocks of Navy and Air Force precision guided munitions, including many
    types designated in our plans for use in Korea. Although Service
    programs have received supplemental funding that will alleviate some of
    the shortfalls over time, critical shortages exist now. Theater plans
    can still be executed successfully, but only by substituting less
    effective munitions early in the conflict. The result is additional
    high-risk sorties by combat crews, a longer conflict, and higher
    casualties.
        Medical Support. Finally, we may be accepting some risk in the area
    of medical support. Although funding has been programmed to meet
    prepositioned medical supply shortfalls, and a test will be made of the
    shortages of prepositioned medical supplies, an initial shortfall in
    the number of hospital beds, the movement of additional hospitals and
    personnel from continental U.S.-based hospital facilities, and the
    untested ability of the industrial base and medical logistics programs
    to support massive deployment and initial in-theater requirements,
    makes our ability to provide adequate force health protection
    uncertain.
        In summary, USPACOM can do the job today. However, we need
    continued investments to attract and retain quality personnel, maintain
    both our equipment and facilities, build stocks of the most modern
    munitions and equipment needed to sustain combat operations most
    effectively, and provide medical support during a major theater war.
        General Schwartz. As I report in my Joint Monthly Readiness Review
    (JMRR), all CFC units are prepared to execute their wartime mission.
    However, we have some significant deficiencies that are reported in
    great detail to the Joint Staff. [Deleted.] While there have been only
    minor changes to the readiness issues reported in the JMRR, CFC
    believes there is [deleted].
        General Pace. There are shortfalls within our units. With one
    exception, none of the shortfalls significantly impact our ability to
    accomplish assigned missions. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

                       PLAN COLOMBIA AND NARCO-TERRORISM

        16. Senator Landrieu. General Pace, last year I followed the
    debates over Plan Colombia, our approach to the problem of narco-
    terrorism in South America, and the issues surrounding counter-
    narcotics efforts with great interest. I am concerned, however, that
    Plan Colombia was significantly watered down. I believe its focus on
    Colombia risks simply pushing drug producers, processors, smugglers,
    and possibly the rebels themselves across the borders into the
    neighboring countries of Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. This
    would just exacerbate the problem and turn Colombia's problem into a
    regional one. Do you agree with this assessment and, if so, what
    changes would you recommend to make Plan Colombia more effective
    throughout your AOR?
        General Pace. While various elements of the drug trafficking
    business already impact virtually all nations in the region, I agree
    with your assessment that a successfully executed Plan Colombia
    increases the risk of pushing drug producers, processors, and smugglers
    across the borders into neighboring countries. Due to the potentially
    lucrative profits of the narco-trafficking business, I fully expect
    drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to employ every measure possible,
    including migration of their activities across Colombian borders, to
    continue their operations. Fortunately, no major change of direction is
    required in planned U.S. support for Colombia and its neighbors. The
    Department of State-led U.S. Government interagency effort supporting
    Plan Colombia anticipated this DTO reaction and is already coordinating
    the regional response required to contain spillover. A substantial
    percentage of both the fiscal year 2001 Emergency Supplemental and the
    proposed fiscal year 2002 Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) provide
    funds to develop bordering country capabilities specifically designed
    to address this problem. USSOUTHCOM, through the Department of Defense,
    is actively supporting this Department of State-led effort.

                                COLOMBIAN REBELS

        17. Senator Landrieu. General Pace, just last week, the U.S.
    Ambassador to Colombia, Anne Patterson, endorsed a proposal to grant
    Colombia's second-largest rebel group a demilitarized enclave to help
    revive suspended peace talks. This proposal, part of President Andres
    Pastrana's land-for-peace policy, would hand over a territory in
    northern Colombia to the 5,000-member National Liberation Army with all
    government troops and police leaving the zone. Based purely on your
    military expertise, what is your assessment of the Colombian military's
    ability to execute Plan Colombia and deal with these rebels?
        General Pace. [Deleted.]

                        READINESS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS

        18. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, General Pace, and General
    Schwartz, last week this committee was briefed by Generals Ralston and
    Franks on the status of their AORs. Like them, you have provided superb
    prepared statements which address your engagement plans and needs. I
    have a few follow-up questions:
        JSTARS. The Air Force reports that JSTARS platforms and air crews
    are severely burdened due to CINCs' requirements--particularly in the
    EUCOM ard CENTCOM AORs. For the past 3 years Congress has added funds
    to continue procurement of the JSTARS aircraft moving the fleet size
    toward the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) requirement of
    19. I would like you to give your views on the importance of that
    system to your AOR, your war plans, and if you have been constrained
    due to lack of assets.
        Force Reductions. Given the fact that our forward-deployed forces
    in Korea serve mainly as a ``tripwire'' and source of deterrence, do
    you see any room for reductions in those forces in the near future?
        Burden-sharing. With regards to the renegotiation of the Special
    Measures Agreement, what is the status of those negotiations and what
    are your expectations as to increase South Korean support of the
    financial costs associated with the facilities and forces we base
    there?
        Admiral Blair. Moving Target Indicator (MTI) coverage over the
    Korean Peninsula is a [deleted]. JSTARS is invaluable in providing
    deep-look MTI especially in light of ongoing [deleted]. The aircraft,
    however, is allocated to the Pacific theater [deleted] JSTARS support
    to the theater is required. During a conflict, JSTARS will play a
    critical role in providing MTI coverage of enemy activities. [Deleted.]
    This is expected to increase in subsequent re-writes of the OPLANS as
    more JSTARS aircraft and trained aircrew come on-line. [Deleted.]
        General Pace. [Deleted.]
        General Schwartz. [Deleted.]
        No. The strength of our alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK)
    is our presence. The ROK soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines defend
    the Republic everyday. They defend the majority of the Demilitarized
    Zone forward of most USFK forces. Northeast Asia will remain vital in
    both strategic and tactical terms. Our presence demonstrates our
    commitment to regional partners and provides credible and practical
    contribution to regional stability and security. Continued access to
    Northeast Asia will be critical to respond to future contingencies/
    crises. Regional presence enables us to respond more rapidly and
    flexibly. Many variables will determine the shape and size of our
    presence such as the nature of regional security situation and the
    national interest of our host nation and perceived threats to those
    interests. However the U.S. will have national interests in the region
    well into the future.
        Ambassador Marisa Lino, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary
    of State for Political-Military Affairs, led the U.S. delegation in the
    first round of the 2001 Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiations
    with the Republic of Korea's Government (ROKG) on 29-30 March in Seoul.
    The U.S. proposed a multi-year agreement, within the current SMA
    structure, with a baseline contribution of USD 584 million for 2002.
    Ambassador Lino further proposed that contributions for future years
    should be calculated with a growth equation based upon the previous
    year's inflation rate, GDP growth, and a fixed escalator clause to
    ensure that the overall ROK contributions reflect an increasing
    percentage of USFK non-personnel stationing costs and fair
    consideration of the ROK's economic situation. The ROKG SMA
    representatives during the initial meeting in March and during three
    subsequent working level meetings lead by the U.S. Embassy expressed
    concerns about our assessment of their ability to pay, evaluation of
    contributions outside of the SMA, commitment to a multi-year agreement,
    and overall fairness.
        Despite the gaps in our initial positions, we fully anticipate a
    new Special Measures Agreement, which results in fair, real, and
    meaningful growth in the Republic of Korea's contribution to the
    payment of USFK's non-personnel stationing costs.

                               PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

        19. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair and General Schwartz, in your
    opening statements you both allude to the fact that, while the last
    year has seen breathtaking developments in North Korea's relationship
    with the South and the rest of the world, their training cycle last
    winter and over the summer was robust and you evaluate their military
    as ``bigger, better, closer, and deadlier'' than when you briefed this
    committee last year. At the same time, the North Korean economy is a
    shambles and most experts agree that the country is breaking down--the
    only question is whether it will explode or implode. Recently, the
    President has expressed skepticism about ongoing peace negotiations
    between North and South Korea and decided to postpone talks with the
    North. Just last Friday, European Union leaders announced they would
    dispatch their own team of mediators to try and jump-start the talks.
    What is your assessment of the ongoing peace negotiations and what
    impact do you believe the EU's actions will have on the process?
        Admiral Blair. President Bush's 6 June policy announcement on North
    Korea has changed the dynamics of the issue significantly. At this
    time, our State Department and its peers in the Republic of Korea (ROK)
    and other nations have the lead in the diplomatic campaign to convince
    North Korea to move from rogue state to becoming a more normal member
    of the international community--with all the benefits and
    responsibilities that entails. As a military leader, I am concerned Kim
    Jong-Il continues to devote scarce resources to maintaining a large
    conventional military force that threatens regional peace and
    prosperity. I certainly support the multilateral efforts to reduce that
    threat and hold North Korea responsible for adhering to international
    norms.
        General Schwartz. The historic meeting between President Kim Dae-
    Jung and Chairman Kim Jong-Il initiated a great deal of diplomatic
    activity on the Korean peninsula which touched off a wave of
    reconciliation euphoria in South Korea and generated the public
    perception that peace was just around the corner. As I noted in my
    statement, the initial pace of diplomatic activity  in the summer and
    fall of 2000 was indeed staggering. North Korea, however, is not a
    predictable and reliable partner for the ROK. The North Koreans have
    repeatedly stalled the promised follow-on to the first ever meeting of
    defense ministers in September 2001. North Korea has yet to implement
    any meaningful military confidence building measures (CBM). A detailed
    agreement, which could have served as a model CBM, on the construction
    of the Seoul-Sinuiju transportation corridor remains unsigned. Meetings
    at the ministerial-level sponsored by the ROK Unification Ministry on a
    wide range of non-military issues have yet to yield concrete results.
    This spring North Korea abruptly cancelled an April Red Cross meeting
    and a March ministerial-level meeting. The promised and long
    anticipated follow-on summit between the leaders of North and South
    Korea is not yet scheduled. While it is encouraging that Kim Jong-Il
    promised to extend the moratorium on missile testing into 2003 the
    recent threat to abrogate the Agreement Framework is a more typical
    example of their unpredictable behavior. While North Korea's greatly
    expanded diplomatic contacts, to included the European Union, provide
    the opportunity from the DPRK leadership to hear from a variety of
    sources about the requirements for predictable and reliable
    international behavior, these contacts have not fundamentally changed
    the DPRK's erratic behavior and the reconciliation process is stalled.

                                 MISSILE THREAT

        20. Senator Landrieu. General Schwartz, the ongoing debates on
    national and theater ballistic missile defense as well as concerns
    about threat assessments and the Rumsfeld Commission's report continue
    to highlight the danger ballistic missiles pose to regional and world
    stability. What is your military assessment of the North Korean missile
    program and the threat it poses to our forces in the Pacific as well as
    Hawaii and the Continental United States?
        General Schwartz. [Deleted.]

                               TAIWAN ARMS SALES

        21. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, just last week President Jiang
    Zemin told American reporters: ``We absolutely oppose the sale of
    advanced weapons by the United States to Taiwan. If the United States
    were to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan such as the Aegis system, that
    would be very detrimental to China-U.S. relations.'' At the same time,
    China continues to deploy increasingly more sophisticated missile
    batteries in the Fujian province (about 100 miles from Taiwan) to
    threaten leaders on the island. Given your expertise on Sino-American
    relations and the security environment in your theater, what is your
    recommendation on the sale of advanced technology systems, including
    the Aegis weapons system, to Taiwan?
        Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]

                                 CHINESE THREAT

        22. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, a source of great debate in
    Washington these days is the strategic review Secretary Rumsfeld is
    conducting at the Pentagon to determine what our strategy should be in
    the coming years. Andrew Marshall is on record as saying he believes
    China represents the true threat the United States will face in the
    21st century. What is your assessment of the Chinese threat and what
    advice would you give this committee on how to deal with it?
        Admiral Blair. [Deleted.]
        Our engagement tempo and range of activities with China may vary
    over time, but it is important to keep a consistent approach that
    promotes cooperation, fosters constructive regional agreements, and
    deters intimidation or the use of force.

                      RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY INTERACTION

        23. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, in your prepared statement you
    allude to restrictions on your ability to interact with 14 of the 43
    nations in the region and question the validity of some of those
    restrictions. What restrictions do you believe should be removed or
    modified to enhance your ability to execute your regional engagement
    strategy? Are any of those restrictions mandated by Congress or are
    they imposed by the administration and/or DOD?
        Admiral Blair. U.S. Pacific Command currently is restricted in some
     manner in its interactions with 14 of the 43 nations in the region. If
    we are to maintain our relationships and ability to influence
    throughout the AOR we must seek to propel inevitable changes in Asia in
    directions we deem desirable. Inflexible restrictions that impose broad
    penalties in the short-term may ultimately damage our overall long-term
    strategic interests.
        While I do not support a reward to ``bad actors,'' suspension of
    all Military-to-Military (Mil-to-Mil) contact activities eliminates the
    opportunity for dialogue and the opportunity for positive influence by
    the U.S. When Mil-to-Mil contact is totally suspended, no shaping can
    occur.
        I favor a baseline activity level that we would sustain with all
    nations. All nations would generally be entitled to attend
    international multilateral conferences, senior service schools, and
    institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
    (APCSS). I believe that it is to our benefit to expose officers and
    other officials even of nations like Burma, Comoros, and North Korea,
    to democratic ideals and international norms.
        Expansion of Mil-to-Mil contact above the baseline would include
    foreign military sales (FMS)/foreign military financing, port visits,
    military training, and exercises. If a nation severely regresses in its
    reform efforts or violates international norms, then discretionary
    activities are rolled back in proportion to the severity of the event.
        For example, under such a Mil-to-Mil baseline policy, Indonesia
    would benefit from continual exposure to democratic ideals and
    international norms. It is in the U.S. interest to influence Indonesian
    armed forces (TNI) to adopt such ideals and norms. Yet, since
    international military education and training was discontinued in 1991,
    few Indonesian officers have been exposed to the U.S. Armed Forces.
    Conversely, we are limited in our ability to influence developments due
    to the scarce number of contacts developed.
        Positive reforms by TNI could result in increased activities,
    ranging from FMS cases like C-130 spare parts and F-16 aircraft, to
    port visits, military training, and exercises. Regression in the TNI
    reform effort would lead to a proportional rollback in discretionary
    activities. Regardless of progress or regression, however, I believe
    there should remain a place for Mil-to-Mil contact to provide long-term
    opportunities for dialogue and positive influence.
        Current restrictions include: New Zealand, Indonesia, North Korea,
    Taiwan, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Fiji, Laos, Mongolia, China, Comoros,
    India, and Russia.

                                     JAPAN

        24. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Blair, you have spoken about our
    relationship with Japan and the sensitivity of negotiations on the 5-
    year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) as well as issues concerning
    various bases in Japan. In your opinion, what impact will the U.S.S.
    Greeneville's sinking of the Ehime Maru have on those negotiations and
    our security relationship? Based on your experience as a naval officer,
    what is your opinion about the calls to raise the Ehime Maru?
        Admiral Blair. The new 5-year SMA was ratified by the Japanese Diet
    in November 2000 and went into effect on 1 April 2001, before the
    U.S.S. Greeneville's collision with the Ehime Maru. I believe the U.S.
    and Japan have a strong bilateral relationship whose enduring strength
    has benefited both sides for close to half a century. I  believe we
    will be able to move forward from this tragedy in the interests of both
    nations and our peoples. I fully support ongoing efforts to raise the
    Ehime Maru. Recovery operations at this depth, though technically
    feasible, will be challenging. We are committed to using the best
    capabilities in the world. When salvage operations begin later this
    summer, the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force will do
    everything possible to recover the remains of the missing crewmembers.

        [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee was recessed, to
    reconvene in closed session.]

     DEPARMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 28, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       MILITARY POSTURE/BUDGET AMENDMENT

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
    Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Santorum,
    Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director; Anita R. Raiford, deputy chief clerk; Madelyn R.
    Creedon, counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Gerald J.
    Leeling, counsel; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
        Professional staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    Evelyn N. Farkas, Richard W. Fieldhouse, Creighton Greene,
    Michael J. McCord, and Terence P. Szuplat.
        Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
    Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority
    counsel; Ann M. Mittermeyer, minority counsel; Suzanne K.L.
    Ross, research assistant; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel;
    and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    Edward H. Edens IV, Brian R. Green, William C. Greenwalt, Gary
    M. Hall, Mary Alice A. Hayward, Ambrose R. Hock, George W.
    Lauffer, Patricia L. Lewis, Thomas L. MacKenzie, Joseph T.
    Sixeas, and Cord A. Sterling.
        Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen, Thomas C. Moore,
    and Jennifer L. Naccari.
        Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, Barry Gene
    (B.G.) Wright, and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd;
    Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew
    Vanlandinghama, assistant to Senator Cleland; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to
    Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal
    Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant
    to Senator Dayton; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator
    McCain; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator Smith; John A.
    Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier III,
    assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Allen McCurry and James
    Beauchamp, assistants to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
    assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
    to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
    Sessions; and Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order. The
    committee meets this afternoon to receive testimony from Donald
    Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; General Hugh Shelton, Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dr. Dov Zakheim, Under
    Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). We welcome them. They will
    be testifying this afternoon on the fiscal year 2002 budget
    amendment. We welcome you all back.
        This may be the final time that General Shelton will be
    appearing before this committee to present his views on a
    defense budget before his term ends this fall. General Shelton,
    you have always put one cause above all others, and that is the
    well-being of America's Armed Forces and their families.
    History will record you as an outstanding Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff who left the U.S. military more capable than
    you found it. On behalf of all of us, I want to take this
    opportunity to express our gratitude for the tremendous service
    that you have given to this Nation.
        Mr. Secretary, we all know there are many reasons why the
    administration is late in submitting the amended budget
    request, but as I mentioned in our hearing last week, the
    administration's delay is forcing Congress to attempt in an 8-
    week session what typically takes 5 months. It will be an
    incredibly difficult task.
        The men and women of our Armed Forces have a lot at stake
    in the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Bill,
    and every member of this committee is committed to working hard
    to complete action on this bill before the start of the new
    fiscal year. To do that, the committee needs an actual budget
    proposal from the Department of Defense. So far, we have
    received only a budget outline. We need details on specific
    budget line items, and we need the justification books
    explaining these line items.
        This morning, we received some of the legislative proposals
    that the Secretary is asking this committee to consider. Mr.
    Secretary, given the extremely compressed schedule that I
    mentioned, we have to ask again for all of that information
    that I have outlined, the specific line items, the
    justification books, and legislative proposals by next week.
        While we have had only 24 hours to review your budget
    request, certain aspects are beginning to emerge. The fog is
    still heavy, but it is beginning to lift. There are some
    positive aspects to the request, such as efforts to build on
    the improvements in quality of life over the last few years by
    giving pay raises, reducing service members' out-of-pocket
    housing costs, and increasing funds for military health care
    and family housing. However, there are some puzzling aspects of
    your request as well.
        For instance, despite a proposed $33 billion increase in
    defense spending over the current fiscal year, spending on
    procurement would actually decrease next year by $0.5 billion;
    despite this $33 billion increase, funding for basic science
    and technology also would decrease next year; and despite a
    $7.8 billion increase in spending for operations and
    maintenance, Army flying hours and tank training miles also
    would decrease.
        At the same time, funding for missile defense would
    increase by $3 billion, from $5.3 billion to $8.3 billion, a 57
    percent jump over this year's level. Every line item in the
    budget involves real choices. It is clear that this budget
    places a huge increase in missile defense ahead of important
    programs in modernization, basic research, and training time
    for Army units.
        Earlier this year, many of us in the Senate expressed our
    concern that the large tax cut sought by the administration
    would leave little, if any, room for some essential
    investments, including defense. In fact, during the debate on
    the budget resolution, Senators Landrieu, Carnahan, and others
    introduced an amendment to redirect $100 billion of the tax cut
    over 10 years to defense, only to have that amendment defeated.
        Our Ranking Member, Senator Warner, offered an amendment,
    which was adopted in the Senate but then later dropped in
    conference, which also would have added funds for defense.
        Under the terms of the budget resolution, the Chairmen of
    the Budget Committees in the House and Senate will decide if
    the current level of funding for national defense in the budget
    resolution should be increased to accommodate your proposed
    budget amendment. As the Chairman of the Senate Budget
    Committee mentioned in a letter to the President earlier this
    week, with the new economic estimate from the Congressional
    Budget Office due in about a month, it would appear that the
    $18.4 billion increase that the administration is requesting
    for the Defense Department in fiscal year 2002 could lead to
    dipping into the medicare surplus.
        Moreover, the request before us is limited to fiscal year
    2002. The Secretary will testify today that an additional $18
    billion increase, totaling $347 billion, will be required in
    fiscal year 2003 just to sustain the proposed 2002 budget level
    on a straight line basis. This could take as much as $30
    billion of medicare funds next year alone without paying for
    any improvements or providing funding for the transformation of
    the military to meet new threats, which the Secretary will be
    proposing in the fiscal year 2003 budget, following the
    completion of his defense strategy review and the quadrennial
    defense review.
        Our men and women in uniform depend on defense budgets that
    are sustainable, yet it is increasingly apparent that the
    funding for any future transformation of our Armed Forces
    cannot be initiated or sustained without cutting existing
    defense programs, using the medicare surplus, returning to
    budget deficits, or cutting important programs such as
    education, health care, and law enforcement, none of which are
    acceptable alternatives.
        The bottom line is this: the administration's strategy of
    first laying out a banquet of tax cuts unnecessarily leaves
    other programs, including our national security programs, in an
    extremely precarious position. In order to avoid dangerous
    instability in the defense budget in the future, the
    administration needs to address this situation and provide a
    clear plan for meeting and sustaining our defense needs.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming our witnesses.
        Mr. Chairman, the Republicans are going to caucus today at
    3:00, so I am going to forego my opening statement and place it
    in the record and give my colleagues who will be attending that
    conference the opportunity, hopefully, to have some questions
    before they depart. I certainly join you in the recognition of
    our distinguished chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his lifetime
    contribution to freedom and service to this country.
        I thank you and your family.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in arranging to
    conduct this most important hearing at the earliest possible date. We
    both recognize the herculean task we now face in thoroughly reviewing
    this defense budget request, crafting an authorization bill, and
    gaining the consent of the full Congress prior to the beginning of
    fiscal year 2002.
        I join Senator Levin in welcoming Secretary Rumsfeld to his first
    posture hearing since the 1970s. It was a very different world when you
    last appeared before Congress to discuss the budget request 25 years
    ago, but the importance of the work we begin today is unchanged.
        I want to thank you for the service that you have once again
    undertaken for your country and for the work you have already begun. I
    also want to commend you and President Bush for submitting a budget
    amendment that begins to address the commitment you both made to our
    service men and women, past and present, to their families, and to all
    American citizens. As President Bush stated at the Citadel last Fall,
    we must, ``. . . renew the bond of trust between the American people
    and the American military; . . . defend the American people against
    missiles and terror; and, . . . begin creating the military of the next
    century.''
        I also extend a welcome to Gen. Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, to what will be your last posture hearing--I won't say
    last appearance before this committee--because as a warrior you know
    none of us can predict with any certainty what the future may bring.
        I do want to extend to you the heartfelt thanks of a grateful
    Nation for your extraordinary service, which now spans five decades--
    from 1963 to the present--and includes combat service during two tours
    of duty in Vietnam and during Operation Desert Storm. As Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs, you have been repeatedly called upon to provide sound
    military advice to our President and to execute military operations
    across the spectrum of conflict that have been the epitome of precision
    and military professionalism. We are indebted to you, General Shelton,
    and salute your service.
        We are clearly at a critical juncture in our military history, and
    in the history of our Nation. We all accept that the United States has
    assumed a unique leadership role in the world today, especially in the
    realm of international security. It is easy to feel secure in our sole,
    superpower status, but as our own Director of Central Intelligence,
    George Tenet, and many other studies and commissions have repeatedly
    reminded us, we, as a Nation, are more vulnerable today than ever
    before in this increasingly interdependent and complex world. Mr. Tenet
    reaffirmed before this committee in March of this year that threats to
    our national security continue to increase, as was so tragically
    demonstrated in the vicious terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The
    pace of both social and technological change, continues to accelerate,
    increasing the concerns and the uncertainty we must accept.
        Ironically, we find ourselves in a fractious, complex world in the
    aftermath of communism. The proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction and the means to deliver them, as well as the pervasive
    spread of information technologies, have combined to empower the
    disaffected of this new world order to increasingly threaten our
    shores, interests, and friends. Simply put, we are more vulnerable than
    ever. Those that would do us harm may not be constrained by
    conventional norms of conduct or dissuaded by the vague threat of
    prosecution or retaliation. New concepts and capabilities must be
    considered to strengthen our deterrence and maintain our security. The
    President has properly called for a new ``strategic framework'' to
    address this new reality.
        Clearly, we must be judicious in determining how and when we commit
    our Armed Forces around the world, but just as clearly this global
    leadership role requires robust, balanced, versatile, and credible
    Armed Forces to deter potential aggressors and defend our vital
    national interests, both at home and abroad. To remain a credible
    force, we must act now to develop the improved capabilities and
    concepts to protect our homeland, and deter and defeat anticipated and
    unanticipated threats in the future.
        Indisputably, our Armed Forces are the best, most powerful in the
    world today. This well-deserved reputation was not earned without cost,
    however. While our servicemen and women have performed their military
    missions with great dedication and professionalism, our people,
    equipment, and infrastructure are increasingly stressed by the effects
    of the unprecedented number of military deployments over the past
    decade, combined with years of declining defense spending. As the
    service chiefs have told us repeatedly, future readiness and the upkeep
    of military facilities have been deferred to pay for current operations
    and maintenance.
        Congress has been sensitive to this issue, providing much needed
    extra funding for defense in recent years. In fiscal year 2000, we
    reversed a 14-year decline in defense spending by authorizing a real
    increase in defense spending. Last year, we continued that momentum by
    providing an even larger increase for fiscal year 2001. Over the past 2
    years, we have increased military pay by over 8 percent; restored
    retirement and health care benefits to keep faith with those who serve;
    raised procurement levels to begin recapitalization and modernization
    of aging equipment; and significantly increased investment in research
    and development for the future.
        While much has been done, much remains. The President is to be
    commended for the increases he has proposed in defense spending. Since
    taking office, the President has recommended increases totaling $38.2
    billion. The increases he has proposed for fiscal year 2002 represent
    an almost 11 percent increase in defense spending above the amount
    available in fiscal year 2001. While this increase begins to address
    the shortfalls, I fear it may not be enough.
        There is one area of the budget before us I specifically want to
    highlight--the funding for the development and deployment of missile
    defenses. Ten years after the Gulf War demonstrated our vulnerability
    to ballistic missile attack, our forces overseas and our homeland
    remain defenseless. The Rumsfeld Commission highlighted--and the North
    Koreans demonstrated--the proliferation and growing sophistication of
    these ballistic missile technologies increasingly available to rogue
    states and lawless elements. We must move rapidly to comply with the
    Cochran Act and deploy missile defenses, ``as soon as technologically
    possible.'' I would remind my colleagues that this act, which was
    passed overwhelmingly by the Senate--97-3--and signed into law by the
    President, limits deployment only by technological progress. There are
    no limitations based on treaty restrictions. The budget request of $8.3
    billion for missile defense is a step in the right direction.
        There is a growing consensus in Congress, in the new
    administration, and among the American people that significant new
    investment in defense is necessary and prudent. I credit the joint
    chiefs for the courageous role they have played in building this
    consensus. Beginning in September 1998, and at least once a year since
    then, the chiefs have come before us to testify to critical shortfalls
    in defense spending. I simply ask now, is the budget amendment before
    us sufficient to meet the near-term and long-term needs of the
    respective services?
        General Shelton, you and the Service Chiefs have often spoken of a
    strategy-resource mismatch. We have followed a strategy that has led to
    a geometric rise in the commitment of our forces, without a
    corresponding increase in resources. Secretary Rumsfeld, we are all
    very familiar with the review process you have undertaken to address
    our military strategy and anxiously await the recommendations you will
    make upon conclusion of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Crafting
    a strategy that more realistically anticipates near-term, as well as
    emerging threats is a noble goal. Whatever strategy is ultimately
    adopted must be adequately funded, lest we create another mismatch at a
    reduced level of capability.
        Mr. Secretary, we look forward to working with you to ensure we
    keep faith with our Armed Forces to fully fund all that we ask them to
    do. We also look forward to forthright dialogue and partnership that
    must be a part of our deliberations this year, as well as the fiscal
    year 2003 budget process and beyond, as we truly begin to turn this
    mighty ship you lead to best confront the challenges of today, and the
    ones that lie ahead.
        Thank you.

        Senator Warner. At this time I would also like to insert
    Senator Thurmond's and Senator Hutchinson's statements for the
    record.
        [The prepared statements of Senators Thurmond and
    Hutchinson follow:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Shelton, I
    want to join our Chairman, Senator Levin, and Ranking Member, Senator
    Warner, in welcoming you to this long overdue hearing on the fiscal
    year 2002 budget. Mr. Secretary, you have been very busy during the
    past 5 months and have stirred up much dust. I congratulate you for
    setting into motion a critical review of our defense strategy and the
    operations of the Department of Defense. I look forward to the
    conclusions of your efforts.
        General Shelton, although this may not be your last appearance
    before the committee, it will be your last posture hearing. You have
    weathered many storms during your 4 years as Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff and will be remembered for the many actions you
    advocated to improve the quality of life for our military personnel and
    their families. I expect that I speak for many here on the committee
    when I say, ``thanks for a job well done!''
        Mr. Chairman, as we begin the process that culminates in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, I would like
    to share a quote from a poem by Elizabeth Barrett Browning:

            Happy are all free people, too strong to be dispossessed. But
            blessed are those among nations who dare to be strong for the
            rest!

        The United States of America is a blessed nation because those who
    proceeded us had the foresight to provide for the best equipped,
    trained, and motivated Armed Forces in the history of our great Nation.
    By our strength we have become the protector of the rest of the world
    and must not shed that mantle of responsibility. The budget that we
    will consider over the next several months will provide for the
    continuation of our leadership whether in the form of a missile defense
    system, new high technology weapons or the best quality of life for the
    men and women who wear the uniforms of our military services.
        I do not think that anyone will dispute the fact that over the past
    several years our Armed Forces have become frayed from over commitments
    and under funding. We must reverse that trend. I believe this budget
    amendment, although less than many of us had hoped for, is a good
    start. With this amendment, President Bush will increase the defense
    budget by more than $38 billion over the fiscal year 2001 defense
    budget. More importantly, the increase will provide real benefits in
    terms of improved family housing, readiness, and research and
    development. It will also provide robust funding for a National Missile
    Defense program which I consider the most urgent requirement for our
    Nation's security.
        Mr. Chairman, despite all the positive aspects of this budget, I
    believe it does not adequately fund the modernization of our Armed
    Forces. It is still short of meeting the standard of revitalizing our
    infrastructure every 67 years. It will not close the pay gap between
    the private sector and the military. More importantly, it assumes
    almost $1 billion in savings or efficiencies that are not going to be
    realized.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that fiscal and time
    constraints will leave us little flexibility to make significant
    changes to the budget request. However, we must ensure that we maximize
    the resources that are available. I intend to work with you, Senator
    Warner and Secretary Rumsfeld, to ensure that we achieve that goal.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                                     ______

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Tim Hutchinson

        Mr. Chairman, the President's Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Budget
    Amendment directly addresses areas of critical need in our military. It
    places the needs of our troops first, and places special emphasis on
    quality of life issues. Mr. Secretary you should be applauded for your
    efforts in shaping a budget that will significantly improve morale and
    retention.
        I am particularly pleased about the level of funding provided for
    military healthcare. Last year, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on
    Personnel, I worked very hard to improved the military healthcare
    system. In cooperation with Senator Warner and other members of this
    committee, we passed Warner-Hutchinson Tricare-for-Life, as well a
    comprehensive pharmacy benefit. The President's budget includes
    substantially increased funding for these and other healthcare items.
        I do have concerns about some specific programmatic decisions, and
    I look forward to working with the administration and my colleagues on
    this committee regarding these issues. However, this budget provides
    needed funding for personnel, missile defense, and military
    construction. I look forward to further reviewing the details of the
    President's submission.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Rumsfeld.

      STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
     ACCOMPANIED BY DR. DOV S. ZAKHEIM, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                             (COMPTROLLER)

        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, I had planned to make
    about 10 to 12 minutes of remarks and ask that my statement be
    put in the record. I can do that, or if the Senators have to
    leave, I could delay it until they have a chance. I can do
    whatever you want.
        Chairman Levin. With leave of my colleagues on this side,
    because of that caucus, instead of alternating, let's have
    three or four on the Republican side ask their questions first
    and then come to us. Would that be agreeable? I am willing to
    forego my first line of questions as well.
        We did not have a chance to talk about this--let's start
    out in that direction. Secretary Rumsfeld, why don't you start
    with your 10-minute opening, and then we will call on our
    Republican colleagues, at least for a few minutes each, while
    they are here, to give them a chance to ask a few questions,
    and then we will take the same number on this side.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that very
    special accommodation.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, please proceed with
    your opening.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of
    the committee.
        In discussing the budget, it seems to me it is useful to
    begin by confronting some less than pleasant but important
    facts. The U.S. Armed Forces have been underfunded in a number
    of respects over a sustained period of years. We have been
    living off of the substantial investments made in the 1970s and
    the 1980s. Shortfalls exist today in a number of areas,
    shortfalls that I must say are considerably worse than I had
    anticipated when I arrived.
        Mr. Chairman, as you and members of the committee know
    well, the U.S. Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-
    equipped, and most powerful military force on the face of the
    earth, and certainly the members of this committee have
    contributed greatly to that strength. Peace, prosperity, and
    freedom across the world are underpinned by the stability and
    security that the men and women of the Armed Forces provide.
        I was recently in Kosovo and Turkey to visit our troops.
    They are dedicated men and women who are ready, willing, and
    able to take on any mission the Government may ask of them. Our
    country has many strengths. Indeed, in some ways it is because
    our forces are so capable that we face the challenges we do.
    Over much of the nineties, the U.S. has simultaneously
    underfunded and overused the force, and it has taken its toll.
    Asked to do more with less, they have saluted, done their best,
    but it has been at the cost of needed investment in
    infrastructure, maintenance, and procurement.
        With an end to the Cold War, there was an appropriate
    drawdown, a well-earned peace dividend, but it went too far, in
    my view, overshooting the mark by a good margin. We are
    certainly well past the time to take steps to arrest the
    declines and put the Armed Forces on a path to better health.
        For example, many of our facilities are dilapidated and
    need repair and replacement. There are shortfalls in spare
    parts, flying hours, training and personnel. Navy nondeployed
    force readiness is down to 43 percent from 63 percent in 1991.
    Only 69 percent of the Air Force total combat units are
    mission-ready, down from 91 percent in 1996. Of the Army's
    major air and ground combat systems, 75 percent are beyond
    their half life, and 60 percent of all military housing is
    characterized as substandard.
        While the DOD was using its equipment at increased tempos,
    procurement of new equipment fell significantly below the
    levels necessary to sustain existing forces, leading to steady
    increases in the average age of the equipment. It was called a
    procurement holiday.
        I know you agree that we have an obligation to make certain
    that the men and women in the Armed Forces have the proper
    equipment, training, facilities, and the most advanced
    technologies available to them. The President's 2002 defense
    budget adds needed funds to begin stabilizing that force. Using
    the 2001 enacted budget of $296.3 billion as a baseline, the
    President earlier this year issued a budget blueprint that
    outlined a 2002 baseline budget of $310.5 billion. This
    included $4.4 billion in proposed new money for presidential
    initiatives in pay, housing, and R&D. The request before you
    proposes to raise that investment $18.4 billion, as the
    chairman said, to a total of $328.9 billion.
        Taken together, these increases amount to $22.8 billion. I
    am told that represents the largest peacetime increase in
    defense spending since the mid-1980s. It certainly would
    represent a significant investment of the taxpayer's money. But
    let's be clear about this increase; while significant, and
    while we certainly need every cent of it, it does not get us
    well. The underinvestment went on far too long, the gap is too
    great, and there is no way it can be fixed in a year, or even 6
    years.
        I want to be very straightforward about what this budget
    will do and will not do. This budget will put us on a path to
    recovery in some categories, such as military pay, housing,
    readiness training, and health care. It will start an
    improvement but leave us short of our goal in others, such as
    maintenance of weapons systems and reaching best standards with
    respect to facilities replacement. In other categories there
    will be continued shortfalls and modest, if any, improvements.
        Considering the private sector, the standard for overall
    facility replacement is 57 years. The DOD's target is 67 years.
    Under the 2001 enacted budget, the DOD was replacing facilities
    at an unbelievably poor average rate of 192 years. The 2002
    budget gets us closer. It would allow us to replace facilities
    at an average of 101 years. That is an improvement, but it is
    still a long way from the acceptable target of 67 years.
        In my view, we could do better. With a round of base
    closings and adjustments that reduce unneeded facilities, we
    could focus the funds on facilities that we actually need and
    get the replacement rate down to a lower level. Without base
    closings, to achieve the target it would require an additional
    $7 billion a year for 9 years, or a total of $63 billion.
        Mr. Chairman, let me just say a word about the 2003 budget.
    Today, we are proposing $328.9 billion defense budget for 2002.
    But to keep the Department going next year on a straight line
    basis with no substantial improvements, just covering the cost
    of inflation, honestly budgeting for outyears in major weapons
    systems, and funding health care, which is going to be another
    $4-plus billion, according to the actuaries, we would need a
    budget of about $347 billion. That is another $18 billion
    increase, which would be before addressing important
    transformation issues.
        So where do we find the money? We simply have to achieve
    some cost savings. We have an obligation to the taxpayers to
    spend their money wisely. Today, DOD has substantial overhead.
    Despite 128 acquisition reform studies, we have an acquisition
    system that is antiquated. It takes twice as long as it did in
    1975 to produce a weapons system, and this is at a time when
    technology generations are shortened to something like a year
    or two, or 18 months.
        We have processes and regulations so onerous that a number
    of commercial businesses developing military technologies
    simply do not want to do business with the Department. The
    Department needs greater freedom to manage so we can use the
    taxpayer's money more wisely. For example, I think we ought to
    consider contracting out commissaries, housing, and some other
    services that are not considered core military competencies,
    which can be performed more efficiently in the private sector.
        For fiscal 2002, the Department proposes a pilot program to
    see if this is a good idea; the Army and Marine Corps will
    contract out certain commissaries, and the Navy will contract
    out refueling support, including tanker aircraft.
        Mr. Chairman, I cannot promise it, but I have never seen an
    organization that could not operate at something like 5 percent
    more efficiency if it had the freedom to do so. It is not
    possible today, given all the restrictions on the way the
    Department must function.
        With those savings, we could increase the shipbuilding
    budget, which certainly needs it. We are on a six-ship basis
    now. It needs nine ships to maintain the 310-ship Navy. If we
    keep going in the direction we are going, we are going to end
    up down at 230 ships at a steady state and that simply is not
    enough. We could procure an additional 700 aircraft annually,
    rather than the 189, to help meet and reach a steady state
    requirement for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, at enormous
    savings in maintenance and repairs.
        We have a big task ahead. Since the Cold War, we have a 30
    percent smaller force doing 165 percent more missions. This
    President's budget proposes a large increase by any standard.
    It will allow us to make some improvements to the readiness,
    morale, and condition of our military. The taxpayers have a
    right to demand that we spend the money more wisely, in my
    view. Today, we cannot tell the American people that we are
    spending it in the best possible manner. I know I cannot.
        Fixing the problem is a joint responsibility. It will
    require a new partnership between Congress and the Executive.
    We certainly owe it to the men and women in the Armed Forces.
        I would point out that one generation bequeaths to the next
    generation the capabilities to ensure peace, stability, and
    security. Today, we have the security of future generations of
    Americans in our hands. We have certainly an obligation to get
    it right. I am anxious to work with you to achieve that goal,
    and it certainly will take the best of all of us.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to present the
    President's 2002 amended budget for the Department of Defense.
        In discussing this budget, it is necessary to begin by confronting
    some less than pleasant, but important facts: The U.S. Armed Forces
    have been under funded in a number of respects over a sustained period
    of years. We have been living off of the substantial investments made
    during the 1970s and 1980s. Shortfalls exist in a number of vital areas
    including readiness, operations, procurement, maintenance,
    infrastructure, modernization and health care--shortfalls, I must say,
    that are considerably worse than I had previously understood.
        The U.S. Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-equipped, most
    powerful military force on the face of the earth. Peace, prosperity and
    freedom across the world are underpinned by the stability and security
    these men and women provide.
        I recently took the opportunity to visit our troops in Kosovo and
    in Turkey. They are dedicated men and women who are ready, willing and
    able to take on any mission their government may ask of them.
        No force in the world can do what they do. Only the United States
    can quickly move large, effective combat forces across long distances,
    or conduct large-scale, all-weather precision strike operations.
        The U.S. is unparalleled in conducting aerial operations at night,
    amphibious operations anywhere in the world, operating high endurance
    Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs), or conducting corps sized expeditionary
    operations, and highly complex joint operations.
        Our advantages in air-to-air combat and on the high seas have made
    it impractical for adversaries to use airplanes to attack us or send
    forces across oceans to threaten us.
        So our country has many strengths. Indeed, in some ways, it is
    because our forces are so capable that we face the challenges we do.
    Over much of the 1990s, the U.S. has both under-funded and overused
    this force, and it has taken a toll. Asked to do more with less, they
    have saluted and done their best--but it has been at the cost of needed
    investment in infrastructure, maintenance, and procurement.
        With the end of the Cold War, there was an appropriate draw down,
    but it went too far--overshooting the mark by a good margin. We are
    well past the time to take the necessary steps to arrest the declines
    and put the Armed Forces on a path to better health.
        The problem goes well beyond op-tempo, and is more profound than I
    expected. For example:

             Many facilities are dilapidated and in urgent need of
            repair and replacement.
             Health care costs are rising at a much greater rate
            than the funds provided.
             Outdated management and acquisition systems and
            processes add millions to the department's costs each year.
             Due to shortfalls in spare parts, flying hours,
            training and personnel, Navy non-deployed force readiness is 43
            percent--down from 63 percent in 1991.
             Only 69 percent of the Air Force's total combat units
            are mission ready, down from 91 percent in 1996.
             75 percent of the Army's major air and ground combat
            systems are beyond their half-life, and Army aviation ``safety
            of flight'' messages have increased 222 percent in the past 4
            years.
             Sixty percent of all military housing is substandard.
             Force protection capabilities have been under funded
            and are in need of investments.
             Financial management systems are so poor that the
            Department can't get a clean audit.
             While DOD was using its equipment at increased tempos,
            procurement of new equipment fell significantly below the
            levels necessary to sustain existing forces--leading to steady
            increases in the average age of equipment. It was called a
            ``procurement holiday.'' Some holiday!
             Basic research funding has declined by 11 percent
            since 1992, and RDT&E funding levels have declined 7.4 percent
            in the same period.

        Clearly, we need to arrest this deterioration and to do a better
    job of balancing the risks we face.
        The first responsibility of the Federal Government is to defend the
    American people. That job is done by brave men and women, who wake up
    each morning and voluntarily put their lives at risk, so that the rest
    of us can go about our days in peace and freedom.
        We have an obligation to make certain these men and women have the
    proper equipment, training, facilities, and the most advanced
    technology available to them.
        The current condition of U.S. Armed Forces didn't happen overnight.
    Each individual action that caused this situation was hardly noticed--a
    little less procurement here, some purchases and repairs put off
    there--until one day, the cumulative total shortfalls amount to tens of
    billions of dollars.
        Even the best built, best-engineered car in the world will
    eventually break down if you put off regular maintenance and repairs. A
    Ferrari on blocks will get beaten by an Edsel every time.
        We have the best Armed Forces in the world. But we cannot allow
    them to deteriorate any further.
        We are about to face new, emerging threats of the post-Cold War
    world. They are real, they are dangerous, and they are just over the
    horizon. If we are to meet them, we need to invest now to begin
    transforming our Armed Forces for the challenges of the 21st century.
        But we cannot build a 21st century force quite yet . . . because
    the 20th century force we have is in serious need of repair.
        We need to get on a path to correct the most serious deficiencies;
    we need to stabilize the force and begin needed modernization; we need
    to restore DOD infrastructure; and we need to make progress toward
    transformation--so that our forces are ready for the new and different
    threats of the new century.
                             the president's budget
        The President's 2002 defense budget adds urgently needed funds to
    begin stabilizing the force.
        Using the 2001 enacted budget of $296.3 billion as a baseline, the
    President earlier this year issued a budget blueprint that outlined a
    2002 baseline budget of $310.5 billion.
        This included $4.4 billion in proposed new money for Presidential
    initiatives, including:

             $1.4 billion to increase military pay,
             $400 million to improve military housing,
             $2.6 billion for research and development.

        The request before you proposes to raise that investment still
    further to a total of $328.9 billion--$18.4 billion more than the
    President's February budget blueprint.
        Taken together, these increases amount to $22.8 billion in proposed
    new money for the Department in 2002.
        I am told that this represents the largest peacetime increase in
    defense spending since the mid-1980s. So, if Congress approves this
    budget, by historical standards, it would represent a significant
    investment of the taxpayer's money.
        But let's be clear: This increase, while significant, does not get
    us well. The systematic under-investment went far too long--the gap is
    too great. There is no way it could be fixed in 1 year, or very likely,
    even 6.
        Mr. Chairman, allow me to provide an idea of the depth of the hole
    we are in. To get well by 2007--to meet existing standards and steady
    state requirements in areas like readiness levels with proper flying
    time, training, and maintenance; replacement of buildings and
    facilities that are falling apart; fixing family housing and restoring
    quality of life for the men and women of our Armed Forces--all of this
    together would cost the American taxpayers many tens of billions of
    dollars. That would do little with respect for the investment needed to
    transform the force for the future.
        So, yes, $22.8 billion is a large increase by historical standards.
    It is a huge commitment of the American people's hard earned tax
    dollars. We need every cent of it, but it only begins to make a dent in
    the leftover problems we face today.
                       what the budget will and won't do
        I want to be very straightforward about what this budget will do--
    and what it won't do.

             This budget will put us on the path to recovery in
            some categories such as military pay, housing allowances,
            readiness training, and health care;
             It will start an improvement but leave us short of our
            goal in others such as defense-related science and technology,
            maintenance of weapons systems and reaching best standards for
            facilities replacement;
             In still other categories there will be continued
            shortfalls such as backlogs in property maintenance
            requirements.

        Here are a few specific cases to illustrate the pattern. Take, for
    example, the Defense health program:

             Today, overall health care costs are increasing at an
            annual rate of 13 percent.
             The 2001 budget provided $12.1 billion--falling short
            of what was needed to cover that rate of increase by $1.4
            billion.
             The 2002 amended budget proposes $17.9 billion for
            defense health--a $5.8 billion increase--that will allow us to
            cover a 12 percent growth in the costs of medical care and a 15
            percent growth in the cost of pharmacy purchases.

        So, for the first time in years, the 2002 budget should fund a
    realistic estimate of military health care costs. This is an area where
    we are getting well.
        We are not getting as well, however, when it comes to the state of
    DOD facilities. Consider:

             In the private sector, the standard for overall
            facility replacement 57 years. DOD's target is 67 years.
             Here is the reality: Under the 2001 enacted budget,
            DOD was replacing facilities at an unbelievably poor average
            rate of 192 years.
             The 2002 budget which proposes to increase funding for
            facilities from $3.9 billion to $5.9 billion gets us closer. It
            would allow us to replace facilities at an average rate of 101
            years--an improvement, but still well off the acceptable target
            of 67 years.
             We could do better. With a round of base closings and
            adjustments that reduced unneeded facilities by, for example,
            25 percent, we could focus the funds on facilities we actually
            need and get the replacement rate down to 76 years at the 2002
            budget level.
             Without base closings, to achieve the target 67-year
            replacement rate would require an additional $7 billion
            annually for a period of 9 years or a total of $63 billion.
            That is simply not going to happen. We will need to close
            unneeded bases.
        So, by putting off needed spending on facilities replacement, DOD
    is now in a deep hole. This budget improves the situation--but leaves
    us short of our goal.
        Or, take an example where things are continuing to decline--
    shipbuilding:

             The current standard based on the 1997 Quadrennial
            Defense Review is to maintain a steady state of 310 ships.
             Here is the reality: Under the 2001 enacted budget,
            DOD is building 6 ships a year at a cost of $11.5 billion--
            which puts us on course to reduce the size of the U.S. Navy to
            a clearly unacceptable steady state of 230 ships by 2030.
             The 2002 budget, by providing for six ships at a cost
            of about $9.3 billion will keep the Navy on the same course
            toward a 230-ship steady-state Navy. We need to begin to turn
            this trend up.
             This puts us in a worse situation than in 2001 because
            the cost of reversing the decline and ``catching up'' to the
            310 ship steady-state increases by $3.0 billion every year we
            put it off.
             To meet the target of 310 ships would require building
            at least 9 ships each year, at a cost of about $12 billion.

        Or consider the aging of Navy aircraft:

             The desirable average age for Navy aircraft is pegged
            at 11 years. Given the impact of continued low procurement,
            that average age has grown steadily to 18 years.
             Here is the reality: Today, with the current strategy,
            the Navy has a requirement for a total of 4200 aircraft, which
            allows them maintain an average age of 18 years.
             To meet this steady-state requirement, the Navy needs
            180 to 200 new aircraft per year at a cost of $11 billion.
             The 2001 budget amendment would provide for 97
            aircraft at a cost of $8.4 billion.
             The 2002 budget would provide for 88 aircraft at a
            cost of $8.3 billion.
             Even at the rate of 122 aircraft a year, the cost of
            reversing the decline and ``catching up'' to the 4200 plane
            steady-state increases by $4 billion every year we put off the
            decision to do so.

        Facility repair and maintenance:

             The deferred maintenance for DOD facilities--the
            cumulative amount that has not been funded from year to year--
            currently stands at least $11 billion.
             The 2001 budget included $4.9 billion for facility
            maintenance.
             The 2002 amended budget would increase the facility
            maintenance budget by $0.9 billion for a total of $5.8
            billion--an increase of 18.4 percent.
             But this increase only funds facility maintenance at
            89 percent of the requirement.
             At this rate, because of years of under funding, it
            would take 20 years to catch up and eliminate the cumulative
            deferred maintenance.

        There are some of the difficulties facing the U.S. Armed Forces
    today. Despite a proposed increase in defense spending unmatched by any
    President since the mid 1980s, this budget still cannot not fix the
    problems we face as a result of a decade of a mismatch between
    requirements and appropriations.
        It is an indication of the depth of the hole we are in today that a
    $22.8 billion increase in defense spending makes just a good start in
    meeting the shortfalls our Armed Forces are facing.
        That is just the tip of the iceberg. Today, we are proposing a
    $328.9 billion defense budget. But to keep the department going next
    year on a straight-line--no improvements, just covering the costs of
    inflation and realistic budgeting--we will need a budget $347.2.
    billion. That is a $18.3 billion increase.
        So, where do we find money for the rest of our pressing needs? We
    simply must achieve cost savings.

                              FINDING COST SAVINGS

        We have an obligation to taxpayers to spend their money wisely.
    Today, we're not doing that. DOD:

             Has overhead that has grown to the point where it is
            estimated by some that as little as 14 percent of DOD manpower
            may be directly related to combat operations.
             Despite some 128 acquisition reform studies, DOD has
            an acquisition system that since 1975 has doubled the time it
            takes to produce a weapon system--while the pace for new
            generations of technology has shortened from years to 18
            months. This guarantees that DOD's newest weapons will be one
            or more technology generations old the day they are fielded,
            and DOD has processes and regulations so onerous that many
            commercial businesses developing needed military technologies
            simply refuse to do business with the Department.

        But the Department needs greater freedom to manage so we can save
    the taxpayers money in areas such as:

             Rationalization and restructuring of DOD
            infrastructure. A 20-25 percent reduction in excess military
            bases and facilities could generate savings of several billion
            dollars annually. Legislation authorizing a new round of
            facilities rationalization will be transmitted later this year.
             Increasing the thresholds in Davis-Bacon. If we could
            change the threshold for contracts subject to Davis-Bacon wage
            requirements from $2,000 to $1,000,000, it would permit the
            Department to achieve savings of $190 million in fiscal year
            2002 alone. We need that money for shipbuilding, for
            modernizing our aircraft fleets and for modernization.
             Contracting out commissaries, housing and other
            services that are not core military competencies and that can
            be performed more efficiently in the private sector.

        In fiscal year 2002, the Department proposes a pilot program with
    the Army and Marine Corps to contract out certain commissaries, and
    another pilot program with the Navy to contract out refueling support
    including tanker aircraft.
        Mr. Chairman, I have never seen an organization, in the private or
    public sector, that could not, by better management, operate at least 5
    percent more efficiently if given the freedom to do so.
        Five percent of the DOD budget is over $15 billion! With those
    savings, we could do many of the following:

             Increase ship procurement from six to nine ships a
            year, maintaining a steady state 310 ship Navy and protecting
            needed job at Navy shipyards $3 billion annually;
             Procure several hundred additional aircraft annually,
            rather than 189, to help meet reach the steady state
            requirements for Navy, Air Force, and Army aircraft $16 billion
            annually; $82 billion from fiscal year 2003-2007;
             Meet the target of a 67-year facility replacement rate
            $7 billion annually for 9 years;
             Fund 100 percent of base operations requirements $1.4
            billion annually;
             Increase defense-related science and technology
            funding from 2.7 percent to 3 percent of the DOD budget $1.2
            billion annually;
             Purchase needed UH-60 helicopters $50 million;
             Replenish precision munitions such as JSOW, JDAM and
            ATACMS $200 million;
             Buy three additional C-17 aircraft $600 million,
            replenish Army trucks $100 million; Buy HMMWVs $50 million;
            Bomber upgrades $730 million; purchase high-speed sealift $122
            million.

        But today there is no real incentive to save a nickel. To the
    contrary, the way the Department operates today, there are
    disincentives to saving money.
        We need to ask ourselves: how should we be spending taxpayer
    dollars? Do we want to keep paying for excess infrastructure that
    provides no added value to our national security? Or we want to spend
    that money on new technologies that will help us extend peace and
    security into the new century? That is the choice before us.
        We are doing two things:

             First, we are not treating the taxpayers' dollars with
            respect--and by not doing so, we risk losing their support, and
             Second, we are depriving the men and women of our
            Armed Forces of the training, equipment and facilities they
            need to accomplish their missions. They deserve better.

                                 V. CONCLUSION

        We have a big task ahead. It took years of coasting and overuse to
    get us where we are today. We can't dig out in a year.
        Following the Cold War, we reduced forces and claimed a well-
    deserved peace dividend for the American taxpayers. But in the mid-
    1990s, we began to overdraw on that account. We kept reducing our
    forces, despite the fact that op-tempo increased.
        As a result, we have a 30 percent smaller force doing 165 percent
    more missions. In short, we have been asking the Armed Forces to do
    more and more, with fewer resources.
        The President's budget proposes a large increase by any standard.
    It will allow us to make significant improvements to the readiness,
    morale and condition of our military.
        Would all services prefer to have more money to get well faster? Of
    course.
        But at the same time, the taxpayers have a right to demand that we
    spend their money wisely. Today we can't tell the American people we
    are doing that. I know I cannot.
        To have the support of the American people, we need to be able to
    make the case that we are fixing these systemic problems and achieving
    significant cost savings.
        Fixing this problem is a joint responsibility. It will require a
    new partnership between Congress and the Executive Branch. It is a
    responsibility we have not only to the men and women who serve in our
    Armed Forces today, but to future generations of Americans as well.
        Because of the long lead times, most of the capabilities any
    President invests in during his tenure are not available during his
    service; rather they are available to his successors. The force that
    won the Gulf War was built on the decisions of presidents and
    congresses over the preceding three decades.
        The Tomahawk cruise missile program, the F-15, F-18 and the F-16
    aircraft flying today, were developed in the 1970s. Many other
    technologies, such as the current generation of space satellites that
    gave us dominant battle space awareness in Iraq, were developed in the
    1980s.
        The point is this: One generation bequeaths to the next generation
    the capabilities to ensure its security.
        Today, we have the security of future generations of Americans in
    our hands. We have a responsibility to get it right.
        Because of the long procurement holiday of the 1990s, we have been
    left a poor hand. We must resolve to leave a better hand to our
    successors.
        I am anxious to work with you to achieve that goal. I know full
    well it will take the best of all of us.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Rumsfeld. General
    Shelton, I know you have a longer statement, but summarize the
    highlights in a few minutes, and we will call on our colleagues
    who have to leave. I hate to do that to you. We could call on
    you later in the afternoon to supplement or amplify.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can also submit
    my statement for the record, if you would like. I would like to
    thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for your very kind
    words a few minutes ago about my tenure as Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been my great honor to serve the
    men and women of our Armed Forces, and I want to once again
    thank this committee, each and every Senator, for your very
    strong and staunch support of our men and women in uniform.
        I can highlight a few areas, if you would like, Mr.
    Chairman. First of all, with your help, I believe we have made
    considerable progress in many areas that have impacted the
    overall health and welfare of our troops in recent months.
    Increases in pay and allowances, pay table reform, TRICARE
    reform and expanded health care coverage, additional funding to
    provide adequate housing for our military families, and the
    budget plus-ups to arrest a decline in our first-to-fight units
    have been critical and have been provided.
        But, let me also say that I believe we need to sustain this
    momentum if we are to preserve the long-term health, as well as
    the readiness, of our force in the years to come. Today, as we
    consider new budgets, new national security strategies, and new
    ideas of transforming the force, it is important that we always
    remember that the quality people in our military are the
    critical enablers that allow us to accomplish the things that
    we are asked to do.
        Since my last testimony, we have been reminded of the human
    element of national security in several profound ways. Last
    October, U.S.S. Cole was savagely attacked in the Port of Aden.
    In that incident, 17 sailors died. Some asked why we put a ship
    in harm's way in such a dangerous part of the world. Well, that
    is what we do. We go into harm's way to protect America's
    interests around the world. The sailors of the U.S.S. Cole were
    en route to the Gulf, establishing presence and protecting our
    Nation's vital interests.
        Last December we had two U.S. Army helicopters that crashed
    during a very difficult night-time training mission in Hawaii.
    In that crash, nine U.S. soldiers died. Some asked, why would
    the U.S. Army put soldiers in harm's way during a dangerous
    training mission in the black of the night? Well, that is what
    we do. We train for the most difficult missions we may face,
    because we know that when America's interests are threatened we
    have to be ready to go, day or night, and failure is not an
    option. We try to minimize the risk to our great men and women,
    but we train like we anticipate having to fight.
        Then, as we all know, just a few weeks ago we had an EP-3
    that was a reconnaissance aircraft flying in international air
    space over the South China Sea struck by a Chinese fighter,
    forced to make an emergency landing, and 24 of our personnel
    were detained. Some asked why we were conducting surveillance
    of another nation. Well, my answer is, that is what we do. We
    are vigilant. We are watchful, because we know that our
    interests and those of our allies in the region may be
    challenged, and if and when they are, we must be ready.
        I am very proud of the performance of these great men and
    women and the many thousands of others who proudly wear the
    uniform of our country. They have been, and will always be, our
    decisive edge. Indeed, they are so good at what they do, that
    unless there is an accident, or an incident, then we rarely
    take notice of their daily contributions to our national
    security. They sail their ships, they fly their aircraft, and
    they go on their patrols, quietly and professionally, and
    America is safe to enjoy great prosperity, in part because of
    them.
        However, today our forces and our people are experiencing
    some significant challenges, a number of which I would like to
    bring to your attention. Our first-to-fight forces are, in
    fact, prepared, trained, and ready to meet emergent
    requirements, but some of our other forces are not as ready as
    they should be. These include our strategic airlift fleet, our
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, our
    combat service support units, and our training bases, all of
    which provide critical capabilities to our warfighting forces.
        These units are in some cases suffering the consequences of
    a high OPTEMPO and a diversion of resources to sustain the
    near-term readiness of the first-to-fight forces. In fact,
    since 1995, DOD has experienced a 133-percent increase in the
    number of military personnel committed to joint operations.
    These are real-world events, not exercises, and we are doing it
    with 9 percent fewer people. That has, in fact, caused a high
    operational tempo on some segments of our force and that, of
    course, puts a strain on our people.
        I believe the fundamental cause of this situation has, in
    fact, been an imbalance between the demands of our national
    security strategy and the post-1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) force structure. Fixing this imbalance, of course, will
    be one of the top priorities for this year's QDR for Secretary
    Rumsfeld and all the Joint Chiefs, because the challenge will
    only increase over time, and we owe it to our people to get it
    right.
        In fact, today we are struggling to reconcile a multitude
    of competing demands, near-term readiness imperatives, long-
    term modernization, and recapitalization of aging systems, and
    infrastructure investments that are central to preserve the
    world's best warfighting capability. As I have mentioned in
    previous testimony, and as the Secretary just commented on, we
    did, in fact, live off of some of our procurement in the 1980s
    throughout the 1990s.
        Now, we have had a marked reduction in procurement. That
    means the average age of most of our systems, and our key
    warfighting systems, have been increasing, as was highlighted
    to some extent by the Secretary.
        Let me provide you with just a few examples. Our frontline
    air superiority fighter, the F-15, averages 17 years of age. It
    is only 3 years away from the end of its original design
    service. Our airborne tanker fleet, as well as our B-52
    bombers, are nearly 40 years old. Our intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance, along with our electronic
    warfare aircraft, such as the RC-135s and EP-3s, the P-3s, and
    our EA-6Bs, all average between 19 and 38 years of service, and
    our main battle tank, the M-1, and our marine amphibious
    assault vehicle, are powered by engines that were designed and,
    in some cases, built in the 1960s.
        Finally, numerous helicopter platforms for all of our
    services have passed or are approaching the end of their
    original design service lives. In fact, most of the warfighting
    platforms that I just mentioned meet the 25-year rule required
    by the great State of Virginia to qualify for antique license
    plates.
        Our force is not aging gracefully. In fact, we are having
    to spend significantly more in each year to maintain our aging
    equipment in repair parts and maintenance down time and in
    maintenance support, which also increases the operational tempo
    of those great soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines that have
    to maintain them.
        If we do not replace some of these systems soon, either the
    force structure will shrink, or we will have to continue to
    maintain the old systems, resulting in spiraling operations and
    maintenance costs and reduced combat capability. In my opinion,
    these are unacceptable alternatives, which begs the question,
    what should we do?
        I believe there are two answers. First, we must bring into
    balance our strategy and our force structure, and we must
    significantly increase our efforts in procurement to modernize
    and recapitalize our force. The QDR should produce the
    strategic blueprint and the investment profile necessary to
    shape our force to carry out the new strategy.
        Another related concern is the fact that our vital
    infrastructure is decaying at an alarming rate, as Secretary
    Rumsfeld has commented. Budget constraints have forced us to
    make some hard choices. The fact is that in the real property
    maintenance accounts today, we currently have a backlog that is
    growing, that today totals over $11 billion. I think that a
    quality force deserves quality facilities, and therefore it is
    essential that we start providing the resources to reverse the
    deterioration of out post, bases, camps, and stations.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus for just a second
    on the decisive edge of our force, the men and women in
    uniform. President Bush stated that a volunteer military has
    only two paths. It can lower its standards to fill its ranks,
    or it can inspire the best and the brightest to join and to
    stay. The latter starts with better pay, better treatment, and
    better training.
        The President, I believe, had it exactly right. We must
    continue to close the significant pay gap that still exists
    between the military and the private sector, and we must make
    continued investments in health care, housing, and other
    quality-of-life programs that are essential to sustain our
    force.
        One of the most valued recruiting and retention tools that
    any corporation can offer potential employees or its current
    workforce is a comprehensive medical package. DOD is no
    different. For that reason, the Chiefs and I strongly urge
    Congress to fully fund the defense health program and all
    health care costs as a strong signal that we are truly
    committed to providing quality health care to our troops. I do
    not think there is a better way to renew the bond of trust
    between Uncle Sam and our service members and retirees than
    this commitment to quality health care.
        Additionally, I would ask for your support to help ensure
    that all of our men and women in uniform, single, married, or
    unaccompanied, are provided with adequate housing.
    Unfortunately, this is not the case today. About 62 percent of
    our family housing units are classified as inadequate, and
    correcting this situation is essential if we are to improve the
    quality of life for our service members and their families. We
    have learned over the years that we recruit the member, but we
    retain the family.
        To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have the best
    military, the best Armed Forces in the world today. But having
    said this, I believe that we will continue to enjoy our
    military advantage, or that it will erode over time if we fail
    to prepare for the evolving strategic landscape for the 21st
    century. Our greatest adversary today, as I have said so many
    times, in my opinion, is complacency. It is imperative that we
    take action today to ensure that our men and women in uniform
    are properly equipped, trained, and led. If we do so, I am
    confident that we will prevail in any challenges that we face
    in the future.
        I am struck by the fact that today I believe we have an
    opportunity to build the foundation for another long era of
    U.S. military supremacy and, in doing so, we will help
    underwrite the peace and prosperity that our Nation currently
    enjoys, and should continue to enjoy well into the future.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to make this
    statement, and we now stand ready to take your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
                Prepared Statement by Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA
        It is an honor to report to Congress today on the state of
    America's Armed Forces. As every member of this committee knows, our
    Nation is blessed with an unsurpassed warfighting force that has been
    actively engaged over the past year supporting America's interests
    around the globe. I am extremely proud to represent the young men and
    women of our Armed Forces. They serve our country selflessly, away from
    home and loved ones, and are frequently put in harm's way. They
    personify America at its very best.
        It is those young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who will
    fight tomorrow's wars with the strategy, force structure, doctrine, and
    equipment that we develop today. For them to do what we ask--to remain
    the best in the world--we must give them the best tools. This means
    ensuring that they always have the resources necessary to be trained,
    armed, and ready. It means properly compensating them today and
    tomorrow. It means recapitalizing our weapon systems and
    infrastructure, and modernizing the force to meet tomorrow's
    challenges. As we consider the choices ahead, may we always remember
    that our great people have the most at stake in the decisions that we
    make here in Washington.
        In this Posture Statement, I will address two broad topics: (1)
    Sustaining a Quality Force, concentrating on those programs that are
    critical to maintaining the force; and (2) Building Tomorrow's Joint
    Force, what we are doing today to prepare for tomorrow's challenges.

                         I. SUSTAINING A QUALITY FORCE

        America's best and brightest must continue to answer the clarion
    call to serve if our Nation is to remain the strongest force for peace
    and stability on the planet. It is the quality of our people that gives
    us a decisive edge over our adversaries and to sustain this qualitative
    edge we must support our personnel with continued investments in pay
    compensation, health care, housing, and other quality of life programs.
    Compensation Gains
        As a result of compensation gains in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal
    year 2001, we have made great strides toward improving the standards of
    living for members of our Armed Forces. With the significant support
    and help of this committee, Congress, and the administration, the
    Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provided one
    of the largest pay raises in recent history, and allowed us to greatly
    reduce out-of-pocket (OOP) costs for off-base housing, instituted
    retirement reform, and implemented pay table reform.
        That same level of outstanding support was evident in the fiscal
    year 2001 NDAA. The 3.7 percent pay increase maintains our commitment
    to close the pay gap between the military and their civilian
    counterparts. Additionally, the fiscal year 2001 NDAA provided $30M in
    Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) to further reduce OOP expenses to
    less than 15 percent. The opening of the Thrift Savings Plan to
    military members, the implementation of a monetary allowance for
    military members currently receiving food stamps, and revising the
    enlistment/retention bonus authority has also demonstrated to our
    forces a commitment to their quality of life. This helps us attract and
    retain quality people.
        We need to sustain the momentum of the past 2 years. The pay raise
    slated for fiscal year 2002 and your continued support of our efforts
    to reduce OOP expenses for housing to zero by fiscal year 2005 will
    further improve the quality of life for our servicemembers and their
    families. This is not only important for their well being, it is
    equally important to our efforts to recruit and retain a quality force.
    Military Health Care
        One of the most valued recruiting tools any major corporation can
    offer a potential employee is a comprehensive medical package. DOD is
    no different. Congress and the administration have done much over the
    last year to address the health needs of our active duty and retired
    servicemembers and their families. As in the civilian sector,
    healthcare costs for the military community have continued to rise
    rapidly. Passage of the fiscal year 2001 NDAA demonstrated Congress'
    commitment to honor the promise to those currently serving and to those
    who served honorably in the past. I appreciate the support of Congress
    for this effort.
        We are pursuing full funding of healthcare costs as a strong signal
    that we are truly committed to providing quality healthcare for our
    active duty military members, retirees and their families. This
    commitment will have a profound impact on all who wear our uniform, and
    will encourage those who are considering a military career. It is also
    imperative that we fund healthcare benefits for retirees and their
    families in such a manner that this funding no longer competes with
    operations, force structure, and readiness. This will honor the
    national commitment we made long ago to our military retirees, without
    impacting the readiness and military capability of today's force.
        Additionally, the Joint Chiefs are working with the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs in seeking business practice
    improvements and implementing the new benefits identified in the fiscal
    year 2001 NDAA. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, TRICARE will pay costs
    not covered by Medicare for over-65 retirees and their families.
    Housing
        Housing continues to be a core element in our efforts to improve
    the quality of life for our service members. All our men and women in
    uniform deserve adequate housing. The Services remain on track with
    plans to eliminate inadequate housing for unaccompanied enlisted
    personnel by 2008. The situation for family housing is more
    challenging. Last year, the Service Family Housing Master Plans deemed
    almost 61 percent of family housing units inadequate. The Services are
    revamping their respective Family Housing Master Plans to revitalize,
    privatize, or demolish these inadequate units by 2010.
        Congressional support for DOD's three-pronged strategy to improve
    family housing has been outstanding and is greatly appreciated. First,
    the initiative to raise housing allowances to reduce out-of-pocket
    expenses for our servicemembers has provided welcome relief to the
    force. Second, creating smart partnerships with the private sector
    makes defense dollars go further and effectively frees up resources to
    revitalize existing housing. Finally, your continued efforts to fund
    our construction and privatization programs will pay great dividends by
    ensuring our servicemembers and their families can live in respectable
    accommodations.
        There is an inseparable, direct link between personal and family
    readiness and our total force combat readiness. Your continued support
    of these and other quality of life programs will provide substantial
    returns in retaining not just the member, but also the family.

                      II. BUILDING TOMORROW'S JOINT FORCE

        In this section, I present some of my thoughts on those actions we
    are taking today, to build tomorrow's joint force. In my view, these
    are the critical enablers for any new defense strategy designed to
    confront the challenges of this 21st century.
    Modernization
        While recent funding increases have arrested the decline in current
    readiness, our modernization accounts, which are critical to future
    readiness, remain under funded. Solving this problem has become my most
    urgent priority.
        Modernization will help reduce our capability concerns by
    leveraging advanced technology to improve interoperability. Also,
    newer, technologically advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) collection assets, communications systems, and
    logistics support systems will help reduce manpower requirements while
    simultaneously improving the CINCs' warfighting capabilities.
    Modernization is also necessary for improved operational flexibility
    and to ensure that we retain a technological and qualitative
    superiority on the battlefield.
        We must modernize our force; however, we must not sacrifice current
    readiness to do it.
    Recapitalization of Force Structure
        After the Cold War, we made a conscious decision to cut procurement
    and live off the investments of the eighties as we reduced force
    structure. Between fiscal years 1993-1998, approximately $100 billion
    was taken out of DOD procurement accounts. The 1997 QDR Report
    identified a potentially serious procurement problem if we did not
    increase investment in new platforms and equipment. A goal of $60
    billion in procurement was established as an interim target to recover
    from the sharply reduced procurement spending in fiscal year 1993-1998.
    Last year, for the first time, this interim goal was achieved.
        However, several recent studies, to include one by the
    Congressional Budget Office, have concluded that $60 billion is not
    sufficient to sustain the force. Since the QDR will determine the
    strategy and size of the force, I cannot give you a precise
    recommendation on the additional amount required. What is clear today
    is that we must accelerate the pace of replacing our aging and worn
    systems if we are to deliver the right capability to meet future
    challenges. We simply cannot continue to defer procurement and continue
    our usage at existing rates if we expect our force to meet all of our
    21st century commitments.
    Recapitalization of Infrastructure
        Our vital infrastructure is decaying. The understandable desire for
    a post-Cold War peace dividend forced us to make hard choices that
    redirected funds from military facilities and infrastructure accounts
    to support immediate readiness requirements. Years of belt-tightening
    have increased the risk of facility failures and have added to the
    costs of upkeep.
        Within civilian industry, the replacement, restoration or
    modernization of physical plant assets is accomplished in roughly a 50-
    year cycle. The rate of investment in DOD infrastructure has fallen to
    a level that requires over 100 years for recapitalization. We must find
    the resources to accelerate the recapitalization of our infrastructure
    to avoid further damage and degradation. A sustained period of
    increased funding is required to develop a modern infrastructure
    capable of supporting our 21st century force and the next generation of
    weapon systems.
        In its current state, the DOD infrastructure is still capable of
    supporting the National Military Strategy; however, in some locations,
    we face a high risk of operational limitations that may affect mission
    success. Throughout DOD, installation readiness is at an all-time low.
    In fact, 60 percent of our infrastructure is rated C-3 (some failures)
    or C-4 (major problems). It is particularly alarming that the current
    condition of training and operational facilities is lower than any
    other facility category in DOD. Usage restrictions and the shortage of
    required training ranges and operating areas slowly but inevitably
    degrade the readiness of our operational units. The poor material
    condition of facilities also directly contributes to lost or degraded
    training opportunities.
        In sum, our deteriorating infrastructure continues to impair
    readiness and detract from the quality of life of our service members
    and their families. I ask you to support our efforts to fix this
    problem, because it effectively reduces the efficiency of our uniformed
    and civilian workforce and further lowers retention rates for highly
    qualified and otherwise motivated personnel. A world class fighting
    force requires mission-ready facilities.
        Additionally, we sorely need further base closure rounds as part of
    our overall recapitalization effort. According to the April 1998 DOD
    BRAC Report, we have 23 percent excess base capacity in the United
    States, a situation that directly impacts the ability of the Service
    Chiefs to provide, train, maintain, and equip today's force. By
    removing validated excess capacity, we could save $3 billion per year
    in the long-term. This money would then be available to fund
    appropriately our remaining bases and help fix the remaining
    infrastructure.

                                 TRANSFORMATION

    Joint Vision 2020
        Our future force must be a seamless joint force and our roadmap for
    achieving this joint force is detailed in Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020).
    Although the Services are busily engaged in the transformation of their
    respective forces, in my view these individual transformations will be
    most effective operationally only if they mesh fully with the more
    encompassing joint transformation called for in JV 2020.
        A key feature of this transformation will be the implementation of
    dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full
    dimensional protection in the context of Joint Task Force (JTF)
    operations. Today, we successfully execute JTF operations when they are
    needed. But, in my view, we will be more responsive and agile in the
    future with JTF operations as our ``national military core
    competency.'' This goal will not be achieved through technology and
    materiel solutions alone. It will also require intellectual innovation
    and the development of doctrine, organizations, training and education,
    leaders, people, and facilities that effectively make use of new
    technologies.
        Using JV 2020 as a conceptual template, the goal of our joint
    transformation effort is a force that is dominant across the full
    spectrum of military operations. DOD is seeking to transform its forces
    to meet future challenges through a comprehensive plan that integrates
    activities in several areas:

             Service concept development and experimentation
            efforts;
             Joint concept development and experimentation designed
            to integrate Service capabilities where possible and develop
            joint solutions where necessary;
             Implementation processes in the Services and joint
            community to identify rapidly the most promising of the new
            concepts; and
             Science and Technology efforts focused on areas that
            can enhance U.S. military capabilities.

        This overall transformation effort is not focused solely on US
    military capabilities. USJFCOM has developed an aggressive plan for
    outreach to multinational partners as well. Our objective is to bring
    allied perspectives into the concept development process to facilitate
    our future ability to operate effectively within a coalition
    environment.
        Based on joint experimentation and implementation programs, we
    expect to see some new capabilities that will be operational well
    before 2020, while other promising concepts will continue to be
    explored and developed. Our overarching goal is to bring these various
    capabilities together in a coherent and synchronized fashion.

                          OTHER TRANSFORMATION ISSUES

    Logistics Transformation
        Our goal for logistics transformation is to provide the joint
    warfighter real-time logistics situational awareness by leveraging
    technology and optimizing logistics processes. The Defense Reform
    Initiative Directive #54, Logistics Transformation Plans, establishes a
    framework of objectives and a means to measure progress toward
    accomplishing this goal.
        Ultimately, we must create a network-centric environment in which
    data can be accessed in real time at its source. This network-centric
    environment will provide the warfighter with operationally relevant
    logistics information necessary to make accurate, timely decisions and
    to maintain our military advantage into the next decades.
    Mobility
        We are making significant improvements in our ability to deploy
    forces. Our fleet of 35-year old C-141s is being replaced with C-17s,
    and numerous conventional break-bulk cargo ships are being replaced by
    Large Medium Speed Roll-on Roll-off ships. However, we foresee
    increased challenges and stresses to the mobility system. These
    challenges were carefully examined in the comprehensive 2-year Mobility
    Requirements Study 05 (MRS-05). The study determined that programmed
    strategic lift capability falls short of requirements for both CONUS
    and inter-theater missions. MRS-05 also determined that increased
    capability is needed within theaters to move equipment and supplies
    forward from pre-positioning sites, airports, and seaports.
    Consequently, we are aggressively pursuing policy changes, host-nation
    agreements, and, where necessary, considering new equipment as part of
    the 2001 QDR to ensure timely force deployment. More than ever,
    Congressional support of strategic lift is needed if we are to build a
    national mobility capability sufficient for our current and future
    needs.
    Joint Interoperability
        We have made progress in the area of interoperability with an
    overall effort focused on creating a force that is ready to fight as a
    coherent joint unit, fully interoperable, and seamlessly integrated.
    Our long-term goal is to require that interoperability be ``designed
    in'' at the beginning of the development process rather than ``forced
    in'' after the fact. We intend to achieve this goal through
    improvements in the requirements generation process, including
    establishment of interoperability Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and
    Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) in systems development. A
    requirements-based Joint Operations Architecture, well grounded in
    joint doctrine, will provide a roadmap for addressing interoperability
    issues across the full spectrum of capabilities. These efforts will
    enable DOD's senior leadership to focus more on interoperability and
    integration of the joint force.

                 INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TRANSFORMATION

    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        Achieving and maintaining a decisive advantage in our ability to
    access, gather, exploit, and act on information remains a critical
    aspect of our combat capability and readiness. A full spectrum ISR
    capability is the mainstay of that concept. To achieve this, we need to
    place more emphasis on the capability to ``watch'' or ``stare at''
    targeted objectives with collection systems able to monitor, track,
    characterize, and report on moving objects and dynamic events as they
    occur in the battlespace. In other words, a constant rather than
    periodic sensor access is required.
    Intelligence Interoperability
        Intelligence interoperability is the foundation of our capability
    for dominant battlespace awareness. Our goal is to ensure that our
    forces retain an information edge over potential adversaries. To be
    fully interoperable, intelligence must be produced and delivered in a
    fashion that immediately supports command decision making and mission
    execution. We are gradually tearing down barriers to interoperability
    between intelligence and operations systems to ensure we provide the
    Common Operating Picture essential to future command and control. The
    Common Operating Picture will provide a unified view of the battlespace
    for the soldier in the field, the pilot in the cockpit, and the
    commander, regardless of location.
    Intelligence Federation
        The Intelligence Federation is a new concept wherein designated
    commands and units provide specified intelligence support to an engaged
    CINC during a crisis or contingency operation using a pre-planned
    methodology tailored to that CINC's area of responsibility and
    operational requirements. The concept evolved from the growing need to
    ensure the collective resources of the intelligence community function
    as a ``system of systems,'' so that users are able to receive
    information tailored to their unique requirements, and with the
    necessary fidelity. To do this effectively, we need to create a
    federation among intelligence components using Joint Tactics,
    Techniques, and Procedures.
    Global Information Grid (GIG)
        The CINCs testified last year that a major warfighting deficiency
    in some theaters is the inability to plan quickly and execute
    decisively because of C\4\ deficiencies. I wholeheartedly agree. Simply
    put, our C\4\ infrastructure falls short of what is needed to support
    properly our decision makers and the men and women on the front lines.
    To help alleviate this shortfall, we must ensure that our warfighters
    have full and reliable access to the GIG from any point on the globe.
    The GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information
    capabilities, associated processes, and personnel that we are
    developing to manage and provide information on demand to warfighters,
    policy makers, and supporting personnel. I believe that our ongoing
    efforts to bring the GIG online will provide the foundation for
    information superiority on the battlefield in the decades ahead. To
    that end, it is necessary to continue to invest in and upgrade the GIG
    infrastructure. Satellites, fiber optic cables, support of network
    operations, information assurance programs, and DOD's use of the radio
    frequency spectrum, are all tremendously important to achieving this
    goal.
    Radio Frequency Spectrum Access
        There is an important debate ongoing concerning the proposed
    reallocation of a segment of the DOD radio frequency spectrum to
    commercial users, an initiative with the potential to disrupt our
    transformation effort. In the last 8 years, 247 MHz of the RF spectrum
    for Federal use, primarily used by DOD, has been reallocated for
    commercial use by the private sector. I am concerned that further
    reallocation of frequency spectrum for commercial use, without
    comparable spectrum to execute DOD's critical functions, will have a
    major impact on our ability to execute our missions. Our success on the
    battlefield largely depends on our ability to use advanced
    communications technology to exchange vital information between
    decision-makers, commanders, and deployed forces.
        One of the principal areas of interest to the private sector is the
    1755-1850 MHz band. This band is currently used for tactical data
    links; satellite telemetry, tracking, and control; precision guided
    weapons; air combat training systems; and the delivery of voice, video,
    and data information to warfighters and commanders in the field. These
    systems are indispensable to our national defense. Some industry
    advocates have suggested that DOD share segments of this frequency band
    or relocate to another operationally suitable spectrum. I believe this
    proposal is problematic for two reasons. First, according to our
    analysis, sharing with commercial users is not possible due to
    interference over large geographical areas and metropolitan centers.
    Second, moving DOD communications to a different, but comparable,
    spectrum could be problematic due to the lengthy transition period
    required. Some national security satellites will use this frequency
    band well into the future. If directed to move, a more detailed cost
    and transition timeline will be required to ensure continuity of our
    Nation's defense capabilities. It is imperative that we strike a
    reasonable and informed balance between commercial needs and military
    requirements. I understand that there is a White House process, led by
    the National Security Council and the National Economic Council, which
    is reviewing this issue to achieve this balance, critical for national
    security. We anticipate that suitable solutions will be found that are
    acceptable to all parties.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Today, even as we seek to transform our force to face an evolving
    security environment, our goals remain firm. We must protect America's
    interests, deter aggression, support peaceful resolution of disputes
    and most importantly, to be ready to intervene or respond to a conflict
    and win decisively.
        This is a critically important time for our Nation as we move
    further into the new millennium as the only global superpower. It is
    clear that we have a great deal of work to do with the administration
    and Congress as we develop a new NSS and support the requirements of
    the QDR. Our professional, highly trained, and motivated young
    Americans in uniform are counting on us to make the right decisions. We
    have an opportunity in the months ahead to build on successes, address
    the challenges, and sustain and support our dedicated forces. We must
    provide our warfighting forces with the best tools available as they
    defend America's interests, and we must shape a future force that will
    help us achieve our national security objectives well into the 21st
    century. Together, I am confident we can capitalize on this
    opportunity.

        Chairman Levin. General Shelton, thank you. We are going to
    modify my announcement on the order for questions. I am going
    to first call on Senator Warner, who is going to allocate his 6
    minutes, and then we will pursue the usual rotation.
        Senator Warner. I thank the chairman. Two of my colleagues
    are going to be leaving us at 3:00, so if the Senator from
    Alabama and the Senator from Maine would like, take my time, 3
    minutes each.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I will
    not use all that time. I would just like to thank Secretary
    Rumsfeld for challenging the system, for asking tough
    questions, and for not believing that anything is a sacred cow.
    The President indicated he was going to do that.
        I think it is your responsibility to do so, and I know you
    are just now beginning to get your staff approved, confirmed,
    and on board. We are behind in that, and I know it is difficult
    to prepare a detailed budget during the time that you are
    giving fundamental review to the priorities of the Department
    of Defense.
        I, for one, am going to be as supportive as I possibly can,
    because when you testify that you need this program or that
    program, I want you to have had the time to study it and make
    that recommendation with the confidence and backing you need.
        We are, indeed, increasing spending around this body an
    awful lot. Cutting social programs, Mr. Secretary, means that
    the projected increases cannot be reduced. That is what cutting
    means in a social program. On defense, however, we do not seem
    to be as determined to protect it.
        I think it is a core function of our Government to provide
    for the national defense and the national security. It ought to
    be given our highest priority in the tough budget-making issues
    that we face. I will support you on that, and I also hope that
    at the same time you will follow through, as you have
    indicated, on commitments to efficiency, productivity, and
    research, which perhaps can save us a lot of money in the years
    to come.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to
    thank Senator Warner for his graciousness in letting me use his
    time so that I can participate in the hearing.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, General Shelton, you have certainly
    painted a very grim picture, which obviously indicates that
    these problems did not occur overnight. They have been building
    for a long time, which raises questions of why the alarm bells
    were not sounded in the previous administration. But leaving
    that issue aside, Secretary Rumsfeld, you have emphasized the
    difficulty of ``getting well'' in 1 year with this budget. You
    have mentioned with regard to shipbuilding that meeting the QDR
    target of 310 ships would require building at least nine ships
    each year, at a cost of about $12 billion.
        Has the Pentagon considered recommending to Congress the
    use of advance appropriations to step up the shipbuilding
    budget in a way that might be more affordable in the short
    term? Ultimately, we are still going to have the same costs,
    but is there consideration underway at the Pentagon to looking
    at advance appropriations?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Collins, that is an important
    question, and I am not an expert on it. Dov Zakheim has been
    working with the Office of Management and Budget on it. I do
    not see any other way we are going to get that shipbuilding
    budget up and going in the right direction without doing
    forward-funding.
        Whether or not the balancing of the pros and cons of it
    will be sufficiently persuasive with the Office of Management
    and Budget (OMB) is a question, but it is clearly a way for us
    to increase the number of ships per year, which we need to do.
    We need to do it because we need the ships. We also need to do
    it because the industrial base and the shipyards need the work,
    and I am certainly hopeful that we will be able to do that in
    addition to increasing funds in the shipbuilding budget in the
    coming year.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might just
    comment on that too, Senator Levin and I met with you yesterday
    and this was central to our discussions. We want to join you on
    this. I think hopefully within Congress there is a majority
    view that this is a way to aid shipbuilding and maybe other
    procurement accounts. So let us work together. If it requires
    legislation, let us roll along with it.
        Chairman Levin. Very good. Thank you, sir.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, just on that last point, I think this
    committee is more than happy to look at the pros and cons of
    these various approaches, but we have had these considerations
    before. There are some definite advantages, but there are some
    definite disadvantages to that kind of funding, and the
    committee will be happy to look at all of those advantages and
    disadvantages when you are ready to submit them to us.
        I was struck, Secretary Rumsfeld, by your comment that the
    United States Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-equipped,
    most powerful military forces on the face of the earth. I can
    assure you that this committee will continue to do everything
    in our power to keep it that way, just as we have in the past.
        This committee has acted consistently on a bipartisan basis
    to make sure that we are the best-trained, best-equipped force
    on the face of the earth. We worked with our Secretaries of
    Defense, with our uniformed leaders, and we will continue to
    carry on that role.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, the Chairman of the Senate Budget
    Committee, Senator Conrad, sent a letter to President Bush with
    copies to you this week outlining the fiscal challenges we
    face, particularly those that relate to your budget amendment
    for the Defense Department.
        The Chairman of the Budget Committee looked at the
    possibility that the impending summer revisions to our economic
    forecast could show that the small remaining surplus left for
    2002 would evaporate because of a slowdown in the economy. Does
    the administration believe that your defense budget amendment
    can be paid for in fiscal year 2002 without using the medicare
    or social security trust funds?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
        Chairman Levin. Last week, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    announced the creation of a senior executive council that would
    make key decisions on defense matters. This council does not
    include, or at least does not appear to include, the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff or other senior military leaders. Can you
    explain why they are not included in that council?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The group you are referring to is the
    Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, and, as
    I recall, the three service secretaries. They deal continuously
    with the Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the services. The
    issues they will address will be issues that are at their level
    and of the nature that are appropriate to them.
        For example, that group, plus Dr. Zakheim and I, have been
    involved with the Chairman and the Chiefs practically every day
    now for the last 4 weeks, and the interaction is continuous.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. At your hearing last week, Mr.
    Secretary, I asked you if you agreed with General Kadish's
    assessment that if you adopted and implemented the
    recommendations on missile defense from the missile defense
    strategy review that he has just completed, that those
    recommendations would not lead to a violation of the Anti-
    Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in fiscal year 2002.
        You said that you would give us your answer relative to
    that, after reviewing General Kadish's assessment. Now that you
    are presenting the fiscal 2002 budget, let me ask you this: In
    this budget request for fiscal year 2002, are you incorporating
    recommendations from the National Missile Defense Strategy
    Review, which General Kadish briefed us on June 13?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It turns out that in our eagerness to
    consult with Congress, General Kadish briefed you and Congress
    prior to briefing me on that program. The program has not been
    briefed to me. It is in a state of some adjustment because of
    changes in the budget plan.
        Yesterday, I met with General Kadish, goodness, for I am
    sure an hour and a half or 2 hours, and some of the people to
    discuss the treaty aspect of it, and I am prepared to speak to
    that. But the actual details of the research and development
    (R&D) budget, not the deployment budget, but the R&D budget
    that General Kadish is working on, as I say, are still in a
    state of some flux.
        Chairman Levin. In the budget that you are presenting to us
    today, is there anything in that budget which would cause a
    violation of the ABM Treaty in fiscal year 2002?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. They do not know for sure. That is to
    say, as you engage in a research and development activity, it
    is not clear how it is going to evolve, and General Kadish
    cannot answer the question, nor can I. What we can say----
        Chairman Levin. Well, let me interrupt you there. General
    Kadish did answer the question. He said it did not.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That was a perfectly honest answer from
    his standpoint at that stage of his knowledge. As I say, he
    has----
        Chairman Levin. You were briefed by him. How can you
    disagree, then, with his conclusion?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. May I finish the sentence here on this,
    so that we can get it completely clarified. General Kadish's
    program is still being adjusted, and therefore we cannot say
    that the program is final and therefore we know.
        Second, we cannot know because it is a research and
    development budget, and it is impossible to be able to say
    exactly which R&D program is going to evolve or progress faster
    or slower than another.
        What I can say is that the law is the law, and we will
    comply with it. I can also say there is a compliance
    requirement in the Pentagon that, as things do evolve, it has
    to go through a compliance review, so the chances of anything
    happening that would be contrary to U.S. law, or contrary to
    the treaty, are zero.
        Now, let me go the next step. The President has said that
    he wants to pursue promising technologies, and he wants to be
    able to at some point deploy a missile defense capability. The
    ABM Treaty does not permit that. That means that they're in
    conflict.
        That is why the President has said he wants to enter into
    discussions with the Russians and see if we can find a way to
    establish a new framework to move beyond the ABM Treaty. Those
    discussions and talks began with my visit with the Defense
    Minister of Russia, Mr. Ivanov, the President's meeting with
    Mr. Putin, and Secretary Powell's meeting with his counterpart.
        They will be starting up again soon, and the President's
    full intention is to find ways that the ABM Treaty will not
    inhibit his goal of providing missile defense for the American
    people, deployed forces, and friends and allies.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we
    have somewhat of a pilot crisis. I think we all agree with
    that. One of the issues we talked about last year was
    individually contracting out to retired military personnel some
    of the flying functions of noncombat vehicles.
        We asked in our defense authorization bill last year that
    the DOD study this and report back to us by April as to what
    their recommendation would be. I would like to ask first, when
    are we going to get the report back, and second, what thoughts
    do you have on the contracting out provision for retired
    military personnel?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Are you familiar with it?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe, we, in fact, in the Joint Staff, based on
    the requirement in the authorization act, completed that study,
    and have forwarded that to the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) for review. It has not reached the Secretary yet.
    We did examine all facets of it. To be candid, and not to go
    into too much detail here, it does not look very promising at
    this point.
        There are numerous things tied into it, including the
    combat-readiness of the pilots that we train in those aircraft
    to end up being commanders of the larger aircraft in our
    strategic lift, but all that has gone up to OSD. You should be
    receiving the complete report shortly.
        Senator Inhofe. Shortly?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. In a month?
        General Shelton. Sir, I cannot speak for the Secretary.
        Senator Inhofe. Why don't you advise us for the record when
    you think we will get that, because I think it is something
    that does have merit, and I would like to kind of bring it up
    for discussion at some point.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The report is still under review in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense. At this point, we cannot offer a date certain when the report
    will be completed. We will ensure that proper notifications are made
    when the report is released by the Department of Defense.

        Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld, in one of your
    management reforms, you talk about outsourcing depot
    maintenance workloads beyond a depot's capacity. It is my
    understanding that you measure capacity by a 40-hour work week.
    In other words, you measure one shift when there is capability
    in all of our three remaining air logistics centers, for
    example, to operate with three shifts.
        Wouldn't it be smarter to go ahead and change the
    definition of capacity, and maybe have that capacity at two
    shifts, as opposed to wasting that infrastructure in
    outsourcing when it isn't really necessary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Dov Zakheim has been working on this.
    My understanding is that the proposal relates just to backlog
    that is not being met, so if a depot is not able to meet the
    backlog, that that then would be freed up for different
    outsourcing.
        Senator Inhofe. But if the depot is not able to meet that
    because they are using the current definition of full capacity,
    would it not be advisable to at least explore expanding that
    capacity by increasing from one to three, or from one to two
    shifts?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to take a look at it.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay. Why don't you do that and answer it
    for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Options for overtime and extra shifts were not excluded. The
    initiative recognizes that depots could choose to bid on competed work
    by increasing overtime and adding extra shifts. However, excessive
    overtime cannot be sustained for extended periods of time and could be
    uneconomical. The ability to hire additional qualified personnel from
    the local labor pool, either for extra shifts or to utilize existing
    equipment and facilities, is a factor in determining a depot's ability
    to accomplish extra work.

        Senator Inhofe. I was pleased to see the Crusader is going
    to receive the funding that would put it online, I believe, in
    2006. I am not sure, General Shelton, but I think you are in
    agreement, as most of the Army people are, as to where we are
    with the old Paladin; it is an outdated system, and many of our
    prospective adversaries have a lot more capacity than we have.
    Is there any chance that you would be able to move that up from
    2006 to 2005 in terms of having one deployed and operating?
        General Shelton. Senator Inhofe, I think that as a part of
    the QDR process, part of the examination of our strategy and
    our force structure, that system, like all the other systems
    that we have will undergo a review. As part of that, certainly
    in the Army's overall plan for transformation, where we would
    need it to dovetail in with their objective force, or with
    their interim force, even, is what will have to be examined. Of
    course, in that comes the priority issues, of where they
    prioritize that, and I cannot speak for the Army right now. I
    will have to take that one for the record and get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Transformation is an evolutionary process and the Fiscal Year 2002
    Amended Budget represents a balanced program, which maintains an Army,
    trained and ready. To support the Army's future goals, significant
    funding increases for Transformation and Science and Technology
    development have been included as part of the President's Amended
    Budget. The service can best articulate in any discussion pertaining to
    transformation tradeoff decisions.
        The Army's Future Goals was part of the process in the Quadrennial
    Defense Review which was released the end of September 2001.

        Senator Inhofe. I am pleased they made the evaluation, the
    commitment, and the funding that they did. Senator Warner and I
    have both had the opportunity to go out and see the reason that
    it is necessary for us to update our 40-year-old Paladin
    system, so it would at least be competitive.
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. It represents a quantum leap in
    capability.
        Senator Inhofe. The modernization cuts proposed with the B-
    2 include installation of the new satellite communication
    system, Link-16. We have been talking about this for quite
    sometime, and I understand that in this budget you are
    proposing to cancel the $123 million in the B-2 modernization
    funding. I was surprised when I saw this, after the performance
    that we witnessed with this, and the criticism of not being
    able to change missions en route during the Kosovo operation.
        Am I accurate on what the budget has on this, Secretary
    Rumsfeld, and can you tell me what the thinking was behind it
    in terms of cutting the updating of the B-2?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I would have to look back into that and
    get back to you on that, unless, Dov, do you have that?
        Dr. Zakheim. No. We need to look into it.
        Senator Inhofe. Good. Well, perhaps it is not true, then. I
    would certainly, again, like to have that answer for the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We are not proposing to cancel the B-2 Link-16 Program. We do have
    an unfunded requirement of approximately $48 million that would
    continue the development efforts that will provide battlefield
    situational awareness for improved survivability and flexible
    retargeting. It is my intention to fully fund this program in the
    Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request.

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, thanks for your testimony. Let me say
    first that I am pleased to see that the budget that you and the
    President are offering us today, despite the fact that it is a
    place-holder, does build on the bipartisan efforts in this
    committee and Congress over the last year to regain real growth
    in defense spending. This is the first time we have done this
    since the mid-eighties, and I am pleased that this budget
    includes an increase over last year.
        Although we have not seen the details, and therefore it is
    pretty hard to endorse them, I applaud the increase that you
    are recommending and I will support it. In fact, in looking
    over the material we have so far, I think the increase in
    defense spending which the President and you are recommending
    is actually too small to meet our national security needs.
        While it does make much-needed progress in quality of life,
    in compensation, and in restoring deteriorating infrastructure,
    I do not think it meets the goals of bolstering readiness and
    transforming military capabilities. Resources to support
    OPTEMPO are flat or down in the categories you have shown us so
    far, such as flying hours and tank training miles.
        I think it was General Patton who once said, ``first-class
    training is the best form of welfare for the troops,'' meaning
    it is another aspect of quality of life. I think the budget, so
    far, falls short there.
        Also, after factoring in increases for the ballistic
    missile defense, spending for research development, testing,
    and evaluation appears to be no better than flat. Basic
    research and advanced research, the source of the technology we
    will need to transform the entire military, is flat. It is well
    below the goal of 3 percent of the budget, which itself, I
    think, is too low, and that is not consistent with your
    transformation goals.
        I am also very concerned that procurement spending in this
    budget is not what it should be, even after accounting for
    additions from transferring missile programs from the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Office to the Services. Even if the QDR
    concludes that we will not transform our force, which I hope it
    does not, we nonetheless must modernize. One independent
    analysis, one of many that have suggested this, was done by the
    Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis headed by Dr.
    Krepinevich, and concluded that modernizing the existing force
    on the current schedule would require between $65 and $85
    billion per year, or $5 to $20 billion more than is in this
    year's procurement budget. Accelerating the schedule would
    require $75 to $95 billion per year, or between $15 and $35
    billion more than is in this year's budget. Even cutting the
    current force and modernization programs could cost $65 billion
    per year, which is $5 billion more than you have in this year's
    budget.
        The fact is that bold transformations, such as the one I
    think you are hoping for and which I agree with, will add
    substantially to those estimated cost increases. So as I said
    at the outset, I endorse the defense increases that you
    propose. I would personally support a larger increase, because
    I believe that is necessary to keep the American military
    dominant into this new century.
        Let me ask you about two of the points that I have just
    made. On procurement, do you agree that we need more, whether
    for a transformed or modernized force, than the amount you have
    requested for procurement?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. The goal for procurement, as
    you will recall, in recent years has been to get up to $60
    billion. In 2001, with the supplemental, it will be $62
    billion. In 2002, we are proposing $61.6 billion, so it is
    quite close, but I agree with you that it is not at a level of
    increase that would modernize the force.
        In regards to OPTEMPO, it is a matter of choices. The Air
    Force, for example, has an increase, whereas the Navy and
    Marine Corps took a slight decrease, as they chose between
    things with finite resources.
        With respect to research, development, testing, and
    evaluation (RDT&E), the number actually is up from $41 billion
    to $47 billion, with some focus on transformational R&D,
    countering unconventional threats to national security,
    improving RDT&E test range infrastructure, reducing cost of
    weapons and intelligence systems, and OPTEMPO. It is uneven.
    The Army's flying hours, you are quite right, went down from
    14.5 to 14. The Navy, on the other hand, went up from 17.8
    hours for their tactical air forces to 22.6. The Air Force held
    level at 17.1 in terms of flight hours.
        The tank miles are different. They actually did go down, as
    you suggested, from 800 to 730. The Army made those kind of
    choices. The National Training Center stayed level at 97, and
    the ship operations stayed exactly level at 15.5. So it's a
    mixed bag, some up, some down, and some staying right where
    they were on OPTEMPO.
        Senator Lieberman. Let me address the first part of your
    answer, if I may, Mr. Secretary. As I gather, you agree that in
    the best of all worlds we should be spending more on
    procurement. Did you request that through the budget process of
    OMB?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We certainly presented to the Office of
    Management and Budget and the President the budget that we felt
    would be desirable for the Department. The process then is, as
    you well know, for them to look at all their needs, social
    security and various other things that are going on in the
    government, and come to a conclusion. This is where we came
    out. It is the largest increase since 1986, 7 percent in real
    terms, as I understand it, and yet it is not sufficient to dig
    us out of the hole that we have been digging ourselves into for
    the past 5, 6, or 7 years.
        Senator Lieberman. So, it is fair to presume, in the normal
    course of the budgetary exercise, that you did not get
    everything you wanted.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Seldom do.
        Senator Lieberman. Therefore, there is some room for this
    committee, hopefully, to make some independent judgments about
    the budget.
        I would just say briefly, in response to Mr. Chairman, on
    the RDT&E, it is true that there has been a substantial
    increase. However, as I look at it, most of it, not all of it,
    is in the defense-wide area, which is mostly missile defense
    and increases to the services. Except for the Navy and Marine
    Corps, it is not great.
        The one part I do want to focus on, and I hope the
    committee can take a separate look at, is the science and
    technology budget. The total for this year is $9 billion, and
    you are recommending $8.8 billion. I don't think we are going
    to be able to do what we need to do unless we are investing in
    the technologies of the future.
        I have gone over my time. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Lieberman, actually, on RDT&E,
    the Army is up from 6.3 to 6.7 billion, the Navy is up from 9.4
    to 11.1, Air Force is up from 14 to 14.3, and defense-wide is
    11.3 to 15.3.
        In regards to transformational R&D, there are any number of
    items, including Global Hawk, Future Combat System,
    digitization, joint tactical radio systems, and several others.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. General Shelton, well done, sir. Thank
    you.
        General Shelton. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Roberts. At about 3:30, Mr. Chairman, I thought I
    had arranged a B-1B flyover from McConnell Air Force Base----
    [Laughter.]
        --to fly about 30 feet over the Senate Office Buildings and
    perhaps over the Pentagon.
        That is a poor attempt at humor that perhaps Senator
    Cleland would enjoy--a little black humor.
        I am discouraged, I am frustrated, and I am angry, Mr.
    Secretary. More to the point, the men and women of the 184th
    Bomber Wing in Wichita, Kansas, at McConnell Air Force Base,
    share my discouragement and my frustration. I do not know if
    they are angry. They should be, and I will tell you why.
        At our last hearing, I asked you to include Congress as you
    go forward with your transformation. I believed your stated
    resolute position to review transformation recommendations
    carefully before decisions were made.
        I was very disappointed--that is not strong enough. I will
    not tell you how strong I felt on Tuesday when, without
    discussion from Congress of any kind, no consultation, and from
    my view, with little close review by senior leaders in the DOD,
    the decisions to significantly reduce the B-1 bomber fleet and
    take the B-1 bombers from Georgia, Idaho, and Kansas, and put
    them in South Dakota and Texas was announced.
        Dr. Zakheim, your able assistant there, told staffers that
    evening that the way this was handled by the services was a
    model of what DOD is trying to do to cut excess. I sure as heck
    hope this is not a model on how you are going to consult with
    Congress.
        I have been quoted as stating that I thought that politics
    may have played in the decision to place the B-1's in South
    Dakota. Why would I say that? I do not think that this
    Secretary is going to do that. I did not think anybody in the
    Air Force would do that.
        Well, I said it because I have here a political impact
    statement from the United States Air Force, and it says here,
    in regards to Texas, the home State of POTUS--I do not know of
    any Senator named POTUS. [Laughter.]
        I do know of a President by the name of Bush whose home
    State is Texas. Then the political impact says, Senate Majority
    Leader, home State of South Dakota.
        It gets to Georgia, it gets to Idaho, and it gets to
    Kansas, and you do not find any mention of Senator Cleland,
    Senator Roberts, Senator Craig, or Senator Crapo. I do not know
    what doofus over at the Air Force put this out, but if there is
    a political impact, why he put it on a piece of paper is beyond
    me.
        I am angry because of the apparent piecemeal approach to
    transformation that this represents lack of any coordination
    with Members of Congress. Will other programs receive the same
    consideration? Will the Senators from affected States and on
    this committee find out one morning of the Navy's decision to
    reduce or cut the DD-21, or the Army decides to cut the
    Crusader? Maybe we are moving from 10 Army divisions to 8.
        We cannot have a piecemeal approach to our transformation.
    These actions to cut or reshape major weapons systems must be
    part of an overall plan, and Congress must be included.
        I am going to make every effort--you know this, we have
    talked about it--to stop any movement of the B-1B aircraft
    until I am confident, and Senator Cleland is confident, that
    this decision fits into our national defense strategy, has had
    the proper review, and every aspect of such a decision has been
    considered. I will do the same for any decision on any major
    weapons system if the proper reviews have not been made.
        I would appreciate your comments, sir, on this recently
    announced decision on the B-1 platform, including the time line
    for such action and the choice for the locations of the
    remaining B-1Bs. Please include how future weapons system
    decisions will be coordinated with the Members of Congress.
        You do not have to answer that right now. You have in your
    possession somewhere in the Pentagon a letter sent to you by
    myself, Senator Cleland, Senator Miller, Senator Brownback,
    Senator Craig, Senator Crapo, and about eight or nine Members
    of the House of Representatives.
        We point out that you have correctly indicated that the
    global environment will likely include limited access to
    overseas bases and require a strategy dependent more on long-
    range precision strike. That is correct. This is the primary
    mission of the B-1 bomber. It is being plussed up in terms of
    offensive capability, so that cannot be a consideration.
        In terms of the strategic portion of this, I do not
    understand it. In terms of the cost-benefit, I really do not
    understand it. The Kansas Air National Guard has made a
    historic mission-capable rate of an average 15 percent higher
    than an active duty at 25 percent less cost per flying hour.
    They do it better than any other outfit in the United States
    from a cost-benefit standpoint, and that is not all.
        We have a General Accounting Office (GAO) report--if I can
    separate it from the other reports--which is approximately 1
    year old, and basically says that we made a good decision in
    turning over the B-1 to the Reserve and the Guard. It discusses
    the exercises in Kosovo and Operation Desert Fox, which proved
    the value of the B-1 as a solid long-range performer and
    validated the CINC's option to provide combat punch without the
    arduous basing problems that other short wing, short-range
    weapons endure. That is a GAO report.
        I have a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report saying
    the same thing. General Shelton just said we have aging
    aircraft--do not come around with that damn note [Laughter.]--
    --
        --under the B-52, the B-1, and the B-2, and we compare very
    favorably, if not more favorably, to the B-52 and the B-2. Let
    me quote Gen. John Michael Loh at a Pentagon press briefing. I
    will just sum it up.
        Throughout this test, we have proved the B-1 can pack up,
    go anywhere in the world, and put bombs on target at the combat
    readiness rates we need and expect. It is, and remains, the
    backbone of our bomber fleet.
        In response to our letter, you indicated that McConnell Air
    Force Base loses all nine B-1s--no, you did not indicate that;
    that was your original statement--and opens up 832 manpower
    authorizations. I think there is 1,300, but if you say there is
    832, that is better.
        Then, the day after we raised a fuss and said that we lose
    all nine B-1s, we were going to find new missions. These people
    have 15 to 20 years of experience. They have flown in every
    aircraft imaginable. I do not know what kind of a new mission
    they are going to find in Wichita. I am for that. God, don't
    take that away.
        We want some answers. We want some answers on the strategic
    side and on the cost-benefit side. Mr. Secretary, if this is
    the way we are going to be consulted with in regards to
    transformation--I thought we were going to have a situation
    where we got well first, then consult with Congress for
    transformation, and then go to the QDR. I think on a bipartisan
    basis, everybody here would support that. This is not the way
    that this should happen.
        Now, I am way over time. If you would like to say something
    I would like to invite your comments.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I would begin with a
    very sincere apology to you and Senator Cleland. There is no
    question that it was not handled well. The Air Force made this
    recommendation and it was executed. Unfortunately, the
    Secretary of the Air Force was out of the country, and the
    handling of it was not well done. I apologize for it, and I do
    not know what else I can say.
        With respect to the details and specific questions you have
    raised, we will certainly take the time and sit down and get
    the specific answers and look at it in the context that you
    requested.
        Your general comment about how the weapons systems were
    going to be handled is exactly correct. It is exactly what I
    said when I was last before this committee. It is exactly how
    it has happened, and the normal order of things is that these
    issues are being addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
    They will be addressed in an orderly way, in context with each
    other.
        Finally, with respect to how it is possible to consult,
    what I suppose we could do--I have not really thought it
    through as to exactly how we can consult with the House and the
    Senate Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations
    Committees who have the particular interest in these subjects.
    But there is no reason at all that we cannot find periodic
    break points in the QDR process and offer opportunities for
    Senators and Members of the House to become aware of how the
    progression is going.
        At some point somebody is going to make a recommendation on
    all of these weapons systems that are coming down the road, and
    at the point that a recommendation is made, one would hope that
    they would be looked at together, as you properly suggest is
    the desirable way to do it.
        Ultimately, a decision will get made, and someone is going
    to like it, and someone is not going to like it. All I can do
    is express the hope that when those decisions are made, we will
    have looked at them in a manner that is satisfactory to the
    Members in terms of the quality of the process, and that we
    will have made, particularly members of this committee and the
    House committee, knowledgeable about how that decision is
    evolving and what the arguments are so people are not
    blindsided badly, the way you and Senator Cleland have been.
    Again, I apologize.
        Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
        Senator Cleland.
        Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, I am here to say that the
    emotion, the feeling, the rage expressed by my dear friend from
    Kansas is bipartisan, deep, and profound. This decision on the
    B-1 bomber and the way it was handled looks to me like a
    mackerel in the moonlight. It both shines and stinks at the
    same time. After all, it was the Reagan-Bush administration
    that cranked up production of the B-1 bomber in the first
    place, and after the Cold War was over, the country no longer
    relied on the triad of missiles, submarines, and bombers to
    retaliate in the case of nuclear attack.
        Then President Bush, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell found a new role
    for the B-1. It is as the Senator from Kansas suggested. It
    would no longer be massed in the center of the country to
    protect it from enemy attack and preserve precious minutes in
    response time for take-off under a nuclear strike scenario. It
    would be dispersed and given a conventional role of supporting
    forces deployed around the globe. It would be dispersed west to
    Kansas and Idaho for quick response to Pacific and Asian
    theaters. It would be deployed east to Warner Robins Air Force
    Base in Georgia for quick response to action in Europe, the
    Middle East, and the Balkans.
        Its dispersion meant a quicker response to a changing
    global environment, and a reduced chance of a terrorist or
    sabotage attack to knock out the force centered in one or two
    sites. Although the B-1 bomber saw limited action in both
    Desert Storm and the Balkan War, it still serves as the
    Nation's only supersonic bomber capable of conventional and
    unconventional missions.
        Additionally, the decision by the Bush administration
    committed the Air Force to build up extensive infrastructure to
    support the B-1 bomber in its new dispersion plan. This was
    offset, in one way, by letting the Air Guard maintain and
    operate the bombers in two States: Kansas and Georgia. This
    became a very effective means of accomplishing the B-1 bomber
    task.
        The two most cost-effective B-1 bomber wings in the world
    are the two run by the Air Guards of Kansas and Georgia. As a
    matter of fact, the GAO report the distinguished Senator from
    Kansas referred to in 1998 says whether the Air Force chooses
    among our options or develops options of its own, we believe
    millions of dollars could be saved without reducing mission
    capability by placing more B-1s in the Reserve component.
    Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
    the Secretary of the Air Force to prepare a plan to place more
    B-1s in the Reserve component and seek congressional support
    for the plan.
        As the Senator from Kansas states, the National Guard B-1s
    have a mission-capable rate higher than that of the active duty
    Air Force. The Air National Guard B-1 units have a lower flying
    hour cost than the active duty Air Force B-1s. At Warner Robins
    in particular, $100 million was committed over a period of 10
    years to bed down a B-1 bomber wing. Some $70 million has
    already been spent in that effort. Recently, a $40 million
    brand-new hangar was completed. Ironically, the two newest
    facilities for the B-1 bomber and the two most cost-effective
    facilities for operating a B-1 bomber wing are the very ones
    you want to shut down.
        I think this puts us back in the Cold War mode, puts us
    back where we were before President Bush, Dick Cheney, and
    Colin Powell made the decision to embark on the policy we have
    lived with for a decade.
        Now, walking away from $100 million in brand-new
    infrastructure and cost-effective operations does not seem to
    be a formula for saving money. I would like to know, and I
    would like for you to explain to this panel, why did you go
    against the GAO recommendation, and why did you make this
    decision?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the decision was made by the
    Air Force, and the logic of it is that they wanted to go from
    93 B-1 bombers down to 60 B-1 bombers and change the basing
    mode from five down to two to save funds. They wanted us to use
    those savings to upgrade the remaining B-1 bombers.
        It is an interesting footnote in history, I was the
    Secretary of Defense in 1976 who first approved the B-1 bomber.
    It was later canceled by the Carter administration, as I
    recall, and then reinitiated in the Reagan period.
        Senator Cleland. I will ask the GAO to take a new,
    independent look at this decision, to give this Senator and
    this committee an objective analysis of where we are with the
    B-1 bomber program and the suggestions as to where we should
    go. Any decision regarding the B-1 bomber program should
    strengthen the security of the Nation, not weaken it, and I
    will be going to Warner Robins tomorrow to see for myself what
    the facts are.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland. Senator Warner
    is yielding very graciously.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
    like to first add my commendation to General Shelton for his
    great service to the Nation.
        General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Reed. One would expect nothing less from a former
    Brigade Commander in the 82nd Airborne Division.
        General Shelton. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Reed. If I may, Mr. Secretary, let me follow up
    with a line of questioning about national missile defense that
    Senator Levin began.
        My understanding of your response is that as we look
    forward in this budget cycle, the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Office will be involved in intensive, aggressive research
    activities. If those activities present opportunities, those
    opportunities will be exploited even if they violate the ABM
    Treaty.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me clarify that. The President has
    said that he does not want to simply give notice under the
    treaty, which is permitted, a 6-month notice, and then go on
    his way, apart from Russia. He has said he would much prefer,
    and told President Putin this, that he would much prefer to
    work with the Russians and see if they cannot come to some
    understanding of a new framework with respect to the
    relationship that goes beyond missile defense; one that
    includes reductions in strategic offensive forces and looks at
    proliferation and counterproliferation. That is his hope. That
    is his intention.
        He has also said that he intends to have a ballistic
    missile defense capability for this country and for our
    deployed forces overseas, and to the extent friends and allies
    want to participate, fine.
        The treaty is inconsistent with his goal of having the
    ability to protect population centers and deployed forces.
    Therefore, he has said he wants to set it aside, or get beyond
    it, and establish some other framework. That process is
    underway. It was started, as I said, with the President's
    meeting with Mr. Putin. The two of them have agreed that the
    Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense will meet. We are
    supposed to begin that process of discussions at some point in
    the period immediately ahead.
        The President has also said that he does not intend to give
    a veto to Russia over whether or not the United States has the
    capability of defending its populations from ballistic
    missiles, so I think the way to think of it is that the R&D
    program is going forward. There is a compliance, the law
    exists, the treaty exists, and the President does not intend to
    violate the treaty. The President intends to set a process in
    motion to discuss with the Russians how we get beyond it.
        Now, clearly, if they are unwilling to do anything to get
    beyond it, the President has indicated that therefore he would
    very likely give notice to the Russians and allow the 6-month
    period and go ahead and do the research and development that is
    inhibited by the current treaty. But that is not his intention,
    that is not his hope, and I must add, it is not his
    expectation.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me turn to a
    more specific issue with respect to this area of national
    missile defense. There was a story today in the Wall Street
    Journal that a contract has been prepared for the construction
    of an interceptor site near Fort Greely, Alaska. Has this
    contract in fact been prepared, and are you entering into
    discussions with a contractor to construct a facility at Fort
    Greely?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I saw the article and I asked about
    that. My understanding of that situation is that there is a
    contract that is in the process of being prepared. It does
    involve Alaska. It involves site preparation, and to my
    knowledge, it would not violate the treaty--correction, it
    would not constitute an act that would be beyond the permitted
    acts under the treaty, I am advised.
        Senator Reed. This approach sounds similar to an option
    that General Kadish briefed to the committee earlier this
    month, to have up to 10 test missiles available for operational
    deployment using an upgraded existing radar on Shemya Island in
    Alaska. Does this budget contain funds to upgrade that radar or
    to build the interceptor silos in Alaska, beyond the issue of
    the contract preparations?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. As I indicated to Senator Levin,
    General Kadish, which was perfectly proper, briefed the
    committee on his thinking prior to the time that he had firmed
    up his research and development plans. Those plans have not
    been firmed up as of this moment, nor have I been briefed on
    them.
        You are exactly right. In his set of options, one of them
    involves the possibility of upgrading an existing radar in
    Alaska and putting some number of interceptors in silos in
    Alaska. To go back to Senator Levin's question, I am told by
    the lawyers that there is a debate among the lawyers as to
    whether, if you actually did those things, as opposed to just
    site-clearing, whether or not that would constitute going
    beyond what the treaty permits. There are lawyers on both
    sides, and apparently, part of the issue involves intent.
        If it is intended that it be a test bed, apparently more
    lawyers than not believe that would not exceed the treaty. If
    it is intended not to be a test bed but possibly a prototype of
    some sort, then some more lawyers would switch over and say,
    ``well, maybe that might be.''
        The problem is, I am not inclined to get into that
    business. I am not a lawyer. Why does the United States want to
    put itself in a position where someone can say, ``you violated
    the treaty,'' or ``you did not violate the treaty,'' and one
    lawyer argues with another lawyer? We want to get into the
    discussions with the Russians, get the treaty straightened out,
    and get a new framework that gets beyond that so this country
    can go forward and do what the President has indicated he would
    like to do.
        Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I am particularly interested in your request
    to raise the threshold for contracts subject to Davis-Bacon
    wage requirements from $2,000 to $1 million. Your request
    states this policy would lead to a savings of $190 million in
    fiscal year 2002. I am concerned about the impact that your
    proposal would have on local economies and businesses.
        The question is, what assurances can you provide to
    mitigate the negative impact this would have on Federal workers
    and local economies? What steps would the Department take to
    avoid the problems experienced by States who have repealed
    prevailing wage laws, which include cost overruns and change
    orders, to correct mistakes in poor workmanship?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I would like to ask Dr.
    Zakheim, who has been working on this specific issue, to
    respond to your question. Thank you.
        Dr. Zakheim. Senator, the Davis-Bacon Act has been around
    for quite some time. At the time it was enacted, $1 million was
    an awful lot for a contract, I believe. We are now talking
    about contracts much, much larger, and so a $1 million contract
    today is really a relatively small contract. That is one point.
        Second, the questions you raise are extremely to the point,
    and there would certainly be efforts to mitigate the kinds of
    impacts you are talking about. But clearly at the present a
    $2,000 contract is not terribly much. Most contracts are well
    above that, and effectively it means that in no circumstances,
    barring very, very minimal ones, can the situation take place
    where one pays non-union wages to non-union workers.
        We are trying our best to find a variety of management
    reforms. We know $190 million is a significant amount, and at
    the same time, we take your concerns under advisement. There
    are people looking at those.
        Senator Akaka. General Shelton, I agree with your goals for
    sustaining a quality force. I believe we need to address the
    quality of life for our service members and their families to
    increase pay, improve housing, reduce out-of-pocket expenses,
    and improve health care for our military retirees. I share your
    concerns regarding the deteriorating infrastructure and its
    impact on readiness and the quality of life for service members
    and their families. I support your efforts to address this
    situation.
        Given your identification of modernization as your biggest
    priority, my question to you is, do you believe that the fiscal
    year 2002 budget adequately addresses this issue?
        General Shelton. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
    support on those very key issues for all men and women in
    uniform. I believe that the fiscal year 2002 budget is a very
    prudent interim budget. It puts people first. It makes sure
    that we have fully funded our current readiness, which is very
    important. As I have said so many times before, when our Armed
    Forces are needed, we do not have time to ask, ``Are you
    ready?'' It is normally time to go.
        The modernization and the recapitalization, as I indicated,
    are still an issue. However, the QDR process right now is
    addressing where we go in terms of capitalizing, modernizing,
    and transforming. Out of that process now we should come out
    with a blueprint, a road map for the way ahead, and see where
    we are going to need the significant plus-ups in the
    modernization and in the transformation accounts.
        As indicated earlier by one of your distinguished
    colleagues, the estimates on how much that would be are still
    to be determined. I think out of the QDR we should have a
    better figure for what that total amount is going to be, where
    it should be applied. The estimates, of course, have ranged
    from $50 to $100 billion. It is a wide range. I think the QDR
    will help us to start focusing that effort and have it ready to
    go in the 2003 budget.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Carnahan.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
    would like to note that General Shelton will be retiring in
    September. I would like to express my gratitude for the
    patriotism that you have shown, and for all you have done in
    the interest of peace around the world. Certainly, the American
    people owe you a great debt of gratitude, and I thank you very
    much for that.
        General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator. It has been
    my honor.
        At this point, I would like to offer my statement for the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Senator Jean Carnahan
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wish to welcome Secretary Rumsfeld,
    General Shelton, and Dr. Zakheim. I am very pleased that this committee
    will begin considering 2002 Defense Authorization and engage our
    Pentagon leadership in a substantive dialogue about the defense budget.
        I am dedicated to providing a strong national defense and intend to
    do what is necessary to ensure we have the best equipped and best
    prepared fighting force in the world.
        To begin with, we need to develop a suitable framework for
    responding to emerging threats around the globe. We need to develop a
    force structure that shifts our current focus on Cold War areas of
    concern to 21st century dangers emanating from Central and East Asia.
    In addition, we must be prepared to confront assymetric threats from
    rogue nations and terrorist organizations. To meet the challenges of
    the future, we need to expand our capabilities in cyber-warfare, rapid
    reaction tactics, and early warning intelligence. Achieving these goals
    will require sizable investments in several areas, including airlift
    assets, research and development of new technologies, and expansion of
    our modern long range bomber fleet.
        But above all else, it is essential that we take care of the most
    important resources in our arsenal--our men and women in uniform. This
    year, I hope that the Department of Defense takes special care to
    ensure that the 2002 defense budget addresses critical shortfalls in
    personnel's quality of life--this means long overdue investments in
    housing units, health care facilities, and education benefits that are
    so crucial to the retention of our service men and women and their
    families.
        It will be a difficult task to meet our pressing needs within the
    confines of the Budget Resolution, but I have great confidence in the
    leadership of Senators Levin and Warner and look forward to working
    closely with them as well as with Secretary Rumsfeld and the Pentagon
    leadership.

        Senator Carnahan. I would like to now address a question to
    General Shelton. In your remarks you emphasize key advancements
    in our military health care system. I agree with your statement
    that our commitment to health care must extend to personnel and
    families of retirees. I supported last year's initiative and
    hope we can continue developing these programs.
        In addition, I hope that this committee, as well as the
    Pentagon, will evaluate our commitment to this component of our
    Armed Services. Indeed, we have increasingly come to depend on
    our Reserve components in almost every major deployment abroad.
    As a result of the post-Cold War downsizing, we have now
    maintained fewer active forces in our military, while we
    continue to expand our commitments around the world. Would you
    describe the expansion of our Reserve component's role in the
    total force since the Gulf War ended in 1991?
        General Shelton. Senator, our use of our Reserve
    components, and I might say great Reserve components, because
    they do yeoman's work day-in and day-out around the world, both
    the National Guard as well as the Reserve Forces, has become
    quite extensive. In fact, I was just in the Balkans this last
    month, and every time I go I am reminded, whether it is in
    Operation Southern Watch at Prince Sultan Air Base, or Northern
    Watch at Incirlik Air Base, wherever I go, the Reserve
    components are a key part of the force.
        I want to say that roughly a third of those at any given
    point in the Balkans come out of the Reserve components, and so
    we have been demanding a lot of them. In some cases, in our
    civil affairs, the percentage of our force that is actually in
    the Reserve components, which we use civil affairs an awful
    lot, is 96 percent. In psychological operations it's about 67
    percent, and so we are forced to go to the Reserves a lot,
    given the types of operations, particularly the long-term
    commitments that we have, like in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the
    Sinai, to a great degree. That has been a concern.
        I have discussed that with the Chiefs of our Reserves, and
    the National Guard. They have some concerns about it, although
    they do not think that we are in a crisis yet. But certainly as
    a part of the Quadrennial Defense Review that has got to be
    something that we do address and plan to address as a part of
    the look at the total force, and whether or not we have the mix
    right in the Guard and the Reserve.
        Senator Carnahan. Does the Department of Defense plan to
    address health care and other benefits for reservists in
    recognition of their increased contribution to the defense of
    our Nation?
        General Shelton. Senator, I will have to take a look at
    that. I do not recall specifically if that was a part of our
    terms of reference for the QDR or not, but we will look at that
    and get back to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Quadrennial Defense Review process addresses health care and
    other benefits and was released by the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense September 2001.

        On health care, I want to once again thank the members of
    this committee for the great support given to our men and women
    in uniform, as well as our retirees. You made it happen, and it
    is reflected in everything that I see now in terms of morale,
    attitude, and recognition and appreciation of their great
    efforts.
        There is still a concern, as we look at health care, that
    it is an entitlement that competes with ammunition, planes, and
    ships. We need to try to figure out a way to get that out of
    the O&M account and into a category of funding that recognizes
    it for what it is: a must-pay that we pay up front and do not
    put in the same category with precision munitions.
        Senator Carnahan. One other question. In your last
    appearance before this committee, you and the secretary
    emphasized emerging threats posed by chemical, biological, and
    nuclear weapons around the globe.
        I believe, as you do, that these threats remain imminent.
    Even as we plan a long-term strategy for dealing with weapons
    of mass destruction, it is essential that our troops remain
    sufficiently protected from chemical/biological agents. I hope
    that the fiscal year 2002 defense budget will sufficiently
    equip our troops with adequate protection to deploy in a
    contaminated environment. Has the Pentagon sought to modernize
    its defense against chemical and biological agents in the
    short-term?
        General Shelton. Senator, the answer is yes. In the short-
    term, and certainly as part of our long-term analysis and
    strategy, that is a growing threat which we know we have to
    deal with. We have programs and plans in place to do exactly
    that.
        We have made some, I think, relatively quantum leaps in the
    area of detection, such as our ability to determine what type
    of agent it is at greater distances than when you are actually
    exposed to it. But that is an area we need to continue to
    press, because obviously it is one of those asymmetrical
    threats that we have to be very concerned about, and that will
    be reflected in the priorities of our programs.
        Senator Carnahan. You have also testified before this
    committee to illustrate the fact that chemical and biological
    agents pose a more imminent threat than most other types of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks. Do you anticipate
    substantial increases in long-term investments in chemical/
    biological defenses equivalent to other investments in WMD
    defense?
        General Shelton. I will respond for the record for that,
    because I need to go back and look at it in terms of the nature
    of your question. Certainly, those are programs that we have to
    have funded. They are very important programs. In terms of the
    percentage of increase relative to the others, I will have to
    go back and check the figures on that, and I will respond to
    you in writing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Our troops are equipped with the most modern defense equipment
    capable of providing more than adequate protection against traditional
    chemical and biological warfare agent attacks. The President's budget
    will provide improved chemical point and standoff detection
    capabilities, and continue research to improve protective ensembles and
    masks, medical, chemical, and biological countermeasures, and
    decontamination technologies. Always cognizant of emerging chemical and
    biological warfare threats, we continue to modernize and upgrade our
    equipment to maintain the highest standards of protection and to meet
    the challenge of future military operations. The DOD Chemical and
    Biological Defense Program is committed to maintaining the proper
    balance between the fielding of state-of-the-art equipment and
    continued investments in science and technology programs. The ongoing
    QDR is assessing our future requirements for countering nuclear,
    biological, and chemical weapons and means of delivery to include
    passive defense capabilities, both for military operations overseas and
    in support of civil authorities.

        Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
        General Shelton. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Bill Nelson. According to the list
    that I have, Senator Bill Nelson is ahead of Senator Ben
    Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Just on this. [Laughter.]
        Senator Bill Nelson. I will hold my tongue.
        It is kind of interesting; two Nelsons, both freshmen, both
    Democrats, both former insurance commissioners. He likes to
    think he is from the State with the football team, but I
    reminded him that Florida has six professional football teams.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. I think we are not going to go there.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Not only in the NFL, but also the
    Gators, the Seminoles, and the Hurricanes.
        Mr. Secretary, I said to you a couple of days ago that you
    have a tough job. I think you are doing a good job,
    notwithstanding the anger of Senators Roberts and Cleland,
    which is quite understandable. I think you are trying to get
    your arms around a behemoth and bring some rationality to it,
    and redirect our force structure to meet the challenges for the
    future. I want to commend you for that, as I said a few days
    ago.
        I would like to discuss what we explored the other day, but
    with a slightly different angle. I notice that Senator Stevens
    has inserted this in the supplemental appropriation which we
    will be voting on probably tomorrow: ``notwithstanding any
    other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may retain all
    or a portion of Fort Greely, Alaska, as the Secretary deems
    necessary, to meet military operational, logistics, and
    personnel support requirements for missile defense.''
        My question is, picking up on what we had discussed the
    other day, how can you start to deploy something that has not
    been developed? You and I discussed that we want to continue
    robust R&D, and then you go about testing, but you cannot
    deploy something that is not developed.
        There are certain lead times that you need, obviously, in
    preparation of ground and so forth, but then you get to a point
    that you have to start building silos. I would like your
    comment in light of the fact that it is a generally accepted
    principle in the Nation's defense that you cannot deploy
    something that is not developed.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. First let me say that I am
    not familiar with the language that you mentioned that may be
    in the supplemental. I can comment on the remainder of your
    question.
        To test something, you frequently need to do something in
    the ground, and the single missile defense activity that was
    the furthest along was the one that the Clinton administration
    had planned to go forward with in Alaska. That concept was to
    have a radar and have some interceptors in the ground, in
    silos, in Alaska. That particular model was the one they were
    working on, to the exclusion of things that might, at some
    point, lead to a breach with respect to the treaty.
        You are correct that lead times become quite important.
    Apparently, in that part of Alaska there are 2 or 3 months, at
    the most, when you can do any kind of construction. It is not a
    friendly, hospitable environment for construction. The site
    preparation and the shipment of materials has to go up and be
    there during that brief period when the weather permits it.
        Second, they have to go up there, I think, a year in
    advance so that they are there when the actual time when
    something is permitted.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. All of that is
    understandable, Mr. Secretary, but let's get on to the
    question, are the interceptors, in fact, developed?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The decision to do what you are
    describing has not been made. There has not been a decision
    made to deploy in Alaska. Indeed, I do not even know if the
    decision had been made in the previous administration, although
    it might have been. Someone here can correct me on this, but
    the intention in the previous administration, or the track they
    were on, was to, in March or April, I believe, ship up to
    Alaska the materials they would need for the radar and possibly
    also for some of the interceptor silos. They would not have
    done that had they not believed that by the time they were able
    to do that the interceptors and the radar would be available.
        The purpose of doing it in the prior administration I
    cannot speak to, whether it was a deployment or not. The
    purpose of doing what they are doing now is something that
    General Kadish is currently considering. That is to say,
    whether or not it would be a test bed or a prototype.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk about those interceptors
    being developed. The theory, you said, is that they would be
    developed, and therefore be able to be deployed. Do we have any
    evidence in any of our R&D and testing now that that kind of
    interceptor would, in fact, work?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The purpose of, of course, a test bed
    would be to experiment to see to what extent it would work. My
    recollection of that particular interceptor is that they do, in
    fact, have something that is in track that could be used,
    although there is also, as I recall, an intention to upgrade
    it. Do you recall, General?
        General Shelton. Sir, you have described it exactly right.
    It is still being tested. It has worked. However, it still
    needs additional testing, additional work, and there are more
    tests scheduled in the next few years.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Where is it being tested, General?
        General Shelton. It is part of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Organization (BMDO) testing. Specifically where the
    test sites are we will have to provide for the record.
        Senator Bill Nelson. This is not part of the test on the
    kinetic energy, the one that is launched from California or
    Kwajalein?
        General Shelton. We will provide you an answer for the
    record, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In response to your questions about testing, we currently use the
    range between Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) in California (for
    launching targets) and the Reagan Test Site (RTS) in the Marshall
    Islands (for launching interceptors) and it has been useful for
    developmental testing. However, the range lacks the required realism
    for tests of BMDS interceptors and sensors. Flight test restrictions on
    trajectories, impact areas, and debris in space are among the
    challenges facing the former ``National Missile Defense'' program, now
    called the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
        To increase the operational realism of GMD testing, proposals are
    being considered to expand our test infrastructure to include
    additional test assets and additional intercept areas. Because this
    expansion is still being analyzed, MDA has not yet determined the
    activities and locations that will be used. The proposals include
    making use of early warning radars on the west coast and using both the
    Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska and VAFB to launch targets. The Kodiak
    Launch Complex may be upgraded to launch single or dual interceptors.
    Currently RTS can launch a single interceptor and may be upgraded for
    dual interceptor launches.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, you obviously see where
    I am going. We have all this discussion and hand wringing about
    breaking the ABM Treaty or maybe not breaking it because it is
    a test and so forth. But I think it gets back to a basic
    question of physics, that you have to develop something before
    you can deploy it. This Senator has not seen that we are at
    that point which ought to justify Senator Stevens inserting
    this language in the supplemental appropriations bill. Mr.
    Chairman, I am going to continue to poke and probe, and
    General, I would appreciate it if you would furnish that
    information to me, not only about this specific test that might
    be applicable to a site in Alaska, but all other tests as well.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, just very briefly, I think you
    made the comment that you are concerned about deployment. There
    is not a plan to deploy ballistic missile defense at the
    present time, and so I do not know quite where you are going
    with respect to that; there will have to be testing done, there
    is testing being done, and there will prospectively, depending
    on which of the R&D programs involved. But there has not been a
    decision made to deploy for the purposes of putting in place a
    system under the theory that it is developed and ready to go.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, when I start reading
    language like this, that I am going to vote on tomorrow, I
    start getting concerned. If we are not going down the road in
    somebody's mind in your shop about deployment, and if it is
    only testing, why is it being considered in that location for
    the testing?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is the location it has been
    considered for from the very beginning of that particular R&D
    project that began back in the prior administration.
        Senator Bill Nelson. My response to that would be, why
    there? Why not continue the testing at the present location?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The reason there is because of the
    decision that was made with respect to where a potential threat
    from North Korea might be.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That starts to sound like deployment
    to me.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, all I can say is what I have
    said. Neither General Kadish, nor I, nor anyone I know in the
    Pentagon thinks they know enough at this time to deploy. I will
    say that the technology has been tested and in some instances
    proven very effective. The Arrow system that the Israelis have
    been working on suggests that the physics are workable, and
    that they are able to do the things that the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Office has been working on and believes is possible.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look
    forward to continuing this.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, and thank you for pressing these
    points. They are very significant ones.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want
    to thank and congratulate General Shelton on a job well done. I
    appreciate all your courtesies and the opportunities we have
    had to get together and your support for our national defense.
    You are certainly to be thanked and congratulated.
        General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I have not seen my
    colleague from Kansas so angry since Nebraska beat Kansas State
    in football. Nevertheless, I would like to continue the
    discussion that my colleague from Florida has raised about the
    difference between development and deployment.
        Obviously, there is some difference, or at least I hope
    there is some difference. Is there a bright line between
    development and deployment? At what point will a decision be
    made on deployment, away from development? Will we be
    surprised, as the trimming of the B-1 bombers surprised us? Is
    this something that is going to happen incrementally, or will
    it happen suddenly?
        I think that gets to the heart of what my colleague is
    trying to probe and explore here, and I feel the same way. I do
    not want to suddenly realize that I voted on something in an
    appropriations bill that constitutes deployment and not be
    aware that that is the decision that I made.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I just cannot imagine
    something happening suddenly in government.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I would agree with you on that.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The situation is that the members of
    the committee can get briefed on the progress in the ballistic
    missile defense activities any time they want. They have been
    briefed on a regular basis, as interested. It is impossible to
    know how any R&D program is going to evolve at any given time.
    You cannot know it in pharmaceutical research and you cannot
    know it in ballistic missile defense research. That is why you
    do the research, because you do not know exactly how it is
    going to evolve.
        Within the Department of Defense there are technical
    meanings for the words, and there are definitions of what each
    stage of a process is supposed to mean. The problem with them
    is that--I am trying to think of a case that could concern you.
    Let me see if I can fashion one.
        General Shelton can tell you one from the Gulf War, where a
    project, an activity that was purely in the development stage,
    was in R&D and it was being tested but it had not been fully
    developed and it was not ready to go. It had not been deployed,
    and suddenly we were in a conflict. Because we had this testing
    capability, it was heaved into the war and used very
    effectively.
        General Shelton. A couple come to mind, including the
    Patriot missile system, which still had testing ongoing, and
    actually improved the capabilities while we were in the 6-month
    pre-deployment phase, or pre-Desert Storm phase. Another was
    the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
    which was still being tested and developed, and proved to be
    very effective.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The reason I mentioned that is because
    I wouldn't want someone to come back to me and say, ``goodness,
    back in June of 2001 you said we would not be surprised,''
    because it is conceivable that something like that could
    happen. A system that was under development could be heaved
    into a conflict because the need was there, and the value was
    there. It might or might not work, because it had not been
    fully developed.
        I do not want to get nailed down too tight on it, but
    certainly anything that anyone could conceive of that would be
    considered deployment would be something that would be rather
    well understood by this committee and by us.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So there will most likely be a
    difference between deployment and a decision to deploy, and we
    will know the difference?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Absent some unusual event like this.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Absent a conflict?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
        Senator Ben Nelson. The missile defense system probably
    would not fit into the same--except for theater-type weapons,
    although that line blurred on us recently as well. But
    generally, what you are saying is, we will not end up being
    surprised that we made a decision to deploy in a budgetary
    context that we did not have the opportunity to visit with you
    about.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is for sure.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
    consent that I be allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.
        Chairman Levin. No objection.
        Senator Bill Nelson. JSTARS was developed in my home town
    of Melbourne, Florida. It continues to be located there. This
    Senator and a Member of the House helped get the initial
    appropriations for JSTARS. It indeed was one of the stars of
    the Gulf War, and it deployed to the Gulf War from my home town
    with a group of civilians.
        But that is not an equal comparison to what Senator Nelson
    was speaking about. In that case, we were in the midst of a
    conflict. In this case, we are talking about a whole new system
    of strategic importance that involves applicable treaties, and
    I think that we need to make that distinction, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I quite agree. I was not suggesting it
    was on all fours with that.
        As General Shelton just reminded me, Alaska was supposed to
    be the first deployment site by the Clinton administration
    because of the North Korea issue. That construction had to
    start this year in March, the shipments had to start this year
    in March to meet the, he thinks, 2005 date for actual
    effectiveness and deployment, because of short construction
    periods.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank
    you again for accommodating our side in the course of the
    afternoon here, and I appreciate your courtesies.
        I would just say to our two new members who are preparing
    to depart, I can assure you that we will not, as a Nation, get
    to the point of deploying anything before such time as our
    President has resolved one way or another these treaty issues
    with Russia. So sleep well, and we are going to be all right.
    But I also say, if someone were to have an accidental firing or
    a rogue firing of a missile, I do not know who might be
    President, but I hope he would bring together everything we
    have to stop and blunt the next one that might come this way.
    We have a good system of government, and it will respond well
    in time of need.
        Gentlemen, I am going to go to some broad questions here
    which we would normally reserve for the posture hearing. It is
    a great credit to you, Mr. Secretary, to General Shelton, and
    to Dr. Zakheim, that three-quarters of the members of this
    committee attended this hearing today. It is a day when we have
    some of the most intense activity going on on the Senate floor
    including party caucuses.
        I want to go back, Mr. Secretary, to the years when I was
    privileged to be chairman, and we were endeavoring in a
    bipartisan way to try and address readiness in particular. We
    turned to the service chiefs, and they came before this
    committee, as General Shelton well knows, for two successive
    fiscal years and told us of their professional opinion. That is
    clearly established by this committee as a duty owing to the
    committee and, indeed, to Congress at the time they are
    confirmed. Each service chief, as part of the record, rendered
    a professional opinion that we, the United States, should be
    spending greater sums on our defense. Largely at the initiative
    of this committee, joined by the balance of Congress, we were
    able the last 2 fiscal years to begin to turn around the
    declining defense budgets.
        General Shelton, I want to pay a special tribute to you,
    because you led that effort in many respects, and the other
    Chiefs joined in that effort. I happen to know, Mr. Secretary,
    that you strenuously tried to get dollars for the 2001-2002
    budget in excess of what has been announced by our President.
    Because you value the consultation and confidence of sharing
    your views with your President, I will not ask you to comment
    on that. But I know as a fact, and this record should reflect
    it, that you worked arduously with the Office of Management and
    Budget to get a higher figure for 2001 and 2002.
        But we are where we are. We are going to have to do our
    best, but I am going to recommend to our chairman, he will
    probably do it on his own initiative, that in due course we
    have the service chiefs up to address what Senator Lieberman
    said. It was his judgment. This is a bipartisan thing, not
    partisan in any way. We are still short, and we will ask the
    chiefs for the marginal differences between what appears to be
    coming along in 2001 and what they need. In 2002 there is some
    certainty as to how these Budget Committees are going to deal
    with the 18-and-a-fraction billion.
        I am optimistic, but until such time as that gavel falls in
    those committees and the Senate acts, there is going to be some
    doubt. General Shelton, my record shows that last year the
    military services indicated that they wanted a $48 to $58
    billion funding increase per year over the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP) as it existed then, if the Department is to
    restore readiness and modernize for the future.
        I think we have to recognize that readiness is a crisis
    across the board in our military, and I do not use that word
    ill-advisedly. You cannot comment, nor should you, on higher
    figures that you have requested, but clearly if the Chiefs were
    correct last year, and I will pass this question momentarily to
    the General, there is a shortfall. How is that going to impact
    on your prime responsibility to deploy our troops when
    necessary?
        I know there is some expectation that we are going to
    reduce the level of deployments, but I think you should address
    what clearly is a shortfall in the 2001 and 2002 budgets, and
    how that is going to impact your ability as advisor to the
    President of the United States with regard to our deployments
    and other things of high priority to our military.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Warner, first let me say that
    the military leadership has been deeply involved in the budget
    preparation and where we are, not in the total amount, that is
    for the President and the Office of Management Budget. But
    certainly with respect to the allocation, I would say that
    readiness did get a priority, people did get a priority, and
    where the balancing came out somewhat shorter was with respect
    to procurement and investing for the future.
        Second, I know that the Chiefs will speak their mind, and I
    want them to. I would say this, however: the readiness issue
    has to be disaggregated. There is readiness with respect to
    various types of training. There is readiness with respect to
    the facilities, and they get ratings as well. There is
    readiness for the forces that are on the leading edge and have
    to be ready to go, and there is readiness levels for the forces
    that have just returned from being on the leading edge and are
    in a down period. The other way I think we have to disaggregate
    it is this, readiness for what?
        If the Third Infantry Division is told by the President and
    Congress, go to Bosnia, and they are doing a great job, and
    they are ready for that, but their other job is to be ready for
    a major regional conflict, because they are in Bosnia doing
    what they have been asked to do and are ready to do, they end
    up with 28 days training instead of 29 days training, and
    therefore their readiness level drops.
        So if you are asking organizations to do several things,
    and your readiness standards do not reflect that, they reflect
    only the one major assignment, then it leaves an impression, it
    seems to me, that is imperfect, and I am asked, and I think it
    will be done in the quadrennial review process, that we give
    consideration to that issue that I have just raised.
        Senator Warner. Let us turn to modernization, because that
    impinges on readiness. I recognize that you have been under a
    battering ram today on shipbuilding, and I join in that
    battering for reasons that are clear, but let us recognize that
    we need to modernize, and we are, in my judgment, right up at
    the top level of what we can obtain by way of military spending
    in 2001 and 2002.
        Where are we going to give in this system? Should we
    diminish the size of our end-strength? Should we make a
    decision that we are going to have less deployments? Where are
    we going to develop the cash that is necessary to go to
    modernization?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The risks that we, the Chiefs, the
    Chairman, myself, the Under Secretaries and the Secretaries of
    the services considered, in terms of reference for the
    Quadrennial Defense Review, were really four. One was the risk
    about the people. If you do not invest in the people, the
    heart, then the total capability of the U.S. Armed Forces
    decays.
        Senator Warner. I agree.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is a risk that tended not to get
    elevated with the risks of not being able to meet your
    strategy, for example, the operations risks of meeting a war
    plan. Can you meet the requirement? Do you have the
    requirements? Are the requirements right? Can you have the
    capabilities to fulfill those requirements so you can fulfill
    your war plan?
        A third risk, which is difficult because it is apples and
    oranges, is that you have to get up on the table and balance
    the question of modernization. What do you do about your legacy
    force, your current force? How do you keep bringing in
    additional capabilities as you are going along, somewhat
    better, but of a kind, so that the aircraft age does not get up
    to the point where the budget is getting destroyed with repair
    cost and the shipbuilding number does not go all the way down?
        The fourth risk was not taking into account that we are in
    a period of time when technologies are changing. The world is
    changed, and we need to not just modernize, but transform. We
    need to invest sufficiently in research and development, S&T,
    and new capabilities, new systems in intelligence, and in space
    capabilities, so that we have the ability to deal with the
    kinds of threats we are likely to face in the period ahead.
        If you take all those risks and try to compare them against
    each other and weigh them against each other, it is an
    enormously difficult, complex task, and you are right,
    something has to give. We need savings out of the Department,
    and at the present time the Department is wrapped around its
    anchor chain. We simply are so tied up in rules and
    requirements and stipulations and prohibitions that it is very
    difficult to manage. There are not many incentives to save any
    money in the Department.
        A captain of a base goes out there, and at the end of a
    quarter he knows that if he does not spend that money, he is
    not going to get it the next year, and so the incentive to save
    is not there. It is not intuitive, but that is what is
    happening. We have to find ways to fix the financial systems we
    talked about. The acquisition system is not working right. It
    is perfectly possible to save money in the Department if we
    could be freed up to do it.
        Senator Warner. I am going to let you a little bit off the
    hook. You have just beautifully restated my whole question, and
    I am not sure I got clearly the answer where the money is
    coming from. You may be able to bring in some savings through
    incentives and a few other things, but I am talking about major
    dollars for shipbuilding, aircraft, and the transformation of
    the Army with new equipment. Those are significant dollars, and
    somewhere, somehow, your Department, this committee, and the
    House Armed Services Committee have to work to solve that
    problem.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir, let me just go directly to
    it. There are three ways the money is going to come, and
    probably it will take, I am afraid to say, most of them. The
    first way is through savings. We have to do a better job, and I
    believe we can.
        A second way is for something to give among those four
    risks. We have to make tradeoffs, just like any business does,
    just like any family does. We have to look at it and say, how
    much are we willing to give up today in exchange for investing
    in the future? Are we willing to give up on the people in
    exchange for operational capabilities? I think not.
        Senator Warner. No.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think we have to keep the people.
        Senator Warner. I agree that is not on the table.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. A third way, the way it normally
    happens in our country, let us be honest, is that there is a
    crisis, a conflict, a major new threat is suddenly on us: North
    Korea invades South Korea. What did we do? We said we could not
    afford an $18 billion budget when it was a $15 billion budget.
    Omar Bradley was asking for $18 billion, they said they could
    not afford it, and the next thing you knew we had a $48 billion
    budget. We could afford it just fine because we were in a war.
        Unfortunately, there is a natural tendency on the part of
    people to not recognize how critically important to prosperity
    and peace in this world the United States Armed Forces are.
    They underpin that prosperity and that peace. We are down to 3
    percent of gross national product going to defense. If there
    were a crisis, we would be right up to 8 or 10 in a minute, and
    we could afford it just fine. The key is to invest what we need
    to invest, and manage it in a sufficiently sensible cost-
    effective way so that we do not get in a crisis because the
    deterrent is sufficiently strong and healthy that we can
    dissuade people from doing things that upset stability.
        Senator Warner. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        General Shelton, last year the Chiefs testified that there
    are $48 to $58 billion additional dollars needed in the FYDP if
    the Department is to restore readiness and modernization for
    the future. You recognize there is a shortfall no matter how
    valiant the Secretary's efforts were to get the 2001 budget
    augmented, and a very significant figure, in a way, for 2002.
    We are still short, are we not?
        General Shelton. Senator Warner, I do not think there is
    any question, this is a budget that does put people first. It
    keeps the emphasis on the quality of the great force we have
    and it fully funds the current readiness for this year,
    something that we are concerned about. If we get called upon
    today we want to be ready to go, and the budget has $18 billion
    plus-up in the current readiness account.
        Of course, that also takes into consideration the fact that
    we have old equipment that is costing more to operate, due to
    the cost of fuel and other factors. That eats up a lot, but it
    ensures that we do not have to come back for a supplemental in
    the middle of the year in 2002, assuming that we do not have
    some other type of disaster for which we have to use our
    forces.
        The challenge remains, as I said earlier, with
    recapitalization and modernization. There again, we have the
    QDR. It is a chance to take a look at our force structure,
    decide where we need to recapitalize and where we really need
    to really put the money in order to modernize. I do not think
    there is any question, when you come out on the other end, that
    it is going to require additional funds in the outyears,
    starting in the 2003 budget and going beyond. We have all seen
    the figures that have come from various studies.
        That is, of course, based on today's national security
    strategy. It is based on today's force structure, and it is
    said that basically somewhere between $30 and $50 billion will
    be required.
        Senator Warner. So in your judgment, is that over and above
    the current FYDP levels?
        General Shelton. Over and above the 2002 FYDP level as we
    look out to the future for recapitalization and modernization.
        Senator Warner. So that is $50 billion over the 6-year
    program?
        General Shelton. Sir, the estimates range from $30 to $50
    billion per year above currently programmed levels. I think
    when we come out of the QDR, the Secretary and myself will have
    a better feel for what the exact number will be, based on the
    strategy and on the force structure to support that strategy.
        But I would like to underscore something the Secretary
    said. We are a global power. We are the only one in the world,
    and sometimes that gets to be lonely, but we have worldwide
    responsibilities. It is the great strength of America, and the
    men and women in uniform that are out there daily, carrying out
    protecting our national interest, help provide for the peace
    and prosperity that we have today. It is quite an investment, 3
    cents on the dollar. That is what our Armed Forces provide for
    us today.
        Ultimately, if we want to continue to enjoy peace and
    prosperity, be recognized as a leading power in the world, and
    provide for the peace and stability for the rest of the world,
    which also helps our own prosperity, we have to make an
    investment in that force. That may mean that 3 cents on the
    dollar will not be sufficient in order to modernize this great
    force we have and keep leading technology in the hands of the
    greatest force in the world.
        Senator Warner. I thank the chairman. I thank you very
    much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. I want to return
    to the subject that I started relative to the ballistic missile
    defense.
        Two of our colleagues here today from Kansas and Georgia
    expressed very appropriately their frustration in terms of
    consultation and, as far as I am concerned, your response was
    appropriate as their feelings.
        General Kadish came before us and said that he has
    completed his review and that his recommendations had not yet
    been reviewed by you. Nonetheless, his completed review was
    briefed to us. In that completed review, he said that all the
    R&D programs which he had laid out for the year 2002 in no case
    bumped up against the ABM Treaty.
        I asked you today, do you disagree with his brief in that
    regard. Your answer was, it seems to me that you had not been
    briefed on it yet by General Kadish, which is fair enough, if
    that is accurate. I do not have any problem with that. If that
    is the situation, that is the situation. But you do not have
    any basis, then, to disagree with his conclusion, which we, it
    seems to me, have a right to rely on at least in terms of the
    head of the BMDO saying that it is his conclusion and his
    review that none of the research and development in his plan
    for the year 2002 would violate the ABM Treaty. So do you have
    any basis to disagree with his conclusion?
        I am not talking about what it evolves into in future
    years, if you use the word evolve. I am talking about 2002
    budget dollars that you are asking us for.
        You may want to keep the Russians guessing as to whether or
    not you pull out of the ABM Treaty, but we have a greater
    responsibility than that in terms of our dollars. We just have
    to know, are there any dollars in this budget request for
    research and development that violate the ABM Treaty, or any of
    these projected programs?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, General Kadish is a fine
    officer. He was requested to come up and brief, and he did.
        Chairman Levin. By whom?
        Senator Warner. I think I was responsible.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not recall.
        Chairman Levin. I think you offered him, by the way, and
    that is fine.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I am delighted he did, and he knows
    what he is talking about, and at the moment he came up here he
    had a budget figure in mind, and he briefed a presentation
    which he tells me now the budget has been reduced on. I could
    be wrong on this.
        Chairman Levin. There were no budget figures that he
    briefed us on, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not say he did brief you on
    budget figures. I said his program was based on a budget in his
    thinking that he was planning his program on, and that budget,
    he tells me yesterday, has been adjusted.
        Chairman Levin. Which way?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Down.
        Chairman Levin. Which means there is even less money than
    he presumably thought he had for 2002.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, that is correct.
        Chairman Levin. There is even less money.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Even less money, exactly.
        Now, the next thing I would say is, I would repeat, he is a
    very fine officer. He is not a lawyer, and he is not the
    compliance officer, so he is not the person, in my personal
    view, to be advising the committee as to whether or not he
    thinks something he is doing conceivably could end up violating
    the treaty.
        Chairman Levin. End up in 2002? This is very important. You
    are asking us for budget dollars in 2002.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand.
        Chairman Levin. We have to know, are any of those budget
    dollars going to violate the treaty? It is a fairly direct
    question. Are they, or not?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I have said, not to my knowledge. I am
    a conservative person. It is conceivable that there are
    lawyers--indeed, there was one in the room yesterday who has
    different views from others, so it is--first of all, a treaty
    depends on historic practice, it depends on interpretations, it
    depends upon debatable legal concepts, and for me to sit here
    and tell a committee of the United States Senate that I, Don
    Rumsfeld, a nonlawyer, am telling you that I understand every
    conceivable thing that an R&D program could conceivably do, and
    that I can assure you that no lawyers are going to tell you
    that it might be in violation of something, I am not going to
    do it.
        Chairman Levin. You have not been asked to do it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I will not do it.
        Chairman Levin. You have not been asked to.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Good, because I cannot.
        Chairman Levin. By the way, General Kadish did consult with
    lawyers. He is not a lawyer.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course he did.
        Chairman Levin. He got legal advice.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course he did.
        Chairman Levin. He gave us his conclusion, not based on
    legal advice, but on the advice of his compliance office and
    his lawyers.
        Your words that you just gave us, however, not to your
    knowledge, are the clearest indication that in your judgment
    there is nothing in the 2002 R&D budget for ballistic missile
    defense, in your judgment, that violates the ABM Treaty. Do I
    read you correctly? Have you reached a judgment or not?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I have. Let me respond, and see if I
    can do it in a way that will add clarity to this.
        The first thing I would say is that the administration has
    no plans to do anything to violate the Treaty. Now, I do not
    know how I could be any clearer on that.
        Chairman Levin. That is fine.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. What the President intends to do is to
    have General Kadish proceed with a research and development
    program. One or more of the activities may, eventually will,
    the Good Lord willing, run up against the treaty and be a
    violation.
        Chairman Levin. But not in 2002.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Before that happens, we would be told,
    and we would have been in discussions with the Russians, and we
    fully intend that we would have fashioned some sort of a
    framework to move beyond the treaty.
        Now, the reason I am being very careful in what I say is
    because I am a conservative person. If you went ahead in
    Alaska----
        Chairman Levin. Is there money for that in Alaska, in this
    budget?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The budget has not been finalized
    because I have not been briefed on the R&D program under the
    new numbers of dollars.
        Chairman Levin. It has been submitted to us.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I know, but you are talking about money
    for a program. There is money in the 2002 budget amendment for
    an R&D program for missile defense. The missile defense program
    itself, that General Kadish is working on, has not been
    finalized because we just got the number from the budget
    bureau, the Office of Management and Budget, and he just got a
    reduced number. He will then fashion that specific program and
    make a recommendation.
        Chairman Levin. To you.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. To me, exactly.
        Chairman Levin. Then when will we get it from you?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. When I get it.
        Chairman Levin. How many days? I mean, we are trying to
    make up a budget here. This is an important issue.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I can tell you we have no intention of
    breaking the treaty, if that is the question.
        Now, is it possible someone could say, ``oh, if you went
    into Alaska and shipped the stuff there and cleared the site,
    and started to do any kind of an upgrade on that radar that is
    there,'' I, some lawyer, could say that that is not a test bed,
    it is a prototype, and therefore it would be in violation of
    the treaty. Could that happen? You bet.
        Chairman Levin. That a lawyer would say that, but it is not
    your judgment?
        Look, you have the responsibility as Secretary of Defense.
    We have a responsibility as people who authorize expenditures.
    We have to make a judgment the best we can. You have to make a
    judgment. There is a lot riding on this judgment, a lot riding
    on it, and we have to make an assessment, and you need to make
    an assessment, frankly. You need to make an assessment.
        If it is not your intention that any 2002 money violate the
    treaty in any of your R&D programs, your statement to that
    effect is very meaningful. We will reach our own judgment.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. All right, let me try it this way. The
    administration has no plans to violate the treaty or to break
    the law in 2002, 2003, 2010. What we intend to do is to have an
    R&D program, begin discussions with the Russians and establish
    a framework to move beyond the treaty, because the treaty
    inhibits the deployment and testing of ballistic missile
    defense, and the President wants to have ballistic missile
    defense.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Allard.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Therefore, we do not intend to break it
    at any time, break the treaty, break the law.
        Chairman Levin. You are hoping to amend the treaty so you
    do not break it. My question is----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, wait--no.
        Chairman Levin. We are going to keep asking.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I see your point. Let me----
        Chairman Levin. We are going to keep asking the question,
    because we need an answer, the country needs an answer, the
    world needs an answer. Is there any money in the 2002 budget
    request which, for R&D programs, missile defense, would, in
    your judgment, violate the ABM Treaty? I am going to keep
    asking it. We need an answer, in your judgment.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me try it--let me finish the
    thought, and maybe this will answer it.
        Violating the treaty means that the treaty still exists. As
    I understand the question, and what I have said is that the
    President fully intends to work with the Russians and fashion
    something that does not allow the constraints of the treaty to
    inhibit the development of missile defense, and if he is not
    able to, he has indicated he will give 6 months notice.
        I mean, that--and then he would not be breaking the treaty,
    or violating the treaty. He would be using the treaty provision
    that allows a country to give 6 months notice and step away
    from the treaty, and the hope is not to do that. The hope,
    obviously, is to fashion an arrangement with the Russians that
    is something that is acceptable to move beyond it.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I
    apologize, I was not here earlier, but a busy schedule dictated
    my absence for the first round of questioning. I appreciate the
    fact that you are giving me a shot here.
        I would like to move to the airborne laser, Mr. Secretary.
    According to my understanding, the supplemental includes about
    $153 million for the airborne laser, and there is full funding
    in the fiscal year 2002 budget. How high a priority is the
    airborne laser program for you and for the Department in
    regards to the missile defense program?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I wish these answers were easy. I
    cannot characterize how high a priority it is. It is one of 8
    or 10 or 12 programs that General Kadish and the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Office has briefed us on a preliminary basis
    that are part of the things he would like to move forward on.
    He is now adjusting that program to fit his new budget mark.
        It is something that has been underway for sometime. It is
    something that, if I am not mistaken, is some way down the
    road. Whether or not it is going to be accelerated, it is, I
    think, something that is yet to be decided in the Department.
        Senator Allard. I want to be supportive in your missile
    defense efforts, and move in this direction. Overall, the
    ballistic missile defense budget will increase about $1 billion
    compared to last year. Some missile defense critics will no
    doubt argue that the increase is too large, and meeting other
    shortfalls in the Department, they will claim, deserves
    priority over missile defense. Can you tell me on what basis
    did you accord missile defense the priority it received in your
    budget proposal?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I suppose it is safe to say that if one
    started out with one's first choice, most of the budgets and
    elements of the budget would be higher than they are. As in any
    organization and any budgeting process, you end up with making
    judgments and tradeoffs.
        At the present time, that budget is at $8.2 billion total,
    and that includes the theater missile defense as well as the
    national missile defense, including the airborne laser dollars.
    It is about 2.0 or 2.5 percent of the total budget. It
    compares, for example, with something like $11 billion in the
    aggregated terrorism number. It is higher than it was. It does
    not fund all the things that General Kadish had hoped to be
    able to fund, and it funds some of them on a somewhat slower
    basis.
        Senator Allard. Let me ask you this, do you think the
    threat in this area is growing greater than other areas of
    threat?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that the threat of a major land
    conflict in Europe is very low. I think the threat of a major
    strategic nuclear exchange with Russia is very low.
        I think that the problem of proliferation and the
    advancement of technologies and the relaxed tension in the
    world has led to the availability of weapons of mass
    destruction and the ability to deliver them in a variety of
    ways. Because it is so difficult to cope with western armies,
    navies, and air forces, the nations that have an interest in
    dissuading us from doing things, and have an interest in
    imposing their will on their neighbors, have looked for these
    asymmetric threats from terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic
    missiles, and I would guess down the road, cyber warfare as
    well, because we have vulnerabilities in those areas that are
    distinctive, compared to the vulnerabilities we have with
    respect to typical warfare.
        I would rank all of those as risks. The proliferation of
    cruise missiles is taking place. I worry a great deal about
    germ warfare and what we read in the intelligence reports about
    what is taking place in the world. There is no question that
    the number of nations that are getting ballistic missiles is
    growing, and I certainly rank the ballistic missile threat up
    among those asymmetric threats very high.
        Senator Allard. In regard to the ballistic missile defense
    program, maybe General Shelton or maybe somebody else on the
    panel would like to answer this question, but the budget
    structure has been substantially changed from last year from
    the one that focused on specific systems, such as national
    missile defense, Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD),
    and the Navy theater-wide, to one that focuses on phases of the
    ballistic missile during flight that our forces might
    intercept. Could you talk a little bit about the advantages of
    this restructuring?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Actually, what happened was that
    General Kadish and various others have decided that
    reorganizing how that program should go forward led to the
    kinds of adjustments that you are talking about, and Dr.
    Zakheim can comment on it.
        Dr. Zakheim. Yes, sir. You are correct, Senator, that the
    general focus now is on the phases of flight: the initial
    phase, mid-course and terminal. There are several things that
    were done. Mature systems have been devolved to the services;
    the Army PAC-3 the Patriot upgrade; the Navy area-wide, which
    used to be known as Navy lower-tier; the international program
    we have with the Europeans, to which they attach high
    importance, the medium-range extended air defense system
    (MEADS).
        On the other hand, systems that were not as mature, and I
    include among those the airborne laser, which the Secretary
    mentioned, space-based laser, and space-based infrared system,
    have devolved to the management of General Kadish at the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Office. If you aggregate what General
    Kadish is essentially now dealing with in his R&D program, it
    is slightly over $7 billion.
        You mention THAAD. There is some program visibility for
    that. Those are being carried as projects within the
    overarching structure that I outlined.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Senator McCain. Thank you.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it
    has been a long afternoon for you, and I will try not to impose
    on your time too much longer.
        General Shelton, on September 27, 2000, you said that it is
    a real success story to go from $43 billion procurement 3 years
    ago to $60 billion in the 2001 budget, a significant
    achievement led by Secretary Cohen. Then you go on to say that
    the simple reality is that after 3 years of demanding and
    unanticipated military and humanitarian operations, we know
    that the $60 billion projected by the QDR will not be
    sufficient to sustain the force.
        I look at the procurement budget, fiscal year 2001, $62.1
    billion, fiscal year 2002, $61.6 billion, an actual decrease in
    procurement. How do you state on September 27 that $60 billion
    projected will not be sufficient to sustain the force and then
    come tell us that $62.1 and $61.6 are sufficient?
        General Shelton. Senator McCain, what I said was that in
    the 2002 budget the emphasis, of course, is sustained quality
    of life issues for the force. It has funded current readiness.
    In fact, it added $18 billion between 2001 and 2002.
        Senator McCain. I am talking about $60 billion projected
    for procurement.
        General Shelton. What I also said was, obviously the
    shortfall, if there is one in the 2002 budget, the place that
    it needs most work is in recapitalization and modernization,
    which maintains slightly over the $60 billion that is
    necessary, but not anywhere near what will be necessary to
    recapitalize, modernize, and transform the force for the
    future.
        That is going to have to be the answer--how much more is
    required over the $60 billion should be the answer that comes
    out of the QDR. What our strategy is going to be, what the
    force structure to support that strategy is going to be, and
    consequently how much additional money is going to be required
    to support the modernization and in the numbers of things and
    types of units that will be required to support the strategy.
    It obviously will be a lot more than $60 billion.
        Senator McCain. I will not belabor the point.
        Mr. Secretary, I was not here for your opening statement,
    but I read it, and I think it is a very powerful and important
    statement. I think it lays out our requirements and our needs
    as strongly as possible.
        Part of your statement is that we could do better with a
    round of base closing and adjustments that reduced unneeded
    facilities by, for example, 25 percent. We could focus the
    funds on facilities, et cetera. Without base closings,
    achieving the 67-year replacement rate would require an
    additional $7 billion annually.
        I take that to mean you are proposing a BRAC.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We will be proposing something that
    people will call a BRAC. Whether it will fit the previous model
    or not, I do not know. We have people working on it right now,
    talking with people on the Hill. They will certainly be
    visiting with the leadership on this committee, with you, and
    those in the House.
        It is not something that I, personally, am delighted to be
    doing. It causes a lot of heartburn, pain, concern, anger,
    apprehension, fear, but we simply have to manage the money in
    this Department better than we are doing. BRAC is only one
    piece of it. There are a host of other things that we are
    prevented from doing that we need to be freed up to do.
        Senator McCain. I agree with you that it is one of many
    things, but I would assume that $7 billion a year is a fairly
    good chunk of some of the things we need to do.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not know this because I have never
    been around for a BRAC, but I am told that problem with it is
    that the money does not start coming in until the fourth or
    fifth year.
        Senator McCain. Every year you wait, that is another year
    delay from the time that it does come in.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
        Senator McCain. My point is, I do not care whether you call
    it BRAC or not, but we have learned from bitter experience it
    has to be a deal where there is an up or down vote on the part
    of Congress.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. That has to be an integral part. I would
    also argue that we have to make sure that it is not
    politicized. It is the view of this Member, I do not speak for
    other Members of the Senate, that the BRAC closing round
    concerning McClellan Air Force Base and Kelly Air Force Base
    was politicized. There cannot be a taint of politicization, so
    we are going to have to tighten up that language.
        I just want to say, Mr. Secretary, I want to support you in
    that. I have been fighting for it a long time, and it is
    absolutely necessary. I have never been able to find any
    military expert who disagrees with the fact that we need a
    BRAC. I have not met a single one, and as we all know, they
    come in all sizes and shapes.
        But the fact is, we also need to look at depot maintenance,
    because a lot of depot maintenance today could be contracted
    out by civilian and competitive sources. If you feel, as I read
    in the media, that some B-1s need to be taken out of
    commission, or any other weapons system in order to modernize
    the force, and you come and make that argument here, I want to
    support you.
        The history of this Congress in recent years has been
    protection of depots, bases, and weapons systems while,
    unfortunately, men and women in the military are living in
    conditions that in many cases are unacceptable, and under
    deployment and operational requirements that have made it
    extremely difficult for us to recruit and maintain quality
    young men and women. I want to help you in this effort in any
    possible way that I can.
        I would like to add one additional comment, if I could. I
    do not believe that you are asking for enough money. I believe
    it is because, as you stated in print, there was so much money
    taken up in a tax cut that there is not money available. I am
    sure that you may have regretted the words, or maybe I
    misinterpreted them.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I did not say that.
        Senator McCain. Well, I will get you the quote. It is a
    pretty good quote. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It does not sound like a good one to
    me. [Laughter.]
        Senator McCain. The fact is, there is not enough money for
    defense, medicare, and social security, and when you ask, as I
    have been told, for $32 billion and get $18 billion, or
    roughly, as the media reports, then I think it is very
    unfortunate. In fact, as long as I have been around here that
    has been the custom. It is driven by budgets rather than
    requirements, and when there is not money available, somehow
    that seems to be the case.
        I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. May we just make one comment?
        Senator McCain. Would you respond? Yes, I would like to
    hear your response.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. On the depot issue, Dov Zakheim would
    like to comment on that.
        Dr. Zakheim. Senator, we do have an initiative specifically
    on the depot issue. It is one that essentially says if a depot
    has back orders, which means by definition they cannot deal
    with it now, and that is by their own definition, because it is
    a back order, then we would propose to contract out that work.
    That results in a savings of nearly $200 million, which we
    could then apply to other departmental activities, so that is a
    step in the direction that you are talking about, sir.
        Senator McCain. Did you want to respond?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I would like to say thank you for your
    offer of assistance, and we will certainly appreciate that, and
    it is going to take a lot of assistance.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Warner. I want to say with regard to BRAC, that I
    was a coauthor with others on these bills. As a matter of fact,
    I joined you one year on the BRAC before this politicization
    issue came along.
        Senator McCain is correct. I think the unanimous view among
    the professional military and others is that we have to reduce
    the infrastructure. I would hope that legislation will be
    brought up here in due course, and I want to support it.
        I would suggest, however, that we not get the depot issue
    tagged onto that one. If it is to be addressed, let us address
    the issues separately. I have been around long enough to know
    how trains run at this station. [Laughter.]
        You can catch one and get to where you want to go, but you
    can't load too many cars on it. With all due respect to my
    friend, if there is a depot question out there, maybe we ought
    to address it, but let us address it separately.
        Mr. Secretary, there have been some hearings in the House
    on the subject of Vieques. I asked the chairman to withhold
    hearings of this committee on that important issue. The fact
    that we have not held hearings should in no means indicate that
    Senator Inhofe, myself, and a number of others, it is
    bipartisan here, are not gravely concerned about the need to
    fully train our men and women of the Armed Forces for combat
    activities with live ammunition, under every circumstance
    possible that parallels those they would face in a combat
    situation.
        It is essential for many of our troops deploying to the
    gulf, because regrettably, in due course, they are often faced
    with hostile fire. Regrettably, they are constantly under a
    threat situation.
        I hope that we can work our way through that. I have not
    had a chance to study your responses to the House today, but I
    will do so. I do not know whether you wish to have this
    opportunity to tell our committee what you feel procedurally we
    should do to work on that. I presume it is a steady
    concentration of looking at alternative means to train our
    troops. On the question of the referendum, I want to be
    supportive of our President, but at the moment I think it is
    uncertain just how that legislation would move or not move,
    should it be brought to Congress.
        I have a suggestion, one that you do represent today, that
    you should press as hard as you can on finding alternative
    means to train our men and women of the Armed Forces,
    particularly those that are faced with deployments to the gulf
    region. Perhaps we can sit down quietly and work out in a
    bipartisan way some solutions to this problem. Is that a
    general summary of where you are on it?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. There is no question that we
    have to redouble the efforts to find alternative location, or
    locations, plural, so that the men and women who go to the gulf
    and deploy to the east have the kind of training they need. We
    are hard at that task, and we look forward to working with you
    on the subject.
        Senator Warner. You say redouble the efforts. I have spent
    a good deal of time working on this together with Senator
    Inhofe, who certainly has spent an enormous amount of time on
    this issue. A conscientious effort has been made. I am sure
    General Shelton is ready to testify to that point, and we had
    two, independent groups that went out and looked at it. Am I
    not correct on that, General?
        General Shelton. Sir, you are correct, and that work
    continues today, as a matter of fact.
        Senator Warner. More emphasis is needed, but I want to say
    that the Navy Department, in my judgment, has conscientiously,
    in the last year, looked at those options very carefully.
        I would like to move to another subject, which is that I
    certainly commend our President. When he was a candidate and,
    indeed, now that he is President, he has recognized we have a
    situation here at home, where perhaps only in the times of
    World War II did we consider homeland defense. Under the
    leadership of our former Chairman Roberts, and now our new
    Chairman Landrieu, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee, which looks at the future threats to this Nation,
    is bearing down again on homeland defense. I will be
    scrutinizing your budget submission to make sure that it is
    adequate, because we have to prepare for an attack of a
    terrorist nature in cities here in the United States, and
    prepare this Nation's response.
        You came before the Chairman and Ranking Members of the
    Intelligence Committee, Armed Services Committee, Foreign
    Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committee and gave
    us your thoughts on how you could marshall the resources of
    your Department to address this problem.
        Clearly, the lines of authority, the lines of
    responsibility and how we would respond can be improved. I hope
    you will take a leadership role in doing that, so it is better
    understood who has what responsibility, should a crisis hit us.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Warner, you know as well as any
    the problem is serious. It is not some distant thought, it is
    something that this country simply must address.
        It is also enormously complex. The Department of Defense,
    in people's minds, has the task of defending our country, and
    under the law, as we all know, the responsibilities are
    elsewhere. The Department of Defense is not a first responder
    with respect to the kinds of attacks you are talking about,
    here at the homeland.
        Senator Warner. The Posse Comitatus Act, which goes way
    back in our history and is a well-thought-out concept, stands
    as a barrier, and I think it is going to remain. I doubt if we
    can modify it, but the Department has enormous resources to
    bring to bear on a crisis. If we had 5,000 casualties, we would
    have to turn to the supplies within the Department to help that
    community instantly.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You are exactly right. If something
    happened in the United States of America, notwithstanding the
    law, notwithstanding the way we are organized, the phone call
    would be right to the Pentagon. The Pentagon has the
    organization with the capabilities to deal with a major
    disruption from weapons of mass destruction in the United
    States of America. Yet our society is not organized so that the
    Pentagon has that responsibility. It does not, and as you said,
    the President has asked Vice President Cheney to address the
    issue and to help put some order and structure into it, which
    he is in the process of doing.
        Senator Warner. General Shelton.
        General Shelton. Senator Warner, I believe, about 2 years
    ago we gave a tasking to our Joint Forces Commander, General
    Kernan, and before that Admiral Gehman, in Norfolk to stand up
    Joint Task Force Civil Support. Its primary purpose was to make
    sure that within the Department, we knew where all of these
    resources that could assist whoever the lead Federal agency
    are. Whether it was the Federal Emergency Management Agency or
    some other organization, we would know that they were
    organized, had the right training, had the equipment, and would
    be able to move very rapidly in the event we had multiple
    locations that were hit simultaneously, not to take the lead,
    but to support whoever was in the lead, realizing that they
    would look to us to provide this type of support, as they
    normally do.
        Of course, in the counterterrorism business we have a
    world-class capabilities, but always in support of the
    Department of Justice, and again, with a waiver of posse
    comitatus by the President.
        Senator Warner. More needs to be done.
        I will pick up on two other points, Mr. Secretary. First is
    the stockpile stewardship program. While it is not under direct
    control of your Department, the readiness of the stockpile
    itself to some extent, impacts on the men and women of the
    Armed Forces who have to deal with nuclear weapons every day.
        I suggest to you that you begin to review that, because it
    concerns me, not only for the men and women of the Armed Forces
    and the civilians that have to deal with this arsenal, but also
    for the communities and the environs where they are housed. We
    have to make certain of the safety and reliability of these
    weapons. From a credibility standpoint if the reliability of
    our weapons is in question that bears directly on deterrence.
    If a potential enemy feels that our weapons have little value,
    then deterence goes.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You are exactly right, there is no
    question that the safety and reliability of that stockpile is
    enormously important to the Department of Defense, as well as
    to the country. It is part of the Department of Energy, as you
    well know, and General Gordon has the responsibility
    specifically within the Department.
        He has a program. I have been briefed on it. In my view, it
    is a sensible program, a rational program. The problem that
    exists, of course, is like others. At what pace are you able to
    fund that program so that in fact you have a confidence level
    that you are dealing properly with safety and reliability?
        Senator Warner. I think you should fund it at the pace that
    technology can accept it, and judiciously and efficiently spend
    those dollars. We are coming down on a curve where the
    stockpile, by the very nature of its age, is beginning to raise
    potential questions of safety and credibility, and we are going
    to have to make the decision as a Nation whether we go into
    production on certain new weapons.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, that program has been
    underfunded for a series of years. It is just a brutal fact.
        Senator Warner. All right. I will address that later.
        Lastly, could you bring us up to date on the policy that
    our President has established together with NATO as to the
    utilization of NATO forces with respect to Macedonia. I believe
    our President has indicated that our forces would be part of
    that effort as NATO makes its decision. Is that generally
    correct?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The circumstance is that the United
    States has, in the country of the former Yugoslavian Republic
    of Macedonia, somewhere between 400 and 700 U.S. military at
    any given time, depending on rotation. They have a variety of
    functions, but most of the functions relate to supporting the
    forces in Kosovo, which is, of course, just a short distance
    away.
        They have been there for a number of years now. They do
    some UAV work, they do some logistics work, and they do some
    transportation work. There is a very small unit that was there
    to assist the Government of Macedonia for a period, and I think
    that group left.
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The situation in the country is very
    difficult. There have been decades of hostility between the
    Albanians and the rest of the population, as you know well. At
    the moment, the Albanian representatives are still part of the
    government. At the moment, most of the ethnic Albanians are
    still a part of the military, although some non-trivial number
    left within the last 7 days, departed the military, which was
    unfortunate.
        There are physical threats from Albanian extremists who are
    using force and violence against the parliament a short
    distance away, against the airport in Skopje, where our troops
    and our UAVs are located. So they are at risk. There have been
    a lot of so-called envoys. Secretary-General Robertson has been
    in and out several times. Solana has been in and out several
    times. Now, the French have appointed some man named Leotard
    who is going to be going in there.
        The government is young and it is facing a very difficult
    situation. They are not all in agreement, as anyone who reads
    the press can tell. There are some tensions between various
    members of the Macedonian Government. There is no way in the
    world to predict what the outcome will be, whether or not a
    deal will finally be arranged for a cease-fire.
        I will say that there recently has been something very good
    that has happened in the area, and that was when the ground
    safety zone actually was turned back over to the Serbs, and a
    great many weapons were turned in voluntarily. It was done
    peacefully, there was no violence, and it was exceedingly well
    done. It is possible that some good things can happen there. It
    is also possible that it can deteriorate rather rapidly. We had
    some buses that were assisting in moving some Albanians within
    the last 48 hours that were surrounded, and it could have
    deteriorated into a very difficult situation, very rapidly.
        Senator Warner. I hope that you will consult with Congress
    should it require putting our troops in that assignment into
    greater risk.
        Lastly, Mr. Secretary, this committee took several
    initiatives last year with regard to unmanned vehicles. I note
    that the Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Amendment has increased
    funding for several of these programs with the potential to
    transform the military. We commend you, and I hope it moves
    forward.
        I note the presence of my distinguished colleague from
    Alabama, who has returned. We are about to wrap up here. Do you
    wish to ask any questions?
        Senator Sessions. I have one brief series to ask. Mr.
    Secretary, we are in such a new era, it seems to me, in regards
    to Russia. I spent 2 weeks there as a private citizen in 1993,
    and the people are wonderful. They are our friends now. They
    are not our enemies, and we need to build on that. I applaud
    the President for doing so.
        It strikes me quite plainly that the ABM Treaty, which has
    been in effect since 1972, is not appropriate for today's
    world. We have threats of missile attacks from other nations
    that endanger American lives. I hope that our negotiations and
    our efforts to work with the Russians will succeed in getting
    them to agree to allow us to construct a national missile
    defense system.
        First of all, it is important to our national security. I
    know you believe that. Your bipartisan commission unanimously
    found that we were facing a threat to our Nation from a
    ballistic missile attack. I hope we can proceed on that because
    the treaty itself provides the United States a way out of it,
    with notice. It is not something that binds us forever.
        Certainly, the Russia that exists today is not the Soviet
    Union that we signed the treaty with. The problem is this: as I
    understand it, President Clinton instructed that the
    development of national missile defense be treaty-compliant.
    There are some ways to do that, but I have heard expert
    testimony, and I would ask if you or General Shelton would
    comment on it, that if we continue with that treaty-compliant
    approach it will delay the implementation of a good system. It
    will make the system more expensive, and at its conclusion, we
    will probably be less secure than if we proceeded outside the
    treaty.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it is certainly my view that
    the way to develop the most effective and most cost-efficient
    ballistic missile defense is not to try to design something
    that fits in a treaty that prohibits you from having a
    ballistic missile defense.
        Senator Sessions. Well said. What is troubling me, Senator
    Warner, is that we have members of this Senate tying the hands
    of the President of the United States. They are saying
    basically to Russia, ``do not agree to this thing.'' If you do
    not agree to the President's request, we may not deploy the
    system, and I think that is tying the President's hands. That
    is not a bipartisan foreign policy that we are a part of.
        The President ran on this issue. It was something that he
    took his case to the American people on, and we voted on it,
    Mr. Secretary. We voted to deploy this. Maybe there is some
    disagreement about how fast we ought to deploy it, but there
    should not be disagreement in Congress, because we voted to
    deploy the system as soon as it was technologically feasible to
    do so.
        So I remain troubled that members of this body make
    statements suggesting that if the Russians hold out and fail to
    work out an agreement with the President, we are prohibited
    from protecting ourselves from missile attacks from rogue
    nations. Maybe you would want to comment on that.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I thank you for your comment.
    As one of the individuals that has been asked to begin the
    process of meeting with the Russians to attempt to fashion some
    sort of a framework that would take us beyond the ABM Treaty, I
    have to admit that entering a negotiation where the Russian,
    the other side that you are dealing with, may have come to a
    conclusion that they have a veto over whether or not the United
    States of America should have a missile defense capability
    would be a terrible way to enter a negotiation.
        So anything that would contribute to the impression on the
    part of the Russians that the United States would like to have
    a ballistic missile defense capability, but we would not want
    it if they did not want us to have it, would clearly mean that
    you would not be in a negotiation. The odds are you would
    simply be stonewalled, and that is not how one wants to spend
    one's time.
        The NATO countries have properly told the Russians that
    they will not have a veto with respect to NATO enlargement, for
    example. There is no reason that Russia should have a veto over
    enlargement, and the President told Mr. Putin that. I mentioned
    that to Mr. Ivanov, the defense minister of Russia, and NATO
    itself has spoken on that subject. If they are not having a
    veto on NATO enlargement, I cannot imagine why anyone would
    want to hand them a veto with respect to a missile defense
    system that would protect the population of the United States
    of America, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, and thank you for having the
    courage to discuss this issue. I think as the American people
    become more aware of it they will be supportive, and you will
    find Congress supportive. I am sure they will be. We voted on
    it previously.
        General Shelton, let me express my appreciation for your
    service. You have testified so many times here, and it is an
    honor to have known you and worked with you. You have been
    truly committed to your Nation's strength and welfare, and we
    appreciate it very much.
        General Shelton. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment? I
    am a little concerned about all this praise for General
    Shelton. I expect to get 3\1/2\ more months work out of him.
    [Laughter.]
        I hope and pray that that is the case, and I would not want
    him to start mentally leaving, because we need this fine
    officer. He is doing a superb job for us.
        Senator Warner. We know him, and know him well. That will
    not occur.
        We have had an excellent hearing, Mr. Secretary, General
    Shelton, and Dr. Zakheim. Thank you, Senator, for your
    observations. I think we had a good, constructive dialogue on
    missile defense here today. I hope no comments by any of our
    colleagues would be construed to suggest that it would
    undermine the President's ability to continue to consult with
    our allies and eventually to sit down and work out a new
    framework with Russia. I think we are all supportive of the
    President in his endeavors to do that. Certainly, I am.
        I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                                    START II

        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, section 1302 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires the U.S. to
    remain at START I strategic force structure levels until such time as
    START II enters into force. Will you be asking Congress to repeal this
    provision of the law?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, I will. The DOD supports repeal of Section
    1302 in its entirety in order to maintain the President's prerogative
    in setting strategic force structure for the defense of the United
    States. As currently written, Section 1302 prohibits the obligation of
    funds for the retirement or dismantlement, or the preparations for
    retirement or dismantlement, of strategic nuclear delivery systems
    until entry into force of the START II Treaty. Unnecessarily linking
    reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear delivery systems to START II entry
    into force severely limits the President's flexibility and could delay
    implementation of important parts of the President's overall deterrent
    strategy. The repeal of this legislation would therefore allow the
    President to make the necessary changes and modifications to strategic
    nuclear force structure in support of his comprehensive review of US
    deterrence requirements.

                               TRIDENT SUBMARINE

        2. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand the amended
    budget requests funding to maintain the option to convert two of the
    four Trident submarines excess to strategic requirements, to a
    conventional non-nuclear role. Have you made a decision as to whether
    any such conversion would or would not allow the submarine to be
    excluded from START II accounting rules?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Our intention is for the Nuclear-Powered Cruise
    Missile Attack Submarine (SSGN) to retain its D5 launch tube and remain
    accountable under current START Treaty rules. To convert SSGN by
    removing the D5 tubes completely and replacing it with a whole new hull
    section would be prohibitive from a cost perspective and would
    approximately double the conversion costs. Although accountable under
    START I, the only applicable strategic nuclear arms treaty currently in
    force, the ``phantom warheads'' associated with SSGN would not cause
    the United States to exceed limits. SSGN would have to be addressed as
    an exemption in any future arms control agreement.

                                    VIEQUES

        3a. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, you have been quoted as
    saying you are in ``full agreement'' with Secretary England's recent
    proposal to leave Vieques by 2003 and cancel the scheduled referendum
    mandated by last year's defense authorization bill.
        Did you participate in and approve this decision? In other words,
    did you tell Secretary England he needed your approval before proposing
    this to White House officials, and did he have your approval before he
    did so?
        When is the administration going to submit your legislative
    proposal regarding the referendum?
        Was your agreement with Secretary England's proposal to cancel the
    referendum and make a commitment now to leave Vieques based on an
    understanding that a suitable alternative exists? If so, can you tell
    us where that new training area is located?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The effective training for our sailors and
    marines is a matter most appropriately handled by the Department of the
    Navy. The Secretary of the Navy has the best vantage point to make
    these decisions and he made it. We did discuss the Vieques range issue
    before he briefed the White House and Congress. I did not tell the
    Secretary of the Navy how to make the decision or specify the mechanics
    of briefing it outside of the DOD.
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
    requiring a referendum by the citizens of the island of Vieques to
    decide whether the Navy can continue to train there, has put Navy in
    the challenging situation of having training matters effecting fleet
    readiness being decided by local vote. Rather than initiating a
    precedent where our training range needs are submitted to a plebiscite,
    we decided to pursue aggressively both legislative relief from the
    referendum and suitable training alternatives now. We expect to submit
    the proposal for legislative relief from the November referendum soon.
        There are currently no singular satisfactory alternatives to
    Vieques. Between now and May 2003, we will work to develop the best
    possible combination of methods and places to replace Vieques. The
    Secretary of the Navy has already directed a study of alternative with
    initial ideas due to him this fall.

        3b. Senator Levin. General Shelton, did you support the decision to
    leave Vieques without trying to win the referendum that had been agreed
    to?
        General Shelton. The training and equipping of our forces is a
    Title 10 responsibility of each of the Services. In this particular
    case, the Secretary of the Navy decided to seek legislative relief from
    the referendum, but in the interim to do all the Navy can do to win
    should the referendum occur. I support his position.

        3c. Senator Levin. General Shelton, the Navy has consistently
    stated that they cannot find a suitable replacement for Vieques. Do you
    disagree with their assessment, or has their assessment changed your
    knowledge?
        General Shelton. My primary concern is to provide trained and ready
    forces to the warfighting commanders in chief, and where that required
    training is performed is not an overriding issue. Navy leadership has
    said that they will provide comparable, not necessarily identical,
    training opportunities for the East Coast Battle Groups, and are
    currently pursuing alternative training methods and locations to ensure
    future battle groups continue to be combat ready for deployment.

        3d. Senator Levin. Last week you said three alternative sites were
    being considered. Can you tell what the three locations you referred to
    are?
        General Shelton. I was referring to the Navy examining training
    opportunities in the Gulf region, in Texas and North Carolina, among
    others.

                                 NATIONAL GUARD

        4. Senator Levin. Army and Air National Guard requirements are
    traditionally underfunded in the Department of Defense budget. What
    strategy have you employed to ensure that the resourcing of the
    National Guard is commensurate with its missions?
        What do you envision as the future missions of the National Guard?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The resourcing of Army and Air National Guard
    units, fleet modernization, and new missions are the responsibility of
    the service secretaries. DOD's oversight of the process assures unit
    resourcing commensurate with missioning within overall DOD fiscal
    constraints. Active, Guard, and Reserve units are addressed in our
    Total Force planning for the present and into the future. Please be
    assured that the Army and Air National Guard and all Reserve Components
    will continue to be full partners with their active counterparts, and
    their missions (current and future) will reflect that relationship.

                                   READINESS

        5. Senator Levin. General Shelton, in the fall of 1998 you told
    this committee that ``we have `nosed over' and our readiness is
    descending.'' When you appeared before this committee last September
    you stated that ``we have made considerable progress these past 2 years
    in several key areas'' such as ``arresting the decline in near-term
    readiness.'' What is your assessment of the morale of our forces,
    including the retention situation in fiscal year 2001, and of the
    readiness of our forces to carry out their missions?
        General Shelton. Even though there are still some trouble spots,
    overall we are doing well. With the significant support of Congress,
    this year provided increased authority for retention bonuses, increases
    in pay and compensation, and enhancements in quality-of-life areas to
    include housing and health care. These continued improvements directly
    help our retention effort, morale of our troops, and more importantly,
    demonstrates to our Service members that we care about them, their
    families, and their quality of life.
        I am pleased to report that retention is up across the board;
    however, we are not out of the woods yet. It appears the Air Force will
    miss its aggregate retention goals. Although their overall retention
    picture looks better, particularly in first-term retention, the loss of
    second-term and career Service members has had an affect on the
    readiness of the Service. Additionally, we continue to see many of our
    senior enlisted and junior officers leaving each of the Services. While
    the Services' overall retention is good, shortages still exist in
    individual skills such as information technology; air traffic
    controllers, pilots, and other high tech skills--the same skills that
    are in high demand in the private sector. The common reasons members
    leave the military are lack of adequate compensation and high OPTEMPO.
        In terms of readiness I'm proud to report that our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and marines remain ready to accomplish their assigned
    wartime mission(s). However, several commanders in chief (CINCs) and
    the Services continue to highlight in the Joint Monthly Readiness
    Review the impact that lower than desired retention rates have on their
    readiness . . . i.e. shortages of experienced personnel. Continued
    congressional support is critical to resolving these readiness
    concerns. Our long-term goal is to enhance the quality of life of those
    who have chosen to defend their country, ultimately ensuring our force
    remains both highly motivated and highly trained.
        As in the past, continued congressional support will allow us to
    achieve higher levels of morale and readiness necessary to maintain the
    premier military force in the world.

                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jean Carnahan

                              AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES

        6a. Senator Carnahan. Secretary Rumsfeld, in April, General
    Robertson, head of U.S. Transportation Command, testified before our
    Subcommittee on Seapower. He stated that current U.S. operations
    required a massive increase in airlift capabilities. Then just this
    Tuesday, General Robertson announced that the military needs at least
    60 more C-17 transports to meet its current requirements. The
    President's proposed budget seems to be addressing this need, with a
    requirement of 15 aircraft.
        Secretary Rumsfeld, can you discuss how such an initiative might
    address a possible strategic shift to Asia and help in the rapid
    movement of new Army brigades?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army strongly supports the proposed 60
    additional C-17 aircraft recommended by General Robertson, regardless
    of a possible strategy shift to Asia. This figure is consistent with
    the 54.5 million ton miles per day (MTM/D) as recommended by the
    Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05). Strategic airlift is vital
    to the Army's strategic responsiveness goals of a brigade anywhere in
    the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and 5 divisions in 30
    days. The C-17 in particular is crucial to achieving strategic surprise
    anywhere in the world with decisive ground combat power to influence
    the battle early on as opposed to reacting to an opponent's strategic
    initiative. The Army's Interim and Objective forces will be lighter and
    smaller than current legacy heavy divisions and therefore more rapidly
    deployable. The vehicles supporting these new organizations are being
    designed to fit inside a C-130 for tactical movement within any theater
    of operations. From a strategic perspective, the C-17 can maximize
    delivery times by delivering much larger cargo loads directly into a
    theater. The C-17 has the same small and austere airfield (SAAF)
    landing capability as the C-130, but with a significantly greater cargo
    capacity. One more advantage of the C-17 is its unique ability to
    leverage maximum on ground (MOG). MOG is a constraint at any aerial
    port of debarkation (APOD) and is determined by the sufficiency of the
    airfield's infrastructure to land, taxi, park, offload, refuel and
    maintain aircraft simultaneously. The C-17 optimizes MOG with its
    ability to back-up, self-load and provide more throughput delivered
    with less time on the ground.
        The operational readiness rate of the C-17 combined with its
    performance parameters to date, make it the airframe of choice to
    rapidly deploy America's Army anywhere in the world expeditiously. Many
    do not realize that strategic airlift today is a scarce resource, which
    is heavily competed for early in any deployment sequence. For example,
    the United States Air Force (USAF) requires nearly 75 percent of the
    entire airlift fleet to move its bare-base sets and Aerospace
    Expeditionary Forces during the first several weeks of deployment. The
    Army requirement to deploy an IBCT in 96 hours will take on the order
    of 250 C-17 equivalent missions. Additionally, the USMC has a
    requirement similar to the Army's to deploy and activate one Maritime
    Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron. The C-17 is also a high demand item
    for CINCs in the execution of their peacetime theater engagement plans.
    The utility of the C-17 to carry outsize and oversize military
    equipment over strategic distances and then land on SAAF in theater
    make it an invaluable asset to all CINCs and Services. During the
    period fiscal year 1996-2002, surge sealift will realize a 135 percent
    increase while Army prepositioned stocks afloat will increase 126
    percent. Unfortunately, strategic airlift will not have increased at
    all from fiscal year 1996 out to fiscal year 2006 even after the 134
    authorized C-17s are in service. The 120th C-17 will be delivered in
    2004 and the 134th in 2005. With an average annual production rate of
    15 C-17s, and even with decisive action today, the additional 60 would
    not be fully realized until 2009. During the interim, as we continue to
    retire the C-141 fleet and experience continued poor mission
    reliability of the C-5 fleet, our strategic airlift capacity will only
    get worse before it gets better. The 60 additional C-17s recommended by
    General Robertson--over and above the 134 originally authorized--will
    go far in balancing our strategic airlift capability with the actual
    requirement as identified in MRS-05. Until then, however, the actual
    airlift throughput capacity will diminish or at best remain static.

        6b. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, can you elaborate on these
    comments?
        General Shelton. Yes. Part of your question applies to a possible
    shift of our strategic focus. The United States has had strategic
    interests in Asia before and after World War II. We have political,
    economic, and military allies and friends with whom we have cooperated
    for many years. The current or future security environment will dictate
    whether we need to have a region of primary focus, but it will not
    suggest that we abandon our commitments to our other allies. As
    mentioned previously, the new defense strategy is not finalized, so it
    would be premature for me to be any more specific about our strategic
    focus at this time.
        The MRS-05 study shows with great fidelity that to meet our
    Nation's contingencies, we must increase our airlift capability to the
    Joint Chiefs `agreed-upon' 54.5 MTM/day as a minimum. Please remember
    that 54.5 MTM/D still puts us at moderate risk, any less capability and
    we enter the high-risk category. The best way for us to accomplish this
    is to purchase additional C-17s and modernize the C-5. The C-17 has
    continued to meet and exceed our expectations as our military's new
    core airlifter. Programmatically, the time is now to execute a follow-
    on multi-year contract; otherwise Boeing and its sub-contractors will
    begin shutting down the production line. If we delay much longer, the
    cost of additional C-17s is going to become prohibitively expensive. A
    shift in strategies toward Asia does not invalidate MRS-05 conclusions,
    nor does Service transformation efforts. A more Asia-centric defense
    strategy naturally carries with it greater deployment distances from
    the continental United States (CONUS), keeping the airlift requirement
    high. Service transformation may mean lighter, leaner, and more lethal
    but it is also means faster. With the lighter forces requiring a faster
    deployment, airlift rate of delivery increases and offsets the
    reduction in total tonnage delivered.
        The 15 C-17s in the President's proposed budget do not address the
    need for 60 additional C-17s. Those aircraft are being purchased as
    part of the original 120 aircraft multi-year contract. In recent
    budgets, 14 additional C-17s were authorized to support the Special
    Operations mission. In the President's proposed budget we have added 3
    more C-17s to continue addressing the airlift shortfall (if approved,
    the total C-17 buy will then be 137). Again, a firm commitment to
    acquire a total of 180 C-17s is critical. That would allow us to
    purchase the additional aircraft already on the books and 40+ more as a
    60 aircraft multi-year, significantly reducing cost.

                                 BASE STRUCTURE

        7. Senator Carnahan. Secretary Rumsfeld, we have received limited
    information about a new program that the Pentagon is proposing, called
    the Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). As I understand it, this
    program has the same objectives as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).
    General Shelton's statement seemed to endorse another BRAC round,
    indicating that the Defense Department is operating at 23 percent
    excess base capacity in the United States.
        Could you explain the difference between the program being
    considered by the administration and the BRAC rounds conducted in the
    past?
        Mr. Secretary, there is great interest in this subject on our bases
    and in our communities. We were advised by the Comptroller about the
    EFI during our discussions about the 2002 budget. When do you plan to
    advise this committee as to whether the administration proposes to
    reduce the base structure in the coming year?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Efficient Facilities Initiative that we are
    developing supports the Department's efforts to transform its
    facilities to meet the challenges of the new century. Three main
    components of this initiative are: authorization of an additional round
    of base closures and realignments in 2003; authorization of significant
    improvements in the existing base closure process; and authorization of
    a set of tools for the efficient operation of enduring military
    installations.
        While using essentially the same process as has been used
    successfully before, the proposal would better ensure the primacy of
    military value in the selection and execution of base closure and
    realignment decisions. It would add authority to better harness the
    strength and creativity of the private sector to facilitate
    environmental restoration. This process would also continue the
    Department's no-cost economic development conveyance authority to
    reinvest in the economic redevelopment of the installation and the
    surrounding community.
        Additionally, this initiative would add a new section to Title 10,
    United States Code, providing specific authorities that permit the
    military departments to explore ways of supporting its missions and
    people at more effectively, more efficiently and at less cost while
    maintaining its operational readiness. It is a collection of innovative
    authorities for the secretaries of the military departments to partner
    with local communities for the ownership, operation, and maintenance of
    an installation. This concept has been tested at Brooks Air Force Base
    in San Antonio, TX, under a pilot program with promising success. Our
    proposal would permanently authorize this program and make it available
    to all the military departments.
        Our goal is to submit this EFI to Congress before the August
    recess.

                          WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

        8. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, in your last appearance
    before this committee, you and the Secretary emphasized emerging
    threats posed by chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons around the
    globe. I believe, as you do, that these threats remain imminent. Even
    as we plan a long term strategy for dealing with Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (WMD), it is essential that our troops remain sufficiently
    protected from chemical/biological agents. I hope that the fiscal year
    2002 defense budget will sufficiency equip our troops with adequate
    protection to deploy in a contaminated environment. Has the Pentagon
    sought to modernize its defenses against chemical and biological agents
    in the short term? We have heard a lot about new approaches to
    examining the ballistic missile threat to the United States and its
    allies. I share the Secretary's concerns over this threat, and support
    research, development, and testing for adequate defenses. I also
    understand that you have testified before this committee to illustrate
    the fact that chemical and biological agents pose a far more imminent
    threat than most other types of WMD attacks. Do you anticipate
    substantial increases in long term investments in chemical/biological
    defenses equivalent to other investments in WMD defense?
        General Shelton. Our troops are equipped with the most modern
    defense equipment capable of providing more than adequate protection
    against traditional chemical and biological warfare agent attacks. The
    President's Budget will provide improved chemical point and standoff
    detection capabilities, and continue research to improve protective
    ensembles and masks, medical chemical and biological countermeasures,
    and decontamination technologies. Always cognizant of emerging chemical
    and biological warfare threats, we continue to modernize and upgrade
    our equipment to maintain the highest standards of protection and to
    meet the challenge of future military operations. The DOD Chemical and
    Biological Defense Program is committed to maintaining the proper
    balance between the fielding of state-of-the-art equipment and
    continued investments in science and technology programs. The ongoing
    QDR is assessing our future requirements for countering nuclear,
    biological, and chemical weapons and means of delivery to include
    passive defense capabilities, both for military operations overseas and
    in support of civil authorities.

                               RESERVE COMPONENT

        9a. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, can you describe the
    expansion of our Reserve components' role in the ``total force'' since
    the Gulf War ended in 1991.
        Are there any DOD plans to address health care and other benefits
    for reservists in recognition of their increasing contributions to the
    defense of our Nation?
        General Shelton. The Department of Defense has actively pursued
    equitable health care benefits for Reserve component members
    commensurate with their increased contribution to Total Force missions
    and their potential for risk and exposure to harm. With the support of
    Congress, health care protections have been expanded to ensure we are
    able to provide medical and dental care for a member who is injured or
    becomes ill while performing military duty. The law was also amended to
    ensure the family of Reserve member has access to the military health
    care system when the member is retained on active duty for treatment of
    or recovery from a service connected injury or illness. The recently
    expanded TRICARE Dental Program offers reservists a comprehensive,
    affordable and portable dental program that provides a uniform benefit
    supported by a robust and stable dental provider network. It also
    offers a family member option, not previously available to reservists.
        DOD also plans to initiate a contract study to specifically assess
    the current health coverage experienced by reserve families. When the
    reservist is ordered to active duty for greater than 30 days, cost-
    effective options may be considered to lessen the burden on reservists
    and their families and the implications for Force Health Protection and
    the medical readiness of Reserve personnel.

                                  HEALTH CARE

        9b. Senator Carnahan. General Shelton, are there any DOD plans to
    address health care and other benefits for reservists in recognition of
    their increasing contributions to the defense of our Nation?
        General Shelton. The Department has actively pursued equitable
    health care benefits for Reserve component members commensurate with
    their increased contribution to Total Force missions and their
    potential for risk and exposure to harm. With the support of Congress,
    health care protections have been expanded to ensure we are able to
    provide medical and dental care for a member who is injured or becomes
    ill while performing military duty. The law was also amended to ensure
    the family of a Guard and Reserve member has access to the military
    health care system when the member is retained on active duty for
    treatment of or recovery from a service-connected injury or illness.
        The recently expanded TRICARE Dental Program offers reservists a
    comprehensive, affordable and portable dental program that provides a
    uniform benefit supported by a robust and stable dental provider
    network. It also offers a family member option, not previously
    available to reservists.
        The Department also plans to initiate a contract study to
    specifically assess the current health coverage provided to Reserve
    component members and their families, to identify new options that
    might be more cost effective, and to evaluate the likely response of
    Reserve component members to these new approaches. The project will
    consider such factors as healthcare for families of reservists when the
    reservist is not on Active Duty; the disruption and expense of
    healthcare coverage experienced by reserve families when the reservist
    is ordered to active duty for greater than 30 days; cost-effective
    options that may be considered to lessen the burden on reservists and
    their families; and the implications for Force Health Protection and
    the medical readiness of Reserve personnel.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond

                                 FAMILY HOUSING

        10. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, the fiscal year 2002
    budget amendment provides an additional $400 million for family housing
    construction, of which I understand 80 percent must be dedicated toward
    the housing privatization initiative.
        If you can sustain this level of funding for family housing, will
    you achieve the Department's 2010 goal for fixing the housing problem?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Currently, each service is pursuing varied
    levels of housing privatization. The Department is working with the
    services to increase the rate of privatization, where it makes economic
    sense, to better leverage the resources we ask for in annual budget
    submissions. Were the Department to receive funding above the current
    program levels in its outyear program, the Department, overall, would
    not only meet the 2010 goal, but would be able to eliminate all our
    inadequate housing prior to 2010. The extent to which the military
    services are able to privatize family housing is another key factor in
    achieving the 2010 goal.

                               RESERVE COMPONENT

        11. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, historically, funding for
    the Reserve component military construction program has been at a level
    of $50 million for the Army and Air National Guard and much less for
    the other Reserve components. As a result, their aging facilities are
    in worse shape than the Active components.
        Does your budget contemplate bringing the Reserve components up to
    the 67-year replacement standard?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The fiscal year 2002 Reserve component military
    construction (MILCON) President's budget of $615 million is the highest
    in over 20 years and represents approximately 6 percent of the total
    Fiscal Year 2002 MILCON request of $9.9 billion. The fiscal year 2002
    budget additions represent an emergency ``down payment'' to begin
    restoring the readiness of facilities rated C-3 and C-4. The
    allocations for the active and Reserve components were, therefore,
    based on readiness ratings rather than on the 67-year recapitalization
    goal. The Reserve components received 20 percent of the additional
    fiscal year 2002 resources. The goal of future budgets is a Department-
    wide 67-year recapitalization cycle for all components, Active, Guard,
    and Reserve, as well as Defense Agencies.

                               MANAGEMENT REFORMS

        12. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, according to the briefing
    information I have received thus far, you plan to save $1 billion by
    implementing a series of management reforms and initiatives.
    Additionally, in a recent interview, you described your vision of
    saving as much as $10 to $15 billion per year through additional
    acquisition and management reforms. Could you briefly discuss your
    vision of these future reforms in detail?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. On June 18, 2001, I announced the formation of
    two new internal management committees that will take action to improve
    the Department's overall business practices and transform the military
    into a 21st century fighting force: a Senior Executive Committee (SEC)
    and a Business Initiative Council (BIC). The mission of the BIC is to
    improve the efficiency of the Department of Defense business operations
    by identifying and implementing business reform actions that allow
    savings to be reallocated to higher priority efforts (i.e., people,
    readiness, modernization, and transformation). Such savings will be
    retained by the services/agencies for their reallocation.
        Past studies have already pointed the way to many beneficial
    reforms. We plan to begin by drawing upon the recommendations of those
    studies, and then moving quickly toward their implementation, as well
    as re-enforcing promising reforms that are underway.
        The functional leadership and expertise from both the business and
    operational communities of the Department, Joint Staff, and the
    Services will be called upon to examine and recommend where we should
    devote our energies. The Joint Staff and the Secretaries of the
    Military Departments have joined me and pledged their commitment to
    provide the steadfast leadership to improve the DOD's business
    practices.

                                  MX MISSILES

        13. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand your
    decision to retire the 50 MX missiles as an economic issue. However, I
    am concerned that it will affect on our ability to negotiate further
    cuts in Russia's nuclear arsenal.
        What were the considerations regarding our overall nuclear arms
    reduction negotiations when you decided to retire the MX missiles?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. In our on-going effort to properly size and
    configure our strategic nuclear forces to deal with the deterrent tasks
    of a post-Cold War world, we have determined after careful study that
    now is the time to retire our 50-missile MX force. This decision is
    consistent with our move toward a new post-Cold War framework and our
    effort to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons to the lowest
    possible number consistent with our national security and our
    commitments to our allies. In our view, such changes to our nuclear
    force posture should not require years and years of detailed
    negotiations under an out-moded, Cold War-style arms control process.
    There is an inherent contradiction in attempting to improve U.S.-
    Russian political relations and enhance strategic stability by
    remaining committed to the Cold War approach to arms control, a
    fundamentally adversarial approach. In 1991, the United States invited
    the Soviet Union to join it in removing thousands of tactical nuclear
    weapons from deployment. Huge reductions were achieved in a matter of
    months, making the world much safer, more quickly. Similarly, in the
    area of strategic nuclear weapons, we should invite the Russian
    government to accept the new vision put forward by the President, and
    act on it. In retiring the Peacekeeper missile force, we have an
    opportunity, to lead by example, to a safer world. It is in our best
    interest and the best interest of the world to take this step.

                                 INFRASTRUCTURE

        14. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the stated fiscal
    year 2002 goals is to streamline and upgrade DOD infrastructure.
    Although the budget reflects the funding to upgrade the infrastructure,
    there is no visibility on how you plan to streamline the
    infrastructure.
        Please provide some specifics on how you plan to streamline the
    infrastructure.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department intends to streamline its
    infrastructure by seeking authority to conduct one additional round of
    base closure and realignment beginning in fiscal year 2003. The
    Department plans on submitting its request as a legislative proposal
    for fiscal year 2002 under the title of Efficient Facilities Initiative
    (EFI). If legislative authority for EFI is provided in fiscal year
    2002, the Department will request funding in the fiscal year 2004
    budget submission to begin implementation of approved base closures and
    realignments.
        EFI is essential to re-shape and properly match installations'
    capabilities with changing military operational needs and to improve
    installation support for readiness. Strategies for privatization,
    competitive sourcing, and housing will be better formulated once
    decisions are made to eliminate unnecessary infrastructure. The
    Department cannot afford to maintain excess infrastructure while
    modernizing its weapons and increasing benefits. While savings will be
    significant and reinvested for other priority needs, an equally
    important message, is that EFI is an integral part of the military
    transformation occurring in all the Services.

                                GOVERNMENT JOBS

        15. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that the
    Office of Management and Budget ordered agencies to offer for
    competition at least 5 percent of government jobs considered commercial
    in nature. The directive also established a deadline of October 2002 to
    complete this task.
        What are the implications of this directive on the Department of
    Defense and how do you plan to accomplish this task?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Through the past several years the Defense
    Department has managed the most robust program of competitions of
    government-performed commercial type activities among all the Federal
    Agencies. The competitions, performed under the procedures identified
    in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, take on average 2
    years to complete. Therefore, most of those that will be completed by
    October 2002 were already initiated by October 2000 and constitute part
    of our ongoing program. While our current projections indicate that
    those that will complete during fiscal year 2002 alone will fall
    modestly shy of 5 percent, the cumulative competitions between fiscal
    year 1999 and fiscal year 2002 will be far in excess of the 5 percent
    target.

                                 STRATEGIC LIFT

        16. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, in your prepared statement
    you indicate: ``Congressional support of strategic lift is needed if we
    are to build a national mobility capability sufficient for our current
    and future needs.'' What are the specific programs for which you are
    seeking support?
        General Shelton. Our Strategic Mobility Triad is the central
    component of our strategy to respond around the world. The triad
    consists of strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and pre-positioning.
    I will address each portion of the triad that could benefit from your
    support, as well as associated infrastructure issues.
    Strategic Airlift
             Acquisition and sustainment for the full fleet of C-
            17s: fund the full complement of C-17s required to attain
            strategic airlift requirement identified by MRS-05/QDR and
            correct sustainment shortfalls for the currently authorized C-
            17 fleet.
             C-5 Modernization: fund Avionics Modernization Program
            (AMP) and Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program
            (RERP). AMP and RERP are needed to improve the C-5 mission
            capable rate, to allow us to improve the oversize and outsize
            requirements. AMP increases navigational safety and complies
            with new internationally mandated Global Air Traffic Management
            standards--ensuring continued access to worldwide air routes.
            RERP will significantly improve mission capable rates through a
            one-time upgrade of aircraft structure, engines, fuel system,
            environmental system, flight controls, hydraulic system,
            electrical system, pneumatic system, and landing gear.
             Large Aircraft Defensive Systems (LADS): fund Air
            Mobility Command's (AMC) Large Aircraft Infrared
            Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system. The system is designed to
            protect critical strategic aircraft from lethal Man Portable
            Air Defensive Systems (MANPADS) in Third World and terrorist
            areas. LADS provides next generation defensive capabilities to
            reduce vulnerability as these aircraft face increasingly
            sophisticated portable anti-aircraft systems. The current AMC
            program calls for the outfitting of a 79-aircraft Small-Scale
            Contingency (SSC) complement, consisting of C-17s, C-5s, C-130s
            and KC-135s.
             Air Refueling: address aircrew and maintenance
            shortfalls in the KC-135 fleet. An AMC initiative to fill the
            additional 75 aircrew and 601 maintenance positions is not
            funded. Without full funding to correct these shortfalls, our
            ability to operate in a timely and flexible manner across the
            full spectrum of contingencies will be severely limited.
             Materials Handling Equipment (MHE): The modernization
            of our MHE fleet consists of Tunner (60,000) loaders and Next
            Generation Small Loader (NGSL) (25,000) loaders. Both loaders
            are able to service all cargo aircraft, especially the Civil
            Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft with their 18.5-foot upper
            cargo decks. The Tunner lacks the funding for the purchase and
            sustainment of the final 38 units. The NGSL is fully funded,
            but has a shortfall in sustainment funding.
    Strategic Sealift
    Regarding strategic sealift the following is provided: The continued
    decline of U.S. flag merchant marine fleet and the increased
    globalization/consolidation of companies within the maritime industry
    may affect USTRANSCOM's ability to meet peace and wartime DOD
    requirements. Our objective is a stable commercial merchant marine
    capability, with maximum emphasis on U.S. flag ships, U.S. citizen
    mariners to support DOD contingency pre-positioning, surge and
    sustainment requirements.

             Continued support to finish the Large Medium Speed
            Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) build. This on-going construction
            program consists of 19 vessels that will provide the backbone
            of our contingency support fleet with over 5.2M square feet of
            militarily useful capacity.
             Re-capitalization of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
            ships. The aging of these critical surge fleet assets causes
            increasing difficulty with operation and maintenance and
            requires re-capitalization.
             Maritime Security Program (MSP)/Jones Act/Cargo
            Preference. These programs are critical to ensure available
            U.S. flag ships and mariners are available to support national
            defense. Additionally, the programs help maintain viability of
            the U.S. merchant marine fleet in a highly competitive global
            environment.
             Merchant Mariner manning. U.S. merchant mariners are
            an integral part of national security to crew the organic and
            commercial fleets.
             Additional sealift issues which are not specifically
            defined yet, but will likely require full Congressional support
            are:

                     Maritime tanker re-capitalization. Maritime
                    tanker situation is adequate at present; however, Oil
                    Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (double hull tanker
                    requirement) requires extensive recapitalization. All
                    tankers must be in compliance with OPA 90 by 2015.
                     Heavy lift for non-self deployable watercraft
                    (NSDW). Military Requirement Study 2005 identified a
                    shortfall in our ability to deliver NSDW to overseas
                    theaters within CINC timeline requirements. Joint
                    Staff/J4 is chairing a study to determine solutions to
                    alleviate this shortfall.

    Pre-positioning
             Pre-positioning is a vital facet of our strategic
            mobility triad. It permits us to respond more quickly to
            developing crises and enhances our ability to deter aggression
            and war. Pre-positioning also helps offset our reduced forward-
            deployed presence and decreases reliance on scarce strategic
            lift assets. The two main components of our global pre-
            positioning strategy require robust investment to ensure their
            continued viability.
             Afloat Pre-positioned Force: Each service maintains
            pre-positioned equipment aboard approximately 30 ships
            stationed in the Mediterranean Sea, and Indian and Pacific
            Oceans. This flexible method of pre-positioning provides timely
            equipment and supplies to the geographic CINCs. Continued
            investment in these strategic assets will help improve
            responsiveness and deliver greater capability to the
            warfighter.
             Land-based Pre-positioning: We currently pre-position
            equipment and supplies in several European, Southwest Asian,
            and Pacific Rim countries. Our overseas commands rely on this
            equipment to support the earliest stages of their war and
            contingency plans. As global threats evolve, we continually
            tailor our pre-positioned assets to meet the warfighting CINCs,
            most critical requirements.
    Infrastructure
             En Route Infrastructure Improvements (Europe and
            Pacific). The current strategic airlift enroute infrastructure
            system comprises seven bases in the Pacific and six in Europe.
            Improvements to ramps, fuel hydrant systems, and fuel storage
            systems are needed for these bases to handle the transiting C-
            5s and C-17s en route to the theaters.
             Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is mandated
            through Presidential Decision Directive 63. DOD is identifying
            what truly is mission-critical (i.e., no Plan B for a
            particular go-to-war capability at a particular node) and
            assessing and remediating vulnerabilities at those locations.
             Ammunition infrastructure improvements to ensure
            efficient ammunition flow from depot to destination from CONUS
            depots to railcar availability to CONUS ports to overseas
            destinations. DOD must improve its container-handling equipment
            and intermodal capabilities.
             Assured Access. The MRS-05 study pointed out
            shortfalls in lift, especially commercial railcars, to carry
            large volumes of ammunition and unit equipment from origins to
            ocean ports. Assured Access program now underway will negotiate
            DOD agreements with carriers, specifying how much equipment is
            needed and when during a contingency.

                                  MILITARY PAY

        17. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, although I strongly support
    increased pay and allowances for our dedicated military personnel, I
    believe we must set a goal on what we hope to achieve. If we continue
    to increase pay and compensation under the current system, we build
    expectations that may not be achievable considering all the other
    requirements to maintain our readiness. What is your ultimate goal for
    the level of military pay?
        General Shelton. The Department's ultimate goal is to attract and
    retain quality personnel in numbers sufficient to sustain the National
    defense. To do so, the Department needs to remain competitive with the
    civilian sector in terms of pay and compensation. The proliferation of
    technology and information-based systems and the changing nature of
    warfare have increased the demand for highly trained, technically
    proficient men and women in the Armed Forces.
        The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (9th QRMC)
    recommends changes that would not only raise the level of pay for some
    grades, but would alter the structure of the pay system as well. The
    pay raise slated for fiscal year 2002 and your continued support of our
    efforts to bring military pay in line with the civilian sector, such as
    the Employment Cost Index +.5 percent initiative, will further improve
    the quality of life for our Service members and their families.

                              LARGE DECK CARRIERS

        18. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, as you may be aware, there
    has been an ongoing debate in the press on the vulnerability of our
    large deck carriers. What are your views on our carriers vulnerability
    in future operations?
        General Shelton. Carriers have been our first on-scene presence in
    many operations over the past decade, protecting our economic,
    political, and security interests in both peace and conflict. I do not
    see their mission changing in the near future.
        To place the on-going debate in context, press articles often do
    not account for the challenges of identifying and targeting a mobile
    platform. If we consider carriers vulnerable to missiles, then land
    bases and land assets share the same vulnerability if not more.
        With that premise, the question becomes ``How survivable are
    carriers?''
        The answer is, they are very survivable.
        An enemy not only has to locate, target, and launch a weapon at
    what is an extremely mobile platform, but that same weapon has to
    penetrate the carriers layered defense systems. Carriers are survivable
    because of limitations in weapon systems acquisition capabilities
    versus the carriers' mobility, offensive, and defensive capabilities.
        In addition, the Navy is developing an array of air and underwater
    sensors and capabilities that will only enhance the carriers'
    survivability in the future.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum

                             UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS

        19. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, traditionally, the
    committee has relied on Service unfunded requirements lists or ``UFR
    lists'' as a guide on where best to apply additional resources. That
    is, these lists have provided Congress with information on the most
    pressing needs facing the services that are not addressed by the
    President's Budget Request. Can you update the committee on whether the
    Services will permitted to submit UFR Lists for fiscal year 2002? If
    not, what recommendations or advice will the Department of Defense
    provide on how best to allocate additional resources for our military
    branches and defense agencies?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Although I have concerns about this traditional
    practice of unfunded requirements lists, I have not prevented such
    lists from being provided to Congress. However, in this or future
    budget years, I would urge members of Congress to seek recommendations
    from me on how best to allocate added defense resources--rather than
    relying on Service lists, which can become dated and which are not a
    reliable way to identify the Defense Department's most pressing
    security requirements.

        20. Senator Santorum. General Shelton, have you begun the process
    of generating UFR lists? If additional funds were added to the Fiscal
    Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act, and if Service UFR lists will not
    be generated, how do you suggest Congress best allocate additional
    funds for the Military Services? Has the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense told the service chiefs not to generate UFR lists for fiscal
    year 2002? Do you have unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2002 that
    are not addressed by this Budget Amendment?
        General Shelton. The Services provide the resources for the
    warfighters and as such they can best articulate unfunded requirements.
    Recently, at the request of Congressman Skelton and with full knowledge
    by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services provided their
    fiscal year 2002 unfunded requirements. If additional resources are
    made available for defense, allocations should reflect inputs from the
    Services' unfunded requirements.

                          SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

        21. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, traditionally, the
    Clinton administration used supplemental appropriations bills to fund
    existing military requirements. Will you require additional or
    supplemental funds in fiscal year 2002 or is this budget request
    sufficient for the year?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. This budget request should be sufficient for
    the year. The Bush administration is committed to preparing realistic
    budgets that will not require supplemental appropriations except for
    genuine emergencies like war or natural disaster.

                             SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

        22. Senator Santorum. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President expressed a
    desire to pursue ``leap ahead'' technologies and has been supportive of
    ``skipping a generation'' in the weapons system acquisition process.
    The ability to realize these goals will largely be driven by our
    investment in our Department of Defense Science and Technology (S&T)
    Program. These budget accounts support research on many of the key
    technologies that will be necessary for the Army to transition to its
    ``objective force,'' for the Air Force and Navy to utilize UCAVs, and
    for many of our chemical and biological agent protection/detection
    capabilities.
        I am alarmed to see that the funding levels for Basic Research
    (6.1) and Applied Research (6.2) have remained equal to the levels that
    were appropriated last year. In addition, I am perplexed to see that
    Advanced Technology Development (6.3) funding has declined versus last
    year's appropriated level. Overall, the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget
    request asks for less in S&T funding than was appropriated last year. I
    am doubtful that the Department can realize advances in ``leap ahead''
    technologies or invest in our next generation of engineers and
    scientists with this level of S&T funding. While I am encouraged to see
    increases in nanotechnology research and chemical and biological agent
    research, the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget request fails to robustly
    fund our S&T accounts.
        How do you intend to support ``leap ahead'' advances with less
    money than was requested last year? Since leaders of industry have
    bemoaned the lack of funding devoted to basic research, how can you
    assure me that the Department of Defense is strongly supportive of
    producing the next generation of scientists and engineers?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Determining a sufficient level of S&T
    investment is not a precise science, rather I believe it is a strategic
    decision. It has always been the Department's goal to fund S&T at a
    level adequate to ensure the technological superiority of our Armed
    Forces. In fiscal year 2001, the Department's total request for S&T
    funding was $7.5 billion and our Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget
    request is for a total of $8.8 billion. This represents an increase of
    more than 17 percent over the fiscal year 2001 request. A strong S&T
    program is required to provide options for responding to a full range
    of military challenges both today, and into the uncertain future. The
    Department's investment in S&T develops the technology foundation
    necessary for our modernization effort, and fosters the development of
    ``leap ahead'' technologies that produce revolutionary capabilities.
    DOD must continue to invest broadly in defense-relevant technologies
    because it is not possible to predict in which areas the next
    breakthroughs will occur. It is the Department's objective to grow the
    S&T budget to be 3 percent of the total DOD top-line budget as soon as
    possible. This goal is consistent with the industrial model of
    investing 3 percent of a corporation's budget in research. However, we
    also need to ensure that the funding levels of the various components
    in the Department's total budget are balanced based on our assessment
    of the most urgent requirements at any given time.
        With respect to your second question, the Department of Defense
    gives a high priority to basic research and to the training of future
    scientists and engineers in defense-critical fields. DOD basic research
    is a wellspring of new knowledge and understanding that underpins
    future defense technologies. Moreover, the DOD basic research program
    provides the majority of the Department's support to students pursuing
    advanced degrees in defense-critical science and engineering fields,
    helping to ensure the future availability of talent for defense needs.
    The Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget request of $1.3 billion for basic
    research is more than 8 percent above the fiscal year 2001 request of
    $1.2 billion. Our carefully considered judgment is that this level of
    basic research investment makes most sense within available resources,
    given that we must maintain a good programmatic balance among all of
    the components of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).
    A balanced RDT&E investment strategy is important to help assure that
    basic research results are fully utilized in a timely way, through
    technology transition to applied research and ultimately to development
    of defense systems.

                                 TRANSFORMATION

        23. Senator Santorum. General Shelton, last year, the Army
    terminated or re-structured seven programs to pay for the Chief of
    Staff of the Army's ``transformation'' initiative. The Army believed
    these terminations and re-structuring were necessary because the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense was unable to provide additional funds to
    support transforming the Army. Congress then restored several of these
    programs because of existing Army requirements. What assurance can you
    provide that the Army's transformation initiative is fully funded in
    the Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Amendment? If the transformation effort is
    not fully funded, what are some of the tradeoffs or choices that the
    Army will have to consider seeing that this effort is adequately
    funded? What is the funding level for the S&T efforts that are
    necessary to support the Army's ``objective force?''
        General Shelton. Transformation is an evolutionary process and the
    Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget represents a balanced program, which
    maintains an Army, trained and ready. To support the Army's future
    goals, significant funding increases for transformation and science and
    technology development have been included as part of the President's
    Amended Budget. The service can best articulate in any discussion
    pertaining to Transformation tradeoff decisions.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

                                    BOMBERS

        24. Senator Roberts. Secretary Rumsfeld, I understand that within
    the Air Force and with other supporters, there is an effort to reopen
    the B-2 line. Part of the justification for the cuts in the B-1B
    program is to free up funds to support needed modernization accounts.
    The strong suggestion is that funds for modernization of this very
    capable platform are scarce--and probably for other programs as well.
    What is the justification for opening the B-2 line while reducing the
    inventory of the B-1B because of funding? If the numbers of long range
    precision bombers is an issue, why spend significant scarce dollars
    when the current inventory could be modernized at a substantially less
    cost?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It is premature to say that the Department
    supports efforts to reopen the production line of the B-2 bomber.
    Funding provided in fiscal year 2002 for the Next Generation Bomber
    program is for basic research and development and will be used for
    introductory flight dynamics and propulsion technology. If the decision
    is made to enter production of a new bomber then a substantial
    investment will have to be made. The entire Air Force aircraft fleet is
    aging, but the fleet of strategic bombers, on average, is the oldest.
    Their current age is 25 years and it is projected to increase to 33
    years if nothing is done to modernize the fleet.
        As for the B-1, it is becoming increasingly expensive to maintain
    the aircraft. I felt it was a prudent decision to reduce the fleet size
    and take those savings and reinvest them into modernizing the remaining
    aircraft, because, as you point out, funds for modernization are
    scarce. Therefore, it was important that funding made available from
    the reduction in the B-1 inventory be used to modernize and increase
    the mission capable rates of the remaining B-1 aircraft.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                               SPACE BASED RADAR

        25. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, in earlier visits, we have
    discussed the importance of the development of space based radar and
    the disappointment of the cancellation of Discoverer II. Last year's
    Authorization Bill required a space based radar roadmap to guide the
    overall effort. Where is the Department on completing the roadmap? How
    does your budget address space based radar?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The space based radar roadmap is now in final
    coordination within the Department and should be delivered to Congress
    in August. While the roadmap uses fiscal year 2008 as a target date for
    initiating deployment of an operational space based radar system, the
    specific system architecture and its integration with airborne assets
    still needs to be defined. The President's Budget request for fiscal
    year 2002 of $50 million sustains and expands the space based radar
    technology effort as well as supports the development of requirements,
    concepts of operation, and architecture options for a space-based radar
    system.

                                  SPACE ASSETS

        26. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, I know you understand the
    importance of protecting our national security and commercial space
    assets. How does the budget fund surveillance capabilities, asset
    protection, and attack prevention?
        Also, what efforts are underway to coordinate protection against
    disruption of our space assets between the commercial and defense
    sectors?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget
    requests increased funding to modernize the existing space surveillance
    network by upgrading the Cobra Dane and Eglin space tracking radars in
    Alaska and Florida, respectively, as well as improving the Navy's space
    surveillance ``fence.'' It also requests funds to increase the number
    and quality of optical sensors in the network to expand coverage and
    improve resolution of space objects, improve command and control, and
    pursue development of a space-based sensor to enhance the performance
    of the existing ground-based surveillance network. With respect to
    space asset protection, the budget requests increased funds for
    radiation hardening of electronics as well as other technology
    development to make satellites, links, and ground control nodes more
    robust. This includes technology for threat warning that, when coupled
    with improved intelligence, will provide a greater ability to
    anticipate and prevent attacks to critical space systems. It also
    requests funds to develop an approach to space asset protection that
    addresses commercial assets used to support national security missions.

                           INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

        27. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, how does this budget
    request address shortfalls in our satellite intelligence and
    communications infrastructure? How will the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP) ensure we have the capacity and flexibility to support
    our intelligence and communications requirements in the future?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Complete integration of intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance systems is a key DOD objective, and
    remains one of our greatest challenges. Our joint service Distributed
    Common Ground Systems (DCGS) architecture has made great progress, but
    much remains to be accomplished through integration of DCGS and
    National Mission Ground Stations to meet the TPED requirements
    associated with our advanced tactical sensors and future overhead
    collectors. New sensors and deployment schemes are being examined that
    could provide important intelligence information to military commanders
    on the battlefield as well as to decision-makers assessing foreign
    leadership intentions.
        Evolution of a Defense Surveillance Architecture of integrated
    surveillance platforms, networks and databases is a top priority for
    meeting DOD requirements in the next 5 to 10 years. The Department is
    currently implementing a Surveillance Integration initiative to
    integrate both airborne and space surveillance systems. We must add
    also new collection capabilities, such as the proposed Space Based
    Radar system.
        It is critical that we continue ongoing efforts to improve
    collection from both space and airborne collectors. This includes
    sensor developments such as Hyperspectral Imagery and chemical/
    biological ground sensors; and platform developments such as stealth
    and tactical UAVs. We must deliver the Future Communications
    Architecture, which will allow individual collectors and-ground
    processing elements, DCGS and MGSs to inter-operate and relay data more
    efficiently and effectively.
        In the communications arena, our goal is to provide our forces with
    the ability to connect to a ubiquitous information grid, requiring only
    the correct communications equipment with the correct security
    capabilities. The most significant shortfalls in meeting this goal are
    in satellite communications (SATCOM) and terrestrial communications.
    SATCOM offers a unique capability for expeditionary forces by allowing
    reliable command and control connectivity from the national command
    authorities to the forces afield, independent of any infrastructure
    where forces are operating. Both spacecraft and connecting ground
    communications equipment procurements have lacked synchronization and
    are being addressed by the QDR and program initiatives.
        System replacement is the near term issue, and DOD has begun the
    planning and design activities required to execute the replacement of
    the existing Defense Satellite Communication, MILSTAR, and UHF Follow-
    On Systems. Looking further into the future, technologies that will
    provide exponential increases in communications throughput, security,
    and responsiveness are also being studied. The National Security Space
    Architect has been tasked to examine space assets, while another task
    group is developing an Information Superiority Investment Strategy.
    Both groups are reviewing the shortfalls and are providing the
    recommendations that span the DOD infrastructure.
        To meet our communications requirements, in the next 5 to 10 years,
    we will continue to develop an integrated architecture and achievable
    roadmap for the acquisition of communications satellites. Replacement
    of the existing communication satellite constellations, MILSTAR, UHF
    Follow On, and the Defense Satellite Communication System will remain a
    priority.
        In concert with new platform acquisitions and expanded use of
    commercial communications, we will continue our dedicated efforts to
    deliver the Global Information Grid (GIG). The communication systems,
    computing systems and services, software applications, data, and
    security services comprising the GIG provide the force structure the
    ability to decisively maintain information superiority over current and
    potential adversaries. The GIG represents the integrating construct and
    architecture for the DOD's use of information technology that supports
    warfighting and other important national security purposes. The GIG
    includes all Defense and Intelligence Community Information Technology
    (including that which is embedded in airborne and space platforms). We
    plan to continue to develop and enforce DOD interoperability policy and
    implement key initiatives such as the Global Command and Control
    System, Defense Message System, and the Cooperative Engagement
    Capability. We also plan to continue and strengthen our
    interoperability efforts with our alliance partners.

                            COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE

        28. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, a recent Defense Science
    Board study stated that the U.S. military is severely lacking in the
    area of computer network defense. They must spend up to $3 billion per
    year or $1.4 billion more than today on computer security technologies
    and training and recruitment of qualified individuals. What is the DOD
    response in this budget to this important and complex problem?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The revised fiscal year 2002 budget submission
    has addressed some of these issues and has included an increase of $142
    million for efforts in training education and retention, cryptographic
    modernization, secured wired and wireless communications, computer
    network defense, global information grid, and network intrusion
    detection. The Quadrennial Defense Review, which is currently on going,
    also addresses these issues and has identified additional requirements.
    Efforts will be made to accommodate these requirements in the upcoming
    program build process.

                                ANTHRAX VACCINE

        29. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, there have been discussions
    regarding the need for a second facility to produce the anthrax
    vaccine. Do you address this issue in the budget?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, the Department of Defense is currently
    planning for construction of a government-owned, contractor-operated
    (GOCO) biological defense vaccine production facility on a generic
    site. The site selection process will be conducted in a fair and open
    manner. A GOCO biological defense production facility will accommodate
    three bulk vaccine production suites, each with different production
    technology processes: spore-forming bacteria (e.g., anthrax), a
    microbial fermentation, and tissue culture (viral vaccines). A modular
    design will allow flexibility and expandable manufacturing capacity for
    production of DOD-critical vaccines, such as anthrax, that are intended
    for force protection and licensing by the Food and Drug Administration.
        Regarding specific funding, there is $0.7 million in the Fiscal
    Year 2002 Military Construction, Defense-wide budget to support initial
    planning and design efforts. Also, $2.4 million in PE 0604384BP is in
    the President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request to establish a program
    management office for a biological defense vaccine production facility.

                                    OPTEMPO

        30. Senator Allard. Secretary Rumsfeld, we often hear reports that
    the PERSTEMPO and the OPTEMPO are too high and that you are having
    difficulty maintaining them with the current force structure. An
    increased reliance on the Reserve components has had a positive effect,
    but they too are suffering from a high OPTEMPO. At the readiness
    hearing last September, the service chiefs implied that the Quadrennial
    Defense Review would likely return a recommendation to increase the
    size of our force structure, particularly in the Army. Do we need an
    increase in force structure? How are you going to reduce the effects of
    a high OPTEMPO?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I also share your concerns about tempo strains
    on U.S. forces. This issue is under examination in the Quadrennial
    Defense Review.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Hutchinson

                             SPECTRUM INTERFERENCE

        31. Senator Hutchinson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I know that there have
    been discussions within the Department of Defense about the future of
    the spectrum band that the military currently uses. Certainly, any
    consideration of changing the DOD's spectrum should have as its primary
    goal the maintenance and enhancement of our military's communications
    system.
        The military's spectrum is also used commercially in most parts of
    the developed world. It has been suggested that a stepwise migration to
    new spectrum could potentially help prevent future interference
    problems in these areas of the world and could be financed through the
    sale of the military's current spectrum. Do you believe that such a
    move could provide national security benefits to our military?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. This is an excellent question that has several
    important issues embedded in it. I would like to provide the bottom
    line answer first and follow that with my rationale that will address
    the embedded issues of both ``new spectrum'' and potential interference
    to our systems when employed outside the United States.
        Essentially, I do not believe the proposal to transition DOD
    systems from the spectrum band of current interest to other bands has
    any potential for providing national security benefits. I am, however,
    willing to objectively participate in the search for the best national
    solution to the spectrum demand problem.
        The specific spectrum band of interest is the 1755-1850 MHz band,
    which DOD employs for a number of critical major systems. This band is
    under consideration, along with others, to be designated for use by
    advanced wireless systems, more commonly referred to as Third
    Generation cellular systems or ``3G''. This band is technically Federal
    Government spectrum, within the borders of the United States, and the
    DOD is allowed to employ the band as a Government entity and does so in
    the provision of warfighting capabilities that are vital to our Nation.
        First allow me to address the issue of ``new spectrum.'' There
    could be other spectrum that the DOD would be able to migrate our
    systems into, but there is no new spectrum that can be made available
    The idea of providing the DOD other spectrum sounds reasonable but the
    Nation's two key spectrum regulatory bodies in the Department of
    Commerce and the Federal Communications Commission have been examining
    this issue for over a year without finding a workable solution. The DOD
    systems that operate in this band support functions that we must
    maintain or else we will seriously degrade our defense capabilities.
    Losing access to the current band, without first being provided
    comparable spectrum that is just as useful would weaken the DOD's
    ability to protect the Nation and cripple our capabilities to execute
    our global missions.
        Second, the responsibility for global missions ties in with your
    reference to potential interference for our systems when operated in
    the developed world. You are correct that the band of interest is used
    in the developed world for commercial systems. We recognize this and
    there are reasons why we do not view the situation as a hindrance to
    fulfilling our obligations in other parts of the world. In the truly
    developed areas of the world, we employ our systems in training ranges
    and areas that are quite remote from the commercial sources of
    potential interference. In those cases where there is a need to use a
    system in proximity to a commercial source of interference, our
    spectrum experts with the Combatant Commands coordinate with the proper
    entities to ensure that any potential interference is avoided. I must
    also point out that our systems are designed with ``spectrum
    flexibility'' so that those who operate them can respond to the
    constraints we experience when we are in other sovereign nations.
    Additionally, the majority of situations where we employ critical
    weapons systems outside our own country are not in the developed world
    but in the less developed regions where interference from commercial
    systems is not a concern.
        My final point is based on a linkage of the two above issues. Our
    nation stands alone with global responsibilities and the requirement to
    consider and, when necessary, apply military force as an instrument of
    foreign policy. No other country faces the security implications that
    we face in designating spectrum for commercial purposes. We cannot
    assume that we can reach a decision on this critical spectrum issue by
    following the same path or assuming the same options that other
    countries may have considered. Our decision must truly be made in the
    best national interest that balances all facets of the issue, including
    ensuring the maintenance of our vital defense capabilities.

                                      BRAC

        32. Senator Hutchinson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am adamantly opposed
    to a new round of base closures. With a changing strategic environment,
    the high cost of base closures, and the uncertain benefits, I would be
    very concerned about the proposal of a new BRAC round.
        Does the administration propose a new round of BRAC? It is my
    understanding that the budget amendment will include something called
    the ``Efficient Facilities Initiative.'' Is that a new name for BRAC?
    What would the criteria be for closing military facilities? When does
    the administration to provide further details on this issue?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department will be requesting additional
    base realignment and closure authority as part of its Efficient
    Facilities Initiative. The Efficient Facilities Initiative that we are
    developing supports the Department's efforts to transform its
    facilities to meet the challenges of the new century. It is not a new
    name for BRAC, but BRAC is a central part of the initiative. The three
    main components of the EFI are: authorization of an additional round of
    base closures and realignments in 2003; authorization of significant
    improvements in the existing base closure process; and authorization of
    a set of tools for the efficient operation of enduring military
    installations.
        While the BRAC authority we are requesting uses essentially the
    same process as has been used successfully before, the proposal would
    better ensure the primacy of military value in the selection and
    execution of base closure and realignment decisions. Specific selection
    criteria will be worked out after Congress has authorized the new BRAC
    round. We intend to submit this EFI to Congress before its August
    recess.

        [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 10, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                SECRETARIES AND CHIEFS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Cleland, Reed, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Carnahan, Warner,
    Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Collins, and Bunning.
        Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gerald J. Leeling,
    counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Christine E.
    Cowart, chief clerk.
        Professional staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
    Creighton Greene, Maren Leed, Michael J. McCord, and Arun A.
    Seraphin.
        Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
    Republican staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
    director for the minority; Charles W. Alsup, professional staff
    member; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; William C.
    Greenwalt, professional staff member; Gary M. Hall,
    professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
    member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
    Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis,
    professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional
    staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer, minority counsel; Suzanne K.
    L. Ross, research assistant; Cord A. Sterling, professional
    staff member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel; and Richard F.
    Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen, Thomas C. Moore,
    and Michele A. Traficante.
        Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
    Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
    Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to
    Senator Carnahan; Brady King and Jason Van Wey, assistants to
    Senator Dayton; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    Robert Alan McCurry and James Beauchamp, assistants to Senator
    Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
    Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
    Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek
    Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to receive testimony on the proposed fiscal
    year 2002 amended budget from the secretaries and the chiefs of
    the military services. I want to welcome Secretary of the Army,
    Tom White; Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki; Secretary
    of the Navy, Gordon England; Chief of Naval Operations, Adm.
    Vernon Clark; the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Jim
    Jones; Secretary of the Air Force, Jim Roche; and Air Force
    Chief of Staff, Gen. Mike Ryan.
        Before we begin, I just want to take a moment to
    acknowledge that last night in North Carolina a CH-46
    helicopter carrying five marines crashed during a routine
    training exercise. Three of the marines were killed, the
    remaining two crew members are hospitalized. Our thoughts and
    our prayers are with them and their families. General Jones, I
    just want to express our condolences to you personally while
    you are here and hope that you will extend all of our
    condolences to the family and friends of the victims and to the
    entire Corps.
        These tragedies remind us of the risks that men and women
    in our armed services take every day on our behalf. We are
    grateful to them and we hope that you will pass along our
    condolences to the families and the victims.
        General Jones. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Warner. May I join our chairman in that, General.
        I think one other thing should be pointed out. Regrettably,
    these types of accidents point out the aging of our equipment.
    We first started buying that type of helicopter in the sixties
    is my recollection. How old would you anticipate that air ship
    to be?
        General Jones. About 35 years old, sir.
        Senator Warner. Thirty-five years old. So it is near the
    very end of its extended life.
        Chairman Levin. Is the cause of the accident known?
        General Jones. It is under investigation, sir. The pilot
    and the copilot survived and they are in stable condition in
    the hospital as we speak.
        Chairman Levin. This is an unusually large panel of
    witnesses, but we are in an unusual situation. The delay in
    submitting the fiscal year 2002 amended budget to Congress has
    left us with just 7 weeks of session to accomplish what
    typically takes 5 months. We still need the detailed
    justification books that are essential to our review of the
    budget request. We just will remind our secretaries here that
    it is absolutely critical that we get those detailed
    justification books as soon as possible.
        It is becoming increasingly clear that the additional $18.4
    billion in defense spending that the President is requesting
    for fiscal year 2002, along with any increases in defense
    spending in future years, cannot be initiated or sustained
    without using the surpluses in the Social Security and Medicare
    trust funds or without returning to budget deficits or without
    cutting important domestic programs, such as education, health
    care, and law enforcement.
        None of those are acceptable alternatives. The only
    alternative that I see is to revisit the upper income tax cuts
    which were recently enacted. But once we address the issue of
    how we are going to pay for the budget increases that are
    proposed, we then have to ask whether or not the
    administration's proposed budget reflects the proper balance
    between the quality of life and readiness of our military men
    and women that they need today and the investments that are
    needed to modernize and transform our Armed Forces to meet the
    threats of tomorrow.
        We will be asking each of our witnesses this morning
    whether this budget request addresses what they consider to be
    the priorities of their respective services, both for the near
    term and the long term. In order for us to evaluate the
    programs and priorities included in this budget, we also need a
    clear understanding of what was not included. In recent years
    each of the service chiefs has provided Congress lists of the
    key programs that were not included in the annual defense
    budget request. We will be asking each of the chiefs to provide
    to this committee the unfunded priorities lists that you
    provided in past years, similar to those lists at least, so
    that we can get some understanding, not just of what is
    requested, but again what has not been able to be funded.
        I will also be asking our witnesses their views about some
    of the choices that were made in this year's budget. For
    example, this budget request would decrease funding for
    procurement and for science and technology programs below the
    current year's level while increasing funding for missile
    defense programs by $3 billion or 57 percent over the current
    year.
        The budget request would also reduce Army flying hours and
    tank training miles in fiscal year 2002 compared to the current
    year. In the latter case, Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee
    that ``the Army made those kind of choices.'' The committee
    looks forward to the testimony of all of the service
    secretaries and chiefs on the thinking behind these and other
    difficult choices.
        All of us share a responsibility to do our best to ensure
    that Defense Department programs and activities are conducted
    effectively and efficiently. In his recent testimony to this
    committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said: ``I have never seen an
    organization that could not operate at something like 5 percent
    more efficiency if it had the freedom to do so.'' He went on to
    say that: ``The taxpayers have a right to demand that we spend
    their money wisely. Today,'' he said, ``we cannot tell the
    American people we are doing that. I know I cannot.''
        That is a very significant and serious statement. If the
    American taxpayers cannot be assured that the Defense
    Department is spending their money wisely, we will not be able
    to sustain public support for the kind of increases in defense
    spending that are contained in this budget request.
        Each of our service secretaries has had extensive
    experience managing large private sector companies. Secretary
    Rumsfeld has set up a new senior executive committee and a
    business initiative council to draw on this experience and to
    help him manage the Defense Department. I hope each of you this
    morning will give us recommendations to improve the management
    of your respective departments, both those requiring
    legislation and those that can be implemented without
    legislation.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    recognizing our service secretaries and service chiefs, and
    particularly you, General Ryan. In all likelihood this could be
    your last appearance before the Senate as you wind up a most
    distinguished career, preceded by your father, who was also
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force when I was privileged to be
    Secretary of the Navy. I remember him well.
        What a proud family tradition. It exemplifies here in the
    United States of America how families, generations of families,
    have proudly worn the uniform of our country in different
    services. That is the very bedrock of our professional military
    force, officer as well as enlisted.
        I commend you and your wife and your family for this
    service.
        Chairman Levin. General Ryan, let me just join Senator
    Warner in congratulating you for your distinguished service. I
    am a little more cautious in saying this is probably your last
    visit before the committee, but just on that chance, I surely
    want to join, and I know on behalf of all the members of the
    committee, in congratulating you and thanking you for an
    extraordinary career.
        General Ryan. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Warner. Across our country we detect a growing
    consensus, and indeed here in Congress. The American people
    want to improve the quality of life for those who serve in
    uniform. They want to obtain modern equipment for those who
    constantly take the risks, whether here at home, as we saw last
    night, or abroad.
        I can think of no more important building block in the
    budget process than the testimony that is provided by those who
    proudly serve as the service chiefs in our military
    departments. I just go back over the past few years, because we
    look to you for the complete professional opinions that each of
    you are able to give. With due respect to the Commander in
    Chief, whoever that may be, this committee time and time again
    has called upon you to give us your personal views with regard
    to the budget levels and the issues.
        Indisputably, our Armed Forces are the best and the most
    powerful in the world today. This well-deserved reputation was
    not earned without cost. While our service men and women
    perform their military missions with great dedication and
    professionalism, our people, our equipment, and our
    infrastructure are increasingly stressed by the effects of an
    unprecedented number of military deployments over the past
    decade, combined with years of decline in defense spending.
        At the same time our force structure was declining in size
    by almost 40 percent, our overseas deployments for peacekeeping
    and other military operations increased by over 300 percent. As
    the service chiefs have told us repeatedly, future readiness
    and the upkeep of military facilities has been deferred to pay
    for current operations and maintenance, and service personnel
    are being asked to do more with less--less people, less
    resources.
        In the past week I have visited seven military
    installations in my State and, General Jones, I spoke with you
    about Quantico. Am I not correct that it has been 60 years
    since we put a new housing unit for either an enlisted or an
    officer on that base?
        General Jones. That is correct.
        Senator Warner. Those things simply have to be corrected,
    and I am hopeful that we can make progress in this budget.
        We have tried here in Congress in the past several years,
    together with my distinguished colleague here Mr. Levin. We
    have worked together as a team to increase defense spending. In
    fiscal year 2000, we reversed a 14-year decline in defense
    spending by authorizing a real increase in spending that year.
    Last year we continued that momentum by providing an even
    larger real increase for defense for fiscal year 2001. Over the
    past years we have increased military pay by over 8 percent,
    restored retirement and health care benefits to keep faith with
    those who serve or have served, raised procurement levels to
    begin recapitalization and modernization of aging equipment,
    and I think significantly increased investment in research and
    development.
        We have to keep that momentum going forward, and we must
    rely on you for your opinions as to whether the budget now
    before us is adequate to keep that momentum.
        Again, while much has been done, much remains. The
    President is to be commended. I just looked at this fiscal 2002
    defense request and our calculations are that $38.2 billion in
    increases have been recognized and requested by President Bush.
    These increases proposed in 2002 represent an almost 11 percent
    increase in defense spending above the amount available in
    2001.
        While this increase begins to address the shortfalls, it
    may not be enough, and we look to you for those answers.
        I talked with my distinguished chairman this morning about
    the $18.4 billion increase. We still have a battle on our own
    home front here with our Budget Committees. They have an
    across-the-board responsibility for the entire budget and we
    will do our best. I will join our chairman in trying to support
    in every way the President's request before those committees.
        So this is a very, very important hearing today. I think it
    is wonderful to go back to the old style of having the service
    secretaries appear side-by-side with the service chiefs,
    because it is a partnership between the civilian oversight and
    the military chief as you work your way for your respective
    departments. Let us do our best.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        In the interest of time and in order to give the members
    chances to get into specific issues in their questions, I am
    going to ask our witnesses now to limit their opening remarks
    to 7 minutes. Secretary White, we will begin with you.

        STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Secretary White. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
    distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate this
    opportunity to discuss the state of America's Army. Consistent
    with your guidance, Mr. Chairman, I will make a very brief
    statement and then submit a longer statement for the record.
        Chairman Levin. All your statements will be made part of
    the record.
        Secretary White. Thank you.
        General Shinseki and I want to talk to you today, against
    the backdrop of the President's 2002 amended budget, about our
    progress in achieving the Army's vision. In our written
    testimony, we described the magnificent work the Army has done
    in recent months and identified the challenges we continue to
    face.
        There is still much work to be done, but the Army has moved
    up. We are transforming in comprehensive and profound ways into
    the most strategically responsive and dominant land force of
    the 21st century, decisive across the entire spectrum of
    military operations. That being said, I want to be very
    straightforward about what this budget does and does not do for
    the Army.
        First, the budget will put us on the road to recovery in
    some categories, such as military pay, housing allowances, and
    health care. Second, it will start an improvement, but leave us
    short of our goals, in other areas, such as restoring our
    deteriorating infrastructure. Third, unfortunately, there will
    continue to be shortfalls in a number of critical areas, such
    as modernization and recapitalization of the existing force.
        Recognizing these budget shortfalls, we must look elsewhere
    for cost savings. The key to this effort is the freedom
    necessary to efficiently manage the Army and generate near and
    long-term savings for reinvestment. Given that latitude, we
    hope to improve efficiency within the Army by adopting better
    business practices, focusing on our core competencies,
    outsourcing or privatizing where it makes sense, and
    streamlining processes to reduce operating costs.
        Success will be achieved by the redirection of resources to
    fully fund the pillars of the Army's Vision: People, Readiness,
    and Transformation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
    questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary White and
    General Shinseki follows:]
       Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. Thomas E. White and Gen. Eric K.
                                 Shinseki, USA
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we thank
    you for this opportunity to report to you today on the United States
    Army's readiness to provide for our Nation's security today and in the
    future.
        The Army exists for one purpose--to serve the Nation. For over 226
    years, American soldiers have answered the Nation's call to duty,
    faithfully and selflessly performing any mission that the American
    people have asked of them. The soldiers are the common denominator that
    has allowed us to enjoy economic prosperity and stability in a rapidly
    changing global environment.
        Throughout that time, the Army--active component, Army National
    Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and Army civilians--has maintained its non-
    negotiable contract with the American people to fight and win the
    Nation's wars decisively. Indeed, the Army stands ready to go into
    harm's way whenever and wherever we are asked. Today, The United States
    Army is the most formidable land force in the world, a fact that
    reassures allies and deters adversaries.
        Today, the Army must also be capable of executing the broader
    requirements of the National Security Strategy and National Military
    Strategy across the full spectrum of operations. The commitment and
    dedication of Army soldiers and civilians, coupled with the support of
    the administration and Congress, are allowing the Army to meet its
    requirements as the decisive landpower component of the U.S. military.
        The bipartisan support of Congress during the past 2 years has
    helped the Army build sustainable momentum for its Transformation. We
    want to talk to you today, against the backdrop of the President's 2002
    amended budget, about where we are in achieving the Army Vision. In our
    testimony, we will describe the magnificent work the Army has done in
    recent months and identify the challenges we continue to face. There is
    still much work to be done, but the Army has moved out. It is
    transforming in comprehensive and profound ways to be the most
    strategically responsive and dominant land force of the 21st century--
    decisive across the entire spectrum of military operations.
        The budget for fiscal year 2002 ensures the Army is funded at
    sufficient levels to support the National Security and National
    Military Strategies. It funds people programs to man the force and
    address quality of life issues relevant to our soldiers and their
    families, ensures our continued warfighting readiness, and advances the
    Army's Transformation to a full-spectrum 21st century force. It is a
    balanced base program that allows the Army to meet these objectives. It
    includes significant increases for installation services and
    infrastructure, mitigating the necessity to divert training funds to
    installation support.
        The Army Transformation is enabled, although not at the optimal
    level. The Army is accepting moderate risk in the level of training
    OPTEMPO, but these risks are considered acceptable to ensure stable
    base operations levels and improved facility maintenance and repair.
    Sustainment programs also remain stable, and we are able to begin some
    modernization of our aging helicopter fleet.
        Today, the Army's active component ``go-to-war'' force is forward
    stationed, deployed, or in the field--advancing our National interests,
    supporting theater engagement plans, and training for tomorrow's
    warfight. But, our Army is one-third smaller, deploys more frequently,
    and is more likely to conduct stability and support operations than its
    Cold War predecessor. Accelerating operational and deployment tempos
    have strained Army capabilities, and over-stretched resources have
    leveraged our warfighting readiness on the backs of our soldiers and
    their families. Indeed, our mission demands create a requirement for
    forces that increasingly can only be sustained by committing the
    Reserve components. When we speak of the Army--Active and Reserve
    components, soldiers, civilians, family members, retirees, and
    veterans--we are acknowledging a single force with common missions,
    common standards, and common responsibilities.
        The Army has competing requirements that are in constant, daily
    tension. First is the Army's requirement to have a trained and ready
    force to fulfill its non-negotiable contract with the American people
    to fight and win our Nation's wars decisively. That mission is
    significantly enhanced by being fully engaged around the globe with our
    allies, partners, and sometimes our potential adversaries to promote
    stability, to gain influence, and to ensure access in times of crisis.
    Further, as contingency operations become long-term commitments, our
    mission tempo--both training and operational--increasingly strains our
    force structure. Second, but most important, the Army must transform
    itself into a force for the 21st century, strategically responsive and
    dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations and
    prepared to meet a growing array of requirements including threats to
    our homeland. The mismatch between strategic requirements and
    operational resources forces us daily to prioritize among support for
    our people, the readiness demanded by the Nation, and the
    transformation necessary to continue our global preeminence.

                                THE ARMY VISION

        More than 10 years ago, during the buildup of Operation Desert
    Shield, the Army identified an operational shortfall--a gap between the
    capabilities of our heavy and light forces. Our heavy forces are the
    most formidable in the world. There are none better suited for high-
    intensity operations, but they are severely challenged to deploy to all
    the places where they might be needed. Conversely, our magnificent
    light forces are agile and deployable. They are particularly well
    suited for low-intensity operations, but lack sufficient lethality and
    survivability. There is, at present, no rapidly deployable force with
    the staying power to provide our national leadership a complete range
    of strategic options. The requirements dictated by the rapidly evolving
    world situation increasingly underscore that capability gap; therefore,
    the Army is changing.
        To meet the national security requirements of the 21st century and
    ensure full spectrum dominance, the Army articulated its vision to
    chart a balanced course and shed its Cold War designs. The vision is
    about three interdependent components--People, Readiness, and
    Transformation. The Army is people--soldiers, civilians, veterans, and
    families--and soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations.
    Warfighting readiness is the Army's top priority. The Transformation
    will produce a future force, the Objective Force, founded on innovative
    doctrine, training, leader development, materiel, organizations, and
    soldiers. The vision weaves together these threads--People, Readiness,
    and Transformation--binding them into what will be the Army of the
    future.

                           ACHIEVING THE ARMY VISION

        Last year, the Army took the initial steps to achieve the vision.
    One step was the continued realignment of our budget priorities,
    generating investment capital by canceling or restructuring eight major
    Army procurement programs. Unfortunately, the Army has had to eliminate
    or restructure 182 programs over the past decade and a half. It is not
    that these systems and capabilities were unnecessary; rather, our
    resource prioritization made the programs unaffordable. Joining with
    the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in a cooperative research
    and development effort, we began to streamline our acquisition process
    to focus and accelerate the development and procurement of enabling
    technologies for our Objective Force. To reduce the risk from the
    capability gap between our heavy and light forces, the Army developed a
    concept and began to organize an interim capability until the 21st
    Century Objective Force is fielded. The Army also completed a
    comprehensive study of how it trains soldiers and grows them into
    leaders, knowing that the capabilities of a transformed Army will
    reside in competent, confident, adaptive, and creative people.

                                     PEOPLE

        The fiscal year 2002 budget continues to emphasize people, the core
    of our institutional strength. Well-being--the physical, material,
    mental, and spiritual state of soldiers, families, and civilians--is
    inextricably linked to the Army's capabilities, readiness, and its
    preparedness to perform any mission.
        To improve well-being, we are offering technology-based distance
    learning opportunities; working to improve pay and retirement
    compensation; working with the Department of Defense to guarantee that
    TRICARE meets the needs of our soldiers, retirees, and their families;
    improving facilities maintenance; and modernizing single soldier and
    family housing. The much welcomed increases in housing allowance and
    efforts to reducing out of pocket expenses is an important step toward
    restoring faith with our soldiers and their families.
        The health care provisions in the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense
    Authorization Act for our soldiers, retirees, and family members
    represent the types of significant improvements the Army continues to
    seek for the force's well-being. Sustained congressional support for
    important well-being initiatives helps us recruit and retain a quality
    force.
        Indeed, the pay raise, pay table reform, and retirement reform, as
    well as diligent efforts by leaders at all levels of the Army helped us
    exceed our recruiting and retention goals in fiscal year 2000.
    Attention to the well-being of our people will keep trained and
    qualified soldiers and civilians in the Army in the years to come.

                                    MANNING

        In fiscal year 2000, we started a 4-year effort to increase
    personnel readiness levels. The Manning Initiative redistributed
    soldiers to fill all personnel authorizations in every active component
    combat division and cavalry regiment, but by doing so, we accepted some
    risk in the institutional base.
        This effort exposed the serious gap that has existed in the
    aggregate between manning requirements and authorizations. It is
    possible that we will need to increase personnel authorizations to meet
    all requirements, dependent upon ongoing reviews of overall Army
    missions. Meeting the requirements with the active component, however,
    is not enough. As mission demands necessitate increased use of our
    Reserve components, we must bolster their full-time support
    requirements to better keep them ready and available. Manning the
    entire force will reduce operational and personnel tempo and improve
    both readiness and well-being.
        The fiscal year 2002 budget increases for enlistment and retention
    bonuses will enable the Army to sustain its recent recruiting and
    retention successes, although some shortfalls remain. Funding for
    change-of-station moves helps to ensure we can place soldiers when and
    where they are needed to man units at desired grade and skill levels,
    and further advance the Army's Transformation.

                               GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

        Readiness is a top priority. It means we must be prepared to
    execute strategic missions across the full spectrum of operational
    requirements around the globe. Our military formations must be able to
    conduct a range of activities from engagement to stability and support
    operations to warfighting. On any given day, the Army has nearly
    125,000 soldiers and 15,000 U.S. civilians forward stationed in over
    100 countries around the world. In fiscal year 2000, on a daily
    average, we deployed more than 26,000 additional soldiers for
    operations and military exercises in 68 countries--from East Timor to
    Nigeria to the Balkans. In Bosnia, the Texas Army National Guard's 49th
    Armored Division assumed the mission for the Multinational Division
    (North), the first time since World War II that a Reserve component
    division headquarters has led active component forces in an operational
    mission. In both Europe and Korea, Army soldiers continue a successful
    security commitment made 50 years ago. In Southwest Asia, the Army
    continues its support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq,
    stability operations in the Persian Gulf, and peacekeeping efforts in
    the Sinai. No other military service works as frequently, as
    continuously, or on as many levels to deter aggression, operate with
    allies and coalition partners, and to respond at home and abroad with
    support to civil authorities.

                                 CIVIL SUPPORT

        The Army provides military support to civil authorities, both
    domestically and around the globe, for crisis response and consequence
    management. Army support after natural disasters ranged from personnel
    and equipment to suppress wildfires to logistical and medical support
    following the disasters in the South African, Central American, and
    Asian Pacific regions. Last year, within the United States, the U.S.
    Soldier and Biological Chemical Command trained over 28,000 people and
    conducted crisis response and consequence management exercises in 105
    cities with Federal agencies, state and local governments, and non-
    government organizations in support of the Domestic Preparedness
    Program. The Army Corps of Engineers prevented an average of $21.1
    billion in damages through flood control management projects including
    383 major flood control reservoirs and 8,500 miles of flood control
    levees as part of its flood fighting authority and the Federal Response
    Plan. The Army supported civil law enforcement agencies in more than
    380 counter-drug operations in 41 states. Finally, as part of a joint
    program, the Army led the development and testing of a fixed, land-
    based National Missile Defense system that offers the most mature
    technology for a near-term deployment decision. The Army stands ready
    to respond to the full breadth of security requirements in the homeland
    and abroad now and in the future.

                                   READINESS

        The fiscal year 2002 budget request supports our most critical
    readiness requirements, although we have accepted some risk in the
    level of funding for active component air and ground OPTEMPO to
    stabilize the deterioration of our facilities and augment training
    enablers.
        Measuring the readiness of the Army to respond to the Nation's call
    requires accuracy, objectivity, and uniformity. Our current standards
    are a Cold War legacy and reflect neither the complexity of today's
    strategic and operational environments nor other important factors.
    Near-term factors encompass the overall capability of units to deploy
    and include training enablers such as training ranges, institutional
    support, and depot maintenance; full time support for our Reserve
    components; and installation support. Long-term readiness factors
    affect the Army's ability to fight in the future and to retain quality
    personnel. We are re-examining how to measure Army readiness in the
    near-term, the long-term, and across the range of missions we may be
    expected to undertake. This new reporting system will provide timely
    and accurate information on the status of the Army's readiness, with
    measurements that are relevant and quantifiable, to enhance the ability
    of commanders to make the best possible employment decisions. It will
    also give the American people a more accurate assessment of how ready
    their Army is to do what it is asked to do.

                             INSTALLATION READINESS

        Installations are an essential, but often overlooked, part of our
    warfighting readiness. They support soldiers and their families,
    enhance the rapid deployment of the Army, and provide efficient and
    timely support to deployed formations. Funding facility Sustainment,
    Restoration and Modernization (SRM, formerly termed Real Property
    Maintenance, or RPM) accounts is one of the Army's greatest concerns
    this year. We must maintain, modernize, and transform the training
    platforms and ranges that prepare the force; the depots and arsenals
    that maintain and equip the force; and the power projection platforms
    and information infrastructures that support the force when deployed.
    The fiscal year 2002 budget provides military facilities and soldier
    housing needed to improve Army readiness, quality of life, and
    efficiency. The military construction projects provide new and
    renovated facilities that improve strategic mobility, modernize
    barracks, and support the missions of the Army's active and Reserve
    components. The family housing budget includes funding for operation,
    maintenance, leasing, construction, revitalization and privatization of
    housing in the U.S. and overseas. Only by taking care of installation
    infrastructure now can the Army secure readiness for the future also.
        In the past, we paid other bills at the expense of facilities
    upkeep or masked these costs by migrating funds from operating tempo
    accounts--a practice we have stopped.
        Of course, the Army would prefer to divest itself of excess
    infrastructure and receive full funding to maintain installations and
    repair critical facilities. The Army's current goal is to sustain
    facilities to a level that prevents further deterioration and to
    improve both the quality and the quantity of facilities to meet
    validated deficits in strategic mobility by fiscal year 2003, barracks
    by fiscal year 2008, and family housing in fiscal year 2010.
        However, even with this significant investment, our overall
    infrastructure condition continues to decline. While the budget meets
    the Army's strategic mobility goal of fiscal year 2003, we need
    sustained funding to achieve our goals of barracks renewal and family
    housing upgrade. Previously, we have funded SRM at only 60 percent. The
    significant increase of SRM funding to 94 percent for fiscal year 2002
    will allow the Army to aggressively attack its deteriorating
    infrastructure and impede the growth in the backlog of maintenance and
    repair. We currently have an unfunded SRM backlog of $17.8 billion and
    an unfunded facilities deficit of $25 billion. The solution requires a
    30-year commitment to fully fund and focus SRM funding on selected
    facility types, in 10-year increments. Army installations will take on
    a greater role as we attempt to reduce the deployed logistical
    footprint and rely on reach-back links for enhanced command and control
    capabilities. Transformation of our operational force without a
    concurrent renovation of the installation infrastructure will create an
    imbalance that will impinge on advantages gained by a transformed
    force.

                                 TRANSFORMATION

        The third thread of the Vision requires a comprehensive
    transformation of the entire Army. This complex, multi-year effort will
    balance the challenge of transforming the operational force and
    institutional base while maintaining a trained and ready force to
    respond to crises, deter war and, if deterrence fails, fight and win
    decisively. Transformation is far more extensive than merely
    modernizing our equipment and formations. It is the transformation of
    the entire Army from leader development programs to installations to
    combat formations. All aspects--doctrine, training, leaders,
    organization, material, and soldiers--will be affected.
        Transformation of the Army's operational force proceeds on three
    vectors--the Objective Force, the Interim Force, and the Legacy Force.
    All are equally necessary to our Nation's continued world leadership.
    The Objective Force is the force of the future and the focus of the
    Army's long-term development efforts. It will maximize advances in
    technology and organizational adaptations to revolutionize land-power
    capabilities. The Interim Force will fill the current capability gap
    that exists between today's heavy and light forces. Today's force, the
    Legacy Force, enables the Army to meet near-term National Military
    Strategy commitments. Until the Objective Force is fielded, the Legacy
    Force--augmented or reinforced with an interim capability--will
    continue to engage and respond to crises to deter aggression, bring
    peace and stability to troubled regions, and enhance security by
    developing bonds of mutual respect and understanding with allies,
    partners, and potential adversaries. It must remain ready to fight and
    win if necessary, giving us the strategic hedge to allow
    transformation.
        The fiscal year 2002 budget supports procurement and upgrade of
    important Legacy, Interim, and Objective Force systems. It procures 326
    Interim Armored Vehicles and five Wolverine systems. It also continues
    support for the Abrams-Crusader common engine program and both the
    Abrams and Bradley upgrade programs. Finally, it accelerates two M1A2
    system enhancement program retrofits.
        As the Army works to develop and acquire the technologies for the
    Objective Force, the Legacy and Interim Forces will guarantee Army
    readiness. Our most pressing concerns this year include the
    modernization and recapitalization of selected Legacy Force systems.

                LEGACY FORCE MODERNIZATION AND RECAPITALIZATION

        Recapitalization and Modernization efforts are necessary to ensure
    current and near-term warfighting readiness. Currently, 75 percent of
    major combat systems exceed engineered design half-life and will exceed
    design life by 2010; system operation and sustainment costs are up over
    35 percent, and aircraft safety of flight messages are up 200 percent
    since 1995.
        We must judiciously modernize key armored and aviation systems in
    the Legacy Force to enhance force capabilities. We will further
    digitize the Abrams tank to increase situational awareness and
    remanufacture early model Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to improve
    lethality, situational awareness, and sustainability. We will procure
    new systems like Crusader to increase force effectiveness, reduce
    friendly casualties, ease logistics support requirements, and improve
    deployability. Crusader will maximize the total capabilities of the
    Legacy Force. Fielding the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile
    defense upgrade and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system will
    significantly increase our in-theater force protection. Current legacy
    forces will benefit from upgrades and enhancements to proven systems.
    Interim forces will demonstrate the power of developmental and off-the-
    shelf communications and intelligence capabilities. The Army has made
    the hard decisions for selective modernization to sustain combat
    overmatch. What is needed is continued support for our prudent
    investment strategy to keep our force strong and credible.
        Concurrently, the Army will selectively recapitalize Legacy Force
    equipment to reduce the rapid aging of our weapons systems. The fiscal
    year 2002 budget takes a step in this direction by providing additional
    funding to depot maintenance in preparation for recapitalization. The
    Army has determined that we preserve readiness best and most cost
    effectively when we retire or replace warfighting systems on a 20-year
    Department of Defense modernization cycle. Today, 12 of 16 critical
    weapons systems exceed this targeted fleet average age. As systems age,
    they become more costly and difficult to maintain in peak warfighting
    condition. They lose combat overmatch with respect to an adversary's
    modernized systems. The Army has established a selective
    recapitalization program that will restore aging systems to like-new
    condition and allow upgraded warfighting capabilities for a fraction of
    the replacement cost. We must maintain the readiness of the Legacy
    Force until the Objective Force is operational. As the Legacy Force
    maintains our strategic hedge and the Interim Force bridges the
    capability gap, the Army will build the Objective Force and complete
    the Vision for a trained and ready 21st Century Army.

                               THE INTERIM FORCE

        The fielding of the Interim Force fills the strategic gap between
    our heavy and light forces and is an essential step toward the
    Objective Force. The key component of the Interim Force is the Interim
    Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), the first of which is being organized at
    Fort Lewis, Washington. Its primary combat platform, the Interim
    Armored Vehicle (IAV), will fulfill an immediate requirement for a
    vehicle that is deployable any place in the world arriving ready for
    combat. The IAV will consist of two variants, a mobile gun system and
    an infantry carrier with nine configurations. The IAV will achieve
    interoperability and internetted capability with other IBCT systems by
    integrating command, control, communications, computer and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Congress
    supported the IBCT concept with an additional $600 million in the
    fiscal year 2001 Defense Appropriations Act for IAV procurement and
    organizing the second IBCT. The Army has programmed resources to field
    six to eight IBCTs.
        The Army will train and test soldiers and leaders in the doctrine
    and organization of these new units to ensure that they can respond to
    operational requirements. An IAV-equipped battalion-sized element will
    undergo training and initial operational testing and evaluation to
    guarantee system suitability and effectiveness. Innovative applications
    and technology insertion in supporting forces will complete the IBCT
    package and enable full operational capabilities for the first IBCT in
    2005.

                              THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

        The Army's ultimate goal for Transformation is the Objective Force.
    Operating as part of a joint, combined, and/or interagency team, it
    will be capable of conducting rapid and decisive offensive, defensive,
    stability and support operations, and be able to transition among any
    of these missions without a loss of momentum. It will be lethal and
    survivable for warfighting and force protection; responsive and
    deployable for rapid mission tailoring and the projection required for
    crisis response; versatile and agile for success across the full
    spectrum of operations; and sustainable for extended regional
    engagement and sustained land combat. It will leverage joint and
    interagency reach-back capabilities for intelligence, logistical
    support, and information operations while protecting itself against
    information attacks. It will leverage space assets for communications;
    position, navigation, and timing; weather, terrain, and environmental
    monitoring; missile warning; and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance. The Objective Force will provide for conventional
    overmatch and a greater degree of strategic responsiveness, mission
    versatility, and operational and tactical agility. With the Objective
    Force, the Army intends to deploy a combat-capable brigade anywhere in
    the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in
    30 days. Our ability to quickly put a brigade-size force on the ground,
    with the balance of a division following a day later, fills a current
    gap for credible, rapid deterrence. The Objective Force will offer real
    strategic options in a crisis and changes the strategic calculations of
    our potential adversaries. The Army with Objective Force capability
    will provide the National Command Authorities with a full range of
    strategic options for regional engagement, crisis response, and land
    force operations in support of the Nation.

                             SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

        Advances in science and technology will lead to significantly
    improved capabilities for the Objective Force. The Army is programming
    over $8 billion for science and technology efforts to begin fielding
    the Objective Force by the end of the current decade. This effort seeks
    to resolve a number of challenges: how to balance sustained lethality
    and survivability against ease of deployability; how to reduce
    strategic lift requirements and logistical footprint required in-
    theater; how to mitigate risk to our support forces and to forces in-
    theater; and how to ensure digitized, secure communications to provide
    battlefield awareness at all levels of command. The Army will find the
    best possible answers while maintaining the ready, disciplined, and
    robust forces our Nation demands, our allies expect, and our
    adversaries fear.
        Future Combat Systems (FCS), a system of systems, is one of the
    essential components for the Army's Objective Force. To accelerate
    development of key technologies, the Army partnered with the Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency in a collaborative effort for the
    design, development, and testing of FCS while simultaneously
    redesigning the force. The fiscal year 2002 budget funds FCS
    demonstrations of system-of-systems functions and cost sharing
    technologies. Forces equipped with FCS will network fires and maneuver
    in direct combat, deliver direct and indirect fires, perform
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions, and transport
    soldiers and materiel. Over the next 6 years, the Army will demonstrate
    and validate FCS functions and exploit high-payoff core technologies,
    including composite armor, active protection systems, multi-role
    (direct and indirect fire) cannons, compact kinetic energy missiles,
    hybrid electric propulsion, human engineering, and advanced electro-
    optic and infrared sensors.
        Equally essential to the Objective Force, and consistent with
    Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review, is the fielding of the Comanche
    helicopter beginning in 2006. The fiscal year 2002 budget continues our
    efforts toward achieving this important capability. Comanche is the
    central program of the Army aviation modernization plan and a prime
    example of existing modernization programs with significant value for
    Objective Force capability. Although Comanche will be fielded as part
    of the Objective Force, its digitization will be compatible with Legacy
    and Interim Force systems. Comanche will provide a lethal combination
    of reconnaissance and firepower.

                          INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

        The fiscal year 2002 budget funds schoolhouse training at 100
    percent. This is a first. It funds U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
    Command (TRADOC) transformation initiatives to include expansion of one
    station unit training, establishment of a land warfare university,
    basic officer leadership course enhancements, establishment of an
    accession command, and quality assurance initiatives.
        As the combat formations are being transformed, the Army's
    institutional base--schools, services, facilities, and installations--
    must also change to support both the Objective Force and current
    mission requirements. TRADOC produces tactically and technically
    proficient soldiers and leaders and the doctrine and concepts for
    operational success. The Army must train soldiers--in simulations, on
    ranges, and in exercises--and grow them into leaders who are capable of
    executing rapid and seamless transitions between missions throughout
    the spectrum of operations. Training must continuously improve and
    respond to emerging technologies. We must recapitalize and modernize
    ranges, distance learning centers, Army schools, and combat training
    centers to keep pace with changes in force structure, technology, and
    the global environment. We must address the increasing challenge to
    readiness posed by encroachment to our ranges and training areas while
    maintaining our environmental stewardship of these same lands.
        Army doctrine and concepts must also transform to keep pace with
    our changing operational force and growing technological advantages. As
    foundations for the Transformation, the two conceptual baselines for
    Army doctrine, Field Manuals, FM-1, The Army, and FM-3, Operations,
    were published June 14, 2001. TRADOC is revising and developing
    doctrine for organization and operation of the Interim Force and
    validating concepts for the Objective Force. We are also developing the
    concepts to integrate the capabilities of space and information
    operations to provide support across the entire spectrum of military
    operations. At every level, the Army is integrating emerging joint and
    multinational doctrine to develop the concepts that will field a force,
    grounded in doctrine, that is capable of providing the National Command
    Authorities a range of options for regional engagement, crisis
    response, and sustained land force operations.

                      ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

        Key to transformation is the training and leader development
    necessary for producing adaptive soldiers and leaders who can lead and
    succeed in both joint and combined environments while capitalizing on
    the latest battlefield technologies. The Army Training and Leader
    Development Panel (ATLDP) has concluded its in-depth study of issues
    affecting the Army's culture and its training and leader development
    doctrine. The ATLDP surveyed and interviewed over 13,500 officers and
    spouses. Follow-on studies of the noncommissioned officer and warrant
    officer corps will be conducted over the next 6 months. The primary
    objectives of the panel were to identify skill sets required of
    Objective Force leaders and to assess the ability of current training
    and leader development systems to cultivate those skills. Study
    participants addressed issues that included well-being, job
    satisfaction, training standards, and the officer education system.
    This study represents a candid self-assessment by the Army; it seeks to
    restore faith with soldiers and set a course for improving all aspects
    of the Army's culture by bringing institutional beliefs and practices
    in line. To that end, some steps have already been taken, including
    adapting the officer education system to meet the needs of the
    transforming Army; eliminating non-mission compliance tasks that
    interfere with war fighting training; allocating full resources to our
    Combat Training Centers; and protecting weekends for the well-being of
    soldiers and their families. It is a testament to the strength of any
    organization when it is willing to take such a candid look at itself,
    and this kind of healthy introspection characterizes a true profession.
        The fiscal year 2002 budget funds development of training, training
    products, and materials that support resident and unit training
    programs. It provides for the analysis, design, development,
    management, standardization of processes and practices integration and
    operations of Army training information systems and automation of the
    training development process. In the area of leader development it
    allows schoolhouse trainers to adapt training programs for future
    leaders and increases training support funding for aviation and
    specialized skill training. Further, the budget funds active component
    unit training OPTEMPO and supports critical training enablers. Our
    Combat Training Center program remains the proving ground for
    warfighting proficiency, and we currently have scheduled ten brigade
    rotations through the National Training Center, ten brigade rotations
    through the Joint Readiness Training Center, and five brigade rotations
    through the Combat Maneuver Training Center.

                           LOGISTICAL TRANSFORMATION

        We will transform logistical services and facilities to enhance
    readiness and strategic responsiveness. Today, logistics comprises
    approximately 80 percent of the Army's strategic lift requirement,
    creating a daunting challenge to deployability. Prepositioning stocks
    and forward presence solves only part of the problem. Currently, the
    Army has seven brigade sets of equipment forward deployed on land and
    at sea with an eighth brigade set being deployed in fiscal year 2002.
    As we fundamentally reshape the way the Army is deployed and sustained,
    we will ensure logistics transformation is synchronized with the needs
    of the operational forces and supports Department of Defense and Joint
    logistics transformation goals. The Army is examining how to reduce the
    logistical footprint in the theater of operations and to reduce
    logistical costs without hindering warfighting capability and
    readiness. Approaches already being explored are recapitalization,
    common vehicle chassis design, a national maintenance program, and an
    intermediate basing strategy for force protection. We are synchronizing
    the critical systems of the institutional Army with our operating
    forces to ensure the Transformation of the Army is holistic and
    complete.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The Army has embarked on a historic enterprise. Recognizing that
    the forces we can provide to the combatant commands are becoming
    obsolescent in a changing strategic environment, the Army is
    transforming. With the support of the administration and Congress, the
    Army has charted a course that will better align its capabilities with
    the international security environment, enhancing responsiveness and
    deterrence while sustaining dominance at every point on the spectrum of
    operations. The Army Transformation is the most comprehensive program
    of change in a century and is already underway. It comes at a
    propitious moment. We live in a time of relative peace. Our Nation's
    economic strength has given us a period of prosperity. A decade of
    post-Cold War experience has provided us strategic perspective and
    American technological power gives us tremendous potential. We have
    seized this opportunity to guarantee our strategic capability and our
    non-negotiable contract with the American people well into this
    century.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we thank
    you once again for this opportunity to report to you today on the state
    of your Army. The statements made in this testimony are contingent upon
    the results of Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review. We ask you to
    consider them in that light. We look forward to discussing these issues
    with you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
                              STATES ARMY

        General Shinseki. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
    distinguished members of the committee: Today more than 24,000
    soldiers are operationally deployed around the world in 67
    countries. These are not new statistics to you. This committee
    in particular gets out to see those soldiers. But I give you
    those numbers because it gives you an indication of where the
    Army is deployed today.
        We remain a warfighting Army and our primary focus day to
    day attends to our warfighting prowess. But we also understand
    that we provide versatile and agile solutions for all the other
    challenges facing the United States. This explains in part our
    deployed profile, and in the absence of better alternatives we
    do not believe that we should leave the Nation without forces
    that can cover the full spectrum of demands that it confronts
    as a global leader day to day.
        To meet these obligations, the fiscal year 2002
    presidential budget amendment reflects a carefully balanced
    program that allows the Army to meet its readiness requirements
    in fiscal year 2002 while sustaining the other key elements of
    our vision--our people and the transformation of the force.
        With tremendous bipartisan support from Congress, we have
    achieved sustainable momentum in transforming the Army. We are
    committed to making that momentum irreversible as we make the
    Army faster, more lethal and decisive, and more affordable. In
    the next 10 years, we must be prudent about accepting more
    operational risk than we are already carrying today without
    good analytical foundations for such additional burdening.
        To date, we have moved out on our two interim brigade
    combat teams at Fort Lewis, Washington, and we are investing in
    science and technologies in ways that will enable us to begin
    research and development on those Science and Technology (S&T)
    initiatives in the 2003-2004 timeframe. Momentum here is good.
    In order to protect that momentum, our priority under the new
    budget is to extend the life of our Legacy Force systems
    through recapitalization and selective upgrades to our current
    warfighting platforms.
        Today 75 percent of those combat systems exceed their
    expected half-life, increasing operations and maintenance costs
    by 30 percent over the past 4 years. Apache helicopter safety
    of flight messages alone have gone up by over 200 percent since
    1995. To combat these spiraling costs, we have identified 19
    systems that must be recapitalized in order to extend their
    useful readiness. We must also selectively modernize those
    capabilities with systems like Crusader and Comanche, which
    will cost-effectively maximize the capabilities of the Legacy
    Force and also answer Objective Force requirements.
        We are grateful for this committee's devotion to improving
    the well being of our soldiers and their families. It is making
    a difference. These initiatives will begin to slow the rate of
    decay of our infrastructure, but not totally reverse it. We
    must protect the dollars we have elected to shift to these
    accounts and remain vigilant in fixing this problem.
        Mr. Chairman, the Army Vision is about future American
    leadership at home and abroad. Decisive land power uniquely and
    critically counters international threats and defends U.S.
    interests, and when resistance is overcome, land power
    ultimately guarantees compliance with terms of peace.
    Thereafter, it enables the establishment of legitimate
    authorities and rebuilding in areas of conflict. In short, land
    power provides the National Command Authorities and the
    warfighting CINCs with the kind of flexibility to respond to
    and resolve crises.
        Thank you for your invitation to appear here today. I look
    forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Shinseki.
        Secretary England.

       STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON R. ENGLAND, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

        Secretary England. Chairman Levin and Senator Warner,
    members of the committee: I am delighted to be here. I am
    especially delighted to be here with Admiral Clark and General
    Jones. Hopefully, you will see us together much in the future
    because we have formed indeed, Senator Warner, a very, very
    close leadership team as we lead our forces into the future.
        I do want to thank this committee for your support in the
    past and for your continuing support of our naval services. In
    fiscal year 2001 and particularly with the supplement provided,
    as a naval service we were able to meet our commitments, but
    with some unfulfilled needs. The submitted budget for fiscal
    year 2002 has the naval service getting better in all
    categories.
        Senator Warner, we do maintain the momentum in 2002 with
    the budget we have submitted. It is still short of our end
    objective and you will be hearing more of that, I know, from
    the chiefs. We are looking to the 2003 budget submittal to
    reflect the ongoing studies and the future force structure.
        Senator Levin, the CNO and the Commandant and I, in
    response to your comment earlier, do plan to include in the
    2003 budget specific business practice improvements within the
    Department of the Navy to make our organization far more
    efficient and effective. We do agree with Secretary Rumsfeld,
    we do believe 5 percent is certainly reasonable in terms of
    improved proficiency and efficiency and effectiveness, and you
    will see that reflected in our 2003 submittal to you.
        So I do look forward to working with each of you as we
    address these challenges ahead. I thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you, and I also look forward to
    your questions.
        Thank you very much, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary England follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Gordon R. England
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning. Thank you for
    the opportunity to speak with you today. The CNO, Commandant and I are
    grateful for your continuing support to keep the Navy and Marine Corps
    the very best in the world.
        Let me begin by saying the Navy and Marine Corps remain a strong
    and potent arm of our Nation's military forces. They have maintained a
    forward presence in all corners of the globe ready to perform any
    mission called for from humanitarian relief to interdiction operations.
    Able to deploy on short notice the Navy Marine Corps team provides the
    theater and regional commanders a well trained and effective fighting
    force.
        In his remarks at the Naval Academy graduation, President Bush
    said, ``We must build forces that draw upon the revolutionary advances
    in the technology of war that will allow us to keep the peace by
    redefining war on our terms--a force that is defined less by size and
    more by knowledge and swiftness . . . and that relies heavily on
    stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.'' I am in
    full agreement with this challenge and, while naval forces inherently
    fit the President's vision, some modifications and alignments may be
    needed to meet these goals.
        But such changes are best made with a full understanding of the
    uses to which Navy and Marine Corps units are being put today. For
    instance, forward deployed naval forces are present around the world
    and are central to assuring the availability of the sea lines through
    which international commerce and key resources such as oil flow. Also,
    as Theater Commanders in Chief develop their comprehensive Theater
    Engagement Plans (TEP) in support of the National Security Strategy and
    National Military Strategy, the Navy and Marine Corps play particularly
    important roles in TEP execution by virtue of their regular forward
    presence. Lastly, we know that naval forces are regularly called upon
    to execute combat tasking on short notice in distant parts of the
    world. From the time my predecessor testified before this committee on
    10 February 2000, Navy or Marine forces have engaged in combat over the
    skies of Iraq, in humanitarian support in East Timor, South America and
    in Europe.
        Looking forward, it is useful to note that for some time the sea
    services have undertaken an evolutionary shift from operations
    predominantly on the open seas to operations that include the littoral:
    an evolution that has underscored the requirement for improved data
    networking; tailored battle management systems and sensors; and
    innovative ideas for employing marines that are attuned to the
    difficult littoral environment--afloat and ashore. This shift in focus
    generates a need to look at our equipment across a broader mission
    range . . . such as time-critical strike, ballistic and cruise missile
    defense; littoral and deep water anti-submarine warfare; intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance; air and ground mobility; and
    expeditionary maneuver warfare.
        We also recognize that we need to recapitalize our force--by that I
    mean building new platforms--for the future. For instance, even as the
    average age of our ships has been steadily increasing to its present
    average of 16 years--and trending upward for the next 5 or so years--
    our building rates have not been keeping apace. Likewise, the average
    age of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft is about 18 years . . . close to
    the age of those sailors and marines who maintain them. However, the
    shape of the Navy of the future may change, as we work to develop a new
    national military strategy that takes new threats and new opportunities
    into consideration. Here also building aircraft in sufficient numbers .
    . . ideally at economical orders of production . . . is called for.
        We have precious few new programs to recapitalize our forces other
    than systems like DDG 51, F/A-18E/F, and the new carrier under
    construction, U.S.S. Ronald Reagan. In fact, projected replacement
    aircraft, such as the F/A-18 E/F and the Joint Strike Fighter do not
    meet the entire need under current plans, as there are no replacements
    scheduled for the EA-6B, P-3, or E-2 aircraft and some of our
    helicopter fleet. New funding may be needed, but I also intend to
    identify some funding sources through process improvement.
        Modernization of our current force is also an imperative because of
    the requirement to be able to prevail if called upon in the near term.
    Nonetheless, it is prudent to accept reasonable risk by some reduction
    of expenditure in these accounts in order to make available assets for
    recapitalization for the future.
        With that backdrop. I intend to make the most of our Navy-Marine
    Corps team by focusing on four strategic areas: combat capability,
    people, technology, and business practices.
        First, as this committee is well aware, the primary purpose of the
    Navy and Marine Corps is to deter, train for, and when necessary, fight
    and win our Nation's battles. In remaining faithful to this charge,
    combat capability, which includes readiness, must be our primary
    emphasis. In all our decision-making, we will ask the question, ``Does
    this task, program, organization, or facility materially contribute to
    improving our combat capability?'' Likewise we will recognize that what
    has worked in the past may not always succeed in the future. Therefore,
    the department will invest more in technical and doctrinal
    experimentation, and in new and different ways of accomplishing our
    mission. Let me emphasize, our mission is, and will remain, joint. We
    are committed to the concept ``One Team, One Fight.'' Along with our
    sister services and allies, we will organize, equip and train to fight
    jointly, recognizing that forward deployed naval forces are integral to
    the combined efforts of all the armed services.
        Second, my very highest priority is our men and women in uniform,
    their families and our civilian workforce. During my confirmation
    hearings, I commented that any capital asset purchased by the
    Department of the Navy has no value to the Nation until it is manned by
    highly motivated and trained people. Therefore, as we plan for the
    future, we need to first be sure that our personnel policies will
    provide us the people and skills we require for our future systems.
        In this regard, emphasis needs to be placed on ``Quality of
    Service''--achieving a higher quality workplace as well as a higher
    quality of life for our sailors, marines, active duty and reserve, and
    civilians and all of their families. The goal will be to create an
    environment where our men and women can excel at their chosen
    profession, unimpeded by factors that divert their attention from work
    and sap their morale. This includes state-of-the-art tools, cutting-
    edge training, competitive compensation and efficient health care, and
    an operational tempo that considers the individual, as well as the
    family. Fostering a positive working environment where young men and
    women believe they contribute meaningfully to their units will
    encourage them to want to stay and grow with our team. When people want
    to stay with a group, others will want to join that group. Retention is
    a great recruiting tool!
        Third, the application of advanced technology is central to our
    Nation's military strength. I am concerned, however, that the
    application of technology in the military has for a generation lagged
    its commercial availability. This is a high priority in our combat
    systems, but also includes technology for training, testing and
    management systems. Technological advances are central to the
    priorities set forth by the President and Secretary of Defense as we
    shift from the 20th century force, to the more lethal and agile one of
    the 21st. Technology will emphasize networks of information and
    communications as well as improvements in sensors and weapons.
    Initiatives are on going to translate such concepts as the Navy's
    Netcentric Warfare and the Marine Corps Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
    into reality. The Naval War College's Navy Warfare Development Command
    and Marine Corps Combat Development Command along with numerous Fleet
    Battle Experiments are but one example of the testing of new concepts,
    equipment, and doctrine in both the joint and naval environments.
        But technology is changing fast, so care must be taken to plan for
    future advances by anticipating logical insertion points early in the
    design process. This preplanned improvement schedule combined with
    spiral design should allow for the delivery of increased combat
    capability over a shorter period of time. Also important, U.S. systems
    need to have designed into them conduits that allow our allies to
    participate to the best of their significant capabilities at increasing
    levels of complexity. It goes without saying that embarking on this
    technological transformation will necessitate we recruit, train, and
    retain bright and intelligent people to operate and maintain these
    systems.
        Fourth, our management team should be more process-oriented,
    working on ways to improve ``how we do business'' rather than
    concentrating only on specific programs and products. To do that, we
    need to know where we are and to have clear visibility of where we are
    going. Measures and metrics provide the tools to do so and as such,
    will be a key element of our process-oriented management strategy. Our
    cold war acquisition infrastructure and regulations have been described
    as a ``voracious dinosaur consuming dollars which should be applied to
    the real mission.'' It is time to change. Borrowing applicable business
    practices from commercial industry is a logical step. While the Navy
    and Marine Corps will always need good leaders in their primary combat
    arms arena, the Department of Navy will also develop leaders with a
    better understanding of business strategies, cost control and rapid and
    flexible design.
        The Department has embraced the use of teams for integrated product
    and process development. We intend also to focus on activity based
    costing to better understand the actual price we are paying for a
    platform or system, both for acquisition and equally importantly for
    support over the life of the system. These initiatives should help to
    free resources to recapitalize our operating forces, establish
    processes that leverage commercial capabilities, maintain excellence
    and attract and retain quality people.
        The world has changed a great deal over the past decade. But one
    thing, has not changed: the Navy and Marine Corps needs to deter, train
    for, and when necessary fight and win our Nation's battles. As we steam
    into this new century, I am reminded that forward presence provides an
    essential benefit for our Nation. The Navy and Marine Corps, and in
    fact the entire U.S. military, contribute to a stable global
    environment allowing our economy and our citizens to prosper along with
    other nations and peoples throughout the world. The stabilizing
    benefits of American military strength are key to our National
    interests and the well being of the international community. The
    investment by our Nation in its military to underwrite this prosperity
    is, indeed quite modest.
        I look forward to working with Congress, the Secretary of Defense,
    and our sister Services to meet the challenges in the next year and
    beyond. The changes and transformations I have discussed constitute a
    start at the beginning of the new century. Thank you for your time this
    morning and your continued support for our sailors, marines . . .
    active and Reserve . . . our civilians and their families.
        The statements made in this testimony are contingent upon the
    results of Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review. I ask that you
    consider them in that light.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary England.
        Admiral Clark.

        STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Clark. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Warner,
    and members of this committee. I thank you for the opportunity
    to appear before you today. I am grateful always for your
    consistently strong support of the men and women of our Navy.
        This morning as I speak, 96 of our 316 ships are forward
    deployed, almost 50,000 of our sailors at the far reaches of
    the Earth. That is the cycle of deployment for our Navy. Every
    day, every year, it never stops and it has not for many years,
    thanks in large part to the support of this committee.
        The young men and women who volunteer to serve in our Navy,
    they work hard, they make it work. We owe them a great deal.
    They are doing a magnificent job and you have much to be proud
    in their service.
        We do this as part of the Navy-Marine Corps team. It is
    appropriate that I am sitting next to General Jones. But we
    also do it operating jointly with the Army and the Air Force,
    projecting sovereign American power on and from the sea, close
    to home and in the far corners of the globe. We are doing this
    today with a relatively small force, 41 percent fewer ships
    than we had 10 years ago.
        Our Navy is not breaking under stress, but its operational
    elasticity has diminished significantly. We face serious fiscal
    challenges due to the mismatch between mission requirements and
    resources. For too long we have deferred modernization and
    recapitalization of the force and paid for mission
    accomplishment by postponing maintenance and repair of our
    infrastructure. This trend now poses, in my opinion, a serious
    risk to our future.
        We also are streamlining our organizations, and I want to
    refer to Secretary England's comment. It is important that we
    improve our analytical underpinning, our metrics on how we
    accurately determine our requirements in the future, to
    continue to improve readiness and to maximize investment
    effectiveness.
        A major focus of our future follows Secretary England's
    emphasis on using better business practices throughout our
    Navy. I share his enthusiasm for this very important cause. We
    need to reform the way we do business in the Department.
        Regarding current readiness, I am encouraged by the fiscal
    year 2002 amended defense budget. It makes substantial
    investments to move the readiness accounts toward required
    levels.
        In previous appearances I have talked here about being at
    war for people. Certainly they are the key to mission
    accomplishment. The improvements in compensation that you have
    supported and in fact brought about--bonuses, pay table
    adjustments, retirement reforms, better medical care, and in
    fact the initiative to balance their out of pocket expenses in
    housing--they are having the desired impact. Recruiting is on
    track for 2001 and this is good news.
        But more exciting to me is the substantial improvement that
    we are making in retention. The targeted pay raise and other
    initiatives in the 2002 budget amendment will reinforce these
    positive trends.
        One word about quality of service. We have made substantial
    gains in our quality of life programs, with the support of
    Congress. Our quality of work programs require improvement,
    especially the infrastructure. Our Navy's shore structure is in
    poor condition. Our recapitalization cycle exceeds 160 years
    and my critical backlog is over $2.75 billion. Our real
    property maintenance funding is significantly below private
    industry norms. I have spoken on this point on virtually every
    trip to the Hill and we continue to seek your support to change
    the way we think about this vital area.
        Certainly the challenge of sustaining current readiness
    while investing in key future capabilities is a difficult
    balancing act. Following underinvestment in the decade of the
    nineties, we face an acquisition bow wave. It has been spoken
    about here before. We need nine ships and at least 180
    airplanes a year to sustain the 1997 QDR level. I use that
    frame of reference because that is what we are targeted against
    until we arrive at a new strategy and force structure profile.
    But we are proceeding at significantly less than that and we
    cannot sustain the Navy that we have today with current funding
    levels, which will lead eventually to a Navy of somewhere
    around 230 ships.
        I am very interested in innovative solutions to accelerate
    ship and aircraft procurement rates. To do this, I am convinced
    that we must find ways to more effectively partner with
    industry and level fund our annual investments in this type of
    construction.
        Ensuring current readiness, modernizing our fleet,
    providing sailors with high quality of service, and
    transforming to meet future needs--we also need these things to
    do this. This budget moves us in the right direction, but we
    need continued and increased investment. The challenges facing
    our Navy are significant, but with the help of this committee
    and Congress they can be overcome.
        I again thank the committee for your continued support to
    our Navy, to our sailors, and to their families, and I look
    forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this
    opportunity to appear before you. Your consistent support of Navy
    requirements and vision of a strong Navy for our Nation have protected
    the quality of life of our sailors and enhanced operational readiness
    during the past year. I am very grateful and I thank you.

            THE UNITED STATES NAVY: ON WATCH FOR AMERICA'S SECURITY

        The defense and prosperity of the United States has been tied to
    the seas since the founding of our Republic and the United States Navy
    has been the principal instrument of that security. Our Navy's history
    is one of international engagement in peacetime, effective response in
    crisis, and victory in conflict. It includes a rich tradition of
    innovation, adaptation, and courage in meeting regional and global
    threats that have confronted our Nation over the past two and a quarter
    centuries.
        Today, on the threshold of this new century, we face emergent
    challenges that are adding complexity to the missions our Navy has
    traditionally accomplished, providing powerful impetus for change.
    Cyberwar, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international terrorism,
    and the violence accompanying failed states--to name but some of these
    threats--do not replace the specter of state on state conflict. Rather
    they add to the danger, providing spark to already combustible
    situations.
        To counter these challenges, we are investing in a 21st Century
    Navy of awesome capability: a Navy that is strategically,
    operationally, and tactically agile; technologically and
    organizationally innovative; networked at every level; highly joint;
    and effectively integrated with allies. It is a Navy that will remain
    at the leading edge of the joint and combined fight--forward deployed
    to enhance deterrence, react swiftly to crises, and triumph in war.
        These attributes are critical because our Navy will operate in a
    volatile world of rapid change, more dangerous in some regards than
    when we faced the global strike and sea denial capabilities of the
    Soviet Union. This strategic environment will place a premium on
    freedom of access, and America will need the capabilities of the Navy/
    Marine Corps team operating from the maritime domain--free to move
    about the world, influencing events, representing our Nation's vital
    interests, and remaining ready to fight and win.

                         THE IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL FORCES

        In 2002 and beyond, our Navy's posture, programs, and character
    will be shaped by the mission of projecting sovereign American power in
    support of national interests while forward-deployed to the far corners
    of the earth.
        Such forward-deployed naval forces are central to the success of
    the National Military Strategy and integral to regional Commander in
    Chief (CINC) plans for peacetime and combat operations. A premier
    instrument of American power, your Navy operates around the globe,
    demonstrating command of the seas, ensuring the free flow of trade and
    resources, providing combat-ready presence, and assuring access for
    joint forces.
        Our Navy is shaped to meet the national and regional requirement
    for forward forces. While some ships and squadrons are homeported
    overseas, most deploy rotationally for periods of up to 6 months in an
    18-24 month cycle. This construct drives the Navy's force structure.
        Fulfilling these important missions has become steadily more
    challenging. While the requirement for forward-deployed, combat-capable
    naval forces has remained constant since the end of the Cold War,
    assets available to meet that requirement have decreased markedly. Our
    force structure declined 41 percent since 1991, from 538 to 316 ships.
    Currently one-third of our ships are forward deployed every day
    compared to approximately one-fifth during the Cold War. Our Navy is a
    carefully balanced force optimized to fill the global presence
    requirements of the Unified CINCs.
        One of today's central defense issues relates to the continued
    relevancy of overseas forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the United
    States military has become a mostly CONUS-based force. We have
    withdrawn two thirds of our permanently stationed forces from Europe
    and are fulfilling Middle East presence requirements with rotational
    units. With the exception of Korea, Asian commitments are being covered
    by naval forces or flyaway units from the United States.
        Emerging technologies have offset some of these overseas presence
    reductions, yet virtually all strategic planners remain committed to
    the importance of forward-deployed forces. They appreciate that
    regionally engaged, combat credible assets maximize our ability to
    dissuade potential adversaries, deter aggression, and quickly bring
    warfighting power to bear when needed. Operationally, such presence is
    fundamental to providing sustained precision fires and projecting
    defense overland to assure access for expeditionary joint forces.
        Forward presence is not without risk, however, and we are committed
    to making the investments necessary to assure mission effectiveness in
    view of emergent threats. In short, we must remain ready to ``climb
    into the ring'' with our opponents--and not only the ring defined by
    us--and prevail.

                       THE CHALLENGE OF CURRENT READINESS

        The standard by which we measure current readiness is the ability
    of naval forces to confidently meet the challenges of an uncertain
    world from the very first day of deployment. We will deploy and operate
    ready to conduct combat operations with maximum effectiveness and
    minimum risk.
        Forward-deployed naval forces are prepared to do so. As reported
    first in the latter part of the 1990s, the readiness of deployed forces
    is being achieved more and more at the expense of the non-deployed
    segment of our force structure. Non-deployed forces are operating below
    satisfactory readiness levels, making it increasingly difficult to meet
    operational standards and deployment requirements. Analysis of fleet
    forces (figure 1) clearly illustrates the growing gap between deployed
    and non-deployed Navy units in overall readiness during the last two
    decades.

                                    Figure 1

        Many ships, including the Austin and Anchorage-class amphibious
    ships, as well as our fleet command ships, are reaching the end of
    their service lives. Such units often require unprogrammed repairs,
    forcing us to divert funds to meet urgent maintenance requirements.
    These actions, in turn, produce a maintenance backlog that is very
    unhealthy, especially given the size of our Navy today.
        Another important fact is that ships reaching service mid-life,
    like the oldest of our Aegis cruisers, require modernization to be
    operationally viable in future hostile situations. Funds to complete
    this type of modernization have historically not competed successfully
    against other recapitalization requirements.
        Naval aviation, in particular, poses profound challenges. Our
    aviation force now contains the oldest mix of type/model/series
    aircraft in naval history, yet it is our aircraft that are routinely
    employed in combat overseas. For the first time, our average aircraft
    age exceeds the average age of combatant ships, leading to a
    corresponding increase in the cost of operations and maintenance.
        Global tasking has continually stressed our aviation force. As a
    result, the F/A-18 has been flown well in excess of planned utilization
    rates and more than 300 aircraft will require service life extensions
    earlier than planned or budgeted. Similar situations apply to F-14s,
    EA-6Bs, P-3Cs, SH-60s, and virtually every other aircraft in the fleet.
        The single most influential factor in achieving near-term aviation
    readiness is the health of our Flying Hour Program, which includes
    fuel, consumable spare parts, and Aviation Depot Level Repairables
    (AVDLRs). The cost of AVDLRs has risen an average of 13.8 percent per
    year from fiscal year 1996-1999; the cost increases are driven
    principally by age. Despite attempts to alleviate shortages in AVDLRs,
    we continue to experience shortfalls. Shortages also exist in aviation
    mission critical items such as targeting pods and repair equipment on
    aircraft carriers.
        The most effective manner in which to address the problems facing
    naval aviation is to introduce new aircraft into the fleet as soon as
    possible. Toward that end, the fiscal year 2002 amended budget takes
    steps to increase the number of F-18 E/F aircraft. We are currently in
    an age/cost spiral that can be best corrected by addressing these
    modernization requirements.
        Current readiness shortfalls facing our ships and aircraft would be
    far worse were it not for aggressive action already taken. We
    reprogrammed nearly $6.5 billion from other Navy programs to the
    current readiness portion of the Navy baseline program for fiscal year
    2002-2007, shoring up the Flying Hour Program, Ship Depot Maintenance,
    Ship Operations, and Real Property Maintenance accounts. The fiscal
    year 2002 amended defense budget will have a further positive impact
    due to the substantial investment being made in bringing readiness
    accounts to required levels. This budget puts us on course to correct
    the under-investment in readiness.
                       the imperative of future readiness
        The challenge of sustaining current readiness while investing in
    key future capabilities has been a most difficult balancing act.
    Current readiness has too often come at the expense of recapitalization
    and modernization. As a result, modernization efforts have not kept
    pace. Figure 2 shows the dramatic decline in authorized ships over the
    past five decades.

                                    Figure 2

        Due to the level of investment in procurement during the 1990s, we
    face a significant acquisition ``bow wave'' for ships and aircraft
    today. I am on the record in stating that the Navy needs about $34
    billion a year to meet procurement requirements--this is about $10
    billion per year more than funded at present. We must buy 180-210
    aircraft and nine ships a year to sustain the 1997 QDR force level of
    4,200 aircraft and 310 ships.
        We are procuring significantly less than that. We will procure just
    six ships and 88 naval aircraft in fiscal year 2002. We cannot sustain
    the Navy we have today with current funding levels, which would lead to
    a 230 ship Navy over time.
        The impact of the current low procurement rate goes beyond force
    levels. It adversely affects the stability of our unique defense
    industrial base. We are paying a premium in program cost today and
    realizing substantial cost growth because of production inefficiencies
    due to the lack of economies of scale. For the Navy, virtually every
    procurement program of record is proceeding at a sub-optimum economic
    order of quantity.
        Still, we are making important investments in programs that will
    comprise the core capability of our forces in the coming decades. DD-
    21, CVNX, JSF, FA-18E/F, LPD-17 and the Virginia-class SSN present
    compelling technological leaps in warfighting capability and
    innovation.
        The status of programs discussed below, as well as the associated
    funding levels, is subject to change as a result of the ongoing
    Quadrennial Defense Review. The Secretary of Defense will develop
    funding guidelines beyond fiscal year 2002 when that review is
    complete.
        Program specifics include:

              DD-21. The Zumwalt-class destroyer will provide sustained,
            distributed, and precise firepower at long ranges to support
            joint forces ashore by conducting precision attacks on land
            targets while simultaneously engaging threats above and below
            the sea. This program is central to our transformation effort,
            including the introduction of Integrated Power Systems (IPS),
            the Advanced Gun System (AGS), multi-function radar, and
            reduced manning concepts. Additionally, DD-21 is another step
            toward the creation of a more integrated Navy/Marine Corps
            team. DD-21 will provide significantly enhanced fire support
            for marines ashore. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget
            provides continued RDT&E investment pending final contractor
            down-select later this year.
              CVNX. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget provides RDT&E and
            advance procurement for the first CVNX, which will replace
            U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2013 and sustain essential
            carrier force levels. Principal design objectives for the CVNX
            class include a significant reduction of total ownership costs
            during the carrier's 50-year expected service life, reduced
            manning, and introduction of a flexible infrastructure that
            will facilitate the insertion of new warfighting capabilities
            as they evolve.
              JSF. The Joint Strike Fighter program will field a family of
            tri-service, next-generation strike aircraft with an emphasis
            on commonality, providing sustainable U.S. and allied
            technological superiority at affordable prices. The fiscal year
            2002 amended budget supports vigorous R&D investments required
            to procure the initial variant in fiscal year 2006.
              LPD-17. We are not requesting additional LPD-17 class ships
            in the fiscal year 2002 budget, due in part to design and
            production challenges with the lead ship. We remain fully
            committed to the program, however, as it supports vital
            littoral warfighting requirements and promises relief from
            mounting costs of our aging amphibious ships. The 12 projected
            LPD-17s will replace four older classes of ships and serve as
            central elements of future Amphibious Ready Groups.
              Virginia-class SSN. This class will sustain minimum essential
            attack submarine force levels as the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-
            class attack submarines leave the fleet. They are specifically
            designed for multi-mission littoral and regional operations as
            well as traditional open-ocean anti-submarine and anti-surface
            missions. Equally important, flexibility is designed into these
            ships to allow incorporation of new technologies. The fiscal
            year 2002 amended budget procures one submarine per year and
            continues RDT&E. This pace of procurement is not sufficient to
            maintain our required attack submarine force level over the
            long term.
              F/A-18E/F. The F/A-18E/F will replace older F/A-18s and all
            F-14s. There is extensive commonality of weapons systems,
            avionics, and software between F/A-18 variants, and the
            infrastructure supporting the Super Hornet builds upon existing
            organizations. We strongly support the fiscal year 2002 amended
            budget's procurement increase from 39 to 48 aircraft to take
            advantage of economies of scale.

                         GROWING AND DEVELOPING SAILORS

        Navy men and women are our most valuable resource and we must
    provide them with the tools and leadership to excel. We are and will
    continue to be in a ``War for Talent'' with other employers. To win
    this war, we are focusing on recruiting the right people, reducing
    attrition, and increasing reenlistments.
        Improvements in compensation that you supported--bonuses, pay table
    adjustments, retirement reforms, and better medical benefits--are
    having the desired impact. The targeted pay raise and other initiatives
    in the Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Amendment will reinforce these positive
    trends.
        The Navy met its overall recruiting and end-strength goals in
    fiscal year 1999 and 2000, and we are on track for fiscal year 2001. We
    are currently reenlisting nearly 60 percent of eligible Sailors who
    reach the end of their first enlistments, compared with 47 percent in
    1999. Sixty-seven percent of petty officers with 6-10 years of service
    are reenlisting, compared with 60 percent 2 years ago. Annual attrition
    rates for first term Sailors have fallen from over 14 percent to less
    than 12 percent since 1998. Officer retention remains well below
    steady-state goals, however, in every community except Naval Flight
    Officers.
        Better than anticipated manning in fiscal year 2001, the result of
    long sought after improvements in recruiting and retention, has reduced
    at-sea billet gaps and allowed our Navy to begin filling increased
    requirements in areas such as anti-terrorism/force protection, aviation
    maintenance, and environmental billets at sea. As a result, we are
    requesting authorization in fiscal year 2002 to increase our end-
    strength from 372,642 to 376,000. This additional end-strength will
    lock-in gains we have made in improved at-sea manning and enhanced
    readiness.
        A major initiative aimed at further strengthening the professional
    development of Sailors is the Revolution in Training that is getting
    underway. This effort, which will unfold over the next 3 years, will
    leverage distance learning technologies, the improved Navy information
    exchange network, and a career-long training investment continuum to
    fully realize the learning potential of our professional force. This
    development is vital to the health of our manpower growth and
    development concepts of the 21st century.
        Looking ahead, two personnel issues concern me. First is the
    erosion in Career Sea Pay, last updated in 1986. Redress of this
    problem was authorized in the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) but not funded.
        Second is the ITEMPO legislation contained in the fiscal year 2000
    and 2001 NDAAs. Despite major progress made in mitigating time away
    from home for our Sailors, this legislation has the potential to
    significantly impact our force. Since October 2000, we have been
    collecting fleet data to evaluate the potential cost of this program.
    We will work closely with you in the months to come as the full impact
    of this legislation becomes clear.
                 quality of service: a critical retention tool
        A high Quality of Service--defined as a balanced combination of
    Quality of Life and Quality of Work--is directly related to retaining
    and motivating Sailors. While we have made gains in Quality of Life
    programs, our Quality of Work requires substantial improvement in many
    areas.
        In previous testimony, I noted that a ``psychology of
    deficiency''--the acceptance of sustained resource shortages as a
    normal condition--has become ingrained in our operating forces. It
    manifests itself in such things as substandard facilities and working
    environments. Over time, our people have not only become accustomed to
    poor facilities, many believe they will never improve.
        Our Navy's shore infrastructure is in such condition because our
    recapitalization cycle exceeds 160 years, our critical backlog of
    maintenance and repair exceeds $2.75 billion, and our RPM funding is
    significantly below the private industry average.
        Meeting this challenge requires finding innovative ways to satisfy
    infrastructure needs. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget makes modest
    increases in RPM and military construction accounts that represent a
    start in bringing our shore facilities up to standard. There is much
    left to be done.

                             THE POWER OF ALIGNMENT

        Navy-wide alignment is critical to ensuring our organizations,
    systems, and processes deliver a combat-capable Navy ready to sail in
    harm's way. To enhance communications and coordination, we reorganized
    the Navy Staff so that a Deputy CNO is focused exclusively on Fleet
    Readiness and Logistics, while another Deputy CNO is dedicated to
    Warfare Requirements and Programs.
        In the fleets, we have taken action to consolidate leadership
    functions for naval aviation, surface, and subsurface forces. This will
    enable us to accomplish our missions in a better organized and more
    consistent manner around the world. Additionally, we are streamlining
    our requirements and readiness reporting process and amplifying the
    fleet voice in Washington decision-making, allowing us to more
    accurately determine requirements, improve readiness, and maximize
    investment effectiveness.
        These actions are taken with the realization that we must, at every
    level, ensure our Navy is functioning as effectively and efficiently as
    possible. The Secretary of the Navy has made the incorporation of
    better business practices a major tenet of his plan of action. I share
    his enthusiasm for this cause. More accurate requirements forecasting,
    enhanced stability in program execution, greater efficiency in system
    design and production, and improved expenditure discipline in
    infrastructure maintenance and renewal all promise the taxpayer a
    fuller return on investment and our Navy a healthier future.

                   TRANSFORMING TO MEET 21ST CENTURY THREATS

        Ensuring future readiness is not solely a matter of procurement. It
    also requires substantial investment in Science and Technology accounts
    to swiftly and effectively leverage emerging opportunities. Such
    agility will be key to the success of our conceptual shift from
    platform-centric warfare to an emphasis on networked, distributed
    systems.
        For the Navy, transformation is about achieving greater warfighting
    capability per unit delivered to the CINC (Battle Group/Amphibious
    Ready Group/Ship/Aircraft/ Submarine.) We are transforming in two ways:
    by gaining capability through investment in critical technologies and
    by experimenting with the application of those technologies in an
    operational environment.
        Enhanced capability will be achieved via prioritized investments
    focusing on networks, sensors, weapons and platforms. Examples of Navy
    investments key to the success of netted warfare include Information
    Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21), Navy-Marine Corps Intranet,
    Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), F/A-18E/F Shared
    Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP), Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infra-
    Red targeting pod (ATFLIR), Naval Fires Network, Unmanned Airborne
    Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), Unmanned
    Undersea Vehicles (UUVs), Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
    Radar, E-2C Radar Modernization Program (RMP), Acoustic Rapid COTS
    Insertion (ARCI), Link-16, and Multi-function Information Distribution
    System (MIDS) data links.
        Also key to transforming the fleet to meet 21st century threats is
    our serious commitment to fleet experimentation, spearheaded by the
    Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport, Rhode Island. Our ongoing
    series of Fleet Battle Experiments, working hand-in-hand with U.S.
    Joint Forces Command's experimentation efforts, holds great promise for
    doctrinal and programmatic development.
        The result of these efforts will be a fleet that enhances
    conventional and WMD deterrence, assures access, conducts precision
    strike, gathers real-time intelligence, exercises joint command and
    control, and exploits the priceless advantages of sea control. In
    short, it will be a transformed Navy that continues its time-honored
    service, on watch for America's security.

                                   CONCLUSION

        I thank the committee for your continued strong support of our
    Navy, our sailors, and their families. Working together, I am confident
    that we can meet the challenges of current and future readiness,
    allowing the United States Navy to fulfill the missions fundamental to
    a more stable and peaceful world.

        Chairman Levin. Admiral Clark, thank you very much.
        General Jones.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Jones. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
    Thank you very much for your kind thoughts and words with
    regard to the families of marines who lost their lives and were
    injured in the accident last night at New River, North
    Carolina. Mr. Chairman, you correctly captured the sentiment
    with regard to the dangerous missions that we entrust to our
    men and women in uniform, and I will convey your words to their
    families and to the Corps. Thank you, sir.
        I would like to add parenthetically, although under the
    backdrop of this tragedy, that I am pleased to report that thus
    far this fiscal year is the safest recorded year for flight
    mishaps in recorded Marine Corps aviation history, despite the
    accident.
        With regard to the 2002 budget and the 2001 supplemental
    that is before you, many good things were done for our marines
    and their families. Quality of life enhancements, pay and
    entitlement, health, flying hours, military construction, force
    protection issues, all received great attention and we are
    profoundly grateful for this assistance.
        I am happy to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the Marine
    Corps is today a very stable culture. The proof of that is in
    its recruiting successes and its retention efforts across the
    board. Officer, staff, NCO, enlisted, 62 percent of the Marine
    Corps budget is now consumed by manpower accounts, pay,
    entitlements, health care and the like. This is good.
        It also underscores what is not being done; despite the
    fixes that we have made in readiness, and they have been
    substantial, we are still going to continue to pay for it out
    of deferred modernization and out of inattention to our
    infrastructure recapitalization, which critically needs urgent
    attention.
        I have said before that the Marine Corps is expeditionary
    by culture and transformational by design. I say that because
    words are important. I would like to talk very briefly about
    two sets of words. The first one is the words ``expeditionary''
    versus ``deployability.'' When you talk about expeditionary
    requirements for the Nation, you are talking about investment
    in speed, and speed is expensive. Speed may get you there
    quickly, but it will not do you any good if it is not
    logistically sustainable.
        So we talk about being able to get to different spots on
    the globe quickly. I just would like to underscore the fact
    that if you cannot sustain them once they are there it is not a
    good investment.
        Simply put, too much speed may not be logistically
    sustainable. Put another way, the Nation does not need all of
    its forces to get to spot X or Y on the globe at the same time,
    nor can we afford it or lift it.
        In 1973 we had an energy crisis and we pledged, or at least
    it was attempted to pledge, that we would not be held hostage
    to fossil fuels for our automobile industry, and we directed
    and pledged ourselves to transformational processes whereby our
    cars would become electric or solar-powered. Well, 27 or 28
    years later, what we really did was modernize. We developed
    fuel efficiencies, better, lighter cars, safer cars, though we
    are still essentially dependent on fossil fuels.
        So you may have transformational goals, but you may wind up
    simply modernizing. So that is the second set of words that I
    would mention. Transformation versus modernization needs to be
    considered, how much of one you need in relation to the other.
        You should consider transformation and modernization and
    expeditionary capabilities versus simply deployable needs in
    relation to how we use our forces. Since the end of World War
    II we have deployed forces in response to burgeoning crises
    over 300 times, we have actually mobilized follow-on forces six
    times, and we have committed forces to major theater conflicts
    three times. So the power of our engagement strategies, which
    are not dependent on speed, but dependent on location and being
    engaged and being present and shaping the environment and doing
    things that are very important for our Nation and our
    alliances, is very important.
        So we need both transformation and modernization, but
    perhaps not in the same amounts. We are likely to need more
    modernization than transformation since transformation is
    sometimes dependent on science and physics and programs that
    may or may not come to pass.
        The Marine Corps' transformation and modernization programs
    are designed and on the books today to result in a convergence
    path that will start coming to fruition in 2008. As an example,
    I consider transformational programs for the Marine Corps to
    include the V-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, the AAAV,
    integrated logistics concepts which will revolutionize the way
    we support our forward-deployed and based forces, information
    operations, and naval precision fires.
        As an example of the modernization process, I consider the
    Lightweight 155, the LCAC, Landing Cushion Aircraft, SLEP
    program, the acquisition of HIMARS, the AH-1T modernization,
    the 120-millimeter mortar program, the M-4 service rifle, and
    the Joint Tactical Radio, and the KC-130J to be examples of
    needed modernization programs.
        I believe that the American citizen of the future
    generation expects that we will be the dominant Nation of
    influence, so-called superpower, 50 years from now. I believe
    we can do this if we understand that the purpose of our
    investment in peacetime is so we do not have to fight wars, and
    the way we used our forces in the last 50 years suggests
    persuasively that we are successful at doing this.
        We understand that national security is not an independent
    investment and that such an investment is the anchor that
    allows our Nation to be the Nation of global influence
    economically, politically, diplomatically, culturally,
    scientifically and technologically.
        It is abundantly clear in my judgment that approximately
    2.9 percent of our gross domestic product towards this goal is
    insufficient. Whatever Congress decides the investment is, I
    recommend that it be proportional and sustained over a gradual
    period of time. I am truly excited by the prospect of working
    with the Secretary of Defense, our Secretary of the Navy, the
    DOD and senior military leaders to adopt better business
    practices, which are critically needed, and much-needed
    acquisition reforms. The Marine Corps is proud to be the
    largest activity-based costing management program in the
    Department of Defense currently.
        Our budget request, designed with both transformation and
    modernization in mind, balances the requirement for
    expeditionary forces with that for simply deployable forces. It
    has its convergence in 2008 and we can do that by sustaining
    and supporting the programs that are currently a matter of
    record. This is inclusive of base housing and modernization and
    recapitalization of our infrastructure.
        We have a path to success. We continue to develop our
    foundational needs, such as the acquisition of Blount Island,
    which in my judgment should be done by 2004--it is a national
    asset and it is a national logistics gateway; enhancing and
    achieving a 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift capability,
    due to the predictable paucity of land-based operational
    support bases in the 21st century. We should look at maritime
    prepositioned ships of the future, to explore rapid sealift.
        I would also caution that we pay a lot of attention to the
    rise of encroachment issues, which are going to face all of us
    in the foreseeable future.
        The Secretary of Defense has said we should only replace
    things if we have something better to replace them with. I
    understand that, I agree with it, and we are already moving in
    that direction.
        The rapidly deployable force with staying power that some
    has said is nonexistent in the military today in fact does
    exist and it is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. It is both
    expeditionary and it is deployable. It is being modernized and
    will be transformed in part, maybe in whole, between now and
    2008, and it exists today for the joint warfighter. It
    possesses forcible entry capability, it is affordable, it is
    scalable, it is forward-based or deployed, it is sustainable,
    it is joint and interoperable, and it is combined arms-capable,
    which is a goal that all true joint forces in the future must
    seek to achieve.
        A final thought, Mr. Chairman. It is an exciting time to be
    a United States Marine. We look forward to our future while
    learning from the past, and we look forward to your questions.
    Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Gen. James L. Jones, Jr., USMC

        Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the
    committee; it is my pleasure to report to you on the state of your
    Marine Corps. On behalf of all marines and their families, I want to
    thank the committee for its continued support. Your efforts to increase
    compensation and improve the quality of life of our young men and women
    in uniform have been central to the health of your Marine Corps and are
    deeply appreciated.

                                     VISION

        I believe the committee is well familiar with the nature of the
    present international security landscape and the current state of our
    forces, so I will begin simply by noting some of the ways in which
    warfare has changed in the 21st century. In the 20th century, mass and
    volume were the primary methods relied upon to win wars. In their
    place, speed, stealth, precision, and sustainment have become the
    emergent principles of modern warfare.
        These four principles have application from the strategic to the
    tactical levels. Furthermore, they are key with regard to how our
    forces maneuver and employ weapons as well as to how they exchange
    information and logistically sustain themselves. The Marine Corps'
    vision, accordingly, is to inculcate these principles into our
    doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and support. One
    indication of our commitment to do this, reflected in Marine Corps
    Strategy 21, is our concerted aim to enhance the strategic agility,
    operational reach, and tactical flexibility of our Marine Air-Ground
    Task Forces. Speed, stealth, precision, and sustainment are integral to
    each of these capabilities.
        Indeed, we are revolutionizing our approach to operations with
    these 21st century principles of war in mind. We are moving beyond the
    traditional amphibious assault operations which we conducted in the
    20th century. Our goal now is advanced, expeditionary operations from
    land and sea to both deter and respond to crises.
        The Corps has been our Nation's premier expeditionary force since
    our landing at Nassau in the Bahamas, 225 years ago. Today, we have
    worldwide responsiveness and the versatility to undertake missions
    across the spectrum of operations. To marines, the term
    ``expeditionary'' connotes more than a given capability. For us, it is
    a cultural mindset that conditions our marines to be able to rapidly
    deploy with little advance warning and effectively operate with organic
    logistical support in austere environments. This is the basis of the
    Marine Corps' culture as well as an acknowledgement of the necessity to
    do more with less and to be prepared to fight and win with only the
    resources we bring with us, without the need to return to fixed bases
    for refitting or retraining.
        A prime example of these attributes is resident within our medium
    weight Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). Nearly 10 years ago, in
    light of pressing manpower considerations, we deactivated our six
    standing brigade command elements. Last year, we reestablished three
    Marine Expeditionary Brigades by embedding their staffs within our
    Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters. These units are now actively
    operating. The 1st MEB recently participated in operation NATIVE FURY,
    a humanitarian assistance mission in Kenya; 2d MEB has been integrated
    into contingency plans for Europe and Latin America; and, 3d MEB has
    conducted a maritime prepositioning shipping offload in Australia.
        The versatility of the MEB is emblematic of the unique scalability
    of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. In size and capability, these
    brigades are midway between our Marine Expeditionary Units and our
    Marine Expeditionary Forces. Furthermore, our MEBs can either deploy on
    amphibious shipping or be airlifted into a theater of operations and
    join up with Maritime Prepositioning Forces.
        A special characteristic of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces is
    that they consist of five integrated elements: command; ground combat;
    aviation; logistics; and, supporting establishment. The MEB consists of
    a regimental landing team, with organic infantry, artillery, and armor
    elements, and in addition to a composite aircraft group with both
    fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, it also has a combat service
    support group--whose supplies can sustain the MEB in full scale combat
    for 30 days. Each of these elements reinforces the others. This
    teamwork, built on training and experience, reaches across every
    battlefield function, creating a unique degree of synergy that
    distinguishes our units from others.
        Ultimately, our vision of the future and our expeditionary culture,
    along with our philosophy of maneuver warfare, come together in our
    emerging capstone concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Achieving
    the full promise of that concept will hinge on our efforts to balance
    the competing demands of near-term readiness and investment in
    equipment modernization and infrastructure. This is no small task.
    These over-arching concerns are interrelated and in the long-term we
    cannot have one without the others.
        In order to improve our near-term readiness, we have made
    significant internal adjustments over the past 2 years. Through
    reduction in attrition of our first term marines, internal management
    efficiencies, outsourcing, and privatization, we will eventually return
    approximately 4,000 marines to the operating forces. We are also
    utilizing numerous best business practices to make our operations both
    efficient and effective and now have the largest Activity-Based
    Costing/Management program in the Department of Defense, if not all of
    government. While these efforts have improved the efficient application
    of fiscal and manpower resources, and directly supported our commitment
    to personnel readiness in the operating forces, we are still assessing
    the totality of our personnel requirement. Should a need for additional
    personnel be determined, we are confident that commensurate funding and
    our continued recruiting and retention successes will support any
    required increase.
        Despite such efficiencies, we are, regrettably, continuing to
    maintain our near-term readiness at the expense of our modernization.
    During the past decade, the Nation has consistently limited the
    resources dedicated to its national security. Consequently, the
    dramatic increases in operational requirements coupled with imposed
    constraints have mandated a substantively reduced rate of investment in
    equipment modernization and infrastructure. We are, in fact, at a point
    where we can no longer fail to rectify these shortfalls. As a nation
    with global responsibilities, we cannot ignore the critical importance
    of readiness.
        The fiscal year 2002 budget submitted by the President proposes
    increased funding for military pay and entitlements, health care
    benefits, flying hours, base and station utilities, depot maintenance,
    strategic lift, essential base operating support costs, and force
    protection requirements. The administration also provided increased
    funding for one of our most underfunded areas--our infrastructure.
    Additional funds provided in this budget will allow us to begin to
    address badly needed family housing requirements at Camp Pendleton,
    California, and bachelor enlisted quarters at various locations. These
    are of great importance to our readiness. Nevertheless, I remain
    concerned about the level of investment in our infrastructure and
    equipment modernization. For example, the fiscal year 2002 budget does
    not include increases for ground equipment modernization.

                                   READINESS

        We assess our readiness in terms of ``four pillars:'' marines and
    their families; our infrastructure; our legacy equipment systems; and,
    our transformation and modernization efforts. Each of these pillars
    requires attention and resources in order to ensure your Corps is
    prepared to serve our Nation's interests. I will discuss each of the
    pillars and comment on what we are currently doing and what we want to
    do with the support of this committee, beginning with the most
    important part of the Marine Corps, its people.
    Our Marines and Their Families
        The Marine Corps has three major goals: making America's marines;
    winning our Nation's battles; and, creating quality citizens. The fact
    that people are the focus of two of these three goals exemplifies the
    extent to which we recognize the special trust and confidence that the
    Nation reposes in us for the care and welfare of the young men and
    women in our charge.
        Safety is central to the Corps' focus on people and it is a
    critical component of maintaining our readiness. It is also a vital
    element of the quality of life that we provide our marines and their
    families. Along these lines, I am pleased to report that we have
    significantly lowered our off-duty mishap rates. Moreover, we have had
    notable success in aviation safety: our Class ``A'' flight mishap rate
    is the lowest it has ever been at this point in the fiscal year. For
    these trends to continue, it will take our unrelenting attention and we
    are dedicated to maintaining our focus on this important issue.
        One factor contributing to our safety challenge is that we are a
    young force. The average age of our marines is 23, roughly 7 to 9 years
    younger than the average age of the members of the other services. This
    is part of the culture of the Corps inasmuch as our unique force
    structure results in 68 percent of our marines being on their first
    enlistment at any one time. The nature of our force structure requires
    us to annually recruit 39,000 men and women into our enlisted ranks. To
    fill this tremendous demand, our recruiters work tirelessly and have
    consistently met our accession goals in quality and quantity for 6
    consecutive years as of the end of June 2001.
        Retention is as important as recruiting. We are proud that we are
    meeting our retention goals across nearly all military occupational
    specialties. Intangibles--such as the desire to serve the Nation, to
    belong to a cohesive organization, and to experience leadership
    responsibilities through service in the Corps--are a large part of the
    reason we can retain the remarkable men and women who choose to remain
    on Active Duty. Concrete evidence of this phenomena is seen in our
    deployed units, which continually record the highest reenlistment rates
    in the Corps. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program (SRB) has been
    an additional, powerful tool to meet our retention goals. The increases
    for the SRB Program as well as the targeted pay raise initiative found
    in the President's budget will go a long way toward assisting in
    meeting our retention goals and helping take care of our marines and
    their families. Retention success is also partly a consequence of the
    investment we make in supporting our operational forces--to give our
    marines what they need to do their jobs in the field when they are
    deployed--as well as the funds we earmark for educating and training
    our marines.
        While we recruit marines, we retain families. As noted earlier, the
    effectiveness of our marines is dependent, in large measure, on the
    support they receive from their loved ones. Our families are indeed
    vital to our readiness. Increased pay as well as improved housing and
    health care directly influence our families' quality of life and, in
    turn, bolster the readiness of our units. Your support of our families'
    quality of life has contributed greatly to our retention success.
    However, the rising costs of rent, utilities, and fuel require
    continued annual increases in pay and Basic Allowance for Housing.
    Furthermore, we need to provide and maintain those essential support
    systems that benefit and protect marines and their families, especially
    accessible and responsive health care. We are extremely thankful, Mr.
    Chairman, for the recent enactment of much-needed improvements to the
    TRICARE system for our Active Duty personnel and for our retired
    veterans. The President's budget includes further improvements in this
    area which we expect to make a significant difference in retention,
    morale, and readiness.
    Our Infrastructure
        Beyond providing for our families, your support in allocating and
    sustaining resources for our bases and stations has had a profound
    impact on our readiness. Bases and stations are the launching pads and
    recovery platforms for our deployed units and thus are integral parts
    of our operating forces. Hence, we want to ensure that our posts
    possess the infrastructure and ranges necessary to prepare our marines
    for the wide variety of contingencies they can expect to confront.
    Equally important, they are sanctuaries for many of our families.
    Moreover, just as our bases and stations are vital to our current
    readiness, the recapitalization of our infrastructure is as important
    to our warfighting strength in the future as is modernization.
        Thirty-five percent of our infrastructure is over 50 years old. Our
    supporting infrastructure--water and sewage systems, bridges, and
    roads--is antiquated and decaying. Though we slowed the growth of
    backlog of maintenance and repair (BMAR) at our bases and stations to
    approximately $650 million this fiscal year, it rises to $687 million
    in fiscal year 2002 and averages approximately $660 million across the
    remainder of the Future Years Defense Plan--far exceeding the goal of
    $106 million set for fiscal year 2010.
        Although the increases provided in the President's budget begin to
    address this problem, I remain concerned. Prior to this budget, our
    military construction replacement cycle exceeded 100 years compared to
    a commercial industry standard of approximately 50 years. While this
    budget allows us to attain an approximately 60 year cycle of military
    construction replacement in fiscal year 2002, the average
    recapitalization rate remains nearly 100 years across the balance of
    the Future Years Defense Plan.
        In more specific terms, approximately half of our family housing
    units are inadequate, and we have a shortage of nearly 9,000 homes in
    fiscal year 2001. The budget submitted by the administration allows us
    to revitalize our current inventory and to accelerate the eradication
    of substandard housing which is our first priority in this regard.
    Additional funding for both base-housing construction and the
    elimination of out-of-pocket housing costs for marines that live off-
    base will allow us to reduce our family housing deficit by 20 percent
    within 4 years.
        On a separate note concerning our infrastructure, we are
    increasingly finding that many forms of encroachment upon our bases and
    stations threaten to degrade our readiness. When most of our bases and
    stations were established, they were distant from civilian population
    centers. Today, population growth and commercial development have not
    merely reached our installations, they have enveloped them. There are
    two major ramifications of this phenomenon. The first is that our bases
    and stations often are the last remaining wilderness zones in otherwise
    over-developed areas--which has meant that we have to balance our
    training requirements with our increasing responsibilities as
    environmental stewards. The second consequence is that we are now
    obliged to routinely deal with a wide variety of complaints, mostly
    regarding noise or flight patterns, from those citizens who have chosen
    to live in close proximity to our bases and stations.
        Such concerns about sea, land, and airspace utilization have
    necessitated close coordination and frequent compromise with many
    elements of the civilian sector. Accordingly, we work diligently to be
    good neighbors and try to accommodate the demands of environmental
    protection and concerns of adjoining communities without degrading
    training and the mission effectiveness of our marines. Despite this
    focus, encroachment issues have the potential to increasingly affect
    readiness in the years ahead. We need your continued support to ensure
    that the growing complexity and expense of encroachment issues do not
    hamstring our efforts to conduct meaningful training in order to
    provide for national security.
    Our Legacy Equipment Systems
        Our present and future readiness does not rest solely on the
    investments we make in our personnel and infrastructure. We also must
    consider the equipment we give our marines. This is no simple task. We
    must apportion our allotted resources between maintaining the ability
    to respond to crises and the requirement to lay the foundation for our
    capacity to respond to the security challenges of the future.
        As a consequence of the procurement pause of the 1990s, many of our
    weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and support systems are approaching or
    have already reached block obsolescence. In the last decade, we have
    watched the size of our forces decline while the number of
    contingencies has increased. Under these circumstances, our equipment
    has been put under tremendous stress. We are devoting ever-increasing
    amounts of time conducting preventive and corrective maintenance as
    well as spending more and more money on spare parts to repair our
    legacy equipment. The limited availability of spare parts has put
    additional strain on these efforts. Our procurement programs seek to
    address this concern, but we are acutely aware that the acquisition
    process is often a slow enterprise. As a result, our legacy equipment
    systems and our efforts to maintain them will remain central to the
    readiness of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces until our modernization
    programs replace those aging pieces of equipment.
        This situation is particularly acute in our aviation combat
    element. In fact, the majority of our primary rotary-wing airframes are
    over 25 years old and in turn they are older than many of the marines
    who fly aboard them. Another illustration of the advanced age of our
    airframes is that our KC-130Fs are 19 years past planned retirement.
    When our first KC-130F rolled off the assembly line, President Kennedy
    was beginning his first year as the commander in chief. Likewise, our
    CH-46Es and CH-53Ds are more than 30 years old, and the average age of
    our CH-53Es is 12 years. Some of our younger pilots are flying the same
    aircraft that their fathers flew.
        The challenges associated with the failure of parts on older
    aircraft, diminishing manufacturing sources, and long delays in parts
    delivery all place demands on readiness. Since 1995, the direct
    maintenance man-hours per hour of flight has increased by 16 percent
    and our ``cannibalization'' rate has increased by 24 percent. During
    the same time period, the full mission capable rate, though still
    within acceptable parameters, decreased by almost 17 percent across the
    force. While recent increases provided by the administration for
    Program Related Engineering and Program Related Logistics (PRE/PRL) are
    extremely helpful, modernization will ultimately relieve the strain
    being placed on these older airframes, as it will do for our ground
    combat and combat service support elements as well.

                        TRANSFORMATION AND MODERNIZATION

        We recognize that we cannot know for certain what missions and
    threats we will face in the future, and that, as a result, we need to
    focus our efforts in such a way as to provide America with weapons
    platforms that are flexible and robust enough to allow her marines to
    excel across the wide spectrum of tasks and environments that they may
    encounter. The Corps' efforts to enhance its capabilities can be
    broadly described in terms of transformation and modernization. On one
    hand, transformation programs are intended to achieve fundamental
    advances in capabilities by exploiting leap-ahead technologies. On the
    other hand, modernization programs represent more modest efforts to
    yield incremental improvements to our equipment systems. Examples of
    the transformational programs that the Marine Corps is pursuing are the
    Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, V-22 Osprey, Joint Strike Fighter,
    Naval Precision Fires, and Integrated Logistics Capabilities. Key
    modernization programs include the KC-130J, Lightweight 155mm Howitzer,
    High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, Medium Tactical Vehicle
    Replacement, and amphibious shipping.
    Transformational Programs
        Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The award winning Advanced
    Amphibious Assault Vehicle program is the Corps' highest ground
    acquisition priority and promises to allow high-speed surface maneuver
    from ship-to-shore as well as on land. Importantly, these vehicles will
    be able to deploy to their objectives from over the visual horizon,
    which will allow our ships to remain beyond the range of many threat
    weapons and surveillance systems. This capability will help negate an
    enemy's anti-access strategies and enable expeditionary operations from
    the sea.
        V-22 Osprey. The Osprey remains the Corps' premier near-term
    aviation acquisition priority. Tiltrotor technology promises to
    revolutionize aviation and the V-22 will radically increase our
    strategic airlift, operational reach, and tactical flexibility. The
    Osprey's superior range, speed, and payload will allow us to accomplish
    combat missions and other operations from distances previously
    unattainable and at faster response times than possible with other
    airframes.
        We are acutely aware of the challenges associated with the Osprey
    but are gratified that the Review Panel, appointed by then-Secretary of
    Defense William Cohen, concluded that tiltrotor technology is mature
    and that the V-22 promises to become a true national asset. Though the
    panel also determined the aircraft's reliability and maintainability
    must be improved, it noted that the V-22 will provide the Marine Corps
    with capabilities that cannot be provided by any single helicopter or
    conventional aircraft. Indeed, the Panel's conclusions mirror those of
    seven major cost and operational effectiveness analyses and the fact
    that the tiltrotor XV-15 has been flying since 1977.
        We are presently in the process of ensuring that the V-22 is
    reliable, operationally suitable, and affordable--just as we did 40
    years ago with each of the aircraft the Osprey is intended to replace.
    Currently, 85 reliability and maintainability improvements have been
    incorporated, or are on contract for incorporation, on the Osprey's
    production line--out of the 120 identified. With time, diligence, the
    close cooperation of our partners in industry, and with the support of
    Congress, we can work through the present challenges confronting us and
    achieve the tremendous operational capabilities offered by this
    remarkable aircraft. We are hopeful that the program's needed changes
    and improvements will be funded at the most economical rate of
    production in the fiscal year 2003 budget.
        As has always been the case, our actions will be guided by an
    unyielding commitment to do what is right for our marines, their
    families, and our Nation. In asking for your support, I assure you that
    we will not compromise our integrity or jeopardize the safety of our
    marines for any program.
        Joint Strike Fighter. Another aviation transformational effort of
    great importance is the Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter
    is, first and foremost, a product of Congressional guidance from the
    1980s. At the time, each service routinely produced a large number of
    different, service-specific airframes. Congress, therefore, asked the
    Department of Defense and industry to develop airframes that could be
    used more commonly by each of the services. The Joint Strike Fighter is
    the first step in that direction. The Short Takeoff and Vertical
    Landing variant promises to combine the current basing flexibility of
    the AV-8 Harrier with the multi-role capabilities, speed, and
    maneuverability of the F/A-18 Hornet and will fulfill both the Marine
    Corps' air-to-ground and air-to-air mission requirements. It will also
    incorporate both stealth and standoff precision guided weapon
    technology. Just as the Joint Strike Fighter has transformational
    operational potential, it also holds remarkable promise for our
    industrial base and our Nation's economy. Considering the fact that
    many of our allies have expressed interest in becoming partners in the
    program, this aircraft has the potential to bolster our defense
    industrial base to a degree similar to that achieved by the F-16
    Fighting Falcon over the past 25 years. There is no other tactical
    aviation program with so much potential for satisfying national and
    international requirements in the first half of this century. The JSF
    program preserves our leadership role on the global stage in tactical
    aviation.
        Naval Precision Fires. Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities are
    intrinsically linked to those of our partners, the U.S. Navy. One
    illustration of this, among many, is that naval precision fires are an
    essential dimension of our power projection capabilities. Yet, today
    the available resources for naval fire support are inadequate. Efforts
    to upgrade current naval surface fires capabilities are focused on
    modifications to the existing Mark 45 gun mount as well as the
    development of an advanced gun system, extended range guided munitions,
    and the Land Attack Standard Missile. Taken together, these planned
    enhancements will dramatically improve the range, responsiveness,
    accuracy, and lethality of the naval surface fire support provided to
    forces ashore.
        Integrated Logistics Capabilities. We are also pioneering
    Integrated Logistics Capabilities to transform our combat service
    support. In this effort, we are analyzing with the help of academia the
    manner in which military logistics can be altered to make our supply
    chain more responsive and better integrated with the operating forces.
    Tangible savings have already been realized by consolidating selected
    unit supply responsibilities at the retail level and we are looking to
    further reengineer our methodologies. With the use of new technologies
    and practices, proven in the private sector, the Corps will, in
    essence, create a ``new order'' for its logistics enterprise and
    undertake the revolutionary changes necessary to ensure that it
    continues to be the premier fighting force in the world.
    Modernization Programs
        KC-130J. Replacement of our aging KC-130 fleet with KC-130J
    aircraft is necessary to ensure the viability and deployability of
    Marine Corps Tactical Air and Assault Support well into the 21st
    century. The KC-130J's performance features include increased cruise
    airspeed, night vision compatible interior and exterior lighting,
    enhanced rapid ground refueling capability, digital avionics, and
    powerful propulsion systems. These strengths promise lower life-cycle
    expenses and eliminate the need for costly KC-130F/R Service Life
    Extension Programs. With the KC-130J, our aerial refueling fleet will
    be ready to support the tremendous increase in capabilities that the
    Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter promise to provide for our Marine
    Air-Ground Task Forces.
        Lightweight 155mm Howitzer. A number of ground weapon system
    programs are also of great interest to us. The Lightweight 155mm
    Howitzer is our first priority in this regard. The Lightweight 155 is a
    joint Marine-Army program that meets or exceeds all the requirements of
    the current M198 Howitzer while reducing the weight of an individual
    artillery piece from 16,000 to 9,000 pounds. This lower weight allows
    for tactical lift by both the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter and the V-
    22. Moreover, the digitization of this platform will greatly reduce
    response time and increase accuracy. I am pleased to note that the four
    minor technical discrepancies--concerning the spade, spade latch,
    recoil dampener, and optical sight--identified by the General
    Accounting Office have each been corrected. The first Engineering
    Manufacturing Development guns have passed all contractor testing and
    been accepted by the Department of Defense for subsequent evaluation. A
    production decision should be reached in September of next year.
        High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Also integral to our plans
    to improve our fire support is the acquisition of the High Mobility
    Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). This system is designed to be rapidly
    deployable as a key part of our expeditionary operations. It will fire
    both precision and area munitions, as well as extend our ground-based
    fire support umbrella to 45 kilometers. HIMARS's tactical mobility,
    small logistics footprint, and capacity to deliver heavy volume fires
    against time-sensitive targets will, in conjunction with the
    Lightweight 155, at last remedy the fire support shortfall we have
    known for much of the last 2 decades.
        Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement. The Medium Tactical Vehicle
    Replacement is at the heart of Combat Service Support modernization and
    will provide our forces improved sustainment and permit maximum
    flexibility in responding to crises. The vehicle's weight and height
    allow it to be transported internally by the KC-130 Hercules aircraft
    and externally by the CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter. The Medium
    Tactical Vehicle Replacement can readily negotiate terrain twice as
    rough as our current vehicles can, and it has increased payload, speed,
    and reliability.
        Amphibious Shipping. Our military presence around the world is the
    framework that enables the application of the other elements of our
    National power--political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and
    technological--to cultivate stability overseas. Yet in the 21st
    century, our forward land-basing options are not likely to increase and
    may even decline and, as a result, U.S. forces will rely less on large
    fixed bases overseas to fulfill America's global responsibilities. It
    is myopic, given the history of the 20th century, to think we can deter
    or defeat aggression on the global playing field solely with
    capabilities based in the United States. It has been proven many times
    over that presence in the operating area will be essential to our
    prosecution of a successful strategy. More specifically, it is going to
    take a sea-based presence in the operating area, a formation of joint
    assets that together project and sustain combat power ashore while
    reducing or eliminating our landward footprint. In the future, U.S.
    forces are going to increasingly deploy and sustain operations either
    from our sea-bases or our homeland.
        Despite the fact that the enduring requirements of global sea
    control, strategic deterrence, naval forward presence, and maritime
    power projection have not declined, the United States Navy's fleet of
    ships has shrunk in number by 23 percent in the last decade. The
    requirement for our amphibious shipping, which has been under-
    resourced, remains the linchpin of the Corps' ability to influence the
    international security landscape, project power, and protect the
    Nation's interest during crises. Simply put, virtual presence amounts
    to actual absence where global events are concerned. We cannot afford
    absence, which will likely result in vacuums that could be filled by
    those at odds with our National interests.
        We are grateful for your support to replace four classes of older
    ships with the new LPD 17 San Antonio amphibious ship class. The
    delivery of these twelve ships to the fleet is programmed to be
    complete at the end of the decade. However, we remain concerned about
    schedule slippage in the LPD-17 program. Such delays are unacceptable
    and must be avoided. Likewise, we should also be concerned with
    replacing the LHD Wasp class ships. Considering the extended time-frame
    for ship design, construction, and delivery we need to ensure now that
    we are ready to replace the Wasp class when they reach the end of their
    35 year service life starting in 2011.
        Today's amphibious ship force structure, when the number of active
    fleet vessels is combined with Reserve ships that can be mobilized, has
    the capacity to lift nearly two and a half Marine Expeditionary Brigade
    assault echelon equivalents. It has long been recognized that we
    require an amphibious ship force structure capable of simultaneously
    lifting the assault echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. I
    strongly recommend that we commit to redress this shortfall as a matter
    of urgent priority.
        The leases of our current fleet of maritime prepositioning ships
    (MPS) will expire in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2011. The
    development of advanced maritime prepositioning capabilities will
    significantly increase the strength and flexibility of our sea-based
    expeditionary operations. The marriage of a modern amphibious fleet
    with maritime prepositioning shipping capable of hosting at-sea arrival
    and assembly of forces will eliminate the requirement for access to
    secure ports and airfields, and give our Nation an unmatched
    asymmetrical advantage in projecting power. The mobility and dispersion
    inherent to this future sea-basing concept promises to provide
    survivability far greater than that afforded by fixed land bases and
    will give us a revolutionary power projection advantage for many
    decades.
    Convergence
        Looking ahead, the programs we have planned will, with your
    support, begin to converge in our operating forces in 2008. In the not
    distant future, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, V-22 Osprey,
    Joint Strike Fighter, KC-130J, Lightweight 155, High Mobility Artillery
    Rocket System, Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement, Naval Surface Fire
    Support, amphibious shipping, and a number of other smaller programs
    will together dramatically transform our expeditionary capabilities. As
    discussed earlier, these systems promise to embody speed, stealth,
    precision, and sustainment as well as afford us modern agility,
    mobility, and lethality. But, we cannot stop here. We must work
    together with the Navy and our defense industrial base to exploit other
    opportunities to advance our capabilities in the future.
        Continuous transformation and modernization are key to our long-
    term national interest; without them, we will fail to keep pace with
    change. The Marine Corps has an institutional tradition of such
    innovation and is expeditionary by nature, while being transformational
    by design. We view transformation as an evolutionary process, not a
    singular event.

                             TRAINING AND EDUCATION

        People, not systems, are the fundamental component of the Corps.
    Just as we are continually striving to evolve our doctrine, equipment,
    and supporting establishment so that we can better win our Nation's
    battles, we are also constantly moving forward to improve how we train
    and educate our marines.
        We believe the old adage, ``you fight the way you train.'' Because
    of this, our training exercises are becoming ever more Joint and
    Combined in order to provide our marines with the experience that they
    will need when they are called upon to respond to crises--because there
    is no doubt that they will work alongside our sister services and
    partners from other nations in such circumstances. Moreover, we
    recognize that while our first duty is to be ready to win our Nation's
    battles, we are increasingly called on to execute missions at the lower
    end of the spectrum of operations. Accordingly, our exercise scenarios
    emphasize both conventional warfighting missions as well as operations
    other than war.
        Experience in tandem with education is the best foundation for
    dealing with both difficulty and fortuity. Accordingly, we are not only
    focused on training our marines, but on educating them as well. We have
    expanded our distance learning programs to ensure that greater numbers
    of marines have the opportunity for education, not merely those who
    attend resident courses. In light of this, we are adjusting
    administrative policies to accommodate family concerns--such as spouses
    with careers or children with exceptional needs--when selecting
    officers to attend our various schools that require a change in duty
    station. We have instituted a ``year-out program'' for our junior
    officers and SNCOs, within the corporate world, think-tanks, and
    Congress. This will widen perspectives and provide valuable experiences
    which will bolster our marines capacity to innovate and adapt in the
    years to come.

                           OUR MARINE WARRIOR CULTURE

        At the very heart of the Corps and its relationship to each marine
    is our service culture. The Marine Corps is sui generis--that is, we
    have a nature that is distinct from all others. This goes beyond the
    unique characteristics of our expeditionary Marine Air-Ground Task
    Forces which are always prepared to be deployed overseas. It, in fact,
    pertains to our warrior ethos. From the individual marine to our
    institution as a whole, our model is the thinking and stoic warrior who
    fights more intelligently than his enemy and is inured to hardship and
    challenges.
        Our commitment to maintaining our warrior culture is illustrated by
    our recently instituted martial arts program. We have developed a
    discipline unique to the Corps and are in the process of training every
    marine in its ways. This program seeks to promote both physical prowess
    and mental discipline. Successive levels of achievement are rewarded
    with different colored belts reflecting a combination of demonstrated
    character, judgment, and physical skill. This training will benefit
    marines in the missions we face; especially in peacekeeping and
    peacemaking operations where physical stamina and mental discipline are
    often vital. At its heart, our martial arts training is fundamentally
    concerned with mentoring our young men and women to understand that the
    keys to mission accomplishment often are a matter of using
    intelligence, strength, and self-control to influence circumstances,
    rather than always resorting to the application of deadly force. In
    this regard, our martial arts training supports our pursuit of non-
    lethal alternatives.
        Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, each of America's Armed Services
    has a different set of responsibilities, separate operating roles, and
    institutional structures that give every service a culture that is
    distinct from the others. Indeed, such cultural diversity should be
    considered a force multiplier. Consequently, ``one-size fits all''
    policies are not often the best solutions in the Department of Defense,
    despite the importance of our on-going work to be fully joint in the
    conduct of operations. It is important to understand how the
    differences between the services may sometimes require separate and
    service-specific means of accomplishing universal goals such as
    promoting the quality of life of our people.
        The recently enacted PERSTEMPO Program is an example of a
    requirement that is likely to impact each of the services differently.
    The 2001 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that any service
    member deployed more than 400 days in 2 years receive $100 for each
    additional deployment day. While the larger services may be capable of
    managing the restriction placed on deployments and the additional costs
    associated with this requirement, the policy runs counter to the Corps'
    rotationally deployed, expeditionary force identity.
        Our young men and women join the Corps to make a difference, to
    challenge themselves, and are prepared to deploy in service of our
    country. The testament to this is our success in recruiting and
    retention: the ``acid-test'' of any service culture. Our young marines
    and their families understand that our forward presence and
    expeditionary deployments are the core expression of our warrior
    culture. It is why they are marines. In turn, though the PERSTEMPO
    Program may be appropriate for the other services, its present
    construct does not comport with the Corps' culture and missions. The
    policy may in fact have the unintended consequences of having a
    profoundly deleterious effect on our cohesion, capabilities, training,
    and budget. As a consequence we are now conducting a study to analyze
    how we can better manage our personnel tempo and still meet our
    operational requirements while remaining true to our culture and our
    fiscal constraints.

                                   CONCLUSION

        One of the clearest indicators that people are our first priority
    is that approximately 60 percent of the Marine Corps budget is allotted
    to funding manpower programs. Yet, this fact also emphasizes the
    relative state of the other pillars of readiness, especially
    transformation and modernization; which have been underfunded for most
    of the past decade. The Marine Corps has long prided itself on being
    able to do more with less. Nothing reflects this more clearly than the
    fact that the Corps provides 20 percent of our Nation's expeditionary
    ground and aviation combat force for 6 percent of the Department of
    Defense budget.
        Just as the other services have pursued plans to reorganize from a
    Cold War posture to one that matches the post-Cold War world, the
    Corps, too, has adapted itself to the challenges and opportunities that
    have emerged during the last 10 years. I want to underscore that the
    Marine Corps intends to remain our Nation's premier expeditionary
    combined arms force with modernized sustainment capabilities. That
    identity is central to who we are as marines.
        With that firmly in mind, the Corps has carefully plotted a course
    for the future. Indeed, if the programs we have currently planned are
    properly funded, we will see a convergence of transformation and
    modernization capabilities in our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
    starting in 2008 that will revolutionize our expeditionary operations.
        While our Nation's current strategy and force structure may change,
    it is clear that a sustained increase in resources will yield the
    operational strength, flexibility, and resilience we envision in both
    the short and the long-term. With regard to the Marine Corps, an
    increased investment of approximately $1.8 to $2 billion a year
    sustained for the next 8 to 10 years--a modest step that is less than 1
    percent of what is allotted to the overarching national security
    budget--will permit us to achieve our vision and deliver a Marine
    Corps, in partnership with the U.S. Navy, which will be capable of
    defending America's global national security interests in the 21st
    Century. Such an investment addresses our warfighting readiness
    requirements, accelerates the pace of our transformation and
    modernization, and recapitalizes our infrastructure. The fiscal year
    2002 plus-ups provided by the administration during budget wrap-up
    reduced our unfunded requirements by approximately $400 million. With
    your consistent support we can achieve our goals and provide our Nation
    with a Marine Corps that will be well on the road to dramatically
    transformed expeditionary capabilities.

        Chairman Levin. General Jones, thank you so much.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of
    the committee: I am honored to appear before you today for the
    first time as Secretary of the Air Force and to be in the
    company of my fellow service secretaries and the distinguished
    flag officers who lead the world's finest military team.
        I, too, would like to pause and say something special about
    Mike Ryan. He is certainly a class act. In fact, besides being
    a superb military officer, I find that he is a man for all
    seasons, and I commend him to you, sir.
        With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will make just a
    short opening statement, as will General Ryan, and we will
    request our written statement and the Air Force 2001 posture
    statement be included in the record.
        Mr. Chairman, America is an aerospace Nation. During the
    last 100 years our country has harnessed and developed
    aerospace power to accomplish many impressive feats, including
    revolutionizing the nature of warfare, changing the face of
    transportation and the conduct of global trade, and enabling
    mankind to open doors to a new universe of discovery in space.
    Those accomplishments, Mr. Chairman, form the legacy of the
    twentieth century.
        In the 100 years to come, aerospace power, properly guided
    and nourished, will further transform the interactions among
    nations for the benefit of our own citizens. With its
    attributes of speed, range, stealth and precision, our Nation's
    outstanding Air Force will continue its current global
    reconnaissance and strike superiority and the greatest
    deterrent power that capability brings with it.
        The President's fiscal year 2002 budget supports critical
    needs for our 21st Century Air Force. It places a special and
    very welcome emphasis on people and readiness, areas of
    immediate concern to our forces. The current quadrennial review
    process and the analysis the Secretary of Defense is leading in
    the Department of Defense will address our strategy, force
    structure, and efficient management of our resources for the
    longer term.
        As these intellectual efforts reach their conclusions, my
    Air Force colleagues and I will be prepared to consider and
    orchestrate the role of military aerospace power in the joint
    and combined operations of the future.
        We also are striving for efficiency. We recognize that we
    cannot just keep coming back and asking for more money, but we
    are looking for things we can do to free up resources so that
    we can in fact devote those resources to modernization and
    transformation where it makes sense to do so.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Senator Warner and members of
    your committee for your tremendous support that has enabled our
    Air Force to become without question the world's finest. We did
    not get here on our own.
        I look forward to your questions and advice and the
    dialogue we will conduct together in the months and years to
    come. Thank you, sir.
        [The joint prepared statement of Secretary Roche and
    General Ryan follows:]

      Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. James G. Roche and Gen. Michael E.
                                   Ryan, USAF

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has and
    will continue to focus on aggressive transformation to the extent our
    budget allows. This fiscal year 2002 budget shores up some of our most
    critical people and readiness concerns and allows us to remain the
    world's most respected aerospace force.
        During the last 100 years, U.S. air and space competence has
    revolutionized the conduct of warfare, providing near-instantaneous
    global reconnaissance and strike capability across the full spectrum of
    engagement, from combat operations to humanitarian aid. This competence
    has contributed to our ability to deter wars, as well as our ability to
    win them. However, in this century, we find that rogue nations, the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the rapid spread of
    information technology, have the potential to threaten our National
    interests. This changing security environment presents us with both
    unique challenges and opportunities.
        The Department of Defense is in the midst of numerous studies and
    analyses--the results of which will undoubtedly influence our future
    aerospace strategy. We must develop a force structure that, when teamed
    in joint or combined operations, will be effective in maintaining the
    peace and preserving freedom. We must also deepen and enrich the bonds
    of trust with the men and women who serve in the Air Force in order to
    attract and retain the very best individuals. We must continue to
    reform our policies, practices, and processes to make our Service more
    effective and efficient. Finally, we must pay special attention to the
    shrinking industrial base and evaluate ways to improve our current
    acquisition processes to ensure innovative future capabilities for the
    Nation.
        We respectfully submit this testimony to recount our
    accomplishments during the past year and outline our plans for the
    future. Without the steadfast support of the President and Congress,
    our past successes would not have been possible. With your continuing
    support, we will build upon those successes.

                     Air Force Posture Statement--Overview

        As we transition to the new century, even the new millennium, we
    will use this posture statement to reflect on what the Air Force
    accomplished during 2000, where we want to go in the future, and how we
    plan to get there.
        We're a service emerging from a decade of continuous
    transformation. During this period, we have molded and transformed
    aerospace power into a crucial component of joint operations. We
    defined ourselves with ``integrity first, service before self, and
    excellence in all we do'' and developed ourselves to be ``fast,
    flexible, and decisive.''
        It was also a time that took a heavy toll on our people and our
    systems. Therefore, we are developing new initiatives in our People,
    Readiness, and Modernization programs. If we are to continue to protect
    America's interests with aerospace power, we must implement these
    initiatives.

                                     PEOPLE

        The state of the economy has exerted considerable pressure on our
    ability to retain and recruit the right people. Frankly, it is
    difficult to compete with the financial compensation available in the
    private sector. Consequently, taking care of our people is our top
    priority. Taking care of people starts with their professional lives,
    so that they are satisfied with the work they do and know they're
    accomplishing something important. It also, of course, means providing
    them attractive compensation, benefits, housing, and facilities that
    show we value their efforts and care about their families.

                                   READINESS

        Our dominance of the full spectrum of operations tends to
    overshadow what has happened to our readiness. Responding across this
    full spectrum of operations necessitates we have a certain number of
    units ready to deploy in the first 30 days of conflict. This is the
    basis of our readiness requirement of 92 percent. Since 1996, our
    worldwide combat force readiness rates have decreased 23 percentage
    points to a rate of 68 percent in April 2001. Furthermore, our overall
    Air Force readiness is lower than any time since June 1987. We are
    capable of winning today; however, we are concerned about these trends
    in readiness indicators. A major factor in the decline is the
    increasing age of our aircraft. For example, our flying hours have
    remained relatively constant over the past 5 years, but their cost has
    increased by over 45 percent after inflation. Older aircraft are simply
    more difficult to maintain as mechanical failures become less
    predictable, repairs become more complicated, and parts become harder
    to come by and more expensive. But, even with these contributing
    factors, we had the best year in our history for aviation safety, a
    clear measure of our people's professionalism.

                                 MODERNIZATION

        Today, the average age of our aircraft is almost 22 years old. Even
    if we execute every modernization program on our books--which amounts
    to procuring about 100 aircraft per year in the near future--our
    aircraft average age continues to rise, reaching nearly 30 years old by
    2020. In order to level off this increasing trend, we would have to
    procure about 150 aircraft per year. To actually reduce the average age
    of our aircraft, we would need to procure about 170 aircraft per year.
    Similarly, where as industry replaces or totally renovates their
    facilities on a 50-year cycle, competing priorities have resulted in a
    150-year facilities recapitalization rate. We are in a position where
    we can only address the most urgent repair issues, while our backlog of
    real property maintenance continues to grow. We are working to slow
    down the aging of our fleet and infrastructure, but the climbing costs
    of operations and maintenance, as well as competing modernization
    effectiveness goals, continue to prevent that from happening.
    Consequently, we do not have the procurement funding to recapitalize
    our fleet and facilities to the extent that we would like.
        However, even with these challenges, we have molded and transformed
    aerospace power into a crucial component of joint operations. Because
    of this, we have expanded our vision for the future. Our new Vision
    2020--Global Vigilance, Reach and Power captures the philosophy that
    transformed us into a ``force of choice'' for rapid expeditionary
    operations. Our strategic plan institutionalizes this vision by linking
    the capabilities we need in the future with what we do best--our core
    competencies.
    Core Competencies
              Aerospace Superiority--The ability to control what moves
            through air and space . . . ensures freedom of action.
              Information Superiority--The ability to control and exploit
            information to our Nation's advantage . . . ensures decision
            dominance.
              Global Attack--The ability to engage adversary targets
            anywhere, anytime . . . holds any adversary at risk.
              Precision Engagement--The ability to deliver desired effects
            with minimal risk and collateral damage . . . denies the enemy
            sanctuary.
              Rapid Global Mobility--The ability to rapidly position forces
            anywhere in the world . . . ensures unprecedented
            responsiveness.
              Agile Combat Support--The ability to sustain flexible and
            efficient combat operations . . . is the foundation of success.

        Nothing illustrates our culture of transformation better than the
    Expeditionary Aerospace Force--the ``EAF.'' In October 1999, the heavy
    demand for aerospace power drove us to restructure our forces so we
    could inject some stability and predictability into the lives of our
    people. By December 2000, we had completed the first full rotation
    cycle of the EAF. In the span of less than 2 years, we succeeded in
    restructuring ourselves into a more sustainable, flexible, and
    responsive force. We now give the commanders in chief (CINCs)
    expeditionary aerospace packages that are tailored and trained-to-task
    to meet their full mission requirements.
        In 2000, we were involved in the full spectrum of operations--from
    famines, fires, and hurricanes to major contingency operations. Yet,
    the diversity of these missions didn't stifle us; it stimulated our
    creativity. We're already light and lean, so now we're pushing the
    envelope with technologies that will revolutionize the way we deliver
    aerospace power for the Nation. We are developing directed energy
    weapons capable of effects at the speed of light; unmanned aerial
    vehicles that reduce the risk to our people while giving us greater
    capability at a lower cost; space technologies that radically increase
    the effectiveness of our aerospace operations; and aircraft like the F-
    22 that are more survivable and lethal than our current fighters. We
    don't wait until we're forced to improve--innovation and adaptation are
    our heritage.
        Our creativity also extends to how we conduct business inside our
    organization. We are realizing significant cost efficiencies by
    benchmarking the best in commercial and government business practices
    and adapting them to our unique environment. We are leveraging
    technology by integrating our people, operations, and oversight into a
    globally-connected, enterprise-wide, and secure information network. We
    are conducting manpower and program competitions to take advantage of
    the best opportunities for outsourcing and privatization. We're
    improving the way we plan, program, acquire, and protect our air,
    space, and information systems. Our reinvention teams have saved more
    than $30 billion during the last decade. Of course better business
    practices aren't a choice; they're necessary to maximize the returns on
    our Nation's investment.
        This posture statement will give you a good idea about where we've
    been, where we're going, and what's necessary to remain the world's
    best aerospace force. Aerospace power is America's asymmetric
    advantage, and we're determined to make sure America keeps it.

                          America's Air Force in 2000

        In 2000, we participated in the full spectrum of military
    operations--from deterrence and combat contingency operations to
    humanitarian aid and disaster assistance. Across this spectrum, it was
    Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power that was essential for assuring U.S.
    national security and international stability. We provided global
    vigilance using our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) assets; force protection measures; and deterrence missions. Our
    mobility assets and pre-positioned munitions contributed to our global
    reach. Finally, we displayed global power in Iraq and the Balkans with
    our unmatched capability to create precise military effects when called
    upon or threatened. These three facets of aerospace power are
    interdependent, collectively providing rapid aerospace dominance for
    America. Perhaps most importantly, all these accomplishments were
    against the backdrop of a pivotal transformation in the way we
    structure our forces to support expeditionary operations. This chapter
    will describe these efforts during the past year.

                       THE EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE FORCE

        This year we completed our organizational transformation to an
    Expeditionary Aerospace Force--the EAF--a groundbreaking approach to
    organizing aerospace capability. Given the demand for aerospace forces
    over the past 10 years, we designed a capability-based force structure
    to ensure that on-call, rotational forces can effectively meet both our
    steady-state and ``pop-up'' commitments, while giving our people more
    predictability and stability in their deployment schedules. We began
    implementing the initiative in October 1999, and successfully completed
    the first full rotation of our ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces--the
    AEFs--in December 2000.
        The EAF includes both deployable and non-deployable warfighting and
    support forces. Our deployable AEFs are 10 packages of aerospace power.
    They provide us with the rotational base required to conduct multiple,
    concurrent small-scale contingencies, immediate crises, and ``pop-up''
    engagements. These AEFs must be fully resourced to provide the full
    spectrum of aerospace power capabilities required by the warfighting
    CINCs. Our AEF Prime forces include those operational capabilities not
    organically assigned to the AEFs. They comprise our nuclear alert,
    regional command and control, and space operation forces, without which
    we could not meet our steady-state and contingency commitments. The
    AEFs are deployed and sustained by a robust mobility force called EAF
    Mobility. EAF Mobility is the Nation's fastest system to transport the
    most urgent cargo, from troops and equipment to humanitarian aid.
    Underlying the AEFs, AEF Prime, and EAF Mobility is EAF Foundation--the
    acquisition, medical, depot, training, and infrastructure resources
    needed to keep the other parts of the EAF operating.
        The EAF offers predictability for commanders to reconstitute,
    train, and organize their assigned forces to better meet their upcoming
    contingency requirements. Two AEFs are on-call every 3 months within
    the full-rotation period of 15 months. Additionally, two Aerospace
    Expeditionary Wings (AEW) supplement these AEFs, alternating on-call
    duties every 120 days for ``pop-up'' conflicts. Two AEFs and one AEW
    represent about 20 percent of our combat forces, which equates to the
    maximum commitment the Air Force can maintain indefinitely without
    adversely impacting training or readiness. If tasked beyond this level,
    we would conduct surge operations as required. Upon completion of
    large-scale operations, the EAF would then reconstitute before
    beginning a new rotational cycle. From now on, we will use the EAF to
    provide Joint Force Commanders trained-to-task, capability-based
    packages to meet their specific requirements.
        AEFs offer many operational advantages:

             An AEF is fast--our goal is to deploy one AEF, or
            about 120 aircraft and 10,000 airmen, within 48 hours, and we
            strive to provide up to 5 AEFs in 15 days.
             An AEF is light and lean--our global command and
            control infrastructure allows high-fidelity operational support
            in near real-time from the continental U.S. This enables a
            ``reachback'' capability that helps minimize the deployment of
            supporting equipment and personnel and simplifies force
            protection.
             An AEF is lethal--it is capable of striking more than
            200 targets per day.
             An AEF is flexible--we provide a tailored, trained-to-
            task, strategically relevant force that rapidly projects power
            anywhere in the world.

        Lessons learned from the first AEF rotation are improving the
    force's expeditionary structure and concepts of operations. For
    example, our low density/high demand (LD/HD) platforms, such as the
    Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and U-2 reconnaissance
    aircraft, have been strained by supporting continuous operations--
    deploying up to five times more frequently than other forces. As a
    short-term remedy, we stood-up another AWACS squadron (without
    procuring additional aircraft) to better align the squadrons with the
    AEF rotation. For the long-term, instead of procuring more LD/HD
    platforms, we are developing transformational solutions to perform
    these missions more effectively, while providing more persistence over
    the target area. For example, we are exploring the transition of the U-
    2 and other over-tasked ISR missions to unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs), common wide-body (multi-radar) aircraft, and/or space-based
    assets. These future capabilities should arrest some of the operations
    tempo issues facing our most critical LD/HD assets.
        The success of the EAF depends on the vital contributions of all
    the components of the Total Force--active, guard, Reserve, civilians,
    and contractors. The stability of the 15-month cycle has allowed the
    Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard to meet (or even exceed) their
    programmed 10 percent tasking to the EAF. Our Reserve components
    currently provide the EAF about 7 percent of its expeditionary combat
    support, 20 percent of its combat forces, 33 percent of its air
    refueling assets, and 44 percent of its intratheater airlift.

                              AEROSPACE OPERATIONS

        Aerospace power can bring a rapid halt to human suffering or
    attacking forces. Our presence in struggling regions of the world, like
    East Timor and Mozambique, brings help where it is needed, builds
    goodwill, improves international relations, and provides valuable real-
    world training. Alternatively, we can create military effects against
    our adversaries, like we have done in the Balkans and Southwest Asia.
        Our aerospace forces have the flexibility and agility for
    simultaneous engagement across the full spectrum of military
    operations. We are prepared to maintain regional stability, protect
    national interests, and help win America's wars whenever called. The
    following are a few of the operations in which we participated this
    year.
    Operation Stabilise
        When the province of East Timor attempted to break away from
    Indonesia, the resulting conflict caused thousands of residents to flee
    their homes. The U.N. relied on our airlift to deliver the manpower and
    supplies to stabilize the region. Intertheater airlift, provided by C-
    5s, C-141s, and C-17s, transported 1,580 Thai peacekeepers to the
    region. Intratheater C-130H aircraft from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, flew
    over 600 hours transporting more than 1,800 personnel and 1,250 tons of
    combat support equipment and humanitarian aid to Dili and Komorro in
    East Timor.
    Operation Atlas Response
        In March 2000, flooding devastated Mozambique, driving hundreds of
    thousands of people from their homes. We responded as part of Joint
    Task Force Atlas Response, flying more than 600 sorties that delivered
    970 tons of crucial supplies. Crews flying C-130s and C-17s transported
    nearly 2,000 non-governmental relief workers to Maputo, Mozambique's
    capital city, and Beira, the country's second largest city. Rescue and
    special operations crews played a key role ensuring supplies were
    distributed properly.
    Balkan Operations
        In 2000, we conducted 16 percent, or about 2,000 of the 12,000
    combat sorties flown in the Balkans in support of the Kosovo Forces
    (KFOR) and Stabilization Forces (SFOR). Yet this statistic
    significantly understates our contribution to these Balkan operations.
    Our fighter, tanker, command and control (C\2\), ISR, and airlift
    aircraft; C\2\ facilities; combat search and rescue forces; special
    operations units; UAVs; and space-based resources were indispensable to
    the performance of all joint and coalition operations.
    United States Wildfire Relief
        Our people played a pivotal role fighting the worst wildfires to
    ravage the western United States in 50 years. In 48 airlift missions,
    we transported 330 tons of cargo and over 5,900 Army, Marine, and
    civilian firefighters to Idaho, Montana, and California. Three Air
    National Guard and one Reserve C-130 aircraft, equipped with the
    Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS), flew 870 missions and
    dropped almost 2.3 million gallons of fire suppressant across 19 states
    within a 6-month period.
    Southwest Asian Operations
        During 2000, we maintained a continuous presence of 8,000 airmen in
    Southwest Asia in support of Operations Northern Watch and Southern
    Watch. Our aerospace superiority assets (including air, space, and
    information systems) produced an environment that permitted more than
    23,000 coalition combat sorties without a single combat loss. Of these
    sorties, 63 percent, or 14,500, were flown by the Air Force. We
    responded to Iraqi no-fly zone violations and air defense threats with
    precision-guided munitions (PGMs), destroying a significant portion of
    Iraq's anti-aircraft artillery systems, threat radars, and command
    centers.
    Northeast Asian Operations
        As the Nation marks the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, we
    continue to maintain a significant presence in South Korea and Japan,
    and conduct joint and combined exercises with the host nations. Cope
    Thunder, executed in early 2000, provided realistic training for
    aircrews, operations and logistics personnel, and selected C\2\
    operators by exercising complex combat operations across the Pacific
    Theater. We also participated in exercise Ulchi Focus Lens, the world's
    largest annual joint and combined computer simulation war game
    conducted with the Republic of Korea's national mobilization exercise
    ``Ulchi.''

                                   DETERRENCE

        America deters potential aggression by maintaining the ability and
    resolve to use overwhelming force against any adversary. We maintain
    this posture through our expeditionary, rapid global mobility, nuclear,
    and space forces. The bomber, with its unique strengths of flexible
    payload, global range, and in-flight retargeting or recall, is the
    cornerstone of our conventional and nuclear force projection
    capability. Additionally, the land-based intercontinental ballistic
    missile (ICBM) provides a quick-reaction and highly reliable force with
    a mission capable rate above 99 percent.

                COUNTER-NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

        The potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against
    America and its allies is one of the most complex threats facing the
    DOD. Our balanced response to the proliferation of WMD, as outlined in
    our recently completed Air Force Counter-Nuclear, Biological, and
    Chemical (NBC) Operations Doctrine document, integrates the four
    pillars of counterproliferation--proliferation prevention, counterforce
    strategies, active defense efforts, and passive defense measures.
    Proliferation prevention restricts the spread of NBC weapons through
    political and diplomatic efforts, such as export controls and treaty
    agreements, but may also include denial operations when directed by the
    National Command Authorities. Counterforce operations include attacking
    an adversary's NBC weapons and their associated production,
    transportation, and storage facilities prior to their use. Active
    defense focuses on intercepting conventional and unconventional NBC
    delivery systems before they reach friendly forces. Finally, passive
    defense measures, including force protection, protect our people from
    the effects of an NBC attack and enable sustained aerospace combat
    operations.
        Our counter-NBC operational readiness initiative sets Air Force-
    wide standards for readiness, identifies shortfalls, and develops
    capabilities to effectively cope with NBC attacks. This initiative
    includes our recently developed counter-NBC roadmap and chemical
    warfare concept of operations (CW CONOPS). The roadmap is an innovative
    investment strategy that cuts across all facets of Air Force plans and
    programs to increase counterproliferation visibility. The CW CONOPS,
    developed by our Pacific forces, is a plan to help us maintain high-
    paced operations during NBC attacks on air bases.

                                FORCE PROTECTION

        Force protection comprises the activities that prevent or mitigate
    hostile actions against our people and resources when they are not
    directly engaged with the enemy. In 2000, our force protection
    personnel made 41 vulnerability assessments that were used to improve
    our physical security, the safeguarding of our food and water supplies,
    and our ability to respond to WMD incidents both at home and abroad. We
    developed a surface-to-air missile (SAM) footprint mapping capability,
    which couples site-specific topography with the effective range of
    hand-held SAMs, to direct security forces to probable threat locations.
    We have also instilled a force protection mindset in our people by
    incorporating force protection into the curriculum at all levels of
    professional military education and as part of Warrior Week during
    basic training. Protecting our people remains a top priority at all
    command levels.

                   INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND NETWORK DEFENSE

        Information assurance (IA) and computer network defense are the
    strategy and means to deliver crucial information securely to the
    warfighter. We are in a daily battle for information superiority. Our
    air tasking orders, flying schedules, maintenance and logistics
    records, C\2\, and other operational functions are carried over our
    networks, making them a key target for potential adversaries. In 2000,
    we developed a plan to integrate operations, people, technology, and
    oversight through an enterprise-wide, network-centric concept. This
    plan includes operations and information protection; automated and
    dynamic detection and response; consolidated situational awareness and
    decision support; and IA in deployed and classified environments. For
    example, we monitor and evaluate network anomalies detected by our
    automated security incident measurement system (ASIMS). This system
    recognizes the latest hacking techniques to ensure early warning of
    attempted penetrations into our systems.

                 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

        Our air-breathing and space-based ISR assets combine to provide
    America global vigilance by exploiting the high ground and actively
    monitoring the entire globe for emerging threats and treaty compliance.
    They provide an integrated capability to collect, process, and
    disseminate accurate and timely information that allows our decision-
    makers to rapidly analyze and respond to changing global conditions,
    and enables us to obtain and maintain decision dominance. In 2000, our
    ISR assets monitored Iraqi compliance with U.N. sanctions as part of
    Operations Northern and Southern Watch and were key to providing
    critical real-time decision-making information to NATO leaders in the
    Balkans.

                            COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

        We are actively supporting the National Drug Control Strategy. Our
    AWACS and other ISR assets, with tanker support, detect suspected drug
    traffickers in the South American source zone and monitor their
    activities through the Caribbean transit zone to their arrival and
    apprehension in the United States. Air National Guard forces conduct
    the majority of our counter-drug missions, employing an impressive
    variety of capabilities from intelligence and airlift to ground-based
    radar and fighter interception. The Guard's domestic counter-drug
    operations focused on state and Federal law enforcement support,
    interdiction, eradication, and drug demand reduction. The Reserve was
    also an important participant, flying patrol missions, and providing
    mobile training teams, intelligence, and linguists. In 2000, the
    Reserve provided 68 personnel, flew 105 missions, and conducted 15
    mobile training team deployments in support of worldwide counter-drug
    operations.
        Our civilian auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol (CAP), joined the Nation's
    counter-drug program in 1986, partnering directly with U.S. Customs and
    the Drug Enforcement Administration. Since then it has flown thousands
    of hours a year in support of counter-drug efforts. During 2000, the
    CAP efforts prevented approximately $3 billion worth of narcotics from
    entering the U.S.--a great all-volunteer accomplishment. The active,
    Guard, Reserve, and CAP are crucial partners in the Nation's ``war on
    drugs.''

                              SECURITY ASSISTANCE

        Cooperative foreign relationships are crucial to building
    multinational coalitions, securing international access, and sustaining
    our commercial defense industry. In 2000, we managed more than 3,800
    contracts for sales of aircraft, spare parts, munitions, and training
    valued at over $103 billion. These contracts included sales of over 240
    F-16s to the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Israel, and several other
    countries. Through the foreign military sales and international
    military education and training programs, we trained approximately
    4,600 international students in warfighting and professional military
    education.
        Our international armament cooperation program co-developed and
    fielded interoperable weapon systems that effectively leveraged DOD
    resources by cost-sharing, employing foreign technical expertise, and
    securing larger economies of scale (reducing the cost per unit). Under
    this program, we have reached more than 360 agreements with our allies
    and coalition partners involving research and development, production,
    equipment loans, and scientific and technical information exchanges.

                                     SAFETY

        The safety of our people is a principal concern in all our
    operations. A combination of increased funding for aircraft
    improvements and the use of operational risk management yielded
    positive results in several safety categories. We had the lowest flight
    mishap rate in our history--1.08 major mishaps per 100,000 hours of
    flight time. On the ground, we had our second lowest annual number of
    off-duty fatalities, with 50 (24 percent below our 10 year average of
    65), and on-duty fatalities, with 6.
        We continue to build on this success with innovative safety tools
    such as bird avoidance warning systems; an automated system to expedite
    mishap collection methods that supports operations and acquisition
    decision making; and a quality assurance system that ensures fleet-wide
    flight safety deficiencies are rapidly corrected.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In 2000, we honored our tradition of operational excellence--firmly
    establishing our position as the National Command Authorities' frequent
    choice for fast, flexible, and precise military response. We also have
    done something difficult for many large organizations--we overcame the
    inertia of the status quo, improving both how we operate and the
    quality of life for our people. We are now an Expeditionary Aerospace
    Force--organizationally transformed to sustain America's aerospace
    advantage. Through global vigilance, reach, and power, we wield the
    unprecedented ability to observe events around the globe, rapidly reach
    out to influence them, and if necessary, bring to bear the force needed
    to secure our National objectives.
        In this chapter we recounted some of our activities during the past
    year. In the next chapter we will move from the present to the future.
    Specifically, the discussion will turn to our understanding of the type
    of capabilities we must pursue to successfully contend with the future
    security environment.

                           America's Future Air Force

        The history of the Air Force is marked by an unshakable dedication
    to the promise and potential of aerospace power as envisioned by our
    early pioneers. This enduring commitment has kept us on the cutting
    edge through continual organizational, operational, and technological
    transformation. We no longer narrowly focus on one overarching
    adversary, but rather on full-spectrum employment of the Total Force
    whenever our Nation calls. In the new strategic environment, we
    integrate air, space, and information to dominate the entire vertical
    realm. Indeed, we have transformed ourselves from a forward-based,
    organizationally stovepiped force structure to a forward-deploying,
    integrated expeditionary force structure. Moreover, we accomplished
    this through a steady, well-planned process of continuous innovation.
    Given the increasing complexity of warfare and an ever-changing
    adversary, expeditionary aerospace power offers an expanded range of
    strategic and operational options across the entire spectrum of
    engagement. Our commitment to technologies such as stealth, precision
    standoff weapons, and information warfare offers America new strategic
    options with less risk. This continuous transformation will preserve
    the Nation's vital role in world leadership and the ability to defend
    its interests around the globe.

                        THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

        Today's security environment is unique in American history. We do
    not have a ``peer competitor,'' nor are we likely to see one in the
    near future. At the same time, we face a number of uncertainties and
    potential challenges that threaten America's security and interests.
    These threats include regional hegemonies, asymmetric and transnational
    threats, and crises that may require intervention for humanitarian
    purposes.
        A hostile power, for example, may attempt to dominate a region by
    intimidating our allies or pursuing interests contrary to our own. Such
    a power may use anti-access strategies that attempt to deny our ability
    to deploy stabilizing military force. Today, we see many potential
    adversaries developing theater ballistic missiles and other anti-access
    capabilities to achieve this goal. Renegade actors may use asymmetric
    means such as terrorism, information warfare, or weapons of mass
    destruction to radically enhance their disruptive capabilities at a
    relatively low cost. We experienced such a tragedy in 1996 when 19
    deployed airmen were killed during the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi
    Arabia. Other transnational or small-scale contingencies, including
    ethnic conflicts, international criminal activity, or insurgencies, may
    threaten our interests or the safety of our citizens (e.g., illicit
    drug activity in Latin America). Non-state actors and criminal
    organizations will continue to threaten American interests through
    sophisticated technical means or by physical attack. Crises that can
    spill over state borders that require humanitarian assistance, such as
    environmental disasters, will persist. We recently responded to the
    floods in Africa and the earthquakes in India.
        Space is an area where threats might emerge in the coming decade.
    Some of our potential adversaries have the ability to improve both
    their offensive and defensive military capabilities with commercially
    available space and information technologies. At the same time, they
    may try to neutralize our space assets, especially as space becomes
    more vital to our military, civil, and commercial interests.
        Ultimately, any national-level response is predicated on the
    ability to rapidly adapt military capabilities and operational concepts
    to precisely achieve the desired objectives. We demonstrated this
    ability during Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force, and we will be
    even more formidable in the future. Should deterrence fail, aerospace
    power is a force of choice for rapid response with minimum risk to U.S.
    personnel and non-combatants.

                                   OUR VISION

        Our vision, America's Air Force: Global Vigilance, Reach, and
    Power--Vision 2020, published in June 2000, provides a template for the
    ongoing transformation of the Air Force and aerospace power into the
    21st century. Our vision underscores that people--our Total Force--are
    the foundation of the Air Force. We describe an aerospace domain best
    exploited by an integrated air, space, and information force. We
    present our forces in capability-based packages, called Aerospace
    Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each built upon the pillars of aerospace
    expertise, our core competencies--Aerospace Superiority, Information
    Superiority, Global Attack, Precision Engagement, Rapid Global
    Mobility, and Agile Combat Support. In the end, our vision focuses us
    on our mission: To defend the United States and protect its interests
    through aerospace power.

                               OUR STRATEGIC PLAN

        We believe that aerospace power will be, indeed must be,
    increasingly called upon as the Nation's military instrument of choice
    in an uncertain world. No other option is as fast, flexible, or
    necessary to the execution of joint operations. The Air Force Strategic
    Plan is the broad framework to institutionalize our vision. It
    anticipates the future security environment and provides guidance on
    major force modernization and investment strategies by identifying
    fourteen critical future capabilities based upon the Air Force core
    competencies and support areas. It is our roadmap to the future.

                                THE TOTAL FORCE

        Our Total Force builds on a foundation of high standards and strong
    cooperation among our active, Reserve, Guard, civilian and contractor
    personnel. Simply stated, we could not perform our mission without the
    combined contributions of all components. On any given day, members of
    the Guard and Reserve work side-by-side with their Active Duty
    counterparts. Today, our Guard and Reserve assets account for 38
    percent of our fighter force, 60 percent of our air refueling
    capability, 71 percent of our intratheater airlift, and significant
    portions of our rescue and support resources. The Reserve is the sole
    provider of unique capabilities such as aerial spray, space shuttle
    helicopter rescue support, and hurricane hunting, while the Guard
    provides 100 percent of our homeland air defense capability.
    Additionally, the Guard and Reserve have an increasing presence in the
    bomber force and in space, intelligence, and information systems. Guard
    and Reserve units provide essential support for training new pilots,
    manning radar and regional control centers, performing flight check
    functions at our depots, and conducting space operations. Equally
    important, our civilian members and contractors provide specialized
    administrative, technical, and managerial expertise that complement the
    functions performed by uniformed members. Without these combined
    skills, we could not operate as an expeditionary force. In the future,
    we will foster an even closer and more interdependent partnership
    between all of our components through new organizational structures and
    more interactive and flexible career patterns.

                             AEROSPACE INTEGRATION

        Our domain stretches from the earth's surface to the far reaches of
    our satellites' orbits in a seamless operational medium. However, even
    with the best aircraft and spacecraft optimized for their respective
    environments, the aerospace effects we create hinge on our people and
    their ability to rapidly and continuously integrate our air, space, and
    information systems. Accordingly, we have modified our command
    organizations to take full advantage of the resulting synergy.
        In September 2000, for example, we designated the Aerospace
    Operations Center (AOC) as a ``weapon system'' of the future. This hub
    of advanced networks will gather and fuse the full range of information
    in real-time--from the strategic to the tactical level--giving Joint
    Force Component Commanders actionable knowledge to rapidly employ their
    forces in the battlespace.
        Effectively employing integrated aerospace power requires
    commanders who exploit the entire aerospace continuum, both on a
    regional and global scale. This new paradigm of employment must be
    instilled in the minds of airmen at all levels of Air Force
    professional military education. To help achieve this end, we created
    an Aerospace Basic Course for newly commissioned officers to ensure
    they understand the different elements of aerospace power. Similarly,
    our Developing Aerospace Leaders initiative is determining the best way
    to cultivate the skills needed to lead in a dynamic, changing
    environment. We are infusing air, space, and information operators into
    all key command and training courses to expand their breadth of
    experience and core knowledge. Finally, our Space Warfare Center
    established a space aggressor squadron to increase the awareness of
    threats from space-capable adversaries and improve our ability to
    defend against them.

                         EVOLVING THE FULL-SPECTRUM EAF

        Providing the flexibility needed for full-spectrum operations
    requires continued efforts to round out the capabilities of our AEFs to
    make them virtually interchangeable. Currently, our 10 AEFs are not
    equal in capability. For example, only three of the ten AEFs are
    equipped with long-range, precision standoff strike capabilities, and
    only nine have an F-16CJ squadron for suppression of enemy air
    defenses.
        As the EAF continues to mature and technologies advance, we will
    expand the capabilities each AEF can provide. We will enlarge the
    battlespace an AEF can control; enhance our ability to do real-time,
    adaptive targeting; and dramatically increase the number of targets an
    AEF can engage in a day. Finally, we will improve our expeditionary
    combat support capabilities--effective, responsive logistics are the
    key to sustaining expeditionary forces and operating from austere
    locations.

              OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

        The changing security environment requires us to change the way we
    plan and operate. Aerospace power's ability to perform effects-based
    operations (i.e., focusing on achieving desired effects versus creating
    target lists) means we can support the joint force commander in ways
    unimaginable only a few years ago. Our ongoing transformation enables
    our long-range, standoff, all-weather precision, and stealth
    capabilities to rapidly counter any adversary's attempt to deny us
    access to a theater.
        This global strike capability, combined with responsive logistics,
    will then help to achieve the rapid halt of human suffering or
    threatening forces. Lastly, the massing of joint firepower at the time
    and location of our choosing will create the conditions that permit the
    safe deployment and employment of our joint forces. Once deployed, our
    force protection measures will provide defense against asymmetric
    threats. Through long-range stealth, precision standoff weaponry, and
    information operations, we are able to project substantial effects
    without subjecting our forces to substantial risk. Aerospace power's
    inherent versatility and precision form a large part of this tremendous
    capability, giving our leaders unprecedented strategic initiative and
    flexibility now and in future operations. Aerospace power is the
    Nation's asymmetric advantage.

                               HOMELAND SECURITY

        The Air Force has always contributed to homeland defense by
    deterring aggressors, intercepting intruders, and providing ballistic
    missile warning. However, defending our homeland has assumed new and
    daunting dimensions with the increased threat of terrorism, the spread
    of information warfare techniques, and the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction. Our traditional defenses are often incomplete against
    these unconventional threats.
        We are significant supporters of a multi-layered missile defense
    system incorporating space-based elements that provide effective,
    affordable, global protection against a wide range of threats. Future
    space capabilities like the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) will
    greatly enhance our ability to track and engage ballistic missiles,
    while space-based radar technologies (if transitioned into deployed
    systems) will track fixed and mobile ballistic missile launchers. The
    Airborne Laser (ABL) will engage boost-phase ballistic missiles, while
    the F-22, working with advanced ISR systems, will defend against cruise
    missiles. The Air Force expects to be a principal player in any future
    missile defense system.
        The Total Force brings a variety of capabilities to the defense of
    our homeland. The Air National Guard is positioned to ensure the air
    defense of the Nation while providing critical resources like airlift,
    command and control, and disaster preparedness response forces to other
    lead agencies and the Joint Forces Civil Support Teams. Our Air Force
    Medical Service is acquiring a variety of modular packages that can be
    used to support civilian authorities requesting our assistance at home
    or abroad. The Small Portable Expeditionary Aeromedical Rapid Response
    or ``SPEARR'' teams deploy ten highly trained specialists within 2
    hours of notification with the capability to provide a broad scope of
    care, including initial disaster medical assessment, emergency surgery,
    critical care, and patient transport preparation. In February 2001, we
    participated in a 3-day bioterrorism exercise, Alamo Alert, in San
    Antonio, Texas. This tabletop exercise explored city, county, state,
    and Federal responses to the release of a biological agent. We will use
    the lessons learned from this exercise to merge the disaster response
    plans of different agencies so they will work together more
    effectively. Developing a robust homeland defense strategy is critical
    to the Nation. The Air Force stands ready today, as in the past, to
    contribute our special capabilities, as well as develop new
    technologies that can aid civil authorities in combating any threat or
    attack to our homeland.

                                URBAN OPERATIONS

        By 2015, half the world's 7.2 billion people will live in urban
    centers. The growing migration to cities means an increased likelihood
    that military targets will be in close proximity to non-combatants. We
    must, therefore, place special emphasis on producing precise,
    predictable effects with minimal collateral damage to surrounding
    structures. Advances in target identification and precision weapons
    delivery have propelled us from committing multiple aircraft for each
    target during World War II (e.g., 1,000 B-17 sorties dropped 9,000
    bombs to destroy one target in 1943) to utilizing a single aircraft to
    neutralize multiple targets during Operation Allied Force (e.g., one B-
    2 with 16 bombs hit 16 different targets in 1999). We are pioneering a
    new class of non-kinetic weapons that will create the desired effects
    without death and physical destruction. Large-scale conflicts will
    always include some degree of devastation, but non-kinetic weaponry and
    precision effects provide expanded options for our Nation's leaders
    across the entire spectrum of conflict. Precision effects also offer
    the potential to significantly reduce the duration of a conflict by
    concentrating our force on high-value military targets. This minimizes
    collateral damage, unintended consequences, and the accompanying
    pressures such problems bring to coalition cohesion.

                       SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITMENT

        Our commitment to a strong science and technology (S&T) program is
    fundamental to maintaining aerospace dominance in the 21st century. We
    continue to invest in a broad and balanced set of technologies derived
    from basic research, applied research, and advanced technology
    development on a continuum of maturity levels from short- to long-term.
    This time-scaled approach keeps emerging capabilities in the pipeline
    and fosters revolutionary developments.
        The Air Force S&T community is working closely with operators and
    strategic planners to explicitly link research activities with our core
    competencies, critical future capabilities, and future concepts of
    operation. This effort has produced S&T goals in the areas of time
    sensitive targeting; improved command, control, and information
    systems; survivability (defensive efforts); lethality and
    neutralization (offensive efforts); and improved power generation,
    propulsion, and vehicles. In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2001
    National Defense Authorization Act, we are also conducting a major
    review of our S&T program to identify both short-term objectives and
    long-range challenges.
        No matter how strong our commitment to S&T, however, our efforts
    will be jeopardized if we don't protect our developing technologies. We
    are taking aggressive measures to safeguard existing and emerging
    technologies from compromise that would degrade combat effectiveness,
    shorten the expected combat life of a system, or stall program
    development.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We have adapted to the new strategic environment by incorporating
    new technologies, operational concepts, and organizational structures--
    the definition of transformation. For the good of the Nation, we cannot
    afford to stop with the transformation we have already achieved. Given
    the increasing complexity of warfare and the access potential
    adversaries have to new technologies, we now need to move ahead even
    more quickly. If we emphasize those force elements that have the
    flexibility to respond to the new strategic challenge, we can realize
    order of magnitude increases in capability. For example, America can
    support the full spectrum of operations at lower cost in dollars and
    manpower by emphasizing stealth, precision standoff weapons, and
    information technologies that mark a qualitative shift in military
    operations. Those same forces have relevance across the entire spectrum
    of conflict. If we exploit the aerospace capabilities that have emerged
    since our current war plans were established, we may not be faced with
    having to shrink from our responsibilities as a global power.
    Capitalizing on America's asymmetric advantage--aerospace power--we can
    expand America's strategic options at less risk. However, there's a
    bill for this tremendous capability. We must fully fund our aerospace
    power force--the force that gives America a capability that is truly
    unique among nations.

                             Roadmap to the Future

        In order to remain the world's preeminent aerospace force, we must
    continue our transformation and work through the financial hurdles
    before us. A strong economy has made retaining and recruiting an all-
    volunteer force extremely difficult, but we have taken significant
    steps to reduce the downward trends. The increasing cost of readiness
    (including operations and maintenance) is consuming the funds required
    to modernize our systems and our infrastructure. We have developed a
    responsible, time-phased plan to modernize our force without
    sacrificing readiness or capability goals. However, even if the plan is
    approved after Secretary Rumsfeld's review, we do not have the
    modernization funds to fully execute it. Finally, through constant
    innovation and adaptation, we are linking emerging technologies with
    our future concepts of operation in order to evolve our aerospace
    capabilities while providing the Nation the most effective return on
    its investments. Taking care of our people, improving readiness, and
    procuring upgraded and new, integrated systems are crucial to ensuring
    we can deliver rapid aerospace dominance well into the 21st century.

                                     PEOPLE

        Force structure drawdowns and a high demand for U.S. military
    presence around the globe have had a significant impact on our Total
    Force--active, Reserve, Guard, civilians, and contractors. Last year,
    at any given time, an average of 13,000 Total Force members were
    deployed around the world. Another 76,000 people were stationed
    overseas on permanent assignment. Retaining our military people is the
    first step in maintaining our combat capability and readiness, and will
    help alleviate many of our current recruiting and training problems. We
    need help to ensure our civilian work force is properly sized and
    shaped. We also continue to address the quality of life and quality of
    service concerns of all our people by creating better living and
    working environments for them. Finally, we are developing leaders who
    understand the full spectrum of expeditionary and integrated operations
    and the importance of giving every member an equal opportunity to serve
    and succeed. All of these actions are crucial to sustaining the
    foundation of our force--Air Force people.
    Retention
        We are unique among the Services in that we are a retention-based
    force. We depend on retaining highly trained and skilled people to
    sustain our readiness posture for rapid global deployment. By meeting
    retention goals, we can reduce our current recruiting and training
    requirements, and build and maintain our technical expertise. However,
    we expect the economic climate will continue to make retaining our
    skilled enlisted and officer personnel difficult over the next several
    years. About 7 out of every 10 enlisted airmen will make a reenlistment
    decision between now and 2004. Exit surveys show the availability of
    civilian jobs as the primary reason our people decide to separate from
    the Air Force. To retain these people, we must continue to improve
    compensation; not only in terms of pay, but also by reimbursing the
    out-of-pocket expenses incurred during frequent moves, deployments, and
    other temporary duty. The viability of the all-volunteer force depends
    on military service remaining a competitive career option. We will
    continue to retain our people through quality of life initiatives.
        In 2000, we held two retention summits chartered to identify the
    reasons people decide to leave the Air Force and to develop solutions
    to retain them. From the summit, we produced and are implementing 19
    initiatives to improve retention, including establishing career
    assistance advisors at our bases to maximize the benefits of
    performance feedback sessions and provide selective reenlistment
    program counseling.
        With respect to officer retention, we closely monitor the officer
    cumulative continuation rate (CCR), or the percentage of officers
    entering their 4th year of service (6 years for pilots and navigators)
    who will complete their 11th year of service given existing retention
    patterns. In fiscal year 2000, the pilot CCR dropped to 45 percent from
    the high of 87 percent in fiscal year 1995. Non-rated operations and
    mission support officer retention rates have also dropped over the past
    2 years. In fact, retention rates have decreased for several high-tech
    specialties--developmental engineers, scientists, communication
    officers, and acquisition managers are in high demand. Conversely,
    navigator and air battle manager rates improved in fiscal year 2000,
    rising to 69 percent and 51 percent from last year's rates of 62
    percent and 45 percent, respectively.
        We aggressively use bonuses to retain our members. For example, a
    flexible aviation continuation pay (ACP) program is integral to our
    multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. Under a provision of the Fiscal
    Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), we began offering
    ACP payments through 25 years of aviation service at up to $25,000 per
    year, and expanded eligibility to pilots below the rank of brigadier
    general. This resulted in a substantial increase in additional years of
    service commitment. The fiscal year 2001 ACP program includes two
    enhancements for first-time eligible pilots: the up-front lump sum
    payment cap was raised from $100,000 to $150,000 and up-front payment
    options were expanded. These changes were made to enhance the
    attractiveness of longer-term agreements.
        Seventy-six percent of our enlisted skills are now targeted with
    reenlistment bonuses, and we are considering bonuses for some non-rated
    line officer categories. The need to widen our bonus footprint, coupled
    with current below-goal retention rates, is strong evidence that the
    basic pay structure is too low. The addition of the officer and
    enlisted critical skills retention bonus of up to $200,000 during a
    career, which was authorized in the fiscal year 2001 NDAA, should help
    retain those people with skill sets in high demand by the civilian
    sector. We have also targeted our enlisted members with those crucial
    skills by increasing special duty assignment pay to $600 per month.
        Our Guard and Reserve have also taken steps to address retention
    problems by authorizing special pay and enlistment bonuses for critical
    enlisted specialties, ACP for active Guard and Reserve pilots, and
    special salary rates for full-time Reserve component military
    technicians. Implementation of the EAF concept will also help alleviate
    some of their retention challenges by providing advanced deployment
    notice to civilian employers.
    Recruiting
        We missed our enlisted recruiting goal only twice since the
    inception of the all-volunteer force in 1973: fiscal year 1979 and
    fiscal year 1999. In fiscal year 2000, we waged an all-out ``war'' to
    recruit America's best--and won. We exceeded our enlisted recruiting
    goal of 34,000 by almost 400 without lowering our standards. We still
    require 99 percent of our recruits to have high school diplomas, and
    nearly 73 percent of our recruits score in the top half of all scores
    on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. In addition, we brought 848
    prior-service members back on Active Duty, compared to 601 in fiscal
    year 1999 and 196 in fiscal year 1998.
        Successful recruiting means enlisting airmen whose aptitudes match
    the technical requirements we need. Although we met our overall
    recruiting goals in fiscal year 2000, we fell about 1,500 short of our
    goal of 12,428 recruits with mechanical aptitudes. In response, we are
    developing a targeted program to highlight the many opportunities we
    offer to mechanics, as well as a ``prep school'' to increase the number
    of airmen qualified to attend courses in areas such as jet engine
    repair and avionics maintenance. These efforts are paying off--through
    the first 4 months of fiscal year 2001 we have met or exceeded our
    monthly goal for mechanically skilled recruits.
        As with our retention efforts, we are using bonuses to improve
    recruiting. An increase in the enlistment bonus to $20,000 for our
    hard-to-fill critical skills positions proved successful--68 percent of
    our bonus-eligible recruits selected a 6-year initial enlistment in
    fiscal year 2000. We also introduced a $5,000 ``kicker'' to encourage
    new recruits to enlist during our most difficult recruiting months:
    February, March, April, and May.
        Additionally, we held a comprehensive review of our recruiting and
    accessions processes. One of the most important initiatives that came
    out of this review was to increase our recruiter force. Therefore, we
    augmented our permanent recruiters with temporary duty personnel for
    periods of 120 days. This action resulted in an extra 1,100 recruits
    during the spring and summer of 2000. We increased the number of
    recruiter authorizations from 1,209 to 1,450 in fiscal year 2000, and
    we project 1,650 recruiter authorizations by the end of 2001. The
    Active Duty drawdown has also created an additional recruiting
    challenge for our Guard and Reserve components. As a result, the Air
    Force Reserve is increasing its recruiting force in fiscal year 2001 by
    50 recruiters (to 564), and the Air National Guard is adding 65
    recruiters (to 413) over the next 3 years.
        Officer recruiting is not immune to the economic factors affecting
    enlisted recruiting. As of March 2001, the Reserve Officer Training
    Corps (ROTC) anticipates shortfalls of 400 officers in fiscal year 2002
    and 280 in fiscal year 2003 (against a yearly goal of 2,000). We are
    considering several initiatives to attract more candidates, including
    offering cadets contracts after their freshman year rather than waiting
    until the end of their sophomore year, as well as recommending
    legislation to permit an officer accession bonus and to increase
    enlisted commissioning opportunities. In fiscal year 2000, we achieved
    97 percent of our line officer accession target, even though fiscal
    year 2000 production was 5 percent above fiscal year 1999 and 21
    percent greater than fiscal year 1998.
        Recruiting health-care professionals has also been challenging.
    Many medical, dental, nurse, and biomedical specialties are critically
    short. For example, only 80 percent of our clinical pharmacy positions
    are filled. In 2001, for the first time, we will be offering a $10,000
    accession bonus to pharmacists who enter Active Duty.
        Finally, we launched a multi-faceted marketing campaign, including
    television and movie theater advertising. Our ads depict the teamwork,
    dedication, and technological sophistication that characterize the Air
    Force. The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard also launched a
    national campaign that includes television, radio, and outdoor
    advertisements.
    Civilian Workforce Shaping
        In 1989, approximately 17 percent of our civilians were in their
    first 5 years of service. Today, that figure is less than 10 percent.
    In the next 5 years, more than 40 percent of our civilian career
    workforce will be eligible for optional or early retirement.
    Compounding this problem, the downsizing of the past decade has skewed
    the mix of civilian workforce skills. While we are meeting mission
    needs today, without the proper civilian force shaping tools, we risk
    not being ready to meet tomorrow's challenges.
        We have developed several initiatives to address our civilian
    workforce concerns. These initiatives include finding new ways to
    attract and recruit civilian employees; developing streamlined,
    flexible, and expedited hiring processes; supporting pay flexibility to
    better align salaries with those of private industry; and increasing
    the availability of student loan repayment programs.
        We also realize that we must renew the mid-level civilian workforce
    to meet the demands of an increasingly technical force. We will
    accomplish this through job proficiency training, leadership
    development, academic courses, and retraining. Further, we believe that
    funding civilian tuition assistance programs, as we do for our military
    people, and having the flexibility to pay for job licenses and
    certifications, will help our shaping efforts.
        However, we must also use separation management tools to create
    vacancies so the civilian work force is continuously refreshed with new
    talent and contains the right skills mix. These tools include pay
    comparability, and extending special voluntary separation incentive pay
    (VSIP) and voluntary early retirement authority (VERA) for workforce
    restructuring. We also need an incentive to provide employees the
    option to offset all or part of the early retirement penalty to their
    annuity through a lump-sum payment to the civil service retirement and
    disability fund.
    Quality of Life
        For the first time in 5 years, we are adding manpower and workplace
    environment to our core quality of life priorities. Updated wartime
    planning factors and real-world operations validated our increased
    manpower requirements. Meeting our existing mission requirements with
    our current end strength is wearing out our people. We need to increase
    our end strength by 12,000 personnel above our fiscal year 2000 level,
    primarily in the combat, combat support, low density/high demand, and
    high-tempo areas.
        A good quality of life is central to attracting and retaining our
    people. The fiscal year 2001 NDAA provided a 3.7 percent pay raise,
    one-half percent above private sector wage growth, and a targeted pay
    raise for our mid-level enlisted members ranging from $32 to $58 per
    month. While these are positive developments, military pay,
    particularly for mid-grade NCOs and officers, remains below comparable
    private sector salaries. In fiscal year 2001, our members' out-of-
    pocket housing expenses will be reduced from 18.9 percent to 15
    percent, but at significant cost to our budget. A goal of zero out-of-
    pocket housing costs by fiscal year 2005, as directed by the former
    Secretary of Defense, will be difficult to fund within current
    projections. To help reduce out-of-pocket moving expenses, the NDAA
    equalized dislocation allowances for our lower ranking enlisted force,
    and authorized advanced payment of temporary lodging expenses and a pet
    quarantine reimbursement up to $275.
        Providing our people with safe, affordable accommodations improves
    their quality of life and, in turn, increases retention. Our dormitory
    master plan will build or replace dormitory rooms throughout the Air
    Force. We continue to pursue a private room policy for our airmen.
    Currently, 86 percent of our unaccompanied airmen housed on base have a
    private room with a shared bath. We also plan to replace, improve, or
    privatize over 10,000 family housing units. In addition, ensuring our
    members have adequate officer and enlisted visiting quarters and
    temporary lodging facilities remains a high priority. Constructing and
    maintaining sufficient numbers of on-base facilities yields significant
    savings in moving and travel costs while aiding force protection.
        Another important component of quality of life is health care. The
    year 2000 was a milestone year for our health-care program, with many
    changes taking effect in 2001. TRICARE was expanded to include 1.4
    million Medicare-eligible beneficiaries, retirees, and their family
    members beginning in October 2001. By enrolling in Part B Medicare,
    they can now visit any civilian health-care provider and have TRICARE
    pay most, if not all, of what Medicare does not cover. Other
    legislation extends TRICARE Prime Remote to immediate Active Duty
    family members stationed in remote areas (i.e., areas not within 50
    miles of a military treatment facility); eliminates TRICARE co-payments
    for Active Duty family members; establishes chiropractic care for
    Active Duty members; reduces the TRICARE catastrophic cap to $3,000 per
    year; and improves claims processing.
        Enhancing community and family programs is crucial to retention
    since 62 percent of our force is married. This year we created the
    Community Action Information Board (CAIB) to bring together senior
    leaders to review and resolve individual, family, and installation
    community issues impacting our readiness and quality of life. We
    recognize the economic benefits our members and their families receive
    from youth programs, family support centers, fitness centers, libraries
    and other recreational programs which support and enhance the sense of
    community. We also continue to support the commissary benefit as an
    important non-pay entitlement.
        Even with the EAF, our tempo can make educational pursuits
    difficult. Our learning resource centers and distance learning
    initiatives address this situation by offering deployed personnel
    education and testing opportunities through CD-ROM and interactive
    television. We support lengthening the Montgomery GI Bill contribution
    period from 1 to 2 years in order to ease the financial burdens of new
    airmen. Additionally, we have joined with the other Services, the
    Department of Labor, and civilian licensing and certification agencies
    to promote the recognition of military training as creditable towards
    civilian licensing requirements.
    Training
        Training the world's best Air Force is challenging in today's
    rigorous, expeditionary environment. Recruits face a demanding basic
    training course, and newly commissioned officers and selected civilians
    attend the Aerospace Basic Course to establish a fundamental knowledge
    of aerospace power and the profession of arms. However, lower enlisted
    retention rates are increasing our training burden. Fewer experienced
    trainers are available to train entry-level personnel. Additionally,
    the increased number of accessions (due to lower retention) stress our
    training facilities and personnel. During accession surge periods, our
    technical training centers operate at over 100 percent capacity by
    triple-bunking students in two-person dorm rooms. Despite these
    challenges, our technical training schools are meeting their mission.
    By increasing our use of technology and streamlining training
    processes, we are producing fully qualified apprentices. Recognizing
    training as a continuous process, we are using emerging technologies to
    establish a training management system capable of documenting and
    delivering the right training throughout a member's career.
    Equal Opportunity
        We strive to build and maintain an environment that is free from
    unlawful discrimination and harassment and reflects the rich diversity
    of our Nation. Equal opportunity, diversity, and fair and equitable
    treatment of our people have evolved from law to a strategic readiness
    imperative. Ensuring that every airman is given equal access and equal
    opportunity to achieve his or her full potential is vital to our
    readiness equation. Creating and sustaining an environment where
    individuals are respected and valued is key to mission performance and
    force sustainment. These issues require constant attention and support.
    Accordingly, we are committed to attracting, recruiting, hiring,
    accessing, developing, managing, rewarding, and retaining a diverse and
    high-quality Air Force that reflects all segments of American society.

                                   READINESS

        Total Air Force readiness has declined 23 percentage points since
    1996. We attribute this decay to the problems associated with
    supporting the oldest aircraft fleet in Air Force history; the
    inability to retain an experienced workforce; and constrained resources
    and spare parts. With recent financial assistance from the
    administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress,
    we are turning our spare parts problems around. However, as our
    fighter, ISR, combat search and rescue, mobility, and tanker aircraft
    continue to age, they need more frequent and substantial repairs,
    driving up readiness costs. This, in turn, reduces the number of
    aircraft available for missions and creates higher demands on the
    remaining fleet. Reversing this trend will take additional funding and
    a concerted recapitalization effort. In addition, the maintenance tasks
    and materiel growth inherent in supporting our aging aircraft fleet
    have increased our depot workload. Limited depot infrastructure
    investment over the past decade, coupled with constrained funding, adds
    to our already significant challenges in meeting readiness
    requirements. We are also experiencing infrastructure shortfalls in our
    facilities (i.e., bases), vehicles and support equipment, and
    communications infrastructure. However, our environmental program
    remains on track. Overall, we are committed to improving readiness, but
    it must be in concert with our people, infrastructure, and
    modernization programs.

                                  SPARE PARTS

        Sufficient inventories of weapon system spare parts are crucial to
    mission readiness. Lack of spares puts a severe strain on the entire
    combat support system, creating increased workload for our logistics
    personnel and reducing the number of mission-capable aircraft available
    to our operational forces. When our logistics system suffers parts
    shortages, maintenance personnel must either cannibalize parts from
    other equipment or aircraft to serve immediate needs, or accept
    degraded readiness while they wait out long-delivery times for
    backordered parts.
        Recent improvements in spare parts funding are turning this
    situation around. Through internal funding realignment, the
    administration, OSD and congressional plus-ups, we were able to spend
    an additional $2 billion for spare parts over the past 2 years. This
    helped replenish inventories drained during Operation Allied Force.
    During the summer 2000 program review, the DOD fully supported our
    efforts to fill shortfalls in the spare-parts pipeline which were
    impacting operational requirements. Additional administration and OSD
    support for fiscal year 2002 includes full funding of the flying hour
    program and our airlift readiness spares packages, and increased
    funding to reduce the spares repair backlog.
        One of our greatest readiness challenges is managing the
    consequences of an unprecedented older aircraft fleet. Today, the
    average aircraft is approximately 22 years old. Even with currently
    programmed procurements, this figure will continue to rise, reaching
    nearly 30 within the next 15 years. Buying spare parts for aging
    aircraft is similar to buying them for aging vehicles. The older the
    vehicle, the more expensive the part due to obsolescence and a reduced
    vendor base. Maintaining an aging fleet with more expensive spare parts
    is one of the costs reflected in the increasing cost per flying hour.
    Over the past 5 years, our flying hours required for training and
    readiness have remained relatively constant, but the cost of executing
    our flying hour program has risen over 45 percent.
    Facility Infrastructure
        Our available resources do not cover the maintenance requirements
    of our facilities. Presently, we are able to sustain only day-to-day
    recurring maintenance and periodic system repairs on our real property,
    creating a backlog of required maintenance. The replacement or
    renovation of existing real property is now on a cycle exceeding 150
    years, compared with the industry standard of 50 years. Military
    construction has also been reduced drastically since the mid-1980s
    (from the high of about $1.8 billion in fiscal year 1986 to the current
    $596 million in fiscal year 2001).
        Reductions in Air Force manpower and force structure have also left
    us with too much infrastructure. As a result, we are required to spend
    scarce resources on unneeded facilities while struggling to maintain
    acceptable operational readiness levels. We must be allowed to close
    unnecessary installations and then reinvest the savings in Real
    Property Maintenance (RPM), base-operating support, family housing, and
    military construction.
    Vehicles and Support Equipment
        Over the past 8 years, the vehicle replacement program has been
    significantly underfunded. This situation has created approximately
    $552 million in deferred vehicle requirements for more than 27,000
    special-purpose, construction, tactical, and material-handling
    vehicles. While our major commands are pursuing temporary solutions,
    like general-purpose vehicle leasing, refurbishment programs, and
    reducing excess vehicle requirements wherever possible, failure to
    replace aging vehicles will directly impact our combat capability.
        Our support equipment program is only 58 percent funded. This
    follows an historical trend of inadequate funding. We have about $134
    million in deferred funding for maintenance stands, aircraft de-icing
    trucks, munitions-handling equipment, military working dogs, and
    Harvest Eagle and Harvest Falcon equipment used to erect bare bases.
    Missions in the Balkans and Southwest Asia have exacerbated equipment
    shortfalls. Addressing this funding gap will improve our readiness.
    Communications Infrastructure
        Information technology (IT) advancements over the past decade have
    revolutionized aerospace power. From desktop computing to near-
    instantaneous worldwide access to information, our communications
    technologies enable information dominance and create ``actionable
    knowledge'' for our commanders. The ability of forward-deployed
    commanders to rapidly and reliably reach back to a large number of
    combat support capabilities at home base, streamlines expeditionary
    operations by reducing airlift requirements and the size of our
    deployed footprint. A vital piece of our ``infostructure'' is our
    global information grid, an interconnected, network-centric information
    environment that provides information on-demand to our policymakers,
    warfighters, and supporting personnel. This infostructure gives us the
    means to meet our future information requirements.
    Environmental Cleanup
        Our environmental program stands on four main pillars:
    environmental compliance, pollution prevention, environmental
    restoration, and resource conservation. The goal at our active
    installations is to have cleanup remedies in place for all our high-
    risk sites by 2007 and for all sites by 2014.
        The environmental program for our closed and closing bases focuses
    on expedient cleanups that stress public health, responsible
    environmental stewardship, and the transfer of property for
    redevelopment. We continue to streamline processes, reduce costs, and
    promote community participation in decision-making. We are on target to
    complete all of our environmental cleanups by 2005, except for
    McClellan AFB, CA, which is targeted for 2015. Still, we require
    continuing investment to ensure properties are ready for permanent
    transfer to civil authorities.

                                 MODERNIZATION

        Our modernization plan includes retiring the C-141 and procuring
    the C-17, buying our future air superiority fighters, considering
    tanker replacements, upgrading conventional bombers and precision-
    guided munitions (PGMs), and developing new C\2\ and ISR systems. An
    important step in achieving these priorities involves sustaining and
    modernizing relevant, capable space forces, with emphasis on the
    development of the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the Global
    Positioning System (GPS), the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV),
    and secure communication satellites. We must also upgrade our space
    launch ranges and satellite control network. The next several pages
    describe our modernization programs aligned under each of our core
    competencies.
    Aerospace Superiority
        Aerospace superiority is the ability to control the entire vertical
    dimension, from the surface of the Earth to the highest orbiting
    satellite, so the joint force has freedom from attack and freedom to
    attack. Aerospace superiority is the crucial first step in achieving
    rapid aerospace dominance. In the 21st century, aerospace superiority
    depends on strike and defensive platforms, such as F-22 and the
    Airborne Laser (ABL), and ISR platforms, such as Global Hawk and SBIRS,
    seamlessly integrated through real-time information sharing and
    appropriate space control measures.
        The F-22, with its revolutionary combination of stealth,
    supercruise (i.e., supersonic-cruise without afterburner),
    maneuverability, and integrated avionics, will dominate the skies. The
    F-22's advanced capabilities will allow it to penetrate an adversary's
    airspace even if anti-access assets are in place, destroying the most
    critical air defense capabilities, thus permitting follow-on forces
    freedom of movement.
        Additionally, the F-22 will serve as the enabling platform for the
    Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and other systems engaging enemy ground
    targets. In 2000, during continued envelope expansion flight testing,
    the F-22 successfully launched an Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air
    Missile (AMRAAM) and an AIM-9 infrared-guided missile from its internal
    side weapons bay, and began testing Block 3.0 avionics software.
        The F-22 has successfully met all congressionally mandated criteria
    necessary to enter low-rate initial production (LRIP) following Defense
    Acquisition Board approval. Entering operational service in 2005, this
    leap in technology is crucial to preserving the Nation's most important
    military advantage for future warfighters: the capability to rapidly
    obtain and maintain aerospace dominance.
        The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a transformational boost-phase
    intercept weapon system that will contribute significantly to the
    missile defense architecture. In January 2000, we began modifying a
    Boeing 747 to become the first of two ABL prototypes. This prototype
    successfully completed critical design review in April 2000. With the
    modifications completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2001, ABL
    is progressing toward a demonstration against a theater ballistic
    missile. This revolutionary capability will bring equally revolutionary
    changes in warfighting.
        The Space Based Laser (SBL) has the potential to provide continuous
    boost-phase intercept for ballistic missile defense. To pursue this
    capability, the SBL integrated flight experiment (IFX) project will
    determine the feasibility and utility of this approach, focusing on
    risk reduction, the sustainment of critical technologies, and system
    architecture studies. The program is currently making excellent
    progress in high-energy laser beam control; acquisition, tracking and
    pointing technologies; and overall systems integration.
        The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) significantly improves on
    the missile warning capability of the 1993 Talon Shield upgrade to the
    Defense Support Program (DSP) missile detection and warning network of
    satellites. DSP has provided strategic missile warning for North
    America for nearly 30 years. Beginning in 1993, the DSP project
    upgraded processing techniques to provide a theater missile warning
    capability that includes timely and accurate detection and tracking of
    tactical ballistic missiles and other theater threats. SBIRS
    significantly improves on the missile warning capability of Talon
    Shield by consolidating the Nation's infrared detection systems into a
    single architecture, meeting our security requirements for missile
    warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
    characterization.
        SBIRS High, SBIRS Low, and DSP, and will operate through a
    consolidated ground segment. DSP currently employs satellites to
    provide early detection and warning of missile launches and nuclear
    explosions to the National Command Authorities. The last three DSP
    satellites will be placed into orbit between fiscal year 2001 and
    fiscal year 2003, and subsequently operated from the new SBIRS mission
    control station. The SBIRS High component, currently in engineering and
    manufacturing development (EMD), is on track for the first delivery of
    a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensor in fiscal year 2002 and the
    first launch of a satellite into geosynchronous orbit (GEO) in fiscal
    year 2005. The SBIRS Low component, now in the program definition/risk
    reduction phase, consists of low earth orbiting (LEO) satellites with
    the first launch planned for 2006. We are working hand-in-hand with the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Office to make the SBIRS program a success.
    In total, we will operate 2 SBIRS HEO, 4 GEO, and between 20 and 30 LEO
    satellites.
        Miniature Satellites
        On July 19, 2000, the Air Force Research Laboratory launched
    MightySat II, a test satellite weighing only 266 pounds. The MightySat
    series of experiments are designed to quickly and inexpensively
    explore, demonstrate, and transition space technologies from the
    drawing board to operational use. MightySat II demonstrates advanced
    technologies for hyperspectral remote sensing and on-board processing
    that could eventually help military commanders detect and identify
    hidden targets. The MightySat series are building blocks for more
    advanced satellite concepts, such as TechSat-21. This concept will
    employ three micro-satellites flying in formation to act as an
    integrated ``virtual'' satellite, enabling revolutionary remote sensing
    capabilities such as ground moving target identification.
        Assured Access to Space
        Achieving and maintaining superiority throughout the entire
    aerospace continuum requires an operational space launch and maneuver
    capability that can deploy to orbit with the same speed and flexibility
    as our other aerospace forces. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    (EELV) will soon replace the current Titan, Atlas, and Delta launch
    vehicles to ensure America's spacelift capability until 2020. It
    consists of two independent launch systems: the Boeing Delta IV and
    Lockheed Martin Atlas V. The first EELV launch is scheduled for 2002.
    Our EELV partnership strategy with industry will meet military,
    government, and commercial spacelift requirements at 25 percent to 50
    percent lower cost than current systems. In the future, we envision
    reusable launch vehicles that will provide launch on demand, high
    sortie rates, reduced operations costs, and increased operational
    flexibility in support of space mission areas.
        Space Control
        We are committed to exploring innovative ways of modernizing space-
    based technologies. Utilizing residual resources from the midcourse
    space experiment (MSX) satellite, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
    transitioned this advanced concept technology demonstration into a
    space-based space surveillance sensor. The Space Based Visible (SBV)
    sensor provides critical positional data on orbiting objects to ensure
    battlespace awareness.
        During the past year, we activated the first-ever space control
    unit--the 76th Space Control Squadron at Peterson AFB, Colorado. The
    76th SPCS is an offensive and defensive counterspace technology unit
    responsible for exploring emerging space control capabilities,
    including concepts of counter-communications and counter-surveillance/
    reconnaissance, and the development of a satellite attack, threat
    detection, and reporting architecture.
        Combat Search and Rescue
        Combat search and rescue (CSAR) forces, identified by DOD as low
    density/high demand (LD/HD) assets, recover downed combat aircrews and
    other isolated people from hostile territory and return them to
    friendly control. The age of our CSAR platforms, and their lack of
    compatibility with our advances in strike, C\2\, ISR, communications
    and other systems, jeopardize our ability to fulfill our operational
    commitments beginning in 2010. For example, the A-10 aircraft does not
    have the latest airborne receivers required to perform the on-scene
    command role during combat rescue missions. In 2010, our HH-60s (search
    and rescue helicopters) will reach the end of their service life and
    require either a service life extension program (SLEP) or replacement.
    Our near-term enhancements include equipping HH-60Gs with over-the-
    horizon data receivers and improved defensive systems. We are also
    improving our CSAR force structure by converting 10 WC-130Hs (weather
    observation aircraft) into HC-130s (rescue/tanker transports) and
    transferring eight HH-60s and five HC-130s from the Reserve to the
    active force. We have established the new combat rescue officer (CRO)
    career specialty to improve the leadership of the CSAR mission area.
    The first CRO commanded pararescue squadron will stand up in May 2001.
    Information Superiority
        Information superiority, like aerospace superiority, means our
    information systems are free from attack while we have freedom to
    attack an adversary's information systems. Information superiority
    enables us to provide tailored, accurate targeting information from a
    sensor to a shooter within minutes. It assures U.S. and allied forces
    have a clear picture of the battlespace and can operate freely in the
    information domain while denying the enemy the same. Information
    superiority includes the ability to gain, exploit, attack, and defend
    information. Integral elements include capabilities in information-in-
    warfare (e.g., ISR, weather, communications) and information warfare
    (e.g., electronic warfare, psychological operations, computer network
    attack and defense).
        Command and Control
        Our operational and tactical command and control (C\2\) airborne
    platforms and ground systems organize and direct ISR efforts and
    tactical forces to successfully apply combat power. Our C\2\ assets
    include the aerospace operations center (AOC) with its decentralized
    component control reporting centers (CRC), the Airborne Warning and
    Control System (AWACS), and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar
    System (JSTARS).
        As the primary element of the Theater Air Control System (TACS),
    the AOC is responsible for planning, executing, and assessing the full
    range of aerospace operations. By fusing the data from a vast array of
    C\2\ and sensor systems, the AOC creates a comprehensive awareness of
    the battlespace so the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) can
    task and execute the most complex aerospace operations across the
    entire spectrum of conflict.
        Especially significant among these operations are time sensitive
    targeting, which provides rapid reaction to the threat, and theater
    battle management, which blends C\2\, rapid intelligence collection,
    analysis, and dissemination with positive control of airspace and the
    tasking of combat forces to coordinate the entire air battle with joint
    and coalition partners and component commanders. We have recently
    designated the AOC as a ``weapon system'' and are working on efforts to
    standardize its capabilities. Our continued efforts in equipment
    baselining, personnel training, and documentation are the precursors to
    a full AOC system modernization effort. The emergence of the AOC as a
    fully developed, standardized weapon system will revolutionize the
    operational level of warfare.
        The CRC is the JFACC's ground tactical execution node for C\2\ and
    battle management. It provides wide-area surveillance, theater air
    defense, identification, data link management, and air battle
    execution. The current system was developed in the 1970s and must be
    replaced. The CRC replacement, the Battle Control System, will exceed
    year 2010 requirements for time sensitive targeting, open system
    architecture, small deployment footprint, remote operations, multi-
    sensor fusion, and AEF responsiveness.
        The Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) is an
    integrated, automated C\2\ and decision support tool that offers the
    senior aerospace commander and subordinate staffs a single point of
    access to real- or near-real-time information necessary for the
    execution of higher headquarters taskings. TBMCS will support a full
    range of functions including threat assessment, target selection,
    mission execution, battle damage assessment, resource management, time
    sensitive target identification and prosecution, and defensive
    planning.
        Communication
        Information superiority, and by extension, all our core
    competencies depend on the availability of a robust, worldwide
    communications capability. Unfortunately, our military satellite
    communication (MILSATCOM) systems can not fully keep up with the growth
    of theater requirements. Over the next 10 years, our need for secure
    communications is expected to increase 15-fold over current capacity,
    while wideband requirements are projected to soar to 20 times the
    current capacity. In an environment of extremely high worldwide demand
    and competition, commercial providers simply cannot supply us with the
    protected bandwidth, security, or coverage necessary to fully support
    military operations.
        MILSATCOM systems, notably the Defense Satellite Communications
    System (DSCS) and the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System
    (MILSTAR), support contingency and ongoing operations. The first DSCS
    SLEP satellite, launched in January 2000, provides users a 200 percent
    increase in military wideband communications capacity compared to
    legacy DSCS III satellites. It also increases the overall reliability
    of the military wideband constellation. Early in 2001, the MILSTAR
    constellation received a third operational satellite, to provide jam-
    resistant communications for tactical operations. Furthermore, a
    complete modernization of protected communications (advanced extremely
    high frequency) and wideband communications (advanced wideband) is
    underway. These are positive steps toward ensuring space superiority
    and information superiority today and in the future.
        While the long-haul communications provided by satellites is
    crucial to operations, transporting information to in-garrison and
    deployed units is equally vital. Theater deployable communications
    provide lightweight multiband satellite terminals that allow our
    deployed forces to reach back on the Global Command and Control System-
    Air Force (GCCS-AF) via the Combat Information Transport System--our
    high-capacity fiber-optic backbone. This capability allows combat
    forces to quickly deploy with a smaller support structure. We are also
    implementing innovative emerging technologies to maximize bandwidth
    availability. This is especially critical given the commercial
    expansion into the frequency spectrum used by the military.
        Information Warfare
        We have fielded eight information warfare flights (IWF) to date,
    providing combatant commanders with full-spectrum information warfare
    (IW) planning for offensive, defensive, kinetic, and non-kinetic
    applications. We plan to field at least one additional IWF to support
    U.S. Special Operations Command. Each IWF integrates offensive
    counterinformation, defensive counterinformation, and information-in-
    warfare functions to gain, exploit, attack, and defend both information
    and information systems. We recognize the potency of psychological
    operations and, therefore, include it in our strategic planning as part
    of our IW capabilities.
        Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        Currently, our limited numbers of airborne ISR systems are in
    extremely high demand. The RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2, and Predator UAV
    were indispensable during Operation Allied Force, providing real-time
    PGM target data, threat warning, and battle damage assessment. UAV
    systems, such as Global Hawk and Predator, promise to expand our ISR
    collection capability while reducing the need to place our people in
    harm's way.
        Global Hawk successfully completed a military utility assessment
    and is poised to move forward as a formal Air Force acquisition program
    with the delivery of production vehicles in fiscal year 2003. The
    Predator continued to demonstrate impressive expandability with the
    integration of a laser illuminator for PGMs and the recent successful
    launch of a Hellfire-C missile against a ground target. Additionally,
    we are nearing completion of a major upgrade to the U-2's sensors,
    cockpit, defensive, and power systems.
        Space-Based Radar Capability
        We are evolving information superiority assets into space. New
    sources and methods of space-based ISR are being explored to provide
    nearly continuous overflight of enemy targets to complement airborne
    and ground-based sensor platforms. We are partnering with other
    Services, agencies, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to
    develop a roadmap for future space-based radar (SBR) capabilities. SBR
    is a pioneering approach to providing near-continuous, worldwide
    surveillance that would complement JSTARS and other ground moving
    target indication and imagery systems. SBR capability would skip a
    generation of sensor technology to provide precision weapons data and a
    nearly continuous deep, denied-area look at ground moving targets.
    Furthermore, as a space-based asset, SBR would not be limited by
    overflight restrictions, basing issues, lengthy personnel deployments,
    crew fatigue, or terrain masking. From a collection perspective, SBR
    would move us to the ultimate high-ground.
        Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
        The JSTARS provides battle management, C\2\, and ground moving-
    target detection. We are replacing the on-board computers with
    commercial-off-the-shelf equipment by 2005 under the JSTARS Computer
    Replacement Program (CRP). The CRP is the foundation of all JSTARS
    communications and sensor upgrades, and should reduce life-cycle costs
    and minimize the number of obsolete parts. However, due to fiscal
    constraints, we are enhancing only 2/3 of the fleet with the capacity
    to simultaneously transmit voice and data through beyond-line-of-sight
    satellite communications by 2005. Finally, the multi-platform Radar
    Technology Insertion Program (RTIP) will replace the current JSTARS
    radar with an advanced electronically scanned array radar that has five
    to ten times the air-to-ground surveillance capability, reduces target
    revisit times, improves moving-target track capability, and enhances
    radar resolution.
        Airborne Warning and Control System
        The AWACS remains the premier air battle management and wide-area
    surveillance platform in the world. Still, aging aircraft issues,
    obsolete technologies, and the proliferation of advanced adversary
    systems necessitate several upgrade programs. An improved radar system
    will become operational this year, with fully upgraded capability
    slated for fiscal year 2005. The next computer and display upgrade will
    replace the 1970 vintage processors with an open architecture system.
    Finally, a satellite communications access program will provide
    improved connectivity with regional and national C\2\ centers.
        Global Access, Navigation, and Safety
        In 1996, we began the most comprehensive avionics modernization
    effort in our history--the Global Access, Navigation, and Safety (GANS)
    program. It comprises an unparalleled avionics procurement and
    installation effort to update the navigation and safety equipment in
    our aircraft and in many ground systems. GANS includes the Joint
    Precision Approach and Landing System; the Air Traffic Control and
    Landing System; modernization of our Global Air Traffic Management
    (GATM) capabilities; and updated avionics to include navigation,
    safety, and installation of Global Positioning System (GPS) capability.
    In May 2000, GPS selective availability was turned off, thereby
    providing the same accuracy to civil and military users. This increased
    accuracy will significantly enhance the capabilities of systems using
    GPS. In 2000, we built a strategic GANS implementation plan to
    synchronize our efforts with those of the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) and International Civil Aviation Organization
    (ICAO). In the future, GANS will define the operational requirements
    for upgrading all our ground and air traffic management systems to
    preserve unimpeded worldwide operations within domestic and
    international airspace systems.
        We project that more than 99 percent of our aircraft will complete
    the congressionally mandated GPS upgrade by the 2005 deadline.
    Additionally, through our GPS Modernization/Navigation Warfare (NavWar)
    Program, we began development of navigation warfare upgrades that will
    be fielded in GPS ground and space segments beginning in fiscal year
    2003. These and future upgrades will allow us to better protect the
    ability of American and allied forces to employ GPS on the battlefield
    while denying it to our adversaries and minimizing potential impacts to
    civilian users.
    Precision Engagement
        Operation Allied Force demonstrated the need to strike targets in
    adverse weather conditions with precision. Our new generation of guided
    weapons couples GPS with an inertial navigation system to put bombs
    precisely on targets, day or night, in nearly all weather conditions.
    Weapons with this capability, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
    Missile (JASSM), Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Joint Direct Attack
    Munition (JDAM), and Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) are
    among our high-priority precision engagement programs.
        JASSM is a precise, stealthy, standoff missile that will enable us
    to destroy heavily defended, hardened, fixed, and relocatable targets.
    As a result of acquisition reform initiatives, JASSM will be delivered
    below the objective unit price of $400K, after a development period
    that will be 35 percent shorter than comparable missile programs. JASSM
    is currently undergoing flight tests with production deliveries
    scheduled to begin in 2003.
        JSOW is an accurate, adverse-weather, unpowered, glide munition. We
    are currently procuring two variants, the AGM-154A and AGM-154B, which
    are capable of destroying soft and armored targets at ranges of up to
    40 nautical miles.
        JDAM employs GPS guidance, incorporated in a tail kit, to deliver
    general-purpose or penetration warheads in adverse weather with near
    precision. We will use JDAM on multiple platforms to destroy high-
    priority, fixed, and relocatable targets. The first operational use of
    a 2,000-pound JDAM was from a B-2 during the first night of Operation
    Allied Force.
        We are currently developing a MK-82 (500-pound) JDAM--a small bomb
    that will multiply kills per sortie by increasing the number of PGMs
    that can be carried. For example, the same B-2 that carried up to 16
    2,000-pound JDAMs in Operation Allied Force will now be able to carry
    up to 80 500-pound JDAMs. This 500-pound JDAM capability, planned for
    initial deployment in fiscal year 2004, is the first step in the Air
    Force's transition to miniature munitions.
        WCMD has an inertial-guided tail kit that enables us to accurately
    deliver the Combined Effects Munition, Sensor Fuzed Weapon, and the
    Gator Mine Dispenser from medium to high altitude in adverse weather.
    WCMD-equipped weapons became operational in late 2000.
        In summary, munitions recapitalization is one of our top
    priorities. A decade of high operations tempo has depleted our large
    Cold War Reserve munition stockpiles. Acquisition of JDAM, JASSM, JSOW,
    and WCMD will increase PGM capabilities over the next few years;
    however, shortages of legacy munitions and consumable munitions items
    (e.g., bomb bodies, rockets, chaff, flares, training ammunition, and
    practice bombs) will continue to hamper training and operations.
    Global Attack
        Global Attack is the ability to engage targets anywhere, anytime.
    Global attack programs include the development of the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF), improvements to our legacy fighters, and the
    modernization of the B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers with PGM capabilities.
    Additionally, modernization of strategic platforms such as the
    Minuteman III, the Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and the Advanced Cruise
    Missile ensures the viability of two legs of the nuclear triad.
        Joint Strike Fighter
        The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program will develop and field an
    affordable, lethal, survivable, and highly common family of stealthy,
    next-generation, multi-role, strike-fighter aircraft for the Air Force,
    Navy, Marine Corps, and our allies. It will provide a 24-hour, adverse-
    weather, precision-engagement capability not provided by our legacy
    systems. The JSF would help us limit our aging fleet problems. With a
    set of fully validated and affordable joint operational requirements in
    place, the competing contractors are completing the concept
    demonstration phase. The EMD phase is expected to begin in the fall of
    2001. Partner countries will share the cost of JSF development,
    including the United Kingdom, which signed an agreement in January to
    contribute $2 billion to the program. Several parallel negotiations are
    underway with other potential international partners.
        Legacy Fighter Modernization
        Our legacy fighters, including the F-15, F-16, and A-10, provide a
    potent mix of air-to-air and air-to-surface capability. The recent
    addition of GPS-guided PGMs on the F-117 gave it an adverse-weather
    capability. However, these aging platforms are growing more expensive
    to maintain and operate, and their combat effectiveness is expected to
    eventually decline as projected surface-to-air and air-to-air threats
    appear. The introduction of the stealthy F-22 and JSF will maintain
    America's technological advantage, ensuring the ability to defeat
    emerging threats while replacing aging force structure with modern
    combat systems.
        One of our Guard and Reserve's top modernization priorities is
    incorporating precision targeting pods into their F-16 aircraft. From
    1998 through 2000, we outfitted all of our Reserve units and selected
    Guard units with Litening II pods. This acquisition gave the Guard and
    Reserve's F-16s a critical precision strike capability while moving
    them closer to the configuration of the active F-16 force. Beginning in
    fiscal year 2001, the Guard will join with the active force in
    procuring the Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP). Collaborative programs
    between our active and Reserve components increase our overall
    procurement flexibility and close the gap in combat capability.
        Bomber Modernization
        Our bomber modernization efforts will continue to increase the
    lethality and survivability of our bomber force by enhancing precision
    strike and electronic combat capabilities. We are applying the lessons
    learned from Operation Allied Force by enhancing the flexible targeting
    and electronic connectivity of the B-2 using electronic data-link and
    UHF satellite communications. We are committed to integrating the MK-82
    500-pound JDAM into the B-2, enabling it to strike up to 80 targets per
    sortie. Further, we are fielding the MK-84 2,000-pound JDAM on the B-1
    and developing the capacity for both the B-1 and the B-52 to deliver
    JSOW, JASSM, and WCMD. Communications, avionics, situational awareness,
    electronic countermeasures, and defensive system upgrades would also
    improve bomber effectiveness.
        Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
        Ongoing modernization of the Minuteman III (MM III)
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force and a clear policy
    decision regarding the future of the Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM are crucial
    to the viability of ICBMs through 2020. For example, we could dismantle
    our PK ICBMs and then retrofit up to 350 MM IIIs with warheads
    currently on PKs to avoid a costly life-extension program on the
    Minuteman system. This replacement effort would ensure that our newest
    warhead, with the most modern safety features, remains part of the ICBM
    force. However, continued delays in START II Treaty ratification, and
    the resultant delay in a PK deactivation decision, make it difficult to
    implement this program and are causing increased maintenance challenges
    that could eventually cause degradation of our ICBM force.
    Rapid Global Mobility
        Rapid Global Mobility ensures the Nation has the global reach to
    respond quickly and decisively anywhere in the world. As the number of
    forward-deployed forces has declined, the need for immediate response
    to overseas events has risen. Airlift and tanker aircraft give the
    United States the ability to rapidly reach out and influence events
    around the world. Yet, some of these platforms are reaching the end of
    their service life. To prepare for the future, the Mobility
    Requirements Study (MRS-05) and Tanker Requirements Study (TRS-05) were
    commissioned to determine long-term military airlift and aerial
    refueling requirements. MRS-05 ascertained the mobility requirements to
    support the Nation's military needs with moderate risk. Additionally,
    the TRS-05, baselined from MRS-05, will inform our decision-makers on
    the number of tankers needed to carry out future military operations.
    The KC-135 fleet now averages about 40 years old, and operations and
    support costs are escalating as structural fatigue, corrosion, systems
    supportability, and technical obsolescence take their toll. The KC-135
    Economic Service Life (ESL) Study was completed in December 2000. This
    study provided specific KC-135 milestones, as well as information on
    projected sustainment costs and operational availability. In fiscal
    year 2001, using the KC-135 ESL study and TRS-05 as baselines, an
    aerial refueling analysis of alternatives will examine options and
    timing for replacing the aging KC-135.
        The procurement of the full complement of C-17s and the continued
    modernization of the C-5, C-130, KC-10, and KC-135 fleets will enhance
    the viability of our mobility forces. Extensive efforts to modernize
    the C-5's avionics and propulsion systems should keep this aging
    platform operational for the future.
        Modernization of the C-130 fleet (for intratheater airlift) is
    proceeding with a two-pronged approach. We are procuring new C-130Js to
    replace 150 of our most worn-out 1960s-era C-130E combat delivery
    aircraft. The C-130J provides increased range, performance, and cargo
    capacity compared with the current C-130E/Hs. The remainder of our C-
    130 fleet will undergo an avionics modernization program (AMP)
    modification. AMP includes state-of-the-art avionics that will
    eliminate the need for a navigator and will increase reliability,
    maintainability, and sustainability. The C-130 AMP modification will
    make the aircraft compliant with GATM standards and navigational safety
    requirements.
        The Air Force has begun a large aircraft infrared countermeasures
    (LAIRCM) initiative to counter increasingly prolific man-portable air
    defense systems (MANPADS). LAIRCM will use state-of-the-art technology
    to provide active defenses for airlift- and tanker-sized aircraft
    against widely deployed shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.
        LAIRCM will build on existing systems designed for helicopters and
    small, fixed-wing aircraft. It will add new missile warning and
    tracking systems to locate and direct a laser at an incoming missile.
    Operational capability is expected on the first C-17s in fiscal year
    2004. Additional airlift and tanker aircraft will be outfitted with
    this system in the near future.
        Rapid Global Mobility is dependent upon the Tunner 60K mobility
    aircraft loader. It is essential for expediting onload and offload and
    maximizing throughput at any location. The next generation small loader
    (NGSL), a replacement for existing 25K loaders and wide-body elevator
    loaders, will provide the versatility to load wide-body commercial
    aircraft and support mobility operations at forward bases.
        Integrated Flight Management Modernization
        Air Mobility Command's (AMC) Mobility 2000 (M2K) program is a
    comprehensive systems integration and C\2\ architecture modernization
    initiative to increase the efficiency and responsiveness of airlift and
    air refueling operations. M2K will revolutionize AMC's C\2\ data flow
    and connectivity, data processing, database management, and information
    display capabilities. By leveraging GATM system installation and
    digital datalink technologies, AMC will realize near-real-time global,
    end-to-end data connectivity between the Tanker Airlift Control Center
    and all AMC mission aircraft. The implementation of M2K programs began
    in 2000 and will continue into 2006.
        Spacelift Range Modernization
        The Spacelift Range System (SLRS) modernization program is
    replacing aging and non-supportable equipment; using automation to
    improve reliability and efficiency; reducing the cost of operations;
    and standardizing equipment on the eastern and western launch ranges.
    To date, the completion of new downrange satellite communication links,
    a new fiber-optic network, and new range scheduling systems are
    providing government and commercial users more flexibility at the
    spacelift ranges. The congressionally directed National Launch
    Capabilities Study concluded that once completed, the SLRS
    modernization program, coupled with the EELV program, would meet the
    future launch demands of national security, civil, and commercial
    payloads.
        The White House-led Interagency Working Group on the future
    utilization of U.S. space launch bases and ranges developed a strategic
    direction for the spacelift ranges. The Air Force was instrumental in
    shaping that strategic direction as well as the findings and
    conclusions contained in the Group's report. Through this effort, we
    have been expanding and formalizing partnerships with states,
    spaceports, and the Departments of Transportation and Commerce to
    better consider the spacelift requirements for civil and commercial
    launches while ensuring our capability to meet national security
    requirements now and in the future. At the same time, we are examining
    options for the use of non-Federal funding to improve the space launch
    ranges.
        CV-22
        The CV-22 is our designation for the special operations variant of
    the V-22 Osprey--a vertical/short-takeoff and landing airplane designed
    for long-range, rapid penetration of denied areas in adverse weather
    and low visibility. With twice the range and speed of a conventional
    helicopter and its state-of-the-art avionics system, the CV-22 will be
    able to complete most of its missions under the cover of darkness
    without being detected. We will use the CV-22 to infiltrate,
    exfiltrate, and resupply special operations forces and to augment
    personnel recovery forces when needed. The CV-22 is currently in the
    EMD phase with two test vehicles designated for flight tests through
    2003.
    Agile Combat Support
        The goal of Agile Combat Support (ACS) is to improve the
    responsiveness, deployability, and sustainability of combat aerospace
    forces. Our four basic objectives are to become more rapidly
    deployable; develop a more responsive planning and execution
    capability; improve agile combat support C\2\; and develop an agile,
    responsive, and survivable sustainment capability. We are making gains
    in the process of right-sizing deployment teams so they are postured
    better for expeditionary needs. We have developed expeditionary site
    planning tools that help tailor our deployment capability based on
    assets prepositioned in the forward theater. We are gradually
    introducing bare base assets and other types of support equipment into
    our inventory. We've invested in infrastructure and prepositioning to
    improve the reception and beddown capabilities of our bomber forward-
    operating locations. We have fielded an integrated deployment system at
    all of our wings that improves the responsiveness of our deployment
    process. Our information technologies, such as the virtual logistics
    suite hosted on the Air Force Portal, will help provide real-time
    situational awareness for ACS command and control.
        Through efforts like our logistics review and logistics
    transformation initiatives, we are reengineering our processes to
    achieve an agile, effective, well-integrated logistics chain that is
    responsive to EAF requirements. These are all examples of initiatives
    that will help achieve our four ACS objectives; however, our ACS
    capability must be improved even more to fully support our EAF vision.
    For example, we need to fix readiness shortfalls in key logistics
    resources including people, skills, spares, munitions, bare base
    assets, and vehicles. We need to improve our capability to rapidly
    develop deployment and sustainment plans for fast-breaking
    contingencies. Finally, we are making enhancements to our ACS command
    and control capability to make it more responsive, better integrated,
    and sufficiently robust to support EAF needs. These agile combat
    support initiatives are crucial to sustaining current and future combat
    operations.
        Aircrew Training Requirements
        We are actively updating the way we train. The Joint Primary
    Aircraft Training System (JPATS), including the T-6A aircraft, will
    replace the Air Force T-37 and the Navy T-34 primary trainers and their
    associated ground-based training systems beginning in June 2001 at
    Moody AFB, GA. We will continue to upgrade the T-38 advanced trainer
    aircraft with new avionics representative of current fighter systems
    while modernizing the propulsion system to improve engine reliability,
    safety, efficiency, and performance. Finally, we are making significant
    strides in developing simulated environments that produce training
    effects comparable to authentic environments. Our groundbreaking
    distributed mission training (DMT) system seamlessly links aircrew
    training devices at diverse locations, allowing aircrews to train as
    they fight.
        Ranges
        Ranges provide the critical airspace we need to test and train on
    our weapon systems. As modern aircraft continue to fly faster and
    deliver munitions from a greater distance, our ranges and associated
    test and training systems must evolve to meet our changing needs. We
    will balance our need to test and train with our responsibilities to
    the public and the environment. We are completing modifications to our
    range and airspace structure that will significantly enhance local
    training for our forces at Mountain Home AFB, ID, Dyess AFB, TX, and
    Barksdale AFB, LA. We are also working to further advance the
    integration of space and information operations into our ranges. This
    includes capitalizing on a common infrastructure across the test and
    training spectrum.
                           innovation and adaptation
        We have a proud heritage of innovation and adaptation. We are
    carefully linking emerging technologies with our future concepts of
    operation to evolve our aerospace core capabilities while providing the
    Nation the most effective return on its investments.
    Experimentation and Wargames
        We conduct experiments and wargames to evaluate near- and far-term
    aerospace capabilities and operational concepts. Joint Expeditionary
    Force Experiment (JEFX) 2000, conducted at various locations throughout
    the U.S. in September, focused on ways to integrate support functions
    into expeditionary operations and technologies to conduct time
    sensitive targeting. The wargame Global Engagement (GE) is held every
    other year to explore the potential capabilities of joint aerospace
    power and alternative force structures 10 to 15 years into the future.
    In June 2000, GE-V explored operational concepts and alternative force
    structures designed to deny and degrade an adversary's strategic
    decision-making ability and accelerate the transition from halt to win.
    GE-V also demonstrated aerospace power's unique capability to ensure
    access to operational areas where the enemy employs robust anti-access
    strategies. We are currently conducting a year-long analysis of GE-V in
    areas such as time sensitive targeting, space control, information
    operations, and forward logistics support. During odd-numbered years,
    we conduct an aerospace future capabilities wargame that takes a longer
    view, striving to shape our decisions and strategic direction by
    testing alternative concepts, systems, and force structures that may
    appear 20 to 25 years into the future. These wargames have produced new
    aerospace concepts, such as standoff warfare and reach-forward C\2\
    capability, which continue to mature through follow-up analysis and
    subsequent wargames.
    Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
        Advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs) marry new
    operational concepts with mature technologies in order to meet
    warfighter needs in 2 to 4 years at a reduced cost. The high altitude
    UAV ACTD, Global Hawk, which has successfully transitioned to a formal
    acquisition program, is targeted for accelerated production and is
    expected to provide a follow-on capability for the U-2. The Miniature
    Air Launched Decoy (MALD), another ACTD system scheduled to enter
    production in fiscal year 2001, will augment our electronic warfare
    capability to protect valuable strike packages.
    Battlelabs
        Since their inception in 1997, the battlelabs have developed over
    100 initiatives, including the application of commercial scheduling
    software for the Air Force Satellite Control Network,
    telecommunications firewalls for base phone systems, and the use of
    speech recognition to reduce mission planning time. The recently
    commissioned Air Mobility Battlelab joined the ranks of the Air
    Expeditionary Force Battlelab, Command and Control Battlelab, Force
    Protection Battlelab, Information Warfare Battlelab, Space Battlelab,
    and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battlelab, with a charter to rapidly
    identify and assess innovative operational and logistics concepts.
    Joint Test and Evaluation
        The Air Force plans to remain at the forefront of the joint test
    and evaluation (JT&E) process. JT&E programs are a means to bring two
    or more of the Services together to evaluate systems interoperability
    under realistic conditions. We are the lead service on five JT&Es in
    the areas of close air support; joint command, control, ISR sensor
    management techniques; cruise missile defense capability; GPS
    vulnerabilities; and electronic warfare in joint operations.
    Conclusion
        Our future hinges on continued advances in people, readiness, and
    modernization programs. Retention and recruitment of people will stay
    challenging in the near-term, but we will remain focused on the quality
    of life of our members. Similarly, we are concerned about readiness,
    but until we solve our aging aircraft troubles, improving our readiness
    will remain difficult. We believe we have developed a sound
    recapitalization plan to address our aging aircraft problem, but if the
    plan is approved, we would require additional funding to execute it.
    Modernization brings increased readiness, along with new technologies
    and enhanced capabilities. We will continue to innovate and adapt our
    revolutionary advances in space technology, directed energy, and
    unmanned aerial vehicles, to name only a few. Our efforts span the
    gamut of the world's most diverse, flexible, and powerfully integrated
    aerospace force. We must balance and fund our people, readiness, and
    modernization programs to ensure aerospace power for America well into
    the future.

                          REFORMING BUSINESS PRACTICES

        The budget constraints of the past decade have forced us to take a
    hard look at our business practices. We have undertaken aggressive
    efforts to realize cost efficiencies by benchmarking the best business
    and management practices, whether in government or industry, and then
    adapting them to our unique environment. During the past year, we made
    significant progress in improving how we do business in everything from
    competitive sourcing of personnel positions to the flow of information
    within the Air Force Headquarters.

                       LEVERAGING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

        We made some tremendous progress in 2000 in the way we plan for,
    acquire, and protect our information technology (IT). We started by
    creating the position of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
    Air Force for Business and Information Management to centralize IT
    decision-making and implement an Air Force-wide process to assess our
    IT investments in preparation for future budgeting efforts.
        Driving our IT efforts is our ``One Air Force, One Network''
    strategy, a multi-layered approach to integrating operations, people,
    technology, and oversight through an enterprise-wide, network-centric
    concept. Included in this strategy is the establishment of the Air
    Force Portal, the consolidation of our servers, and improvements in
    information assurance (IA). The Air Force Portal will provide all our
    members with a platform-independent, single logon capability to meet
    practically all their information needs. Currently, network-based
    access allows our members to logon anywhere in the world, supporting
    over 75 applications. The migration of most of our critical databases
    is planned for the near future.
        In 2000, we saw the initial consolidation of our servers improve
    the utilization of our computer resources. We have created teams of
    experts at central sites and reduced our exposure to outside threats.
    Our goal is to have one base from each major command completed by
    August 2001 and all bases by September 2002. Our strategy advances IA
    through standardized practices and procedures; integrated network
    operations and information protection; automated and dynamic detection
    and response; consolidated situational awareness and decision support;
    and enhancements for deployed and classified environments. We are
    committed to IA as our top information warfare priority for long-term
    investment.
        Finally, our Global Combat Support System-Air Force (GCSS-AF) is
    key to integrating our critical combat support information systems and
    processes across functional areas. GCSS-AF incorporates the Air Force
    Portal, allowing customer specific access while permitting the
    customization of information within our business information systems.
    Together, GCSS-AF and the Air Force Portal will provide the warfighter,
    supporting elements, and other Air Force members with timely and
    accurate data and the capability to transform this data into meaningful
    information. Seamlessly incorporating combat support into war planning
    allows military planners to improve their course of action development,
    analysis, and collaborative planning; and it measurably streamlines our
    business processes.

                              COMPETITIVE SOURCING

        Our public/private manpower competitions are a defense reform
    initiative success story. In 2000, we began new competition studies
    impacting 2,895 positions, as required by Office of Management and
    Budget Circular A-76. The A-76 circular calls for the review of
    government functions meeting specified criteria, and competition with
    private-sector firms to determine the most efficient and cost-effective
    method to perform the work. In 2000, we concluded 30 competitions that
    covered 5,534 positions. These competitions resulted in 46 percent of
    the work being contracted, and the remainder being performed by the
    most efficient government organization. Both results yielded
    significant cost savings. As of April 2001, we have completed 48
    percent of the A-76 competitions targeted by the 1997 QDR and the
    Defense Reform Initiative. Our annual top-to-bottom review of our
    manpower authorizations identified an additional 3,491 positions as
    eligible for competition.

                                 PRIVATIZATION

    Utilities
        Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #49 directed the
    privatization of all utility systems by September 30, 2003, except
    those needed for unique mission or security reasons, or when
    privatization is uneconomical. This included two interim milestones:
    determining the feasibility of privatizing each system by September 30,
    2000, and releasing all requests for proposals by September 30, 2001.
    Currently, we have completed the first milestone by determining whether
    or not to pursue privatization for each system (i.e., water,
    wastewater, electrical, and natural gas). This evaluation resulted in
    434 systems becoming candidates for privatization. We continue to
    assess our options, and are now preparing the requests for proposal
    that are required to meet the second milestone.
    Housing
        The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act provided legislation to
    privatize military family housing. Privatization efforts are underway
    to meet the goal of eliminating inadequate military family housing
    units by the year 2010. We have awarded 4 of 9 pilot projects to
    privatize 6,280 housing units. During fiscal year 2001-04, we plan to
    privatize over 21,000 housing units at 22 additional installations. Our
    privatization efforts are part of our overall housing revitalization
    program outlined in our Family Housing Master Plan.

                               ACQUISITION REFORM

        Today's environment demands continuous acquisition reform. We have
    consistently led the way with new acquisition initiatives, or
    ``Lightning Bolts,'' and reinvention teams, which succeeded in saving
    more than $30 billion during the last decade. Today, we are
    institutionalizing acquisition reform through new initiatives, such as
    the use of cost as an independent variable and reduction of total
    ownership cost, which improve acquisition affordability. In addition,
    we've recently developed an acquisition cycle-time reduction initiative
    known as the warfighter rapid acquisition process. This initiative has
    the potential to speed up the development and deployment of innovative
    solutions to warfighter requirements by 2 to 5 years. Our motto of
    ``faster and smarter'' continues to guide us as we build upon the
    successful efforts of the past.

                           PARTNERSHIP WITH INDUSTRY

        We have consistently counted on industry to deliver superior
    products at reasonable prices. Now, we are institutionalizing
    partnering between industry and the warfighter. Initiatives such as
    teaming on proposals (TOPS) and total system program responsibility
    (TSPR) allow us to establish these partnerships early in the
    acquisition process. Integrated product teams extend this relationship
    throughout the acquisition life cycle. The process of alternative
    dispute resolution is now a part of all major acquisition projects,
    reducing the threat of expensive claims. We are reaching out to
    industry to maintain robust, rewarding, and healthy relationships. In
    our partnerships with industry, we are also developing a blueprint for
    defense reform that will guide future reform initiatives throughout the
    government. This blueprint was unveiled in February 2001. We will
    continue to look for new areas in which we can improve our partnership.

               PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM REFORM

        We are reengineering the Air Force Resource Allocation Process
    (AFRAP) to better link strategic planning, requirements generation,
    programming and budgeting, while providing a consistent focus on
    capabilities throughout the process. This new process will have a more
    rigorous and consistent analytical underpinning than earlier methods.
    We are planning to give our major commands an explicit slice of total
    obligation authority with the flexibility to program funds to best meet
    their own priorities. We believe this approach will improve the
    accountability and visibility of our resource requirements during the
    DOD and congressional review and funding processes.

                                FINANCIAL REFORM

        We continue to make progress toward achieving auditable financial
    statements as required by the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act. An Air
    Force integrated process team is resolving issues related to the
    reduction of erroneous or unsupported obligations. This, in turn, will
    enable us to achieve an auditable statement of budgetary resources. We
    are making efforts to validate at least four of our crucial inputs that
    provide the foundation for unqualified audit opinions on Air Force
    financial statements. All these efforts will provide better financial
    information for Air Force commanders and managers.

                            LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

        The Defense Planning Guidance, DOD Logistics Strategic Plan, and
    Defense Reform Initiative Directive #54 (Logistics Transformation) all
    identified a requirement for the services to modernize their logistics
    programs. Accordingly, we initiated a logistics transformation effort
    designed to improve overall combat capability. Through improved supply
    chain management practices, this effort gives the warfighter a complete
    picture of the enterprise's supply, maintenance, and sustainment
    support activities affecting readiness. Reengineered logistical support
    concepts will directly support warfighter readiness with a tailored
    sustainment strategy for a downsized, but expeditionary force
    structure, that is within the budgets currently projected across the
    FYDP.

                           DEPOT MAINTENANCE STRATEGY

        Over the past year, we conducted a comprehensive review of our
    depot maintenance strategy to ensure our capability is properly sized
    for both wartime and peacetime utilization. Our current depot posture
    and future planning has been influenced by the downsizing of our
    operational force; the reduction of our organic infrastructure; a more
    active and robust private sector; the introduction of new technologies;
    and recent depot legislation changes. This review reaffirmed that depot
    maintenance is a critical element of our overall warfighting
    capability. Our recent experience in support of Operation Allied Force
    once again proved the wisdom of having a ready and controlled source of
    depot maintenance. As a result, our depot strategy will ensure we
    possess an organic ``core'' capability sized to support potential
    military operations. In addition, we recognize the need to efficiently
    utilize our organic facilities during peacetime. To that end, our
    depots are allowed to pursue repair workload beyond their ``core''
    requirements that is awarded through public/private competitions when
    doing so would increase their ``core'' production efficiencies or offer
    a ``best value'' source of repair.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In a time when the Air Force was asked to do more with less, we
    succeeded in reinventing our business approaches to capitalize both on
    the inherent strengths of our enterprise and the best practices found
    in the private sector. We are at the forefront of apportioning
    positions between military and civil service functions and those that
    can be accomplished by contract personnel. We are becoming
    interconnected with a single, Air Force-wide network that puts crucial
    information at everyone's fingertips. We are reforming the acquisition
    process and partnering with industry, not only delivering products
    faster but assuring superior quality as well. In the last decade, our
    better business practices have saved billions of dollars, allowing us
    to revolutionize the application of aerospace power.

                                CLOSING THOUGHTS

        From the beginning of powered flight almost 100 years ago to the
    space-related operations we conduct today, we have demonstrated that we
    are an innovative and adaptive force. We were born of change and it
    remains a part of our nature. We will continue exploring new
    technologies and operational concepts to identify those that offer
    potential for evolutionary or revolutionary increases in capability.
        Our success as an aerospace force is founded on recruiting the
    finest men and women available and then retaining them. We must size,
    shape and operate the force to best meet the needs of our Nation.
    Through the structure of our ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, we
    provide the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) with trained-to-task forces,
    while adding predictability and stability to the lives of our airmen.
    We owe our people the education, equipment, and training to perform the
    missions we ask them to do. Finally, to keep our aerospace advantage,
    we must modernize and replace our worn out, aging, and increasingly
    difficult to maintain systems and infrastructure.
        In a world that is globally-connected, national security and
    international stability are vital foundations of America's prosperity.
    Ensuring security and stability requires global vigilance, reach, and
    power--global vigilance to anticipate and deter threats, strategic
    reach to curb crises, and overwhelming power to prevail in conflicts
    and win America's wars. We are postured to provide balanced aerospace
    capabilities across the full spectrum of military operations, but in
    order to maintain America's aerospace advantage we must recapitalize
    our force.

        Chairman Levin. Secretary Roche, thank you.
        General Ryan.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL E. RYAN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
                            STATES AIR FORCE

        General Ryan. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, distinguished
    members of the committee: Before we get started, I would like
    to thank my fellow chiefs for all their service and support,
    flying in close formation through the years, and these service
    secretaries for their commitment to serve. I also want to thank
    members of the committee for all you have done for the men and
    women in uniform over the 4 years I have had the privilege of
    serving as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
        During that time we have seen a drop in readiness that has
    concerned us all. With your help, we have been able to arrest
    the decline, but much more needs to be done to regain our edge
    across the board. Consequently, this budget submission for the
    Air Force has a great emphasis on people and readiness.
        We still need your help in attracting the highest quality
    individuals to serve in our military. I am happy to say this
    year we are making our recruiting goals, both in terms of
    quality and numbers. Our major challenge is retaining our best
    and brightest to stay with us for a career. Your help over the
    past years on pay, retirement, health care, etcetera, has been
    much appreciated.
        Quality of life issues are terribly important to attracting
    and retaining great people, but also so is quality of service.
    Quality of service addresses the need to assure we give our
    airmen the proper tools to do the tough jobs we ask of them in
    Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, in No Fly Zone enforcement where
    combat occurs daily. The same is true in the Balkans and in
    Korea. Quality of service is not just about the equipment with
    which we operate, but the ranges, hangars, buildings and shops
    in which we ask these dedicated individuals to do their work.
        We all know quality begets quality and we have underfunded
    our modernization of our capital equipment and our
    infrastructure for too long. The average age of an Air Force
    aircraft is 22 years and continues to climb. We must turn this
    aging problem around.
        In summary, I look forward to working with Secretary Roche
    and all of you as we complete the quadrennial defense review
    and address the budget issues before us. I know together we can
    make a great difference as we continue to rebuild our military
    to meet the challenges of the 21st century, and I look forward
    to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Ryan.
        We are going to have a 6-minute first round.
        Senator Inhofe. Could I have a question, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        Senator Inhofe. Do we intend to have more rounds?
        Chairman Levin. Yes. For our first round we will use the 6-
    minute rule and then, depending on how many people are still
    here and how much time we have left, we will decide on how long
    the question period will be for the second and any successive
    rounds.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. I want to ask each of you for the record to
    give us your list of unfunded requirements for 2002. I am not
    going to ask you here, but I am going to ask each of you to
    submit that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]
                                      Army

                             UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS

        I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Army's fiscal year
    2002 resource posture. Clearly, the fiscal year 2002 Amended Budget
    represents a balanced program that will allow the Army to remain
    trained and ready. I am pleased to note significant increases in a
    number of key areas--soldier pay and housing, base operations, real
    property, and science and technology. These will improve quality of
    life for our soldiers and their families, slow deterioration of our
    aging infrastructure, and advance Army Transformation.
        However, there is still much to be done. To stem the critical
    decline in our facilities, the Army has assumed some risk in our
    operating accounts. We will mitigate this risk in the year of
    execution. Additional resources will allow us to accelerate
    recapitalization of our counterattack corps, restore necessary OPTEMPO
    funding and begin stabilization of our infrastructure.
        The following list outlines these and other fiscal year 2002 Army
    shortfalls.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2002 ARMY SHORTFALLS
                            [in millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Shortfall      Cum
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    OPTEMPO.........................................       300.0       300.0
    Antiterrorism/Force Protection..................       306.0       606.0
    SRM/RPM.........................................       287.7       893.7
    Reserve Component Duty Training Pay.............       100.0       993.7
    Reserve Component Full Time Support.............        76.4     1,070.1
    Recapitalization................................       566.2     1,636.3
    Objective Force Development.....................        43.1     1,679.4
    Interim Brigade Combat Teams....................        93.6     1,773.0
    Second Destination Transportation...............        70.7     1,843.7
    Ammo Stockpile Management.......................        81.4     1,925.1
    Current Force Modernization.....................     1,969.0     3,894.1
    Test and Evaluation.............................       193.8     4,087.9
    Infrastructure Support and Information                 449.1     4,537.0
     Technology.....................................
    CTC/Training Range Modernization................       493.1     5,030.1
    Initial Entry Training..........................        32.6     5,062.7
    Mission Oriented Readiness......................       259.9     5,322.6
    Sustainment Systems Technical Support...........        68.4     5,391.0
    Depot Maintenance...............................       194.4     5,585.4
    Education, Transition, and Other People Programs       137.6     5,723.0
    Spares/War Reserve Secondary Items..............       675.0     6,398.0
    Homeland Security (Weapons of Mass Destruction).        19.6     6,417.6
    Army Family Housing.............................       353.0     6,770.6
    Maintenance and Repair Backlog..................     2,778.5     9,549.1
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Navy/Marine Corps
        The Navy's list of unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2002 is
    provided in the following tables.

                                   Air Force
        The following are the Air Force's fiscal year 2002 unfunded
    priorities:

        Chairman Levin. We do not know to what extent Congress is
    going to be able to accommodate the budget amendment for the
    year 2002. The Budget Committee and other committees are going
    to be involved in that as well as us. But the larger question I
    want to ask you about has to do with future year funding, and
    that has to do with whether or not you are putting together a
    longer term strategy which our fiscal situation can support.
        So let me start with the service secretaries and ask each
    of you this question. Do you expect that after the completion
    of the QDR you will be proposing a fiscal year 2003 budget
    which will require additional funding above the level that you
    are requesting for the year 2002, or are you planning to make
    offsetting reductions in lower priority programs or in business
    practice savings which would finance a new strategy at or below
    the funding levels that you are requesting for the year 2002?
        So we will start with you, Secretary White, as to what is
    your current expectation relative to the 2003 request following
    the QDR, just your best estimate at this point.
        Secretary White. Well, Senator, it is difficult to predict.
    If the QDR process dictates or the Secretary decides that force
    structure changes will be a part of that, then obviously if the
    force gets smaller as a part of the QDR process that will
    create a different funding requirement going forward. If the
    force stays the same, we will make every attempt to offset the
    additional requirements above the levels we are looking at now
    with business efficiencies that we will hope to employ during
    the 2003 year and get sorted out over the next few months as we
    continue to work this.
        So it is difficult to see exactly where that balance is
    going to come out short of the final decisions on the strategy
    review. But if it were to stay the same, I think that we will
    look toward at least this level of funding next year net of
    business practice improvements that we could make.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary England.
        Secretary England. Senator, I think it would be a
    combination, and that is my best estimate at this point. If you
    look at our recapitalization rate, as the CNO commented, at our
    present rate we will go down to about 240 ships. I do not know
    what the outcome of the QDR will be, but I doubt it will be
    that low in terms of our naval services. After all, we are a
    forward-deployed force, a rotational force, so we are always
    around the world. Therefore I would expect that we would not be
    that low. So we will need additional resources.
        Our airplanes are also very old. We do need to recapitalize
    the airplanes. At the same time, we do anticipate that we will
    have better efficiency, we will indeed save money as we go
    forward through business practices. So I would expect that we
    will save money, but we will also have some additional needs.
    So I do not see that our request will be lower this year, but
    hopefully it will not be as much as if we did not take action
    in terms of better business practices.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Roche.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, the 2002 budget does a lot
    to help us get well in maintenance and people-related things,
    but it does not do all that we need. We cannot live with the
    procurement holiday in airplanes that has existed for the last
    8 or so years, where we have just had insufficient purchases of
    airplanes. Our planes age increasingly. The costs--the time to
    put a tanker through a logistics center now is over a year
    because these planes are failing in ways that we did not
    anticipate because they are just getting old.
        So we will need more money. At the same time, we have an
    obligation to look for offsets, to look for ways to do things
    more efficiently, put in better business practices. But some of
    these things will make pain for certain areas and we will have
    to work that out, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I want to talk to you about an additional round or rounds
    of base closures. Let me start with you, General Ryan, and go
    down and ask each of our service chiefs and our service
    secretaries this question: Do you agree with the President and
    Secretary Rumsfeld that we have unneeded bases and that we
    should have another round of base closures to eliminate the
    excess infrastructure and to free up resources for
    modernization or for other higher priorities? General?
        General Ryan. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Could you be a little more fulsome? Why do
    you believe that? Give us an estimate as well of the
    significant savings here.
        General Ryan. Over the past 4 years we have continued to
    ask for a base closure. The Air Force is overbased for the
    force structure we have today. We think that we can save
    significant amounts of money in the out years with a base
    closure. But sir, during the years that you do the base
    closures you actually have to invest to be able to save in the
    future.
        We have out of the past rounds of savings of base closures
    had extensive savings, calculated in the $4 billion to $5
    billion a year amount over these years today, the last base
    closure being in the mid-nineties. So we emphatically support
    base closure.
        Chairman Levin. Now I will have to ask each of our other
    witnesses to be much shorter because my time is up. If you
    could just give us now a short answer to that question.
        Secretary Roche. Yes.
        General Jones. Sir, yes, I support it. I support the
    Secretary's findings on that. But as the smallest service with
    the smallest bases, I have the least to offer.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. I have always believed that one of the
    fundamental principles we should follow is that we should not
    pay a nickel for a structure we do not need. Then, having said
    that, I would say we are already in our major naval bases very
    consolidated. I think that the potential savings would be in
    the area of support structure.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary England.
        Secretary England. I would support the comments of the CNO.
    We definitely as we go forward, depending on what our future
    force is, we do have to size it appropriately because we cannot
    afford to carry extra infrastructure.
        Chairman Levin. General Shinseki.
        General Shinseki. The Army has excess capacity that we have
    carried and we believe that a BRAC would help adjust that.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary White.
        Secretary White. I agree with the chief. I think we have
    excess infrastructure and we have to do something about it.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
        I will lead off with an Army question. It really goes to
    operational, but we have before us today a great deal of
    concern about the future of NATO, the future of NATO expansion,
    our participation in NATO. General Shinseki, I remember
    visiting you in Bosnia when you were the commander of our
    forces over there, and throughout the Bosnia-Kosovo chapter it
    seems to me that the United States shouldered equally with our
    allies the burdens and the risks of those operations.
        But today's headline says: ``U.S. Offers Aid to Macedonia
    Effort: Rumsfeld Limits Role to Logistics of Rebel
    Disarmament.'' Logistics. Is there something behind this that
    is not in the headline, because we are constantly concerned
    about the European defense initiative and their desire to go
    off and establish their own force structure, which I believe is
    somewhat redundant and in competition with NATO? This may feed
    into their arguments that they should establish their own force
    structure because we decline to take on and share equally the
    burdens and the risks of military operations.
        I will lead off with the Secretary. You start and then I
    will invite the General, who had hands-on experience over there
    for many years.
        Secretary White. Senator, I am unaware of any change coming
    from the Secretary or even a part of the QDR discussions to
    date that would indicate any less emphasis on our commitment to
    NATO. We have been the leader of that alliance since its
    founding and we have actively participated and provided the
    leadership in Kosovo and Bosnia, and I think we will sustain
    that in the future. I defer to the chief.
        Senator Warner. Chief.
        General Shinseki. Senator Warner, I apologize, I am not as
    quick with the morning headlines and I had not read that
    article. I am not aware of any changes. Our leadership both as
    a global leader and inside of NATO has been consistent.
        Senator Warner. I should hope so, and I would hope that
    does not indicate that we are going to say we will opt for just
    logistics and leave the risk fighting to others.
        Yesterday I had a chance to visit my National Guard group
    in Virginia and I was astonished to learn that the Army
    indicates what level of technical assistance the Army should
    supply and yet only 50 percent of the commitments from the
    regular Army are flowing to the Guard in terms of manpower. I
    will provide this chart to you.
        But the point is that our Guard in Virginia are very
    proudly working up to go in to be a contingent in Bosnia to
    take on those duties. Other States' Guards are right alongside
    the regular forces. Yet back home in their duties, which are
    quite diverse as the Guard in training up and working up, they
    seem to have--and this is nationwide, it was related to me--all
    50 States are roughly only receiving from the Department of the
    Army about half the trained personnel full-time that they need.
        Mr. Secretary, have you had an opportunity to address that
    question? If not, I will give you a month or 2 to work on it
    and then I will be back.
        Secretary White. Clearly, the integration of Reserve
    components and their stepping up the missions that in the past
    have been taken almost exclusively by active forces indicates
    that we are one Army, and we have to sustain and resource on
    that basis and they deserve the support of the Department in
    accomplishing this.
        Senator Warner. I would like to come back to you in about
    30 days and get an update on that.
        Chief, do you care to add?
        General Shinseki. I am not familiar with the chart,
    Senator, but I would be very happy to review it and provide
    some detailed responses.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                 Active Component Support the Reserve Component
        I share your concerns about the levels of full-time support manning
    in our Reserve components. The numbers on the chart you provided
    indicate the current levels of manning for Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)
    and military technicians (MILTECH) of the Virginia Army National Guard.
    The matching of Reserve component requirements to resources is an issue
    that the Army has pursued for several years. In regard to the chart, it
    is correct that the Virginia Army National Guard is near 50 percent of
    their required strength with AGR and MILTECH. This is similar in the
    Army National Guard in other states and in the Army Reserve. We have
    sought, along with the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve, to
    obtain budgetary increases to permit the manning of approved
    requirements.
        As such, the Army seeks to incrementally increase Army National
    Guard full-time support at a rate of 794 AGR personnel in fiscal year
    2002 and 724 AGR personnel per year from fiscal year 2003 through
    fiscal year 2011, with a final increment of 188 in fiscal year 2012.
    For the Army National Guard MILTECH, the Army seeks an increase of 487
    per year from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2010, with a final
    increment of 208 in fiscal year 2011.
        For the Army Reserve, the Army seeks an increase of 482 in fiscal
    year 2002 and an annual increase requirement of 300 AGR for fiscal year
    2003 through fiscal year 2010, with a final increment of 273 in fiscal
    year 2011. The requested MILTECH increase for the Army Reserve is 250
    personnel per year from fiscal year 2002 through 2008, with a final
    increment of 146 in fiscal year 2009. I am including a table that shows
    these increases.
        Full-time support has been the number one integrated priority list
    item with Joint Forces Command for the last 2 years. During fiscal year
    2001, we were successful in obtaining funding for the first increment
    of the AGR and MILTECH ramp-up to meet required levels.

        General Shinseki. I am not sure what the 50 percent means.
        Senator Warner. Well, you provide regular Army personnel to
    the Guard units all across America.
        General Shinseki. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator Warner. You also have prescribed, that is the
    Department of the Army, how many regular Army should be given
    to Virginia, Maryland, Arizona, and so forth. I am told that
    you are only providing half of the needed personnel that your
    own tables of organization state that should be supplied.
        General Shinseki. We are providing 5,000 officers and NCOs
    under the title that mandates----
        Senator Warner. We will go into it together, but I am going
    to be very, very persistent on this. We will address this issue
    in the current authorization bill before the Senate.
        General Shinseki. We are meeting the obligation of the
    5,000, Senator. So I need to see what the 50 percent
    represents.
        Senator Warner. Now to the Navy and, of course, the
    question of shipbuilding. Mr. Secretary, you and I have talked
    extensively on this. You touched on it in your opening
    testimony this morning together with our distinguished Chief of
    Naval Operations. The curve is going down to where you are at
    313 ships. As we talked about this morning, it is going to drop
    below 300 because we are simply not building enough ships. We
    are looking for innovative ways to finance. There used to be
    the old long lead, the early procurement. We have had a dozen
    different names.
        Mr. Secretary, what progress are you making with the Office
    of Management and Budget towards establishing a new type of
    funding whereby you can better husband that limited amount of
    money each year that you allocate to shipbuilding and do it in
    a manner that hopefully will produce a greater number of ships
    as the pipeline grows?
        Secretary England. Senator, we are not having those
    discussions in detail with OMB at the moment. We are having
    discussions within the Navy because this is a problem within
    the Navy. If we do anything in terms of advance appropriations
    or whatever, it commits us to a strategy of each year funding
    at some significant level.
        I will tell you that--and I will let the CNO speak after me
    on this issue, but I believe he and I do agree we definitely
    need to increase the rate and we need to do this at some
    sustained level. It is part of the business practice
    improvements that we can put in place.
        Senator Warner. But are you working on that the best you
    can?
        Secretary England. We are definitely working to do that,
    sir.
        Senator Warner. General Jones, a question on Vieques. This
    committee follows this issue very, very carefully. I have spent
    a considerable amount of my time on this issue, as have my
    other colleagues, particularly my colleague from Oklahoma,
    Senator Inhofe, who during my years as chairman devoted much of
    his time to this issue. I know the Department of the Navy, both
    Navy and Marine Corps service chiefs, are looking for
    alternatives. I think we accept the assumption that we will not
    likely find anything that will meet the excellent standards
    that Vieques has provided the Navy for 50 years, and that is a
    piece of property owned by the United States Navy, I hasten to
    remind all.
        But nevertheless, our President has indicated a policy
    decision, which I presume that you are trying to salute and
    march off to fulfil. But it brings to mind that we are going to
    have to look at the funding for Roosevelt Roads, which is an
    ancillary base. In my recollection, when I was in your seat,
    Secretary England, that base was largely justified by the
    periodic use of the ranges at Vieques.
        What is likely to be your recommendation with regard to
    Roosevelt Roads as we work our way through this problem on
    Vieques? If you want to lead off, Mr. Secretary, then let your
    two service chiefs respond.
        Secretary England. Let me just refer this to Admiral Clark
    because he has detail on that subject. I will just let Admiral
    Clark respond to that, sir.
        Admiral Clark. Well, this really falls in the category of
    the previous question about support structure and facilities
    and whether we need it or not. We absolutely need Roosevelt
    Roads if we are in Vieques and if we are not in Vieques it
    raises the question about how we put the whole structure
    together to train, organize, develop, and deploy a task force.
        It costs us between $200 and $300 million a year to keep
    that going. The Secretary has laid out the requirement for a
    group to reevaluate alternatives. We have had discussions on
    this. My posture is if I do not need the structure to get the
    task done, my recommendation would be to not be supporting that
    kind of investment.
        But we have to put together the posture we are going to use
    and the actual tactics, techniques, and procedures to develop
    and deploy these forces.
        Senator Warner. General Jones.
        General Jones. Sir, I agree with the CNO.
        Senator Warner. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks to you gentlemen for your outstanding and in some
    senses unsettling testimony. I thank you for it. The chairman
    expressed at the beginning a thought that I want to associate
    myself with, which is that we are facing some real resource
    constraints here, which are unfortunate, because the projected
    surpluses were so significant and remain, notwithstanding the
    economic slowdown. So that some of us--I do not say this in a
    partisan way--regret the amount of money that we have committed
    for the tax cut program because it puts us in a bind in meeting
    and fulfilling our committee's responsibility to meet the needs
    of the military.
        But I do think that is our responsibility and we as a
    committee on a bipartisan basis should go ahead and try to do
    that and then see if at other points along the way in this
    process we can figure out where to get the money and how to do
    it, because we are dealing here with a fundamental
    constitutional responsibility to provide for the common
    defense, as Senator Warner said.
        While I appreciate the significant increase that the
    administration has recommended for defense, as I said to
    Secretary Rumsfeld last week, and I say with even more force
    today having heard your testimony, because you are on the line,
    we are not giving you enough. We have to find a way to do that.
        As I look at the numbers in the various budgets, in the
    Army budget in real terms procurement and research and
    development (R&D) seem to be, by my calculation, down because
    Patriot Advanced Capability-3 was transferred from the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) to the Army, adding
    $714 million in procurement and $107 million in R&D to the Army
    number. So procurement actually may be down by $500 million and
    R&D may be down by $600 million.
        In the Navy budget, procurement is down by $1.9 billion;
    family housing is down by $100 million in the Air Force budget.
    Most troublingly, the R&D picture is not getting better. It is
    down again this year, and it is only at 2.1 percent of the Air
    Force total obligational authority, which is well under the 3
    percent that DOD has set as a goal.
        The supplemental appropriations bill is on the floor now. I
    am going to be joining with Senator McCain and two others to
    introduce two amendments that would increase funding for the
    Department of Defense, one by $2.74 billion, the other by $846
    million. These are largely driven by what we understand to be
    requests, quite justifiable, that the service chiefs have made
    for supplemental funding.
        I hope we can convince our colleagues to take first steps
    in the direction of giving you what you need. Maybe I should
    start there as an example. For instance, one of the items that
    we are adding is procurement of ammunition for the Army at the
    rate of $14 million. I know it would be hard for you, based on
    the generality, to indicate, but I wonder, General Shinseki, if
    you could tell us what you would do with that $14 million for
    procurement for ammunition for the Army?
        General Shinseki. Well, Senator, we traditionally have an
    unfunded requirement for ammunition, because the ammunition
    statement is against a war to be determined at a future date.
    We procure about a billion dollars in ammunition every year.
    Until recently, we carried over the Program Objective
    Memorandum (POM) about a $9.5 billion critical war reserve
    shortfall--against which we programmed $2 billion.
        So we have reduced that shortfall. But that shortfall is
    one that we have carried and I think we have addressed in terms
    of our available dollars and suitable risk for requirements
    that are to be determined in the near future.
        There are stockpiles that we do maintain. When we are
    unable to use them, those ammunition stockpiles, in a timely
    manner, they outlive their shelf life. We then have to go
    through the process of demilitarization, which we spend about
    $100 million a year doing. So it is a balance of getting it
    right.
        Senator Lieberman. So that is the purpose that Congress
    should appropriate an additional $14 million for ammunition?
    That is the purpose for which you would use it?
        General Shinseki. I have a priority list of the kinds of
    ammunitions, probably mostly in the precision arena, but I will
    provide that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                           Procurement of Ammunition

        The Army would spend the additional $14 million procuring 135,000
    Modular Artillery Charge Systems, as the most pressing unfunded
    ammunition requirement. These new modular propellant charges are
    critical to support both war reserves and training.
        The Modular Artillery Charge System, a replacement system for 155
    millimeter propelling charges, offers simplified logistics compared to
    traditional bag propellant systems. Simplified logistics directly
    support Transformation, reducing the logistics footprint and making the
    Army more agile and lethal.

        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Admiral Clark, Navy procurement, by my calculation, at
    $24.6 billion is down by $1.9 billion. Am I reading that right?
        Admiral Clark. I do not have the exact numbers in front of
    me, Senator, but you probably are. Last year I testified before
    the Readiness Committee about the level of investment we had to
    have in acquisition to sustain the Navy that we needed and I
    suggested it was somewhere in the neighborhood of $34 billion a
    year. There is a delta----
        Senator Lieberman. Again, excuse me, but on that basis I
    accept your number. You are the Chief. We are at $24.6 billion?
        Admiral Clark. That is correct.
        Senator Lieberman. So we are almost $10 billion below that.
        Admiral Clark. I am on the record, I have been, that we
    have to do something on the acquisition accounts. That is the
    point I tried to get forward in my statement. If you compare
    the 2001 and 2002 and try to analyze the difference,
    fundamentally you will see that we purchased an aircraft
    carrier in 2001 and that creates a spike.
        Senator Lieberman. Sure.
        Admiral Clark. This is the point, though, that I have tried
    to make with regard to the requirement to better partner with
    industry, that industry cannot size itself properly. We have
    unique industrial bases that support the defense structure of
    the United States and with this sine-cosine curve kind of
    investment structure it is not the economic way to go at it.
        Senator Lieberman. General Ryan, let me ask you about that
    number for research and development, which concerns me, and I
    would guess it concerns you. How can we get to the future Air
    Force that I know you want with research and development
    funding at that level?
        General Ryan. Our S&T funding, science and technology
    funding, in the current budget that we presented for Air Force
    is up to 2 percent of our total TOA this year, which is up from
    last year's budget we presented. This committee and others
    helped us increase the funding for our S&T up to approximately
    $1.5 billion last year. We submitted a budget this year at $1.4
    billion as we prioritized.
        But I agree with you, we must not eat our seed corn and S&T
    is the essence of our future readiness.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you all.
        My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I hope that we will be able to
    work in this committee on a bipartisan basis to respond to the
    statement of need from the secretaries and the chiefs and then
    be advocates for them through our authorization bill. I thank
    you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I had an experience yesterday I thought I would share with
    this committee. I was flying my plane from Oklahoma to
    Washington and I had with me a guy named Charles Savett, who is
    one of the most highly decorated pilots from the Vietnam era,
    having flown 288 missions. Senator Warner, what he told me, he
    said: You can argue with the war; it was highly controversial,
    but when they were in combat, he said, the one thing we had the
    assurance of is that everything we were using was better than
    what they were using--the F-100, the F-105's, F-4's. You can
    say the same thing for the Navy; the A-4's and A-6's were all
    better than the equipment that was being flown by the
    adversaries at that time.
        I think most of the American people probably believe that
    is still true today. But it is not true today if you look at
    our air to air vehicles. One of the things I like to do each
    year, as I have for the last 15 years, is go to the air show
    over there and see what the competition is doing and see what
    is on the market that the Chinese and other potential
    adversaries are buying. Air to air vehicles, the F-15 is the
    best that we have, and they have the SU-27's that are on the
    market today. Air to ground, the F-16's that we have, compared
    to the SU-30s that they are using right now in many areas, are
    inferior in terms of range, in terms of detectable range, which
    means they can detect us before we can detect them.
        So we do not have the best of everything right now. Look at
    the double digit SAM's that are out there on the market today
    that are putting the lives of our pilots in danger because they
    are able to reach them now. This was not the case before. They
    have this type of equipment.
        General Shinseki, look at the artillery right now, the
    Paladin. I have the chart that shows that the British, the
    Russians, the Africans, and the Germans, if you use as a
    comparison the rate of fire and the range, are better than we
    are right now in terms of the Paladin. This is the case for the
    Crusader, of course.
        I know that we are looking at different forces and how we
    are going to change the force structure, but in terms of rate
    of fire and range we are already inferior today to what is on
    the market and anyone is able to buy.
        So let me just real quickly try to--first of all, General
    Ryan, do you agree with my assessment of where we are
    competitively with our modernization program?
        General Ryan. Absolutely, sir. I think the equipment that
    is being produced worldwide surpasses our current equipment.
    What makes us good is the fact that we have great people
    operating that equipment.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, then you are looking at--the obvious
    answer to this, to certainly the first part, the deficiencies
    that I was outlining, is the F-22. You have been very
    outspoken, both of you have been, on the necessity of that F-
    22. As it is right now, are 339 aircraft enough to meet the Air
    Force's needs?
        General Ryan. We have used 339 as a number that would fit
    underneath the caps that we had imposed coming out of the last
    QDR, Quadrennial Defense Review. We are relooking at the number
    this year. That does not recapitalize all of our F-15 air to
    air fleet and falls far short of that.
        We also believe that the aircraft has some capability in
    the future to be used as replacements for things like the F-15E
    and the 117.
        So to answer your question, I think, built in numbers, the
    F-22 will be a great addition, not just to the air to air
    fleet, but our air to surface capability also.
        Senator Inhofe. Good, good.
        Secretary Roche, I will just ask for a real quick response
    on this. The administration's budget proposal includes $922
    million in assumed savings from management reform initiatives,
    including $140 million in depot maintenance savings if Congress
    approves a waiver of the 50-50. We are not talking about the
    national security waiver. We are just talking about the waiver.
        We have been asking for the analysis of that. Do you have
    that?
        Secretary Roche. What we would like to do, Senator, is to
    come back to you with a definition of ``capacity.'' That would
    trigger only if our ALC's were at 100 percent capacity. That is
    the only reason that would trigger.
        Senator Inhofe. How would you define ``capacity'' in coming
    to that conclusion?
        Secretary Roche. We would like not to play games as we
    define ``capacity.'' Right now our view is that which exists
    today on one shift--no special games.
        Senator Inhofe. For instance, if you had three ALC's right
    now operating at 100 percent capacity at only one shift a day,
    if you had two shifts they would be at 50 percent capacity; is
    that correct?
        Secretary Roche. If that was the definition, yes. In fact,
    at one of the ALC's I know that they do weekend shifts and that
    they contract out that weekend shift, and that has worked very
    well, and that is at Warner Robins. It has worked out very,
    very nicely.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        General Shinseki, getting back to the Crusader, I wanted to
    get this in before this first round expires for me. One
    Crusader has the firepower of three Paladins, but when you get
    into sustained fire or after the first 3 minutes it is about
    ten times. Can we continue to be in the inferior position that
    we are today and, if not, what is there out there other than
    the Crusader that would take care of that problem, that
    deficiency?
        General Shinseki. Well, Senator, coming out of Desert Storm
    we realized that in terms of artillery we were carrying
    significant risk. We were outgunned, outranged, and outmassed
    by other formations. The reason we did not pay a big price to
    that difference, which I would categorize as risk, was the
    failure on the other side to be able to employ their artillery
    the way we would have.
        So coming out of Desert Storm, we added to that risk. Not
    only were we outgunned, outmassed, and outranged, but we took
    25 percent of our artillery systems and retired them in order
    to husband those resources for future capabilities. But we went
    beyond that. We also retired 25 percent of our direct fire
    systems, our tanks and our Bradleys, and reduced by 25 percent
    the number of platforms inside each battalion.
        We invested those monies in future capabilities that
    ultimately became known as Crusader and directed our efforts at
    digitization to give us better situational awareness so we
    could fight our systems in an integrated fashion.
        We are on the verge of fielding Crusader, and Crusader is
    an important aspect of filling that risk we have incurred.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
        I know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I have one last
    question, just yes or no. General Jones, if I wrote this down
    right, I do not think it was in your submitted statement, but I
    think you said that you agreed with Secretary Rumsfeld that we
    should only replace things when we have something better to
    replace them with. Is that an accurate----
        General Jones. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you agree with this, Secretary England?
        Secretary England. Yes, I do. I think that is definitely
    the case for our weapons systems, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Does that include Vieques?
        Secretary England. No, sir, it does not.
        Senator Inhofe. General Jones, do you think that includes
    Vieques?
        General Jones. The requirement for training----
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
        General Jones.--does not take a back seat to programs.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Without objection, I will ask that a statement by Senator
    Thurmond be inserted into the record and let me read the order
    here that I will be calling on senators. We have really an
    extraordinary attendance here this morning, which is a real
    tribute to you all and to the issues that we grapple with. But
    next will be Senator Reed and then Senator Allard, Senator
    Cleland, Senator Collins, Senator Carnahan, Senator Bunning,
    Senator Sessions. Senator Akaka is here now. After Senator
    Bunning would be Senator Akaka, and then Senator Sessions and
    then Senator Roberts.
        That is the present order. Now, some may leave and some may
    come and switch for that matter, but that is where we now
    stand.
        Senator Reed.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
        Thank you Mr. Chairman:
        Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our Service Secretaries to
    this, their first official hearing before the committee. We have great
    expectations on their ability to bring about change in our Armed Forces
    and look forward to working with them as they take up the challenges of
    their office. I also want to extend a welcome to our senior military
    chiefs. All of them are well known to this committee and are highly
    respected for their distinguished service to our Nation.
        Mr. Chairman, I have been a member of the Armed Services Committee
    almost 42 years. During these years, I have witnessed the many positive
    changes that have transformed our Armed Forces into the world's most
    powerful and professional forces. Despite this achievement, the
    military services must be prepared to meet the challenges of the new
    threats posed by international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction'
    and missile proliferation. Therefore, I fully support the
    transformation plans for each service.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe the President's budget amendment, although
    less than many of us had hoped for, is a good start to provide for the
    transformation of our Armed Forces. With this amendment, defense will
    realize an increase of more than $38 billion over the fiscal year 2001
    defense budget. More importantly, the increase will provide real
    benefits in terms of improved family housing, readiness, and research
    and development. It will also provide robust funding for a National
    Missile Defense program which I consider the most urgent requirement
    for our Nation's security.
        Mr. Chairman, despite all the positive aspects of this budget, I
    believe it does not adequately fund the modernization and
    transformation of our Armed Forces. It is still short of meeting the
    standard of revitalizing our infrastructure every 67 years. It will not
    close the pay gap between the private sector and the military. More
    importantly, it assumes almost $1 billion in savings or efficiencies
    that are not going to be realized.
        The coming months and years will challenge the expertise and will
    power of each of our witnesses as they struggle to prepare our forces
    to fight in an environment that is new to all of us. I believe we are
    fortunate to have men of their caliber in the key positions which they
    occupy. They have my support, and I expect that they will have the
    bipartisan support of this committee.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me begin by associating myself with Senator Lieberman's
    remarks. I believe that the mutual dilemma we all have, both
    the members of this committee, the service chiefs, and the
    service secretaries, is that the budget Congress passed did not
    explicitly or adequately address the needs of the Department of
    Defense. Those needs were secondary to the tax cut.
        The very legitimate and compelling demands you make today
    are not able easily to match with resources since they have
    already been committed. So the budget we are looking at may be
    enough to keep you going, but it is not enough to get you
    ahead. That is the dilemma that we all have to face going
    forward.
        Having said that, let me, if I may, ask more detailed
    questions. Admiral Clark, I understand that in this budget
    there is $110 million set aside for the SSGN conversion. Have
    you made a decision as to the number of boats that would be
    converted? If not, when will that decision be made? Also, could
    you roughly describe how the funding would be used, $110
    million?
        Admiral Clark. I sure can, Senator. Question number one: A
    definite decision as to the total numbers. We put--frankly,
    this was something Secretary England and I worked together on
    in doing what we thought was the best we could do for the
    procurement accounts as we closed this down and made
    recommendations on the amended budget, that the money put in
    there would do advanced planning and design work and would take
    care of two Tridents and that as we continue to examine the
    program in the course of the next year that we could
    potentially pick up two more.
        So that was our thinking. How the money will be spent
    specifically, design, planning work.
        Senator Reed. In your conversion, will you try to make
    these submarines outside the accounting rules of START II,
    which I assume is a more expensive proposition?
        Admiral Clark. That is an issue that has to be dealt with,
    whether they will be START accountable or not, and that is not
    a decision that I get to make. The final bill will of course be
    dependent upon that, and that decision is not made yet.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Secretary White and General Shinseki, the budget briefings
    on the Army budget suggest that there might be a significant
    deterioration in the momentum for transformation, given your
    other demands. In fact, if one looks forward, there is a real
    danger that, because of budget concerns rather than strategic
    concerns, the Army would be forced to cut back its force
    structure.
        Could you elaborate on those concerns or the pace of
    transformation, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary White. Well, first of all, Senator, in the fiscal
    year 2002 budget, we have made funding the S&T effort to
    support Transformation a priority. We have fully funded that
    and gotten support, both from Congress in the past and from the
    Secretary as we go forward. So we are going to maintain the
    momentum of bringing on both the Interim Brigades and the
    Objective Force as we have laid it out.
        Where we have taken the shortfall is in the sustainment of
    the Legacy Force, as it is called, the existing force in the
    modernization and the recapitalization of that.
        The second part of the question, having to do with force
    structure, is a decision that will be made as a part of
    decisions on the strategy and where that is headed, and the
    Secretary has not made those decisions yet and we will just
    have to wait and see how that comes out.
        Senator Reed. General Shinseki, do you have any comment?
        General Shinseki. I would only add, in agreement with the
    Secretary, that if you think of the three efforts that we have
    described--Army Transformation as being this interim effort,
    Interim Brigade Combat Teams, we have funded that requirement.
    We have also funded aggressively our investments in S&T for
    that future Objective Force capability.
        In terms of the Legacy Force, the current force that we
    have today, that is going to be the force that we go to war
    with for the next 10 years. We have said we need to do
    something about recapitalization of those systems, as well as
    taking care of our infrastructure in terms of revitalization.
        Given the profile of where Army soldiers serve today in my
    opening statement, nothing has changed in the last 10 years
    about where we find Army soldiers deployed. The requirement for
    the structure to support those deployments is real and if the
    strategy changes, of course, that is subject to review.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Allard.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am concerned about whether we are going to have the
    capacity and the flexibility to support our intelligence and
    communications requirements over the next 5 to 10 years. This
    budget that has been proposed--are we addressing the shortfalls
    in the satellite intelligence and communications infrastructure
    that we have had in this budget? Please elaborate a little
    further about whether you think we will be meeting those needs
    in 5 to 10 years down the road.
        I would like to address that question to General Ryan.
        General Ryan. Senator Allard, quite honestly, the appetite
    for communications, particularly secure communications, is
    huge. Trying to keep up with that demand has put a great strain
    on our capability both in space and terrestrially, quite
    honestly, to modernize at a rate that the demand is out there
    for. So no, we are struggling with communications. I think all
    of us are.
        Senator Allard. Are we at least beginning to address that
    issue in this budget?
        General Ryan. Yes, sir. We have funding for our satellite
    constellations for communications, which is probably not
    completely adequate, but it is good funding considering the
    budget levels that we are at.
        Senator Allard. The military services must transform into a
    force that is more flexible and more joint and more capable of
    providing military power to the President that is relevant in
    today's job. I would like to hear from each one of the chiefs
    just a comment on that, on how your service is responding to
    that requirement. We will start maybe with General Shinseki.
        General Shinseki. Senator, I would use the Army's efforts
    over the last 2 years to begin transformation of what it has
    described as the force we carried forward or inherited from the
    Cold War designs that we applied and look forward to the 21st
    century and, if I could use the term, see constant whitewater.
    We have begun the process of adjusting our thinking about how
    we organize, how we describe our doctrinal responsibilities, to
    accommodate where we are headed there.
        I think that what we have described is a relevant force for
    the future and a way to get there, labeled the three vectors in
    Army transformation: an Interim Brigade Combat Team concept
    that, applied to today's Legacy Force, gives us capabilities
    out for the next 10 years as we have the time to design that
    future force we were describing.
        As I indicated earlier, we have applied resources against
    all three of those efforts. The initiative in most need of
    support right now is the Legacy Force initiative in terms of
    recapitalization and we believe that is where we have put as
    much energy as we could in this budget.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. Yes, sir. Well, we oftentimes talk about
    stealth--about transformation in terms of platforms. Excuse me
    for saying ``stealth.'' I was thinking about the
    characteristics I want to describe.
        I think that when I look at my Navy, I have 60 to 70
    percent of the hull forms that I am going to have 15 to 20
    years from now. So is the Navy going to be the same 15 to 20
    years from now? Well, it is nothing today like it was even 10
    years ago. So when I talk about transformation I talk about the
    characteristics. It is stealth, it is lethality, precision, it
    is about command and control, superior knowledge, and with that
    for us it is network-centric warfare, investing in the channels
    that--by the way, General Ryan talks about the insatiable
    appetite. It is about a different way of fighting the war and
    it is about being smarter than the enemy and it is about having
    that edge that Senator Inhofe talked about, and it is about
    speed of response and reach.
        In every area, I can give you programs that we are
    investing in for the future. That is the way we are
    transforming our Navy. It involves DD-21, it involves JSF, it
    involves programs that we cannot talk about in an open hearing,
    that allow us to take it to the enemy.
        Senator Allard. General Jones.
        General Jones. Senator, it is an exciting period to be in
    because it really is crossing the bridge between the 20th
    century and the 21st century. The 20th century force structure
    was based on mass and volume. As the CNO pointed out, the 21st
    century forces will have characteristics of speed, not only in
    being able to get to where we need to get to, but also speed in
    decisionmaking. It will be stealthier; there will be much more
    precision involved in these forces. It will be more lethal, as
    the CNO pointed out.
        I think if we do it right they will also be sustainable
    from greater distances. I think that piece of it is equally
    important, if not more so, than the others. We will get into
    some asymmetric advantages that will, as a result of our world
    leadership in technology and the development of those
    technologies, allow us to move away from this mass and volume
    twentieth century characteristic to perhaps a smaller force,
    but one that is certainly much more capable and will have
    tremendous aspects of cohesion and will be able to delegate
    down to unbelievable levels of responsibility tremendous
    missions. The captains of tomorrow are going to be excited
    about serving in this force if we do it right.
        Senator Allard. General Ryan.
        General Ryan. Sir, I think you hit on it in your previous
    question also and that is that, though we will have some
    excellent capabilities in the future and all of the services
    are I think tending toward stealthy, long-range rapidly
    deployable and sustainable forces, what will pull that together
    for us will be our ability to command and control the force, to
    have the knowledge, the vigilance and knowledge of what is
    going on in a particular area to apply the force properly.
        That is a function of a new way of doing business, reaching
    back to many, many different pieces of our military capability
    for analysis and bringing it forward to make it actionable. I
    think that is where the revolution in military affairs is
    headed.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX CLELAND

        Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country. I am
    fascinated about this discussion here at the end of Senator
    Allard's question about the whole concept of transformation. I
    agree with General Ryan that the whole military is going
    through this transformation.
        Over the holidays and the Fourth of July break, I had the
    pleasure of reading General Wesley Clark's book ``Waging Modern
    War.'' How we go to war now is so different than even going to
    war in terms of Desert Storm. The emphasis on massive air and
    sealift, the ability to respond quickly, flexibility, the use
    of precision weapons, massive amounts of air power, the ability
    to deploy the Apaches and so forth and take it to the enemy
    from a long range point of view, on the ground and in the air.
        Wow, what an exciting time to be a young officer in the
    American military. But I am afraid that this budget that I
    review grossly underfunds our ability to do that. The budget
    does not procure enough ships to sustain a 300-ship fleet. It
    does not procure enough aircraft to halt the aging problem that
    adds to flying hour costs and safety concerns. It does not even
    procure enough precision guided munitions to address the
    shortfall in our Reserves. That is simply unacceptable.
        Many say that we simply have deferred the procurement
    decisions until the next budget, after the defense review. That
    is all fine and good, except that the outcome of the strategic
    review is not going to change the fact that we need adequate
    numbers of ships to meet worldwide commitments and we will need
    safe aircraft for our young men and women to fly. We will need
    an adequate stockpile of precision munitions to be ready when
    necessary to protect our vital interests.
        These things have been deferred. They have been deferred in
    some measure so that we can accelerate on a range of missile
    defense programs that have not yet been proven to work and that
    raise significant issues regarding our international
    commitments under the ABM and other treaties. An extra $2.2
    billion by some accounts has actually been allocated in this
    budget to the $6 billion that is already going to these
    programs.
        By ``these programs'' I mean the missile defense programs.
    No one has come to Congress with a threat briefing, classified
    or otherwise, that justifies accelerating these unproven
    programs by literally billions of dollars. I cannot in good
    conscience support it when I know of many legitimate defense
    requirements which you have articulated here and those I have
    mentioned above that do require urgent attention.
        One of those decisions about our future military has to do
    with the B-1 bomber decision, Secretary Roche. Just some
    questions. You have been kind enough to spend some time with me
    and other members of this panel with regard to this decision. I
    look forward to seeing you down at Warner Robins on August 8
    and we will review some of these decisions in more detail.
        But I would like to ask you, do you have in your mind any
    concept of what will happen to the Guard personnel when the
    bombers are removed from Georgia, Kansas, and Idaho? Any
    thoughts about that at this point?
        Secretary Roche. The Guard issues, Senator, I think are
    principally in Georgia and in Kansas. Our goal is to not do any
    harm to the Guard, but to do good for the B-1 fleet by
    modernizing and by transforming them without having to come
    back and ask for more money. We would like to try to integrate
    and look for ways to use the Guard. For instance, we would like
    to consider an associate squadron for the Joint STARS. We would
    like to consider Warner Robins for some of the other things
    that are coming along. The same with Kansas. In terms of
    Kansas, we would like to work with the Guard there to find out
    what is best.
        As I pointed out to Senator Roberts, there is an engine
    remanufacturing facility that is run at the base which is
    really quite superb and there is no reason for it to go away.
    We are trying to both be efficient and to have a better
    fighting force with the B-1 bomber and consistent with our
    long-range standoff aircraft, which now we see as a good
    strategy that we feel very comfortable being able to discuss
    with you, sir.
        Senator Cleland. As you evolve the strategy, Mr. Secretary,
    continue to keep in mind not only the great investment in terms
    of hardware and software in these bases that maintain the B-1,
    but the great service of the Air Guard as well.
        General Ryan, were the expenditures on precision guided
    munitions during the Kosovo air campaign higher or lower than
    projected at the outset of the campaign?
        General Ryan. I have to say that there was no projection
    stated on the length of the campaign. There were those who
    opined that the campaign would only last 2 or 3 days and
    Milosevic would roll over and it would be over. There were
    others who said it is going to go on for a while. Seventy eight
    days into the operation, it was called off, with Milosevic
    rolling.
        The expenditure of precision weapons in that engagement was
    very, very large. What offset it somewhat was our bomber fleet
    that went in using smart airplanes with dumb bombs and doing
    great damage to some facilities and infrastructure that the
    Serbs were using during that time. So it is hard to say whether
    the amount of precision munitions used was within a calculation
    because there was no calculation base, but we certainly used a
    lot of them and fell short in our inventories, and we are still
    short in our inventories.
        Senator Cleland. That was my next question: Are we still
    short of precision weapons?
        General Ryan. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Clark, thank you very much for your service and
    thank you for the conversion of two Trident submarines to more
    unconventional forces and use. Of course, the Navy I am sure
    would like to have the money to do four of these. What are some
    of the advantages that you see in the conversion of maybe a
    total of four Tridents to the mission that you have
    articulated?
        Admiral Clark. Well, not only will an SSGN Trident give us
    the ability to do massive long-range strike, but I look at this
    as a space-weight-volume issue for future transformations. We
    get real sensitive real quick here, Senator, but if we look at
    future systems that are possible where space and weight and
    cube are going to be required, I see the potential of this
    platform to be significant. I would be happy to talk to you
    about this in a closed forum.
        Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Collins.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
    important to note for the record that the Department inherited
    serious shortfalls in virtually every account, making it very
    difficult for the new administration to correct all of these
    deficiencies in a single year. As a result, we have some very
    serious problems to solve.
        Admiral Clark, you testified this morning that we need to
    build nine ships a year to sustain the QDR level. Similarly, a
    senior DOD official recently told me that it would take between
    $11 and $12 billion per year just to sustain, not to grow but
    just to sustain, the current naval force structure, So we have
    a long way to go to recapitalize our naval force structure.
        In that regard, Secretary England and Admiral Clark, I want
    to get comments from both of you on three issues that offer the
    promise of helping the Navy recapitalize the fleet in the most
    economical way possible. The first is greater use of multi-year
    procurements; the second is more of a focus on life cycle
    costs; and the third is an exploration of the use of advanced
    appropriations.
        I want to first comment on multi-year procurements and get
    you to respond to that. I may have to go to the other two
    issues in a subsequent round. This committee took the
    initiative last year in extending the Navy's authority to
    procure DDG-51 Aegis destroyers at a rate of three ships per
    year through fiscal year 2005. The Navy has previously
    testified that using the multi-year procurement approach has
    saved more than a billion dollars compared to annual
    procurements of the same ships and that multi-year procurements
    have introduced a degree of industrial base stability.
        So my question to Mr. Secretary and Admiral Clark: Congress
    has provided the Navy with clear legal authority and
    encouragement to buy as many as 12 DDGs over the next 4 fiscal
    years at a rate of 3 per year through a follow-on multi-year
    procurement. Would you agree that sustaining the 3-ship DDG-51
    procurement rate at a minimum would serve both the Navy's
    interests and be the most economical way from the taxpayers'
    and budget perspective of starting to recapitalize our fleet?
        Secretary England?
        Secretary England. Senator, an additional DDG-51 was put in
    the 2002 budget so we could exercise that option, which is a
    very good price as part of that other ship that was on the
    multi-year. So we did exercise that to get three of them this
    year in the 2002 budget. I would certainly agree that multi-
    year is an approach that provides stability for the industry
    and also provides economy of scale for the Navy. So certainly
    we would look to partner and to continue to do that in the
    future.
        So certainly I would hope that we are going to be able to
    continue to do that.
        Senator Collins. It essentially allows you to buy three
    ships for the price of two if it is carried out and executed
    effectively and, given the huge shortfall that we face in
    shipbuilding, it seems to be an approach that is extremely
    economical and helps us resolve the underlying problem of the
    declining number of ships.
        Secretary England. Definitely. Any way that saves money for
    us, we can utilize that money in other procurements or for
    additional ships. Certainly we look favorably upon that. So
    definitely we are interested in multi-year and continuing to do
    that, Senator.
        Senator Collins. Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. Well, here I am, Senator, sitting in uniform
    and wanting more ships, and so we talk about three a year. I
    sure am happy to sign up for--I said I need nine. Three a year
    would be great.
        The point on multi-year, I want to reinforce the
    Secretary's comments, Senator. One of the things I am most
    pleased about in this budget, the amended budget, is that we
    were able to pick up that extra DDG. I believe that this is
    consistent in what I was trying to get to in my initial
    comments. This is the kind of partnering that we have to do
    with industry. The reason we save money is because industry can
    now project the work force it needs and get its industrial
    plant lined up the way it needs to.
        This is the kind of thing that we have to do. Secretary
    England also made the point that we have to commit to, I
    believe, a more consistent investment posture across the years
    to help in that partnership.
        Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, I would now like to go on
    to the issue of total ownership costs or life cycle costs. The
    Navy has testified on several occasions that the key to
    reducing total life cycle costs while continuing to provide
    combat capability to our naval forces is to invest in research
    and development for our future naval platforms. Would you
    please elaborate on the research and development investments
    that are included in the fiscal year 2002 budget amendment that
    could reduce total ownership costs associated with current and
    future naval platforms?
        Admiral Clark. Well, of course the biggest area in our--
    there are two areas that are affected here principally. It is
    the investment in reducing life cycle costs that are part of
    the DD-21 R&D effort, and obviously a major cost associated
    with any combat system is the manpower associated with it. So a
    principal piece of that is the reduction in manpower.
        The second thing I would--actually, there are at least
    three. The second thing is the R&D in the Joint Strike Fighter,
    and that is all about reliability and maintainability. I
    believe that is--for all of the things that JSF will bring to
    us in the future, the ability to reduce life cycle costs
    because of the specifications laid on for reliability and
    maintainability are to me among the most significant.
        Then the third piece that I would talk about is an effort
    we have in S&T, and that S&T work is specifically about hull
    forms and potential new ship types that will allow us and lead
    us to lower life cycle costs.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        My time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Carnahan.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEAN CARNAHAN

        Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Ryan, my home State of Missouri is the proud home
    of the 131st Fighter Wing, recognized as the best F-15 wing in
    the United States Air Force. This honor reflects the new
    concept of total force because the 131st is a National Guard
    unit. Whether they are patrolling the dangerous skies of Iraq
    or bringing disaster relief to Honduras, these Reserve
    components are serving alongside our Active Duty personnel. I
    certainly hope the budget suitably addresses the needs of our
    Reserve components as well as our active components.
        I was wondering if you would elaborate on our Reserve
    components' contribution to the U.S. air superiority missions
    abroad.
        General Ryan. Senator, we in the Air Force integrate our
    Guard and Reserve Forces in with our Active-Duty Forces in as
    seamless a way as possible. We ask our Guard and Reserve Forces
    to share our operations tempo, not just with air superiority,
    but across-the-board into the support areas. It is not unusual
    to go to, say, Incirlik, Turkey, and find the National Guard
    flying air superiority missions intermixed with our Active Duty
    flying support missions. It is that way across our Air Force.
        So we are very, very proud of the ability to integrate our
    forces and we are very, very dependent upon our Guard and
    Reserve Forces for our OPTEMPO and our readiness.
        Senator Carnahan. Following up on that dependency, I might
    ask Secretary Roche the next question. The F-15 Guard units
    have identified an engine upgrade as the most pressing need.
    Does the fiscal year 2002 defense budget suitably address our
    shortfalls and are there plans to use F-16 engine parts to
    provide for the F-15 inventory?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I am not familiar with that
    particular issue. If General Ryan is, I would ask him to
    answer. If not, we will get back to you for the record, ma'am.
        General Ryan. I will take it for the record, too, ma'am, if
    that is okay.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The current ANG F-15 fleet consists of mostly A and B models:

            - The training unit at Klamath Falls has 12 C/Ds, 6 Bs.
            - All other units have 108 A/Bs (99-As/9-Bs).
            - All aircraft have the PW F-100-100 engine.

        The ANG F-15 modernization priorities do not include an engine
    upgrade for the A/B models. The annual prioritization process listed an
    advanced Interrogator Friend/Foe as the #1 priority. The list is
    developed at the unit level and approved through the Director of the
    ANG.
        The active duty F-15 modernization program includes engine upgrades
    for the C/D models. The current funding plan includes continued engine
    upgrades although budget reductions have decreased the rate at which
    the engines are being upgraded. The fiscal year 2002 budget does not
    have sufficient funds to address the C/D shortfall. Higher budget
    priorities continue to pressure the remaining funding. The engine
    upgrades are listed on the active duty unfunded priority list submitted
    to Congress on 6 July by CSAF.
        The ANG will inherit the upgraded engines as the active C/D models
    migrate to the ANG inventory. There is a single engine Systems Program
    Office (SPO), making repair an engine type issue, not an aircraft
    origin issue. The 220E upgrade kit works in both the F-15 and F-16 and
    the kits are bought without designation as F-15 or F-16.
        The ANG units have an ever-increasing requirement to modernize the
    subsystems of the F-15 to maintain the level of combat capability
    required by the AEF. Upgrading the engines is reviewed annually and
    prioritized.
            - The cost of upgrading the entire fleet is approximately
            $500M.
            - Partial upgrades create major logistics challenges as all six
            combat coded F-15 units contribute to the AEF #9 force.

        Senator Carnahan. I might ask you as well, Secretary Roche,
    that during the first 9 weeks of the Kosovo operation our B-2's
    flew 45 sorties out of Whiteman Air Force Base and in this time
    they destroyed 90 percent of their targets on their first
    strike. I think the B-2, all of us can say, certainly has a
    very successful track record.
        Would you comment on the administration's commitment to B-2
    upgrades?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, ma'am. I spent 18 years of my life
    cleared to level 4 on the B-2 and it is a superb airplane. We
    are committed to upgrading it. The first upgrade we want to go
    to is JDAMS, which will take it up to 80 weapons per flight.
    These will be precise and can be used to get close to a target
    because of the B-2's stealth. In certain conditions we may need
    F-22's to be around to make sure no one shoots it down.
        Then the next step past that is what is called the small
    precise weapon, the small diameter bomb. There we can get up to
    numbers in excess of 300 per airplane, so that we take a fleet
    of 21 aircraft and the lethality of those 21 aircraft will grow
    dramatically over the next 10 to 15 years.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
        Then a final question here of General Shinseki. I believe
    it is important to be able to treat our soldiers on the
    battlefield in the event of a chemical or biological attack,
    and the Army has sought to procure chemically and biologically
    protective shelters that are specially designed, rapidly
    deployable, mobile medical aid stations. I was wondering if you
    would be able to comment on our preparedness to treat military
    forces on a contaminated battlefield.
        General Shinseki. Well, Senator, this is one of the areas
    that we constantly train to and the procurement of this kind of
    equipment reflects what we learned out of that training, that
    we need capabilities we do not have. If you would like, I would
    be happy to provide for the record specifically what that
    program buy is about in terms of those specific shelters.
        For all the services, but particularly for the Army,
    operating in a contaminated environment is a key part of our
    training programs.
        Senator Carnahan. Do you feel that there are any
    improvements that need to be made at this time?
        General Shinseki. I think we have made in investments what
    we have declared as important. We have go-to-war stocks in
    terms of chemical equipment set aside for go to war, as well as
    chemical equipment that we use for training. The program buy
    information for these particular shelters, I think probably
    would provide you a better answer for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]
               Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters (CBPS)
        The Army trains with the assumption that we will fight on a
    contaminated battlefield and will require the capability to treat
    casualties on that battlefield. The CBPS is a critical component of
    that capability. Although the Army is currently the only Service with a
    requirement for the system, the CBPS is funded through the Joint
    Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense Program and a Defense-wide
    appropriation. The CBPS is the primary collective protection shelter
    used for echelon I and II medical treatment facilities and forward
    surgical teams. The system provides a rapidly deployable mobile medical
    treatment capability to treat casualties in a nuclear, biological,
    chemical environment. It is mounted on a high-mobility multipurpose
    wheeled vehicle and is fully operational by a crew of four within 20
    minutes. This capability does not exist in the field today.
        The CBPS contract was first awarded in February 1996, and the Army
    has exercised several options under the contract to maintain
    production. There are 33 systems currently located at Pine Bluff
    Arsenal and at the contractor's facility. An additional 80 systems are
    currently under contract, and we plan to field the first 122 CBPS
    systems in the very near future. The Army also plans to complete a type
    classification standard decision in September 2001 and exercise another
    option under the contract in January 2002.

        Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
        Senator Bunning.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING

        Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I sit here in amazement because of the questions coming
    from one side and the other. For 8 solid years the defense
    budget declined. How many military personnel here were at this
    table, any of them, during the last 8 years? [A show of hands.]
        General Ryan. 4 of the last.
        General Shinseki. The last 2.
        Senator Bunning. Did you make the point that you were a
    little short in your budgets before this committee at that
    time?
        General Ryan. Yes, sir.
        General Shinseki. In testimony last fall before this
    committee, as I recall, the Army's statement of needs on
    finance requirements----
        Senator Bunning. What about the ones in the prior 8 years?
    How much more are you now receiving in your military budgets
    than you were in the last 8 years? Take 1993, 1994, 1995.
        General Ryan. I can partially answer that.
        Senator Bunning. Thank you.
        General Ryan. 1996 was the bottom-out year of the drawdown
    of our forces and the budgets from 1996, 1997 were fairly
    level. I have to tell you that we----
        Senator Bunning. Only because Congress in their wisdom put
    more money back into the request that came from Pennsylvania
    Avenue.
        General Ryan. We did get substantial help from Congress
    during those years to shore up our budgets.
        Senator Bunning. I just want that to be in the record.
        General Shinseki, you brought up the fact that we were
    technologically inferior during the Gulf War. Is that an
    accurate statement?
        General Shinseki. I was referring specifically to the
    capabilities of the adversary's artillery systems.
        Senator Bunning. Just the artillery? General Ryan, what
    about the military aircraft?
        General Ryan. During the Kosovo conflict we were able to,
    quite honestly, overwhelm a smaller force. What we were unable
    to do and lost two airplanes because of is coming to grips with
    how to defend against the surface to air missile threats that
    were in that area.
        Senator Bunning. Even with stealth?
        General Ryan. Even with stealth. In fact, we lost one
    stealth aircraft. It was a lucky shot, but we lost a stealth
    aircraft.
        Senator Bunning. It was just a barrage that brought down
    that aircraft?
        General Ryan. I would like to answer that question in a
    closed form, sir.
        Senator Bunning. OK. I have to go to the base closures.
    Someone mentioned the fact that there was $4 billion plus
    saved. Where did the money go? General Ryan, it is your
    statement.
        General Ryan. We have continued to put most of our emphasis
    into people and into readiness accounts. That is where I would
    say most of our investment from any savings we have had through
    the years, particularly over the past 4 years, that is where we
    put our money and our emphasis, at the expense of our
    infrastructure and modernization of our force.
        Senator Bunning. Secretary Roche, you are also a base
    closure advocate. Where would you say the savings have gone
    over the last two base closures?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, clearly at this stage of base
    closing you put up a lot in the front in order to save over a
    very long period of time, so you have investment in the
    beginning and then you have recurring savings over the long
    term, which are cost avoidance. I believe that if those bases
    had not been closed then the kinds of monies that we would have
    left over for maintenance, for modernization, for our people,
    would be under significantly greater stress.
        Senator Bunning. All the civilian personnel that are for
    base closures, would you bring before me or this committee the
    savings that have gone on from the two prior BRAC's that we
    have had? Because I am having a terrible time finding any of
    the money that we saved by the first two BRAC's.
        Secretary Roche. Their costs avoided, sir? We would be glad
    to.
        Senator Bunning. No, no. I want to see the actual dollars
    that now you are spending for something else. In other words,
    if there is $4.5 billion saved in the first two BRAC's, and you
    said that in a passing way and I do not know if you were really
    meaning exactly $4.5 billion, I would like to see it so that I
    can be informed.
        I do not think there is one person here, sitting up here at
    the table, that actually knows anything about the exact dollars
    being saved by the first two BRAC closings.
        [The information referred to follows:]
                                 Navy Response
        As of the end of fiscal year 2001, the Department of the Navy will
    achieve a projected net savings of $5.8 billion as a result of two
    rounds of Base Realignment and Closure. Beginning in fiscal year 2002,
    we will save an additional $2.6 billion each year. These net savings
    estimates have been validated by several independent sources.
                                 Army Response
                  base realignment and closure (brac) savings
        The Army will realize $945 million in annual savings with the
    closure and disposal of all BRAC properties. Savings represent
    reductions in personnel and infrastructure operating costs. The Army
    realizes the majority of these savings when the closure and realignment
    actions are complete. The remainder of the savings occurs when the
    properties are disposed. BRAC actions resulted in $945 million in
    savings in the Army's operating accounts in fiscal year 2001, while the
    Army is spending $288 million in this final year of BRAC
    implementation. The Army has $1.1 billion in remaining environmental
    liabilities after fiscal year 2001, which will be paid from a little
    more than 1 year of savings.
        The savings resulting from closing and realigning installations are
    real. The BRAC savings have been recognized by the Congressional Budget
    Office and audited by the General Accounting Office and the Army Audit
    Agency. After closing 112 installations and realigning 27 others, the
    Army has reduced base operations and sustainment, restoration, and
    modernization costs and eliminated 16,462 civilian positions. The $945
    million in savings each year are now spent on readiness, modernization,
    and remaining infrastructure. Spending these cost avoidance dollars for
    priority programs rather than unneeded infrastructure presents an
    opportunity for the Army to operate more efficiently within the
    available top line obligation authority.

        Secretary Roche. Sir, we will be glad to. In the Air Force
    it is cost avoidance principally. Since money is fungible, it
    is hard to find where a specific dollar went. But it is costs
    we do not have to pay in the long run.
        Senator Bunning. We cannot make up in 2 years or 3 years
    what took place in the last 9 years.
        Secretary Roche. That is absolutely correct, Senator.
        Senator Bunning. So we have to do it on a gradual basis.
    You will get my cooperation to do it on a gradual basis. I am
    not going to blow the budget out of the water just to take care
    of future needs 20 years down the pike. But I will support
    increases and gradual increases in the DOD authorization and
    the budget to make sure that we are ready to fight a war if we
    have to.
        Secretary Roche. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Bunning. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Akaka.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to welcome all the witnesses here before us
    this morning and tell you that I am particularly interested in
    the readiness of our troops. A multitude of issues impact
    readiness, from adequate funding to addressing concerns about
    encroachment as it pertains to training ranges and facilities.
    I am looking forward to working with my colleagues and with you
    on these.
        Secretary England, I want to tell you that I agree with
    your four strategic areas--that is, combat capability, people,
    technology, and business practices--and wanted to particularly
    ask you about this question that we discussed already. But to
    bring me up to date, what is the current status of the
    situation involving the Navy's decision to stop training at
    Vieques, and are alternative training sites available?
        Secretary England. Senator, there is a request coming in to
    Congress to change the law that requires a referendum in
    November. So we are asking, because we feel that is bad public
    policy, not to have that election in November. In the meantime,
    we have funded the Center for Naval Analysis to stand up the
    group to look at alternative sites.
        In addition, it is not just a site issue, which is why I
    answered no to Senator Inhofe, because the real issue is one of
    adequate training for our sailors and marines. So they will
    look at the total issue of what is the training that we are
    trying to accomplish, what is the best way to accomplish that
    training, and then what are the facilities required to support
    that.
        I was pleased, by the way, with General Jones' answer to
    that question because he said training does not take a back
    seat, and I agree with that. The question is, what is the best
    way to do it? So that is what this group will be doing, and
    that group is now being stood up and people named to that
    panel. So that is where we are at present, sir.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, your prepared statement
    refers to the difficulty of sustaining current readiness while
    investing in key future capabilities. In your testimony, you
    refer to the $6.5 billion that has been reprogrammed from Navy
    programs to the current readiness portion of the Navy baseline
    in the program for fiscal year 2002 to 2007. This action has
    been characterized as putting the Navy on course to correct the
    underinvestment in readiness.
        My question to you is, do you have any additional thoughts
    regarding this issue that this committee should consider?
        Admiral Clark. When I came here, Senator, last year for my
    confirmation hearing, we talked about the issue of readiness
    and it was my number one priority. I said as the CNO that that
    is where I was going to put my priority, that failing to do it
    was taking it out on the backs of our sailors and I was not
    going to do that.
        I do not have final decision authority on this. I make
    recommendations. I am extraordinarily pleased with the steps
    that we are taking in this budget. It is the right thing to do.
    When we fail to do it, what we end up doing is that we have to
    reprogram or take action in an execution year to fix a bill
    that we have to pay, current readiness, in order to deploy the
    forces. That has an extraordinarily corrosive impact on all of
    the people that are affected in this process.
        Here is what I have learned since I came here for my
    confirmation hearing in all sorts of analysis. This is
    happening because of the age of the force. We have proven to
    ourselves that the demand for spares on our aircraft, for
    example, not the dollar amount, the demand for spare parts, is
    going up 9 percent a year, spares alone. This is costing us
    between 13 and 15 percent a year. The costs are spiraling out
    of control.
        So when we got down to the amended budget, we were really
    happy that we were able to put additional F-18's back in the
    budget. The only way out of this is to buy our way out in terms
    of getting rid of these airplanes that are costing us a fortune
    to operate. So that is what I have learned in the past year. I
    now have data to back up what I was experiencing in the fleet
    when I came into this job.
        I am convinced that the challenge here is the balance. We
    cannot short the current readiness accounts or our people to
    pay for it. At the same time, we have to figure out how--and
    this is why I am so much in support of Secretary England's
    initiative about real reform. We have to know exactly where
    every dollar is going and we have to not only pay the current
    readiness bills, because that is why the Nation has a Navy, to
    be out there, but also to do something significant to turn
    around this problem.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        General Jones, I took note of your concern regarding the
    aging infrastructure that is being indicated here and the
    backlog in maintenance and repair. I share your concern,
    especially as it pertains to family housing and encroachment.
    It is important to continue discussions with the community
    regarding encroachment and to do what is necessary to be
    environmental stewards.
        I am particularly interested in your assessment that the
    PERSTEMPO program enacted in last year's defense authorization
    act does not comport with the mission and culture of the Marine
    Corps. Could you further elaborate on this assessment and
    provide comment as to what alternatives the Marine Corps is
    examining to address this issue?
        General Jones. Thank you, sir. We are fully tracking our
    PERSTEMPO per DOD guidance and will report to Congress as
    required. To our way of thinking, the high PERSTEMPO per diem
    equates to paying premiums for doing what we do as normal
    operations in deployments in support of our national mission.
    As I have said before in previous testimony, 68 percent of the
    Marine Corps is always on its first enlistment. That means we
    have a young force, average age is 24 years or younger.
        We are able to recruit people, young men and women of great
    courage and character, to do these types of missions, and they
    come into our ranks to do those kinds of things, and we do not
    disappoint them. It is a matter of fact and record that the
    highest reenlistment rates in the Marine Corps are in our
    deployable or deployed units.
        So satisfying the expectation of this very young force with
    the idea that they are going to do something important for the
    Nation in pursuit of our national objectives and in support of
    really a historically proven record over the last 50 or 60
    years that being forward engaged is good for the Nation across
    a whole broad spectrum of interest items.
        We feel that it is a question of capable and good
    management and leadership of the force. To have a policy that
    compels us to pay money to do what we naturally want to do does
    not seem to be, at least at first glance, something that we--it
    should be something that we look at.
        For example, it is not just limited to operations. People
    who go on temporary additional duty from headquarters, people
    that train on our bases, have a clock that starts counting with
    every day they spend away from their domicile, be it a BEQ or
    bachelor quarters or married quarters.
        We will know more later on this summer about the fiscal
    impact of this. But I think we need to come back to Congress,
    and I propose to do that, with some greater facts and figures
    to show exactly what the impact of that legislation will be. My
    personal judgment is it will be significant.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses.
        My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I will submit additional
    questions that I have for the record.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Roberts.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS

        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Ryan, thank you for your courtesies and a job well
    done. As the Air Force has moved from a stationary military
    fighting force to an expeditionary force, you have piloted, if
    I can use that term, the Air Force in outstanding fashion. We
    owe you a great debt of thanks. You do an outstanding job, and
    we like you as well. I like Mike.
        General Ryan. Thanks.
        Senator Roberts. I want to thank you all for your candor.
    We have asked for candor in the past. The Senator from Kentucky
    sort of alluded to that in a different kind of question. As a
    result, we have all experienced a time frame where we have
    understood our military has been stressed, drained, and in some
    cases hollow. But most of all, we appreciate your coming with
    your candor.
        As a result, we have passed significant pay raises. We
    fixed the retirement system. We have done a lot with health
    care. We are doing a lot with emergency supplemental funds. So
    thank you all for the job that you are doing.
        General Jones, my heart goes out, as a member of the Marine
    Corps family, to the families of the three marines that lost
    their lives in protecting our Nation's 911 force in readiness.
    I appreciate your comments and the comments of our
    distinguished chairman.
        Now it is time to move to the B-1. Secretary Roche, you
    remember the old days when Bob Dornan was known as ``B-1 Bob''?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, I have met the gentleman.
        Senator Roberts. Well, now you have B-1 Max, B-1 Larry, B-1
    Mike, B-1 Zell, B-1 Sam, and B-1 Pat. It is my hope in
    discussing this with the distinguished chairman and the ranking
    member and the subcommittee members that we are going to have a
    hearing on this in the immediate future in the Strategic
    Subcommittee with the Emerging Threats and Capabilities and the
    Airland Subcommittees invited to take part. So we will welcome
    you at that particular time.
        The Senators from Kansas and Georgia and Idaho, however,
    are being painted, and I am upset about this, as only
    interested in the B-1, and I have a statement I am going to
    read here, ``because of the loss of the platforms and the jobs
    in their respective states.'' That is not it.
        I am interested in ensuring that the men and women of the
    United States military, active, Guard, and Reserve, that serve
    in the State of Kansas or Georgia or any other place are not
    jerked and assets are moved only when it makes sense and when
    it is part of an overall plan.
        For the past 3 years, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee, a new subcommittee by the grace of our ranking
    member and our former chairman--and I chaired that subcommittee
    until recently--has looked closely at military transformation
    and the very real need to align our forces to the threats we
    are most likely to face. I am a strong believer in
    transformation.
        Secretary Roche, thank you for coming this morning to visit
    with me about this. I am all in favor of your efficiency
    initiatives. I know you will do a great job. You have started
    something called the Business Initiative Council or Committee.
    It is called ``BIC''. That is the new acronym. I am all for
    that. I want to thank you for coming up.
        But I also feel strongly that any effort to make any
    significant changes to our force structure and our weapons
    systems must be well thought out and part of an overall plan.
    Part of my frustration--and I shared it with you--is that this
    B-1B move was done quickly, quietly, with zero consultation,
    more stealth by the way, than any B-1 or B-2 has, and not part
    of any defense-wide strategy. I know you do not agree with
    that, but that is my take.
        I do not think we should let arbitrary actions made in
    isolation from the rest of DOD impact on the transformation I
    believe to be vital to our future defense strategy. Now, I see
    placards frequently touting the Air Force Active and Guard as
    one team. Senator Carnahan just asked General Ryan about that.
    This action to pull the B-1B away from the Guard and place them
    only in Active Duty military bases speaks louder than any
    placard.
        If I were a member of the Kansas Guard--and I just was out
    on the flight line yesterday when Lieutenant General Whirly
    took time to come out and explain the administration's
    position--of the Georgia Air National Guard who spent years of
    blood, sweat and tears maintaining the high state of readiness
    of their B-1B units, only to see them transferred--I originally
    had ``jerked away''; I have now changed that to
    ``transferred''--to active forces, I would question the
    commitment of the active Air Force to the Guard.
        They are not doing that, by the way. They are standing tall
    and they are standing at parade rest and saying: We will do the
    mission.
        Finally, from my understanding the mission capable rate of
    the B-1B is low because of the lack of funding for support for
    the aircraft. As the congressionally-mandated study showed,
    given the proper funding and support, the mission capable rate
    of the B-1B is very good. If the same lack of funding and
    support was provided to any of the Air Force's other bombers,
    what would happen to the mission capable rate of that platform?
        I have about six questions here that I am going to submit
    for the record. I am going to skip over those. Some of them are
    a little argumentative. Some are meant to produce some
    meaningful dialogue, which I am sure that we will have. I want
    to cut to the chase.
        Congressman T. Hart and Senator Brownback and I yesterday
    in Wichita at McConnell Air Force Base, home of the proud 184th
    Bomber Wing, said the first thing we need to do is to delay
    this. We cannot do this in 10 weeks. You cannot jerk people
    around that way.
        You agreed with that as of this morning and said that you
    are going to go back to the Secretary of Defense and indicate
    we are not going to do it until 2002. That means not 10 weeks.
    At least there would be 16 months. In the 16 months--and I want
    to clarify that--it would at least give us an opportunity to
    compare this with the QDR, with another GAO study requested by
    Senator Cleland, let us scrub the numbers that are in dispute,
    let us try to not start a sheep and cattle war between the
    National Guard and the active duty folks, and that we would
    have sort of a time out and we could arm-wrestle over the
    future of our long-term strike capability, whether it is B-2 or
    B-1 or B-52 or the future bomber that we talked about.
        But I do not think that is going to be the case. I got a
    report of your statement that in 2 months time as of 1 October,
    to use a Dodge City term, we are going to head them up and move
    them out. I do not want to head them up and move them out. I
    want at least a little time to present our case to you, sir.
        So I want a clarification. Do we have 16 months or do we
    have 2 months and we take the gloves off?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, thank you. First of all, the
    Secretary of Defense has apologized for how this was unveiled.
    On the part of the Department of the Air Force, I apologize as
    well. We never intended for it to come out the way it did. We
    thought we would have time to consult and we failed to make our
    case strongly enough at that time. So that is our
    responsibility.
        Second, Senator, we do not want to do anything draconian to
    people and, therefore, it would be our intent to ask the
    Secretary's permission to be able to use all of 2002 to do this
    in a sensible manner.
        Third, this is not something against the Guard. This is
    something for the B-1 force. The B-1 force was designed in an
    era of nuclear weapons. It was designed at a time when you
    spread bombers around the country because you were afraid of
    SLBM's being fired from our shores, attacking the bomber leg of
    the triad.
        It is time now to try to be more efficient and to make this
    force a usable force. It is $2 billion behind as it stands in
    maintenance and modifications. I view this as a force that has
    low capability rates, very, very high cannibalization rates,
    because it is just not as relevant as it should be, and I wish
    to make it relevant.
        I do not see the kind of money necessary to be able to make
    the whole fleet relevant and meet our other needs, our
    purchases of C-17's, F-22's, etcetera. Therefore, we proposed a
    way to save part of the force and to make it very relevant for
    the next 30 years. That was what was going on.
        With regard to the Guard members, we would like to engage
    with the Guard in Kansas and Georgia to look for alternative
    missions for them, such things as associate squadrons. We would
    like to have a dialogue on the MILCON on those two bases that
    was associated with the B-1 to see how much of it would be
    useful for the base in large, because we see those bases going
    on.
        We hope we will be permitted to do the kind of thinking and
    discussions with you in the intervening period and not be
    restrained from doing that so that we can work with you, make
    our case, and, as I promised you this morning, when I have
    looked at the numbers and have asked for them recently, the
    comparisons between mission capability rates and flying hours
    are very, very close. We understand that the Guard in Georgia
    has a different analysis and we respect those folks. They are
    part of one Air Force. We will go over their numbers and I have
    promised you that we will set up a session with your folks,
    with the Guard, our people, and I am sure we are going to come
    back to the fact that we do not have an auditable set of books
    and that how you allocate overhead is going to be the clear
    issue.
        But we have nothing to hide. We would be glad to share
    this. But the intent was to take the investment made in B-1s
    and to make it a useful investment and not one that is not. We
    do not see our ability to come back and just ask you for more
    and more money on top of what our other needs are, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Could I
    have 1 additional minute? I apologize for asking this.
        Chairman Levin. Sure.
        Senator Roberts. Well, I do not apologize. I am just going
    to ask for a minute.
        Chairman Levin. In that case you cannot have it.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Roberts. Welcome to the minority. [Laughter.]
        I appreciate all that. We went over that as of this
    morning. Again, I want to thank you for taking your time out.
        We want the B-1 to be relevant. How on earth could anybody
    say that it should not be relevant as part of the B-52, B-1, B-
    2? As we go through this, I am looking for the future strategic
    bomber that everybody knows we are going to have to have. I do
    not even see it on the table yet, but we need to talk about
    that.
        I am for consolidation if it works. But basically what you
    have done is you have said we are not going to--we are going to
    give it to the two active duty bases because that is the only
    mission they have, and you did not want to go down the road,
    despite everybody saying yes on a BRAC, you did not want to
    take that step that might lead to a BRAC. I am being very
    candid about it.
        But the two military installations that are run by the Air
    National Guard do it better. Now, I know we are going to have
    some argument about the numbers. I just have some more numbers
    here in regard to the allegations that you have made. We need
    to compare apples to apples, and I think we will do that.
        But basically now you have told me that over the period of
    time we will have an opportunity to make our case, and I really
    appreciate that and we can do so in hearings and hopefully the
    hearings will take place in a couple of weeks. On behalf of the
    warfighters in Georgia and Kansas, we are not going to simply
    jerk them away as of the 1st of October; is that correct?
        Secretary Roche. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you.
        I thank the chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary England, relative to Vieques, is the Defense
    Department going to be submitting a legislative proposal to
    Congress to change the current law that requires a referendum
    on the continuation of live fire training on the Vieques
    training range?
        Secretary England. Yes sir, they are.
        Chairman Levin. When will that be submitted?
        Secretary England. Sir, I hope it is any day now. I thought
    it would have happened by this time.
        Chairman Levin. Is that going to recommend that the
    referendum be cancelled?
        Secretary England. Yes, sir, it will recommend--it would
    say to delete that part of the legislation that now says have a
    referendum. It will delete that language.
        Chairman Levin. What progress are you making to identify
    alternative training sites?
        Secretary England. We are standing up the outside group and
    naming those people right now, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. But your cancellation recommendation--and I
    emphasize it is only that--is not contingent upon your finding
    another site?
        Secretary England. No, sir. Our feeling is that we will be
    able to find another site, other techniques. Again, this is not
    site-specific. It is how do we achieve the level of training
    that we require. So that could be a combination of sites,
    technology. So it is not to look for a one for one replacement
    for Vieques.
        Chairman Levin. Have you identified that alternative
    approach?
        Secretary England. No, sir, we have not. We are working at
    that. We do have preliminary findings from CNA that indicates a
    combination of other sites that would be appropriate, sir. So
    there have been previous studies that indicate there are
    alternatives.
        Chairman Levin. But until that alternative approach is
    identified, you are not making your recommendation that the
    referendum be cancelled contingent upon the identification of
    an alternative approach?
        Secretary England. No, sir. The recommendation is made
    really because in our view, at least my view and I think some
    other people's view, it is just poor public policy to have
    people voting on actions important to our sailors and marines.
    We would much rather make those decisions in the Department of
    the Navy and the DOD and with consultation with Congress than
    have people vote on those decisions, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Is your proposal going to say that you will
    end training in May of 2003?
        Secretary England. Yes sir, it will.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral Clark, let me ask you about
    Vieques. Were you consulted on the decision to ask Congress to
    cancel the referendum before that recommendation was made?
        Admiral Clark. I think, Senator, there were discussions for
    several months and before Secretary England arrived with regard
    to this issue. With regard to the specifics of going to
    Congress with this, I would say that the discussion was more
    about the desirability of having a referendum. I would tell you
    that I represented my case in those discussions that I thought
    the referendum itself--and I am a military guy, not the policy
    guy--but that I thought that it was bad public policy.
        Chairman Levin. That was before the recommendation was made
    to have a referendum?
        Admiral Clark. That is correct.
        Chairman Levin. But I am talking about----
        Admiral Clark. No, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Oh, you did not make that before the
    recommendation to have the referendum last year?
        Admiral Clark. No sir, that is not what I am talking about.
        Chairman Levin. So it was the current----
        Admiral Clark. I am talking about currently in this
    calendar year, after the new administration arrived.
        Chairman Levin. But before there was actually a decision
    made, apparently, to come to Congress to recommend cancellation
    of that referendum, were you consulted at that time? This year
    were you consulted before, that Congress was going to be asked
    to cancel the referendum?
        Admiral Clark. I was not told that--I characterize it the
    same way. We had discussions about potential courses of
    actions. I was not told before the decision was announced that
    this was going to happen.
        Chairman Levin. Were you surprised by it?
        Admiral Clark. I was not surprised that this was the
    conclusion of the administration.
        Chairman Levin. What were you surprised by?
        Admiral Clark. Was I surprised by which piece of it?
        Chairman Levin. By the fact that you were not notified that
    the request was going to be coming to Congress?
        Admiral Clark. I had discussions with both Deputy Secretary
    Wolfowitz and Secretary England. On this particular, when
    Secretary England made the decision, he did not come and we did
    not talk about it until after he made the decision and then he
    informed us.
        Chairman Levin. General Jones, were you consulted?
        General Jones. My answer echoes the CNOs because I was at
    the same meetings.
        Chairman Levin. To the service secretaries here, Secretary
    Rumsfeld has assigned all three of you, I guess, to sit on a
    new board of directors to manage the business affairs of the
    Department of Defense. The Secretary has testified that the
    Department should be able to save $15 billion a year through
    improved business practices. In the past, the Department has
    tried to save money by contracting out commercial functions to
    the private sector, but the Department has never provided the
    management attention needed to ensure that savings are actually
    realized when it contracts for the services from the private
    sector.
        A series of reviews by the Inspector General and the
    General Accounting Office have revealed that the Department has
    failed to compete requirements for the delivery of services and
    has barely begun to implement requirements for performance-
    based services contracting.
        At a more fundamental level, the Department of Defense has
    no centralized management structure for service contracts, has
    never conducted a comprehensive spending analysis of its
    service contracts, has made little effort to leverage its
    buying power, improve the performance of its service
    contractors, rationalize its suppliers base, or otherwise
    ensure that its service contract dollars are well spent.
        Do you believe that the Department should be able to
    achieve significant savings by instituting better commercial
    practices for the management of the $50 billion service
    contract budget? Secretary White?
        Secretary White. Yes, I do. It is done all the time in the
    business world. Outsourcing of non-core functions is a way of
    life. You do not stay in business if you spend a lot of time on
    non-core activities, and I see no reason why we should not be
    able to do the same thing in the Department. That is our
    intent.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary England.
        Secretary England. I would agree. I think Secretary White
    summed it up very well, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Roche.
        Secretary Roche. In general I agree. We have some examples
    in the case of having total maintenance on the 117, where we
    have absolutely measurable dollars that we can point to. But
    with regard to the BIC, it is not just contracting out. There
    are a lot of things we are probably doing that create our own
    inefficiencies, where we are laundering our own laundry back
    and forth, we would like to eliminate. We would like to find
    areas where we are asking each other for work that simply does
    not have to be done or duplicating sets of meetings--a series
    of things to get smarter, better, faster, and to get the
    decisionmaking down at lower levels and empower people to do
    this in a better way.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        A little bit of good news every now and then, not that we
    have not had good news here today. But Senator Levin and I have
    been in this Senate for 23 years and we have gone through many
    military operations by our Nation and each of us in our own
    respective lives have been involved with the military in other
    ways long before we came to the Senate.
        But this is the booklet that is being given to a private
    first class, who happens to be my executive secretary's son, as
    he embarks on a mission to the Bosnia-Kosovo region. I have
    never seen a better prepared document. It is carefully written
    so that a, in his case, private first class can read it and
    learn the history of the region going way back to the 1300s and
    exactly what each soldier is expected to do in the performance
    of his or her duties in the platoon, in the company, in the
    regiment, and the other nations that are involved.
        I just wish to commend those, presumably in the Department
    of the Army and indeed maybe throughout the Defense Department,
    who are preparing our men and women in both the active and the
    Guard as they embark into that region of the world to better
    understand why they are going and to some extent, depending on
    their assignments, putting their safety at risk in the cause of
    freedom.
        So this is very, very well done, and I commend the
    Department of Defense and the military departments for their
    preparation of their people as they deploy.
        To the Air Force Department, Mr. Secretary and Chief. I do
    not like to use the personal pronoun ``I'', but I will go ahead
    and do it anyway. Last year I included $200 million in the
    defense authorization bill to accelerate the development of
    unmanned combat aircraft. I have been joined by a number on
    this committee. We are moving in that direction.
        General Ryan, I do not want as a heritage, you being a
    proud aviator of many years, to be too strong an advocate today
    of moving toward unmanned cockpits, but I believe that is the
    direction that this country has to go in. You have some of the
    leading programs in this area, and I wonder if you might lead
    off with your own enthusiastic support of this concept.
        It is not going to totally, in any way I think, threaten or
    abridge or otherwise limit the number of manned cockpits in the
    future, but a certain percentage of our warfighting equipment
    in my judgment should be unmanned or remotely controlled, so to
    speak, or both. Your own views about those programs and what
    you see as the future for them?
        General Ryan. Yes sir. First of all, I do not think pilots
    across our Air Force in leadership positions have any hatred
    for unmanned aerial vehicles. In fact, if you look at our
    inventories, we have gone that way in almost every munition we
    have. Almost every one of our munitions is a standoff munition.
    It in itself is an unmanned aerial vehicle, whether it is an
    AMRAAM or an air-to-air missile or an air-to-surface missile,
    things that give us standoff, where we do not have to put
    people in harm's way. It is just most of those do not come
    back; they go one way.
        We are now working very hard on technologies that would
    allow us to do it, to use these vehicles, where they are
    reusable. Predator is a very good example. We used Predator
    first in combat in Bosnia and it went to places that I as the
    commander over there did not want to send----
        Senator Warner. I remember seeing those operations. I went
    on the actual sites and watched them go and return.
        General Ryan. Yes, sir.
        Global Hawk is another capability. We are building a UCAV
    now to look at the applications of unmanned aerial vehicles in
    a direct combat mode, where we would have the vehicle dispense
    munitions or high energy capabilities that would disenable
    military capabilities of the other side. So we are very much
    into this and I see nothing but increased involvement in these
    kinds of activities.
        Senator Warner. I thank you.
        Secretary Roche.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, the Secretary of Defense is very
    much supporting our increasing the amount of money we are going
    to put into unmanned vehicles. They are not substitutes for
    piloted vehicles; they are complements. We will run into in
    time--it is a bandwidth problem, the communications problem
    raised earlier by one of your colleagues, because when you put
    sensors in you want to remote everything back and you are using
    a lot of bandwidth.
        So we know we are stressing this, but the state of digital
    technology is such that we feel these vehicles have a high
    reliability and can be very useful and can complement us very
    well.
        Senator Warner. But I think that they have a mission in
    land warfare, General Jones. Do you agree with me?
        General Jones. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. You are moving along. You have some
    excellent research and development going on in the Marine
    Corps. We want to compliment you particularly; you are on the
    cutting edge of all the military services as it comes down to
    the weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and
    chemical. You are spearheading that research and development
    within the Corps.
        But back to the unmanned, you support that?
        General Jones. Absolutely. Our warfighting lab at Quantico
    is doing extraordinarily good work in support of the
    requirements of our ground warfighters. As I said, the future
    lieutenants and captains are going to have an incredible array
    of information that is going to come in. They will be able to
    look over the next hill with great precision. This is exciting
    stuff.
        Senator Warner. Admiral.
        Admiral Clark. Absolutely, Senator. In fact, I predict that
    some day they will be flying from aircraft carriers.
        Senator Warner. I hope I am around.
        General Shinseki.
        General Shinseki. Likewise, Senator. We have dedicated a
    good bit of our look in science and technology toward the
    robotics arena as well. Even with a system like Crusader, we
    have the crew separated from the weapons system's ability to
    deliver fires. I mean, whether it is 3 feet, 30 meters, or 3
    miles, control over a weapons system that delivers like the
    Crusader does is a matter of distance, and we are working on
    those technologies.
        Senator Warner. I make an observation for the Department of
    the Navy--I thank you, General--that in my judgment, Mr.
    Secretary, we have had a very good discussion on BRAC today,
    but our information for the committee indicates that the
    Department of the Navy has not sufficiently funded--as a matter
    of fact, we look at $90 million in deficit financing--BRAC
    funding for installations that have been the subject of closure
    in past legislation of BRAC and awaiting transfer to the
    communities.
        Now, that hiatus period is very difficult for those
    communities to deal with the loss of the military, frankly
    payroll, and the awaiting of a follow-on substitute in the
    private sector. Would you examine that?
        Secretary England. Yes, I will, sir. I understand it is the
    case. I do not have those specifics, but I will take that for
    the record and get back with you, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Base Realignment and Closure account has been buffeted by
    budget reductions from the Navy, through the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and Congress in the last few years, primarily due to the
    expectations that prior year unexpended balances could be used to fund
    current requirements. Because of competing budget needs, the Navy was
    unable to fully fund the fiscal year 2002 budget requirement. There are
    significant shortfalls in our ability to accomplish the work agreed to
    in state and federal cleanup agreements and, at our current funding
    levels, turnover of some bases will be delayed by 8 to 10 years. In
    addition, the Navy will miss the opportunity of good business decisions
    to transfer significant parcels of land to local communities through
    Early Transfer Authority.

        Senator Warner. Our chairman asked I think very penetrating
    questions about the Vieques situation and indeed he and I
    collaborated on deciding when we would address that issue. I
    think we jointly decided we would wait until this hearing today
    rather than take the initiative as did the House of
    Representatives in a special hearing.
        You are advocating coming up with language canceling the
    referendum. That was the position taken by the previous
    administration, endorsed by Congress, enacted into law with
    Congress and the President's signature.
        Chairman Levin. Not the cancellation.
        Senator Warner. No, no, but the referendum was a part of a
    thought-out process of Congress and the executive branch.
        My question to you is very simple: What do we get in return
    if we cancel that referendum? It is something that is being
    demanded by the present governor of Puerto Rico, but it was
    agreed to by her immediate predecessor. The United States is
    caught in the switches politically between one governor, who
    worked with our President and Congress to get a framework
    solution, and the next governor comes right along and
    absolutely abdicates any responsibility with regard to the law
    of the land.
        So what do we get in return?
        Secretary England. Sir, I think what we get in return--
    first of all, there are no ``good alternatives'' here. This is
    a contentious issue. The situation that we have today is the
    one we have to deal with.
        What we get in return is we do not allow other people to
    vote on the policies affecting our naval services. In my
    judgment and I think in the judgment of other people, it is
    very bad policy to have someone vote on issues that affect our
    sailors and marines. I think that is a very bad message to send
    around the world and around the country.
        Senator Warner. I think you have made that point clear. But
    let me ask you the following: Have we any assurance from this
    governor for the balance of the life, which goes to 2003--and
    that remains part of the legislation, does it not?
        Secretary England. Yes, it does.
        Senator Warner.--that she will work to help enforce such
    security as is needed to enable us to carry forward the use of
    that range during that period of time? Because, frankly, before
    this Senator accedes to a change in the legislation I want to
    know what we are getting in return. Is this governor going to
    work with us to have the security so that the range can be
    utilized to balance, or are we going to stop that?
        Secretary England. It is my understanding, Senator, that
    the governor will indeed uphold the law. The last time we were
    in Vieques we did have much better security at the site, much
    better than we had previous times. That occurred after the
    announcement we were going to leave, so I viewed that as a
    positive sign. I was hopeful that would occur. It did occur.
    While we had some disruptions the last time, it was
    significantly less than we had the prior time.
        My expectation is that we will probably continue to have
    some disruption, but hopefully at a lower level. It is
    important that we stay, however, until May of 2003.
        Senator Warner. I agree with that.
        Secretary England. Because we do need the time to develop
    an alternative. As you recall, my rationale was the worst
    possible situation was to have to leave early for whatever
    circumstances.
        Senator Warner. I have to move on. We are in agreement on
    that, but I am going to press to figure out what we get in
    return if we are canceling this referendum, because I am not
    ready to concede that we would have lost that referendum. We
    put $40 million out there to work with the people of that small
    area of Vieques and I am not so sure that we could not prevail.
    But it looks as if that option may well be removed in the
    future by Congress.
        But I want to finish up with the following question. This
    committee will--and I will be working with our chairman and may
    well during the course of this year be revisiting Goldwater-
    Nichols. For those that are watching this hearing, that was
    framework legislation adopted by our committee many years ago
    that kept in balance what I view as the responsibilities of the
    uniformed military and the responsibility of the civilian
    secretaries of the services and of defense in the management of
    the Department.
        Now, clearly from the earliest times in our Republic it has
    been civilian control over the military and it should always be
    that way. But we want to assure that the uniformed services
    have the opportunity to make known their views, to have those
    views carefully considered as you evolve through the decisions
    that are being made.
        Quite frankly, I am going to ask you, in the context of the
    current QDR--and a lot of communications come to this committee
    from the Department. I have the highest respect for Don
    Rumsfeld. He and I have had parallel careers for many, many
    years. We go way back. I think that he has put together, along
    with the President, one of the finest teams I have ever seen of
    civilian managers, and three of the great ones are here before
    this committee today.
        But at the same time, in this QDR process, I am going to
    ask each chief, do you feel that your views are, first, given
    an adequate opportunity to be expressed and, second, are being
    taken into consideration, because this QDR process will be a
    foundation block for the 2003 budget which could represent a
    significant change of direction in the management and the
    future of our Armed Forces?
        General Ryan.
        General Ryan. Yes, sir, I believe that our inputs were
    taken and we had the opportunity in developing the terms of
    reference for the QDR and our participation is substantial in
    the review process we are going through now.
        Senator Warner. General Jones.
        General Jones. I concur with General Ryan. I do think that
    it would be a worthwhile discussion to have to examine the
    Goldwater-Nichols from the standpoint of other unintended
    consequences as a result of the legislation. But in the context
    of the QDR, I have absolutely been consulted and participated
    fully.
        Senator Warner. Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. Senator, we have been consulted, I have been
    consulted, we collectively, extensively. We are spending hours
    and hours on the QDR process. The end product will determine
    the extent to which we have affected the process.
        I would like to align myself with the comments of General
    Jones regarding Goldwater-Nichols and follow-on discussions
    that you might have. I am convinced there are areas that need
    to be pursued.
        Senator Warner. General Shinseki.
        General Shinseki. Likewise, I think it would be a good
    opportunity to relook Goldwater-Nichols. With regard to the QDR
    strategy, for the last 6 to 7 weeks I think all the members at
    this table have been involved, really sometimes several times a
    day, in discussions about that strategy. The output of that was
    the terms of reference for the QDR, which is currently under
    way, and our ability to bring, at least in the case of the
    Army, about the important contributions of land power,
    discussions about the relevance of warfighting and what
    principles apply, and discussions about risk and how we see
    risk and think about it, not as an academic exercise, but for
    us operationally it is about mission success and the ability to
    execute those missions without exorbitant cost.
        Senator Warner. I thank the witnesses.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank all of you for being here today and for the
    opportunity to receive your reports and respond to them. In my
    limited time with the Armed Services Committee thus far, I have
    come to believe that the United States military has legitimate
    and pressing needs that include, among other things, better
    pay, housing, health care, and training areas. I have also come
    to believe that the Pentagon's accounting system does not work
    very well. Some might suggest it is broken. As Senator Byrd has
    indicated on more than one occasion, a simple audit cannot be
    done to explain where the money is being spent.
        What I would like to know is, if we are spending more
    money, that it is going towards the things that we need most,
    our highest priorities. So I look forward to the findings of
    Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic review and learning what broad
    missions the Secretary believes the military should prepare for
    if it is not going to be a two-war concept, a two-war strategy.
        I am also anxious to learn what steps are being taken in
    the development of a missile defense system which could cost a
    considerable amount of money by anybody's terms, money that can
    be spent certainly on domestic and international terrorism as
    well as fully funding already existing defense programs.
        So my question for the chiefs today is, as we are looking
    at phasing out a two-war requirement as a strategy, what do we
    do to replace that with? If the two-war strategy is no longer
    needed, no longer fundable, what do we replace that with? What
    will the strategy be for the branches in the years ahead?
        General Ryan, we will start with you and perhaps we could
    go down to the other chiefs.
        General Ryan. Yes, sir. Part of our Quadrennial Defense
    Review is addressing that very question. It is not so much a
    two-war strategy as it is a force structuring mechanism to
    determine the depth of forces you need across all of the
    services. So we are struggling with that issue right now.
        What we did in the previous QDR was to take the two major
    regional contingencies or two major theater wars and use that
    as a force sizing mechanism for the amount of capability that
    you need, the depth, and then assumed that all of the other
    activities that we do are lesser included cases of those two.
        This particular strategic review and QDR, we are not using
    that as the construct. We are using a different look at being
    able to continue to do in critical areas of the world, our
    ability to halt aggression and also fight major regional
    contingencies at the same time, a major regional contingency,
    at the same time doing humanitarian operations, etcetera. So it
    is a completely different look at how we force structure.
        We are not through with that work yet, but that is the
    direction in which it is headed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. But if the two-war strategy or two-
    theater strategy is the base now from which all other force
    structure questions might arise and that is being phased out,
    then is there something that takes its place? Or is it just
    that it might be some strategy for protection, some for
    defense, some for offense? Do we have anything that comes back,
    or is that what we will find out when we get the review?
        General Ryan. Well, we have set in general the terms of the
    force construct. That is, to be able to protect the capability
    to win in a major theater, one major theater war, while in
    other vital areas being able to repel attacks, while at the
    same time doing a series of smaller or lesser scale
    contingencies.
        That replaces the two. Then what you do is you go through
    the exercise, which we are in the middle of now, of putting
    forces against doing that all at the same time, and that
    becomes the substitute for the two major regional
    contingencies. It is not a strategy. It is a force sizing
    mechanism.
        Senator Ben Nelson. General Jones.
        General Jones. Senator, this is an extraordinarily complex
    issue and it is one that is uniquely faced by our Nation
    because we have global responsibilities that, frankly, no one
    else does at this point. Warfighting is obviously the most
    pressing requirement to be able to make sure that you have
    sufficiency in your force structure and capabilities and the
    right systems and the right programs to guarantee that, as
    people have said, it will not be a fair fight, that we will win
    overwhelmingly and convincingly.
        Coupled with all of this in the process is the ability to
    examine the sufficiency that is required to do all the other
    things that we do in executing our unique role as leaders:
    engaging with other militaries, providing the bases for
    peaceful economic cooperation in various parts of the world,
    teaching by the fabulous example of our armed people in uniform
    in our employed forces, land-based, sea-based, whatever, that
    subordination of the military to civilian authority is a good
    thing and how you do that.
        We attract other militaries to sit around conference tables
    with us who want to try to be like us or want to have an
    association with us on a permanent and long-term basis. That
    takes a certain amount of robustness that is calculated into
    the force structure or force sizing mechanism where we have to
    respond to real threats or be able to.
        Then there is the problem of trying to figure out what you
    do in the near term, which is obviously more pressing, versus
    the difficult-to-define far term. You can use the case of
    Desert Shield-Desert Storm as a force that was built and put
    together when the Soviet Union was dominant and we were
    building a force to react to the Soviet threat, and we wound up
    using it for something dramatically different.
        So this is all rolled into the QDR. We are working our way
    through that to whether it is one major theater war or one plus
    several lesser contingencies or two. The force structure
    implications do not necessarily mean less forces. These are
    tough issues and you have to go beyond the warfighting to talk
    about what the force will look like on a day to day basis
    because of how we use it. You need sufficiency, you need
    rotational forces that routinely deploy, have to be refreshed.
    So it is a big issue.
        Admiral Clark. Senator, in the past, frankly, one of the
    problems with the two MTW strategy was that the force structure
    that fit that did not fit the world we were living in. We had
    these forces that we tagged as low density, high demand, and
    that is because we were engaged in a lot of areas where there
    was not a major theater war going on, but we had forces
    committed for peacekeeping, for any kind of activity. The fact
    is that once the force is committed the commander has to know
    what is going on, he has to collect intelligence, and these are
    the kind of resources that did not match.
        For the Navy, I see this unfolding and what we have to do
    as a Nation is answer the question, what do you want us, the
    Navy, to do? The answer in QDR 1997 was clearly that in the
    post-Cold War era we had moved a significant portion of our
    force back to the continental United States instead of being
    based overseas and the whole posture was set up so that
    Presidents in the past asked the question, where are the
    carriers? Do you want the carrier battle group and this kind of
    capability to be there in a month or do you want it to be there
    in 72 hours? The answer was in 72 hours, and our force
    structure has been sized in order to give the President those
    kind of options.
        So General Ryan has laid this out. Clearly, this posture
    will be able to deal with additional contingency, smaller scale
    things, and be postured and the force structure put together
    correctly to be able to do that, instead of believing that two
    MTW's gives you the ability to do any and all lesser included
    offenses.
        I believe that the challenge for us then is to size how
    many of those we are talking about, and that work is going on,
    and what is reasonable and whatever the opportunity costs, and
    we are working toward that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        General Shinseki. Senator, a key element of the current QDR
    that does not get enough attention is an assumption that says
    plan on strategic surprise. I think that is a key point here,
    that if you try to get it perfect you are probably going to be
    wrong, and if you are confident that your perfection in
    prediction is exactly right you could be wrong by a wide
    margin.
        I think for all of us, as we have participated in this
    exercise, it is to accept that assumption and then to lay out
    the requirements for as much flexibility as we can provide in
    the formations we can afford, so that we can accommodate that
    kind of reality, a strategic surprise.
        For an Army that is likely to go to war in the foreseeable
    portion of this century, we would like to go to war with the
    best and the biggest Air Force we can afford. We would like to
    go to war with the best and the biggest Navy we can afford. We
    certainly want to bring to this joint equation here of Navy,
    Marine Corps, and Air Force the best Army that we can afford.
    That is part of our deliberations.
        Our contributions have been about warfighting and about why
    decisive warfighting is a key element of discussion and why
    risk and the way we treat risk operationally is important. I
    think we have been able to bring those contributions to the
    debate.
        Our Army today is the best Army in the world, but we have
    to do something about it. I think all the chiefs have laid out
    programs to describe their particular perspectives, but we are
    the ninth largest army in the world. We do not have to be
    necessarily any bigger, but we better be the best on the day we
    have to go, because seven of the eight ahead of us are
    potential adversaries.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all let me echo, everything good and glittering
    that was stated about General Ryan. I would like to have it all
    attributed to me, but I do not want to take the time right now
    to do it if that is all right, General Ryan.
        General Ryan. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. I was very disturbed, Secretary England, by
    your answer to my last round of questioning. The statement that
    was attributed to Don Rumsfeld by General Jones, which was that
    we should only replace things when we have something better to
    replace them with, I asked if that should include training
    ranges. As I understand it you said that should apply to
    weapons, but not to ranges. Is that accurate?
        Secretary England. No, sir. I believe you said does that
    apply to Vieques and I said no, it did not.
        Senator Inhofe. Does it apply to ranges?
        Secretary England. Pardon me, sir. I thought you said does
    it apply to Vieques, and I said no to that question because the
    issue in my mind is not Vieques. The issue is one of adequate
    training and it is not necessary, at least in my mind, that we
    have Vieques. The issue and the question is what is the best
    way to train our men and women. So it is a broader question.
        Senator Inhofe. I do want to use up all my time on your
    answer here. It was not an accurate interpretation of your
    response that this should not, does not apply to training
    ranges, just to weapons systems? That is not what you said?
        Secretary England. No, sir. Again, I do not want this to be
    just a Vieques issue. This needs to be an issue of training and
    not just specifically Vieques. So it definitely applies to
    training. Training is as important as our weapons systems. I
    certainly recognize that, and that is the whole objective in my
    approach, is to make sure we will have adequate training in the
    future. So that is the whole approach, is to make sure we have
    the same objective. We come at it from a different way,
    Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, I would suggest that we have five
    dead American soldiers today as a result of not being able to
    use the Vieques range for integrated training. It happened on
    March 12 in the Udari Range in Kuwait. Do you have any concern
    about that?
        Secretary England. Sir, for my understanding that is not
    the case. Those personnel did train at Vieques.
        Senator Inhofe. But not live fire training. It was inert.
        Secretary England. That is correct, sir. But they did do
    their training at Vieques. My understanding is that the
    findings of that do not relate that to Vieques. So I would not
    agree with that finding, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Let me read from the report of that
    accident that took place on March 12 of this year:
    ``Discrepancies were noted in the deployment certification
    message''--and this would have been 5 months before--with
    regard to amphibious warfare CAS--that is close air support; it
    is a submission of amphibious warfare. ``Some of those comments
    regarded the lack of live fire training that was available
    during the strike missions.''
        Later on it says: ``The commander and the deputy commander
    stated that they actively sought close air support
    opportunities whenever possible, but the limiting factor was
    range availability.`` They were talking about Vieques.
        Secretary England. I do not believe, however, sir, there is
    a relationship between those comments and the specific accident
    that occurred.
        Senator Inhofe. That is on the accident report of March 12.
        Secretary England. Yes sir, but it does not relate directly
    to the situation that occurred.
        Senator, I indicated I would be happy to come discuss this
    subject with you. I am happy to do that, sir. I do believe
    there is a chain of logic here that is logical and reasonable
    and in the best interests of our naval services. Otherwise I
    would not take this position. The last thing I want to do is
    put our men and women in harm's way. Certainly there is no way
    that I would ever endorse doing that without adequate training.
        The issue here again is to make absolutely certain for some
    period of time until we can find an alternative that we do have
    Vieques available to us. That is the risk that in my view has
    to be addressed. I believe that is a substantial risk that we
    face, and that is not being able to use Vieques in the near
    term, and we do need it for a limited period of time. So this
    approach is to buy us time to get an alternative. I am
    convinced this is the best----
        Senator Inhofe. I understand that, Secretary England. But
    you are using my entire 6 minutes on this one justification and
    I do not agree with it. I believe that live fire training is
    very, very valuable and it trains much better than inert. I
    think this report clearly states that they had sought live fire
    training and were not able to get live fire training.
        Let me ask Admiral Clark and General Jones--there are no
    two more brilliant military minds in America today,
    particularly in this rather confined subject. Do you consider
    the live fire aspect of training to give a better, more
    qualified job or qualified training than using inert?
        Admiral Clark. I believe that a principle we pursue
    constantly is train the way we intend to fight, and the more
    real you can make it the better.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        General Ryan--General Jones.
        General Jones. I agree with that.
        Senator Inhofe. I was very disturbed. This is the first
    time I heard, during the course of this meeting, Secretary
    England, that you are now talking about putting together
    another group and they are going to go out and look again. We
    have already had the Pace-Fallon report, which studied all
    sites known at that time as alternative sites for unified
    training. We had the Rush report which had retired admirals and
    a retired general doing the same thing. Both reports came back
    and said there is no alternative that can be found out there
    for this quality.
        But now we are talking about lowering the standards, Mr.
    Chairman, lowering the standards of this training so that it is
    no longer unified training. I can remember being out on the
    U.S.S. Kennedy and the U.S.S. Eisenhower before their East
    Coast deployments to the Persian Gulf, and it happened by
    coincidence even though it was both in a confined period of
    time, that the F-18 pilots told me in a gathering out there on
    those aircraft carriers, they said--they used the football
    analogy, and you have heard me state it several times privately
    and in these meetings, that you can have the very best people
    out there and you can have the very best football players, you
    can have the very best quarterbacks, the very best halfbacks.
    You let me group train over here and let another group train
    over here and you have your quarterbacks over here, never
    scrimmaging together, and the day of the big game comes and
    they lose.
        It is the unified training. Now I understand you are saying
    that you are going to consider a combination of other sites and
    get away from that unified training.
        Before you answer that, let me ask the two experts here. In
    the unified aspect of this training, primarily three functions
    take place. You have a marine expeditionary landing, you have
    live Navy fire, and you have the F-14s and the F-18s up
    dropping live ammunition. Is it not accurate for me to come to
    the conclusion that the unified training is much more valuable
    and does a better job of training than having them do it in all
    different areas, such as is now being suggested?
        Admiral Clark. Whether it is your conclusion or anybody
    else, the reality is that the integration of multiple
    disciplines is the graduate level exercise and is what our
    advantage has been, and that is the kind of training that we
    like to bring people to. All of our certifications seek to
    maximize that kind of training before we deploy them.
        Senator Inhofe. General Jones.
        General Jones. I agree with the CNO. I would just go on to
    say that I hope that in our search for an alternative solution
    that we will continue to hold to that standard; that is
    obviously the best thing to be able to do for us, and
    everything else is not as good.
        Senator Inhofe. Let me just address this third thing, with
    the indulgence of the chair. I think it is important. Secretary
    England, I agree with you that it is very bad policy to have a
    referendum. But if you had the choice of having a referendum of
    self-determination or having a bunch of law-breaking,
    trespassing political activists kick us off of the land that we
    own, which is the worse policy?
        Secretary England. I do not believe that is the choice,
    Senator, and I would like to first address your first issue
    that you brought up, because the Pace-Fallon report and the
    Rush report indeed concluded that there was no direct
    replacement for Vieques, one for one replacement. Those reports
    were the basis of a further study that was conducted by the
    Center of Naval Analysis and they concluded that, while there
    was not a direct replacement for Vieques, there was a
    replacement in terms of a combination of bases that would give
    an equivalent level of training. They recognized that we had to
    do some changes to some of the bases, but they were existing
    bases.
        So in my judgment there was a foundation to go forward.
    This decision was not made without any consideration of
    potential alternatives. So there is a foundation, and they will
    now use the prior studies that they have done to go forward and
    look for, to build upon those studies to see if we cannot
    develop those alternatives previously identified.
        So I believe that, while there were earlier reports, there
    are also later reports that built upon those, that indicate
    there are opportunities for alternatives.
        Senator Inhofe. One last thing. I do not like the idea of
    the referendum, but we can win the referendum. This notion that
    is coming out of the White House that we cannot do it, or
    wherever this came from--I am not sure where this came from,
    Mr. Secretary. You and I have had many private conversations.
    We will have more, and I do not want this to be a personal
    thing because I certainly have the highest regard for you and
    your abilities. I think you are doing a great job in here.
        Frankly, I think you were put in a terrible, awkward
    situation. I do not envy you at all. But as far as the
    referendum is concerned, there is a difference here. We are
    talking about Vieques, which is a municipality of the big
    island of Puerto Rico. There are 9,300 people on there, of
    which there are 6,400 voters on that island.
        Those people do not like, as a general rule, the
    politicians and the people who are coming over and protesting
    on their land from Puerto Rico. We had an election with three
    different parties running for election, all of them seeing who
    could be the meanest to the Navy in order to get elected
    governor, and the one won who was.
        Now we have a situation. I have in my office petitions
    signed by 2700 registered voters with their social security
    numbers, their addresses, their telephone numbers, people who
    live on Vieques, not only supporting the Navy, but wanting to
    secede from Puerto Rico. Now, with that base we can win the
    referendum and then just hope we never have another referendum
    again.
        Secretary England. If we have one, I hope you are right,
    Senator. On the other hand, there are over 2,000 people on that
    island who are suing the Navy.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, wait a minute now. Let us talk about
    trial lawyers going around getting people to sign things
    saying, if we are able to get a large judgment here would you
    like to participate in the judgment? That is essentially who
    those 2,000 people are, and you know it and I know it.
        Secretary England. Well, it is not clear to me that you
    will win this election. If you look at all the past results,
    the indicators are we will not, and if we do not it is a
    significant embarrassment.
        Senator Inhofe. I think we have covered that enough. I
    would just ask for your full support in helping to win the
    referendum.
        Secretary England. If we have a referendum, we will
    definitely try to win that referendum. I have made that
    commitment to you before, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Secretary England. I repeat that commitment.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Senator Warner. If I might indulge a minute----
        Chairman Levin. It might be useful to see if any of the
    names might be on both lists. [Laughter.]
        Senator Warner. I would like to say that in the past few
    days--I mentioned I had been working in my State. I have
    visited two ranges in Virginia where there is live firing of
    artillery and tanks. One of them is at Quantico not more than
    25 miles from where we are sitting right here. Am I not
    correct, General Jones?
        General Jones. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. The other, General Shinseki, is right down
    there in Blackstone, Virginia, which is the biggest training
    center on the East Coast, really.
        Senator Inhofe. I trained on that range.
        Senator Warner. So we have that going home, and nobody
    around here is going to have a referendum down in Virginia as
    long as I am Senator.
        Chairman Levin. I have a couple more questions on Vieques.
    I think we appropriated $40 million that the Navy was to use
    for economic development down there and a very small amount of
    that has been used so far. Assuming the referendum goes
    forward, do you plan on spending all of that money?
        Secretary England. Senator, I do not know if we will spend
    all of it, but what we have done so far is spend $3 million for
    other agencies for health and environmental type issues. We
    have $5 million obligated for small business development and
    for apprenticeship programs, and on Thursday I will review the
    detailed schedule of all the activities, the activities with a
    spend plan, to make sure we are spending the money wisely.
        It does include, for example, reimbursement for fishermen
    who cannot fish on the days that we use the range, etcetera.
    There are a wide range of activities on the island. People are
    working diligently to schedule those activities in terms of
    both time and money. I will have that available on Thursday and
    then I am pleased to make that available to this committee. So
    we are working that very hard, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Assuming the referendum goes forward or
    otherwise, you do plan on spending most of that money; is that
    correct?
        Secretary England. Sir, I would expect that would be the
    case. I do not know if in the time between now and November we
    can spend it all wisely, but we will definitely have a plan to
    spend it.
        Chairman Levin. Well, let us know, if you would, within a
    week just exactly what your plans are.
        Secretary England. Yes, I will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Of the $40 million authorized and appropriated, $3 million has
    already been transferred to other Federal agencies ($1.6 million to
    Department of Health and Human Services; and $1.4 million to Department
    of Interior) for health studies and land management. Of the remaining
    $37 million, the Navy has released $5 million for apprenticeship
    training and economic development. We are still considering how to
    spend the rest of the money, but the focus will be on improving health
    care, economic development, and educational assistance.

        Chairman Levin. There was a provision in this referendum
    requirement that if the CNO and the Commandant jointly submit a
    certification that the range is no longer needed for training,
    then the requirement for a referendum shall cease to be
    effective on the date on which the certification is submitted.
        Are you prepared, either of you, to sign that certification
    at this time?
        Secretary England. I hope not.
        Admiral Clark. No, I am not.
        Chairman Levin. That was addressed to them.
        Secretary England. I am sorry, sir.
        Admiral Clark. No, I am not, and I testified on a prior
    occasion that when the subject came up--and you asked if I was
    consulted--I raised this issue during the consultations, that
    for the referendum to be set aside, lacking some other action,
    the Commandant and I would have to so certify and that I could
    not do so, and it was said--the comment to me was that they
    would not ask me to do so.
        Chairman Levin. General?
        General Jones. The same answer, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Now, the question then arises about 2003.
    Are either you, Admiral Clark, or you, General Jones, prepared
    to tell us that there will be a satisfactory alternative that
    meets the standards that you have set out by the end of 2003?
    Can you tell us that today, that that will occur?
        Admiral Clark. In answering your question, Mr. Chairman, I
    would say we have to define ``satisfactory.'' I am given
    guidance about the level I am supposed to deploy the battle
    groups and the amphibious ready groups, and it is a Charlie 2
    rating. The CNA study is based upon the plan that Admiral Bill
    Fallon put together when he was the Second Fleet commander to
    pull various pieces together, and we did in fact do that during
    the time that we were not conducting training on Vieques.
        That gets us to a low C-2 level. So if you define
    ''satisfactory`` as low C-2, well, then I would tell you that
    we can do that today. If you ask me if that is where I think I
    ought to have our forces when we deploy, I would tell you, no,
    of course, I want them to be in the highest state of readiness
    they can be. I do not know where that place is today.
        Recall, when you asked me to----
        Chairman Levin. You do not know whether that will be
    achievable by 2003?
        Admiral Clark. I do not know how to do that today, and that
    has to be discovered. If you recall our discussion----
        Chairman Levin. Are you able to tell us--excuse me,
    Admiral, for interrupting--that will be discovered by the year
    2003?
        Admiral Clark. No, I cannot.
        Chairman Levin. General Jones, can you tell us that that
    level of training will be discovered, that alternative
    discovered, by the year 2003? Can you tell us that today?
        General Jones. I cannot.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary England, how can you then tell us
    that it will be discovered by the year 2003 if your experts
    here cannot tell us that.
        Secretary England. Again, sir, I have to go back and rely
    on the earlier CNA studies that indicated there were
    alternatives, a combination of bases that would include live
    fire testing, so that it would give us an equivalent level.
    That with hopefully additional technology, that we will be able
    to do it.
        It does buy us a considerable period of time. I mean, 2003
    is a reasonable time in which to look at alternatives and
    develop it. So we do have to rely on the fact that we are going
    to put the best people together on this problem, look at the
    best set of alternatives, look at technology, and come out with
    the best answer.
        Chairman Levin. Base it on a hope, in your words, on a
    hope.
        Secretary England. Well, I believe that is a better
    opportunity for us----
        Chairman Levin. I understand, but----
        Secretary England. --than the other side.
        Chairman Levin. --it is still a hope.
        Secretary England. Well, it is an expectation, sir. It is
    based on facts and information.
        Chairman Levin. I guess the last question on Vieques I have
    has to do with the governor. Have you received the governor's
    assurance that, assuming your proposal that you are going to
    make in the next few days passes, she will use her best efforts
    to provide non-disrupted training through the year 2003? Have
    you received that assurance from the current governor?
        Secretary England. Senator, I believe the only thing she
    can do is enforce the law. So she can provide security for our
    facilities. She obviously just cannot keep people from showing
    up on the island, but she can provide security for the forces.
    My belief is she will do that, but I will confirm that with
    her, sir.
        Chairman Levin. I am not asking about your belief, though.
    I am asking about whether or not she has given you assurances
    that she will use her best efforts to provide undisrupted
    training through 2003.
        Secretary England. The governor has told me that she will
    indeed uphold the law.
        Chairman Levin. Do you understand that to mean she would
    use her best efforts to provide--is that what you understand
    that to mean? I do not want to use some words that are not----
        Secretary England. I am trying also to understand, sir. I
    am trying to make this clear. I think what she would do is
    provide security, so she will uphold the law in terms of trying
    to keep trespassers off the Navy property during the times of
    our testing.
        Chairman Levin. Would she withdraw the lawsuit?
        Secretary England. I do not know, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Have we asked?
        Secretary England. No, sir, we have not.
        Chairman Levin. Are you going to?
        Secretary England. I have had preliminary discussions with
    the governor. They were, I would say, very preliminary, get
    acquainted, basically understand each other's position. We have
    not gone beyond that, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Well, Mr. Chairman, those were very good
    questions and it goes to the heart of the one that I earlier
    asked: What do we get in return?
        I assure you, Mr. Secretary, this committee, if this
    language comes up, we will all be back in this room and we are
    going to go over these questions and they will be tougher. I
    for one am going to petition the chair to bring that governor
    up here, because I do not think I want you to answer this
    question, but I know the answer. If she indicates to you that
    she will uphold the law, has she done that in the period of
    time between her election and now? I do not think so.
        Secretary England. Well, she did the last time, sir. My
    impression is the last time she did indeed put considerable
    forces in Vieques to uphold the law. So my understanding is
    that she did do that during the last training session.
        Senator Warner. Well, I would ask you to go back and talk
    with your commanders, because I have information that the
    United States military departments are spending a great deal of
    money in security down there and all types of things. That
    money is being diverted from readiness and other desperate
    needs in your department that are going down there to enforce
    the law of the United States of America, which Puerto Rico
    accedes to.
        Secretary England. We definitely augment what she does,
    sir. There is no question about that.
        Senator Warner. Just an observation, Mr. Chairman and
    members of the committee. My analysis of the R&D programs
    across the board for the military departments--correct me if I
    am wrong, but in the past the Pentagon-sponsored R&D programs
    certainly made our country the world's undisputed superpower.
    The fiscal year 2002 research and development account actually
    decreases when compared to the 2001 appropriated amount.
        Now, time has run out here this morning, but I would have
    you supply the answer to the record as to what your opinion is
    with regard to R&D. R&D is the thing that keeps us on the
    cutting edge.
        [The information referred to follows:]
                       Research and Development Accounts
                                 army response
        The Army expects significant science and technology advances that
    will enhance our Objective Force capabilities, and we have focused
    investments in these areas. The Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget
    submission has less funding for science and technology than what was
    appropriated in fiscal year 2001. However, a comparison of the Fiscal
    Year 2002 President's Budget submission show a 22 percent increase in
    real growth. The Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget submission
    requests $1,579 million for advanced technology research and
    development, which is an increase of $285 million over the $1,294
    million requested in fiscal year 2001. The Army's commitment to
    maintaining this investment in research and development is critical for
    our successful transformation to the Objective Force.
                                 navy response
        The fiscal year 2002 budget provides a very robust RDT&E program,
    and satisfies our highest priority research and development needs. As
    compared to the fiscal year 2002 estimates in the Fiscal Year 2001
    President's Budget Future Year's Defense Plan, the Navy's RDT&E has
    increased by more than $1.9 billion. The increase provides additional
    funding for a number of programs, including DD-21, CVN(X), Virginia
    class submarine, SH-60R, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, and Science
    and Technology efforts.
                               air force response
        The Air Force Readiness portion of the overall R&D budget changes
    from $8.6 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $8.5 billion in fiscal year
    2002, a net reduction of $0.1 billion.
        This $0.1 billion reduction is primarily attributed to a
    combination of one-time congressional actions in fiscal year 2001 ($+.5
    billion), and various fiscal year 2002 programmatic changes, the most
    significant being the transfer of the Space Based Laser, Airborne
    Laser, and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low programs to the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) ($-.6 billion).

        Senator Warner. Lastly, we have not said much this morning
    about our CINC structure. For those watching this hearing, we
    have worldwide the commanders who rely on you to prepare the
    forces by way of equipment, readiness, and the training such
    that they can use those forces as a deterrent and then, if
    necessary, actual combatants.
        Now, it is interesting. The quarterly readiness reports to
    Congress identify a number, around 90, of CINC-identified
    readiness-related deficiencies. About 30 of these deficiencies
    are listed as category 1 deficiencies, which entails
    significant warfighting risk to the execution of our national
    military strategy. That is risk beginning on the battlefield to
    the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, and then to
    the conclusion of the political decisionmakers to employ those
    forces.
        Most of the specific deficiencies have been reported for
    the past several years and have not as yet been effectively
    addressed. Does this budget provide the necessary resources to
    address these CINC-identified readiness deficiencies? Again, I
    will ask that for the record, given the time, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]
                     CINC-Identified Readiness Deficiencies
                                 army response
        The Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget submission provides the
    resources necessary to address CINC-identified deficiencies at an
    acceptable level of risk. The Army will continue to use the Department
    of Defense's Joint Monthly Readiness Review process to provide the
    appropriate level of visibility to these programs. This review examines
    each program to make recommendations to senior level officials as the
    level of risk that can be accepted and still meet the requirements to
    execute our National Military Strategy.
                                 navy response
        Three of the six CINC Class ``A'' readiness deficiencies that
    require Navy funding have been adequately funded in the fiscal year
    2002 budget. However, while additional resources wee applied in the
    fiscal year 2002 budget for preferred munitions, engine maintenance
    backlogs, and aviation spares, these deficiencies were not funded at
    levels necessary to eliminate the identified shortfalls.
                               air force response
        The CINC-identified deficiencies are addressed at an acceptable
    level of risk in the Amended Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget. Air
    Force components of each Unified Command are constantly assessing
    requirements to insure we are aware of CINC's warfighting priorities.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        I want to thank all of our witnesses this morning. It has
    been a long hearing. There are a number of things that have
    been requested for the record already. Senator Warner also
    raised the question of Goldwater-Nichols. With his agreement on
    this since he raised it, I think it would be useful that we ask
    them for what suggested changes they might make. We made
    reference to a number of them, and that they supply those for
    the record.
        There was a question that I thought you raised very
    appropriately and, since a number of our witnesses said that
    there were a number of other areas in Goldwater-Nichols that
    they would make some suggested changes to, that we ask them for
    the record to submit those changes. So we would ask each of you
    to do that within a week or so.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                 Army Response

        Note: All the changes relating to Internal Department of
    the Army would have to be replicated by parallel changes in the
    provisions of Title 10 relating to the headquarters of the
    other military departments. One of the purposes of Act was to
    align the Military Departments in this regard, and it is
    unlikely that Congress would make changes in the Department of
    the Army without making the same changes in the other Military
    Departments.

                                 Navy Response
        The Goldwater-Nichols Act has significantly benefited the
    Department in numerous ways, including clearly setting forth the
    responsibilities of the Secretary. I do not presently have any
    recommendations to change this defense legislation. However, a part of
    our effort to improve and transform the Department, the Chief of Naval
    Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I will also be
    examining the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to see whether any
    future improvements would be beneficial. The Department would also
    welcome the opportunity to participate in any effort by the committee
    to review the Act.

                             Marine Corps Response

                               Air Force Response

        Senator Levin. Also, the shortfall list, if you could do
    that within a week or so. Senator Warner and others have made
    other requests for items for the record. We will keep the
    record open 24 hours for additional requests.
        We want to thank all of our witnesses. Again, General Ryan,
    if this turns out to be--I will not add any word there after
    that, either ``thankfully'' or ``regrettably''--the last
    hearing of ours that you attend, we all again want to just give
    you one big thank you for a career and a lifetime of service.
        Senator Warner. Your family, too.
        General Ryan. Thank you, sir. It is an honor to serve.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
        1. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, the Fiscal Year 2000 and 2001
    Defense Authorizations required the services, commencing on 1 October
    2000, to track the ``deployment'' of service members on an individual
    basis. It also required that members be paid a per diem allowance of
    $100 per day (effective 1 October 2001) if their cumulative days of
    deployment exceed 401 days out of the preceding 730 days.
        What has the Navy done to implement this program, what challenges
    or unintended consequences has the Navy encountered in the process and
    what possible measures do you suggest to address these challenges and/
    or consequences?
        Admiral Clark. In direct compliance with the legislation, the Navy
    has inaugurated its Individual Personnel Tempo (ITEMPO) Program and is
    actively tracking the `deployments' of sailors on an individual basis.
    In keeping with the spirit and intent of the legislation, the Navy has
    and is continuing to pursue more equitable and efficient ways to
    utilize individual members' time away from home and to lessen the
    impact of attendant high deployment pay on Navy budgets while
    continuing to meet our broad spectrum of global commitments. Battle
    group/unit operational employment schedules for fiscal year 2002 and
    beyond, for example, are being structured to reflect more time in
    homeport between major deployments and underway periods. Communities
    with historically high operational tempo, such as the Seabees and
    Military Sealift Command, are undergoing fundamental review and
    restructuring to better comply with the intent of legislation.
    Similarly, the personnel assignment process has been revamped to more
    effectively identify and assign personnel to critical sea duty billets
    to preclude ITEMPO `busts'. Additionally, maintenance availability for
    major combatants and support vessels are being evaluated with an eye to
    better sequencing and locating these within homeports to minimize
    ITEMPO consequences.
        At the same time we move to comply with the intent of the
    legislation, however, our efforts are exposing a range of unintended
    consequences which have significant potential to negatively impact our
    service members and our operational readiness. Operational schedule
    adjustments instituted to reduce overall deployed days will translate
    into some global naval forward presence and capability gaps in critical
    theatres. Similarly, desired adjustments to maintenance availabilities
    may create contractual conflicts and scheduling issues. While more
    restrictive personnel assignment policies threaten to reduce the
    overall distributable inventory and severely limit the options of our
    personnel vis-a-vis requisite career path requirements and family
    geographic and financial stability. In essence, it has become clear
    that the comprehensive consequences of ITEMPO implementation are not
    yet adequately understood.
        The Navy fully supports the underlying premise of ITEMPO
    legislation; however, with just 9 months of individual ITEMPO related
    data on file and with current Navy cost estimates indicating up to $160
    million per year in attendant ITEMPO costs, Navy believes it would be
    prudent to seek legislative relief which extends for 2 years the
    effective date of implementation of payments to allow more time to
    gather data and conduct detailed analysis. In so doing the full
    spectrum of unintended consequences could be better understood and
    requisite effective measures taken to mitigate them.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
        2. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England and Admiral Clark, the
    administration's draft plans for expanded intercontinental-range
    ballistic missile defense include looking to sea-based defenses. The
    Navy seems split over this matter, with some advocating a greater Navy
    role in missile defenses, other than the Navy Area Defense and Navy
    Theater Defense programs, and others who are concerned over the impact
    this new mission would have on the number of ships available to the
    fleet for conventional missions.
        What are your views of the impact that using Navy ships for
    intercontinental-range ballistic missile defense testing or deployment
    would have on the availability of ships for existing missions?
        Secretary England and Admiral Clark. In February, the Secretary of
    Defense signed out a joint Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and
    Navy study on how the Navy could supplement the initial land based
    missile defense site. While this conceptual study indicated that
    layered defenses, including forward positioned sea-based interceptors
    and radars could provide operational benefits to an initial land-based
    defense system, no policy decisions were made to determine the size,
    deployment or employment of a Naval capability in defense of
    intercontinental ballistic missiles.
        Since the Navy still has not been assigned a Ballistic Missile
    Defense system role, it remains focused on the Area and Theater
    Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) mission development.
        The Navy's top priority in missile defense is to get Navy Area to
    sea onboard Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers in Fiscal Year 2004.
    Testing of the SPY radar and Aegis computer programs is ongoing at sea
    using the LINEBACKER ships (U.S.S. Port Royal and U.S.S. Lake Erie). In
    addition, extensive land based testing of the SM-2 Block IVA missile
    and vertical launch systems are ongoing at the White Sands Missile
    Range. Following the land and sea based testing this year, the Navy
    expects to conduct final system integration at sea during live missile
    firings in fiscal year 2003-2004.

        3. Senator Kennedy. General Jones, for months now, we have been
    asking ourselves what to do with the V-22 Osprey program. Since
    December of last year, the program has undergone a Mishap Investigation
    Report and JAG Manual Report for the December accident that claimed the
    lives of four marines; the Blue Ribbon Panel Review; and a DOD
    Inspector General investigation to determine if maintenance records
    have been falsified--according to the preliminary results of this
    investigation, it seems that they were.
        The administration requested 12 V-22s in its final Fiscal Year 2002
    Defense Budget. This number of V-22s is said to be the minimum
    sustainable rate of production for this aircraft. Yet, to my knowledge,
    procurement funding provided in fiscal year 2001 for 11 V-22s has not
    yet been released.
        There are many changes that have been recommended for the V-22
    program, including those needed to address design and manufacturing
    problems which resulted in the chaffing of wires and hydraulic lines in
    the nacelles, safety reporting problems where the program manager
    didn't know about flight problems that had been detected during
    operational test and evaluation, and the most disturbing to me--the
    lack of thorough testing of the NATOPS operations manual. As you may
    recall, in the December tragedy, this manual instructed that the pilots
    push the illuminated Primary Flight Control System reset button, but,
    when they did, the pressed button started an unanticipated, software-
    related, chain of events that likely resulted in the deadly crash of a
    potentially air worthy aircraft. This emergency procedure was included
    in the NATOPS manual, but was never tested and verified in the V-22
    simulators.
        Will the V-22 program complete the further development and changes
    necessary to improve the program's safety and reliability record before
    procurement funding for the 12 fiscal year 2002 aircraft is released?
        If not, then these aircraft will have to go through the same
    modifications that will have to be performed on the 8 Ospreys already
    manufactured, and the 11 Ospreys from fiscal year 2001.
        Does the Navy or Marine Corps know how much these modifications
    will cost? Has the Navy or Marine Corps provided funds for these
    necessary modifications in the fiscal year 2002 budget or any future
    years budgets?
        General Jones. No. All developmental changes to improve the safety
    and reliability of the V-22 will not be completed before the release of
    fiscal year 2002 funding. However, the aircraft procured in fiscal year
    2002 will not be delivered until fiscal year 2004. This should allow
    time for changes to the aircraft production lines before this lot is
    produced. In any event, all required modifications to these aircraft
    will occur before delivery to the fleet. The V-22 program is
    continuously incorporating changes to improve the aircraft's safety and
    reliability performance. This process of identifying improvements and
    incorporating changes has been ongoing and will continue throughout the
    life of the program.
        We will not know the total cost of the modifications until we have
    ascertained exactly what they are. However, the fiscal year 2001 and
    fiscal year 2002 budgets (as well as outyear planning) reflect funding
    to design, develop, test and install corrective actions in the aircraft
    already delivered as well as those planned to be procured.

        4. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, will the V-22 program
    complete the further development and changes necessary to improve the
    program's safety and reliability record before procurement funding for
    the 12 fiscal year 2002 aircraft is released?
        If not, then these aircraft will have to go through the same
    modifications that will have to be performed on the 8 Ospreys already
    manufactured, and the 11 Ospreys from fiscal year 2001.
        Secretary England. No, all developmental changes to improve the
    safety and reliability of the V-22 will not be completed before the
    release of fiscal year 2002 funding. However, the aircraft procured in
    fiscal year 2002 will not be delivered until fiscal year 2004. This
    should allow time for changes to the aircraft production lines before
    this lot is produced. In any event, all required modifications to these
    aircraft will occur before delivery to the fleet. The V-22 program is
    continuously incorporating changes to improve the aircraft's safety and
    reliability performance. This process of identifying improvements and
    incorporating changes has been ongoing and will continue throughout the
    life of the program.

        5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, does the Navy or Marine
    Corps know how much these modifications will cost? Has the Navy or
    Marine Corps provided funds for these necessary modifications in the
    fiscal year 2002 budget or any future years budgets?
        Secretary England. We will not know the total cost of the
    modifications until we have ascertained exactly what they are. However,
    the fiscal year 2001 and 2002 budgets (as well as out year planning)
    reflect funding to design, develop, test, and install corrective
    actions in the aircraft already delivered as well as those planned to
    be procured.

                       outsourcing and commercialization
        6. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Roche, the Air Force has been in the
    forefront of public-private competition and contracting out. The DOD
    budget request plans to save millions of dollars with more competition
    and outsourcing and further commercialization efforts. While I believe
    that competition is a great way to ensure that the Department of
    Defense is getting the best value for the taxpayers, it seems that many
    involved in these efforts have forgotten that competition for work can
    go both ways.
        Are you planning to offer Federal Government employees the
    opportunity to compete for workload that is done both in-house and
    outside the government to achieve the most savings and efficiency for
    the government?
        Secretary Roche. It has long been the policy of the Federal
    Government to obtain commercial services from the private sector when
    it is cost effective to do so. Once it has been determined that
    government performance of a commercial activity is not required, an A-
    76 cost comparison may be performed to determine the most cost
    effective method of performance--in-house or contract.
        Normally, contracted activities are not re-competed between the
    private sector and an in-house government workforce because it has
    already been determined that government performance is not necessary.
    However, current OMB, DOD, and Air Force policy provides for contracted
    workload to be converted to in-house performance if it can be
    demonstrated, via A-76 cost comparison, that the government can operate
    the activity on an ongoing basis at a lower cost than a qualified
    commercial source. Today, many of our A-76 cost comparisons include
    currently contracted workload as part of the total competition. If the
    cost comparison demonstrates that in-house performance is more
    economical, the previously contracted portion can be converted to in-
    house performance.

                                     dd-21
        7. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, several of us on the
    committee are very supportive of the DD-21 program. This ship is the
    next-generation destroyer for the Navy and is the only near-term
    solution for shore-fire support for the Marine Corps and the Army.
        Earlier this summer, the Navy delayed the selection of the winning
    team, which will design and build the DD-21. This decision was made, in
    part, due to a new study, ordered by Under Secretary Aldridge, which is
    to examine the future shipbuilding program.
        Because no future years defense program was submitted with the
    final fiscal year 2002 defense budget request, we don't know when--or
    if--DD-21 procurement funding will be forthcoming. The fiscal year 2002
    budget only requests research and development funding to keep the
    program alive.
        What is the status of Under Secretary Aldridge's study?
        Secretary England. I will have to refer you to the Department of
    Defense on the details of the Shipbuilding Review and the process used
    to perform it. However, the Navy supported the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense-led effort with operational and acquisition subject matter
    experts as required. It is the Navy's understanding that the results of
    the study will be incorporated as part of the overall Quadrennial
    Defense Review.

        8. Senator Kennedy. General Jones, is there another means of
    providing for the Marine Corps shore-fire support requirements other
    than DD-21?
        General Jones. No other system is currently under development that
    will fully satisfy the Marine Corps' requirements for all-weather,
    precision and volume naval surface fires at the required ranges.
        The 155mm Advanced Gun System, with a family of precision-guided
    and ballistic ammunition, is being designed specifically for DD-21 as a
    means to provide both precision and volume fires for expeditionary
    maneuver forces. Additionally, the Advanced Land Attack Missile, with a
    family of general use and specialty warheads, will provide responsive
    fires out to the ranges required to support a vertically lifted Ship-
    to-Objective Maneuver force. The capabilities provided by the DD-21 and
    its associated systems remain vital to realizing the full potential of
    Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and the conduct of expeditionary
    operations and sustained operations ashore in a fluid, non-linear
    battlespace.

        9. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, do you support the DD-21?
        Secretary England. Yes, the Navy supports the DD-21 and remains
    committed to the objectives of the program. This position was
    reiterated by Under Secretary Pirie in his May 31, 2001, letter
    temporarily placing the source selection on hold, ``While the
    objectives of the DD-21 program remain valid, it is prudent to afford
    the Department of the Navy an opportunity to consider if a change in
    program strategy is warranted based upon the outcome of the respective
    defense strategy studies.''

        10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, when will the Department of
    the Navy be making a decision to pick the winning team for the DD-21?
        Secretary England. The source selection decision for the DD-21
    program will not be made until the Department of the Navy has
    determined if a change in program strategy is warranted based upon the
    outcome of the ongoing defense strategy studies, specifically the
    Department of Defense QDR, Strategic studies and the Future
    Shipbuilding Program Study.

        11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary England, will you encourage
    Secretary Rumsfeld to keep the program as you go through the
    Quadrennial Defense Review?
        Secretary England. The Navy remains committed to the objectives of
    the DD-21 program. As you are aware, DD-21 source selection was delayed
    by the Navy pending the results of several on going defense strategy
    reviews, specifically the Office of Secretary of Defense's Strategic
    Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and Future Shipbuilding Program
    study. The Navy is working closely with the Department of Defense on
    these force structure reviews and is an active advocate for all our
    future acquisition programs, including DD-21.

                           unexploded ordnance (uxo)
        12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary White and General Shinseki, the
    financial and technical problems of cleaning up unexploded ordnance at
    all of the Army's bases--open, active, inactive, closing and closed--
    continues. In Massachusetts, the Army is currently having to remove UXO
    to keep their contents from further contaminating the sole-source
    aquifer under the Upper Cape. What resources has the Army invested in
    both ongoing UXO cleanup efforts and in research and development
    programs to find better and more effective ways of removing UXO?
        Secretary White and General Shinseki. In our ongoing UXO cleanup
    efforts, we are investing nearly $79.4 million. Of this, we are
    executing $53 million as DOD's Executive Agent for Formerly Used
    Defense Sites, which is a DOD-funded program.
        In the last 2 fiscal years, we invested approximately $19 million
    in our research, development, and technology programs to find better
    and more effective ways of identifying, discriminating, and addressing
    unexploded ordnance and buried munitions. Next fiscal year, we have
    programmed an expenditure of approximately $15.3 million in research
    and development programs.
        We are currently conducting a complete inventory of our ranges.
    When complete, the inventory will assist us in developing the scope of
    munition-related issues at our ranges.

        13. Senator Kennedy. General Jones, the Pentagon estimates that
    personnel living in off-base housing currently pay about 15 percent
    out-of-pocket for housing costs. The goal for next year is to raise the
    basic allowance for housing to reduce out-of-pocket expenses to about
    11.3 percent for the approximately 750,000 service members living off-
    base. But, it is my understanding that there are areas where military
    families currently pay much more than the 15 percent out-of-pocket
    expenses to meet housing costs. For example, military personnel
    stationed in Southern California and living in off-base housing have
    felt the impact of the rapidly rising energy costs and pay well above
    the current 15 percent out-of-pocket goal.
        What steps are being taken by the Marine Corps to reduce this
    expense or mitigate this burden?
        General Jones. The 15 percent out-of-pocket cost is a national
    average. Some marines will pay more than 15 percent while others will
    pay less. This is not a regional issue and servicemembers in southern
    California are not different from anywhere else we have marines
    stationed. Although the Office of the Secretary of Defense establishes
    BAH rates and updates them on a periodic basis, they do so with Service
    involvement and the involvement of local commanders. In the particular
    case of Southern California, throughout the fall of 2000 when the
    current BAH rates were being developed, it was forecast that the
    utility portion of the BAH for southern California would continue to
    rise into 2001. Instead of using measured utility costs in 2000, costs
    were forecast by comparing the growth in utility costs from June 1999
    with May-July 2000 and then doubling that rate of growth then applying
    this inflated estimate to the 2001 rates. The actual cost of
    electricity in southern California has still not yet risen to the
    inflated level applied to the 2001 BAH rates.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
                         armored security vehicle (asv)
        14. Senator Landrieu. General Shinseki, I've been reading in daily
    periodicals that the Army intends to terminate the Armored Security
    Vehicle (ASV) program at the end of fiscal year 2002. The ASV was
    developed for use in operations other than war to protect military
    police (MP) units from weapons up to .50 caliber armor piercing
    ammunition and 12 lb. landmines. What is the rationale for that
    decision?
        General Shinseki. The Army does not have plans to terminate the ASV
    program at the end of fiscal year 2002.

        15. Senator Landrieu. General Shinseki, is there an Interim Armored
    Vehicle (IAV) variant for the ASV programmed for MP units? If so, what
    is this vehicle, when will they be issued to the MPs, what are its
    capabilities, and what will it cost compared to an ASV?
        General Shinseki. There is no IAV variant for the ASV programmed
    for MP units. The IAVs are fielded to the Interim Brigades and not
    individual MP units. The current plan is to continue to field the ASV
    to MP units. Therefore, no cost analysis has been performed concerning
    the use of an IAV in the MP role.

        16. Senator Landrieu. General Shinseki, what is your plan for
    providing vehicles for this mission, if ASV is terminated and there is
    no IAV equivalent?
        General Shinseki. If the Army were placed in a position where a
    substitute vehicle would be required for the ASV, the UpArmored High-
    Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) would be used. The
    UpArmored HMMWV is already in use in MP units.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
        17. Senator Reed. General Jones, your statement refers to the AAAV
    as a transformational program ``intended to achieve a fundamental
    advance in capabilities by exploiting leap-ahead technology.'' Could
    you please elaborate? What is the difference between transformational
    technologies and modernization for the Marine Corps?
        General Jones. To the Marine Corps, transformation is a continuing
    process that spans decades of innovation and experimentation with the
    implementation of new systems, operational and organizational concepts.
    It involves the development of new operational concepts, refinement of
    enabling capabilities through experimentation, and the development of
    new organizations, tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies as
    necessary to turn these concepts into warfighting capabilities.
        Modernization, as used by the Marine Corps, explicitly means
    reshaping the Marine Corps capabilities to meet the future through the
    selective acquisition of new equipment that will enable the execution
    of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in support of emerging joint
    warfighting concepts. Modernization leads to increases in capability.
    Since it is part of an on-going process of Marine Corps combat
    development, there is not a requirement for a major shift in the way
    the Marine Corps trains, organizes, and equips operating forces implied
    in the term ``transformation''. Modernization is more than simply
    replacing worn out equipment; rather, effective modernization is our
    means of opportunistically implementing new technologies in order to
    enable new concepts and increased warfighting capability.
        In this sense, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is
    more than simply a replacement for the 1970s technology of the
    venerable AAV7A1 that has served the Marine Corps for over 30 years.
    The AAAV will join the MV-22 and LCAC as an integral component of the
    amphibious triad that will enable Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in the
    21st century. With an eightfold increase in speed and a range of
    greater than three times its predecessor, the AAAV will allow
    immediate, high-speed surface maneuver of marine infantry units as they
    emerge from ships located over the visual horizon 25 nautical miles and
    beyond. Projection of these forces will be conducted in a manner that
    exploits the intervening sea and land terrain to achieve surprise and
    rapidly penetrate weak points in the enemy's littoral defenses to seize
    operational objectives. For the first time in the history of naval
    warfare, maneuver ashore in a single, seamless stroke will be possible
    thereby providing both ships and landing forces sufficient sea space
    for maneuver, surprise, and force protection during power projection
    operations.
        The result is a truly transformational operational capability
    stemming from a convergence of various modernization programs that,
    when joined, result in a truly revolutionary gain in warfighting
    capability.
                          long range power projection
        18. Senator Reed. Secretary Roche, as recently demonstrated, long-
    range power projection remains critical to U.S. national security. What
    are your plans to modernize the U.S. long-range bomber force? Does the
    fiscal year 2002 budget request begin this modernization process?
        Secretary Roche. The fiscal year 2002 budget request continues the
    modernization process via aircraft modifications outlined in the Air
    Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers. The Air Force established time
    phased modernization plans--near, mid, and long term modernization
    initiatives--for the B-52, B-1, and B-2. The purpose of a time phased
    plan was to outline a program to improve the combat capability of the
    bomber platforms through integration of precision, gravity and standoff
    weapons, avionics, computers, communications suites, and
    maintainability upgrades. The modernization plan will improve bomber
    fleet lethality, survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness.

                        space commission recommendations
        19. Senator Reed. All secretaries and chiefs, could you each
    discuss your views of the Secretary's (SECDEF) decision to implement
    the recommendations of the Space Commission? How will this initiative
    effect the Services' roles in this area?
        Secretary White and General Shinseki. The Commission released its
    report containing 10 major recommendations in January 2001. The Army
    concurred with many of the Commission's recommendations, but presented
    comments about three of the recommendations as outlined below.
        The first comment centered on the designation of the Air Force as
    executive agent (EA) for space. Without a clearly defined description
    of the responsibilities and authority delegated to the Air Force, it is
    difficult to assess specific Army impacts. The Army requires additional
    clarification on issues such as Army role in assisting the EA in
    maintaining the space program plan; Army responsibilities for
    developing and funding Service-unique space systems and capabilities;
    Army authorities with respect to maintaining their own space
    requirements determination process; the Services' authority for their
    unique doctrine, strategy, education, training, and operations; the EA-
    Army relationship with respect to the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Committee (JROC) requirements process; the Services' right to appeal EA
    decisions to the Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence,
    and Information or any subordinate oversight bodies; and the cost of
    implementing the Commission's recommendations. The Army anticipates
    having an opportunity to review and comment on the draft of Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) charter to the Air Force that would
    describe its responsibilities as the space EA and acquisition executive
    (AE).
        A second comment centered on the creation of an Under Secretary of
    the Air Force (USECAF) and assignment of responsibilities as the
    Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and designation as the
    Air Force AE for space. The report is not clear as to the disposition
    of the other Services' program executive officers as related to such
    areas as space control, force enhancement, and force application.
    Without an EA charter, and without further clarification, the value of
    assigning the EA duties to a Service instead of a Joint or Defense
    organization is not clear. Designating the USECAF as the Air Force AE
    for space would provide a single agency within the Air Force for
    integrating space funding and acquisition. Again, the Army is seeking
    an opportunity to review and comment on OSD's draft charter to the Air
    Force.
        A third comment centered on the importance of maintaining the
    independence of the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) efforts.
    The Space Commission recommended that the NSSA report to the USECAF.
    The Army proposes that the existing architecture review process, to
    include the National Security Space Senior Steering Group and the JROC
    review process, be maintained. The Army looks forward to working with
    the Air Force on this subject during the development of the Space
    Architect memorandum of understanding.
        Secretary England and Admiral Clark. The Navy concurs with the
    recommendations of the Space Commission. We see the report as an
    opportunity and we look forward to an active role in the implementation
    of the recommendations to better enable joint land, air, and maritime
    warfighting using space assets. Space systems are critical to naval
    warfighting and network centric operations, so it is imperative for
    Navy to continue to participate--with the Air Force as Executive
    Agent--as a joint partner in the requirements, science and technology,
    research and development, acquisition, and operations processes for
    space systems.
        A Naval Review Panel on Space, sponsored by the Under Secretary of
    the Navy, is currently meeting to help us focus on and address several
    key areas. These include: the maintenance of an effective naval space
    cadre of both military and civilian personnel to participate throughout
    the National Security space organization; strong space science and
    technology/research and development within Navy to continue to provide
    innovative space solutions as recommended by the Space Commission; the
    education of our naval warfighters in all facets of space systems;
    strategic joint partnerships with other space stakeholders; and the
    identification of any space-related missions for which Navy may be
    uniquely qualified.
        General Jones. The Marine Corps enthusiastically concurs with, and
    is actively engaged in supporting the decision of the Secretary of
    Defense (SECDEF) to implement the recommendations of the Space
    Commission. The Commission was faced with a balkanized landscape of
    less than optimally coordinated national security space efforts that
    lacked a coherent vision. Lack of adherence to military principles of
    organization had been the fault of the conceptual restriction of space
    to an information medium. The Commission recognized that the
    technology-enabled threats and opportunities ``in, to, through, and
    from space'' demanded change. The SECDEF's implementation will now lead
    to the establishment of singular leadership, unity of effort, and
    advocacy for this all-important environment, one that could eventually
    evolve into a warfighting Area of Responsibility (AOR).
        The Secretary's decision to implement fundamental changes comes
    none-too-soon, and the DOD has an arduous task ahead. Our space-borne
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems, not to
    mention our military and civil space communications-navigation assets,
    are extremely vulnerable. For example, the asymmetric anti-satellite
    (ASAT) threat from less Information Technology (IT)-dependent potential
    adversaries must be addressed immediately. As the Commission observed,
    without a superior space protection operational capability and other
    space control measures, the U.S. could suffer a space version of Pearl
    Harbor. This could very well occur without the simple pre-space era
    industrial capacity to effectively compensate for lost military
    platforms.
        Our national dependency on precious few information nodes in space
    has many causes. These include our military cultural euphoria with IT
    convenience, a naive confidence in our invincibility atop the strategic
    high ground, and reluctance within the public and private sectors to
    bear the cost of space system swivability and robustness in the post-
    Cold War era. But, given sufficient resources and institutional
    motivation, the new priority of space in DOD may enable us to
    effectively respond in time.
        For Marine Corps warfighters the potential for improved space-
    enabled terrestrial battlefield capabilities is more hopeful than ever
    before. When the Marine Corps vision for national security space was
    briefed to the Commission we reminded the members that the Marine
    Corps' 23rd Commandant, Gen. Wallace M. Greene, was one of the Defense
    Department's first space visionaries. As early as 1963 he proposed
    rapid expeditionary Marine Corps power projection using the space
    medium, including the sub-orbital, hypersonic transport of small units
    to crisis hot spots anywhere on earth. Even today, the technical
    challenges of General Greene's vision remain great, but the new DOD
    emphasis could lead to the earlier realization of many other advanced
    capabilities.
        The Commission also recognized that the need for a Space Force,
    Corps, or Service might emerge in the future. Since the Air Force has
    been designated the Executive Agent (EA) for space it should rightfully
    receive the exclusive Title X responsibility for raising such forces.
    It is noteworthy that the Air Force has been managing approximately 85
    percent of the DOD's military space programs to date. Furthermore, the
    Air Force already has over 40,000 military and civilians serving in
    space-related duties, and those positions and personnel will now begin
    to be managed as a professional space cadre. With its assumption of EA
    responsibilities, the Air Force will also take under its programmatic
    cognizance major Navy and Army space programs, as well as the United
    States' greatest ISR success legacy, the National Reconnaissance Office
    (NRO). In coming years Air Force ``space forces'' can expect to remain
    terrestrially based, with systems and weapons remaining robotic or
    remotely controlled, and primarily operating in support of soldier,
    sailor, airman, and marine terrestrial warfighters.
        However, technology and future crises may bring surprises, and the
    need for routine manned military space flight and operations in space
    could emerge. For General Greene's vision of expeditionary marine
    transport, our Service's environmental connection to space appears
    secure. But it is the Air Force that will have the charter and
    responsibility to develop space transport, space warfighting, and other
    advanced space capabilities; awesome tasks that could change the
    character and identity of a large fraction of that Service. The history
    of the emergence of the Air Force from the Army Air Corps should be
    carefully studied in this regard, and further sensible evolution should
    not be hindered.
        Our military cultural decision to ride the IT bandwagon is a two-
    edged sword. The cost of global, speed-of-light information
    dissemination and communications is that USMC terrestrial warfighting
    victory across the spectrum of conflict will largely hinge on our
    Nation's ability to exploit and defend assets in the unusually exposed
    space medium. Therefore, with a small contingent of qualified Marine
    Corps space professionals, we must increase our influence over space
    operational and programmatic processes in the future through strategic
    personnel assignments. The critical nodes in which we are aggressively
    seeking increased participation are the National Reconnaissance Office
    (NRO) (legacy ISR acquisition programs and operations), United States
    Space Command (USSSPACECOM) (space warfighting operations), Air Force
    Space Command (AFSPC) (Joint and multi-user space acquisition
    programs), the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) (the joint
    space concepts development and requirements arbitrator for the JROC),
    and the Joint Staff.
        Our cadre's core qualifications will continue to be rooted in the
    superb educational foundation provided by the Naval Postgraduate
    School, and could include U.S. Army and Air Force space cadre
    qualification curriculums in the future. Marines are already assigned
    to a few of the key nodes noted above, but that participation will now
    increase, in concert with a larger network identity that operates off
    of a single, coherent, requirements-based USMC vision. The objective is
    to have acquisition qualified space cadre marines managing or
    functioning within all the nodes, particularly in Joint programs at the
    NRO and AFSPC, to help guarantee the relevance of future weapons, C\4\,
    ISR, and other capabilities for USMC warfighters.
        It is worth noting that some have questioned the weight that should
    be assigned to Marine Corps positions on space. Admittedly, of all the
    services, the Marine Corps space cadre is the smallest, and with the
    exception of some C4 terminal procurements and a modest experimentation
    budget, we have no programmatic stake in the approximately $20B per
    year that constitutes U.S. national security space. But our Service's
    space-related warfighter requirement equities are exactly equal.
    Arguments based on the preservation of Service Total Obligation
    Authority (TOA) in space programs appear to run counter to the SECDEF's
    aims for improved national defense through focused purpose and
    efficiency. Fortunately, the Corps' programmatically neutral broker-
    warfighter perspective was heard, and we believe it had a useful
    influence on the outcome.
        In summary, the Marine Corps is elevating the priority of space
    unilaterally. It is up to us to recognize the importance of national
    security space expertise and commit ourselves to long-term Joint
    influence during its emergence as a warfighting medium.
        Secretary Roche and General Ryan. The changes described by the
    Space Commission and directed by the Secretary will help create a
    stronger center of advocacy for national security space missions and
    resources and build the critical mass of space professionals within the
    Air Force and in the Nation's national security space programs.
    Implementing the changes directed by the Secretary will strengthen Air
    Force space management and organization, consolidate the Department's
    space activities, and provide a focal point for the Department's
    interaction with the commercial, civil, intelligence, and international
    space communities.

                             black hawk production
        20. Senator Reed. Secretary White and General Shinseki, the Army
    has cut the number of Black Hawks procured in fiscal year 2002 from 16
    to 12. Could you tell us why this decision was made and the impact it
    will have? What plans do you have to ensure the much-needed
    modernization of the Guard units?
        Secretary White and General Shinseki. In the fiscal year 2001
    President's Budget, the Army allocated sufficient funds to procure nine
    UH-60s in fiscal year 2002. The Army has funded the procurement of 12
    UH-60s in the fiscal year 2002 President's Budget submission. This
    increase is an indication of the Army's commitment to provide as many
    Black Hawks as possible to the fill the revised aviation force
    structure, including the Army National Guard force structure, within
    current Total Obligation Authority.
        The Army plans to continue to procure Black Hawks to facilitate the
    full modernization of the Reserve components. We have identified an
    unfunded requirement for an additional 10 Black Hawks in fiscal year
    2002 to accelerate modernization of the Army National Guard.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                           space command organization
        21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, how quickly should we
    anticipate changes in the organization of Space Command? For each of
    you, how will you ensure the missile defense programs BMDO is devolving
    to the Services will be integrated and interoperable?
        Secretary Roche. The changes described by the Space Commission and
    directed by the Secretary will help create a stronger center of
    advocacy for national security space missions and resources and build
    the critical mass of space professionals in the Nation's national
    security space programs. Implementing the changes directed by the
    Secretary will strengthen Air Force space management and organization,
    consolidate the Department's space activities, and provide a focal
    point for the Department's interaction with the commercial, civil,
    intelligence, and international space communities.
        Within the Air Force, the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is
    planning to transfer from Air Force Material Command (AFMC) to Air
    Force Space Command (AFSPC) on or about 1 October 2001. This is part of
    AFSPC's effort to develop a comprehensive approach for managing and
    organizing Air Force space activities from research and development
    through acquisition to operations. Further, the practice of dual-
    hatting CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD with the Commander of Air Force Space
    Command will end and a separate four-star will be assigned as Commander
    of Air Force Space Command.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jones, you are on record as
    calling the Blount Island complex a national asset. What is the mission
    of the Blount Island complex? What efforts have been made by you and/or
    the civilian leadership within DOD and the Navy to fund the purchase of
    this facility?
        General Jones. The mission of the Blount Island Complex focuses on
    attainment, maintenance, and sustainment of all requirements in support
    of the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS). Maritime
    Prepositioning Force (MPF) Maintenance Cycle operations conducted at
    Blount Island are vital to maintaining the readiness and continued
    capability of the MPF program. Blount Island is recognized by DOD, the
    Joint Staff and the commanders in chief (CINCs) as a vital national
    strategic asset, through its role in support of the MPF program. Since
    1986, the MPF Maintenance Cycle for prepositioned equipment and
    supplies has been conducted at Blount Island. Blount Island is part of
    the Strategic Enabler entitled ``Strategic Mobility'', and is an asset,
    which is critical to the worldwide application of U.S. military power
    and our military strategy, under the strategic concepts outlined in the
    National Military Strategy of Forward Presence and Crisis Response.
    Under these concepts, the MPF program provides rapid and efficient
    strategic deployment options through strategic siting around the globe
    for the geographic and combatant CINCs. This enables MPF to be
    especially responsive to regional crises and disaster relief. With
    regards to the purchase of Blount Island, we appreciate the support of
    Congress in funding the first phase of this acquisition and are well
    underway in executing it.
        I have included the second phase within the FYDP and am continuing
    to work with the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD) to move it forward in the program. I did submit the
    project as my number 1 priority for consideration as OSD made final
    adjustments to the fiscal year 2002 budget. However, their guidance for
    these final adjustments precluded new footprints, to include Blount
    Island. That said, I am committed to pursuing earlier programming
    during the next budget cycle.

                       potential alternatives to vieques
        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary England, what is your target
    date to decide on an alternative to Vieques? What alternatives are you
    considering?
        Secretary England. I have a November 6, 2001 deadline to report to
    the President with alternatives to Vieques, however, there is no
    specific decision date as yet. I will make a decision as soon as I have
    all the relevant information, and will review any alternative location
    or combination of locations that enables the Navy to effectively meet
    our challenging and demanding training requirements in support of Fleet
    readiness.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary England, why is the Navy not
    taking advantage of the availability of increased dollars to purchase
    new T-6 training aircraft, especially in view of recent loss of two
    more Naval aviators in the old T-34 at Pensacola?
        Secretary England. The T-34C is a safe and reliable aircraft that
    has sufficient service life remaining and can satisfy Navy requirements
    for several more years. Navy conducted a prioritized review of Navy
    programs including Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
    procurement profiles. In this review all options were investigated,
    including maintaining T-34C in service longer than previously
    envisioned. JPATS procurement was deferred to fund more urgent
    competing priorities. JPATS procurement will resume in the future to
    take better advantage of service life remaining on the T-34.
        The T-34C has an excellent safety record. Over the last 20 years,
    the mishap rate for the T-34C in the Training Command has been 0.66
    mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. The average overall Navy/Marine Corps
    mishap rate was 2.8 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours for the same
    period.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
        25. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, Secretary White, and
    Secretary Roche, the Department of Defense has established 2010 as the
    goal for improving the quality of military family housing. The budget
    amendment proposes a $400 million increase in the family housing
    account to facilitate the achievement of this goal, but focuses the
    funding on the housing privatization.
        Do you believe that housing privatization is the most appropriate
    method for improving the military family housing stock?
        Secretary England. DOD is using a three-pronged approach to
    eliminating its inadequate housing stock. First, Basic Allowance for
    Housing is being raised to zero out of pocket by fiscal year 2005 in
    order to eliminate the economic inequities between community and
    military family housing. Second, the Navy is entering into Public
    Private Ventures (PPV) where feasible. Third, where PPV is not
    feasible, the Navy is using Family Housing, Navy appropriated funds to
    eliminate inadequate housing units.
        The Navy was first in DOD to implement PPV in 1996 and will soon
    privatize additional existing Family Housing units. Having just awarded
    several PPVs, there is no long-term history on the success of the
    executing phase of PPVs, property management (Navy awards typically
    range from 20 to 50 year programs).
        PPV Housing has as its primary advantage the ability to accelerate
    inadequate home elimination by leveraging funds with the private
    sector. Accordingly, PPV is playing a large role in the Navy's Family
    Housing program. It is important though that the use of PPV be
    considered as one of several tools available to improve Navy housing
    standards. However, due to the long term impact, all housing options
    should be assessed on their ability to meet each installation's unique
    housing needs. The Navy accomplishes this by assessing all housing
    construction, including PPV feasibility assessments, annually on an
    installation-by-installation basis through the Shore Installations
    Programming Board (SIPB). The SIPB is comprised of the Fleets and Chief
    of Naval Operations Ashore Readiness Division. Its charter is to
    consider regional PPV opportunities while promoting decisions that take
    both the short and long term PPV impact into account. In some instances
    it has been determined that PPV is not feasible. This is due to several
    unique factors which include but are not limited to anti-terrorism
    force protection concerns (housing is not severable from the
    installation), existing commercial activity studies, available number
    of housing units, lack of regional opportunity to partner with other
    installations, or a poor private sector environment (low growth, high
    vacancy rates, etc.).
        Additionally, the Navy is conducting a Family Housing Functionality
    Assessment (FA) that should be completed October 2001. This FA is
    expected to assist in the decision making process by identifying
    alternatives to traditional family housing asset management; namely, a
    property management prototype, commercial activity, and PPV.
        Current Navy guidance is to use PPV where feasible. The use of PPV
    quotas though has the potential to introduce long-term risk for short-
    term objectives as each installation's unique housing requirements may
    not receive full consideration.
        Secretary White. Yes, privatization of our family housing inventory
    remains a key factor in helping the Army achieve its goal to provide
    quality housing and improve the well being of soldiers and their
    families. The Army has an aggressive privatization program utilizing
    the Military Housing Privatization Initiative Act that Congress granted
    in 1996 and extended until December 2004. These authorities allow the
    Services to leverage appropriated family housing funds and assets to
    attract private-sector capital and expertise to operate, manage,
    maintain, improve, and construct new housing. By the end of 2005,
    approximately 62 percent (67,842 units) of the worldwide end-state
    inventory of 109,355 units is planned for privatization.
        Secretary Roche. Given the limited MILCON budget for revitalizing
    59,000 housing units, and the need to upgrade these units by the OSD
    goal of 2010, privatizing 27,000 housing units is the most appropriate
    method to achieve this goal. On average, the Air Force is leveraging
    its assets by greater than five to one using privatization.

        26. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, Secretary Roche, and
    General Shinseki, under the current funding profile, will your service
    achieve the 2010 goal for family housing improvement?
        Secretary England. Yes. The Navy's current Master Plan eliminates
    currently identified inadequate homes by fiscal year 2009.
        Secretary Roche. Our Family Housing Master Plan provides our
    corporate Air Force strategy to meet the 2010 goal. While we have
    worked hard to provide an integrated plan which concentrates on fixing
    our worst housing first, we recognize the realities of budget
    shortfalls. Recognizing ongoing QDR discussions, the administration has
    yet to establish our future funding levels beyond fiscal year 2002.
    However, we are committed to find a solution to revitalize, divest
    through privatization or demolish inadequate housing by 2010. This
    commitment will guide our revision to our Family Housing Master Plan in
    2002.
        General Shinseki. Using a mix of traditional military construction
    and privatization, the Army is able to allocate sufficient resources to
    eliminate all inadequate Army family housing by 2010.

        27. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, Secretary Roche, and
    Secretary White, one of Secretary Rumsfeld's more significant goals is
    to fund facility replacement on a 67-year standard, rather than the
    almost 200-year cycle under prior funding programs. Although this
    standard is still short of the industry standard of 57 years, it will
    significantly increase the readiness of our military installations.
        Will the current budget request support the 67-year replacement
    standard? If not, what are the funding requirements or other
    initiatives that will allow you to reach the standard?
        Secretary England. The Navy's amended fiscal year 2002 budget
    request supports a 113-year recapitalization rate. While still short of
    the 67-year standard this is a substantial improvement over the
    previous rate of over 160 years that existed prior to the amended
    budget. The facility replacement program will require nearly $600M
    additional recapitalization funds in fiscal year 2002 to meet the 67-
    year standard.
        Infrastructure reduction initiatives to assist in reaching this
    standard include planning efforts to identify true requirements,
    consolidation of facilities where feasible and demolition of aging and
    excess facilities. Key to consistently achieving the long-range
    recapitalization goal will be successful implementation of the Defense
    Department's Efficient Facilities Initiative to realign and reduce base
    infrastructure.
        Secretary Roche. No. It would take a fiscal year 2002 add of about
    $1 billion to achieve a 67-year replacement cycle investment rate.
    However, the AF has had to take risk in the infrastructure accounts
    over the last decade and has a backlog of deteriorated facilities. An
    additional $1.7B/year is required to buyout this backlog by 2010.
        Secretary White. In fiscal year 2002, the budget request does not
    support the 67-year replacement standard. An additional $526 million in
    fiscal year 2002 is needed to get the total inventory replaced in 67
    years. Other initiatives that help the Army reach the 67-year standard
    include privatization of housing and utilities, leasing facilities to
    the private sector (i.e., the hospital at Fort Sam Houston), and
    elimination of excess facilities.

                           european restationing plan
        28. Senator Thurmond. General Shinseki, European Army units
    continue to be stationed in World War II facilities that limit mission
    capability, complicate training, drain repair and maintenance
    resources, and are extremely costly to renovate. To correct this
    situation the Army is reviewing alternatives to the current stationing
    plan.
        What is the status of the European restationing plan and what is
    the anticipated cost?
        Does this budget provide any funding to initiate the relocation
    effort? If not, when do you anticipate funding will be available for
    this transition?
        General Shinseki. United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) initiated
    the Efficient Basing-East program to enhance readiness and improve
    soldier well being through the restationing of a brigade combat team
    from numerous small installations to the Grafenwoehr area. The goal is
    to gain efficiency by improving command and control, providing improved
    training at lesser cost, reducing the USAREUR footprint and operating
    cost, enhancing force protection, reducing personnel tempo and
    operational tempo, and reducing manpower overhead and long-term costs
    by eliminating small, costly, and inefficient installations.
        USAREUR continues to develop this initiative in terms of costs and
    phasing. Current identified costs total $477.7 million for fiscal year
    2003 to fiscal year 2007 for construction, planning and design, Army
    family housing, and design of other support facilities, i.e., schools,
    medical facilities, commissaries, post exchanges, etc. If allowed to
    reprogram identified funding, the net additional cost to USAREUR would
    be reduced to approximately $200.2 million.
        The Commander in Chief Europe has approved the plan, and the Army
    is evaluating this initiative along with other military construction
    projects. The draft 2002 Presidential Budget Future Years Defense
    Program contains seven projects totaling $68 million for the
    restationing. If approved, the initiative will be presented to the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress with the intent of
    gathering full support.

              sustainment, restoration, and modernization backlog
        29. Senator Thurmond. General Shinseki, although the overall
    funding request for the Army increased by more than $6.5 billion over
    fiscal year 2001, the Army reduced the number of tank miles funded by
    the budget from 800 to 730 miles--reduction of $300 million. I
    understand this was done to support facility stabilization.
        Despite this significant adjustment, what is the Army's current
    backlog for real property maintenance? ,
        General Shinseki. In fiscal year 2002, the current unfunded backlog
    to bring our facilities to a C-1 level is $17.8 billion. The increased
    level of sustainment funding in fiscal year 2002 needs to continue into
    the outyears to prevent the backlog from growing.

        30. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, in 1999, your predecessor
    reported that the Navy was experiencing critical skills shortfalls
    resulting in more than 13,000 gapped billets. Since that time,
    Congress--working with the Department of Defense--has supported a
    series of personnel initiatives such as increased pay and health care.
        How have these initiatives improved your gapped billets problem?
        Admiral Clark. The At-Sea Enlisted Gap has been reduced from 13,000
    in 1993 to less than 5,000 today. This success has resulted from strong
    leadership combined with the significant pay raises and bold
    compensation initiatives enacted by Congress in the last 2 years. With
    the help of Congress, we reinvigorated efforts to retain every eligible
    sailor by offering new or enhanced officer continuation pays and
    enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, and increases in base pay. We improved
    advancement opportunities by gradually increasing the number of sailors
    in the top six pay grades. We also expanded E4 and E6 High Year Tenure
    gates and concentrated efforts on reducing attrition. Recruiting and
    retention successes have allowed us to execute total Navy end strength
    approaching the 1-percent statutory flexibility above our fiscal year
    2001 authorized strength. This has decreased the Gap and improved
    battlegroup readiness by getting more sailors with the right training
    to their ships earlier in the pre-deployment cycle. Manning for our
    fiscal year 2001 battlegroup deployers has been as much as 3-4 percent
    greater than our fiscal year 2000 deployers across the entire
    deployment cycle. We are deploying at 98-101 percent manning with as
    many as 250-360 fewer billet gaps per battlegroup.

        31. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, I understand that the Navy has
    a $5.0 billion backlog in the repair and maintenance of its facilities.
    Despite this backlog, the funding requested for real property
    maintenance increases less than $90.0 million over the fiscal year 2001
    appropriation.
        How do you explain such a small increase in the real property
    maintenance account when the overall Department request for facility
    sustainment and base operations increased by more than approximately
    $3.0 billion?
        Admiral Clark. Due to funding priorities, sustainment, restoration
    and modernization (SRM) and base operating support funding have been
    programmed to minimally adequate sustainment levels in fiscal year
    2002. While the SRM increase request is only $90 million, the fiscal
    year 2002 MILCON funding request represents an increase of $130 million
    from the fiscal year 2001 request. Therefore, the total requested
    increase in facility investment for the Navy is $220 million.
        The current backlog in facilities repair and maintenance (BMAR) is
    over $5.0 billion with the critical portion being $2.6 billion. The
    Navy is in transition from the BMAR metric to the Facility Sustainment
    Model and the Installation Readiness Reporting System (IRRS) to improve
    the identification of facility repair and maintenance investment
    requirements.

        32. Senator Thurmond. General Jones, both you and General Krulak
    have always made the point that the Marine Corps equipment was showing
    its age and causing additional work for our marines and cost to our
    taxpayers. Despite these problems, your budget funds depot maintenance
    at only 78 percent of requirement. How do you explain the low level of
    funding for Depot Maintenance and what will be the cumulative effect of
    this funding shortfall?
        General Jones. The Marine Corps must fund a balanced program within
    the resources we have available. In the past we have funded near-term
    readiness at the expense of modernization. We can no longer continue
    this trend. Modernization has now become a readiness issue. We have
    realized that we must accept some measured risk in the short term in
    order to modernize our force. The Ground Depot Maintenance Program is
    funded at 78 percent of the executable requirement in fiscal year 2002.
    This level of funding will not impact the near term readiness of the
    operating forces. The $14 million Depot Maintenance Shortfall on the
    fiscal year 2002 Unfunded Priority List would fund us to the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense prescribed goal of 90 percent, but it is not
    critical to near term readiness.

        33. Senator Thurmond. General Jones, the Marine Corps will not
    recover from the accumulated effect of the procurement holiday which
    lasted from 1992 to 1999 until well beyond fiscal year 2007.
        What is the trade-off of this delay in terms of additional funding
    for repair parts and maintenance of your aging equipment?
        General Jones. The Marine Corps has experienced a rise in the
    average cost to maintain spare parts for our major end items. That is,
    the cost per repair has increased. As the Marine Corps faces virtual
    block obsolescence for many repair parts, we are required to spend more
    time and money to maintain aging equipment and weapons systems. As
    ground equipment has continued to age, and because the Marine Corps has
    yet to reap the benefits of modernization efforts, funding required for
    consumable and reparable spare parts has continued to grow.
        The Marine Corps has begun initiatives to modernize our aging
    equipment. For example, we are now fielding the Medium Tactical Vehicle
    Replacement and the HMMWV A2, as well as rebuilding our Assault
    Amphibious Vehicle. As we continue to modernize equipment we expect the
    cost of maintaining spares to begin to decline.

                             new ship construction
        34. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, the Navy's budget request
    reflects a goal for the construction of new ships of 8 to 10 per year.
    The budget we are considering builds six new ships.
        What is the objective of the goal of building 8 to 10 ships
    annually?
        When will you make up the shortfall in this year's ship
    construction program?
        Secretary England. The objective of the goal of building 8 to 10
    ships annually is to sustain a battle force capable of addressing all
    likely joint and combined warfighting requirements, overseas presence,
    and support to contingency operations. The foundation supporting the
    goal is the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and additional requirements
    articulated in the 30-year shipbuilding plan report provided to
    Congress in June 2000.
        Until we know the results of the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review
    and the Secretary of Defense's strategic review, I cannot comment on
    the extent of the shortfall. Currently, the Navy is limited to
    procuring six ships per year due to fiscal constraints and competing
    demands for Navy Total Obligation Authority. In order to build 8 to 10
    ships per year, the Navy requires approximately $3 billion to $5
    billion more in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy funding.

        35. Senator Thurmond. Secretary England, because the Marine Corps
    has been flying the CH-46 Helicopter since the 1960s, it is critical to
    the safety of our marines to find a replacement for the aging
    workhorse.
        Now that the V-22 program has been delayed for who knows how long,
    are there any alternatives or interim fixes for the CH-46?
        Secretary England. There have been seventeen Cost and Operational
    Effectiveness Analyses (COEs) conducted by a diverse series of trusted
    institutions to determine the most suitable replacement for the CH-46.
    The V-22 was a very consistent first choice with no clear second choice
    among the widest possible variety of potential alternatives to replace
    the CH-46. Each analysis showed that the MV-22 Osprey is the most
    operationally effective choice and the most cost effective (affordable)
    choice for the Marine Corps. They revealed that no other options or
    combination of platforms could provide the balance achieved with the V-
    22. Other alternatives including mixes or `silver bullets' offer no
    real advantage in cost savings or avoidance given the requirement. The
    bottom line is the V-22 is significantly more capable and cost
    effective than any alternative. The V-22 is the only alternative that
    meets the requirement.
        Based on current utilization rates, the service life of the CH-46E
    does not need to be extended to compensate for the delay of the MV-22.
    The only interim improvement in place for the CH-46E is the Engine
    Reliability Improvement Program (ERIP). This ERIP will ensure the
    health and reliability of the CH-46 at a cost of $200 million. The
    Engine Reliability Improvement Program is fully funded, and thanks to
    Congressional support, we were able to start it 1 year early (in this
    fiscal year). However, ERIP was procured based on a projected
    retirement schedule of the CH-46. As the delay of the MV-22 becomes
    more definitive, Marine Aviation will have to examine how many more
    ERIP kits the Marine Corps will need to procure. The current ERIP cost
    estimates are $1.3M per aircraft (then year dollars). Although the CH-
    46 will endure a delay in the introduction of the V-22, the cost of
    ownership of the CH-46E will likely continue to rise. Over the past 7
    years, flight hour costs and maintenance man-hours-per-flight-hour have
    increased by approximately 30 percent (in constant fiscal year 2000
    dollars).

                             transformation funding
        36. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, the Army's Transformation is
    critical not only to the Army, but also to the Nation's future.
        Does the fiscal year 2002 budget fully support your Transformation
    goals? If not, what changes would you propose?
        Secretary White. The fiscal year 2002 budget generates sustainable
    momentum for Army Transformation, although not at optimal levels. We
    invested in Objective Force research, development, testing, and
    evaluation to set the stage for modernization of equipment; continued
    fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams; and funded modernization of
    key Legacy Force systems to enhance force capabilities. We made a
    number of tradeoffs to ensure a well-balanced Army program and will
    continue to evaluate competing requirements in our efforts to
    transform.

                                rc modernization
        37. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, historically, the
    modernization of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve relied on the
    cascading of equipment from the active component.
        How does this budget request support the modernization of the
    Reserve components?
        Secretary White. This budget focuses on selective upgrades and
    modernization of key organizations while rebuilding and maintaining
    existing capabilities in others. Reserve component units that are
    paired with active component units will be selectively modernized,
    recapitalized, or rebuilt to attain full interoperability and
    compatibility with their active component teammates, ensuring current
    and near-term readiness.

                                training ranges
        38. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roche, one of the concerns I have
    is that our training ranges are not providing the challenges that our
    pilots will meet in future combat. For example, the pilots of Shaw Air
    Force Base training at Poinsett Bombing Range engage emitters that
    represent 1960s technology rather than the modern systems that our
    pilots will face over almost any hostile nation.
        How does your budget support the upgrading of training ranges in
    general? Regarding the Poinsett bombing range in South Carolina, I
    would appreciate it if you answer it for the record.
        Secretary Roche. Although many technological advances in surface-
    to-air threats have occurred over the past 40 years, recent conflicts
    have been against countries which have possessed predominately 1960s
    and 1970s vintage air defense systems. This fact highlights the need to
    train against these older systems; however, we cannot count on future
    adversaries employing older, less sophisticated threat systems. Combat
    readiness/survivability training for our aircrews must include
    proficiency training against modern, sophisticated threats.
        In general, we have ongoing programs that our fiscal year 2002
    budget supports to modernize our existing range electronic warfare
    threat emitters, weapon scoring systems, and air-to-air combat training
    systems, and targets through upgrades and procurement of additional
    items. Our fiscal year 2002 budget also supports modernization of an
    aging range electronics and telecommunications infrastructure and
    invests in the development of a new Advanced Threat Emitter System
    intended to provide simulation of modern threat capabilities,
    densities, and mobility for combat training. Poinsett Range in
    particular is scheduled to receive high-fidelity HARM targets to
    support training of the F-16s at Shaw AFB. Our fiscal year 2002 budget
    also provides for installation of a Joint Advanced Weapons Scoring
    System at Poinsett to score practice and inert munitions dropped on the
    range. Additionally, eight older Mini-Multiple Threat Emitter Systems,
    are slated for upgrade at Poinsett Range by fiscal year 2004 as part of
    an ongoing modernization program for this particular emitter system.

        39. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roche, what is the total number of
    B-52 aircraft in the Air Force's inventory, and what is the number B-
    52s required to support both the conventional and SIOP missions?
        If the number on hand is greater than required, why are they in the
    inventory?
        Secretary Roche. [Deleted.]

        40. Senator Thurmond. General Ryan, I understand that the average
    readiness of your combat squadrons is running at approximately 69
    percent against a readiness requirement of 92 percent. What are the
    major causes of this low level of readiness?
        Assuming no major changes as a result of the QDR, when will you be
    able to achieve your readiness requirements at the current funding
    level?
        General Ryan. As of 15 July 01, the overall readiness, measured by
    percentage of units C-2 or better, of our major operational units is
    down 22 percentage points while Active Duty stateside combat air force
    units are down 40 percentage points since 1996. The major causes for
    the decline are past underfunding (particularly of spare parts), the
    aging aircraft fleet, a less experienced workforce due to declines in
    retention, and past years of higher TEMPO.
        Our looming backorders caused by past underfunding continue to have
    a negative effect on readiness. These negative effects include lower
    mission capable rates, higher cannibalization rates, and added work
    hours for our people. Older aircraft are subject to organic problems,
    which are often discovered only after an aircraft ages. As these age-
    related problems surface, it's possible that they will affect large
    portions of the fleet. Moreover, older aircraft require more manpower
    and resources to keep them ready to fight in the future.
        Our overall retention rate is also a major cause for the decline in
    AF readiness. The Air Force failed to achieve our first-term, second-
    term, and career re-enlistment goals for the past 3 years (fiscal year
    1998-2000). Although, we are encouraged by the recent upturn in first-
    term re-enlistment rates, we continue to remain below our second-term
    and career re-enlistment goals. Retention challenges also exist for our
    mid-grade officer corps, not only for our pilots but also for many of
    our non-rated line officers.
        Past years of higher TEMPO has also contributed to the decline in
    overall readiness. Although, we have seen a significant drop in TEMPO
    recently, our people are still deploying over three times more often
    than in 1989 despite the fact that the drawdown reduced the size of the
    Active-Duty Force to approximately 60 percent of its former size. This
    TEMPO exacerbates the negative retention trend because it places a
    greater burden on those who are forward deployed and those who remain
    at home. Additionally, the sustained TEMPO not only takes a toll on our
    people but also on our equipment as we conduct split operations.
        Because our current readiness is the result of several years of
    sustained underfunding, poor retention, TEMPO, and aging systems, it
    will require several years of substantial and sustained investment to
    recover readiness.

        41. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roche, the Air Force's current
    backlog in maintenance and repair of facilities is in excess of $4.0
    billion and is expected to grow to $5.6 billion by the end of the
    fiscal year. Despite this significant backlog, the Air Force funded
    real property maintenance at less than 1 percent of plant replacement
    value.
        What was the basis for the low level of funding for RPM? How long
    will it take for the Air Force to make up the ever increasing backlog
    in real property maintenance?
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force topline supported the priorities of
    readiness, recruitment and retention, modernization, flying hour and
    utility cost increases. Unfortunately, the plus up from the recent
    amended budget was not enough to address facility O&M shortfalls.
        If facility sustainment requirements were fully funded, our
    facility restoration and modernization requirements would be an
    additional $1.2 billion per year to buy down the backlog by 2010. This
    funding would be in addition to a MILCON funded to meet the 67-year
    facility replacement standard and would allow the Air Force to buy down
    the backlog.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
                                okinawa incident
        42. Senator Smith. Secretary England and Secretary Roche, the July
    9th New York Times had an article on this latest incident in Okinawa
    involving a U.S. servicemember and a rape charge, I recognize the
    importance of Japan in the U.S. security framework in the Pacific and
    as a partner in missile defense research. However, I have concerns
    about turning over U.S. servicemembers to the Japanese Government for
    prosecution. The article states that the Japanese judicial system
    permits interrogation without a lawyer present and with an interpreter
    chosen by the police, which it says is ``standard Japanese procedure,''
    U.S. demands that a U.S. appointed interpreter be present and a defense
    attorney were rejected. When did the U.S. cede the rights of these
    service members to a foreign judicial system and can this be revisited
    at any point, since it appears that their civil rights under the UCMJ
    are being violated?
        Secretary England. Under general international law, a country may
    exercise criminal jurisdiction over anyone found within its borders.
    For instance, a nation is not obliged to give any different treatment
    to a foreign tourist accused of a crime than it would give to one of
    its own citizens. Unless, that is, it has agreed by treaty to provide
    special treatment to the foreign national.
        One of the functions of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is to
    recognize that military personnel invited into a country have special
    status and are therefore entitled to special treatment under the SOFA.
    One of the ways host countries typically recognize this status is to
    grant to the United States the right to exercise its criminal
    jurisdiction over U.S. service members who commit crimes within the
    host nation. However, in a number of agreements host nations have
    reserved the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in certain types
    of cases, such as where there is an allegation of a very serious
    offense committed against someone who is not part of the U.S. force or
    civilian component. The United States seeks to secure the greatest
    latitude possible for bringing service members accused of crimes in
    foreign countries back under its jurisdiction.
        In those cases where the host country retains the right to
    prosecute, the United States seeks, through the SOFA, to secure for the
    accused service member as many due process rights as possible. The
    United States then augments those safeguards by providing lawyers,
    translators and trial observers to the accused service member without
    charge.
        The Navy will always seek the same procedural rights for U.S.
    service members facing trial in a foreign country that they are
    entitled to under the UCMJ and the Constitution. That may not always be
    possible given the sovereign status of the host nation within its
    borders. But, we will in all cases demand that U.S. service members be
    afforded an investigation and trial that are open to observation by
    U.S. representatives and are objectively fair.
        Secretary Roche. Under general international law, a country may
    exercise criminal jurisdiction over anyone found within its borders.
    For instance, a nation is not obliged to give any different treatment
    to a foreign tourist accused of a crime than it would give to one of
    its own citizens. Unless, that is, it has agreed by treaty to provide
    special treatment to the foreign national.
        One of the functions of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is to
    recognize that military personnel invited into a country have special
    status and are therefore entitled to special treatment under the SOFA.
    One of the ways host countries typically recognize this status is to
    grant to the United States the right to exercise its criminal
    jurisdiction over U.S. service members who commit crimes within the
    host nation. However, in a number of agreements host nations have
    Reserved the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in certain types
    of cases, such as where there is an allegation of a very serious
    offense committed against someone who is not part of the U.S. force or
    civilian component. The United States seeks to secure the greatest
    latitude possible for bringing service members accused of crimes in
    foreign countries back under its jurisdiction.
        In those cases where the host country retains the right to
    prosecute, the United States seeks, through the SOFA, to secure for the
    accused service member as many due process rights as possible. The
    United States then augments those safeguards by providing lawyers,
    translators and trial observers to the accused service member without
    charge.
        The Air Force will always seek the same procedural rights for U.S.
    service members facing trial in a foreign country that they are
    entitled to under the UCMJ and the Constitution. That may not always be
    possible given the sovereign status of the host nation within its
    borders. But, we will in all cases demand that U.S. service members be
    afforded an investigation and trial that are open to observation by
    U.S. representatives and are objectively fair.

        43. Senator Smith. Secretary England, I'm concerned about an
    organization affiliated with CINCPAC called the ``Asia-Pacific Center
    for Security Studies''--based in Hawaii. A retired Marine Lieutenant
    General, Hank Stackpole, who runs this organization, told a conference
    in Australia that the Bush administration's missile defense program
    would be destabilizing. Here's the quotation: ``I don't believe, in my
    own personal view, that it is worth the effort to go ahead and create a
    space war field. . . . What rogue states are going to build ICBM that
    are easily targeted when you can do, you've heard the old argument,
    suit-case nuclear device somewhere in downtown New York.'' First, he's
    comparing apples and oranges--we have to worry about ICBM and suitcase
    nokes--but second, I'm concerned about an organization which is
    affiliated with PACOM that is undermining the president on missile
    defense. I would recommend that PACOM end its affiliation with this
    organization.
        Would you care to comment?
        Secretary England. Modeled after the George C. Marshall European
    Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
    Studies was established to build on the strong bilateral relationships
    between the United States Pacific Command and the Armed Forces of the
    nations in the Asia-Pacific region. The relationship between the Asia-
    Pacific Center for Security Studies and United States Pacific Command
    is an issue for the Secretary of Defense.

        44. Senator Smith. Secretary England, when the U.S. accidentally
    bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the U.S. agreed to pay for
    refurbishment of the Embassy. On April 1, when the Chinese pilot
    crashed into the Navy EP-3 and forced an emergency landing on Hainan
    Island, we had to pay for a Russian transport to carry our aircraft
    back to the States.
        Is there any reason why the Navy did not ask the Chinese Government
    to pay for the damage it did to our aircraft over international waters?
        Secretary England. The U.S. Government did not request compensation
    for damage to the U.S. aircraft, nor did it address the issue of
    damages to the Chinese aircraft involved in the incident as raised by
    the People's Republic of China. Further questions regarding these
    matters should be referred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

                             submarine force level
        45. Senator Smith. Secretary England, the Director of Undersea
    Warfare for the Navy volunteered that the submarine force wasn't able
    to ``do some of the national-level missions that we're asked to do.''
    He commented this spring that submarines have been pulled off those
    missions to go off and do other work.
        Reportedly, strategic intelligence tasking has doubled in the past
    10 years, while the number of attack subs in the fleet have declined by
    40 percent--what is the solution to this problem?
        Secretary England. The solution is two-fold. First, we must ensure
    our submarines are employed efficiently and effectively to carry out as
    many operational requirements as possible with existing resources.
    Second, we must preserve and acquire the right number of submarines in
    order to build up our SSN force structure.
        In the area of submarine employment practices, the interdeployment
    training cycle and maintenance periods have been reduced, deployment
    duration has been increased to 6 months for all submarine deployments,
    and our ships and crews are operating at maximum operating tempos. We
    are also proceeding with plans to homeport three submarines in Guam
    starting in 2002 to increase their availability for Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions in that theater. The
    submarine force providers are operating the forces as efficiently as
    possible. Further reductions in training time or deferrals of
    maintenance to increase operational time would have a significant
    negative impact on submarine force material and personnel readiness.
        The remaining option, if we are to fulfill all of the current and
    projected ISR mission requirements for submarines, is to increase force
    size. Increasing submarine force structure in the near and mid-term can
    be done by refueling existing SSNs otherwise scheduled for early
    inactivation and by converting SSBNs to SSGNs to boost the overall
    force structure and free SSNs to perform more intelligence missions. In
    the President's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Proposal, we recommend new
    funding to begin converting SSBNs and to refuel one of the five SSNs
    scheduled for inactivation. For the long-term, fixing submarine force
    structure shortfalls can be done only by increasing the Virginia Class
    SSN build-rate to 2-3 per year as soon as possible.

        46. Senator Smith. Secretary England, if the Navy can't meet U.S.
    intelligence requirements, what price are we paying in terms of
    readiness and isn't good intelligence one of the most important
    missions of all, and one that should never be underfunded?
        Secretary England. Understanding the price paid in terms of
    national or military readiness is complicated by the fact that we
    cannot assess what we don't know--i.e. what we have failed to hear or
    see due to a lack of submarine presence for intelligence collection.
    The best that can be done is to address examples, invariably highly
    classified examples, of situations where the submarine was the only
    ``sensor'' that was able to identify ad evaluate significant actions or
    capabilities of a potential adversary--even when all other intelligence
    collectors identified nothing. In the 1999 Attack Submarine Study,
    Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions were
    assessed by the Geographic CINCs as the highest priority missions for
    SSNs. In that study, the CINCs assessed the impact of not executing
    both current and future missions by articulating, at a classified
    level, detailed consequences of not executing specific missions.
    Because of submarines' long dwell time and ability to collect
    intelligence covertly from close-in, the impact of unfilled submarine
    intelligence missions could include missed intelligence tippers for the
    National Command Authority, lost cueing for national sensors, or missed
    opportunities to observe and evaluate adversaries' tactics and
    operating patterns. Although intangible by nature, all of these
    intelligence ``gaps'' degrade, to varying degrees, our Nation's
    national security and readiness.
        I heartily agree that intelligence requirements should not be
    underfunded. At the same time, I must guide the Navy within the budget
    limitations and with careful consideration of the resources required to
    support all of the Navy's missions and operational requirements.

        47. Senator Smith. Secretary England, the U.S. and Russia signed a
    new bilateral maritime agreement recently ostensibly to facilitate
    trade between our Nations--I would like to know whether the Navy was
    consulted on this agreement? Can you explain why Puget Sound was left
    off the list of naval facilities that would have required advance
    notification for Russian merchant vessels? (given we know the Russians
    use ``merchant'' vessels for espionage and especially since Puget Sound
    was the site of the 1997 lasing incident involving the Russian, the
    Kapitan Mann-which caused eye damage to both the American and Canadian
    pilots).
        Secretary England. The Navy vetted the proposed bilateral maritime
    agreement with Russia through the Interagency. In the process, the Navy
    provided input to the Joint Staff in order to formulate a Department of
    Defense position for the U.S. negotiating team. Puget Sound was removed
    from the port security list in 1991. The Navy has continuously
    expressed concern in the interagency process over that removal.

        48. Senator Smith. Secretary England, General Jones, and Admiral
    Clark, when we recently met, we discussed a myriad of subjects. During
    the meeting you mentioned that you have been told that there is an
    approximate 25 percent excess in the military's infrastructure.
        In light of such an estimate and given the President's desire to
    withdraw from the island of Vieques by 2003, can we justify a continued
    presence on mainland Puerto Rico?
        Can you promise me that you will give serious consideration to
    closing Fort Buchanan and Naval Station Roosevelt Roads if the primary
    reason for their existence was to support operations on Vieques?
        Secretary England. The architecture and structure of Naval Station
    Roosevelt Roads has been built up over the years to support training in
    the Puerto Rico operating areas. Without that training, and coupled
    with our need to effectively use tight resources, the issue of whether
    the Navy will maintain a presence on mainland Puerto Rico, and to what
    degree is a question that will require careful examination. We have
    stated that the Navy will conduct this examination during the course of
    our resource decision-making.
        General Jones. The issue of closing facilities in Puerto Rico is
    outside my purview as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. While Marine
    Corps forces utilize the training facilities on Vieques, the Marine
    Corps does not own or operate any facilities in Puerto Rico. For this
    reason, the issue of continued facilities presence in Puerto Rico is
    better directed to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff
    of the Army and their Service Secretary, all of whom have facilities
    responsibilities in Puerto Rico in the form of Fort Buchanan and Naval
    Station Roosevelt Roads. Additionally, the Commander in Chief of
    Southern Command is a significant tenant at Fort Buchanan and his
    operations in the Southern Command Area of Responsibility must be taken
    into account when analyzing future facilities requirements in Puerto
    Rico.
        Admiral Clark. Bases are part of the overall structure that
    supports our combat capabilities. This ``support of combat capability''
    is the value-added measurement that must be applied to all our Defense
    infrastructures. Naval Station Roosevelt Roads supports various
    missions related to the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility,
    including Vieques. Any decisions regarding the value of this base must
    include an objective review of the contribution to combat capability
    (in this case training) that the base makes. This method of measuring
    value, the contribution to ``support of combat capability'', will be
    continually applied to our infrastructure, and I will certainly apply
    this criteria in any future assessments of the need for Naval Station
    Roosevelt Roads.
        The Army will have to address the Fort Buchanan portion of this
    question. With respect to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads (NSRR), the
    mission of the base is to support training in the Puerto Rico operating
    area, to support U.S. Southern Command presence and outreach into South
    America, and support multi-agency drug interdiction efforts. Should
    training on the Vieques inner range cease, valuable training may
    continue to take place in the unencumbered sea and air space of the
    larger Puerto Rico operating area, in addition to continuation of the
    U.S. Southern Command and drug interdiction missions. The Navy will
    conduct an examination to determine the extent of training to be
    performed in the Puerto Rico operating area and the required Navy
    presence at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads.

        49. Senator Smith. General Jones, what is the current status of the
    MPF(E) initiative? What are its funding shortfalls and timeline for
    completion of the third and final ship?
        General Jones. The first MPF(E) ship, the USNS Harry L. Martin, is
    assigned to Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One (MPSRON 1) in the
    Mediterranean.
        Conversion of the USNS Stockham, MPF(E) ship two, was recently
    completed by NASSCO, San Diego, CA. The naming ceremony for the USNS
    Stockham occurred 06 July 01 at Blount Island Command (BIC),
    Jacksonville, FL. The USNS Stockham will complete load out in July 2001
    and join MPSRON 2 in Diego Garcia.
        We reached a major milestone and averted a work stoppage with our
    last MPF(E) ship to be fielded, the USNS Wheat/GTS Bazilaya. The new
    projected delivery date is late November 2001. Military Sealift Command
    (MSC) negotiated a contract modification (firm, fixed price vice cost
    plus contract) with Bender Shipbuilding (Mobile, AL) and additional
    funding of $11 million was provided from the National Defense Sealift
    Fund (NDSF) for the USNS Wheat/GTS Bazilaya conversion.

                                  abaya policy
        50. Senator Smith. Secretary Roche, I wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld,
    along with four of my colleagues, including Senator Collins on this
    committee, asking for an explanation of the DOD policy which requires
    female service members to don an abaya--which is standard wear for
    Muslim women, but is not a Saudi mandate--either for State Department
    female employees or for tourists. I have yet to receive an answer, but
    I have had a lot of women and men who have since voiced their outrage
    over this policy--arguing that it isn't justifiable under any
    rationale--including force protection. An Air Force officer first went
    public about this, since her private efforts to reverse this Muslim
    garb edict were ignored for years--can you look into this and let me
    know when my letter will be answered substantively?
        Secretary Roche. As of 20 July, letters relating to this issue were
    in General Shelton's office awaiting approval. We have assurances from
    his staff that the letters will be forwarded to the concerned Senators
    shortly.

                              rogue nuclear threat
        51. Senator Smith. Secretary Roche, an article from the Jerusalem
    Post (July 9) claims Iran will have a nuclear bomb by 2005, and that
    the Iranian Shahab-3 will be capable of reaching any point in Israel.
    The Iranians are believed to be already in possession of chemical and
    biological weapons of mass destruction. The arms control lobby says
    we're exaggerating the threat from ``rogue'' states--but what about the
    threat to U.S. forces deployed near rogue states--e.g. in Korea, in
    Japan, in Guam, in Europe, etc.--and the threat to our close allies,
    such as Israel? If the Iranians are to become nuclear-capable, how
    would that transform our debate over missile defenses and the ABM
    Treaty? Are we going to wait for the surprise results of an Iranian
    test, as we witnessed with India (to the surprise and dismay of our
    intelligence community)--and then launch a crash program for deployment
    of missile defenses?
        Secretary Roche. No ``crash'' program is necessary to protect U.S.
    troops and allies near rogue states that may be developing Weapons of
    Mass Destruction (WMD). We have a robust capability and are developing
    additional capability against missile attack. The U.S. has currently
    fielded the Patriot missile defense system in areas close to rogue
    states to protect our troops and Allies. Additional Patriot systems are
    available in the U.S. to field worldwide if a new threat is perceived.
    We also have the capability to attack suspected sites of WMD launchers
    by using airpower and special operations units. In addition to these
    capabilities, the U.S. is developing additional layers of missile
    defense. Systems such as the Army's THAAD, Navy Theater Wide and the
    Air Force's Airborne Laser will further strengthen our ability to deal
    with future threats. All of these systems are designed for use in a
    theater and have been judged to be compliant with the ABM treaty, which
    only addresses missile defenses within the U.S.
                               acquisition reform
        52. Senator Smith. Secretary Roche, in his testimony before this
    committee on January, 11, 2001, the SECDEF pledged to undertake a
    wholesale reorganization of the acquisition process to reduce the time
    it takes to field new systems, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, and I quote,
    ``The U.S. military needs to get on a new path that will permit the
    rapid introduction of advanced technology that can materially increase
    military effectiveness and decrease the cost of operating and
    maintaining those forces''. In previous communications with me you
    stated that the Air Force is fully committed to the expeditious
    development, procurement, and implementation of new technologies to
    ``own the night'' such as the Integrated Panoramic Night Vision Goggle.
    As you stated in your letter to me dated January 23, 2001, ``Increasing
    our warfighters nightfield of view from 40 degrees to 100 degrees adds
    a combat dimension not present in current night vision devices''.
        Do you agree with the SECDEF that we need to fundamentally reform
    the acquisition process in order to accelerate the development and
    delivery of key technologies? Can you provide the committee with your
    plan to accelerate the delivery of the Integrated Panoramic Night
    Vision Goggle, and how your funding reflects your accelerated efforts.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, and we are working aggressively to improve
    our acquisition processes. We are embracing evolutionary and spiral
    development, experimenting with new ways to quickly fund and deliver
    promising technologies, and streamlining the requirements-writing
    process.
        Delivering the Integrated Panoramic Night Vision Goggle to the
    field is not a question of process, but funding. Currently, estimated
    costs of $11.3M RDT&E to fund flight test and ejection testing and
    $82.7M Procurement across the FYDP are needed to field a baseline
    quantity of 2,200 units. There is no specific funding for this effort
    in the Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget. However the program is
    currently competing with other Air Force requirements for fiscal year
    2002 funding through one of our acquisition reform initiatives, the
    Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program Process.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum
                             transformation funding
        53. Senator Santorum. Secretary White, last year, the Army
    terminated or restructured seven programs to pay for the Army's
    Transformation initiative. The Army believed these terminations and
    restructurings were necessary because the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense was unable to provide additional funds to support transforming
    the Army. Congress then restored several of these programs because of
    existing Army requirements. What assurance can you provide that the
    Army's Transformation initiative is fully funded in the Fiscal Year
    2002 Budget Amendment? If the Transformation effort is not fully
    funded, what are some of the trade-offs or choices that the Army will
    have to consider to see that this effort is adequately funded?
        Secretary White. The fiscal year 2002 budget generates sustainable
    momentum for Army Transformation, although not at optimal levels. We
    invested in Objective Force research, development, testing, and
    evaluation to set the stage for modernization of equipment; continued
    fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams; and funded modernization of
    key Legacy Force systems to enhance force capabilities. We made a
    number of tradeoffs to ensure a well-balanced Army program and will
    continue to evaluate competing requirements in our efforts to
    transform.
                                    grizzly
        54. Senator Santorum. General Shinseki, the Army's Grizzly is a
    Military Load Class 70 complex obstacle-breaching vehicle that
    integrates advanced countermine and counter-obstacle capabilities into
    a single survivable system. The Grizzly incorporates a full-width mine
    clearing blade, a power driven arm for obstacle reduction and digging
    and a commander's control station (crew compartment) on a refurbished
    M1 tank chassis. The Grizzly will be capable of breaching other types
    of natural and man-made, simple and complex obstacles, creating a lane
    for vehicles to follow. The Grizzly is designed to provide our maneuver
    forces with mobility support (i.e., counter-obstacle breaching) for
    decisive operations.
        The fiscal year 2001 Army budget request included decisions to
    restructure or ``divest'' a number of programs in order to provide some
    of the resources to support its Transformation to achieve the ambitious
    deployment goals outlined in the October 1999 Army Vision. Grizzly was
    one of the programs that was terminated. Prior to this action being
    taken, the Grizzly breacher was scheduled to be fielded in 2004.
        Last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized $108
    million in funding to restore the program. The committee did so because
    it believes that critical mobility systems like the Grizzly must be
    continued to correct critical operational shortfalls for deployed
    forces. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided only $15 million
    in research and development funding for fiscal year 2001. In the end,
    only $15 million in funding was provided for Grizzly.
        If the Grizzly breacher is not fielded, the Army will have to rely
    on the M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV), an armored vehicle which
    consists of a basic M60A1 tank with a hydraulically operated debris
    blade, a 165mm turret-mounted demolition gun, a retractable boom, and a
    winch. The CEV was placed in service in 1965 with a total of 291
    vehicles. During Operation Desert Storm the CEV proved unable to
    maneuver with the heavy force due to the inability of the M60 chassis
    and power train to keep pace with the M1A1.
        What is the level of support requested for fiscal year 2002 for the
    Grizzly breacher? If the Grizzly breacher is not fielded, how does the
    Army intend to meet its requirements for decisive operations? What are
    the costs associated with sustaining the CEV?
        General Shinseki. The Grizzly program is not funded in the Fiscal
    Year 2002 President's Budget.
        For the Legacy and Interim Forces, the Army will continue using the
    current deliberate breaching tactics of sequentially orchestrating
    multiple systems with soldiers on the ground to affect a breach in
    support of mounted operations. Deliberate breaching operations are
    resource and time intensive. Current systems used in support of
    breaching operations include the Armored Combat Earthmover for
    breaching craters and ditches, the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge for
    breaching ditches, the Armored Battalion Countermine Set used to proof
    lanes in minefields, the Mine Clearing Line Charge used to breach
    minefields, the bangalore torpedo used to clear mines, and dismounted
    soldiers employed to reduce wire obstacles and to reduce other
    obstacles with explosives. For the Objective Force, Future Combat
    System concepts are under development. These will ensure we meet our
    requirements for decisive operations.
        There are no sustainment costs for the CEV, the vehicle was retired
    from service in 1998. However, 14 vehicles remain in the inventory.
    Four of these vehicles were converted into special purpose, remotely
    controlled, mine clearing vehicles in the Balkans. The remaining 10
    vehicles are located at Anniston Army Depot and are cannibalized for
    spare parts to support the four operational mine clearing vehicles.
        We do not have fiscal year 2001 cost data for these vehicles.
    However, historical fiscal year 2000 data show sustainment costs at
    $533,948. This cost was based on a total operational tempo of 560 miles
    for the four operating mine clearing vehicles.

        55. Senator Santorum. Secretary England, the T-6A Joint Primary
    Aircraft Training System (JPATS) turboprop is designed as a dedicated
    training aircraft possessing jet-like handling characteristics.
    Replacing the Air Force's T-37 and the Navy's T-34C aircraft, the T-6A
    will offer better performance and significant improvements in training
    effectiveness, safety, cockpit accommodations and operational
    capabilities. Powered by a PT6A-68 turboprop engine with a four-blade
    propeller, it features a stepped-tandem, cockpit configuration, with
    the instructor's rear seat raised slightly to improve visibility from
    the' rear cockpit; modern avionics; and improved egress systems.
        Briefing materials provided by the Navy note that the Service had
    originally intended to purchase 24 JPATS aircraft. Last year, the Navy
    purchased 24 trainers to continue modernizing its inventory of training
    aircraft. However, this year it appears that the Navy has not requested
    funds to purchase any JPATS aircraft in fiscal year 2002.
        Please explain this decision and please note the impact on the
    industrial base, which ramped up from producing 12 JPATS for fiscal
    year 2000 to 24 JPATS for fiscal year 2001. That is, what will be
    impact on the JPATS producer if no additional aircraft are purchased in
    fiscal year 2002? How is the Navy planning to fill the 24-aircraft gap?
        Secretary England. The T-34C is a safe and reliable aircraft and
    has sufficient service life remaining to satisfy Navy requirements for
    several more years. The Navy conducted a prioritized review of Navy
    programs including the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS)
    procurement profiles. In this review all options were investigated,
    including maintaining the T-34C in service longer than previously
    envisioned. JPATS procurement was deferred to fund more urgent
    competing priorities and take better advantage of the service life
    remaining on the T-34C.
        Previously, the procurement profile would have resulted in a
    production rate in excess of economic order quantity. While this was a
    boon to industry in the short run, the end of the Air Force buy in
    fiscal year 2007 would have resulted in a Navy buy (of 24) far below
    minimum sustaining rate and at a premium cost to the Navy. By deferring
    the Navy buy to post Air Force procurement, we optimize the remaining
    life on the T-34C and allow the Navy to commence procurement at an
    economic order quantity in the future. This would provide industry with
    long-term steady state production and minimize the near-term fiscal
    year 2002 quantity reduction impact.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts
        56. Senator Roberts. General Jones, your statement refers to the
    differences between the terms transformation and modernization. Please
    explain for the committee the basic differences between these two terms
    as they relate to the Marine Corps.
        General Jones. Unlike the other services that have undergone a
    major restructuring in response to the changing strategic and
    operational landscapes of the post Cold War world, the Marine Corps has
    been assigned a role and organized, trained, and equipped as an
    expeditionary force in readiness that is as relevant today as it was in
    1952 when Congress established in law the role of the Marine Corps. The
    Marine Corps has neither had to downsize nor reshape itself as a result
    of the Cold War. Instead, the Marine Corps has continued to follow a
    plan for developing additional capabilities needed to hone its ability
    to conduct its assigned role against the changing threat in the 21st
    century.
        Absent a change of role as a result of the end of the Cold War, the
    Marine Corps has sought to modernize its forces through selective
    acquisition of new equipment that takes advantage of emerging
    technologies such as precision weapons, information technology, new
    engines, stealth technology, etc. In some cases, such as the Light
    Weight 155mm Howitzer, the intent is to replace existing equipment that
    is past its service life. In other cases--such as the MV-22 and AAAV--
    the ideas for the technologies were developed during the 1980s to
    enable new operational concepts while the technologies to build the
    equipment have not been sufficiently developed until 20 years later. In
    this sense, modernization through the addition of new equipment that
    will provide a major increase in the depth and speed that the Marine
    Corps can carry out its assigned role as an inherently naval
    expeditionary force will result in potentially revolutionary increased
    capabilities but without a major restructuring and transformational
    change in the operating forces of the Marine Corps.
        Accordingly, modernization as used by the Marine Corps explicitly
    means reshaping the Marine Corps capabilities to meet the future
    through the selective acquisition of new equipment that will enable the
    execution of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare in support of emerging
    joint warfighting concepts. Modernization does lead to quantum
    increases in capability; however, because it is part of an on-going
    process of Marine Corps combat development there is no requirement for
    a major shift in the way the Service trains, organizes, and equips
    Marine Corps operating forces that is implicit in the term
    transformation.
        To the Marine Corps, transformation is a continuing process that
    spans decades of innovation and experimentation with the implementation
    of new systems, operational and organizational concepts. It involves
    the development of new operational concepts, refinement of enabling
    capabilities through experimentation, and the development of new
    organizations, tactics, techniques, procedures and technologies as
    necessary to turn these concepts into warfighting capabilities.

        57. Senator Roberts. General Jones, your statement highlights
    concerns you have regarding the 2001 congressionally-mandated PERSTEMPO
    program. Could you please comment on some of your concerns and
    recommended solutions?
        General Jones. The Marine Corps understands the intent of the
    PERSTEMPO legislation, is fully complying by actively tracking and
    managing the PERSTEMPO of our marines, and will report to Congress as
    required. However, we have several concerns: The high-deployment per
    diem payment equates to paying premiums for doing what we do as normal
    operations and deployments in support of the nation. PERSTEMPO
    requirements put our commanders on the horns of a dilemma by causing
    them to make decisions they wouldn't ordinarily make: Use scarce
    Operations and Maintenance funds to pay per diem, or; break the
    continuity and cohesion of units to avoid putting some marines over the
    400 day threshold, or; reduce the amount of necessary re-deployment
    training so that individuals will not break the 400-day threshold
    during the deployment. We ask that Congress recognize that the
    PERSTEMPO legislation is a new requirement and the full impact is not
    known at this time. We need time to fully assess the impact and
    possible unintended adverse consequences and implement any necessary
    corrective actions. The Marine Corps recommends delaying the
    requirement to begin paying the high-deployment per diem payments, for
    those exceeding the 400 day threshold, until 1 October 2003. This delay
    allows the Services the time to use the tools we have devised to manage
    PERSTEMPO before we are required to start the payments. Using our
    tools, we will be able to reduce PERSTEMPO to the least possible amount
    and have time to budget for the PERSTEMPO per diem that we must pay.

        58. Senator Roberts. General Jones, your statement highlights the
    Marine Corps' efforts to move beyond traditional amphibious assault to
    advanced expeditionary operations from land and from sea. Please
    explain what expeditionary means as applied to the Marine Corps.
        General Jones. To the Marine Corps, expeditionary implies an ethos
    and state of mind. It defines both a constant state of readiness for
    deployment as well as a required preparation to adapt to a wide range
    of missions and warfighting conditions. As a naval service, the Marine
    Corps is specifically tailored to serve as part of a seabased
    operation. However, the same qualities that make it readily adaptable
    to a variety of seabased missions make it a force of choice for a
    number of expeditionary missions that are not necessarily seabased in
    nature.
        The Marine Corps is expeditionary by culture and transformational
    by design. Its organizational paradigm has been proven fundamentally
    sound and relevant, providing templates to forge innovation for the
    future. Each Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is an integrated
    combined-arms team, modular and scalable to meet the unique
    requirements of the specific mission, including leading or enabling
    joint and coalition operations. The objective is to develop the
    capability to use the sea both as maneuver space and sanctuary for
    reach back to integrated long-range precision fires, network centric
    command and control, adaptive integrated seabased logistic support, and
    assembly of follow-on forces.
        At the same time, the Marine Corps is capable of expeditionary
    operations that are not seabased. Historically, marines have been a
    force of choice for a variety of expeditionary missions that have not
    been seabased such as sustained support of the United Nations efforts
    in Somalia, and aviation support of joint operations over Bosnia and
    Kosovo from an expeditionary airbase at Aviano, Italy. During Desert
    Storm, marine expeditionary forces were among the first on the ground
    in Saudi Arabia through maritime prepositioning in support of an
    expeditionary operation that was hosted by a friendly nation rather
    than conducted from a seabase.
        As the Marine Corps modernizes with the addition of the AAAV and
    MV-22 it will have certain inherent capabilities for power projection
    that will enable even greater reach for Marine Corps operating forces
    operating either from the seabase or from intermediate staging bases
    ashore. This expanded reach will permit forcible entry operations over
    a much greater range of shoreline making it less predictable and
    vulnerable than traditional amphibious assaults against established
    defenses. At the same time, the addition of the MV-22 will provide an
    extraordinary extension in the range that marine expeditionary forces
    will be able to be projected from either sea or land bases in order to
    pursue the range of humanitarian and crisis response missions that U.S.
    military forces are required to conduct in addition to more traditional
    forcible entry operations.

        59. Senator Roberts. General Jones, how does the Marine Corps
    define its amphibious lift requirement? To what extent is this
    requirement being met today? Is this requirement being re-examined as
    part of the ongoing defense review?
        General Jones. The naval warfighting requirement, the capability
    the Marine Corps strives to provide to our Nation, remains at 3.0
    Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons. The long standing
    requirement for an amphibious force structure plan that supports lift
    for 3.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelons, as stated in the
    Department of the Navy's 1990 Integrated Amphibious Operations and USMC
    Air Support Requirements Study, the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study,
    and reemphasized in congressional testimony and the Secretary of
    Defense's 26 June 2000 Report On Naval Vessel Force Structure
    Requirements, remains a priority requirement.
        To determine amphibious ship requirements in this context, a Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade is measured by the five fingerprints of lift
    consisting of troops, square feet for vehicles, cubic feet for cargo,
    vertical take off and landing spots, and landing craft air cushioned
    spots. Today's active amphibious fleet is capable of lifting the
    following Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon equivalents:
    Troops--2.72; Vehicle square feet--2.1; Cargo cubic feet--3.71;
    Vertical Take Off and Landing spots--3.25; and Landing Craft Air
    Cushioned spots--3.5. Shortfalls in active amphibious ships remain an
    area of concern.
        Naval amphibious ships combined with embarked marines provide
    forward presence and flexible crisis response forces for employment in
    support of foreign policy objectives. These forces provide the most
    formidable amphibious forcible entry capability in the world.
    Amphibious lift requirements are formulated to support the National
    military strategy, satisfy combat surge requirements, and can also be
    tailored to meet real world day-to-day commitments. Although this
    particular requirement is not being examined as part of the ongoing
    Quadrennial Defense Review, the Marine Corps, expeditionary by nature
    and transformational by design, continuously reexamines requirements to
    ensure validity.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard
                             out-of-pocket expenses
        60. Senator Allard. Secretary Roche, Secretary White, and General
    Shinseki, I have long been concerned on the high out of pocket expenses
    of military personnel living off post in the Colorado Springs area and
    now outside of Buckley Air Force Base. The reduction of out of pocket
    expenses for military personnel living offpost is long over due. Can
    you comment on your efforts to meet the goal of reducing or eliminating
    these costs and increasing the availability of housing on these
    installations?
        Secretary Roche. In 2000, the Secretary of Defense directed that
    BAH would pay for 100 percent of the median out-of-pocket expenses by
    2005. BAH is being transitioned over the next few years to avoid any
    sizable changes to allowances. 2000 BAH rates were set at 18.9 percent
    out-of-pocket, 2001 is 15 percent, 2002 will be 11.3 percent, 2003--7.5
    percent, 2004--3.5 percent, and 2005--0 percent.
        The Air Force, along with DOD, is on track to meet the milestones
    of this reduction plan to decrease out-of-pocket expense. However,
    these improvements generate large DOD bills: $486 million for fiscal
    year 2002, $614 million for fiscal year 2003, $635 million for fiscal
    year 2004, and $718 million for fiscal year 2005. Continued
    congressional support is needed to pay for housing allowance reform and
    process improvements.
        Our Family Housing Master Plan (FHMP) identifies locations where
    there is not a sufficient supply of affordable and adequate units in
    the local community. The FHMP identifies a future requirement to
    construct 80 additional units at Peterson AFB in Colorado Springs and
    201 units for Buckley AFB in Denver. Consistent with this plan, our
    fiscal year 2002 program includes a privatization project to construct
    201 units for Buckley AFB.
        Secretary White and General Shinseki. The Army has been on a
    campaign to reduce out-of-pocket expenses. We have concentrated our
    efforts on the largest areas where out-of-pocket expenses occur: basic
    pay, housing, medical care, and permanent change of station (PCS)
    moves. With the help of Congress, we have been able to obtain pay
    raises at a rate higher than the National employment cost index through
    2006.
        The Secretary of Defense established a goal to eliminate out-of-
    pocket housing expenses by fiscal year 2005 through increases to the
    basic allowance for housing. This initiative should increase off-post
    housing available to soldiers in the local community. At Fort Carson,
    the housing privatization contractor is constructing an additional 840
    housing units on post to meet the housing needs of soldiers assigned
    there.
        The Army has achieved substantial improvements to health care that
    our soldiers and their families receive. TRICARE Remote, elimination
    and reduction of co-pays, and reduction of pharmacy costs will help
    eliminate soldier out-of-pocket expenditures. Healthcare improvement is
    an ongoing process, and we will continue to adjust to meet the needs of
    an ever-changing world.
        A multi-service working group is reviewing ways to reduce out-of-
    pocket expenses related to PCS moves. The working group is reviewing
    ways to streamline the moving process, introduce cost efficiencies, and
    improve entitlements for service members during and after their move.

                                force structure
        61. Senator Allard. General Ryan and General Shinseki, we often
    hear reports that the PERSTEMPO and the OPTEMPO are high and that the
    services are having difficulty maintaining them with the current force
    structure. An increased reliance on the Reserve components has had a
    positive effect, but they too are suffering from a high OPTEMPO. At the
    readiness hearing last September, the service chiefs implied that the
    Quadrennial Defense Review would likely return a recommendation to
    increase the size of our force structure, particularly in the Army. Yet
    in the fiscal year 2002 budget, all services maintain the same number
    of troops. How are you going to reduce the negative effects of a high
    PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO now and in future years?
        General Ryan. The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) construct
    addresses high PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO by spreading deployment
    requirements over a larger Total Force pool and making deployments more
    predictable for our airmen and their families. Ten Aerospace
    Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) and two Aerospace Expeditionary Wings
    (AEWs) represent the core of the EAF's deployable combat power and
    forward presence capability. Employing a rotational cycle allows us to
    manage the force better by making more Air Force people available for
    deployments and determining when, where, and how to focus contingency
    OPTEMPO relief. We are also reviewing and ``rightsizing'' the number
    and type of airmen we deploy in support of contingency deployments. The
    AEF schedule further helps us identify shortfalls in the current force
    and make appropriate changes to our investment strategies. We are
    exploring options to reduce the tempo for Low Density/High Demand (LD/
    HD) assets, standoff precision weapons capability, and Suppression of
    Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) capabilities, but the bottom line is there are
    no quick fixes.
        We have also taken steps to ensure we have sufficient personnel to
    support future OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO demands by addressing our total
    end-strength. The Air Force's programmed-end strength was reduced from
    357,000 in fiscal year 2001 to 352,200 in fiscal year 2002. We are no
    longer attempting to achieve this reduced end strength and have added
    back 6,600 billets in pursuit of a new fiscal year 2002 programmed end
    strength of 358,800. In addition to adequate manpower, we continue to
    focus on other quality of life issues which address the effects of
    PERSTEMPO by providing improved family support, better working
    conditions, and improved compensation.
        General Shinseki. Please allow me this opportunity to define the
    terms PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO, and deployment tempo or DEPTEMPO. OPTEMPO is
    the annual operating miles or hours for major equipment or systems in
    battalion-level or equivalent organizations. PERSTEMPO is the number of
    days an individual soldier is engaged in official duties at a location
    or under circumstances that make it infeasible to spend off-duty time
    in his or her normal residence. DEPTEMPO is the average number of days
    spent away from barracks or quarters for training or operational
    deployments. DEPTEMPO is measured as the number of days a unit would
    have to deploy as a whole.
        That said, I can best answer your question from a DEPTEMPO
    perspective. The Army has studied DEPTEMPO and associated readiness
    issues and implemented several initiatives to improve the readiness of
    the force, mitigate the impacts of deployments, and improve the well
    being of our soldiers and their families.
        The Army manning initiative has significantly improved the
    personnel readiness of our combat divisions. We have manned these units
    to 100 percent of their authorized personnel to ensure they have the
    resources to execute and sustain the full range of missions they might
    be assigned. Fully manning the divisions has reduced personnel
    turbulence and increased unit readiness.
        We have implemented a corps alignment policy that tasks one corps
    at a time to support both Bosnia and Kosovo? allowing the other corps
    to focus on collective training requirements and quality of life. We
    believe this policy can provide additional leader focus and
    predictability to both deploying and non-deploying units.
        The Army has increased the use of our Reserve component for
    overseas deployments to distribute mission load, mitigate active force
    shortfalls, and reduce active component DEPTEMPO. At the same time, our
    Reserve component soldiers have developed valuable mission experience.
    We have studied the frequency, deployment, and recovery for our Reserve
    components. We are adapting our model for mobilization, training, and
    deployment for contingency operations to reduce the impact on soldiers,
    families, and employers.
        The Army has implemented a deployment policy that limits
    operational employment to 179 days. Where appropriate, based on
    specific mission requirements, we have reduced deployment lengths to as
    low as 120 and even 90 days. We are implementing PERSTEMPO legislation
    directed by the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Years 2000
    and 2001 that requires general officer involvement in decisions to
    deploy soldiers for greater than 182 days over a moving 365-day window.
    Additionally, the Army also implemented a PERSTEMPO tracking and
    management system and a stabilization policy that prevents soldiers
    from back to back deployments. The Army also designs and announces
    deployment schedules to ensure deployments are spread throughout the
    force and to offer a greater degree of predictability of deployments.
    We continue to study ways to reduce soldier time away from home.

       departure area control group operations at peterson air force base
        62. Senator Allard. General Shinseki, in your written statement,
    you state the budget meets the Army's strategic mobility goal of fiscal
    year 2003. Does this include the Army's requirement for a building at
    Peterson Air Force Base to support the Departure Area Control Group
    operations? It is my understanding that building has been slipped to
    fiscal year 2004. Please explain.
        General Shinseki. The budget does not include the building at
    Peterson Air Force Base to support the Departure Area Control Group
    operations. During the fiscal year 2002 program review and subsequent
    discussions, U.S. Army Forces Command requested that funds programmed
    for the Departure Area Control Group building be reprioritized and
    reallocated to support the Sabre Hall project at Fort Stewart. The
    funds were subsequently reallocated with the understanding that since
    there is no funding for the Army Strategic Mobility Program in fiscal
    year 2004, the Departure Area Control Group building would compete
    within the Army's normal installation infrastructure program, until
    such time as funding becomes available. The project may also be
    considered in a planned follow-on program to the Army Strategic
    Mobility Program in support of Army Transformation, which will be the
    Army Power Projection Program.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
        63. Senator Collins. General Jones, you recently testified to the
    Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that ``the future of
    naval precision fires is represented by the Zumwalt class DD-21 Land-
    Attack Destroyer and the development of an Extended Range Guided
    Munition.'' Further, General Nyland testified before our Seapower
    Subcommittee that the Marine Corps, at present, lacks organic fire
    support capabilities. General Nyland highlighted the need and
    requirement for the Advanced Gun System currently scheduled to deploy
    on DD-21, which would help to address this sustained fire support
    shortfall. He went on to state that, ``I am confident that the top-down
    strategy review will reveal, given the state of the world and the
    potential for future conflict, that DD-21s validity and value will be
    certain to be characterized as a necessity and a relevant element of
    the future security.'' Taken together, these planned enhancements will
    dramatically improve the range, responsiveness, accuracy, and lethality
    of the Naval Surface Fire Support provided to forces ashore. General
    Jones, would you agree that the attributes and technologies, such as
    the Advanced Gun System, Extended Range Guided Munitions, and Land
    Attack Standard Missile, currently scheduled to deploy on DD-21 will
    make significant strides in addressing this critical fires support
    shortfall?
        How key is the DD-21 program to transforming our naval surface
    fires capabilities?
        General Jones. The attributes and technologies being developed for
    DD-21 are vital for meeting the Marine Corps' Naval Surface Fire
    Support (NSFS) requirements. The Navy has recognized the current
    deficiency in NSFS and has embarked upon a two-phased program to
    eventually satisfy the requirements of the Marine Corps.
        Near-term programs such as the 5''/62 gun, Extended Range Guided
    Munition and Land Attack Standard Missile will provide an enhanced NSFS
    capability, but will not meet all of the range and lethality
    requirements for supporting the Marine Air Ground Task Force in future
    expeditionary operations. These systems will enhance the fires support
    capability of the Navy in the near-term, but will also provide a means
    by which to leverage technological development to reduce the
    developmental costs of far-term. Specifically, the technological
    developments supporting the 5-inch Extended Range Guided Munition
    program will directly benefit the 155mm Long Range Land Attack
    Projectile under development for the Advanced Gun System for DD-21.
        In the far-term, the 155mm Advanced Gun System, with a family of
    precision-guided and ballistic ammunition, and the Advanced Land Attack
    Missile, with a family of general use and specialty warheads, will
    fully meet these requirements. The capabilities provided by the DD-21
    and its associated systems remain vital to realizing the full potential
    of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and the conduct of expeditionary
    operations and sustained operations ashore in a fluid, non-linear
    battlespace.

                          objective crew served weapon
        64. Senator Collins. Secretary White and General Shinseki, the
    Objective Crew Served Weapon (OCSW) is a perfect example of leap-ahead
    technology to support Army Transformation. The advanced materials from
    which it is made, and the increased lethality and survivability that
    come from this weapon should push it to the forefront of
    Transformation, yet it has taken a back seat to other work. As
    Secretary, can we expect you to press forward on this weapon system and
    ensure that our fighting men and women have the best possible
    equipment? General Shinseki, would you care to add any comments on this
    program?
        Secretary White. I agree that the OCSW has great potential to
    provide our soldiers with a lighter, more lethal weapon system that has
    leap-ahead characteristics. Rather than saying that this program has
    taken a back seat, I would say that more work needs to be done before
    the Army can commit to full development and fielding. The Army has
    applied lessons learned from the Objective Individual Combat System.
    Among those lessons are ensuring that the system is sufficiently mature
    before transferring it from the science and technology base to a
    program manager and addressing important issues, such as affordability,
    reliability, and manufacturability. Once these issues have been
    resolved, the Army will have confidence that OCSW is ready for
    transition to system development and demonstration and follow-on
    procurement. The Army shares your desire to get OCSW in soldiers' hands
    as soon as possible.
        General Shinseki. I agree with Secretary White that OSCW, when
    successfully developed and fielded, will provide leap-ahead
    capabilities. I would add that OCSW will greatly enhance the lethality
    and survivability of dismounted warriors. It also has potential as an
    armament for vehicles. OCSW's ability to engage targets in defilade at
    extended range offers the Army warfighting capabilities that we need.

        65. Senator Collins. Secretary England, we have discussed the P-3
    aircraft as an integral part of our current war plans, patrol and
    reconnaissance programs before, and the fact that the average age of
    the P-3 platform is roughly 25 years old. While aircraft avionics
    upgrades have kept the plane relevant and viable in today's threat
    environment, the airframe itself is reaching the end of its useful
    service life. I am aware that an ongoing service life assessment
    program is studying this airframe fatigue life issue and that there is
    an ongoing Analysis of Alternatives underway to look at the Multi-
    Mission Aircraft as a follow-on to the P-3 program.
        What will the fiscal year 2002 budget amendment allow us to do to
    further extend the life of our current P-3 aircraft and/or further
    identify a follow-on program to meet this critical patrol and
    reconnaissance Navy mission?
        Secretary England. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget contains
    $53.8 million of Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation funding
    to conduct the next phase of the planned acquisition (Component
    Advanced Development) for the P-3 replacement aircraft. Contracts will
    be signed with one or more contractors to further refine concepts
    proposed late in 2000. The Navy plans to continue work on analyses
    supporting development of acquisition documentation, performance
    specifications, and acquisition planning required by current directives
    and law.

        66. Senator Collins. Secretary England, do you agree that the
    Department needs to actively pursue and apply resources in the near-
    term to ensure that we can continue the P-3 reconnaissance operations
    without impacting readiness, as these aging aircraft reach the end of
    their useful service life?
        Secretary England. The Navy agrees that the capability provided by
    P-3 aircraft is a core capability it intends to leverage in the future.
    The Navy is actively pursuing alternative funding options that minimize
    impact on readiness within budgetary constraints.

        [Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Cleland, Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton,
    Warner, Smith, Inhofe, Allard, Sessions, and Bunning.
        Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; and Peter K. Levine,
    general counsel.
        Majority staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswait,
    Richard W. Fieldhouse, and Terence P. Szuplat, professional
    staff members.
        Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
    Republican staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
    director for the minority; L. David Cherington and Scott W.
    Stucky, minority counsels; Brian R. Green and Mary Alice A.
    Hayward, professional staff members.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer Key, Thomas C. Moore,
    and Jennifer L. Naccari.
        Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
    Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
    Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A.
    Contostavlos and William K. Sutey, assistants to Senator Bill
    Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Brady
    King, assistant to Senator Dayton; Wayne Glass, assistant to
    Senator Bingaman; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator
    Smith; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M.
    Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
    McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
    assistant to Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
    to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
    Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and
    Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning everybody. The committee meets
    this morning to receive testimony on ballistic missile defense
    policies and programs in the proposed fiscal year 2002 amended
    budget from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the
    Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lt.
    Gen. Ron Kadish. I welcome you both to the committee this
    morning.
        We are 2 days away from the first attempted intercept test
    in over a year of a missile defense system intended to address
    the possibility of a limited long-range missile attack from a
    nation such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. All of us hope that
    Saturday's test will be successful. However, the future of a
    research program will not hinge on the success or failure of
    any one test. Learning whether or not a system can be developed
    and understanding the true costs will take many tests over many
    years. But there is a more fundamental uncertainty than the
    outcome of Saturday's test or future tests. Would a National
    Missile Defense system that is unilaterally deployed conflict
    with a treaty to produce a destabilizing response from other
    countries and increase the threat of proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction? Further, would that response increase the
    possibility that the unimaginable horrors of a nuclear attack
    would be reigned upon us as a result of breaching the treaty?
    Would such a system make the United States, in other words,
    more secure or less secure? Is it worth risking those reactions
    to a unilateral deployment, particularly given the fact that
    we're told by the intelligence community that a ballistic
    missile is the least likely means of delivering a weapon of
    mass destruction and that a truck, a ship, or a suitcase would
    be more reliable, less costly, and have no return address?
    These fundamental policy questions will be the focus of later
    hearings.
        Today we will try to understand the budget request for
    missile defense programs that the administration has presented
    for fiscal year 2002. The administration is proposing a large
    increase for missile defense--a $3 billion or 57 percent
    increase over the current fiscal year--while proposing to
    decrease investments in other critical areas of the defense
    budget, such as procurement, science and technology, and even
    some readiness areas. Secretary Rumsfeld told the committee 2
    weeks ago that the ``taxpayers have a right to demand that we
    spend their money wisely.'' Well, a 57 percent increase is a
    huge amount for any program to absorb and spend wisely and
    efficiently in a single year. The administration proposes to
    spend $8 billion on missile defense in fiscal year 2002 but the
    Pentagon has not provided Congress the details of how it
    intends to spend that $8 billion. General Kadish briefed the
    committee 3 weeks ago on his recommendations to the Secretary
    of Defense. Two weeks ago Secretary Rumsfeld told us that the
    actual details of the R&D budget for missile defense are still
    in a state of flux. The administration's plans for missile
    defense for fiscal year 2002 have been harder to zero in on
    than a target in a missile defense test.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to attempt to get
    specific details on activities proposed in this budget request
    and clear answers to critical questions. Among the questions is
    whether any proposed activities in the administration's fiscal
    year 2002 budget request for missile defense would be in
    conflict with the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. General
    Kadish addressed this very question in a briefing to the
    committee 3 weeks ago. He said that if all of his
    recommendations for missile defense were implemented, there
    would be no conflict with the ABM Treaty in fiscal year 2002.
    We have put the question of possible violations of the treaty
    in fiscal year 2002 to Secretary Rumsfeld twice in recent
    hearings. Secretary Rumsfeld first told the committee 3 weeks
    ago that ``I don't think the 2002 budget is a problem in that
    regard.'' He then told the committee 2 weeks ago that ``we
    don't know for sure.'' On July 2, I sent a letter to Secretary
    Rumsfeld asking the following question: ``Are their any
    activities proposed to be carried out with the funding you are
    requesting for missile defense in fiscal year 2002 that would
    not be in compliance with the ABM Treaty and, if carried out,
    either would cause a violation of the treaty or would cause the
    United States to give notice under the provisions of the treaty
    that we would withdraw from the treaty?'' I've yet to receive
    an answer to my July 2 letter.
        This morning the press reports that the administration has
    informed our allies that our missile defense research and
    development activities will conflict with the ABM Treaty in a
    matter of months, not years. That is exactly the question that
    I've been asking the administration for weeks without getting
    an answer. If press reports are true, Congress will need to
    decide within months whether to fund research and development
    activities that conflict with the ABM Treaty. The consequences
    of such funding and the responsibility that goes with it are
    serious. Secretary Wolfowitz will, I am sure, tell us if the
    reports in the papers are true and that we have informed our
    allies and Russia that ``these tests will come into conflict
    with the ABM Treaty in months, not years.''
        The President alone has the right to withdraw from a
    treaty, but Congress has the heavy responsibility of
    determining whether or not to appropriate the funds for
    activities that conflict with a treaty. Knowing the
    consequences of the budget actions requested of us is
    essential, not just for those who are concerned about whether a
    treaty violation would leave America less secure. It is also
    essential for those who are concerned about the huge 1-year
    increase in funding for missile defense given other pressing
    defense needs.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
    examined the article this morning. I think the only detail that
    I could determine was in the Washington Post and the Secretary
    I think has verified it, that emanated from briefings on
    Capitol Hill yesterday and it's sort of a gathering of
    fragmentary reports that there is not a single press release in
    place. So, I hope we give our witnesses this morning, whom I
    welcome with you, the benefit of the doubt and we should
    hopefully receive the testimony today. I've reviewed Secretary
    Wolfowitz's statement, the complete and accurate statement by
    the administration that was made yesterday. But you and I have
    been engaged here some 23 years in this committee, in all types
    of reviews, of this issue of missile defense and it's been a
    long and arduous uphill climb. In that period of time, we have
    now reached, I think, clarity that all agree on here in the
    United States as well as abroad. There is a threat.
        It is absolutely the duty of any president of the United
    States to step up and prepare our Nation to defend itself
    against this threat. That's precisely what President Bush is
    doing in my judgment. I think that we should as a Congress give
    him the opportunity to, in a statesman-like manner, prepare to
    lead this Nation and hopefully our allies in a course of action
    to defend this country against what we clearly see now are
    actual threats.
        Secretary Wolfowitz in his opening statement refers to the
    attack in the Gulf War where we, the United States, sustained
    the largest number of casualties as a consequence of a SCUD
    attack during that conflict. I, together with Senators Inouye,
    Stevens, and Nunn, were in Tel Aviv one night during the war
    when a SCUD hit Tel Aviv. The following day we went out and saw
    the devastating damage inflicted upon the nation of Israel.
    Although we had our PAC system in there at the time, and I
    think that system was effective to a degree, it was defenseless
    and we as a Nation are just as defenseless 10 years after those
    attacks. Now, the PAC-3 has been upgraded, but there's still a
    growing threat. We accept that and so now I think the President
    has properly outlined what he intends to do. He did that
    initially on May 1, 2001 and I quote him: ``Today the sun comes
    up on a vastly different world. The wall is gone and so is the
    Soviet Union. Today's Russia is not our enemy. Yet this is
    still a dangerous world--a less certain, a less predictable
    one.''
        More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have
    nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons.
    Some already have developed a ballistic missile technology that
    would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long
    distances. We need new concepts of deterrence to rely on both
    offensive and defensive forces. We need a new framework that
    allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different
    threats of today's world. That is simply a responsible
    statement by the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces as he
    is so designated under our Constitution. He is the chief
    architect, not Congress, of foreign policy. Quite true, we have
    the power of the purse. But I plead with my colleagues, let us
    form a partnership with the President to move forward. Let us
    recognize that he has the constitutional responsibility to lead
    and see where and how we can best support him.
        I think it's far too early to get tangled up in the small
    details of the lawyers trying to determine whether this does or
    does not comply with the ABM Treaty. As far as I know, the
    President has made good faith efforts in consultation with our
    allies. He has had preliminary discussions with Russia. This
    system which defends us against only perhaps as many as a dozen
    missiles is not a threat to the awesome--and I repeat,
    awesome--inventory of missiles that Russia has today in an
    operational status. I'm confident that if we, Congress, show
    our support to our President, he will eventually be able to
    work through the consultative process and eventually the
    negotiating process with Russia such that a hopeful new
    framework can be reached to replace the aging 1972 ABM Treaty
    and that we can go forward in such a way as to look at a far
    broader spectrum of technical options to defend this country
    and, in all probability share to some extent that technology
    with our allies and possibly with Russia. Russia should
    recognize that it is also threatened and threatened by systems
    in existence today with shorter ranges whereas our principal
    threat here at home are from the longer range missiles. I
    believe our President will succeed and I just hope that
    Congress will act as a full partner and be supportive to let
    him take the initiatives as the Constitution clearly empowers
    him, and we hopefully will give him that support so that he can
    be successful.
        Now, I will just put the balance of my statement in the
    record.
        [The prepared statement by Senator Warner follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
        Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming our witnesses
    today. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, welcome, and I look
    forward with interest to hearing your testimony.
        The effort to develop and deploy missile defenses that will protect
    our Nation, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed
    overseas, and our allies and friends has been a long and arduous one.
    There have been many setbacks and many interruptions along the way.
    This year, that effort may hang in the balance.
        President Bush has proposed a bold new approach--to depart from the
    past and to restructure the strategic environment. ``We need a new
    framework,'' the President said on May 1 on this year, ``that allows us
    to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's
    world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old
    ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to
    the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from
    addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising
    technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our
    interests or in the interests of world peace.''
        I agree with every word of that. I remain firm in my conviction
    that the deployment of effective missile defenses as soon as
    technologically possible is critical to the security of this nation. We
    have no higher responsibility than to protect our Nation, our troops,
    and our allies from the threats posed by the most lethal military
    weapons ever invented and the missiles which deliver these weapons.
        Today, the international situation is far different than in 1972
    when the ABT Treaty was signed and missile defense for our Nation was
    banned.
        Our treaty partner, the Soviet Union, is no more. Our relationship
    with Russia is still evolving, but clearly we cannot remain mired in
    the notion that our two great nations are implacable enemies. Far from
    a world in which two giants embraced each other in a death grip, today,
    many nations, some of them unstable, unpredictable and hostile to the
    United States, either have or are seeking to acquire ballistic
    missiles, weapons of mass destruction, or both.
        Yet today, despite these greatly changed circumstances in the
    world, our Nation remains completely defenseless against attack by even
    a single ballistic missile. Our friends and allies do not have the
    capability to defend themselves against short, medium, and intermediate
    range ballistic missile threats.
        Many in Congress have long recognized the critical need for missile
    defenses. I was a cosponsor of Cochran bill, which was finally enacted
    into law despite the strong opposition of the Clinton administration.
    That act--which is now the law of the land--states that ``it is the
    policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically
    possible an effective National Missile Defense system. . .'' against
    limited missile attacks. The decision to deploy has been made.
    President Bush has made that decision and Congress has already endorsed
    it. What we are now debating is ``when'' and ``how'' to deploy-not
    ``if.''
        We will today, I believe, hear many of the specifics in the BMDO
    program proposal that will help answer the questions of when and how.
    The lateness with which our committee has received the defense budget
    is a matter of concern, and time is short. I understand that the BMD
    program is intended to provide a flexible path forward. At the same
    time, in our oversight capacity, we need to have a clear sense of
    program content and structure to determine whether the BMDO budget
    proposal will support the goal of deploying effective missile defense
    systems as soon as technologically possible.
        While the BMD program is vitally important, it is bound up in wider
    policy considerations, some of which I have already noted.
    Consequently, part of the path forward must involve continued
    consultation with our allies and Russia. I commend the President for
    reaching out to allies and friends, and to Russia, to build a new
    foundation of security based on openness and trust and to move beyond
    the confines of Cold War relationships.
        To those who would argue that deployment of missile defenses is too
    dangerous and destabilizing I would say this: given American leadership
    a chance. If the United States leads, there is every reason to believe
    that Russia and our allies will respect American determination to move
    forward and work with us to build a safer world. But if congress
    undermines this effort, we will surely cede to others the right to
    dictate American vulnerability and that of our allies to missile
    threats from rogue nations.
        I am looking forward to the discussion with Secretary Wolfowitz
    today about the complex policy issues, ranging from arms control, to
    deterrence policy, to our relationships with Russia, Europe, and our
    Asian friends and allies, that all relate to our efforts to defend our
    homeland, allies, and forces abroad from missile attack. Not all of the
    Department's answers, particularly with respect to the arms control
    implications of the BMDO program about which we will hear today, have
    been entirely clear or consistent. I anticipate that any confusion that
    has been created by this lack of consistency will be addressed today.
        Thank you again, Senator Levin, for your courtesy.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Secretary Wolfowitz.

       STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members
    of the committee, before I get into my testimony I'd like to
    thank you particularly but also the ranking member and the
    entire committee and your hard-working staffs for moving so
    quickly with our nominees. I know you held hearings when you
    weren't even officially organized yet to do so, and I know you
    moved, I think 15 of our nominees to the floor. We desperately
    need them. I hope the full Senate will act with the expedition
    that you did, but I sincerely thank you and everyone who
    participated in that. There are more coming. We need help.
        I also appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on
    this very important subject. General Kadish and I are here to
    try to answer in as much detail as we possibly can your
    questions and your concerns and to describe the program and to
    address those issues that you've raised--very important issues
    about where we are heading with respect to the treaty. But let
    me begin with a broader sketch.
        Imagine, if you will, the following scenario. A rogue state
    with a vastly inferior military but armed with ballistic
    missiles and weapons of mass destruction commits an act of
    aggression against a neighboring country. As President Bush
    sends forces into the theater to respond, the country's
    genocidal dictator threatens our allies and deployed forces
    with a ballistic missile attack. Almost without warning,
    missiles rain down on our troops and pound into densely
    populated residential neighborhoods of allied capitals. Panic
    breaks out. Sirens wail as rescue crews in protective gear
    search the rubble for bodies and rush the injured to hospitals.
    Reporters mumbling through their gas masks attempt to describe
    the destruction as pictures of the carnage are instantaneously
    broadcast around the world.
        Mr. Chairman, that scene is not science fiction. It is not
    a future conflict scenario dreamed up by creative Pentagon
    planners. It is a description of events that took place 10
    years ago during the Persian Gulf War--events that Senator
    Warner personally witnessed in Tel Aviv. I too have a vivid
    recollection of those events. When Saddam Hussein was launching
    SCUD missiles against Israel, I was sent there with Deputy
    Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to help persuade Israel
    not to get drawn further into that war. We saw children walking
    to school carrying gas masks in gaily decorated boxes--no doubt
    to try to distract them from the possibility of facing mass
    destruction. They were awfully young to be thinking about the
    unthinkable. With those missiles, Saddam Hussein terrorized a
    generation of Israeli children and almost succeeded in changing
    the entire strategic course of the Gulf War.
        This year is the tenth anniversary of the first U.S. combat
    casualties from a ballistic missile attack. In the waning days
    of Operation Desert Storm, a single SCUD missile hit a U.S.
    military barrack in Dhahran, killing 28 of our soldiers and
    wounding 99, 13 of them from a single small town in
    Pennsylvania called Greensburg. For American forces, it was the
    worst single engagement of the Gulf War. For 13 families in
    Greensburg, it was the worst day of their lives. Today, 10
    years later, it is appropriate to ask: How much better able are
    we to meet a threat that was already real and serious 10 years
    ago--and has become even more so today? The answer, sadly, is
    not much better.
        Today our capacity to shoot down a SCUD missile is not much
    improved from 1991, when we deployed--as Senator Warner
    correctly recalled--on an emergency basis the PAC-2 missiles to
    Israel and to Saudi Arabia and other countries.
        We are still a year or 2 away from initial deployment of
    the PAC-3, our answer to the SCUD, and let me add, a very
    effective answer, and General Kadish will be talking about that
    technology in a few minutes. But we are still many years from
    full deployment. Today, our forces in the Persian Gulf and
    Korea, and the civilian populations they defend, have almost no
    means of protection against North Korean ballistic missiles
    armed with both chemical and conventional warheads. With no
    defenses, an attack by North Korea could result in tens or even
    hundreds of thousands of casualties.
        Mr. Chairman, we underestimated the ballistic missile
    threat 10 years ago and today, a decade later, we are in danger
    of underestimating it still. The time has come to lift our
    heads from the sand and deal with unpleasant but indisputable
    facts. The short-range missile threat to our friends, our
    allies, and our deployed forces arrived a decade ago. The
    intermediate-range missile threat is here now and the long-
    range threat to American cities is just over the horizon--a
    matter of years, not decades, away--and our people and our
    territory are defenseless. Why? The answer to that last
    question has four letters: A-B-M-T--the ABM Treaty.
        For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously
    the challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have
    not adequately funded it. We have not believed in it, and we
    have given the ABM Treaty priority over it. That is not how
    this country behaves when we are serious about a problem. It's
    not how we put a man on the moon in 10 years. It's not how we
    developed the Polaris program or intercontinental ballistic
    missiles in even less time. The time to get serious is long
    past. The number of countries pursuing nuclear, chemical, and
    biological weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing
    advanced conventional weapons and ballistic missiles is
    growing.
        Consider these facts. In 1972, we knew of only five
    countries that had nuclear weapons. Today, we know of 12 with
    nuclear weapons programs. In 1972, we knew of a total of nine
    countries that had ballistic missiles. Today, we know of 28. In
    just the last 5 years, more than 1,000 of those missiles of all
    ranges have been produced. Those are just the cases that we
    know of. There are dangerous capabilities being developed at
    this very moment that we do not know about and which we may not
    know about for years--perhaps only after they are deployed. For
    example, in 1998 North Korea surprised the world with its
    launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan with a previously
    unknown and unanticipated third stage. The intelligence
    community tells us that this launch demonstrated a North Korean
    capability to deliver a small payload to the United States.
    North Korea is now developing the Taepo Dong 2 missile, which
    will be able to strike even deeper into U.S. territory and
    carry an even larger weapons payload. If we do not build
    defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers will soon
    have, or may already have, the ability to strike U.S. and
    allied cities with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
    They might not even have to use the weapons in their possession
    to affect our behavior and achieve their ends.
        While we have been debating the existence of the threat for
    nearly a decade, other countries have been busily acquiring,
    developing, and proliferating missile technology. We can afford
    to debate the threat no longer. We are in a race against time
    and we are starting behind. Thanks in no small part to the
    constraints of the ABM Treaty, we have wasted the better part
    of a decade. We cannot afford to waste another one.
        President Bush has declared his intention to develop and
    deploy defenses capable of protecting the American people, our
    friends, our allies, and forces around the world from limited
    ballistic missile attack. The 2002 amended budget requests $8.3
    billion for missile defense.
        We have designed a program to develop and deploy as soon as
    is appropriate, and General Kadish will be describing it in
    more detail. Developing a proper layered defense will take
    time. It requires aggressive exploration of key technologies,
    particularly those that have been constrained in the past by
    the ABM Treaty. So, we plan to build it incrementally,
    deploying capabilities as the technology is proven ready, and
    then adding new ones over time as they become mature.
        We have not yet chosen a systems architecture to deploy. We
    are not in a position to do so because so many promising
    technologies were not pursued in the past.
        In order to accelerate the program, we must first broaden
    the search for effective technologies before we can move
    forward toward deployment. We must dust off technologies that
    were shelved, consider new ones, and bring them all into the
    development and testing process. To do this we have designed a
    flexible and strengthened research, development, testing, and
    evaluation (RDT&E) program to examine the widest possible range
    of promising technologies and basing modes, including land,
    air, sea, and space-based capabilities that had previously been
    disregarded or inadequately explored.
        Notwithstanding the delays of the past decade, the
    capability to defend America is within our grasp. A great deal
    of work was done. The technology of 2001 is not the technology
    of 1981, or, for that matter, 1991.
        Today, ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem of
    invention. It is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge
    we are up to and General Kadish will describe in a few minutes
    how to go about it. Before he does, Mr. Chairman, let me
    address the very important questions about the ABM Treaty and
    try as best as I can to answer your very pertinent questions.
        Our program is designed to develop, as I said, the most
    capable possible defense for our country, our allies, and our
    deployed forces at the earliest feasible time. That means it
    must at some point, and increasingly over time, encounter the
    constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We will not conduct
    tests solely for the purpose of exceeding the constraints of
    the treaty, but neither have we designed our program to avoid
    doing so.
        However, this administration does not intend to violate the
    ABM Treaty. We intend to move beyond it. We are working to do
    so on two parallel tracks: First, we are pursuing the
    accelerated research, development, and testing program that I
    have described. Second, we are engaged in discussions with
    Russia on a new security framework--one that would reflect the
    fact that the Cold War is long over and that the U.S. and
    Russia are not enemies. We are moving forward on both of these
    tracks simultaneously, and we feel the prospects for success in
    both cases are promising.
        Mr. Chairman, we have begun a dialogue with Russia on how
    to build a new security relationship, one whose foundation does
    not rest on the prospect of the mutual annihilation of our
    respective populations that was the basis of the old U.S.-
    Soviet relationship. That is not a healthy basis for U.S.-
    Russian relations in the 21st century.
        On his recent visit to Europe, President Bush had good
    discussions with President Putin, and Secretary Rumsfeld had an
    unexpectedly productive dialogue at NATO last month with
    Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Indeed, after their
    meeting, Minister Ivanov declared his agreement with Secretary
    Rumsfeld, and I'm quoting from the Russian Defense Minister,
    ``there are not only more threats facing us now in the 21st
    century, but they are multifaceted--much more so than in the
    past.''
        Our discussions with Russia are ongoing, and we have no
    reason to believe they will fail. The question of whether we
    will violate the ABM Treaty in 2002 presumes they will fail.
    But there is no reason to assume that and if we succeed, the
    ABM Treaty will no longer be an obstacle to protecting the
    American people, our allies, or our deployed forces from a
    ballistic missile attack.
        We hope and expect to have reached an understanding with
    Russia by the time our development program bumps up against the
    constraints of the treaty. We would prefer a cooperative
    outcome, and we are optimistic that such an outcome is
    possible. But we must achieve release from the constraints of
    the treaty.
        If we all agree that a cooperative outcome is the
    preferable one, I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that it is
    important also for Congress to demonstrate the same resolve as
    President Bush that we are going to proceed with development of
    defenses to protect our people, our friends and allies, and our
    forces around the world--defenses that cannot, by the wildest
    stretch of the imagination, be considered a threat to Russia or
    to Russia's broader interests. Conversely, if we give Russia
    the mistaken impression that, by insisting on adherence to the
    ABM Treaty, they can exercise a veto over our development of
    missile defenses, the unintended consequence could be to rule
    out, and certainly make a cooperative solution more difficult
    and perhaps leave the President no choice but to withdraw from
    the treaty unilaterally.
        As I stated earlier, as the program develops and the
    various testing activities mature, one or more of those will
    inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions and limitations.
    Such an event is likely to occur in months rather than in
    years.
        Mr. Chairman, this is the reason it has been difficult and
    remains still somewhat difficult to answer your questions with
    precision, but we're trying today to get as much precision as
    we possibly can. It is not possible to know with certainty
    whether that will occur in the coming year. This uncertainty is
    in part the result of the inevitable uncertainty of all
    research and development programs. You learn from your tests.
    You proceed from your tests. Your program gets altered
    depending on the results of your test. But the uncertainty also
    reflects legal uncertainties. Many of the early issues that we
    will encounter inevitably involve legal complexities; legal
    ambiguities. These we will fully resolve through the treaty
    Compliance Review Group and the established procedure for
    addressing those issues.
        In the interest, Mr. Chairman, of trying to give you more
    precision about where we see those issues coming in the next
    fiscal year, let me give you what I believe are the most
    important examples.
        For example, the test bed currently scheduled to begin
    construction in April 2002 is designed to permit the testing of
    a ground-based midcourse capability under realistic operational
    conditions. There will also be opportunities, while we are
    testing the Aegis midcourse system, to test the ability of
    Aegis ship-based radars to track long-range ballistic missiles
    and there will also be opportunities in the coming fiscal year,
    if the program proceeds as planned, to combine the data from
    radars used in midcourse tests with the radars used to track
    short-range missiles. Will these tests exceed the limits of the
    treaty? In each case, you will be able to find lawyers who can
    argue on all three sides of the coin, but we have an
    established system for resolving these difficult issues and
    what I can tell you is this: by the time a planned development
    activity encounters ABM Treaty constraints, we fully hope and
    intend to have reached an understanding with Russia. We would
    expect to identify any such issue 6 months in advance of its
    occurrence. At that point, we will either have reached an
    understanding with Russia, in which case the question would be
    moot, or we would be left with two far from optimal choices:
    either to allow an obsolete treaty to prevent us from doing
    everything we can to defend America, or to withdraw from the
    treaty unilaterally, which we have every legal right to do.
        However, even in the latter circumstance, we should
    continue our efforts to reach an understanding with Russia. But
    our goal is to reach an understanding with Russia well before
    that time. Such an understanding is in both countries'
    interest. The end of the Cold War has fundamentally transformed
    our relationship. We ask for your support as we continue to
    work towards that cooperative solution. I can assure you that
    the President will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to
    conduct the proper notifications as we go forward.
        Let me conclude with a few words about the new deterrence
    framework. We are optimistic about the prospects of reaching an
    understanding with Russia because the Cold War is over. The
    Soviet Union is gone. Russia is not our enemy. We are no longer
    locked in a posture of Cold War ideological antagonism. Yet,
    the ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War relationship that is no
    longer relevant in the 21st century.
        The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that--
    defenses. They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter
    those who would threaten us or our friends with a ballistic
    missile attack. Russia is not such a country. Americans do not
    lie awake at night worrying about a massive Russian first
    strike, the way they worried about a Soviet first strike during
    the Cold War.
        Our missile defenses will be of no threat to Russia. Their
    purpose will be to protect against limited missile attacks that
    are now possible from an increasing number of sources--but not
    conceivably against the thousands of missiles in Russia's
    arsenal. Further, they will be just one part of a larger 21st
    century deterrence framework.
        Just as we intend to build layered defenses to deal with
    missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of
    layered deterrence which can deter and dissuade a variety of
    emerging threats at different stages. Just as America's
    overwhelming naval power discourages adversaries from investing
    in competing navies, we should develop capabilities that, by
    their very existence, discourage adversaries from investing in
    other hostile capabilities. Missile defense is one example
    where we hope to achieve exactly that. It has received
    significant attention because it is new--but it is just one
    element of a new deterrence framework that includes several
    mutually-reinforcing layers of deterrence, including diplomacy,
    arms control, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and
    smaller but effective offensive nuclear forces.
        Having said what the program aims to do, let me say,
    briefly, what the program is not. It is not an effort to build
    an impenetrable shield around the United States. This is not
    Star Wars. We have a much more limited objective to deploy
    effective defenses against limited missile attack. It is not a
    threat to anyone and will be a problem only for those states
    that wish to threaten our people, our allies, or our deployed
    forces with ballistic missiles.
        Very importantly, Mr. Chairman, it will not undermine arms
    control or spark an arms race. If anything, I believe building
    effective defenses will reduce the value of ballistic missiles
    and remove incentives for their development and proliferation.
    Since they will have virtually no effect on Russia's
    capabilities, there is no incentive for Russia to spend scarce
    resources to try to overcome them. China is already engaged in
    a rapid modernization of its missile capabilities, and will
    continue this modernization whether or not we build defenses.
    But, in fact, both the Russians and the Chinese, and I think
    this is very important, will be able to see that we are
    reducing our offensive nuclear forces substantially and there
    is no need for them to build up theirs. In this budget proposal
    alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident, and B-1 reductions, we will
    be reducing START-countable warheads by well over a thousand.
    We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what Russia
    decides to do, but we believe it is in their best interest, and
    we think sooner rather than later, they will recognize that it
    is in their best interest to follow the same path.
        This is not a ``scarecrow'' defense. We intend to build and
    deploy defenses that will grow more and more effective over
    time. The more capable, the better. But defenses don't have to
    be perfect to save lives and reduce casualties. No defense is
    100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions we spend on
    counterterrorism, and should be spending on counterterrorism,
    we did not stop terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers or on
    our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or on the World Trade
    Center. Yet no one would suggest that we stop spending money on
    counterterrorism because we have no perfect defense. Moreover,
    defenses don't need to be 100 percent effective to make a
    significant contribution to deterrence.
        I've heard some astronomical figures attached to this
    program, Mr. Chairman. But we are not planning to spend
    hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. The money we
    propose to spend is comparable to other major defense
    development programs, and comparable to other elements of our
    security strategy. We are proposing $8.3 billion for missile
    defense in 2002. That is still a large amount, but the
    consequences of failure could be larger still.
        Finally, I do not believe it diverts attention and
    resources from other more pressing threats. Some have argued
    that we should not spend any money on missile defense, because
    the real threat comes from terrorists using suitcase bombs.
    There is no question that terrorist threat is a real one, and
    we should be addressing it. But we shouldn't lock our front
    door because a burglar might break through the window. We
    should address both problems.
        As we move forward with accelerated testing and
    development, there are going to be test failures. There isn't a
    single major technological development in human history that
    didn't proceed with a process of trial and error, including
    many of our most successful weapons systems.
        Let me just mention six. The Corona satellite program,
    which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites,
    suffered 11 straight test failures at the beginning of the
    program. The Thor Able and Thor Agena launch programs failed
    four out of five times. The Atlas Agena failed five out of
    eight times. The Scout launches failed four out of six times.
    The Vanguard program failed 11 of its first 14 tries. The
    Polaris failed in 66 out of 123 test flights. Yet, from these
    failures and from the successes came some of the most effective
    capabilities we have ever fielded. Failure is how we learn. If
    a program never suffers test failures, it probably means we're
    not pushing the envelope hard enough.
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began. This threat is
    not fictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. It won't
    disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears. This
    is not a partisan issue. We do not know whether the President
    who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of striking
    Los Angeles, Detroit, or New York with nuclear, chemical, or
    biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat. But we
    do know that individual will be an American. That is how we
    must proceed--not as Republicans or Democrats, but as
    Americans. Let future generations who look back at this period
    see statesmen who rose above party lines to make sure that
    America and its allies and its deployed forces were protected
    against this real emerging threat.
        Thank you very much for your attention.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz
                                  introduction
        Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the committee, thank you
    for this opportunity to testify on the administration's 2002 budget
    request for Ballistic Missile Defense.
        Imagine, if you will, the following scenario: A rogue state with a
    vastly inferior military, but armed with ballistic missiles and weapons
    of mass destruction, commits an act of aggression against a neighboring
    country. As President Bush sends U.S. forces into theater to respond,
    the country's genocidal dictator threatens our allies and deployed
    forces with a ballistic missile attack. Suddenly, almost without
    warning, missiles rain down on our troops, and pound into the densely
    populated residential neighborhoods of allied capitals. Panic breaks
    out. Sirens wail, as rescue crews in protective gear race to search the
    rubble for bodies and rush the injured to hospitals. Reporters,
    mumbling through their gas masks, attempt to describe the destruction,
    as pictures of the carnage are instantaneously broadcast across the
    world.
        Mr. Chairman, the scene I have described is not science fiction. It
    is not a future conflict scenario dreamed up by creative Pentagon
    planners. It is a description of events that took place 10 years ago--
    during the Persian Gulf War.
        I have a particularly vivid recollection of those events. When
    Saddam Hussein was launching SCUD missiles against Israel, I was sent
    there with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to help
    persuade Israel not to get drawn further into the war, as Saddam
    Hussein was seeking to do. We saw children walking to school carrying
    gas masks in gaily decorated boxes--no doubt to try to distract them
    from the possibility of facing mass destruction. They were awfully
    young to have to think about the unthinkable. With those missiles,
    Saddam Hussein terrorized a generation of Israeli children, and almost
    succeeded in changing the entire strategic course of the Gulf War.
        This year marks the 10th anniversary of the first U.S. combat
    casualties from a ballistic missile attack. In the waning days of
    Desert Storm, a single SCUD missile hit a U.S. military barracks in
    Dhahran, killing 28 of our soldiers and wounding 99. Thirteen of those
    killed came from a single small town in Pennsylvania called Greensburg.
    For American forces, it was the single worst engagement of the Gulf
    War. For 13 families in Greensburg, it was the single worst day of
    their lives.
        Today, 10 years later, it is appropriate to ask how much better
    able are we to meet a threat that was already real and serious 10 years
    ago--and has become even more so today? The answer, sadly, is hardly
    any better. Despite this tragic experience, here we are, a decade
    later, still virtually not yet able to defend against ballistic missile
    attacks, even from relatively primitive SCUD ballistic missiles.
        Today, our capacity to shoot down a SCUD missile is not much
    improved from 1991. We are still a year or 2 away from initial
    deployment of the PAC-3--our answer to the SCUD, and an effective one--
    and many years from full deployment. Today our forces in the Persian
    Gulf and Korea--and the civilian populations they defend--have almost
    no means of protection against North Korean ballistic missiles armed
    with both chemical and conventional warheads. With no missile defenses,
    an attack by North Korea could result in tens or even hundreds of
    thousands of casualties.
        To those who wonder why so many of the regimes hostile to the
    United States--many of them desperately poor--are investing such
    enormous sums of money to acquire ballistic missiles, I suggest this
    possible answer: They know we don't have any defenses.
        It cannot have escaped their notice that the only weapons that
    really permitted Saddam Hussein to make American forces bleed during
    the Gulf War--the only weapons that allowed him to take the war into
    the territory of his adversaries and murder innocent women and
    children--were ballistic missiles.
        We underestimated the ballistic missile threat 10 years ago--and
    today, a decade later, we are underestimating it still.
        Mr. Chairman, the time has come to lift our heads from the sand and
    deal with some unpleasant but indisputable facts: The short-range
    missile threat to our friends, allies, and deployed forces arrived a
    decade ago; the intermediate-range missile threat is now here; and the
    long-range threat to American cities is just over the horizon--a matter
    of years, not decades, away--and our people and territory are
    defenseless.
        Why? The answer has four letters: A-B-M-T.
        For the past decade, our government has not taken seriously the
    challenge of developing defenses against missiles. We have not
    adequately funded it, we have not believed in it, and we have given the
    ABM Treaty priority over it. That is not how America behaves when we
    are serious about a problem. It is not how we put a man on the moon in
    just 10 years. It is not how we developed the Polaris program or
    intercontinental ballistic missiles in even less time.
        The time to get serious is long past. Today, the number of
    countries pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is growing.
    The number of countries pursuing advanced conventional weapons is
    growing. The number of countries pursuing ballistic missile technology
    is growing. The number of missiles on the face of the earth is growing.
        Consider these facts:

             In 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed, the number of
            countries pursuing biological weapons was unknown; today there
            are at least 13;
             In 1972, 10 countries had known chemical weapons
            programs; today there are 16 (4 countries ended theirs, but 10
            more jumped in to replace them);
             In 1972, we knew of only 5 countries that had nuclear
            weapons programs; today we know of 12;
             In 1972, we knew of a total of 9 countries that had
            ballistic missiles; today we know of 28, and in just the last 5
            years more than 1,000 missiles of all ranges have been
            produced; and
             Those are only the cases that we know of. There are
            dangerous capabilities being developed at this very moment that
            we do not know about, and which we may not know about for
            years--perhaps only after they are deployed.

        For example, in 1998 North Korea surprised the world with its
    launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile over Japan, with a previously unknown
    third stage. The intelligence community tells us this launch
    demonstrated a North Korean capability to deliver a small payload to
    the United States. North Korea is currently developing the Taepo Dong 2
    missile, which will be able to strike even deeper into U.S. territory
    and carry an even larger weapons payload.
        Other unfriendly regimes, like Iran, Syria, and Libya, are also
    developing missiles of increasing range and sophistication. A number of
    these countries are less than 5 years away from being able to deploy
    such capabilities. These regimes are collaborating with each other,
    sharing technology and know-how.
        The countries pursuing these capabilities are doing so because they
    believe they will enhance their power and influence; because they
    believe that if they can hold the American people at risk, they can
    prevent us from projecting force to stop acts of aggression, and deter
    us from defending our interests around the world.
        If we do not build defenses against these weapons now, hostile
    powers will soon have--or may already have--the ability to strike U.S.
    and allied cities with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. They
    will have the power to hold our people hostage to blackmail and terror.
    They may secure, in their estimation, the capability to prevent us from
    forming international coalitions to challenge their acts of aggression
    and force us into a truly isolationist posture. They would not even
    have to use the weapons in their possession to affect our behavior and
    achieve their ends.
        But we cannot be sure they would not use these weapons in a crisis.
    If Saddam Hussein had the ability to strike a Western capital with a
    nuclear weapon, would he really be deterred by the prospect of a U.S.
    nuclear strike that would kill millions of Iraqis? Is he that concerned
    about his people? Would we really want our only option in such a crisis
    to be destroying Baghdad and its people? A policy of intentional
    vulnerability is not a strategy to deal with the dangers of this new
    century.
        While we have been debating the existence of the threat for nearly
    a decade, other countries have been busily acquiring, developing and
    proliferating missile technology. We can afford to debate the threat no
    longer. We are in a race against time--and we are starting from behind.
    Thanks in no small part to the constraints of the antiquated ABM
    Treaty, we have wasted the better part of a decade. We cannot afford to
    waste another one.
                            development and testing
        President Bush has declared his intention to develop and deploy
    defenses capable of protecting the American people, our friends, allies
    and forces around the world from limited ballistic missile attack. The
    2002 amended budget requests $8.3 billion for missile defense.
        We intend to develop defenses, capable of defending against limited
    missile attacks from a rogue state or from an accidental or
    unauthorized launch. We intend to develop layered defenses, capable of
    intercepting missiles of any range at every stage of flight--boost,
    midcourse, and terminal.
        We have designed a program to develop and deploy as soon as is
    appropriate. Developing a proper layered defense will take time. It
    requires more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly
    those that have been constrained by the ABM Treaty. So we plan to build
    incrementally, deploying capabilities as the technology is proven
    ready, and then adding new capabilities over time as they become
    mature.
        We have designed the program so that, in an emergency, we might, if
    appropriate, deploy test assets to defend against a rapidly emerging
    threat. This has been done a number of times before with other military
    capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. But barring such an
    emergency, we need to consider the operational deployment of test
    assets very carefully--because such deployments can be disruptive, and
    can set back normal development programs.
        However, we have not yet chosen a systems architecture to deploy.
    We are not in a position to do so because so many promising
    technologies were not pursued in the past. The program we inherited was
    designed not for maximum effectiveness, but to remain within the
    constraints of the ABM Treaty. As a result, development and testing
    programs for defense against long-range threats were limited to ground-
    based components--ignoring air, sea and space-based capabilities with
    enormous potential.
        In order to accelerate the program, we must first broaden the
    search for effective technologies before we can move forward toward
    deployment. We must dust off technologies that were shelved, consider
    new ones, and bring them all into the development and testing process.
        To do this, we have designed a flexible and strengthened research,
    development, testing and evaluation program to examine the widest
    possible range of promising technologies, of which there are many. We
    will expand our program to add tests of technologies and basing modes,
    including land, air, sea, and space-based capabilities that had been
    previously disregarded or inadequately explored.
        Notwithstanding the delays of the past decade, the capability to
    defend America is within our grasp. The technology of 2001 is not the
    technology of 1981, or, for that matter, 1991--the year we suffered our
    first losses to a ballistic missile attack by a rogue state.
        Today, ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem of
    invention--it is a challenge of engineering. It is a challenge we are
    up to.
                                   abm treaty
        Our program is designed to develop the most capable possible
    defense for our country, our allies and our deployed forces at the
    earliest feasible time. That means it will at some point--and
    increasingly over time--encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM
    Treaty. We will not conduct tests solely for the purpose of exceeding
    the constraints of treaty--but neither will we design our program to
    avoid doing so.
        However, this administration does not intend to violate the ABM
    Treaty; we intend to move beyond it. We are working to do so on two
    parallel tracks: First, we are pursuing the accelerated research,
    development and testing program I have described. Second, we are
    engaged in discussions with Russia on a new security framework that
    reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and
    Russia are not enemies. We are moving forward on both of these tracks
    simultaneously, and we feel the prospects for success in both cases are
    promising.
        We have begun a dialogue with Russia on how we can build a new
    security relationship whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of
    the mutual annihilation of our respective populations that was the
    basis of the old U.S.-Soviet relations. That is not a healthy basis for
    U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century.
        On his recent visit to Europe, President Bush had a good discussion
    with President Putin, and Secretary Rumsfeld had a productive dialogue
    at NATO last month with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Indeed,
    after their meeting, Minister Ivanov declared his agreement with
    Secretary Rumsfeld that ``there are not only more threats facing us now
    in the 21st century, but they are multifaceted, much more so than they
    were in the past.''
        Our discussions with Russia are ongoing, and we have no reason to
    believe that they will fail. The question of whether we will violate
    the ABM Treaty in 2002 presumes they will fail. But there is no reason
    to assume we will fail; and if we succeed, the ABM Treaty will no
    longer be an obstacle to protecting the American people, our allies and
    deployed forces from ballistic missile attack.
        We hope and expect to have reached an understanding with Russia by
    the time our development program bumps up against the constraints of
    the ABM Treaty. But President Bush has also made clear that a 30-year-
    old treaty designed to preserve the nuclear balance of terror during
    the Cold War must not be allowed to prevent us from taking steps to
    protect our people, our forces, and our allies. We would prefer a
    cooperative outcome, and we are optimistic that such an outcome is
    possible. But we must achieve release from the constraints of the ABM
    Treaty.
        If we all agree that a cooperative outcome is preferable, then it
    is important that Congress demonstrate the same resolve as the
    President to proceed with development of defenses to protect our
    people, our friends and allies, and our forces around the world--
    defenses that cannot, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, be
    considered a threat to Russia or its security.
        If, conversely, we give Russia the mistaken impression that, by
    insisting on adherence to the ABM Treaty, they can exercise a veto over
    our development of missile defenses, the unintended consequence could
    be to rule out a cooperative solution and leave the President no choice
    but to walk away from the treaty unilaterally.
        As I stated earlier, the current planned testing program is not
    designed with the constraints of the ABM Treaty in mind; neither has it
    been designed for the purpose of exceeding those constraints. However,
    as the program develops and the various testing activities mature, one
    or more aspects will inevitably bump up against treaty restrictions and
    limitations. Such an event is likely to occur in months rather than in
    years. It is not possible to know with certainty whether it will occur
    in the coming year. This uncertainty is in part the result of
    inevitable uncertainty of all research and development programs. Many
    of the early issues will involve legal complexities, which we will
    fully resolve through the treaty Compliance Review Group.
        For example, the test bed currently scheduled to begin construction
    in April 2002 is designed to permit the testing of a ground-based
    midcourse capability under realistic operational conditions. There will
    also be opportunities, while we are testing the Aegis midcourse system,
    to test the ability of Aegis ship-based radars to track long-range
    ballistic missiles. There will also be opportunities to combine the
    data from radars used in midcourse tests with the radars used to track
    short-range missiles. Will these tests exceed the limits of the treaty?
    In each case, there will be those who argue on all three sides of the
    coin. We have an established system for resolving these difficult
    issues.
        What I can tell you is this: by the time a planned development
    activity encounters ABM Treaty constraints, we fully hope and intend to
    have reached an understanding with Russia. We would expect to identify
    such issues 6 months in advance. We will either have reached an
    understanding with Russia, in which case the question would be moot, or
    we would be left with two less than optimal choices: to allow an
    obsolete treaty to prevent us from defending America, or to withdraw
    from the treaty unilaterally, which we have every legal right to do.
        However, even in the latter circumstance, we should continue our
    efforts to reach an understanding with Russia. But our goal is to reach
    an understanding with Russia well before that time. Such an
    understanding is in both countries' interests. The end of the Cold War
    has fundamentally transformed our relationship. We ask for your support
    as we continue to work towards a cooperative solution. I can assure you
    that the President will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to
    conduct the proper notifications as we go forward.
                            new deterrence framework
        We are optimistic about the prospects of reaching an understanding
    with Russia, because reaching a new security framework is in both of
    our nations' interests. The Cold War is over. The Soviet Union is gone.
    Russia is not our enemy. We are no longer locked in a posture of Cold
    War ideological antagonism. Yet the ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War
    relationship that is no longer relevant to the 21st century.
        The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that--defenses.
    They will threaten no one. They will, however, deter those who would
    threaten us with ballistic missile attack. We do not consider Russia
    such a country. Americans do not lie awake at night worrying about a
    massive Russian first strike, the way they worried about a Soviet first
    strike during the Cold War.
        Our missile defenses will be no threat to Russia. Their purpose
    will be to protect against limited missile attacks from an increasing
    number of possible sources--but not against the thousand of missiles in
    Russia's arsenal.
        Further, they will be just one part of the larger, 21st century
    deterrence framework we are working to build. During the Cold War, our
    aim was to deter one adversary from using an arsenal of existing
    weapons against us. In the 21st century, our challenge is not only to
    deter multiple potential adversaries from using existing weapons, but
    to dissuade them from developing dangerous new capabilities in the
    first place.
        This requires a different approach to deterrence. Just as we intend
    to build ``layered defenses'' to deal with missile threats at different
    stages, we also need a strategy of ``layered deterrence'' in which we
    develop a mix of capabilities--both offensive and defensive--which can
    deter and dissuade a variety of emerging threats at different stages.
        Such a strategy would aim to dissuade countries from pursuing
    dangerous capabilities in the first place, by developing and deploying
    U.S. capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete; to
    discourage them from investing further in existing dangerous
    capabilities that have emerged, but are not yet a significant threat;
    and to deter them from using dangerous capabilities once they have
    emerged to threaten us all, with the threat of devastating response.
        Just as America's overwhelming naval power discourages potential
    adversaries from investing in building competing navies to threaten
    freedom of the seas--because, in the end, they would spend a fortune
    and not accomplish their strategic objectives--we should develop a
    range of new capabilities that, by their very existence, dissuade and
    discourage potential adversaries from investing in other hostile
    capabilities.
        Missile defense is one example. It has received significant
    attention because it is new--but it is just one element of a new
    deterrence framework that includes several mutually-reinforcing layers
    of deterrence, including diplomacy, arms control, counterterrorism,
    counterproliferation and smaller but effective offensive nuclear
    forces.
                            what the program is not
        We have discussed what the program is; we must also discuss what
    the program is not.

             It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield
            around the United States. This is not Star Wars. We have a much
            more limited objective to deploy effective defenses against
            limited missile attack. Indeed the change in the threat--from
            the thousands of missiles in the Soviet arsenal to handfuls of
            limited missile attacks--makes deployment of effective defenses
            more realistic than ever before.
             It is not a threat to anyone, and will be a problem
            only for those rogue states that wish to threaten our people,
            our allies or our deployed forces, with ballistic missile
            attacks.
             It will not undermine arms control or spark an arms
            race. If anything, building effective defenses will reduce the
            value of ballistic missiles, and thus remove incentives for
            their development and proliferation. Since they will have
            virtually no effect on Russia's capabilities, there is no
            incentive for Russia to spend scarce resources to try to
            overcome them. China is already engaged in a rapid
            modernization of its missile capabilities, and will continue
            this modernization whether or not we build missile defenses. To
            the contrary, the Russians and the Chinese will be able to see
            that we are reducing our offensive nuclear forces substantially
            and there is no need for them to build up theirs. In this
            budget proposal alone, with Peacekeeper, Trident, and B-1
            reductions, we will be reducing START-countable warheads by
            over 1,000. We plan to reduce our nuclear forces no matter what
            Russia decides to do, but we believe it is in their best
            interest to follow the same path.
             It is not a ``scarecrow'' defense. We intend to build
            and deploy effective defenses at the earliest possible moment.
            Those defenses will grow more and more effective over time, as
            we deploy an increasingly sophisticated mix of capabilities
            that provide ``layered defenses'' against all ranges of
            missiles at all stages of flight. The more capable the better,
            but the defenses don't have to be perfect to save lives and
            reduce casualties. As imperfect as the PAC-2 system was during
            the Gulf War, there wasn't a single ally or commander who
            didn't clamor for more.
              Will our defenses be 100 percent effective? Mr. Chairman, no
            defense is 100 percent effective. Notwithstanding the billions
            we spend on counterterrorism, we failed to stop terrorist
            attacks on the Khobar Towers, our embassies in Kenya and
            Tanzania, or the World Trade Center. Yet I know of no one who
            has suggested that we stop spending money on counterterrorism
            because we have no perfect defense. Moreover, defenses won't
            need to be 100 percent effective to make a significant
            contribution to deterrence.
             It will not cost the taxpayers hundreds of billions of
            dollars. The money we propose to spend on missile defense is
            comparable to other major defense development programs, and
            comparable to other elements of our security strategy. We are
            proposing $8.3 billion for missile defense in 2002. That is
            still a large amount, but the consequences of the failure could
            be enormous.
             It does not divert attention and resources from other,
            more pressing threats. Some have argued that we should not
            spend money on missile defense, because the real threat comes
            from terrorists using suitcase bombs. That is like arguing that
            you should not lock your front door because a burglar can break
            in through your window. Both threats are real--but for the last
            decade, work on countering the terrorist threat has proceeded
            aggressively, while work on ballistic missile defense has been
            hamstrung by an obsolete theory. We are correcting that.

        As we move forward with accelerated testing and development, Mr.
    Chairman, there will certainly be bumps along the way. We expect there
    to be test failures. There is not a single major technological
    development in human history that did not begin with a process of trial
    and error and many of our most successful weapons developments have
    been marked by testing failures:

             The Corona satellite program, which produced the first
            overhead reconnaissance satellites, suffered 11 straight test
            failures.
             The Thor Able and Thor Agena launch programs failed 4
            out of 5 times.
             The Atlas Agena launches failed 5 out of 8 times.
             The Scout launches failed 4 out of 6 times.
             The Vanguard program failed 11 of its first 14 tries.
             The Polaris failed in 66 out of 123 flights.

        Mr. Chairman, from these failures came some of the most effective
    capabilities ever fielded. Failure is how we learn. If a program never
    suffers test failures, it means someone is not taking enough risks and
    pushing the envelope. Intelligent risk taking is critical to any
    advanced development program--and it will be critical to the
    development of effective ballistic missile defenses.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude where I began. This threat is not
    fictional. It is not limited. It is not remote. It is not going to
    disappear if one or another troublesome regime disappears.

             If there were a war in Korea tomorrow, our best
            intelligence estimates are that North Korean missiles would
            wreak havoc on population centers and our deployed forces in
            South Korea, even if armed only with conventional weapons, and
            North Korea now poses a significant threat to Japan as well.
             We know that it is a matter of time before Iran
            develops nuclear weapons, and may soon have the capacity to
            strike Israel and some NATO allies.

        Think about what kind of hearings we would be having 3 or 4 years
    from now if Iran demonstrates intermediate-range capability to strike
    Israel or U.S. troops deployed in the Gulf--or if North Korea
    demonstrates the capability to strike the U.S. with long-range nuclear
    missiles. I, for one, don't want to have to come before this committee
    and explain why we ignored the coming threat, and didn't do everything
    we could to meet it.
        This is not a partisan issue. We do not now know whether the
    President who first faces a crisis with a rogue state capable of
    striking Los Angeles, Detroit or New York with nuclear, chemical or
    biological weapons will be a Republican or a Democrat. But we do know
    that individual will be an American. That is how we too must proceed--
    not as Republicans, or Democrats, but as Americans.
        Let future generations who look back at this period not see
    partisan bickering, but statesmen who rose above party lines to make
    sure America and its allies and deployed forces were protected against
    this real emerging threat.
        Thank you very much.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Wolfowitz.
        General Kadish.

        STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR,
                 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

        General Kadish. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee. It's a pleasure to appear before you today and to
    present the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2002 Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) program and budget. To allow more time
    for your questions, I request that the prepared statement that
    I forwarded to the committee be entered into the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        General Kadish. The fundamental objective of the BMD
    program is to develop the capability to defend the forces and
    territories of the United States, its allies, and friends from
    all classes of ballistic missiles. The Department will develop
    and deploy promising technologies and concepts in order to
    build and sustain an effective, reliable, and affordable
    missile defense system. The research, development, test, and
    evaluation (RDT&E) program is designed to enhance system
    effectiveness over time by developing layered defenses that
    employ complementary sensors and weapons to engage threats in
    the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight and to
    deploy that capability incrementally.
        At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have
    developed a research, development, and test program that
    focuses on missile defense as a single integrated ballistic
    missile defense, no longer differentiating between theater and
    National Missile Defense. This revised structure involves three
    basic thrusts. First, the new Ballistic Missile Defense program
    will build on the technical progress we have made to date by
    providing the funding required to develop and test elements of
    the previous program.
        Second, the new program will pursue a broad range of
    activities in order to aggressively evaluate and develop
    technologies for the integration of land, sea, air, or space-
    based platforms to counter ballistic missiles in all phases of
    their flight. The new program will not cut corners. Rather, it
    is designed to pursue a parallel development path to improve
    the likelihood of achieving an effective, layered missile
    defense.
        Third, the new testing program will incorporate a larger
    number of tests than in the past. They will employ more
    realistic scenarios and countermeasures. This will allow us to
    achieve greater confidence in our planning and development.
    Through this robust testing, we may discover opportunities to
    accelerate elements of the program based on their performance
    and increase the overall capability and credibility of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System. This approach is designed to
    enable contingency use of the demonstrated ballistic missile
    defense capabilities if directed.
        The goal of the BMD System is a layered defense that
    provides multiple engagement opportunities along the entire
    flight path of a ballistic missile. Over the next 3 to 5 years,
    we will pursue parallel technical paths to reduce schedule and
    cost risk in the individual RDT&E efforts. We will explore and
    demonstrate kinetic and directed energy kill mechanisms for
    potential sea-, ground-, air-, and potentially space-based
    operations to engage threat missiles in the boost, midcourse,
    and terminal phases of flight. In parallel, sensor suites and
    battle management and command and control will be developed to
    form the backbone of this system.
        Before I proceed to describe the new program in detail, I
    would like to make clear what this program does not do. It does
    not define a specific architecture yet. It does not commit to a
    procurement program for a full, layered defense. There is no
    commitment to specific dates for production and deployment
    other than for lower tier terminal defense elements. It is not
    a rush to deploy untested systems. It is not a step back to an
    unfocused research program. It is not a minor change to our
    previous program. Rather, this is a bold move to develop an
    effective, integrated layered defense against ballistic
    missiles of all ranges.
        The new program is a major change in our approach to
    developing ballistic missile defense. The previous National
    Missile Defense program, for example, was a high-risk
    production and development deployment program dependent for its
    success on an RDT&E effort that was somewhat underfunded but
    charged with developing a system that would operate at the
    outset with near perfection. It was based on rigid military
    requirements. The new program is built around a fully-funded,
    rigorous RDT&E effort designed to demonstrate increasing
    capability over time through a robust, realistic testing
    program.
        The objective of the new program is a layered defense to
    protect the United States, its allies, friends, and deployed
    forces against ballistic missiles of all ranges, and we will
    pursue this objective in the following way: First, we are
    recommending an acquisition approach that is evolutionary--one
    that will allow us to field systems incrementally once they are
    proven through robust testing. Because of uncertainties in the
    development program, the evolutionary approach is implemented
    in 2-year planning blocks. This allows us to adjust rapidly to
    change in the development performance of our sub-systems and
    allows us to build on our successes over time without the
    inherent difficulties of date certain expectations.
        Second, rather than committing to a single architecture as
    we have done in the past, we will deploy over time different
    combinations of sensors and weapons consistent with our
    national strategic objectives.
        We have designed the program so that, in an emergency and
    if directed, we might quickly deploy test assets to defend
    against a rapidly growing threat. This has been done before
    with other military capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in
    Kosovo. But barring such an emergency, we do not intend to
    deploy assets until they are ready because such emergency
    deployments are disruptive and can set back normal development
    programs by years.
        The technical and operational challenges of intercepting
    ballistic missiles are unprecedented. While these challenges
    are significant, our testing accomplishments to date tell us
    they are not insurmountable. Given the threats we expect to
    face, there is a premium on fielding highly reliable and
    effective systems.
        Reliability will be realized, in part, through redundancy
    in our system. Effectiveness is partly a function of the number
    of opportunities the system provides to intercept an in-flight
    missile and how early and often those opportunities occur in
    the missile's flight. Because we need redundancy, we determined
    that whatever BMD Systems we deploy, they should allow multiple
    engagement opportunities in the boost, in the midcourse, and
    terminal phases of a ballistic missile's flight.
        The boost phase is that part of flight when the ballistic
    missile's rocket motors are ignited and propel the entire
    missile system towards space. It lasts roughly 3 to 5 minutes
    for long-range missiles and as little as 1 to 2 minutes for
    short-range missiles.
        When the missile boosters are spent, the missile continues
    its ascent into what we call the midcourse part of flight,
    which lasts nominally 20 minutes for long-range missiles. In
    this stage of flight, a ballistic missile releases its payload
    warhead, submunitions, and/or penetration aids in space. The
    missile enters what we call the terminal phase when the missile
    or elements of its payload reenter the atmosphere. This is a
    very short phase, lasting from a few minutes to less than a
    minute.
        We are presented with unique opportunities and challenges
    when engaging a threat missile in each of these phases. The
    layered defense, or defense-in-depth approach, will increase
    the chances that the missile and its payload will be destroyed.
        Intercepting a missile in boost phase, for example, results
    in the defense of any target that the missile might be aimed at
    and can destroy a missile regardless of its design range. A
    midcourse intercept capability provides wide coverage of
    regions, while a terminal defense protects a localized area.
    Intercepting a missile near its launch point is always
    preferable to intercepting the same missile closer to its
    target. When we add shot opportunities in the midcourse and
    terminal phases of flight to boost phase opportunities, we
    increase significantly the probability we will be successful.
        Another advantage of the layered approach is that it
    complicates an adversary's plans. Countermeasures, for example,
    will always be a challenge for the defense. But because
    countermeasures have to be tailored to the specific phase of
    the missile's flight, layered defenses pose major challenges to
    an aggressor.
        The fiscal year 2002 program speeds development of
    established technologies, enables robust testing and evaluation
    of systems that are more mature, and explores new missile
    defense concepts and technologies. We plan to pursue multiple,
    parallel development paths to reduce the risk inherent in
    ballistic missile defense engineering with RDT&E initiatives in
    each of the boost, midcourse, and terminal defense segments of
    the overall system.
        We do not want to be in a position, in other words, where
    we discover a fundamental design flaw in our kill vehicle or in
    our only sea-based booster that might be under development.
    That would amount to a single point failure that could cost us
    years in developing effective missile defenses. We must be
    agile in our engineering approaches to keep the program on
    track and affordable.
        This robust RDT&E program aims to demonstrate what does and
    does not work. These activities showing the greatest promise
    will receive greater resource emphasis. Our progress will
    inform an annual high level decisionmaking process that will
    steer the BMD program in the most promising direction, taking
    into account optimal approaches and the most reliable
    information on costs that we can get. This process will allow
    us to make informed decisions regarding research, production,
    and any deployment.
        This RDT&E approach will also minimize possible disruptive
    effects that the introduction of new technologies, development
    challenges, or changes in the threat otherwise could have on
    any Ballistic Missile Defense program and allow us to keep
    pressing forward along the most promising paths. We will pursue
    enough paths so that the scaling back of any one effort will
    not undermine progress in other areas and that technological
    advances we make even in failed efforts will be put to good
    use. This represents the best approach for pursuing promising
    capabilities that will allow us to get out in front and pace a
    dynamic ballistic missile threat.
        Now I'd like to discuss the fiscal year 2002 budget and how
    it helps to implement this aggressive program. As I've said, we
    propose to invest in previous efforts as well as newer
    activities in order to set up multiple paths for solving this
    difficult technical challenge.
        The amended budget adds $2.54 billion to our program for a
    total of nearly $8.3 billion DOD-wide and just over $7 billion
    with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDOs) RDT&E
    program.
        In the terminal defense segment we have $968 million, an
    increase of $212 million over fiscal year 2001 enacted funding.
        In the midcourse, for both ground- and sea-based
    approaches, we have $3.9 billion, an increase of $1.4 billion,
    and in boost we have $685 million, an increase of $313 million
    over the fiscal year 2001 enacted funding.
        In fiscal year 2002, we are requesting $496 million for our
    sensors activities, which represents an increase of $221
    million over the fiscal year 2001 enacted funding.
        For integration of these segments in the overall Ballistic
    Missile Defense System, we have $780 million, which is an
    increase of $253 million for test infrastructure and
    countermeasures.
        These funds will enable us to improve the more mature BMD
    activities, begin development of the much needed BMD test bed,
    and undertake new concept development activities and
    experiments.
        In the terminal defense segment, we will continue
    investment in two of our most mature programs, THAAD and Arrow.
    We have added resources to accelerate the acquisition of a
    THAAD radar and buy more test missiles. This will allow us to
    capitalize on any early flight test successes should our
    disciplined development program prove effective in the test
    program. The U.S-Israeli Arrow Program initiated deployments of
    its first battery this year. Next year, there will be
    additional flight-testing of the Arrow system, and we will
    invest in additional production capacity for the Arrow missile.
        Patriot and Navy Area are approaching procurement and
    deployment decisions. For this reason, and in compliance with
    our program philosophy to have BMDO do research, development,
    test and evaluation and the services do procurement, and to
    support the services' air defense mission, the Department is
    transferring to respective services the responsibility for the
    execution and management of these three programs: Patriot 3,
    Navy Area, and the Medium Extended Air Defense System--MEADS.
    The transfer of these systems will maintain internal focus,
    consistency, and the interdependence of both BMDO and the
    services.
        In the midcourse segment we will continue to make
    improvements to counter the long-range ICBM threat, and to
    expand the ballistic missile defense test bed. The test bed is
    a central part of this program. It will provide an
    operationally realistic environment to test system elements and
    integration and to prove our construction, transportation, and
    logistics concepts. Over time, the test bed will expand to
    include weapons and sensor capabilities, to improve overall
    missile defense capabilities as they are made available. We
    will also proceed toward the development of a sea-based
    midcourse capability against long-range missile threats. Under
    the new BMDO program, we will continue the Navy Theater Wide
    Aegis LEAP Intercept, or ALI program, to counter short-range
    threats.
        In the boost defense segment, we will explore directed
    energy and kinetic energy options leading to experiments and
    demonstrations in the 2003 to 2005 timeframe. We are
    considering a sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed,
    high-acceleration booster coupled with a boost-phase kill
    vehicle. This activity will simultaneously support a proof-of-
    concept space-based experiment somewhere after 2004 using a
    space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle.
        We will continue the airborne laser development and plan a
    lethal demonstration in the 2003 to 2004 timeframe. We will
    also continue space-based laser risk reduction as we work
    towards an integrated flight experiment early in the next
    decade. The Department will consolidate program and management
    responsibility for the airborne laser and the space-based laser
    within BMDO.
        The sensors program element funds two key efforts: the
    SBIRS-Low, which was transferred from the Air Force to BMDO,
    and the Russian-American observation satellites cooperative
    research project with Russia.
        Mr. Chairman, we have an aggressive RDT&E program designed
    to enhance system effectiveness over time by developing layered
    defenses that employ complementary sensors and weapons to
    engage threat targets in the boost, midcourse, and terminal
    phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.
    Along the way, there will be successes and there will be
    failures. We will learn from both and make significant progress
    in developing a layered Ballistic Missile Defense System.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a short film, if the equipment works,
    to demonstrate the fact that we have achieved the ability, at
    least in the demonstration phase in some of our programs, to
    hit an incoming warhead very accurately. If I might, I would
    like to walk you through the low altitude, the medium altitude,
    and in the space realm that we are testing on Saturday, and the
    successes that we have had. Now, to be sure, we have had
    failures, but I want to show you the continuity of hitting
    warheads directly with hit-to-kill technology and how that has
    developed over the past few years.
        Chairman Levin. About how long will it take?
        General Kadish. 3\1/2\ minutes.
        Chairman Levin. That is fine. Thank you. [Video.]
        [Copy of video retained in committee files.]
        General Kadish. We will start out with this, a target
    launch for our Patriot 3. You can see the Patriot 3. This is in
    the atmosphere, hit-to-kill. There are no explosives on Patriot
    for theater ballistic missile (TBM) intercepts. You can see the
    Patriot maneuvering to get in the position to very accurately
    intercept a TBM warhead that is coming in, a short-range
    missile. Towards the terminal, you will see white smoke and you
    will see that hit. That is a direct hit, hit-to-kill, in the
    atmosphere with the Patriot.
        The Patriot has missed only once in our test program, and
    we have had nine flights.
        Now we move to THAAD, which is higher up in the atmosphere
    and into space. That was the target launch, THAAD missile
    taking off. To stay on the range, it has to do a maneuver, but
    it is very high acceleration. This program is now in
    development to fix some of the problems we had with it. You can
    see it climbing into altitude to intercept the warhead in outer
    space. Here is a depiction of the target, and the THAAD you can
    see maneuvering to hit it very accurately. There were no
    explosives. That is pure kinetic energy, hit-to-kill, body-to-
    body impact on the program.
        That was high enough so that you could see this particular
    intercept from Albuquerque from over White Sands.
        This is another view of it in more real-time.
        Now an example of what we are going to try to do on
    Saturday. The first time we did a National Missile Defense or
    long-range missile defense intercept, this is the last frame
    that THAAD saw before it intercepted. You can see the image of
    that warhead getting bigger in the sights of that intercept
    vehicle.
        This is a target launch out of Vandenberg into the South
    Pacific, 5,000 miles away. It occurred in October 1999, the
    first time we tried this. You can see the ranges are getting
    longer. This is the rise of the target into outer space. This
    is the interceptor at Kwajalein. Now, the intercept takes place
    over 140 miles into space, and you can see in a minute the two
    bodies coming together, from an infrared sensor.
        This is a more real-time look at it from a better
    perspective. That is the warhead in there coming together.
        Now, to be sure, we have major difficulties in making this
    type of technology work and work reliably and effectively. That
    is what this test program is designed to do, especially in the
    midcourse. We have had many failures in this process. However,
    it is an engineering challenge at this time.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks.
        [The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]
             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF
        Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a
    pleasure to appear before you today to present the Department of
    Defense's Fiscal Year 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense program and
    budget.
        The fundamental objective of the BMD program is to develop the
    capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States,
    its allies, and friends against all classes of ballistic missile
    threats. The Department will develop technologies and deploy systems
    promising an effective, reliable, and affordable missile defense
    system. The RDT&E program is designed to develop effective systems over
    time by developing layered defenses that employ complementary sensors
    and weapons to engage threat targets in the boost, midcourse, and
    terminal phases of flight and to deploy that capability incrementally.
        At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have developed a
    research, development and test program that focuses on missile defense
    as a single integrated BMD System, no longer differentiating between
    theater and National Missile Defense. This revised structure involves
    three basic thrusts. First, the new BMD program will build on the
    technical progress we have made to date by providing the funding
    required to develop and test selective elements of the current program
    fully.
        Second, the new program will pursue a broad range of activities in
    order to aggressively evaluate and develop technologies for the
    integration of land-, sea-,
    air-, or space-based platforms to counter ballistic missiles in all
    phases of their flight. The new program will not cut corners. Rather,
    it is designed to pursue parallel development paths to improve the
    likelihood of achieving an effective, layered missile defense.
        Third, the new testing program will incorporate a larger number of
    tests than in the past. They will employ more realistic scenarios and
    countermeasures. This will allow us to achieve greater confidence in
    our planning and development. Through this robust testing activity, we
    may discover opportunities to accelerate elements of the program based
    on their performance, and increase the overall credibility and
    capability of BMD Systems. This approach is designed to enable
    contingency use of the demonstrated BMD capabilities, if directed.
        The goal of the BMD System is a layered defense that provides
    multiple engagement opportunities along the entire flight path of a
    ballistic missile. Over the next 3 to 5 years we will pursue parallel
    technical paths to reduce schedule and cost risk in the individual
    RDT&E efforts. We will explore and demonstrate kinetic and directed
    energy kill mechanisms for potential sea-, ground-, air-, and space-
    based operations to engage threat missiles in the boost, midcourse, and
    terminal phases of flight. In parallel, sensor suites and battle
    management and command and control (BMC\2\) will be developed to form
    the backbone of the BMD System.
        But before I proceed to describe the new program in detail, I would
    like to make clear what this program does not do. It does not define a
    specific architecture. It does not commit to a procurement program for
    a full, layered defense. There is no commitment to specific dates for
    production and deployment other than for the lower tier terminal
    defense elements. It is not a rush to deploy untested systems; it is
    not a step back to an unfocused research program; and it is not a minor
    change to our previous program. Rather this program is a bold move to
    develop an effective, integrated layered defense that can be deployed
    as soon as possible against ballistic missiles of all ranges.
        The new program is a major change in our approach to developing
    ballistic missile defense. The previous National Missile Defense
    Program, for example, was a high risk production and deployment program
    dependent for its success on an RDT&E effort that was underfunded but
    charged with developing a system that would operate at the outset with
    near perfection; and it was based on rigid military requirements. The
    new program is built around a fully-funded, rigorous RDT&E effort
    designed to demonstrate increasing capability over time through a
    robust, realistic testing program.
        The objective of the new program is a layered defense to protect
    the United States, allies, friends, and deployed forces against
    ballistic missiles of all ranges. We will pursue this objective in the
    following way: First, we are recommending a broad, flexible approach to
    RDT&E that allows us to explore multiple development paths and to
    reinforce success based on the best technological approaches and the
    most advantageous basing modes in order to hedge against the inherent
    uncertainty of the ballistic missile defense challenge. Second, we are
    recommending an acquisition approach that is evolutionary, one that
    will allow us to field systems incrementally once they are proven
    through realistic testing. Third, rather than committing to a single
    architecture as we have done in the past, we will deploy over time
    different combinations of sensors and weapons consistent with our
    national strategic objectives.
        We have designed the program so that, in an emergency and if
    directed, we might quickly deploy test assets to defend against a
    rapidly emerging threat. This has been done before with other military
    capabilities, both in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. But barring such an
    emergency, as the Deputy Secretary has stated, we do not intend to
    deploy test assets until they are ready because such emergency
    deployments are disruptive, and can set back normal development
    programs by years.
               layered defense--effective against countermeasures
        The technical and operational challenges of intercepting ballistic
    missiles are unprecedented. While these challenges are significant, our
    testing accomplishments to date tell us that they are not
    insurmountable. Given the threats we expect to face, there is a premium
    on fielding a highly reliable and effective system. Reliability will be
    realized, in part, through redundancy in our system. Effectiveness is
    partly a function of the number of opportunities the system provides to
    intercept an in-flight missile and how early and how often those
    opportunities occur in the missile's flight. Because we need
    redundancy, we determined that whatever BMD Systems we deploy, they
    should allow multiple engagement opportunities in the boost, midcourse,
    and terminal phases of a ballistic missile's flight.
        The boost phase is that part of flight when the ballistic missile's
    rocket motors are ignited and propel the entire missile system towards
    space. It lasts roughly 3 to 5 minutes for a long-range missile and as
    little as 1 to 2 minutes for a short-range missile. When the missile
    boosters are spent, the missile continues its ascent into what we call
    the midcourse part of flight (which lasts nominally 20 minutes for a
    long-range missile). In this stage of flight, a ballistic missile
    releases its payload warhead(s), submunitions, and/or penetration aids
    it carried into space. The missile enters what we call the terminal
    phase when the missile or the elements of its payload, for example, its
    warheads, reenter the atmosphere. This is a very short phase, lasting
    from a few minutes to less than a minute.
        There are opportunities and challenges to engage a threat missile
    in each of these phases. The layered defense, or defense-in-depth,
    approach will increase the chances that the missile and its payload
    will be destroyed.
        Intercepting a missile in the boost phase, for example, results in
    the defense of any target that the missile might be aimed at and can
    destroy a missile regardless of its design range. A midcourse intercept
    capability provides wide coverage of a region or regions, while a
    terminal defense protects a localized area. Intercepting a missile near
    its launch point is always preferable to intercepting that same missile
    closer to its target. When we add shot opportunities in the midcourse
    and terminal phases of flight to boost phase opportunities, we increase
    significantly the probability that we will be successful.
        Another advantage of the layered approach is that it complicates an
    adversary's plans. Countermeasures, for example, will always be a
    challenge for the defense. But because countermeasures have to be
    tailored to the specific phase of a missile's flight, layered defenses
    pose major challenges to an aggressor.
                                rdt&e activities
        The Fiscal Year 2002 Program speeds development of established
    technologies, enables robust testing and evaluation of systems that are
    more mature, and explores new missile defense concepts and
    technologies. I will address some of these activities in a moment. We
    plan to pursue multiple, parallel development paths to reduce the risk
    inherent in BMD engineering, with initiatives in each of the Boost,
    Midcourse, and Terminal Defense Segments of the BMD System. As part of
    our risk reduction activity, we will explore different technologies and
    paths. We will also pursue technologies that may be useful across
    multiple segments and employ multiple technologies to avoid single
    point failures in each segment.
        We do not want to be in a situation, for example, to discover a
    fundamental design problem in our only Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
    (EKV), or in our only sea-based booster under development. That would
    amount to a single point failure that could cost us years in developing
    effective missile defenses, not to mention leaving America and our
    allies unnecessarily exposed. We must be agile in our engineering
    approaches to keep the BMD program on track and affordable.
        This robust RDT&E program aims to demonstrate what does and does
    not work. Those activities showing the greatest promise will receive
    greater resource emphasis. Our progress will inform an annual high-
    level decisionmaking process that will steer the BMD program in the
    most promising direction, taking into account optimal approaches and
    the most reliable information on costs, allowing informed research,
    production, and deployment decisions.
        This RDT&E approach also will minimize possible disruptive effects
    that the introduction of new technologies, development challenges, or
    changes in the threat otherwise could have on the BMD program and allow
    us to keep pressing forward along the most promising paths. We will
    pursue enough paths so that the scaling back of one effort will not
    undermine progress in other areas and the technological advances we
    make even in failed efforts will be put to good use. This represents
    the best approach for pursuing promising capabilities that will allow
    us to get out in front and pace a dynamic ballistic missile threat.
        The business of missile defense requires coping with a number of
    technological, developmental, acquisition, and threat uncertainties.
    For this reason, I cannot tell you today exactly what the system will
    look like 15, 10, or even 5 years from now. This system will take shape
    over time. We do not intend to lock ourselves into a highly stylized
    architecture based on either known technologies or hoped for advances
    in technology that will take a decade or more to complete. We intend to
    go beyond the conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process.
        We have adopted a capability-based approach, which recognizes that
    changes will occur along two separate axes. On the one axis, the threat
    will evolve and change over time based on the emergence of new
    technologies, continued proliferation of missiles worldwide, and
    operational and technical adjustments by adversaries (including the
    introduction of countermeasures) to defeat our BMD System. On the other
    axis lie changes we will experience. These include improving
    technologies, incremental system enhancements, evolving views of system
    affordability, and out-year decisions expanding coverage, potentially
    including the territory and populations of our allies and friends.
        The BMD System will feature a uniform battle management and command
    and control network and leverage, where possible, other Department
    communication channels to integrate elements of the BMD System. Because
    the system must act within minutes or even seconds to counter ballistic
    missiles, the information we receive on threats must be accurately
    received, interpreted, and acted upon rapidly. The information network
    must be seamless and allow information to be passed quickly and
    reliably among all the elements of the system.
        Mobility in our sensor and interceptor platforms and the capability
    to do boost phase and/or midcourse phase intercept must be central
    features in our architecture if we are to provide effective territorial
    protection at home and abroad. Placing sensors forward, or closer to
    the target missile launch point, either on land, at sea, in the air, or
    in space, will expand the battle space, improve discrimination of the
    target complex, and increase engagement opportunities. We will develop
    complementary elements in different combinations in order to afford the
    system a high degree of synergism and effectiveness.
        Specific system choices and timelines will take shape over the next
    few years through our capability-based, block approach. We will
    increase our capability over time through an evolutionary process as
    our technologies mature and are proven through testing. The block
    approach allows us to put our best, most capable technologies ``in
    play'' sooner than would otherwise be possible. We have organized the
    program with the aim of developing militarily useful capabilities in
    biannual blocks, starting as early as the 2004-2006 timeframe. These
    block capabilities could be deployed on an interim basis to meet an
    emergent threat, as an upgrade to an already deployed system, or to
    discourage a potential adversary from improving its ballistic missile
    capabilities.
        Consequently, the CINCs and military services will be involved
    throughout the development process so that with each block we move
    steadily forward towards systems with ever increasing military utility
    that complement other operational capabilities and that minimize life
    cycle cost.
                                    testing
        We have restructured the BMD program to facilitate success through
    rigorous, robust, and realistic testing. To ensure rigor our BMD
    testing philosophy recognizes that we must have an integrated, phased
    test program that comprehensively covers all aspects of testing; and
    our budget submission reflects our investment in the requisite test
    infrastructure to support this. To enable more robust testing we will
    invest in additional test articles and targets. The test bed we propose
    constructing will enhance our ability to test the full range of missile
    defense capabilities in realistic configurations and scenarios. Let me
    describe our approach to testing and discuss broadly what we are
    undertaking in fiscal year 2002.
        Our BMD developmental testing entails conceptual prototype
    development, assesses the attainment of technical performance
    parameters, generates data on risk, supports risk mitigation, and
    provides empirical data to validate models and simulations. Testing of
    systems, subsystems, and components, especially early in the
    developmental cycle, helps us to achieve two fundamental objectives:
    (1) determine performance capabilities, and (2) identify potential
    design problems to support timely changes. Later testing will
    demonstrate the broad range of effectiveness and suitability of missile
    defenses in increasingly realistic environments.
        Our test philosophy is to add, step-by-step over time, complexity
    such as countermeasures and operations in increasingly stressful
    environments. This approach allows us to make timely assessments of the
    most critical design risk areas. It is a walk-before-you-run, learn-as-
    you-go development approach. These testing activities provide critical
    information that reduces developmental risk and improves our confidence
    that a capability under development is progressing as intended.
        Given the number of technical challenges shared among the many
    elements of the BMD System, we will conduct a number of program-wide
    tests, experiments, and measurement projects each year to achieve our
    program-wide objectives. System interoperability and critical
    measurements flight tests and ground experiments will be conducted to
    support development of BMD System operating concepts, reduce
    development risks, and assess BMD System integration and
    interoperability. Program-wide collection and measurement needs will be
    met by phenomenology measurements, countermeasure characterizations,
    and analysis of lethality, kill assessment, and discrimination.
    International cooperative test and evaluation activities could become
    an important part of our program.
        Each test range currently in use is equipped with precision
    instrumentation sensors (radar and optical), telemetry capabilities,
    and flight and range safety systems. Additionally, BMDO deploys mobile
    airborne sensors. Core supporting ranges include both short- and long-
    range test facilities with multiple launch sites, primarily in New
    Mexico and over the Pacific Ocean. These collection capabilities are a
    critical part of our program. In fiscal year 2002, we will be engaged
    in a number of activities to develop and upgrade the test range
    infrastructure we require.
        The new program will feature range improvements for boost segment
    and system level testing, and will allow us to increase the tempo of
    our testing operations. Existing ground facilities will be upgraded for
    testing of Boost Segment elements, advanced sensors, counter-
    countermeasures, and nuclear weapons effects. Airborne instrumentation
    platforms will be upgraded, and modeling and simulation software having
    system-level and program-wide application will be developed.
        Ground test facility development and enhancement will help us to
    improve sensor testing, strengthen our end-to-end test capability, and
    undertake tests using scenarios we cannot duplicate in our flight-
    testing, such as nuclear weapons effects testing. Facilities for
    program-wide interoperability ground tests must be upgraded to be
    capable of both analyzing yesterday's flight test data and predicting
    tomorrow's expected system performance.
        With our more robust test program we will increase the number of
    tests and add tests of different technologies and basing modes. To meet
    the challenges of missile defense development we must upgrade our
    capabilities to test with flexibility over greater distances. Test
    scenarios must accommodate multiple intercepts occurring nearly
    simultaneously at realistic intercept geometries. Upgrades will be
    required in our launch facilities, flight hardware, and range tracking
    and collection assets.
        In fiscal year 2002 we will develop an inventory of targets and
    initiate procurement of additional test hardware to support a more
    aggressive test program. We must have quicker reaction in our targets
    program in order to accommodate changes in threat knowledge and to
    incorporate countermeasures. The BMD program will fund development of
    new threat-credible ballistic missile targets and countermeasures for
    all defense segment development activities, risk reduction flights, and
    comprehensive target system support, to include direct target costs and
    launch operations.
        Challenges we face in this area include development of new targets
    for boost segment testing, proper incorporation of countermeasures, and
    overcoming a dwindling supply of target hardware, particularly hardware
    incorporating countermeasures. The objective is to ensure an adequate
    supply of target boosters, reentry vehicles, and countermeasures to
    prevent major delays in development schedules resulting from a shortage
    of these major target components. We need to be able to test more and
    more often, and this requires that we have the test articles on hand
    and ready for use. Larger quantities of hardware also will help us
    overcome lengthy delays caused by, for example, a pre-launch problem
    with a target booster.
        As I mentioned earlier, we will increase testing of alternative
    technologies, especially in the medium and high-risk areas of
    development. We must be hardware rich if we are to have a robust
    testing program and if we are to avoid single point failures in any of
    our development efforts.
        Among the challenges that faced the previous NMD program was
    overcoming flight test restrictions on trajectories, impact areas, and
    debris in space in order to test overall system performance limits. The
    range we have been using between Vandenberg Air Force Base in
    California and Kwajalein Missile Range, while useful for developmental
    testing, lacks realism for tests of BMD interceptors and sensors.
        The amended budget request contributes significantly to the
    development of a BMD test bed, which will be used initially to prove
    out the midcourse capabilities. That test bed will expand test
    boundaries and develop and enhance test infrastructure and will provide
    for more operationally realistic testing. Over time the test bed will
    expand to include weapons and sensor capabilities to improve all
    missile defense capabilities as they are made available.
        The integrated test bed will be oriented in the Pacific region and
    extend many hundreds of miles from the Marshall Islands in the South
    Pacific to Alaska. It will allow more realistic flight-testing of
    capabilities in the Boost, Midcourse, and Terminal Defense Segments.
        The new test bed would make use of early warning radars at Beale
    Air Force Base and Cobra Dane at Shemya Island, and use the Kodiak
    Launch Facility in Alaska to launch targets and interceptors. The test
    bed would continue our practice of integrating early warning cueing
    information from Defense Support Program satellites and leveraging a
    battle management system operated out of Colorado Springs, Colorado.
    The test bed also will include up to five ground-based silos at Fort
    Greely, Alaska. We anticipate a prototype ground support capability, to
    include launch facilities, sensors, and networked communications, will
    be developed in fiscal year 2002 and built in fiscal year 2003. We will
    initiate construction of an interceptor integration facility in fiscal
    year 2002 to support a wide range of interceptor needs for testing.
        This test bed will allow us to test more than one missile defense
    segment at a time and exploit multiple shot opportunities so that we
    can demonstrate the viability of the layered defense concept. The test
    bed will provide a realistic environment to test different missile
    defense capabilities under varying and stressing conditions. It will
    also help us prove out construction, transportation, and logistics
    concepts we will need to clarify as we execute deployment decisions.
        If directed, the BMD test bed also could provide a basis for a
    contingency defensive capability if the security environment warrants.
                             bmd program management
        We must deviate from the standard acquisition process and recognize
    the unprecedented technical challenges we are facing. We do not have
    major defense acquisition programs in the fiscal year 2002 budget. We
    do not have program activities with traditional fixed milestones and
    clearly marked phases showing the road to production.
        The new approach to BMD development features more streamlined,
    flexible management through comprehensive and iterative reviews. We
    will establish yearly decision points to determine the status of the
    available technologies and concept evaluations in order to be in a
    position to accelerate, modify, truncate, or terminate our efforts in a
    particular area. This comprehensive annual review process will also
    help us make decisions to shape the evolving systems and allocate
    resources to optimally support them. This decision process will allow
    for: (1) more complete understanding of current technologies and the
    evolving capabilities; (2) evaluation of innovative concepts; (3)
    development of competing technologies to reduce cost, schedule, and
    performance risks; and (4) better estimation of complete costs for
    making informed decisions concerning system capability, production, and
    deployment. We believe that full annual evaluations of our program
    activities and demonstrated technical achievements will build
    confidence for decision makers.
        This program is designed to seek opportunities to provide the most
    effective and efficient missile defense by exploiting advances in
    technology as they emerge and by making timely decisions to direct
    individual development activities. We will make adjustments as we learn
    what we can and cannot do technically and as we make the tough calls on
    selecting among the promising technologies to create the best mix of
    missile defense capabilities across the threat missile flight envelope.
        As missile defense capabilities mature, we envision transferring
    the individual elements to the military department for production and
    procurement as part of a standard acquisition program. This approach
    will ensure that the military department can operate these capabilities
    effectively and reliably.
                        program elements and activities
        To manage and account for program resources, BMDO plans a
    configuration of nine Program Elements (PE): BMD System; Terminal,
    Midcourse, and Boost Defense Segments; Sensors; Technology; Pentagon
    Reservation Maintenance Reserve Fund; Small Business Innovative
    Research; and Headquarters Management. This PE structure supports the
    revised BMD program goals by aligning activities and funding with the
    program's internal technical focus. It also provides the flexibility to
    mitigate, through internal adjustment, unforeseen consequences and
    risks in budget and schedule. The following table illustrates the PE
    structure.

    Program Element Descriptions
        BMD System

        The BMD System Program Element allocates the resources required for
    the overarching conduct and integration of the multi-layered BMD
    System. The BMD System PE comprises five primary projects: Battle
    Management, Command and Control (BMC\2\); Communications; Targets and
    Countermeasures; System Engineering and Integration (SE&I); and Test
    and Evaluation (T&E). System-level activities involve integrating the
    Boost, Midcourse, Terminal, and Sensors segments into a single and
    congruous missile defense system; this PE also includes management
    efforts to preserve and promote architectural consistency,
    interoperability, and integration of PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area
    systems within the overarching BMD mission. Our amended request of $780
    million for these activities represents an increase of $253 million
    over fiscal year 2001 enacted funding, and $251 million over the
    initial fiscal year 2002 budget submission.
        Our evolutionary acquisition process will increase the BMD System
    capabilities over time in 2 year increments. Each BMD System block will
    comprise multiple weapon and sensor elements. The BMC\2\ and
    Communications project funding is for developing and integrating the
    command and control and communications for the BMD System. The BMC\2\
    project includes the development and allocation of BMC\2\
    specifications to ensure the weapons and sensor system products are
    fully interoperable with each other and with external systems,
    providing optimum flexibility to the warfighter. To this end, a
    Ballistic Missile Defense Integration Center will be established at
    BMDO's Joint National Test Facility.
        The Communications project consolidates and refines BMD System-wide
    communication systems to allow components to exchange data and to
    permit command and control orders to be transmitted to the weapons and
    sensor systems.
        The Targets and Countermeasures project funding provides threat-
    credible ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and target system
    support. This project will provide new target and countermeasure
    development, risk reduction flights, and target characterization.
        As the central engineering component within BMDO, the Systems
    Engineering and Integration (SE&I) project provides the overall system
    engineering development and integration of the BMD System. The SE&I
    mission is to define and manage the layered BMD System, providing the
    collaborative, layered, and detailed systems engineering and
    integration required across the entire spectrum of BMD warfighter
    capabilities.
        Lastly, the Test and Evaluation project provides consolidated
    system-wide Test and Evaluation capabilities and resources required to
    allow for cohesive facilitation, management, and execution of test
    activities. Test and Evaluation efforts include the development,
    operation, maintenance, and modernization of the BMD program-wide Test
    and Evaluation infrastructure. The T&E program also addresses
    crosscutting issues related to BMD System lethality, discrimination,
    and other T&E derived mission critical functions. Finally, the T&E
    program conducts system integration tests for the entire BMD System and
    will validate performance of each block. Test & Evaluation activities
    are grouped in terms of Program Wide Test & Evaluation; Test Support of
    facilities, ranges, sensors, and test instrumentation; modeling and
    simulation; and facilities, siting, and environmental efforts.
    Terminal Defense Segment

        The Terminal Defense Segment (TDS) allocates resources to support
    development and selective upgrades of defensive capabilities that
    engage and negate ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their
    trajectory. The primary projects under this PE are the Theater High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Israeli Arrow
    Deployability Program (ADP). Related activities include the Israeli
    Test Bed (ITB), Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP), and studies
    via the Israeli Systems Architecture and Integration (ISA&I) effort
    that assess the Arrow performance relative to both existing and
    emerging threats. Our amended request of $988 million represents an
    increase of $212 million over fiscal year 2001 enacted funding, and an
    increase of $224 million over the initial fiscal year 2002 budget
    submission. Note: The PAC-3, MEADS, and Navy Area programs are funded
    within their respective service accounts.
        The mission of the THAAD System is to defend against short- and
    medium-range ballistic missiles at significant distances from the
    intended target and at high altitudes. THAAD will protect U.S. and
    allied Armed Forces, broadly dispersed assets, and population centers
    against missile attacks. This evolutionary program is structured to
    demonstrate capability in Block 2004, with planned improvements based
    on upgraded seekers, ground support equipment, and discrimination
    software. Current efforts are addressing component and system
    performance, producibility, and supportability. A robust ground-testing
    program will precede flight testing, currently planned for fiscal year
    2004. The budget adds resources to accelerate acquisition of a THAAD
    radar and to buy more test missiles in order to capitalize on early
    flight test successes should our disciplined development program prove
    effective. The Arrow Weapon System (AWS) (developed jointly by the U.S.
    and Israel) provides Israel a capability to defend against short- and
    medium-range ballistic missiles and helps ensure U.S. freedom of action
    in future contingencies. Arrow also provides protection against
    ballistic missile attacks for U.S. forces deployed in the region. The
    successful Arrow intercept test on September 14, 2000, resulted in
    Israel declaring the system operational in October 2000. The Arrow
    Deployability Program (ADP) also supports Israel's acquisition of a
    third Arrow battery and Arrow's interoperability with U.S. TMD systems.
    Interoperability will be achieved via a common communication
    architecture utilizing the Link-16. An interoperability test was
    completed in January 2001 using the Theater Missile Defense System
    Exerciser (TMDSE) that validated that the Arrow Weapon System is
    interoperable and can exchange surveillance and missile track cueing
    data with U.S. Patriot and Aegis missile defense systems. The Arrow
    System Improvement Program (ASIP) will include both technical
    cooperation to improve the performance of the AWS and a cooperative
    test and evaluation program to validate the improved AWS performance.
    We added $20 million in our amended budget specifically for additional
    flight testing and development of additional production capacity for
    the Arrow missile.
        Equally important to the integrated BMD System are the lower tier
    programs that are being transferred to the military departments. We
    have had significant success with the PAC-3, and interceptor missiles
    will be delivered to training battalions this year. PAC-3 system will
    provide critical operational capability to defend our forward-deployed
    forces, allies, and friends. The system is designed to counter enemy
    defense suppression tactics that may include tactical ballistic
    missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft employing advanced
    countermeasures and low radar cross-section. The PAC-3 technology has a
    proven record of hit-to-kill success. We are now 7-for-8 in body-to-
    body intercepts against ballistic missile targets. PAC-3 missile
    technology also accomplished 4-for-4 body-to-body intercepts against
    cruise missiles and air-breathing threats. Recent successes included
    multiple simultaneous engagements of both short-range ballistic
    missiles and cruise missiles using PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors.
        Although the Navy Area Program has experienced technical, cost and
    schedule challenges we are now at a point where we can execute a
    rigorous set of flight tests and likely achieve a capability in the
    middle of this decade. A fly-by test is anticipated for early 2002, to
    be followed by a series of intercept flight-tests. At-sea testing is
    expected to begin in late 2002/early 2003. Navy Area has been
    positioned to undertake initial at-sea tests using, Aegis
    ``LINEBACKER'' ships.
        With the German Parliament funding recently made available to
    continue the trilateral MEADS activity, that program is about to embark
    on a 3-year risk reduction effort. MEADS will use the PAC-3, which has
    already begun production, as its interceptor. Once deployed, MEADS will
    improve tactical mobility and strategic deployability over comparable
    missile systems and provide robust, 360-degree protection for
    maneuvering forces and other critical forward-deployed assets against
    short- and medium-range missiles.
        These systems have been in development for many years and Patriot
    and Navy Area are approaching procurement and deployment decisions. For
    this reason, and in compliance with our program philosophy to have BMDO
    do RDT&E and the military departments do procurement, and to support
    the military departments' air defense mission, the Department is
    transferring to the respective services the responsibility for
    execution and management of PAC-3, Navy Area, and MEADS.
    Midcourse Defense Segment

        The Midcourse Defense Segment (MDS) develops increasingly robust
    capabilities for countering ballistic missiles in the midcourse stage
    of flight. The MDS will develop and test multiple technologies to
    provide credible capabilities against this threat to operate in this
    segment of flight. The MDS program of work is divided into multiple
    elements including Ground-Based Midcourse System, and Sea-Based
    Midcourse System, the successors to the National Missile Defense and
    Navy Theater Wide programs, segment Systems Engineering and
    Integration, and segment Test and Evaluation. Our amended request of
    $3,941 million represents an increase of $1,455 million over fiscal
    year 2001 enacted funds, and an increase of $1,237 million over the
    fiscal year 2002 initial budget submission.
        Under the previous BMD program, we had under development only one
    system that could provide a midcourse intercept capability for
    defeating ICBMs. We made significant progress in the National Missile
    Defense (NMD) program and brought system development to the point where
    an independent review team led by retired Air Force General Larry Welch
    concluded that, despite some challenges, the technical capability was
    in hand to develop and field the limited system to meet the projected
    threat. We were pursuing a highly concurrent development and production
    program focused on a 2005 deployment. While the NMD testing program
    experienced delays in development and testing, our analysis last year
    showed that ground and flight tests to date have demonstrated about 93
    percent of the system's critical engagement functions and have shown
    the ability to integrate the system elements.
        The revised Ground-Based Midcourse System has three objectives: (1)
    to develop and demonstrate an integrated system capable of countering
    known and expected threats; (2) to provide an integrated test bed that
    provides realistic tests and reliable data for further system
    development; and (3) to create a development path allowing for an early
    capability based on success in testing. During its initial phase, the
    program will develop an integrated system, further demonstrate a ``hit-
    to-kill'' capability, and prepare for the RDT&E test bed capability and
    subsequent blocks. Each block will develop capability against
    increasing threat complexity.
        Within the MDS, the bulk of the resources are designed to build and
    sustain an operationally realistic test architecture that represents
    the envisioned operational capability. We plan to have an RDT&E ground-
    based test bed available in the 2004-2006 time frame. As designed, this
    test bed will expand to enhance overall test infrastructure and system
    maturation, although its initial development will occur within the
    midcourse segment. Over time the test bed will expand to include
    weapons and sensor capabilities from throughout the BMD System when
    they become available.
        The test bed will consist of up to five ground-based silos with an
    upgraded Cobra Dane radar; associated command and control and launch
    facilities; other sensors; and networked communications to support
    robust testing with credible targets, scenarios, and countermeasures.
    This project includes four flight tests in fiscal year 2002. Moreover,
    upon availability, the test bed could incorporate air launched targets,
    thereby providing geographically realistic scenarios and improving
    overall testing realism. Throughout, enhancements will be made to both
    the Fort Greely and Kodiak Island test facilities, improving both
    target and interceptor launch capabilities.
        This approach might provide a near-term option to employ the test
    facilities--radars, C\2\, and interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and
    Kodiak--in an operational mode. Its use in this mode could provide an
    interim capability to meet an emergent threat. This interim capability
    could subsequently be upgraded through technical improvements, replaced
    by deployment of production-quality radars, C\2\, and interceptors as
    described below or supplemented with a Sea-Based Midcourse System,
    described below.
        The Sea-Based Midcourse System is intended to intercept hostile
    missiles in the ascent phase of midcourse flight, which when
    accompanied by a ground-based system, provides a complete midcourse
    layer. By engaging missiles in early ascent, sea-based systems also
    offer the opportunity to reduce the overall BMD System's susceptibility
    to countermeasures. The Sea-Based Midcourse System will build upon
    technologies in the existing Aegis Weapon System and the Standard
    Missile infrastructures and will be used against short and medium-range
    threats. Funding in fiscal year 2002 offers the ability to continue
    testing and enables a potential contingency sea-based midcourse
    capability that can grant limited defense to U.S. and allied deployed
    forces as an element of the BMD System Block 2004. To support this
    effort five flight tests of the sea-based midcourse system are planned
    in fiscal year 2002. Funding also begins concept development and risk
    reduction work for advanced capability blocks to include more robust
    capability against intermediate and long-range threats to complement
    ground-based midcourse capabilities later this decade.
        The United States and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding in
    August 1999 to conduct a 2-year cooperative project to conduct systems
    engineering and to design four advanced missile components for possible
    integration into an improved version of the SM-3 interceptor. This
    project leverages the established and demonstrated industrial and
    engineering strengths of Japan and allows a significant degree of cost-
    sharing.
        Other segment activities include Systems Engineering and
    Integration (SE&I), Test and Evaluation (T&E), and Program Operations.
    SE&I funding will allow for further risk reduction activities and
    counter-countermeasure development and will begin a complementary kill
    vehicle development which could be common to both ground- and sea-based
    interceptors. T&E funding starts a new target booster development that
    will allow for testing against more realistic targets.
    Boost Defense Segment

        The mission of the Boost Defense Segment (BDS) is to define and
    develop boost phase intercept (BPI) missile defense capabilities. Our
    amended request of $685 million for the Boost Defense Program
    represents an increase of $313 million over the fiscal year 2001
    enacted funding, and an increase of $384 million over the initial
    fiscal year 2002 budget submission.
        The capabilities defined and developed in the BDS will
    progressively reduce the ``safe havens'' available to a hostile state.
    A ``safe haven,'' is formed by geographic and time constraints
    associated with BPI. It is the region of a state from which it can
    launch a missile safely out of range of a potential boost phase
    intercept. To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, quick reaction
    times, high confidence decisionmaking, and multiple engagement
    capabilities are needed. The development of higher power lasers and
    faster interceptor capabilities are required to reduce the size of safe
    havens, whereas development of viable space-based systems could
    potentially eliminate them entirely. Thus, resources have been
    allocated to develop both kinetic and directed energy capabilities in
    an effort to provide options for multiple engagement opportunities and
    basing modes to address a variety of timing and geographic constraints.
        Successful BDS operational concepts could be fully integrated with
    midcourse and terminal elements in the overall BMD System. In
    accordance with the overall BMD acquisition strategy, BDS will employ
    multiple paths and acquisition methodologies to deliver initial
    capability blocks as soon as practical, and upgrade the initial
    capabilities over time. From information gained following this
    approach, BMDO will evaluate the most promising projects to provide a
    basis for an architecture decision between 2003 and 2005.
        There are four principal objectives for the BDS. First, it will
    seek to demonstrate and make available the Airborne Laser (ABL) for a
    contingency capability in Block 2004 with a path to an initial
    capability in Block 2008. Second, it will define and evolve space-based
    and sea-based kinetic energy Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) concepts in
    the next 2 to 4 years, supporting a product line development decision
    in 2003-2005. This effort will include concept definition, risk
    reduction activities, and proof-of-concept demonstrations. For example,
    the sea-based boost program is considering a high-speed, high-
    acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill vehicle. This same
    booster will be evaluated (with a different kill vehicle) for sea-based
    midcourse roles. Third, the BDS will execute a proof-of-concept Space-
    Based Interceptor Experiment (SBX). Fourth, the BDS will also continue
    Space-Based Laser (SBL) risk reduction on a path to a proof-of-concept
    SBL Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL-IFX) in 2012. At appropriate
    times, BMDO will insert mature system concepts and technologies into
    product line development and deployment. Planned tests within the Boost
    Segment include a ground test of the ABL project and a ground test of
    the Sea-Based Boost concept in 2002.
        Kinetic Energy Concepts
        Little has been done in this area in recent years. We intend to
    address operational concept development and technical risk reduction to
    produce experiments and systems to deliver demonstrations in the 2003-
    2006 timeframe. Kinetic boost phase intercept is a challenge because
    the threat missile must be detected and confirmed within a few seconds
    of launch. It then becomes a race between an accelerating ballistic
    missile and the interceptor in which the threat missile has had a head
    start. Another technical challenge is designing a kill vehicle that can
    detect and track the target following missile-staging events and then
    impact the missile in the presence of a brilliant plume.
        The money requested in fiscal year 2002 will allow us to begin risk
    reduction activities to resolve critical technological risks associated
    with candidate boost systems and the development of a concept of
    operations through war-gaming and other planning activities. We are
    considering a sea-based boost activity to develop a high-speed, high-
    acceleration booster coupled with a boost kill vehicle. This activity
    will simultaneously support a proof-of-concept Space-Based Experiment
    (SBX) using a space-based kinetic energy kill vehicle.
        Directed-Energy Capabilities
        The two primary programs in this area are the Airborne Laser (ABL)
    and Space-Based Laser, now transferred to BMDO. The Air Force ABL
    program has been focused on short- and medium-range threats. We are
    taking deliberate steps to prepare ABL for a strategic defense role as
    well. With onboard sensors, each ABL aircraft will conduct long-range,
    wide-area surveillance of regions from which threat missiles might
    launch. The fiscal year 2002 budget request will allow us to conduct an
    initial flight test of ABL and plan for a lethal demonstration in 2003.
        The budget request will enable BMDO to continue SBL risk reduction
    work. Near-term SBL activity will focus on ground-based efforts to
    develop and demonstrate the component and subsystem technologies
    required for an operational space-based laser system and the design and
    development of an Integrated Flight Experiment vehicle that is
    scheduled to be tested in space in 2012. The SBL project builds on many
    years of previous development and is based on prudent reduction of
    technical risk as early as possible in the design process.
    Sensors

        Sensors developed in this segment will have multi-mission
    capabilities intended to enhance detection of and provide critical
    tracking information for ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
    This PE funds the Block 2010 SBIRS-Low sensor satellite constellation,
    and the Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) Program, as
    well as emergent technologies and test and evaluation activities. In
    addition, resources are provided to further concept development and
    risk reduction efforts. Our amended budget request of $496 million
    represents an increase of $221 million over the fiscal year 2001
    enacted funding, and an increase of $113 million over the initial
    fiscal year 2002 budget submission.
        SBIRS-Low (transferred from the Air Force) will incorporate new
    technologies to enhance detection; improve reporting of
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Sea-Launched Ballistic
    Missile (SLBM) and tactical ballistic missiles; and provide critical
    midcourse tracking and discrimination data for BMD. SBIRS-Low, in
    conjunction with SBIRS-High (developed by the Air Force), form the
    SBIRS system, which will consist of satellites in Geosynchronous Orbits
    (GEO), Highly Elliptical Orbits (HEO) and Low Earth Orbits (LEO) and an
    integrated centralized ground station serving all SBIRS space elements
    and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.
        The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) Program is an
    innovative U.S.-Russian space-based remote sensor research and
    development program addressing ballistic missile defense and national
    security directives. This program engages Russian developers of early
    warning satellites in the joint definition and execution of aircraft
    and space experiments.
    Technology

        The Technology Segment will develop components, subsystems and new
    concepts needed to keep pace with the evolving ballistic missile
    threat. The primary focus of the Technology Segment is the development
    of sensors and weapons for future platforms that can complement today's
    missile defense capabilities. Investments will maintain a balance
    between providing improvements in current acquisition programs and
    demonstrating the enabling technology for new concepts. Our amended
    request of $113 million represents a decrease of $74 million relative
    to the fiscal year 2001 enacted funding (and congressional adds), and a
    $41 million increase over the initial fiscal year 2002 budget
    submission.
        The technology program is divided into four thrust areas: (1)
    terminal missile defense, (2) midcourse counter-countermeasures, (3)
    boost phase intercepts, and (4) global defense. Specific projects
    include the development of a doppler radar to be used in a missile
    seeker, the demonstration of active and interactive midcourse
    discrimination techniques, the design and development of miniature kill
    vehicles for boost and midcourse application, and the development and/
    or testing of space relay mirrors for laser tracking systems. In
    addition to thrust area projects, investments are made in technology at
    the component level to improve the state-of-the-art in radars, infrared
    sensors, lasers, optics, propulsion, wide band gap materials, and
    photonic devices.
        In closing, the Ballistic Missile Defense System Strategy balances
    significant engineering, management, schedule and cost challenges. It
    also provides for a robust RDT&E program with rigorous testing. Your
    support will be critical to our success.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions
    you and the members of the committee might have.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you both.
        The issue that this Nation is going to have to face is not
    whether North Korea is trying to develop missile capability,
    but whether our response to that will make us less secure or
    more secure. That is the issue.
        The moral obligation that the President has and that
    Congress has is to make us more secure. If it comes down to the
    breach of a treaty, which leads to a Russian and Chinese
    response to increase the number of weapons they otherwise would
    have and to increase the amount of nuclear material on Russian
    soil particularly, and speed up the development of a nuclear
    program in China, this could lead to the greater possibility
    that terrorists could get their hands on a nuclear weapon. This
    increases the terrorist threat because of the greater access to
    nuclear material, the greater number of nuclear weapons in this
    world. If that is the response--and that very well could be the
    response--we then have a new arms race on our hands, a new Cold
    War on our hands and a greater proliferation threat on our
    hands.
        This is the reason for the original ABM Treaty. Countries
    are going to respond. As one of the experts put it back then,
    one side's quest for safety can heighten the other side's
    insecurity. That is the issue. Is our quest for safety in this
    particular way going to increase Russian and Chinese
    insecurity? You hope it does not. We would all hope it does
    not. You say it should not. We would all feel it should not.
    But the question is, will it?
        Does that mean we give anybody a veto? Of course not.
    Nobody has a veto. But does that mean that the response of
    other countries, nuclear powers with the capability of
    increasing their capability, MIRVing their weapons, of
    transferring countermeasures and decoys to other countries and
    developing themselves--is that response relevant to what we do?
    It seems to me it surely is relevant. If it comes down to a
    unilateral deployment in violation of a treaty, we need to
    weigh that response and decide whether or not we will be left
    more or less secure by a unilateral deployment.
        That is a particularly difficult question, it seems to me,
    in light of the fact that we have been informed over and over
    again by our intelligence sources that the more likely means of
    delivery of a weapon of mass destruction is not a missile. It
    is not a ballistic missile. It is a truck or a suitcase or a
    ship. Do we then take action to defend unilaterally in
    violation of a treaty against the least likely means of
    delivery with the likelihood of increasing a proliferation
    threat when there is another means of delivery more likely,
    cheaper, more accurate, stealthier?
        Those are the questions which this administration I believe
    has not given adequate attention to. We will be spending a lot
    of time on those questions at a later hearing. Obviously, today
    people will comment on that, and you already have.
        What I want to focus on today with my time has to do with
    the testing, which is now being requested, the budgeting that
    you are requesting.
        For the first time we are told in your statement that the
    tests or activities that you are seeking funding for are likely
    to bump up against the ABM Treaty in months rather than years.
    Now, as my good friend Senator Warner said in his opening
    statement, when the press reported that this morning, we were
    wondering whether that was just sort of snippets from various
    comments put together by the press. Well, it is not. What we
    have here this morning for the first time is the administration
    telling us that, if we fund this budget request, the likelihood
    is that this treaty will be violated in months not years.
        We have been told that our allies and the Russians have
    been informed of that recently. That is what the press was told
    yesterday. That is what we have been told, that the Russians
    and the allies have been informed that the activities that
    would be budgeted for 2002 are likely to bump up against and be
    in conflict with the ABM Treaty in months not years.
        Now, we were told by General Kadish just 3 weeks ago that
    there would be no treaty violation in 2002 based on the
    recommendations that he had made. We were briefed on that, and
    that is what you told us, General, 3 weeks ago.
        Something has changed in the last 3 weeks.
        You obviously hope that these tests proceed well. You want
    them to proceed well, these tests that we budget. Therefore, if
    it is likely that they will bump up against the treaty in
    months not years, that means that you are telling us that if we
    adopt this budget that you have requested, that this treaty, if
    not amended--everybody hopes there will be an amendment, but if
    it is not amended with the Russians--that this treaty would be
    violated unless we withdrew from it during fiscal year 2002. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. There is a very important measure of
    difference. I used in my testimony the phrase ``bump up.'' I
    think in the talking points we used with our allies, we used
    the phrase ``encounter.'' I noticed the newspaper uses the
    phrase ``conflict,'' and that is a very different--that
    presumes you have already made the legal judgment.
        As I tried to lay out very clearly in my testimony, at this
    early stage, the legal issues are just loaded with ambiguities.
    The central ones in the examples I mentioned have to do with
    the question of whether the development of a test bed, which
    would clearly be legal under the treaty, becomes illegal if you
    harbor the intention or the plan or the possibility of turning
    that test bed into an operational capability. It is going to
    take a great deal of legal argument to decide what the answer
    is to that.
        The other issues that I described involve issues
    essentially of testing non-ABM radars in so-called ABM modes or
    essentially issues that were argued throughout the period of
    the treaty because we had one interpretation and the Russians
    had another. The lawyers are going to have to come up with some
    definitive judgments as to which of those interpretations
    apply.
        We are in a gray area, Mr. Chairman, and that is why I use
    a fuzzy phrase like ``bump up'' rather than a very clear-cut
    phrase like ``conflict.'' As I said in my testimony, if we come
    to a judgment that it conflicts and we have not yet revised the
    ABM Treaty, then we either can withdraw from the ABM Treaty,
    not violate it--we are not going to violate it. We are legally
    allowed under the treaty to give 6 months' notice of
    withdrawal--or we can scale back our program and take out some
    tests that would otherwise be useful or stop doing something
    that would give us both the test and operational capability.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, I must tell you the
    administration handed out a document to the press yesterday.
    The press asked us to comment on it. Can we give them a copy of
    this?
        I am just going to read this. This is what the press
    quoted. You can say there is a big difference between conflict
    and bump up against. OK. The administration said conflict in
    this document. The document is titled, ``The Administration's
    Principal Themes on Missile Defense: Questions and Answers.''
    It says, ``Moreover and again as we have told both allies and
    the Russians, while we do not know precisely when our programs
    will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the
    timing is likely to be measured in months not years.'' Those
    are your words. Those are the administration's words. Now you
    are telling us you did not mean conflict, you mean bump up.
        You cannot tell us whether there is anything in this budget
    which, if everything works well, would lead to activities which
    conflict with the ABM Treaty? You do not know?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I can tell you--and I have identified
    them--that there are activities in this budget that will raise
    issues of treaty interpretation, and we have not yet come to a
    resolution of those issues.
        Chairman Levin. You have a Compliance Review Group, do you
    not?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Which is working on these issues as we
    speak.
        Chairman Levin. Have they decided whether they would
    conflict or not?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not believe they have.
        Chairman Levin. When will we know that?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. At least 6 months before we proceed
    with these.
        Chairman Levin. We are not going to know that before you
    are asking us to vote on this budget, whether your own
    Compliance Review Group thinks that the activities that you are
    asking us to fund are in conflict with the ABM Treaty, which
    could lead to all kinds of ramifications for the world? We are
    not going to have that assessment from your Compliance Review
    Group before you are asking us to approve a budget? Is that
    what you are telling us this morning?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I am telling you, Mr. Chairman, that
    we do not have that assessment now. We will get it as soon as
    we can, and we will certainly get it well in advance of 6
    months of the event.
        Chairman Levin. The whole purpose of that group, by the
    way, is to tell us whether or not an activity violates a
    treaty. A pretty significant judgment. You are proceeding
    without it, and you are asking us to proceed without it. I hope
    we do not.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. I opened the comments that I provided at
    this hearing with the statement that it is really my belief
    that Congress will work constructively as a partner in a calm
    manner to achieve the necessary defenses that this Nation must
    have.
        Now, I also point out that we are going to talk about
    different interpretations of different statements, but clearly
    on page 7, your last sentence, ``I can assure you that the
    President will adhere to the requirements of the treaty to
    conduct the proper notifications as we go forward''--in other
    words, time and time again our President has indicated that he
    is going to follow a path of consultation, then negotiation. I
    think that should be sufficient reassurance to Congress that we
    can work as full partners.
        Now, much was said rather loosely about unilateral
    withdrawal. I think the President had no alternative but to lay
    down very clearly the threat against this country, his
    determination as the constitutional leader to deal with that
    threat technologically, to the extent that we can, but at the
    same time, leave no doubt that if consultations and subsequent
    negotiations do not result in a framework, we have no
    alternative but to exercise the right under the treaty to
    withdraw.
        Otherwise, it is my judgment--and I ask the question to
    you, Secretary Wolfowitz--we put squarely in the hands of the
    Russians a veto. Am I not correct in that assumption?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe that is what we would be
    doing and then we would, in effect, be making the judgment that
    the kinds of dangers Chairman Levin has talked about and which
    I believe are very manageable are much more serious than what I
    believe the rather unmanageable proliferation of missile
    threats in the hands of rogue nations.
        Senator Warner. Now, this phrase that within months we
    will--whatever you want to use--bump up or challenge the ABM
    Treaty--all during that period, our President will be
    conducting consultations and negotiations, will he not,
    Secretary Wolfowitz?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We expect those negotiations and
    discussions to be intensifying significantly in the coming
    months.
        Senator Warner. Correct. In good faith, he is manifesting
    not only to our country but to the world that he is trying to
    work within the treaty framework to seek a resolution of the
    differences.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is absolutely right. We are also
    demonstrating in a number of ways, including most importantly
    with the way we are bringing down our offensive forces, that we
    are no longer enemies with Russia and that we need to move
    beyond the old thinking that put the focus on being able to
    annihilate one another within 30 minutes of warning. That is
    old. I understand we lived with that kind of thinking for so
    long. There are vestiges of it certainly even in this country.
    It is rife in Russia, but I think we can move beyond it.
        Senator Warner. I think that case is made very clearly.
        Another observation in my judgment, and I say this with
    great deference to this institution which I have been
    privileged to serve these almost 23 years. I really believe
    Congress will reach down into its own wisdom and find a common
    basis to support our President. But should somehow we fail to
    do so or should we turn up the rhetoric and heat it up, does
    that not hinder our President in those negotiations?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think, Senator, you are absolutely
    right. The entire record of negotiating with almost every
    country and certainly with Russians and the former Soviet Union
    suggests that the most effective way to reach agreement is to
    demonstrate some determination to move forward on our own.
        Senator Warner. If we can move as partners, it is more
    likely that he will succeed.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely. I think partnership and
    solidarity between the executive and legislative branches on
    this issue is crucial.
        Senator Warner. Now, the law of the land was stated by
    Congress in the Cochran legislation. There were 97 yea votes to
    3 negative votes on that piece of legislation. It is very clear
    that it gives the President, this President--it was enacted and
    signed by the previous President--the clear authority to move
    within the technological framework of milestones. In any way
    can anyone point to where the President has breached that law?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe he is in full compliance
    with both the letter and the spirit of it.
        Senator Warner. I agree with that.
        Now, General Kadish, let us assume for the moment that we
    are able to work through a satisfactory revision of the
    framework of the ABM Treaty. Your program under 2002 is
    consistent with the Cochran bill, namely that we will pace
    ourselves in accordance with technology?
        General Kadish. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Warner. I think it is important, General Kadish,
    that we also address the question of the limited defense which
    we use in terms of the intercontinental ballistic missiles.
    That is what we are endeavoring to do to defend ourselves
    against the hopefully less than a dozen that attack us.
    Assuming this system becomes effective, I do not see how it
    poses a threat to Russia. Their arsenal could crush that system
    like an ant. Am I not correct?
        General Kadish. The system certainly would have inherent
    limitations against long-range missiles.
        Senator Warner. The question simply is this. If we are able
    to bring into being technologically this limited defense, the
    Russian inventory today could overwhelm it in a matter of
    hours. Am I not correct?
        General Kadish. That is correct.
        Senator Warner. It does not pose a threat. Do you see that
    it poses any threat to Russia to induce them to go into an arms
    race again?
        General Kadish. It is not designed against thousands of
    nuclear warheads.
        Senator Warner. It would be overwhelmed.
        General Kadish. So, it would be overwhelmed, as could any
    defenses in the history of mankind could eventually be
    overwhelmed.
        Senator Warner. Now, again, the word ``limit'' is applied
    to the intercontinental system, but when we get down to the
    smaller systems, particularly those systems we hope to have in
    the architecture to defend our forward deployed troops, those
    systems could interdict more than the few missiles. Am I not
    correct?
        General Kadish. That is correct. Our intention would be to
    have enough inventory to have a robust protection of our
    deployed forces.
        Senator Warner. I think some clarity has to be made as we
    move along because the fundamental concept is limited and that
    is the main target that we are dealing with under the ABM
    Treaty. But there will be more missiles involved in that
    system.
        My time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, I thank you for
    your testimony today. I think this is a very important day and
    discussion on a most significant and difficult issue. I do
    think that you have moved us forward today by speaking directly
    about this new approach to a ballistic missile defense. I for
    one find it helpful.
        I hope that the aim that you described, Secretary
    Wolfowitz, of ultimately having bipartisan support here in
    Congress is realized because this is a very important question
    of national security we are discussing. Traditionally we have
    found ways not to divide on partisan lines on exactly this kind
    of question. That goal will be greatly assisted if the
    administration speaks with more clarity and consistency on this
    question than it has up until this time. I would like to feel
    that the statements that you have made today, which I have
    found at least personally to be helpful and clear, whether one
    agrees with them or disagrees with them, whether one is
    reassured by them or alarmed by them, will set a standard for
    what will follow.
        Words are very important here, as Senator Levin's questions
    illuminated. I think it is very important that everyone in the
    administration use the same language, be on the same program,
    and that will help us to find the common ground that we ought
    to be able to find on this critical issue.
        I implore you to spend as much time as necessary in
    speaking directly to the members of this committee in closed
    and open session, and to members of the relevant House
    committees so we can find that common ground that is ultimately
    going to be in the interest of our country.
        The prevailing law here--and we are, after all, a Nation of
    laws--is the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I was an
    original cosponsor of this proposal with Senator Cochran and
    others. I think it is important for us to go back to it because
    it is important for our allies and others around the world to
    understand this, that in this law, the United States committed
    to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective
    National Missile Defense system capable of defending the
    territory of the United States against limited--limited--
    ballistic missile attack.
        So the question then, according to this law, is not whether
    we will build a ballistic missile defense, but how and when we
    will do it.
        These are serious questions that involve matters of
    international treaty and international security. I think you
    have spoken directly to this today, and I appreciate it. I for
    one will not shy away from supporting authorization and
    appropriation that might necessitate a withdrawal from the ABM
    Treaty if I am convinced that it is necessary to do so for the
    protection of our national security and that the administration
    has made every possible effort to negotiate the appropriate
    modifications of the ABM Treaty with the Russians and that
    effort has failed.
        I think your directness has helped us to move forward here
    into difficult territory, but it is important territory. I urge
    you to hold the line on the position you have taken as we begin
    to negotiate and discuss more specifically how we can achieve a
    bipartisan agreement on this critical question.
        The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 had in it what I
    would consider to be two qualifications or conditions. The
    first is that the deployment of the National Missile Defense
    would be subject to the annual authorization of appropriations
    and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile
    Defense.
        I have taken that to mean that we in Congress and members
    of whatever administration was in office at the time would have
    to make a judgment about priorities. How much are we prepared
    to invest in NMD or BMD now as compared to other national
    security needs?
        I want to ask you to go into a little more detail in
    answering a question that you touched on in your opening
    statement. The Bush administration's proposed defense budget
    for fiscal year 2002 goes up overall 7 percent after inflation.
    The budget proposal for the Ballistic Missile Defense Office
    goes up 57 percent after inflation. We have seen in hearings
    that this committee has held that, notwithstanding the 7
    percent overall increase, there are serious cuts in weapons
    procurement. Procurement for the Navy, for instance, is down as
    we rapidly head toward less than a 300-ship Navy. Basic
    research and development for the Air Force, for instance, is
    down, and certain elements of readiness and training are less
    than they have been in the past.
        So, my question is, can you respond to that qualifier or
    condition in the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 that the
    administration has its priorities right here and that the
    reductions in funding that are part of the overall budget, as
    compared to the dramatic increase in the National Missile
    Defense budget, are justified?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. A couple of points, if I might. First,
    on your original comment, if there has been any lack of clarity
    in what people say--and I also address this to the chairman--it
    is not because of a lack of desire to achieve clarity. It is
    because these issues are murky. As I said, there are
    technological uncertainties and there are legal uncertainties.
    We are trying--and my statement represents another part of that
    effort--to be as clear and direct as we possibly can.
        We have never for a minute hidden the fact that we have
    directed General Kadish to develop a program that is not in any
    way constrained by the treaty, not to go out of his way to look
    for opportunities to violate the treaty at its earliest
    possible time, but also not to foreswear something that makes
    developmental or deployment sense because it would conflict
    with the treaty. That has been a whole new revision in the way
    BMDO has done its work. It has flushed new ideas and new issues
    on the table, and we are trying to be as clear as we possibly
    can with Congress.
        I agree these are important issues and we will continue to
    do that. I appreciate the effort of bipartisanship, but we have
    never made a secret of the fact that the President fully
    intends to deploy a defense of the United States. Of course,
    that is what the National Missile Defense Act calls for as
    well. It should be no secret to anyone that article I of the
    treaty explicitly prohibits such defense of American territory.
        So, we are on a collision course, and trying to determine
    the exact point of collision or the closest point of approach.
    But no one is pretending that what we are doing is consistent
    with that treaty. We have to either withdraw from it or replace
    it.
        The question about priorities is a crucial one, we have
    been wrestling hard with it. I would challenge the notion that
    we have increased missile defense at the expense of everything
    else. I am sorry the numbers are not as fresh in my mind as I
    would like, but we have I think approximately a $22 or $23
    billion real increase in defense spending this year over the
    2001 budget, and I believe of that, roughly 10 percent of that
    increase is in missile defense. We have weighed that against
    many other priorities. We have invested even more heavily in
    improved flying hours, improved base maintenance, not to
    mention increased health care costs, in which there is a $5
    billion real increase. The largest single portion of that $23
    billion increase is essentially going to welfare and training
    of our troops which is the first priority. There is a $7
    billion increase in research and development over and beyond
    the $2.4 billion that we are adding to missile defense.
        Yes, Senator, I really do believe that is an appropriate
    allocation. As I said in my opening statement, our current
    schedule for deploying PAC-3 is woefully inadequate. It has to
    be accelerated. On the current schedule, it will not be until
    the year 2007 that we complete the planned deployment, and that
    is not nearly as thick as it ought to be in places like Korea.
    So, we are accelerating theater missile defense, as well as
    longer-range missile defense, and we will continue to weigh
    those priorities very carefully as we look in the 2003 budget
    where we really have to address the fundamental issues of force
    structure--how large the Navy should be, for example--as you
    mentioned in your comments just now. What Secretary Rumsfeld is
    trying mightily to do with a very intensive approach to the
    quadrennial defense review is to flush up as much as possible
    the tradeoffs so that he, the President, and ultimately
    Congress can make sensible decisions about what we are funding
    and what we are not funding and where those tradeoffs lie. But
    I really do believe this is a very important priority for our
    country.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. My time is up.
        I would just say finally that it seems to me that you and
    General Kadish have laid out the administration's plans
    regarding missile defense with clarity and directness today.
    That is an important step in this very significant debate. I
    just urge you again to not only work as hard as you can with
    the Russians to see whether we can achieve a modification in
    the treaty to allow the testing program that the administration
    wants to carry out or something like it, but that you work as
    hard as you possibly can with members of both parties in
    Congress to see if we can find a way to go forward on this
    critical national security matter without having party
    identification divide us. I think that weakens the overall
    effort and it is worth really reaching as far as possible to
    avoid that result. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman has made reference to the National
    Missile Defense Act, and we will make part of the record at
    this point the entire act, including section 3, which was not
    referred to, which is the policy of the United States to seek
    continued negotiated reductions in nuclear forces of Russia.
        The statement by President Clinton when he signed that
    Missile Defense Act on July 23, 1999, will also be made part of
    the record, including his words that our missile defense policy
    must take into account our arms control and nuclear
    nonproliferation objectives.
        I do not know if that was the second condition that Senator
    Lieberman was going to refer to, but his time ran out. We will
    make both of those documents part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, General Kadish, I appreciate the visual that
    you brought with you today and the way you explained it. I wish
    all of the American people could be here watching this.
        I said to Senator Smith, because he was a little late in
    getting here, Secretary Wolfowitz, that your opening statement
    I believe was the most passionate, accurate, and superb opening
    statement I have heard in the 15 years that I have served in
    the House and the Senate. I thank you very much for that.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. I know it came from your heart.
        I want to ask four quick questions that should just take a
    minute to answer. The reason I want to ask these questions is
    we sit around the table here and we are with Senators and we
    are with top military leaders and with negotiators and experts.
    But there are a lot of people who are not here today, and those
    are the people, a lot of whom are in Oklahoma. There are some
    basic questions that I think need to be brought to their
    attention, questions we know the answer to but they do not. But
    they are performing one important thing, and that is they are
    paying for all this fun that we are having. So, I would like
    just to pose four quick questions and then I want to get into
    something here.
        The first is, does the United States currently have the
    ability to defend the 50 States against an incoming missile?
    Very simply asked.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. None at all, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Does article I of the ABM Treaty not
    explicitly prohibit the United States from defending our
    territory, the 50 States, against missile attack?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, it does.
        Senator Inhofe. Does article V not prohibit the
    development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based,
    space-based, or mobile land-based missiles?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, it does, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Now the other question. The three of us
    have something in common. We are not attorneys. So, let me ask
    you the question that is asked of me quite often because I have
    not heard a good answer yet. Why is it we are sitting around
    spending so much time talking about the violation or the
    amending of a treaty that was between two countries, one of
    which no longer exists today?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I am not a lawyer, so I will not get
    into legal issues. I know the President has made a judgment
    that rather than to get into those legal issues--and I know
    there are lawyers who would argue that the treaty lapsed with
    the demise of the Soviet Union--that it is a very important
    fact in the relationship between the United States and Russia.
    In fact--I will try to keep this answer short, but my
    impression from discussions that I had in May in Moscow, when
    the President sent Steve Hadley and I there and from the
    discussions that Secretary Rumsfeld has had with his Russian
    counterpart, is that the ABM Treaty is important more because
    it is a tie to the United States that they badly want to
    preserve, rather than because of its exact content. I think
    that is the spirit in which we are trying to replace it.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Let me just share with you--there are two areas of this
    whole debate that I have found most offensive. One is the
    argument about the suitcase and the terrorist threat. It is a
    very real threat. It is there. There is no one in this hall
    today who is more sensitive to that than I am being from
    Oklahoma, being from an area where I was moments after the
    largest domestic terrorist attack in the history of this
    country, and seeing what happened to the Murrah Federal Office
    Building and seeing the parts of bodies stuck to the walls and
    people I knew intimately with loved ones that were never found.
        To think that the explosive power of that was about 1 ton
    of TNT, and yet those nuclear warheads that we talk about, in
    most cases the smallest ones are about a kiloton, 1,000 times
    the explosive power that devastated the Murrah Federal Office
    Building and killed 168 Oklahomans. When you put that in
    perspective, it changes the whole thought I think around this
    subject in terms of defending ourselves.
        The other thing that I have found offensive is this
    discussion today of the treaty. It is a treaty that could be
    argued is not there, but let us assume that that treaty is in
    some degree of effect. It was put together at a time in our
    history that we three are all old enough to remember even
    though I did not agree with it at the time, but there was a
    pretty smart guy named Henry Kissinger who did. He felt that we
    did have two super powers and that perhaps this mutual assured
    destruction made some sense at that time.
        But Henry Kissinger himself has said--and I have used his
    words on the floor of the Senate many times--this is not 1972.
    There are not two superpowers. In fact, the threat that is
    facing America today because of its proliferation and its lack
    of identity is greater in my opinion than it was at that time.
    He said, ``It is nuts to make a virtue out of our
    vulnerability.'' Here is the guy who was the architect of the
    ABM Treaty of 1972. As you have both so accurately pointed out,
    along with some others, that is not true today.
        So, with that treaty as a major discussion, in the last few
    seconds here I want to just throw out a few things to at least
    get into this meeting the real sense of threat that faces this
    country. I agree with George Tenet, Director of Central
    Intelligence, who before this committee said that we are very
    likely in the most threatened position today that we have been
    in the history of our Nation.
        Remember the movie that we saw recently that is out right
    now, ``Thirteen Days,'' talking about the Cuban missile crisis
    of the 1960s. We have the same defenses today that we had back
    then. People really are not aware of this.
        We had something happen in 1996 in the straits off of
    Taiwan. Trying to intimidate their elections, the Chinese were
    firing missiles. Their second highest military authority said
    that we are not concerned about America getting involved
    because they would rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei.
        We recall that just 2 years after that, the Minister of
    Defense of China, Chi Hou Tun, said war with America is
    inevitable.
        You look at all of these and as you pointed out in your
    opening statement, Secretary Wolfowitz, the three-stage
    rocket--that was August 31, 1998--was a rocket from North Korea
    that has the capability of hitting the United States of
    America. Only 7 days before that, we had a letter, dated August
    24, 1998, that said that it would be 5 to 10 years before that
    threat would be there.
        We know that when they talked, during the last
    administration, about how far out this threat was, later on
    they said, well, that is an indigenous developed missile. We
    are not talking about that anymore. We are talking about
    countries that we know have the ability to fire a rocket to hit
    us and we have no defense for that. We know that they are
    trading technology and assistance with countries like Iraq,
    Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan. We know specifically that Iraq is
    trading technology and systems with North Korea. We know that
    Saddam Hussein said at the end of the war, if we had waited 10
    years to go into Kuwait, we would not have had to worry about
    America because we would have had a missile that could have
    reached them. Here it is now 10 years later.
        So, my question is, what is your current comfort level?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. My comfort level is very low, or my
    discomfort level is very high. I should have said that in
    partial answer to Senator Lieberman's previous question on the
    relative priorities: if you go back to the Gulf War, we over-
    estimated virtually every Iraqi capability except this one.
    Ballistic missiles were the only area in which Saddam Hussein
    was much more capable than we thought he would be.
        We know if there were a war in Korea this year that the
    ballistic missile threat from North Korea would be one of the
    most serious threats we would face. One of the decisions
    Secretary Rumsfeld made was to stop talking about this
    difference between national and theater because many of these
    capabilities apply across the board. Just as North Korea is
    seeking to extend the range, it is also true that our ability
    to defend across the board in a Korean conflict would be
    crucial.
        The airborne laser, for example, which would be a clear
    violation of the ABM Treaty, if it is successful, can shoot
    down short-range missiles as well as long-range missiles in
    boost phase. When you do an analysis of what would make the
    greatest difference for a theater missile defense on the Korean
    peninsula, I believe the analyses conclude the most important
    effective advance would be airborne lasers.
        So, I think we are sitting here already very vulnerable to
    short-range missiles, increasingly vulnerable to intermediate-
    range missiles, and as you said, Senator, it is only a matter
    of time and not 15 years but 5 or less before those countries
    acquire the capability to reach the United States, and not just
    a limited piece of the United States.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Cleland.
        Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. Thank you all for
    appearing today.
        General Kadish, you mentioned an interesting point that in
    the history of warfare, there has been no defense system that
    was 100 percent perfect. Is it your opinion that this National
    Missile Defense system that is seeking to be deployed will not
    be 100 percent perfect in defense?
        General Kadish. We will make it as good as we can make it,
    Senator.
        Senator Cleland. No, no. The question is, is it not true
    that this system that we are going to spend billions on to
    perfect and test will not be 100 percent effective?
        General Kadish. I do not think I could answer that question
    the way it is stated because 100 percent against what amount of
    threat? Although you could be overwhelmed at some point, these
    systems can be very effective against a certain number of
    threats.
        Senator Cleland. All it takes is one nuclear warhead to
    ruin our day.
        Now, is it not true? You just said it yourself. In the
    history of warfare, there was no defense system that could not
    be overwhelmed. So, is it not true the deployment of this
    National Missile Defense system will not be 100 percent
    effective? There is no such thing out there as 100 percent
    security that we are going to get from that in terms of
    incoming missiles? Is that not true?
        General Kadish. That is true, but it is true for all the
    weapons systems we have in all our services.
        Senator Cleland. Now, is it not also true that over the
    last 29 years since 1972, the inauguration of the ABM Treaty,
    that the combination of our deterrence and our treaty
    obligations, particularly in terms of the ABM Treaty, has been
    100 percent effective? We have not had an incoming missile in
    terms of the United States territory. Is that not true?
        General Kadish. That is true.
        Senator Cleland. It does seem to me that this is part of
    the crux of this argument here. Are we going to shift from a
    system that has been reliable for 30 years, a combination of
    deterrence and treaty obligations, particularly with Russia, to
    something here that actually is not going to be 100 percent
    effective and may, indeed, destabilize, as the chairman has
    indicated, our relationships not only with Russia, but with
    China and cause the Russians to MIRV their warheads, cause the
    Chinese to build more missiles and actually destabilize our
    relationship with our allies?
        Secretary Wolfowitz, in all honesty, your comment about
    bumping up against the ABM Treaty but not inhaling--[Laughter.]
        That is strange credibility.
        So, that is where I get off the boat. I happen to be a big
    supporter of theater missile defense. There is a distinction
    between theater missile defense and a National Missile Defense
    system. Theater missile defense is allowed under the law. All
    this testing we saw, General Kadish, that you pointed out, was
    that not allowable under the ABM Treaty?
        General Kadish. Yes, it was.
        Senator Cleland. Well, we could continue to test and do
    those kind of things that we need to do. As a matter of fact, I
    am a strong supporter of the Arrow missile defense program with
    the Israelis, the THAAD missile high altitude intercept, the
    Patriot-3. Those are theater missile defense programs that can
    protect our troops and can be moved from time to time against
    whatever rogue nation we choose to target it against.
        This deployment of a National Missile Defense system is
    actually illegal under the ABM Treaty, and I think if we throw
    out the ABM Treaty here, we are throwing out the baby with the
    bath water. That is where I get off the boat.
        Let me just say I also think that it compromises other
    aspects of our defense. I just finished reading ``Waging Modern
    War.'' It is a book about the whole Balkan war. We used
    precision weapons to a degree unheard of in modern warfare, and
    yet the Chief of Staff of the Air Force sat right at that table
    2 days ago, and when I asked him if we had replenished our
    stockpile of precision munitions, he said no. Yet, we are going
    to spend $2.2 billion extra here on some National Missile
    Defense system in an effort to deploy it when it is not quite
    ready for prime time and we cannot even replenish the stockpile
    of precision munitions that do work. I am greatly concerned
    that we are putting the cart before the horse here.
        I will say that the chief sat here and talked about $30
    billion in unfunded requirements that are not being met. I
    would say to you that increasing National Missile Defense
    funding by some 57 percent more than last year is a little bit
    out of line with what we are trying to do in other aspects of
    our military.
        I think, quite frankly, the real threat, as the chairman
    has indicated and as others have indicated and intelligence
    analysts have indicated, is not so much from a missile with a
    return address, but from a terrorist attack somewhere. Look at
    the most recent attack. It was on the U.S.S. Cole, sitting dead
    in the water and vulnerable to a terrorist attack.
        So, I think we have to rethink our priorities here. The
    Defense Department's own reports call the deployment of this
    National Missile Defense program into great question.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the report. It took 8 months
    to get this out of the Pentagon. I would like to have it
    entered into the record, along with an article, ``Pentagon
    Report Reveals Flaws in Missile Defense.'' I ask that this
    report be included in the record.
        Chairman Levin. Both will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]
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        Senator Cleland. Why are we in such a hurry to spend an
    additional $3 billion on National Missile Defense? It is termed
    National Missile Defense in the law. I can find no good reason
    to justify the increase. I think it is unconscionable when our
    servicemen and women are flying aircraft that are 18 to 22
    years of age. It is unconscionable when American pilots flying
    foreign-built fighters defeat those flying our own equipment in
    90 percent of training engagements. That is one reason why I am
    so big on the F-22. It is unconscionable when we are procuring
    ships at a rate that will erode our Navy to a level of ships
    well below that which is reasonable to meet our requirements,
    and it is unconscionable when 70 percent of our Army's major
    combat systems are more than halfway through their projected
    service lives.
        I just state quite sincerely that I was as much for a
    theater missile defense as anyone and the technology involved
    in it. But in a fiscal environment that precludes us from
    meeting our legitimate bread and butter needs, in a global
    security environment that presents us with a multitude of
    potential threats more imminent than missiles not yet off the
    drawing board, I cannot look the taxpayers of this country and
    of my state in the eye and tell them that this is a worthy
    expenditure of their money. I am convinced that this NMD effort
    is something we need to take a strong look at and that Congress
    ought to use the power of the purse in rejecting this increase.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
        Senator Bunning.
        Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I would like to thank both the Secretary and
    the General for their clarity and straightforwardness in
    answering questions and discussing our National Missile Defense
    and all theater missile defenses and for the notification of
    Russia and our allies that we intend to go forward with this
    defense system. The first priority in the Constitution is
    national defense, and things certainly have changed since 1972
    and we are now in the year 2001 and spending money to defend
    the United States of America from intercontinental ballistic
    missiles ought to be the top priority that we have. I
    congratulate you on making that decision and doing what is
    necessary to defend the majority of our American people.
        General Kadish, are you positive the technology is there to
    build this system?
        General Kadish. I guess the way I would answer that is that
    at this point for the technologies we are pursuing, there are
    no inventions required to do it. It is a matter of very
    difficult engineering activities. Then as we pursue some of the
    additional ideas that might come out of this new process,
    because of treaty issues and other activities we did not
    explore very much, there may be some new technologies that
    could be applied. So, it is an engineering challenge rather
    than an invention challenge for the types of systems that we
    are looking at very early in this process.
        Senator Bunning. Secretary Wolfowitz, I just came back from
    Seoul, Korea. There are about 45 million people in the greater
    Seoul area. The North Koreans have just moved up their
    conventional artillery 10 miles behind the 38th parallel. Not
    only do we face the nuclear threat out of North Korea but a
    conventional weapons threat. Do we have anything possible in
    our systems right now if North Korea decided to pull the
    trigger on the conventional weapons? Could we defend ourselves
    and our 35,000 to 38,000, depending on what time of the year it
    is, American troops that are there?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Against conventional ballistic
    missiles, our capability is negligible.
        I would like to make this also an answer to some of Senator
    Cleland's comments before. The theater missile threat, as you
    were describing it, is very real and very urgent. There are
    hundreds of those North Korean conventionally armed missiles.
    Some may have chemical weapons on them.
        Frankly, I do believe, particularly when we are talking
    about conventional missiles, if you can take out 50 percent of
    them, that is a heck of a lot better than 0. During the Gulf
    War with the PAC-2, which was a lot less than 50 percent, there
    was not a single ally or a single commander who did not clamor
    for more.
        We are adding a substantial amount of money. I believe it
    is on the order--and General Kadish can correct me--of $1.5
    billion, Senator Cleland, in this increase goes exclusively for
    theater missile defense.
        Another large part of what we are doing is dual capable. I
    bring up, as I said before, the airborne laser, which when it
    starts to shoot down missiles will be a clear violation of the
    ABM Treaty, whether those missiles are heading for Los Angeles
    or heading for Seoul, because it shoots them down in the boost
    phase when it cannot tell the difference, unless we are going
    to start putting software in to tell it you can only shoot down
    missiles of a certain limited boost capability.
        That threat is very real. I agree strongly with Senator
    Cleland on the urgency of dealing with the theater missile
    threat, but what I would also urge all of your colleagues to
    consider is that the more serious we are across the board, the
    more our capability will be across the board. By pursuing
    defenses against long-range missiles, we develop technologies
    that are also useful against shorter-range missiles and vice
    versa. Frankly, if it has taken us more than 10 years to field
    PAC-3, I have to conclude we have not yet been serious as a
    country. It is time to be serious.
        Senator Bunning. In other words, the money we are devoting
    to the upgrade of not only theater missile defense but National
    Missile Defense is a priority that should be at the top of the
    list not down the list.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. In fact, every theater commander will
    tell you that is his biggest vulnerability. Again, I believe
    strongly in investing in ships and aircraft, and I wish we had
    more money to spend on them. But in a war in Korea, many of our
    air bases could be rendered completely useless, many of our
    ships would be sunk by a ballistic missile attack. It is a
    critical deficiency in our military capability in both that
    theater and in the Persian Gulf.
        Senator Bunning. I suggest that everybody on the Armed
    Services Committee that has not been to the 38th parallel can
    look just 10 miles north and see the encampment and the
    batteries that have been moved in place that expose 45 million
    people to, my God, who knows what, whether there is nuclear or
    whether--if it is just conventional warheads on those, we would
    have a slaughter that would shock not only our own people in
    the United States, but would put in jeopardy all of the 35,000
    or 38,000 U.S. service people that are there to defend and help
    defend and enforce the 1953 cease-fire that was put in force.
        So, I want to thank you for going forward with this and
    make it as fast and quick as possible.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
        By the way, the increasing range of North Korean missiles
    means that it is not just South Korean facilities that are at
    risk. Everything in Japan----
        Senator Bunning. No. I am just talking about those bases.
    The other ones are capable of reaching the United States of
    America.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bunning.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Mr. Secretary, General Kadish.
        This morning's testimony, together with other positions of
    the administration with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban
    Treaty (CTBT) and others, raises great concerns because I
    believe what is happening is there is conscious rejection of
    arms control as a central tenet of American foreign policy, and
    by that I mean an endeavor, through bilateral and multilateral
    agreements, not just to limit weapons, but to create a stable
    strategic structure. I know the Secretary has indicated that
    you intend to talk to the Russians, but the definite insistence
    that, regardless of the result of those discussions, you will
    proceed with these plans, suggests that that is less than an
    invitation to negotiations and more of a demand for
    acquiescence, which is very difficult to achieve in the
    international arena.
        What I have heard this morning I would sum up as the four
    noes. No specifics with respect to a deployable system. No cost
    estimates with respect to the life cycle of a deployable
    system. No agreement with our allies, both our old allies and
    our newfound allies, and most emphatically, no ABM.
        Now, let me turn to some specific issues. Mr. Secretary,
    you have several times referred to the reduction of our
    missiles as part of this new framework, making specific
    reference to Peacekeeper. Yesterday we had the opportunity in
    the Strategic Subcommittee to discuss these issues with Admiral
    Mies and General Blaisdell and Admiral Dwyer. You have budgeted
    $5 million to acquire some equipment to begin the preparation
    for the reduction and elimination of the Peacekeeper.
        We are told that is less than a third of what is necessary.
    There is absolutely no provision going forward that we were
    shown to suggest that you have budgeted the approximately $500
    million necessary to actually retire the Peacekeeper missile.
    So, your words today do not seem to be supported by your budget
    proposals in this budget and looking forward to 2003. Is that
    accurate?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to get the details,
    Senator, because you are asking me something I am not
    completely certain about, but I believe the remaining funds
    would be coming in 2003 and possibly future years, although I
    assumed we would be finished in 2003. You do not have a 2003
    budget request yet. You have an old 2003 budget that did not
    plan for Peacekeeper in or Peacekeeper out.
        Senator Reed. I understand that, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The clear intent is to retire
    Peacekeeper.
        Senator Reed. Well, if that is your clear intent, then you
    are grossly underfunding the first preliminary step in terms of
    acquiring equipment to do that, and you apparently have not
    made any provisions, at least not to the awareness of Strategic
    Command, to fund the approximately $500 million that will be
    necessary to do that.
        Again, when not just the Senate but the world looks at our
    words and then looks at our budget, if there is a
    discontinuity, then I think they will tend to look more at the
    budget than our words.
        General Kadish, the proposed budget dedicates funds to
    something called space-based kinetic. Is it right to assume
    this is a Brilliant Pebbles type system? If so, I have some
    specific questions. Are you planning to ultimately deploy a
    space-based interceptor system if the technology works?
        General Kadish. The line also includes sea-based kinetic as
    well. So, this is an effort to define how we can do boost phase
    kinetic energy intercepts as a hedge against the directed
    energy that we have in that area, namely the airborne laser.
    There has been very little work done on that in the last few
    years.
        The situation we face with kinetic energy boost phase
    interceptors, terrestrially based, is that you have to catch an
    accelerating missile with another accelerating missile that is
    launched many minutes after the first one. Overtaking and
    intercepting an accelerating missile is a very tough challenge.
    So, we are going to explore that area with the monies involved.
        We have an additional effort to look at an experiment doing
    the same from space because you are in a better position to do
    that, and that has some legacy back to Brilliant Pebbles but it
    is not a major effort at the beginning to look at that as part
    of our architecture other than to do the early experiments.
        Senator Reed. But if these experiments prove to be
    effective, there is a possibility that you could propose to
    deploy a system of satellites in order to acquire these targets
    and essentially put in a space-based system. Is that correct?
        General Kadish. That would just be one of the many hundreds
    of decisions that have to be made about how the architecture
    develops in an incremental way. That is certainly not imminent
    in our program right now.
        Senator Reed. It is not imminent, but we have heard
    repeatedly in the discussions, both your responses and my
    colleagues', that Russia, China, no one has anything to fear
    with the proposals that we are talking about today in this
    budget. Yet, you are beginning to do research which could
    create a space-based interceptor system, which unlike the
    airborne laser needs to be closely proximate to the threat
    area, and could effectively interdict Russian or Chinese
    missiles. Is that correct?
        General Kadish. Well, Senator, if my memory serves me, we
    got $5 million out of a $7 billion budget to look at that
    effort.
        Senator Reed. General, you know I will not quibble with you
    on the dollars, but essentially you are beginning to
    investigate possibilities that could, in fact, raise legitimate
    concerns from a technical point with both the Russians and the
    Chinese. Is that fair?
        General Kadish. I am not sure exactly what their concerns
    would be.
        Senator Reed. Let me put it this way. If Russia had a
    system in space that was capable of intercepting our
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) when they left our
    launch pad, would you be concerned?
        General Kadish. I am always paranoid about those types of
    things. That is what you pay me for. [Laughter.]
        I guess it is a strategic framework issue, and maybe the
    Secretary should answer that from a policy----
        Senator Reed. My time has expired, but if--Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Levin. Yes.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would say, Senator, that we are
    years away from anything of that kind. Whether it is in space
    in Russian altitudes or in space over Iranian altitudes or
    Iraqi altitudes, for example, would make all the difference in
    the world. But we are just years away from that. As the General
    said, it is a very small piece of the program. But I think it
    is important to try to understand what the technological
    possibilities are.
        We are looking for a relationship with Russia where we are
    not threatening one another. We have already moved
    significantly in that direction. We have a much longer way to
    go.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, if I may, but if you would
    throw off an ABM Treaty, this research could--there is no
    constraint on deploying a system such as this if it proves out
    technically. Is that correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Unless we came to some different
    agreement with the Russians that constrained it, or unless we
    decided politically to constrain it because it was a matter of
    concern, or unless we limited it in a way that made it clear to
    the Russians that it was not a matter of concern. We could
    perhaps do it cooperatively because we are both vulnerable to
    those kinds of attacks.
        We are talking about something that is at least 10 years
    away from even being something that you could talk about
    concretely. By that time, I would hope the U.S.-Russian
    relationship is genuinely transformed and then, in fact, we
    could talk about whether those capabilities could be mutually
    beneficial if deployed in the right way or the right numbers.
        Lord knows neither of us want to be vulnerable to an
    accidental attack by the other side. If you asked me, would I
    feel threatened if the Russians had a limited capability to
    shoot down an accidentally launched American ICBM, I would feel
    much more comfortable if they had that capability than if they
    are primed, as they are today, to launch on warning. They
    nearly launched a few years ago when they saw a Norwegian
    weather rocket. I would feel so much safer if they had some
    ability to defend against a limited attack than if they sit
    there thinking that launch on warning is the answer.
        So, I am not trying to be contentious. We are miles down
    the road. We are trying to develop a relationship with the
    Russians where we are talking regularly and frequently about
    where we are heading in our defense programs across the board
    from a perspective of essentially common interests, which I
    think are growing.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, my colleagues have been very
    kind, but let me say it is not just a question of how far down
    the road we are going. It is what roads we are taking. I think
    this is a critical issue.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank
    Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish for I think a ringing
    call to reality to face the fact that the world has changed and
    we have different threats. Jim Inhofe referred to Henry
    Kissinger. I believe one of the statements I heard him make was
    that he never heard of a country whose policy it was to keep
    itself vulnerable to attack when we have the ability to defend
    ourselves from attack.
        Secretary Wolfowitz, you served on a commission to examine
    this, a bipartisan commission when President Clinton was in
    office. Would you tell us how many people served on that
    commission, the makeup of it, and what your conclusion was?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. In fact, it was known as the Rumsfeld
    Commission because Don Rumsfeld--I guess he was already
    Secretary Rumsfeld by that time--was the chairman of the
    commission. There were nine of us, five Republicans, four
    Democrats. Very diverse points of view. I felt honored to be
    included among those people.
        Senator Sessions. The commission rendered a unanimous
    report, did it not?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It did, and I think that surprised all
    of us. We came in there with very diverse points of view. Our
    mandate was--let me emphasize--not to assess how to deal with
    this problem. It was to assess what the problem was. If we had
    been asked to recommend how to deal with it, you would have
    probably had 11 different solutions from our nine members. But
    on assessing what the threat was, we came to a degree of
    unanimity that surprised me and I think surprised everyone. It
    happened because the more we dug into the facts, the more
    astonished we were at how rapidly this ballistic missile
    technology had proliferated, how much the various bad actors
    were cooperating with one another, sharing technology with one
    another, and how aggressively this had all moved forward.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think you found that in 1972 nine
    nations had ballistic missiles and now we have 29 nations with
    ballistic missiles. Those things I think are important.
        As to what is unconscionable, I think it is unconscionable
    for us to have the President of the United States handcuffed in
    the ability to take strong action around the world because in
    doing so, he might subject the American people to a missile
    attack. It is that fundamental to me.
        Now, with regard to the Soviet Union, which is gone, and
    the now existing Russia, it is my great hope and belief that we
    can reach a peaceful partnership between those two countries
    and that we can move forward carefully to expand that
    friendship in a way that we cannot even imagine today. Nothing
    would be better for the world, and I think we have every reason
    to believe that is possible.
        But is it not true that we have a treaty with Russia, the
    ABM Treaty--presumably it is still a treaty--and that agreement
    does not impact any of the other nations around the world who
    have these ballistic missiles? It does not bind them. Is that
    right?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct, although some of them
    feel it should bind us, but it does not bind them.
        Senator Sessions. So, what we are saying is this agreement
    we have with Russia over how we are going to conduct our
    bilateral relations beginning in 1972 is now a major detriment
    to our ability to protect ourselves from North Korea or some
    other nation that may decide to attack us with a ballistic
    missile.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Or from even a limited accidental
    attack.
        Senator Sessions. It might come from one of the Russian
    missiles.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It could.
        Senator Sessions. So, to me we are in a new world here. We
    are holding on to this relic of the Cold War, this agreement
    between the United States and a nation that no longer exists,
    the Soviet Union, and we are denying ourselves the ability to
    prepare a defense against attack by missiles from any other
    country in the world. Is that fair to say?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is pretty accurate.
        Senator Sessions. Are you familiar with the 1999
    legislation, Secretary Wolfowitz, that the Senate passed 97 to
    3 to move forward with a National Missile Defense, to deploy it
    as soon as we are technologically able to do so?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, I am.
        Senator Sessions. I know the chairman mentioned that
    President Clinton, when he signed it, made a statement that did
    not make any reference to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty or
    not. But that language is not a part of the law of the United
    States, is it?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I am not a lawyer. I will not try to
    practice without a license. But I think not.
        Senator Sessions. I think not also. I am a poor lawyer and
    I do not think that a piece of legislation can be changed by a
    statement made at the time the President signed it if it is not
    made a part of that legislation. So, that is not a factor here.
        Secretary Wolfowitz, is it your view that it is now time in
    this post-Cold War period for us to reassess how we are going
    to defend America, what the threats are to America? Do you
    consider it your challenge to analyze this situation and move
    us into a new period to deal with the changed threats to
    America? Is that what the President has directed you to do?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, Senator, but can I also make a
    bipartisan appeal? I think it is much broader than just
    rethinking those threats and developing the abilities to defend
    against them. It is also a matter of rethinking the whole
    relationship with Russia.
        I think General Kadish was a little nonplussed at the
    question of how we would feel about a Russian ability to shoot
    down an American ICBM. I do not mean to suggest that my good
    colleague here is mired in the Cold War, but frankly I think we
    need to think about an era in which, if the Russians have a
    capability to shoot down an accidentally launched American
    missile, we will understand that to be in our interest just as
    it is in their interests if we are not vulnerable to their
    accidental attack. If we could pass an agreement that abolished
    all ballistic missiles in the world, we would probably be a lot
    better off. We cannot do that, but let us move away from the
    mind-set that said stability rests on the ability of Moscow and
    Washington to push a button and be absolutely sure within 30
    minutes they had annihilated the other country. It is
    absolutely appalling.
        Senator Cleland said it worked 100 percent. It worked 100
    percent for a limited amount of time. I lived through the 1962
    Cuban missile crisis, old enough to be pretty darned scared. I
    do not think it is the greatest system in the world, but a big
    change in thinking is necessary to get beyond it.
        Again, I am going to pick on General Kadish because he is
    here and he is useful. The fact that somebody as forward
    thinking as my colleague here has a little bit of trouble
    thinking that way, imagine the mental changes, the intellectual
    changes we are asking of the Russians who in many ways are much
    more mired in the Cold War than anyone you could find in this
    country.
        But let us think beyond not just in terms of defenses, but
    in terms of our whole relationship with Russia. It is a
    different country. It is a brand new country. It will never be
    the threat to the United States that the Soviet Union was, and
    frankly I think it can be a real partner because if you look
    around the world at real stability, which in my view is not the
    stability that comes from mutual annihilation, it is the
    stability that comes from a stable Europe. It is the stability
    that comes from a stable Northeast Asia. It is the stability
    that comes from a stable Persian Gulf. Those three critical
    parts of the world are right around the border of Russia. They
    are not interested--they should not be. Sometimes they act
    contrary to their interests, I think. We need to try to talk
    them out of that. But Russia's interests are served by
    stability in those regions just as ours are served. We ought to
    be aiming at a relationship that is based on that kind of
    interest in mutual stability, not the interest in mutual
    annihilation.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I thank you for that wonderful
    response. I think you are right and I think your concern that
    we need to be able to defend ourselves from other threats
    around the world that are growing and becoming more
    sophisticated is legitimate. I thank you for having the courage
    to articulate a new vision for America's defenses. Thank you
    very much.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I share with the President and with your
    administration, being newly arrived in Washington, in our
    responsibilities in January of this year. So, from the outset,
    I have thought that the administration's request for the
    broadest possible latitude in developing its plans and the
    budget were appropriate and I think they have been supported by
    Congress with, among other things, what I am told was an
    unprecedented provision in the budget resolution that permitted
    the Secretary of Defense, subsequent to the adoption of that
    resolution, and the chairman of the two budget committees to
    put in what had not been contemplated until that time. So, I
    think Congress has been responsive and supportive.
        I would say that my own view is, before today's testimony,
    that there has been a reprehensible lack of detail and even at
    times candor about these enormously consequential decisions
    that you are making and we are being asked to concur with. I
    support entirely what Chairman Levin recounted in terms of the
    difficulty of obtaining accurate information. I noted that you,
    Mr. Secretary, respectfully had a different perspective, which
    is understandable, from the chairman in your response to
    Senator Lieberman.
        I would just go back again and say that if you reviewed the
    prepared testimony of the Secretary on June 21 and June 28 of
    this year and his response to questions posed here, to hear
    this now, 2 weeks later, it has either been a great
    intellectual leap forward or it has been a matter of, I think,
    difficulty for this committee to obtain the information that I
    would believe I and others are entitled to in order to carry
    forward our responsibilities.
        I would just say, again from my own personal experience, I
    have learned more information about your intentions by watching
    and reading the independent news reports than I have from any
    hearing in this room or even in closed session and executive
    session. I think that is antithetical in terms of what you are
    talking about here in terms of a collaboration and a
    partnership.
        I think it would be one thing to ask for that kind of
    latitude and ambiguity if what you were discussing or proposing
    is the continuation of essentially the previous and generally
    accepted military and diplomatic strategy rather than what is
    in this case a very dramatic and even radical departure from
    both prior military theory and strategy, as well as what is
    contemplated to be an abrupt rupture of a longstanding
    international arms control agreement.
        I would say today's testimony is the first real specificity
    and I certainly trust the veracity that has been forthcoming
    and I commend you for that. I think perhaps now on the basis of
    this--and I would certainly second what the chairman, Senator
    Lieberman, and others have said in urging you to make this the
    new hallmark and trademark of this relationship, that perhaps
    this committee and Congress can now begin to engage in the same
    process that the administration claims it is pursuing with its
    allies and its former adversaries--that is a discussion and a
    debate about the merits and the demerits of these momentous
    decisions.
        I recall the very distinguished former chairman of this
    committee, the Senator from Virginia, noted the word
    ``partnership'' between Congress and the administration, and I
    think that is appropriate to ask for. In my business and
    professional experience, the partnership requires that I know
    who or what my partner really is and that I will be consulted
    and informed rather than engaged in an intellectual game of
    hide and seek where words are often more intended to evade and
    even to mislead than to inform and then finally being told what
    the administration has already decided it is going to do and
    asked to concur with that under the guise of partnership and
    patriotism.
        I would also like to say to you in partial response to some
    observations that have been made by other members of this
    committee that I do not think there is anybody on this
    committee or anybody in Congress or in this administration or I
    believe in former administrations who does not want to make
    this country safer and more secure, who does not want to reduce
    the chance of nuclear war and annihilation anywhere and
    everywhere in this world. But I think we can admit that we need
    to have an honest debate and even disagreement about how best
    to achieve those conditions. I hope we can proceed on that
    basis.
        I guess I would ask, Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you
    said that this system will not undermine arms control or spark
    an arms race. If anything, defenses will reduce the value of
    ballistic missiles and thus remove incentives for their
    development and proliferation. Are you willing to acknowledge
    that that constitutes at least a significant departure from
    previously established U.S. military theory and strategy?
        I recall that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, General Shalikashvili said words to the effect that any
    new defensive system creates a new wave of offensive systems
    and technology. You referred to the former Soviet Union,
    Russia, and our hope for a new relationship there. But as you
    yourself have noted, sir, this world is in a constant state of
    flux. Is it reasonable to assume that setting up this kind of
    multi-layered defense system is not going to spawn worldwide an
    attempt to develop offensive systems of greater ability to
    evade and destroy?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Before I answer that question, let me
    just address very briefly the concern you stated at the outset.
    I really do not believe in intellectual games of hide and seek.
    I do not believe I have ever practiced them in my dealings with
    Congress.
        Senator Dayton. When I referred to you, sir, I am speaking
    in general terms.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, I understand what you are
    saying, and I am understanding the desire of this committee and
    the whole Congress to be as well informed as possible on these
    crucial issues. We will do our level best to give you that
    information.
        One of the reasons that some of these independent news
    reports tell you things that we have not told you is because
    sometimes they know things that we do not know and some of
    those things are not true. You get a contractor who has a gleam
    in his eye about some way that General Kadish can help keep him
    going, and before you know it, there is a story in some
    newspaper that says we are actively considering or maybe even
    have decided. We have to be a lot more careful before we come
    up with something that is actually a program. Even when we have
    a program, as we have tried to explain, programs change,
    especially development programs, in the course of testing.
        So, as far as I am aware, there has been no effort to
    conceal. There has been a genuine difficulty in absorbing a lot
    of change, a lot of facts in a really relatively short period
    of time. As you alluded to, Senator, this is not the only issue
    on which we have been having to scramble hard. So, I appreciate
    your indulgence, and I hope that you will take this testimony
    today as a significant measure of trying to respond to those
    concerns. Quite honestly, I would acknowledge that I think the
    mere scheduling of this hearing has flushed a lot more
    information up in our system to higher levels, and that has
    been useful.
        On the question you raised about defenses spawning a new
    arms race, at the risk of picking a fight with an even higher
    ranking general, or at least an intellectual argument, I think
    that thinking is a vestige of the Cold War. There is no reason
    for the Russians to start taking their scarce resources and
    investing them in new nuclear systems because we build a very
    limited capability to shoot down an accidental launch or a
    North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile. I do not honestly
    believe they will. I think they might come and ask us for some
    relief from some of the arms control restrictions that are
    going to end up costing them money because their security
    problems are above all economic security problems.
        But you have to take each of these things I think in very
    specific context. I used in my testimony the example of what
    American naval supremacy--in fact, you could go back further
    and say Anglo-American naval supremacy--has done to piracy.
    People, except in fairly remote parts of the world, do not
    invest in big pirate fleets because they cannot succeed. In
    fact, very few countries invest in big navies because they
    cannot challenge us. So, the effect of our improving missile
    defense capability I think will be to discourage countries from
    following the path of North Korea and Iran and maybe even
    discourage North Korea and Iran from investing so heavily in
    those capabilities.
        You have to take it case by case. You have to look
    carefully. But I really do believe that it is a nontrivial fact
    that this is the one capability where Iraq did better than
    expected in the Gulf War. It is the one Achilles' heal of the
    American military. The reason these countries are putting so
    much money into ballistic missile capabilities, conventional
    and non-conventional, has to be because they cannot beat us any
    other way, and they see this as a vulnerability. I think it is
    a vulnerability we should close.
        Senator Dayton. I thank you again for your specificity and
    candor and the diligence you are putting into this. You have an
    enormous responsibility and we want to share that with you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator Dayton.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
        Senator Allard.
        Let me, before you start, indicate where we are. We have
    two votes that are now scheduled. The first vote began just a
    few minutes ago. After Senator Allard, we have Senator Nelson
    for the first round. There may be other Senators who come for
    their first round, and the question is how do we proceed to our
    second and third rounds?
        One possibility, because there is a huge amount of material
    here which we have not yet proceeded to discuss--I guess the
    possibility that I want to talk to Senator Warner about is that
    given the fact that we have a subcommittee meeting this
    afternoon and that we have much material to cover, that after
    everybody concludes their first round here--we will call on
    Senator Allard in a moment because he can get his questions in
    before the first vote is over. I am not sure that Senator
    Nelson will be able to do that--that we then adjourn this
    hearing until next Tuesday where we had an open slot and we
    pick up at that point. It is either that or we go after lunch,
    which would create a conflict I think with the subcommittee,
    which we would like to avoid.
        So, this is no way to consult on this publicly, but we do
    not have much choice.
        Senator Warner. I am just wondering. If I were to go vote
    right now and Senator Allard used the time for his questions,
    then you and I each have a follow-on round, I think we could
    almost continuously use the time between now and, say, 1:30 and
    conclude this hearing. I am prepared to do that.
        Chairman Levin. Is that agreeable with you, that you stay
    here until 1:30 if we are able to conclude by then? If I make
    an assessment that we can conclude--I would like to talk to
    other members of the committee, but assuming that we reach that
    assessment, are you able to stay that late?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, I will be a little late to
    something else, but this is more important.
        Chairman Levin. You can do that.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. We have received an enormous amount of
    information today, and given the importance of this subject, I
    think I would be better prepared, others perhaps as well, to
    come back next Tuesday and ask a follow-up round of questions.
        Chairman Levin. I think I am going to proceed that way for
    this reason, and I hate to do it, given Senator Warner's
    suggestion, which is somewhat different. But we did not have
    your testimony until this morning. We expect it 48 hours in
    advance under our rules. You were asked about that at your
    confirmation. This is a hugely important subject. Given the
    fact that we have this problem now and that we need time to
    digest that testimony, I think what we will do is after
    everyone's first round here now, we will adjourn this until
    next Tuesday, if that is an agreeable time with the ranking
    member. If that is not an agreeable time, we will pick this up
    at another date which is agreeable with the ranking member.
    There is just too much material here to squeeze in this way.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, we accept your perfect right
    to schedule for next Tuesday, but I would like that you and I
    at least have the opportunity--I have purposely withheld one or
    two observations until I could have the benefit of hearing all
    colleagues comment on this. So, I do have some concluding
    remarks about what I think has been an extraordinarily
    successful hearing.
        Chairman Levin. We will do that. After everybody's first
    round here today, you and I will then take a few minutes to
    wind up today. We will then adjourn until next Tuesday, at
    least tentatively, at the same time. We will now call upon
    Senator Allard.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Chairman, does that mean that I
    would go ahead and do mine next Tuesday or whenever it is set?
        Chairman Levin. No. If you can squeeze it in today,
    definitely. Anybody who has not had a first round today will
    have an opportunity today to do their first round.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Come back after the two votes?
        Chairman Levin. After the two votes, absolutely.
        Senator Ben Nelson. OK, thank you.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to commend the panel on their great
    presentation today. I have watched the presentation by General
    Kadish in the past where he showed the technology, that we do
    have the capability to use a missile to hit another missile
    during flight. I think that is phenomenal technology and every
    time I see that, I am continually amazed. It demonstrates to me
    that we are clearly on the way technologically to being able to
    even apply that kind of technology to longer-range missiles,
    and I am confident that we are moving in the right direction
    technologically and showing that that can technologically be
    done.
        The other thing that particularly amazes me is that the
    argument is made that somehow or other we are perpetuating a
    nuclear arms race because we are just responding to what other
    nations are doing throughout the world. I was struck by your
    statement that we now have some 28 countries that have
    ballistic missiles. We have some 12 countries that are
    developing the ability to have a nuclear program.
        Yet, when we come forward and this administration comes
    forward with a proposal that says that we are going to move
    from strictly an offensive posture established during the Cold
    War and we are going to begin to look more closely at a truly
    defensive way of protecting ourselves and that even when the
    administration has said, look, we are willing to even step
    ahead of any treaty that we have signed and reduce our nuclear
    warhead capability below what is being called for in any other
    treaties that we have signed, that somehow or other we are
    accused of moving towards some kind of an arms race.
        From what I see out of this administration, there is a
    definite commitment to bring about world peace. I commend the
    President for reaching out to our allies. He has really just
    started that process. I think he has a long ways to go, but I
    think it will work and I think it is the right thing to do. I
    think that we need to move ahead with our own technology, and I
    am impressed with what the panel has presented to this
    committee here today.
        Senator Levin, chairman of the committee here, had raised
    concerns that the ballistic missile budget before us had not
    been fully vetted, in other words, had not been looked at as to
    whether it was complying with the treaties and the review
    process. But I understand that the BMDO budgets have never been
    fully vetted when they have been submitted to Congress. In
    fact, they have never been fully vetted even after they have
    passed Congress. I am told, for example, that the Compliance
    Review Group certified your last long-range missile defense
    test on June 30, 2000, and the test took place on June 8, 2000.
        So, the question I have is, does the process to determine
    the compliance of program activities during the budget cycle
    differ significantly from the process used in past years? In
    other words, you are using the same budget process as far as
    the vetting process as we have ever done in that past. We have
    not deviated from that, have we?
        General Kadish. No, Senator. We are using the same
    compliance review process, but that will be adjusted somewhat I
    think to ensure that we put more attention than we have in the
    past on that, given the Secretary's interest in this subject.
        Senator Allard. Which shows again a commitment I think by
    the administration to try and comply and work with our allies.
        I want to follow that up with another question. Is it not
    true that compliance certification usually comes in only a
    matter of days to months prior to the test event?
        General Kadish. That has been true in the past because
    there is so much analysis that goes into those compliance
    reviews of testing activities. So, many times we do not know
    exactly the final configuration of the test until days
    beforehand or weeks beforehand. We are trying to improve that,
    but that is just a fact of life. Therefore, the final
    compliance certification tends to follow those decisions in the
    program. So, we have had that situation I think in the past few
    tests that we have done.
        Senator Allard. Were you going to comment, Secretary
    Wolfowitz?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, my first comment, Senator, is
    you have just informed me of something rather significant that
    I did not know about before that we certified a test after it
    had been conducted. So, obviously, there is more I have to
    understand about this arcane process than I knew before I came
    here. Obviously, we have to make it work in a way that gets
    information on these legal judgments to the President and to
    Congress in a more timely way than that particular example
    suggests, but at this moment I cannot tell you how we are going
    to do that exactly.
        Senator Allard. According to my information, it was a week
    before.
        My understanding is that I have a vote on the floor. I am
    the only one here in the committee, so I am going to put it in
    recess so I do not miss my vote. Then when I return, I will
    finish my question period. I will put the committee in recess.
    [Recess.]
        I would like to go ahead and call the Armed Services
    Committee back to order. When you are at the first of the
    alphabet and you get a chance to vote first, sometimes there is
    an advantage. So, I was the last to leave and first to arrive.
        I will continue to use my time to question the panelists, I
    would like to move forward with my questioning by addressing
    this to General Kadish.
        In your testimony, you spoke about a significant effort to
    improve your testing capabilities in the Pacific. As I recall,
    the realism of your testing program has been criticized
    considerably not only by individuals like Mr. Coyle, who is the
    former Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, but also
    by groups like the Union of Concerned Scientists and even some
    Members of Congress.
        In fact, Mr. Coyle made the following recommendations in
    his NMD DRR report, ``Current test range limitations need to be
    removed to adequately test the NMD system. Target trajectories
    or radar surrogate locations need to be changed.'' It goes on
    to say that ``flight testing artificialities must be
    eliminated. Multiple engagements must be accomplished. This
    type of engagement should have flown in integrated flight tests
    before OT&E.''
        The Union of Concerned Scientists stated that testing
    should be conducted--and I quote them--``under realistic
    conditions.''
        The GAO had cited in their May 20, 2000 report--and I quote
    that report--``A number of test limitations affect the ability
    to test, analyze, and evaluate system performance.''
        Now, it seems to me that the test bed you are proposing
    should go a long way towards answering the criticism that I
    have just mentioned. In fact, it seems that it is a much better
    way to test the systems we are trying to develop. Could you
    comment on the advantages of the test bed that you are
    proposing?
        General Kadish. You are exactly right, Senator. In fact,
    all of those recommendations have been, in one way or another,
    incorporated into this test bed idea because the best way to
    test against a long-range missile threat in a midcourse type
    system, whether it is ground-based or, for that matter, sea-
    based, is to do it the way you plan to operate.
        This test bed in the Pacific, with elements at Fort Greely
    and Kodiak, Alaska, and at Kwajalein and Vandenberg, and other
    elements, does exactly that. To the best of our ability, it
    replicates an operationally realistic test arrangement. That
    gives us many more geometries to test against. It gives us much
    more flexibility and realism to test the communications and
    command and control, as well as reliability and maintainability
    of the systems. It provides us with a lot more information than
    we had planned to get. But it is expensive.
        Senator Allard. Now, as I had mentioned in some of my
    remarks earlier, the President has proposed a new strategic
    framework that relies on a mix of offensive nuclear forces,
    missile defenses, and nonproliferation efforts. I wondered if
    the panel would elucidate again what you see as the fundamental
    differences between deterrence during the Cold War and the 21st
    century challenge.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I guess the heart of it comes down to
    who it is you are trying to deter and what you are trying to
    deter them from doing.
        While there were many other concerns that we had during the
    Cold War, I think our whole nuclear posture, the whole
    structure of arms control during the Cold War was driven by the
    fact that there were 23 Soviet divisions, heavy divisions, in
    eastern Germany. There were some 100, more or less, divisions
    backing them up all the way to the Urals. They had operational
    plans to, in the event of war, move within a matter of a few
    weeks to the English Channel. We on the other side went from
    planning to deal with that with tactical nuclear weapons to
    planning to deal with it with increasing levels of long-range
    nuclear weapons, and the Soviets responded in kind. So, we had
    a hair trigger situation built on a major military
    confrontation in the heart of Europe.
        What we have today is something very different. The
    relationship with Russia is just completely transformed. It
    bears no similarity to the old Soviet Union, and I would submit
    not only are we not enemies, but as I said to one of your
    colleagues earlier, I believe we have a real interest in mutual
    stability, but it is not the mutual stability that comes from
    mutual annihilation. It is the mutual stability that comes from
    stability in Europe, stability in East Asia, and stability in
    the Persian Gulf.
        The people we are trying to deter are a number of countries
    whose hostility in the United States and hostility to its
    friends has been made abundantly clear. What they are really
    trying to do, as exemplified in some ways by the Gulf War, is
    find ways to keep us from applying our unquestioned
    conventional superiority to protect our friends and allies from
    threats from those countries.
        If you imagine what the Gulf War crisis would have been if
    Saddam Hussein had had the capability to threaten Tokyo and
    Paris and London with nuclear armed ballistic missiles or, even
    worse, if he could have threatened Washington with nuclear
    armed ballistic missiles, maybe we would have gone ahead in
    just the same way that we proceeded. I question that. I
    question even more whether our allies would have proceeded in
    that way.
        So, what we are trying to do is add to the obvious,
    enormous offensive nuclear capability we have relative to any
    of those small countries and to the impressive conventional
    capability that we have an ability to protect against limited
    attacks and to deny them, as much as we possibly can, that
    option of blackmailing us or blackmailing our friends.
        In this framework, I think the larger efforts of
    nonproliferation and counterproliferation loom much larger as
    well. The Soviet Union's capabilities were almost entirely
    indigenous, although we did make a big effort to make sure that
    they did not get help from our friends and allies. In the case
    of these countries, they all depend on a great deal of help
    from other places, and we cannot cut off all of it. We cannot
    stop North Korea from cooperating with Iraq. But we can try to
    prevent France and Japan from cooperating with Iraq or North
    Korea. So, that has to be another major piece of preventing
    these threats from emerging.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to thank both of you, Mr. Secretary
    and General Kadish, for being here today. I appreciate the
    opportunity to learn more about missile defense and some of the
    other issues that are extremely important to national defense.
        I have a lot of questions about missile defense, but
    personally I think it is important to say that we should never
    say no to missile defense outright. There are some who say
    absolutely yes and there are some who say absolutely no. I want
    it clear that I am saying maybe. Maybe not because I do not
    think there is a legitimate threat. I think there is a
    legitimate concern from the so-called rogue nations, that they
    might launch toward us. I think there is a legitimate concern
    about accidental launch. I think these are certainly things
    that we do need to take into account.
        But I want to be assured that sufficient research has been
    done and is being done so that we can determine if missile
    defense is even possible and how likely it is that it is going
    to work because it is a cost-benefit analysis in many respects.
    It is certainly a personal safety and humankind safety issue as
    well.
        But what we are being asked to do is to consider it in
    terms of the overall budget for defense and how it might relate
    to taking money away from other threats that are very likely.
    Biological warfare is clearly very possible or chemical warfare
    or even another weapon of mass destruction being delivered
    through another mechanism.
        So, I want to make sure that what we do is based on sound
    science and that our cost-benefit analysis is thorough.
        I have asked the Secretary if he could give me some idea of
    a percentage of success that we might be able to evaluate to
    determine whether or not missile defense is possible, whether
    it truly is the kind of security that we would want it to be if
    we are going to spend that kind of money.
        I have heard the argument that at least it is a scarecrow.
    I come from an agricultural state, and I know my Nebraska
    farmers would not put a scarecrow out that did not scare crows
    and they would not call it a scarecrow if it did not scare
    crows. They would want to know how much that scarecrow costs
    before they invested in it and whether on a cost-benefit basis
    it was going to be worthwhile.
        What I am leading up to is that I want to make sure that we
    have done everything that we can in this arena because I am
    worried that we are inching our way toward deployment before I
    have received answers to my questions. I think whether it is a
    runaway train that is heading down the track or whether it is
    boiling a lobster slowly or whatever it is, I think there is a
    decision made that we are going to have it and we are going to
    have it regardless. I hope that is not the case, but everything
    that I hear, everything that I see would almost lead me to that
    conclusion.
        I do not want to be a cynic. I hope that we are being asked
    to pursue this honestly and sincerely, as I am attempting to
    do, because I have not concluded that we ought not to deploy
    it. But I have not concluded either that there is such a thing
    as a true missile defense. I know we can call it that, but will
    it be a defense? Will it really work the way we want it to work
    and how will it fit into our other defense needs and our
    defense requirements? Those are my questions. They are very
    simple.
        I know that we have tried to arrange schedules to get
    together where I could talk to you privately and I hope we are
    able to do that because I do not simply want to talk about it
    in the public forum. I want to talk about it in every way and
    explore every avenue that I can.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, first of all, I would be eager
    to get together with you privately and talk at whatever length
    is useful.
        Let me just, therefore, sort of summarize by saying we have
    no intention of deploying things that do not work.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Maybe you can give me what the
    definition of ``work'' is. What does it have to do to work?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me give you an example which I
    think is germane. It is not with respect to defense against
    longer-range missiles, but we are getting ready to deploy the
    PAC-3 as a defense against shorter-range missiles. Up to what
    range, General?
        General Kadish. In tens of kilometers, 20, 30 kilometers.
        Senator Ben Nelson. More for the theater defense.
        General Kadish. Oh, the range of the incoming. They are
    short-range missiles up to 600 kilometers.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, the theater defense----
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We are getting ready to deploy
    finally.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I really do not have a problem with
    that at all.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It does work, but it did not work 4
    years ago and 5 years ago, and we are actually investing
    significant additional amounts in that program because it does
    work.
        If you look at the defenses against longer-range systems,
    what this program represents is a certain stepping back to
    explore what does and does not work and to research much more
    aggressively things that we set aside maybe for other reasons,
    but I think largely because they raised ABM Treaty issues. We
    will try and learn from research and development which of those
    potentially promising technologies work and which ones do not.
    When we have decided which ones work, we will come up with
    sustainable notions of what they can do and what they cannot
    do.
        For example, the airborne laser, which we have referred to
    many times in this hearing--if it works as we hope it may work,
    that still then leaves the issue about how much to invest in it
    because its geographical range is intrinsically limited.
        So, we definitely are going to take this step by step and
    every one of those steps will be up here for thorough scrutiny
    and appropriation and authorization. So, the intention is
    certainly not to throw money at things that do not provide us
    real capability.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I would not suggest that we would
    or that you would advocate that either.
        My time has expired. Maybe you can clarify for me what the
    installation--maybe during the next round of questions, you can
    help me understand a definition of deployment. As we work on
    the definition of what works and what percentage of success it
    has to have for us to be able to say it works, maybe you can
    help me understand the steps of deployment because I must admit
    that I would see the installation in Alaska as steps 1, 2, 3,
    some incremental steps, of deployment. But maybe I do not
    understand the word.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not know if we have time.
        Senator Ben Nelson. We can do it the next round.
        Chairman Levin. We are going to pick this up Tuesday, and
    that is the type of question which we are going to be focusing
    on, those kinds of technical questions at the Tuesday hearing.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, that is such a key question.
    I think we really ought to take just a minute or 2. I will
    yield a minute or 2 of my time.
        Chairman Levin. It will take many more minutes to answer
    it, but fire away.
        Senator Warner. I think it is important. The Senator raises
    a key question and a lot of people want to know because I look
    at the Missile Defense Act of 1999, and it is clear that we are
    not going to do anything until it is technologically feasible.
    There are 97 votes behind that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Excuse me. That is what I am referring
    to because I am in favor of research and development to get the
    technology to the point where we can say it works. But I am
    worried that we have not defined what ``works'' is yet, and I
    certainly do not have any understanding of what deployment is
    when it starts. I think I will know when it is over, but I will
    not know when it started. That is what worries me.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me try a quick answer. If it needs
    correction, I will ask General Kadish to correct. If it just
    needs elaboration, then we will keep the elaboration until next
    week.
        The Alaskan system is a complicated issue because what we
    are trying to develop there is a uniquely realistic test bed
    for exploring the land-based midcourse intercept system. It
    would be hard to improve on it I think as a way of finding out
    as well as possible how that kind of system would work. In
    fact, it will do it so well that at some point we might say,
    gosh, this works as well as we expected or maybe even better
    than we expected. If at that same time country orange--let us
    not be too specific--came out with a primitive ballistic
    missile threat to the western United States, we would say,
    well, we have a primitive capability to shoot down that
    primitive missile.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So, is it part of development? Is it
    part of the technological development to comply with the vote,
    the 97 vote?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. But that is not the capability we are
    aiming at. That would be sort of an emergency departure. What
    we would really anticipate is if we say, gosh, it works and we
    are not in an emergency state, we would take that information
    that it works, develop a real architecture that makes maximum
    use of that capability, and then come here with a full-fledged,
    long-term program for deployment of that full-up capability.
        Senator Ben Nelson. It might be in the range of development
    at this point in time or research or something, not deployment.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is the way I would consider it,
    Senator. But it has a little bit of dual potential.
        The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
    (JSTARS), which is one of the most spectacular technological
    developments of the last decade--it has this ability to track
    vehicles moving on the ground with amazing precision--was still
    in the development phase when the Gulf War broke out. Someone
    said, gee, it is just developmental, but we can use anything
    that might possibly work. So, we sent it to the Gulf. It turned
    out it worked amazingly well. We tracked the one major Iraqi
    attack on Khafgi. These aircraft in the air saw three large
    armor formations converging on one place and we were able to
    destroy them from the air. So, it certainly proved its worth.
        People will also tell you that it set back the long-term
    development of the JSTARS program by some significant amount of
    time because it is disruptive to do that. So, you do it in an
    emergency. You do not do it according to a plan.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        We will now turn to Senator Warner for his remaining
    questions and wrap-up. Then I will do the same.
        Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I think we have had an excellent hearing. The
    intensity of the debate I think is constructive. We have made a
    solid foundation for the Senate, indeed, I think for Congress
    eventually, to make a decision. It is my personal judgment that
    we move forward, that we had a positive sequence of exchanges
    today on the whole and that you move forward toward the goal of
    defending this country. We have a long way to go, but I commend
    both of you.
        I am going to just ask some very basic questions here
    because so many people are going to look at this hearing in
    many parts of the United States, and some of it is a little
    complicated. I recognize that, and I am just going to ask some
    basic questions.
        First, General Kadish, I am confident that our President,
    if not hindered by Congress, will be able to achieve a new
    framework with Russia. That is just my own personal conviction.
        Now, on that assumption that we resolve that this new
    framework will enable us to go ahead with these various options
    which the treaty has precluded our country from doing for 30
    years in its various formulations of trying to meet this
    threat, if we are able to go ahead, would we not then be able
    to get a system that is more effective and achieve it in less
    time?
        General Kadish. I believe that to be the case, Senator.
        Senator Warner. So do I, and I have often said that, for
    decades, around here that that treaty has acted--well, it was
    designed for the purpose of not letting the United States--it
    was the intent of the treaty not to let us build any defenses.
    So, once we resolve this new framework, then we can go ahead
    and it will be more effective.
        Now, much has been said about the suitcase bomb, and this
    is a chart that the Joint Chiefs have provided the committee.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Quite accurately, my colleague points out that the suitcase
    bomb sort of falls in the middle spectrum of threats. In other
    words, it is more likely that someone would bring a suitcase
    bomb than the intercontinental exchange of an accidental or a
    rogue firing of a missile.
        But at the same time, the other axis of the chart clearly
    shows that the damage done by a suitcase bomb is but a small
    fraction of the damage that potentially could be done by an
    intercontinental ballistic missile. Am I not correct in that,
    General Kadish?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        Senator Warner. Could you give us some possible multiple of
    the damage? Would it be 10 or 100 times more damaging? Say that
    the North Koreans did send that missile on to a major city in
    California or Hawaii or the Chinese who had some bellicose
    statements about firing a missile against California at one
    time. Suppose that did happen and it had a nuclear warhead.
    What is the multiple of damage that that missile would create
    as opposed to the suitcase bomb? These are just rough
    estimates. I realize it is speculation.
        General Kadish. To speculate a little bit, probably 15
    times.
        Senator Warner. 15 times as great.
        General Kadish. I would say 14 to 15 times.
        Senator Warner. Now, also in the case of the suitcase bomb,
    it is in the category quite properly of a terrorist weapon.
    Secretary Wolfowitz, as I have sat here these many years, we,
    the United States, have put in place as best we can
    technologically and by other means by the expenditure of
    literally billions of dollars every resource we can to prevent
    that suitcase bomb. Take, for example, the intelligence. That
    is the first and it has proven to be the most successful way to
    interdict that suitcase bomb.
        But in sharp contrast to the accidental firing of a missile
    where we have not yet been able to devise a defense, we have in
    place significant defenses and deterrence for the suitcase
    bomb. Am I not correct? We have expended enormous sums of
    dollars.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct, and we should do so.
    I think we should continue to aggressively pursue every
    reasonable avenue in that direction. As you are implying,
    Senator, in the case of an accidental missile launch, we have
    not only not pursued it aggressively, we have allowed our hands
    to be tied behind our backs.
        Senator Warner. We have covered that ground very clearly.
        Now, you pointed out I think quite clearly that the
    accidental firing could be an accident here by the United
    States of America in our arsenal. I regret to have to point out
    that we have seen two very significant military accidents here
    in a little over 12 months: one, the Russian submarine which I
    think the public should understand was the very top of their
    technology, a modern submarine. We have every reason to know
    that their crews are the finest trained among their Armed
    Forces. Yet, they lost that submarine with all hands. The full
    accident report is yet to be known. But it happened.
        In stark contrast, one of our own submarines with one of
    the finest trained crews that we have was brought to the
    surface negligently, in my judgment, and created a loss of
    life.
        There is a clear example of how the military itself, both
    sides, Russia and the United States, is subject to accidents
    happening. I do not know what clearer proof we need that
    accidents can happen.
        If we were to accidentally fire a missile, your comment was
    we would want to have Russia be able to interdict that missile
    with a system which presumably we might be able to help them
    with in building rather than have it cause severe damage. Am I
    not correct in that?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Correct.
        Senator Warner. We cannot, under the current framework of
    the ABM Treaty and the current provisions, share that
    technology should our President and successive presidents so
    desire. Am I not correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe that is correct, Senator.
        Senator Warner. I know it to be correct. So, I think there
    is another example of the reason why we should move forward and
    change this framework.
        Lastly, the reductions in the levels of our own inventory
    of nuclear weapons. That has been a subject that has been
    discussed by our President. It is his intention at an
    appropriate time. To the extent that you can inform the Senate
    in public hearing, is that to be an integral part of the
    negotiations with Russia in the ABM framework of negotiations?
    Is it independent? What is the likely timing of a decision?
    Again, is it linked to the ABM or could our President
    independently make that decision?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think, Senator, we are still in a
    discovery mode. We have already made some decisions, as I
    pointed out, three quite significant ones in this year's budget
    that were done without relation to any requirement to negotiate
    with the Russians or see how our forces compare with the
    Russians.
        But in his meetings in Genoa later this month with
    President Putin, I would hope one of the points President Bush
    makes is that we are already doing this kind of thing. We are
    not trying to threaten Russia and we would encourage Russia to
    take as many economies as she can in her forces. It just does
    not make sense to have unnecessary nuclear capabilities.
        But we are trying to proceed with more precision, as
    rapidly as possible, to come up with a structure for what is a
    truly required, long-term nuclear posture in an era when Russia
    is no longer an enemy. I think that is going to come in stages.
    I think it will be part of this framework of discussions with
    the Russians. Some will be formal negotiations, some will be
    other kinds of things.
        In fact, I think a major goal of what we would like to
    achieve with the Russians is the kind of dialogue and
    transparency that we take for granted with allies. We do not
    have treaties with Britain and France to regulate the nuclear
    balance between our two countries. Russia is not yet at the
    level of being a member of NATO, but we have very important
    common interests. We think that with openness and with showing
    them what we have in mind and where we are going, that we can
    encourage them in a positive direction with us.
        Senator Warner. Lastly, you are one of the most seasoned
    and experienced members of this administration with regard to
    Russia. You were recently there. Do you share my view of
    optimism that our President can work out a framework agreement?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do very strongly because I think so
    strongly that it is in the interests of both Russia and the
    United States. I really think we are in a new era. I understand
    for everyone, myself included, there are a lot of thoughts that
    come from the Cold War that you have to extract from your
    brain, but the faster we can do that, the further we can go
    with that. That is I think really building mutual security for
    the future.
        Senator Warner. That is a very sound note on which to
    conclude my participation. I thank both of you.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        I think everybody wants to make this world safer. We all
    start with that. There is no argument that North Korea is
    seeking that capability. The only real question here is whether
    or not our response to it, if it is unilateral and if it
    results in a Russian and Chinese response to maintain a lot of
    additional nuclear weapons on Russian soil, nuclear material,
    which then makes the proliferation of it, the theft of it more
    likely by terrorists, surely that is going to make us less
    safe, not more safe. If China speeds up their activities, works
    on countermeasures, decoys, sells them to others, we have then
    helped to unleash an arms race, which will make us less secure,
    not more secure.
        So, the question is not whether there is a threat that is
    emerging over here. The question is whether the response to
    that threat will make us more secure or less secure. That is a
    very significant issue. The issue is not whether there is a
    threat which is emerging, which North Korea is working on, it
    is what is the best way to respond to that threat in a way
    which makes us more secure.
        That is our moral obligation. That is the moral obligation
    of the President and the moral obligation of Congress, to make
    us more secure and not to respond to the least likely threat,
    which is the attack with a ballistic missile from North Korea,
    and increase the likelihood of terrorist threats from a
    different direction as a result.
        That, it seems to me, is what requires a great deal of
    analysis. It is not good enough to simply say there is a threat
    without asking yourselves: is there a way to respond to that
    threat which makes us more secure rather than less secure?
    Would a unilateral response, if we cannot get a modification of
    the treaty with Russia, precipitate some actions by Russia or
    China, including not just the increased likelihood of
    proliferation, but also the countermeasures and the decoys
    which can be then created by them in order to overcome such a
    threat and then be transferred to others as a result?
        I could not agree with you more about getting out of Cold
    War thinking, by the way. I think everybody agrees with that,
    but I hope that you will firmly keep in your minds what was
    known back then, which is still true. It was known in the
    1970s, is known now, and will always be the case that when one
    country seeks unilaterally to achieve its own safety, it can
    increase the insecurity in another country. That is not our
    intent. I could not agree with you more. That is not your
    intent.
        But you have to consider the Russian and Chinese view. Do
    not give them a veto. No one is going to give them a veto, but
    at least consider why it is that they do not agree with you.
    Why is it that they feel less secure if we deploy a limited
    defense? You have to consider it and I hope you will consider
    it.
        The problem is you have made a decision. You are going to
    deploy without consideration of why it is that those other guys
    out there will feel less secure by that unilateral deployment.
    That is the challenge.
        I wish you had gone about this in a very different way,
    frankly, I wish you had started with the argument, hey, let us
    move together to a different structure based on defenses. The
    world will be better off. Then try to persuade people, rather
    than the statement, the declaration, we are going to do it,
    like it or not. We hope you like it. Because it is more likely
    you are going to precipitate a negative response by taking that
    approach than you would by the persuasive approach, which is,
    hey, does it not make more sense for us to have defenses rather
    than to continue the same form of deterrence?
        Deterrence has worked. I think you would agree with that.
    Deterrence is important. You are not aiming to end deterrence.
    It has worked with North Korea, by the way. Has it not?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. A combination of different things,
    yes.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, but deterrence has worked with North
    Korea.
        All those missiles that North Korea now has have not been
    used. There are probably a number of reasons, but I will tell
    you one good reason. It would amount to their suicide if they
    used them. We have been told by our intelligence people that
    the number one goal of the North Korean regime is survival.
    That is the number one goal we have been told. That being the
    case, for them to launch a missile at us, which may or may not
    work, which would lead to their immediate destruction, runs
    counter to their number one goal, which is the survival of
    their regime.
        In addition, we have been told on this threat spectrum,
    that there are other means of delivery of a weapon of mass
    destruction, not just a truck bomb, but a nuclear weapon,
    biological, chemical weapon, not just with a suitcase, but with
    a truck and with a ship. I take it, General, that a nuclear
    weapon that is delivered by truck of the same size as a nuclear
    weapon delivered by a ballistic missile would have the same
    damage. Is that a fair statement? The same size nuclear weapon.
        General Kadish. The same size nuclear weapon. It would be a
    little harder to deliver by truck I think, though.
        Chairman Levin. It may be a little harder, but if it were
    deliverable by truck, would that be about the same damage?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. How about two trucks and three trucks?
        General Kadish. Scales.
        Chairman Levin. So, in addition to being concerned about
    the response and why other countries respond to this unilateral
    approach of ours, there is this other factor, which is that in
    pursuing that road, we are ignoring the fact that it is much
    easier, cheaper, more accurate for them to deliver a weapon of
    mass destruction with another means. No return address, which
    does not lead necessarily to their own destruction if we do not
    know where it came from.
        Those are critical policy questions. Now, we have many
    technical questions as well, and we are going to get into those
    next time. But I just want to ask a few questions and then wrap
    it up.
        General Kadish, 3 weeks ago you told us there was nothing
    in your recommendations which, if implemented, would violate
    the ABM Treaty in 2002. Is that still true in your judgment?
        General Kadish. No, it is not, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. What has changed since you testified
    before?
        General Kadish. At the time we talked about this, I believe
    I said at the time that the program was not fully approved and
    that the Compliance Review Process was ongoing and could change
    things a lot.
        Chairman Levin. What has changed?
        General Kadish. What has changed is that the definition of
    the program in getting into the compliance review, which is a
    lengthy process to some degree, pointed out events that were
    potentially more near-term that the Secretary described. So,
    this process is ongoing and it will yield the types of
    decisions that you are talking about.
        Chairman Levin. Now, we need to know precisely. If
    everything goes well in this program in 2002, what are those
    events which would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty? If
    everything that goes well that is in your budget request, what
    specific activities are in conflict with the ABM Treaty?
        General Kadish. That is a living list, and I think
    Secretary Wolfowitz has outlined a couple of them in his
    testimony already.
        Chairman Levin. He did not say they would in 2002.
        General Kadish. That is right.
        Chairman Levin. I am asking you if everything goes well in
    2002, give me the specific activities in your budget which
    would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty. Just give me one,
    two, and three.
        General Kadish. That is not my responsibility to determine
    whether they are in compliance.
        Chairman Levin. OK. Secretary Wolfowitz, what activities in
    your budget request will be in conflict with the ABM Treaty in
    2002 if all those activities in the budget go well?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Again, that is also not my
    responsibility. It is a legal determination that goes through
    the treaty compliance----
        Chairman Levin. You have not asked your lawyers yet.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The lawyers are working on these
    issues. What I have outlined in my testimony, Senator, are, as
    best we can identify them, the most significant issues that are
    coming. I am sorry I do not have the same version of the
    testimony that you have, but as I said, as the program
    develops, we have some issues coming.
        The first issue is the test bed currently scheduled to
    begin construction in April 2002, designed to permit the
    testing of a ground-based midcourse capability under realistic
    operational conditions.
        Chairman Levin. Are you saying that is in conflict with the
    ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. No. I am saying that raises an issue
    about ABM Treaty interpretation.
        Chairman Levin. You do not care what the answer to the
    issue is?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Of course I care but I do not know the
    answer.
        Chairman Levin. When will we find out? When will you find
    out?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not know.
        Chairman Levin. If you care, why is it in your budget
    before you know?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Because we are trying to do two things
    at once, and we have to. I mean, we need to proceed.
        I have listed the other two major examples in my testimony.
        Chairman Levin. But you are not able to say now, without
    this board giving us a decision, whether or not those
    activities are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. Is that
    correct? Is that your testimony today?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct.
        Chairman Levin. I just want to end with this one comment.
    Clarity is important and I think at least there is a little
    greater clarity today than there has been. But I have to tell
    you, we are a long way from there. Just on policy issues, we
    are a long way from there because just yesterday--just think
    about this. We have an issue here which is so significant to
    the world. Everybody is involved in this issue. Just about
    every country cares about this issue. We get visits from the
    British. We get visits from other allies in Europe. They come
    and visit us. This is the issue we talk about.
        Yesterday the administration hands out a document which
    says that ``while we do not know precisely when our programs
    will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in the future, the
    timing is likely to be measured in months not years.'' That is
    just yesterday.
        Today you tell us that one or more aspects will inevitably
    bump up against the treaty. Such an event is likely to occur--
    that is, the bump up--in months rather than years.
        Now, this is not splitting hairs because you also testified
    today that there is a difference between bumping up and in
    conflict with. That is your testimony. So, yesterday the
    administration hands out a document which uses the word in
    ``conflict'' with ABM. Today the administration testifies that
    it will bump up in months, or likely to bump up in months
    instead of years.
        We have a long way to go before there is just clarity, and
    clarity, it seems to me, is the basis for a solution--hopefully
    a bipartisan solution--because that has to be the goal of
    everybody, but then ultimately a solution not just between
    Congress and the administration, but ultimately a solution that
    hopefully will allow us to move together with our allies, who
    are very skeptical of this, and hopefully with the Russians
    towards a new kind of structure because that is everybody's
    goal I think, to try to move together towards a new kind of
    structure where defenses have a role.
        That is the reason that we are doing the testing. We want
    to see if we can come up with something that is operationally
    effective, cost effective, and which will make us more secure.
    That is everybody's goal.
        I think this has been a helpful hearing. I agree with
    Senator Warner. I also feel, though, that it is important that
    we spend this time, and I hope you feel it is useful as well
    for us, for Congress, being asked to fund these programs, as
    well as for the country and for the world, that we really
    explore what roads we are walking down at what speed with what
    advantages, what disadvantages, with what risks, and what
    gains.
        We hope that your recovery is complete so that when we see
    you next Tuesday, you will be out of that temporary interim
    cast.
        Senator Warner. I would like to say a word here. I thank
    you, my colleague.
        First, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that our
    committee proceed to try and declassify that testimony that
    General Kadish provided this committee which has been the
    subject of discussion as to what you did say. It seems to me
    there are sufficient caveats in here that you properly placed
    about taking certain steps with lawyers and others before
    proceeding.
        Chairman Levin. I would very much like that, as a matter of
    fact. What I have said here, however, I want to assure my good
    colleague was approved. I think it is important, though,
    however, that we try to declassify General Kadish's entire
    testimony.
        Senator Warner. Lastly, Mr. Chairman, we have had a lot of
    discussion today about unilateralism and the term has been used
    by a number of Senators. I think I would like to just clarify
    my own view on a very important point.
        First, the treaty explicitly provides for that. Am I not
    correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Warner. So, it is not a matter of breaking the law.
    The treaty gives a president that option.
        Chairman Levin. Do you mean to withdraw? I am sorry.
        Senator Warner. Yes. I mean it is explicit. It is not
    something that we would just do. It is in the treaty. Those who
    wrote the treaty--and I happen to have been around at the time
    it was written--envisioned a problem could arise some day and
    it would be in the national interest, and the commander in
    chief, our President, would have to make that decision. So, it
    is in the treaty.
        Second--and this is my own view. Having come to know our
    President and having formed a great respect for him, I am
    confident that if after a clear and credible program of, first,
    consultation with allies and then negotiations with Russia, if
    he were of the mind that that was the only alternative to go to
    that provision of the treaty, that he would come to Congress,
    particularly when I predict that Congress will be a full
    partner in each step of the way, and consult with Congress
    before he would take that action under the treaty. He would not
    simply be raising the telephone and calling the leadership and
    say, I am going to do this tomorrow morning. He would go
    through a period of consultation.
        Would you share that view with me?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe so, yes, Senator.
        Senator Warner. I think that should be known by the people
    following this.
        Chairman Levin. Well, it also should be known that we will
    give you a chance. It is great to hear that he is going to
    consult, but the President said he is going to withdraw if he
    cannot get modification. I mean, he has already said that. We
    always welcome consultation, but the consultation needs to come
    before decisions, not after.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, this is part of the
    consultation.
        Senator Warner. I think he had to say that in fairness to
    the Russians to know the full----
        Chairman Levin. He said that to the American people, not
    just to the Russians.
        Senator Warner. Well, the Russians know it. It is in the
    treaty, and he simply says, I have to protect this Nation and I
    want to do it through a new framework.
        Chairman Levin. What is in the treaty is the power to
    withdraw. The President has told the American people he is
    going to deploy, and if he does not get an agreement to modify,
    he is withdrawing.
        So, I welcome consultation but again, the consultation, to
    be real, needs to be real. It has to come before decisions, not
    after decisions.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, can I make one quick
    response?
        Chairman Levin. Yes, absolutely.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. There is a great deal in what you said
    that I guess we will discuss at length on Tuesday. I agree with
    you. All these choices are a matter of balancing risks, and you
    and I may assess the risks differently. Maybe if we discuss
    them more, we will come to convergence on that.
        But I think we would absolutely agree that the way to
    minimize most of the risks that you are concerned about is to
    come to some kind of cooperative approach with the Russians. I
    do not think there is any argument on that question.
        On that question, I think I would implore you and everybody
    in Congress to think about the fact that I think the record
    shows consistently that our success in getting that kind of
    cooperative outcome depends on having some momentum. The ABM
    Treaty itself would never have come into being if the United
    States had not shown some determination through some extremely
    difficult votes up here, one of which in fact succeeded on a
    tie vote, as I recall, to move ahead with the so-called
    Safeguard system. That is what brought the old Soviets to the
    negotiating table.
        We went through a very difficult period a few years ago
    with a completely different country, that is, Russia, over the
    subject of NATO enlargement. It was difficult, but I think if
    you look at it from 20/20 hindsight now a couple of years
    later, I think even the Russians are beginning to realize that
    bringing Poland into NATO is no threat to Russia and has
    actually improved relations between Poland and Russia.
        Chairman Levin. We never had a treaty with Russia that we
    would not enlarge NATO.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Each case is different, but what I am
    saying is if the Clinton administration brought the Russians
    around I think in that process to a framework, not an
    agreement, but a framework of understanding that actually did
    include a formal agreement between Russia and NATO, that was
    part of the enlargement of NATO process, I think what you need
    to achieve a cooperative approach is both a willingness to
    cooperate and some determination to move forward. I think that
    is the combination that the President is looking for.
        Chairman Levin. A lot of determination to move forward,
    plenty of momentum in the billions that we put into test
    programs, a lot of momentum that everyone has supported. We
    have supported the research and development programs. So, there
    is a lot of momentum in that.
        But I think we will pick this up next Tuesday at 9:30. Let
    me just make this clear to everybody. There have been a number
    of people who have not had a chance to have their first round.
    We will start with questions instead of opening statements,
    except if the ranking member and I want to make a brief opening
    statement at the beginning. But other than that, we will not
    have opening statements from you. We will go directly to
    questions. I want to hold open the possibility that if there is
    time, that we consider additional witnesses on the technical
    side, which we want to get to at some point anyway.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, they may wish, upon
    examination of today's lengthy record, to make some brief
    opening statement.
        Chairman Levin. We would have to keep it very limited,
    otherwise we are going to run into the same kind of problem. We
    would welcome corrections, clarifications.
        Senator Warner. That gives them the chance.
        Chairman Levin. They may be very long in that case, though.
    [Laughter.]
        We will stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was recessed, to
    reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, July 17, 2001.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 17, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Kennedy,
    Lieberman, Cleland, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin
    Nelson, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Allard,
    Sessions, Collins, and Bunning.
        Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
        Professional staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswait
    and Richard W. Fieldhouse.
        Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
    Republican staff director, Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
    director for the minority, and Scott W. Stucky, minority
    counsel.
        Professional staff members present: Brian R. Green and Cord
    A. Sterling.
        Staff assistants present: Kristi M. Freddo, Thomas C.
    Moore, and Jennifer L. Naccari.
        Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
    Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
    Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to
    Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton;
    Christopher J. Paul and Dan Twining, assistants to Senator
    McCain; J. Mark Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M.
    Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan
    McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
    assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; Kristina Fauser, assistant to Senator
    Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order. The
    committee meets this morning to continue our hearing from last
    Thursday with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and General Ron
    Kadish on the Defense Department's missile defense programs in
    the fiscal year 2002 amended budget request.
        General Kadish, before we begin, I want to congratulate the
    BMDO team that was involved in last Saturday night's successful
    intercept test. That test, as you pointed out, is just one of
    many tests that are needed to determine whether an operation of
    a successful system is feasible, but it is an important test,
    and we congratulate you for it.
        Protecting and defending the American people must be our
    goal in all that we do. In my judgment, we should be mighty
    cautious before ripping up an arms control treaty in order to
    meet the highly unlikely threat of North Korea using a missile
    against us.
        Unlikely, because they could use a truck more cheaply and
    with greater accuracy, and without a return address. Unlikely,
    because if they launched a missile against us, it would lead to
    their immediate destruction. We are told that regime survival
    is their number one goal, so in order to meet a highly unlikely
    threat, if you rip up an arms control treaty and you start a
    new kind of arms competition or cold war with Russia and China,
    America could be less secure.
        Protecting and defending America from that state of affairs
    must also be one of our goals. No one I know of is willing to
    give Russia or anyone else a veto over our actions, but Russian
    reaction to a unilateral breach of an arms control agreement is
    relevant to our security and could leave us a lot less secure.
    That is an issue that Congress hopefully will grapple with.
    Long before the administration submitted this budget request
    that is before us, it notified the world that it would rip up
    the ABM Treaty if Russia refused to modify it. Congress will
    hopefully find a more moderate course than that. Senator
    Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you
    and I have been here many years together, and I rarely
    challenge you on an opening statement, but I really believe
    that the terminology, ``ripping up'', is not supported by the
    record of our President. I have talked with him one-on-one
    several times, and I feel he is pursuing first a course of
    orderly consultation with our allies.
        He has had some initial discussions--perhaps they could be
    classified as preliminary negotiations--with the President of
    Russia on the subject of the treaty. He is due to meet with him
    again. I feel very strongly that he is pursuing an orderly
    process consistent with the ABM Treaty at this point in time,
    and that we in Congress should give our President a chance in
    his role as commander in chief and chief architect of not only
    foreign policy but of those policies that relate to the Armed
    Services and our weapons programs, and hopefully we can work
    with him and structure a partnership.
        To the extent that Congress backs a President, it is more
    likely that President can succeed throughout history. I
    remember very well, when I was Secretary of the Navy, the early
    negotiations on the ABM Treaty, the presentation, the action by
    the Senate and Congress, and they were narrow margins, but
    nevertheless, President Nixon did succeed in negotiating that
    document and signing it. Treaties are the law of the land, and
    I find our President is doing the best he can.
        I join my distinguished colleague, General Kadish, in
    saluting you and many others in the program for the test over
    the weekend. I note very carefully the observations by the
    Secretary of Defense, yourself and others, putting into
    proportional balance the significance of this test, but making
    clear that it is but a step in a long process. It is not the
    decisive one, but certainly we are pleased that it did add a
    constructive step forward in this program, and that it is
    subject to the evaluation of the vast quantity of test analysis
    that has to be done with this particular test. We will have to
    await all of that analysis, but it looks like it is a step
    forward.
        I am hopeful that we can work out the partnership with the
    President. I think we are making good progress. I would like to
    bring a matter to the attention of my colleagues here today.
    During last Thursday's hearing there was a concern expressed
    that the President was asking Congress to vote for a ballistic
    missile defense budget request even though all the programs in
    that budget request had not gone through, ``the compliance
    review process,'' which to an extent determines whether the
    activities are compliant or noncompliant with the ABM.
        In the many years I have been here there has never been
    total clarity among the lawyers on this subject. The issue of
    judging compliance is often subject to a conscientious
    difference of opinion of lawyers, but we do our best in the
    compliance process.
        This concern here in the committee was picked up and
    properly, I think, reported in the press. I just wanted to go
    back and point out the following. I think it is important to
    note for the record that the process this administration is
    following is consistent with the steps taken by the BMDO office
    for many years. I hope you can assert that in your testimony,
    General.
        I point to our distinguished former chairman, now ranking
    member of the Subcommittee on Strategic, Senator Allard, who
    pointed out last Thursday that the BMD programs had never been
    fully vetted through the compliance review process either when
    the BMDO budget is submitted to Congress or when Congress has
    approved the BMDO budgets.
        You, Senator, noted an excellent example on Thursday. The
    certification that last year's integrated flight test under the
    Clinton administration, test number 5, was compliant with the
    ABM Treaty. That was issued on June 30, 2000, the compliance
    analysis. The test took place on July 8, just 8 days later,
    clearly indicating that the test had to start the preparations
    long before the compliance letter was in hand.
        In fact, most of the time the Compliance Review Group
    continues to review test plans as these tests are refined,
    until shortly before the test is conducted. In other words,
    every time we voted, that is, Congress, on a BMDO budget in
    past years, we have voted without full knowledge that each of
    the test activities contained in the BMDO budget request would
    be ABM-Treaty compliant.
        Therefore, it seems to me we are following a consistent
    pattern. That pattern may be changed under this administration.
    Perhaps Secretary Wolfowitz wants to attest to that this
    morning, or others, but I just point that out.
        So I welcome you, Mr. Secretary, once again, and General,
    and I am going to strive as best I can to see that Congress
    gives our President every opportunity to discharge his
    constitutional responsibilities with regard to this treaty.
    Hopefully Congress will form a partnership in the near future,
    because I must say that this particular piece of legislation
    that the Armed Services Committee is entrusted each year to
    prepare, the annual authorization bill, is a crossroads at
    which these issues will be met, and we have had an
    authorization bill for 30-plus years now.
        I am absolutely desirous, as is the President, to have
    another one this year, but these issues have to be, with due
    respect to my colleagues who have different views, worked out
    ahead of time. Otherwise this bill could be held up, or stalled
    on the Senate floor, and this bill covers the entire Armed
    Services of the United States, in all aspects. The missile
    defense portion of the bill, the authorization, is a vital part
    of it. Hopefully we can reconcile such differences as we may
    have before the time of a markup in this committee and, indeed,
    debate on the floor, such that this bill can be passed by the
    Senate eventually.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Again, Secretary Wolfowitz, we are very anxious to mark up
    this budget, but we need the justification material, which is
    not yet in from two of the services. We have been very
    impatiently awaiting that material. It is essential for our
    markup, because we absolutely share the goal that Senator
    Warner just set forth of trying to mark up our bill as quickly
    as possible so we can get an authorization bill to the floor.
    Secretary Wolfowitz, do you have a statement?

       STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I
    know you want to get to questions. I do not have an extended
    opening statement, but let me just make a brief comment about
    events that have taken place since we met last week. Last
    Saturday we conducted a successful test intercept of an
    intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean, and
    General Kadish has a short film clip of that intercept. It is
    very short. I would ask your indulgence to show it to the
    committee.
        Chairman Levin. We would be happy to see it.

        STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR,
                 BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

        General Kadish. If you could roll it, this will show the
    interceptor in the Kwajalein Islands. The intercept kill
    vehicle is on top of the silo. You will see the shroud remove
    itself on launch. This prototype booster accelerates rather
    rapidly. It is not the booster that we intend to ultimately
    use, but it is only for the test program at this point. You can
    see the booster climbing for altitude with the kill vehicle
    attached, and this year we did get separation of the kill
    vehicle, which is very encouraging.
        The booster goes through a series of maneuvers. It is a
    rather short, but important set of maneuvers that make sure it
    stays on the test range. If we had a longer trajectory to test,
    we would not necessarily have to do these types of maneuvers to
    dissipate the energy and they are characteristic of solid state
    boosters. So you can see it maneuvering, almost changing
    direction a number of times in order to stay on the particular
    test range. That is one of those maneuvers.
        Senator Warner. You might talk a little bit about the
    guidance it is receiving, and where that comes from.
        General Kadish. The ground gives it. It has autonomous
    guidance, but it gets at least one update from the ground to
    tell it where to go in space, and then the kill vehicle, after
    it launches, will take an immediate set of star shots in order
    to confirm its position, and then get ground up-dates from the
    same communications system that the booster did, so the whole
    idea here is the booster gets the kill vehicle in position to
    be separated and launched over the target complex, and that is
    a major part of the integrated part of the system.
        The altitude of the intercept is about 140 miles, 220
    kilometers, and you will see this next series of different
    phenomenology that confirmed the actual intercept. This is an
    infrared picture, and a series of infrared pictures all showing
    that the impact of the hit-to-kill on the warhead was
    successful.
        We lost all telemetry at the same time we were expected to
    lose it in a successful intercept, and so we are very confident
    that we hit very accurately. This is a radar trace, the
    interceptor coming through, and you can see the debris that
    resulted from the intercept picked up by the radar, and this is
    the final shot.
        So it built our confidence, but there is a long way to go
    in the test program, and we hopefully will be here over the
    next year showing many more of these types of successes.
        That is all I have.
        Chairman Levin. General, just before Secretary Wolfowitz
    begins, you made a comment that after the test it would be a
    number of weeks or months before you had the final analysis of
    the test results. Could you just briefly tell us, is there
    anything we should expect, other than what we have seen, that
    it was a successful hit?
        General Kadish. Each test has a number of objectives we are
    after, all the way from whether the communications system works
    properly, to the radar traces, and we compare that to the truth
    data that we get from other sensors on the test range, and in
    that process we may discover that there was an anomaly with one
    of the elements that did not quite work properly, and we have
    backups to make sure the tests come out successfully at certain
    points, so what we want to do is compare that truth data to the
    actual telemetry data to see if there were any anomalies, and
    that takes us a number of weeks to accomplish.
        So right now, the initial data indicate we had a fairly
    good test.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you. That successful test is
    another step forward on the long road to developing and
    deploying effective defenses to protect the American people
    from limited ballistic missile attacks, but it is an important
    step. It underscores the point General Kadish and I made to
    this committee last week that missile defense is no longer a
    problem of invention, it is a challenge of engineering, and it
    is a challenge America is up to.
        To build on the success of this test, we will need
    successive tests that push the envelope even further, that are
    even more operationally realistic, and we need to begin testing
    the many promising technologies which were not pursued in the
    past, but which have enormous potential to enhance our
    security.
        This inevitably means our testing and development program
    will eventually encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM
    Treaty. We are seeking to build defenses to defend the American
    people. The treaty's very purpose is to prohibit us from
    developing such defenses. If we are to build on this weekend's
    accomplishments, we must move beyond the ABM Treaty.
        We are working to do so on two parallel tracks, first with
    a robust research development and testing program and, second,
    through discussions with Russia on a new security framework
    that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over, and that the
    U.S. and Russia are not enemies.
        To succeed, we need Congress' help in both areas. First, we
    need your support to fully fund the President's budget request
    for development and testing of missile defense. The ability to
    defend the American people from ballistic missile attack is
    clearly within our grasp, but we cannot do so unless the
    President has Congress' support to expand and accelerate the
    testing and development program.
        This weekend's test shows the potential for success. Let us
    not fail because we did not adequately fund the necessary
    testing, or because we artificially restricted the exploration
    of every possible technology.
        Second, we need your support for President Bush's efforts
    to achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile
    defense. The President is working to build a new security
    relationship between the U.S. and Russia, one whose foundation
    does not rest on the prospect of the mutual annihilation of our
    respective populations. He will meet with President Putin
    shortly in Genoa, and he has invited Putin to his ranch in
    Crawford, Texas, and he has accepted an invitation to visit
    President Putin in Russia.
        Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell are engaged in
    discussion with their Russian counterparts as well, so a very
    important dialogue is underway. We are optimistic about the
    prospects for reaching an understanding with Russia, but
    Congress can have a significant impact on the outcome of those
    discussions. If Congress shows the same resolve as the
    President to proceed seriously with development and testing of
    defenses to protect our people, our friends and allies, and our
    forces around the world, it will significantly enhance the
    prospects for a cooperative outcome.
        Conversely, I would urge Congress not to give the Russians
    the mistaken impression that they can somehow exercise a veto
    over our development of missile defenses. The unintended
    consequence of such action could be to rule out a cooperative
    solution, and leave the President no choice but to walk away
    from the treaty unilaterally, an outcome that none of us surely
    wants.
        As we proceed with robust testing, we will work to achieve
    an understanding with Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty. We
    have established a process that will identify issues raised by
    our program at the earliest possible moment. The Department's
    ABM compliance review group has been directed to identify ABM
    Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for
    new development or treaty events. That process is already
    underway.
        The Secretary and I will be informed of whether the planned
    test bed, the use of Aegis systems in future integrated flight
    tests, or the concurrent operation of ABM and air defense
    radars in next February's test, are significant treaty
    problems. I have attached to my testimony fact sheets prepared
    by the Ballistic Missile Defense Office on each of these three
    cases, and I would like to submit them for the record.
        Chairman Levin. They will be made a part of the record.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. This process will permit us to take
    them into account as early as possible as we pursue our
    negotiations with Russia on a new strategic framework. We will
    keep Congress informed as the process unfolds, but if we agree
    that cooperation in setting aside the constraints of the ABM
    Treaty is preferable to unilateral withdrawal from the treaty,
    then we need Congress' full support for missile defense
    research and testing.
        We look forward to working with the committee to build on
    this weekend's successful test, and to ensure that we can
    defend the American people, our friends and allies, and our
    deployed forces, from limited ballistic missile attacks.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz
        Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the committee, I don't
    have an extended opening statement today, but allow me to make a brief
    comment about events that have taken place since we met last week.
        Last Saturday we conducted a successful test intercept of an
    intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean. This
    successful test is another step forward on the long road to developing
    and deploying effective defenses to protect the American people from
    limited ballistic missile attacks. But it is an important step. It
    underscores the point General Kadish and I made to the committee last
    week: that missile defense is no longer a problem of invention--it is a
    challenge of engineering. It is a challenge America is up to.
        To build on the success of this test, we will need successive tests
    that push the envelope even further, that are even more operationally
    realistic, and to begin testing the many promising technologies which
    were not pursued in the past, but which have enormous potential to
    enhance our security.
        This inevitably means that our testing and development program will
    eventually encounter the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. We are
    seeking to build defenses to defend the American people. The ABM
    Treaty's very purpose is to prohibit us from developing such defenses.
        If we are to build on this weekend's accomplishments, we must move
    beyond the ABM Treaty. We are working to do so on two parallel tracks:
    First, with a robust research, development and testing program; and
    second, through discussions with Russia on a new security framework
    that reflects the fact that the Cold War is over and that the U.S. and
    Russia are not enemies.
        To succeed we need your help in both areas:
        First, we need Congress's support to fully fund the President's
    budget request for further development and testing of missile defense.
    The ability to defend the American people from ballistic missile attack
    is clearly within our grasp. But we cannot do so unless the President
    has Congress' support to expand and accelerate the testing and
    development program. This weekend's test shows the potential for
    success is there. Let us not fail because we did not adequately fund
    the necessary testing, or because we artificially restricted the
    exploration of every possible technology.
        Second, we need Congress' support for President Bush's efforts to
    achieve an understanding with Russia on ballistic missile defense. The
    President is working to build a new security relationship between the
    U.S. and Russia whose foundation does not rest on the prospect of the
    mutual annihilation of our respective populations. He will meet with
    President Putin shortly in Genoa, he has invited President Putin to his
    ranch in Crawford, Texas, and has accepted an invitation visit
    President Putin in Russia. Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell are
    engaged in discussions with their Russian counterparts as well.
        So an important dialogue is underway, and we are optimistic about
    the prospects for reaching an understanding with Russia.
        But Congress can have a significant impact on the outcome of those
    discussions. If Congress shows the same resolve as the President to
    proceed seriously with development and testing of defenses to protect
    our people, our friends and allies, and our forces around the world, it
    will significantly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome.
        Conversely, Congress should not give Russia the mistaken impression
    that they can somehow exercise a veto over our development of missile
    defenses.
        The unintended consequence of such action could be to rule out a
    cooperative solution, and leave the President no choice but to walk
    away from the treaty unilaterally--an outcome none of us surely wants.
        As we proceed with robust testing, we will work to achieve an
    understanding with Russia to move beyond the ABM Treaty. We have
    established a process that will identify issues raised by our program
    at the earliest possible moment.
        The Department's ABM Compliance Review Group has been directed to
    identify ABM Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the
    plans for new development or treaty events. That process is already
    underway.
        The Secretary and I will be informed of whether the planned test
    bed, use of Aegis systems in future Integrated Flight Tests, or
    concurrent operation of ABM and air defense radars in next February's
    tests are significant treaty problems (I have fact sheets prepared by
    BMDO on each of these cases which I would like to submit for the
    record). This process will permit us to take them into account as early
    as possible as we pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new
    strategic framework. We will keep Congress informed as the process
    unfolds.
        But if we agree that cooperation in setting aside the constraints
    of the ABM Treaty is preferable to a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM
    Treaty, then we need Congress' full support for missile defense
    research and testing.
        We look forward to working with the committee to build on this
    weekend's successful test, and to ensure that we can defend the
    American people, our friends and allies, and our deployed forces, from
    limited ballistic missile attacks.
        Thank you.
               AEGIS SPY-1 TRACKING A STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILE
                               plans and purpose
             Plans to use an Aegis SPY-1 radar to track long-range
            ballistic missiles are currently under development and are only
            at a preliminary stage.
             The most likely near-term scenario is for an
            unmodified Aegis SPY-1 radar to track an outgoing target
            immediately after its launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base
            during an ABM intercept attempt at Kwajalein Missile Range.
             This test would provide initial data for assessing the
            basic capability of the Aegis SPY-1 radar to track long-range
            targets that will assist in formulating Aegis development
            options.

                     The Aegis SPY-1 radar may be connected to the
                    test's command, control and data communications
                    backbone.
                     The SPY-1 radar, however, would likely not
                    contribute to the data used to complete the intercept
                    (i.e., it will not help guide the interceptor).

             Future (and currently unprogrammed) plans might
            include an Aegis SPY-1 radar:

                     Collecting intercept data at the ABM test
                    range during ABM testing.
                     Providing real-time data to the U.S. strategic
                    early warning system.
                     Providing data to assist an Integrated Flight
                    Test intercept attempt.
                     The Aegis SPY-1 radar might also participate
                    in testing at the Missile Defense System Test Bed using
                    targets with various ranges and velocities.

             We eventually expect to integrate a modified, more
            capable version of the Aegis SPY-1 radar into tests of our
            boost and ascent phase elements.
     SYSTEMS INTEGRATION TEST II (SIT II) COMBINING DATA FROM ABM AND NON-
                                   ABM RADARS
                               plans and purpose
             We will conduct a short-range missile defense test
            beginning next February.

                     Three targets will be tracked by two Aegis
                    SPY-1 radars, a Patriot PAC-3 radar and the THAAD UOES
                    radar.
                     An ABM radar located at Kwajalein Missile
                    Range will also track each target, but will not
                    communicate with any of the other radars.
                     During the flight test of at least one target
                    missile, a Patriot PAC-3 missile system will attempt an
                    intercept.

             The ABM radar will obtain data supporting all U.S. TMD
            programs. This is critical information as to how both our
            interceptor and the threat targets behave, as well as unique
            information measuring the lethality of the intercepts. Using
            the ABM radar will significantly improve the quality of the
            information gained from the test.
                      THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM TEST BED
                               plans and purpose
             Test Bed as a Whole. Allows overall system performance
            testing to occur using more realistic threat trajectories and
            allowing more complex engagement scenarios.
             Launchers.

                     Construction at Fort Greely, AK (5 silos) will
                    be in the spring or early summer next year. Once
                    complete, the five silos will allow tests of
                    operational command and control, communications, and
                    the capability of the long haul communications network;
                    rehearsal of maintenance and upkeep processes; and
                    assessment of the adverse effects of Arctic conditions
                    at a potential operational site.
                     The two Kodiak, AK launcher silos to be
                    constructed in the spring/summer of 2003 will allow
                    higher closing velocities, more realistic test
                    geometries, and multiple engagements.

             Radars. At least three large phased-array radars will
            be part of the Missile Defense System Test Bed: Cobra Dane
            (Shemya, AK), Beale, CA, and a new X-Band in the mid-Pacific.

                     Cobra Dane currently collects data on
                    ballistic missile launches from Russia and also has the
                    mission of early warning and space track. An upgraded
                    Cobra Dane radar will provide enhanced early warning
                    and may have some ABM radar capability.

                             Initial upgrades are software
                            modifications like those ongoing for the Beale,
                            CA early warning radar. No changes to the
                            radar's hardware are currently planned.
                             Boeing is investigating what
                            additional upgrades to Cobra Dane might be
                            appropriate, and when. Possibilities range from
                            mere software upgrades to significant physical
                            modifications. We will know our options this
                            fall.
                             In any operational system, we
                            anticipate that the X-Band radar at Shemya
                            would be required to provide needed
                            discrimination, even with all possible upgrades
                            to Cobra Dane.

                     Beale software modifications will not raise
                    ABM Treaty issues before fiscal year 2004.
                     Current plans contemplate constructing an X-
                    Band radar in the mid-Pacific in fiscal year 2006.

             In-Flight Interceptor Communications Systems (IFICS)
            to be constructed next spring/summer may raise ABM Treaty
            issues depending on whether they are determined to be
            subcomponents of an ABM radar.

        Chairman Levin. General Kadish, do you have an opening
    statement?
        General Kadish. No.
        Chairman Levin. At last week's hearing, I said we would
    first call on members who were able to come to the hearing but
    were not able to participate. So I will first recognize those
    committee members who attended last Thursday's hearing but did
    not have a first 6-minute round of questioning. We will then
    follow our normal early bird order of recognition, and begin a
    new 6-minute round of questioning.
        Under that announcement which I made last week, I would
    first call upon Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    add my word of welcome to Secretary Wolfowitz and General
    Kadish, and also to your staff people who are here. National
    missile defense is among the most important issues that is
    facing Congress and the American people today. As Vice Admiral
    Dennis McGinn said recently at the Naval War College,
    ``Whatever money we spend on national missile defense against
    ballistic missile threat to this Nation is a high opportunity
    cost, and we should do it very, very carefully.''
        Today's hearing is an effort by this committee to study the
    issue very carefully, and I commend the chairman and members of
    this committee for their dedication shown in ensuring that
    Congress does a job before committing great amounts of scarce
    funds to an expanded program.
        Let us remember that we are designing a system to meet
    future as well as present threats. The system may not be fully
    deployed until the year 2010 or 2020. We need to consider
    whether the major threats faced 10, 20, or even 30 years down
    the road will be delivered in a way that a missile defense
    program protects us, or will our missile defense system be the
    defensive equivalent of France's Maginot Line, something our
    adversaries will be able to easily evade? This is a much more
    difficult question, and one which argues for more caution in
    our current approach to setting priorities for defense
    spending.
        I would ask the Chairman to place my full statement in the
    record, and if it pleases the Chairman, I will proceed with
    questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. It will be made part of the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. National missile defense is among the most
    important issues facing Congress and the American people.
        As Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn said recently at the Naval War
    College, ``whatever money we spend on national missile defense against
    a ballistic missile threat to this Nation is a high opportunity cost
    and we should do it very, very carefully.''
        Today's hearing is an effort by this committee to study this issue
    very, very carefully. I commend the Chairman for his dedication to
    ensuring that Congress does its job before committing great amounts of
    scarce funds to an expanded program. We heard testimony this week from
    the service chiefs and secretaries that they need more money in fiscal
    year 2003 and beyond to provide for basic procurement and operations.
    We cannot afford to do everything. Basic decisions must be made
    concerning what is a reasonable financial commitment to make, to deter,
    or prevent a realistic threat.
        The Pentagon's acquisition chief, Edward Aidridge, Jr., has said
    that ``we are not sure we know what the answer is [for providing
    missile defense].'' We need to know more accurately the response to
    that question before proceeding with a crash program involving billions
    of dollars.
        If our approach is, as some have suggested, ``test through
    failure,'' that sounds like we will try anything, go anywhere, spend no
    matter what, until we find something that works some of the time. That
    sounds like a prescription for waste: a waste of time and a waste of
    money.
        Rather than trying everything at once, it may make more sense to
    build slowly, test by test, a defense system that works against the
    most likely threats. Make it simple, effective and efficient. What we
    have now is a little of this, a some of that, and a lot of money.
        Let us also remember that we are designing a system to meet future
    as well as present threats. The system may not be fully deployed until
    the year 2010 or 2020. We need to consider whether the major threats we
    face 10 or 20 or even 30 years down the road will be delivered in a way
    that a missile defense program protects us or will our missile defense
    system be the defensive equivalent of France's Maginot Line--something
    our adversaries will be able easily to evade. This is a much more
    difficult question and one which argues for more caution in our current
    approach to setting priorities for defense spending.
        I thank the Chairman once again for his leadership in this area. I
    look forward to this morning's discussion.

        Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Rumsfeld has
    decided that a mid-course system alone is not sufficient to
    provide global protection, but many boost-phase systems such as
    an airborne or space laser will only be able to destroy an ICBM
    booster. The warhead is built to survive reentry, and could not
    be affected by a laser.
        Are you concerned about knocking out a booster to prevent
    the warhead from hitting U.S. territory, only to send that
    warhead falling on some other territory, such as Canada, Japan,
    or Europe, where we have American troops and allies present?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I am more concerned at the
    moment that we do not have the capability at all. I would like
    to develop it. When we develop it, we will also have much more
    knowledge about exactly the kind of question you raise.
        I think it is almost certain that a missile launched by a
    hostile country will do much more damage if it hits the place
    that it is aimed at than if it is knocked off-course somewhere
    along the way, and I would prefer to knock it off-course as
    early as possible so that the problems that you are raising
    arise for the country that launches the missile, not for our
    friends or our allies, and certainly not for ourselves, but it
    is a valid question. It is one that one would have to look at
    in the operational context of a successful capability, and we
    are unfortunately a long way from that capability.
        To give you a for instance, during the Gulf War, when we
    were subjected to ballistic missile attack and our friend,
    Israel, was subjected to ballistic missile attack, our pilots
    flying over Western Iraq watched missiles rising from the
    launch pad with big, bright signatures, but no capability to
    shoot them down. If one of those missiles had had a chemical
    warhead on it, I would have much preferred to have it land in
    Iraq than to land on Israel or Saudi Arabia.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, one of the criticisms of the
    old national missile defense schedule was that it required a
    deployment decision to be made before any operational testing.
    The BMDO has stated that the focus of missile defense is no
    longer on deployment, but on testing. Does the new plan put off
    a deployment decision until after all the developmental testing
    is complete and operational tests have begun?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I will let General Kadish answer that
    question.
        General Kadish. There are no procurement or deployment
    activities in the current program, but there are decision
    points to offer it to the Secretary and others to decide
    whether we have enough information to proceed with a
    procurement and deployment program. Right now that is not part
    of the plan, and our intention at this point is to test as
    robustly and rapidly as we can all the systems that are under
    development so that we can be in a position to actually provide
    that information to the decisionmakers.
        Senator Akaka. General, I would like to mention and discuss
    countermeasures. In space, a warhead and simple decoy, such as
    a traffic cone, look the same. Is that correct?
        General Kadish. They theoretically can be made to look the
    same, but you have to define look, and what visible or IR
    spectrum. There is a number of ways that you would want to look
    at them in the spectrums we deal with.
        Senator Akaka. It is my understanding that the flight test
    on Saturday used a single balloon decoy. How many decoys are
    you planning to use in future tests? If it is just a few
    decoys, is this a realistic test, when an enemy could use
    multiple cheap decoys, such as a simple traffic cone to deceive
    us?
        General Kadish. The countermeasure and the decoy problems
    will be addressed as we build our test to be more complex in
    these areas, and ultimately I am hoping that we have--I could
    not give you the exact number of decoys, but a lot of decoys,
    and see how the system performs.
        In fact, in the world of development, we would like to
    actually test what we call the edge of the envelope, so that we
    can actually break the system and find out how many decoys you
    can have or not have, and that would be my intention, if we can
    afford to do that in the long run. But again, that is the issue
    of having a layered system, because countermeasures that work
    in the midcourse, like the tests that we did on Saturday, do
    not work in boost phase, and those that work potentially in
    boost phase do not work in midcourse, so having a layered
    system greatly complicates the countermeasure problem for our
    adversary, and it simplifies it for us to a large degree.
        That does not mean that we would not aggressively pursue
    overcoming midcourse countermeasures, but it certainly would
    help us to have a layered system.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Carnahan.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    for extending this hearing on this most important subject.
        The committee is tasked with the responsibility of
    authorizing funds for our Nation's defense programs. As we
    address this year's defense budget, we will need to address
    some fundamental questions that I believe concern the American
    people. First, are we spending the available defense funds in a
    way that maximizes our national defense? We need to strike the
    right balance.
        The President has requested a huge increase in missile
    defense, but his requests for readiness are modest. We are
    actually cutting funds for nonmissile defense science research.
    Even if one supports the concept of missile defense, we all
    need to ask, at what cost, and what other defense priorities
    will be sacrificed, and second, we need to make sure our budget
    is geared toward addressing the most imminent and realistic
    threats to the United States.
        I believe the average American is genuinely and
    appropriately concerned about the possibilities of a terrorist
    attack with a deadly virus, or some other devastating lethal
    attack. Of course, we must also address the serious threat of
    an accidental missile launch, or a missile attack by a rogue
    nation. Again, the difficulty is striking the right balance. I
    hope that this hearing will bring us closer to answering these
    questions. I am encouraged by the successful results of last
    weekend's flight test, but I believe that we must remain
    cautious in our enthusiasm.
        As General Kadish commented on Saturday night, this success
    was only one step on the journey. We have a long road ahead in
    all of the missile defense activities that we have ahead of us.
    I hope that today, General Kadish and Secretary Wolfowitz will
    be able to help us as we proceed along that road.
        My first question is to General Kadish. I understand your
    organization intends to accelerate its testing schedule with
    close to two dozen flight tests before the 2004 deployment
    date. Are you at all concerned that this schedule is so
    condensed that you may not have sufficient time between each of
    the tests to evaluate the performance of the system's
    components, and what primary factors will you be reviewing to
    measure the success of this program?
        General Kadish. Well, Senator, that is a good question.
    Whenever we accelerate tests of this magnitude, the
    intercontinental ranges--I think you saw how complex it was on
    Saturday. When we decide to increase the number of tests, we
    will also at the same time put in the management practices to
    deal with that acceleration, and so to some degree having a lot
    of time between tests gives us the luxury of having a lot of
    time to do data reduction and data analysis. As we squeeze that
    time between tests, we have to make the management changes as
    well as invest in some equipment to do the data analysis
    quicker.
        In addition to that, as we have more experience with our
    tests, doing high ops tempo testing, we will be looking at
    finer grain type elements of the system, and we should be able
    to reduce that data quicker. So I am confident that, as we
    increase the number, we will not lose any of our fidelity of
    analysis, but we will be able to accelerate that as well, and
    if we cannot, we are going to look very carefully at slowing
    the test program down, but I do not think we should slow down
    the test program based on our ability to analyze data.
        Senator Carnahan. Secretary Wolfowitz, legal discussions on
    missile defense have recently focused on two important
    documents, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the 1999
    Cochran-Inouye National Missile Defense Act. At the last
    hearing, we learned that the President has requested funds for
    missile defense programs that may violate the ABM Treaty. Would
    you once again explain how missile defense development proposed
    in the President's defense budget might bump up against our
    commitment to the ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would point out that this is not the
    first budget that has done that. One budget actually includes
    money that the Clinton administration asked for to begin the
    construction of a radar in Shemya, Alaska which is, I think,
    the consensus of virtually all lawyers, and that is a hard
    consensus to find, that would have been, or would be a
    violation of the ABM Treaty.
        In the 2002 budget, as best we can determine, there are
    three events that raise questions about the treaty. I discussed
    them in some detail in my last testimony, and they are
    addressed in the attachments to this testimony.
        Each of the three, the test bed at Fort Greely, Alaska and
    the two test events of non-ABM radars, and some of our missile
    shots, raise issues under the treaty that we still do not have
    full review by the lawyers as to whether they are compliant or
    not compliant. They are in the gray zone on the boundaries of
    the treaty, and therefore one cannot say with clarity whether
    they violate the treaty or not.
        Senator Carnahan. Before leaving the treaty, the United
    States would have to announce its intention to do so at least 6
    months in advance. Is the administration prepared to make this
    announcement if it is determined that the U.S. missile defense
    policies compete with the treaty's provisions?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think the President has made
    that decision. It is certain we will comply with the treaty,
    and that if we were to do something in violation of the treaty,
    we would only do it after withdrawing, and withdrawal, as you
    correctly point out, requires 6 months notification.
        But as I have said, and I have said it repeatedly, our goal
    is to get to a situation where we can move forward
    cooperatively with the Russians beyond the constraints of the
    treaty, and not to find ourselves in a situation where we are
    forced either to constrain our program and limit our ability to
    protect the American people or, alternatively, to withdraw from
    the treaty unilaterally.
        We would like to find a cooperative approach with the
    Russians, and Senator, I am optimistic we can do so.
        Senator Carnahan. One final question. The 1999 Cochran-
    Inouye National Missile Defense Act mandated a dual-track
    approach toward national missile defense. First, it authorizes
    as soon as technologically possible deployment of a national
    missile defense system capable of defending the territory of
    the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks
    with funding subject to the annual authorization, and
    appropriations, and the annual appropriation of funds for
    national missile defense, and second, the law authorizes that
    the United States continue negotiating reductions in Russian
    nuclear forces.
        Does your budget request seek funds for programs designed
    to address more than a limited ballistic missile attack? In
    other words, do you feel that you need additional statutory
    authority to plan and design and build the layered missile
    defense that you have proposed?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. All we are seeking in the missile
    defense area this year is the money we are requesting under the
    authorization, but on the other side of that act, the Cochran-
    Inouye Act, the part you referred to about negotiated
    reductions, that is part of the framework of issues we are
    discussing with the Russians. We are pursuing further
    reductions in nuclear forces, but we are also, in fact,
    reducing our nuclear forces in areas where we think we have
    systems that we do not need in this year's budget.
        We are proposing to remove four Tridents, some 30 B-1s, and
    some 50 Peacekeeper missiles, and I believe at least for the
    Peacekeeper missile reduction we would require congressional
    authorization.
        Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan. We will now
    begin our next round.
        Secretary Wolfowitz, the administration has expressed an
    interest in the option of having an early emergency deployment
    capability focused on having a small number of test
    interceptors and linking them to an upgraded radar that already
    exists at Shemya called Cobra Dane, and this is something
    General Kadish mentioned in his briefing to the committee on
    June 13.
        My questions are relative to Fort Greely. As well as being
    part of a test bed, do you intend that Fort Greely have
    operational capability, even if primitive, or rudimentary?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is too early to make that
    determination, Senator. It would depend, I think really and
    principally on two things: first, how the tests proceed, what
    operational capability we think we could acquire, and we will
    not know that until we have done further testing, and then
    second, the question of where we are with respect to potential
    threats.
        It is envisioned much more as a kind of rudimentary
    emergency capability that one would have available if two
    conditions are met, if the testing and development goes well,
    and if the threat proceeds rapidly. If the threat does not
    proceed rapidly, or if the testing does not go well, then we
    could not turn into an operational capability, but the
    philosophy is here, since we need a much more operationally
    realistic test bed, let us do it in a way that makes that
    investment convertible to operational capability if and when we
    decide to go forward.
        Chairman Levin. When would you expect the earliest date for
    that convertibility to an operational capability?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I had better let General Kadish make
    the prediction about dates.
        Chairman Levin. Well, if all the tests go well, it would
    have that capability, and I want to know at what point would it
    have that capability?
        General Kadish. Well, I think the clearest declaration of a
    capability, if it was directed, would be when we actually had
    that physical assets on site.
        Chairman Levin. When would that be?
        General Kadish. At this point, the planning is ongoing, but
    sometime in the calendar year 2004 to 2006, and I put a 2-year
    window in there because of the nature of the uncertainty that
    we have.
        Chairman Levin. You want this test bed at Fort Greely to
    have an operational capability, is that correct? You want that
    option?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, and a very rudimentary one, and I
    think it is worth emphasizing, Senator, if we did not have a
    treaty issue, the Russians would look at that and they would
    laugh. This is not something that should make any Russian
    planner stay awake at night for even a single minute.
        Chairman Levin. I do not think they are laughing about what
    you are proposing. From what I gather, they are not laughing at
    all, unless you think that is just----
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is because of the larger treaty
    issues, but what I am trying to emphasize is, this capability
    we are talking about at Fort Greely may disturb a North Korean
    planner, but it is not in any way a capability that threatens
    Russian missiles at all.
        Chairman Levin. But they do view it as a serious possible
    violation of a treaty, is that correct, with broader
    implications? Is that a fair statement, that they view it that
    way?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is a fair statement, and I am
    trying to make a distinction which I think is a relevant one
    between the broader implications of the treaty, which we take
    very seriously, and the actual military implications of this
    deployment, which are quite modest.
        Chairman Levin. I want to be really clear, though, on one
    point. You do intend now that the Fort Greely activity have as
    soon as possible an operational capability, albeit rudimentary.
    That is your current intent, is that correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Not necessarily.
        Chairman Levin. Well, you do intend that the tests work
    well, and the threat from North Korea is here and now.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The General said 4 to 6 years. There
    are some people--and I cannot say I am quite this optimistic.
    There are people who think the North Korean regime might
    collapse within that time frame.
        Chairman Levin. But that is not where you are coming from.
    You believe the North Korean threat is basically here and now,
    is that not correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think it is moving along rapidly,
    yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. You do want the tests to succeed, is that
    not correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is correct.
        Chairman Levin. Given those two facts, what you believe and
    what you hope, is it not a fair statement to say that you want
    the Fort Greely activity to have the operational capability,
    albeit rudimentary, as soon as possible? Is that not a fair
    statement?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is a fair statement. I am
    not a lawyer. I do not know what intent means.
        Chairman Levin. Your intent.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would like that development to give
    us an option for a rudimentary operational capability.
        Chairman Levin. To give it to us as quickly as possible.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. So then you are going to have your review
    group tell us whether or not, since that is your intent for
    that activity, that activity then would violate--yes or no, we
    do not know yet--the ABM Treaty, and we are going to have a
    compliance review group decision on that issue, I assume, when?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Soon.
        Chairman Levin. Within weeks?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I hope within weeks, yes.
        Chairman Levin. Now, is it correct that no test
    interceptors would be launched from Fort Greely?
        General Kadish. That is our current state of planning right
    now because of safety considerations. However, I am going to
    ask our people to look hard at that particular issue over time.
        Chairman Levin. My time is up.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary and General, again, I think the opening
    statements by both clearly are a step forward in this debate,
    and a constructive and positive step forward, and I
    congratulate you.
        I have gone back and listened to you carefully, then reread
    your testimony with regard to the caption, ``we need Congress'
    support for President Bush's effort to achieve an understanding
    with Russia on ballistic missile defense.'' To me, that clearly
    indicates the course which the President is pursuing, namely,
    consultation, negotiations, and working toward an
    understanding.
        We have also used a term, a new strategic framework.
        Now, let us go back to the treaty itself. Those two generic
    terms that you use, understanding, and new strategic framework,
    they do not preclude, I presume, the option of a series of
    amendments to the treaty, is that correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think we preclude anything at
    this point, Senator.
        Senator Warner. So that is still an open option, and I
    refer to the President's statement, to offer Russia amendments.
    I am reading from the speech he gave down at the University of
    South Carolina. To make this possible, we will offer Russia the
    necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty. You have not at this
    time ruled out as a possibility for either the understanding or
    the new strategic framework an amended treaty.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. As I said, Senator, I do not think we
    have ruled out anything.
        Senator Warner. But we are coming to this question of
    ripping up the treaty. It seems to me the option of amending it
    is on the table.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is, Senator.
        Senator Warner. It is?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
        Senator Warner. I just wanted to spell that out, because we
    are moving, as the Senator said, on two tracks, the track the
    President is doing, consultation and negotiation with Russia,
    and at the same time the track under the 2002 budget of testing
    and the like. This committee in its authorization bill will be
    the first station at which this issue stops, as to whether or
    not we can obtain from Congress the support that you expressed
    a request for on behalf of the President to work as a partner.
    I am hopeful we can clarify these things, and I think you have
    moved forward today in that clarification.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I would hope that whatever
    understanding we reach with the Russians goes beyond the old
    notion that we have to stay awake at night worrying about small
    changes in the nuclear posture of either side. We do not do it
    with the countries with whom we are clearly and openly friends,
    and that is the relationship we would like to get into with
    Russia.
        Senator Warner. I know there are some who desire, and I
    fully appreciate that, completely taking the treaty and
    agreement with Russia, to drop it and start over with an
    entirely new framework. But at this point in time, to allay
    fears that we are trying to rip it up, you say the amending
    process--which could achieve that and go beyond it--amendments
    could clearly take us beyond the ABM Treaty. Amendments can be
    very broad in their scope--but that option is on the table.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. As I said, I do not think the
    President has ruled out anything.
        Senator Warner. If for some reason these negotiations with
    Russia do not meet the goals that the President has laid down,
    he would come back to Congress, would he not, in the
    consultative process?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I am certain we will be consulting
    closely with Congress throughout the coming months.
        Senator Warner. So that would be, again, a partnership with
    Congress.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe it must be, Senator.
        Senator Warner. That is very reassuring.
        Now, I raise this question of the amendments because it is
    my understanding that President Putin has indicated Russia is
    now open to revising though not abandoning the ABM Treaty. Is
    that a correct statement?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I have heard different statements. I
    think that is correct, Senator, yes.
        Senator Warner. I think that lends great hope to the
    negotiations thus far, preliminary though they may be, with
    Russia producing fruitful comments.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is the indication we have
    gotten from comments we have heard directly from him, and
    comments he has made to other people, and even some comments he
    has made in public.
        Senator Warner. Can you also address the issue of the
    process we are undertaking with Russia? The process does not
    provide a basis for other nations in the world to say that they
    should begin to suddenly augment, precipitously, their
    strategic systems and build more, because these other notions
    perceive we are going through a process that makes the world
    more unstable than stable.
        Clearly, if we reach a new framework agreement with Russia,
    that should send a message to the world that it would be a more
    stable situation, and would not provide a basis for them moving
    out unilaterally in their own security interests and
    substantially augmenting their missile capability. Was that a
    correct assumption?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is correct, Senator, and
    as far as those countries, the small number of what some have
    referred to as the walking wounded that pursue these ballistic
    missile offensive capabilities because they think it will
    secure advantage, I would think this demonstration of our
    ability to move forward on missile defense and to move forward
    cooperatively with the Russians might help to begin to
    discourage them from those investments, and that would also
    make the world a more stable place.
        Senator Warner. So clearly, a part of the case that the
    President is making in his consultations and negotiations is to
    ensure that the defenses will increase rather than detract from
    global security.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Warner. General Kadish, the proposed budget request
    includes a greatly expanded test bed that will enhance test
    realism and allow for a larger number of tests. The expanded
    test bed will allow the BMDO office to implement many of the
    recommendations made by former Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation, Philip Coyle. He is due to appear before this
    committee shortly. Those tests will help meet the demands of
    some BMD critics that BMD programs be thoroughly tested prior
    to deployment to assure operational effectiveness. Do you
    generally agree with my opening statement on this question?
        General Kadish. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Warner. What would be the impact on the test
    program should Congress elect to cut the BMD budget by, say, a
    billion, or $2 billion?
        General Kadish. Well, we would have to reevaluate what type
    of testing we would be able to accomplish, and obviously, it
    would be less. The ability to prove our systems, our models and
    simulations, hinges on a robust testing program in addition to
    making it more operationally representative.
        Senator Warner. Such failure to authorize the President's
    request would go contrary to what Philip Coyle projected, would
    it not?
        General Kadish. In my view, yes.
        Senator Warner. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary and General, welcome back. I wanted to come back
    to some of the items we discussed last week. Last week, I said
    that I thought the program you laid before us for missile
    defense was generally consistent with the National Missile
    Defense Act of 1999, which was adopted with support, I believe,
    of 97 Members of the Senate, but I expressed my concern about
    the availability of resources generally to the Pentagon. I am
    worried about your capacity to carry out this program in a way
    that does not affect other priority items in the Department.
        I did note, Secretary Wolfowitz, and perhaps you did, too,
    that Bill Kristol and Bob Kagan have an article in this week's
    Weekly Standard in which they call upon you and Secretary
    Rumsfeld to resign in protest over the failure of the
    administration, and particularly the folks at OMB, to
    adequately fund defense priorities. It is an editorial worth
    reading for the details, if not the ultimate recommendation.
    [Laughter.]
        I presume you have no intention to resign.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not want to get into a discussion
    of that, but no, I have no plans to resign.
        Senator Lieberman. You have been very consistent about
    that. Thank you.
        I do think, in seriousness, we have to keep coming back to
    this, and again I express the hope that I have expressed
    earlier that this committee on a bipartisan basis will provide
    adequate levels of funding for the Pentagon generally.
        I want to come to a direct question about Russia and ask
    you to speak a little bit more on it. Last week when you were
    here, you expressed not only a commitment to attempt to
    negotiate modifications in the ABM Treaty consistent with the
    Ballistic Missile Defense program you and General Kadish
    outlined, but I thought you expressed a certain degree of
    optimism about the ability to reach those modifications with
    the Russians. To some extent, you have done that this morning.
        After the hearing last week, in response to your testimony,
    there was an interview with the minister of defense in Russia,
    Ivanov, and I guess at best, as I read the interview, I would
    describe his frame of mind as puzzled by the optimism expressed
    here, and at worst, I would say he disagreed with it.
        Of course today we see on the front page of the papers Mr.
    Putin and Mr. Jiang embracing in friendship, and one of the
    items that draws them together is their opposition to our
    missile defense initiative, and even agitated by what has
    pleased and delighted us here, which is the successful test on
    Saturday.
        So why are you optimistic about our ability to negotiate
    the necessary modifications with the Russians on the ABM Treaty
    to allow this program to go forward?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. If I might very briefly, before I
    answer that, in opening you talked about the balance among
    different things, and I would just like to point out that our
    adversaries, the countries we worry most about, are investing
    heavily in the offensive capability. It is the one Iraqi
    capability we underestimated during the gulf war. It is in many
    ways one of the biggest weaknesses in our overall defense
    posture, and I think our adversaries have discovered it.
        I think we have done a careful job of balancing, but it is
    a very big increase. It may not be as big as Bill Kristol or
    Bob Kagan would like it. Frankly, it is not as big as I would
    like, but it is the largest in 15 years, and it is a 7-percent
    real increase. It is substantial.
        To come now to your main question, my reasons for optimism
    rest most fundamentally on the fact that I think we have a
    fundamentally different relationship with Russia, but we have
    not yet gotten to the point of really developing that or
    elaborating it in ways that I think are important.
        I think their concerns about the ABM Treaty rest very
    heavily on broader political significance of the treaty, as I
    think--and I do not want to put words in the chairman's mouth,
    but it seems to me that was one of the points he was making
    when I said that from a military point of view, from a Russian
    military planner's point of view what we are doing is
    insignificant.
        I think what they are looking for is a framework of
    relations with the United States, and I hope it is one that
    addresses the real security needs of this era. I do not think
    the Russians have to lay awake at night worrying about our
    attacking them with nuclear missiles, and I do not think we
    need to waste a lot of time worrying about them attacking us. I
    think what we have is very substantial common interests in
    mutual stability in Europe, and mutual stability in Asia, and I
    must say, I take with a certain amount of salt the agreement
    with the Chinese.
        I do not object to it. I think good relations between
    Russia and China contribute to stability in Asia, but I do not
    think the Russians have discounted the possibility that China
    could be a problem for them. I think working together on
    stabilizing those critical areas of the world is where the
    cornerstone of strategic stability is today, if I might use
    that phrase. It is not in the old pattern of mutual
    annihilation, and I think when they see that we are not only
    saying things, we are doing them, we are bringing down our
    offensive nuclear forces, we are not waiting for protracted
    years and years of negotiations in Geneva before we remove a
    single warhead, that our whole posture is one that they should
    be comfortable with, and I think as we deepen those discussions
    we will begin to make some progress.
        I think the fact that they have shown great interest not
    just in traditional arms control negotiations between the
    foreign ministry and the State Department, but very serious
    interest in discussions between Defense Minister Ivanov and
    Secretary Rumsfeld suggests to me that they are viewing this in
    a broad context of security.
        Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The opening
    sentence of our chairman has, I think, kind of set the tone for
    one thing we all agree with, and that is, if I recall him
    right, he said protecting and defending the American people is
    our number 1 objective. Do you consider that to be our number 1
    objective?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is why we are all serving in the
    Defense Department, and I think it is what everyone on this
    committee agrees with.
        Senator Inhofe. I think we all do, and it is significant.
    When you look at the threats that are out there--I notice that
    Senator Roberts is not here, but there is a new subcommittee
    that he chaired on the new types of threats, emerging threats,
    and yet the one that we are facing right now is one that is
    really not emerging, it is here. It is one that we have been
    dealing with for a long time.
        I would like to just briefly respond to a couple of the
    arguments you keep hearing against moving forward with our
    missile defense system, one being that we might precipitate an
    arms race. I would suggest, and I want to say this for the
    record, I think there is already an arms race as far as China
    is concerned. We do not know the exact number, but China has
    made a very large purchase of approximately 240 SU-27s and SU-
    30 vehicles that are air-to-air and air-to-ground superior to
    anything that we have.
        They currently, it is my understanding, have purchased some
    of the rapid-fire artillery systems and platforms that are
    better than our Paladin is, and they are spending a very large
    percentage of their money on this arms race.
        But there is something else that I think is significant to
    bring out, and that is, could it not be argued that by having a
    missile defense system not only are you defending yourself, but
    you are also allowing us to reduce our nuclear weapons.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is certainly true we can do both at
    the same time, Senator. That is fundamental, and I do think to
    some degree if we were to think about very low levels of
    offensive forces it would be, frankly, impossible to
    contemplate, if we did not have a security that we have some
    ability to defend against limited missile attacks.
        But I think the main point is, there is plenty of room to
    bring down our offensive forces. We are doing so. That ought to
    be a strong signal, particularly to Russia and to anyone else
    who thinks about it, that there is absolutely no reason to
    respond to a limited American missile defense capability by
    building up their offensive nuclear forces.
        Senator Inhofe. I guess what I am saying, and let me make
    sure it is clear, is that if we had a system in place to defend
    ourselves against an incoming missile, would that not allow us
    to reduce our nuclear capability in terms of offensive weapons?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. In some circumstances it might. The
    reason I am hesitating, Senator, is I do not think in any case
    we would want to do that in the foreseeable future. I mean, one
    could imagine a world of complete disarmament, and that might
    be a wonderful world, but in the foreseeable future, I do not
    think we would----
        Senator Inhofe. I am not suggesting that.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We would not want to give up our
    deterrent capability, and these calculations of how one
    substitutes for another are complicated.
        Senator Inhofe. As far as one substituting for another, the
    argument we always hear is the suitcase threat, the terrorist
    threat. We know that is a very real threat, but I think it is
    important for the record to reflect that we are currently--
    maybe not through the Department of Defense--we are currently
    addressing this threat, the suitcase threat, and in the case of
    the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal Office
    Building, that was a pickup truck.
        We have gone back, and we have been doing it right here in
    Washington to see what could be done, what could be placed to
    keep something like this from happening again, so we are doing
    that very actively, and I think it is important to talk about
    that. I was likening it to an insurance policy. There is a risk
    out there, so you insure your house. That does not mean you do
    not insure your car, and so we need to do both, and I think it
    is very significant that we talk in those terms.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. If I might, Senator, on that point, I
    think they are both serious threats, and we need to work on
    protecting ourselves from both.
        What is different about the two as far as I can see is that
    number one, we have some capability to defend against that
    terrorist threat. We have intercepted people at the border. We
    have counterintelligence means to disrupt terrorist cells. We
    work on it constantly.
        We do not have any means of protecting this country from a
    ballistic missile attack, not a single one, and second we have
    no treaty that prohibits us from protecting ourselves against
    terrorist attack. I cannot imagine signing one, and I think we
    need to think about that in thinking about the anachronism of
    this treaty that had a purpose during the Cold War, but I think
    has long since outlived that military purpose.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. That is a very good
    answer.
        Just for a minute, could you describe some of the
    advantages of a sea-based system, and then we can kind of go
    into how we might be able to move toward that.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. You always have to qualify these
    things by if it works, but if it worked, if we could develop
    the capability to intercept from the sea, I think there are at
    least three benefits that you get from it. I am sorry, I
    started to say advantages, but I think one needs to get away
    from the mind set that one system is better than another
    system.
        In fact, one of the advantages of developing sea-based
    capability allows you to introduce another method of
    interception, another point at which you can intercept, another
    complication for any attacker, and so the more different things
    that work, the better off you are.
        Number two, by being mobile and deployable you could locate
    it in a crisis situation closer to wherever the relevant threat
    is, and that, one could imagine, could be useful.
        Finally, because it is mobile and could be located in a
    crisis situation, depending on where the crisis is, it might
    provide you with boost intercept capability, and I think of all
    the phases at which you would like to be able to intercept for
    reasons I said to Senator Akaka, boost phase is the place I
    would most like to be able to get things.
        Senator Inhofe. I think you made that very clear. My time
    has expired. I did want to ask, if there is anything you would
    like to suggest to us? This is our fourth test. I believe the
    first one was successful. We had a couple that were not, and
    you have not really talked too much about what we are going to
    do next time, where do we go from here. Is there anything you
    want to share with us that you have not already?
        General Kadish. Well, Senator, I think we are going to go--
    --
        Senator Inhofe. Maybe more sophisticated decoys?
        General Kadish. A lot will depend on the internal data
    analyses to see if we want to proceed and replicate the same
    tests, and then we will be looking at complicating it, but
    those decisions will be taken over the next month and a half.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, in a recent commentary in the Washington
    Post, you stated two of the most important conditions for
    success in building and deploying a missile defense system. I
    guess I would like to ask if you would agree that these would
    represent two of those important conditions for success. One,
    prove the technology before deployment, and second, that we
    reach agreements with Russia and other nations that ensure the
    defenses will increase rather than detract from global
    stability.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, certainly I agree with the
    general proposition that you want to prove technology before
    you deploy. As General Kadish has said, there is always the
    judgment to be applied as to what level of demonstration you
    require to achieve a certain level of capability, but clearly
    there is no point in deploying things that do not work.
        Second, I think the way you said it was reaching agreements
    with other nations to ensure that missile defense increases
    stability rather than decreases it. In that general way, I
    think I would agree, but I would certainly point out I do not
    expect to get Iraq or Iran or North Korea to agree to our
    deployment of ballistic missile defense.
        I think some of the stability we would hope to achieve in
    the world is precisely from demonstrating to them that their
    large investments in their offensive missile capabilities will
    come to naught.
        Senator Dayton. Regarding Russia, and the pact we have with
    them, in your testimony today you indicate one of the possible
    violators of the ABM Treaty would be the systems integration
    test, which is scheduled for next February, and the treaty
    requires the 6-month notification if we are going to
    unilaterally withdraw from it.
        So if I do the arithmetic, that says to me that if you
    determine through what your outlined procedure is today that
    this test will violate the ABM next February, by next month,
    August, the administration will have to notify Russia and the
    world of its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Is that
    the kind of timetable we are looking at here, respectively?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe these are a series of tests
    that we will be conducting. I do not believe we are going to
    have--if there were a determination that this is a treaty
    problem, I imagine we would just wait a little while. Is that
    the plan, General?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is a series that begins next
    February. It is a series that raises issues. I do not think we
    consider that if it is a treaty issue, that we would proceed
    with that particular test, and force the issue by next
    February.
        Senator Dayton. There is another reference to the missile
    defense test bed, the construction beginning next spring, as
    another possible violation of the treaty, which again is going
    to require a 6-month notification, that would require that
    notification occur sometime in the fall. I guess without
    quibbling over a particular month or another, it seems that
    this reflects the kind of very accelerated timetable that this
    testing is proceeding under as it relates to the ABM Treaty,
    and I guess that leads into my question.
        You reference the President's intention to meet with
    President Putin this week and have reciprocating visits, which
    I think is commendable. You also talked in your testimony last
    week about moving beyond the ABM Treaty and setting up this new
    agreement that reflects the new strategic framework.
        In the history of arms control negotiations and agreements,
    I am not aware of any major agreement that has proceeded on the
    kind of accelerated timetable that this would require. I guess
    I am wondering, are you aware of such a timetable such as this
    having been met in the past, and if not, what makes you think
    it can be achieved this time?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, the history of arms control
    agreements are mostly these protracted negotiations between two
    heavily armed, essentially hostile adversaries, the United
    States and the Soviet Union, and you are right, those
    negotiations took forever. I participated in a lot of them, and
    it was reminiscent of root canal work, and we are certainly not
    going to reach an agreement early if we approach it in that
    way. But the premise on which we are proceeding is that Russia
    is not the Soviet Union.
        This is not a potential adversary. It is, in fact, a
    country that we would like to bring into closer partnership
    with us. It is a potential friend, maybe even a potential ally,
    and I think that is the way we want to move forward.
        I must say that if someone envisions a negotiation like the
    old ones with the Soviet Union, and that we will not in any way
    encounter constraints to the ABM Treaty during the time of a
    protracted negotiation like that, I think, Senator, that really
    is giving the Russians a veto over our program, and that is the
    dilemma we are caught in here.
        I think everyone agrees we need to move forward in missile
    defense. We do not want to give the Russians a veto. I think
    everyone agrees also we would like to achieve a cooperative
    outcome, and I think that forces a fairly rapid schedule.
        I would emphasize, too, though I hope this is not where we
    end up, that even in the worst case if we say these are
    important things we have to proceed with them. If we do not yet
    have an agreement but we need to withdraw, that certainly
    should not be the end of negotiations. In fact, most of the
    negotiations that you refer to did not begin from a treaty.
    They began from an American program. In fact, the ABM Treaty
    itself grew out of a vote in this body to move forward with a
    Safeguard ABM system.
        Senator Dayton. I would agree with you, Mr. Secretary, that
    we certainly do not want to give Russia a veto. On the other
    hand, what seemed to be an agreement that the improvement, or
    at least the retention of global stability is the sine qua non
    in this arrangement, so as you say, you are in a delicate
    situation. It would seem that if the actions diplomatically of
    this administration are such that they cause Russia to respond
    adversarially, rather than cooperatively, that would seriously
    undermine even the military's intent of this undertaking.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is a fair point, Senator, but we
    are doing more than trying to achieve an agreement with the
    Russians. We are doing a lot of things that they can observe,
    and I think ought to discourage them from any kind of
    precipitous or dangerous reaction. I come back to what I think
    is really very fundamental, and that is the reductions in our
    own offensive nuclear forces.
        We are already taking some without any protracted
    negotiations. We did not even negotiate a week to remove 50
    MIRV'd MX missiles from our force, nor to remove four Trident
    submarines, with nearly 800 nuclear warheads. We are taking
    more than 1,000 nuclear warheads out of our force with this
    budget alone, and it did not take a week of negotiations with
    the Russians.
        I mean, you go back 10 years, when the previous President
    Bush, and I believe it was September--I think it was even
    September 27 of 1991--announced that we were going to make
    major reductions in both our tactical nuclear forces and our
    strategic nuclear forces, and that we hoped the Russians would
    reciprocate, within 10 days and no negotiations. No first-class
    tickets to Geneva, not even any coach tickets to Geneva, yet
    within 10 days President Yeltsin and President Gorbachev, who
    was still the president at the time, responded positively.
        We did more arms control in those 10 days than in 20 years
    of negotiating with the old Soviet Union, so I think it really
    is a different era, and we have a different view of Russia. I
    hope they realize that we have a different view of them, and I
    hope they have a different view of the United States.
        Senator Dayton. That is a very good point, sir, and I wish
    you success with that undertaking.
        My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With regard to
    the treaty, I do salute you and the President and others for
    the consistent message you have sent to the world that we want
    to work and be responsive and listen and cooperate, but we do
    have a primary responsibility, which is to defend the United
    States from missile attack, which you just noted we have no
    defense for whatsoever.
        We also know that more and more nations are developing a
    missile attack system with the capability of reaching the
    United States, and I am glad, Secretary Wolfowitz, that you are
    there, having served on the bipartisan commission that
    evaluated this problem and reached the conclusion that we did
    need to deploy a national missile defense system, before you
    became Assistant Secretary of Defense.
        One of the objections that has been raised is that there
    has been this huge increase in spending on national missile
    defense. There has been a 56-percent increase in spending for
    ballistic missile defense. I believe that refers primarily to
    going from President Clinton's $5 billion that he planned to
    spend on ballistic missile defense to $8 billion that this
    administration proposes in its new budget.
        I would like to talk about those numbers a little bit.
    Under the numbers as I calculate them, President Bush in his
    defense budget, including the supplemental this year, has
    proposed a $38 billion increase in defense over the last year's
    budget, and that is a significant increase for sure, but it
    does show that the $3 billion increase that is alleged here is
    not as big as some would say.
        I would like to ask a little further, General Kadish, of
    the $3-billion increase from $5 billion to $8 billion that is
    being proposed here. A lot of that is involved with other
    missile systems that many on this committee strongly support,
    like the Patriot and the THAAD, the theater missile defense
    that has been going on for years.
        Can you tell us pretty much where the numbers come out
    there, how much of that $3 billion is not in ballistic missile
    defense, but in the theater and the Patriot-type missiles that
    all of us agree need to be built?
        General Kadish. Senator, I would like to get you the exact
    figures for the record, but as I recall, all but about $800
    million to $1 billion of it is in the theater, or dual-use type
    of systems, but I would like to be precise and answer the
    question for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In the previous construct of shorter-range theater missile defense
    and longer-range missile defense, the following budgets are requested.
    All funds are requested in BMDO's budget except where noted. Programs
    marked with an asterisk are split evenly between the two categories as
    their efforts apply to both.

                     FISCAL YEAR 2002 AMENDED BUDGET REQUEST
                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Short and Medium
                                              Range            Long Range
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Patriot Advanced Capability -3....            \1\ 784  .................
    Medium Extended Air Defense System             \1\ 74  .................
    Navy Area.........................            \2\ 395  .................
    Ground Based Terminal (THAAD).....                923  .................
    Arrow.............................                 66  .................
    Ground Based Midcourse............              3,285  .................
    Sea-Based Midcourse (NTW).........                596                 60
    Space-Based Kinetic Boost.........                105  .................
    Airborne Laser *..................                205                205
    Space-Based Laser project *.......                 85                 85
    SBIRS-L *.........................                210                210
    Advanced Technology *.............                 56                 57
    International programs *..........                 38                 37
    Systems Engineering *.............                410                411
                                       -------------------------------------
      Total...........................              3,842              4,455
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In Army budget.
    \2\ In Navy budget.

        Senator Sessions. So we are really talking about, in terms
    of ballistic missile defense, no more than half of the $3
    billion, maybe less, actually going into the development of a
    Ballistic Missile Defense program.
        General Kadish. Under the old definitions, that is heading
    in the right direction. We are trying to define this as a
    system now, a layered system.
        Senator Sessions. I know you see it correctly as one system
    and not a series of systems, but many here say, well, we
    approved theater, we approved Patriot, but we do not approve
    ballistic. When you look at those numbers, that is not much,
    when you take $1.5 billion out of the $30 billion increase
    President Bush has proposed, we are talking about 5 percent or
    less of his increase going to missile defense, and that is not
    reckless spending, in my view. Am I far wrong from that,
    Secretary Wolfowitz? Do you see it that way?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I see it that way, and we can try to
    get you precise numbers.
        I do know that just the PAC-3 increase alone is $750
    million, the Navy area-wide is $396 million, so that is $1.3
    billion that is exclusively for shorter-range systems. We are
    trying to get away from this national and theater, but there is
    shorter-range and longer-range.
        I think to understand precisely what General Kadish said a
    few minutes ago, there is a large chunk of it that is
    applicable to short, intermediate, and long-range. You can
    improve better radars, you have Airborne Lasers, there are a
    whole variety of things that will intercept missiles of a
    variety of ranges, so I think it is probably roughly correct
    that there is between $1 and $2 billion that is exclusively for
    shorter-range, including two programs I mentioned, and between
    $1 and $2 billion that is exclusively for longer range, and the
    rest is dual applicable. I can get you the exact numbers.
        Senator Sessions. That would represent less than 1 percent
    of the total defense budget of $300-plus billion.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. $1 billion would be one-third of 1
    percent.
        Senator Sessions. As you had concluded, the President and
    Secretary of Defense, and really the President announced it
    during the campaign, that he considered having a national
    defense system to be a national priority.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is, Senator, and it is a defense
    priority. The threats that we are talking about, if they were
    effective and we had no ability to cope with them, could render
    all of the rest of our investment in defense capabilities
    useless, and that is why hostile countries, I think, are
    investing so much money in their own offensive capabilities.
        Senator Sessions. So hostile countries are investing in
    attack missiles, missiles that eventually, as they improve
    them, can reach the United States, and oddly, they are the ones
    that are opposed to us building a national missile defense, and
    our allies, Israel and Taiwan and Japan and other countries,
    are very interested and supportive, or at least are interested
    and generally supportive of what we are doing, is that not
    correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think you find, Senator, the closer
    they are to the threat, the more supportive they are.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I am not surprised that nations
    like some of our adversaries would be opposed to this, because
    we would be denying them a capability of intimidation and even
    attack that they presently think they can have in the years to
    come.
        My time is up. I just would like to say that I thank you
    for the courage to confront this issue openly and talk about it
    plainly, and to recognize that the treaty does contemplate
    completely that we would not have a national missile defense
    system. There is no need to try gimmicks to get around it. Let
    us confront it. Let us work with the Russians and our European
    allies and others, and see if we cannot improve, and establish
    a way to get around that, and build what we need to build for
    America.
        Thank you for your work.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I want
    to thank the Secretary and the General for being here today and
    to extend my congratulations on a successful test.
        Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your take on the Russia-
    China agreement that was just announced during the last day or
    so regarding either the ABM Treaty or an ABM Treaty. Is there
    any authority for them to do that, for Russia to do this under
    the existing treaty, to add unilaterally, or is this a separate
    treaty arrangement without regard to our treaty with the former
    Soviet Union and others?
        I guess the question really is, is this sort of a tacit or
    de facto veto of what we are attempting to do with the missile
    defense system as it relates to our treaty with the former
    Soviet Union, which is in question, and finally, were we aware
    that this was going to this treaty, or that this agreement, if
    not a treaty, between Russia and China was imminent?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, we were definitely aware they
    were likely to sign a treaty of friendship during this meeting.
    I have to confess I have not yet seen it, and I do not know
    that we have the exact text of what they have signed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. But it is outside of the agreement that
    we have with the former Soviet Union which is in question.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, I think it has no direct bearing
    on the ABM Treaty. I think what it does indicate is, at least
    if one thinks about what the Russians are doing here, first of
    all, they have a 12,000 mile border with China, and they have
    good reason to try to have good relations with that country.
        Second, we know that in relationships like this, countries
    try to use their relationship with another country to try to
    get some leverage in another negotiation, and this clearly is
    intended to get some leverage with us, and we know outside of
    that arrangement, and frankly much more disturbing, that the
    Russians are selling a number of military systems to China that
    some day I think they may come to regret.
        There is no direct connection to the ABM Treaty, and I
    think we can reach the kind of understanding we are hoping to
    reach with the Russians consistent with their having a treaty
    of friendship with China.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So you do not see this as a de facto
    veto of our efforts to move forward without regard to an
    agreement with Russia.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not think it is a veto. I think
    it probably is, among other things, intended by the Russians to
    give them more negotiating leverage, but it certainly does not
    give them a veto.
        Senator Ben Nelson. At least it may be in part sending a
    message.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It may be, yes.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I want to thank you for your patience,
    or at least your appearance of patience. When I keep trying to
    bore in on some definitional things so I know whether we are
    moving from development to deployment, I am really trying to
    figure out whether there is a difference, or if it is a matter
    of shades of gray.
        I get a little concerned when we begin to lump all defense
    systems together--theater as well as intercontinental--as
    layered, because I am not sure where one shade of gray begins
    and the other ends. Maybe that is the fair way to do it, but it
    is a harder way for a person such as myself to analyze where we
    are, and I was taken by General Kadish's comment that there is
    a long road ahead.
        At least on a road, if I am looking at a map, I know from
    point A to point B the points in between. I cannot determine
    for myself right now the points in between from development to
    deployment. Sometimes I think we are definitionally encumbered
    here, and it makes it more difficult for somebody such as
    myself. Is it a definitional difference, or is there a real
    difference?
        I need to know whether Fort Greely is a test bed becoming
    an operational facility, not whether the decision has been made
    to do that, but is it a very short step? Is it a very short
    shade of gray difference from being a test bed to an
    operational entity? That is what I am really trying to get my
    arms around as we go through this.
        I applaud the test. I think it was exceptional that it was
    successful, but I am still concerned about not knowing the
    difference between development and deployment.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Well, we can come to the treaty part
    of it, or try to, if you like, in a minute, but I think the
    important thing, when we are engaged in a weapons system
    development for us, and the General can elaborate on this,
    there is a very important difference between the development
    stage and the deployment stage, and there are very important
    hurdles you have to cross to get to the point of a deployment.
        When you do a deployment you have multiyear plans for how
    you are going to spend the money and what the total system is
    going to look like at the end, whereas when you are doing
    development, by definition, you are feeling your way. You do
    one test to see where you go with the next test.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is that correct? Excuse me. Is that
    pretty much where we are right now with this missile defense
    system?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It is, but I think if I take an
    example from a different arena, maybe you will realize that it
    is not an effort to be obscure that is causing the obscurity
    here.
        We had a system in development called Joint Surveillance
    and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which gave us this
    remarkable ability to track moving vehicles on the ground, and
    we had no deployment plans for it. It was not far enough along.
    It had not been proven out.
        Then suddenly, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and we needed
    emergency capability to track vehicles on the ground, and the
    decision was made that even though JSTARS had not met the
    requirements that we would normally impose to do a multiyear
    procurement to send it to a war, we sent it to a war, and it
    had a great deal of operational capability.
        Senator Ben Nelson. In a theater layer.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. What we are talking about in Alaska is
    something like that. It is a test bed. It will be used to
    improve our knowledge of how the system works, but it is a test
    bed designed with the thought in mind that if it works as well
    as we hope it will work, it could have a rudimentary
    operational capability.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So the theater capability we are
    looking at right now from this test bed could develop into
    intercontinental capacity, is that fair to say?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would put it just slightly
    differently, but I think the idea is the same, that this
    developmental capability could become, with very little
    modification, an operational capability.
        Senator Ben Nelson. My time has expired. Thank you very
    much. I appreciate you both being here.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bunning.
        Senator Bunning. First of all, I would like to ask that my
    opening statement be put into the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bunning follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Jim Bunning
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before
    us again. I would like to begin by congratulating you on a successful
    test this last weekend.
        The defense of our Nation from all kinds of threats is the most
    important responsibility of government. Ballistic missiles, and the
    weapons they carry, contain a threat of destruction so terrible that
    ballistic missile defense must be our first priority in protecting this
    Nation.
        During the 1980s when President Reagan wanted to deploy
    intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe, many resisted,
    believing that it would be provocative to the Soviet Union. The result,
    as we all know, was that we were able to convince the Soviets to remove
    all of their intermediate range missiles, in exchange for removing
    ours.
        The world is very different today than it was then. Russia is not
    our enemy, and we are not proposing to deploy an offensive system, as
    President Reagan did. We are going to deploy a defensive system, that
    will protect our citizens from the threat of a rogue nation or of an
    accidental launch.
        Our missile defense system will not threaten the Russian's
    strategic capabilities. Once they know that to be true, they will
    accept our program, and perhaps wish to work with us to establish their
    own. The only people who should be upset by our defensive shield, are
    those who might one day wish to threaten us with their missiles.
        It is important to remember that arms control treaties exist
    because they improve the security of both parties to that treaty. When
    the strategic situation changes, as it has since the end of the Cold
    War, and those treaties hinder security rather than strengthen it, then
    they serve no further purpose. This is clearly the case with the ABM
    Treaty.
        Gentlemen, I realize that we have a long way to go to protect our
    country from this threat, but we will never get there unless we
    continue to press forward.

        Senator Bunning. I congratulate you, General and Mr.
    Secretary, for the successful test that we had last Saturday.
    It is a step in the right direction, obviously. To succeed is
    better than failing, and to move one step forward in the
    missile defense program is very important at this point in
    time.
        A question for Secretary Wolfowitz. Russia is actually
    located a lot closer to a large number of countries that are
    developing ballistic missile technology. They are closer than
    we are. It would seem to me that the threat to their nation is
    at least as great as the threat to ours. If that is the case,
    then it would seem to be in their national interest to develop
    national missile defense also. Do you feel that a limited
    national missile defense is in Russia's national interest, as
    well as ours?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do absolutely, Senator, and if you
    will indulge me for a minute, we had talks with the Russians 9
    years ago. In the summer of 1992 Dennis Ross led a delegation
    to Moscow and met with Foreign Minister Mamyedov. One of the
    things they addressed specifically was the situation of the
    threat of third countries to both of us, and the impression our
    people had at the time was that there was a great deal of
    Russian interest in the possible danger to themselves from
    these capabilities, and at one point in the discussions, the
    subject came up.
        The Russian side said, well, what would you Americans do if
    you had a missile defense capability in space and one of these
    third countries launched a missile at us, and the American side
    said, well, if we could, we would shoot it down, and this was
    the moment at which people were falling asleep in this hot
    room, and they suddenly woke up. The Russians were, I think,
    quite surprised, pleasantly surprised that in this new world we
    would see a threat to them from third countries as something we
    would like to help them defend against.
        We talk about a new strategic framework with Russia. We do
    not just mean amendments to the ABM Treaty, we mean a different
    kind of approach to the whole subject. I think it would
    include, Senator, along the lines of your question, every
    effort to work cooperatively on improving missile defenses,
    because it is not in the interest of the United States--and let
    me repeat this--it is not in the interest of the United States
    or Russia to be vulnerable to limited missile attack from any
    direction. I do not believe it is in the interest of Russia for
    the United States to be vulnerable to limited missile attack. I
    believe that we have more to do working together to cooperate
    in dealing with that than in trying to work around the edges of
    a 1972 treaty between two hostile adversaries.
        Senator Bunning. I would like to follow up. Would you
    characterize the fiscal year 2002 testing program as being the
    first step in developing a missile defense system that is more
    concerned about being successful than being in compliance with
    an outdated treaty from 1972 which does not take into account
    modern threats?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think this is the first time that
    the Secretary of Defense--and General Kadish I guess should be
    the witness here--when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, I
    want you to develop the best possible development program to
    move as rapidly as we can to explore these technologies and be
    in a position to deploy. Do not worry about the ABM Treaty. If
    there are ABM Treaty issues, you through your compliance review
    group will bring them to me, but I will resolve them. I think
    that was the first time you had that guidance, is that not
    correct, General?
        General Kadish. Certainly during my tenure, yes.
        Senator Bunning. Let me ask the General a follow-up, then.
    The Clinton administration designed its ballistic missile
    program around the goal of ensuring compliance with the ABM
    Treaty. As a result, it only pursued technologies that would
    not violate the treaty, rather than pursuing technologies that
    had the best chance of working.
        Unlike the previous administration, I actually want to see
    a missile defense system that works. The current RDT&E program
    pursues a number of different technologies that the previous
    administration did not. Do you believe that the structure of
    the current program provides the most likely chance of
    developing a system, or a group of systems that can actually
    defend the American people?
        General Kadish. I do, Senator, and that is the basic thrust
    of the multilayered system approach, because we have to
    consider mobile systems, sea-based and others, in order to
    achieve that, which do have treaty implications.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, in fairness, the last
    administration did submit in its last budget a request for
    money for the Shemya radar, which, as a matter of fact, would
    have been a violation of the ABM Treaty. They were prepared at
    least in that area to move forward, but I think constrained the
    program artificially with a variety of technologies that
    General Kadish is pursuing that I think were kept off of the
    table because of their treaty implications.
        Senator Bunning. One last question. It is about the ground-
    based interceptors and radars in Alaska. Please, please explain
    to me--and I know you have tried to explain to many others--the
    advantage gained for the program by that placement. I mean, is
    it specifically to counter North Korea, or is it specifically
    to develop and test the technology?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me try, since I am not the
    technician, and then the technician can correct it, but as I
    have understood the explanations, and it made sense to me, in
    order to move beyond kind of rudimentary capability that was
    demonstrated in the test Saturday night that you saw the film
    strip on, in order to begin to introduce the sort of real-world
    complications that I think Senator Akaka referred to with
    multiple decoys and multiple angles, longer ranges, in other
    words, in order to be more realistic, you need a different test
    bed, a more dispersed test bed.
        Alaska allows us that geometry. It also puts it in a place
    where that test bed will ultimately begin to be the basis of an
    operational capability, and it is a philosophy of, if we are
    going to spend this much money on a test bed, let us have it be
    in a place where it could also become operational, rather than
    deliberately put it somewhere where it cannot be operational,
    and then have to reproduce that whole expenditure somewhere
    else.
        General Kadish. I would agree wholeheartedly with that.
    That is exactly why we chose to do it this way. Instead of
    building it twice, we build it once, basically.
        Senator Bunning. My time has expired. I want to thank you
    both for your straightforward answers, and Godspeed.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Cleland.
        Senator Cleland. Mr. Secretary, are you on track for
    deploying a national missile defense system by 2004?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I am not sure what on-track
    means, and you may not have been here when General Kadish
    explained, with this test bed in Alaska, if things worked well
    we would have expect to have in the time frame 2004 to 2006
    some rudimentary capability to set up an operational system,
    but it is rudimentary. It is not something I would call a
    national missile defense system. It is not a long-term
    procurement.
        Senator Cleland. Will that violate the ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That would surely violate the ABM
    Treaty.
        Senator Cleland. How much will that system cost?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. What is the test bed, General?
        General Kadish. The test bed itself, or a larger system?
        Senator Cleland. How much will this system, this
    rudimentary system deployed between 2004 and 2006, that
    violates the ABM Treaty, how much will it cost?
        General Kadish. I would like to be precise for the record,
    but as I remember the number, the physical emplacement of the
    test bed is about $750 million out of the budget for the
    development program.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The 2004 RDT&E test bed provides a development test bed consisting
    of an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska as a surrogate for the
    planned Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) capability, initial In-
    Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS), and Battle Management
    Command Control and Communications (BMC\3\) capability, five silos,
    Command Launch Equipment (CLE), and software upgrades. Up to five
    ground-based interceptors using the Payload Launch Vehicle Plus (PLV+)
    booster, which is comprised of the current test configuration booster
    plus a Minuteman (MM) II first stage, could be installed expeditiously
    to provide a contingency defense if needed in the fiscal year 2004 to
    2006 timeframe.
        In fiscal year 2002, BMDO is developing the test bed with RDT&E
    funding exclusively.

             Total fiscal year 2002 = $786.485 million

        Major Fiscal Year 2002 Test Bed Activities include:

             Initiate development of five PLV+ interceptors
            ($305.444 million)
             Initiate upgrades to Cobra Dane radar ($55.000
            million)
             Execute test program ($98.500 million)
             Initiate Kodiak Island target/interceptor launch
            facility modifications ($21.700 million)
             Kwajalein Missile Range upgrades ($6.000 million)
             Accelerate BMC\3\ development and installation
            ($17.020 million)
             Initiate facility construction activities at Fort
            Greely ($273.121 million)
             Efforts to mitigate community impacts at Fort Greely
            ($9.700 million)

        Senator Cleland. I am not talking about the development
    program. I am talking about the total system here that you are
    going to deploy that will violate the ABM Treaty, that you are
    going to deploy this rudimentary system between 2004 and 2006.
    You cannot tell me it is going to cost just $750 million.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, that is why it is a very
    rudimentary capability. If you wanted to turn it into a full
    national missile defense capability, it would be more money,
    more time, and a whole different set of decisions.
        Senator Cleland. We are spending $3 billion just to test
    out this rudimentary system here. Next year, it will be more
    money, and the year after that. I mean, what is the total cost
    of the system, to deploy it, that will violate the ABM Treaty?
    Do you know?
        General Kadish. I would have to get the actual number. I do
    not know off the top of my head, but the number was in 2002 not
    the total cost, nor the life cycle, nor any of the other ways
    we defined it that I just referred to.
        Senator Cleland. It seems like before we walk down this
    road here over the next 4 or 5 years, we ought to have a sense
    of the total cost of the system. Can either one of you share
    that with us?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We will get you something for the
    record, Senator.
        Senator Cleland. You do not know now?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not know the outyear cost.
        Senator Cleland. Well, I think the costs are obvious. As to
    the fall-out from what this effort will do in violating the ABM
    Treaty, the fall-out has already produced an amazing picture.
        We have driven the Russians and the Chinese into the arms
    of one another. According to the New York Times the Russians
    and the Chinese joined to oppose a missile shield for the U.S.,
    and one Russian commentator pointed out that it was, ``an act
    of friendship against America''.
        It was a chilling picture for me, because the last act of
    friendship between Russia and China against America they got
    involved with, I was a part of. It was called the Vietnam War,
    and I almost got killed by a Russian 122 millimeter rocket in
    1968, and so this is a chilling photograph for me. I think it
    should be chilling for all of us to understand the impact of
    what we are doing here. We have a cost associated with this
    effort, and this is just phase 1, if you might want to indicate
    it, of that cost.
        Politically, I think it makes the world less secure, and it
    is painfully obvious what the Russians are going to do. Two
    years ago I sat in a meeting with Senator Levin and Senator
    Lugar, one of the authors of the Nunn-Lugar program which this
    administration is underfunding by over $100 million, I might
    add, and sat in the presence of the former director of the
    Russian rocket forces, and 2 years ago he told us that if you
    deploy a national missile defense system, we will not build
    more rockets, we will just MIRV our warheads. We will go from 8
    warheads per missile to 12.
        I think that makes the world less secure. It is painfully
    obvious that the Chinese, not only with this friendship pact
    with the Russians, but they are going to go on their own and
    build more missiles. It seems to me that makes the world less
    secure, so I think there is a price exacted here, whatever the
    actual total in dollars to us.
        Now, in testimony last Thursday, General Kadish stated that
    your missile defense proposal has no milestones by which to
    measure progress. At the Frontier Institute last Friday,
    Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``We do not have a proposed
    architecture. All we have is a series of very interesting
    research and development and testing programs''.
        In fiscal year 2001, the entire Department of Defense
    budget is $9 billion for basic research and development, $9
    billion for basic research and development in all of DOD. You
    are now proposing to spend $8 billion on missile defense
    research and development alone. How can you, Mr. Secretary,
    justify spending $8 billion on missile defense if you have no
    milestones, requirements, or architecture in mind? If you do
    not know where you are going, how can you know what it will
    cost?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is the essence of
    development programs. We are not setting up an architecture
    until we know what we can do. We do not think we should spend
    enormous amounts of money on architectures until the technology
    has been proven. We are pursuing a great deal of research and
    development, and we think the total in this year's budget is
    $47 billion, of which this is a very important piece.
        I do not know if you were in the room when the subject was
    discussed. A good deal of that $8 billion you referred to is
    either exclusively theater missile defense or dual use, theater
    and long-range missile defense. The portion that is exclusively
    for long-range missile defense is a very small fraction of that
    $8 billion, and I think a very necessary fraction.
        General Kadish. Senator, I might add that when we referred
    to specific major defense procurement milestones, it is true we
    do not have those right now, but that does not mean that we do
    not have plans, and we are developing criteria to move forward
    on a very disciplined way on a development program. We do and
    will have those. How they lead to specific procurement and
    deployment milestones, however is yet to be determined.
        Senator Cleland. My time is up, but the Chiefs have
    identified some $32 billion in unfunded requirements, and part
    of that is still making up the precision weapons inventory that
    we expended more on.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would first
    of all like to thank the Ranking Republican, Senator Warner,
    for his comments at the start of the hearing, and I would also
    like to congratulate General Kadish and everyone who was
    involved on what appears to be a very successful Saturday
    evening.
        I know you were all under a great deal of pressure, and I
    can think back 2 years ago where you had a failure due to a
    fogging over of the optical system from the cooling equipment.
    It seems to me you learned something from that, and the last
    failure we had here, where you had a failure of a system we
    have been using over and over. It just proved to us again we
    are dealing with a machine, and even the best designed machines
    sometimes surprise you.
        As you indicated in your comments, this is a long journey.
    It is step-by-step, but at least I am pleased that we completed
    the steps still standing up, and I think that if this had been
    a failure we probably would have had a great deal more
    attendance at this committee meeting today, so I want to
    congratulate you on where you stepped forward this last
    weekend.
        During Thursday's hearing, I had a question regarding the
    test, and the ABM compliance review, and I stated that the
    compliance review group certified a test on June 30, 2000, and
    I believe I made a misstatement in that I said the test itself
    took place on June 8 of 2000. I want to correct that for the
    record, because the certification actually took place on June
    30, with the test taking place on July 8, and so then I want to
    restate my question for the record.
        Does the process to determine the compliance of program
    activities during this budget cycle differ significantly from
    the process used in past years?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe it does, Senator, in that in
    past years they would assess events, and frequently sort of go
    down to the wire back and forth with the developers, and the
    fundamental premise was, if anything was ultimately decided to
    violate the ABM Treaty, they would not do it.
        Since then we have told General Kadish to proceed
    differently, to proceed with the most aggressive possible
    development, and that means we have asked them to surface
    compliance issues much earlier in the process. So we are trying
    now to change the process so instead of last-minute
    determinations we get notification well in advance of 6 months
    of the actual event.
        Senator Allard. So in other words, have we deviated from
    the same budget process as the compliance vetting procedures,
    as we have done in the past?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. No, we have not.
        Senator Allard. That is the question.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. No. We are applying the same
    compliance standards. We are just trying to apply them much
    earlier, because we realize that we are consciously in a zone
    where we----
        Senator Allard. You are bringing it up appropriately for
    discussion.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Correct.
        Senator Allard. But then your fiscal year budget for 1999,
    and the fiscal year budget for the year 2000 budget request,
    that was not certified by the compliance review group before
    the President submitted it, was it?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I do not believe any of the previous
    budgets were, and the budget for last year included an event
    that I do not think anybody disputes would be a treaty-
    violating event, and that would have been the construction of
    the radar in Shemya in Alaska, which we decided not to proceed
    with.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. It has been suggested that
    because the Department of Defense cannot say for certain now
    whether the testing activities you plan are compliant with the
    ABM Treaty the Senate cannot approve the budget, but my
    understanding is that compliance determinations are almost
    never made well in advance of a test or other activity, and
    that it is virtually impossible to do so because the plans
    often change right up to the time of the test.
        Now, my question is, is that a fair description,
    characterization of the process?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, that is a fair description of
    the process, and obviously if you get within the 6-month limit
    and you are under the treaty, it is law and we will follow it,
    and therefore, if at the last minute we discover a compliance
    problem we will fix the event to comply, but we have simply for
    the first time now tried to make sure the compliance process
    surfaces these problems earlier, and as I pointed out, and I do
    not mind repeating it, last year's budget included events that
    would have been judged to be noncompliant, and there was never
    an issue about that.
        Senator Allard. General Kadish, your organization prepared
    information for another Senator not on this committee regarding
    compliance determinations for various tests that have occurred
    over the years, and I would like to highlight some of those for
    the record.
        For example, you conducted integrated flight test 1, or
    IFT-1, which was the first test of the exoatmospheric kill
    vehicle, on January 16, 1997, but compliance was not certified
    until December 20, 1996.
        Another example, you pointed out the technical critical
    measurements program, or TCMP flight 2A, was not certified
    until September 14--I mean, February 14, 1996, just 8 days
    before it occurred.
        Also, the risk reduction flight test 1 for what was then
    the National Missile Defense Program was certified 3 days
    before it occurred in 1997, and then a second risk reduction
    flight was certified just 2 days before it was conducted a
    month later.
        Another example is the test of the NMD prototype radar was
    not certified until August 31, 1998, less than 3 weeks before
    it occurred.
        The first test of the Navy theater-wide missile was
    certified November 2, 1999, for a November 20 flight. The IFT
    number 3 for the national missile defense system, which was the
    first successful intercept attempt, was certified on September
    28, 1999, just 4 days before the test.
        The IFT 4 was certified 12 days before the test took place
    on January 18, 2000.
        The certification IFT 5 was issued 8 days before that test
    last summer, but the certification actually had to be modified
    on July 7, the day before the test, because of changes in the
    test plan.
        Is it not the case that the certification for Saturday
    night's test was also modified 1 day before, on Friday, July
    13, because of changes in the test plan, and I would like to
    follow that first question up with a second question. It seems,
    then, it is not unusual at all to be uncertain about whether a
    planned test activity conflicts with the ABM Treaty until
    shortly before the test occurs. Would you agree with that?
        General Kadish. I would agree with that, Senator. Under the
    process we have been using, and I believe those dates are
    correct, I would have to check them in detail, but even the
    Saturday's flight had a modification, as you pointed out.
        [The information follows:]

        The first Navy Theater Wide Control Test Vehicle Test was certified
    September 3, 1997, for a September 26, 1997, flight.
        IFT 4 was certified 12 days before the test took place on January
    18, 2000, and was modified on January 14, 2000, because of changes in
    the test plan.

        Senator Allard. I hope I have stated those situations
    correctly. If for some reason we disagree, let me know, and I
    will correct it for the record.
        I want to thank you for the response, Mr. Chairman. I see
    my time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kadish,
    congratulations on your successful intercept over the weekend.
        Mr. Secretary, if I could pursue for a moment a response
    you gave to Senator Allard with respect to compliance
    immediately prior to a test event. You said that if at that
    late period it was noncompliant, in your words you would fix
    the event to comply. Is that your approach to all of these
    potential tests going forward, that you would endeavor to fix
    the event to comply in all cases?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. If you are under the ABM Treaty you
    have no choice, and in fact, frankly, it is not the right way
    to go about optimally pursuing a development program. It means
    that you come up with something you say may be the optimal test
    program, and the lawyers say, whoops, it does not comply, and
    you have to drop it. That is why we are trying to alert the
    senior decisionmakers early, and well in advance of 6 months
    before the event, if we think we see something that will
    definitely raise a compliance issue. But once you are within
    that 6-month window, if you are still within the treaty, then
    you have no choice.
        Senator Reed. You could fix the test to comply, you could
    violate the treaty, or you could simply postpone the test for 6
    months plus a day. Those to me are the three options.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We have ruled out violating the
    treaty.
        Senator Reed. So as we go forward, the real choice you will
    have when these events are scheduled and you discover they are
    noncompliant, or you think they are noncompliant, is to fix it
    or to postpone the event, or announce you are withdrawing from
    the treaty.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think that is correct.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Kadish, last year I understand the Defense
    Department canceled the Navy theater-wide block 1 program in
    order to pursue the more capable block 2 variant. I gather the
    decision was driven not only by technical shortcomings with
    block 1, but because the planned quantity of 40 block 1 ships
    and Navy block 1 missiles was insufficient. The proposed budget
    we are discussing today asked for $410 million in the 2002
    budget for Navy theater-wide, yet this effort is apparently
    focused once again on deploying a block 1 version of the
    system. Could you explain the funding? Will it go to block 1
    and, if so, why, since there apparently was a decision
    previously to step away from that system.
        General Kadish. Well, Senator Reed, to the best of my
    knowledge there was no formal decision to step away from Navy
    theater block 1. There was an analysis that we did under the
    approach of where we were trying to do procurement and
    development at the same time, that it might be more economical
    and beneficial to go beyond block 1 in that framework.
        Now, under this layered approach that we are pursuing for
    these classes of missiles, the development of the block 1 and
    the completion of the intercept program that underlies that is
    certainly a viable part of our development program, and we want
    to aggressively pursue that. It does not mean that we will
    actually procure these types of systems. It depends on the
    development program and the results of the test.
        Senator Reed. But you are pursuing block one for the
    potential deployment, for a potential deployment?
        General Kadish. To the degree that the Aegis interceptor
    program represents a block 1, we are, and I know I cut that
    fine, but that is an important distinction.
        Senator Reed. That is not only fine, that is metaphysical,
    I guess. Is it fair to say, though, that there were technical
    questions raised about the capability of the system, and also a
    question raised about the availability of sufficient platforms
    that could force you to seriously reevaluate block 1 last year
    that now you are aggressively moving toward a block 1 potential
    deployment?
        General Kadish. Both of those cases we are pursuing are
    test programs, and what I am saying is, the decision to pursue
    that from a procurement program will not be taken until we get
    sufficient test data.
        Senator Reed. Let me move to the THAAD system, which is a
    system, I believe, that has great potential, and I am strongly
    supportive of. It is a fundamentally sound system, I believe,
    but it is plagued by tests which some people ascribe to a
    mentality that puts the schedule ahead of really looking at
    quality control and important fundamentals.
        Last year, I understand the Defense Department considered
    accelerating THAAD but decided not to, since it felt the
    program was at a prudent pace, with acceptable technical risk.
    Again, the proposed budget adds $224 million to THAAD's program
    for 2002 for program acceleration. Once again, are we in a
    situation where experience told us to slow down, but politics
    are telling us to speed up?
        General Kadish. No, Senator. In that particular case the
    money to ``accelerate THAAD'' is designed to buy more test
    hardware early on and take a risk that we will be successful.
        We do not intend to change the structure of our current
    program from a very risk-handling approach, where we are very
    deliberate on ground tests and on redesign of THAAD, but
    instead provide the money to more aggressively test the
    program, and take the idea that should it be successful we
    would have test assets to actually put in an emergency
    situation, and thereby accelerate that capability if we should
    deem it capable. There is no intent to speed up or eliminate or
    cut corners in that program, and that is something that I am
    going to watch very carefully that we do not do across a broad
    spectrum. We cannot afford it.
        Senator Reed. SBIRS-Low is being transferred from the Air
    Force responsibility to your responsibility. The current
    estimate of life cycle cost, about $20 billion or so. That is
    an estimate, and also you have indicated how critical it is to
    your national missile defense plans. Do you have a good idea at
    this point of how much SBIRS-Low will cost?
        General Kadish. We have a generalized estimate, as you
    point out, that varies to some degree up to $20 billion. I
    think we have to get through the next few years of the
    competition and design activity to really nail that down, and
    so I think we are 18 months to 2 years out from really
    understanding what the long-term cost will be, and then it
    would only be an estimate, based on where we are.
        Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Secretary, you testified that the
    administration is pursuing two parallel tracks, that first you
    are pursuing an accelerated research and development and
    testing program, and second, the administration is engaged in
    discussions with Russia on a new security framework. If the
    Senate were to significantly reduce the money in this budget
    for missile defense, what would be the impact on the
    President's attempts to achieve a new strategic framework with
    Russia? Would it lessen the chances of success in your
    judgment?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I think it would lessen it
    substantially, because I do think our ability to reach an
    understanding with Russia is going to depend in considerable
    part on their sense that we are moving forward. We are ready to
    move forward together. We would like to do it in a way that is
    cooperative, but if they feel that if they drag their feet we
    will not move forward at all, they might well prefer to drag
    their feet.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, Senator Inhofe raised a common criticism of
    missile defense that I want to pursue further with you. Critics
    of missile defense repeatedly contend that the United States
    faces a far greater threat from the so-called suitcase
    terrorist than from ballistic missile attacks from a rogue
    nation.
        It is my understanding that last year the United States
    spent about $11 billion on counterterrorism programs, and that
    this is about twice the amount that was dedicated to pursuing
    missile defense. Is the administration continuing a significant
    investment in counterterrorism programs while continuing the
    accelerated research and development of missile defense?
        In other words, is this not a false choice, and in fact we
    are pursuing aggressively counterterrorism measures while
    pursuing the research for our missile defense?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think it is, Senator, and I do not
    have a sufficiently good crystal ball to say which is the more
    likely one, and frankly, I have spoken to a lot of intelligence
    analysts. I do not think their crystal balls are perfect,
    either.
        I do know that the countries hostile to the United States
    are investing a lot of money in both efforts, and probably, if
    you look at their budgets, they are investing more in ballistic
    missiles, just because it is an expensive program. I think they
    understand that it is one of our weaknesses. It is, as I said,
    the one Iraqi capability we underestimated during the Gulf War,
    but I think it is a false choice.
        I think we have to pursue efforts in both directions, but I
    think before you came I was pointing out that these are both
    threats. They should both be taken seriously, but when I think
    about it, what is different about the two is, number one, we
    have some capability against the terrorist threat today. We
    intercepted people coming in from Canada during the Millennium
    event. We have aggressive counterintelligence programs that
    disrupt efforts when we can.
        It is not 100 percent perfect, or we would not have had the
    Cole catastrophe, but we are actively engaged in--we have some
    ability to protect ourselves. We have no ability to protect
    ourselves against ballistic missiles.
        Second, and this is the reason we have no ability, or part
    of the reason we have no ability to protect against ballistic
    missiles, we have a treaty prohibiting us from doing so. There
    is no treaty prohibiting us from working against terrorist
    attacks, and we would never contemplate signing them.
        Senator Collins. General, I would like to switch gears and
    ask you a couple of questions about the Arrow weapons system
    which is being developed jointly by the United States and
    Israel, and would provide Israel with a capability to defend
    against short to medium-range ballistic missiles.
        Last year, Congress provided $95.2 million for the Arrow
    program. Could you tell me what you propose for funding for the
    Arrow this year, and whether or not you will be supporting the
    Arrow system improvement plan which Congress initiated last
    year?
        General Kadish. In the fiscal year 2002 budget, if I recall
    the numbers correctly, we complete the purchase of the Arrow
    third battery and finish our commitment there, and I think the
    dollars associated with that and interoperability type
    activities amount to somewhere around $50 million.
        We have also proposed a $20-million addition over and above
    those activities for further allocation to either the ASIP
    program or the improvement program, or for other activities
    that might be deemed beneficial, so we have added basically $20
    million to our commitment for 2002.
        Senator Collins. It is my understanding that there is also
    cooperation underway with Israel in examining the possibility
    of an intercept in the boost phase over the course of the last
    several years, and that Israel has proposed a new joint boost
    phase launcher intercept program. Do you have a judgment of the
    feasibility of the Israeli program, and does your office intend
    to work with Israel on the boost phase launcher intercept
    program?
        General Kadish. We have been in discussions with Israel
    over that particular effort, and I believe, if I am not
    mistaken, we have sent a report to Congress, I think last year,
    over the feasibility assessments that we put together for that,
    and I can provide that for the record, if you like.
        [The information follows:]
     Report to Congressional Defense Committees On Joint U.S.-Israel Boost
     Phase Intercept-Attack Operations Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles--15
                                   April 2000
                                i. introduction
    Purpose
        This report responds to the request set out in the Senate report to
    accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
    S. Report No. 106-50, page 226. The Senate Armed Services Committee
    requested that the Secretary of Defense study the feasibility and
    benefits of a joint U.S.-Israel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) boost
    phase intercept (BPI)-attack operations (AO) program. This report
    summarizes the potential opportunities and pitfalls in establishing
    such a program. The committee report language is shown below.
        The committee is aware that BMDO and the government of Israel have
    examined options for boost-phase intercept (BPI) of ballistic missiles,
    and the possibility of a joint U.S.-Israeli program using unmanned
    aerial vehicles (UAVs) to defeat ballistic missiles in the boost-phase
    or missile launchers following the launch of a missile. The committee
    understands that to date there is no agreement between the two
    governments on the potential merits of the options considered, nor has
    agreement been reached on a joint program.
        Believing that the ability to defeat ballistic missiles before and
    during their launch phase could significantly enhance the security of
    the United States and its allies, the committee directs the Secretary
    of Defense to study the technical and operational feasibility of such a
    joint program, and determine if the missile defense benefits would
    justify initiating a joint U.S.-Israel BPI-attack operations program
    employing UAVs. The study shall include an assessment of whether a BPI-
    attack operations program can be developed that supports U.S. and
    Israeli requirements, whether the United States would support a program
    that is oriented primarily or exclusively toward satisfying Israeli
    requirements, and whether DOD supports an attack operations UAV system
    that does not include BPI capabilities. The committee directs the
    Secretary to submit a report on these matters to the congressional
    defense committees not later than February 15, 2000.
    Background
        [Deleted.]
                            ii. systems description
        [Deleted.]
                                    uav bpi
        [Deleted.]
                      FIGURE 1. UAV Boost Phase Intercept.
        [Deleted.]
                                   FIGURE 2.
        [Deleted.]
                            iii. program assessment
    The assessments responding to the congressional report language are
            detailed in the next sections.

        1. Technical Feasibility Assessment.
        2. Operational Feasibility Assessment.
        3. Missile Defense Benefits Assessment.
        4. U.S. and Israeli Requirements Compliance.
        5. U.S. Support for Program Oriented Primarily or Exclusively to
    Israeli Requirements.
        6. DOD Support for an Attack Operations UAV That Does Not Include
    BPI Capabilities.

        1. Technical Feasibility Assessment
        UAV BPI
        2. Operational Feasibility Assessment
        [Deleted.]
                      weapon control and battle management
        [Deleted.]
        3. Missile Defense Benefits Assessment
        4. U.S. and Israel UAV BPI-Attack Operations Requirements
    Compliance
        [Deleted.]
        5. U.S. Support for Program Oriented Primarily or Exclusively to
    Israeli Requirements
        [Deleted.]
        6. DOD Support for an Attack Operations UA that does Not Include
    BPI Capabilities
        [Deleted.]
                   iv. non-proliferation and policy concerns
        [Deleted.]
                                  v. summary
        [Deleted.]

        We will continue those discussions, but I think subject to
    the Secretary's further comments, that will be basically a
    fiscal year 2003 decision as we deliberate through those budget
    issues.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
    Secretary, and General Kadish. We are glad to see you here.
        I think, as maybe the members of the committee know,
    General Kadish was the commanding officer at Hanscom AFB in
    Massachusetts. He had some very important responsibilities in
    the areas of intelligence, advanced research, a whole wide
    range of areas, and has many, many friends up there. He did an
    outstanding job. Mr. Secretary, you are fortunate to have the
    General.
        I want to get back to the point about where we are and
    where we are going. We want to congratulate you on the success
    of the test last Saturday. We all understand we still have a
    long way to go, but that is an important benchmark. We all take
    pride, I certainly do, in the work that is being done on
    theater defense. That has been impressive. We followed that. I
    have closely, obviously, because Raytheon is in my own State of
    Massachusetts, and we are always interested in the progress, as
    well as some of the problems that they have up there.
        But I want to get back to the question of where we are and
    where we are going, and where we have been in terms of research
    and get some idea now about how we are going to make judgments
    about the research program.
        We had the Secretary of Defense, on June 28, appear before
    the committee to present the 2002 budget, and when asked about
    the details on ballistic missiles, he said he had not been
    briefed on the BMD proposal, and he had not made any
    decisions--this was the end of June. We are now into mid-July--
    been briefed about it, and had not made any decisions about it,
    even though we now have been provided with the budget
    information, we are told. It is for a proposed program. The
    actual content of the program will be decided later.
        Now, this is the Secretary of Defense before the committee
    as recently as 3 weeks ago.
        So now we have your own response to others about the fact
    that a lot of this is going to be in-theater defense, and
    others on ballistic defense, and General Kadish's statement
    today, he said, I cannot tell you today exactly what the
    ballistic missile system will look like, even 5 years from now.
        Well, he says, he continues here, evidently--and General
    Kadish, you also said at a press conference last Friday that
    you have internal plans that you are working on at the present
    time that are spelling out how these resources are going to be
    made. What have we spent, what has DOD spent during the whole
    ``Star Wars'' on ballistic missile defense, $35, $40 billion,
    some have estimated to $60 billion, roughly? General, do you
    know? Well, if it is not that figure, are we in the ball park?
        General Kadish. About $5 billion a year, on average.
        Senator Kennedy. Well, $45 or $50 billion has now been
    expended on this to date. We are not starting over here. We
    have spent $45 or $50 billion. I think we want to disabuse
    ourselves that we are suddenly starting fresh now with all of
    this. The DOD has already spent $45 or $50 billion to date on
    this.
        Now you are asking for $8 billion more, and even though you
    have spent $45 or $50 billion, evidently you are not able to
    give the committee a clear idea of why we would expect that
    this would be either more effective than what has been spent in
    the past, other than I hear that maybe we are looking along
    some different areas, or different lines.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. If I might, Senator, what we spent in
    the past has already produced results. I would complain that it
    has not produced results as fast as I think this country might
    have in the past been capable of. We produced Polaris
    submarines in 5 years with a crash effort. We got to the moon
    in 10 years with a crash effort. I would say this has not been
    a crash effort, but it has produced important results.
        You referred to one of the most important ones a few
    minutes ago, which is our ability now, finally, 10 years after
    the Gulf War, to have hit-to-kill capability against a
    primitive SCUD missile. I would have thought, given the fact
    that Saddam Hussein almost brought Israel into that war and had
    success in killing Americans with SCUD missiles, that we might
    have moved faster, but we have moved, and this budget includes
    a substantial amount of money, $857 million, to accelerate the
    acquisition and deployment of that PAC-3 system which would
    protect us in the Persian Gulf, and could protect allies.
        Senator Kennedy. I am talking about the other, the PAC-3. I
    have been a strong supporter, many of us have been, in terms of
    the theater missile. We are trying to ask, in terms of outer
    space, the ballistic missile defense, the amounts we are going
    to be spending on this, and quite frankly, for every
    technology, for the most part we have seen countertechnologies,
    and serious questions with all the billions we spent on the
    Stealth technology, whether that is really going to work any
    more because of new breakthroughs in radar in terms of it.
        I do not want to spend much of my time here now going and
    thinking in terms of technology that has developed that there
    have not been countertechnologies that have been developed. The
    moon example is not really clear, because that is a different
    situation, but to come back to this question, we have spent the
    $45 billion.
        We want to have, again, some idea as to how the $8 billion
    is going to be expended, because we heard testimony by the
    Secretary of Defense before the committee 3 weeks ago where he
    indicated that he was not prepared to give that to us. My
    question is, which has been repeated by others here, and
    perhaps we are going to get the same answers, can you give us
    any more indication or assurance that it is going to be any
    more successful, and what it is going to be, and what the time
    lines are going to be in terms of expenditures?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, the Secretary has been
    briefed in detail. We have submitted detail, and I was trying
    to explain in my previous response that detail includes a great
    deal of money on systems like PAC-3, $857 million on PAC-3
    alone that have now been demonstrated to be successful.
        I think before you came, Senator, we showed a film strip of
    the successful test Saturday night, and believe me, I would not
    say that that test demonstrates a capability, but it certainly
    demonstrates a very big advance in what we can do, and you do
    not get to this kind of very successful, I mean, very demanding
    technological challenge overnight. I think the record shows we
    are making serious progress, demonstrable progress on shorter-
    range missiles and I think we clearly are within reach of doing
    something with long-range systems, so yes, we can give you
    great detail on the plan for that expenditure, and I think it
    is a very convincing story that General Kadish and his team put
    together.
        Senator Kennedy. Well, my time is up, but you are going to
    give us, then, how that $8 billion is going to be expended?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Has it been made available to
    the committee?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe it is.
        Senator Kennedy. The $8 billion, how you are going to spend
    that $8 billion?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The General says at the end of this
    week.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The fiscal year 2002 amended budget submission has been submitted
    to Congress and provides detailed program plans for the full fiscal
    year 2002 program.

        Senator Kennedy. It has not been, then, you have not given
    it to the committee.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. My understanding is we will be
    submitting it at the end of this week.
        Chairman Levin. Which means you have not yet given it to
    the committee.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes. I apologize.
        Chairman Levin. At this time, I request unanimous consent
    that Senator Landrieu's statement be made a part of the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

        Thank you Mr. Chairman: I would like to thank you for calling this
    important hearing to review the National Missile Defense Program. I
    would also like to take this opportunity to welcome and thank Secretary
    Wolfowitz and General Kadish for appearing here today.
        As we all know, the impassioned dispute over U.S. national missile
    defense has dominated press coverage around the world almost daily over
    the last few months. Secretary Wolfowitz has worked tirelessly since
    taking office on the difficult but important task of selling missile
    defense, not only to the Russians and Chinese, but to our allies as
    well.
        Unfortunately, we all know that the threat of a missile attack from
    a rogue nation is credible and the proliferation of missile technology
    continues as we sit here today. As long as this remains the case, it is
    our responsibility to devise an effective defense system and a policy
    that provides the American people with a sufficient level of
    protection. Adm. Richard Mies, the Commander in Chief of the U.S.
    Strategic Command uses an interesting analogy which I find quite
    appropriate. To have an effective military, you need both a sword and a
    shield. A soldier without a shield is defenseless and a soldier without
    a sword lacks the ability to take action against his enemies. If either
    is too big, it prevents the soldier from maximizing use of the other.
    The trick is to balance both the shield and sword in an equitable
    manner.
        We are faced with that very task when it comes to missile defense.
    While no rogue nation possesses the capability today, we know that
    several states are actively pursuing development or acquisition of
    ballistic missile technology. There is mounting and credible evidence
    that, in the future, national missile defense is a capability this
    country will be forced to acquire. However, it is important to develop,
    test and deploy a valid, credible system. If the shield is made of
    paper, it's worse than having no shield at all because it gives false
    confidence with potentially disastrous consequences.
        Across the political spectrum there is debate over the need for
    missile defense, the impact on the ABM Treaty, our relationship with
    Russia, our allies and other countries and on the amount that should be
    invested on missile defense. There are strong opinions on all aspects
    of this tremendously complicated issue. Senator Sam Nunn, a man I have
    a great deal of respect for, has commented on this debate saying,
    ``It's time to get the theology out of it and the technology into it.''
        I couldn't agree more. When you look at the National Missile
    Defense Deployment Readiness Review, one fact is undisputable.
    Regardless of politics or ideology, the one thing the national missile
    defense program and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization need is
    TIME. Time to develop, test and evaluate this technically complex
    system. Time to negotiate with the Russians. Time to consult with our
    allies and address their concerns. No matter how bad we want the
    system, or how much money we throw at it, time is still required.
        It's clear that money must be spent on this program, and I support
    that. It is equally clear that there are other threats and pressing
    needs facing our military, indeed facing our country, today. Given the
    limited resources available, it would be unwise to invest all of them,
    or even the majority of them, on national missile defense. It's a time
    for tough choices. Those choices will significantly impact the
    readiness, posture and capability of our military forces for years to
    come. They will affect the size and strength of both our sword and
    shield. The administration amended it's defense budget request adding
    $18.4 billion which I wholly support. That budget includes spending an
    additional $3 billion on missile defense which needs further review
    based on developing technology and its implications on ABM Treaty
    negotiations.
        It's important that the American People have the confidence that
    their tax dollars are properly spent. With that in mind, I look forward
    to hearing Secretary Wolfowitz' and General Kadish's testimony here
    today. I know it will be insightful and help this committee make those
    tough choices.
        Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this important hearing.

        Chairman Levin. First, about your statements, General, that
    your predecessors did not have the same instructions that you
    did relative to ABM. I just want to read General Lyles'
    testimony, when he said there is nothing we would do
    differently.
        The question from Senator Robb was, ``If you did not have
    an ABM Treaty, are there things you would be doing, or could be
    doing less expensively now?'' General Lyles: ``In all honesty,
    Senator Robb, there is nothing we would be doing differently.''
        Do you disagree with General Lyles?
        General Kadish. No.
        Chairman Levin. General Ralston said, I would like to add,
    as I understand it, and as General Lyles has said, there is
    nothing today in the Antiballistic Missile Treaty that is
    constraining what we are doing in our National Missile Defense
    Program, or our theater missile defense program. Do you
    disagree with that?
        General Kadish. No, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. So this is really the first time we may be
    facing that issue, and the difference, of course, between what
    President Clinton did last year and what you are doing this
    year is that President Clinton never made the decision that if
    you could not modify the treaty, that he would walk away from
    it.
        That decision was never made by President Clinton. He said
    there would be four factors which he would consider before
    making that decision, whereas this President, this
    administration has said ``if Russia refuses the changes we
    propose, we will give prompt notice under the provisions of the
    treaty that we can no longer be a party to it.'' That is a huge
    difference.
        Senator Warner. Can you give a citation to what you just
    read?
        Chairman Levin. That is the Citadel speech, September 1999,
    Governor Bush, then a candidate.
        ``If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give
    prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no
    longer be a party to it.'' This is a totally different set of
    circumstances from what it was in the previous administration,
    which said, we might give notice, we might not, we are going to
    look at four factors, including whether or not we are more
    secure by pulling out of that treaty, including the effect on
    arms reductions, including the cost-effectiveness, including
    the operational effectiveness. All factors would go into it.
        You have given us three sheets of paper with the outline of
    the three activities which you apparently indicate could bump
    up against the ABM Treaty this year. One is called the missile
    defense system test bed, the other one, Aegis, Spy-1 tracking
    and strategic missile, the other one is System Integration Test
    II.
        First of all, we will make those three documents a part of
    the record, but my question is this to either one of you. Could
    you identify on those three sheets of paper which of those
    activities will in a matter of months, not years, likely
    conflict with the ABM Treaty's limits, since you have now
    informed us that in a matter of months, not years, it is likely
    the activities that are in the budget request for 2002 will
    conflict with, as the administration said last Wednesday,
    ``bump up against'' the treaty? Can you just identify for us on
    these three sheets now which of these specific activities are
    likely to either conflict with or bump up against the treaty
    under your budget request?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, we identified all three of
    these because all three of them have the potential of raising
    serious ABM Treaty compliance problems.
        Chairman Levin. Can you just identify, for instance, in the
    test bed document, some of these--a lot of this you say is not
    likely to happen inside these documents.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is why we need a compliance
    review.
        Chairman Levin. I know, but will you do this for the
    record? Since there is a lot in these documents, which you say
    do not see any compliance problem, it is hard for me to sort
    out which will and which will not, and this is a specific
    question, and you can do it for the record. On these three
    sheets of paper, which of these activities will, in all
    likelihood, if you are funded in 2002 as requested, conflict
    with or bump up against the ABM Treaty? That is my question for
    the record.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We will work with your staff to make
    sure we have the correct question and we will answer it for the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        All three activities (the Missile Defense System Test Bed, Aegis
    SPY-1 tracking a strategic ballistic missile, and Systems Integration
    Test II (SIT II) combining data from ABM and non-ABM radars) could
    conflict with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. A compliance
    assessment is underway within the Department to determine whether these
    activities would violate the treaty. That said, the administration has
    made clear that it will not violate the treaty, and the activities of
    the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, like all DOD activities,
    will be conducted in compliance with U.S. arms control obligations.
    Therefore, the ABM Treaty will not be violated if the missile defense
    program is funded as requested.

        Chairman Levin. Will you also be giving us the compliance
    review group's results promptly after you receive them?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I will do my best.
        Chairman Levin. What would constrain you? There is no
    treaty that prohibits you from doing that.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. These are advisory opinions from the
    Secretary of Defense's lawyers to the Secretary of Defense, and
    I assume we will share them with you.
        Chairman Levin. Let us know, would you, promptly, if you
    are not going to promptly share those with us.
        Secretary Wolfowitz, you said today that the developmental
    activity at Fort Greely could be made an operational capability
    with little modification. What specific modifications would be
    needed to convert Fort Greely from a developmental or test
    capability to a rudimentary operational capability?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think I will let General Kadish
    answer that.
        General Kadish. We still have a lot of planning to do to
    implement this test bed and the ongoing activities in the
    coming months, and certainly through 2002, we would probably be
    in a better position to answer that when we do exactly the
    configuration we want to test and to put that together.
        But I guess I would answer in a general way that if we have
    a test activity that represents an operationally realistic
    configuration where everything is hooked up right and that we
    could launch out of Fort Greely if we wanted to test a
    particular segment and it was safe enough. Then by definition
    you have a capability there to launch and then if you have
    confidence in the system based on all the other testing you are
    going to do to actually use it in combat, that would be a
    decision that would have to be taken by the Department.
        Chairman Levin. But the question was not the decision, but
    what specific modifications would need to be made to convert
    Ft. Greely from your proposed developmental test facility to a
    rudimentary operational capability.
        General Kadish. I guess the answer to that is we don't know
    in detail what those would be, but in general it would be
    command and control activities to uniformed people to actually
    do the combat alert type of activities. So over time we will
    define exactly what that is. I can't tell you specifically
    today what it would be.
        Chairman Levin. My time is up. Thank you. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to defer my time
    to our colleague and then I will follow back in sequence with
    my wrap-up. But I would like to make one unanimous consent
    request, that Secretary Wolfowitz provide for the record
    statements that President Bush made subsequent to his September
    24, 1999 Citadel speech to which our chairman referred. At that
    time he stated if Russia refuses to accept changes to the ABM
    Treaty, as we've proposed we will give prompt notice of our
    intention to withdraw, under article 15 of the treaty. I think
    he has made a series of statements about the framework that he
    is hoping to achieve and I think those statements should be
    examined in parallel with his statement at the Citadel. So will
    you provide that for the record?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We will do that, Senator.
        Senator Warner. It can be put in the record at this
    juncture. I will yield my time to Senator Allard.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                  May 23, 2000

                              National Press Club

                                 Washington, DC

        Senator Allard. I thank Senator Warner for yielding. I
    would like to pursue this issue on the THAAD radar and direct
    my question to General Kadish. I understand the THAAD radar was
    present at Kwajalein this weekend when you conducted your
    missile defense test. Did that radar participate in the test?
        General Kadish. No, it did not, Senator.
        Senator Allard. Since you've identified the THAAD as part
    of the terminal defense element of your overall ballistic
    missile defense system, isn't it potentially useful to have at
    least the THAAD radar or the BMC-3 participate in tests like
    the one conducted this weekend?
        General Kadish. Eventually it would be, Senator.
        Senator Allard. Is such participation permitted by the ABM
    Treaty?
        General Kadish. At this time, it is not and I believe one
    of the situations that has been provided by the Secretary's
    testimony of using our X-band radar at Kwajalein to do a
    theater-level test, which is the opposite of what you're
    describing, is in fact on the table for treaty compliance
    issues. So concurrent use of these assets is an issue with the
    treaty.
        In regard to the THAAD, we haven't at this point in time
    done sufficient planning, although we have for use of the GBRP
    such that we would want to propose using the THAAD in these
    types of tests. Our intent over time and certainly over the
    next year is to plan in detail how we would exploit those types
    of resources.
        Senator Allard. I'm further told that several years ago the
    THAAD radar was at Kwajalein for testing when an operational
    ICBM test was conducted and I'm told that the THAAD test
    manager saw this as a wonderful opportunity to characterize the
    performance of the THAAD radar but that his proposal to do so
    set off a minor panic in the Pentagon because this would have
    violated the ABM Treaty. Is this an example of the kind of
    opportunity you have to forego because of the constraints of
    the ABM Treaty?
        General Kadish. Without the constraints or thinking about
    the constraints we would be able to exploit that, and that is
    our intent at this point in time.
        Senator Allard. I would like to pursue the ABM Treaty and
    security issues. We have heard from several colleagues about
    their concerns that U.S. missile defenses will spur the
    proliferation of missile and weapon/missile defense
    technologies and lead to the build-up of offensive forces that
    would reduce U.S. security. Since concerns are based in part on
    a belief that the ABM Treaty has inhibited the growth of these
    forces, or such concerns based on that, how many warheads did
    the Soviet Union have in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was signed?
    Do you know that?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would be dredging up my memory. I
    don't believe they had substantially MIRVed their force at that
    time, thousands less than they do today, that's for certain.
        Senator Allard. Then when we looked at it 10 years later,
    do you have any idea how many warheads the Soviet Union had and
    if you can't give me a specific figure, was it dramatically
    increased, moderately increased?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think dramatically increased
    throughout the seventies, Senator. We can get you those exact
    numbers for the record, obviously.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        When the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, the Soviet Union had 2,081
    strategic missile (e.g., ICBM and SLBM) warheads. By 1982, the Soviet
    inventory had grown to 8,555 warheads.

        Senator Allard. So in your view, did the ABM Treaty
    accomplish its goal of preventing or slowing down the Soviet
    offensive buildup?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't know if that was its goal. It
    certainly didn't accomplish it if that was the goal.
        Senator Allard. Since 1972 how many nations have ballistic
    missile capabilities?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I believe we now estimate--let me get
    it exactly.
        Senator Allard. I think it was 28 or 29 now that I
    remember.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Yes. How many nations have or are seeking
    to have ballistic missile capabilities today?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Beyond the ones that already have it?
        Senator Allard. Yes, of the 28.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to get you that for the
    record. I think they are, in experimental programs there are
    quite a few.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        At present, 28 countries have ballistic missile capability, either
    through purchase (17 countries), or through indigenous development
    programs (11 countries). Six countries, all with indigenous capability,
    are developing longer range (MRBM, IRBM, or ICBM) systems.

        Senator Allard. I think it would help us to better
    understand what's happened worldwide and the dynamics out there
    if you could describe the ongoing Chinese strategic
    modernization. In your view is this modernization effort a
    response to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense programs?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Absolutely not. It's been underway for
    some time and I think it has its own dynamic partly motivated
    by growing Chinese military budgets, partly motivated by, I
    think, their growing sense of their position in Asia. If I
    might say in answer to your previous question, it's my own
    personal sense that one of the reasons that countries like Iraq
    and Iran and North Korea are investing so much in ballistic
    missile defenses is precisely because they realize that they
    can't match us in other areas of military capability and I am
    sorry to bore you, but as I've said repeatedly, this is the one
    Iraqi capability that proved in the Gulf War to be more serious
    than what we had estimated it to be.
        I think they're investing, not in spite of the ABM Treaty,
    but to some extent because of the ABM Treaty.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz, I'm going to ask for
    your view on Russian security. Would Russian security be
    enhanced by proliferating missile and WMD technologies?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. No, it wouldn't, and again a point
    that I think was observed in an important way earlier, I think
    Russian security would be enhanced if they could reduce their
    vulnerability to limited missile attack. I also think our
    security will be enhanced if they can reduce their
    vulnerability and I think the same goes for the United States.
    We are in a different era. It is not an era where it is our
    goal to keep Russia vulnerable and it shouldn't be their goal
    to keep us vulnerable.
        Senator Allard. Also, as we all know, MAD, or mutually-
    assured destruction, was the only means by which we deterred
    the Soviet Union from missile attack against the United States.
    While mutually-assured destruction worked in a bipolar world,
    today the world has changed and is a more chaotic and dangerous
    place and that is why we must have an updated approach, I
    believe, to deterrence, both offensively and defensively. I
    believe that Admiral Mies said it best on July 11 in front of
    the Strategic Subcommittee when he said: ``Missile defense
    would not be a replacement for an assured retaliatory response,
    but rather an added dimension to complement our existing
    deterrent capabilities and an insurance policy against a small-
    scale ballistic missile attack. It would also serve as an
    element of our strategy to dissuade countries from acquiring
    weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.''
        My question: will the concept of mutually-assured
    destruction remain a part of the administration's deterrent
    strategy?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I've never been fond of the mutually-
    assured destruction term, but yes, certainly nuclear deterrence
    will remain part of our deterrent strategy but the reliance
    exclusively on retaliation as our deterrent is something we're
    trying to move away from. Retaliation is always, I think, going
    to be a part of deterrence, the potential of retaliation.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired again.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Allard, thank you.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
    Secretary, following up on your exchange with the Chairman, as
    I understood it, the concept of Alaska becoming operational
    comes to fruition when you replace the testing crew with
    operational personnel. Was that your answer to the Chairman's
    question?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I would have to refer back to General
    Kadish, but what I hear General Kadish saying is that I think
    it is essentially, if everything worked well experimentally, it
    would be essentially a software change to turn it into an
    operational capability. It's a little more than just changing
    the mental intent. There would have to be definitely command
    and control changes, probably some communications changes, but
    I think it is what you would call in the area of software.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In terms of Alaska and the treaty, is
    that when, in your opinion, the treaty would be abrogated and
    up until that point with regard to the Alaska facility it would
    not?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't think I need to be a lawyer to
    say that if we crossed that line and turned it into operational
    capability that would be a violation of the treaty.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, I understand. My question is up
    to that point.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is where you get into questions
    of intent and verification and what can and can't be verified
    by national technical means and, it isn't simply that lawyers
    have a way of making problems complicated, this is a genuinely
    complicated problem because in the, what is it now, 29 years
    since the treaty was signed, we have had a lengthy, tedious
    record of going over these issues with the Russians. You have
    to look at that record. You have to examine it. You have to
    weigh American positions, Russian positions. We are in a
    difficult zone and so I'm hoping that when the lawyers look at
    this they will give us at least some more clarity than I have
    right now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, thank you. General, I want to
    congratulate you on your test over the weekend. I would like to
    see you be very successful as you proceed with the various
    tests. By reading the press I get the impression that you're
    going to have these tests scheduled quite frequently, and I am
    a little bit concerned that we might be sacrificing some of our
    success in the future with the number of tests. Would you
    comment on that, and the frequency of those tests?
        General Kadish. I think our goal has always been in the
    test program to test frequently and often and move rapidly
    through our development program, because we built a whole
    series of technical milestones and specifications we want to
    check out. So the sooner we get it done, not only does the
    technology develop, but we save a lot of money, even though
    these tests are expensive.
        So it is not our intent to test without the discipline
    required to do testing. I think that is the basic thrust of
    your question.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Senator, I share the congratulations
    to General Kadish on his success, but I sort of worry that
    people have to understand, I think, that if a program never
    suffers from test failures, then it's probably been too
    conservative a program. If you look at the history of our
    developments, the satellite program which put satellites in
    orbit suffered 11 straight test failures in its initial
    testing. The Polaris, which is one of our most successful
    systems, failed 66 out of 123 flights. I have a number of other
    examples in my testimony.
        A successful development program has to include testing
    failures, so I would like to see them pushing aggressively and
    if and when they fail, I may not show you the film strip of it,
    but I do think they will be learning things.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Hopefully the successful testing of a
    man-rated system does not occasion all of those failures,
    although we have seen those in the past, unfortunately, for
    example with the space shuttle.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Obviously when you get to the point of
    putting people's lives at risk with a test, you have to go up
    to a higher standard and even then, as you point out, you can
    have a failure.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, under that theory, then, why did
    we wait over a year after the last one for this test to occur?
        General Kadish. We are dealing with prototype hardware and
    over time we expect and intend and are working very hard at
    making this hardware more like the system we want to actually
    use and so it's going to get better.
        But basically in the last 3 years to do four tests and to
    have two successes out of four is a major achievement. But we
    learn from our failures and the reason why it took us a year to
    come to this point is because we took the two failures that we
    had and learned from those and went back and took the time to
    fix everything.
        Those types of failures we experienced, unfortunately from
    my point of view, were more related to quality problems, if you
    will, process problems and not the fundamental design and
    hardware. So in order to wring those types of process problems
    out, you have to put more discipline in the program and make
    sure that people do the right thing and in fact are rewarded
    for telling us when there is something wrong and that took us
    time.
        Once we are confident we have those processes in place,
    which I have right now, then I expect that we will be able to
    do things more rapidly without those types of problems
    occurring.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What was the reason for the failure a
    year ago?
        General Kadish. The reason for the failure a year ago, we
    believe, was a circuit card that failed, that did not send the
    right signal to the kill vehicle to separate from the booster,
    and the reasons for those types of failures have to do with
    foreign object damage, those types of things.
        Senator Bill Nelson. It was a failure that had nothing to
    do with the actual design of the new system of the kill vehicle
    to home in on the target?
        General Kadish. Correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So why did it take a year for what
    would normally be a pedestrian kind of failure? For what you
    are trying to test, why would it take a year?
        General Kadish. Because it indicated that it was a failure
    in something that we did not expect because as you correctly
    point out, it actually worked on all the other flights and it
    is something we know how to do. That indicated to us that we
    needed to go back and look at every piece of the hardware in
    the test program and not leave any stone unturned and make sure
    that the smallest detail in our program was looked at to ensure
    the type of discipline I talked about earlier. That took time
    and we took the time to do that.
        Now that we have gone through that and have adjusted
    people's expectation to this rigorous way of doing it, it is my
    opinion we can move faster in our test program, especially
    given if you have successes, you want to turn up the complexity
    and the challenge, as Secretary Wolfowitz points out, to test
    the edges of the envelope, or you may fail doing such.
        Senator Bill Nelson. When is the next test scheduled?
        General Kadish. Our next test is currently scheduled for
    the end of October, early November time frame of this year.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The next one after that?
        General Kadish. It will be in the February time frame.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You feel comfortable with that kind of
    interval to build on either the success or failure of each of
    those tests?
        General Kadish. That is correct, and when you have a
    success and you analyze the data that supports that and find
    that there are minor or no glitches, it gives you even more
    confidence in your next test schedule.
        Senator Bill Nelson. When in this regime of testing is your
    first major full up with many different targets that are not
    actual targets, that are decoys; when does that occur?
        General Kadish. We haven't taken the decision of how we are
    going to add complexities to the test in final detail yet, so I
    think that will occur in the next couple of months. But
    certainly over the next 18 months we are going to be adding
    complexity, but it won't be until we've built the full test bed
    capability where we will have the ability to put more targets
    in flight almost simultaneously rather than just one and fire
    more interceptors than just one and then put more decoys in to
    get the different geometries that will convince ourselves as
    well as our critics that we have an operationally viable
    system. So that's why the test bed is so important to us.
        Senator Warner. Senator, I have to interrupt. We have just
    a few minutes left. The Chairman suggested that we now adjourn
    the hearing and you can come back and resume your questioning.
    Would that be inconvenient?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Oh, we have a vote? I'm sorry, I did
    not know that, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Warner. These are good questions and I am
    listening.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I just conclude by
    asking one simple question? When do you expect that full up
    test bed onto your present regime?
        General Kadish. Between fiscal year 2004 and 2006.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Warner. We will stand in adjournment. [Recess.]
        Chairman Levin. We will be back in session. Let me ask this
    question of both of you. It has to do with when that test bed
    becomes operational. You said, Mr. Secretary, you hope, it is
    your intent and your hope, that it become operational as
    quickly as possible. It is your hope--I guess everybody's
    hope--that the tests succeed. It is also, it seems to me then,
    the question comes back as to what is the change which would
    need to be made to make that an operational system. General
    Kadish said before that there are some changes that would need
    to be made. You characterize those as software changes, I
    believe, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That's my understanding from hearing
    the General speaking. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Is that a difficult thing to do--to make
    those software changes? Does that have to be tested or is it
    something that we assume could be done quite readily?
        General Kadish. Well, I hesitate to say it's only a
    software change because those things are monumental in our
    business but the issue is that I wouldn't expect the changes to
    be difficult to implement. However, in keeping with the
    philosophy of making sure we test like we use it in this test
    bed, we would have to, at some point, start testing those
    command relationships and making sure when you turn the switch,
    the right thing happens. So, what I said earlier about having
    detailed plans to do that, I would expect us to start thinking
    about how to do that over the next year to 18 months and even
    beyond that and that plans will change over time based on what
    we discover. So, that's why its difficult for me to say
    precisely right now exactly what it will take to turn it
    operational.
        Chairman Levin. But it will take that?
        General Kadish. It will at least take that.
        Chairman Levin. It's our intent to have that tested so that
    it is ready when the other elements of an operational system
    are ready to go as well.
        General Kadish. Well, again, this is where it gets
    imprecise because if you recall, last year, Senator, we were
    doing things concurrently and you questioned me very closely on
    why the high risk on a concurrent program. This program doesn't
    have that now. We wait to make that decision--to actually
    produce the system that we intend to deploy based on more
    concrete test data and performance of the program. So, at some
    point over the next 3 to 4 years I would expect, based on the
    progress of our test bed testing, to take to the Secretary and
    the decisionmakers options every year as to whether or not we
    want to start one of those concurrent programs. In that regard,
    we would use what we know in the test bed and that test bed
    capability then could provide only an interim capability on our
    way to a larger system.
        Chairman Levin. But the interim system, which has been
    called a rudimentary capability, is that the way you're using
    it basically?
        General Kadish. That's the best term we've come up with to
    date.
        Chairman Levin. But the words rudimentary or primitive or
    interim all are intended----
        General Kadish. Not the final system.
        Chairman Levin. But they're all intended to describe a
    system which has operational capability and is intended to have
    minimum or modest operational capability. Is that accurate?
        General Kadish. That's one of the things it would do. Yes.
    There are two primary functions--test bed first and then the
    residual capability it gives you.
        Chairman Levin. But that residual capability, that
    operational capability is one of the purposes here. Is that not
    correct?
        General Kadish. That's correct.
        Chairman Levin. You've said, Mr. Secretary, that it is your
    intent that that be achieved as quickly as possible. Is that
    correct? I just want to be real clear here.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. I want to talk about the Cobra Dane radar
    for a few minutes. In your point paper that was provided to
    this committee, you said that an upgraded Cobra Dane radar,
    ``may have some ABM radar capability.'' But in any operational
    system we anticipate that a new X-band radar Shemya would be
    required to provide needed discrimination even with all
    possible upgrades to Cobra Dane. So, are you then saying that
    Cobra Dane will provide that contingency capability as early as
    2004?
        General Kadish. If I understand the question, I believe the
    answer will be yes because it's an early warning radar and it
    only functions as an early warning radar. One of the issues is
    the countermeasure problem for any midcourse system that we
    need X-band for. So, the capability is very basic and as we've
    been describing it, rudimentary.
        Chairman Levin. But Cobra Dane will provide useful
    contingency capability?
        General Kadish. That's what our belief is today.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, this is a bit unrelated to
    the series of questions that I want to keep pursuing here but I
    have been troubled by it because a number of times in the last
    few hearings, I think at least twice, it has been stated that
    you are on a commission that concluded that we needed to deploy
    a national missile defense system. You have not said that that
    was not accurate.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That is not what the commission
    concluded.
        Chairman Levin. I think it would have been useful for you
    when that statement is made as it has been repeatedly here for
    you to say when it's your turn to respond to the question that
    in fact that is not what the commission recommended. I would
    just ask you in the future that you clarify.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That's a fair point, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. In your statement today, Mr. Secretary, on
    page 3 at the top, you make the following statement. Well,
    first let me go to the bottom of page 2. ``The Department's ABM
    compliance review group has been directed to identify ABM
    Treaty issues within 10 working days of receiving the plans for
    new development of treaty events. That process is already under
    way.'' When did that begin?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. This new procedure, I think, was
    instituted by Under Secretary Aldridge within the last week or
    2.
        Chairman Levin. Then at the top of the next page you say
    the following: ``The Secretary and I will be informed of
    whether the planned test bed use of Aegis systems in future
    integrated flight tests or concurrent operation of ABM and air
    defense radars in next February's tests are significant treaty
    violations.'' Then you made reference to those three fact
    sheets that are made part of the record. You say here, you're
    going to be informed as to whether they are significant treaty
    violations. Are you going to distinguish between significant
    treaty problems and just treaty problems? Is that word
    significant supposed to tell us that you will say that if it's
    a treaty problem or a treaty violation in your judgment or the
    judgment of that compliance review group that then there's
    going to be another test. Is it a significant violation?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. It doesn't say significant violation.
    It's significant problem and I have to read in the mind of the
    authors who gave me the phrase. I think what it means is if
    it's a prospective violation, it is a significant problem. If
    you can't guarantee because of the way these things change and
    alter over time that there are no treaty problems, but it
    certainly better mean it's what I took it to mean that if
    there's any serious prospect of a violation that this is going
    to surface early.
        Chairman Levin. That a violation is a violation. You're not
    trying to distinguish between a serious and a non-serious
    violation?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Not at all.
        Chairman Levin. Alright. The next sentence, which I found
    to be a really interesting sentence, I must tell you. ``This
    process will permit us to take them,'' and I assume that is
    referring to the treaty problems?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. ``Into account as early as possible as we
    pursue our negotiations with Russia on a new strategic
    framework.'' What do you mean by take into account?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I mean that it becomes part of the
    considerations that the Secretary and the President have to
    make. In their discussions with the Russians, it becomes
    something we have to take into account in our consultations
    with you and other members of Congress. It becomes something we
    have to take into account in moving forward with the program.
    There are different ways to go with these issues depending on
    the character they raise and so, there's not a--until you see
    the forum in which the issue specifically arises, it's hard to
    say exactly which way you'll go with it.
        Chairman Levin. See, what I'm struggling with is whether or
    not the administration, the President, has decided that if
    modifications cannot be agreed to with Russia, the decision has
    already been made to withdraw from the treaty. That's what I'm
    trying to figure out. Has it?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think there is a decision that at
    some point, and I'm not sure--I think the point is a crucial
    question--that at some point if we can't get modifications that
    allow us to proceed with missile defense, we will withdraw from
    the treaty. The question is at what point and I don't think
    there's been a decision about what point.
        Chairman Levin. To that point, even if all of this testing
    worked out this year may not come this year?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I guess the most I can say is this
    phrase that there seems to be an agreement with the
    administration that we're talking about months and not years. I
    mean, I think you yourself would say at some point you would
    withdraw from the treaty.
        Chairman Levin. I might. Not would. That's the whole
    difference. You just put your finger right on it.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. OK.
        Chairman Levin. I read this before and Senator Warner very
    appropriately asked for later comments to the administration
    that if Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give
    prompt notice under the provisions of the treaty that we can no
    longer be a party to it. What you're telling us is that it may
    or may not be the situation now because it may not be such
    prompt notice. Now you're saying that at some point. That's
    fine with me, by the way, because that begins to show a little
    complexity in how to approach a--probably the most significant
    security decision we're going to make, which is if we can't
    modify the treaty, whether we're going to, in fact, withdraw
    from it. What I'm trying to see is whether or not there are in
    fact the beginnings of flexibility, that opening to considering
    the ramifications of withdrawal.
        The impact on our security of withdrawal from a treaty is a
    factor to be considered. I was glad to hear you answer Senator
    Warner's question about if, in fact, the modifications cannot
    be agreed to whether you would come back to Congress in a
    consultative process and your answer was yes. That, to me,
    means that what you do in that circumstance is subject to
    consultation. That, to me, means you have not made a final
    decision; that no matter what the circumstances are; no matter
    what the fallout out is; no matter what the reaction is; no
    matter what the actions which we would then expect from Russia
    and China are; no matter what anything, that you're going to
    promptly withdraw from the treaty. Instead, if you're going to
    be consulting with us, and I would welcome that, I gotta tell
    you, before you make the decision that you're going to
    withdraw, I view that as progress. I don't want to look to see
    something that isn't there but I took a little bit of heart
    from your answer to Senator Warner's question because it's
    different. It's a different kind of a spirit to say that if
    Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will consult with
    Congress and come back to you as to what then, what actions,
    we're going to do. If those actions are already decided, if
    you've already decided that if Russia doesn't agree to the
    changes that you're then going to give prompt notice under the
    provisions of the treaty that you're withdrawing from it, that
    puts us in a very different position. So, you can comment on
    that or not.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Let me say a great deal of complexity
    has been added to the President's position since the Citadel
    speech that you quoted that from and even last year in May when
    he made his statement about a new approach to nuclear weapons
    and deterrence talked in quite elaboration about the importance
    of a new approach to offensive retaliatory forces as well. I
    mean, that already is a very major layer of complexity added to
    what we're trying to present. When we talk about a new
    framework with Russia, we're talking about something that
    actually goes beyond missile defense and beyond nuclear weapons
    and to incorporate a much broader view of security and one that
    I think is appropriate to this era. So, we are very much trying
    to take a lot of people's views into account.
        Certainly, Congress is our ally but certainly also the
    Russians and I do think that--I made a comment earlier which I
    think you may have taken as dismissive that I didn't think this
    rudimentary capability in Alaska would keep a Russian military
    planner awake even for a minute. I don't believe it would. But
    I in no way mean to dismiss the importance of the ABM Treaty as
    something that unfortunately became the centerpiece of U.S.-
    Soviet relations. We'd like to have a different centerpiece for
    U.S.-Russian relations and that's what we're working on
    constructing. It's going to take work and we need to work with
    Congress in doing it.
        Chairman Levin. Well, that's more than welcome but the
    complexity, again, that I'm referring to, the layer of
    complexity that I'm referring to, is the question of whether to
    withdraw. The question that I'm trying to figure out the answer
    to is whether or not that decision has been made to promptly
    withdraw from this treaty in the event--or just a decision made
    to withdraw from this treaty--in the event that the
    modifications cannot be made. If, in fact, there's true
    consultation that is going to take place on that question
    before the decision is made, that puts us in one situation. If,
    in fact, the decision has been made that there's going to be a
    prompt withdrawal, in the event modifications cannot be
    achieved, that seems to me to put us in a different situation
    in looking at your budget request. So, I guess I'll try the
    question again. Is it your judgment that the decision has been
    made in the event modifications cannot be achieved to promptly
    withdraw from the ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I think we are at the point, as the
    phrase is said, that it's a matter of months, not years, before
    we reach that point. Now, does that----
        Chairman Levin. Reach the point of deciding whether or
    reach the point of withdrawing?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. Reach the point of deciding that we
    would have to.
        Chairman Levin. Reach the point of deciding later on? You
    have not now decided? Look, to me this is a very important
    little conversation we're having here. I don't know; I can't
    speak for others, but to me it's a very important conversation.
    It is not something which is splitting hairs. It is something
    which goes to the heart of a very important issue because we
    have a responsibility, as do you, to defend this country, the
    security, and to protect and defend America. We want to, it
    seems to me, make sure we don't create a greater problem by
    addressing the problem over here in a North Korean threat and
    create a bigger problem with a larger number of nuclear weapons
    on Russian or Chinese soil. The response can leave us less
    secure if we don't do this right. I think most of us would like
    to see a new framework. I really believe we'd like to see a new
    cooperative framework. There's no difference in that regard.
    The question is how best to achieve it and whether it's best to
    achieve it by telling Russia we're going to withdraw if there's
    no modification, or to tell Russia we may withdraw if there's
    no modification, depending on how we perceive our security
    circumstances at the moment that we think we have something
    that might be workable. Those are very different issues and
    very different ways to phrase an approach. So, I don't want to,
    unless you'd like to comment further on what I just said, I'll
    just go on to a couple other questions and then turn it over to
    Senator Warner. Do you want to add anything.
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I don't think I can add.
        Chairman Levin. In the statement which was given to the
    media last Wednesday the following sentence appears. The
    administration made this following statement: ``As we have
    informed our allies and Russia, we expect our RDT&E efforts
    will conflict with the ABM Treaty limitations in a matter of
    months, not years.'' When was Russia informed that we expect
    our RDT&E efforts to conflict with the ABM Treaty limitations
    in a matter of months? When did we notify them?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I'm not sure, Senator. I'll have to
    get that for the record.
        Chairman Levin. I'd appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        During frequent high-level discussions throughout 2001 we informed
    the Russians that in pursuing the best options available for defense of
    our territory, our allies, and our friends, we would come into conflict
    with the ABM Treaty. We further communicated that we did not intend to
    conduct tests solely designed to exceed treaty constraints, but neither
    could we design tests that conformed to the treaty and still build the
    most effective missile defense system.

        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
    Wolfowitz, I listened very carefully to your response to
    Senator Reed and your responses to his question about a
    violation of a treaty, the ABM Treaty, were very succinct, very
    clear and consistent with what you have said in 2 days of
    testimony but tightly packaged in one response. I wrote it down
    as best I could quickly. You simply said, we will not violate
    the ABM Treaty, isn't that correct?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Warner. Fine. To me that puts to one side very many
    concerns of others and, second, you indicated that you would
    further consult with Congress, if the option--well, let me put
    it this way. It would be my hope that at some point in time
    this statement could somehow be embraced by the administration.
    I've just sort of put it together. That the United States will
    continue its consultations with our allies, negotiations with
    Russia, and indeed I support the President having indicated
    that withdrawal is an option, that he is commander in chief of
    our forces and he must consider should he be unable to
    structure a new framework and/or the option as we discussed
    earlier of amendments. But that in his final decision he would
    have further consultation as necessary he deems with allies and
    with Congress before exercising the treaty provision of
    withdrawal. Now, it would be my hope that somehow words could
    be crafted along those lines. I'll just leave it at that.
        Further to General Kadish, a legitimate concern has been
    made that we, the United States, prove the technology before
    deployment and I guess I have been around weapons system about
    as long as anybody up here in Congress--30 years plus. Clearly,
    a deployment decision of a new weapons system or new defense
    against a weapon would only be done after the full test
    evaluation, all the various steps and benchmarks were taken.
    Then it's certified to the Secretary of Defense. Am I not
    correct in that?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That's the way we normally do our
    major procurement programs. However, there is precedent and I
    think it's embedded in some of our thinking here, that we may
    want to take decisions a little bit earlier and take some risk
    in this. No defense system is ever perfect even if it's fully
    operationally tested. So, we may want to do some things
    concurrently that would advance the capability with a little
    bit of risk.
        Senator Warner. I don't think that's any significant
    departure, in my judgment, from what we have done because I
    think there's several concerns that one, we would be foolishly
    throwing money at the system were we to deploy it without
    having gone through the normal sequence of benchmarks prior to
    certification that the system can be employed and that we would
    take it without pursuing which I fervently believe our
    President will do, consultation with allies, negotiations with
    Russia and the like. All of these things. So, I think the
    testimony today has gone a long way to clearly lay a foundation
    of fact that this administration is proceeding in a prudent
    manner with regard to reaching at some future point in time a
    deployment decision. It has met my satisfaction. I hope it has
    met those of others.
        Mr. Chairman, I will submit a series of questions for the
    record. We are way over our time estimates here and you and I
    have other commitments with regard to several questions on the
    treaty itself and the necessity. I just think the general
    public fully understands that this treaty constrains the United
    States from developing missile defenses cooperatively with
    other allies and indeed Russia. Am I not correct on that?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Warner. That's such a fundamental proposition
    because I think basically the world wants to see a greater
    framework of security against the threat of these missiles and
    that at some point in time our President, not unlike what
    President Ronald Reagan did, would offer to share technology
    and to allow this greater security to not only benefit the
    United States and our allies but Russia and indeed some others.
    So, I think those fundamentals have to be pointed out in very
    simple, plain, good old fashioned American English language. I
    intend to do just that but I commend both of you today. I think
    this hearing has been a very significant step forward in
    meeting the challenge of legitimate concerns of others with
    regard to what this administration is doing to protect our
    fundamental security against an overgrowing threat of missile
    technology. I'm glad that you said today very clearly, Mr.
    Secretary, that unless we come to grips with a defense against
    the threats of missiles, whether they're ballistic or
    intermediate, it renders almost useless the entire inventory of
    weapons that we now have and seriously impairs the ability of
    our Nation to help other nations when their security could be
    challenged by a common enemy. Because a threat against our
    Nation, should we employ forces to save another nation, could
    be seriously put in jeopardy if we were threatened with
    retaliation by some nation against us should do that by use of
    this missile.
        We also have to understand that many nations are putting
    their limited resources behind acquiring this capability
    because those limited resources do not enable them to have the
    conventional forces and other forces to promulgate their
    foreign policy even though that foreign policy may be
    antithetical to our own. This is a very simple, less costly
    means by which to enter the world of politics in foreign policy
    and we've got to prepare ourselves to defend against it.
        I thank both of you.
        Chairman Levin. General Kadish, today I guess, you prepared
    these three sheets for us, or the Department prepared these
    three sheets for us, and they're now part of the record. When
    you told the committee on June 13 that none of the recommended
    activities would cause a violation of the ABM Treaty in fiscal
    year 2002, were any of these activities on these three sheets
    included in the recommendations at that time?
        General Kadish. I think they're all being developed and
    subject to the normal look by those in compliance review. As I
    stated and in qualifying that it was all subject to the
    compliance process.
        Chairman Levin. Have there been any changes in your
    proposed activities since June 13.
        General Kadish. Oh yes, Senator. Lots of changes.
        Chairman Levin. Since June 13?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir and that is part of the problem we
    have is that there's always changes to this process and as
    stated earlier in the hearing it wasn't until Friday, the 13th,
    that we got a modification to our latest test. So, that is why
    it is so difficult for us to be precise, at least for me to be
    precise, on this because planning at very low levels in our
    organization on the construction projects could change a date
    by months. That has treaty significance.
        Chairman Levin. You gave us a booklet on June 13 laying out
    what your program was and what I would appreciate your doing
    for the record is telling us in what specific ways these three
    sheets differ from that presentation which you made to us on
    June 13.
        General Kadish. We will attempt to do that.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, might I also ask unanimous
    consent that I have obtained clearance, security clearance, on
    the June 13 testimony which further amplifies General Kadish's
    reply to your questions and the questions of others. I would
    ask unanimous consent that that be placed in today's record. I
    presume this would be an appropriate juncture.
        Chairman Levin. It would be. It would be very helpful, as a
    matter of fact. I appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The June 13 booklet was provided to provide information about the
    status of the program, not to provide information related to treaty
    issues. The fact sheets provided on July 17 set forth information
    related more specifically to treaty issues. From June 13 to July 17,
    the planning the testing and development program continued, decisions
    were made and the fact sheets document some of those decisions. The
    fact sheets are attached.

        Chairman Levin. First, let me say relative to Senator's
    Warner's comments about a formulation of a position that I
    commended to you. It's something I've been urging for quite
    some time, which is that the President, rather than saying he's
    going to withdraw from the treaty if modifications are not
    agreed to, state that he's going to consider the option to
    withdraw in that event. It's a very significant statement and
    it's significantly better, I believe, both in terms of trying
    to obtain an agreement but also in terms of working with
    Congress. This is really what the position has been of Congress
    for some time, at least in the Senate. Senator Warner, then
    Senator Cohen, Senator Nunn and I talked about getting
    ourselves in a position to have capability so that a president
    could determine whether or not to withdraw based on the nature
    of the threat, based on whether or not overall we'd be more
    secure with a withdrawal, based on operational effectiveness,
    based on impact on arms reductions, based on cost
    effectiveness.
        Those factors were put into a bill that the four of us
    worked on in the mid-1990s so that the President would be in a
    position to decide whether or not to exercise the treaty
    provision relative to withdrawal. In that formulation that
    Senator Warner just made about the President stating that if
    modifications were not available, and were not achievable, that
    then he would consider that option, it seems to me is
    consistent with the position that we have wanted each President
    to be in since we've started down the road of research and
    development of a missile defense.
        In terms of wanting another framework, I think everyone of
    us would like to see a new framework. But we also would like to
    see a new framework in place before the old one is destroyed
    unilaterally--before it's torn down. That is going to take some
    real effort and it's worth trying for but it's very different
    from saying we're going to tear down the old before we have a
    new one--to say we would like to get to a new one and here's
    why. That's a matter of persuading folks that it is in their
    interest and our interest to be able to defend against that
    rogue state or that accidental launch. Both of those are
    useful. But it also means that we don't want to do it in a way
    which could put us in a less secure position. That would
    actually add to our insecurity because of the unilateral action
    which then precipitates a response on the part of Russia and
    China to overcome what they consider to be a threat to their
    security. We may not understand why it's a threat to their
    security but if they feel that way, they're going to act.
    They're going to respond if they feel threatened by our
    unilateral action. We should at least factor that into our
    thinking--not be stymied by it, not give anyone a veto--just be
    aware of what that response is and consider whether or not,
    given what the likely response might be, we would be left in a
    more or less secure position.
        Thank you. You both have been very helpful. These have been
    long hearings, but helpful hearings. We will keep the record
    open for 24 hours for those of our colleagues that have
    additional questions. There is material you're going to be
    submitting for the record. We stand adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                            ALLIES, RUSSIA AND CHINA

        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, the administration released
    a paper during the week of July 9, 2001 that stated that it had
    ``informed our allies and Russia'' of its expectation that the
    ballistic missile program will ``conflict'' with the ABM Treaty in
    months, not years.
        What exactly has the administration told our allies and Russia?
    When did you tell them?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We have informed them on several occasions
    that in pursuing the best options available for defense of our
    territory, our allies, and our friends, we will come into conflict with
    the ABM Treaty in months, not years. We communicated that we do not
    intend to conduct tests solely designed to exceed Treaty constraints,
    nor do we intend to design tests to conform to, or stay within the
    confines of the Treaty.
        Additionally, we have told them that we hope and expect to have
    reached an understanding with Russia by the time our development
    program bumps up against the constraints of the ABM Treaty, and that we
    would prefer a cooperative outcome. In this context, we have told our
    friends and allies that we intend to continue our consultations with
    them as our discussions with Russia proceed.

        2. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, what, if anything, has the
    administration told China?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We have communicated the same information to
    China.

        3. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, did the administration tell
    these nations that you do not plan on modifying the ABM Treaty, but
    rather to move away from it in the hope of a new framework?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. We have informed these nations that we plan to
    move beyond the constraints of the 1972 ABM Treaty--which the President
    has called ``an artifact of the Cold War confrontation'' that prevents
    us from acquiring the capabilities we need to deter and defend against
    new threats and that perpetuates an adversarial relationship with
    Russia.

        4. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, has the administration
    considered, or ruled out, the option of deploying long-range
    interceptor missiles in NATO or other allied nations? If so, has the
    administration discussed such an option with our allies?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. As the President has stated, missile defenses
    will be designed to protect the United States, deployed forces, and its
    friends and allies. To accomplish this mission, the Department of
    Defense is exploring a wide range of technologies and basing modes that
    could contribute to an effective missile defense program. Therefore, we
    have not ruled out the possibility of needing to deploy interceptors on
    allied territory, though no decisions have been made. Over the past
    several months we have been involved in an intense dialogue with our
    allies and friends on missile defense issues. In these discussions, a
    number of allies have expressed interest in participating in U.S.
    missile defense plans. We expect these discussions to continue and
    expand.

                              STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

        5. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, your prepared statement from
    July 12 stated: ``We hope and expect to have reached an understanding
    with Russia by the time our development program bumps up against the
    constraints of the ABM Treaty.''
        Why do you expect to have reached agreement with Russia within this
    near term period, which you described elsewhere in your statement as
    ``in months rather than in years''? Are there any indications from the
    Russians that they are willing to reach agreement on a new strategic
    framework, or to amend the ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. My reason for optimism is that I think we have
    a fundamentally different relationship with Russia than we had with the
    Soviet Union. I do not think that the Russians have to lay awake nights
    worrying about our attacking them with nuclear missiles, nor do we need
    to worry about the Russians attacking us. What the Russians are looking
    for is a new framework of relations that addresses the real security
    needs of this era. Both the United States and Russia have a very
    substantial common interest in maintaining stability in Europe and
    Asia. Working together on stabilizing those critical areas of the world
    is the cornerstone of strategic stability today. I believe that as we
    deepen our strategic framework discussions with the Russians--which are
    well underway--we will begin to make some progress.

        6. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, what is the U.S. proposing
    for a strategic framework with Russia on the following elements:
    offensive nuclear forces, defensive forces, threat reduction and
    nonproliferation?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. President Bush has called for the development
    of a new strategic relationship with Russia based on openness, mutual
    confidence and real opportunities for cooperation, which recognize the
    fundamental changes in the international security environment.
        In the missile defense area, we are prepared to examine a range of
    cooperative activities with Russia such as the sharing of early warning
    information, sensor technology, and expansion of our existing U.S.-
    Russia Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) Exercise. With regard to offensive
    nuclear forces, we see the new framework including substantial
    reductions in offensive nuclear forces
        In the threat reduction area, we are prepared to assist in
    deactivating additional nuclear warheads, destroying strategic delivery
    systems, and improving accountability, storage and transport security
    for deactivated warheads. With regard to nonproliferation, the U.S. and
    Russia could establish a defense-to-defense dialogue on proliferation
    concerns and the challenges to regional and global security posed by
    the acquisition of longer-range missiles and WMD in regions of
    instability. We could also work together in areas of shared
    proliferation concern to identify approaches that can reduce the risks
    of instability.

         LEGAL BASIS FOR R&D FUNDING OF A MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT

        7. Senator Levin. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Defense Department
    budget proposal for fiscal year 2002 requests research and development
    funding to construct five missile silos at Fort Greely, Alaska for NMD
    interceptor test missiles. Section 2353 of Title 10, U.S. Code,
    prohibits the use of research and development funding for ``new
    construction,'' and the five proposed silos are clearly ``new
    construction.'' The Department has not requested, and Congress has not
    approved, military construction funds specifically for building these
    new silos at Fort Greely.
        What is the legal authority for requesting research and development
    funding for this new construction?
        Section 2802 of Title 10, U.S. Code, states that military
    construction projects require an authorization in law. They also
    require an appropriation. If you are seeking neither of these required
    elements for military construction funds for construction at Fort
    Greely, would the construction you propose conflict with the law?
        General Kadish. The construction at Fort Greely, Alaska will be a
    portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense System Test Bed. Section 2353
    of Title 10, United States Code authorizes construction and acquisition
    of research, developmental or test facilities needed for the
    performance of a research or development contract using Research,
    Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, provided that the
    facilities constructed do not have ``general utility.'' Because some of
    the Ballistic Missile Defense System Test Bed facilities to be improved
    or constructed may have general utility, the Department of Defense has
    proposed new legislation to establish that RDT&E funds may lawfully be
    used for the purpose of constructing the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System Test Bed.
        The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is proceeding in fiscal
    year 2001 with site preparation work for the portion of the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System Test Bed located at Fort Greely, Alaska using
    the authorization and appropriations of the Fiscal Year 2001 National
    Defense Authorization Act and Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction
    Appropriations Act. The Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization
    Act provided project authorization at unspecified worldwide locations
    in the amount of $451,135,000. It also provided an authorization of
    appropriations for such military construction projects at unspecified
    worldwide locations in the amount of $85,095,000. The Fiscal Year 2001
    Military Construction Appropriations Act provided a lump sum
    appropriation for ``Military Construction, Defense-Wide,'' of which the
    table in the accompanying conference report indicates $85,095,000 was
    intended for ``NMD Initial Deployment Facilities (Phase I).'' It is
    critical to the initial deployment of a ballistic missile defense
    system for the United States that the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Organization provides for robust testing in an environment that
    resembles as closely as possible a realistic, operational environment.
    The construction of the Test Bed facility at Fort Greely is consistent
    with and is a necessary and prudent intermediate step toward the
    ultimate construction of an initial deployment facility at Fort Greely.
    Such activities comport with both the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense
    Authorization Act and the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction
    Appropriations Act.

                    KODIAK AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FORT GREELY

        8. Senator Levin. General Kadish, you have indicated that you
    intend to launch test interceptors from Kodiak Island, but not Fort
    Greely, yet you propose putting test missile silos at both Kodiak
    Island and Fort Greely.
        Would it be possible to just use Kodiak, and put as many test silos
    (and other assets) there as you are proposing to put at Kodiak and
    Greely combined? Why couldn't such test assets placed at Kodiak have
    just as much ``residual operational capability'' as those you plan to
    place at Fort Greely?
        General Kadish. First, it is important to note that Kodiak could
    not provide as effective a missile defense as Fort Greely because the
    Kodiak silos would be ineffective against select and specific
    trajectories. Thus, Kodiak could not provide the same ``residual
    operational capability.''
        As a launch site within a test bed, Kodiak has advantages, but even
    then, unlike Fort Greely, it could not allow for proving out and
    testing of operations in a realistic arctic environment. Silo
    construction, silo and interceptor maintenance procedures, system
    acceptance and turnover, training development, and system operations
    would all be different at Kodiak.
        Kodiak has insufficient space for five silos, and there would be no
    room for growth should such a decision be taken. In addition, since
    Kodiak is not Federal land, it cannot assure the same force protection
    and physical security as Fort Greely. Site-specific facility designs
    have not been started, and environmental requirements are not complete
    for Kodiak, while they are approaching completion for Fort Greely.
        Finally, it would be duplicative and wasteful to build the required
    communications and battle management infrastructure at both Fort Greely
    and Kodiak. These elements will be needed at Fort Greely for any
    operational system, so it would be cost prohibitive to construct test
    versions at Kodiak, as well.

        9. Senator Levin. General Kadish, is there anything you can do with
    a silo at Fort Greely that is impossible to do with a silo at Kodiak?
        General Kadish. Yes, Fort Greely can provide for proving out and
    testing of operations in a realistic arctic environment, while Kodiak
    cannot. Silo construction, silo and interceptor maintenance procedures,
    system acceptance and turnover, training development, and system
    operations would all be different at Kodiak.
        In addition, since Kodiak is not Federal land, it cannot assure the
    same force protection and physical security as Fort Greely. Site-
    specific facility designs have not been started, and environmental
    requirements are not complete for Kodiak.

                      TEST MISSILES FOR LONG TERM TESTING

        10. Senator Levin. General Kadish, you propose to build five test
    silos at Fort Greely and place test interceptors in them on a long-term
    basis for logistics and maintenance testing, to make sure electronics
    work, and that you understand everything you want to know about the
    missiles. There would be test missiles, rather than fully developed,
    tested and operationally deployed missiles. Is it typical for a missile
    test program like this to build 5 test missiles just to store them in
    silos and never fire them?
        General Kadish. Although this is not a typical program, it is
    typical to build missiles for long-term storage testing in projected
    deployment climates as part of shelf-life reliability assessment
    programs. It is also typical to test missiles in the full range of
    expected deployment climates. In order to verify the functionality of a
    complex system such as this, and to launch and engage several missiles
    simultaneously, multiple silos are required. The test bed requires five
    silos to simulate a maximum Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense
    salvo. Five silos are also a reasonable sample to construct, load, and
    observe interceptors in an arctic environment.

        11. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do we do such testing now at
    either Vandenberg Air Force Base or at the launch site at Kwajalein,
    where we have test silos for missile launches?
        General Kadish. No. The target missile and ground-based interceptor
    launched from existing ranges are put in place a few weeks prior to the
    scheduled test execution date.

        12. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do we now do this sort of thing
    anywhere else, where we basically deploy these missiles permanently
    just to test them for logistics and maintenance issues, knowing that
    they are not operational missiles?
        General Kadish. Yes, we typically employ test missiles for
    logistical and interface verification purposes. For example, this
    testing approach was used for the Hawk missile system. A battery of
    Hawk missiles along with all complete operational support equipment was
    emplaced at Redstone Arsenal for the purpose of testing. All changes to
    the system and first article testing were performed on the battery of
    Hawk missiles.
        The test bed missiles will not be operational and will be built to
    test out the interface and functionality of the ground based mid-course
    system, which is very complex. The missile along with functional Launch
    Site Components, Command Launch Equipment, and Environmental Control
    Systems will be stored for a period of years in the environment
    expected during deployment and sustainment. These missiles will
    eventually be removed from the silos at Fort Greely and taken to a test
    range for Live Fire Testing. This approach adds realism to the
    Reliability Test Program.

        13. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do we do this sort of permanent
    testing deployment with any operational missiles; as opposed to
    developmental or surrogate test missiles, where we place them in silos
    or launchers for long periods for the exclusive purpose of testing them
    in logistics and maintenance issues?
        General Kadish. No, it is not typical to permanently deploy
    operational missiles in a testing deployment. We do, however, conduct
    testing deployments and simulations for our ICBM forces at Vandenberg
    AFB and at their operational bases.
        However, it is not unusual to construct and deploy permanent
    testing facilities when developing missile programs. For example, the
    U.S. ICBM program constructed permanent silos and support facilities
    for each type of ICBM developed. These facilities allowed the proving
    out of logistical, maintenance, and operational procedures prior to the
    system's deployment and construction of operational facilities. Many of
    these facilities remain in use to support the Follow-on Operational
    Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) of our current ICBM force.
        Testing of operational ICBMs does occur at the operational base as
    well. Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman (SELM) exercises isolated
    10 missiles from the operational wing for a period of approximately 1
    month. During these exercises, the Minuteman ICBMs are put through a
    series of ground tests and then given orders to launch. The missiles
    are safed to prevent the firing of the motors. These end-to-end tests
    help provide confidence in the force.
        Yes, we typically employ test missiles for logistical and interface
    verification purposes. For example, this testing approach was used for
    the Hawk missile system. A battery of Hawk missiles along with all
    complete operational support equipment was emplaced at Redstone Arsenal
    for the purpose of testing. All changes to the system and first article
    testing were performed on the battery of Hawk missiles.

        14. Senator Levin. General Kadish, how much funding is proposed in
    the fiscal year 2002 budget request for building the silos at Fort
    Greely?
        General Kadish. Of the $273.121 million programmed for the
    Ballistic Missile Defense test bed facilities construction, $168.645
    million is programmed for the Ground Based Interceptor. $20.911 million
    of this amount is allocated to prepare Fort Greely for the five missile
    silos.

                 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR FORT GREELY

        15. Senator Levin. General Kadish, has an Environmental Impact
    Statement (EIS) been prepared in accordance with the requirements of
    the National Environmental Protection Act for the construction of the
    five proposed test silos and placement of interceptor missiles at Fort
    Greely?
        General Kadish. Yes. The National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment
    Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was final December 15, 2000.
    One of the five alternative locations analyzed in the EIS for the
    construction of up to 100 NMD missile silos and placement of up to one
    hundred missiles was Fort Greely, AK. The Fort Greely portion of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System test bed proposal is essentially a
    down-scoped version of the deployment proposal analyzed in the NMD
    Deployment EIS. Accordingly, the environmental consequences associated
    with the Fort Greely portion of the test bed proposal are not expected
    to differ materially from those already analyzed in that EIS, but are
    anticipated to be reduced in scope and intensity.

        16. Senator Levin. General Kadish, if so, when was it completed and
    issued?
        General Kadish. December 15, 2000.

        17. Senator Levin. General Kadish, if so, please provide the
    committee with the relevant portions of the EIS that deal with the
    specific proposal to build five test silos and emplace test missiles at
    Fort Greely.
        General Kadish. Relevant portions of sections 2, 3, and 4 are
    provided that analyze activities of like kind at Fort Greely.
    (Information retained in committee files.)

        18. Senator Levin. General Kadish, has a Record of Decision been
    issued for this specific proposal to build five test silos and emplace
    five interceptor missiles in these silos? If so, please provide the
    committee with the relevant portions of the Record of Decision
    pertaining to this specific proposal.
        General Kadish. No Record of Decision has been issued for the
    specific proposal to construct five test silos and emplace five
    interceptor missiles in these silos. BMDO would issue a Record of
    Decision before it awards a contract to begin test bed site preparation
    work. The relevant portions of a Record of Decision pertaining to this
    specific proposal would be provided to the committee upon its issue.
        NOTE: A Record of Decision dated August 10, 2001 was signed and
    published in the August 15, 2001 Federal Register. Contract award date
    was August 18, 2001.

         19. Senator Levin. General Kadish, was there a ``Finding of No
    Significant Impact'' for this specific construction proposal?
        General Kadish. No. A ``Finding of No Significant Impact'' (FONSI)
    would not be issued for this specific construction proposal. In
    accordance with the implementing regulations of the National
    Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a FONSI is issued in conjunction with
    an environmental assessment (EA) process, to document no significant
    impacts were identified for activities analyzed in the EA process. The
    NEPA process that analyzed the NMD activities at Fort Greely was an
    environmental impact statement (EIS).

                            COBRA DANE RADAR UPGRADE

        20. Senator Levin. General Kadish, how much funding is included in
    the fiscal year 2002 budget to upgrade the Cobra Dane radar on Shemya?
    Precisely what activities are funded? According to your proposal, when
    would upgrade begin and when would it be completed?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 budget contains $55.0 million
    to begin the Cobra Dane radar upgrades on Shemya Island, AK. The effort
    would begin in fiscal year 2002 and be completed in fiscal year 2004.
    Boeing, the Prime Contractor, would upgrade the existing data
    processor, modify Midcourse Defense Segment software to accommodate L-
    Band system radar inputs (from Cobra Dane), provide for a SATCOM link
    to the BMC\3\ node at Fort Greely, and provide final integration and
    testing. In addition, the fiscal year 2002 construction requirements
    are $44.566 million for facilities and power requirements upgrades at
    Eareckson Air Station.

        21. Senator Levin. General Kadish, what is the missile defense test
    purpose for this proposed radar upgrade, and what would it do that the
    existing test range capability does not do?
        General Kadish. The test approaches being considered include flying
    air-launched targets into the Cobra Dane's field of view. The air-
    launched targets provide realistic target opportunities for Cobra Dane
    and would allow interplay between the radar and BMC\3\. The use of
    Cobra Dane in such operationally representative test scenarios would
    provide test data that are relevant to evaluating system development
    concepts and performance against a wider range of test parameters.
    Additionally, employing Cobra Dane in the BMD test scenarios would
    allow the radar to utilize legacy capabilities against targets of
    opportunity. Existing prototype and surrogate radars at Kwajalein and
    Hawaii cannot provide for such realistic tests on realistic geometries.

        22. Senator Levin. General Kadish, can the Cobra Dane radar, either
    now or after the proposed upgrade, see target missiles launched from
    Vandenberg Air Force Base or from Kodiak, Alaska?
        General Kadish. No. None of the planned upgrades will change Cobra
    Dane's field of view to the point where it will detect targets launched
    from Vandenberg or Kodiak along their customary trajectories. Note that
    Cobra Dane is in the architecture as a surrogate for a forward deployed
    early warning radar. Shemya's geographic relationship to Vandenberg
    clearly precludes this function for Vandenberg launched targets. Cobra
    DaneS's primary utility will involve air- or other mobile-launched
    targets.

        23. Senator Levin. General Kadish, General Franklin told committee
    staff that the upgraded Cobra Dane radar would be able to look westward
    over the Pacific to track a Long-Range Air Launched Target that is
    under development. Do you have fiscal year 2002 funding proposed for
    development of an ICBM-class air launched target? If so, how much?
        General Kadish. A specific request for funding of an Air Launched
    Target in fiscal year 2002 was not made. A study is currently underway
    to look at development of an increased target launch capability
    (payload and range). In fiscal year 2002, $10 million has been
    requested for this study.

        24. Senator Levin. General Kadish, when do you plan on first using
    this target in a test with the Cobra Dane radar?
        General Kadish. The use of the Long-Range Air Launched Target is
    part of a study to improve testing. The planned use will be determined
    based on the results of that study.

        25. Senator Levin. General Kadish, what will this target's range be
    during this test?
        General Kadish. The desired target performance parameters will be a
    product of the study.

        26. Senator Levin. General Kadish, since that target does not yet
    exist, and it may turn out not to be a long-range target, why is the
    Department requesting funding in fiscal year 2002 to upgrade the Cobra
    Dane radar?
        General Kadish. The funding requested for the Cobra Dane radar in
    fiscal year 2002 will only initiate hardware and software upgrades. The
    Cobra Dane upgrade would assist in development of both the X-Band and
    upgraded early warning radar (UEWR) systems, which would be used in an
    operational ground-based midcourse defense. The Cobra Dane upgrades
    will also allow the BMD program to learn earlier about how such a radar
    and BMC\3\ interoperate. In addition, the short construction window at
    Shemya means that the time required to install and test the planned
    upgrades to the Cobra Dane radar and supporting facilities will require
    more than a single construction season to complete. It is therefore
    prudent to begin this activity as soon as possible.

        27. Senator Levin. General Kadish, would the proposed Cobra Dane
    radar upgrade make sense if you did not build the five interceptor
    silos at Fort Greely? What is the connection between the upgrade of the
    Cobra Dane radar and building five silos at Fort Greely that will never
    launch test missiles?
        General Kadish. Yes, the proposed Cobra Dane upgrades make sense
    even without the five planned silos at Fort Greely. Both the Cobra Dane
    radar and the five Fort Greely silos are part of the overall test bed
    architecture that is intended to allow more robust and realistic
    testing of the ground-based midcourse element of the BMD System.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Max Cleland

                               PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        28. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, according to the briefing you
    presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 13 June, the
    earliest, ``high risk'' deployment for the various missile defense
    systems under consideration are 2009 for Airborne Laser, 2010 for sea-
    based systems, and 2006 for a ground-based system designed to intercept
    missiles in mid-course. The only system whose earliest, high-risk
    deployment was claimed to be 2004 is the ground-based system designed
    to intercept missiles in the missile's terminal phase. Is this correct?
    I define the term ``high risk'' to mean that these programs have a
    probability for success that is lower than what is generally acceptable
    for defense programs, and that rushing these programs is likely to lead
    to expenditures and blind alleys that might be avoided with a more
    deliberate research and testing schedule. Is that correct?
        General Kadish. You are correct regarding our planned fielding
    dates for the Airborne Laser, the Sea-based system and the Ground-based
    portion of the Mid-course segment. However, all of our programs have
    been restructured to support an earlier contingency capability in the
    2004 timeframe.
        By its very nature, building a ballistic missile defense is an
    extremely complex undertaking and is inherently high-risk. The ABL,
    Sea-based Mid-course, Ground-based Mid-course systems are all high-risk
    ventures in the traditional sense because they are all truly ``state of
    the art'' efforts. The Ballistic Missile Defense Program is as complex
    as any in our Nation's history. However, we intend our highly rigorous
    testing and risk-reduction efforts to prevent us from entering ``blind
    alleys.'' We are dedicated to these testing and risk-reduction efforts
    and confident they will serve their intended purpose.

                     ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

        29. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, are you aware that the
    military services have identified $32.4 billion in requirements that
    are not funded in the administration's fiscal year 2002 budget
    amendment? In light of these very tangible unfunded requirements, how
    do you justify asking for an additional $3 billion for missile defense
    when Saturday's test indicates that the current program, as funded last
    year and programmed for the next several years, is making progress?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The priority the Department places on missile
    defense reflects the current administration's understanding of the
    growing threat the United States faces from short-, medium-, and long-
    range ballistic missiles. While we are just beginning to field systems
    to reliably counter the shorter-range threats, there is still much work
    to be done before we will be in a position to deploy capabilities to
    protect U.S. and allied cities and troops against the emerging longer-
    range threats from rogue states, whose leaderships may use these
    offensive capabilities for purposes of terror, coercion, or aggression.
        While we currently have deployed many systems to counter threats
    from the land, sea, and air, and we have initiatives and operations to
    take care of numerous other defense needs, today we have no capability
    against longer-range threats against the American population. Nor do we
    currently have a capability to defeat the medium- and intermediate
    threats that could threaten our troops and allied and friendly cities
    this decade. Much like the threat we expect to face, the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System we are endeavoring to deploy is unprecedented.
    The administration will pursue a robust missile defense research,
    development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program to acquire the
    capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon
    as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our
    friends and allies. The proposed missile defense funding for fiscal
    year 2002 represents our commitment to developing a rigorous test
    program, which will be essential to our ability to determine which
    technologies and basing modes will be most effective against what by
    all measures is a very dynamic threat. Early deployed capabilities may
    be expected to provide more protection than we currently have.
        Missile defense technologies have been under development for years.
    Many of the technologies required to build an effective BMD System are
    in hand and are improving year by year. The challenge before missile
    defense developers is in engineering the system. We will increase our
    knowledge of system capabilities over time through our RDT&E
    activities, and especially our testing program. These activities will
    give us a sound understanding of the technological and engineering
    possibilities inherent in the system we intend to deploy.

                              BUDGET/ARCHITECTURE

        30. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, in testimony last
    Thursday, General Kadish stated that your missile defense proposal has
    no milestones by which to measure progress. At the Frontier Institute
    last Friday, Secretary Rumsfeld said that: ``We don't have a proposed
    [missile defense] architecture. All we have is a series of . . . very
    interesting research and development and testing programs . . .'' In
    fiscal year 2001, the entire Department of Defense spent $9 billion on
    all basic research and development alone. How can you justify spending
    $8 billion on missile defense if you have no milestones, requirements,
    or architecture in mind? If you don't know what you are going to do,
    how can you know what it will cost?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The Ballistic Missile Defense program includes
    funding for research, development, testing and procurement. Procurement
    activity and funding will be transferred to the Service responsible for
    the acquisition, and these pro rams--namely PAC-3 and Navy Area
    Defense--have traditional milestones. The remaining missile defense
    activity, which encompasses a significant majority of the funding, is
    for research, development, and testing, and is directed by the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. There are no procurement
    activities in the current BMDO program, but there are decision points.
    The goal of the program is to have sufficient information at these
    decision points to determine whether we should proceed with procurement
    and deployment of particular systems. At this point, our plan is to
    test as robustly and rapidly as possible all systems under development
    so we can provide the necessary information to decisionmakers.
    Therefore, although there is no architecture, per se, there are
    distinct points at which we will measure progress.

                            NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

        31. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, what specific missile
    defense-related activities will take place in Alaska in fiscal year
    2001?
        Has the Compliance Review Group or the DOD General Counsel ruled on
    whether each of these actions violate the ABM Treaty?
        Were there any dissenting opinions expressed by the legal experts
    consulted on the legality of the preparations that you intend to carry
    out this year?
        Are there any missile defense plans outside of Alaska in fiscal
    year 2001 which raise significant compliance issues with respect to the
    ABM Treaty? If so, please give us the views of the Compliance Review
    Group and General Counsel as well as any dissenting views on each such
    plan. Will you assure us that there will be no violations of the ABM
    Treaty during the remainder of fiscal year 2001? During fiscal year
    2002?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. In fiscal year 2001, BMDO is scheduled to
    begin site preparation activities, which will include clearing,
    excavating and grading the site at Ft. Greely, AK.
        In accordance with the procedures set forth in DOD Directive
    2060.1, the General Counsel for the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Organization reviewed the planned activities and determined that they
    did not reasonably raise any issue of compliance with the ABM Treaty.
    As permitted under the Directive, the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology and Logistics was informed of this
    determination.
        No. The determination was based on the plain language of the
    relevant Treaty documents. Furthermore, the determination was well
    within the prior consensus of the legal community established during
    consideration of when construction of the Shemya radar would be
    considered to first violate the ABM Treaty.
        There are no missile defense plans outside of Alaska in fiscal year
    2001 which raise significant issues with respect to the ABM Treaty. The
    Secretary of Defense has assured Congress that the Department will
    comply with the law.

        32. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, is prep work on a missile test
    facility at Alaska being contracted for this year? What funds are to be
    used for this work? For what purpose were these funds authorized and
    appropriated?
        General Kadish. Yes, work for the test bed is intended to be
    contracted in fiscal year 2001. BMDO notified Congress on 16 July 2001
    of its intent to solicit a proposal and subsequently anticipates award
    of a construction contract for initial site preparation of a test bed
    at Fort Greely, Alaska, using the authority and appropriations provided
    in the Fiscal Year 2001 Military Construction (MILCON) Authorization
    and Appropriations Acts.
        Congress authorized the Department of Defense Agencies to carry out
    a $451.135 million MILCON project, for which Congress appropriated
    $85.095 million in fiscal year 2001 for the National Missile Defense
    (NMD) Initial Deployment Facilities, Phase I.
        The test bed is essentially a limited portion of the Fiscal Year
    2001 NMD MILCON project, sized appropriately for a testing, not
    operational, mission. The site preparation work planned for Fort Greely
    in fiscal year 2001 will be a small portion of the same work authorized
    for the GBI site construction work. The site preparation contract is
    not expected to exceed $9.0 million.
        NOTE: The contract to begin site preparation work was awarded on
    August 18, 2001.

        33. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, the proposal to build
    interceptor silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, is part of a proposed
    expansion of the BMD test infrastructure. (a) Exactly what would those
    silos be for, and (b) what would they add to the test infrastructure
    that either doesn't exist elsewhere or could not exist elsewhere? (c)
    How much funding is proposed in the budget request for building the
    silos at Fort Greely? (About $200 million) That sounds like a lot of
    money to spend in a single year on construction. (d) Given the short
    construction season in Alaska (I understand it's about 8 weeks), how do
    you plan to spend that much money in a single year, from a ``standing
    start?''
        General Kadish. The elements of the test bed at Fort Greely would
    allow us to test interceptors and associated command launch equipment
    in an operationally realistic environment. Operational aspects that
    will be tested include Battle Management, Command, Control, and
    Communications throughout the system, from radars and sensors in
    various parts of the world all the way to the silos, including critical
    digital message timing. Operations in an Arctic environment, such as
    silo construction, silo and interceptor maintenance procedures and
    planning and rehearsal for system acceptance and turnover, can be
    developed and tested in no other location, not even Kodiak.
        The test bed requires five silos to simulate a maximum Ground-Based
    Midcourse Missile Defense salvo. Five silos are also a reasonable
    number to construct, load, and observe interceptors in an arctic
    environment. Other factors that were considered arise from the fact
    that Fort Greely is optimally suited to be a future deployment
    location. Because of this, environmental requirements and site specific
    facility plans are complete; enough land is available, both for the
    initial five silos and for a future expansion if authorized; and
    Federal ownership provides force protection and physical security.
        Of the $273.121 million programmed for the test bed facilities
    construction, $168.645 million is programmed for the Ground Based
    Interceptor. $20.911 million of this amount is allocated for the five
    missile silos at Fort Greely. The construction season for central
    Alaska is from approximately April through October. This totals about
    28-32 weeks per year depending on weather delays. The first year's
    expenses include mobilization costs, procurement by the contractor for
    long lead items, and the costs for foundation work and enclosing the
    facilities. After enclosure of facilities, some inside work can
    continue into the winter season. It is anticipated and planned that all
    requested funds will be obligated during the fiscal year.

        34. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, your testimony from last week
    indicated that a test bed activity consisting of five test interceptors
    in silos at Fort Greely linked to an upgraded Cobra Dane radar could
    provide an emergency operational capability for limited missile
    defense. When does a test bed activity become an operational capability
    and what needs to happen to change its status? What is the difference
    between the two? What can a test facility do that an operational
    facility cannot do and vice versa? At what point would either activity
    conflict with the ABM Treaty?
        General Kadish. The interceptors in silos at Fort Greely will be
    used to conduct realistic ground testing and gain experience working
    with a variety of different aspects of missile defense, including
    integration of critical system interfaces, maintenance, security, and
    construction. These crucial aspects of developing our capability will
    not include operational command and control (C\2\) linked to the
    National Command Authority, but rather a test command and control
    configured for safety. The test bed could not become an operational
    capability until the operational C\2\ infrastructure, which is part of
    the National Command Authority, is put into place and direction is
    given to make the site operational. The test facility will only launch
    interceptors from Kodiak and only after significant preparation. An
    emergency operational capability would be able to launch interceptors
    from Fort Greely if needed. Although ABM Treaty issues are not within
    my purview, I understand that the compliance questions have not yet
    been resolved.

        35. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, if Fort Greely is intended as
    a test bed site, is it correct that no test interceptors would be
    launched from Fort Greely, but instead the missiles would be stored
    there in silos, and that interceptor test launches would instead be
    conducted from Kodiak Island? Under what conditions, if any, would you
    launch interceptors from Fort Greely?
        General Kadish. It is true that current plans call for test
    interceptors to be launched only from Kodiak Island. It would be
    desirable to be able to launch test missiles from Fort Greely.
    Investigations into the safety and environmental issues involved with
    future test launches from Fort Greely are ongoing. Under current plans,
    interceptors would be launched from Fort Greely only in an emergency.

        36. Senator Cleland. Secretary Wolfowitz, at the outset of this
    administration's defense review, we in Congress were assured that major
    defense program changes would be deferred until after the completion of
    the strategic review. That review is still ongoing. Notwithstanding
    congressional support for the previous administration's program of
    missile defense research and development, adding $3 billion to that
    program is, by any definition, a major defense program change. Why has
    this administration selectively chosen to accelerate missile defense
    programs in violation of your own previously established guideline?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The Department initiated several major reviews
    at the outset of the administration. The defense strategy review is
    ongoing, and most major defense program changes will await the outcome
    of that review. The Department also initiated a missile defense review,
    which is completed, and the results briefed to Congress. Missile
    defense is one of the Administration's top priorities, and it was
    important to implement the results of the review as soon as possible.
    The budget increase request for missile defense was part of this
    implementation.

                               PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        37. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, you have stated in your
    testimony that there are no milestones or other elements of major
    defense acquisition program architecture by which we can measure
    progress with the new missile defense approach you have proposed, but
    you have also indicated that you have ``internal plans'' that provide
    detail on the specific things for which the money is being requested.
    Provide for the record, and in as much detail as is available, the
    internal plans for spending the money you are asking for in the fiscal
    year 2002 budget request.
        General Kadish. The Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission has
    been delivered to Congress with additional program details. BMDO will
    monitor the development of our systems through disciplined, internal
    engineering and program management processes. The only change we are
    proposing is how the Department oversees our progress. In lieu of the
    formal Milestone review, which occurs at intervals often spanning
    several years, the Department is planning to review BMD at a senior
    level in a formal process on an annual basis. These incremental steps
    allow technologies that are proven successful to continue to mature or
    be accelerated and those that do not prove successful to be slowed or
    terminated.
        At an oversight level, a senior executive council, chaired by the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense, will provide BMDO guidance and direction.
    The top-down oversight will enable BMDO to carry out our new approach
    with shorter lines of communication and authority. BMDO will have the
    flexibility to adjust program priorities and will support major annual
    reviews with the oversight council to refresh policy and strategic
    framework for program direction. During these annual reviews, the
    oversight council will make executive level decisions to deploy,
    accelerate, truncate or modify capabilities or elements of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System, major programming decisions, and
    execution year adjustments. The review process will help make decisions
    to shape the evolving systems and allocate resources to optimally
    support missile defense. Congress will have insight into detailed
    spending plans through the budget submissions provided by the
    Department.

              NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT READINESS REVIEW

        38. Senator Cleland. General Kadish, many theater missile defense
    programs that were funded under BMDO last year have been broken out to
    the services in this budget request. Provide for the record the exact
    amount of money that was authorized and appropriated for Patriot,
    Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and Navy Area Wide program in the
    fiscal year 2001 Appropriations Act. Provide also the dollar amount of
    BMDO funding that you expect will have been spent, obligated, or
    otherwise committed for each of these programs as of 30 September 2001.
        General Kadish. The appropriated and authorized funding is the same
    and is as follows:

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Expected
                                                            Obligation Rate
                                                             \1\ (Percent)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    RDT&E:
      PAC-3................................       81.016                 99
      Theater High Altitude Area Defense...      549.945                 97
      Navy Area Program....................      274.234                 96

    Procurement:
      PAC-3................................      365.457                 70
      Theater High Altitude Area Defense...        0.000
      Navy Area Program....................        0.000

    MILCON:
      PAC-3................................        0.000
      Theater High Altitude Area Defense...        0.000
      Navy Area Program....................        0.000

                                            --------------------------------
    Total:
        PAC-3..............................      446.473                N/A
        Theater High Altitude Area Defense.      549.945                N/A
        Navy Area Program..................      274.234               N/A
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Obligation rates apply to the current program funding which differs
      from the authorized/appropriated funding position.

                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

                   NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE READINESS REVIEW

        39. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, the National Missile Defense
    Deployment Readiness Review is critical of the current program.
    Specifically, it notes problems in situations with ``phantom tracks''
    where interceptors were accidentally launched despite operator's
    attempts to override the system. It also indicates flight tests to date
    have been ``dumbed down'' by reducing the number of decoys and
    utilizing canned scenarios. Despite this, the system has met deployment
    readiness criteria. Specifically, ``it has not achieved two intercepts
    nor demonstrated integrated system performance with a successful
    intercept.'' What steps are being taken to address the concerns
    expressed in this report?
        General Kadish. The NMD Deployment Readiness Review evaluated the
    previous administration's National Missile Defense program, not the
    Ballistic Missile Defense program that is currently planned. The
    previous administration's plan was to undertake development and testing
    for three years, review the results and then determine whether to
    deploy over a three year period. The Deployment Readiness Review
    documented whether the previous administration's program had met its
    stated criteria supporting a decision to deploy. In contrast, the
    planned approach is a research, development, testing and evaluation
    effort that will allow more robust testing, including software testing.
        It appears that the question is in fact referring to the DOT&E
    Report incident to the DRR process, which raised several valid points
    about testing which would be applicable to the current program. BMDO
    has taken several steps to address those concerns. The Battle
    Management Command, Control, and Communications (BMC\3\) software
    accurately correlates sensor data with good covariance estimates;
    however, duplicate tracks may temporarily be created in the system
    track file due to real-world sensor uncertainty in reporting their
    track data covariance estimates to BMC\3\. The BMC\3\ software
    correlation process automatically recognizes and purges these temporary
    duplicate tracks within a few sensor-reporting cycles. It does not
    become "confused" as to which target cluster(s) to engage, since
    engagements are only planned against stable system tracks. This
    reported problem was a development maturity issue identified during
    earlier testing, and it has since been corrected.
        Testing has not been simplified in order to guarantee success.
    Rather, we are ensuring that we know how to walk before we begin to
    run. Flight testing up to this point, as well as tests for the
    foreseeable future, has been designed to prove that hit-to-kill can
    work. Once we have confidence in the hit-to-kill approach, we will add
    more realistic countermeasures and employ more complex testing
    scenarios. Much of this testing is envisioned to be done with the
    proposed missile defense test bed, as laid out in the fiscal year 2002
    budget request.
        At the time of the Deployment Readiness Review (DRR), we had
    achieved only one intercept, and that one intercept did not demonstrate
    a fully integrated system test, as originally planned; however, the one
    intercept demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of hit-to-kill
    technology. Also, in each flight test, we have met many of our test
    objectives and this has added to the understanding of how the system
    will perform. At DRR, ground and flight tests had demonstrated about 93
    percent of the critical engagement functions and had shown the ability
    to integrate these elements. The failures that occurred in Integrated
    Flight Test (IFT)-4 and IFT-5 reflect problems in basic engineering and
    fabrication rather than underlying NMD technology or design.

        40. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, when do you expect system
    maturation and test evaluation to arrive at a point where we need to
    commit to system deployment in a way which would violate the ABM Treaty
    as it is written today?
        General Kadish. Months, not years.

                              ABM TREATY VIOLATION

        41. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, there has been much
    discussion before this committee on the subject of ABM Treaty violation
    and the fiscal year 2002 budget. We keep hearing different things from
    different witnesses. Can you definitively state that the missile
    defense program for fiscal year 2002, to include the test plan and
    proposed range expansion to Alaska, will not violate the ABM Treaty? If
    not, when can you provide this committee with that information?
        General Kadish. It is not known at this time whether the referred
    to activities are consistent with the ABM Treaty. We will inform
    Congress when a final recommendation by the ABM Treaty Compliance
    Review  Group has been approved by the appropriate decision maker. The
    United States will comply with all of its international treaty
    obligations, including those imposed by the ABM Treaty while it remains
    in force.

                                 AIRBORNE LASER

        42. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, most missile defense experts,
    while possessing varying degrees of confidence in the Airborne Laser
    system's viability, agree that the concept of Boost-Phase Intercept
    holds great promise from a political and technical standpoint. Can you
    please update us on the status of the Airborne Laser program and where
    it is going?
        General Kadish. The concept of boost-phase intercept does hold
    great promise. In a layered approach to ballistic missile defense, the
    capability to destroy ballistic missiles early in their flight profile
    will be a very important capability. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program
    has made a lot of progress over the last calendar year. Some examples
    include ``first light'' from laser module # 1, which achieved a power
    output of 111 percent of design specification. Major structural
    modifications to the 747-400F aircraft were completed in Wichita,
    Kansas, including attaching the 14,000 pound turret to the aircraft.
    This culminates the largest structural modification ever undertaken to
    a commercial aircraft. The integration and test checkout facility for
    the beam control/fire control system was opened in Sunnyvale CA; and
    developing the software and hardware that will comprise the BMC\4\I
    system will continue. Next year's activities will include flight
    testing of the airframe with the turret installed, laser integration in
    the system integration laboratory at Edwards AFB, and continuing to
    populate the beam control/fire control integration and test checkout
    facility with hardware. It is expected that ABL will allow the United
    States to counter missiles of all ranges in the boost and ascent phase.

                               SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT

        43. Senator Landrieu. General Kadish, the proposed fiscal year 2002
    budget includes provisions to expand the range complex by building
    facilities, to include missile silos used to store test interceptors,
    at a site in Alaska which has been proposed as the location for the NMD
    system when ultimately deployed. We've also been told that storing
    these test vehicles in silos would provide the United States with an
    ``emergency capability'' even before system deployment. Is this true?
    If so, does it violate the ABM Treaty?
        General Kadish. The program includes plans to construct test silos
    at Fort Greely, Alaska that will contain test interceptors to support
    testing activities. Should the United States face an emerging threat,
    it will have the option to take steps necessary to give the test site
    some operational capability on an emergency basis to provide a very
    limited defense capability. The process of reviewing the ABM Treaty
    compliance of these activities has not been completed. The United
    States will not take any action that will violate the ABM Treaty while
    it remains in force.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                                 AIRBORNE LASER

        44. Senator Reed. Secretary Wolfowitz, at the hearings we held, you
    stated twice that the Airborne Laser program is a clear violation of
    the ABM Treaty. My understanding is that unless the Airborne Laser
    system is tested against a strategic ballistic missile target, it would
    not constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty since it is a theater
    ballistic missile defense system. I gather that the Compliance Review
    Group at DOD has reviewed the program previously, but had not conducted
    a final compliance review because the technology was not mature enough
    to render a compliance determination.
        Has the Department changed its position on whether the Airborne
    Laser system would comply with the ABM Treaty, and has it reached a
    final determination on compliance of the ABL system? Is it the
    Department's determination that the ABL system would violate the ABM
    Treaty even if not tested against a strategic missile target?
        General Kadish. The Air Force has briefed the ABL program to the
    DOD Compliance Review Group (CRG) on a regular basis. While no final
    determination of treaty compliance for ABL has yet been made by the
    CRG, nor have they determined at what point the ABL program might bump
    up against the ABM Treaty, they have determined that no formal
    compliance certification under DOD Directive 2060.1 has yet been
    required.

        45. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the Program Manager for the ABL
    program recently briefed committee staff on the program and said that
    the program remains a TMD program designed and intended to defeat
    theater ballistic missiles. Has the Department changed the program's
    objectives recently away from a TMD mission?
        General Kadish. Yes, the Department has broadened the objectives
    for the ABL Program to address longer range missiles. We have not, yet,
    changed the performance specifications of the baseline ABL program.
    Rather we are investigating its capability against other BMD threats in
    addition to theater ballistic missiles to determine if changes should
    be made to the baseline program.

        46. Senator Reed. Secretary Wolfowitz, is the current lethal shoot
    down test currently planned for fiscal year 2003 going to be against a
    theater missile target or a long-range missile target?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The current ABL baseline program plan is to
    test against a theater missile target at the end of calendar year 2003.
    The baseline test plan is being reviewed for possible inclusion of
    other BMD threats.

                               PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        47. Senator Reed. General Kadish, at the hearing, we discussed the
    Space-Based Kinetic initiative proposed in the fiscal year 2002 budget
    request. At the hearing you indicated that the program is funded at
    roughly $4 million for fiscal year 2002. A recent newspaper article
    suggested it may be a much higher figure. Please provide for the record
    the amount of funding proposed for fiscal year 2002, and a description
    of what the funding is intended to accomplish during fiscal year 2002.
    Is there a plan to deploy such a system, and if so what is the
    estimated cost and deployment date? What would be the system's intended
    capability?
        General Kadish. Within the Fiscal Year 2002 Amended President's
    budget request is $20 million for space-based, kinetic energy boost
    phase intercept (BPI) activities: $15 million to support space-based
    BPI concept definition and operations concepts, and $5 million for the
    design and hardware requirement definition for a space-based kinetic
    energy experiment. These efforts are specifically aimed at advancing
    the state of the art for space-based BPI applications. Alternative
    platforms for space-based interceptors will be conceptualized and
    evaluated during concept definition to determine system and platform
    trade-space. In parallel, this element will be supported by modeling
    and simulation. Experimentation and phenomenology data collection
    activities conducted within the segment integration line of this
    program element (PE 0603883C) will provide validation for the models
    and simulations used.
        There are no plans at present to deploy such a system. The specific
    ballistic missile defense architecture and deployment timelines are as
    yet undefined, but will take shape over the next few years. As new
    ideas (such as a space-based kinetic energy BPI concept) mature, they
    will be integrated into the BMD System if they increase the capability
    to respond to the evolving threat, and if they are effective within the
    overall system, technical risk, potential deployment schedule, and
    cost.

                        SPACE-BASED KINETIC INTERCEPTOR

        48. Senator Reed. General Kadish, at the hearing I asked if you
    would think it beneficial for Russia to have a space-based kinetic
    interceptor program capable of shooting down U.S. long-range missiles.
    Your answer indicated that you thought it could be useful if Russia had
    a space-based kinetic interceptor capability to defeat an accidentally
    launched U.S. missile. I would like to know what your view would be if
    Russia had the capability to intercept all U.S. long-range ballistic
    missiles, rather than just an accidentally launched missile. Do you
    think such a capability would be good for our security, or would that
    cause you concern that our deterrent capability is reduced?
        General Kadish. Senator, you've asked me to comment on a
    hypothetical question that does not fall within my purview. As the
    Department of Defense official in charge of being the materiel
    developer for our missile defense program, it is not for me to comment
    on the strategic implications of various hypothetical Russian missile
    defense deployments.

                  DEVIATION FROM STANDARD ACQUISITION PROCESS

        49. Senator Reed. General Kadish, in your prepared statement you
    stated that: ``We must deviate from the standard acquisition process
    and recognize the unprecedented technological challenges we are facing.
    We do not have major defense acquisition programs in the fiscal year
    2002 budget. We do not have program activities with traditional fixed
    milestones and clearly marked phases showing the road to production.''
    But it is just these ``traditional acquisition processes and clearly
    marked phases'' that have made the U.S. military the best in the world,
    bar none. If the F-22 fighter were being developed without these
    traditional processes, there would be no way to determine what stage it
    was in its testing, when it would be deployed, and how much it would
    cost, or even what it was being designed to do. Without these
    traditional processes how do you expect oversight organizations both
    within and outside the Pentagon, including Congress, to do their jobs
    in the missile defense area?
        General Kadish. The Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission has
    been delivered to Congress with additional program details. BMDO will
    monitor the development of our systems through disciplined, internal
    engineering and program management processes. The only change we are
    proposing is how the Department oversees our progress. In lieu of the
    formal Milestone review, which occurs at intervals often spanning
    several years, the Department is planning to review BMD at a senior
    level in a formal process on an annual basis. These incremental steps
    allow technologies that are proven successful to continue to mature or
    be accelerated and those that do not prove successful to be slowed or
    terminated.
        At an oversight level, a senior executive council, chaired by the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense, will provide BMDO guidance and direction.
    The top-down oversight will enable BMDO to carry out our new approach
    with shorter lines of communication and authority. BMDO will have the
    flexibility to adjust program priorities and will support major annual
    reviews with the oversight council to refresh policy and strategic
    framework for program direction. During these annual reviews, the
    oversight council will make executive level decisions to deploy,
    accelerate, truncate or modify capabilities or elements of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System, major programming decisions, and
    execution year adjustments. The review process will help make decisions
    to shape the evolving systems and allocate resources to optimally
    support missile defense. Congress will have insight into detailed
    spending plans through the budget submissions provided by the
    Department.

        50. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how will we know the taxpayers
    are getting their money's worth for missile defense, or that the
    programs you are pursuing will work effectively?
        General Kadish. Let me start with the second question. The programs
    we have pursued for a number of years now are bearing fruit. The PAC-3,
    for example, designed to intercept short-range missiles like the Scud,
    will be fielded this fall. It will work. Other important systems are
    maturing--the technology is at hand, and we're working hard on
    engineering and reliability. Any future deployments made from the
    programs we are pursuing will be done with an initial early capability
    and grown to be more and more effective over time in a layered system
    of defenses.
        Will it be worth the money? That must be measured by the cost of
    not having a defense, by the cost of devastation of an American city or
    two. We have national defenses against terrorism, but nothing against
    missiles targeted at American soil. We have air defenses for our
    deployed troops, but woefully little to protect them from ballistic
    missiles, such as the one that killed 28 and wounded another 99 service
    members 10 years ago.
        As major defense programs go, the expenditures are in line with, or
    less than, programs of comparable impact. The entire BMD budget request
    this year is about 2\1/2\ percent of the DOD request and fills a gap
    where no previous effective capability existed against missiles. In so
    doing, it will strengthen both deterrence and defense as one important
    part of our national security fabric.

                         CAPABILITIES-BASED DEVELOPMENT

        51. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you stated last week in your
    prepared statement that you ``intend to go beyond the conventional
    build-to-requirements acquisition process . . . [and have] adopted a
    capability-based approach.''
        Requirements serve an important role in the defense business. They
    define, among other things, how much time and money to spend on a
    program. Development programs come to a successful conclusion once
    their performance requirements are met and the required number of units
    are bought. With no requirements, how do you know you are spending the
    correct amount?
        General Kadish. Given the considerable technical challenges of our
    mission, a traditional acquisition process that includes rigid,
    predetermined user requirements does not provide the requisite
    flexibility to build missile defenses efficiently. For this reason,
    capability-based acquisition is appropriate for this program.
        Nevertheless, while it is correct that we intend to go beyond the
    conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process, BMDO will
    conduct a structured acquisition process. In fact, we do have
    requirements in the form of system development objectives and goals,
    which can and will be adjusted based upon the results of research,
    experimentation, and testing. These standards differ from the
    conventional process in that they will evolve in parallel with
    capabilities, allowing us to significantly reduce schedule and cost
    risk.
        We successfully followed this approach in our early ICBM programs,
    when progress was paced by the evolution of our technological and
    engineering maturity. As needed and possible, those capabilities were
    enhanced. In accordance with our Block acquisition approach, BMDO and
    the Department will conduct rigorous annual reviews of all program
    activities to ensure that we proceed steadily towards an architecture
    that will maximize defensive capabilities. At these recurrent decision
    points, systems will be evaluated on the basis of technological
    maturity, mission requirements, technology readiness levels, cost,
    resource availability, and schedule. Throughout, the CINCs and Service
    Users will be involved in the development process so that, with each
    block, we move steadily forward towards a system with ever-increasing
    military utility that incorporates complementary operational
    capabilities and minimizes life cycle cost.

        52. Senator Reed. General Kadish, it sounds like your proposed
    approach is something like ``we'll see what we can build and then say
    that level of capability is our requirement.'' If so, doesn't that turn
    the normal definition of a ``requirement'' on its head? How can you
    judge whether your programs are successful or not if there is no
    standard for measuring success?
        General Kadish. While it is correct that we intend to go beyond the
    conventional build-to-requirements acquisition process, BMDO will
    conduct a structured acquisition process. In fact, we do have
    requirements in the form of system development objectives and goals
    that can and will be adjusted based upon the results of research,
    experimentation, and testing. These standards differ from the
    conventional process in that they will evolve in parallel with
    capabilities, allowing us to significantly reduce schedule and cost
    risk.
        We successfully followed this approach in our early ICBM programs,
    when progress was paced by the evolution of our technological and
    engineering maturity. As needed and possible, those capabilities were
    enhanced. In accordance with our Block acquisition approach, BMDO and
    the Department will conduct rigorous annual reviews of all program
    activities to ensure that we proceed steadily towards an architecture
    that will maximize defensive capabilities. At these recurrent decision
    points, programs will be evaluated on the basis of technological
    maturity, mission requirements, technology readiness levels, cost,
    resource availability, and schedule. Throughout, the CINCs and Service
    Users will be instrumental in the development process so that with each
    block we move steadily forward towards a system with ever-increasing
    military utility that incorporates complementary operational
    capabilities and minimizes life cycle cost.

                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

        53. Senator Reed. General Kadish, So far, the proposal for missile
    defense has been described only in general terms. Given the far-
    reaching nature of the proposed restructuring of the missile defense
    program, one would expect you have a detailed implementation plan to
    achieve the program's objectives, including schedule, milestones,
    technical objectives, test program and cost estimate. We need this
    implementation plan to do our work in marking up the fiscal year 2002
    budget request. When will you deliver this plan to the committee?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget submission has
    been submitted to Congress that provides detailed program plans for the
    full fiscal year 2002 program.

        54. Senator Reed. General Kadish, at a press conference on June 13
    you said that you have ``internal plans that [you] are going to work
    to.''
        When will you submit those internal plans to the committee?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 amended budget submission has
    been submitted to Congress that provides detailed program plans for the
    full fiscal year 2002 program.

                             uncertainty in program
        55. Senator Reed. General Kadish, in your prepared statement for
    the first BMDO hearing you stated: ``I cannot tell you today exactly
    what the [ballistic missile defense] system will look like even 5 years
    from now.''
        We have been researching missile defense technologies for decades,
    and have spent tens of billions of dollars on them, but this comment
    seems to be suggesting that we have to start again as if we have not
    learned from all that effort.
        For what time frame can you tell us what the system will look like?
        General Kadish. Our evolutionary approach focuses on developing a
    single integrated BMD System that will change over time, depending on
    the threat, operational need, and technological maturity. We have
    learned a great deal from past efforts and will continue to build on
    our technical progress. However, by not committing to a single
    architecture, as we have in the past, we can explore multiple
    development paths and take advantage of the best technological
    approaches and most advantageous basing modes. This approach also
    provides the opportunity to deliver capabilities incrementally, in
    increasingly enhanced blocks, rather than wait for the ultimate
    architecture. We have organized the program with the aim of delivering
    militarily useful capabilities in biennial blocks, starting as early as
    the 2004-2006 time frame. Therefore, the composition and capability of
    the BMD System will evolve based upon selection of proven technology,
    demonstrated successes, and opportunities and need for incremental
    employment, and, of course, affordability. While we cannot tell you
    what the final composition of the BMD System will look like, system
    choices and timelines will take shape over the next few years, and the
    evolution of the system will be defined though our capability-based,
    block approach.

        56. Senator Reed. General Kadish, if you have no clear idea of
    where you are heading over 5 years, how can you be sure that you are
    funding the correct activities?
        General Kadish. Our fundamental objective is to develop the
    capability to defend the forces and territories of the United States,
    its Allies, and friends against all classes of ballistic missile
    threats. What we do not know, at this point, the most promising
    developmental paths. Our evolutionary strategy is to fund a broad range
    of activities and parallel development paths to improve the likelihood
    of achieving an effective, layered missile defense. To ensure that we
    are funding the right activities, we are putting in place a stringent
    engineering approach to aggressively develop and evaluate technologies
    and concepts and a new rigorous test program incorporating a larger
    number of tests and employing more realistic scenarios and
    countermeasures. This robust engineering and test activity will provide
    the technical basis for decisions to accelerate, continue, truncate, or
    terminate activities.

        57. Senator Reed. General Kadish, what would be the basis of any
    future decisions to adjust funding between different programs?
        General Kadish. Decisions will be based on thorough analysis of
    risks, technical progress, performance, and affordability.

                                PENTAGON REVIEW

        58. Senator Reed. General Kadish, has the fiscal year 2002 proposal
    for ballistic missile defense been looked at by the military services
    as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review?
        General Kadish. The Department initiated several major reviews of
    strategy and forces at the outset of the administration. The ongoing
    Quadrennial Defense Review reflects the decisions made as a result of
    these initial assessments. Among these was a missile defense review,
    which has been completed, and the results have been briefed to
    Congress. Missile defense is one of the top priorities for the
    administration, and it was important to implement the results of the
    review as soon as possible. The Services played a role in the budget
    review process for missile defense.

        59. Senator Reed. General Kadish, given the focus the proposal has
    on testing, has it been reviewed by the Director, Operational Test and
    Evaluation organization?
        General Kadish. The Department budget process combines numerous
    budget proposals into the overall budget for the fiscal year in concert
    with Departmental guidance. These budget proposals are provided to the
    Comptroller for consolidation into the Departmental budget. The
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation organization reviews the
    justification materials that accompany the budget submission.

        60. Senator Reed. General Kadish, if not, why? When will DOT&E
    review the testing plan?
        General Kadish. DOT&E is provided an opportunity to review and
    comment on all major revisions to MDA test programs. They also approve
    all operational test planning as documented in the Test and Evaluation
    Master Plans (TEMPs).

                         CONSOLIDATION OF FUNDING LINES

        61. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you propose to establish six
    major pots with $7 billion of research and development money and to do
    annual reviews each November to determine what technologies are proving
    successful. The idea, as I understand it, is that you could accelerate,
    truncate, deploy or slow down specific programs after each review. Are
    you proposing to be able to transfer funds within these pots without
    requiring a specific authorization from Congress, or at a minimum a
    reprogramming request?
        General Kadish. The question focuses on the proposed November
    department review process of the BMD program. Our idea is that BMDO
    will make annual recommendations to the OSD senior leadership on
    program plans and budgets in November in order to finalize the
    President's Budget position submitted to Congress in the following 2
    months. BMDO and the Department, just like every year, will propose an
    allocation of funds to support our priorities, which may include
    program acceleration, truncation, or deployment. Once funds are
    appropriated, BMDO will have the ability to reallocate funds across
    projects within a Program Element, consistent with the Department's
    current operating procedures. Current procedures also limit transfers
    to only $3.999 million between Program Elements for RDT&E; for
    transfers greater than this, we would coordinate with OSD and Congress,
    as necessary.

                                 AIRBORNE LASER

        62. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the Airborne Laser has great
    potential as a boost phase intercept program, but it is technically
    challenging, as most revolutionary concepts are. The proposed $196
    million plus-up in fiscal year 2002 almost doubles the ABL funding
    level. What is the new funding to be used for? Will any of this funding
    be used for EMD? What changes in program schedule would result if this
    additional funding is or is not made available?
        General Kadish. Fiscal year 2002 funds continue execution of the
    Airborne Laser Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction Program. This
    includes completing fabrication, integration, and testing of the key
    ABL segments: battle management, beam control fire control, and laser.
    It also provides for preparation of facilities and support equipment at
    Edwards AFB, CA. The Fiscal Year 2002 ABL budget reflects funding for
    increased (1) spares, (2) contractor test manning, (3) test assets, and
    (4) government test support in order to correct program shortfalls and
    to reduce technical and schedule risk during ABL integration and
    testing.
        In regards to funding used for EMD, the budget includes $10 million
    to initiate purchase of long lead optics for the first full-power ABL
    aircraft. The $10 million is needed to meet congressional direction in
    the fiscal year 2001 authorization act to maintain the ability to meet
    a fiscal year 2008 IOC. In addition, the program will conduct risk
    reduction efforts on technologies for application in the full power
    ABL. None of the fiscal year 2002 funds will be used for EMD design
    efforts or purchase of an aircraft.
        Without full funding in fiscal year 2002, the ABL PDRR program
    execution will increase in schedule and technical risk. The program
    will be forced to reduce spares, test assets, and test manning. Given
    such circumstances, the test schedule will likely face delays.

        63. Senator Reed. General Kadish, can the new funding be spent
    efficiently in 1 year without increasing program risk? Why or why not?
        General Kadish. Yes, the program can efficiently spend the
    requested funding. Fiscal year 2002 funding of $410 million is
    comparable to the fiscal year 2001 funding of $386 million, including
    the Fiscal Year 2001 Emergency Supplemental. The new funds allow us to
    buy spares off the current ABL fabrication lines. Additional manning
    for the test team will come from the existing design teams. The lean
    funding for the ABL program in the fiscal year 2001 President's budget
    would have forced us to shut down ABL fabrication lines and reassign
    ABL design teams. The fiscal year 2002 President's budget bridges this
    funding gap.

        64. Senator Reed. General Kadish, since the ABL laser must fit into
    a 747 aircraft, the size and weight of the laser system are critical,
    and must be kept below a certain limit. How does the current estimated
    weight of the test system compare to the operational system weight
    limit?
        General Kadish. The prototype weapons system engineered in the
    Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction phase of development is currently
    projected to weigh 174,194 pounds. The current target weight the
    program office has set is 180,000 pounds for the operational system at
    design completion.

        65. Senator Reed. General Kadish, if the laser system exceeds the
    weight limit, will you reduce the number of laser modules to
    compensate? Would the system be effective with less laser power?
        General Kadish. For the operational system, the design will be
    optimized to provide the warfighter with optimum system performance and
    effectiveness. The ABL program maintains a database of weight reduction
    and aircraft-performance enhancement concepts that will be explored
    during the EMD design. Reducing the number of laser modules would not
    be the first consideration.

        66. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how are you addressing potential
    countermeasures to the Airborne Laser? What are the most important
    potential countermeasures that the department has examined thus far,
    and by what numerical amount would these countermeasures reduce ABL
    performance, if deployed?
        General Kadish. The AF has established a Directed Energy
    Countermeasures Assessment Team managed and operated separately from
    the ABL Program office, which is exploring all possible countermeasures
    identified within the Defense community. The details regarding their
    efforts are classified. BMDO is also funding a significant counter-
    countermeasures effort to comprehensively explore realistic
    countermeasures, across all phases of a missile trajectory, that could
    be employed by adversaries attempting to defeat the BMD System.

        67. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the Airborne Laser is designed to
    rupture the fuel and/or oxidizer chambers of a ballistic missile,
    thereby causing early termination of the missile's boost phase. What
    test activities has the department conducted, or does the department
    have planned, to determine whether or not the warhead carried by a
    missile will still detonate after an ABL engagement?
        General Kadish. The Preliminary Design and Risk Reduction test
    program focuses on demonstrating the concept of tracking and destroying
    a ballistic missile in the boost phase. The weapon system's primary
    objective is to prevent a missile warhead from hitting its designated
    target. There are other modeling and simulation efforts underway within
    the BMDO Test directorate to examine boost phase lethality and debris
    and warhead shortfall stemming from missile defense engagements. ABL is
    participating in those efforts.

                           SBIRS-LOW SATELLITE SYSTEM

        68. Senator Reed. General Kadish, SBIRS-Low is a satellite program
    being developed primarily to contribute to the National Missile Defense
    Program. Your proposed fiscal year 2002 budget would transfer SBIRS-Low
    from the Air Force to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization.
    General Kadish, in your testimony last week, you stated that SBIRS-Low
    will ``enhance detection . . . and provide critical mid-course tracking
    and discrimination data for ballistic missile defense.'' You have
    indicated that current life cycle cost estimates for SBIRS-Low
    currently range as high as $20 billion or so. I understand there is a
    study on SBIRS-Low going on now, led by BMDO. What is the purpose of
    the study, and what results seem to be emerging? Do you plan on
    providing the results of this study to Congress?
        General Kadish. The purpose of the study is to comply with the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense direction from Program Decision Memorandum
    (PDM-1), dated 22 Aug 2000. PDM-1 directs BMDO to ``. . . provide to
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense . . . a comprehensive study of cost-
    effectiveness issues concerning the contributions of SBIRS Low to
    defense missions, with the primary emphasis on NMD.'' The objective of
    the study is to estimate the military utility and total cost of SBIRS
    Low as a basis for future Department decisions and determine the cost-
    effectiveness of selected alternatives to SBIRS Low.
        New analysis conducted in fiscal year 2001 for the SBIRS Low PDM
    study involved assessing the military utility of SBIRS Low and/or
    terrestrial radar alternatives in support of national missile defense.
    With the directed focus on NMD the study relies on summarizing past
    analyses to show the military utility of SBIRS Low to the former
    Theater Missile Defense mission area and Missile Warning, Battle Space
    Characterization and Technical Intelligence mission areas. Since the
    inception of the SBIRS Low PDM Study, the Secretary of Defense directed
    BMDO to develop a research, development and test program that focuses
    on missile defense as a single integrated Ballistic Missile Defense
    System, no longer differentiating between NMD and TMD. The new analysis
    performed for the study analyzes military utility with respect to what
    is now known as the Ground-based Midcourse element of the BMD System.
        The preliminary results emerging from the SBIRS Low PDM Study
    support the need for SBIRS Low capability within the legacy NMD
    architecture and are consistent with the many studies performed by BMDO
    over the last decade. Results show that SBIRS Low will provide critical
    precision cueing and midcourse tracking and prevent threat complexes
    from overwhelming system radars with countermeasures. In addition to
    providing the BMD System a robust solution against complex threats, it
    provides significant added value to the ancillary missions: Missile
    Warning, Battlespace Characterization, and Technical Intelligence.
        The study will be provided to the Deputy Secretary upon conclusion
    and will be made available to Congress with his approval.

        69. Senator Reed. General Kadish, why do you propose to accelerate
    SBIRS Low now, before the study is completed and the results are
    reviewed?
        General Kadish. The emerging SBIRS Low PDM study results are
    consistent with the many studies performed by BMDO over the last
    decade-SBIRS Low satellites are essential for supporting a robust
    missile defense capability against the evolving threat. It is necessary
    to accelerate the program now, because sophisticated threat
    countermeasures are expected to be such that, by the time SBIRS Low
    constellation is fielded, performance of a radar-only defense will be
    below that needed to counter the threat. The proposed schedule for
    SBIRS Low development is capable of addressing over time an evolving
    advanced threat. SBIRS Low will provide multiple engagement
    opportunities and complicate the adversary's plans with a layered
    surveillance capability. SBIRS Low is also expected to be capable of
    handling a larger number of reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and
    associated objects that could otherwise overwhelm existing radar
    sensors.
        The program plan focuses on accelerating the early risk reduction
    activities to preserve an option to speed up the deployment of the
    satellite constellation. The program will be reviewed annually to
    assess program needs and progress. Review of options to accelerate
    SBIRS Low deployment will take place annually.

        70. Senator Reed. General Kadish, would the proposed acceleration
    of SBIRS Low allow for adequate testing of the basic satellite
    performance prior to committing to buy a large number of satellites?
        General Kadish. Based on our revised acquisition strategy and
    associated risk reduction activities, the proposed acceleration of
    SBIRS Low allows for adequate testing of satellite performance prior to
    committing to purchase a large number of satellites. It also allows for
    evolutionary block upgrades as necessary and feasible. These risk
    reduction activities will allow the SBIRS Low program to address design
    issues earlier, allow more design schedule recovery time, provide for
    higher confidence in source selection, and achieve the proposed
    development schedule. A description of risk reduction activities
    follows:
        The SBIRS Low Program has developed a robust Ground Demonstration
    Program (GDP), in which contractors use simulations and hardware-in-
    the-loop testing to reduce risk during the design process and on-orbit
    test period. The GDP has supported engineering trades at the beginning
    of the Program Definition and Risk Reduction Phase and will continue to
    provide lessons learned during the satellite design process. When the
    initial satellites are launched, they will be electronically networked
    with simulated satellites in the GDP to further enhance the fidelity of
    test results prior to additional launches.
        The SBIRS Low Program added an Engineering Model Sensor Package
    with the acceleration of the program. The Engineering Model Sensor
    Package will allow contractors to test an integrated SBIRS Low sensor
    prior to development of the satellite qualification unit and the final
    operational satellite design.
        The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will review the SBIRS
    Low Risk Reduction program results at the annual BMD System review,
    while facilitating the build-up for production of the SBIRS Low
    constellation. The robust risk reduction program aims to demonstrate
    what does and does not work within the hardware and software designs.
    The annual BMD high-level decision review will steer the program in the
    most promising direction based on data generated by risk reduction
    activities and contractor progress.

        71. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much funding would be
    committed to satellite purchases prior to the first operational test
    results?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2002 APB includes $46.881 million
    to start the satellite buys for testing purposes. The Department has
    not addressed fiscal year 2003-2007 requirements.

                            NAVY AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM

        72. Senator Reed. General Kadish, just last year, about $120
    million had to be added to the Navy Area Defense System across the next
    2 years to cover program cost growth during the research and
    development phase. Despite this, the First Unit Equipped date for the
    program has slipped from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004.
        Just last week, the Secretary of the Navy sent a letter to Congress
    stating that the average procurement unit cost for the Navy Area
    program was expected to exceed the planned value by more than 25
    percent. Recent news reports suggest an additional program delay. The
    proposed budget adds a further $98 million to the Navy Area program to
    fix R&D problems, and I understand from the Secretary of the Navy's
    letter that significantly more will be needed in the outyears to cover
    program cost growth. How much cost growth do you expect in the program
    over the next 6 years--the time frame of the Future Years Defense
    Program?
        General Kadish. The Secretary of the Navy notified congressional
    members on July 13, 2001 that unit costs for the Navy Area TBMD Program
    have exceeded the Acquisition Program Baseline values by more than 25
    percent. The exact amount is still pending given uncertainties related
    to the DOD Strategy Review and fiscal year 2003 budget development
    process.

        73. Senator Reed. General Kadish, what are the reasons for the
    significant cost growth in both procurement, and research and
    development costs?
        General Kadish. Research and development cost growth has been
    driven by technical integration issues associated with the SM-2 BLK IVA
    missile's increased cost for target procurements and restructuring of
    test and evaluation events. SM-2 Block IVA technical issues in the area
    of software integration and hardware/software integration within the
    guidance section have required adjustments to the program schedule.
    Schedule adjustments impact other parts of the program, including key
    missile/ship integration activities, test ship certification, and
    extension of the Developmental Testing/Operational Testing (DT/OT) test
    program, all of which add additional cost.
        Increased target costs are attributable to contract overruns for
    DT/OT testing at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), in addition to
    increased estimates for at-sea Short-Ranged Air Launched Targets. The
    restructuring of Test and Evaluation execution phases at WSMR and for
    at-sea DT/OT has resulted in increased costs for test execution and
    range charges.
        Procurement cost growth has been driven by a number of factors.
    These factors include: higher unit cost estimates due to a flatter
    learning curve based on Long Lead Material/Low Rate Initial Production
    proposal; changes in assumptions for Value Engineering Change Proposal
    (VECP) phase-in/costs; and higher estimates for spares, canisters, and
    production support. Decreases in near-term production due to higher
    missile costs and budgetary constraints have affected vendor stability
    and increased risk to the industrial base. Additionally, common
    component costs have increased based on fiscal year 2001 contract
    awards.

        74. Senator Reed. General Kadish, given the excellent prospects for
    the PAC-3 program, and the high interest our allies have in purchasing
    PAC-3 batteries, what is the relative military contribution of the Navy
    Area program to our theater ballistic missile defense posture?
        General Kadish. The Navy Area and PAC-3 provide two different but
    complementary and essential capabilities for defense against short-to-
    medium range ballistic missiles. Conclusions of the Navy Area Theater
    Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD)/Patriot PAC-3 Report to Congress of 24
    May 2001 were that the PAC-3 interceptor does not meet Navy Area
    performance requirements.
        If PAC-3 is not pre-deployed, the Navy Area-equipped ship could
    protect an asset such as a port or coastal airfields from ballistic
    missile threats and Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) threats while U.S. forces,
    including other missile defense assets, are arriving in theater. Navy
    Area could also be used alone to provide littoral defense as well as
    fleet protection. Navy Area assets would provide great flexibility and
    quick response to regions that do not have forward-deployed ground-
    based missile defense systems. In addition, the Navy Area Block IVA
    missile maintains AAW requirements of the SM2 Block IV against advanced
    anti-ship cruise missile threats.
        The PAC-3, when forward deployed, can be used alone to provide
    point defense of collocated assets. But when used together, both the
    PAC-3 and the Navy Area can provide a defense in depth that neither
    could provide alone. These complementary capabilities could appeal to
    other nations for the same reason. The Navy Area capability might be
    particularly attractive to those nations already possessing an Aegis
    capability.

                          NAVY THEATER WIDE VS. ICBMS?

        75. Senator Reed. General Kadish, currently, the Navy Theater-Wide
    program is being designed to defend against theater ballistic missiles,
    rather than ICBMs. Do you plan on testing the Navy Theater-Wide system
    against ICBMs? If so, when?
        General Kadish. The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program is being
    integrated into the Mid-Course Segment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System as the Sea Based Mid-Course (SBMC) element to defeat medium to
    long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse ascent phase of the exo-
    atmospheric battlespace. A concept definition phase will be initiated
    in fiscal year 2002 to focus on a more robust SBMC system with a
    desired deployment in the fiscal year 2008-2010 time frame. Given the
    early stages of the concept definition study, specific test objectives
    have not yet been defined.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

        76. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, I asked you about the
    international consequence of using an Airborne Laser, specifically of
    disabling a missile booster with a nuclear warhead which would then
    lead it to fall someplace, other than the United States, and
    potentially land on an ally or neutral party. You stated that we do not
    have the capability, at this time, for the airborne or space laser, and
    that you would rather work on that before worrying about consequences
    of that capability. A boost phase intercept has very little time to
    intercept a fast moving target. By the time we detect and launch an
    interceptor against a missile launched by, for example, North Korea or
    Iraq that missile will likely be over another country's territory.
    There is nothing to prevent an adversary from arming its warhead at
    launch rather than in the descent phase so we must be prepared for the
    consequences of knocking down a missile with an armed warhead.
        If the U.S. policy is to convince our allies and the international
    community that the layered BMD approach will serve all our interests,
    how can that be reconciled with the very real consequence of dropping
    warheads on them after they are deflected from their original
    trajectory?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The Airborne Laser is part of our proposed
    system of layered missile defense. The benefit of a layered missile
    defense is that it increases the probability of hitting the target
    missile and its warhead, as there are multiple opportunities for
    engagement. An increased probability of hitting the target missile and
    its warhead serves all our interests.

        77. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, there have been several
    comments about the U.S. NMD program not being a threat to Russia's
    thousands of nuclear warheads. While it is true that Russia has
    thousands of warheads, the real question is the number of missiles that
    Russia believes are reliable. How many do Russian planners consider
    effective on any given day? How many do they believe would survive the
    theoretical U.S. first strike? When all the missile silos, stored
    submarines, mobile units and warheads are subtracted from the total
    number, how many are left?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. [Deleted.]

        78. Senator Akaka. Secretary Wolfowitz, you have stated that you do
    not believe that Russia would increase its missiles or MIRV warheads in
    response to a limited American capability. Do you have the same
    assessment for China? Is it our intelligence assessment that China will
    not increase its missiles or warheads if the U.S. deploys a limited
    capability?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. [Deleted.]

        79. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, you have outlined a very
    aggressive test plan for the next few years. You stated that you plan
    on performing 12 tests over the course of the next 2 years. Do you have
    the personnel to prepare and carry out these tests, perform the
    analysis, and other research and development for which you are
    responsible?
        General Kadish. Yes. We had expected the load on program and staff
    personnel, particularly test and engineering, to become much greater
    and have budgeted for, and already started, adding additional personnel
    to accommodate the extra load over this time period. I am comfortable
    that our organization can support this test plan.

        80. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, an alternative to mid-course
    missile defense is a re-entry, or terminal phase system. A terminal
    phase system waits until a warhead and countermeasures have re-entered
    the atmosphere and decoys will begin acting differently depending on
    the type of decoy being used. For example, balloon decoys may begin
    slowing down relative to the warhead at 250km, while a traffic cone may
    not until 50 or 60km. What requirements have you defined for the
    proposed re-entry system? At what altitude do you expect it to work?
    How large an area do you expect it to cover? How much time will it have
    to track and home in on the warhead?
        General Kadish. You are correct that a characteristic of terminal
    defense systems is that they can take advantage of atmospheric slow-
    down (which begins at about 100 km altitude) of intentional and
    unintentional penetration aids to assist the discrimination process to
    identify the lethal warhead in the presence of decoys and debris. Each
    of our terminal defense systems has different requirements, depending
    on the specific threats they are engaging. The THAAD system, for
    example, is an area defense system that counters short-, medium-, and
    long-range theater ballistic missiles. Therefore, it operates in both
    the mid- to high-endo- and exo-atmosphere to defend a large area on the
    ground. This allows THAAD to time its engagement to take advantage of
    the very phenomenon you mentioned, but to also intercept at higher
    altitudes that would be more effective in the presence of other
    counter-measures. PAC-3, Navy Area, and MEADS, are limited area defense
    systems that defend critical assets from short- and medium-range
    ballistic missiles. Engagements by these systems occur in the low endo-
    atmospheric regime. Their effectiveness is also enhanced by atmospheric
    strip out. Speaking very broadly, Lower Tier systems such as PAC-3
    could defend a city, while an Upper Tier system such as THAAD could
    defend a medium sized state. Tracking is a function of warning time
    provided by sensors not on the interceptor, with more obviously being
    better. Homing is done by the interceptor and is a function of optimum
    intercept altitude.

        81. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, you testified before the House
    Armed Services Committee on June 14, 2001, that advances in lightweight
    structures have enabled a lighter and smaller kill vehicle. This allows
    costs of the kill vehicle to be kept low while increasing lethality.
    However, such gains may be lost to a boost phase missile defense system
    that requires a kill vehicle to maneuver and accelerate to reach an
    ICBM after its launch. Such diverting capability will require
    considerable fuel, which will increase the kill vehicle weight and
    volume. How will a larger and more massive kill vehicle affect plans
    for a ship-based boost phase system for ICBM threats?
        General Kadish. There are many factors that affect the size and
    mass of the kill vehicle. For boost phase interceptors, the two most
    important factors are: (1) the ability to predict where the hostile
    booster is going; and (2) the need to be able to accelerate the kill
    vehicle quickly from side-to-side if the target maneuvers.
        The first factor requires that we have a lot of fuel on board the
    KV to take out any errors we might have in predicting where the threat
    missile will be when we intercept it. This may require having more than
    half again as much fuel for the divert and attitude control system as
    we need for coasting targets.
        Studies have shown that to counter a maneuvering boosting
    capability, we may require twice the acceleration that we currently
    need in our mid-course kill vehicles for coasting targets.
        Intercepting during the boost phase does have its advantages as
    well. Since the burning missile is much brighter than a reentry vehicle
    coasting in space, we will need far less sensitive missile seekers to
    find it during boost.
        Our investments in kill vehicle technology since 1986 have been
    focused on developing and testing lightweight, high performance
    seekers, high strength, light weight composite structures, and high
    performance divert and attitude control systems. These advances have
    enabled an order of magnitude weight reduction in the kill vehicles
    since the early 1980s. We will draw on this extensive technology base
    to help us solve this engineering problem.
        Our plans for risk reduction in the boost phase include extending
    the kill vehicle technology base in flexible, high performance divert
    systems and integrated passive and active seeker systems. We believe
    this will provide the necessary engineering capability to make boost
    phase kinetic energy intercepts a reality.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                            COMPLIANCE REVIEW GROUP

        82. Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz, according to testimony
    from the Chairman of the Compliance Review Group before the
    Governmental Affairs Committee, ``the Military Services and Defense
    Agencies must seek compliance approval before taking any action that
    would reasonably raise a compliance issue.'' So, by definition,
    activities that are evaluated by the Compliance Review Group have some
    sort of substantive compliance question at stake. Do you agree?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. I agree.

                     COMPLIANCE REVIEW, TESTS AND CONGRESS

        83. Senator Allard. General Kadish, THAAD is a particularly
    interesting example, because it is one in which a compliance
    determination was made ahead of time, at the insistence of Congress,
    although there was no attempt to withhold funding pending the outcome
    of the review, as some seem to be suggesting now.
        The Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Authorization Bill required the
    administration to report to Congress on whether THAAD was compliant
    with the ABM Treaty because of its potential to have capabilities to
    counter strategic ballistic missiles. That report was sent to Congress
    on January 14, 1994, and concluded that THAAD, as its design was then
    understood, in fact would not comply with the ABM Treaty, and,
    according to testimony from General O'Neill, then Director of BMDO,
    ``would have to be treated as an ABM system,'' and of course an illegal
    one since it is a mobile system. Later that year, the Senate passed a
    Defense Authorization bill that funded THAAD. In January of 1995, THAAD
    was cleared for initial flight testing, but on the condition that its
    ability to accept cueing data from space-based sensors be crippled.
    Finally, in September of 1996, the Clinton administration declared that
    THAAD was fully compliant, even with cueing software, because as more
    became known about the system, it became clear that the initial
    determination was wrong, and THAAD really didn't have ABM capabilities
    after all.
        Thus--In the fall of 1993, the Senate funded a system whose
    compliance with the ABM Treaty was at the time questionable.
        In the fall of 1994, the Senate funded a system which had been
    determined not to be compliant with the ABM Treaty, and continued that
    funding in subsequent years, until finally the system was declared
    compliant.
        I also point out that last year's authorization bill authorized
    $85.1 million for National Missile Defense Initial Deployment
    Facilities--which some of the expenditures are for the construction of
    an X-band radar at Shemya, Alaska, which is an activity which will
    clearly come into conflict or bump-up against the ABM Treaty.
        So, would I be wrong in concluding that far from being some
    extraordinary departure from normal practice, uncertainty about the
    compliance of these testing activities is the way we have always done
    business, and necessarily so, given the nature of a test program?
        General Kadish. That is correct. The compliance approval for any
    particular activity cannot be completed until all relevant plans are
    complete. On several occasions, that has meant that the compliance
    approval was completed weeks, or even days, prior to the activity.

                                 OTHER THREATS

        84. Senator Allard. General Kadish, some have argued that missile
    defense does not defend against other means of delivering a WMD payload
    to the U.S., such as a terrorist using a suitcase or car bomb. However,
    I know we are spending billions of dollars to combat terrorism which I
    do not believe will protect us from a ballistic missile attack. Thus,
    does this mean we shouldn't do either.
        Can you please comment on this as well as discuss not only the
    Department's efforts, but also the Government's efforts as a whole to
    combat against this form of attack against the United States?
        General Kadish. The United States must be prepared to defend itself
    against the full spectrum of threats--from conventional attack to
    terrorism. To combat terrorism, the DOD engages in intelligence
    collection and maintains force protection measures, the capability to
    preempt or otherwise counter terrorism, and units to assist with
    consequence management. DOD and other Federal agencies have undertaken
    a significant, integrated effort to develop effective policies on
    counterterrorism and establish mechanisms that enable the United States
    to preempt and deter terrorism against American citizens and U.S.
    interests around the world. Unfortunately, some terrorists succeed in
    accomplishing their objective. Even under those circumstances, the
    United States has aggressively pursued a policy that seeks to bring
    these terrorists to justice and has been successful in bringing a
    number to the United States for trial and convictions.

                        CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

        85. Senator Allard. General Kadish, the U.S. has or is developing
    substantial defensive capabilities to deal with the threats posed by
    chemical and biological weapons and WMD terrorism. Do we have defensive
    capabilities that we have developed in response to the threat of
    chemical weapons?
        General Kadish. We place a high priority on protecting our forces
    against chemical agents and have developed and continue to modernize
    our defenses against these weapons. The objective of our Chemical and
    Biological (CB) Defense Program is to enable our forces to survive,
    fight. and win in a chemically or biologically contaminated
    environment. Joint and Service-unique programs support the framework of
    CB defense: Contamination Avoidance (detection) and NBC Battle
    Management (reconnaissance and warning), Force Protection (individual,
    collective and medical support), and Decontamination. These
    capabilities combined with sound doctrine and realistic training are
    fundamental to our success.
        Contamination avoidance capabilities are designed to detect,
    identify and confirm the presence of chemical hazards. Examples are
    chemical agent alarms, sensors, and NBC reconnaissance vehicles.
    Currently we are fielding the Joint Warning and Reporting Network that
    will enhance our NBC Battle Management capability by providing chemical
    hazard area predictions to the warfighting commander. Individual and
    collective protection capabilities allow forces to operate safely while
    in a chemical environment. These include the eye/respiratory protective
    masks, and battlefield protective suits. Collective protection
    capabilities include tentage and shelter systems as well as filtration
    systems on ships and vehicles. Decontamination capabilities allow the
    sustainment of operations in a contaminated environment. These
    capabilities include personnel decontamination kits, and combat
    equipment, vehicles, and aircraft decontamination systems and
    decontamination solutions. Additionally, integral to our chemical
    defensive capability are medical countermeasures designed to enable the
    individual warfighter to survive, fight and win in a chemical
    environment. These countermeasures include pre- and post-chemical
    exposure measures such as the nerve agent antidote and treatment
    procedures for chemical casualties. All of these capabilities
    integrated together are essential to avoid contamination. and to
    sustain operational tempo on an asymmetric battlefield.

        86. Senator Allard. General Kadish, has there been a ``chemical
    weapons arms race'' in response the U.S. development of defenses to
    chemical weapons threats?
        General Kadish. We view the proliferation of chemical and other
    weapons of mass destruction by nation states and transnational groups
    as a means to counter U.S. conventional superiority rather than as a
    response to enhanced U.S. defense against such weapons. Potential
    adversaries recognize their inability to fight and win a conventional
    war against the U.S. and therefore have pursued asymmetric methods such
    as chemical weapons to support their objectives. These weapons are also
    seen by nations as ways to complicate the U.S. regional presence, or
    influence U.S. decision making during a crisis. Other motivations for
    pursuing these weapons include enhanced prestige, intimidation or
    deterrence of regional adversaries, and the relatively low cost of
    these weapons. This strategy also applies to terrorist groups intent on
    inflicting a large number of casualties if they do not fear political
    or military retaliation.

        87. Senator Allard. General Kadish, is the U.S. developing
    defensive capabilities in response to threats posed by biological
    weapons?
        General Kadish. We place a high priority on protecting our forces
    against biological agents and have developed and continue to modernize
    our defenses against these weapons. The objective of our Chemical and
    Biological (CB) Defense Program is to enable our forces to survive,
    fight, and win in a chemically or biologically contaminated
    environment. Biological agents are different than chemical agents. It
    is difficult to detect a biological attack and the onset of symptoms
    may not occur until days after the attack. Therefore, biological
    defense is especially challenging and is receiving increased attention.
    Our Joint and Service-unique programs support the framework of CB
    defense: Contamination Avoidance (detection) and NBC Battle Management
    (reconnaissance and warning), Force Protection (individual, collective
    and medical support), and Decontamination. These capabilities combined
    with sound doctrine and realistic training are fundamental to our
    success.
        Contamination avoidance capabilities are designed to detect,
    identify and confirm the presence of biological hazards. Examples are
    the U.S. Army's mobile Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS)
    units and fixed site biological detection systems such as Portal
    Shield. Essential to the identification of biological agents is the
    laboratory confirmation of samples and this is provided by the U.S.
    Army's deployable Theater Medical Laboratory unit as well as other
    medical laboratories in the United States and overseas. The Joint
    Warning and Reporting Network will enhance our NBC Battle Management
    capability by providing biological hazard area predictions to the
    warfighting commander. Individual and collective protection
    capabilities allow forces to operate safely while in a biological
    environment. Examples of individual protection capabilities include the
    eye/respiratory protective masks. Collective protection capabilities
    include and shelter systems as well as filtration systems on ships and
    vehicles. Critical to the defense against biological agents are medical
    countermeasures. We have fielded and are developing more medical
    countermeasures that will improve individual protection, treatment, and
    diagnoses. These include vaccines that enable forces to be immunized
    against potential biological agents and antibiotics that may be used
    for treatment following a biological attack.

        88. Senator Allard. General Kadish, has there been a ``biological
    weapons arms race'' in response to the U.S. development of defenses to
    biological weapons threats?
        General Kadish. We view the proliferation of biological weapons and
    other weapons of mass destruction by nation states and transnational
    groups as a means to counter U.S. conventional superiority rather than
    as a response to enhanced U.S. defense against such weapons. Potential
    adversaries recognize their inability to fight and win a conventional
    war against the U.S. and therefore have pursued asymmetric methods such
    as biological weapons to support their objectives. These weapons are
    also seen by nations as ways to complicate the U.S. regional presence,
    or influence U.S. decision making during a crisis. Other motivations
    for pursuing these weapons include enhanced prestige, intimidation or
    deterrence of regional adversaries, and the relatively low cost of
    these weapons. This strategy also applies to terrorist groups intent on
    inflicting a large number of casualties if they do not fear political
    or military retaliation.

        89. Senator Allard. General Kadish, do we have, and are we
    developing, capabilities to defend against WMD terrorism?
        General Kadish. The WMD terrorist threat is one of the most
    difficult and pervasive challenges. To ensure a comprehensive approach
    to combating this threat to U.S. forces, DOD has organized a strong and
    aggressive antiterrorism/force protection program. The Department has
    persisted in making improvements, such as identifying and correcting
    antiterrorism vulnerabilities to ensure there is a reduction in risk to
    our personnel and property and implementing enhancements in planning,
    training, assessing, and equipping. Further, the Department is
    providing guidance and direction to assist the field commanders in
    developing and implementing antiterrorism programs.

        90. Senator Allard. General Kadish, has there been an increase in
    terrorist efforts--a ``terrorist arms race''--as a result of U.S.
    efforts to prevent and defend itself against terrorist threats?
        General Kadish. [Deleted.]

                                     ALLIES

        91. Senator Allard. Secretary Wolfowitz, I have a hypothetical,
    what if an ally, Poland for example, comes to the United States to ask
    for our assistance in developing a missile defense system to combat a
    long-range ICBM threat. Can we share with them our ABM technologies to
    help them defend their territory against this long-range ICBM?
        Secretary Wolfowitz. The ABM Treaty prohibits both transferring ABM
    systems or their components to other States and providing to other
    States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for
    the construction of ABM systems and their components. All responses to
    requests to share ABM-related technologies with another State must be
    reviewed to assure that they are consistent with those obligations.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                            FISCAL YEAR 2002 BUDGET

        92. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, Secretary Wolfowitz answered
    my question regarding what is the breakout of costs between theater and
    national missile defense in the fiscal year 2002 budget by stating,
    ``About one to two billion for long range systems, one to two million
    for short range systems, and the rest for dual use technologies.'' With
    greater fidelity, what is the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's
    (BMDO) budget for short range, long range and dual use technologies/
    programs for fiscal years 2001 and 2002? Also, similarly delineate the
    fiscal year 2001 supplemental request for BMDO.
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2001 supplemental request of $153
    million for Airborne Laser is to support the existing baseline Air
    Force program. The Department-wide fiscal year 2002 amended budget
    requests $8.3 billion total for missile defense. This information is
    based on the Fiscal Year 2002 Amended Budget Submission, which has been
    submitted to Congress.
        In the previous construct of shorter-range missile defense and
    longer-range missile defense, the following budgets are requested. All
    funds are requested in BMDO's budget except where noted. Programs
    marked with an asterisk are split evenly between the two categories as
    their efforts apply to both.

                                                [In millions of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Short & Medium Range            Long Range
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Patriot Advanced Capability-3.............................                    \1\ 784  .........................
    Medium Extended Air Defense System........................                     \1\ 74  .........................
    Navy Area.................................................                    \2\ 395  .........................
    Ground Based Terminal (THAAD).............................                        923  .........................
    Arrow.....................................................                         66  .........................
    Ground Based Midcourse....................................  .........................                      3,285
    Sea-Based Midcourse (NTW).................................                        596                         60
    Space-Based Kinetic Boost.................................  .........................                        105
    Airborne Laser *..........................................                        205                        205
    Space-Based Laser project *...............................                         85                         85
    SBIRS-L *.................................................                        210                        210
    Advanced Technology *.....................................                         56                         57
    International programs *..................................                         38                         37
    Systems Engineering *.....................................                        410                        411
                                                               -----------------------------------------------------
      Total...................................................                      3,842                      4,455
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ In Army budget.
    \2\ In Navy budget.

        93. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, why did BMDO eliminate
    THAAD's Fiscal Year 2006-2007 procurement line and move funds from
    THAAD's EMD line in fiscal year 2002.
        General Kadish. All THAAD funding has been designated as RDT&E to
    comply with the overarching BMD System acquisition approach. Funding
    levels for THAAD have been increased in fiscal year 2002 by $210
    million. In accordance with BMDO's restructured management process, it
    is BMDO's intent to transfer management of mature programs at the
    procurement stage to the Services. BMDO expects THAAD to be a mature
    program in fiscal year 2006-2007, at which time procurement
    responsibilities would be transferred to the U.S. Army. To facilitate
    the program transition to the U.S. Army, BMDO will allocate at the
    appropriate time ``transition to procurement'' funding to initiate low-
    rate production provided that development and testing prove successful.

                               PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        94. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, THAAD funds were lumped with
    other programs in a BMDO Dem/Val line. There is no indication of how
    much RDT&E belongs to THAAD. What are the details of the restructured
    funds?
        General Kadish. The R-2 for the Terminal Defense Segment
    (PE0603881C) provided in the Fiscal Year 2002 Amended President's
    Budget Submission includes an R-2A exhibit for the THAAD program. This
    exhibit breaks out in detail the Fiscal Year 2002 Planned Program. No
    funding has been cut from the THAAD program. Funding was consolidated
    into a uniform budget and does account for funding for EMD and the
    transfer to production in later years.

        95. Senator Sessions. General Kadish, what is BMDO's level of
    support under PBD 816 for PAC-3 in the out years? I am concerned about
    funding all ten Army Patriot Battalions and feel the Department has an
    inherent responsibility to support all ten battalions, not just the
    Army.
        General Kadish. The Department is still undergoing its Quadrennial
    Defense Review process. The QDR will address force structure issues
    such as the number of Patriot Battalions. PBD 816 transferred all
    funding to the Army so that they could assess their total warfighting
    capability and affordability constraints. The Department's intent with
    regard to PBD 816 is to transfer $3B in PAC-3 procurement from BMDO to
    the Army. However, final PAC-3 funding is subject to the QDR and
    subsequent DOD guidance over the FYDP.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

                                   TECHNOLOGY

        96. Senator Collins. General Kadish, some defense experts are
    questioning the technology that is available today and in the near-term
    that would be available to contribute to the development of a robust,
    layered BMD System. You have addressed some of the program elements and
    activities in your written testimony, but I would ask that you
    elaborate on some of the promising technologies which could lead to a
    robust, layered missile defense system, and tell us in what time-frame
    these technologies could be deployed? Further, can you briefly discuss
    how your proposed capabilities-driven approach, vice requirements-
    driven, will benefit the overall goal of a robust, layered missile
    defense system?
        General Kadish. We are exploring multiple technologies that will
    enhance current capabilities or form the foundation for the development
    of new missile defense capabilities. Currently, we have funded a number
    of concept definition and risk-reduction efforts intended to support
    this approach. Although we have not yet developed comprehensive
    schedules showing deployment time frames, as BMD technologies emerge
    and mature and we progress in our development activities, we will
    further define schedules and make overall architecture decisions
    consistent with our Block acquisition approach.
        Given the considerable technical challenges of our mission and the
    dynamic nature of the threat, a traditional acquisition process that
    includes rigid, predetermined user requirements does not provide the
    requisite flexibility to build missile defenses efficiently. For this
    reason, capability-based acquisition is appropriate for this program.
        BMDO will conduct a structured acquisition process, applying
    requirements in the form of technological objectives and goals that can
    and will be adjusted based upon the results of research,
    experimentation, and testing. These standards differ from the
    conventional build-to-requirements process in that they will evolve in
    parallel with capabilities, allowing us to significantly reduce
    schedule and cost risk.
        We successfully followed this approach in our early ICBM programs,
    when progress was paced by the evolution of our technological and
    engineering maturity. As needed and possible, those capabilities were
    enhanced. In accordance with our Block acquisition approach, BMDO and
    the Department will conduct rigorous annual reviews of all program
    activities to ensure that we proceed steadily towards an architecture
    that will maximize defensive capabilities. At these decision points,
    programs will be evaluated on the basis of technological maturity,
    mission requirements, technology readiness levels, cost, resource
    availability, and schedule. Throughout the CINCs and Service Users will
    be instrumental in the development process so that, with each block, we
    move steadily forward towards a system with ever-increasing military
    utility that incorporates complementary operational capabilities and
    that minimizes life cycle cost.

        97. Senator Collins. General Kadish, in your written testimony you
    briefly describe the boost phase intercept. Would you describe in more
    detail the advantages of intercepting a missile during its boost phase?
    Further, is it fair to say that the Airborne Laser program is the most
    mature boost-phase intercept system currently under development?
        General Kadish. Interception in boost phase has many advantages. It
    precludes the deployment of countermeasures, such as decoys, in later
    phases of flight. The payload falls short of its intended target
    presenting the attacker with the possibility the warhead, potentially
    carrying nuclear, biological or chemical agents, will fall on his
    territory. Also, the missile is easily identified by its bright exhaust
    plume. Furthermore, the area that can be defended is the entire
    operational area of the threat missile--potentially global for the
    intercept of an ICBM. Finally, any intercept in boost phase lessens the
    load for other elements in the layered BMD System.
        The ABL program is the most mature boost-phase intercept system
    currently under development.

        98. Senator Collins. General Kadish, if the Airborne Laser is close
    enough to the missile being launched, will it have the capability to
    destroy both long-range and short-range missiles? For example, will it
    be able to destroy short-range North Korean Scud missiles, as well as
    the long-range Taepo Dong 2 missile under development in North Korea?
        General Kadish. ABL is designed to kill ballistic missiles at a
    range of several hundred kilometers while the missile is boosting. The
    specific range depends on the details of the construction of the
    missile and the altitude at which booster burn out occurs. Specifics on
    ABL capabilities (range, power requirements) against certain missiles,
    such as the Taepo Dong 2, are classified.

        99. Senator Collins. General Kadish, for the past several years,
    this committee and both bodies of Congress have voted to authorize and
    appropriate funding for the Airborne Laser, yet it has not been
    certified as compliant with the ABM Treaty, is that correct?
        General Kadish. That is correct.

        100. Senator Collins. General Kadish, in your written testimony you
    briefly discuss sea-based boost-phase defense. Would you further
    elaborate on the benefits of sea-based missile defenses? Further, do
    you intend to pursue development of sea-based defenses against a long-
    range missile attack on the United States?
        General Kadish. Sea-based missile defenses are complementary to
    land-based and airborne missile defense platforms. Sea-based defense
    offers several key advantages:

             Ships may already be forward deployed in the theater,
            monitoring missile launches. This real-time reaction to a
            hostile missile launch is necessary to destroy the missile as
            close to the launch site as possible.
             While territorial waters are a concern, ships can
            maneuver without being encumbered by land-based host nation
            restrictions or, in the case of airborne platforms, obtaining
            host agreements from foreign countries for temporary basing,
            maintenance, and re-supply.
             For specific periods of time, they can be
            operationally ready 24 hours a day; aircraft would be stressed
            to provide such a capability over a long period of time.
             Deployment of a contingency Sea-based Midcourse may be
            done more rapidly with an existing fleet of Aegis-equipped
            cruisers.

        It is our intent to develop the Sea-Based Midcourse System to
    intercept and destroy medium to long-range ballistic missiles in the
    midcourse ascent phase of the exo-atmospheric battlespace.

        [Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2002

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2001

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
    Cleland, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Warner, Inhofe,
    Allard, Sessions, and Bunning.
        Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Anita R.
    Raiford, deputy chief clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
    Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, deputy
    staff director for the minority; Brian R. Green, professional
    staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Thomas C. Moore, Jennifer L.
    Naccari, and Michele A. Traficante.
        Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
    assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
    Senator Lieberman; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator
    Cleland; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn
    Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A.
    Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; J. Mark Powers, and John A.
    Bonsell, assistants to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier, III,
    assistant to Senator Santorum; Douglas Flanders and Charles
    Cogar, assistants to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
    Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator
    Bunning.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to continue to receive testimony on
    ballistic missile defense policies and programs from three
    individuals with extensive experience in foreign and defense
    policy. I want to welcome to the committee Samuel Berger,
    Chairman of Stonebridge International and former Assistant to
    the President for National Security Affairs; Philip Coyle,
    Senior Advisor at the Center for Defense Information and former
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Department
    of Defense; and Richard Perle, Resident Scholar at the American
    Enterprise Institute and former Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for International Security Policy.
        This is the committee's third hearing on missile defense
    policies and programs in the proposed fiscal year 2002 amended
    budget request. Over the last 2 weeks, Deputy Secretary of
    Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Director of the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Organization, Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF,
    have presented the administration's proposal for an
    ``aggressive'' research and development program for ballistic
    missile defense, costing $8 billion in fiscal year 2002 alone,
    a 57 percent increase in spending on missile defense over the
    current fiscal year.
        Despite the unfortunate absence of specific details on how
    the administration would spend that $8 billion in the next
    fiscal year (details we have been promised by the end of the
    week), our hearings have helped to shed some light on the
    administration's plans for a national missile defense system.
        We learned that one or more aspects of this research and
    development program could either, ``conflict with the ABM
    Treaty,'' as we heard Wednesday of last week from Deputy
    Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, or, ``bump up against,''
    ABM Treaty restrictions, as we heard Thursday of last week,
    also from Secretary Wolfowitz, ``within months rather than
    years.''
        Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a somewhat different
    slant this week when he said he did not want to say ``months.''
    It certainly is not going to be years before we would, in his
    words, ``hit the wall of that treaty.'' We learned that there
    are three specific activities for which funds are requested for
    fiscal year 2002 that would likely conflict or bump up against
    the treaty.
        We learned the administration would like the Fort Greely
    and Shemya Island test bed to, ``give us the option for
    rudimentary operational capability,'' as quickly as possible.
    In other words, a major purpose of the Fort Greely and Shemya
    activities is to provide a rudimentary operational capability.
    The test bed is but one of two purposes for which these sites
    will be used.
        Finally, I was heartened to see the beginnings of a spirit
    of flexibility in how the administration would approach the
    sensitive issue of the ABM Treaty. In the event that
    modifications to that treaty cannot be achieved with Russia,
    Senator Warner asked on Tuesday whether, ``if for some reason
    these negotiations with Russia do not meet the goals that the
    President has laid down, whether he would come back to Congress
    in a consultative process.''
        Secretary Wolfowitz responded, ``we will be consulting
    closely with Congress throughout the coming months.'' Senator
    Warner continued by stating that he hoped that the President
    ``would have further consultation as necessary with Congress
    before exercising the treaty provision of withdrawal.''
        I also believe that consultation is critical before such a
    momentous shift is made. Drawing on their wealth of experience,
    today our witnesses can help us better understand the
    consequences of the administration's budget actions. The
    critical question is whether testing in violation of the ABM
    Treaty or deploying a national missile defense system, if done
    unilaterally by withdrawing from the ABM Treaty without a new
    arrangement to replace it, would leave America more or less
    secure.
        Senator Warner.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming our three witnesses, who I have known for a very long
    time. They bring to the hearing corporate knowledge of foreign
    affairs that goes back many decades. Mr. Berger, you certainly
    earned a place in history by serving President Clinton very
    loyally. I also feel you set new parameters for consultation
    with Congress. Many times the President, through you, invited
    Members down to work with him, particularly in the troublesome
    period of Bosnia and Kosovo, and I value those consultations
    and respect them, and I thank you for those meetings.
        Mr. Perle, you are an icon, who needs no further
    elaboration from me. Mr. Coyle, while I do not know you that
    well, I studied many times your pragmatic and objective
    assessments of those serious issues, particularly relating to
    the subject before us today. So I welcome you all.
        We awakened this morning to find that our distinguished
    Majority Leader Daschle made some fairly troublesome
    statements, in my judgment, with regard to our President.
    President Bush is making a conscientious effort to consult with
    our allies and to initiate preliminary negotiations with Russia
    on the subject before us today, and that is missile defense.
        It seems to me in my 23 years in the Senate, as I have
    observed colleagues in the Senate, they have always at least
    given the President, irrespective of party, some latitude as
    they undertake their primary function under the Constitution,
    that is, to be the chief architect of our foreign policy and
    security issues. I would hope during the course of the next 24
    hours that somehow this rhetoric from Majority Leader Daschle
    can be resolved.
        Also, in this hearing room we have had some pretty tough
    criticism directed at our President. While I believe our
    hearings have been very productive and a major step forward in
    seeking to better understand the necessity for our country to
    look at a new relationship with Russia, and to move forward
    with a series of options to explore the full parameters of how
    we construct a missile defense system, we too have been
    pockmarked here and there with some pretty tough criticism.
        Even in this morning's paper there seems to be some very
    interesting and constructive comments by Russian President
    Putin, toward the actions of our President. I remain very
    confident that our President can forge a mutually acceptable
    new framework, and to allow this country and, indeed, others to
    proceed toward the necessity for missile defense.
        Mr. Chairman, I am anxious, as you are, to proceed. I would
    note, however, that Secretary Wolfowitz, as you stated to
    General Kadish in our last hearing, did a remarkable job of
    testifying for 2 consecutive days. These sessions were in
    excess of 4 hours, and we covered, I think, the basics for this
    committee and the Senate as a whole. It was excellent. I thank
    the chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner, and a
    very warm welcome to you, Sandy. It is great to see you again.
    Please proceed.

       STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL R. BERGER, CHAIRMAN, STONEBRIDGE
     INTERNATIONAL, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
                            SECURITY AFFAIRS

        Mr. Berger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator
    Warner, for those kind words. Members of the committee, I thank
    you for the invitation to appear today on one of the most
    consequential national security issues our Nation faces. These
    are difficult issues, and they need full discussion among
    people of varying perspectives conducted with goodwill and with
    a shared interest in advancing the security of the United
    States.
        Mr. Chairman, the issue is not whether to protect America,
    but how best to protect America. There is an emerging threat
    from proliferation of long-range missiles. Missile defense may
    be an appropriate part of our response, but how we get there
    matters. We must pursue a strategy that advances our security
    interest, not just with tunnel vision, but also with peripheral
    vision.
        That is why I find the missile defense that Secretary
    Wolfowitz sketched out over the past several days troubling. It
    requests congressional support for activities the
    administration says are likely to ``bump up against'' the ABM
    Treaty ``within months.''
        To me, that means either we will be constrained by or
    withdrawing from the treaty in the absence of an agreement with
    the Russians in a very short timeframe. It is a schedule that
    key experts tell us is not necessary to vigorously pursue a
    range of missile defense technologies. It means we could incur
    serious cost and risks before we know what threat our system is
    designed to target, whether the system is likely to work
    against that threat, the cost and tradeoffs involved (including
    within the defense budget), and the overall consequences for
    our national security. It is as if the objective is to put the
    most pressure on the treaty and collapse the time frame for
    negotiations.
        The Bush administration's focus, in my judgment, is at this
    stage too narrow. The issue is, how do we enhance the overall
    security of the American people in a world with complex and
    diverse threats and overlapping security equities. The
    administration is correct to give serious weight to the
    emerging threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
    But we must also give serious weight to former adversaries
    still armed with nuclear weapons, in particular Russia, whose
    actions can affect our security; to allies whose solidarity
    with us is a strategic asset and whose cooperation to build any
    missile defense system is highly desirable if not necessary; to
    bountiful but not unlimited budgetary resources; and to a
    multitude of threats--some old, some new--which impose the
    obligation to establish priorities and balance.
        I welcome Secretary Powell's statement last week that we
    intend to make a serious effort with the Russians to modify the
    current ABM Treaty and seek a new strategic framework as the
    President has discussed. But the game plan outlined by the
    Pentagon last week proceeds on a timetable that makes it
    impossible for any such negotiations to succeed.
        Indeed, we may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy,
    leading almost inevitably to a breach or unilateral abrogation
    which, at the very least, is premature. In the past 6 months, I
    have heard a number of different objectives articulated for our
    missile defense program. But there is little detail regarding
    the capabilities and architecture that would be required to
    accomplish these objectives. Each would have different
    potential consequences for the Russian deterrent.
        How can we expect to negotiate modifications to the ABM
    Treaty or a change in decades of strategic policy with the
    Russians in a matter of months when the purpose, architecture,
    and scope of our missile defense system are all undefined? This
    is a collision course to unilateral breach or abrogation sooner
    rather than later.
        Is that necessary? Mr. Coyle will speak to the view he has
    expressed that testing a range of technologies which would
    require modifications to the ABM Treaty is, ``many years
    away.'' I welcome the successful flight test conducted last
    weekend. But the ABM Treaty is not constraining vigorous
    pursuit of a range of technologies.
        Why not unilaterally abrogate the treaty? Does it matter?
        Let me address these questions: No other country can ever
    have a veto over U.S. security requirements. But that does not
    end the argument. For in calculating our national interest, we
    need to include reasonably foreseeable consequences of our
    actions.
        What are the risks and costs, particularly from what would
    be seen as a precipitous withdrawal from the treaty?
        First, as President Bush has said, Russia is no longer our
    enemy, but it is also true that a cycle of instability,
    uncertainty, danger, and paranoia is still possible. In very
    recent years, we have been through crises in the Balkans, the
    Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere in which the
    United States and Russia have been at tense, fast-moving,
    confusing, and contentious moments of crisis. Even with the end
    of the Cold War, our two countries still harbor distrust,
    burdens of history, fierce national pride, and large nuclear
    arsenals. Uncertainty about each other's capabilities and
    intentions still can be dangerous. Agreed constraints,
    transparency, and verification of our nuclear capabilities are
    important; we erode this as we move away from agreed rules.
        Second, while changes in the ABM Treaty may be warranted,
    agreed constraints on defenses are not obsolete. The purpose of
    the ABM Treaty was to decrease each side's sense of
    vulnerability to preemption or coercion, and therefore, to keep
    their nuclear guns in the holster, and not on a hair trigger.
    While the political context has changed, the strategic dynamic
    changes more slowly. Without the ABM Treaty, or a modification
    thereof, the Russians have said--and there is risk in ignoring
    this--that they will act in ways they believe will decrease
    their vulnerability, not just to U.S. attack--which is, of
    course, hard to conceive--but to U.S. coercion, which for the
    Russians is not hard to conceive. In the context of what is
    seen as a precipitous abrogation by us, unfortunately they
    would have sympathy from much of the world. There are steps
    which are not beyond their means, including withdrawing from
    the START and INF Treaties, adding warheads to strategic
    missiles, and redeploying tactical nuclear weapons at sea, or
    on NATO's periphery. These all would take us back down the path
    of instability in a dangerous world.
        Again, none of this is to suggest that Russia should have a
    trump card. It does mean to me, however, that the path to
    unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, particularly without a
    serious effort at modification, is not without risk that must
    be part of our calculation of our national interest.
        In this respect, I agree with Henry Kissinger.
    ``Unilaterally American decisions,'' he recently wrote,
    ``should be a last resort. The most powerful country in the
    world should not adopt unilateralism until the possibilities of
    agreement have been fully explored.''
        There are other essential questions that need to be
    clarified if we are to move forward in a way that looks at our
    security interests broadly, not narrowly.
        First, what will be the effect of missile defense on
    stability in Asia? We acknowledge that this system we seek to
    build could defeat China's small nuclear deterrent. Our answer
    seems to be: they are going to build up anyway. I think that is
    a strange posture for the United States which would be in
    effect, legitimizing and perhaps accelerating China's strategic
    modernization. What impact will that have on the intertwined
    Asian nuclear dynamic, on India's nuclear program, and
    Pakistan's? On the calculations across the Korean peninsula? On
    the sense of vulnerability, and the incipient nuclear debate,
    in Japan? This all must be part of the equation as we decide to
    move forward.
        Second, are we looking at weapons of mass destruction
    through the wrong end of the telescope? There is a significant
    possibility that the United States will be attacked by a
    nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon over the next decade.
    But I agree with the former chairman of this committee, Sam
    Nunn, who recently wrote, ``the clear and present danger is not
    from North Korean missiles that could hit America in a few
    years . . . the likeliest nuclear attack against the United
    States would come from a warhead in the belly of a ship or the
    back of a truck.''
        The obvious response to this argument is that it is not
    either/or. We should build a missile defense to bolster
    deterrents and provide insurance in case deterrence fails and
    do more to protect ourselves against other threats, including
    the more probable attacks in the United States. But, in fact,
    as the members of this committee know, in the real world, we
    cannot avoid choices, setting priorities, and allocating
    resources.
        Missile defense appears to be the central strategic
    imperative of the Bush administration, with virtually
    everything else subordinated to it. The allies, Russia, Asia,
    the merits of arms control, other defense modernization needs,
    other WMD threats, and cooperation with the Russians through a
    fully funded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to
    control nuclear materials seem to have been forgotten. The
    essential job of the administration and Congress is to strike
    the right balance.
        Let me briefly suggest how I propose we should go forward.
    First, we should continue to pursue actively a range of
    potential missile defense technologies and define the scope of
    the threat, but not engage in a 2-minute drill that is likely
    to put us on a collision course with the ABM Treaty and most of
    the rest of the world in the next few months.
        Second, with greater clarity on the scope of the system, we
    should press for an agreement with the Russians on new
    defensive constraints, and engage in real consultations with
    the allies.
        Third, we should vigorously fund our theater missile
    defense programs, which are needed on today's battlefield and
    need not conflict with the ABM Treaty.
        Fourth, we must see the issue before us as WMD defense, not
    simply national missile defense. To the extent the American
    people think about this in bed at night, I believe their
    greatest fears relate to a terrorist attack: toxic chemicals
    placed in the water supply or an anthrax attack that could
    swiftly sweep across the country or a nuclear device in a
    truck. There is far more we must do to fight virulent anti-
    American terrorists who are seeking these weapons and to
    protect our critical infrastructure.
        Fifth, we can reduce offensive nuclear arsenals to levels
    commensurate with today's needs, either bilaterally or
    unilaterally verified through existing strategic arms accords,
    which still have great value for our security.
        Sixth, we must address the needs and requirements of
    tomorrow's military across-the-board, as Secretary Rumsfeld's
    current defense review will require, for we need a strong
    defense and the right defense, and that will require adequate
    resources and difficult choices.
        Seventh, we should resume serious negotiations with the
    North Koreans to stop their missile program--the front edge of
    the threat. I do not know whether a verifiable, acceptable
    agreement is possible. I do know that the missile testing
    moratorium we negotiated in 1999 has slowed their program and
    that we will never find out what is possible if we do not
    reengage in a serious way at a serious level.
        Mr. Chairman, our first obligation is to protect America.
    But America's national security interests are not one-
    dimensional. I hope the United States will fashion a course
    that provides that protection with wide-angle vision.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Samuel R. Berger

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I thank you for the
    invitation to appear today on one of the most consequential national
    security issues our Nation faces. These are difficult issues, and they
    need full discussion among people of varying perspectives, conducted
    with good will and with a shared interest in advancing the security of
    the United States.
        Mr. Chairman, the issue is not whether to protect America but how
    best to protect America. There is an emerging threat from proliferation
    of long-range missiles. Missile defense may be an appropriate part of
    our response. But how we get there matters. We must pursue a strategy
    that advances our overall security interests, not just with tunnel
    vision but also peripheral vision.
        That is why I find the missile defense outline that the
    administration sketched out to this committee over the past several
    days troubling. It requests congressional support for activities the
    administration says are likely to ``bump up against'' the ABM Treaty
    ``within months.'' To me, that means either we will be constrained by
    or withdrawing from the treaty in the absence of an agreement in a very
    short timeframe. It is a schedule that key experts tell us is not
    necessary to vigorously pursue a range of missile defense technologies.
    It means we could incur serious costs and risks before we know what
    threat our system is designed to target, whether the system is likely
    to work against that threat, the cost and tradeoffs involved--including
    within the defense budget--and the overall consequences for our
    national security.
        It's as if the objective is to put the most pressure on the treaty
    and collapse the timeframe for negotiations.
        The Bush administration's focus appears, at this stage, too narrow.
    The issue is: how do we enhance the overall security of the American
    people in a world with complex and diverse threats and overlapping
    security equities. The administration is correct to give serious weight
    to the emerging threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
    But we must also give serious weight to former adversaries still armed
    with nuclear weapons, in particular Russia, whose actions can affect
    our security; to allies whose solidarity with us is a strategic asset
    and whose cooperation to build any missile defense is highly desirable
    if not necessary; to bountiful but not unlimited budgetary resources;
    and to a multitude of threats-some old, some new-which impose the
    obligation to establish priorities and balance.
        I welcome Secretary Powell's statement last week that we intend to
    make a serious effort with the Russians to modify the current ABM
    Treaty and seek a new strategic framework as the President has
    discussed. But the game plan outlined by the Pentagon last week
    proceeds on a timetable that makes any such negotiation virtually
    impossible to succeed.
        Indeed, we may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading
    almost inevitably to breach or unilateral abrogation which, at the very
    least, is premature. In the past 6 months, I have heard a number of
    different objectives articulated for our missile defense program. But
    there is little detail regarding the capabilities and architecture that
    would be required to accomplish these objectives. Each would have
    different potential consequences for the Russian deterrent.
        How can we expect to negotiate modifications to the ABM Treaty with
    the Russians in a matter of months when the purpose, architecture and
    scope of the system are undefined? This is a collision course to
    unilateral breach or abrogation sooner rather than later.
        Is that necessary? Mr. Coyle will speak to the view he has
    expressed that testing a range of technologies which would require
    modifications to the ABM Treaty is ``many years away.'' I welcome the
    successful flight test conducted last weekend. But the ABM Treaty is
    not constraining vigorous pursuit of a range of technologies.
        Why not unilaterally abrogate? Does it matter?
        First, let me be clear. No other country ever can have a veto over
    U.S. security requirements. But that doesn't end the argument. For in
    calculating our national interest, we need to include reasonably
    foreseeable consequences of our actions.
        What are the risks and costs, particularly from what would be seen
    as a precipitous withdrawal from the treaty?
        First, as President Bush has said, Russia no longer is our enemy,
    but it also is true that a cycle of instability, uncertainty, danger
    and paranoia still is possible. In very recent years, we've been
    through crises in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Gulf and elsewhere
    in which the U.S. and Russia have been at tense, fast moving,
    confusing, and contentious moments of crises. Even with the end of the
    Cold War, our two countries still harbor distrust, burdens of history,
    fierce national pride and large nuclear arsenals. Uncertainty about
    each other's capabilities and intentions still can be dangerous. Agreed
    constraints, transparency and verification of our nuclear capabilities
    are important; we erode this as we move away from agreed rules.
        Second, while changes in the ABM Treaty may be warranted, agreed
    constraints on defenses are not obsolete. The purpose of the ABM Treaty
    was to decrease each side's sense of vulnerability to preemption and
    coercion and, therefore, to keep their nuclear guns in the holster, not
    on a hair trigger. While the political context has changed, the
    strategic dynamic changes more slowly. Without the ABM Treaty, or a
    modification thereof, the Russians have said--and there is risk in
    ignoring this--that they will act in ways they believe will decrease
    their vulnerability, not just to U.S. attack--which, of course, is hard
    to conceive--but of U.S. coercion, which for the Russians is not hard
    to conceive. In the context of what is seen as a precipitous abrogation
    by us, unfortunately they would have sympathy from much of the world.
    There are steps which are not beyond their means, including withdrawing
    from the START and INF Treaties, adding warheads to strategic missiles,
    or redeploying tactical nuclear weapons at sea or on NATO's periphery.
    These all take us back down the path of instability in a dangerous
    world.
        Again, none of this is to suggest that Russia should have a trump
    card. It does mean to me, however, that the path to unilateral
    abrogation of the ABM Treaty, particularly without a serious effort at
    modification, is not without risks that must be part of one calculation
    of our national interest.
        In this respect, I agree with Henry Kissinger. ``Unilateral
    American decisions,'' he recently wrote, ``should be a last resort; the
    most powerful country in the world should not adopt unilateralism until
    the possibilities of agreement have been fully explored.''
        There are other essential questions that need to be clarified if we
    are to move forward in a way that looks at our security interests
    broadly, not narrowly.
        First, what will be the effect of missile defense on stability in
    Asia? We acknowledge that the system we seek to build could defeat
    China's small nuclear deterrent. Our answer seems to be: they're going
    to build up anyway. That is a strange posture for the U.S.: in effect,
    legitimizing and perhaps accelerating China's strategic modernization.
    What impact will that have on the intertwined Asian nuclear dynamic? On
    India's nuclear programs, and Pakistan's? On calculations across the
    Korea Peninsula? On the sense of vulnerability, and the incipient
    nuclear debate, in Japan? This must all be part of the equation as we
    decide how to move forward.
        Second, are we looking at the weapons of mass destruction threat
    through the wrong end of the telescope? There is a significant
    possibility that the United States will be attacked by a nuclear,
    chemical or biological weapon over the next 10 years. But I agree with
    the former chairman of this committee, Sam Nunn: ``The clear and
    present danger,'' he recently wrote, ``is not from North Korean
    missiles that could hit America in a few years . . . The likeliest
    nuclear attack against the United States would come from a warhead in
    the belly of a ship or the back of a truck.''
        The obvious response to this argument is that it is not either/or.
    We should build a missile defense to bolster deterrence and provide
    insurance in case deterrence fails and do more to protect ourselves
    against other threats, including more probable attacks in the U.S. But,
    in fact, in the real world, we cannot avoid choices, setting
    priorities, and allocating resources. Missile defense appears to be the
    central strategic imperative of the Bush administration, with virtually
    everything else subordinated to it: the allies, Russia, Asia, the
    merits of arms control, other defense modernization needs, other WMD
    threats, including cooperation with the Russians through a fully-funded
    Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to control nuclear
    materials, now inadequately protected in Russia and in quantities that
    could build 60,000 nuclear weapons.
        The essential job of the administration and Congress is to strike
    the right balance.
        Let me suggest how I think we should proceed going forward:

             First, we should continue to pursue actively a range
            of potential missile defense technologies and define the scope
            of the threat, but not engage in a ``2-minute drill'' that is
            likely to put us on a collision with the ABM Treaty and most of
            the world in the next few months.
             Second, with greater clarity on the scope of the
            system, we should press for agreement with the Russians on new
            defensive constraints and engage in real consultation with
            allies.
             Third, we should vigorously fund our theater missile
            defense programs, which are needed on today's battlefield and
            need not conflict with the ABM Treaty.
             Fourth, we must see the issues before us as WMD
            defense, not simply national missile defense. To the extent the
            American people think about this in bed at night, I believe
            their greatest fears relate to terrorist attack: toxic
            chemicals placed in the water supply or an anthrax attack that
            could quickly sweep across the country or a nuclear device in a
            truck. There is far more we must do to fight virulent anti-
            American terrorists who are seeking these weapons and to
            protect our critical infrastructure.
             Fifth, we can reduce offensive nuclear arsenals to
            levels commensurate with today's needs, either bilaterally or
            unilaterally, verified through existing strategic arms accords
            which still have great value for our security.
             Sixth, we must address the needs and requirements of
            tomorrow's military across-the-board, as Secretary Rumsfeld's
            current defense review will require, for we need a strong
            defense and the right defense, and that will require adequate
            resources and difficult choices.
             Seventh, we should resume serious negotiations with
            the North Koreans to stop their missile program--the front edge
            of the threat. I don't know whether a verifiable, acceptable
            agreement is possible. I do know that the missile testing
            moratorium we negotiated in 1999 has slowed their program and
            that we'll never find out what's possible if we don't reengage
            in a serious way at a serious level.

        Mr. Chairman, our first obligation is to protect America. But
    America's national security interests are not one-dimensional. I hope
    the United States will fashion a course that provides that protection
    with wide-angle vision.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Berger.
        Mr. Coyle.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP E. COYLE, SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR
      DEFENSE INFORMATION, FORMER DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND
                   EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Coyle. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I
    appreciate this opportunity to discuss the National Missile
    Defense (NMD) Program. NMD is the most difficult program the
    Department of Defense has attempted. This is as true today as
    it has been for the 30 years that national missile defense has
    been on the American political scene. While the technology that
    might be used for NMD has changed over the years, the overall
    difficulty at each stage in the development of new technology
    has not.
        Some have compared the difficulty of NMD with the Manhattan
    Project, but a difference is that NMD is being developed
    without either the urgency of the threat or the constituency of
    wartime emergency.
        The NMD program or, rather, a portion of it, which is now
    being called the mid-course defense segment, has begun to
    demonstrate considerable progress. The battle management
    command and control and communications system has progressed
    well. The X-band radar performance looks promising, and an
    initial systems integration capability has been demonstrated,
    although achieving full system of systems interoperability is
    recognized as one of the most challenging aspects of NMD
    development.
        There are many limitations in the test program so far, but
    notwithstanding the limitations in the testing program and
    failures of important components in all of the first four
    flight intercept tests, including the two that achieved
    intercept, the program has demonstrated considerable progress.
        To address the limitations in the testing program, while I
    was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I made over 50
    recommendations to enhance NMD testing. These recommendations
    included more realistic flight engagements, tests with simple
    countermeasures beyond those planned, tests with simple
    tumbling re-entry vehicles (RVs), and tests with multiple
    simultaneous engagements. BMDO is now implementing many of
    those recommendations. For example, I recommended that the
    program develop more realistic engagement geometries, either
    with launches of interceptors or targets from the Kodiak launch
    complex in Kodiak, Alaska, and BMDO has recently announced that
    they will be implementing this recommendation.
        Developmental tests in a complex program, especially those
    conducted very early, contain many limitations and
    artificialities, some driven by the need for specific early
    design data, and some driven by test range safety
    considerations. Also, the program was never structured to
    produce operationally realistic test results early.
    Accordingly, it was not realistic to expect that early test
    results could have supported a full deployment decision in the
    Clinton administration, even if all of the tests had been
    unambiguously successful, which they were not.
        Similarly, the early test results to date, including the
    latest flight-intercept tests last Saturday, do not yet justify
    a Bush administration decision to deploy an operational system
    in Alaska. The Bush administration is proposing a very
    aggressive new testing program. Such a test program, with many
    activities conducted in parallel, will be necessary if
    deployment of even a primitive operational capability is
    expected this decade.
        For example, four or five tests per year of the midcourse
    defense segment could complete in 4 or 5 years the 20 or so
    developmental tests needed before realistic operational testing
    could begin. This would assume that all 20 tests were
    successful and that no tests needed to be repeated because of
    setbacks, surprises, or failures.
        The midcourse defense segment of the Clinton administration
    is the farthest along, technically, and will be a necessary
    part of any layered system. Also, the Bush administration has
    emphasized mobile land-based, sea-based, airborne, and space-
    based approaches to these segments, whereas the Clinton
    administration was focused on a fixed land-based mid-course
    system.
        This array of options and the declared intention to also
    defend our friends and allies around the world has produced
    confusion about what we will actually try to build, since all
    of these options are probably not affordable. Each of the
    approaches to NMD has its strengths and weaknesses. Mid-course
    NMD provides national coverage in a relatively cost-effective
    way, but has been lambasted by scientists for its inability to
    discriminate decoys and countermeasures.
        Boost-phase NMD avoids the problem with countermeasures and
    decoys, but requires interceptors to be very close to enemy
    territory, and confronts the operators with breathtakingly
    short reaction times. The sensing radars and satellites must
    begin to discriminate and characterize the enemy missiles
    within seconds, and intercept must occur within 3 or 4 minutes,
    possibly within 120 seconds in some scenarios.
        A boost-phase system must be essentially computer-operated
    and autonomous, with no time for consultation with the
    President, the National Security Advisor, or the Secretary of
    Defense. Also, boost-phase systems can be vulnerable to certain
    countermeasures and tactics themselves.
        Terminal-phase systems have the advantage of atmospheric
    stripping, that is, using the atmosphere to strip out lighter
    objects, decoys, and chaff that are designed to conceal the
    desired target. However, the effects of the atmosphere on
    decoys are observable only during the last 60 seconds or so of
    flight and, once again, there are countermeasures an enemy
    could use.
        In general, regardless of which phase of NMD you are
    talking about, the systems must achieve reliability,
    availability, and effectiveness levels that are rarely, if
    ever, achieved by military systems and, when parsed out into
    various components and subsystems, the required reliability of
    those components and subsystems becomes exceedingly high.
        There is nothing wrong with testing the program the
    Department has been pursuing, so long as the desired results
    match the desired pace of acquisition decisions to support
    deployment. However, a more aggressive testing program with
    parallel paths and activities will be necessary to achieve an
    effective operational capability by 2005 or even for several
    years thereafter. This means a test program that is structured
    to anticipate and absorb setbacks that inevitably occur.
        I am pleased that the NMD program is developing test plans
    that move in this direction. However, the Test and Evaluation
    Master Plan (TEMP) is obsolete, and much work must be done just
    to develop detailed test plans and a TEMP which cover the
    administration's newest research, development, test, and
    evaluation (RDT&E) program for NMD. As these plans are
    developed, continued interaction with the operational test and
    evaluation organizations will be essential. I recommend that
    this committee follow these developments closely and encourage
    BMDO and the NMD program offices to improve the frequency and
    candor of their interactions with these operational test
    experts.
        Considering a layered system, I would expect that each
    segment, boost phase, mid-course, and terminal, could each
    require 25 or 30 tests before they get to realistic operational
    testing, bringing the total for the full system to over 100
    tests.
        Mr. Chairman, deployment means the fielding of an
    operational system with some military utility that is effective
    under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and
    countermeasures, possibly without adequate prior knowledge of
    the target cluster composition, timing, trajectory, or
    direction, and one operated by military personnel at all times
    of the day and night and in all weather. Such a capability is
    yet to be shown practicable for NMD. These operational
    considerations will become an increasingly important part of
    test and simulation over the coming years.
        Mr. Chairman, in my prepared testimony, I also discuss the
    relationship between NMD and the ABM Treaty, NMD and
    deterrence, and the importance of greater priority on Theater
    Missile Defense (TMD). I will skip those sections in the
    interest of time and just proceed to my conclusion.
        The technical and political challenges for NMD are such
    that careful oversight will be required by this committee for
    many years, probably decades, to come. To demonstrate an
    effective operational capability, the service test
    organizations who work together jointly on NMD provide an
    essential operational perspective. This operational perspective
    is vital for any military system, but particularly so for NMD
    because of its complexity.
        Working with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the service
    operational test agencies provide valuable insights to the NMD
    program office, to the services and OSD leadership, and to
    Congress. The early involvement of the operational test
    community can help avoid setbacks and delays and help solve
    problems early that will be much more difficult and expensive
    to fix later.
        The early involvement of the operational test community
    will be key to NMD systems that really work in realistic combat
    environments. I am confident that the future and ultimate
    success of NMD will depend on the OT&E community. It is through
    the operational test community that you will know whether
    Theater Missile Defenses can reliably protect our sons and
    daughters serving in the military overseas.
        It is through the operational test community that you will
    know what kind of protection an NMD system can provide from
    unauthorized or accidental launches, ICBM launches from Russia
    or China, as well as intentional launches from States of
    concern, and it is through the operational test community that
    NMD and Theater Missile Defense as well has its best chance for
    success.
        Throughout, the DOD operational test community will require
    the encouragement and the steadfast support of this committee
    and Congress. I urge this committee and Congress to require the
    assessments of the operational test agencies in congressional
    reviews of the progress of NMD.
        Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to take your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Coyle follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Philip E. Coyle

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate this
    opportunity to discuss the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.
        From 1994 to 2001, I was an Assistant Secretary of Defense and the
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, in the Department of
    Defense. During those 6\1/2\ years, I became the longest-serving
    Director in the 18-year history of the office. I have spent more than
    40 years in defense testing, including testing of the warheads of the
    original Safeguard ABM system in Nevada and Alaska more than 30 years
    ago. Currently, I am serving as a Senior Advisor to the Center for
    Defense Information.
        NMD is the most difficult program the Department of Defense has
    attempted, more difficult than the F-22 Raptor, the Land Attack
    Destroyer (DD-21), or the Abrams M1A2 tank complete with battlefield
    digitization. This is as true today as it has been for the 30 years
    that national missile defense has been on the American political scene.
    While the technology that might be used for NMD has changed over the
    years, the overall difficulty at each stage in the development of new
    technology has not. Some have compared the difficulty of NMD with the
    Manhattan Project, but a difference is that NMD is being developed
    without either the urgency of the threat or the constituency of a
    wartime emergency. In fact, one question that has dogged NMD is who
    exactly is the enemy? Is it North Korea? Is it Iran, Iraq, or Libya? Is
    it China or Russia? Or is it all those countries at once?
        You requested that today's testimony focus on the impact of the
    test results to date on technology maturity and deployment schedules.
    You also indicated I should address the relationship between NMD and
    the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, NMD and deterrence, and NMD
    and Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and the current proposals to design,
    test, and deploy an effective missile defense system. Throughout my
    testimony, you will hear my conviction about the value of early and
    close coupling of the operational test perspective during the whole
    life cycle of a major system such as NMD, and especially during
    development. First, I will discuss the progress so far.

                                PROGRESS SO FAR

        The NMD program--or rather what is now being called the Midcourse
    Defense Segment--has begun to demonstrate considerable progress toward
    its defined goals. The Battle Management Command, Control, and
    Communications (BMC\3\) system has progressed well. Potential X-Band
    Radar performance looks promising, as reflected in the performance of
    the Ground Based Radar-Prototype (GBR-P). An initial systems
    integration capability has been demonstrated, although achieving full
    system-of-systems interoperability is recognized as one of the most
    challenging aspects of NMD development.
        The ability to hit a target reentry vehicle (RV) in a direct hit-
    to-kill collision was demonstrated in the first flight intercept in
    October 1999. However, in that test, operationally representative
    sensors did not provide initial interceptor targeting instructions, as
    would be the case in an operational system. Instead, for test purposes,
    a Global Positioning System (GPS) signal from the target RV served to
    first aim the interceptor. We were not able to repeat such a successful
    intercept in the next two flight intercept tests due to failures of
    systems we would have liked to have been able to take for granted, i.e.
    failure of a cooling system in the second flight intercept test, and
    failure of rocket stage separation and of the decoy to deploy in the
    third test. The fourth test, conducted just last Saturday, also
    achieved a hit-to-kill and was essentially a successful repeat of the
    two previous tests that did not go as well. Like the previous two
    tests, this latest test was an early test with necessary test
    limitations. Notwithstanding the limitations in the testing program and
    failures of important components in all of the first four flight
    intercept tests, the program has demonstrated considerable progress.

                              TESTING LIMITATIONS

        In these early tests, the engagement conditions are different from
    an operational situation. The target, launched from Vandenberg AFB in
    California, is seen immediately by the early warning radar also in
    California, so early warning is not an issue. These early tests all
    have used a single large balloon as a decoy; more realistic tests later
    will use more representational decoys. The prototype X-band radar at
    Kwajalein is not forward-based in relation to the interceptor as it
    would be in many operational scenarios. As a result, either a C-band
    radar beacon or GPS has been used in the tests so far to provide target
    track information. These and other limitations will need to be phased
    out as the NMD program moves forward.

                              TEST RECOMMENDATIONS

        In the correspondence with the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Organization (BMDO), my former office has made over 50 recommendations
    to enhance the NMD testing program. These recommendations also were
    stated in my August 11, 2000, deployment readiness review (DRR) report,
    my testimony last September before the House Committee on Government
    Reform and Oversight, and in my Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Report. These
    recommendations include more realistic flight engagements, tests with
    simple countermeasures beyond those planned, tests with simple tumbling
    RVs, and tests with multiple simultaneous engagements. BMDO is now
    implementing many of those recommendations. For example, I recommended
    that the program develop more realistic engagement geometries either
    with launches of interceptors or targets from the Kodiak Launch Complex
    in Kodiak, Alaska. BMDO has recently announced that they will be
    implementing this recommendation.
        Because of the nature of strategic ballistic missile defense, it is
    impractical to conduct full, operationally realistic intercept flight-
    testing across the wide spectrum of possible scenarios. The program
    must therefore augment its flight-testing with various types of
    simulations. Overall, NMD testing is comprised of interrelated ground
    hardware and software-in-the-loop testing, intercept and non-intercept
    flight-testing, computer and laboratory simulations, and man-in-the-
    loop command and control exercises.
        Unfortunately, all of these simulations have failed to develop as
    expected. This, coupled with flight test delays, has placed a
    significant limitation on the ability to assess the technological
    feasibility of NMD.
        The testing program has been designed to learn as much as possible
    from each test. Accordingly, the tests so far have all been planned
    with backup systems so that if one portion of a test fails, the rest of
    the test objectives might still be met.
        Developmental tests in a complex program, especially those
    conducted very early, contain many limitations and artificialities,
    some driven by the need for specific early design data and some driven
    by test range safety considerations. Also, the program was never
    structured to produce operationally realistic test results this early.
    Accordingly, it was not realistic to expect such early test results
    could have supported a full deployment decision in the Clinton
    administration, even if all of the tests had been unambiguously
    successful, which they were not. Similarly, the early test results to
    date, including the latest flight intercept test last Saturday, do not
    yet justify a Bush administration decision to deploy an operational
    system in Alaska. The Bush administration is proposing a very
    aggressive new testing program. Such a test program, with many
    activities conducted in parallel, will be necessary if deployment of
    even a primitive operational capability is expected this decade. For
    example, four or five tests per year of the Mid-course Defense Segment
    could complete in 4 or 5 years, the twenty or so developmental tests
    needed before realistic operational testing could begin. This assumes
    that all twenty tests are successful and that no tests need to be
    repeated because of set-backs, surprises, or failures.
        In a way, the NMD program has been set back during the last 6
    months. While the Bush administration has not yet said exactly what its
    system--or system-of-systems will be, in policy statements the
    administration has emphasized layered defenses with new emphasis on
    boost- and terminal-phase defenses. However, the Midcourse Defense
    Segment of the Clinton administration is the farthest along
    technically, and will be a necessary part of any layered system. Also,
    the Bush administration has emphasized mobile land-based, sea-based,
    airborne, and space-based approaches to these segments, whereas the
    Clinton administration was focused on a fixed, land-based midcourse
    system. This array of options, and the declared intention also to
    defend our friends and allies around the world, has produced confusion
    about what we will actually try to build since all of these options are
    probably not affordable.
        In addition, during the last 6 months, NMD fell another 6 months
    further behind in its planned testing. Three tests of the new two-stage
    booster which were to all have taken pIace by now have slipped about 6
    months, with the first of these now scheduled for next month. Also the
    fourth flight-intercept test, so-called IFT-6, just conducted, was to
    have taken place many months ago. Since my testimony before the House
    last September, the latest flight-intercept test had slipped 6 months,
    as have the three booster vehicle tests. This tendency for NMD tests to
    suffer significant delays, which has been a characteristic of the NMD
    program for several years now, will need to change if satisfactory
    overall progress is to be realized.

                           OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

        Each of the approaches to NMD has its strengths and weaknesses.
    Midcourse NMD provides national coverage in a relatively cost-effective
    way, but has been lambasted by scientists for its inability to
    discriminate decoys and countermeasures. Boost-phase NMD avoids the
    problem with countermeasures and decoys, but requires the interceptors
    to be very close to enemy territory and confronts the operators with
    breathtakingly short reaction times. The sensing radars and satellites
    must begin to discriminate and characterize the enemy missiles within
    seconds, and intercept must occur within 3 or 4 minutes, possibly
    within 120 seconds in some scenarios. A boost-phase system must be
    essentially computer operated and autonomous, with no time for
    consultation with the President, the National Security Advisor or the
    Secretary of Defense. Also, boost-phase systems can be vulnerable to
    certain countermeasures and tactics as well. Terminal-phase systems
    have the advantage of atmospheric stripping, that is, using the
    atmosphere to strip out lighter objects, decoys and chaff that are
    designed to conceal the desired target. However, the effects of the
    atmosphere on decoys are observable only during the last 60 to 90
    seconds of flight, and once again there are countermeasures an enemy
    could use.
        Taken together in a layered system, all these segments could be
    better than any one segment alone, provided that they worked together
    and that failures in one part of a layered system didn't lead to
    failures in another. The more complicated the overall system, the
    greater the cost and the demands on reliability and availability.
        In general, NMD systems must achieve reliability, availability and
    effectiveness levels that are rarely if ever achieved by military
    systems, and when parsed out to the various components and subsystems,
    the required reliability of those components and subsystems becomes
    exceedingly high.
        For the sake of comparison, in Iraq and in Kosovo, the enemy air
    defense systems have had zero effectiveness against U.S. aircraft.
    Using a combination of stealth, jamming and tactics, we have prevented
    these enemy air defense systems from having any real capability against
    U.S. targets. While conventional air defense is not the same thing as
    missile defense, the comparison does illustrate the challenge.
        Midcourse NMD is analogous to a golfer trying to hit a hole in one
    when the hole is going 15,000 miles per hour. With decoys, midcourse
    NMD is analogous to trying to hit a hole in one when the hole is going
    15,000 miles per hour, and the green is covered with flags and other
    holes that look similar to the real hole.
        Boost-phase NMD is analogous to trying to hit your golf partner's
    drive out of the air with a drive of your own. Your reactions must be
    quick, and your drive has to be very fast to catch up.
        In terminal-phase NMD, your golf perspective flips and is analogous
    to being the hole. But now you are trying to prevent another golfer's
    drive from landing anywhere on the green, where the green is as big as
    the United States.
        Such analogies may seem exaggerated, but they really aren't. For
    example, to take just one component of both boost-phase and midcourse
    systems, it is difficult for us to visualize how the infrared seeker on
    the kill vehicle ``sees.'' With human sight and human brains we may get
    clues about which is the real target, clues the kill vehicle doesn't
    get. On the kill vehicle, the IR seeker sees in only one color--you
    could think of it as a particular shade of red--and it sees through a
    narrow field of view, like a soda straw. Sometime try telling what's
    going on by watching black and white television through a soda straw
    with one eye closed and without sound. Then you'll begin to see how
    difficult discrimination is for NMD seeker systems.

                              FUTURE TEST PLANNING

        Recently, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has said that
    the focus of the NMD program is going to be on testing, not deployment,
    a development I applaud. This new emphasis could help correct what has
    been a chronic problem, namely, that test results were not likely to be
    available soon enough to support a recommendation for early deployment
    anyway. This is because the planned testing program continues to run
    behind schedule, because the test content has not yet addressed
    important operational questions, and because ground-test facilities for
    assessment and training are considerably behind schedule.
        NMD developmental testing needs to be augmented to prepare for
    realistic operational situations in the IOT&E phase, and will need to
    be very aggressive to keep pace with the recently proposed plans to
    achieve early operational capability with test assets in Alaska. The
    testing schedule, including supporting modeling and simulation,
    continues to slip while plans for deployment have not. Important parts
    of the test program have slipped a year and a half in the two and a
    half years since the NMD program was restructured in January 1999.
    Thus, the program is behind in both the demonstrated level of technical
    accomplishment and in schedule. Additionally, the content of individual
    tests has been diminished and is providing less information than
    originally planned.
        While in the Pentagon, I expressed concern that the NMD program had
    not planned nor funded any intercept tests until IOT&E with realistic
    operational features such as multiple simultaneous engagements, long-
    range intercepts, realistic engagement geometries, and countermeasures
    other than simple balloons. I am pleased that BMDO has accepted many of
    my recommendations and is changing the flight-test matrix to include
    such tests. While it may not be practical or affordable to do all these
    things in developmental testing, selected stressing operational
    requirements should be included in developmental tests that precede
    IOT&E to help ensure sufficient capability for deployment. For example,
    the current C-band transponder tracking and identification system,
    justified by gaps in radar coverage and range safety considerations, is
    being used to provide target track information to the system in current
    tests. This practice should be phased out prior to IOT&E. This will
    ensure that the end-to-end system will support early target tracking
    and interceptor launch.
        There is nothing wrong with the limited testing program the
    Department has been pursuing so long as the achieved results match the
    desired pace of acquisition decisions to support deployment. However, a
    more aggressive testing program, with parallel paths and activities,
    will be necessary to achieve an effective operational capability by
    fiscal year 2005 or even for several years thereafter. This means a
    test program that is structured to anticipate and absorb setbacks that
    inevitably occur. I am pleased that the NMD program is developing test
    plans that move in this direction. However, the Test and Evaluation
    Master Plan (TEMP) is obsolete, and much work must be done just to
    develop detailed test plans and a TEMP which covers the
    administration's newest RDT&E program for NMD. As these test plans are
    developed, continued interaction with the Operational Test and
    Evaluation organizations will be essential. I recommend that this
    Committee follow these developments closely, and encourage BMDO and the
    NMDO Program Offices to improve the frequency and candor of their
    interactions with these operational test experts.
        The time and resource demands that would be required for a program
    of this type would be substantial. As documented in the Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO) report on the budgetary and technical implications
    of the NMD program,\1\ the Safeguard missile program conducted 165
    flight tests. The Safeguard program was an early version of NMD.
    Similarly, the Polaris program conducted 125 flight tests, and the
    Minuteman program conducted 101 flight tests. It is apparent from these
    test schedules that an extensive amount of work was done in parallel
    from one flight test to another. Failures that occurred were accepted,
    and the programs moved forward with parallel activities as flight-
    testing continued.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ CBO Papers, Budgetary and Technical Implications of the
    administration's Plan for National Missile Defense, April 2000.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Rocket science has progressed in the past 35 years, and I am not
    suggesting that a hundred or more NMD flight tests will be necessary
    for each segment of a layered NMD defense. However, I would expect that
    each segment--boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal--could each require
    25 or 30 tests, bringing the total for the full system to over 100
    tests. Also, the technology in the current NMD program is more
    sophisticated than in those early missile programs, and we should be
    prepared for inevitable setbacks.
        As in any weapons development program, the NMD acquisition and
    construction schedules need to be linked to capability achievements
    demonstrated in a robust test program, not to schedule per se. This
    approach can support an aggressive acquisition schedule if the test
    program has the capacity to deal with setbacks. On three separate
    occasions, independent panels chaired by Larry Welch (General, USAF
    Retired) have recommended an event-driven, not schedule-driven,
    program. In the long run, an event-driven program will take less time
    and cost less money than a program that must regularly be re-baselined
    due to the realities of very challenging technical and operational
    goals.
        Aggressive flight-testing, coupled with comprehensive hardware-in-
    the-loop and simulation programs, will be essential for NMD.
    Additionally, the program will have to adopt a parallel test approach
    that can absorb occasionally disappointing test results that do not
    achieve their objectives in order to have any chance of achieving a
    deployment of operationally effective systems this decade. As noted by
    CBO, the Navy's Polaris program successfully took such an approach 30
    years ago.
        Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with some
    military utility that is effective under realistic combat conditions,
    against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly without
    adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster composition, timing,
    trajectory or direction, and when operated by military personnel at all
    times of the day or night and in all weather. Such a capability is yet
    to be shown to be practicable for NMD. These operational considerations
    will become an increasingly important part of test and simulation plans
    over the coming years.
        My work in the DOD, and more than 30 years experience at Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory, has given me a perspective I'd like to
    share with the committee on the ABM Treaty, the role of deterrence, and
    the nature of the current threat.

                             NMD AND THE ABM TREATY

        Currently, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty restricts
    conduct of flight-testing to the declared test ranges of Kwajalein
    Missile Range and White Sands Missile Range. In particular, with
    targets launched from Vandenberg toward Kwajalein, the targets are
    moving away from the early warning radar at Beale AFB, near Sacramento.
    In this geometry, early warning is not realistically tested. However,
    under the ABM Treaty, this can be relatively easily remedied by the
    declaration of other ranges as test ranges. Recently, BMDO has
    announced a plan to develop new test facilities in Kodiak and at Fort
    Greely, Alaska. This will support alternative Ground-Based Interceptor
    launches from more operationally representative locations. These
    additional launch sites would expand the test envelope beyond that
    currently available, as recommended by my former office and the Welch
    panel, to validate system simulations over a broader range of the
    operating regimes
        The treaty also currently precludes use of a surrogate radar in the
    NMD mode to skin track the incoming target RV during testing and to
    support creation of the Weapon Task Plan that first aims the
    interceptor. This necessitates the use of a non-operationally realistic
    beacon transponder or GPS on the RV for midcourse tracking during
    intercept testing.
        Since additional test ranges can be established under the ABM
    Treaty, the treaty is not now an obstacle to proper development and
    testing of a National Missile Defense system. Development of an
    effective NMD network, even one with only a limited capability to
    intercept and destroy long-range missiles, will take a decade or more.
    This is for simple technical and budgetary reasons. In the near-term,
    the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing.
        Development and testing of fixed-site, midcourse missile defense is
    permitted under the ABM Treaty. The Pentagon, in fact, has been
    developing and testing technologies necessary for such a system for at
    least a decade in compliance with the treaty. Most flight-testing is
    done at the Army's Kwajalein Missile Range in the Pacific Ocean, a test
    site that is specifically permitted under the ABM Treaty.
        Eventually, intercepts will be attempted at greater distances from
    Kwajalein to demonstrate more realistic engagements, but this also will
    be permissible under the ABM Treaty. More importantly, a midcourse
    missile defense system will need to demonstrate that it can
    discriminate decoys, countermeasures, and rocket debris from the real
    target, the re-entry vehicle. This will take many tests paced by time,
    money and other resources, again not by the ABM Treaty.
        At the point where the program is ready to move from developmental
    work to true operational testing, more realistic tests of NMD--using
    real soldiers and mimicking battlefield or attack conditions--would be
    required, and these tests likely would require modifications to the ABM
    Treaty. But there is plenty of time to consider this, as such real-
    world testing is many years away.
        What about boost-phase missile defense? While the ABM Treaty
    prohibits the development and testing of mobile NMD systems, there is
    plenty of work on boost-phase systems that not only could be, but also,
    in any case, must be, done before running afoul of the treaty.
        Boost-phase interceptors could be launched from Navy ships or from
    land. Either way the interceptors must be close enough to the enemy
    launch site that the interceptors can catch up before the enemy missile
    has traveled too far and deployed its payload. The process of detection
    and classification of an incoming missile must begin within seconds of
    its launch, and intercept must occur within only a few minutes.
    Consequently, a boost-phase system would need to be essentially
    autonomous, commanded by computers.
        Naturally, any administration would want extensive testing of such
    a system to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the command and
    control computer network. But, again, the ABM Treaty would not be an
    obstacle. Testing can be done at various U.S. testing centers,
    including Kwajalein and the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
        Boost-phase systems, whether on land or aboard ship, would also
    require very fast rockets and high acceleration maneuvering--more so
    than midcourse systems. Such new rockets would take years to develop
    and test. The interceptor rocket for midcourse NMD has been under
    development and testing for many years, and within accepted
    interpretations of the ABM Treaty. Similarly, still-faster rockets for
    a boost-phase NMD could be tested in the same way.
        With respect to the Airborne Laser and the Space Based Laser, each
    has its own special challenges that have little to do with the ABM
    Treaty. In the case of the Airborne Laser, there are important
    operational considerations. A Boeing 747 aircraft loaded with heavy
    laser apparatus, and flying close to an enemy, makes an inviting
    target. To permit the 747 to stand back from the forward edge of
    battle, the airborne laser needs very high power to damage its targets
    through the atmosphere. Development of such lasers is ongoing at
    contractor and government test facilities in full compliance with the
    ABM Treaty.
        As for the Space Based Laser, the current prototype is too heavy to
    be launched into space by existing U.S. boosters. Perhaps it can be
    made lighter and more powerful, but this will take time--at least a
    dozen years. The ABM Treaty is not currently an issue here.
        Perhaps the greatest challenge for NMD right now is building
    realistic simulators to model how all the elements of a system, from
    launcher to interceptor to radar to command and control networks, might
    work together. As I noted, the NMD program is years behind in this
    arena, but not because of the ABM Treaty. The problem is a
    technological one.
        The United States faces a very complex and difficult set of
    expensive NMD development problems--problems that abrogating the ABM
    Treaty will not overcome. Rather than focusing on the red herring of
    the ABM Treaty, the NMD program would do better to concentrate on
    crafting long-term, affordable approaches to technology development.

                               NMD AND DETERRENCE

        Unfortunately, to justify the possible near-term abrogation of the
    ABM Treaty, the Bush administration has been talking down the value of
    traditional nuclear deterrence. This simply is not necessary in making
    a case for development of NMD, and is potentially harmful to global
    strategic stability.
        In talking down deterrence, the administration has suggested that
    nuclear deterrence is obsolete and that the United States wouldn't drop
    a nuclear bomb on, say, Pyongyang, even if North Korea attacked the
    U.S. homeland with weapons of mass destruction first. The
    administration also has coupled plans for reducing the U.S. nuclear
    stockpile with an increased effort on National Missile Defense.
        The administration is saying, in effect, that as we reduce our
    nuclear stockpile, we become more vulnerable and thus must have NMD.
    The general idea is that our nuclear deterrent stockpile will become
    too small to be effective, and we won't have the resolve to use it
    anyway, so NMD can fill the gap.
        Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent takes steady
    determination. Adversaries must believe that U.S. nuclear weapons work,
    and that U.S. leaders have the will to use them if so attacked. This
    explains why it is so difficult for nuclear powers to adopt a no first
    use policy. While no nuclear power has the intention of striking first
    with nuclear weapons, saying so officially begs questions about the
    resolve necessary to maintain deterrence.
        The Bush administration, on the other hand, is flipping traditional
    deterrence theory upside down. Administration officials are saying that
    U.S. nuclear deterrence policy is to turn the other cheek. They are
    acknowledging a lack of resolve to use nuclear weapons no matter what,
    and are suggesting instead that the answer is to absorb enemy missile
    attacks with NMD.
        The trouble with this approach is that it leaves us empty-handed.
    Pentagon briefings for National Missile Defense show a flawless
    Plexiglas dome covering the United States. We imagine that incoming
    enemy missiles would bounce off it like hail off a windshield.
    Unfortunately, such a missile shield--even under the Bush
    administration concept for a layered system--is a practical
    impossibility.
        Recognizing this technical problem, Defense Secretary Donald
    Rumsfeld has noted that missile defense doesn't have to be perfect, and
    that if it worked only part of the time it would still be worth it.
    This makes little sense. It is hard to believe that an adversary who is
    not afraid of nuclear retaliation would refrain from shooting missiles
    at the United States simply because of a missile shield that only works
    part time. It is also hard to believe that any U.S. president would be
    comfortable in taking action that might provoke a missile attack
    knowing that one or more of the weapons might well hit its target.
        Giving up deterrence for an unpredictable defense leaves the United
    States holding the bag. As former Secretary of State George Shultz put
    it in the days of President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense
    Initiative, such propositions for intercontinental missile defense are
    nothing more than the sleeves in our vest. If we give up deterrence for
    nothing, we invite conflict around the globe, and encourage rather than
    deter first use of nuclear weapons by rogue nations.
        In addition to inviting U.S. enemies to test our resolve, the
    rejection of deterrence policy in favor of national missile defense
    places U.S. arms control proponents in a devilish dilemma. On the one
    hand, they would like to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, and
    nuclear deterrence too. On the other hand, they see missile defense as
    dangerously destabilizing, and sure to cause Russia, China and other
    nations to build up their own nuclear stockpiles simply to beat our
    missile defense.
        Also, pursuit of national missile defense threatens the very
    sensible proposal by many serious scholars of global security to take
    nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. Why would Russia or China agree
    to take their nuclear weapons off alert if they thought that quick
    surprise was the best counter to a U.S. attempt at missile defense?
        The danger with talking down deterrence is that some may listen and
    change their behavior accordingly.
        As Secretary Rumsfeld put it at the Munich Conference on European
    Security Policy last February, ``We know from history that weakness is
    provocative. That it entices people into adventures they would
    otherwise avoid.'' With those words, the Secretary was trying to
    justify national missile defense. But those words also justify a
    believable nuclear deterrent.

            THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE REAL AND PRESENT THREAT

        Amidst all the political and technical turmoil surrounding NMD, the
    U.S. military today faces a real enemy threat that, for the past 10
    years, we unfortunately have failed to seriously address. Not something
    hypothetical that could possibly arise in the future, but a real danger
    to our military forces and capabilities that we have already
    experienced and have failed to handle. That danger is attack against
    U.S. troops overseas from short-range ballistic missiles.
        A few months ago we observed the tenth anniversary of the first
    lethal Scud attack against U S. troops. In that attack, 28 U.S.
    soldiers were killed and more than 100 were wounded. Yet, today, a
    decade after the Persian Gulf War, American troops overseas remain in
    serious peril from short-range ballistic missiles. The United States
    has soldiers stationed in the Persian Gulf or in Korea who are
    potential targets of enemy short-range missile attacks.
        It is unusual for the United States to be so far behind a real
    military danger. Our military is sometimes accused of ``fighting the
    last war,'' of not preparing for the future. Scuds, unfortunately, are
    a threat from the last war we still need to fight.
        In fact, both the Army and the Navy have tactical missile defense
    development programs that are making progress toward dealing with this
    vulnerability. These systems are called ``area'' or ``lower tier'' for
    countering short-range attacks, and ``theater'' or ``upper tier''
    defense systems for intermediate-range attacks. These promising short-
    to intermediate-range systems are technically and politically distinct
    from NMD, which is intended to defend against missiles of
    intercontinental range.
        However, the debate about National Missile Defense has drowned out
    the most urgent missile defense need, namely, defending our troops on
    the battlefield. The debate also has affected priorities inside the
    Pentagon. As currently scheduled, realistic operational tests of our
    short-range missile defense systems won't take place for many years.
    The theater defense systems have field deployment schedules after the
    deployment dates now being proposed for NMD, even though the theater
    missile threat is much more imminent.
        Whether we can successfully develop NMD technology is debatable. By
    contrast, the technology needed for area and theater missile defense is
    much more straightforward, and the lessons learned from working on
    shorter-range defenses could usefully be applied to an NMD network.
    Nevertheless, at the current pace, we are still years away from
    realistic operational demonstrations of area and theater missile
    defense systems, and the complex command and control, interoperability,
    and reliability standards they must achieve to be effective.
        As I noted, the administration has begun to describe missile
    defense in new ways, and administration officials have emphasized the
    importance of defending our friends and allies. Equally important,
    however, is defending our own troops overseas, something about which we
    have heard little.
        The area and theater missile defense systems have been set back by
    the pressures to push NMD. The shorter-range systems could be further
    ahead today if they had not been delayed by the distractions and the
    budgetary priorities of NMD. Because shorter-range attacks are the real
    threats our troops overseas face every day, shorter-range defensive
    systems should be getting more urgent priority.
        I would recommend that this Committee in exercising its oversight
    over NMD, consider as well the question of TMD as a separate issue, and
    one deserving of more attention.
        The Pentagon's recent decision in PBD 816 to transfer the Army and
    Navy area and theater missile defense systems out of BMDO and back to
    the Army and Navy is a positive step. Assuming the area and theater
    defense programs are adequately funded, this will enable the services
    to move forward on area and theater missile defense undistracted by NMD
    issues.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The technical and political challenges for NMD are such that
    careful oversight will be required by this Committee for many years--
    probably decades--to come. To demonstrate an effective operational
    capability, the Service Test Organizations, who working together
    jointly on NMD, provide an essential operational perspective. This
    operational perspective is vital for any military system, but
    particularly so for NMD because of its complexity. Working with the
    Director, Operational Test and Evaluation in OSD, the Service
    Operational Test Agencies provide valuable insights to the NMD Program
    Office, to Service and OSD leadership, and to Congress. The early
    involvement of the operational test community can help avoid setbacks
    and delays, and help solve problems early that will be much more
    difficult and expensive to fix later. The early involvement of the
    operational test community will be key to NMD systems that really work
    in realistic combat environments. I am confident that the future and
    ultimate success of NMD will depend on the OT&E community. It is
    through the operational test community that you will know whether
    theater missile defenses can reliably protect our sons and daughters
    serving in the military overseas. It is through the operational test
    community that you will know what kind of protection an NMD system can
    provide against unauthorized or accidental ICBM launches from Russia or
    China as well as intentional launches from states of concern. It is
    through the operational test community that NMD--and TMD as well--has
    its best chance for success. Throughout, the DOD operational test
    community will require the encouragement and the steadfast support of
    this committee and Congress. I urge this committee and Congress to
    require the assessments of the operational test agencies in
    congressional reviews of the progress of NMD.
        Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions you or the
    members of the committee may have.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Coyle.
        Mr. Perle.

    STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
    ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                     INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

        Mr. Perle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for including
    me in these hearings. In complex issues of this sort, there is
    no substitute for thorough discussion, and you and your
    colleagues have done well to devote time and serious attention
    to this issue.
        The issue before you is one that I have followed since the
    spring of 1969, when I came to Washington to work for Senator
    Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson. I had met Scoop in the course of
    assessing the debate over missile defense for a small committee
    headed by Dean Acheson, Karl Nitze, and Albert Wohlstetter.
    These three distinguished Americans believed that it was
    dangerous for the United States to remain vulnerable to a
    missile attack, and they formed a committee to develop the
    argument for ballistic missile defense.
        At the time, we were deep in the Cold War. Suspicion,
    hostility, and fear dominated the relationship between the
    United States and the Soviet Union. We observed the heavy-
    mechanized Warsaw Pact divisions arrayed along the Iron Curtain
    and devised the means to deter them. Outnumbered in Europe, we
    relied on nuclear weapons to achieve a military balance.
        The situation then required us to calculate the nuclear
    balance between the United States and the Soviet Union to a
    degree of arithmetic precision that included the provision--I
    had one as a young staffer--of a calculator that permitted you
    to estimate how much of our nuclear deterrent would survive in
    the face of a massive Soviet attack, depending on the accuracy
    of their weapons and whether they were air or ground-based and
    the like. We spent our time doing those calculations.
        We were forced to consider whether enough of our nuclear
    deterrent would be able to survive a massive Soviet strike, and
    retaliate with force sufficient to deter, and since many of
    these scenarios that preoccupied our military planners began
    with a nonnuclear war in the center of Europe, the control of
    escalation was fundamental to our strategy.
        In those circumstances, the argument was made first by
    American strategists and scientists and eventually by Soviet
    officials that the deployment of a missile defense by the
    United States would threaten the Soviet ability to destroy us
    in a retaliatory attack if we should launch a massive nuclear
    strike against them. Thus, it was argued, any American missile
    defense would inevitably be countered by a buildup of Soviet
    missiles and bombers. An effort to defend ourselves would
    simply stimulate an arms race as the Soviets sought to
    neutralize our defense by expanding their offense.
        That was the core argument against missile defenses, and it
    was made in the context of a bitter, deadly cold war between
    two nuclear superpowers with fundamentally different
    philosophies and interests. I remember well the debate about
    the Safeguard Missile Defense System in 1969 and 1970. Much of
    it took place before this very committee, and in 1970 the
    Senate, by a single vote, approved going forward with the
    Safeguard system.
        Armed with the authority to begin building defenses, the
    Nixon administration, led by Henry Kissinger, negotiated a
    treaty with the Soviet Union essentially banning the deployment
    of missile defenses. Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty, together
    with an interim agreement on offensive weapons, sought to
    freeze the growth of offensive missile forces and to fix the
    balance between offense and defense. The ABM Treaty marked the
    acceptance of the view that a legally binding arrangement was
    necessary to achieve stability in the nuclear balance between
    hostile powers.
        Parenthetically, in the end, the Soviets found ways to
    significantly expand their nuclear force, with the result that
    the two agreements of 1972 largely failed to achieve their
    underlying intended purpose.
        When the ABM Treaty was before the Senate, it was approved
    overwhelmingly. There was either one vote against it, or two. I
    know Senator Buckley from New York voted against it, and
    possibly Senator Hollings.
        A number of Senators who had misgivings about whether the
    treaty would lock us into a set of constraints that might later
    prove unwise were reassured by a key provision in the treaty,
    the right of either side to withdraw 180 days after giving
    notice, and I call this to your attention, Mr. Chairman,
    because if we now find it impossible to exercise that right to
    withdraw, which was understood at the time the treaty was
    approved as essential flexibility to respond to historical
    change, it raises a question about whether any withdrawal
    provision offers any real protection when history changes.
        At this point, Mr. Chairman, you might well ask, why is he
    boring us with this ancient history, and the answer is that
    much current thinking about missile defense, and especially
    about the ABM Treaty, is mired in ancient history, the history
    and the context of the Cold War, and one could not have found a
    better illustration of that than the arguments we just heard
    from Sandy Berger.
        Today, the United States stands naked before its enemies,
    unable to intercept even a single ballistic missile aimed by
    accident or design at our territory. Many Americans are shocked
    to learn that this condition of abject vulnerability has been
    the freely chosen policy of the government of the United
    States, and is widely, if superficially, supported by many of
    our allies.
        It is, Mr. Chairman, a legacy of the Cold War. Frozen in
    that Cold War like a fly in amber are those who oppose missile
    defense because it is inconsistent with the ABM Treaty,
    believing that our exposure to attack by ballistic missiles
    actually makes us safer. Therefore, they argue, the
    vulnerability that developed during the Cold War should
    continue to be a permanent feature of American policy,
    enshrined forever in the ABM Treaty, or some minor modification
    of it, operating on an autopilot set during the Cold War.
        The opponents of missile defense argue that a
    technologically serious defense, even if limited, would
    precipitate an arms race because other nuclear powers,
    especially Russia, would build additional missiles to overwhelm
    any defense we might deploy. You heard that argument from Sandy
    Berger.
        Perhaps this is why, according to talking points prepared
    for official U.S.-Russian meetings, American officials in the
    last administration sought to assure the Russians that even if
    the United States built a modest, ground-based defense, Russia
    would still be able to incinerate the United States after a
    massive American nuclear strike. It is hard to imagine a mind
    set more reflective of the Cold War than that, yet this is the
    logic that animates the idea that the ABM Treaty is the
    cornerstone of strategic stability.
        The idea of the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of stability is
    simply anachronistic and dangerous. How can a treaty that was
    the cornerstone of stability in 1972, at the height of the Cold
    War, still constitute a cornerstone in 2001, with the Cold War
    over and the Soviet Union dissolved? After all, there is almost
    nothing in common between the geopolitical situation in the
    middle of the Cold War and the situation we face today. That is
    why Henry Kissinger, who managed the negotiations that resulted
    in the ABM Treaty, has wisely and convincingly argued that it
    no longer serves American interests.
        Far from assuring stability, the Cold War doctrine that we
    must seek safety through voluntary vulnerability is dangerously
    ill-conceived. Consider the core of the argument, that the
    Russians would build more nuclear weapons if we were to build a
    defense against ballistic missiles. Since we have no defense at
    all today, a nuclear force consisting of even one missile could
    do catastrophic harm to Los Angeles, Washington, or New York. A
    handful would mean destruction beyond imagination.
        Now, suppose we were to deploy a defense capable of
    countering not one, or a handful, but a few hundred incoming
    warheads. With such a defense, we might no longer be
    vulnerable, as we are today, to such nuclear powers as, say,
    Britain, or France, each of which has offensive nuclear
    weapons.
        Would the British feel compelled to build more nuclear
    weapons to overpower our defense, if our defense robbed them of
    their deterrent capability? Of course not. They do not regard
    the United States as an enemy. It is the political context, not
    the weapons themselves, that determines whether and to what
    extent any particular military capability is threatening, and
    whether agreements banning it are a source of stability.
        Now that the Cold War is over, should Russia regard us as
    an enemy? We are more likely to send Mr. Putin a check than a
    massive barrage of missiles with nuclear warheads. We have
    sought in countless ways to work with, not against, the
    Russians. It is unimaginable that we would launch thousands of
    nuclear weapons against Russia and hope to benefit thereby, and
    that would be true even if we had a defense that would knock
    down every missile that might be launched in retaliation.
        Would it make sense for Mr. Putin to respond to an American
    defense against North Korea or Saddam Hussein, or some unknown
    threat? Unless you believe history has stopped, it is simply a
    matter of time before a country hostile to the United States
    acquires a ballistic missile capable of reaching our territory
    and a warhead capable of inflicting mass destruction, and it
    almost does not matter exactly when or exactly who, because
    unless we are prepared to wait until that threat has already
    emerged, we have to begin at some point to build a defense that
    we all understand will take a long time to achieve.
        Would it make sense for Mr. Putin to respond to an American
    defense against North Korea or Saddam Hussein by building more
    missiles? Is the Russian economy such that a vast investment in
    new weapons aimed at the United States would benefit his
    country? It is sometimes said in response, and there was a
    glimmer of this argument in what Sandy had to say, that it is
    perceptions, not reality that counts. If the Russians or the
    Chinese perceive the United States as a threat, and, therefore,
    regard any antimissile system it may build as a danger to them,
    shouldn't the United States stand down?
        This seems to me a particularly unwise line of argument. In
    psychiatry, it would lead to humoring paranoids, and Sandy
    referred to paranoia, by accepting their paranoia and acting to
    accommodate baseless fears. In science, it would mean the
    abandonment of rigor and discipline, pretending instead of
    proving, and in international politics, it would mean
    nurturing, rather than finding ways to correct false,
    dangerous, and even self-fulfilling ideas.
        The Cold War is over, but we will not realize the full
    benefit of its passing until everyone involved behaves
    accordingly, abandoning the fears and apprehensions of half a
    century of conflict and the ideas about security that flowed
    from and were reflected in that long, dark conflict.
        By clinging to the idea that the security of others is
    diminished if the United States is protected against missile
    attack, some Americans, and a number of European leaders,
    perhaps unwittingly, and certainly ironically, are perpetuating
    the anxiety of the Cold War. By arguing that the Russians or
    the Chinese or others are right to feel threatened by our
    defense, we are perpetuating the psychology of the Cold War.
        Sandy Berger said, and I think I am quoting, for the
    Russians, U.S. coercion is not hard to conceive. I cannot
    imagine a less prudent argument to put in the mind of Mr.
    Putin, or, perhaps more to the point, in the minds of his
    critics and detractors, legitimizing the notion that Russia is
    right to fear an American missile defense because U.S. coercion
    is not hard to conceive.
        We should be responding to those fears and those
    apprehensions by developing a new policy with Russia and by
    assuring the Russians in convincing ways that they need not
    fear coercion from the United States, rather than accepting the
    premise, and adjusting our self-defense capability to reflect
    that.
        We should proceed to develop and employ defenses against
    the Saddam Husseins of this world, and we must explain,
    explain, and explain again to President Putin that such a
    defense does not diminish the security of his country, and we
    should be prepared to reduce sharply the size of our nuclear
    offensive forces both because the end of the Cold War enables
    us safely to do that, and because it will lend credibility to
    our new approach to Russia.
        Mr. Chairman, some opponents of a robust missile defense,
    including, for example, French President Chirac, argue that
    such a defense would encourage the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons, and we heard some of that in Sandy Berger's testimony,
    too, yet the opposite is far more likely.
        Imagine, if you will, the sharp rise in tension between
    India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and
    ballistic missiles. Suppose the United States could dispatch an
    Aegis cruiser to the region with instructions to intercept any
    ballistic missile fired by either side. Such a capability in
    American hands would be highly stabilizing, reducing the
    likelihood of a conflict, discouraging the use of offensive
    missiles, and reassuring to both sides.
        Other nations, like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are
    actively trying to acquire missiles capable of attacking the
    United States. They believe that acquiring even a single
    missile will catapult them into a select class of states
    capable of inflicting massive damage on the United States.
        They are well aware of Sandy Berger's suggestion that a
    truck with a bomb in it, or a ship with a bomb in it, could do
    great destruction, and yet they are investing massively, with
    only limited resources, not to acquire trucks, not to acquire
    ships in which they could assert a nuclear weapon, but to
    acquire ballistic missiles with ranges capable of reaching the
    United States. They have declared what they consider to be
    important. They have judged where they think their potential
    advantage to coerce and to attack may lie.
        They believe that acquiring a single missile will catapult
    them into a select class of states capable of inflicting
    massive damage on the United States and, given time and money,
    a single missile or even several is not beyond their reach.
        We can debate endlessly exactly when they emerge with it,
    but suppose that we were to construct a defense that could
    intercept all the warheads and decoys carried by 100 or 200
    enemy missiles, that a Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jung Il would
    need that number to be confident that he could land a missile
    on New York, or Chicago, or an allied capital. In that case,
    even a determined adversary might well throw up his hands and
    conclude that such a missile force is beyond his reach.
        By having no defense at all, we set the bar so low that it
    is an encouragement to the Saddam Husseins of the world. The
    hurdle they have to overcome is as small as it could possibly
    be, and our purpose should be to raise that barrier, to raise
    that hurdle.
        The best way to protect against a missile attack is to
    discourage our adversaries from investing in the missiles in
    the first place, and there can be no more powerful disincentive
    than to have the shield that guarantees that their hugely
    expensive programs will fail. Based on our most advanced
    technology, it is that shield, not an outdated treaty, that
    will protect us best.
        Sandy Berger put some emphasis on negotiating with Russia,
    and I infer from what he had in mind that he is thinking in
    terms of preserving, perhaps amending, but preserving the ABM
    Treaty. Mr. Chairman, I think we would be wise to put the ABM
    Treaty behind us, even if we had no plan or desire to build a
    ballistic missile defense, because as long as that treaty is
    regarded, as it is in some places today, as fundamental to the
    security of Russia and the United States, it continues the
    context of the Cold War. There is no other way to understand
    it.
        Unless you take seriously the prospect of a massive
    American missile attack on Russia, or a massive Russian missile
    attack on the United States, the regulation of the offense-
    defense relationship, which is what the ABM Treaty is all
    about, makes no sense, and when we say to the Russians we want
    to renegotiate the legal right we both enjoy to build defenses
    as well as offenses, we are saying to them that it is necessary
    to have such a structure in order to ensure that neither of us
    launches a nuclear attack on the other.
        Until we break decisively with the history of the Cold War
    and the institutions that reflected that history, the Cold War
    will carry on. I think that is true of the relationship on
    offensive forces as well, which is why I believe we should
    reduce our forces unilaterally to the levels that we think
    appropriate, and without concern that doing so will make us
    vulnerable to an attack from Russia, because I do not believe
    there is evidence that we need be concerned about a massive
    nuclear attack from Russia. But there is a great deal of
    evidence that we need to be concerned about the Saddam Husseins
    of the world, those who are active today and those who will be
    active tomorrow, because it is simply a matter of time.
        Let me conclude with one last point, and I read Phil
    Coyle's testimony, which has deterrence theory in it in
    addition to comment on testing, and he is obviously concerned
    that by building defenses we may appear to be abandoning or
    diminishing the importance of nuclear deterrence, of the threat
    to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The point I want to make is
    a moral one.
        During the Cold War, none of us liked the fact that we
    based our security on the threat to destroy millions of people
    if we should come under attack, but we contented ourselves with
    that morally difficult policy by persuading ourselves that we
    had no choice, that defense was neither technically feasible
    nor practically feasible because it would precipitate the arms
    race that we have been talking about.
        But today we have a choice. We no longer need to depend
    exclusively on the threat to use nuclear weapons in
    retaliation, nuclear weapons that might be aimed against us by
    a Saddam Hussein. If deterrence alone is to be the means by
    which we defend, it would require us in response to destroy
    women and children in Baghdad who would have no say in the
    decision by Saddam Hussein to launch a monstrous attack, or the
    attack from Saddam might be on another country, on a country
    friendly to the United States.
        Can we justify holding hostage a hapless civilian
    population when we have the alternative of building a defense,
    and my answer to that is no. I hope the committee will consider
    that, in time, basing our security on the threat to destroy
    millions of civilians is not a tenable policy when we have
    alternatives.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Richard N. Perle

        Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to
    appear before the committee today. The issue before you is one I have
    followed since the Spring of 1969 when I came to Washington to work for
    Scoop Jackson. I had met Scoop in the course of assessing the debate
    over missile defense for a small committee headed by Dean Acheson, Paul
    Nitze, and Albert Wohlstetter.
        These three distinguished Americans believed that it was dangerous
    for the United States to remain vulnerable to a missile attack and they
    formed a committee to develop the argument for a ballistic missile
    defense.
        At the time, we were deep in the Cold War. Suspicion, hostility and
    fear dominated the relationship between the United States and the
    Soviet Union. We observed the heavy mechanized Warsaw Pact divisions
    arrayed along the Iron Curtain and devised the means to deter them.
    Outnumbered in Europe, we relied on nuclear weapons to achieve a
    military balance.
        The situation then required us to calculate the nuclear balance
    between the United States and the Soviet Union. We were forced to
    consider whether enough of our nuclear deterrent would be able to
    survive a massive Soviet strike and retaliate with force sufficient to
    deter. Since many of the scenarios that preoccupied our military
    planners began with a non-nuclear war in the center of Europe, the
    control of escalation was fundamental to our strategy.
        In those circumstances, the argument was made first by American
    strategists and scientists and, eventually, by Soviet officials, that
    the deployment of a missile defense by the United States would threaten
    the Soviet ability to destroy us in a retaliatory attack if we should
    launch a massive nuclear strike against them. Thus, it was argued, any
    American missile defense would inevitably be countered by a build-up of
    Soviet missiles and bombers. An effort to defend ourselves would simply
    stimulate an arms race as the Soviets sought to neutralize our defense
    by expanding their offense. That was the core argument against missile
    defenses and it was made in the context of a bitter, deadly cold war
    between two nuclear powers with fundamentally different philosophies
    and interests.
        I remember well the debate about the Safeguard missile defense
    system in 1969 and 1970. Much of it took place before this very
    Committee. In the end, in 1970, the Senate, by a single vote, approved
    going forward with the Safeguard defense system.
        Armed with the authority to begin building defenses, the Nixon
    administration, led by Henry Kissinger, negotiated a treaty with the
    Soviet Union essentially banning the deployment of missile defenses.
    Signed in 1972, the ABM Treaty, together with an interim agreement on
    offensive weapons, sought to freeze the growth of offensive missile
    forces and to fix the balance between offense and defense.
        The ABM Treaty marked acceptance of the view that a legally-binding
    arrangement was necessary to achieve stability in the nuclear balance
    between hostile powers. (In the end the Soviets found ways
    significantly to expand its offensive forces with the result that the
    two agreements of 1972 largely failed to achieve their intended
    purpose.)
        When the ABM Treaty was before the Senate it was approved
    overwhelmingly. A number of Senators who has misgivings about whether
    the treaty would lock us in to a set of constraints that might later
    prove unwise were reassured by a key provision in the treaty: the right
    of either side to withdraw 180 days after giving notice.
        At this point, Mr. Chairman, you might well ask: why is he boring
    us with this ancient history?
        The answer is that much current thinking about missile defense--and
    especially about the ABM Treaty--is mired in ancient history, the
    history--and context--of the Cold War.
        Today the United States stands naked before its enemies, unable to
    intercept even a single ballistic missile aimed, by accident or design,
    at our territory. Many Americans are shocked to learn that this
    condition of abject vulnerability has been the freely chosen policy of
    the government of the United States, and is widely--if superficially--
    supported by many of our allies. It is a legacy of the Cold War.
        Frozen in the Cold War like a fly in amber, those who oppose
    missile defense because it is inconsistent with the ABM Treaty believe
    our exposure to attack by ballistic missiles actually makes us safer.
    Therefore, they argue, the vulnerability that developed during the Cold
    War should continue--a permanent feature of American policy, enshrined
    forever in the ABM Treaty or some minor modification of it.
        Operating on an autopilot set during the Cold War, the opponents of
    a missile defense argue that a technologically serious defense, even if
    limited, would precipitate an arms race because other nuclear powers,
    especially Russia, would build additional missiles to overwhelm any
    defense we might deploy.
        Perhaps this is why (according to talking points prepared for
    official U.S.-Russian meetings) American officials in the last
    administration sought to assure the Russians that even if the United
    States built a modest ground-based defense, Russia would still be able
    to incinerate the United States after a massive American nuclear
    strike. It is hard to imagine a mind-set more reflective of the Cold
    War than that. Yet this is the logic that animates the idea that the
    ABM is the ``cornerstone'' of strategic stability.
        The idea of the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of stability is simply
    anachronistic--and dangerous. How can a treaty that was the cornerstone
    of stability in 1972 still constitute a cornerstone in the year 2001?
    After all, there is almost nothing in common between the geopolitical
    situation in the middle of the Cold War and the situation today. That
    is why Henry Kissinger, who managed the negotiations that resulted in
    the ABM Treaty, has argued wisely and convincingly that it no longer
    serves American interests.
        Far from assuring ``stability,'' the Cold War doctrine that we must
    seek safety through voluntary vulnerability is dangerously ill-
    conceived. Consider the core of the argument, that the Russians would
    build more nuclear weapons if we were to build a defense against
    ballistic missiles.
        Since we have no defense, a nuclear force consisting of even one
    missile could do catastrophic harm to Los Angeles or Washington or New
    York. A handful would mean destruction beyond imagination. Now, suppose
    we were to deploy a defense capable of countering not one or a handful,
    but a few hundred incoming warheads. With such a defense, we might no
    longer be vulnerable--as we are today--to such nuclear powers as, say,
    Britain or France. Would the British feel compelled to build more
    nuclear weapons to overpower our defense? Of course not. They don't
    regard the United States as an enemy. It is the political context, not
    the weapons themselves, that determine whether, and to what extent, any
    particular military capability is threatening--and whether agreements
    banning it are a source of stability.
        Now that the Cold War is over, should Russia regard us as an enemy?
    We are more likely to send Mr. Putin a check than a massive barrage of
    missiles with nuclear warheads. We have sought in countless ways to
    work with, not against, the Russians. It is unimaginable that we would
    launch thousands of nuclear weapons against Russia and hope to benefit
    thereby. That would be true even if we had a defense that would knock
    down every missile that might be launched in retaliation.
        Would it make sense for Mr. Putin to respond to an American defense
    against North Korea or Saddam Hussein by building more missiles? Is the
    Russian economy such that a vast investment in new weapons, aimed at
    the United States, would benefit his country? It is sometimes said in
    response that it is perceptions, not reality, that counts. If the
    Russians or the Chinese perceive the United States as a threat and
    therefore regard any anti-missile system it may build as a danger,
    shouldn't the United Sates stand down?
        This seems to me a particularly unwise line of argument. In
    psychiatry it would lead to humoring paranoids by accepting their
    paranoia and acting to accommodate baseless fears. In science, it would
    mean the abandonment of rigor and discipline, pretending instead of
    proving. In international politics, it would mean nurturing rather than
    finding ways to correct false and dangerous and even self-fulfilling
    ideas.
        The Cold War is over; but we will not realize the full benefit of
    its passing until everyone involved behaves accordingly, abandoning the
    fears and apprehensions of half a century of conflict and the ideas
    about security that flowed from, and were reflected in, that long, dark
    conflict.
        By clinging to the idea that the security of others is diminished
    if the United States is protected against missile attack, some
    Americans and a number of European leaders, perhaps unwittingly, and
    certainly ironically, are perpetuating the anxiety of the Cold War.
    That is a climate we must now transcend.
        We should proceed to develop and deploy defenses against the Saddam
    Hussein's of this world and we must explain, explain and explain again
    to President Putin that such a defense does not diminish the security
    of his country. We should be prepared to reduce sharply the size of our
    nuclear offensive forces both because the end of the Cold War enables
    us safely to do that and because it will lend credibility to our new
    approach to Russia.
        Mr. Chairman, some opponents of a robust missile defense, including
    President Chirac, argue that such a defense would encourage the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons.
        Yet the opposite is far more likely. Imagine a sharp rise in
    tension between India and Pakistan. Both countries have nuclear weapons
    and ballistic missiles. Suppose the United States could dispatch an
    Aegis cruiser to the region with instructions to intercept any
    ballistic missile fired by either side. Such a capability in American
    hands would be highly stabilizing, reducing the likelihood of conflict,
    discouraging the use of offensive missiles, and reassuring to both
    sides.
        Other nations, like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are actively
    trying to acquire missiles capable of attacking the United States. They
    believe that acquiring even a single missile will catapult them into a
    select class of states capable of inflicting massive damage on the
    United States. Given time and money, a single missile, or even several,
    is not beyond their reach. But suppose that we were to construct a
    defense that could intercept all the warheads and decoys carried by 100
    or 200 enemy missiles. A Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jung Il would need
    that number to be confident he could land a missile on New York or
    Chicago or an allied capital. In that case, even a determined adversary
    might well throw up his hands and conclude that such a missile force is
    beyond his reach.
        The best way to protect against a missile attack is to discourage
    our adversaries from investing in the missiles in the first place.
    There can be no more powerful disincentive than to have a shield that
    guarantees their hugely expensive programs will fail. It is that
    shield, based on our most advanced technology--not an outdated treaty--
    that will protect us best.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We are now going to give the witnesses an opportunity to
    respond to each other. Mr. Perle, your testimony was not
    presented in advance, as the rules require. The other two
    witnesses did present their testimony in advance so that we had
    an opportunity to read them. You had an opportunity to read the
    other statements, so we are going to give each of you an
    opportunity to respond to the other's comments for a few
    minutes, and then begin our first round of questions.
        Mr. Berger.
        Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, I would make a few observations,
    because I think I would really like to engage with this
    committee. First of all, I suspect we all might object to the
    proposition that something over 30 is, ipso facto, obsolete.
    That would include most of us.
        But putting aside that comment, I find it, first of all,
    rather startling that Mr. Perle takes objection to my saying
    that the Russians could believe that our attempt, or could see
    our attempt, to build a system, the definition of which they do
    not know, with very little opportunity to engage, as an
    opportunity to gain unilateral advantage, and be concerned
    about the context of not that we are going to launch a nuclear
    strike against them, but what do we do in a crisis if we had
    that capability.
        We have been toe-to-toe quite recently. I find it ironic
    that he would take objection to that, and say that is
    responsible and yet in a sense say to Saddam Hussein and Kim
    Jong Il and the rogue-state leaders that their threat of
    coercion against us will work. That is, we do not have the will
    to respond either preemptively or otherwise to a rogue state
    that threatens to wipe out an American city with a long-range
    nuclear weapon.
        He is saying, essentially, do not believe that we will use
    these things for deterrence. He is saying our deterrence will
    not work, to Saddam Hussein. I think that is equally unwise.
    The fact of the matter is, I cannot believe any President,
    faced with the statement by Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il that
    he is threatening Los Angeles would not preemptively eliminate
    the source of that threat, and I think we should be very
    careful in saying that deterrence does not work against rogue
    states, because the very statement of that lowers our security.
        Second of all, I think again what Mr. Perle has
    demonstrated is a single-minded view of our national security,
    and essentially said at the end let us just get rid of the
    treaty. That is the objective.
        Well, to me the objective is, let us enhance our security,
    and it seems to me that while we do have a rogue-state missile
    threat, we need to deal with it. The first line of defense is
    deterrence. There may be desire for an insurance policy, a
    value in an insurance policy in the nature of a defensive
    system.
        How we go about that matters, and if we say right now, as I
    hear the administration saying, and I certainly hear Mr. Perle
    saying, we are going to do that without regard to what you
    think, we are going to just abrogate the ABM Treaty, or as the
    administration says, we are going, in the next 6 months, to be
    at a point where we either are bumping up against the treaty,
    or abrogate it, I think we cannot ignore the potential that
    there will be consequences and that there will be consequences
    in a number of different respects.
        The Russians, in that situation, not knowing, because we
    have not told them what the purpose and scope of this defensive
    system is, I think quite possibly will respond in various ways,
    including eroding the framework of arms control, which gives us
    verification, transparency, and predictability.
        I believe if our allies see us proceeding in this way
    without regard to trying to reach some sort of a strategic
    framework, as the President has said, they will think that our
    objective is getting rid of treaties, not enhancing our
    security. I do not think they will support us, and under those
    circumstances I do not know how we deploy a system.
        I think in general, if you look only at one dimension here,
    the answer is self-evident. I think we ought to try to figure
    out how we get this apple if we need it without upsetting the
    entire apple cart in the process of doing that.
        I think you heard from Mr. Perle in perhaps slightly more
    pure form than you heard it from Deputy Secretary of Defense
    Wolfowitz what the objective is here, which is, the principal
    objective is, get rid of the treaty, and my judgment is, let us
    proceed here in a way that looks across the range of our
    interests and tries to maximize our security and not put us in
    a collision course with the world.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Coyle, do you have any
    comments for a couple of moments before we begin our round of
    questioning?
        Mr. Coyle. Just a brief one, Mr. Chairman. If I thought we
    knew how to build a national missile defense system that would
    work, in realistic operational situations, I would agree with
    Mr. Perle in his remarks about deterrence, but as I noted in
    the longer version of my statement, Pentagon briefings on
    national missile defense show a flawless plexiglass dome
    covering the United States. We imagine that incoming enemy
    missiles would bounce of it like hail off a windshield.
    Unfortunately, such a missile shield, even under the Bush
    administration concept for a layered system, is a practical
    impossibility.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Perle, do you have a couple of moments
    of rebuttal?
        Mr. Perle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Sandy Berger is
    right to observe that there have been some difficult situations
    with the Russians in the post-Cold War period. We have been
    toe-to-toe recently, he said. I do not believe that our nuclear
    arsenal had any bearing on the way in which those issues were
    dealt with. Whether we are talking about differences over
    Kosovo or differences about Chechnya or other differences, I
    simply do not believe that the nuclear arsenals of either
    nation are relevant to the way we conduct our relationship.
        Sandy Berger says of my argument that our deterrent will
    not work with Saddam Hussein. He is saying to Saddam Hussein
    that our deterrence will not work. Sandy Berger is saying that
    you can count on Saddam to be deterred by our deterrent, and I
    frankly do not want to count on the rational judgment of a man
    who has used poison gas against his own people, who has
    murdered his own closest associates, and whose stability and
    rationality cannot be assumed, because when we discover that
    deterrence did not work it will be too late. This applies, as
    well, to an accident. After the accident, it will be too late.
        I am sure that Mr. Coyle will tell us that there are no
    foolproof systems. There are no absolute systems. There is
    reason to be concerned about how safe nuclear arsenals are over
    the long term, particularly in the deteriorating circumstances
    of the former Soviet Union, so it seems to me simple prudence
    that you do not bet the life of an American city, you do not
    bet the lives of millions of Americans, on the theoretical
    confidence that you will deter a Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jong
    Il, or some other individual who may possess the means to
    attack us who we do not even know today. Unless you believe
    that for the foreseeable future there is no danger, it makes
    sense to begin the process of a prudent insurance.
        Now, Sandy says if we just abrogate the treaty we cannot
    ignore the consequences, and I agree with that. Of course we
    cannot ignore the consequences. We also cannot ignore the
    consequences of continuing the treaty, of continuing the Cold
    War relationship, which is the context for that treaty, and he
    has suggested the Russians will respond, or may respond by
    eroding arms control.
        I am not quite sure what that means. I think what he meant
    to say is, they may respond by holding on to more nuclear
    weapons than they would otherwise have, or that they might
    respond by building new nuclear weapons. I tried to address
    that issue in my testimony, and it is up to you to judge
    whether that would be a rational and sustainable decision by
    Mr. Putin, whether he would conclude that it is in Russia's
    best interest to invest further in nuclear weapons because we
    had deployed a defense against the Saddam Husseins of the
    world.
        He said further, our allies will not support us. In the
    recent weeks of this debate, I have met with any number of
    allied officials, dozens, and I have been encouraged by the way
    in which, as they listen to the argument, as this committee is
    listening to the argument, they have come to adjust their view,
    which in some cases was, indeed, an expression of opposition,
    and it is much less opposition today, and if we continue this
    argument in a careful and deliberate and rational way, I am
    convinced most of our allies will support us, but we have to do
    what is best for our own security. We are not going to take a
    vote among our allies and have our policy determined by them.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. I think we can have a 10-minute
    round here. We have three witnesses, and I think that would
    work all right. I did not consult with my colleague on that,
    but let us try a 10-minute round of questions here.
        Senator Warner. I am just wondering about the schedules of
    our colleagues. I simply would like to have a 6-minute round.
        Chairman Levin. We will do that. We will have 6-minute
    rounds.
        Senator Warner. We could perhaps go to a second round.
        Chairman Levin. We will have a second round, if necessary.
        Mr. Coyle, your written testimony says that development of
    an effective NMD network, even one with only a limited
    capability to intercept, will take a decade or more. This is
    for simple technical and budgetary reasons. In the near term,
    the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing. Now, we
    have been given testimony that is somewhat different from that,
    which is that there are constraints.
        Secretary Wolfowitz told us the following: that we designed
    a program to develop and deploy as soon as is appropriate.
    Developing a proper layered defense will take time. It requires
    a more aggressive exploration of key technologies, particularly
    those that have been constrained by the ABM Treaty, so the
    administration is arguing that the ABM Treaty constrains
    testing in the near term. You have indicated that it does not.
    I would like you to comment on that.
        Also, have you read the three pages given to us by
    Secretary Wolfowitz, one page for each of the three possible
    technology testing, which could bump up or conflict with the
    ABM Treaty within months, and if you would comment particularly
    on the test bed situation, as to whether or not that is
    necessary, does it add something? If so, does that not
    conflict, in a few months, with the ABM Treaty, and then how
    does that then fit with your statement that in the near term
    the ABM Treaty hinders neither development nor testing?
        Mr. Coyle. Perhaps I could give a general answer first and
    then go to the specifics. We have been testing for years, in
    full compliance with the ABM Treaty, national missile defenses,
    and there are many tests still to be done. For example, the
    tests that are being done so far, the intercepts occur very
    close to Kwajalein.
        Obviously, you would want to do tests where the intercepts
    really were at mid-course, which they have not been so far, but
    that is something you can do under the ABM Treaty now, just
    like the tests we have already been doing.
        Also, as many scientists have pointed out, you would want
    to do tests with different kinds of countermeasures, different
    kinds of decoys, but again that is something that you can do
    right now from Kwajalein or Vandenberg or Kodiak, if that turns
    out to be a new test site, as well.
        Similarly, you would want to do tests at different ranges,
    different trajectories, but all of those things take time and
    money, and there is nothing about them that requires new
    freedoms from the ABM Treaty.
        With respect to boost-phase missile defenses, it is true
    that the treaty prohibits mobile defenses, such as from a ship,
    but we already know that the Navy missiles that they have now
    are too slow for boost-phase defense. They need to be twice as
    fast, so those new rockets would have to be developed and
    tested, something we have to do now at Kwajalein, White Sands,
    or other places. We already know that the radars on those ships
    are not suitable for NMD-class engagements, so new radars have
    to be built. Again, that would take time and money. So that is
    again why I said what I said.
        Chairman Levin. If you would just focus, because of time
    constraints, on the test results at Fort Greely now.
        Mr. Coyle. With respect to Fort Greely, my understanding is
    the administration does not intend to launch from Fort Greely
    for test purposes because of nearby populations of caribou and
    the like, so the things you might do there are store missiles
    that you would launch from Kodiak. I suppose there is nothing
    wrong with that, but that is not much of a test purpose. You
    could just as well store them at Kodiak, and it might be safer
    than hauling them from the middle of a very large state like
    Alaska down to Kodiak.
        Fort Greely is the place where the Army has had its cold-
    regions test center, and it gets miserably cold there in the
    winter. I suppose an argument could be made also that you could
    learn something about operating a potential operational site at
    Fort Greely by having equipment there, because things that work
    in the rest of the world do not work at Fort Greely.
        But again, there are many things that need to be done
    first, long before we would get to those kinds of issues.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Perle, you have said whether or not the
    ABM constrains this testing or not, that we should withdraw
    from the ABM Treaty, is that accurate?
        Mr. Perle. Yes, Senator. Can I just say one thing on the
    testing?
        Chairman Levin. If you do not mind, because of time
    constraints, do you then disagree with Mr. Kissinger's comment
    that unilateral American decisions should be a last resort?
        Mr. Perle. No. I think we should have and are having a
    dialogue with the Russians.
        Chairman Levin. You do believe, then, that the most
    powerful country, as he puts it, should not adopt unilateralism
    until the possibilities of an agreement have been fully
    explored? Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Perle. Yes. I think as a general rule, that sounds----
        Chairman Levin. No, as a specific rule here, relative to
    withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, do you agree that the most
    powerful country in the world should not adopt unilateralism
    until the possibilities of agreement have been fully explored?
    Do you agree to that statement relative to withdrawal from the
    ABM Treaty?
        Mr. Perle. No. Stated that way, I do not agree with it.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Berger, on the question of Shemya,
    which in the last budget we had put some money in for Shemya,
    if we had deployed that radar at Shemya, there would have been
    a clear violation of the ABM Treaty at some point.
        The point has been made that we did that without a
    compliance review group deciding anything, we did other testing
    without a compliance review group telling us that a particular
    test would be in compliance, and in the case of Shemya, we
    actually put money in which, if obligated at a certain point,
    at least, along the construction curve would have violated the
    ABM Treaty. What is the difference between what this budget
    request is asking for, if any, and what we did in the last year
    of the Clinton administration relative to Shemya?
        Mr. Berger. I think the context is entirely different, Mr.
    Chairman. The context of last year's budget request, which did
    include money for Shemya which we did not actually spend, meant
    we were embarked upon a testing program that was consistent
    with the treaty: we had a discrete, specific architecture for a
    treaty, we were engaged in negotiations with the Russians, and
    had amendments on the table, including amendments to START III,
    so that is one context.
        In this context, the administration has told you that their
    intent is to bump up against the treaty in the next several
    months, that as someone said in the New York Times today, a
    senior administration official, we do not want to have formal
    restrictions on development testing and deployment, similar to
    what Mr. Perle has said, so the context is different.
        You have an administration that is putting you on notice
    that their intent is, essentially, to bump up against this
    treaty in the next several months unless the Russians agree to
    some new strategic framework in that period of time, so I think
    the context here is entirely different between where we were a
    year ago, a testing program consistent with the treaty, in the
    context of an ongoing negotiation and specific architecture,
    and an administration which seems in my judgment to be heading
    toward the horizon for abrogation unless, in the next few
    months, we can replace 50 years of strategic policy with a new
    strategic framework. I do not think that is enough time.
        I actually believe, if I could add one thing, Mr. Chairman,
    it may be possible to reach a deal with President Putin. I
    agree with Senator Warner. I do not think it is at all
    inconceivable that the Russians would agree to changes in the
    ABM system that would accommodate a more robust testing
    program, or that would in other ways accommodate some of what
    we want to do.
        But I do not believe that in the absence of telling them
    what we intend to do, what the architecture is, with some
    people, Mr. Perle writing in the Wall Street Journal saying we
    should have a residual capacity against the Russians in a
    defensive system without knowing what the architecture is, and
    saying in February, March, we are basically going to be between
    a rock and a hard place, I just think we are not creating
    enough space here, and it is in that context that I say to Mr.
    Perle that I think the allies are going to be deeply troubled.
        If they see us acting here in a prudent, responsible way,
    as the President has suggested, trying to move to a new
    strategic framework, I applaud them for that, but that is not
    going to happen overnight. I think over time it is conceivable
    they will come around.
        If they see that our objective is abrogation, and that our
    testing regime is neither necessary, as Mr. Coyle said, in
    terms of aggressive pursuit of a range of technologies, and is
    designed in a sense to create this kind of confrontation and
    create this collision as soon as possible, I think we are going
    to be isolated in the world. I think that matters.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman and witnesses, I think we have
    had another good day of hearing our witnesses come forth and
    share their views. I have certain agreements with each of you
    and certain disagreements, so I will start with my long-time
    friend, Mr. Perle.
        I thoroughly benefitted by your historical references as to
    how this whole concept of the ABM Treaty evolved. You were here
    in this building, and I was across the river in that period of
    time, and we were young and vigorous in those days. We do
    respect the framework and the concept of our elders, and I
    think that the withdrawal clause was put in there for a
    purpose; to enable both sides to have essential flexibility in
    the face of change.
        I think, Mr. Berger, you underestimate how much change has
    really taken place since May 1972, and ironically I was there,
    primarily for other purposes, but as a part of that delegation
    which took place in Moscow in May 1972. I remember it very
    well.
        But let me start with how I disagree with each of our
    witnesses to some extent.
        Mr. Perle, I am of the frame of mind that the ABM Treaty in
    a sense has outlived its justifications and foundations, but I
    also believe that you have to deal with Congress as the chief
    executive. As Congress moves toward a new framework of
    understandings with Russia given Congress as a partner, and
    that a number of our colleagues have strong views, contrary to
    those of the President, we should thoroughly explore first a
    two-step process:
        Step 1, to see whether or not we can conceive of a series
    of amendments to the ABM Treaty which, in effect, would give us
    a new framework, almost in the nature of a substitute amendment
    which is a phrase we use frequently on the Senate floor. I
    think that that is within the realm of possibility of our
    President to negotiate the new framework and somehow leave some
    vestiges of the ABM Treaty in place. This would address the
    difficulty so many nations have understanding on the heels of
    the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty why our country has not
    consistently gone ahead with the old framework.
        So keep an open mind. Eventually I think our President can
    show Russia the advantages of having an entirely new framework,
    but I do believe amendments can accommodate the near-term
    objectives of our President as he devises essential new steps
    in an architecture which I strongly support. We will take it a
    step at a time. That is my view.
        Mr. Berger, I think you have very carefully analyzed the
    relationships between the United States and the former Soviet
    Union, today Russia, but we cannot be unmindful of the fact
    that a lot of nations are hell-bent on trying to acquire one or
    more of these weapons for whatever purpose they wish.
        We dwell on my good friend and former chairman's views
    about the threat of one single weapon in the suitcase, and we
    are expending enormous sums of money, primarily in
    intelligence, to intercept those types of threats, but we are
    not spending commensurate funds to give us the essential
    ability to stop one or two missiles fired against the United
    States.
        We have seen here recently two events involving the finest-
    trained military people. In Russia, they lost their submarine.
    We all know that their finest go into the submarine force. No
    dollars are spared in terms of safety, training, and capability
    in modern submarines, and then we saw gross negligence by the
    commanding officer of a submarine in Hawaii, when that
    submarine surfaced and caused the loss of life of innocent
    people.
        Mistakes happen in the military. Mistakes can happen with
    the aging forces in Russia today--its missile forces which they
    can no longer economically support in the numbers they have.
    Accidents happen with our military as well. So we have to
    prepare ourselves against that type of situation.
        I hope, Mr. Berger, in the course of your remarks this
    morning you can allay any concerns I have in listening to you
    that you might advocate a preemptive nuclear first strike
    against these countries that threaten us with their ballistic
    missiles, as opposed to putting a defensive system in to
    interdict that missile. Preemptive strikes by a superpower like
    ours against a small nation of helpless people, I just hope you
    will correct that in the course of the morning, I will move on
    to another subject, which is directly related to this.
        We wake up this morning, to hear Russian President Putin
    advocating that he wants to join NATO. Now, it may be just
    jocular rhetoric on his part as he goes off to meet with our
    President, but that is something that has been discussed from
    time to time in your administration and others. What is your
    assessment? I will lead off with you, Mr. Berger. What is your
    assessment of his comments this morning, because if he were to
    join NATO, it seems to me we could very quickly reach an
    accommodation with regard to missile defense, because it is in
    the common interests of Russia as well as the United States.
        Mr. Berger. I think that is a long way off in the future,
    at the very least.
        Senator Warner. I certainly would not advocate it at this
    point in time. I think it would be the demise of NATO.
        Mr. Berger. Let me say I certainly agree, and the Clinton
    administration was never accused of underestimating the change
    in Russia over the last 8 years. I certainly agree that there
    is a new Russia, new leadership, new democracy, but in fact it
    is in part because of their crumbling offense, the fact that
    they cannot put their subs out on deployment, they cannot
    deploy their strategic aircraft, that a defensive system that
    we do not define for them in a system without rules, is going
    to cause them concern.
        I do not think that concern is a trump card. I do not think
    that we ask their permission. We certainly did not as we were
    proceeding with our system, but I do think that we have to look
    smartly at how they could respond to decrease what they already
    see, as they lose confidence in their deterrent and as they see
    an increasing vulnerability from their own economic----
        Senator Warner. Excuse me, under my time constraints, I
    would like to have Mr. Perle address that.
        Mr. Berger raises the question which I think we have to
    respond to, the timetable that the Bush administration has put
    down to achieve a new framework is so unrealistic that it
    raises a credible inference that their subliminal intention is
    to just trash the treaty from the beginning. I think our
    testimony here from Mr. Wolfowitz went a long way to dispel any
    basis for that assertion, but nevertheless, you have spent many
    years in the negotiating field.
        Go back to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) weapons in
    Europe. We took in the 1980s a very assertive stance, quickly
    told them what we were going to do, and while our allies
    objected initially, eventually that unfolded successfully.
        Mr. Perle. Senator, I think this is unlike the issues, the
    arms control issues of the Cold War, where every detail was
    important, where we wanted to cross every T and dot every I,
    and the difference is, we are talking about a whole new
    conceptual relationship between the United States and Russia.
    It is not a question of the details, it is a question of the
    concept.
        Sandy Berger wants to stick with the old concept. He does
    not like the idea of replacing 50 years of strategic policy in
    a few months' time, but that was 50 years of policy during the
    Cold War. The Cold War is over.
        It is rather more akin to demobilization after a world war,
    and so I do not think we need protracted negotiations to say to
    the Russians, unless you can conceive of an American, a
    massive--and we are talking thousands of weapons, nuclear
    attack on Russia, you do not need to be concerned about the
    very limited defense we have in mind. I frankly find it hard to
    imagine how a Russian across the table could say we would be
    concerned about a defense against a modest number of ballistic
    missiles that might be aimed at you.
        How could they justify that concern, and if they cannot,
    and I believe they cannot, then we should put this treaty
    behind us, and without regret. It served a useful purpose
    during the Cold War. It now prevents us from mounting a modest
    defense against a Saddam Hussein or against an accident.
        On balance, and I think the chairman put the question
    exactly right at the outset, are we better off with the treaty,
    or are we safer with or without it? On balance, the threat of
    an accident or a rogue state is much greater than the
    likelihood of a nuclear war, deliberate, massive nuclear war
    between the United States and Russia.
        Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, can I add one comment to that?
        Senator Warner. I am going to defer to the chairman. I
    think we had best stick to our time.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
    three of you for excellent testimony this morning.
        I want to pick up on a question Senator Warner raised, and
    it goes to the heart of the changing strategic relationship
    between Russia and the United States, which is in many ways the
    premise, or it is certainly the reassuring context that the
    administration and others who support development of a national
    missile defense put forward, which is that the Cold War is
    over. Russia and the United States are no longer enemies,
    therefore, why is Russia concerned about our development of a
    missile defense?
        I must say in that regard that, although this is not the
    first time this has been discussed, I took President Putin's
    comment at the press conference--I believe it was in Moscow
    yesterday--about his own interest in altering the strategic
    framework and in having Russia be considered for membership in
    NATO as a significant statement, and it is one that I hope on
    which the administration will engage him.
        I hope President Bush will pick President Putin up in their
    discussions in Europe this weekend, because if, in fact--and
    look, NATO was created, as I understand its history, for two
    reasons. One, obviously, was in response to the Warsaw Pact, as
    the centerpiece of a Cold War confrontation. The other, which
    is so often ignored, but at which NATO has been extraordinarily
    historically successful, is to form an institution in which
    historic enmities within Europe could be reconciled.
        I mean, after all, we were talking about, this is a post-
    Second World War institution in which previous enemies in the
    Second World War, Germany, France, Britain, came together and
    have formed an alliance over the years.
        We have already begun to work with Russia, I think quite
    constructively, in the Balkans, so I do not think there should
    be any inherent reason not to commence with such discussions.
        They have another salutary effect. There are qualifications
    for membership in NATO. Some of them go to military
    comparability and preparedness. Obviously, Russia is in a much
    better position than some of the other nations we have taken in
    to meet that standard, and the others go to proof of the
    vibrancy or reality of democracy, which is an important
    additional guarantee to the people of Russia, who have suffered
    for too long under communism.
        So I hope we will engage President Putin on this. I think
    it is a great thing to happen now, as we begin to talk to him
    about missile defense and modifications, or even abandonment of
    the ABM Treaty, because what better way than to say, President
    Putin, history has changed, the Cold War is over, we are no
    longer enemies, so much so that we are prepared to begin a
    process which may lead to your admission in to NATO, where you
    will generally be our ally.
        My question is this. Just very briefly, I have been saying
    at these hearings, and I think the National Missile Defense Act
    of 1999, which passed the Senate 97 to 3, committed the United
    States to a policy of developing a national missile defense
    against limited attack as soon as it is technologically
    feasible, so to me the question is not whether we are going to
    have a missile defense, but when.
        I also think, in truth, that the adoption of that act put
    us on another course, which was to have a missile defense
    obviously at some point requires either the comprehensive
    modification or abandonment of the ABM Treaty. You cannot have
    both, and, therefore, I think the question about ABM is not
    whether it will be altered, but when and how, and those are the
    questions that I want to ask particularly Mr. Berger.
        Mr. Perle, I was troubled in this regard to read a
    statement in the New York Times today from Condoleezza Rice,
    President Bush's National Security Advisor. The reporter said,
    first, the White House has no interest in detailed talks about
    permissible testing and deployments--this is on missile
    defense--and then, ``this is not about lining in, lining out
    the ABM Treaty to try to get a little bit of flexibility to do
    this test or that test.''
        I presume she is talking about a broader alteration, but
    if, in fact, we are going to violate the ABM Treaty soon, as I
    think Mr. Berger is saying this morning, modifications are
    necessary or we are going to have to totally withdraw and
    precipitate a crisis, so I would ask the two of you two
    questions, Mr. Berger and Mr. Perle.
        First, listening to Mr. Coyle particularly, who thinks we
    are not in any danger in the near term of violating the ABM
    Treaty, speaking generally and simplistically, to the extent
    that the two of you understand the administration's program
    here, when do you think we are going to violate the ABM Treaty,
    which would require us to pull out? Second, perhaps covered in
    the last round, why not modify the ABM Treaty if, in fact,
    there is going to be a violation soon, rather than forcing what
    may be very difficult, which is a major reorganization of the
    geopolitical strategic architecture between Russia and the
    United States?
        Mr. Berger. Let me try to answer both of those questions as
    concisely as I can. I think what Mr. Coyle is saying is that we
    need not violate the ABM Treaty any time soon to have an
    aggressive program with respect to a range of technologies.
        Now, as I see it, as I read what the administration is
    putting forward, they have said they are going to bump up
    against the treaty in several months, and there are three ways
    in which that could happen. One is they have said there is
    going to be a PAC-3 test sometime in February. Now, if that is
    tested against a strategic missile, that would be a violation.
        Second of all, they said they are going to use Aegis
    radars. Depending on how that happens, that could raise a
    treaty issue on the test track. We have a right to additional
    test sites under the treaty when we notify the Russians of
    that. We do not have a right to do that inconsistent of the
    treaty. That is, if we are doing it as an operational base.
        So they have raised a series of--they have designed a test
    plan that they have said will bump up against the treaty, and
    depending on at least how those three tests go, could cross the
    line. I think what Mr. Coyle is saying--and I do not want to
    speak for him--is we want to be very aggressive in going
    against a range of technologies without bumping up for the time
    being.
        On the second question, why not modify, we tried. We
    designed an architecture which BMDO and the Pentagon said was
    the fastest, most mature, most affordable way to meet the
    threat before us, which was the rogue state threat against the
    United States, and as Mr. Coyle has said, we made a good deal
    of progress in moving toward that system.
        At the same time, we went to the Russians with a specific
    architecture and specific modifications. In the last 3 weeks,
    Senator Lieberman, I have heard four different rationales. We
    should have a system to defend ourselves against the United
    States, against rogue-state threats. That is what we were
    doing.
        Second, we should have a system that should protect us and
    the Europeans and our friends against long-range ballistic
    threats. That is a different system. I do not know whether the
    Europeans are volunteering to pay for their portion of that. I
    have not heard that yet.
        Third, we should have a system that does all of that plus
    enables us to deal with an unauthorized or accidental launch
    from Russia. That is a different system. Unless we know which
    SS-18 is going to accidentally launch, that is a different
    footprint.
        Others say we need a 360-degree system that can defend us
    against anything from anywhere.
        We are going to the Russians at this point saying, we
    cannot tell you what we are going to do. We cannot really tell
    you why we are going to do it. We cannot really tell you what
    we are asking you to do in the way of modifications. Just let
    us out of this treaty and trust us.
        I think that we have a better chance of doing what
    President Bush has said, which is negotiating a new strategic
    framework, if we give ourselves more room, and what Mr. Coyle
    is telling us is that we can do that without prejudice to the
    development of a range of technologies.
        Mr. Perle. Senator, the ABM Treaty says we cannot have a
    defense, and what it permits is insignificant. The question, it
    seems to me, before the country is do we want to continue to
    live with that prohibition? Do we want to try to open enough
    freedom to take the next step for the next few months, or do we
    want to deal with the fundamental underlying conceptual
    question of whether we are right to prohibit defenses on the
    theory that we are somehow going to be safer if those defenses
    are to be prohibited?
        What I put before the committee is an admittedly radical
    proposal. It is to recognize the way in which the world has
    changed, and not cling to this anachronism, and we would be
    clinging to the anachronism if we tried to deal with these
    small details in a way that would buy us some time.
        The whole idea of buying some time implies that this treaty
    is serving our interest, and therefore we should preserve it
    for as long as we can. I think it is no longer serving our
    interest. It is contrary to our interest, and the sooner we
    exercise the right that was agreed upon in 1972 that we can
    withdraw, the better, and it has the added benefit that it will
    put the U.S.-Russian relationship in a new and much healthier
    context than the one that produced that treaty and has led some
    people to cling to it.
        It is significant that in Russia the proponents of the
    treaty are the opponents of real change in the relationship
    between the United States and Russia. I am going to Moscow on
    the weekend to participate in the discussion, as I did last
    year, and I can tell you that the reformers, the most ardent
    reformers in Russia are the people who are most anxious to be
    rid of the Cold War context, and they are not in the least
    concerned about abandoning the ABM Treaty.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Berger, you are quoted, I guess in the International
    Herald Tribune on Friday, July 13, of this year, saying,
    ``China does not have the capability to be a destabilizing
    force in Asia, nor is there much evidence that it intends to do
    so.''
        Right now, with some 209 M-11 missiles, with the building
    of the destroyers, the submarines, with the upgrading of their
    platforms, with the recent purchase that--the number has not
    been confirmed, but around 240 SU-27s and SU-30s, which are
    state-of-the-art, and are actually better and more
    sophisticated than our F-15s and F-16s, and their air power
    conservatively estimated to be 3 to 1 over Taiwan, do you not
    believe that that military buildup is a destabilizing force on
    Taiwan?
        Mr. Berger. I think the sentence before the one you read,
    Senator--I have not seen how that was edited by the Herald
    Tribune--said that after several, a period of declining
    military budgets, the Chinese have increased their defense
    budgets. They are modernizing. These are things we need to be
    concerned about and to watch carefully. That was the context.
        Senator Inhofe. So they could be a destabilizing force?
        Mr. Berger. I think at this point, I do not see them having
    the capability to launch a successful attack against Vietnam or
    against Korea. I think Taiwan is a unique and very difficult
    set of problems, but my view is, we should be dealing with that
    in a very deliberate way.
        Senator Inhofe. Back during the Clinton administration,
    when you had the position of National Security Advisor, we went
    through an event that I know you were involved in, where we
    were all a little bit embarrassed after our intelligence had
    said that it would be somewhere around 5 years before North
    Korea would have the multiple stage rocket capability--I
    actually have a letter dated August 24, 1998, that stated
    that--then on August 31, they fired a three-stage missile
    capable of reaching the United States of America.
        It is also well-known that North Korea is selling--not just
    trading its technology but selling systems to Iraq and Iran.
    Can you sit here today and say that there are currently no
    weapons of mass destruction and ICBM threats to the United
    States from rogue nations today?
        Mr. Berger. I am troubled, very troubled by the Korean
    program, which is why, Senator, we did several things. We
    negotiated a missile test moratorium to stop their testing,
    number 1, in 1991. That moratorium holds still today. Number 2,
    we initiated discussions----
        Senator Inhofe. Let me interrupt you on that, because your
    recommendation number 7 in your opening statement was, and I
    wrote it down here, ``negotiate with North Korea to stop the
    missile threat.'' You essentially did that, and it is my
    understanding that there is strong evidence of testing that is
    taking place since that agreement was made.
        Mr. Berger. I do not know. You have greater access at this
    point to classified information than I do, Senator. I am not
    aware of any long-range testing by the Koreans since that
    moratorium. I think that is something we would know about and
    read on the front page of the New York Times.
        We also, at the very end of the Clinton administration,
    began a conversation with the North Koreans about stopping
    their exports to states in the Middle East and elsewhere, and
    about ending their program. We did not have enough time to
    satisfy ourselves that we could reach an agreement that would
    reach our standard in terms of verification and otherwise, but
    I think we have an obligation to see whether we can negotiate
    away the threat in a verifiable way.
        Senator Inhofe. This is chewing up my time rapidly, so I
    think your statement is that you feel comfortable in
    negotiating with North Korea to stop the missile threat. You
    have enough confidence in them.
        Mr. Berger. I do not think that is the only thing: Trust,
    but verify.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Perle, do you have any comments to make
    about either of those two things? First of all, can we sit here
    today and assume that there is no threat from a rogue nation
    today, in light of this trading of technology and systems with
    North Korea?
        Mr. Perle. No, I do not think we can make that assumption.
    There is a great deal we simply do not know, and we have to
    assume that we could be surprised.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you totally trust the North Koreans to
    agree to stop their missile threat?
        Mr. Perle. I do not trust the North Koreans at all.
        Senator Inhofe. On the missile, the ABM Treaty.
        Mr. Berger. I would say I agree with that statement.
        Senator Inhofe. On the ABM Treaty of 1972, this was back
    when, as we have said before, the Soviet Union was our enemy.
    Is Russia our enemy today?
        Mr. Berger. Senator, I find it somewhat ironic to hear
    myself cast here as the defender of old things, since Mr. Perle
    spent most of the last 8 years saying we had an overly romantic
    view of Russia. The fact is, a lot has changed, and Russia is
    not our enemy. The Soviet Union does not exist. The Cold War
    does not exist. We promoted NATO in large measure----
        Senator Inhofe. They are our ally.
        Mr. Berger. They are not our ally, but they are not our
    enemy, but that does not mean that they do not have a gigantic
    nuclear arsenal, and that they are still not a strategic
    dynamic, and there is still not danger and uncertainty.
        Senator Inhofe. Just a yes or no, do you think it could be
    argued, logically, that--and we want a missile defense system
    that will protect us but also our allies, and also Russia--it
    could be to their benefit for us to have this?
        Mr. Berger. I argued that to President Putin face-to-face.
    I said to President Putin, I think you ought to make these
    changes because I think it is in Russia's interest to have this
    system proceed in the context of arms control and in the
    context of constraints, not unbounded by constraints.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Berger, you said in your opening
    statement also that you agree with Henry Kissinger, and then
    you went on to talk about it. I would ask you also if you agree
    with another statement Henry Kissinger made.
        Henry Kissinger, having been the architect of the 1972 ABM
    Treaty, felt at that time, and frankly I did not agree with him
    at that time, but many people did, that mutually assured
    destruction (MAD) was the right thing to do.
        Since that time, that very architect has said he is very
    much opposed to its application today because of the changing
    world, the proliferation we have been talking about, and he
    said, ``It is nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.''
    Do you agree with Henry Kissinger on that statement?
        Mr. Berger. First of all, Senator, I do not know anybody
    saying we should abandon deterrence with respect to Russia,
    unless someone is saying we should build this system as a
    system designed against the Russian arsenal. No one is saying
    we should walk away from deterrence of mutual destruction. They
    are saying, do it at a lower level.
        What I am saying, and I think Henry Kissinger and I
    disagree on a number of aspects of this, what he is saying is
    big nations like the United States do not preemptively withdraw
    from treaties without demonstrating to the world that they have
    tried to make the changes that are necessary.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I have
    just one yes or no question for Mr. Coyle.
        Mr. Coyle, you said, and I believe national missile defense
    is being developed without the urgency of a threat. Don't you
    believe that, with the buildup that we are seeing in China, and
    with the comments that were made back when the demonstrations
    were taking place off the Taiwan Strait, and the comment was
    made that America would rather defend Los Angeles than Taipei,
    and when their defense minister said war with America is
    inevitable, would you not throw that into a category of urgency
    of a threat?
        Mr. Coyle. Senator, I find it hard to believe that North
    Korea would be so reckless as to attack----
        Senator Inhofe. No, I am talking about China now. This is
    China.
        Mr. Coyle. I would make the same comment. I find it hard to
    believe that China would try to attack the U.S. homeland
    tomorrow, whereas I can certainly imagine North Korea or China
    firing short-range missiles, and the sense of my testimony was
    I believe the short-range missile threat is much more urgent.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Perle, you premised a great deal of your testimony on
    the assertion, repeatedly, that the Cold War is over, and in a
    very obvious sense you are absolutely right, describing the
    conflict, the competition between the United States, the Soviet
    Union, China, and the Communist Bloc.
        But the Cold War is also a shorthand for a strategic
    situation where two nations have antithetical interests,
    commercial and ideological. They both have weapons of mass
    destruction that inhibits their use of conventional forces, and
    at the time that you are talking about the demise of the Cold
    War, you are also talking about the inability of nations
    acquiring these weapons, in effect, creating at least the
    dynamics of a Cold War in the future, i.e., two nations with
    antagonistic interests and nuclear weapons.
        In that sense, and I guess it goes back to the point that
    has been made by others, is there any way that we can step away
    from mutual assured destruction, ultimately, as a strategic
    concept?
        Mr. Perle. I think that ultimately we will, of course,
    reserve the right and the capability to respond with nuclear
    weapons under certain circumstances. I think the circumstances
    are becoming much narrower than they once were.
        We always preserve the right to use nuclear weapons to deal
    with a conventional attack in the center of Europe, for
    example. I no longer think that that makes sense. I believe
    that at the end of the day the role of nuclear weapons will be
    solely as a last resort, a response if nuclear weapons are used
    against us, and in all other contingencies we will have to find
    nonnuclear ways of protecting our interest and the interests of
    our allies.
        Where I think the world is fundamentally different now is
    that we cannot be sure that there will not be a missile fired
    by accident. We could not be sure before, but we did not have a
    ready response, and second there are countries and individuals
    who I believe it is imprudent to assume will be deterred in the
    way that we were able to deter the Soviet Union.
        I do not want to bet on the stability of a Saddam Hussein
    or a Kim Jong Il if they are in possession of a missile that
    can reach our territory with a warhead of mass destruction. I
    think we are in immediate jeopardy, and it is going to take,
    everyone agrees it is going to take, many years before we have
    a highly competent defense. They will argue that very
    effectively. It may take 30 years, and the second or third
    generation, before we have a defense that we can be completely
    confident about. We have to start somewhere.
        Senator Reed. I think we all agree we have started. The
    question is where are we going, what path, and how fast we are
    going, and without being facetious, but it seems that some of
    your foundation is psychoanalytical. You are looking into the
    mind, if not the soul, of these people, and concluding that
    they are irrational, whereas Joseph Stalin was reasonably
    rational, and others who are rather unseemly characters were
    rational, and essentially that is one of the great issues here,
    the rationality of our foes.
        Let me say something else, too, that in your concluding
    paragraph you say the best way to protect against a missile
    attack is to keep our adversaries from investing in the
    missiles in the first place. One of the problems I have with
    that is, our adversaries have their own adversaries.
        It would seem to me that the Indians and the Pakistanis are
    not developing nuclear weapons and missiles because they want
    to attack New York. It is because they are concerned about
    their border, the Iraqis, the Iranians, and as a result, if the
    premise is this national missile system is going to dissuade
    rogue states, or even developing states from developing
    missiles, I think that is an erroneous presumption.
        Mr. Perle. That is not my assumption at all. There are
    going to be additional nuclear powers. We do not worry about
    the British or French nuclear capabilities, and I do not worry
    about the Indian nuclear capability. I do not think India is
    going to attack the United States. I do worry about Saddam
    Hussein. I do worry about Kim Jong Il.
        Senator Reed. So this comes down, essentially your
    presumption is that you just feel that they are irrational,
    that they will sacrifice themselves and their regime in a
    conflict or a contest with the United States.
        Mr. Perle. I do not know whether they will or not, but I do
    not think you can rule that out. That is the difference. You
    can take the position that you are prepared to take that risk.
    Let us not have a defense and we will hope that neither Saddam
    Hussein, or Kim Jong Il, nor someone else in the future does
    something that we would consider totally irrational and launch
    an attack on the United States. That is a risk that I do not
    think we need to take, and given the catastrophic nature of
    getting that wrong, I want to err on the side of prudence and
    be able to intercept that missile.
        To repeat, this applies to an accident as well. There are
    no guarantees there will not be an accident.
        Senator Reed. A quick comment in response. The accident,
    there is also a possible consequence of our abandoning the ABM
    Treaty in that the Chinese, or perhaps even the Russians,
    decide they had to increase their alert status and for the
    Chinese to put warheads on their missiles, which ironically
    increases the chance of a dangerous accidental launch, but let
    me also go to Mr. Coyle for a quick question.
        It seems to me, as we go down here, we could find ourselves
    in a race between the offense and the defense, between our
    limited defensive shield and the capability of Iran or Iraq or
    North Korea to take offensive weapons and make them more
    effective than our defense, and in that way do you have any
    comment about who wins the offense or defense? You have looked
    at these systems.
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, Senator Reed. It is a classic comment,
    really, certainly not original with me, that in such matters as
    we are discussing here today, the offense always has the
    advantage. The United States being an open society, the defense
    trade journals will publish details of the work that we are
    doing on missile defenses, and an adversary will have insights
    about how to build countermeasures and decoys that could be
    very difficult for us to deal with.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Bunning.
        Senator Bunning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Berger, in your opening statement you say that we
    should take into account the reaction of the Chinese when we
    assess the risks and costs of developing missile defense for
    our citizens. Well, as Jim Inhofe has said, for years now over
    our strong objectives, the Chinese have been providing
    ballistic missile technology to many rogue nations, nations
    like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan that are the source
    of this missile threat to the United States.
        If the Chinese had not been providing this technology to
    these nations, we probably would not be here talking about this
    today. We would likely have no missile threat to us, at least
    not right now. Do you think that the Chinese should have
    thought about the risks and costs of giving missile technology
    to other countries like North Korea?
        The risks and costs to the Chinese turn out to be that we
    are forced to develop a system to protect ourselves. They may
    not like it, but they have made their bed and now they are
    going to have to sleep in it. Do you think that we should
    ignore the threats that have been created as a result of the
    Chinese proliferation, that we should let the Chinese, through
    third countries, create a threat to us and then not respond to
    that threat because they may not like it?
        Mr. Berger. I do not think it is a question at all of what
    they like, Senator Bunning. I think that the Chinese
    proliferation has been something that has been a serious
    problem. We spent a considerable amount of time in the Clinton
    administration trying to get greater constraint on Chinese
    proliferation practices. We made substantial progress in the
    nuclear area. We have made less progress in the missile area,
    and there is no question that the Chinese, among others, have
    added to the capability of the North Koreans and others.
        My point is simply this, that we cannot ignore, in
    assessing the overall consequences of this, what effect it will
    have in Asia. We are basically saying that we are acknowledging
    that this system will defeat the Chinese deterrent. Some are
    even suggesting that is part of its purpose, but we are saying
    the answer. The administration has said as well, we will just
    say, ``Fine, the Chinese can build up.''
        I find that actually to be a strange posture for the United
    States to be in a sense acquiescent to the buildup, and the
    only point I am trying to make here is that we have to assess
    as part of this overall equation, and it may lead ultimately to
    the conclusion that the best part of wisdom is going forward
    with a robust national missile defense.
        But the part of the equation is, what does it unleash in
    China or in Asia? What does China do? What do Pakistan and
    India do as a result?
        Senator Bunning. I think we understand that. I think
    because of the fact of the Chinese intervention in the creation
    of third countries and their proliferation, that we have
    reacted to that.
        Let me ask you some other questions. I understand that you
    were at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson. You represented the
    Chinese government, is that correct?
        Mr. Berger. That is not correct. I was at the law firm,
    along with my distinguished friend, Senator Warner, of Hogan &
    Hartson for about 15 years, but I did not represent the Chinese
    Government.
        Senator Bunning. Someone at the firm did.
        Mr. Berger. I do not know. There are 860 lawyers at that
    law firm, sir.
        Senator Bunning. That is a lot of lawyers.
        Mr. Berger. It sure is.
        Senator Bunning. God help us all. [Laughter.]
        You do not have an ongoing relationship with that law firm?
        Mr. Berger. I have my own firm now. They are a client of my
    firm, but I do not have any kind of----
        Senator Bunning. You do not have any relationship with the
    Government of China?
        Mr. Berger. I do not.
        Senator Bunning. In your prepared statement, you indicated
    that negotiations with Russia to modify the ABM Treaty would be
    difficult if we did not know the purpose and the architecture
    of the system. The purpose of the system is to protect our
    citizens against a limited ballistic missile attack. The reason
    that we do not have a defined architecture, as the
    administration has repeatedly explained, is because we do not
    know what will work the most effectively.
        The way to find that out is to conduct a rigorous testing
    program. That is what the administration is doing. Don't you
    think that it is irresponsible not to be sure we have the best
    system available to protect our citizens?
        Mr. Berger. Senator, the Pentagon and the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Organization said to us repeatedly during the 1990s
    that the most effective, fastest, affordable way to deal with
    the threat, I think all of us are saying, is the most immediate
    threat. That is the rogue state missile threat against the
    United States, to which the best response was a land-based,
    mid-course, limited system.
        Senator Bunning. But that was considering we were going to
    use the ABM Treaty, and it would still be in effect forever.
        Mr. Berger. No, that was inconsistent with the ABM Treaty,
    which is why we went to the Russians to seek to modify it, and
    why we reserved the right ultimately to decide to stay within
    it, but now we have a situation where we have blurred what we
    are doing here. Are we still focused on rogue state threats to
    the United States? Are we focused now on covering Europe?
        Senator Bunning. No. I think we are focused on protecting
    the citizens of the United States, primarily.
        Mr. Berger. I agree with that, Senator. That should be our
    only overriding and single-minded concern.
        Senator Bunning. I think that is the Bush administration's
    overriding concern. I cannot help what is being said in the
    press by other people.
        Mr. Berger. But what I am saying, Senator, is that
    acknowledging that, which I agree is not only a moral but in a
    sense a constitutional and patriotic responsibility, does not
    predetermine how you do that, and in doing that we cannot only
    look through the prism of saying, how do we get this system up,
    we also have to say, are the allies going to support us,
    because we need their participation in building the system.
        Senator Bunning. The allies and/or Russia and/or any other
    country have no veto power over us protecting our citizens.
        Mr. Berger. Senator, now, Mr. Coyle knows more about this
    than I do, but most of the systems that I have seen require
    radars and other activities on European soil, and so we
    cannot--we do not ask their permission to do what we need to
    do, but the fact of the matter is, we would need to build and
    expand radar for the system we were designing in England and
    Greenland, and therefore we need to proceed in a way here that
    maintains some degree of consensus. If we are seen as pushing
    pell-mell when it is not necessary to abrogate----
        Senator Bunning. We can debate about how necessary it is.
        Mr. Berger. The last thing, I agree we should be engaged in
    an aggressive effort to look at other technologies. One of the
    things I said to President Putin when I saw him was, you talked
    about boost-phased sea-based systems. They could be of benefit
    to you. Why shouldn't we develop them? Why shouldn't we change
    the ABM Treaty?
        Senator Bunning. My time has expired. I thank you for your
    comments. Mr. Putin's comments in the paper were very
    constructive today.
        Mr. Berger. I agree, and that is why I think it is possible
    to do this if we do it in the right way.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Cleland.
        Senator Cleland. Thank you very much to all of our
    panelists today. Let me just say, Mr. Berger, thank you very
    much for articulating what I think is the strategic question
    before us, and that is, are we going to pursue a WMD capability
    as our number 1 priority, or an NMD capability as our number 1
    priority? I think that really is the question.
        WMD, weapons of mass destruction, I think that is the great
    threat to the country. Every intelligence briefing I have been
    in for every one of the last 5 years that I have been here
    indicates the great threat to the country is not from some
    missile attack from some nation with a return address where you
    have to have a third-stage rocket or a nuclear missile, or a
    biological or chemical weapon, that is not the delivery system
    that is most likely to come our way. It is a WMD threat,
    weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, chemical,
    coming from a terrorist threat, backpack, truck, or whatever.
    That seems to be the way military installations have been
    attacked in recent years, the most recent being the U.S.S.
    Cole.
        Now, I think that that is right on target, and so I think
    our number 1 priority should be defending against WMD, not so
    much NMD.
        Now, in terms of treaties, I think that Mr. Coyle is
    correct, from what I understand, and being a strong advocate of
    the theater missile defense and research therein, namely
    supporting the Arrow missile defense system research and
    development, which is a very successful system with the
    Israelis going on, the third generation of Patriots, the
    Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), high altitude
    intercept program, all of that is consistent with the theater
    missile defense, and can be targeted to a Saddam Hussein or
    some rogue state.
        What bothers me is the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. We
    seem to be throwing the baby out with the bath water and
    triggering other things. About 3 days ago, I saw a chilling
    photograph on the front page of the New York Times. It shows
    the price that we are paying politically for pursuing pell-
    mell, as you say, the abrogation of the ABM Treaty to put
    together an NMD system that, at best, cannot be deployed for
    another 10 years; at best, is not the plexiglass shield that we
    are led to believe and; at best, is not the maximally effective
    against anybody who wants to put some decoys out there and
    attack either our forces or this country.
        The chilling photograph I saw as a result of our pell-mell
    efforts to abrogate the ABM Treaty and pursue this NMD quest
    was the President of Russia and the President of China
    embracing in a friendship pact. The last time Russia and China
    got together in a friendship pact was when Mao Tse Tung and
    Stalin got together, and a few months later the Korean War
    broke out.
        A few years later, the Vietnam War broke out, all with the
    support of Russia and China working together against the United
    States. That is a strategic concern I have. That is the price
    we are paying for this pell-mell pursuit, as you mentioned, on
    NMD, which I think is not necessary.
        Let me ask you, Mr. Berger, if you do not agree with this
    statement. It is a statement by Mr. Ivo Dadler of the Brookings
    Institution, quoted in today's New York Times. ``Treaties that
    place limits on the testing and deployment of defensive systems
    provide predictability to all sides about the future strategic
    environment, and it is that predictability that will enable
    Russia to avoid worst-case assumptions and to continue to
    reduce its nuclear arsenal significantly. It is wrong to equate
    arms control treaties with the Cold War. Treaties are an
    instrument for reducing tensions among states in a Cold War,
    and for avoiding a return to the Cold War.'' Is that something
    you would agree with?
        Mr. Berger. Yes, I do, Senator.
        Senator Cleland. Let me just say, would you also not agree
    with the German official quoted in the New York Times today
    about the impact of the ABM Treaty on our allies, particularly
    our NATO allies, with whom we just fought the Balkan War? The
    German official is quoted as saying, ``If the ABM Treaty is
    changed, it should be a negotiated solution between the United
    States, the Russians, and the Europeans, namely Germany. Our
    concern is that there is a framework that has served us well,
    and that we should only do away with it, with the old
    framework, if we have a better one.''
        Mr. Berger. I do not believe that we ever should rule out
    unilateral action. I do not. I agree with my colleagues up here
    that the Russians do not have a veto, but I do think that
    agreed constraints on defense are not obsolete. They do provide
    predictability. They are likely to diminish the chance that the
    consequences of our proceeding will solve one problem--that is,
    the rogue state problem--and aggravate another problem, and
    that is the tension and uncertainty.
        Senator Cleland. Is it not true that for a number of years
    with the Arrow missile system, with the upgrade of the Patriot,
    with the THAAD, high-altitude intercept, we have been pursuing
    at a reasonable pace theater-based antimissile technology to
    defend our troops and our allies in a theater, in a region?
    Isn't that true?
        Mr. Berger. Yes, and in 1993, when the Clinton
    administration came into office, one of the things that came
    out of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) with Secretary Aspin was to
    reorient our programs to focus on TMD, and all of those
    programs that you mentioned are complaint with the ABM Treaty,
    as we learned in the Gulf War.
        Senator Cleland. Mr. Coyle, I was concerned today about
    another piece in the New York Times, where one senior officer
    in the Pentagon says, missile defense is their number 1
    priority, namely, the administration's. He said we have to find
    a way to deemphasize conventional programs to pay for strategic
    defense.
        That is the thing that bothers me, that you have a 57
    percent plus-up, of $8 billion for so-called missile defense,
    which at best in 10 years will give us only a rudimentary
    system that is not the plexiglass shield that is contemplated.
    At the same time, our Service Chiefs have testified we have $30
    billion in unfunded requirements, we have 75 percent of the
    United States Army's equipment more than half of its life gone,
    we have the average age of American aircraft 18 to 20 years of
    age, and we have a Navy under 300 ships.
        It does not seem to me to be very smart for us to put this
    pell-mell pursuit of some National Missile Defense Program,
    which at best will not provide the security that we think it is
    going to provide, and does, at worst, mitigate against our
    relations with potential adversaries now, Russia and China who
    have embraced each other, in each other's arms, so I am very
    concerned.
        Mr. Coyle, you mentioned the Manhattan Project. I
    understand we have already spent about two or three times the
    amount of money on missile defense and research as we spent on
    the Manhattan Project.
        Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    having this important hearing. I also want to thank the three
    witnesses for taking time to be here, and Mr. Chairman, at
    today's hearing I would just observe that this is the third
    hearing in 7 days on missile defense. I am very glad to see
    that protecting the United States and its allies and friends
    from incoming missiles is a high priority for the committee.
        I look at the number of full committee hearings we have had
    this year, and 25 percent of our full committee hearings have
    been regarding missile defense, and that is why I am glad we
    are focusing on this critical need and threat, and look forward
    to working with my colleagues to ensure that we address the
    needs of missile defense.
        Mr. Chairman, I too have a small piece of information that
    concerns some of what my colleague from Georgia just mentioned
    with respect to Russia and China. President Putin stated in a
    news conference just yesterday that: ``As for a possible
    response, a joint reply of Russia and China to a U.S.
    withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, each state itself decides
    what it is to do and how. It is possible in theory, but in
    practice Russia plans no joint actions with other states in
    this sphere, including China.''
        Now, Mr. Coyle, last week you wrote an op-ed piece for the
    Washington Post titled, ``The ABM Ambush,'' in which you made
    some interesting claims. That piece opened with the following
    sentence, and I will quote: ``Despite claims by some in the
    Bush administration, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty is not an
    obstacle to proper development and testing of a national
    missile defense system.''
        That claim is certainly at odds with statements made by
    both Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Kadish, who
    testified earlier this week in this committee. They said they
    had already identified at least three development and testing
    activities in the coming months which, in their words, ``have
    the potential of raising serious ABM Treaty compliance
    problems.''
        They also pointed out that the compliance determinations
    are not simple matters, and, in fact, Secretary Wolfowitz said,
    ``this is a genuinely complicated problem, because in the, what
    is it now, 29 years since the treaty was signed, we have had a
    lengthy, and I would actually say, tedious, record of going
    over these issues with the Russians. You have to look at that
    record. You have to examine it. You have to weigh American
    positions and Russian positions. We are in a very difficult
    zone.''
        Mr. Coyle, in February of this year the Office of
    Operational Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense
    issued the operational test and evaluation report. Your office
    made some very detailed recommendations and conclusions, and so
    my question is, when you were the head of OT&E, did your office
    conduct studies or analysis concerning ABM Treaty compliance?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, Senator Allard, we did. We looked at
    the question of how these various tests would be done, and with
    respect to the work at Fort Greely that is being proposed by
    the administration, if the administration wants to turn Fort
    Greely into a test site for NMD, the treaty permits the
    administration to declare Fort Greely as a test site. As I said
    earlier, it has already been a place where the Army has done
    cold-weather testing. So if they want to do more testing, but
    specifically on NMD, that is something that the treaty would
    permit.
        Senator Allard. Department of Defense directive 2060.1
    prescribes procedures for compliance review of DOD activities.
    What role in assessing compliance does that directive provide
    for the Director of Operational Testing in the Pentagon?
        Mr. Coyle. It does not provide a role for the DOT&E.
        Senator Allard. Did every one of the 50 activities go
    through your compliance review group?
        Mr. Coyle. No. We were looking at ways to improve testing.
    For example, I supported and recommended the initiative which
    the Bush administration is now taking to add testing
    capabilities at Kodiak.
        Senator Allard. In testimony before a Governmental Affairs
    Subcommittee, the head of the Defense Department's compliance
    review group was asked numerous questions like the one I just
    asked you regarding the compliance of various potential testing
    activities for both theater and national missile defense, and
    he said, ``we cannot make judgments on questions like that
    until we see the actual system design.'' So, if the head of
    DOD's compliance review efforts cannot make those assessments,
    how are you able to assert what is and is not a treaty obstacle
    to our missile defense plans?
        Mr. Coyle. So far, I have not seen anything proposed that
    would come into conflict with the ABM Treaty any time soon. For
    example, we have just been talking about the Fort Greely work.
    A different example is the PAC-3 test, which Mr. Berger brought
    up a little while ago. That is a test of a short-range missile
    system. Tactical missiles are not governed by the ABM Treaty,
    and if the Department of Defense wants to do short-range tests,
    that is something we do all the time.
        Senator Allard. Are you aware of the administration's
    statements that the United States will not violate the treaty?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Then on the test-bed restructure, hasn't
    the program been restructured significantly since your tenure
    at the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation at the
    Department of Defense?
        Mr. Coyle. It is beginning to be restructured. General
    Kadish has proposed a much faster rate of testing, something
    which I testified would be necessary in my testimony before the
    House last fall. General Kadish has talked about doing four or
    five tests per segment per year for each of the segments of
    national missile defense, maybe a test every month. I do not
    know whether they will be able to sustain that kind of a test
    rate, but they are proposing it. They have not yet developed
    test plans, nor reviewed those test plans with my former
    office, something I hope they will do.
        Senator Allard. The expanded test bed will provide an
    opportunity for more realistic intercept and target
    trajectories during testing. Do you believe this is consistent
    with your recommendations to improve the missile defense test
    program?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, I do.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. What is it about the
    present test, Mr. Coyle, from Vandenberg to Kwajalein, that
    does not break the ABM Treaty?
        Mr. Coyle. Kwajalein is an accepted test site, along with
    White Sands, under the ABM Treaty. While the treaty allows for
    the test sites to be established, the Russians could establish
    new test sites and so could we; Kwajalein is already a
    permitted test site under the ABM Treaty, and so the tests we
    have been doing there for years, and I expect we will continue
    to do there for years, are permitted.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So a similar test could be done at
    Fort Greely and it not break the ABM?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes. The United States would have to declare
    that that was going to be a new test site, but that is all they
    would have to do.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You mentioned Kodiak Island testing.
    That would not break the treaty. Can you repeat that, please?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes. Once again, the administration would have
    to declare that Kodiak was to become a new test site in
    addition to Kwajalein and White Sands, but they could do that.
    As I said, it is something I would support, because it produces
    more realistic engagements than the current geometry.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In Mr. Perle's testimony he mentioned
    that, as we look at a conflict between India and Pakistan, the
    Aegis system could be deployed off the coast that could knock
    down an ICBM launched from one to the other. Is the current
    technology of the Aegis system able to do that?
        Mr. Coyle. No, sir. The standard missiles that are on the
    Aegis destroyers and cruisers are not capable for NMD-class
    engagements, nor are the radars. The Aegis radar is a wonderful
    radar for ship defense, but it is not capable of NMD
    engagements.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Would the testing of such a system
    break the treaty?
        Mr. Coyle. I suppose you could find lawyers who could argue
    that. It could be, but for example, you could take an Aegis
    destroyer today and go down off the coast of Florida and look
    at missile launches there and get the same data, where you were
    launching satellites, or whatever. So you would have to go out
    of your way to do it, and I am not sure it would prove much if
    you did.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But to develop a system that would
    knock down a missile from an Aegis platform, you are saying
    that that would violate the treaty?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes. The treaty prohibits mobile systems, and a
    defense system on a Navy ship would be a violation of the
    treaty, but we are not at that point yet. We do not have either
    the rockets or the radar we need for that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In your opinion, how long down the
    road would that occur before the treaty were to be abrogated?
        Mr. Coyle. I would not be surprised if it took 10 years for
    a ship-based defense to be built. You are talking about
    developing a new missile that is twice as fast as the existing
    missile. That would take many years, as it has for the mid-
    course missile. You are talking about a new radar that would
    also require extensive modifications to a ship, or perhaps a
    new ship or ships, and all of these things would take time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask you about the descent
    phase, which you referred to as terminal. Tell me something
    about the development of a system that would be effective in
    the terminal phase of an ICBM's trajectory.
        Mr. Coyle. Tactical systems like PAC-3 and THAAD are coming
    along quite well, and they are effective. They have not been
    through realistic operational tests yet, so they still have a
    ways to go. There are many years before they will be ready to
    be fully deployed, but they are effective in defending
    themselves, defending an area of troops, or a battery that they
    are trying to defend.
        The difficulty with extending that technology to national
    missile defense is now you are trying to defend a very large
    area, and these theater systems are not capable of doing that.
    They are good at defending the troops they are trying to
    defend, but they do not yet have the technology to defend an
    area, say, the size of the United States.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want you to know how appreciative I
    am of this discussion. This has been quite illuminating to me.
    We have talked about Russia's reaction. What would be, in your
    opinion, China's reaction, as we proceed with robust research
    and development, whether it did or did not break the treaty? I
    would like to hear your differing opinions on that, Mr. Berger.
        Mr. Berger. I think China has a strategic modernization
    program. They have about 18 or 20 strategic missiles. There is
    a program that they are planning. I think one would expect
    probably an acceleration of that program, and that could
    trigger consequences all through Asia.
        That to me again is not, ipso facto, a statement that we
    should not do this, but it seems to me we ignore that chain of
    consequences at our risk. That is part of the overall equation.
    If the incipient nuclear debate in Japan winds up over 10
    years, as we have nuclear buildups throughout Asia, changing
    the fundamental direction of Japan with respect to nuclear
    weapons, I am not sure that we will have been better off in the
    end, and so I think it is a factor that we have to know more
    about, this committee I think should inquire about, and is part
    of the equation.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Perle.
        Mr. Perle. Senator, I think we probably have the capacity
    today to destroy the Chinese deterrent in a first strike, if we
    chose to do so, and that is a situation that they have
    tolerated I assume because they reason that we are unlikely to
    do that, or at least it is sufficiently unlikely so that they
    do not want to make a huge effort to deal with it.
        I think we must be very careful about slipping into the
    idea that because we had a Cold War with the Soviet Union, and
    because we have differences with the Chinese, we are going to
    have another cold war with the Chinese to which all of the
    rules and history of the Cold War between the United States and
    the Soviet Union will now apply. I see no reason to expect a
    Cold War with China.
        We will have our differences. I think we will be able to
    resolve those differences, and if at the end of the day there
    is a Cold War with China, it will have to be the responsibility
    of the Chinese. We should take no actions that would cause that
    Cold War, or that situation to occur between us.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to get Mr. Coyle's response to
    the question as well, but let me just say, on that note, it
    seems to me that in a common-sense way, Mr. Chairman, of
    approaching this whole thing so that you do not make a decision
    that you are going to break the treaty, but rather, recognizing
    the sensitivities of our relations with others, as Mr. Perle
    has suggested, with regard to the Chinese; that you work with
    them, showing them how it is in their interest that we continue
    a robust research and development program of missile defense.
    That eliminates a lot of the problem, as long as you are
    working along with people.
        I would like Mr. Coyle's response.
        Mr. Coyle. I have been very interested to see that some
    members of the Bush administration have said that they are
    interested first and foremost in an aggressive testing program,
    and testing, not deployment. This is an emphasis which I
    applaud, and I think, if they follow that emphasis, the issues
    with the ABM Treaty will become moot.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On that subject,
    Mr. Coyle and Secretary Berger, this Congress has spoken. As
    Senator Lieberman said, we voted 97 to 3 to deploy a system as
    soon as technologically feasible. The President signed it, I
    suppose, with National Security Adviser Berger's advice, and
    that committed us on a course that seems to me, in all honesty,
    of suggesting that we have to do something about this treaty.
        The whole purpose of this treaty was to prohibit a national
    missile defense from being built by the United States. The
    first clause of the first article says, each party undertakes
    not to deploy an ABM system for a defense of the territory of
    its country, and not to provide a base for a defense, and not
    to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region,
    even, except as provided in Article III of the treaty.
        So, we are really looking at something here that was a
    treaty between two nations, one of which no longer exists, the
    Soviet Union, and we are facing threats now from 29 nations
    that have ballistic missiles. So I just think that the honest,
    direct approach is to create a new form of relationship in the
    world, including a statement about Russia joining NATO--what a
    comment that was.
        I mean, we do have an opportunity for new relationships in
    the world, but we must not allow this Nation and this President
    to be intimidated from carrying out his duties to protect our
    Nation by threat of some rogue nation with a few missiles that
    could reach our country and kill, perhaps, millions of people.
    That, to me, is basically where we are, and I am somewhat
    frustrated, I have to say.
        The President is negotiating daily. He is negotiating with
    the Russians and the Europeans daily and consistently. He is
    making progress in that negotiation, and we have the former
    National Security Adviser and others in this Congress
    undermining his ability to negotiate. They appear to think that
    we do not want to fund this program, we do not have to fund it,
    but I think we ought not to undermine the President's ability
    to have the freedom to do what we voted 97 to 3 to do.
        I think it is a big issue for America, and I think this is
    the right thing for this country to do, and I believe we have
    to be careful on this committee how we conduct ourselves, that
    we do not tie the hands of the President of the United States.
        You have been there, Mr. Berger, that it is difficult to
    work out negotiations. You say negotiate, but if you argue the
    position of the Russians here on this floor, then how can you
    negotiate effectively? I would ask you to respond to that.
        Mr. Berger. Senator, I hardly believe that I am arguing for
    the position of the Russians. The only country I care about is
    the United States. I was invited to testify. I am giving you my
    best assessment here. I do not think it is any more
    irresponsible for me to offer my view of how best to do this
    than it is for Mr. Perle to say we are going to abrogate the
    treaty no matter what the Russians think. President Bush
    probably swallowed that pretty hard in terms of going into a
    negotiation with the Russians. If we are going to present them
    with a fait accompli, I do not know how we create a new
    relationship.
        All I am saying, Senator, is let us take the time to see
    whether we can do this, to create a new relationship, a new
    strategic relationship, and not do it on a schedule, which Mr.
    Coyle says is not necessary. That makes that much more
    difficult to do.
        I applaud the President's efforts to negotiate this with
    President Putin, and I hope he succeeds.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Coyle, in June, in Defense Monitor,
    you wrote a number of articles about this question. You
    question the threat the United States faces, and you wrote,
    ``One question that has dogged NMD is exactly who is the enemy?
    Is it North Korea? Is it China? Is it Iran, Iraq, or Libya? Is
    it Russia? Is it all these countries?''
        A year and a half ago, North Korea was emphasized as a
    threat, but thanks in good measure to fine diplomatic efforts
    of former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, North Korea no
    longer seems to be the same threat as before.
        That reflects your observations and thoughts, but you are
    not privy to intelligence information, and you do not consider
    yourself an intelligence expert, do you, Mr. Coyle?
        Mr. Coyle. No, sir. I think the best way to answer your
    question is in personal terms. I have a son who serves overseas
    in the military. I am a heck of a lot more concerned about his
    danger, being attacked by short-range missiles, than I am
    concerned about the United States, say, Los Angeles being
    attacked, where I have recently moved. That is my point.
        Senator Sessions. I understand that, but let me read you
    what the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet,
    said in a committee hearing over a year ago: ``Over the next 15
    years, however, our cities will face ballistic missile threats
    from a wide variety of actors, North Korea, possibly Iran,
    possibly Iraq, and in some of these cases this is because of
    indigenous technological development and in other cases because
    of direct foreign assistance, and while the missile arsenals of
    these countries will be fewer in number, constrained to smaller
    payloads and less reliable than those of the Russians and
    Chinese, they still pose the lethal and less-predictable
    threat. North Korea already has tested a space-launched
    vehicle, the Taepo Dong I, which could theoretically convert
    into an ICBM capable of delivering a small biological or
    chemical weapon to the United States already.'' He goes on to
    say, ``moreover, North Korea has the ability to test its Taepo
    Dong II this year. This missile may be capable of delivering a
    nuclear payload to the United States. Most analysts believe
    that Iran, following the North Korean pattern, could test an
    ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to the United States
    in the next 5 years. Given that Iraqi missile developments are
    continuing, we--that is the CIA--think that it, too, could
    develop an ICBM, especially with foreign assistance, sometime
    in the next decade.''
        There was a commission--you were not on the Rumsfeld
    Commission, I know--a bipartisan commission reviewed this
    subject and they said the threat could be, would be real by
    2005, so that is the basis, I think, of where we are.
        My time has expired. I believe that we do have a threat, we
    do have a commitment to deal with it, the President is working
    with our allies, he is working with the Russians. I believe he
    is going to be successful, but at any rate, we have an
    opportunity and a responsibility to defend this Nation from
    missile attack, we have the technological capability of doing
    so, and we need to get busy about deploying it before we are
    vulnerable.
        I thank the chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        First, on the question of the National Missile Defense Act,
    which has been raised both by Senator Sessions and Senator
    Lieberman, is it not true, Mr. Berger, that there are two
    provisions in that act, one of which has been referred to this
    morning, which is the intent to deploy as soon as
    technologically feasible, but another provision that it is also
    the policy of the United States to negotiate further reductions
    in nuclear weapons with Russia, is that not correct?
        Mr. Berger. That is correct, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Is it not correct that if we unilaterally
    withdraw from the ABM Treaty, that it is possible that the
    Russian response will be not to reduce or dismantle their
    weapons, not to carry out START II, not to negotiate START III,
    but to maintain the number of nuclear weapons they have and,
    indeed, MIRV some of their weapons? Is that not true?
        Mr. Berger. I think that is also true, particularly if we
    seem to be doing it in a precipitous way.
        Chairman Levin. So there are a number of provisions of
    those acts, not just the one that has been referred to here
    this morning, but the other provision, which could be in
    conflict with the policy of the United States to deploy a
    national missile defense system when technologically feasible.
        Mr. Berger. When the President signed that, he made it
    clear that his deployment decision would be based on his
    evaluation of four factors: cost, threat, technology, and the
    overall security effect on the United States.
        Chairman Levin. The next question goes to Mr. Coyle. How
    much operational capability do the five test interceptors
    provide at Fort Greely? Let me put it another way to you: The
    administration proposes to build five test silos at Fort Greely
    and place NMD interceptors in them by 2004. They plan to link
    the five test missiles to an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in
    Shemya to provide a rudimentary operational capability to shoot
    down a North Korean missile.
        First of all, could you do the testing with one silo
    instead of five, if that was the major purpose?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. So when you say that they could declare it
    as a test site, they have already told us--and this is Mr.
    Wolfowitz--that it is his intention to have the option, as he
    put it, to have a rudimentary operational capability at Fort
    Greely as soon as possible. That is the option that they want
    as soon as possible. Is that something different from just
    declaring it as a test site? Is it inconsistent with declaring
    it as a test site? Is it a second purpose? How would you define
    that?
        Mr. Coyle. If the purpose of having a test site there is to
    give soldiers training, that would be a fine thing, I suppose.
    If the purpose is to learn about the effect of the very cold
    weather at Fort Greely, that would certainly be a worthwhile
    thing to do. But they do not plan to actually launch missiles
    from those silos for test purposes--the missiles are going to
    be launched from Kodiak or Kwajalein, as I understand it. Since
    they do not plan to launch any missiles from those five silos
    for test purposes, they will not play much of a test role. You
    can question whether or not the investment in five silos is
    needed to give them the experience working with cold weather. I
    think you can do that equally well with just one silo.
        Chairman Levin. Have you heard or read Mr. Wolfowitz's
    testimony that it is their intention that they have the option
    as soon as possible to have a limited operational capability at
    Fort Greely?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, I have.
        Chairman Levin. Is that a different purpose from a test
    site?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, it is.
        Chairman Levin. Is that permitted under the ABM Treaty?
        Mr. Coyle. Under my understanding, it would not be.
        Chairman Levin. So this, then, comes down to a question
    that if a principal purpose is an operational capability as
    soon as possible, which may, indeed, conflict with the ABM
    Treaty. Is that true?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir, it would be a new deployment site.
        Chairman Levin. He did not quite say that. He said, to give
    us the option to do that as soon as possible, I do not want to
    put words in his mouth. That is what the compliance review
    group, I guess, will look at, as to what the purpose of that
    site is, but you said this morning that if they declared it as
    a test site, that is fine. It may not be worth the money in
    terms of that additional value it gives them, but that that
    would be consistent with the treaty if they declare it as a
    test site.
        If they declare it as both a test site, but a site which
    would also give them the option as soon as possible to have a
    limited operational capability, then what is your understanding
    of the treaty connection?
        Mr. Coyle. If the declaration were that this is a new
    operational site, that would be in conflict with the treaty.
        Chairman Levin. Now, Mr. Berger, do you have any comments
    on that in particular?
        Mr. Berger. I think it is very important, the line of
    questioning you are pursuing, because while we do not know that
    the plan of the administration is to--they are not going to
    violate the treaty. They have said that. But, of course,
    withdrawal is not inconsistent with violation, so the question
    is, is this test plan going to cross that line, and it seems to
    me in three respects there are questions that this committee
    needs answers to.
        The treaty says you cannot deploy an ABM system for defense
    of territory or its country, and not provide a base for such a
    system, so there is the first question of what is the nontest
    purpose of what is happening in Alaska.
        Second of all, while I agree with Mr. Coyle that if the
    PAC-3 test is against a short-range missile, that is not a
    violation. If the PAC-3 test is against a strategic missile, or
    if the Aegis cruiser is used in a test, in an ABM mode, those
    would be a violation.
        Now, it does not say that on the fact sheets, but Mr.
    Wolfowitz has told us that they are going to bump up against
    the treaty in February. That, it seems to me, leaves an
    important area for clarification. That is, is it the plan of
    this administration to engage in activities in this fiscal year
    which in fact will cross the line of the treaty? I think this
    committee and the American people have a right to know the
    answer to that question.
        Chairman Levin. Much of our three hearings are aimed at
    getting an answer to that question. As a matter of fact, I have
    asked the Secretary of Defense exactly that question in a
    letter to which we do not yet have a response, but that is a
    critical question, because it is not just the administration
    which must make a judgment as to whether or not it wishes to
    abrogate the treaty, giving notice, of course. That is a part
    of the treaty, to give notice to pull out of the treaty, but
    nonetheless, it must make that judgment.
        Whether or not the value of these tests marginally give
    them anything, whether they want to do that or need to do this
    testing early, leaving themselves very little time to negotiate
    what they say they want to negotiate with the Russians, putting
    themselves in a time box which is very severe in terms of a new
    agreement, whether they want to do that, whether they need to
    do that, whether the marginal gain in terms of testing
    outweighs the loss of time which is necessary to negotiate, or
    might be necessary to negotiate particularly a whole new
    structure. Putting aside modifications to the ABM Treaty, that
    is a judgment which the administration must make in the first
    instance, whether or not to give notice of withdrawal, and
    whether or not what it is asking for in this budget will, in
    fact, put them in a position where they are, through their
    testing program, conflicting with the treaty.
        However, we have a responsibility of whether to fund that
    after we figure out what they are doing. After they notify us
    what their intent is, we, as a Congress, have the
    responsibility to decide whether or not we are safer with such
    a withdrawal from the treaty, a unilateral withdrawal if that
    is what it takes.
        Now, Mr. Perle takes the position you ought to withdraw
    anyway. Your position is pretty clear. It is a radical
    proposal, as you have suggested and self-described it, but
    nonetheless it is very clear. Whether or not these tests bump
    up against the treaty is not relevant to you. You believe we
    ought to withdraw from the treaty as a relic of the Cold War in
    any event.
        By the way, I happen to agree with you, the Cold War is
    over, but that also means that we should deal with Russia on a
    different basis than we used to deal with the old Soviet Union,
    and you say you cannot imagine anybody sitting across the table
    from you in Russia who could possibly have any problem with
    these tests. I think we ought to be listening to what they are
    saying.
        Why is it that they are disturbed by these tests? I am not
    saying give them a veto. God knows, we are not going to do
    that. We are not going to give anyone a veto, but we sure as
    heck ought to consider, at least, what their reaction is, and
    whether or not, given what they tell us their reaction is going
    to be--whether we think it is logical or not, given what they
    tell us their reaction is going to be or may be, the same with
    the Chinese, whether we are more secure with or without pulling
    out of the treaty. I think that is the overarching question
    which we all have to address.
        My time is up.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have
    kept our panel a little longer than we anticipated so I will be
    brief in hopes we can wrap up here. I think we've had a good
    session, a very good session. I'm going to try and ask two
    questions--one to you, Mr. Coyle, and one to each of our
    distinguished foreign-policy experts in hopes that maybe some
    others who are trying to follow this debate can get a better
    grasp on it.
        I introduced you, or at least gave you my view, that you
    have a reputation for being pragmatic and objective, Mr. Coyle.
    I continue to believe that. Now, supposing there wasn't an ABM
    Treaty right now and that it had expired this year. Would you
    advise the President as to how to redesign the previous efforts
    by previous administrations--not only Clinton--but Bush before
    it, and so forth. Would you advise them how to redesign the
    architecture of a missile defense system to meet the threat of
    limited missile attack? Would you move out into space?
    Throughout the long time that I've been on this committee, 23
    years, I've dealt with this issue, and time and time again I've
    put the question to people such as yourself: If there were no
    constraints of the ABM Treaty, would you do something
    differently? I've always believed that we could. If we had full
    authority to devise an architecture, particularly to defend
    against unlimited attack, we could utilize space, we could
    utilize mobility, we could utilize other aspects of our
    technology to move more swiftly with a greater likelihood of
    success perhaps at less cost to the American people. My
    question is simply, if there were not the constraints of the
    treaty, would you be advising the President to do something
    different today, not unlike the architecture that was laid out
    here with the direction of the BMDO, Lt. Gen. Kadish, here in
    the past week or two?
        Mr. Coyle. I believe I understand, Senator Warner. I
    understand the logic behind the layered defense. It does give
    you three bites at the apple. If you miss the missile in the
    boost phase, you have the mid-course and terminal phases left.
    I also believe that the United States could have the technology
    to do boost-phase defenses from ships, and under the ABM Treaty
    that would be a mobile system and mobile systems are not
    permitted.
        The technology for boost-phase defenses from ships is much
    farther ahead than the airborne laser or the space-based laser
    in my view. The space-based laser is too heavy to even be
    lifted into orbit by any boosters that the United States has
    and the airborne laser has a very long way to go in development
    also. But ship-based defenses for the boost phase, I think,
    could become practicable. It may take a decade; it may be many
    years away, but I think it could become practicable.
        Senator Warner. But had we not had the ABM Treaty, we may
    well have done the research, development, and testing on that
    ability a decade ago and now be in a position where we could
    consider the deployment of such systems. My question to you is
    that there has been serious constraints by this treaty for
    decades and as a consequence we've labored along within the
    lawyers' framework of what we can and cannot do. I'm asking you
    to put the treaty to one side. I'm not suggesting by this
    question that you just trash it and shred it and tear it up--
    phrases that have been used in this hearing, unfortunately--but
    simply that it didn't exist. Or I might rephrase it: Suppose
    there was the opportunity for this President to say I can go
    and set up amendments to the ABM Treaty that would enable us to
    do other things. Would you recommend that he do some other
    things now prohibited by ABM Treaty within the framework of a
    series of amendments?
        Mr. Coyle. Not for the foreseeable future. If the Navy
    wants to build higher velocity missiles for ships for boost-
    phase defenses, that's something they can do at White Sands, as
    they do now when they do standard missile tests. So, there's a
    lot of work that can be done on new missiles for Navy boost-
    phase defenses. If the Navy wants to build high-power X-band
    radars for ships that work on the seas, that's something else
    they can do, but that's not bumping up against the ABM Treaty
    either. I'm not trying to say that there isn't any conceivable
    thing that might ever occur that couldn't cause a problem with
    the ABM Treaty. Obviously, mobile defenses themselves are a
    problem with the ABM Treaty, but there is so much work that
    needs to be done, whether you talk about ship-based defenses or
    other defenses.
        Senator Warner. I understand it's a lot of work, but
    somebody has to start at some point in time to explore other
    options, other architectures, than the one that we have
    prodigiously followed for decades in the United States, in my
    judgment. That's the initiative that this President is taking
    and it raises legitimate debate as to whether or not those
    architectures come up against the ABM Treaty. My question to
    you is could we not devise a framework of amendments to the
    treaty to accommodate the parameters of moving out into such
    architectures that you and other experts indicate should be
    explored if we're trying to pursue a defense against a limited
    attack.
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir. My answer would be, yes, I believe we
    could devise such amendments and there is plenty of time to do
    that.
        Senator Warner. Now, to both of our other experts here. Mr.
    Berger, I've followed very carefully in the years that you were
    National Security Advisor to President Clinton the efforts to
    negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty. The record is clear,
    for whatever reason, you didn't succeed, but I think you made
    an honest effort. I frankly think that the fact that our
    President had finally pointed out that there is a withdrawal
    clause and that he as President could at some point and time be
    forced to utilize that clause unless we can work out amendments
    to the treaty and/or a new framework might have been the tactic
    that is beginning to bring President Putin, in my judgment,
    around to an open discussion with the President on the
    parameters of either amendments or a new framework.
        I'll start with you, Mr. Perle, since you feel so strongly.
    I think the option to not try and keep the ABM Treaty in
    existence is not preferable. I still think a two-step process
    is a wise one. I say that because, again, I have had the
    responsibility either as chairman or ranking member to get a
    bill through for the Armed Services Committee and that is a
    mighty train to drive through the floor of the Senate, and the
    appropriations likewise are difficult. I think it is extremely
    important that we do get an authorization bill this year, that
    it not be side-tracked by a continuing debate on this issue,
    and that we do, as a Congress, support our President in his
    initiatives with the funding and the authorization necessary
    for him to explore a new architecture and at the same time
    continue his negotiations with Russia. So, that's why I suggest
    a two-step process. But it seems to me it's in President
    Putin's interest to pursue that two-step process for the
    following reason. I'm beginning to admire him even though,
    incidentally, gentlemen, he has not yet met one single member
    of Congress and that puzzles me. I was with the first
    delegation that met Mr. Gorbachev led by Robert Byrd and the
    second delegation to meet Mr. Yeltsin led by Robert Dole. But
    anyway, Mr. Gephardt, who had considerable standing in this
    Congress, was not able to meet President Putin a few weeks ago,
    nor has anyone else. But in any event, I think he's an
    interesting man and he is trying to do his best with a country
    that is suffering economically and suffering in many other
    ways. It would be devastating, not only from a military
    standpoint but from an image standpoint, for the United States
    to withdraw from a treaty to which he attaches so much
    significance. I have to believe that our President, in pointing
    that out has done it properly thus far and that gives
    considerable leverage to these options whereby we can devise a
    framework of changes to the treaty to enable us to pursue such
    architecture as he and his advisors deem necessary. Do you
    share that view, Mr. Perle?
        Mr. Perle. Yes, I think on serious reflection, the treaty
    does nothing to enhance President Putin's security and he would
    be well-advised to work with us in getting it behind us because
    it also puts the Cold War behind us.
        Could I just add, Senator, the question you asked at the
    end, of course, prompts the reflection that if the ABM Treaty
    didn't exist today, would anyone propose that the United States
    and Russia negotiate anything that looked like the ABM Treaty?
    Of course, the answer is, nobody would propose that. So, we're
    dealing with a legacy. We're dealing with an historical legacy.
    Second, because we have spent a great deal of time in the
    latter part of this hearing on the question of testing and
    where the program is today and where it might go, we have tied
    our hands from 1972 until the present.
        People who might have had ideas about approaches to missile
    defense that were outside the treaty were unable to do anything
    effective with those ideas. Companies that might have had
    scientists within them who had ideas knew that they couldn't
    get funded to produce programs that would violate the ABM
    Treaty. There was just an exchange with Senator Nelson about a
    ship-based system. You can take a narrow legal perspective and
    say, well, you could do research for years before you encounter
    the limitations of the treaty but I don't believe anyone is
    going to make a significant investment in a system that
    violates the terms of the treaty until the treaty is clarified
    one way or another. So, we're not going to build a sea-based
    system until the treaty obstacle to a sea-based system has been
    eliminated, and we are not going to look at the other new
    architecture that you are talking about until the treaty issue
    is resolved. It prevents us from applying our minds and our
    talent, our scientific talent, from solving technical problems.
    So, it isn't a question of how much can you do before you bump
    up against the treaty. No one invests in a business that is
    prohibited by regulation from operating and no one's going to
    invest in new approaches to missile defense until the treaty is
    clarified, and by clarified, I mean the obstacles within it are
    removed. So, if we want to put our technical genius to work, we
    have to deal with the treaty now and not pretend we can get
    started now and only deal with the treaty when we bump up
    against it, as we have heard today.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Berger, I commend your efforts to try
    and negotiate changes to the treaty. Let's talk about whether
    or not it would be in Russia's interest, quite apart from ours
    and their military considerations, to be faced with the fact
    that the United States, an acknowledged superpower, would
    withdraw from that instrument. It really relegates Russia to a
    second-class status, which we do not wish to do. We do not wish
    to embarrass that country and our President has said that many
    times. They're not our enemy. We have a number of programs with
    Russia today to help them in different ways, particularly with
    the struggle to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. So, I think there is much at stake here, but you
    never put on the table that we might have to withdraw. I think
    this President has, and I think it's been to his benefit.
        Mr. Berger. Senator, first all, I think we can't rule out
    that possibility. I do think that it will, if we do it, as I
    said several times here, preemptively walk into the room, and
    say, sometime in the next several months, this is where we are
    going to be.
        Senator Warner. Yesterday Mr. Wolfowitz said in response to
    questions from me that there would be consultations with
    Congress.
        Mr. Berger. As you've said to me many times Senator, there
    are consultations and there are consultations when the shoe is
    on the other foot. But I would say that we should be exploring
    other technologies and I've made the argument to President
    Putin, for example, that sea-based, boost-phase defense is
    something that may be very much in their interest. In fact, he
    has spoken favorably about boost-phase defense. So, I don't
    believe that it is inconceivable at all that we could work out
    a new arrangement. What I think would be very damaging in the
    context of the end of the Cold War, as Mr. Perle has talked
    about, is to say we're withdrawing. We're not going to tell you
    what this new strategic framework is. We have no amendments on
    the table. We've not put one on the table with respect to the
    ABM Treaty. First, we want to withdraw, and then we'll sit down
    and talk about what comes next. I don't think that's an
    effective way to get a strategy framework, a new strategic
    framework that President Bush seeks.
        Senator Warner. I thank all the witnesses.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, I really
    don't believe that if we had to withdraw from this treaty we
    would be relegating them to second-class status. I just don't
    believe that. I think what we need to be doing is moving to a
    higher period of relationship between the two countries. I
    spent 2 weeks there in 1993 visiting with the Russian people
    and they are wonderful, talented people. I think somehow we can
    develop a new, positive relationship, not focusing on a relic
    of the old Cold War. One of the things that I would want to
    note here is in the ABM Treaty itself. Article 1 says each
    party undertakes not to deploy an ABM system for defense of its
    territory. Then, I think it is healthy that we begin to make
    clear what it prohibited explicitly in it. In Article V it says
    each party undertakes not to develop tests or deploy ABM
    systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
    based, or mobile land-based. Now, Secretary Wolfowitz has
    indicated that he believes, and it certainly makes sense to me,
    that we need a layered, comprehensive system, one system of
    defense against missile attack, that many of the component
    parts could serve all of our system. Wouldn't you agree, Mr.
    Coyle, that we would be constrained in developing that kind of
    system under this treaty?
        Mr. Coyle. Eventually, yes.
        Senator Sessions. You say eventually. Let me ask about an
    additional word in Article 5. Article 1 says we will not deploy
    a system. Article 5 says we will not develop, test, or deploy a
    sea-based, air-based, or mobile system. Doesn't that go
    further? Doesn't that even, perhaps, prohibit research?
        Mr. Coyle. No, it doesn't, sir. I certainly was not a
    negotiator of the treaty, so I can't speak first-hand about
    this but I've talked to people who were involved in the
    negotiations first-hand. They point out that the ABM Treaty
    permits both countries to have a missile defense system, not a
    missile defense system of its entire territory but a missile
    defense such as we deployed briefly in North Dakota and the
    Russians around Moscow. It was understood under the
    negotiations that both countries would--we have decided not to
    keep the system that we deployed--but if both countries wanted
    to keep that kind of a missile defense system, it was
    understood that they would need to continue to develop and
    improve and test that system. So testing a missile defense
    system was expected to take place.
        Senator Sessions. What about a sea-based, air-based, or
    space-based system that seems to be pretty explicit. I'm sure
    they argued over every word. Now, Mr. Perle, were you there or
    do you have an opinion on that?
        Mr. Perle. I do. I was very much involved in the hearings
    that examined that treaty, and the simple answer is, we cannot
    test a space-based, a sea-based, or a land mobile-based system,
    period. We can't do it. Now, you can try to find ways around it
    by testing components that do not in and of themselves
    constitute elements of a system, and the question you have to
    ask is whether a furtive approach of that kind can ever be made
    to work and can ever be the basis on which we're prepared to
    commit serious resources to a development program. I don't
    think we can and don't think we should. I think it's very
    misleading when Mr. Coyle says ``eventually,'' because you
    don't start developing a system you know you cannot deploy
    under the terms of the treaty. So eventually is today.
        Mr. Berger. Senator, I don't want to impose on your time
    but could I just say something? First of all, we have been
    working on a system for the last 5 years. The land-based mid-
    course system which is prohibited by the treaty and which would
    require either amendment to the treaty or withdrawal from the
    treaty and we've spent billions of dollars doing it. So, of
    course, you can do that. Second of all----
        Senator Session. Wait a minute. Let me get that straight.
    You're saying that we are now in violation of the treaty?
        Mr. Berger. No, I'm saying that we have been developing and
    testing a land-based limited mid-course system consistent with
    the treaty and that we can't deploy it unless there's a change
    in the treaty or we withdraw. So, it defies the kind of
    economic-business model that Mr. Perle was talking about.
    Second of all, we can research the other technologies, and I
    think again Mr. Coyle has said that there's a lot of work we
    can do before we bump up against the treaty to give ourselves
    time to go to the Russians and say, let's talk about a sea-
    based system.
        Senator Sessions. But the treaty says we can't develop.
    Where it says develop, test, or deploy, presumably that is an
    upward trend test. We know what test means. Develop it seems to
    me to mean no serious research.
        Mr. Berger. No, it does not, sir. The research is
    specifically permitted on sea-based and on other systems. We
    are doing research on sea-based systems and as I understand Mr.
    Coyle, if I read his remarks, there's a lot more research we
    need to do. If we went to the stage that we had to test, that
    would require a modification of the treaty, but that's not
    February or March.
        Mr. Perle. I think there is a potential for some real
    misunderstanding in these statements. It is true that the
    previous administration did work on a system which, if deployed
    in certain locations, would require an amendment to the treaty.
        Mr. Berger. We assumed it would.
        Mr. Perle. It was a land-based system and they essentially
    made a bet. I don't think they were ever serious about this, to
    be blunt. But if you give them the benefit of the doubt and
    assume they were serious about it, if they had another 16 years
    maybe they would have gotten around to deploying something, but
    they assumed that they would be able to go to the Russians and
    say, look, we're going to have 100 interceptors, which we're
    entitled to have. Under the treaty, we could have those at
    ground force. How about letting us have them someplace else.
    That was the extent to which they ran into the treaty and I
    believe they selected that program because there was such a
    modest modification to the treaty that they assumed the
    Russians would readily agree to that.
        Mr. Berger. Excuse me, I'm sorry. We have gone 3 hours and
    15 minutes without getting gratuitous. I guess that must be the
    limit. We selected that system because BMDO and the Pentagon
    said that that was the fastest, most affordable, most mature
    system to get to a system that would be effective against the
    threat we faced which was the rogue state threat, and I don't
    think we should get into motivations, Mr. Perle.
        Mr. Perle. Set the motivations aside. When you get to any
    sort of ambitious system like a sea-based system, a space-based
    system, or a mobile system, you cannot do what Sandy Berger
    suggested could be done in the other case where the only change
    to the treaty would have been permission to deploy 100
    interceptors in one location rather than another location and
    that was a trivial change in the whole program over many years
    and not just this administration. It was true under the Bush
    administration as well. The whole program of ballistic missile
    defense has been conducted within the suffocating constraints
    of the ABM Treaty, which as you rightly observe, begins by
    saying neither side will protect its national territory. That
    is the treaty we're talking about. That is the artifact of the
    Cold War and we can talk all week about how to work around, how
    to amend, how to revise, how to negotiate. At the end of the
    day, you're talking about taking a treaty that prohibits
    defense and revising it so that it permits defense. The
    straightforward, honest approach is to say the treaty no longer
    serves our security interests, and go on to negotiate something
    entirely different with the Russians, which is a security
    arrangement for the future.
        Senator Sessions. I think that is precisely correct and I
    think that is what Condoleezza Rice and the President have
    concluded. I would just mention in Article 6, I read that as a
    clear prohibition of theater missile defense if it any way
    could be utilized to knock down incoming ballistic missiles. It
    prohibits capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles
    or their elements in flight trajectory and not to test these
    missiles in the ABM mode. Then it goes on to say, in
    subparagraph b, we commit not to deploy in the future radars
    for early warning of strategic ballistic attack except at
    locations along the periphery of our national territory. So,
    wouldn't that complicate both our desire to integrate in a
    layered approach theater missile defense and our radar systems
    that might be necessary? Wouldn't we be running into the treaty
    on those two issues also?
        Mr. Berger. Senator, I'm sure Mr. Perle would have a
    slightly different take on this but all of the theater missile
    systems can proceed unencumbered. Our understanding with the
    Russians----
        Senator Sessions. But not in an ABM mode.
        Mr. Berger. Not in an ABM mode. That is correct. We have an
    understanding with the Russians. If they're tested against a
    missile that is proceeding at more than 5 kilometers per second
    or has a range of more than 3,500 kilometers, that's a
    ballistic missile. That's the demarcation between theater
    missile defense and ABM and I think all of our TMD programs are
    proceeding unencumbered by the treaty. I think the one concern
    I have about the new approach is whether we lose focus on
    getting the TMD systems done, up, and ready as Mr. Coyle has
    said, and getting to the end zone on a deployable system that
    can deal with missile threats rather than running all over the
    field trying to discover what is possible to do before focusing
    on what we need to do.
        Mr. Perle. Senator, could I comment on that? The reference
    from Mr. Berger was to a proposed understanding with the
    Russians on the line of demarcation between permitted and
    prohibited test of systems that are in fact theater defense
    systems. The administration proposed but has never submitted to
    the Senate as an amendment to the treaty, a proposal that we
    limit the speed of an interceptor, not to 5 kilometers, but to
    3 kilometers. That unfortunately is too slow for an effective
    theater defense. It was a terrible mistake to propose that, in
    my view, but happily, it has no legal status and the new
    administration is free to proceed in any way it wishes with
    respect to this.
        Let me tell you what the difference is between 3 kilometers
    a second and 5 kilometers a second. At 3 kilometers a second, a
    sea-based system, theater system, if we deployed it off the
    coast of Italy, say in the vicinity of the waters of Rome,
    could defend our forces in the field in central Italy. Roughly,
    I think it's 70 or 80 kilometers either side of Rome, at 5
    kilometers per second, that same system, other things being
    equal, could defend most of western Europe. So, the last
    administration, in an effort which I thought at the time was
    unnecessary, in an effort to strengthen the ABM Treaty to which
    it remained committed until it's last day in office, we all
    understand that, in an effort to strengthen that treaty,
    burdened our theater missile defense programs with technical
    and physical restrictions that make it very difficult to
    justify them. That's the simple truth, and one of the first
    things we should do is say to the Russians, we no longer think
    that 3 kilometers per second is an appropriate limitation and
    therefore we intend to explore sea-based systems at
    accelerations higher than that because that will give us the
    potential for a serious defense that can be of significant use
    to our troops in the field and to our allies.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Just for what
    it's worth, Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, who was the previous head of
    the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said the following
    in response to a question from Senator Robb in 1998: Senator
    Robb asked ``If you did not have an ABM Treaty, are there
    things you be doing or could be doing less expensively now?''
    Lt. Gen. Lyles said ``In all honesty, Senator Robb, there's
    nothing that we would be doing differently. General Ralston has
    said there is nothing today in the Antiballistic Missile Treaty
    that is constraining what we are doing in our national defense
    program or our theater missile defense program.'' Now, will we
    at some point bump up against an ABM Treaty, a program, a
    National Missile Defense Program? The answer is yes. As a
    matter of fact, the one that was proposed by President Clinton
    and if deployed would have bumped up against the treaty, put
    money in there to develop it, and indeed again on the
    deployment of it subject to those four conditions which Mr.
    Berger has laid out for us today.
        But what we're facing now is a very different question.
    Everyone points out that the Cold War is over. It seems to me
    that that is a given. The Cold War is over. We're grateful for
    it. Now the question is how do we get from an old structure to
    a new structure. What you're suggesting, Mr. Perle, we just
    simply destroy the old structure. Just simply say it's over.
    We're pulling out of the ABM Treaty which was the keystone to
    the old structure. Just yank out that keystone, the arch
    collapses, and now let's build a new arch. I don't think that's
    any way to treat someone who takes a treaty as seriously as the
    Russians take this treaty. I happen to fully agree with what
    Senator Warner said when he said it would be devastating for us
    to withdraw from a treaty to which President Putin places such
    great importance. That is not something we should do very
    readily. We should be exhausting, it seems to me, the
    possibilities of negotiating a new structure before we reach
    that conclusion. Does that mean we'll never reach that
    conclusion? No. We could reach that conclusion, but if you're
    serious about the Cold War being over and if you're serious
    about really renegotiating with Russia, you don't put a
    deadline of months on those negotiations and say then we're
    pulling out of a treaty which has been so important if we don't
    succeed within that period of months. Now, what gets me is that
    we've taken that position for a relatively small gain. In terms
    of testing, I think what Mr. Coyle has told us is that the
    testing advantages of what is being proposed for Fort Greely,
    first of all, could be achieved as I understand what he said at
    Kodiak, is that correct?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Number 2, those testing advantages wherever
    they take place are marginal gains, what you could do with one
    silo are small testing gains in terms of the whole scheme of
    things. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Coyle?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. All right, so that if there's an advantage
    to negotiating a new structure, and it seems to me there surely
    is if we're serious that the Cold War is over and that we no
    longer treat Russia as an adversary. If we're really serious
    about that and really want to understand why is it that they
    would like a new structure in place before the old one is
    destroyed, why is that important to them? If we really want to
    negotiate something new with them, then we don't put down the
    ultimatum of months, particularly when the advantage from a
    testing perspective can be gained somewhere else.
        Now, with respect to Kodiak. Assuming you want the
    advantages, which are very costly but nonetheless, if you want
    those testing advantages, you can do them somewhere else and
    you can do them without bumping up against the ABM Treaty or
    conflicting with the ABM Treaty the way it was phrased last
    Wednesday. You can do it without conflicting with the ABM
    Treaty. What conflicts with the ABM Treaty, and I want to be
    real clear on this, Mr. Coyle, is not what they are proposing
    in terms of test. As I understand it, if they declare that as
    part of a test bed, that does not conflict with the ABM Treaty
    whether it's in Fort Greeley or whether it's at Kodiak. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Coyle. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. What is the problem and what does bump up
    against the ABM Treaty, isn't that robust additional testing?
    But if they declare or if it is their intent that that
    development be in addition to a test site a rudimentary
    operational capability, that is where the conflict comes in. So
    I want to ask Mr. Coyle this question about that rudimentary
    operational capability. I want you to judge for us the
    operational capability of that system, that test bed at Fort
    Greeley. Would you expect it to be effective in shooting down
    an operational long-range missile?
        Mr. Coyle. If it only had five interceptors and if it
    didn't have the capability to deal with decoys and
    countermeasures which so far we haven't demonstrated any
    capability to handle, it would not be effective.
        Chairman Levin. Then it seems to me that we all have to
    weigh whether or not it is advantageous to enter into a new
    relationship with Russia, to try to negotiate that new
    relationship. But whether or not in order to get an operational
    capability at Fort Greely, which we've just heard is described
    because it doesn't have those capabilities that Mr. Coyle
    described, which would be ineffective. In the rush to gain an
    ineffective capability, we constrain ourselves to months of
    negotiations with a country for whom this treaty is a very
    serious matter, has been a keystone in that arch, that
    structure. As a matter of fact, it has been for us too as well.
    Secretary Baker even said that, by the way, after the collapse
    of the Soviet Union.
        So, we have a treaty which has been a keystone in an arch
    of a security arrangement, the removal of which would cause
    great problems for someone who is no longer an enemy, doing
    that for no testing advantage because we can declare that as a
    test site and do all the testing we want, assuming it's worth
    the money. We can do all the testing we want there to gain an
    ineffective rudimentary operational capability, whether or not
    doing that makes us more or less secure. That's what it comes
    down to. It's a very significant issue that everyone's
    grappling with. People reach different conclusions on it, but
    we all start with the same goal, I hope, and that is to make
    America more secure by that kind of an action. That's the only
    question. Are we more or less secure? Would our doing that
    unilaterally, would saying we're pulling out of this treaty, it
    no longer serves a purpose in our mind, goodbye, sayonara to
    that kind of a security arrangement. If we do that
    unilaterally, will we be precipitating a reaction in Russia and
    China, particularly which maybe from your perspective, Mr.
    Perle, isn't the way they should react. You can't understand
    why they would react that way. But if they in fact would react
    that way because they feel less secure by our unilateral action
    and because of the response that they would take to make
    themselves secure even though Richard Perle doesn't understand
    it, whether or not that reaction will leave us and the world
    less secure. It is a major issue.
        I would hope that the President would consult not just with
    our allies and with the Russians and with Congress but with the
    best minds that he can find of all different persuasions on
    this issue before he makes this judgment because it is a
    judgment which would have huge implications for the future. We
    all agree that North Korea is trying to achieve a capability
    that we do not want them to have. We would like to have a
    defense against it, if we could do it without creating a
    greater threat to ourselves. At least, I'll say that that's
    where I'm at. I'd love to have a defense against a North Korean
    missile if I could have it operationally effective and take
    away whatever leverage that it gets them. But I don't, in that
    process, want to create a greater danger to ourselves, and we
    have to weigh all those dangers. That's the broader picture
    which Mr. Berger talked about as he opened up this discussion
    today.
        It's been a long morning for all of you and I would like to
    ask Mr. Coyle, for the record, to do the following. I don't
    know that we went into great detail on those three pages which
    Secretary Wolfowitz gave to us. I gather you did not see those
    until today. Is that correct?
        Mr. Coyle. In exactly the form they're in, no. But I had
    read about them in other ways.
        Chairman Levin. I would like you to take a look at them in
    the exact form in which we received them and made them part of
    the record, and to then analyze for us how they might bump
    against or conflict with the ABM Treaty, in your judgment. I
    would offer to each of our other witnesses an opportunity to
    comment on the same question if you wish and with that we will
    bring this hearing to a close.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned. Thank you.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson

        1. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, in his testimony, Philip Coyle
    said that a missile defense system is a matter of cost and workability.
    Isn't he right?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        2. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, Secretary Rumsfeld said missile
    defense is a ``scarecrow'' which would serve as a deterrent to
    potential aggressors. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has said missile
    defense is not a scarecrow. Who is right?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        3. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, how workable does a missile
    defense system have to be to be an effective deterrent?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        4. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, how would you advise the
    Secretary and President to prioritize their financial resources in
    terms of the potential threat of a rogue states launching a missile at
    the U.S. and our allies versus the threat of weapons of mass
    destruction?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        5. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, shouldn't we continue to pursue
    development of a national missile defense system first before pushing
    toward deployment of a system still being tested? If the threat level
    increased, I have no doubt that we would be able to speed up our
    development phase as was the case during the Gulf War with the Patriot
    system.
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        6. Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Perle, at what point would you recommend
    we move to deployment of a land-based missile defense system?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

        7. Senator Collins. Mr. Berger, during your tenure as National
    Security Advisor, the Clinton administration engaged in discussions
    with Russia on revising the ABM Treaty to permit the United States to
    deploy a national missile defense system. President Bush has said that
    he would also like to reach an agreement with Russia that would pave
    the way for deployment of a system to defend the United States against
    missile attack. I assume you support President Bush's efforts to reach
    such an accommodation with Russia, is that correct?
        Mr. Berger. I support a mutual agreement to amend the ABM Treaty in
    ways that would enable us to pursue a limited national missile defense.

        8. Senator Collins. Mr. Perle, we have heard many opponents of
    missile defense warn that if the United States withdraws from the ABM
    Treaty to deploy a missile defense system, the Russians and Chinese
    might build up their nuclear forces and an arms race would ensue. Then
    the Russians and Chinese dutifully threaten just such an outcome, and
    those same critics point to those threats as confirmation of their
    theory. It becomes sort of an echo chamber in which the threats are
    bounced back and forth between the Russians and domestic opponents of
    missile defense. How seriously should we take such threats, or are
    these discussions simply rhetoric to slow down the progress the United
    States makes on developing a robust, layered missile defense system?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        9. Senator Collins. Mr. Perle, would it not be in the interest of
    Russia and China to make these threats knowing that missile defense
    critics will themselves dutifully echo them in their efforts to prevent
    deployment of a robust, layered missile defense system?
        [The information was not provided in time for printing of this
    hearing. When received, it will be retained in committee files.]

        [Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.]