[Senate Hearing 107-126]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-126
THE PUTIN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
TOWARD NON-RUSSIAN REGIONS OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 18, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-011 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Balzer, Dr. Marjorie M., research professor and coordinator of
Social, Ethnic, and Regional Issues, Center for Eurasian,
Russian, and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown
University, Washington, DC..................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Dunlop, Dr. John B., senior fellow, Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, CA....... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Goble, Paul A., director, Communications Department, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Washington, DC........................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 3
Solnick, Dr. Steven L., associate professor of Political Science,
Columbia University, New York, NY.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
(iii)
THE PUTIN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES TOWARD NON-RUSSIAN REGIONS OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
The Chairman. I thank my colleague, Senator Helms, and the
distinguished witnesses we have today for their patience. The
Amtrak Metroliner was 20 minutes late today, and I do
apologize.
Today we will consider the topic that is fundamental to an
understanding of the Russian Federation, that is the policy of
the Moscow-based Federal Government toward the non-Russian
regions of the country.
Russia, as everyone knows is, in geographical terms, by far
the largest country in the world. East to west, it spans 11
time zones. North to south, it goes from the frozen Arctic
Tundra to the subtropical Black Sea coast. In terms of
nationality, the Russian Federation is equally diverse.
Although the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991
removed huge blocks of non-Russian peoples from Moscow's rule,
nearly 19 percent of the Russian Federation's population
remains non-Russian, and their birthrate exceeds the Russian.
Many of these nationalities have small populations. Others,
like Tatars and Ukrainians, still number in the millions within
the borders of the Federation, but there is not necessarily a
direct correlation between their population size and their
importance to the Kremlin. The Yakut population of Sakha in
eastern Siberia is relatively small, but their vast homeland
contains extremely valuable natural resources. More well known
has been the ability of the Chechens, a small group of people
in the Caucasus, to bring the entire Russian military machine
to its knees.
Our distinguished witnesses today will examine how the
Putin administration's policies toward the one-fifth of its
citizens that is ethnically non-Russian differs or, in some
respects, resembles pre-1991 Soviet nationalities policies.
This hearing is the first in a series that the full committee
plans to hold on what we are terming ``Putin's Russia.'' Later
this summer and in the fall, we will hold hearings on political
conditions, on economic reform, on civil society, culture, and
religious life, and on Russia's foreign policy.
Throughout my 29 years in the Senate, I have consistently
maintained that there is no international relationship, no
bilateral relationship, more important to the United States
than that with Russia. Much has changed in Russia since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, but I believe the importance of
the bilateral relationship endures. I hope today's hearing will
constitute an outstanding beginning for an important new
venture on this hearing regime that we plan on moving forward
with.
I now yield to my friend, and again apologize to him for
keeping him waiting.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, to the contrary, I genuinely
appreciate your scheduling this meeting. We had requested this.
And before I begin, let me point out, as I have done many
times, that this committee welcomes the young people who attend
these hearings. We have several in the back there and I want to
be sure that they can hear what's going on? Nod if you can. Do
you want us to cut it off?
No. Well, you are welcome. And these witnesses are great
patriots, and they have done a great deal of work on the
subject, as you will understand as they proceed. Now, I
welcome, of course, the four people there, the lady and three
gentlemen. I'm grateful for the enormous amount of research and
writing that every one of you has contributed to the field of
Russian studies and U.S./Russian relations. And I am certainly
aware that some, if not all, of you have traveled to Washington
from all parts of America to share with us this morning your
views regarding relations between the Kremlin and the
Federation's non-Russian regions.
Now, how the Kremlin addresses the cultures and potentials
and grievances and aspirations of its non-Russian peoples is
not merely a measurement of the state of democracy in Russia,
or the lack thereof. What the Kremlin does also affects the
evolution and long-term prospects of democratic reforms in that
country. Repression and political and cultural heavy-handedness
can unavoidably leave the non-Russian populations of the
Russian Federation disenfranchised and resentful, and that is
an obvious recipe for unrest and instability, both within and
beyond the Federation's borders.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in Chechnya, where
President Putin continues to execute a savage, indiscriminate
war against the Chechen people. This bloodthirsty campaign
includes a systematic and obvious effort to strip Chechnya of
its cultural heritage. Russian forces have obliterated Chechen
religious and historic sites in an effort to transform Chechnya
into a physical and cultural wasteland.
Since 1999, Russian forces have caused the deaths of more
than 30,000 non-combatants. The dislocation of 600,000
civilians has been caused by the Russian forces, as well as the
illegal incarceration of 20,000 Chechens, of which the Russian
forces boast. They brag about that. And the countless reports
of rape and torture and summary executions committed by the
Russian forces complete this ugly scenario. And all this bloody
carnage has been imposed upon a population of just one million
people. Today, the vicious Putin war in Chechnya continues
unabated with no inclination even to try to bring this tragic
war to a negotiated and peaceful end.
For a comparative measure of what Mr. Putin has done in
Chechnya, one has only to look to Kosovo where Milosevic's
ethnic cleansing has caused at least 10,000 deaths--at least
10,000--and the illegal detention and torture of thousands of
Albanians.
So, Mr. Chairman, this hearing is well timed. And, again, I
appreciate your scheduling it, because 3 days from now, on
Friday, the G-7 will meet in Genoa, Italy. The G-7 leaders are
certain to celebrate the recent incarceration of Mr. Milosevic;
and when they do, I prayerfully hope that, when they sit across
the table from the Russian President in the so-called G-8
summit, they will not forget that Mr. Putin's unjustified war
against the Chechen people has been far more savage and far
more devastating than the destruction Milosevic--bad as he is,
and he is terrible--has wreaked upon Kosovo.
As today's witnesses are, no doubt, aware, the Union of
Councils for Soviet Jews has issued a report documenting
official discrimination and mistreatment of Chechens throughout
the Russian Federation. The report makes a simple, but
profound, point: If a government mistreats one ethnic or
religious group, that same government is likely to subject
other groups to similar persecution in the future. In light of
what is happening in Chechnya, that is spine-chilling.
I ask that the balance of my statement be made a part of
the record, and I thank the Chair.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jesse Helms
Mr. Chairman, I genuinely appreciate your accommodating our request
to schedule this hearing this morning.
Obviously, I, too, welcome the members of our panel to this
morning's session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
I am grateful for the enormous amount of research and writing each
of you has contributed to the field of Russian studies and U.S.-Russian
affairs. I am certainly aware that some of you have traveled to
Washington from all parts of the country to share with us this morning
your views regarding relations between the Kremlin and the Federation's
non-Russian regions.
How the Kremlin addresses the cultures, potentials, grievances and
aspirations of its non-Russian peoples is not merely a measurement of
the state of democracy in Russia or lack thereof; what the Kremlin does
also affects the evolution and long-term prospects of democratic reform
in that country.
Repression and political and cultural heavy-handedness can
unavoidably leave the non-Russian populations of the Russian Federation
disenfranchised and resentful--and that is an obvious recipe for unrest
and instability both within and beyond the Federation's borders.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in Chechnya, where
President Putin continues to execute a savage, indiscriminate war
against the Chechen people. This blood thirsty campaign includes a
systematic, and obvious, effort to strip Chechnya of its cultural
heritage. Russian forces have obliterated Chechen religious and
historic sites in an effort to transform Chechnya into a physical and
cultural wasteland.
Since 1999, Russian forces have caused the deaths of more than
30,000 non-combatants, the dislocation of 600,000 civilians, and the
illegal incarceration of 20,000 Chechens of which the Russian forces
boast. The countless reports of rape, torture and summary executions
committed by Russian forces complete this ugly scenario.
All this bloody carnage has been imposed upon a population of just
one million people. Today, the vicious Putin war in Chechnya continues
unabated, with no inclination to even try to bring this tragic war to a
negotiated and peaceful end.
For a comparative measure of what Mr. Putin has done in Chechnya,
one only has to look to Kosovo were Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic
cleansing has caused at least 10,000 deaths and the illegal detention
and torture of thousands of Albanians.
So Mr. Chairman, this hearing is well timed. Three days from now,
on Friday, the G-7 will meet in Genoa, Italy. The G-7 leaders are
certain to celebrate the recent incarceration of Mr. Milosevic.
When they do, I prayerfully hope that when they sit across the
table from the Russian President in the so-called G-8 summit, they will
not forget that Mr. Putin's unjustified war against the Chechen people
has been far more savage and devastating than the destruction Milosevic
has wreaked upon Kosovo.
As today's witnesses are no doubt aware, the Union of Councils for
Soviet Jews has issued a report documenting official discrimination and
mistreatment of Chechens throughout the Russian Federation. The report
makes a simple, but profound point: If a government mistreats one
ethnic or religious group, that same government is likely to subject
other groups to similar persecution in the future.
In light of what is happening in Chechnya today, that is
spinechilling.
We have genuine humanitarian and strategic interest in this
conflict. The West, including the United States, should apply all the
political and economic leverage that can be mustered to encourage, and
if necessary leverage, President Putin to peacefully and immediately
end the war in Chechnya.
This war is not only perpetuating and exacerbating a humanitarian
crisis, it is sowing the seeds of hatred that will poison relations
between the Kremlin and the Federation's non-Russian peoples for
generations to come. Each day this war proceeds, it further harms the
prospects for democracy and rule of law in Russia.
For all these reasons, I look forward to the testimonies of our
witnesses. I know they will share with us their insights into what
President Putin's treatment of Chechnya portends for Russia's struggle
to evolve into a stable democracy.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be. And I might
add that the reason we are having this hearing today, and the
reason we have started with Chechnya is because of the
distinguished Senator from North Carolina and his intense
interest and his request that this be done, and I happen to
agree with him.
Senator Lugar, would you like to make an opening statement?
Senator Lugar. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward
to hearing the witnesses.
The Chairman. Let me say a brief word about our witnesses
today. We are fortunate today having four of this country's
outstanding experts on the nationalities of the Russian
Federation. In the interest of time, I am not going to recount
their impressive professional histories, except to say that the
witnesses represent three leading American universities--
Columbia, Georgetown, and Stanford--as well as Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, an indispensable broadcasting and
research organization.
I am told that there has been some prehearing coordination
among the witnesses and with the committee's staff, so we will
proceed in the order that they have suggested.
We will begin with Dr. Solnick, associate professor of
Political Science at Columbia University; then Dr. Dunlop, a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
Peace at Stanford University; and Dr. Balzer, research
professor and coordinator of Social, Ethnic, and Regional
Issues in the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European
Studies at Georgetown University; and an old friend--and it is
good to see you again, Paul--Mr. Paul Goble, who is the
Director of the Communications Department of Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, here in Washington.
So if we begin in that order, I would appreciate it, and we
will hear all of your testimonies, and then we will move to
questions. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEVEN L. SOLNICK, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Solnick. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, members
of the committee, I would like to thank you for inviting me to
address this topic this morning. It is a great privilege to be
here.
When many observers of Russia think of policy toward non-
Russians in the Russian Federation, the first image that does
come to mind is of the senseless carnage in Chechnya. Russia's
war there, of course, has been cruel beyond measure, as Senator
Helms was just commenting, and it has taken a heavy toll on
both Russian and Chechen lives. In my remarks this morning,
however, I would like to try and place Chechnya in context. I
would like to discuss how the Federal Government, beyond
Chechnya, in Russia, has fashioned a surprisingly effective
policy of carrots and sticks aimed at holding together the
multi-ethnic patchwork inherited from the Soviet Union. I will
suggest the deadlock and violence that has characterized the
Chechen conflict almost from the start are the exception rather
than the rule in Russian regional politics today.
Throughout much of the rest of Russian Federation, non-
Russian enclaves continue to be recognized by the Russian
constitution despite their dubious historical and demographic
foundations, and non-Russian elites continue to enjoy
significant power and prestige within the Russian Federal
structure. Ironically, the disconnectedness of the Chechen
problem from the rest of regional policy in Russia today simply
underscores the pointlessness of the war in Chechnya.
In the prepared statement I brought to the committee, I
have tried to provide some details of the Soviet origins of
Russia's Federal structure, Yeltsin's policy of cooptation,
Putin's steps toward recentralization. Rather than summarize
those remarks here, though, I would like to focus on just three
main points, and to make them a bit livelier, I would like to
present three common misconceptions about non-Russians in the
Russian Federation.
First, as you all know, Chechnya is just one of 21
autonomous republics within the Russian Federation. Russia
inherited a complex Federal structure from the Soviet Union: 21
republics, 11 autonomous districts, and 57 other predominantly
Russian administrative units known as oblasts or krais. This
Federal structure is a direct legacy of Bolshevik nationality
policy which had declared that each of the major ethnic groups
in the Soviet Union had its own homeland within the Soviet
federation; but, of course, the centralized institution of the
Communist Party made that federation something of a sham.
When the Communist Party collapsed at the end of the
1980's, however, the leaders of these ethnic republics within
Russia found themselves in a position to play Boris Yeltsin off
against Mikhail Gorbachev to win concessions for themselves.
And ultimately, in a phrase he would come to regret, Yeltsin
told the leaders of the ethnic enclaves to ``take as much
sovereignty as you can swallow,'' and he preserved their
special status in a Federal treaty in 1992 and subsequently in
the Russian Constitution of 1993. The resulting state
structure, in the words of one Russian observer, left 23
million Russians living in a federation--that's the ethnic
enclaves--and 124 million living in a unified state.
Now, a common misconception about this period, however, the
late 1980's and early 1990's, is that these ethnic territories
were hotbeds of separatism during this period. With the notable
exception of Chechnya--and even that is a qualified exception--
none of the leaders of these ethnic republics demanded
independence from Russia during this period. Instead, what they
demanded was higher status and special privileges within the
Russian Federation. Furthermore, it is even misleading to speak
of these republics as non-Russian territories. A single non-
Russian nationality comprises an absolute majority in just five
of the 21 republics; and in 12 of them, Russians are the
largest ethnic group.
A second misconception concerns the relationship between
Yeltsin and the leaders of these republics under the 1993
constitution. Once that constitution was ratified, Yeltsin
began signing additional bilateral agreements, commonly
referred to as ``treaties,'' with the leaders of several
republics. The first of these, with Tatarstan, granted the
Tatars constitutional and fiscal privileges that offended many
of the Russian regional leaders in the oblasts. It also opened
the floodgates to similar deals with other leaders of
republics. The failure to agree on a similar treaty with
Chechnya helped trigger the first Chechen war.
The misconception about this period, in my opinion, is that
Yeltsin and the Federal Government were essentially powerless
to resist the regional elites during the 1990's. In fact, I
believe, the Federal Government was employing a rather
sophisticated strategy of coopting individual regional leaders
through selective distribution of economic and political
benefits. The scheme was improvised, and it was complex. For
instance, when interbudgetary transfers became more
transparent, under pressure from the IMF, the Federal
Government shifted to delivering subsidies within the Federal
budget by paying some regional debts on time and leaving others
unpaid. Eventually, the potential for solidarity among regional
leaders in the Federation to oppose the Federal Government was
eroded by this divide-and-rule strategy employed by the
Kremlin.
Eventually, as the Kremlin began signing treaties with
oblasts as well as republics, the Russian/non-Russian
distinction began to lose its importance within the Federation.
And by the time of the 1999 elections, when regional leaders
tried and failed to create a political party to capture the
Federal Government, the most important division among regions
within the Russian Federation was between rich and poor, not
between Russian and non-Russian.
That brings me to the final misconception I wish to
address, that Vladimir Putin has launched a campaign of re-
centralization at the expense of regional power. It is
certainly true that one of the first issues addressed by Putin
after becoming President in March 2000 was the strengthening of
the ``vertical of Federal control,'' as he put it. There were
three main components to this. First, under the reform of the
Federation Council, regional Governors, both Russian and non-
Russian, no longer automatically sit in the Council; and the
Council is, in effect, Russia's Senate. Second, under a new
procedure for removing elected regional officials, Putin can
dismiss regional Governors or republic Presidents who issue
decrees in violation of the Federal constitution or who face
criminal charges. Finally, a new districting plan has created
seven super-regions headed by Presidential representatives
whose job it is to ensure that Federal laws take precedence
over regional laws. Five of the seven men that Putin has
appointed to be these representatives in these regions come
from the KGB and the military.
While Putin is certainly keen on strengthening vertical
accountability within Federal institutions, however, he has
continued Yeltsin's strategy of coopting regional leaders
wherever and whenever possible. He has changed Federal law to
allow certain regional leaders, including the President of
Tatarstan, to run for third or even fourth terms. He has
limited success in promoting his own candidates in
gubernatorial races, ultimately working with, rather than
defeating, financial and industrial elites in the more powerful
territories.
In the sole instance where he forced a corrupt Governor out
of office, he did so not by invoking his new powers to fire the
Governor, but by offering him a powerful and lucrative job as
head of the Federal Fisheries Committee. That is Yevgenii
Nazdratenko in Primorskii Krai. So while Putin's team has
prosecuted a number of deputy Governors on corruption charges,
he, the President, and his seven envoys have not moved to
redistribute property at the regional level in any meaningful
way. And so the political and economic machines remain intact.
By allowing non-Russian elites in these republics to
preserve their political, economic, and media power bases in
the regions, he has reduced the level of center-regional
conflict significantly since coming to power, and he has
assembled a regional consensus behind his drive to consolidate
power at the center.
This should not be confused with democracy or federalism as
we know it. The emerging political structure in Russia
preserves the power of elites, in large part by
disenfranchising large segments of society, undermining civil
rights, and curtailing media freedoms. What I want to suggest
here is that this project has lately become a cooperative
effort, by Federal and regional elites, Russian and non-
Russian, rather than a project directed by the Federal leaders
against regional leaders.
One concluding thought. The emerging consensus between
Federal and regional elites over the nature of the Russian
state only deepens the tragedy of Chechnya. There can be and
should be no illusion that the Russian Government's actions in
Chechnya are necessary or even useful for preserving the
territorial integrity of Russia. The Russian Army is not making
an example of Chechnya for the benefit of other non-Russian
regional leaders. Those leaders have long since made their
peace with the Kremlin. As an antiterrorism campaign, the
second Chechen war has been counterproductive; but, even worse,
as a political statement, it has been pointless. As it has been
for over a century, Chechnya remains a special case in Russia,
and it merits a special solution to end the conflict there.
Let me thank you again for the invitation to appear, and I
look forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Solnick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Steven L. Solnick
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to discuss the current
state of Russian policy toward the non-Russian republics of the Russian
Federation. It is a great privilege to appear before this committee.
The post-Soviet Russian Federation--with its vast territorial
scope, complex political structure and volatile ethnic mix--faces
state-building challenges that should not be underestimated. Over the
last 7 year as, much of the world's attention has focused on Russia's
brutal and senseless war in Chechnya as the most visible symbol of
Moscow's continuing oppression of non-Russian minorities on Russian
territority. While the carnage in Chechnya merits this scrutiny on its
own terms, it would be a mistake to treat Chechnya as either an example
or a harbinger of Russia's broader policy toward its non-Russian
regions.
In my statement today, I will attempt to place Chechnya in context.
I will suggest that the irreconcilable differences and endemic violence
that has characterized the Chechen conflict almost from the start are
the exception rather than the rule in Russian regional politics today.
Throughout much of the rest of Russia, non-Russian enclaves continue to
be recognized by the Russian constitution, despite their dubious
historical and demographic foundations, and non-Russian elites continue
to enjoy significant power and prestige within the federal structure.
Ironically, the disconnectedness of the Chechen problem from the rest
of regional policy in Russia today simply underscores the pointlessness
of that bloody conflict.
I will begin by briefly reviewing the origins of the ``republics''
that survive as non-Russian enclaves in modern Russia, and sketching
the outlines of Yeltsin's strategy of co-opting regional elites--
Russian and non-Russian alike. I will then discuss in a bit more detail
Putin's attempts to recentralize the federal structure, with particular
attention to implications for the non-Russian regional elites. I will
conclude with a few thoughts about the future of Russia's federal
system and the significance of the Chechen wars.
ROOTS OF RUSSIA'S ASYMMETRIC FEDERAL STRUCTURE
The federal structure of the Soviet state was based upon a detailed
hierarchy of federal sub-units: 15 union republics, contained 20
autonomous republics and over 120 administrative-territorial
``oblasts'' and ``krais.'' As a legacy of Bolshevik nationality policy,
it was a multi-ethnic federation in which major ethnic groups were
associated with particular national ``homelands'' that received varying
degrees of formal self-rule and cultural autonomy. In reality, however,
Russians constituted the majority in many of these autonomous
``ethnic'' territories, and the Russian-dominated Communist Party never
sacrificed its absolute control.
In June 1990, the Russian Federations newly elected legislature
followed the lead of the Caucasian and Baltic republics and declared
Russia to be ``sovereign.'' The most important implication of this
declaration was that Russia's laws were to take precedence over Soviet
laws, and that Russia was to control the disposition of natural
resources on her territory.
This action was quickly mimicked by the 16 ``autonomous republics''
within the borders of the Russian Federation, eager to seize the
opportunity to gain greater control over their own affairs. Yeltsin
encouraged them, reluctant to provide Gorbachev with any precedent for
recentralization; in August 1990, he famously told the leaders of the
republics to ``take as much autonomy as you can swallow.'' By October
of 1990, eleven of these sixteen republics had passed their own
sovereignty declarations, and by the beginning of 1991 all had followed
suit. This ``parade of sovereignties'' appeared at the time--and has
been interpreted since--as a direct threat to the territorial integrity
of Russia, though the declarations generally stopped short of declaring
``independence'' from Russia.
Viewed in their historical context, the sovereignty declarations
were actually quite limited. In April 1990, the all-Union Supreme
Soviet had passed a law intended to serve as the blueprint for a new
Federal Treaty sought by Gorbachev. According to the new law, the
``autonomous'' republics were granted equal status to union republics
in the economic and socio-cultural spheres, and were instructed to sign
bilateral and multilateral ``treaties'' with their parent union
republics to clarify the consensual nature of their subordination.
Perhaps most important, the autonomous republics were invited to take
their seats alongside the union republics as equal parties in
negotiating the new Federal Treaty to preserve the Soviet Union.
Thus, the sovereignty declarations of the autonomous republics
appear to be an attempt to upgrade their status within a federal
structure rather than any bid to leave a federal structure. The
omission of any mention of Russia in Tatarstan's declaration, for
instance, which is often taken as a sign of Tatar separatism, is more
accurately seen as a bid for Tatarstan to join the new Soviet
federation on equal footing with Russia. Yeltsin's encouragement of
these declarations was a clear attempt to outbid Gorbachev; Yeltsin
proposed his own ``Union Treaty'' in January 1991 in an attempt to
foreclose Gorbachev's options.
For their part, the autonomous republics were able to goad the
Russian and Soviet governments into a high stakes bidding war. In 1990,
for instance, Yeltsin promised the government of Sakha/Yakutia, home to
most of the Soviet Union's diamonds, that it could keep a share of its
diamonds for independent sale. Sakha subsequently accepted Russian
sovereignty and ceased diamond shipments through Soviet channels.
Eleven regions sought and received ``free enterprise zone'' status,
offering tax and regulatory concessions. Tatarstan, for its part, began
negotiating a bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation, as dictated
by the April 1990 law.
The abortive coup of August 1991 put an abrupt end to the bidding
free-for-all. The December 1991 agreements establishing the
Commonwealth of Independent States effectively ended any hope for a
confederation retaining a Soviet center. From this point on, the
Russian government bargained directly with provincial leaders over the
institutions of the new Russian state.
YELTSIN'S REGIONAL POLICY
When Russia became independent at the end of 1991, it consisted of
twenty-one autonomous regions (all but one of these were ultimately
reclassified as autonomous republics), ten autonomous okrugs, and 57
additional administrative units (oblasts, krais, and federal cities)
for a total of 88 subnational units. While the Soviet state had
accorded ``autonomous'' status to regions based on their designation as
national homelands for specific ethnic groups, these subnational units
did not represent indigenous islands in a Russian sea. On the contrary,
Russians constituted a plurality of the population in twelve of the
``ethnic'' republics, and an absolute majority in nine of these. In
only five republics did a single titular nationality comprise an
absolute majority of the population. The national composition of the
republics is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Ethnic Characteristics of Republics (c. 1992) \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pop.
Territory (,000) % Russian % Titular (and Other) Nationality
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dagestan................................. 2,098 9.2 Avar 28%, Dargin 16%, Kumyk 13%, Legzin 11%,
etc.
Ingushetia............................... 304 13,3 74.5
Chechnya (Ichkeria)...................... 862 24.8 66.0 (NB: Pre War figures)
Chuvashia................................ 1,338 26.7 67.8
North Ossetia............................ 664 29.9 53.0
Tuva..................................... 309 32.0 64.3
Kabardino-Balkaria....................... 790 32.0 Kabardin-48.2/Balkar-9.4
Kalmykia................................. 318 37.7 45.4
Bashkortostan............................ 4,080 39.3 21.9 (Tatar: 28.4)
Karachai-Cherkessia...................... 436 42.4 Karachai-31.2/Cherkess-9.7
Tatarstan................................ 3,642 43.3 48.5
Mari-El.................................. 764 47.5 43.3 (Tatar 6)
Sakha.................................... 1,094 50.3 33.4
Komi..................................... 1,172 57.7 23.3 (Ukranian 8.3)
Udmurtia................................. 1,640 58.9 30.9 (Tatar 6.9)
Altai Repub.............................. 202 60.4 31.0
Mordovia................................. 950 60.8 32.5 (Tatar 4.9)
Adygea................................... 450 68.0 22.1
Buriatia................................. 1,050 69.9 24.0
Karelia.................................. 780 73.6 10.1 (Belorussian 7.0)
Khakassia................................ 584 79.5 11.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data from ``Political Almanac of Russia'' (Moscow Carnegie Center 1997). The table does not include the 10
autonomous okrugs. Most of these territories, while vast, are sparsely populated (150 thousand or fewer
residents). Two exceptions are the Khanti-Mansi AOk, with its vast oil reserves, and the Yamalo-Nenets AOk
with its natural gas fields. Both are subordinated administratively to Tyumen oblast. Khanti-Mansi has a
population of 1.3 million, of which fewer than 2% are Khanti or Mansi. Yamalo-Nenets has a population of
480,000, of which just 5% are of the Nentsi people (the vast majority of the population in both okrugs is
Russian).
Since the late Gorbachev era, relations between Yeltsin's
administration and Russia's 89 regional administrations have been
characterized by extensive and protracted negotiation. Central and
provincial leaders have bargained over division of budgetary funds,
natural resources, policy jurisdictions, personnel appointments, and
other questions of fiscal and policy competence. This period can be
divided into two distinct phases, marked by different strategies
pursued by federal leaders. While non-Russian regions received certain
privileges as a group in the first phase, by the end of Yeltsin's first
presidential term the dominant cleavages in the Federation were between
rich and poor regions rather than between Russian and non-Russian
regions.
1990-1994: Collective Bargaining
Beginning with the declarations of sovereignty of the Russia's
ethnic republics in 1990, the federal government in Moscow pursued a
strategy of bargaining collectively with groups of regions. In 1992, it
signed three ``Federation Treaties'' to serve as the basis for a new
Russian constitution. Similar but distinct documents were signed with
Russia's ethnic republics, predominantly Russian oblast/krais, and
sparsely populated autonomous okrugs. In doing this, federal
authorities effectively defmed three major groupings of regions which
it would recognize in subsequent collective bargaining.
During 1992 and 1993, the heads of Russia's ethnic republics met
regularly and defined a coherent bargaining bloc in their relations
with the federal center. Oblasts and krais were unable to match their
coherence, despite abortive efforts to define analogous oblast-centered
``republics'' (like the Urals Republic led by Sverdlovsk oblast or the
Far Eastern Republic led by Primorskii krai). Unlike these ad hoc
collaborations based on geographic proximity, the collective bloc
formed by the ethnic republics had readily-identifiable markers of
membership: regions defined constitutionally as ``republics'' could
easily recognize their stake in the success of the bargaining unit.
When Moscow granted a concession to one ``republic,'' all other
republics could and did claim it as their constitutional entitlement as
well. As a consequence, ethnic republics retained a disproportionate
share of both fiscal subsidies and policy autonomy through 1993.
1994-1998: Bilateralism
After the ethnic republics failed to collectively support Yeltsin
in his showdown with the Russian parliament in 1993, the center moved
to dismantle the structural advantages enjoyed by ethnic republics. It
did so by attacking the unifying principle of their bargaining unit--
their common stake in securing collective privileges.
Beginning with the 1994 Bilateral Treaty with Tatarstan, the
Kremlin began distributing resources and autonomy to regions based on
individual rather than collective deals. Beginning first with selected
republics, and then extending the practice in 1996 to selected oblasts
and krais, the federal government began defining its relations with
specific regions through direct bilateral negotiations. As a
consequence, it was able to restrict the privileges enjoyed by some
republics without incurring the ire of other republics fearing their
privileges were also at stake.
Thus, in 1997, the Kremlin was able to restructure Sakha's highly
lucrative diamond marketing concession without encountering any
protests of solidarity from other resource-rich regions. Perhaps most
strikingly, the Kremlin was able to prosecute its brutal war against
Chechnya (with whom treaty negotiations broke down) without encountenng
united protests from other Islamic republics. In instances like these,
it was clear than regions were conceiving and structuring their
relations with federal officials bilaterally rather than collectively.
By June 1998, more than half of the 89 subjects of the Russian
Federations had signed bilateral ``treaties'' with the federal
government.
1998 and the Limits of Bilateralism
Beginning in 1998, the Kremlin's reliance on bilateral bargaining
with the regions became increasingly costly. By the spring of 1998, the
central government was already losing access to the policy levers it
needed to maintain a strategy of bilateral bargaining with regions. The
fiscal collapse of August 1998 thus created a political as well as
economic crisis by depriving the federal center of the few resources it
could dole out to keep regional leaders in line.
Especially troubling to the Kremlin was the emergence of
``governors' blocs'' as players in the 1999 parliamentary election.
While these were essentially loose alliances with overlapping
memberships, parties like ``Gobs Rossiia'' and ``Vsia Rossiia'' amount
to regional blocs defined not by inherited constitutional status (like
the heads of republics) or accidents of contiguity (like Urals or Far
Eastern associations). Instead, these new unions of governors represent
political alliances specifically aimed at influencing the post-Yeltsin
succession. The most successful of them was the OVR bloc--Otechesvlo-
Vsia Rossiia--led by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime
Minister Yevgenii Pnmakov. Several non-Russian republican
``presidents'' including Shaimiev of Tatarstan, Rakhimov of
Bashkortostan, and Aushev of Jngushetiia--were prominent in the
formation of this bloc, along with leaders of such rich regions as
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhnii Novgorod. Their cooperation
underlined the degree to which Russian/non-Russian cleavages no longer
defined the federal landscape in Russia.
A bloc of regional leaders, united across geographic areas and
ethnic differences, represented the Kremlin's worst nightmare as the
2000 presidential elections approached. With few carrots to offer those
regional elites who remained loyal, the federal center instead used
sticks to disrupt the emerging solidarity of the periphery.
The Center's Response: A Bloc of its Own
Yeltsin's response to the new regional threat was swift and
dramatic, and it led directly to the emergence of Vladimir Putin as a
national politician. It came in two phases, as two challengers ``from
then regions'' commanded the attention of the Kremlin.
Lebed: In early 1998, the election of Alexander Lebed as governor
of Krasnoyarsk krai raised the first real specter of a credible
presidential challenge mounted by a ``regional leader.'' Lebed's
election led swiftly to the dismissal of Victoria Mitina, Yeltsin's
deputy chief of staff for regional policy.
In Mitina's place, Yeltsin elevated Vladimir Putin from his post as
head of the fiscal oversight Control Commission of the presidential
administration. Putin's previous responsibilities had included the
investigation of misuse of budget funds by regional leaders, and his
appointment raised fears of an imminent vendetta against regional
opponents of Yeltsin. So palpable was this fear that Putin's first act
in his new job was to hold a press conference to avow that he
considered no governor to be ``enemies'' of the administration,
regardless of their views.
Putin's next major initiative, however, signaled a new strategy by
Yeltsin's team. Yeltsin presided over a meeting of the heads of the
non-Russian republics, the same body coopted by Yeltsin during the
early days of his presidency. According to published reports, Yeltsin
made a ``separate deal'' with the republic heads, promising additional
transfers of federal property and a renewed dedication to protecting
privileges granted in earlier negotiations. The meeting foreshadowed a
return to the co-optation model of the 1990-94.
Luzhkov: By early 1999, the chief presidential challenger ``from
the regions'' was no longer Lebed but Yurii Luzhkov, the mayor of
Moscow. Luzhkov's bid was more threatening to the Kremlin, since it
linked a charismatic politician to a bloc of governors--Vsia Rossiia--
formed to contest the 1999 parliamentary elections. His failure to
derail the Luzhkov-Vsia Rossiia alliance in August 1999 cost Sergei
Stepashin his job as Prime Minister.
Stepashin's replacement--Putin--wasted little time in defusing the
momentum generated by the Luzhkov-Primakov OVR bloc. Shortly after
replacing Stepashin, Vladimir Putin attended a meeting of the
``Siberian Accord,'' an inter-regional association in which Lebed has
played a prominent role. Putin assured the Siberian leaders that the
federal government would give priority to Siberian development. More
significantly, he signaled that regional policy was and would remain
near the top of his agenda.
By the end of September, Putin's supporters had launched a new
governors' bloc, labeled Yedinstvo, or Unity, to provide what he termed
``an alternative'' to OVR. More significantly, by the end of September
the Russian army was once again on the move in Chechnya, no longer on a
mission to preserve the Federation but rather to combat domestic
terrorism. As Yeltsin's poll numbers began to climb, driven by the
Chechen war, the invincibility of the OVR alliance looked less and less
certain. Throughout the fall, regional leaders quietly withdrew their
support from OVR and began to climb aboard the Unity bandwagon,
reluctant to be buried under what increasingly looked like a Putin
landslide. After the December 1999 Duma elections, Luzhkov retreated
from the national political scene, eager to reach some modus vivendi
with Putin that would allow him to protect his economic and political
power base in Moscow. After Yeltsin's surprise resignation at the end
of 1999, OVR failed to offer its own candidate for the presidency, and
the regional alliance that looked so threatening to Yeltsin six month
earlier faded into the background of the Duma.
CENTER-REGIONAL RELATIONS UNDER PUTIN
As one of his first acts as president, Putin moved to restructure
the institutions that regulate center-periphery relations in the
Russian Federation. In part, Putin has expressed a straightforward
concern that the ``vertical'' dimension of power must be strengthened
if federal laws are to be implemented. More subtly, however, he has
also warned of the dangers of a fragmented legal or economic space in
Russia. Putin has forcefully argued that foreign investors will
continue to shun Russia unless it presents itself as a unified market
and an arena in which property rights are equally respected in all
regions.
To these ends, Putin has begun dismantling the patchwork of
bilateral agreements and treaties concluded by Yeltsin with many of
Russia's regions. One of Putin's first acts as President was to
pressure Bashkortostan's president Rakhimov to relinquish that
republic's special tax status and to reintegrate itself into unified
national fiscal system. According to Putin, president Shaimiev of
Tatarstan similarly agreed to forego some of the benefits granted to
the republic in its landmark 1994 treaty, though negotiations between
Tatar and federal officials have been contentious over the past year.
More formally, Putin has introduced a series of laws and decrees
that alter the essential relationship between regional governors and
the federal government. Laws on the Federation Council and on removing
elected governors from office encountered some resistance from the
Federation Council (the upper house of the legislature, composed ex
officio of the governors and regional assembly speakers of each of
Russia's 89 regions) but were finally passed at the end of July 2000. A
May 2000 decree reorganizing the structure of the federal bureaucracy
in the regions went into effect immediately, but the new structures it
created are still taking shape.
Many Russian and Western analysts view these reforms as heralding a
recentralization of power at the expense of regional leaders--Russian
and non-Russian alike--but this interpretation of the reforms is not
consistent with the details of the new structures.
Restructuring the Federation Council
Under the law finally signed by Putin on 5 August, the new
Federation Council (FC) will have two representatives from each region,
one from the executive side and one from the legislative side (as
stipulated by the Russian constitution). Current FC deputies are to
serve out their terms, or yield their seats by 1 January 2002.
The FC delegate from the legislative side is to be nominated by the
Speaker of the regional assembly. The FC delegate from the executive
side is appointed by the governor directly, by decree. That appointment
is subject to a potential veto by a vote of two-thirds of the regional
assembly. The new FC delegates will serve terms that run concurrently
with the terms of their respective appointers: the executive delegate
serves as long as the governor/president of the region; the legislative
delegate serves as long as the regional legislative session.
Crucially, delegates are subject to recall by the same organs that
appointed them. This provision casts doubt on the conventional wisdom
that the Federation Council reform will diminish the power of the
regional leaders. On the contrary, the FC delegates who replace the
current governors will serve only as long as they retain the support of
the governors. In addition, the new FC delegates will not concurrently
hold responsible positions in their home territories, and will
therefore be able to remain in Moscow--and in session--far longer than
the previous FC norm of one or two days per month. As a consequence,
the new Federation Council may prove to be a more significant
legislative institution than its predecessor.
Removing regional leaders from their automatic seats in the
Federation Council will deprive them of a regular opportunity to meet
and find common ground in their dealings with the center, however. Many
of the regional alliances formed for the 1999 Duma elections were
hatched in the corridors of the Federation Council. Some Russian
observers have also complained that many of the new delegates to the FC
are Muscovites rather than individuals living in the regions they
represent. This may have the consequence of diminishing the
representation of non-Russian interests in the parliamentary process.
Removing Governors and Regional Legislatures
Another common misconception is that Putin has won the right to
``fire'' regional governors and disband regional legislatures. This is
a drastic overstatement. According to the new law on the structure of
regional authorities, signed 29 July, Putin can essentially impeach
regional authorities found to be acting in violation of the
constitution. But the new law makes extensive provisions for federal
courts and the Duma to play a role in regulating the process.
Putin's objective in this reform is to create a mechanism to force
regional authorities to comply with federal law. Under some estimates
by the Russian Ministry of Justice, as many as half of all laws and
decrees passed at the regional level prior to 2000 were in violation of
the federal constitution or other federal laws. Since regional
executives and legislatures became elected starting in 1995, there has
been no clear mechanism for removing authorities who openly refuse to
comply with federal law. On several occasions--most notably Moscow
mayor Luzhkov's refusal to enforce court orders to scrap the capital's
residence-permit system--regional authorities have remained in
violation of federal court orders for years.
Under the new law, if a court finds a regional law (or set of laws)
to be in violation of the federal constitution, the regional assembly
that passed it has three months to fix or annul the law (unless the
court provides a different deadline). If it fails to change the law,
the President issues a decree putting the regional assembly on
``warning.'' If the regional assembly ignores the ``warning'' for a
further three months, the President can introduce a law into the Duma
to dismiss the regional assembly. If it passes and is signed by the
president, the regional assembly is stripped of its powers on the day
the law goes into effect. When an assembly is disbanded, new elections
are scheduled.
For governors (or republic presidents, as the law makes no clear
distinction for republics), the President exercises more discretionary
authority. If a governor issues decrees in violation of the federal
constitutions there are two alternative responses by the center. First,
a court can fmd the act unconstitutional, and the governor then has two
months to annul it or face a Presidential decree putting him/her on
``warning.'' Alternatively, if the executive act is annulled by an act
of the Russian president rather than a court, the governor has two
months to comply with the presidential order or appeal to a court, or
else face a ``warning.'' If the warning has no effect after a month,
the President can remove the governor (or republic president) from
office. The decree removing the governor has a ten-day waiting period
before taking effect, and during that time the governor can appeal to
the Russian Supreme Court, which must act within 10 days.
On the recommendation of the General Procurator, however, the
President can also temporarily remove a governor (or republic
president) if there is evidence s/he has committed serious crimes and
the procuracy attests that an indictment is planned. In the event the
chief executive is dismissed by the president, s/he is replaced
according to the procedures specified in the regional constitution/
charter. If the charter/constitution makes no provision for an acting
chief executive, the President appoints one to serve until new
elections are held.
It is important to note, however, that in the most prominent case
to date of a regional leader forced out of office by Putin--that of
Primorskii Krai's Yevgemi Nazdratenko--Putin did not make use of his
new powers to oust Nazdratenko. Instead, after ratcheting up the
pressure on the governor though a serious of auditors and emissaries
dispatched to respond to the region's heating crisis, Putin won the
governor's agreement to resign. Shortly thereafter, Putin appointed him
to chair the federal fisheries committee. Just as Yeltsin had done for
years, Putin relied at the crucial moment on the carrot rather than the
stick.
REDISTRICTING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION
A final reform, this one accomplished by federal decree on 13 May
2000, reorganizes the federal bureaucracy into seven ``federal
districts'' each headed by a Presidential representative. Some
observers in Russia and the West have called this reorganization the
beginning of a radical redrawing of Russia's federal map. As with the
laws discussed above, however, this evaluation is also unsupported by
the limited facts currently available.
Proposals to reorganize the federal bureaucracy in Russia along
regional lines have been in circulation since the 1920s, and a plan at
``regionalization'' of the economic planning system contributed to
Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. More recently, however, two arguments for
redistricting have become confused in Russia. On the one hand, some
advisors and politicians have called for a replacement of the current
map of 89 federal subunits of varying status (oblast, krai, okrug and
republic) with a simpler system of 10-20 ``gubemiyas'' of comparable
size and equal status. This plan would directly threaten the power
bases of virtually all regional politicians in Russia and would
eliminate the distinction between Russian oblasts and non-Russian
``republics.'' On the other hand, as early as 1997, Yeltsin considered
reforming the moribund system of ``presidential representatives'' which
placed a presidential appointee in each region as to serve as the
center's ``eyes and ears.'' The presidential representatives in place
since 1990 had played almost no role in regional politics and had
generally been ``captured'' by local governors upon whom they depended
for support. Under the reforms first considered in 1997, Yeltsin would
designate one representative to oversee a group of regions rather an
individual region, diminishing the likelihood of their capture by an
individual governor.
Putin's reorganization represents a revival of the original Yeltsin
plan of 1997-not the more radical ``guberniya'' plans occasionally
discussed. Putin himself has disavowed any intent to change the federal
map of Russia or abolish the current territorial divisions into
oblasts, krais and republics. Instead, far more modestly, Putin intends
for the newly appointed presidential representatives--or ``governors-
general''--in the seven new federal districts to have complete
oversight authority to supervise the functioning of regional branches
of federal institutions. To ensure that these new overseers are loyal
to him, Putin has relied heavily of appointees with a military or
security background: five of the seven new governors general come from
the armed forces or KGB.
The exact role the new governors-general will play remains highly
uncertain, even a year after the system went into effect. Certain
prominent law-and-order ministries--notably Interior and Justice--are
explicitly reorganizing their field operations along federal district
lines. While the governors-general may have different powers in
different districts, Putin's intent seems to be to interpose the
governors-general between regional governors and the Moscow officials.
Rather than lobbying federal officials in Moscow for subsidies or tax
breaks, governors are already finding their calls redirected to the
governors-general. Laws and regulations in need of regional input are
now sent to governors-general for comment, rather than to regional
governors directly. Nominations for appointments to vacancies in the
regional branches of federal ministries now go to the governors-general
rather than the Presidential administration.
Not all federal ministries are embracing the district
reorganization. The federal treasury system, which has opened branch
offices in each of Russia's 89 regions, has not reorganized along the
seven-district model. This means that while governors-general will have
oversight power in the area of law-making and personnel appointments,
they will not have institutional mechanisms to interrupt or rechannel
the flow of federal expenditures to the regions. Under the new Tax
Code, however, the flow of tax revenues will be significantly more
centralized. Governors-general have also been reviving the Soviet-era
(and tsarist) position of ``inspectors'' who will have the power to
conduct audits of regional administrations within the federal
districts.
One symbolic element of the reorganization was widely noted by
Russian observers: none of the seven district ``capitals'' are in non-
Russian republics. Instead, by basing the federal redistricting on the
existing model of militaiy districts rather than economic associations,
Putin has signaled that these are to be institutions of control rather
than mechanisms of representation or self-govermnent.
Two of the seven appointees to the posts of governor-general played
significant roles in the Chechen war. The Southern District,
encompassing Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus, is the most
volatile of the seven. The federal envoy there is Viktor Kazantsev, a
general in the Russian Army who was commander of Russian troops in
Chechnya until April 2000. Muslim and other non-Russian minorities in
the region expressed concern that the district capital was located in
Rostov, a Russian oblast capital, rather than in an ethnic republic.
The choice of Kazantsev, whose role in the Chechen campaigns was
prominent, only served to inflame tensions. In addition, Konstantin
Pulikovsky, the federal envoy to the Far Eastern district, is a retired
Lieutenant General in the Army. Pulikovskii directed Russian troops
assulting Grozny in the summer of 1996. In addition to Primorskii Krai,
Pulikovskii's district includes the vast republic of Sakha.
Regional Political Machines
Many governors and republic presidents who secured re-election to
office in 1996-97 have been coming to the end of their second terms in
2000-2001. Federal law imposes a two-term limit on regional leaders,
but manipulations of the election law have already been commonplace. In
Tatarstan, President Shaimiev seems intent on pushing the envelope of
electoral law manipulation. In February 1996, Shaimiev defied federal
election requirements that no candidate run unopposed and won 97
percent of the vote as the only name on the ballot. In 2000, he began
to fight against a two-term limit on regional leadership that was due
to take effect in 2001. Shaimiev at first framed the issue as a test
case in the primacy of republican over federal law, since republican
election legislation contains no limit on the number of terms served.
Ultimately, Putin supported a change in federal law that would have
removed the bar to Shaimiev's reelection--and open the door to dozens
of other regional leaders to seek third or even fourth terms. Once
again, Putin opted for a concession that he could use to neutralize
regional opposition, in this case from a leader on the non-Russian
republics.
Even in regions where the Kremlin manages to intervene
successfully, its control over events is limited. While Konstantin
Pulikovskii, the governor-general in the Far East, was able to
orchestrate the ouster of Primorskii governor Nazdratenko, he failed
miserably in his bid to have his deputy elected as Nazdratenko's
replacement. In other regions over the last year, the backing of Putin
and the Kremlin has been insufficient to guarantee the election of
gubernatorial candidates favored by the center.
Beyond their ability to manipulate electoral laws, incumbent
regional leaders have secured their hold on regional power by
consolidating economic and political mechanisms of control. In many
administrations, especially in the non-Russian republics, large
enterprises are now partly owned by regional administrations, which
secured stakes in payment for tax debts. This gives regional leaders
control over significant cash flows and leverage over large labor
forces who are also voters. In addition, in many regions, local media
are heavily dependent on financing by regional administrations. Local
media independence has been waning across Russia for the last five
years. Taken together, these factors have resulted in a much higher
reelection rate for incumbent governors in the 1997-2000 elections than
during the initial 1995-97 election season. In 1999, for instance, 9 of
13 incumbent governors who stood for reelection won.
Implications
The reforms of center-regional relations have diminished the
governors' presence in Moscow, but have yet to decisively limit their
grip on power at home. Since they will still exert significant control
over federal legislation through the new Federation Council, and as the
functions and staffing of the new governors-general offices are still
being worked out, regional leaders--Russian and non-Russian--seem
poised to continue their dominance of political life within their
regions, even if their ability to influence federal policy may diminish
under Putin.
CONCLUSIONS
This review of Russian regional policy over the last ten years
highlights two important trends. First, with the exception of Chechnya,
non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation have retained their
peculiar constitutional status but increasingly are treated on an equal
footing with other components of the Russian Federation. The ``ethnic
factor'' in federal politics is not entirely gone, but it is certainly
less prominent at the federal level than it was even five years ago.
(It remains a factor at the local level, especially in ``republics''
where Russians are in the majority.)
Second, despite his campaign of strengthening vertical
accountability, Putin has continued Yeltsin's strategy of co-opling
regional leaders--Russian and non-Russian--wherever and whenever
possible. By allowing non-Russian elites in the ethnic republics to
preserve their political and economic power bases in the regions, he
has reduced the level of center-regional conflict significantly and
assembled a regional consensus behind his drive to consolidate power at
the center. This should not be confused with democracy or federalism as
we know it: the emerging political structure preserves the power of
elites in large party by disenfranchising large segments of society,
undermining civil rights, and curtailing media freedoms. What I have
tried to suggest here is that this project has lately become a
cooperative effort by federal and regional elites--Russian and non-
Russian--rather than a project directed by the federal leadership
against regional leaders.
Finally, the emerging consensus between federal and regional elites
over the nature of the Russian state only deepens the tragedy of
Chechnya. There can be, and should be, no illusion that the Russian
government's actions in Chechnya are necessary or even useful for
preserving the territorial integrity of Russia. The Russian army is not
``making an example'' of Chechnya for the benefit of other non-Russian
regional leaders--those leaders have long since made their peace with
the Kremlin. As an anti-terrorism campaign, the second Chechen war has
been counterproductive, but even worse, as a political statement it has
been pointless. As it has been for over a century, Chechnya remains a
special case in Russia. It merits a special solution to end its agony.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, doctor. Dr. Dunlop.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN B. DUNLOP, SENIOR FELLOW, THE HOOVER
INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
STANFORD, CA
Dr. Dunlop. Thank you, Senator Biden, Senator Helms,
Senator Lugar.
The current war in Chechnya has lasted 2 months longer than
did the previous 1994-1996 conflict, and there appears to be
little chance of a negotiated settlement occurring in the
foreseeable future. The term ``Khasavyurt Accords,'' signifying
the August 1996 peace settlement which put an end to the
fighting, has now become a term of abuse, both for the Putin
leadership and the Russian military and police. ``No more
Khasavyurts!'' is a rallying cry frequently heard in statements
by regime representatives and by their supporters. Russian
opinion polls show that the public has, by now, grown weary of
this stalled and costly military campaign.
President Putin, however, has made it clear that he intends
to carry on with the war for as long as it takes to achieve an
unconditional victory. In mid-March of this year, he indicated
that Stalin's postwar campaign against anti-Soviet partisans in
western Ukraine and the Baltic could serve as a relevant
precedent, suggesting that he, like Stalin, is prepared, if
necessary, to continue this war for 10 years or longer, for as
long as it takes.
It should be underscored that the economic costs of this
war have been and remain very high. In April of this year,
economic specialist Boris Vishnevsky calculated that in 1999
and the year 2000, the Russian Government had spent
approximately $8.8 billion on military activities in Chechnya,
thereby exceeding the annual budgets of the capital cities of
Moscow and Petersburg.
In light of the Putin regime's apparent commitment to
soldier on with the war, despite these appalling human and
economic costs, what should the representatives of the G-7
countries be saying to Mr. Putin at the upcoming Genoa summit?
In my opinion, they should, inter alia, talk to him about war
crimes and about the apparent impunity of the Russian forces
stationed in Chechnya.
Recently, a number of high-ranking pro-Moscow Chechen
officials have begun to complain vigorously about lawlessness
and marauding on the part of the Russian forces based in
Chechnya. On 9th of July, for example, the pro-Moscow head of
administration for the republic, Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov,
maintained that ``large-scale crimes against civilians'' had
been committed, while ``not a single bandit was arrested, not a
single rifle was confiscated, and no explosive substances were
found.'' In similar fashion, Shamil Beno, until recently
Kadyrov's official representative in Moscow, confided:
``Chechen civilians are being killed on a daily basis. Our
estimates show that an average of from 15 to 20 civilians are
being killed every day, and these are the cases that become
known.'' Statements such as these from well-informed pro-Moscow
administrators, are important. If even such officials claim
that war crimes are taking place in Chechnya, then one can be
quite sure that they are.
From such accounts, which could easily be multiplied many
times over, it seems obvious that a breakdown of discipline and
of elementary order has taken place among the Russian forces
based in Chechnya. Sent into the republic to combat bandits,
they have themselves become bandits who prey lawlessly on the
civilian populous. To date, these marauders have been acting
with virtual impunity.
This question of the impunity of the Russian Federal forces
based in Chechnya should be raised by the G-7 leaders when they
meet with President Putin in Genoa at the end of this week. On
the 12th of this month, Lord Russell-Johnston, president of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or PACE,
stated in Strasbourg: ``In recent weeks, there has been
mounting evidence of a rapidly deteriorating human-rights
situation in Chechnya. There is little doubt that the conduct
of the Russian forces is largely to blame for this. I expect
all human rights violations to be condemned at the highest
levels by the Russian authorities.'' And Russell-Johnston
continued: ``The reports of human-rights abuses come against
the background of the Russian authorities' deplorable lack of
willingness to properly investigate allegations of past abuse.
The failure to bring to justice those responsible for crimes
constitutes a blatant violation of Russia's obligations as a
member of the Council of Europe and as a party to its most
important conventions.''
Noting that a PACE delegation would be visiting Chechnya in
mid-September and that the dreadful situation in the republic
would be discussed in detail at an assembly session that month,
Russell-Johnston added: ``By September, we expect to receive
evidence of concrete and substantial progress with regard to
both the present conduct of Russian security forces and the
investigations of past abuses.'' This message, one would think,
is one that should also be delivered to the Russian President
by G-7 representatives at the upcoming Genoa summit.
The recent transfer of former Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague,
an action sharply criticized by President Putin, has prompted
several leading Russian democrats to envisage a similar fate
awaiting those responsible for committing war crimes in
Chechnya. ``I affirm, and I am prepared to prove,'' Duma deputy
and former Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalev
observed recently, ``that the losses taking place among the
civilian population of Chechnya are not simply the result of
clumsiness or imprecision by the Federal command. I affirm,
rather, this a conscious and purposeful policy.''
The issue of Chechen refugees represents one facet of the
present conflict which deserves to be highlighted. Currently,
there are at least 150,000 to 160,000 Chechen refugees seeking
shelter in the autonomous Republic of Ingushetia. The Putin
leadership has made it clear that it wants this entire populace
relocated to Chechnya, even though it cannot conceivably
guarantee their physical safety. The Chechen refugees do not
want to be sent back into a war zone, an action which would
furthermore constitute a violation of the Geneva Conventions.
As one refugee woman put it, ``I have three children. Do you
think that we are being kept here in Ingushetia against our
will or that we are living here for humanitarian aid, for moldy
macaroni? I would be glad to live in my own home in Chechnya,
but I am responsible for my children and I cannot subject them
to danger. If the war ends, then we will immediately go home.''
This sentiment appears to be that of a weighty majority of the
refugees.
I was asked to add a few comments concerning the position
of other minority peoples living in Russia, but, due to lack of
time, let me only say that, in my opinion, we do appear to be
seeing a retreat from federalism in Russia today and a desire
to recreate a unitary state such as existed under the
Communists, though this process is ongoing and far from
complete.
I conclude my paper with two policy recommendations. First,
the U.S. Congress should require an annual report from the
State Department detailing the status of human rights and the
violations of international law in Chechnya. And, second, the
State Department should be asked to appoint a special
coordinator for Chechnya who would coordinate the logistical
work among different bureaus and areas: human rights, refugees,
Russia, North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. A key focus
for this coordinator would be the Chechen refugee tragedy. And,
finally, let me offer support for the concurrent resolution
which will be shortly introduced by Senator Helms concerning
the tragedy in Chechnya and other recent Russian political
developments on the occasion of the upcoming G-7 meeting. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dunlop follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. John B. Dunlop
RUSSIA'S UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST CHECHEN CIVILIANS
The current war in Chechnya has lasted two months longer than did
the previous 1994-1996 conflict, and there appears to be little chance
of a negotiated settlement occurring in the foreseeable future. The
term ``Khasavyurt Accords,'' signifying the August 1996 peace
settlement which put an end to the fighting, has now become a term of
abuse both for the Putin leadership and for the Russian military and
police. ``No more Khasavyurts!'' is a rallying cry frequently heard in
statements by regime representatives and by their supporters.
Russian opinion polls show that the public--which, at the beginning
of the conflict in 1999, enthusiastically embraced the war effort, thus
propelling Vladimir Putin into the Russian presidency at the time of
the March 2000 elections--has by now grown weary of the stalled and
costly military campaign. A Russia-wide survey conducted last month by
the independent research center ROMIR found only 33.7% of Russian
citizens to one extent or another supporting the actions of the federal
forces in Chechnya, while 53.5% opposed those actions. The poll also
found that 20.2% of respondents wanted a full withdrawal of Russian
forces from Chechnya and a recognition of the independence of that
republic.
``A tectonic shift,'' the well-known sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky
commented earlier this month, ``is occurring in [Russian] society now,
as an anti-military mood is not only becoming widespread, but actually
predominant. This mood is already, in my estimation, stronger than it
was at the end of the first Chechen war.'' Kagarlitsky went on to note
that, ``The recent state attacks on the [Russiani press have been
largely motivated by its military failures. Not able to achieve results
on the battlefield, the Kremlin can only double and redouble its
propaganda effort. . . . This means opening a second front--at home,
against journalists.'' (Moscow Times, July 9)
Despite the ``tectonic shift'' in public opinion to which
Kagarlitsky refers, few in Russia expect President Putin or his team to
be seriously concerned over this decline in public support for the
conflict. Russia now possesses what has been described as an ``elective
monarchy,'' and a Russian sitting president must briefly focus upon
public moods only when an election draws near (the next presidential
election, of course, is scheduled for March of 2004). The Russian
public is aware of this situation. When, at the end of last month, Ekho
Moskvy Radio asked its listeners if the war in Chechnya would end soon,
90% of those who phoned in with a comment predicted that the conflict
would not end soon; only 10% believed in an early end to the war.
President Putin has made it clear that he is prepared to carry on
with the war for as long as it takes to achieve an unconditional
victory. In mid-March of this year, during a conversation with the
editors of four leading Russian newspapers, Putin cited Stalin's
postwar campaign against anti-Soviet partisans in western Ukraine and
the Baltic as a relevant precedent, suggesting that he, like Stalin, is
prepared, if necessary, to continue the war for ten years or longer--
for as long as it takes. (Izvestiya, March 22)
It should be underscored that the economic costs of the war have
been and remain very high. In April of this year, economics specialist
Boris Vishnevsky calculated that, in 1999 and 2000, the Russian
government spent approximately $8.8 billion on military activities in
Chechnya, thereby exceeding the annual budgets of the capital cities of
Moscow and St. Petersburg. (Novaya Gazeta, no. 29) The war has also
been costly in terms of human life. On the sixth of this month, sources
in the Russian Defense Ministry told Interfax that 3,433 servicemen had
been killed to date in the conflict, and that 10,160 had been wounded.
The Soldiers' Mothers' Committee of Russia believes that these figures
are far too low and estimates that to date approximately 10,000
soldiers have been killed and 12,000 wounded. (New York Times Magazine,
8 July)
In light of the Putin regime's apparent commitment to soldier on
with the war despite these appalling human and economic costs, what
should representatives of the G-7 countries say to Mr. Putin at the
upcoming Genoa summit? In my opinion, they should talk to him about war
crimes and about the apparent impunity of the Russian forces stationed
there. Whether or not he is prepared to admit it, Putin faces a growing
political and social crisis in the form of the massive loss of
discipline by and the disintegration and criminalization of the Russian
military and police forces based in Chechnya. In the 26 June issue of
the Boston Globe, journalist David Filipov reported the widespread
practice of Russian officers' selling the bodies of deceased Chechens
to their relatives at an exorbitant price. One woman with whom Filipov
spoke, the mother of five children, was offered the body of a nephew by
a Russian officer for the sum of $1,000, plus a $200 gold necklace.
Military and police shakedowns, Filipov notes, take place non-stop at
the numerous checkpoints set up throughout the republic. ``Everyone in
Chechnya,'' he writes, ``must pay bribes to pass military checkpoints,
some of which have `cash register' signs pointing out where to pay.
Nearly everyone has had property or valuables confiscated during
document checks.''
At the beginning of this month, as correspondent Patrick Tyler
reported in the 11 July issue of the New York Times, hundreds of
Russian Interior Ministry troops, backed by helicopter gun-ships, swept
into two villages--Assinovskaya and Sernovodsk--lying close to
Chechnya's border with the neighboring autonomous republic of
Ingushetiya. They arrived in more than one hundred armored personnel
carriers, whose identification numbers had been intentionally smudged
over. All Chechen males between the ages of 15 and 55 were then
forcibly taken away to filtration points. In the village of
Assinovskaya. which Tyler personally visited, soldiers had kicked down
the doors of a school, thrown grenades into empty classrooms, and blown
open three safes, from which they had appropriated the equivalent of
$2,000 in cash, funds earmarked for the payment of teachers' salaries.
Recently a number of high-ranking pro-Moscow Chechen officials have
begun to complain vigorously about such lawlessness and marauding on
the part of the Russian forces based in Chechnya. On 9 July, for
example, the pro-Moscow head of administration for the republic, Mufti
Akhmad Kadyrov, maintained that ``large scale crimes against
civilians'' had been committed, while ``not a single bandit was
arrested, not a single rifle was confiscated, and no explosive
substances were found.'' Kadyrov accused the Russian troops of robbing
hospitals as well as the already-mentioned school in Assinovskya.
(Gazeta.ru, 9 July)
In similar fashion, Shamil Beno, until recently Kadyrov's official
representative in Moscow, confided to Ekho Moskvy Radio on 9 July:
``[Chechen] civilians are being killed on a daily basis. Our estimates
show that an average from 15 to 20 civilians are killed every day.
These are cases that become known.'' In the village of Novyi Sharoi,
Beno went on to report, all males between the ages of 14 and 55 had
been detained by Russian troops and subjected to electric shock torture
while they were being interrogated. Chechen detainees, he said, were
required to pay 500 rubles to keep their cars from being smashed and
1,500 rubles to avoid being physically beaten.
Lastly, Rudnik Dudaev (no relation to the late Chechen president),
who is currently the secretary of the pro-Moscow security council of
Chechnya, told Moscow News a week ago: ``They [Russian soldiers] move
about in armored vehicles carrying black flags upon which a skull and
crossbones have been emblazoned. Many of them also have a skull and
crossbones on the [ski] masks they wear. . . . Almost all of the
armored vehicles they drive have their numbers smeared over with dirt:
in case of an incident, and such incidents occur often, the vehicle
cannot be found.'' The Russian military and police, Dudaev went on to
assert, are heavily involved in--indeed they effectively control--the
vast illegal transport of Chechen oil out of the republic. (Moskovskie
Novosti, no. 28)
Statements such as these from well-informed pro-Moscow
administrators are important. If even these officials claim that war
crimes are taking place in Chechnya, then one can be quite sure that
they are. Significantly, the commander of the Russian Combined Group of
Forces in Chechnya, General Vladimir Moltenskoi, himself admitted a
week ago: ``Those who conducted the searches [in Sernovodsk and
Assinovskya] did so in a lawless fashion, committing numerous outrages,
and then pretending that they knew nothing about them.'' (Quoted in the
New York Times, 11 July) Later on the same day that he had made this
admission, however, Moltenskoi began to backpedal and to qualify his
remarks. (Washington Post, 12 July)
The crimes committed by Russian forces in Chechnya have been
confirmed and amplified by other sources of reliable information. Thus,
the office of the leading human rights organization, Memorial, in
Nazran, Ingushetiya reported that one man, Salambek Amagov, had died of
liver failure after being harshly beaten by Russian soldiers in
Sernovodsk. In that village, Memorial also reported, 700 people had
been herded together: ``The rates were made clear: boys cost 200
rubles, older people from 500 to 1,000 rubles depending on whether they
had local registration.'' (Moscow Times, 9 July)
From the above accounts--which could easily be multiplied many
times over--it seems obvious that a complete breakdown of discipline
and of elementary order has taken place among the Russian forces based
in Chechnya. Sent into the republic to combat ``bandits,'' they have
themselves become bandits who prey lawlessly on the civilian populace.
To date, these marauders have been acting with virtual impunity. The
national chair of the human rights organization Memorial, Oleg Orlov,
recently pointed out that, in Chechnya, 212 criminal cases in which
Russian soldiers were suspects had been quashed by the pro-Moscow
Chechen procuracy, allegedly because that entity had been unable to
determine which soldier had committed a specific crime. (Interfax, 10
July)
This question of the shocking impunity of the Russian federal
forces based in Chechnya should be raised by the G-7 leaders when they
meet with President Putin in Genoa at the end of this week. On the
twelfth of this month, Lord Russell-Johnston, President of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), stated in
Strasbourg: ``In recent weeks, there has been mounting evidence of a
rapidly deteriorating human rights situation in Chechnya. There is
little doubt that the conduct of the Russian forces--as manifested
during the recent ``mop-up'' operations in Assinovskaya and
Sernovodsk--is largely to blame for this. I expect all human rights
violations to be condemned at the highest levels by the Russian
authorities.'' And Russell-Johnston continued: ``The reports of human
rights abuses come against the background of the Russian authorities'
deplorable lack of willingness to properly investigate allegations of
past abuse. The failure to bring to justice those responsible for
crimes constitutes a blatant violation of Russia's obligations as a
member of the Council of Europe and as a party to its most important
conventions, notably the European Convention on Human Rights and the
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.''
Noting that a PACE delegation would be visiting Chechnya in mid-
September and that the dreadful situation in the republic would be
discussed in detail at an Assembly session to be held in late
September, Russell-Johnston added: ``By that time [September], we
expect to receive evidence of concrete and substantial progress with
regard to both the present conduct of the Russian security forces and
the investigations of past abuses.'' (Council of Europe Press Unit, 12
July) Russell-Johnston concluded by inviting European and world leaders
who have developed close and cordial relationships with President Putin
to ``use their influence to bring to bear effective pressure on the
Russian authorities to change their present unacceptable conduct.''
This message, one would think, is precisely one that should be
delivered to the Russian president by G-7 representatives at the
upcoming Genoa summit.
The recent transfer of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic
to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague--an action sharply
criticized by President Putin--has prompted several leading Russian
democrats to envisage a similar fate awaiting those responsible for
committing war crimes in Chechnya. ``I affirm and am prepared to
prove,'' Duma deputy and former Russian human rights commissioner
Sergei Kovalev observed recently, ``that the losses taking place among
the civilian population of Chechnya are not simply the result of
clumsiness or imprecision by the federal command. I affirm, rather,
that this is a conscious and purposeful policy.'' (Russkaya Mysl'
[Paris], 28 June)
In similar fashion, a leading Russian military journalist, Pavel
Felgenhauer, recently wrote in a hard-hitting essay entitled ``An Echo
of Groznyi in the Hague'': ``It has already been proven that, during
the course of the present Chechen campaign, the Russian military have
massively infringed international conventions which have been ratified
by Russia and have been employing forbidden forms of weaponry.'' Citing
a report by Colonel General Leonid Zolotov, commander of the
prestigious Frunze Military Academy, Felgenhauer remarked that
incendiary bombs and so-called vacuum bombs had been employed by the
Russian air force on the city of Groznyi at a time when it contained
``up to 100,000 peaceful inhabitants.'' In Groznyi and other Chechen
cities, ``there were killed thousands of women, the elderly and
children.'' Such actions manifestly violated the Geneva Conventions.
Felgenhauer thus foresees a day when ``[military] staffs and ministers
and many individuals'' in Russia will find themselves ``on an
international wanted list.'' (Moskovskie Novosti, no. 27)
The issue of Chechen refugees represents one facet of the present
conflict which deserves to be highlighted. Currently there are at least
150,000-160,000 Chechen refugees seeking shelter in the autonomous
republic of Ingushetiya. Indeed the numbers of these refugees seem to
have swollen as a result of recent marauding by the Russian military
and police. The Putin leadership has made it crystal clear that it
wants this entire populace relocated to Chechnya, even though it cannot
conceivably guarantee their physical security.
On 6 June, at a meeting held at the Andrei Sakharov Museum in
Moscow, Ruslan Badalov of the Chechen Committee for National Salvation,
presented a representative of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with an appeal which had been signed by
10,000 Chechen refugees living in Ingushetiya. ``Today,'' Badalov said,
``the Russian government has unveiled a new campaign, the goal of which
is, at any cost, to return the refugees to Chechnya.'' This is being
done, Badalov said, because ``Russia fears complicating its relations
with the West and is therefore prepared to hide the human tragedies far
away from everyone.'' (Kommersant, 7 June)
The Chechen refugees, as was repeatedly stressed at this meeting,
do not want to be forced back into a war zone, an action which would,
furthermore, constitute a violation of the Geneva Conventions. As one
Chechen refugee in Ingushetiya, Zareta Sembieva, put it to a Russian
newspaperwoman: ``I have three children. Do you think that we are being
kept here [in Ingushetiya] against our will? Or that we are living here
for the humanitarian aid--for moldy macaroni? I would be glad to live
in our own home [in Chechnya] . . . But I am responsible for my
children and cannot subject them to danger. If the war ends, then we
will immediately go home.'' (Novye Izvestiya, 25 May) Sembieva's
sentiments appear to be those of a weighty majority of Chechen
refugees.
I have been asked to add a few brief comments concerning the
position of other minority peoples living in Russia. Obviously the
tragedy of the Chechens is unique, but other Russian minorities, too:
are feeling the effects of the Putin regime's retreat from democracy
and from its apparent desire to reconstruct a de facto unitary state.
In Ingushetiya less than a week ago, President Ruslan Aushev felt
required to publicly condemn the ``barbarism and vandalism'' of Russian
troops stationed in his republic. The troops had shot up an ancient
funeral vault, dating back at least to the sixteenth century, and had
desecrated a twelfth century Christian church (``Khaba-Erdy'' church).
An ancient tower had likewise been razed. Russian soldiers had been
stunning fish by throwing hand grenades into the Asa and Aramkhi
rivers; had been wantonly chopping down local forests; had fired with
automatic weapons at and had killed livestock belonging to the local
populace; and had set fire to hay gathered by local farmers. The Ingush
populace were understandably said to be enraged at this wanton
behavior. (Strana.ru and NTV.ru, 13 July)
In its manifest retreat from federalism and in its clear-cut desire
to recreate a unitary state such as existed under the communists, the
Putin regime, backed up by a generally subservient judiciary, has been
repudiating provisions contained in forty-two treaties signed by the
Russian government during the Yeltsin period with autonomous republics
and other subjects of the Russian Federation. The republics of
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha-Yakutiya, and Tyva were reported to be
especially unhappy over these developments. In another recent change,
the heads of republican ministries of internal affairs have been made
directly subordinate to President Putin rather than to local regional
heads. The movement back toward a Soviet-style unitary state continues.
I conclude my paper with two policy recommendations:
1. The U.S. Congress should require an annual report from the
State Department detailing the status of human rights and of
violations of international law in Chechnya.
2. The State Department should be asked to appoint a special
coordinator for Chechnya who would coordinate the logistical
work among different bureaus and areas: Human Rights, Refugees,
Russia, North Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Georgia. A key focus for
this coordinator would be the Chechen refugee tragedy.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Dr. Balzer.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARJORIE M. BALZER, RESEARCH PROFESSOR AND
COORDINATOR OF SOCIAL, ETHNIC, AND REGIONAL ISSUES, CENTER FOR
EURASIAN, RUSSIAN, AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES (CERES),
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Balzer. Thank you. It is an honor to be here.
I am a cultural anthropologist, and I spent 10 of the last
12 summers in the Sakha Republic, but I will try to be broader
than that for this talk and discuss federalism in Russia, or
Rossiia, as people there often call it, implying the multi-
ethnic dimensions of the Federation. And the question is: From
above, from below, or nowhere?
As economic, political, and military crises inside the
Federation of Rossiia worsen, debates intensify over whether
central, Moscow, policies and practices aggravate the fissures
of separatism and nationalism. To probe issues underlying this
still-unfolding process, diverse ways that republic
representatives have been responding to chaos and attempts to
reassert central control should be explored. Through the study
of the crisis-driven 1990's, enormously painful to victims of
war and economic deprivation, we can learn much about the
dynamics of polarization and the politics of social and
national identity.
The secession attempts of the Chechens from Russia have a
long history aggravated by two 1990's brutalizing wars that
have not subsided despite President Putin's protestations of
peace at hand. While President Putin's handling of Chechnya is
the opposite of a reasoned Federal strategy, other aspects of
his policies do come closer to a negotiated federalism and also
represent his attempts to become a populist President. Images
of President Putin piloting a fighter plane in Chechnya
contrast with his smiling participation at the annual Turkic
Sabbantui summer festivals of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan where
he went to court and cajole the Presidents of these republics
in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
These public displays were noticed by my friends in the
Parliament of the Sakha Republic where surprised deputies,
seeing President Putin in shirt sleeves and knowing his KGB
background, proclaimed, ``He has gone to the people. He is
appealing to the public.'' Like President Yeltsin, President
Putin has been using a combination of carrots and sticks to
attempt to manage the unwieldy Federation he inherited. But, to
continue Steve Solnick's metaphor, unlike President Yeltsin,
President Putin has shortened the carrots and strengthened the
sticks. Leaders in the republics have been put on notice that
all the carrots have sticks behind them.
The main message of this testimony is that most of the
republics inside of Russia are not secessionist and not likely
to become dominoes in a potential aftermath of any successful
Chechnya negotiated secession. However, the potential for
radicalization and polarization does exist, depending on center
policies and on center-republic dynamics.
The region where radicalization is greatest is the North
Caucasus, especially among the neighbors of Chechnya where the
outpouring of Chechen refugees, as we just heard, including
embittered, unemployed, and poorly educated youth, has become a
serious destabilizing problem made worse by recent Russian
military atrocities in villages near the unstable Chechen-
Ingushetia border.
By way of introduction--I can skip some things because
Steve has already explained--history matters. The ``matrushka-
doll'' Federation that President Putin inherited is multi-
leveled, complex, asymmetrical, and quite entrenched. My table
1 \1\ gives you a line-up of all of these. The idea behind it
is to show you the complexity that he inherited. Borders
involving ethnic-based territories are nearly impossible to
change without dangerously violating various ethnic groups'
understandings of what constitutes their rightful homelands.
The legacies of the Federation adapted from the Soviet Union
mean that the geographic structure of the Russian Federal
politics--and ``Federal,'' in this case, may be in quotes--is
only poorly analogous to the multi-cultural United States, with
possible exceptions of our Native American treaty-based
reservations and Puerto Rico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The tables referred to by Dr. Balzer in her oral presentation
can be found in her prepared statement on page 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Demography also matters. Steve explained that only five
republics have majorities inside their own republics of non-
Russians. In addition, one could put it this way, in most of
the ethnic-based republics of Russia, the local ``titular''
ethnic group has a demographic plurality, but not a majority.
These kinds of proportions are outlined in table 2. These are
``swing-vote,'' as I call them, republics such as the Sakha
Republic, Altai, Kalmykia, Marii-El, and Udmurtia, where
referendums on central policies could matter and where
electoral candidates backed by the Putin administration can be
contested. These are areas where the zigzags of center-republic
dynamics are especially sensitive and where ethnic relations
are very important with tensions potentially magnified by
policy mistakes or local inter-ethnic discrimination scandals.
I also want to point out that names and cultural symbols
matter. These are republics, in their 1990's incarnations, that
have specific names for themselves, and there is a sensitivity
over their new names. President Putin recently acknowledged
name sensitivities by signing a decree endorsing Chuvashia as
the Chavash Republic, for instance. But he has acknowledged
such politically sensitive name changes unevenly and has not
supported the rights of republic citizens to state their
nationalities in their passports. A compromise was recently
found for Tatarstan to have a separate page in the Tatar
language in Tatarstan passports. Each of these republics has
its own seals and flags, many generated through competitions
among local artists. Most have local-language names for their
newly constituted parliaments and new language programs to
compensate for past unbalanced bilingualism that favored
Russians.
In my next section, I discuss managing federalism or, in
some cases, mismanaging it, and I want to just outline, without
going into details, the major points of contention, as I see
it, between the republics and President Putin's administration.
These include resource competition and the related demise of
bilateral treaties, changes in republic constitutions,
electoral politics at multiple levels, and administrative
redistricting.
Let me turn to the debates about administrative
redistricting. As outlined in my chart, and by Steve, instead
of appointing republic Presidents, which President Putin
threatened to do, the 2000 redistricting created seven mega-
districts over-seeing the republics using larger regional
military districts as the basis for their borders. Debates
abound as to whether the mega-districts are working or
represent a new layer of potential bureaucratic confusion, at
best, and corruption, at worst. Republic authorities are
nervous about their loss of direct lobbying access to the
Kremlin and angry about which cities have been chosen as
capitals of the districts. The only silver lining concerning
these districts, given both blatant and latent opposition to
them in the republics, is that they may satisfy President
Putin's taste for redistricting from above.
He has, in several speeches, suggested even more radical
redistricting: that the asymmetrical federation would be better
off as a more controllable, symmetrical country of 30 to 50
regions. Such statements, the execution of which would involve
extensive boundary changes, are deeply frightening to many non-
Russians living in their established ethnicity-based republics
and smaller districts.
In my conclusions, I want to point out that President Putin
just recently addressed an assembly of the peoples of
Bashkortostan, in June 2001, proclaiming proudly, ``Rossiia has
an absolutely unique place on Earth with its enormous number of
nations, nationalities, languages, and cultures. Its uniqueness
consists in that, over the centuries, practically 1,000 years,
this mixture of peoples and different ethnicities have lived
harmoniously.'' He sounded like a Soviet official, propounding
the friendship of the peoples. Indeed, interethnic harmony,
including high rates of interethnic marriage, has been part of
the history of the peoples of today's Russian Federation, but
these romanticized friendships have been sorely tried by
experimentation that began with Russian imperialism, continued
with many of Stalin's nationality policies, and have been
inflamed by the Chechnya war and its cover-up. As my colleague
Paul Goble has said, ``The best antidote to chauvinist brands
of nationalism is a well-managed federalism.''
What can the United States do to encourage Rossiia to
practice what President Putin preaches about mixtures of
peoples living harmoniously? We can only influence on the
margins, but we do have some leverage. While Russians are
understandably averse to being lectured by Americans, we can
encourage more civic and less nationalist chauvinist behavior
on the part of central and regional authorities by investing
directly in those regions and republics where relatively
greater efforts are made at civil society.
First, we can attempt to deal directly with regions and
republics, sometimes bypassing Moscow entirely, although taking
care that this not be perceived as a new round of espionage or
secession-mongering. While some authorities on Russia's regions
and republics, including some of President Putin's advisors in
Moscow, tend to think of the republics as, in general, more
corrupt ``ethnocracies'' than the Russian-led regions,
corruption seems to be an equal-opportunity phenomenon. We can
try to reward both Russian-led regions and ethnic-based
republics for greater transparency in economic relations.
Second, we can encourage our allies in Europe to reinforce
calls for negotiation and to address major human-rights
complaints. The recent call of the OSCE for negotiations to
resume over Chechnya, including with the elected President,
Aslan Maskhadov, is a step in the right direction. A political
settlement is crucial, possibly including phased independence
for Chechnya. At the same time, good-faith reconstruction
efforts should be made in Chechnya to help bring refugees home
and to start the painful process of educating a whole
generation of young people who have been left behind and
radicalized after years of war. Chechnya without Chechens is
unacceptable policy.
Third, the Chechnya war has caused a hemorrhaging of not
only blood, but money. A reasonable argument to Russian
authorities in the economic summit is that if the war stopped,
enormous sums of money would be freed for the Federation-wide
health and education programs that Rossiia badly needs.
Incentives to reinforce peace negotiations could be promised by
suggesting future backing for humanitarian support, for social
programs, and for emergency relief throughout the North
Caucasus and in selected other regions: for instance, aid for
recovery from the Sakha Republic's recent flooding.
Fourth, and finally, Rossiia is likely to remain an
asymmetrical quasi-federation for a long time. We should
somehow convince Russian colleagues and Duma parliamentarians
that one of the fastest, most polarizing ways to stimulate
secession is by redistricting from above. Changes in republic,
regional, and district borders at all levels must be negotiated
and not decreed. We also should diplomatically make clear that
it is not in our interest to have Rossiia break into numerous
or even seven regional parts.
In sum, the single most dangerous scenario for Rossiia is
polarization resulting from unilateral, from above, radical
ethno-national homeland boundary changes. Instead of
regularization, it can result in subversion, chauvinist
nationalism, susceptibility to radical religious influences,
and the very chaos President Putin has been trying to avoid. So
far, federalism has been from above, from below, and nowhere.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Balzer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer
FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA [ROSSIIA]: FROM ABOVE, BELOW OR NOWHERE?
Introduction
As economic, political, and military crises inside the Federation
of Russia [Rossiia] worsen, debates intensify over whether central
Moscow policies and practices aggravate the fissures of separatism and
nationalism. To probe issues underlying this still unfolding process,
diverse ways that republic representatives have been responding to
chaos and attempts to reassert central control should be explored.
Through study of the crisis-driven 1990s, enormously painful to the
victims of war and economic deprivation, we can learn much about the
dynamics of polarization and the politics of social and cultural
identity. Understanding how groups shape and reshape their nationalism
in times of travail, on multiple levels, involves listening to how
politicized voices shift and adapt within various social and cultural
contexts.
The secession attempts of the Chechens from Russia have a long
history, aggravated by two 1990s brutalizing wars that have not
subsided, despite President Putin's protestations of peace at hand.
While President Putin's handling of Chechnya is the opposite of a
reasoned federal strategy, other aspects of his policies come closer to
a negotiated federalism and also represent attempts to become a
populist president. Images of President Putin piloting a fighter plane
in Chechnya contrast with his smiling participation at the annual
Turkic Sabbantui summer festivals of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, where
he went to court and cajole the presidents of these republics in 2000
and 2001 respectively. These public displays were noticed by my friends
in the parliament of the Sakha republic, where surprised deputies,
seeing President Putin in shirt-sleeves and knowing his KGB background,
proclaimed ``he has gone to the people, he is appealing to the
public.'' Like President Yeltsin, President Putin has been using a
combination of carrots and sticks to attempt to manage the unwieldy
federation he inherited. Unlike President Yeltsin, President Putin has
shortened the carrots and strengthened the sticks. Leaders in the
republics have been put on notice that all of the carrots have sticks
behind them.
The main message of this testimony is that most of the republics
inside of Russia are not secessionist, and not likely to become
dominoes in a potential aftermath of any successful, negotiated
Chechnya secession. However, the potential for radicalization and
polarization exists, depending on central policies and on center-
republic dynamics. The region where radicalization is greatest is the
North Caucasus, especially among the neighbors of Chechnya, where the
outpouring of Chechen refugees, including embittered, unemployed, and
poorly educated youth, has become a serious destabilizing problem made
worse by recent Russian military atrocities in villages near the
unstable Chechen-Ingushetia border.
History matters. The ``matrushka-doll'' federation that President
Putin inherited is multi-leveled, complex, asymmetrical and entrenched.
(See table 1.) Borders involving ethnic-based territories are nearly
impossible to change without dangerously violating various ethnic
groups' understandings of what constitutes their rightful homelands.
The legacies of the federation adapted from the Soviet Union mean that
the geographic structure of Russian federal politics is only poorly
analogous to the multicultural United States, with the possible
exceptions of our Native American treaty-based reservations and Puerto
Rico. Thirty-five ethnic-based political-administrative divisions
(Republics and Okrugs) take up about one third of Rossiia's territory,
while non-Russians are less than one fifth of the country's population.
This awkward position has evolved because of the local histories of
indigenous homelands, where large influxes of Slavic peoples became
normal during the Russian imperial and especially the Soviet periods.
Demography matters. In most of the ``ethnic-based'' republics of
Russia, the local ``titular'' ethnic group has a demographic plurality
but not a majority. (See table 2.) These are ``swing vote'' republics,
such as the Sakha Republic, Altai, Kalmykia, Marii El, and Udmurtia,
where referendums on central policies could matter and electoral
candidates backed by the Putin administration can be contested. These
are areas where the zig zags of center-republic dynamics are especially
sensitive and where ethnic relations are very important, with tensions
potentially magnified by policy mistakes or local inter-ethnic
discrimination scandals. In the 21 republics, only 5 had majority
titular populations as the Soviet Union broke up, and more recently one
of these, Chechnya, has been nearly emptied of its civilian Chechen
population. The others are the Chavash Republic (Chuvashia), Tyva
(Tuva), and Kabarda-Balkaria, listed in the order of their majorities.
By the 2002 census, Tatarstan is likely to be included in this list,
with many Tatars coming home to their republic in the 1990s. In 16 of
the republics, non-Russians are considerably less numerous than the
Russians. However, this did not stop some republics, such as Karelia,
Khakassia and Komi, from being in the forefront of the so-called
``parade of sovereignties'' in 1990-1991.
Names and cultural symbols matter. The official name the Federation
of Rossiia, which signals its multiethnic composition, is preferred
here instead of Russia, with its more monocultural connotation. Many
non-Russians call themselves ``Rossiany,'' citizens of Rossiia, not
``Russkie,'' Russians, a distinction lost in English. They also have
specific, sometimes recently politicized, names for their republics,
and deserve to have these names used. This includes the Sakha Republic,
often called by Russians in the Putin administration Yakutia, and Tyva,
usually called Tuva. President Putin recently acknowledged name
sensitivities by signing a decree endorsing Chuvashia as the Chavash
Republic. But he has acknowledged such politically sensitive name
changes unevenly, and has not supported the right of republic citizens
to state their nationalities in their passports. A compromise was
recently found for Tatarstan to have a separate page in the Tatar
language in Tatarstan passports. The Altai Republic (formerly Gorno-
Altai) is surveying its population to decide if an insert in the Altai
language is worth the expense. Each of the republics has its own seals
and flags, many generated through competitions among local artists.
Most have a local language name for their newly constituted parliaments
and new language programs to compensate for past ``unbalanced
bilingualism'' that favored Russians.
Theory matters. A premise of this testimony is that the Russians,
in the multiethnic negotiated community of Rossiia, are ``ethnic'' too,
since they are subject to some of the same tensions and striving that
the non-Russian minorities within the fledgling federation have been
feeling. Indeed, the term ``ethnonationalism,'' merging a distinction
between nationalism and ethnicity, as discussed by Walker Connor (1994)
and Leokadia Drobizheva (1999), may be appropriate for the mild,
nonchauvinist nationalism of many of the groups inside Rossiia. While
many Russian actions potentially labelled as nationalism have been
consolidation-oriented and defensive, others, most clearly those
involving Chechnya, have been counter-productively aggressive and
chauvinist against non-Russian minorities. The rekindling of the
Chechnya war puts debates about justifiable ``patriotism,''
``nationalism'' and ``defense against terrorism'' into sharp relief.
With Russian nationalism increasing, it becomes harder for President
Putin to stimulate policies enabling a civic-society to develop in both
the ethnic-based republics and the Russian-led regions of the
federation.
(Mis)managing Federalism
Major points of contention between the republics and President
Putin's administration include resource competition and the related
demise of bilateral treaties, changes in republic constitutions,
electoral politics at multiple levels, and administrative
redistricting. Questions of corruption, emergency aid programs, and the
ramifications of legal reform cross-cut these issues and sometimes
enter into the rhetoric of mutual reproach.
Resource competition. While in the Soviet period, so-called
``autonomous republics'' within the Russian Union Republic got less
than a 5% share of their own resources, the increasingly self-assertive
republics negotiated far greater shares in the 1990s, in some cases by
playing brinkmanship tax withholding games. Bilateral treaties became a
major mechanism under President Yeltsin, starting in 1994, for
negotiating distributions of resources, with industrialized Tatarstan
leading the process, and energy rich Bashkortostan and diamond rich
Sakha Republic gaining important concessions as well. By the time the
treaty process ended in 1998, 46 Russian-led regions and ethnic-based
republics had garnered varying degrees of advantages. Norms for
allocations of revenues going to federal and regional budgets before
2000 became approximately 51% and 49%, but under President Putin the
federal share increased to 63%. More republics subsequently became
``donors'' within the budget process, meaning they are not receiving
federal equalization transfers after taxes. In 2000, these included
Komi, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha.
Recently the leader of the Republic of Marii-El, hoping to curry
favor with President Putin, unilaterally rejected his republic's power-
sharing treaty with the central government (along with the heads of
three Russian-led regions). He could see that the 2001 commission
established by President Putin to divide powers among governmental
levels has as one of its goals the cancellation of these treaty
arrangements. A warning of this policy came in 2000, when President
Putin renounced significant aspects of the bilateral treaties with
Tatarstan and with the Sakha Republic. (I was sitting at what felt like
a ground-zero, the Sakha parliament, when deputies heard of his
announcement and ventilated bitterly. But the next day, several
admitted that the treaty was due to expire and would have to have been
renegotiated anyway.)
Cross-cutting the new budget trends have been emergency funds
flowing back to the republics, including extensive subsidizing of
Dagestan (given its proximity to Chechnya) and the support of refugee
camps in Ingushetia. In this category should be substantial
reconstruction money for Chechnya. Several plans (including one created
by former Nationalities Minister Valery Tishkov) are circulating, but
monies have been notoriously diverted or not forthcoming.
Relief expenditures also include the support of programs through-
out the North to help Russian out-migration from previously subsidized
towns with collapsed economies, as well as humanitarian reconstruction
for flood victims suffering, for example, in the Sakha Republic in 1998
and, especially, in 2001. Sakha and Russian leaders of the Sakha
republic, in a good example of civic mindedness and interethnic
cooperation, have jointly appealed to central authorities. President
Putin made a personal and effective trip of solidarity to the main
flood-devastated town of Lensk, which is mostly ethnically Russian. His
attempt to place some of the burden of funding on the selling of
diamond company ALROSA stock was less appreciated, however.
Reconciling Constitutions. President Putin has made the
identification and rectification of legal discrepancies between the
Federation of Rossiia's constitution and the republic constitutions a
top priority. Contrary to some conspiracy theories, many of these
discrepancies occurred for the relatively simple reason that many of
the republic constitutions were written and ratified in the early
1990s, before Russia managed to get its constitution passed by its
Duma. The acceptance of republic constitutional changes recommended by
Russia's supreme court has been relatively smooth in many cases, which
is why President Putin's preoccupation with the formal legal aspects of
this has puzzled some participants in the process. Kalmykia, Altai, and
Tyva, among others, have been named in the local press as having
revised their constitutions quite quickly.
Other republics have been less compliant, including Chavashia,
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Sakha. In the Sakha Republic case, a huge
63 of 144 articles were declared nonbinding by Russia's supreme court.
The Sakha parliament (optimistically called Il Tumen, or Council for
Accord) discarded aspects deemed minor and has appointed yet another
committee to reconcile the constitutions ``on the basis of federal
norms.'' However, the main points seen as unjustified meddling in the
internal affairs of the republic center on the wording of Sakha's
declaration of sovereignty, the ability of Sakha Republic to have its
own citizenship together with the citizenship of Rossiia, and,
predictably, the ownership of underground resources, given the enormous
mineral wealth of the republic. A further issue is qualifications for
republic president, on the basis of age, residency length, and language
ability.
Electoral politics. President Putin has attempted to change the
rules of the game of how elections are run at multiple levels of the
federation. He has done this through legal reform of how parties are
defined (their membership must cross-cut republics and regions), and
through declarations concerning qualifications of the presidents of the
republics, including their rights to third terms. He or his
representatives have also publicly backed specific candidates, not all
of whom have subsequently won their elections.
One relevant issue concerning republic politics has been debate and
back tracking on the question of which republic presidents may run for
a third term, a deviation from the Federation of Rossiia constitution.
In Spring 2001, Duma deputies passed a Putin-backed law enabling a huge
number (69) of regional and republic leaders to have this right, but
the Duma subsequently reduced the number to a handful. Some theorized
that quid pro quos for republic president cooperation had been
negotiated behind the scenes. In the process, interesting discrepancies
emerged. For example, President Mintimer Shaimiev of Tatarstan was
endorsed for a third term in a post-facto exercise, after his republic
parliament had also ensured his legal right to a third term. President
Mikhail Nikolaev of the Sakha Republic, who had not gotten his
parliament to endorse a third term, was first supported and then
dropped in the political maneuvering.
In President Putin's millennium 2000 address, he appeared to
advocate two contradictory principles: democracy for the republics and
regions, including their continued right to elect their own officials
at multiple levels, and a more authoritarian right of the president to
remove elected officials from office. While the right of removal must
now be backed by a criminal conviction, this is one reason why some in
the republics are calling his rule creeping authoritarianism. When he
was first elected, he also tested a possible trial balloon by
suggesting that republic presidents and regional governors be appointed
by the president. This provoked enough of an uproar to be quietly
dropped, since it is notoriously difficult to take away a democratic
right once it has been enjoyed.
Administrative redistricting. Instead of appointing republic
presidents, in 2000 President Putin created his famous 7 mega-
districts, using the larger regional military districts as a basis for
their borders. The districts are (moving from East to West to South):
Far East, Siberia, Urals, Northwest, Central, Volga, and the North
Caucasus.
Each district has a president appointed governor-general, who
answers directly to President Putin. Nearly all the first appointees
have military or intelligence backgrounds, with the exception of one
former diplomat (Leonid Drachevski to the Siberia district) and one
former prime minister-economist (Sergei Kirienko to the crucial Volga
district). Their roles, Putin insists, are carefully delineated and
contained. Most have been busy following orders concerning the
reconciliation of the constitutions and the stream-lining of economic
relations in their regions. Critics, including some of President
Putin's own nationality advisors and ministers, have pointed out that
eventually such meta-districts could become the basis for viable
secessionist tendencies. The argument emphasizes that smaller,
economically and politically powerless regions and republics would have
less chance of becoming full-fledged independent states, and most would
have no external borders.
Debates abound as to whether the mega-districts are working or
represent a new layer of potential bureaucratic confusion at best and
corruption at worst. Republic authorities are nervous about their loss
of direct lobbying access to the Kremlin, and angry about which cities
have been chosen as capitals of the districts. The only silver lining
concerning these districts, given both blatant and latent opposition to
them in the republics, is that they may satisfy President Putin's taste
for redistricting from above. He has in several speeches suggested even
more radical redistricting: that the asymmetrical federation would be
better off as a more controllable, symmetrical country of 30-50
regions. Such statements, the execution of which would involve
extensive boundary changes, are deeply frightening to many non-Russians
living in their established ethnicity-based republics and smaller
districts (okrugs). Again, it is dangerous to remove existing rights.
More organic, ``from below'' or negotiated redistricting may be
possible, however. The strategically located Altai Republic, on the
border with Kazakstan, has rejected its larger, neighboring Altai
Krai's greedy, energy pipe-line oriented call for a merger. But a
process of merging budgets already has begun between one of two Buryat
districts (Ust-Orda) with its encircling Irkutsk region. This
negotiation should be seen in the larger historical context of the
gerrymandering of Buryat territory, according to Stalin's nationalities
policies. Some Buryats have also called for a merging of the three
Buryat territories (Buryat Republic, Ust-Orda, and Agin-Buryat).
Conclusions
President Putin, addressing an Assembly of the Peoples of
Bashkortostan in June, 2001, proclaimed proudly ``Rossiia [Russia] has
an absolutely unique place on Earth, with its enormous number of
nations, nationalities, languages, and cultures . . . Its uniqueness
consists in that over the centuries, practically 1,000 years, this
mixture of peoples and different ethnicities have lived harmoniously.''
He sounded like a Soviet official propounding the friendship of the
peoples. Interethnic harmony, including high rates of interethnic
marriage, has been part of the history of the peoples of today's
Russian federation. But these romanticized friendships have been sorely
tried by experimentation that began with Russian imperialism, continued
with many of Stalin's nationalities policies, and have been inflamed by
the Chechnya war and its cover-up. As my colleague Paul Goble has said,
the best antidote to chauvinist brands of nationalism is a well-managed
federalism.
What can the U.S. do to encourage Rossiia to practice what
President Putin preaches about mixtures of peoples living harmoniously?
We can only influence on the margins, but we do have some leverage.
While Russians are understandably averse to being lectured by
Americans, we can encourage more civic and less nationalist, chauvinist
behavior on the part of central and regional authorities by investing
directly in those regions and republics where relatively greater
efforts are made at civil society.
1) We can attempt to deal directly with regions and
republics, sometimes bypassing Moscow entirely, although taking
care that this not be perceived as a new round of espionage or
secession-mongering. While some authorities on the regions and
republics, including some of President Putin's advisors in
Moscow, tend to think of the republics as in general more
corrupt ``ethnocracies'' than the Russian-led regions,
corruption seems to be an equal opportunity phenomenon. We can
try to reward both Russian-led regions and ethnic-based
republics for greater transparency in economic relations.
2) We can encourage our allies in Europe to reinforce calls
for negotiation, and to address major human rights complaints.
The recent call of the OSCE for negotiations to resume over
Chechnya, including with the elected president Aslan Maskhadov,
is a step in the right direction. A political settlement is
crucial, possibly including phased independence for Chechnya.
At the same time, good faith reconstruction efforts should be
made in Chechnya, to help bring refugees home and to start the
painful process of educating a whole generation of young people
who have been left behind and radicalized after years of war.
Chechnya without Chechens is unacceptable policy.
3) The Chechnya war has caused a hemorrhaging of not only
blood but money. A reasonable argument to Russian authorities
at an economics summit is that if the war stopped, enormous
sums of money would be freed for the federation-wide health and
education programs that Rossiia badly needs. Incentives to
reinforce peace negotiations could be promised by suggesting
future backing for humanitarian support for social programs and
emergency relief through-out the North Caucasus and in selected
other regions.
4) Rossiia is likely to remain an asymmetrical, quasi-
federation for a long time. We should somehow convince Russian
colleagues and Duma parliamentarians that one of the fastest,
most polarizing ways to stimulate secession is by redistricting
from above. Changes in republic, regional, and district borders
at all levels must be negotiated, not decreed. Just as
President Putin has said he needs a public consensus to move
Lenin's body, so too a public consensus is needed for boundary
changes. We also should diplomatically make clear that it is
not in our interests to have Rossiia break into numerous, or
even 7, regional parts.
In sum, the single most dangerous scenario for Rossiia is
polarization resulting from unilateral, radical ethnonational homeland
boundary changes. Instead of regularization, it can result in
subversion, chauvinist nationalism, susceptibility to radical religious
influences, and the very chaos President Putin has been trying to avoid
with his ominous phrase ``the dictatorship of law.'' So far, federalism
has been from above, from below, and nowhere.
Table 1: Post-Soviet Independent States and Russian Federation
(Rossiia) Ethnic Components
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republics Signing The Federal Treaty, Ethnic-Based Regions,
Post-Soviet Independent States Bilateral Treaties Districts
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Armenia [C=Commonwealth] Adigei Agin-Buryat
Azerbaijan [C] Altai (Gorno-Altai) Ust-Orda Buryat
Belorus [C] Bashkortostan Chukotsk
Estonia [B=Baltic] Burya Evenkt
Georgia [C] Chavash (Chuvashia) Eveno-Bytantaisk
Kazakstan [C] Dagestan Evrei
Kyrgyzstan [C] Ingushetia Khanty-Mansi
Latvia [B] Kabarda-Balkar Komi-Permiak
Lithuania [B] Kalmykia Koryak
Moldova (Khalmg Tangch) Nenets
Russian Federation [C] Karachai-Cherkess Yamalo-Nenets
Tajikistan [C] Karelia Dolgan-Nenets
Turkmenistan [C] Khakassia Taimyr
Ukraine [C] Komi (Nganasan)
Uzbekistan [C] Marii-El (Mari)
Mordva
North Ossetia
Sakha (Yakutia)
Tatarstan
Tyva (Tuva)
Udmurt
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major Disputed Areas: Abkhazia, Chechnya (Republic of Ichkeria), Crimea, Dniester, Nagorno(ny)-Karabakh, North
and South Ossetia, North Kazakstan.
Ethnic Representation Dynamics: Five districts (Adygei, Gorno-Altai [now Altai], lngushetia without Chechnya,
Karachai-Cherkessia, and Khakassia) were upgraded to republic status in the 1992 Federal Treaty. This included
an lngushetia border delineation. Many ethnic groups, such as the Kurds of the Caucasus or the Nivkh of the
Siberian Far East, are not represented here because they do not have official territorial jurisdictions. In
Soviet censuses, 26 ``small-numbered peoples of the North'' were usually grouped (in order of size): Nenets,
Evenk (Tungus), Khanty (Ostiak), Even (Lamut), Chukchi, Nanai (Goldy), Koryak, Mansi (Vogul), Dolgan, Nivkh
(Gilyak), Selkup, Ulchi, Itelmen (Kamchadal), Udegei, Saami (Lapp); Eskimo (Yupik); Chuvansty; Nganasan;
Yukagir; Ket; Orochi; Tofalar; Aleut; Negidal; Enets; Orok. Some Federation components were legally
constituted since 1989. For example, the Eveno-Bytantaisk district (raion) was created within the Yakut-Sakha
Republic as a homeland for the Even people in 1989.
President Putin's 7 Mega- [Meta-, Military] Districts: Far East, Siberia, Urals, Northwest, Central, Volga,
North Caucasus (Southern) (each with Presidential appointee administrators).
Table 2: Demography and Ethnicity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republics of Rossiia in Sovereignty Percent Titular Percent
Declaration Sequence Nationality Russians
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Ossetia...................... 53.0 29.9
Karelia............................ 10.0 73.6
Khakassia.......................... 11.1 79.5
Komi............................... 23.3 57.7
Tatarstan.......................... 48.5 43.3
Udmurtia........................... 30.9 58.9
Sakha (Yakutia).................... 33.4 50.3
Buryatia........................... 24.0 70.0
Bashkortostan...................... 21.9 39.3
Kalmykia........................... 45.4 37.7
Marii El (Mari).................... 43.3 47.5
Chavash (Chuvashia)................ 67.8 26.7
Gorno-Altai........................ 31.0 60.4
Tyva(Tuva)......................... 64.3 32.0
Karachai-Cherkess.................. 40.9 42.4
Checheno-Ingushetia................ 70.7 23.1
Mordova............................ 32.5 60.8
Karbarda-Balkaria.................. 57.6 31.9
Dagestan........................... 27.5 (Avars) 9.2
Adegei............................. 22.1 68.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian Federation; Russians....... 119,865,946 81.5
Russian Federation; Non-Russians... 27,155,923 19.5
Largest groups:
Tatar............................ 5,522,096 3.8
Ukrainians....................... 4,362,872 3.0
Chavash.......................... 1,773,645 1.2
Bashkir.......................... 1,345,273 0.9
Belorusans....................... 1,206,222 0.9
Mordva........................... 1,072,939 0.8
Chechen.......................... 898,999 0.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sources, Explanations, 2002 census projections: Natsional'nyi sostav
naseleniia SSSR (1991), from the 1989 census; Argumenty i fakty (March
1991). The Chechen-Ingush Republic split in 1992. Many ethnic groups
have substantial populations living outside their republic, especially
the Tatars, and, with the Chechnya wars, the Chechens. Since 1991,
Russian influx into the federation as a whole has raised their
proportion to about 83%, Russian outflow from specific ethnic-based
republics, especially Chechnya and Tyva, also should be noted. By the
2002 census, Russian percentages in most of the ``ethnic-based''
republics will have decreased, with percentages of the titular
nationalities substantially increased. However, as the order of the
``parade of sovereignties'' in 1990-01 indicates, non-Russian
demographic dominance in a republic is not necessarily a predictor of
radicalism.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Paul Goble.
STATEMENT OF PAUL A. GOBLE, DIRECTOR, COMMUNICATIONS
DEPARTMENT, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Goble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has regularly
insisted that he has had to act with vigor and dispatch against
the Chechen drive for independence in order to prevent the
disintegration of Russia. That argument has served him very
well. It has both generated support among Russians for what he
is doing and, at least equally important, it has restrained
Western criticism of Russian actions in the North Caucasus. But
an examination of his claims suggests that it is not only
false, but that his campaign against Chechnya and the West's
failure to hold him and Russia accountable may ultimately very
well contribute to the problem he says he is fighting against
and, even worse, to other far more serious problems. That is my
subject here, and I want to praise you, Mr. Chairman, and the
committee, for holding this hearing on such an important
subject and also to thank you for inviting me to take part. I
have entitled my remarks, ``Are there more Chechnya's ahead for
Russia?'', and I've submitted them for the record. I will
summarize them here.
This morning, I would like to look at three different
aspects of this problem. First, I want to examine the nature of
Mr. Putin's claim. I cannot do that without recalling the
events of the late 1980's when we were regularly told that we
could not support the Baltic drive for the recovery of
independence because it might undermine Gorbachev and that, of
course, the Balts had to work out a staged development to
independence and that we must not criticize. In fact, by
holding the Baltic countries in as long as he did, Gorbachev
lost all the other republics. But since it has been mentioned
about the dangers of ethnic engineering, perhaps this committee
should recall that, on the very day that Boris Yeltsin, in the
presence of Belorussia and Ukraine, effectively dismembered the
Soviet Union at Belovezskaja Pusha, Mikhail Gorbachev issued a
call for redrawing the lines inside the USSR to make it have 50
States. Originality was never one of his long suits.
Second, I want to argue that the threat Putin has outlined
is not a real one, at least not real now in the sense that he
and his spokesman usually claim. And third, I want to suggest
that Putin's actions and, even more, the West's restraint in
criticizing them, are having the unintended consequence of
ethnicizing Russian life and, thus, undermining the chances for
stability and progress toward democracy in the country as a
whole.
More than any other issue, Chechnya has been Mr. Putin's
issue. He has used it to generate support for his election as
President and then to maintain his popularity at home and gain
grudging respect from abroad. By arguing that the Chechen drive
for independence threatens the disintegration of Russia as a
whole, Putin has, of course, played on the deepest insecurities
of a Russian public that has suffered a great deal over the
last decade. He has used it to revive an us-versus-them
attitude between Russians and the West, to generate the kind of
surrogate national enthusiasm for an increasingly authoritarian
approach to the media and elsewhere, and he has used it to
restrict Western criticism of his new toughness, arguing that,
``You must allow me to do this because I am working for you.''
But Putin has implicitly acknowledged the factual weakness
of his own claims by constantly coming up with yet newer
arguments as to why he is using overwhelming force in the way
that he is in the North Caucasus. Over the past year, he has
gone from talking about the disintegration of Russia to
invoking the bogeyman of Islamic fundamentalism to insisting
that he is defending the West from Islamic terrorism. Each of
these arguments, of course, has found some supporters in both
Russia and the West, but Putin's apparent need to come up with
more than one justification for what he is doing are just like
my children's explanation for why they have screwed up the
latest time. When you have to come up with more than one
reason, the odds are good that none of them are the truth. And
I think in Putin's case, that is certainly true.
Now, Putin has been wrong about Chechnya and about Russia
as a whole on this issue because he fundamentally does not
understand that Chechnya never wanted to be part of Russia,
never wanted to be part of the Soviet Union, and never wanted
to be part of the Russian Federation. But his errors that
Chechnya must remain part of Russia lest some other non-Russian
entities leave, have been aided and abetted by the attitudes
and public positions of Western governments.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many of those in
the academic and policy communities, who insisted that the
Soviet Union would never disintegrate on the basis of ethnic
aspirations, immediately reversed themselves and said that the
future of the Russian Federation would be the past of the
Soviet Union; namely, it would come apart along ethnic lines.
That argument was superficially attractive, but, for some of
the reasons you've heard already this morning, it is not real.
Most of the other entities did not have the numbers, did not
have the location, and did not have the historical background
that would drive them to seek independence.
But--and this is the more important thing--this Western
assumption led the West to approach Putin in ways that have
made the situation worse, because we have come to define the
success of the post-1991 Russian enterprise in terms of border
stability. Chechnya was the exception. Its leaders aspired to
independence precisely on the model of the Baltic States.
Djokhar Dudaev, the first President of Chechnya, had spent 3
years in Estonia immediately before becoming President of his
own country in the Caucasus, and he assumed that Chechens had
an equal moral right to be a country, as did the Estonians.
The consequences of the West's acceptance of Putin's view
on territorial integrity has led many to assume that we must
defend territorial integrity no matter what. That argument was
made to defend the existence of the Soviet Union. But
unfortunately, since 1991, several things have happened that
have made it worse. While we talked about the end of the Soviet
Union initially in terms of the self-determination of the
nations, we suddenly shifted to no-secession from secession,
which had the effect of trivializing what the non-Russian
peoples had achieved in 1991 and put the West on record against
any further independence. In short, we became the last
guarantor of Stalin's nationality policy.
Second, it led another earlier administration into becoming
almost a cheerleader for Russian actions against Chechnya.
American officials, as you know, compared Yeltsin's actions in
the first Chechen war to President Abraham Lincoln's actions
during the American Civil War, which was an obscenity. But
worse, it recalled the situation in the late 1960's and early
1970's when the international community, in the name of border
stability in Africa, tolerated and even aided the genocide of
the Biafran people so that they could not become a country on
their own.
And third, the fact that we have not criticized openly,
harshly, and specifically what Putin and his regime have done
in Chechnya has contributed to a new and growing Russian sense
that the West will not hold Russia accountable to anything. And
that is triggering a kind of Russian exceptionalism that will
make it difficult, if not impossible, to integrate Russian into
the modern democratic world.
But Putin's obsession with Chechnya does reflect a more
fundamental problem, one that I think should be attracting more
attention in the West than it has so far, and that is the
problem of the Russian community. When we talk about ethnic
groups in the Russian Federation, the first and most important
ethnic community is the Russian community, and it is very
special. The tragedy is that Russian integration, as a
community, is much less strong than the integration of the
Chechens or others. And that flows back from a historical
record in which the Russian state became an empire before the
Russian people consolidated as a nation, as a result of which
the Russian state has never been a nation state, but the
Russians have remained a state-defined nationality, one whose
strength tracks with the power of the state rather than acts as
a counterweight to it.
Putin's actions in Chechnya have not and will not end the
Chechen drive for independence. Chechnya will be an independent
country. But his brutal military campaign there has had three
effects; one that he said he hoped for and two that entail
risks for the future of Russia and its relations with us. By
using force against Chechnya, Putin has, in fact, intimidated
many of the other non-Russian peoples in the Russian
Federation. Many of their leaders have told me that what they
understand from Chechnya is, you can pursue all the
independence you want as long as you don't declare it. As long
as you do not say, ``We are going to leave,'' you can act as
independently from Moscow as possible. That is certainly the
calculation behind people like President Mintimir Shaimiev, of
Tatarstan, who is taking a very tough line and reminding
Moscow, even today, even as we speak, that Tatarstan did not
sign the Federation treaty either. And the stripping of its
Federal--its power-sharing arrangement, which Putin has talked
about, could end its relationship with Russia.
That is problematic enough, but there are two other things
which I would like to end with. The first is that Putin's
policies in Chechnya have led to that republic's Afghanization.
By destroying so much of the republic's infrastructure and by
killing or driving out so many of its people, Putin and his
government have effectively destroyed the basic cultural
transmission mechanisms there. That has led to a rise of young
men who know little of anything but fighting, who have not been
acculturated to the Chechen nation and who are available for
radicalization. That is what happened in Afghanistan. That is
why the Taliban happened.
I happen to know President Djokhar Dudaev, of Chechnya, and
he once told me that he was a good Muslim who prayed three
times a day. I did not point out that a good Muslim prays five
times a day, but he had been a member of the Communist Party
from the age of 18 and had been a major general in the Soviet
Air Force, so perhaps that was not in the officer instruction
manual.
But the image of Chechnya as an inevitably Islamic force is
wrong. It is being converted into that by the brutality of the
Russian Government. And, as a result, Russia now faces a more
intractable and dangerous enemy than it would have had it
either allowed the Chechens to go for independence in 1991 or,
if Moscow had at least observed the provisions of the 1996
Khasavyurt Accords. It did neither, and it is going to lose
this war.
The other consequence of Putin's approach is likely to be
far more dangerous for Russia's future, and that is the
ethnicization of political life and the revival of the cult of
force. In recent days, as you know, there have been reports
that anti-Semitism is on the wane in Russia. That is great
news. But it has been replaced by antagonism to people from the
Caucasus, in general, and Chechens, in particular.
The demonization of the Chechens by the Russian Government
and the Russian media have contributed to acts of
discrimination and violence that are not punished. Indeed, they
are excused or praised. And I wonder how we would react to any
other government in the world whose Defense Minister said, ``I
am sympathetic and understand a Russian colonel who is on trial
for killing a Chechen woman.'' Even non-Russians, who have
never heard of Pastor Niemoeller and his observation about the
ways violence against one group can spread to another, have got
to be worried. And that is the risk that Mr. Putin has invited
by his actions, a risk that increases as the demographic
realities change.
You have been given some numbers which are snapshots of
where Russia is today ethnographically. The reality is that the
Russian community is declining by almost a million a year, and
the share of non-Russians in some of these areas will increase
over time. I submit to you that those changes may matter more
than the figures that we have at the present.
I, personally, am very pleased that this committee, the
Congress in general, and the American Government have begun to
speak out more vigorously to demand that Russia seek a
political solution in Chechnya. Many, of course, are still
urging caution, lest we drive Putin supposedly into more
nationalist or authoritarian directions--I find it difficult to
understand what those might be--but we need to recognize that
it is his actions and our failure to speak out vigorously that
threatens the territorial integrity and political progress of
Russia, far more than anything any Chechen or other non-Russian
inside the Russian Federation has ever dreamed of doing. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goble follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul A. Goble *
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* The views expressed here are Mr. Goble's own.
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ARE THERE MORE CHECHNYAS AHEAD FOR RUSSIA?
Russian President Vladimir Putin has regularly insisted that he has
had to act with vigor and dispatch against the Chechen drive for
independence in order to prevent the disintegration of Russia. That
argument has served him well: it has both generated support among
Russians for what he is doing and even more important it has restrained
Western criticism of Russian actions there. But in fact, an examination
of his claim suggests that it is not only false but that his campaign
against Chechnya and the West's general failure to hold him and Russian
accountable may very well contribute to the very problem that he says
he is fighting against.
That is my subject here, and I want to praise you, Mr. Chairman,
and the committee for holding a hearing on this important subject and
also to thank you for inviting me to take part.
This morning, I would like to look at three different aspects of
the problem: First, I want to examine the nature of Mr. Putin's claim
and compare it with claims made by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and by Putin's predecessor,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Second, I want to argue that the
threat Putin has outlined is not a real one--or at least not real in
the sense that he and his spokesmen usually claim. And third, I want to
suggest that Putin's actions and the West's restraint in criticizing
them are having the unintended consequence of ethnicizing Russian
political life and thus undermining the chances for stability and
progress toward democracy. Moreover, it reduces the likelihood that
Russia will be able to prevent more ethnic violence and more moves
toward national self-determination in the future.
A Politically Effective Claim
More than any other issue, Putin has exploited the Chechen conflict
first to generate support for his election as president and then to
maintain his popularity at home and grudging respect from abroad. By
arguing that the Chechen drive for independence threatens the
disintegration of Russia as a whole, Putin has played on the deepest
insecurities of a Russian public buffeted by more than a decade of
unpredictable developments that have left an ever greater number of
them impoverished and angry. He has used it to revive an ``us versus
them'' attitude between Russians and the West, to generate a kind of
surrogate national enthusiasm for his increasingly authoritarian
approach to the media and other aspects of Russian life. And he has
used it to restrict Western criticism of his new toughness, playing on
Western weariness about the political upheavals in Russia and Eurasia.
But Putin has implicitly acknowledged the factual weakness of his
own claims by putting out a variety of other arguments as to why his
use of overwhelming force in Chechnya is not only justified but must be
supported by Russians and the international community. Over the last
year, he has routinely invoked the bogeyman of Islamic fundamentalism
as a reason for his actions. And most recently he has said that Russia
is fighting the West's battle against terrorism by its actions in
Chechnya.
Each of those arguments has found some supporters in both Russia
and the West, but Putin's apparent need to shift the justification for
his actions simultaneously reflects his broader needs--after all, he
has proclaimed this spring that he has ended the threats to the
disintegration of Russia despite the ongoing fighting in Chechnya--and
the fact that his original argument was never as impressive as he and
his supporters in both Russia and the West often suggested.
Why Putin is Wrong on Chechnya and Russia as a Whole
Putin has been wrong about Chechnya and about Russia as a whole on
this issue, but his errors--that Chechnya must remain part of Russia
lest other non-Russian entities within Russia leave--have been aided
and abetted by the attitudes and public positions of Western
governments.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many of those who had
insisted that the USSR would never disintegrate on the basis of ethnic
aspirations immediately changed course and insisted that the future of
the Russian Federation would inevitably be the past of the Soviet
Union: namely, it would be threatened with disintegration along ethnic
lines.
The argument was superficially attractive: After all, the Russian
Federation, while more ethnically homogeneous than the Soviet Union had
been, included 22 non-Russian autonomous state formations within it.
Although these included only about 18 percent of the population, they
covered some 53 percent of the territory of Russia as a whole. And many
of them, especially in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Soviet
empire, aspired to greater autonomy or even ultimate state
independence.
But this Western assumption was not only wrong on the facts of the
case but carried with it some dangerous political implications that
Putin continues to exploit and that appear to guide the thinking of
many in the West. With regard to the facts, the non-Russian entities
within the Russian Federation were less interested in, less capable of,
and less able to appeal to the West for help. Only six of the 22 had
non-Russian ethnic pluralities. Most were located in areas where the
pursuit of independence was largely precluded either because they
lacked access to the outside world or even were surrounded by ethnic
Russian territory. Few of them had any recent experience with
independence, and most concluded early on that independence was not an
option, especially because of changed attitudes in Moscow and in the
West.
Chechnya was the exception: its leaders aspired to independence on
the model of the Baltic States, it had suffered in ways that had
created a genuine national movement, and it had a well-organized
secular nationalist leadership that appealed to the world on the same
basis that the non-Russian union republics of the former Soviet Union
had done. But just as many in the West refused to demand that Gorbachev
allow the Baltic countries to acquire de facto independence lest such
demands drive him from his reformist path on other issues, so too many
in the West have made the same calculation with Yeltsin and now with
Putin.
But with regard to the implications for the West, the assumption
that Russia was threatened with immediate territorial disintegration
that had to be countered had three dangerous consequences. First, it
lead many in the West to assume that the maintenance of Russia's
territorial integrity was necessary for progress on other issue. That
led one earlier administration to shift its rhetoric on what had
happened to the Soviet Union from a discussion of the end of empire to
an insistence that there be ``no secession from secession,'' a shift
that trivialized what happened in 1991 and put the West on record
against any further independence. In short it put the West in the
position of being the last guarantor of Stalin's nationality policy.
Second, it led another earlier administration into becoming almost
a cheerleader for Russian actions against Chechnya. American officials
compared Yeltsin's actions in 1994-96 to President Abraham Lincoln's
actions during the American Civil War. Worse, it effectively returned
the West to the position it had adopted in the late 1960s and early
1970s when it sanctioned a genocide of the Biafran people in Nigeria in
the name of border stability in Africa.
And third, this focus on territorial integrity had the effect of
leading some in the West to excuse behavior in Chechnya first by
Yeltsin and more recently and especially by Putin, thus contributing to
a Russian sense that the West would not hold Moscow to the same
standards it holds others to and thus helping to power precisely the
kind of Russian exceptionalism that has made it difficult for Russia to
integrate into the broader international community so often in the
past.
But Putin's obsession with Chechnya does reflect a more fundamental
problem, one that should be attracting more attention than it has so
far both in Russia and here. That is the problem of the Russian
community itself. Strange as it may seem to many, it is the lack of
integration of the Russian nation that explains much of Putin's fears
and approach. Because the Russian state became an empire before the
Russian people consolidated as a nation, the Russian state has never
been a nation state but the Russians have remained a state-defined
nationality, one whose strength tracks with the power of the state
rather than serves as a counterweight to it.
That puts Russia at odds with the situation in European countries
and is ultimately why Russians find it difficult to accept the loss of
the outer empire and fear that the disintegration of the Soviet Union
will inevitably spread to the Russian Federation itself.
A Dangerous Precedent
Putin's actions in Chechnya have not ended the Chechen drive for
independence. Instead, his brutal military campaign there has had three
effects, one that he and some others hoped for and two that entail
risks for the future of Russia.
By using force against Chechnya, Putin has in fact intimidated many
of the other non-Russian peoples in the Russian Federation. Many of
their leaders have concluded from the events in Chechnya that they can
seek as much autonomy as possible but that the price of doing so is
avoiding any moves that look like a drive to independence. That is the
calculation behind the actions of Tatarstan President Mintimir Shaimiev
and many others. But if these nations are intimidated, they are also
offended, as Shaimiev and others have suggested. Indeed, some are angry
and may now be more inclined to pursue an independent course should
future circumstances allow.
That is problematic enough. But there are two other consequences of
Putin's actions in Chechnya with respect to Russia's future that are
even more frightening. Putin's policies have led to the Afganization of
Chechnya. By destroying so much of that republic's infrastructure and
by killing or driving out so many of its people, Putin and his
government have destroyed the basic cultural transmission mechanisms
there. That has led to the rise of a new group of young men who know
little of anything but fighting and who have not been acculturated into
the Chechen nation. And they have become available for mobilization by
extremist groups, often acting in the name of Islam.
I knew and respected Chechen President Djokar Dudaev. In an earlier
incarnation, he helped prevent Gorbachev from visiting on Estonia the
kind of violence the Soviet president inflicted on Lithuania and Latvia
in January 1991. Dudaev, who had been a major general in the Soviet air
force and a communist from a young age, told me once that he was a good
Muslim in that he prayed three times a day. Of course, good Muslims
pray five times a day, but he was sufficiently secular that he did not
appear aware of that. Dudaev's approach defined the Chechen national
cause until the Russian military actions first of Yeltsin and
especially now of Putin. And the Islamist and terrorist threats that
Moscow regularly complains of are--just as is the case in Afghanistan--
the product of Russian actions rather than arising somehow naturally
out of the Chechen milieu.
As a result, Russia now faces a far more intractable and dangerous
enemy than it would have had it either allowed the Chechen's national
self-determination in 1991 or observed the terms of the 1996 Khasavurt
accords. It did neither, and it is going to lose this war, just as
almost every other colonial power has done. Unfortunately, the Chechnya
that is likely to emerge just like Afghanistan after the Soviet
invasion or Algeria after the French colonial war there will be a very
different and less pleasant place than would otherwise have been the
case. And equally unfortunately, the world is likely to blame the
victims rather than the victimizers.
The other consequence of Putin's approach in Chechnya that is
likely to be even more dangerous for Russia's future is the
ethnicization of political life there and the revived cult of the use
of force. In recent days, there have been reports that anti-Semitism is
on the wane in Russia. I for one celebrate that progress. But these
reports have pointed out that there is a new enemy in Russia, the
Chechen people. The demonization of the Chechens by the Russian
government and the Russian media have contributed to acts of
discrimination and violence by Russian officials and citizens against
ethnic Chechens and others from the Caucasus. Few of these actions are
ever punished, and many of them are justified, excused or even praised,
as witness the outrageous remarks of Russian officials about a colonel
who is accused of killing a Chechen woman.
Even non-Russians who have never heard of Pastor Niemuller and his
observation clearly understand about the ways violence against one
group can spread to another. And that is a risk that Putin has invited
by his actions.
I am personally very pleased that this committee, the Congress in
general, and the American government have begun to speak out more
vigorously to demand that Russia seek a political solution in Chechnya.
Many are still urging caution against doing so lest we drive Putin into
even more nationalist and authoritarian directions. But in fact, it is
his actions and our failure to speak out vigorously about them that
threatens the territorial integrity and political progress of Russia
far more than anything any Chechen or other non-Russian inside the
Russian Federation has ever dreamed of doing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We will start with 10-
minute rounds here. Let me pick up my questioning where you
left off, Paul. As a result of this war, are the republics in
regions with sizable Islamic populations becoming more critical
of Putin, and is there a possibility they will attempt to gain
independence?
Mr. Goble. In 1991, there were no regions except Chechnya
that were talking about independence. At the present time,
there are a number of officials in Tatarstan--not the top
officials, but a number of officials at lower levels--who are
saying, ``You know, if this gets much worse, we will have no
choice.'' In many ways, we are watching a recapitulation of the
process of radicalization that took place in Soviet times. As
has been properly pointed out, these places are not in the best
position, you know, geographically or demographically, to
pursue it, but there has been a radicalization of views.
If you look at the debates over the last 6 months about
whether you have an insert in the passport, whether you
maintain your power-sharing treaty, and then you look at what
is being said in the local press, there is a process of
radicalization. I am not prepared to say that next week or 6
months from now the Tatars are going to declare that, ``We're
out of here.'' What I'm suggesting is that the ethnicization of
political life, where attacking people on ethnic lines becomes
acceptable, which is, in fact, what is going on in Russia
because of the Chechen war, more and more non-Russians--and I
would say the people of the Tatar-Bashkortostan area in the
middle of the Volga are the first candidates for this and,
second, some in Buriatia--are beginning to say things that
suggest they are very disturbed about the future of the Russian
Federation and what their place will be in it. Many of them
wish the Chechens had never tried for independence, because
they think they are suffering as a result. Again, repeating the
kinds of things you have heard among Ukrainians about the Balts
in 1989 and 1990.
I am not suggesting there is a simple repetition. I am more
worried about the poisoning of Russian political life than I am
about the changing of borders, except that I believe Chechnya
will be independent. I think no one has won a colonial war,
effectively, and Putin is not going to be the first. But what
you are seeing is a low-grade, below-the-top leadership
discussion. I happen, for professional reasons, to read the
Tatar and Bashkir press each day, OK, and I can tell you that
there are articles and statements in there today that would not
have been there 6 months ago and that there is a process of
radicalization just below the official level.
The Chairman. Dr. Solnick, you spoke of the uniqueness of
Chechnya within the Federation. Would you expand on that? Why
is it so different from any of the other areas?
Dr. Solnick. Well, on my right here is someone who is more
of an expert on Chechnya than I, but I think many of the
problems that we encounter in Chechnya stem from that moment in
1994 when the Federal Government--and Yeltsin, in particular--
had managed to get his constitution ratified. There were two
republics that were not yet on board the new Federal structure:
One was Tatarstan, the other was Chechnya. And many of his
advisors urged that he use a treaty process to basically strike
a deal with Tatarstan and strike a deal with Chechnya. And he
went and did that with Tatarstan, and then it broke down with
Chechnya. And the breakdown of that negotiation with Chechnya
essentially got the republic off the rail.
Now, why did that happen? I think a lot of that has to do
with the geostrategic position of Chechnya--it sat atop a
pipeline route--with internal politics in Chechnya--there was
not an interlocutor for the Federal Government in Chechnya--
with the clan politics internal to the political structure in
that republic. According to some accounts, the people that they
were close to reaching agreement with were unable to deliver
that agreement, and the Ministry of Defense wanted to display
its ability to use force, and that was a lethal combination at
that time. And once the action was made, there was no turning
back because of the baggage that Chechnya brings.
I will conclude with this--it took more czarist troops to
incorporate Chechnya into the Russian empire than it did to
repel Napoleon. So there is a long, long history here.
The Chairman. Dr. Dunlop, would you like to comment on
that?
Dr. Dunlop. Yes, I think Steve has accurately described the
background to the breakdown of relations, especially in 1994,
between the Russian Republic and Chechnya. I do think--and I
have written a book on this, on the antecedents to the first
war; I published it in 1998--I do think that a deal could have
been struck with General Dudaev, President Dudaev. As Paul has
mentioned, he was very much a Soviet man. And he, all along,
indicated that he wanted a negotiated settlement. I do fault
the Russian side more than the Chechen side in that case. I
think some kind of an associated arrangement could have been
worked out. And when you think of the two wars fought since
then, at enormous human and economic cost, one can say that
Yeltsin and his team made a horrible mistake in 1994, and that
that mistake is continuing today.
The Chairman. One of the things I find as I travel Europe
is the same kind of characterization of Chechnya that I have
found with regard to the Balkans, namely Islamic fundamentalism
and the radicalization of society. In other words, this is as
much a religious uprising as anything else. Would any of you
speak to that for a moment?
Mr. Goble. If I might. The Chechens were Islamicized very
late. They were Islamicized by Avar missionaries between the
14th and 16th centuries. The Islamic overlay of the tight
``clannic'' system meant that Islam was domesticated very
heavily. The Naqshbandiyya and to a lesser extent, the Khalidi
tariqyat of Sufism had an influence, but it was something where
Islam became the basis for political unity under only one
condition, and that was when you were attacked from the
outside.
As far as deep attachment--you know, the whole Middle
Eastern idea of what Muslims are, something straight out of the
popular press in this country--this was not a heavily Islamic
place. This was not even like that in Daghestan, next door.
There is an unfortunate tendency, in Europe and here, to
think that once you have invoked the word ``Islam,'' you've
explained the world. It is a kind of acceptable racism, I am
afraid. If anyone explained European history by reference to
the fact that almost everyone was a Christian, people would
laugh. But if you say Islam causes something, this is
considered scholarly insight. It is nonsense.
The Chechen national movement, in 1989, 1990, and 1991, was
entirely secular. They were not interested in promoting an
Islamic state. Dudaev, as has been said, was a Soviet man. He
was a very good Soviet man. He prevented Gorbachev from killing
people in Estonia the way he had done in Lithuania and Latvia.
He closed down the air-traffic control over Estonia to prevent
Soviet paratroopers being sent into Tallinn on the third
weekend in January, and he was responsible for saving Boris
Yeltsin, who went to Tallinn on January 13, 1991. He got him
driven back to the airport in St. Petersburg to avoid his plane
being blown up. This was a secular movement. It was modeled
explicitly on the Baltic aspirations.
It was only once Russia started the killing, the massive
killing, in 1994, 1995, and 1996, that you began removing the
traditional elders of these type communities and people became
available for mobilization by others, the same thing that
happened in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, historically, was not a
very Islamic place. The Taliban happened because of the Soviet
destruction of the community in Afghanistan. And we find
ourselves--and the Europeans, even worse, I would suggest--find
ourselves blaming the victim. In other words, the Afghans are
responsible for the Taliban. No, the Taliban happened because
of what the Soviets and the Russians did in Afghanistan.
What is happening in Chechnya, the Islamization of
Chechnya, is exactly the same. It is an extraordinarily
unfortunate thing. The image of the enemy, of Islam, has been
put out by a number of people in Moscow because, guess what,
they found it works. They found that if you say that here, it
works. And it does.
Dr. Balzer. Let me add a footnote to what Paul just said
about Islam. The range of available Islams within the Russian
Federation is quite great, including a brand of Islam that is a
reformist Islam that blends European and Eastern philosophies.
It's called ``The New Way,'' Jadidism. It was part of the turn
of the 20th century politics. And it was born in Tatarstan.
There are many different kinds of Islam--Islamic fundamentalism
is not all one word. Therefore, it is possible that some of the
more reformist Islamic tendencies can be grown--and, indeed, in
Tatarstan, are being grown locally by new community centers,
with mosque-centered, politics that are not radical. In other
words, there is a way to look at the development of religion
that is not necessarily fundamentalist when you do talk about
Islam.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I think that we have four
distinguished, articulate witnesses here. And, for my part, and
for my 10 minutes, I wish that you would interrupt me or each
other and let us have a discussion among you four, with me sort
of sitting up here cheering you on or whatever.
Now, first thing before I do that, I turned around the
chart. And on there, it has Milosevic's war in Kosovo and
Putin's war in Chechnya. Now, Milosevic--death toll by war:
10,500--and that's five-tenths of 1 percent, a half of 1
percent. Putin's war: 30,000-35,000--three percent of the
population. Detentions during the war: 2,000 for Milosevic;
20,000 for Putin. Displaced persons caused by war: 1,500,000
people, 75 percent of the population; and Putin: 600,000-
700,000, and that is 60 to 70 percent of the population. And
the pre-war population: two million--that was the estimation in
1999--and one million in Chechnya in 1999.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milosevic's War in Kosovo Putin's War in Chechnya
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deaths Caused by War 10,500 (00.5% of pop.) 30-35,000 (3% of pop.)
Detentions During War 2,000+ 20,000+
Displaced Persons Caused by War 1,500,000 975% of pop.) 600-700,000 (60-70% of pop.)
Pre-War Population 2,000,000 (estimated 1999) 1,000,000 (estimated 1999)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Helms. Now, my question to any of you--my
understanding is that Russian forces have destroyed some 85
percent of Chechen historic and religious sites in Chechnya,
not to mention a library that was the central repository of
Chechen historical documents. What do you believe is the
strategy behind this destruction; and, further, is this
destruction compatible with international obligations
concerning the conduct of war? Anybody that wants to grab that
one, I would like to hear.
Mr. Goble. Senator, there have been suggestions in the
Russian press that, ``If we cannot defeat the Chechens, we can
destroy them.'' Destroying cultural artifacts, destroying
cultural transmission mechanisms, is, under international law,
genocide. This is an act of genocide by the Russian Government.
It is incompatible with the undertakings Russia has signed with
the United Nations, with OSCE, and a bunch of other places. It
is--to destroy a nation's culture is genocide under
international law. To destroy this many people is genocide
under international law.
If this action had been committed by any government that
did not have nuclear weapons, the country that did it would be
outside--would be considered beyond the pale. But a government
that has nuclear weapons that does things like this is usually
in a position to insist that it not be criticized too much. And
we have now watched--in the last week, following the statement
by Lord Russell-Johnston at PACE, which has been referred to
several times this morning--Russians complaining that, ``PACE
is putting too much pressure on us, and if the Europeans don't
stop, we'll find a way to respond.'' I mean, that is the--you
know, that is the response you are getting. As long--I think
the Russians have violated all kinds of international
agreements. I think if we do not hold----
Senator Helms. All right. All right. Dr. Balzer, I saw you
shaking your head. Tell my why.
Dr. Balzer. Well, my reaction to this comparison is that it
does a good deal of credit to the late human rights worker in
Chechnya and the Balkans, Fred Cuny, who was murdered in
Chechnya. And he began pointing out these kinds of comparisons
that----
Senator Helms. Are you saying it is false--that it is not
accurate?
Dr. Balzer. No, I am not at all. On the contrary, I am
saying it does honor--the idea behind the comparison is an
important one, and it does honor to the spirit of what Fred
Cuny did, because he started making these comparisons precisely
in order to show how much more violent Chechnya has been. And
it also blows away stereotypes, because there was an assumption
that our involvement, which was so much greater in the Balkans,
was because the intensity of the war in the Balkans was so
great.
Senator Helms. I see. Dr. Dunlop, do you have a comment?
Dr. Dunlop. Yes, I would like to make a couple of points,
Senator. First, I recently published a study of human losses in
the first war, the 1994 to 1996 war, in ``Central Asian
Survey,'' and I concluded, in a very rough estimate, that
46,500 people had died in that war, about 35,000 of them
civilians. So we could add those figures to these new figures
and get an even more catastrophic total.
And second, I wanted to mention that the Lam Center for
Pluralism in Grozny-Nazran, which works with the Institute for
Democracy in Eastern Europe, recently issued a report on the
fate of Chechnya's architecture and natural treasures in which
they provide in great detail information on the destruction of
the traditional tower monuments in Chechnya dating from the
11th to the 17th century. These are ancient architectural
monuments, many of which have been destroyed or damaged as a
result of the military operations in Chechnya.
Senator Helms. Dr. Solnick.
Dr. Solnick. I just want to add one thing. While Chechnya
is a predominantly Chechen republic, one of the more
concentrated non-Russian Republics, I just want to emphasize
that the population in the cities, particularly Grozny, was
heavily mixed. And when the war came, especially the first war,
but also the second war, the casualties were not only on the
Chechen side, but on the Russian population living in the
cities, especially the Russian population of Grozny. So while I
think I agree with my colleagues that there is a racist
character to this war, it is also true and consistent with the
general brutality of the Russian Armed Forces, that the deaths
have been seen on both sides.
Senator Helms. Yes or no, a question I had. Do you think
Mr. Putin will ever, ever be able to establish control over
Chechnya, short of a genocidal outcome?
Dr. Dunlop. No.
Mr. Goble. No.
Dr. Solnick. No.
Senator Helms. No, no, no. Dr. Balzer?
Dr. Balzer. There is a school of thought that discusses low
intensity--and I'm not sure Chechnya really is so low
intensity--wars that go on for a long, long time. And if
Chechnya becomes something like Northern Ireland or other
places that have had protracted multi-generation wars, then it
is extraordinarily difficult for us to predict what will
happen. However, the degree of destruction of the small Chechen
people is so great that the only answer, short of that kind of
horrifying long-term war, is negotiation.
Senator Helms. Thank you, ma'am. Now, by the year 2015,
it's estimated that as much as 20 to 25 percent of Russia's
population will be Muslim. Now, what does the war in Chechnya
today portend for a country where Muslims will, in the not too
distant future, if that estimate is accurate, amount to nearly
a quarter of the population? That is to say 25 percent. What's
the future for Russia?
Mr. Goble. As has been pointed out, Senator, there are many
kinds of Muslims, and there will continue to be many kinds of
Muslims. Some of the Muslims are going to be radicalized. It is
worth noting that, in the last 3 months, President Putin has
spent a great deal of time trying to sort out the internal
contradictions within the leadership of the Russian Muslim
community. There are two claimants for the top spot, and Putin
desperately wants to establish a single Muslim entity, if you
will. Islam not being a clerical religion, that's a little
problematic, but the Russians and the Soviets did it, so Putin
is trying to have one. It is not clear that the Muslims will
not become increasingly important and, it is worth noting,
Putin is----
The Chairman. Putin what? I'm sorry, Paul.
Mr. Goble. I'm sorry?
The Chairman. You said it's not--they won't become
increasingly what?
Mr. Goble. Well, it's not clear that they will become
increasingly radical.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Goble. But they will necessarily be increasingly
important.
The Chairman. I understand.
Mr. Goble. Mr. Putin has been involved, also, in the
organization of the Eurasian movement, the Refrock party and
a--to try to have some kind of party that will rope in the
Muslims. Whether that's going to work, we don't know, but these
people are not happy about what's going on in Chechnya, and
there is more draft resistance among Muslims.
Senator Helms. Dr. Balzer, I noticed you, this time, were
nodding your head. Do you agree with that?
Dr. Balzer. Yes, indeed. Islam is increasingly important,
and Islamic people have been organizing themselves. Whether
this new Eurasian movement will come to pull in those Islamic
leaders is another question. I think the Eurasian movement, and
even in its past, has been more a Russian phenomena than a non-
Russian one.
Senator Helms. Thank you. Dr. Dunlop.
Dr. Dunlop. I wanted to add one point which I don't think
we've addressed sufficiently so far, which is the percentage of
Muslims in the North Caucasus region. This is a particularly
volatile area, and there are very few Russians there. I
believe, in Ingushetia, I read recently, there's only 2 percent
Russians. And in Daghestan, 5 percent?
Mr. Goble. Maybe as much as eight.
Dr. Dunlop. Eight percent? Five to eight--there are very
small numbers of ethnic Russians in these regions. And, of
course, the violence, the fighting, is right on their doorstep.
These are areas which are subject to more volatility, perhaps,
than Muslim regions in central Russia and elsewhere. So what
happens in Chechnya, and the resolution of the crisis there,
directly impacts the other North Caucasus regimes. Furthermore,
numerous Russian troops are based in these republics. And,
according to recent reports, they've been behaving as badly in
Ingushetia as they have in Chechnya. Recently, the President of
Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, had to complain officially against
what he called barbarism being perpetrated by these Russian
troops in his own republic. So I think the Muslims in the North
Caucasus region should be a subject of particular attention for
us.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, would you allow Dr. Solnick to
answer the question?
The Chairman. Sure.
Dr. Solnick. I just wanted to note that we may be more
discriminating in distinguishing Caucasian and Muslim and North
Caucasian than the Russian people are. This war is generating a
lot of prejudice against dark-skinned Russian citizens. Not all
dark-skinned Russian citizens are Muslims. So the social
tensions generated from this war are not quite so neatly
compartmentalized as we might portray them here.
Senator Helms. Anybody want to say anything, in a sentence
or two, further on this question?
Mr. Goble. Could I just add one sentence?
Senator Helms. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goble. Last week, the leader of the Tatar community of
Moscow pointed out that the Russian Government should not treat
the Muslims in Moscow as immigrants because, as he said, ``We
were here when this city was founded.''
Senator Helms. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join Senator
Biden and Senator Helms in their compliments on four
extraordinary papers--each tremendously helpful for our
understanding and for all who may be listening to this hearing.
I'm going to have two sets of questions. First of all, to
prey upon your expertise to get a finer point on the economic
effects on Russia of this war in Chechnya. And, second, the
morale factor--which would include draft evasion. You have
touched upon that with the Muslim community, but it seems much
more widespread, including the phenomenon of living off the
land and the violations that may be occurring in other sectors.
In addition to this, I'll phrase the economic issue in this
way: as commonly portrayed in our press it's suggested the
Russian budget, as a total budget of the country--the Duma
adopted a budget of about $50 billion in U.S. dollar terms and
about $8 billion in defense spending. When Americans hear that,
they think there must be a misprint--single-digit--because
we're talking about $300 billion-plus for our defense budget.
But nevertheless, some would say, well, you've masked this,
because there's a lot of demonetization here, the living-off-
the-land factor, barter and so forth. But nevertheless, it's a
very small budget for the country and a very small budget for
defense, yet there's a pretty big war going on. Can anybody
characterize how much of this budget is consumed in the war, or
what the effects are upon the economy of Russia from the
prosecution of this war?
Dr. Dunlop. Well, Senator, as I mentioned, one--there was
an article in a well-known Russian journal recently which
calculated that $4 billion a year is being spent on the
conflict. Much of this is presumably off the books--magic, if
you want--but the money comes across. Pavel Felgenhauer, a
leading Russian military journalist, a specialist in military
affairs, also came up with the figure of about $4 billion a
year, and that's just for the military operations. Obviously,
if they try and restore anything in Chechnya, that's an
additional expense. So given the annual budget you've cited,
it's clear that an enormous sum of money, in Russian terms, is
going for this war, more than--as the journalist I cited
remarked, more than is being used to pay for the budgets of
Moscow and Petersburg.
Mr. Goble. Senator, as you have been one of the pioneers in
costing out what the real expenses are in Russian budgets and
Soviet budgets so that we'd have some basis for knowing about
aid, so you know that translate--if you talk about the
replacement cost--in other words, what it would cost us to do
the same thing--the fact is that the number is several orders
of magnitude, really, bigger than this. I think I'd like to
address the morale issue. This week, it was reported that there
are currently 5,000 Russian soldiers deserting every year, of
whom about 80 percent are deserting from the North Caucasus
military district. Prime Minister Kasyanov said last Friday
that the brutalization of young men in the military----
The Chairman. Hazing.
Mr. Goble. But it's worse than hazing. This is not
fraternity house stuff. This is beating people to the point of
killing them--I suppose there are fraternities where that
happens, too, but never mind--is increasing to the point that,
and along ethnic lines, that the army is doing the same thing
it did in Soviet times, which is radicalizing the non-Russians
rather than integrating them, which is what the expectation
was. In addition, because the soldiers are often not paid--one
of the ways you get your budget down there is not to pay them.
So what happens? The military sells weapons. It sells
equipment. The Chechens were proud for a while on their
Websites to tell you how many bottles of vodka it took to get a
tank. And they figured that when it got down to one bottle of
vodka for one tank, the Russians would go home, but it never
got below two. So we're getting there, but not quite. This is
having enormous morale problems. This is not a war the military
wanted; this was a war the military got sucked into. The
commanders were very unhappy about it. This was an FSB forced
conflict in 1994 and again now. It was not what the army
wanted. Armies do not like this kind of fighting. And one of
the reasons there was the discussion by Nemstov and others
about stopping at the Tarik, is that is when you stop before
you get in the mountains. It is really easy to fight in the
lowlands if you are an organized military force. You go into
the mountains, you start taking casualties big time, and that
is where they are, and they are not happy either. The army
would be thrilled to be pulled out, and that is something which
has an effect on the ability of the Moscow political leadership
to use the Russian military for other things.
Dr. Balzer. Let me add a footnote on morale and also on the
draft. A lot of the republics, especially as the first cycle of
the 1990's Chechnya war got started, said they weren't going to
send their sons. Part of the points of contention with the
center was that republics drafted laws saying, ``Our folks
aren't going to go there. We don't want to fight our non-
Russian brethren, to fight the Chechen people.'' In the small
Republic of Tyva, it was worded slightly differently. They
said, ``We need all of our sons to help police our serious
criminal activity in our own republic.''
Dr. Solnick. If I could just add to that, I think Paul's
comment may have left the impression that the Soviet Army was a
brutal, hazing, violent institution that then got better and is
now getting worse again.
Mr. Goble. No, it has continued to be bad, but it has
perhaps gotten worse in the North Caucasus.
Dr. Solnick. Yes, I want to emphasize that. Just to put
this in scale, this became an issue in the Soviet times during
the Afghan war, and we're seeing a lot of the same syndromes
now. In the late 1980's, there were on the order of 10 to 20
non-combat deaths--and this is a conservative estimate--in the
Soviet Army every day. These are people being beaten to death
within brigades. These are people killing themselves to avoid
being beaten to death. It's ethnic conflict. It's generational
conflict. It's senior officers beating up young recruits. Now
they are professional soldiers and conscripts who are violent
toward each other. The morale is horrific in the Russian Army,
and Chechnya is making it worse, not only because there doesn't
seem to be a lot of regard for the lives of Russian soldiers
there, but as the New York Times reported a couple of weeks
ago, there seems to be an active trade in Russian soldiers
themselves bartered from the army to the Chechens and then
bought back by their mothers in some cases.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask another line of questioning now.
This one is based upon President Putin's comment the other day.
There was an anti-NATO expansion expression, for example, but
he really broadened that to say that, essentially, NATO is
trying to exclude Russia, and is trying to have something less
than Europe whole and free. This begs the question again and
again, should Russia ever become a member of NATO. Under the
circumstances we're discussing today, probably not, because the
eligibility criteria really wouldn't permit that. Taking a more
friendly view down the trail, however, clearly we're going to
be discussing in this country as well as with our European
friends, the Baltic States and their inclusion in NATO next
year. The argument will be, once again, that this would
antagonize Russia and make it unstable. On the other hand,
leaving aside the Russian attitude, what would it take or what
criteria are there for Russia to become a member so that they
don't feel that anybody is carving up their territory and that,
as a matter of fact, we want them. As historians of Russia, is
this simply inconceivable. The cultural traditions, the
institutions that are there don't really permit a realistic
appraisal of Russian membership.
Mr. Goble. Senator, it's worth noting, the next sentence in
Mr. Putin's comment about NATO. He said, ``We had hoped that
the OSCE would become the basis for a pan-European security
arrangement in place of NATO, but the OSCE has turned into
nothing more than a venue for criticizing us and criticizing
our central Asian friends.'' If Russia wants to live by the
rules of an organization, it can join. The tragedy is that
Russia has insisted that it doesn't have to follow the rules in
order to get in, and that's been true at the Council of Europe,
that's been true a whole lot of times. The Russians have said,
``We're important. And besides, if you don't take us in, we'll
be unhappy.''
Dr. Solnick. I must confess, when I think about this, I
find it as close to an intractable problem as one can find, and
I'm reminded--during the NATO bombings of Kosovo, when Russia
objected and said, ``You have been saying that NATO is not an
offensive force, and here you are using it in an offensive
manner,'' the American response at the time--or the NATO
response at the time was, ``Well, yes, but this is a European
matter. You need not fear, we would never intervene in a case
that is clearly within your sphere of influence. For instance,
let us say, Chechnya. That would be off limits.'' So I think
it's just an illustration of the sort of constraints on
American policy that would come along with conceding of that
enlargement of NATO.
Dr. Dunlop. I would add that I think that the Russia we see
today isn't inevitably the Russia that would have emerged from
the early 1990's from the independence of Russia. I personally
think it's a tragedy what's happened. But I think that Mr.
Putin is a person who is capable of instituting change if he
feels that it's to his advantage and that of the country. That
is, I believe he could be induced to recognize international
law. But very heavy pressure has to be brought to bear on him.
On the otherhand, to give way to what he's doing, to
countenance it, is entirely the wrong approach, in my opinion.
Senator Lugar. Maybe such as our giving criteria, one of
which would be to stop the war in Chechnya.
Dr. Dunlop. Exactly.
Senator Lugar. Or stop brutalizing people or--in other
words, you may be right that he's effectively a good leader.
But without the right guidelines, they're unlikely to get to
the right conclusions.
Dr. Dunlop. Right, and that's why I supported Senator
Helms' concurrent resolution.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Let me followup with a couple of questions,
and anybody on the panel here as well as my colleagues can
please interrupt.
Assume for the moment that Chechnya, by whatever means,
achieves its independence. Chechnya's off the table. Is the
Russian Federation, as presently in place, capable of being
governed? I look at the way in which it came about after the
demise of the Soviet Union and think to myself, as a student of
government, how, in God's name, could you possibly govern under
the set of relationships that exists among the various
republics, autonomous regions, and the central government, even
on something as simple as taxes? I mean if you sit down, as a
political scientist, and try to figure out how you're going to
make this country work, this Federation work, is it possible?
Mr. Goble. Senator, if you are saying, can a country move
along and make compromises and constantly have to adjust
itself, Russia should be capable of doing that. If----
The Chairman. No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying,
as the Federation is presently----
Mr. Goble. I would suggest that--when we say ``as
presently,'' I don't think there's one thing there. There are a
bunch of different arrangements, and this is a country that
Putin is trying to have one arrangement for. The great French
Sovietologist Alain Besancon once said that Russia's tragedy is
that it was three empires, not one, and that it had to govern
them all in the same way. It was an Austro-Hungarian in the
west, it was an overseas empire in central Asia, and it was
like the American empire in the east, in the Aboriginal
populations in Siberia. If you govern them all the same way,
you create one kind of political tension. If you govern them
differently, you create another kind of political tension. But
that does not mean that it is not possible to have a complex
way. I believe that the stronger the regions are, the stronger
Russia can become. Putin, unfortunately, I think, believes the
weaker the regions are is the only way for the future. I think
he's wrong, and I think trying to take power back from the
regions, which he's trying to do, is going to create political
instability. I don't think there is a snapshot. That's what I'm
trying to say.
Dr. Solnick. If I may, I think it's important to remember
that we're 10 years on from independence in Russia. Ten years
on from American independence, if there were to have been a
hearing at the court of the czar, they would have concluded
that the United States was a country unable to collect taxes,
unable to break down interstate trade barriers, clearly pulled
in different directions. The south was under the influence of
the Spanish empire. There were problems with Canada in the
north. The British were making inroads once again. It looked
pretty close to a hopeless situation. The nation reinvented
itself a year later. The nation reinvented itself again under
Jefferson.
So I think it's important to remember, in the scope of
these sort of post-imperial transformations, that it's very,
very early in the Russian case. And the centrifugal forces that
would fragment Russia are really not all that great--again, in
world historical terms. It's a badly governed country, no
doubt. It's a mess, but it's not exactly flying apart at the
seams.
The Chairman. Anyone else?
Dr. Dunlop. Yes, I would add that I consider it unfortunate
that there appears to be a kind of a rollback--we can disagree
to what extent it's happening, but there's definitely a
rollback away from federalism occurring, I think, at this point
under Mr. Putin--and I believe that's unfortunate for Russia,
because a country that size needs decentralization. It
obviously has to be able to collect taxes and do other normal
things that a modern state does. But to have elected Governors,
to take one example is an excellent idea. Many in Putin's
entourage, however, believe that's a bad idea and that they
should have appointed Governors from Moscow. To run that vast
country with bureaucrats appointed in Moscow, in my view, would
be a very negative phenomenon. And therefore, I think that the
tendency, which is in its beginning stages, that we're seeing
now, is an unfortunate one.
Dr. Balzer. I would very much agree with what John Dunlop
just said--what everyone has said--but also add that the
struggling of Federal rights and powers is being discussed and
negotiated right now. We can sympathize with what President
Putin inherited. And there are some really almost ironic
incidents. Recently, the leader of the Republic of Marii-El,
hoping to curry favor with President Putin, unilaterally
rejected his republic's power-sharing treaty with the central
government, along with the heads of three Russian-led regions.
He could see that a new commission was formed to do exactly
what you are calling attention to, to discuss the divisions of
powers. It has just been established in 2001 and has, as one of
its goals, the cancellation of these treaty arrangements. So he
was trying to get a jump on that.
This is a very interesting commission to watch. A lot of
what worked in the past, in the 1990's, was calculated
ambiguity as arrangements were fought out or contended. And now
they're trying to----
The Chairman. Don't use the word ``ambiguity.'' My
colleague doesn't like that word.
Dr. Balzer. Oh, dear.
Well, what I'm actually trying to say is that people were
trying to use it then, but it has come back to haunt them.
They're trying now to be more specific about what those power-
sharing arrangements really will be. So that is a commission to
watch, as is all of the negotiation process going on currently.
It is unwieldy, but it is happening, including some
arrangements, even for changing borders and tax structures.
Some local area arrangements are being negotiated inside
particular regions--Altai Krai with Altai Republic. Well, the
republic just rejected an overture. But in the case of
Buriatia, Buriatia has merged its taxation with its wider
Irkutsk region. This seems to be an agreement that is actually
working on the ground and not started by the center.
The Chairman. We have only scratched the surface here
today. That is why I want to have a series of these hearings. I
am reminded by Dr. Haltzel behind me that in 1997, I was
meeting in Moscow with General Lebed and he was pounding the
table, you know, being very tough. I will never forget what he
said about Chechnya, where he was given credit for ending the
first war, and he said--I am paraphrasing, but it is close to a
quote--he said, ``I don't care if it is independent. It doesn't
matter to me.'' Now, he came out of that Afghanistan
experience. He was a military guy, and I remember being
impressed by what I believed to be the earnestness of his
comment. I left there thinking he really did not care whether
or not Chechnya was independent.
I would also note for the record, as the fellow who has
been held primarily responsible in the Senate for our
involvement in the Balkans, I would point out that 250,000
people were killed in Bosnia, which is 5 percent of the
population. I do not in any way denigrate the point being made
here. I just do not want people leaving here thinking that the
Balkan wars and Milosevic's efforts quote, ``only killed 10,500
people.'' They are responsible for over 300,000 people dead.
That does not in any way undercut the point that Senator Helms
is making about what is going on in Chechnya. Do you have any
comments?
Senator Helms. Yes, you said something about ambiguity.
I don't think Washington could survive without ambiguity.
It is sort of like that old expression, ``When promulgating
your esoteric cogitations or articulating your superficial
sentimentalities, beware of platitudinous,'' et cetera.
Now, having said that----
The Chairman. Well said.
Senator Helms [continuing]. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
calling this hearing. Thank you, gentlemen and lady, for
coming. Now, please--you are going to get questions in writing
from the Senators who were not able to come. I hope you will
answer them, because we are going to make it part of the
record. And I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the
proceedings of this hearing be printed.
The Chairman. Without objection, they will be. And I myself
have additional questions to ask. I really do know that this is
not easy. I mean, you do not come here just off the top of your
head and plop down here--as much as you know about this
subject--and we do appreciate the effort and the commitment,
and I can assure you we will be calling on all of you again.
That is both the good news and the bad news.
Thank you very, very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]