[Senate Hearing 107-36]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-36
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO SERBIA: BENCHMARKS FOR CERTIFICATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-226 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL NELSON, Florida
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Democratic Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Abramowitz, Hon. Morton, I., senior fellow, the Century
Foundation, Washington, DC..................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Bang-Jensen, Nina, executive director, Coalition for
International Justice, Washington, DC.......................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 4
Bugajski, Janusz, director, East European Project, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC............ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio................ 5
Statements Submitted for the Record:
Albanian American Civic League, Ossining, NY, statement
submitted for the record................................... 26
Koszorus, Frank, Jr., president, American Hungarian
Federation of Metropolitian Washington, DC, statement
submitted for the record................................... 27
(iii)
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO SERBIA: BENCHMARKS FOR CERTIFICATION
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THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Smith and Biden.
Also present: Senator Voinovich.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you all to
this very important hearing on U.S. assistance to Serbia. I am
very pleased to be joined by my colleague from Ohio, Senator
Voinovich. He takes a very personal and I think a family
interest in issues related to the former Yugoslavia.
I must apologize at the outset that we are told there are
votes scheduled during the course of the hearing, but I did not
want to postpone this hearing. This is a timely hearing, an
important hearing, and as best we can, Senator Voinovich and I
will make sure we get through this hearing and get our votes in
as well.
October 7, 2000, an historic day for the people of the
former Yugoslavia, was a day that the Serbian people ended a
dark era of tyranny and violence. Slobodan Milosevic was
peacefully deposed as one of Europe's last dictators, and
Vojislav Kostunica emerged as the leader of a democratically
elected FRY Government, a government that has promised sweeping
political and economic reforms.
The United States is committed to supporting these reforms.
Toward that end, Congress appropriated up to $100 million in
development assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
[FRY]. However, recent history in the FRY prompted Congress to
condition much of that assistance on the conduct of the new
government in Belgrade. Specifically, that assistance will
continue to flow to the FRY after March 31 only if our
President certifies that Belgrade is meeting three basic
conditions. They are the following.
First, the Government in Belgrade must be cooperating with
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and that
cooperation is defined as including access for investigators,
provision of documents, and surrender and transfer of indictees
or assistance in their apprehension.
Second, Belgrade must be taking steps that are consistent
with the Dayton Accords that brought peace to Bosnia. Clearly,
Belgrade must end financial, political, security, and other
support to Serbian separatists in Bosnia.
Third, the new Government in Belgrade must be implementing
policies which reflect a respect for minority rights and the
rule of law.
As the March 31 deadline approaches, it is an appropriate
time to assess the FRY's progress in each of these areas. To
assist us in this evaluation, we have with us today three very
distinguished witnesses. Our first witness will be Ambassador
Morton Abramowitz of the Century Foundation. He has served as
U.S. Ambassador to many places, Turkey and Thailand, just to
name a couple. He remains a powerful voice on matters
concerning the Balkans.
Our second witness will be Janusz Bugajski, who directs the
East European Project at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He has written extensively on
developments in Central Europe, particularly the Balkans.
The third member of our panel will be Nina Bang-Jensen,
executive director for the Coalition for International Justice.
The Coalition provides support to the International Court in
the form of technical legal assistance, advocacy, and public
education.
All of our witnesses are well-qualified to address the
subject. I appreciate their willingness to share their views
with us this afternoon.
In the past 5 months, there has indeed been positive change
in the FRY. I welcome the commitment of the new government to
democracy and market reform, as well as establishment of
diplomatic relations with Bosnia. I have been particularly
impressed by its calm and restrained response to the violence
committed by Albanian extremists in the Presevo Valley.
However, I am concerned by other developments in Belgrade.
President Kostunica continues to balk on cooperating with the
court. He recently condemned the War Crimes Tribunal as
illegitimate and politically motivated. Second, Mr. Kostunica
has questioned the legality of the Dayton Accords. He has done
little to reduce political and material support flowing from
the FRY to Serbian separatists in Bosnia.
Third, 5 months after the fall of Mr. Milosevic, hundreds
of ethnic Albanians remain wrongfully imprisoned in Serbian
jails. They were jailed for resisting the repressions of his
regime.
I would like to recognize and honor here today Dr. Flora
Brovina, an Albanian prisoner who was tried in Serbia and
convicted on false charges of terrorism. We welcome you, madam.
Because so many Albanian prisoners were not as fortunate as
Dr. Brovina, and remain in prison, I recently introduced a
resolution calling for their immediate release. In short, it
appears doubtful that today one could certify that Belgrade is
meeting the conditions Congress placed upon assistance to FRY.
These are not symbolic benchmarks. They are steps that must be
taken if the FRY is to successfully complete its transformation
from an unstable and violent kleptocracy into a democratic
State that contributes, rather than undercuts, stability in
southeastern Europe.
It is imperative that the United States hold the FRY firmly
to these standards. Democracy will not prevail in the FRY if it
is unable to acknowledge that accountability for wars and their
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia lies within the Milosevic
regime. Democracy will not flourish in the absence of ethnic
reconciliation, and that reconciliation cannot occur if
Belgrade refuses to release Albanians who have been wrongfully
imprisoned.
The consolidation of stability in the Balkans will be
undermined if it becomes evident that cooperation with the
court and commitment to the Dayton Peace Accords are optional.
Indeed, those in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who are sending
indicted war criminals to The Hague and isolating separatists
in Bosnia and Herzegovina will closely observe the standards
the United States sets for the FRY in these two areas.
Finally, I hope that our European partners will be willing
to stand with us in the effort to ensure that the Government of
the FRY meets these three conditions. If there is a division
between the United States and Europe on this matter, there is
little hope that decisive progress will be made in the FRY.
Moreover, such division would jeopardize support in the United
States to work with our European allies and partners in the
effort to bring enduring peace and stability to the Balkans. We
now recognize Senator Biden, who is the ranking member of the
full committee, and we welcome you, sir.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In the
interest of time, because we are going to have five votes, I am
told, beginning at 2:30, I will ask unanimous consent that my
entire statement be placed in the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Senator Biden. And I would like to associate myself with
the remarks you made. I thought you made a very good opening
statement, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just focus on two things very quickly. One, if we
examine the policy implications and the possible outcomes of
the March 31 deadline, the first seems to me what might be the
political and economic ramifications of that decision I think
we have to examine. The second is, will we lose leverage in the
future with Belgrade if President Bush decides to move ahead
with certification, if it took an especially liberal
interpretation of the compliance for him to do so?
I am very concerned, quite frankly. The Bush administration
is showing signs of caving on certification. My suspicion is
only enhanced by the refusal to send up a witness today, but I
could be wrong about that. I hope I am.
It seems to me we have to stay the course on this matter,
because if we certify Serbia prematurely, without genuine
compliance, I fear we will have cashed in our last and our best
form of leverage, particularly by signing our unconditional
support for to aid Yugoslavia from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. Let us be honest about it; support
from international financial institutions is of greater value
to Belgrade than the approximately $60 million in U.S.
assistance not yet distributed this fiscal year.
In the past few days, there have been news reports that
Belgrade is hoping to win certification at the eleventh hour by
arresting Milosevic. While I would be the first to cheer such a
move, I caution that we must not lose sight of the ultimate
goal of the process. I do not want Mr. Milosevic to become this
century's Al Capone--a ruthless murderer, as you recall, but
was convicted and incarcerated for tax evasion.
I have no objection to the Government in Belgrade arresting
and trying Milosevic for domestic crimes if they are going to
turn him over after that to The Hague, and I have no objection
to having The Hague on the Danube. If that is part of the
problem, I have no objection to The Hague moving to Belgrade to
conduct those war crimes tribunals. That is what I mean by
Hague on the Danube. But I have significant objection if we
fail to try Mr. Milosevic.
We do have three distinguished witnesses, one of whom I
know extremely well, and I rely on him for his advice. The
other two I know of, and have spoken with in the past. I am
anxious to hear what they have to say, and I yield the floor,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important
hearing.
Our goal here today is fairly straightforward. We want to examine
whether or not the new regime in Belgrade is meeting or, at the very
least, attempting to meet the three conditions set forth in Section 594
of the FY2001 Foreign Operations bill.
This legislation lays out conditions that must be fulfilled by the
Government of Yugoslavia in order for U.S. assistance to continue.
These criteria are well known: progress on minority rights and the
rule of law; steps to sever aid and other support for institutions in
the Republika Srpska; and, perhaps the most demanding of the three,
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in The Hague.
Additionally, I hope we can examine the policy implications of two
possible outcomes following the March 31st deadline.
First, what might be the political and economic ramifications if
the President decided not to certify?
Second, would we lose leverage in the future with Belgrade if
President Bush decided to move ahead with certification, especially if
it took an especially liberal interpretation of compliance for him to
do so?
But before we discuss these questions, I think it is worthwhile
briefly to re-examine the rationale behind the certification
legislation.
In truth, Congress was attempting to strike a fairly delicate
balance. On the one hand, we wanted to give Kostunica and his allies
the chance to gain their political sea legs and to consolidate their
hold on power, which they did by winning the December 2000
parliamentary elections and by weathering a severe winter energy
crisis--with the help of emergency U.S. assistance, I might add.
On the other hand, we did not want to fall prey to the kind of
uncritical ``Yugophoria''--to borrow a phrase from former Senator
Dole--that gripped some of our European allies in the heady weeks
following Milosevic's ouster.
While we all agree that Yugoslavia has made monumental strides in
the past year, these accomplishments cannot erase the terrible crimes
committed by Slobodan Milosevic's brutal regime. As Nuremberg taught
us, accountability is the quickest way to salve the psychic wounds left
by war crimes and allow a society to move forward.
Sooner or later, Serbia must come to terms with its role in the
tragic events that took place in Bosnia and Kosovo during the past
decade. The new regime in Belgrade needs to understand that the United
States will stand firm on this issue, even if it must stand alone.
Furthermore, Congress wanted to avoid creating a regional double
standard whereby we hold Croatia, whose government is making courageous
efforts to comply with The Hague, to a more stringent set of criteria
then we do Serbia.
We did not want to create a new policy based on the flawed logic of
``Serb exceptionalism.''
To be perfectly honest, I do not see how at this moment President
Bush could possibly certify Serbia. With a little more than two weeks
remaining before the March 31st deadline, the only progress Belgrade
can point to is this week's voluntary surrender of Bosnian Serb
indictee Blagoje Simiy.
He is one of at least fifteen individuals indicted for alleged war
crimes currently believed to be hiding out in Serbia. This was a
positive step, no doubt, but a relatively small one.
I am equally concerned that the Bush Administration is showing
signs of caving in on certification--a suspicion that is only enhanced,
I must say, by the conspicuous absence of any administration witnesses
at this hearing.
We need to stay the course on this matter, because, if we certify
Serbia prematurely and without genuine compliance, I fear we will have
cashed in our last and best form of leverage, particularly by signaling
our unconditional support for aid to Yugoslavia from the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund.
Let's be honest--support of the international financial
institutions is of much greater value to Belgrade than the
approximately sixty million dollars in U.S. assistance not yet
disbursed this fiscal year.
In the past few days, there have been news reports that Belgrade is
hoping to win certification at the eleventh hour by arresting
Milosevic. While I would be the first to cheer such a move, I would
caution that we must not lose sight of our ultimate goal in this
process.
I do not want Mr. Milosevic to become this century's Al Capone--a
ruthless murderer who, you'll recall, was convicted and incarcerated on
the far lesser crime of tax evasion.
I would have no objection to the Yugoslav Government's trying Mr.
Milosevic for domestic crimes, but only if Belgrade clearly stipulated
that his extradition to The Hague to face war crimes charges would
follow.
I look forward to hearing the viewpoints of our distinguished
witnesses. I thank each of you for taking time out of your busy
schedule to testify before this committee.
Nina Bang-Jensen is the highly regarded Executive Director of the
Coalition for International Justice.
Janusz Bugajski a prominent expert on the Balkans, joins us from
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he heads the
Center's East European Project.
And, of course, we are fortunate once again to have with us
Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, one of America's most distinguished
diplomats and a person with an unsurpassed knowledge of the region.
From my conversations with Mort, I believe that he has a keen sense of
the policy direction toward which this country ought to be moving.
Mr. Chairman, I will stop here. I would like to thank you again for
calling this hearing.
Senator Smith. Thank you, and I share your concern about
the State Department's response in not sending a witness or the
memo that they have sent so that we could examine it.
Senator Voinovich, do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Just a brief response. First of all, I
want to thank you very, very much for giving me the opportunity
to sit in on this meeting of your Subcommittee on European
Affairs. I think you know that during the last 2 years I have
been very active on issues affecting Southeast Europe. I have
traveled to the region five times, and I have met with leaders
of every country in the Balkans, as well as representatives
here in the United States.
Most recently, over the New Year's holiday, I traveled to
the Balkans with Senator Specter to visit with the new leaders
in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. My goal has
been to work toward democratization in the FRY, to emphasize
the importance of human rights, the rule of law, and a market
economy. I have also encouraged the United States and our
allies to remain committed to the implementation of the
stability pact and to stay involved in the region.
Earlier this morning, I spoke with President Kostunica and
reiterated the importance of arresting Milosevic before March
31 and cooperating with The Hague. I encouraged him to grant a
Presidential pardon to the 143-member Djakovica group, ethnic
Albanians held in Serb prisons on charges of terrorism, and I
told him it was important that he take steps before the March
31 deadline to demonstrate his commitment to making real
progress on the three conditions for certification.
President Kostunica said he was doing his best to work
through the three conditions outlined in the FY2001 Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill. After talking to Ambassador
Montgomery, I know that President Kostunica has made progress,
particularly on dealing with the Dayton situation and taking
steps to release the Albanians that are in jail.
President Kostunica also indicated that his country's high
unemployment rate, failing economy and so on, make it pretty
difficult for him. He is not having an easy time of it. The
violence in the Presevo Valley has put a lot of political
pressure on him, and he has had to exercise a great deal of
restraint there. I understand from talking to the Ambassador
this morning that President Kostunica and his government are
cooperating with Covic and so forth in southern Serbia.
And last but not least, the FRY government has present and
serious challenges with President Djukanovic talking about
independence. I think President Kostunica gets the message, and
I will be interested in hearing from the witnesses here today
on their observations of what they think is happening there.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Let us hear first from Ambassador
Abramowitz, then Mr. Bugajski, and Ms. Bang-Jensen. We thank
you, and we welcome you, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ, SENIOR FELLOW, THE
CENTURY FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Abramowitz. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator
Voinovich, I gather we are going to be constrained in time, so
I will dispense with much of my testimony. Much of what you
gentlemen have already said is very similar to my own thinking,
so let me highlight some of the things I want to say.
First of all, on this certification I think it is important
to make no mistake, this is an enormously important decision.
It will affect all the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and
the ultimate success of our efforts, and it comes at an
extraordinary juncture in the Balkans.
First, the change in Serbia, remarkable, has been welcomed
by the world. Obviously, we all feel that a Serbia increasingly
democratic and free of the virulent nationalist aspirations of
the last decade is indispensable for Balkan stability, but
democracy in Serbia is far from assured, and the United States
must stand with those forces in Belgrade battling for real,
systemic reform, and facing up to Serbia's role over the past
decade.
It is not encouraging that so few of Serbia's leaders,
including President Kostunica, have expressed even the
slightest remorse for Serbia's contribution to ethnic cleansing
and all the death and destruction of the Milosevic era.
Second, the situation in Kosovo is deteriorating because of
the delay in establishing a Kosovo-run Government. The West has
helped undermine moderate elements and encouraged militants
there by the unconditional embrace of the Nationalist Democrats
in Belgrade, raising for Kosovars the possibility of the return
of Serbian rule to Kosovo.
Extremist Albanian activities in southern Serbia are, I
believe, in part directly related to the fact that the area in
Kosovo north of Mitrovica has been allowed by the West to
effectively separate from Kosovo, which has supported Belgrade.
Such militant Albanian activities, including those in
Macedonia, I might add, are destroying international support
for the Kosovars.
Third, and most important for the United States, NATO faces
a serious dilemma in helping stop the violence in south Serbia
and increasingly in Macedonia. The alliance once again confined
its viability, threatened by a failure to staunch an emerging
Balkan conflict with significant spill-over capacity. NATO's
recent pledge not to station peacekeeping forces in Macedonia
could become an invitation to Albanian militants.
Finally, the Dayton Accords on Bosnia are presently under
strain from extremist Bosnian Croats, and radicals and
moderates there will watch how the West responds to Serbia's
handling of Milosevic and its relationship with the Republic of
Srpska, and the three conditions, I think the case is open and
shut. Unless major steps are taken in the next 15 days,
Belgrade is nowhere near on the way to meeting any of the
conditions for certification.
Let me go briefly, on cooperation with the international
criminal tribunal, Belgrade has yet to detain and transfer a
single indictee to The Hague, and President Kostunica's hostile
public statements have left no doubt about his attitude toward
cooperation with The Hague in general, and the effort to have
Milosevic face charges in The Hague in particular.
Early this week, one indictee did go to The Hague under
American importunings, a Bosnian Serb of dual nationality, and
Mr. Kostunica's Government was eager to emphasize his surrender
was voluntary and entailed no change in policy. I think we
should take them at their word.
Ending support for separate Republic of Srpska's
institutions. Belgrade's policy of supporting the extremist
party in Srpska has not altered since the opposition took over.
President Kostunica instead effectively campaigned for them
during Bosnian elections last fall, and he has publicly praised
Radovan Karadzic as a national hero. He has left in place the
shadow infrastructure of financial military support that
sustains the Republic of Srpska army and counterintelligence
services and destabilizes Bosnia.
Let me add a personal aside on a matter of great interest
to me. I am simply amazed that the U.S. Government sees fit to
publicly critique some electoral rules of a potential
Montenegro referendum designed to permit the people of
Montenegro to vote on whether or not to separate from Serbia,
but is completely timorous on getting Serbia to refrain from
its separatist activities in Bosnia. The message seems to be,
beware of being a small, friendly country that acted as a key
NATO wartime ally and cooperates with The Hague tribunal.
Now, respecting minority rights and the rule of law,
President Kostunica came to office on the shoulders of
thousands of Serbs demanding that the rule of law govern their
elections and their lives. Progress has been made in
eliminating many of the oppressive aspects of the Milosevic
regime. Yet many of Milosevic's cronies still hold positions of
great influence. Police and military officers who led
Milosevic's assaults are still in office, or have gained
greater power.
Minorities are still under discriminatory law, and on the
subject you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Belgrade announced plans,
as you know, to release the Kosovar Albanians in jail for
almost 2 years on unsubstantiated charges of terrorism, but in
reality the new amnesty law would leave three-fourths of them
behind bars.
Now, let me discuss the case that will be made that there
are overriding reasons to certify Serbia's progress, however
tenuous, toward satisfying the congressional conditions, and I
agree with both of you, Senators, that I think the State
Department is determined, or the administration is determined
to make a certification whatever the circumstances.
In any event, the reasons for a wider look at this are an
important matter. First, let me make clear what I think the
administration is doing on this issue. Like many previous
administrations, they are following policies that do not fit
the facts on the ground, and that usually gets the United
States into trouble.
The previous administration was correctly criticized for
basing its policy toward Russia on certifications that were
more fantasy than fact. Now this administration seems to be
directing the State Department to follow that same road. In
this case, because of your interest, and your attention to the
facts, they feel the need to find or produce some signs of
progress to provide some ostensible basis for certifying
compliance, thus, according to the New York Times, our envoy in
Belgrade has been working out with the Belgrade Government the
steps it should take or announce to show some progress on the
three conditions, and some cover for certification.
For example, as you pointed out, Senator Biden, the
administration has reportedly asked the Yugoslav Government to
arrest Milosevic, something they had been planning to do, I
believe, anyway, and that is good, but for charges other than
war crimes, and without any commitment to send him to The
Hague, and as far as Belgrade's support for the Bosnian Serb
army, effectively paid for with millions of outside aid
dollars, moneys fungible here, the State Department apparently
insists not that Belgrade stop, but that its activities become
transparent. I am not sure what that does to support the Dayton
Accords. Maybe Yugoslav Army officers will now wear their FRY
uniforms all the time instead of part-time.
So let me now deal with the serious considerations for
keeping the flow of support to Yugoslav going, and not the
pattern of compliance that we are asking of an unwilling
government. Now, some have suggested that these three
conditions are evidence of anti-Serb bias, pure and simple. I
reject that completely. It is not anti-Serb to say that the new
government in Belgrade is only at the beginning of the road, a
long road. It is not anti-Serb to say, quite simply, that
extreme nationalism has no place in 21st century Europe, and it
is profoundly in the interests of the people of Serbia. Serbs
and all Serbian minorities have heard too many false promises
for too long to give them a straightforward map back to full
membership in the international community.
Second is your question, Mr. Biden. The United States has
no real leverage. It is certainly true that our $100 million,
$60 million now, or $40 million now in direct aid is only a
small part, but a large chunk of the aid which is actually
already dispersed. It is only a small part of the assistance
Serbia is receiving, or needs to receive, and it is regrettably
true that Serbia maybe benefactor, the European Union, has
opted out of conditionality altogether.
Until now, most of Europe seems to go along with anything
Mr. Kostunica does. That has been unfortunate, because in the
long run there is no question that Europe will have to play the
leading role in the reintegration of Belgrade and the entire
region into the world economy, and they can best serve that
goal by making clear to the government in Belgrade what
international norms are, and that the EU takes them seriously.
Now, it is true that leverage we have will diminish with
time, and we will likely lose it all once Serbia is certified,
and that is despite various elements in the State Department.
We will lose it. Where our voice can make a crucial difference
is in discussing Belgrade's membership in and assistance from
the national financial organizations and in rescheduling the
large external debt.
Economic revival will not get anywhere without debt
restructuring and significant assistance from the World Bank,
and the administration should be focusing in getting the
political and economic conditions right for those efforts and
you, gentlemen, I hope will make sure that it happens.
Third and most important is the argument that existing on
these conditions will prompt a back-lash in Belgrade, that they
will weaken the new government, fuel extreme nationalism, and
discredit the goals we seek to advance, and that is a serious
concern. While it is unlikely, I certainly cannot rule it out.
I think, however, that certifying now has likely produced far
greater political damage. It lends more support to nationalist
forces, indicates that Serbia does not have to change much to
get the West to open its pockets.
Moreover, all the evidence suggests that, since Congress
put these conditions into law last year, they have, in fact,
promoted debate, and have promoted increasing openness in
Belgrade, and the democratization of Croatia, one of the real
positive lessons from the experience of the international
community in the Balkans, reinforces the conclusion that this
kind of leverage does promote serious change. In that country,
the U.S.-led full performance based conditionality on
cooperation with the tribunal, including the transfer to The
Hague of all Croatian and Bosnian-Croat indictees and the
cutoff of Zagreb's military and economic support for Bosnia
were pivotal to breaking down the old structures and declaring
the way for reform. I might add, uncharitably, that the U.S.
Government initially did not support any such effort.
Now, let me point out the negative consequences if the
administration certifies progress that does not, in fact,
exist. The costs will be severe, particularly for the position
of reformers in Belgrade, as well as for the position of the
reform options in the region. It is now recognized that NATO's
failure to apprehend the most wanted war criminals in Bosnia
after Dayton was signed has probably been the single biggest
blow to the peace process in that country. Instead of sending a
message about responsibility, we gave encouragement to
extremists on all sides, and helped continue the mafias and the
construction to flourish, and letting up on pressure to send
Milosevic and his cronies to The Hague will produce a similar
effect, not just on Serbia, but throughout the region.
In Croatia, President Mesic has resolutely supported these
three conditions, and his has been a brave and principled voice
in trying to overcome the poisoned legacy of the past. We
cannot simply say that is acceptable for Belgrade to do less.
We will be sending also the wrong signals to the Kosovars who
urgently need to back away from their own extremists, and we
will send a wrong signal to Macedonia, which is now struggling
in a very difficult situation.
The nationalists in Belgrade will continue to help fuel
extremism across the region, and that is harmful, and this is
not an effort to deny aid to Serbia. No one questions the need
and the help they require in establishing a democracy and
rebuilding the society and the role that the United States can
play, but I hope you will stand firm, and you will hold the
administration's feet to the fire as best you can, in saying
that the extremism and the hate that we helped defeat on the
battlefield not be allowed to triumph through our neglect.
There is always reasons to postpone hard-making decisions, but
this is a time to make our standards clear, and I urge you to
stay involved and to keep asking the hard questions.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. That we will do.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abramowitz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
Congress has mandated, in the 2001 Foreign Operations Assistance
Act, that the President certify by March 31 whether or not the
government of President Kostunica in Belgrade has met three conditions
for further American aid and other forms of support. Thank you for
inviting me here to discuss the choice that the Bush Administration
must shortly make. I will be brief and as pointed as possible.
Make no mistake. This is an enormously important decision. It will
affect all the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the success of
American and allied efforts there. Congress has a great responsibility
on this critical issue and I know will look at it with the candor and
thoroughness it deserves.
This decision comes at an extraordinary juncture in the Balkans:
The remarkable change in Serbia since last fall has been
welcomed by the world. A Serbia increasingly democratic and
free of the virulent nationalist aspirations of the last decade
is indispensable for Balkan stability. But democracy in
Belgrade is far from assured--and the US must stand with those
forces in Belgrade battling for real systemic reform and facing
up to Serbia's role over the past decade. It is not encouraging
that so few of the country's leaders, including its President,
have expressed even the slightest remorse for Serbia's
contribution to ethnic cleansing and all the death and
destruction of the Milosevic era.
The situation in Kosovo is deteriorating because of the
delay in establishing a Kosovo-run government. The west has
further helped undermine moderate elements and encouraged
militants there by their unconditional embrace of the
nationalist democrats in Belgrade, raising for Kosovars the
possibility of the return of Serbian rule to Kosovo. Extremist
Albanian activities in Southern Serbia are, I believe, in part
directly related to the fact that the area in Kosovo north of
Mitrovica has been allowed by the west to effectively separate
from Kosovo with the support of Belgrade. Such militant
activities including those in Macedonia, I might add, are
destroying international support for the Kosovars.
NATO faces a serious dilemma in helping stop the violence in
south Serbia and increasingly in Macedonia. The alliance, once
again, can find its viability threatened by a failure to
staunch an emerging Balkan conflict with significant spillover
capacity. NATO's recent pledge not to station peacekeeping
forces in Macedonia could become an invitation to Albanian
militants.
The Dayton accords in Bosnia are presently under strain from
extremist Bosnian Croats. Radicals and moderates alike there
will watch too how the West responds to Serbia's handling of
Milosevic and its relations with Republika Srpska.
On the three conditions Congress has placed on assistance to
Serbia, I think the case is open and shut unless major steps are taken
in the next 15 days Belgrade is nowhere near or on the way to meeting
any of the conditions for certification. When the condition is
progress, incessant talk and promises do not fit the bill. Briefly:
1. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: Belgrade has yet to detain and transfer
a single indictee to the Hague Tribunal. It has plagued the
work of the Tribunal's Belgrade office with bureaucratic
obstacles. And President Kostunica's hostile public statements
have left no doubt about his attitude toward cooperation with
the Tribunal in general, and the effort to have Milosevic face
charges in the Hague in particular. Earlier this week, one
indictee did go to the Hague--a Bosnian Serb of dual
nationality--and Mr. Kostinica's government was eager to
emphasize that his surrender was ``voluntary'' and entailed no
change in policy. I think we should take them at their word.
2. Ending support for separate Republika Srpska institutions:
Belgrade's policy of supporting the extremist party in
Republika Srpska has not altered since the opposition took
power. President Kostunica instead effectively campaigned for
them during Bosnian elections last fall and has publicly
praised Radovan Karadzic as a ``national hero.'' He has left in
place the shadowy infrastructure of financial and military
support that sustains the Republika Srpska Army and
counterintelligence services--and destabilizes Bosnia. Let me
add a personal aside: I am simply amazed that our government
sees fit to publicly critique some electoral rules of a
potential Montengro referendum designed to permit the people of
Montengro to vote on whether or not to separate from Serbia,
but is so timorous on getting Serbia to refrain from its
separatist activities in Bosnia. The message seems to be beware
being a small friendly country that acted as a key NATO wartime
ally and cooperates with the Hague Tribunal.
3. Respecting minority rights and the rule of law: President
Kostunica came to office on the shoulders of thousands of Serbs
demanding that the rule of law govern their elections and their
lives. And progress has been made in eliminating oppressive
aspects of the Milosevic regime. Yet many of Milosevic's
cronies still hold positions of great influence. Police and
military officers who led Milosevic's most murderous assaults
are still in office--or have gained greater power. Minorities
are still under discriminatory laws. Belgrade announced plans
to release the Kosovar Albanians held in its jails for almost
two years on unsubstantiated charges of terrorism. But in
reality, the new amnesty law will leave three-fourths of them
behind bars. And the work of building strong, legitimate
judicial and economic institutions has hardly begun.
Let me now discuss the case that will be made that there are over-
riding policy reasons to certify Serbia's progress--however tenuous--
toward satisfying the Congressional conditions. That is an important
matter, and I would like to devote the rest of my time to it.
First it needs to be made clear what the administration is doing on
this issue. Like many previous administrations they are following
policies that do not fit the facts on the ground. That usually gets the
U.S. into trouble. The previous administration was correctly criticized
for basing its policy toward Russia on certifications that were more
fantasy than fact. Now this administration seems to be directing the
State Department to follow that same road. In this case because of
Congressional attention to the facts, they feel the need to find or
produce some signs of progress to provide some ostensible basis for
certifying compliance.
Thus, according to the New York Times, our envoy in Belgrade has
been working out with the Belgrade government the steps it should take
or announce to show progress on the three conditions and some cover for
certification. For example, the Administration has reportedly asked the
FRY government to arrest Milosevic, something they have been planning
to do anyway--but for charges other than war crimes and without any
commitment to send him to the Hague. As far as Belgrade's support for
the Bosnian Serb army, effectively paid for with millions of outside
aid dollars, the State Department apparently insists not that Belgrade
stop but that its activities be ``transparent.'' I am not sure what
that does to support the Dayton accords. Maybe FRY officers will now
wear their FRY army uniforms all the time instead of part time. Let me
deal with the serious considerations for keeping the flow of support to
Yugoslavia going and not the patina of compliance we have asked for
from an unwilling government.
Some have suggested that the three conditions are evidence of anti-
Serb bias, pure and simple. I reject that completely. It is not anti-
Serb to say that the new government in Belgrade is only at the
beginning of a long road. It is not anti-Serb to say quite simply that
extreme nationalism has no place in 21st-century Europe. And it is
profoundly in the interest of the people of Serbia--Serbs and all
minorities--who have heard too many false promises for too long, to
offer a straightforward roadmap back to full membership in the
international community.
Second is the assertion that the United States has no real
leverage. It is certainly true that our hundred million dollars in
direct aid is only a small part--but a large chunk of the aid already
actually disbursed--of the assistance Serbia is receiving or needs to
receive. And it is regrettably true that Serbia's main benefactor, the
European Union, has opted out of conditionality all together. Until now
most of Europe seems prepared to go along with anything Mr. Kostunica
does. That has been unfortunate, because in the long run, there is no
question that Europe will have to play the leading role in the
reintegration of Belgrade and the entire region into the world economy.
Today, they could best serve that goal by making it clear to Belgrade
what international norms are--and that they take them seriously.
It is also true that what leverage we do have will diminish with
time. We will likely lose it altogether once Serbia's progress is
certified. Where our voice can make a crucial difference is in
discussing Belgrade's membership in and assistance from the
international financial organizations--and in rescheduling Belgrade's
large external debt. That debt now equals the country's GDP, crippling
any effort to restore infrastructure and social services in Serbia.
Economic revival will get nowhere without debt restructuring and
significant assistance from the World Bank. The Administration should
be focusing on getting the political and economic conditions right for
those efforts--and Congress should be there to make sure that it
happens.
Third and most important is the argument that insisting on these
conditions will prompt a backlash in Belgrade; that they will weaken
the new government, fuel extreme nationalism, and discredit the goals
we seek to advance. This is a serious concern. While not likely I
cannot rule it out. I think, however, that certifying now is likely to
produce far greater political damage. It lends more support to
nationalist forces and indicates that Serbia does not have to change
much to get the West to open its pockets. Moreover, all the evidence
suggests that since Congress put these conditions into law last year,
they have in fact promoted debate and increasing openness in Belgrade.
And the democratization of Croatia--one of the real positive lessons
from the experience of the international community in the Balkans--
reinforces the conclusion that this kind of leverage will help promote
positive change. There, the U.S. led full performance-based
conditionality on cooperation with the Hague tribunal, including the
transfer to the tribunal of all Coatians and Bosnian Croat indictees
and the cut-off of Zagreb's military, economic and political support to
Herceg Bosnia, were pivotal to breaking down the old structures and
clearing the way for reform. I might add uncharitably that the USG
initially did not support such an effort.
Lastly, let me point out that there will be negative consequences
if the Administration certifies progress that does not in fact exist.
The costs will be severe not only for the position of reformers in
Belgrade, but also for the prestige of the reform option in the region
and ultimately for regional stability.
It is now broadly recognized that NATO's failure to apprehend the
most-wanted war criminals in Bosnia quickly after Dayton has been
probably the biggest single blow to the peace process there. Instead of
sending a message about responsibility, we instead gave encouragement
to extremists on all sides and helped the mafias and corruption to
continue to flourish.
Letting up on pressure to send Milosevic and his cronies to the
Hague will produce a similar effect not just in Serbia but throughout
the region. In Croatia the outspoken President, Stipe Mesic, has
resolutely supported just these conditions--cooperation with the
Tribunal, breaking ties with Croat extremists in Bosnia, and increasing
respect for minority rights in Croatia itself. His has been a brave and
principled voice in trying to overcome the poisoned legacy of the past.
We cannot simply say that it is acceptable for Belgrade to do much
less. We will be sending the wrong signal to the Kosovars, who urgently
need to back away from their own extremists. We will send the wrong
signal also to Macedonia, as it struggles to succeed as a multi-ethnic
state. Nationalism in Belgrade will continue to help fuel extremism
across the region--and that will be harmful to the region's interests
and to our own.
This is not an effort to deny aid to Serbia. No one questions that
Serbia badly needs outside help in establishing democracy and
rebuilding its society--and no one questions that the United States
ought to play an important part in assisting that country. But I hope
Congress will stand firm in saying that the extremism and hate that we
helped defeat on the battlefield must not now be allowed to triumph
through our neglect, or our unwillingness to confront facts we do not
like.
There will always be reasons to postpone making hard judgments. But
there will not come a better time than this to make our standards
clear, and express our determination to see a democratic Serbia emerge
as the anchor of a stable region. To seize that opportunity, this
discussion must be a first step, not a last step. I urge Congress to
stay involved; to keep asking the hard questions about whether U.S.
policy is truly furthering the cause of peace and justice in the
Balkans; to keep insisting on the three conditions being met before aid
is provided, and to send the strong message that we will do our best
not to allow the region to slide back into the habits of violence and
extremism.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Mr. Bugajski.
STATEMENT OF MR. JANUSZ BUGAJSKI, DIRECTOR, EAST EUROPEAN
PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bugajski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Biden, Senator Voinovich. To save on time I will simply sum up
my paper, which is not that long to begin with, but I will try
and make it even briefer.
In sum, while the Government in Belgrade has made some
progress domestically in the human rights front in promoting
pluralism and so forth, in the three crucial areas specified by
the U.S. Senate, they are clearly falling short of the targets.
Let me just summarize the three.
First of all, in terms of cooperating with the
International War Crimes Tribunal, despite persistent urging by
the IWCT to begin proceedings for extraditing Slobodan
Milosevic and other high-ranking Serbian war criminals to The
Hague, the Government in Belgrade has failed to meet
international requirements.
Indeed, Serbia remains the only country in the world with
an indicted war criminal serving as its President. Instead of
reaching out to the international community and its neighbors
by promoting justice and disassociating itself actively from
the Milosevic regime, Belgrade has instead reached out
primarily for foreign funds. This has left a network of
civilian and military war criminals at liberty and in business
inside Serbia.
Second, abiding by the Dayton Accords to end support for
Serbian separatists. Kostunica has cast doubts on his support
for the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina by claiming that the
Dayton agreement was never ratified by the Yugoslav Parliament.
Moreover, he maintains close ties with the leadership of the
Republica Srpska in Bosnia, and little has been done to reduce
political, military, intelligence and materiels support for
separatist groupings.
Serbia continues to provide the Bosnian Serb military with
officers and resources, and it controls the entity's
intelligence structures. The recent agreement on special
relations between Yugoslavia and the Bosnian-Serb Republic must
be carefully monitored, as it appears reminiscent of a similar
concord between Tudjman's Croatia and the Croat Muslim
Federation designed to break up the central state.
And third, in terms of implementing policies in respect to
human rights and the rule of law, although Serbia has made some
progress in lifting the most repressive features of the
Milosevic regime, the law remains obstructed. Substantial
segments of the socialist apparatus remain intact, reinforcing
the supposition that this was not a revolution but a secret
deal enabling the socialists, the former war criminals, to
preserve their positions and privilege even after Milosevic's
ouster.
The country's economy is subject to organized crime and
corruption, while the lack of transparent government
institutions is evident in many situations, including the
unreformed judicial system.
A number of Serbian security officers continue to operate,
the ones responsible for some of the worst atrocities during
the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. Belgrade has
insufficiently addressed the position of ethnic minorities.
Serbia's numerous minorities were constantly under threat
during the past decade, and their demands and aspirations
continue to be neglected. Belgrade's opposition to restoring an
autonomous status for Vojvodina has escalated tensions with the
new democratically elected authorities in that province, and
moreover, Belgrade's tolerance of indicted war criminals and
Serbian paramilitary leaders responsible for war crimes
encourages lawlessness and criminality inside Serbia.
Very briefly, there are four minimal steps that that Serbia
has to meet in order to meet the conditions specified by the
Senate. First, it must promptly begin the process of
extraditing Milosevic and other indicted war criminals to The
Hague, and establish full informational and logistical
cooperation with The Hague. Belgrade must also publicly
acknowledge the responsibility of the Milosevic Government in
perpetrating genocide in the former Yugoslav Republics.
Second, Serbia must cutoff all state funding to the Bosnian
Serb military forces, police units, separatist political
parties, and other institutions promoting the disintegration of
Bosnia. Belgrade should focus on developing strong bilateral
relations with Sarajevo, and not primarily with one of the
Bosnian entities.
Third, Serbia needs to remove from office a number of
military officers and security chiefs instrumental in
repression over the past decade. Additionally, I believe it
must offer the Presevo Albanian leaders a position in the
central government to diffuse the ongoing conflict, and then
pursue administrative decentralization throughout Serbia that
would restore autonomy to Vojvodina.
Fourth, in terms of the future of Yugoslavia, Serbia must
not interfere in or seek to disrupt the upcoming Montenegran
parliamentary elections, and the subsequent referendum of
independence. Belgrade must respect the will and decision of
the Montenegran people, and aim to build cooperative bilateral
relations between the two emerging states. I think here
Washington can also play a very constructive role in this
process.
Last, very briefly, let me just say why it is important to
keep these conditions. First, democratic development, second,
regional security, third, international law. First, Serbia's
lack of full compliance with U.S. conditions undermines
democratic developments inside the country and encourage
nationalist forces emboldened by a lack of accountability and a
permissive international climate. Belgrade must be actively
encouraged to pursue more extensive structural reforms to root
out criminality and foster bilateral cooperation with all of
its neighbors.
Second, regional security. Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo are
dismayed that after 10 years of aggression Serbia is not being
held accountable for offenses against its neighbors, and has
failed to acknowledge its responsibility. This, in turn,
encourages revanchist and extremist sentiments in all these
three territories, and boosts populist and nationalist
formations waiting in the political wings. Belgrade's lack of
acknowledgement for the mass murder of Kosovar Albanians
prevents any hopes of inter-ethnic reconciliation and
encourages calls for revenge attacks by Albanian militants.
And last, international law. The allies must curtail the
widespread impression that double standards prevail on the war
crimes issue, one for Serbia, and one for the other former
Yugoslav republics. Responses to war crimes must not become an
issue of political expediency, but a measure of justice,
morality, and Western values.
Contradictory policies on war crimes send precisely the
wrong message to Serbia. Belgrade has concluded, quite frankly,
that their threat of domestic instability, whether real or
imaginary, can extract concessions in foreign aid with a brazen
disregard for international norms. In practice, I believe
flexible standards on war crimes will corrode the legitimacy of
the international court, as well as the consolidation of
democratic government and rule of law throughout the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bugajski follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANUSZ BUGAJSKI
In sum, while the two governments in Belgrade (a Yugoslav
administration led by Vojistav Kostunica and a Serbian administration
led by Zoran Djindjic) have made significant progress domestically in
removing the most blatant human rights abuses, in three crucial areas
specified by the U.S. Senate they have fallen short of meeting targets
that are important for consolidating an indigenous democracy and
promoting regional security.
has the serbian government met u.s. senate conditions for funding?
Cooperating with International War Crimes Tribunal: Despite
persistent urging by the IWCT (International War Crimes Tribunal) to
begin proceedings for extraditing Slobodan Milosevic and other indicted
high-ranking Serbian war criminals to The Hague, the governments in
Belgrade have failed to meet international norms.
President Kostunica, much like his predecessor, continues to claim
that the international court is an anti-Serb body despite the fact that
IWCT recently sentenced Croatian generals for their role in war crimes
against Muslim civilians in Bosnia. Kostunica also claims that
Yugoslavia has no extradition agreements with foreign countries, a
proposition contradicted by the government in Montenegro which points
out that The Hague is not a foreign state but an international legal
instrument. Indeed, the glaring difference between Serbia's obstruction
and Montenegro's cooperation with the IWCT was underscored by the UN's
chief war crimes prosecutor Carla del Ponte after her recent visits to
both capitals.
Serbia remains the only country in the world with an indicted war
criminal serving as its President, Milan Milutinovic, a close
accomplice of Milosevic. Instead of reaching out to the international
community and to its neighbors by promoting justice and disassociating
itself actively from the Milosevic regime, Belgrade has instead reached
out primarily for foreign funds. This has left a network of civilian
and military war criminals at liberty and in business in Serbia. The
impending trial of Milosevic on corruption charges inside Serbia does
not constitute cooperation with the IWCT. On the contrary, it may
hinder the process of international justice and worsen relations
between Belgrade and its neighbors. Moreover, Belgrade's assertion that
NATO leaders should be tried concurrently on alleged war crimes charges
does not foster international cooperation.
Abiding by Dayton accords to end support for Serbian separatists in
Bosnia? Kostunica has cast doubts on his support for the integrity of
Bosnia by claiming that the Dayton agreement was never ratified by the
Yugoslav parliament. Moreover, he maintains close ties with the
leadership of the Serb Republic in Bosnia and little has been done to
reduce political, military, intelligence and material support to
separatist groupings. Serbia continues to provide the Bosnian Serb
military with officers and resources and controls the entity's
intelligence structures.
The recent agreement on ``special relations'' signed between
Yugoslavia and Bosnias Serb Republic must be carefully monitored as it
appears reminiscent of a similar concord between Tudjman's Croatia and
the Croat-Muslim Federation designed to break up the central state.
Belgrade has also refused to cooperate in extraditing Bosnian Serb war
criminals known to be residing in Serbia. For example, General Ratko
Mladic conveniently disappeared from his home in Belgrade recently when
the IWCT requested that as a sign of good will non-Yugoslav citizens
indicted for war crimes be dispatched to The Hague. Former Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic has also reportedly traveled to Serbia
unhindered in recent months.
Additionally, there is a palpable fear that in the event of
Montenegro declaring its independence, Belgrade will seek a new federal
``partner'' to maintain a Yugoslav state. In such an eventuality,
Bosnia's Serb Republic could become a primary candidate. Such a move
would further undermine regional stability and encourage Croatian
separatists in western Hercegovina who, contrary to the position of the
Croatian government, are pushing for the breakup of the Bosnian
Federation.
Implementing policies in respect of human rights and the rule of
law? Although Serbia has made visible progress in lifting the most
repressive features of the Milosevic regime, the institutionalization
of the rule of law remains obstructed. Substantial segments of the
Socialist kleptocracy remain intact, reinforcing the supposition that
DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) made a ``secret deal'' with the
entrenched establishment enabling it to preserve its positions and
privileges even after Milosevic's ouster. The country's economy is
subject to organized crime and corruption while the lack of democratic
and transparent government institutions is evident in the unreformed
judicial system and in recent appointments to Serbia's security
services. These include several officials who served under Milosevic
throughout the Balkan wars. Numerous military and police commanders who
engaged in brutal attacks on the Kosovar population remain in office.
Belgrade has insufficiently addressed the position of ethnic
minorities. Serbia's numerous and sizeable ethnic minorities were
constantly under threat during the past decade and their demands and
aspirations continue to be neglected. The application of laws
established under the Milosevic dictatorship have prolonged tensions
with several minority populations. The partial amnesty law passed in
February left several hundred Albanians in prison on terrorism charges
despite the lack of credible evidence. Belgrade's opposition to
restoring an autonomous status for Vojvodina has escalated tensions
with the new democratically elected authorities in that province.
Moreover, Belgrade's evident tolerance of indicted war criminals and
Serbian paramilitary leaders responsible for war crimes in Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosova encourages lawlessness and criminality inside Serbia
and maintains a persistent fear of repression against minority groups.
what does serbia need to do to meet congressional conditions?
In order to meet the conditions established by the U.S. Senate,
Belgrade must initiate three minimal steps.
First, Serbia must promptly begin the process of extraditing
Slobodan Milosevic and other senior indicted war criminals to
the Hague Tribunal and establish full informational and
logistical cooperation with IWCT officials in this matter.
Belgrade must also publicly acknowledge the responsibility of
the Milosevic government in perpetrating genocide in the former
Yugoslav republics.
Second, Serbia must cut off all state funding to Bosnian
Serb military forces, police units, separatist political
parties, and other institutions promoting the disintegration of
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Belgrade should focus on developing strong
bilateral relations with Sarajevo and not primarily with one of
the Bosnian entities--a strategy that encourages separatism and
irredentism.
Third, Serbia needs to remove from office a number of
military officers and security chiefs instrumental in
repression over the past decade. Additionally, it must offer
Presevo Albanian leaders a position in the central government
to defuse the ongoing conflict and pursue administrative
decentralization throughout Serbia that would restore autonomy
to Vojvodina and local self-government to the country's
Hungarian, Albanian, Muslim, and other sizeable ethnic and
territorial minorities.
Fourth, in terms of the future of Yugoslavia, Serbia must
not interfere in or seek to disrupt the upcoming Montenegrin
parliamentary elections and the subsequent referendum on
independence. Belgrade must respect the will and decision of
the Montenegrin people and aim to build cooperative bilateral
relations between the two emerging states. The United States
can play a constructive role in this process.
why is it important for the allies to uphold conditionality?
There are three principal reasons why the Allies need to strictly
maintain conditions in return for releasing aid to Serbia: democratic
development, regional security, and international law.
Democratic Development: The foundations of any democratic state
need to be based on constitutional principles in line with
international standards. If either domestic laws or their
implementation fail this test, then legislation needs to be changed and
strictly applied by an incoming democratic administration. Delaying
democratization and international cooperation because of an evident
concern for legalism is merely a convenient cover for inaction and
obstruction. Serbia's lack of full compliance with U.S. Senate
conditions will undermine democratic developments inside the country
and encourage authoritarian and nationalist forces emboldened by a tack
of accountability and a permissive international climate. Kostunica and
Djindjic need to be actively encouraged to pursue more extensive
structural reforms, to root out criminality, to launch a process of
``denazification,'' and to foster bilateral cooperation with all of
Serbia's neighbors. Lax international standards will paradoxically do
more harm than good in propelling Serbia toward democratic rule.
Regional Security: Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosova are dismayed that
after ten years of aggression and genocide, Serbia is not being held
accountable for offensives against its neighbors, and indeed has failed
to acknowledge its responsibility. This in turn encourages revanchist
and extremist sentiments in all three territories and boosts populist
and nationalist formations waiting in the political wings. The most
glaring example of this tendency has been evident in Croatia where the
former governing party, the HDZ, has latched on to the war crimes issue
to try and discredit the democratic government for being too
accommodating with The Hague tribunal.
Belgrade's lack of acknowledgement for the mass murder and mass
expulsion of Kosovar Albanians in 1999 prevents any hopes of inter-
ethnic reconciliation and encourages calls for revenge attacks by
Albanian militants. Instead of seeking rapprochement, the Kostunica
government continues to blame NATO for the devastation in 1999 and
shirks away from recognizing Serbia's primary responsibility for
provoking the war. Indeed, the violence in the Presevo Valley is being
fueled both by Albanian radicalism and by Serbia's inability to
generate confidence among the Albanian population. Belgrade's political
offers are not perceived as the genuine moves of a democratic
government but the result of pressures exerted by NATO.
International Law: The Allies must curtail the widespread
impression that double standards prevail on the war crimes issue: one
for Serbia and the other for all other former Yugoslav republics. For
example, in the case of Croatia, a strict standard has been set since
the demise of the Tudjman regime, but in the case of Serbia a lax and
flexible standard evidently appiies. The international community has
paid lip service to the arrest of leading Serbian war criminal in an
apparent effort to keep Kostunica in power. Western leaders fear that
pursuing Milosevic and company too vigorously will undermine Kostunica
and democracy in Serbia. As a result, they have tacitly condoned the
deal that the DOS coalition struck with the Milosevic apparatus in
October 2000 and allowed Yugoslavia to gain entry to several
international organizations without having to deliver anything
substantial in return. Indeed, valuable bargaining chips have been
discarded that could have contributed to apprehending the principal
instigators and practitioners of genocide. Responses to war crimes must
not become an issue of political expediency but a measure of justice,
morality, and ``Western values.'' In this context, by failing to
cooperate with the IWCT Belgrade is violating the international
convention on genocide.
Contradictory policies on the war crimes issue send precisely the
wrong message to Serbia. Belgrade has concluded that the threat of
domestic instability (whether real or imaginary) can extract
concessions and foreign aid and this in turn encourages nationalist
arrogance and a disregard for international norms. In practice,
flexible standards on war crimes will corrode both the legitimacy of
the international court and the consolidation of democratic governance
and the rule of law throughout the region.
Senator Smith. Thank you. Unfortunately, the voting buzzer
has gone off. I do not know how long your statement is. We want
to hear it.
Ms. Bang-Jensen. I can make it very short.
Senator Smith. Why don't we proceed with you, and we will
stay until the last moment, and we apologize for this. We
rendered our objections to the leadership that they would call
a vote at such a time, but----
STATEMENT OF MS. NINA BANG-JENSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Bang-Jensen. I understand. Thank you very much for
inviting us to testify, and most importantly, to appear before
the three of you who have done so much to promote the rule of
law and peace in the Balkans. I am afraid we are going to have
to call on you again to help the State Department avoid its
instinct, which is so often an instinct toward equivocation and
appeasement in the face of hardliners.
With 16 days left before March 31, the Serbian Yugoslav
Governments really have come nowhere close to complying with
Congress' modest conditions. On the specific benchmark of
cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The
Hague, even rhetorical progress is lacking. Significantly, none
of the leadership in Belgrade is even claiming that they have
met the standards for certification. For its part, the State
Department, by publicly and privately stating over the past few
months its low expectations of what Belgrade can do by the 31st
has created an almost self-fulfilling prophesy of
noncompliance, which we have seen before.
As a result, the new government in Belgrade seems to have
expended near zero political capital in pursuing the reasonable
targets for progress toward the rule of law and democracy
identified by Congress. There is, however, very good news
coming from Serbia itself. Recent polls in Serbia indicate the
citizens are well ahead of their leadership. Over 66 percent
have expressed a willingness to hand over indictments at The
Hague. And 60 percent support the transfer of Milosevic,
particularly if there are economic consequences for not doing
so. Given those poll numbers, a lot can happen in 16 days if
leaders in Belgrade and in Washington muster the necessary
political will. Again I am afraid we are going to have to count
on the Senate to help muster that political will.
Much is at stake. You have heard from Ambassador Abramowitz
and Janusz Bugajski about how hardliners are watching what
happens here. Those hardliners can be in Belgrade, or Mostar,
or Foca, or in the Presevo Valley, or now in Macedonia. What we
do here has significance far beyond Serbia.
As you have heard also, according to the New York Times the
State Department is effectively rewriting the standard. The
language of the law is very clear. It requires that the
President certify that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
cooperating with the Tribunal, and that includes access for
investigators, the provision of documents, and the surrender
and transfer of indictees or assistance in their apprehension.
You have already heard about the surrender on Monday. You
know very well that the Yugoslav Government has gone to a great
extent to say that the surrender was a personal act, that they
had nothing to do with it. The head of Kostunica's party said
it could not be interpreted as the beginning of FRY citizens
indicted by the tribunal being handed over to The Hague.
Regrettably, we agree. While a positive development, this is
not cooperation by the government.
A Presidential certification of Serbian and Yugoslav
compliance under this section of the Foreign Operations
Assistance Act despite Belgrade's failure to make any serious
efforts at cooperation with the tribunal, to even acknowledge a
willingness to turn over indictees--and that is plural--as the
plain language of the law requires, would have grave
consequences, as you have heard from Ambassador Abramowitz and
Mr. Bugajski, to reform and stability throughout the region.
Federal Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic acknowledged
yesterday that about 15 indictees are currently in the FRY.
Five months have passed since Slobodan Milosevic was
overthrown, and 2 months since the installment of a new
government. Belgrade has yet to even detain any indictees, let
alone transfer anyone.
The recent opening of a tribunal office in Belgrade is, of
course, welcome, but it has been plagued with bureaucratic
obstacles and really does not represent significant progress.
The office was open during the Milosevic regime. We talked to
the tribunal as recently as yesterday. They said the effective
level of cooperation with the tribunal office in Belgrade is
the same as it was pre-NATO intervention in 1998.
The lack of progress on the tribunal cooperation is likely
due to President Kostunica's sincere nationalist convictions
that the tribunal is anti-Serb and unjust because it has not
investigated the 1999 NATO intervention sufficiently, in his
mind. The intervention Kostunica has called ``senseless,
unnecessary, irresponsible, and largely criminal.'' He has
explicitly linked the tribunal's refusal to investigate alleged
NATO war crimes to his refusal to transfer Slobodan Milosevic
to The Hague.
That core belief of Kostunica's that Belgrade should not
cooperate with an anti-Serb tribunal has been cloaked in
numerous other more reasonable-sounding excuses designed to
ease pressure from the West. However, these excuses, like the
contention that the tribunal is anti-Serb, do not stand up to
scrutiny.
Certainly, there have been lots of reformers within the
coalition itself, the governing coalition, who initially were
quite bold about the need for cooperation with the Tribunal.
They are beginning to couch their statements. That is a
worrisome development.
You have heard before the claim that the constitution
forbids transfer to The Hague. It is simply not true. The
Justice Minister has said that is not the case. Some claim, and
the State Department has even picked up on this, that there
needs to be a law in cooperation with the tribunal. That's
simply not so. The State Department is even claiming that the
same kind of law was needed and passed before Croatia turned
over indictees. Not so again.
In response to Senator Biden's question about the
Europeans, it is worth reminding that really the push on
Croatia using international financial institution
conditionality was led by the United States. There was no
support, initially, from Europeans. Congress can again force
the hand of the administration to garner support elsewhere. The
Europeans eventually came along. The same is entirely possible
here.
I can also say, too, the Europeans have not all been that
bad on this. As recently as February, the European Union
mission said that they were going to condition long-term
assistance. Certainly there is room to go, though.
Senator Biden. I love your optimism.
Ms. Bang-Jensen. Since a lot of this has been addressed
already, and you have not much time, I will just turn in
closing to the most difficult issues, which are the arguments
that Serbia should not be required to send Milosevic to The
Hague, but should be allowed to try him themselves on other
charges, or host a trial on Serbia run by the tribunal.
The prosecutor has said that this absolutely will not
happen. It cannot happen for really practical and logistical
problems, as well as fairness. If you do this in Belgrade, do
you do this in Sarajevo, do you do this in Zagreb? Every time
you have part of a hearing you have to bring all the judges,
all the documents, all the prosecutors, you have to bring the
person who is accused, all the witnesses. Witnesses are simply
not going to feel safe in Belgrade. Witnesses from Kosovo,
witnesses from Croatia, from Bosnia, Belgrade is not,
regrettably, yet a safe and secure place.
The court system there, while there has certainly been
progress in the removals of some of the judges, is not
independent yet. We need to help them with judicial reform, but
it is not going to happen quickly.
The consequences of a spurious certification are immense.
If we accept a lesser standard for certification, we are really
sending a troubling message to all the leaders in the Balkans
who have met their obligations, to those reformers in Belgrade
brave enough to understand this obligation and speak about it,
and most importantly to the hundreds of thousands of people who
lost their homes, lost family members, lost their livelihoods
in this carnage, the worst carnage since World War II on
European soil.
The first Bush administration stood up for these victims
before by vigorously supporting the establishment of the
tribunal, and now is not the time to abandon them.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bang-Jensen follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NINA BANG-JENSEN
With sixteen days left before March 31st , the Serbian and Yugoslav
governments have come nowhere close to complying with Congress' modest
conditions for eligibility for substantial U.S. bilateral and
multilateral economic assistance. On the specific benchmark of
cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague,
even rhetorical progress is lacking. Significantly, none of the
leadership in Belgrade is claiming that they have met the standards for
certification.
For its part, the State Department, by publicly and privately
stating over the past few months its low expectations of what Belgrade
``can'' do by the 31st has created an almost self-fulfilling prophecy
of non-compliance. As a result, the new government in Belgrade seems to
have expended near zero political capital in pursuing the reasonable
targets for progress toward the rule of law and democracy identified by
Congress.
There is, however, good news. Recent polls in Serbia indicate that
its citizens are well ahead of their leadership. Over 66% have
expressed a willingness to hand over indicted persons to The Hague.
Given those poll numbers, a lot can happen in sixteen days if leaders
in Belgrade and Washington muster the necessary political will.
Much is at stake. Extremists and hard-liners--whether they be in
Belgrade, Mostar, Foca or the Presevo Valley or Macedonia--are watching
and hoping to see signs that if they wait long enough and are
intransigent enough, they can outmaneuver State Department officials
and Congressional standards. At critical moments concerning U.S. policy
in the Balkans over the past decade, Congress has reined in the State
Departments first instincts toward equivocation, prodding it
successfully to apply standards consistently and firmly. A firm prod is
necessary here.
According to Saturday's New York Times, the State Department
appears to be in the process of effectively rewriting the standards of
Section 594 of the 2001 Foreign Operations Assistance Act. The
leadership in Belgrade has apparently been told by State Department
officials, in a memo entitled ``Specific actions that would contribute
to March 31 certification,'' that at least one indictee--explicitly not
Slobodan Milosevic--needs to be transferred to The Hague by March 31,
2001 and that Milosevic should be arrested and held in custody in
Belgrade.
The language of the law is clear. It requires that the President
certify, ``that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is . . . cooperating
with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia including
access for investigators, the provision of documents, and the surrender
and transfer of indictees or assistance in their apprehension.''
As you know, on Monday, a Bosnian Serb indictee named Blagoje Simic
flew to The Hague and surrendered to the Tribunal. Dr. Simic had served
as the mayor of Bosanski Samac in Bosnia when the town was overrun by
Serb forces in 1992 and ``ethnically cleansed'' of non-Serbs. While
charged with serious crimes, he should not be considered a high level
suspect. Simic is reported to have been living in Belgrade for the past
four years and to be a FRY citizen.
During his court appearance, Simic's lawyer emphasized that his
surrender was entirely voluntary and at his own initiative. The
spokesperson for President Kostunica's party, Milorad Jovanovic, was at
pains to say that the surrender was a ``personal act and cannot be
interpreted as the beginning of FRY citizens indicted by the Tribunal
being handed over to The Hague.'' Regrettably, we agree. While a
positive development, this is not ``cooperation'' by the government.
A presidential certification of Serbian and Yugoslav compliance
under Section 594 of the 2001 Foreign Operations Assistance Act at this
point, despite Belgrade's failure to make any serious efforts at
cooperation with the tribunal, to even acknowledge a willingness to
turn over indictees (plural) as the plain language of the law requires,
would have grave consequences for reform and stability in Serbia and
throughout the region.
There are at least six, and as many as 15 publicly indicted war
criminals in Serbia. Federal Interior Minister Zoran Zivkovic
acknowledged yesterday that ``about 15'' indictees are currently in the
FRY. Five months after Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown, and two
months after the installment of a new government in Serbia, Belgrade
has yet to detain any indictees, let alone transfer any to The Hague.
The recent opening of a tribunal office in Belgrade is welcome, but it
has been plagued with bureaucratic obstacles and does not represent
significant progress.
Indeed, a high-level tribunal source told us last week that the
level of cooperation from Serbia is the same now as when the office was
open under Milosevic--a time when investigations were limited to crimes
against Serbs and could generally proceed only when investigators were
accompanied by Serbian officials. This morning, an official in the
Office of the Prosecutor indicated again that the level of cooperation
with the Tribunal is akin to that of the Milosevic regime in 1998.
The lack of concrete progress on tribunal cooperation is likely due
to Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica's sincere nationalist
convictions that the tribunal is anti-Serb and unjust because it has
not investigated the 1999 NATO intervention, an action Kostunica has
called ``senseless, unnecessary, irresponsible and largely cnminal.''
Kostunica has explicitly linked the tribunal's refusal to investigate
alleged NATO war crimes to his refusal to transfer Slobodan Milosevic
to The Hague.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Mrs. Carla Del Ponte says that there was not enough time to
investigate the consequences of the NATO bombing of this country . . .
which [was] seen in 1999 on televisions all around the world. Just
because of that, the case of Slobodan Milosevic will be treated, and
must be treated, in this country.'' B-92, 2/13/01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This core belief of Kostunica's--that Belgrade should not cooperate
with an ``anti-Serb'' tribunal--has been cloaked in numerous other,
more reasonable sounding excuses designed to ease pressure from the
West. Indeed many of these excuses seem to have found resonance within
the State Department, leading to public statements from State
Department officials urging a lenient interpretation of the March 31
criteria. However, these excuses, like the contention that the tribunal
is anti-Serb, do not stand up to scrutiny.
There is a reasonable concern among many in Washington that
applying too much pressure on Belgrade to fully comply with its
tribunal obligations could spark a nationalist backlash and
undermine reformers--but the evidence is to the contrary. An
opinion poll conducted in Serbia last month showed that 66
percent of respondents favored the transfer of indictees to The
Hague, with 60.3 percent specifically supporting the transfer
of Milosevic to The Hague. Over half (51 percent) of those
polled thought their government would transfer Serbian
indictees to the tribunal.\2\ The Serbian and Yugoslav justice
ministers and the Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister have in the
past spoken in favor of full compliance with the tribunal. In
short, there is a majority constituency in Serbia that supports
full compliance with the tribunal, but compliance will only
materialize if the March 31 deadline is publicly wielded as
leverage to pressure hard-liners in the leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Poll conducted February 12-19, 2001 by the polling firm
``Argument'' with a sample of 910 in 26 Serbian municipalities. Blic,
February 28 and March 1, 2001.
President Kostunica, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic,
and others have claimed that the Serbian constitution forbids
delivery of Milosevic and other Yugoslav nationals to The
Hague. This assertion has been given credence by some western
policymakers, but this assertion is false. Serbian
constitutional experts, among them Yugoslav Justice Minister
Momcilo Grubac, have pointed out that the constitution forbids
extradition of Serbian citizens to other states, but not their
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
transfer to an international tribunal.
The claims of some FRY officials that they need six months
to enact a law before cooperation with the Tribunal begins is a
delaying tactic. Some State Department officials have lent
support to this notion and have even suggested, erroneously,
that the new government in Croatia waited to pass a new law on
cooperation with the Tribunal before turning over indictees.
Over a dozen indictees have ended up in The Hague with the
assistance of the current Croatian government and its non-
democratic predecessor.
Another excuse raised in Belgrade and sometimes echoed here
and in Europe, is that the new governments face daunting
tasks--economic and political reform, the unrest in Southern
Serbia, relations with Montenegro and the future of Kosovo--and
that compliance with the tribunal, therefore, cannot be a
priority. However, hard-liners in the new Serbian and Yugoslav
leadership must be made to realize that fulfilling their
commitments to the UN Tribunal is not inconsistent with
addressing what they regard as more important priorities. In
fact ridding Serbia of war criminals well connected with
organized crime organizations will aid political and economic
reform, and strengthen the rule of law. The new leadership in
Serbia and Yugoslavia currently enjoys widespread popularity.
If it can not deal with the war crimes issue now, then it will
be all the more difficult down the road when the public becomes
impatient with the pace of economic recovery, as has been the
pattern in all Eastern European countries in transition.
Many have argued that Serbia should not be required to send
Milosevic to The Hague, but should be allowed to try him itself
on other charges, or host a trial in Serbia run by the
international tribunal. The Chief Prosecutor at the tribunal,
Carla Del Ponte, has stated unequivocally that Milosevic must
first face trial in The Hague for war crimes before facing
other charges in Belgrade. The Tribunal's position is well-
founded in law and common sense. Security Council resolutions
established and then reinforced the tribunal's primacy of
jurisdiction over domestic prosecutions for war crimes in the
former Yugoslavia because the war-ravaged domestic judicial
systems were not yet ready or likely to try their own war
crimes suspects. While domestic war crimes prosecutions have
begun in Croatia and Bosnia and will, over time, occur in
Serbia, the Tribunal has been entrusted by all member states of
the United Nations with the responsibility of pursuing the
major figures from all sides.
Furthermore, conditions for a safe and fair trial in Belgrade are
nowhere near adequate. Protection for witnesses, prosecutors
and judges would not be guaranteed, especially given the level
of nationalist vitriol directed at the tribunal by President
Kostunica and others. Kosovo Albanian, Croatian, Bosnian
Muslim, and even Serb prosecution witnesses would doubtless
fear for their safety, especially since violent mafia
organizations thought to have links to the accused continue to
flourish in Serbia. Even a domestic trial of Milosevic on
corruption charges held now would be dangerous and difficult,
more so now than later because the long process of judicial
reform has only just begun.
The same rules that apply to Zagreb and to Sarajevo should
apply to Belgrade. Most prosecutions for war crimes in Croatia
and Bosnia are being handled through their domestic systems.
Where the Tribunal has exerted primacy, however, those
governments have transferred indictees. In earlier years when
Croatia did not do so, the international community--led by the
U.S.--exerted strong conditionality on economic assistance.
If Belgrade does not fulfil the Congressional criteria for funding
by March 31 and the Administration chooses to certify it anyway based
on a weak standard of ``progress'' based principally in wishful
thinking rather than facts, there will be serious negative
ramifications for stability in Serbia and the Balkans, and for U.S.
policy options there.
A spurious certification would undermine the real reformers
in the ruling coalition--the same individuals who also have
sought more aggressive reforms in other areas. By coddling
Kostunica and other hard-liners at the expense of more
pragmatic and less nationalist members of the ruling coalition,
the mistake of U.S. policy toward Russia in the early 1990s is
repeated. By putting support for individual leaders above
support for policies, we are in danger of undermining true
reformers who would otherwise rise to the top.
The current Croatian government has faced strong western
pressure and taken genuine political risks to comply with the
Hague tribunal. Creating a separate standard for Serbia will
fuel nationalist anger within Croatia against the reformist
government in Zagreb and teach that obstructing tribunal
compliance might have been a reasonable alternative to the
reformist approach.
An unearned presidential certification of Serbia's
compliance with the criteria crafted by Congress would
undermine efforts in Serbia at establishing the rule of law.
Serbia has an unambiguous legal obligation to fully comply with
the tribunal. If it feels it can skirt the law with a wink and
a nod from the U.S., then the message will just be reinforced
that it is acceptable for nationalist policy desires to take
precedence over laws--a concept that Belgrade must overcome if
it is to progress and become a stable democracy.
Finally, an unearned presidential certification of
Belgrade's compliance with the tribunal would undermine the
crucial NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, prolonging the need
for U.S. troops there. Not only has the new leadership in
Belgrade failed to turn over any of the publicly indicted
Bosnian Serb war criminals in Serbia, but in January Yugoslav
President Vojislav Kostunica even went so far as to raise the
prospect of granting them political asylum in a bid to protect
them from prosecution.\3\ Among those Bosnian Serb indictees
still in Serbia is wartime army commander Ratko Mladic,
indicted for genocide for among other things, the Srebrenica
massacre. NATO sources have also reported that the indicted
wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic also spends time
in Serbia. Until these men are arrested and transferred to The
Hague, they will lend hope and power to ultranationalist forces
in Bosnia, destabilizing the country and delaying the day when
U.S. troops can leave.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``If we assume that in Yugoslavia there are people who are
indicted and they are citizens of some other country, they could seek
refuge in this country. This country could give them asylum.''
Christian Science Monitor, 1/19/01.
Likewise, Belgrade's failure to transfer to The Hague the five
leaders publicly indicted for war crimes in Kosovo--among them Slobodan
Milosevic--only feeds acceptance among ethnic Albanians for the current
wave of extremist acts in Kosovo, Southern Serbia, and Macedonia.
Rewarding nationalist policies in Belgrade not only sidelines Serbian
reformers, but also moderate forces in the Albanian community.
In adopting Section 594 as law, Congress has provided a service to
the true reformers in the DOS coalition and to the citizens of the
former Yugoslavia by explicitly setting forth the minimum standards for
eligibility for U.S. bilateral and multilateral economic assistance.\4\
This law has impressively defined and guided the international debate
about aid to the region. Without it, there is little doubt that the
debate about progress by the new government, within and without
Belgrade, would be even less rigorous than it now appears to be.
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has called upon European governments to
adopt similar laws, and has vowed to go to the Security Council in
April seeking sanctions if progress is not made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The law exempts humanitarian and democratization assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It would be a great mistake now for Congress to allow the
Administration to define the law so loosely to deprive it of any
meaning in the mistaken notion that now is the time for unconditional
carrots instead of incentives to be earned. That tack has been tried in
U.S.-Balkans policy before and it does not work. Holding firmly and
consistently to standards does.
Again, the language of the law is clear. It requires that the
President certify, ``that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is . . .
cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
including access for investigators, the provision of documents, and the
surrender and transfer of indictees or assistance in their
apprehension.'' If Congress accepts a lesser standard for
certification, it is sending a troubling message to the new
Administration, to leaders in the Balkans who have met their
obligations to the Tribunal, to reformers within Belgrade who
understand this fundamental obligation and, most importantly, to the
hundreds of thousands of people in the region who lost relatives, homes
and livelihoods in the worst carnage on European soil since World War
II.
The first Bush Administration stood up for these victims before by
vigorously supporting the establishment of the Tribunal. Now is not the
time to abandon them by interpreting this straight-forward standard in
anything less than a rigorous, common-sense way.
Cooperation cannot be certified now because it does not exist.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much. Again, we apologize for
this intrusion on an important hearing. I do want to say the
timing of this was so important we thought we should at least
do as much as we can, because these messages need to be sent to
Belgrade and perhaps to the State Department as well.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I would just like to make one point. I
apologize for it but we are going to have these five votes, and
one of the five votes is an amendment that I have on the floor.
I think you are absolutely right on all three of your
statements, and as far as I am concerned, I will do everything
in my power that I am able to do, which is limited, to not
certify. Not certify.
I want to point out one thing. You have some real genuine
folks in this Government in Belgrade. They are not all bad
guys. You have got guys like Djindjic and Covic. I met with
Covic for a long time at the request of General Casey at KFOR,
sitting down with him and talking about what to do in the
Presevo Valley. They made some significant concessions and
progress, and talked about it.
If you read what happened today, Covic went down there, and
the deal was, anyone coming into that zone now, that little
piece that the Serb military is now allowed to be in, could
have no part of any of the atrocities that took place before.
Who shows up in a white jeep but General Pavokvic--Covic went
off the wall on this. He is being undercut. We need to stop
this most radical element of the Yugoslav military.
I have been speaking with the folks in Kosovo from Rugova
on down through Thaci, and--I am mispronouncing this name--
Haradinaj, and so far they have been behaving well. The ethnic
Albanian minority in Macedonia has been behaving well. Yet when
you see these two generals come rolling down, who are like
billboards saying, ``we are back.'' It sets everything back. So
I just give you that as one concrete example of what is
happening this very moment to undercut Covic.
Now, that old general headed back up to Belgrade he had
made his presence felt, but is anybody in the Presevo Valley
going to believe that? Is anybody going to believe that Covic
had really winnowed around and put together a clean military
operation down in this small 5 meter, or 5 kilometer area? I do
not think so. I do not think so.
I am really sorry that we have these votes. I do not know,
Mr. Chairman, whether there is more. Are there still five? If
not, maybe we can come back, but otherwise I think we are
holding these----
Senator Smith. Senator Voinovich, do you have anything you
want to say?
Senator Voinovich. The only thing I would like to say is,
first of all, I am glad I was here today, and I am going to
send both your opening statements to President Kostunica,
because I tried to convey to him, and so did Senator Specter
when we were there, that we were dead serious about the
cooperation with The Hague, that in spite of the fact that he
claims political problems in trying to get things going there,
that that is not going to be acceptable.
In regard to the three areas that you both talked about, or
the three of you talked about, I agree wholeheartedly in terms
of The Hague. I think that in terms of the issue of Bosnia,
from what I understand, that the cooperation there with the
Republic of Srpska has diminished substantially in the last
several weeks and that the President has made it very clear
that they are not going to support those individuals, and I
know that--what you said today verifies some testimony that was
from the OSCE meeting that was held. I think there is more
progress that has been made there than you think.
In terms of the Albanians in jail, they have released a
substantial number of them under the amnesty agreement. What it
is suggesting to them is that some of them they say are really
criminals, that each case be taken care of individually very
quickly, and that try and get the Djakovica people, let them
out of jail right off.
So I guess what I am saying to you, Mr. Chairman, and
ranking member, that there is a major problem with The Hague,
and I think in the other two areas that some substantial
progress has been made, and the only suggestion I would make is
that before we finally make this decision, or you make this
decision, that you bring in Ambassador Montgomery and have him
come here so you can question him and some other people to get
their perspective on how they praise this progress in terms of
all three of these issues.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, one very important person is
here that we have not introduced. Sonia Biserko a Serb who has
been very courageous and who is a leading, leading person. I
would just like to recognize her, and thank her for being here.
Ms. Biserko. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you, and I am
sorry. We will leave the record of this hearing open for an
additional 3 days, and any other additional comments or
questions, we will leave it open for colleagues.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, with their permission, I will
send--I am not going to make a lot of work for you, but send a
few questions so that we have them for the record, if you do
not mind.
Senator Smith. Thank you all. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:58 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
----------
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE--OSSINING, NEW
YORK
President George Bush must certify to the U.S. Congress by March 31
that the newly elected Serbian government of Vojislav Kostunica is
ready to arrest and imprison former President Slobodan Milosevic,
transfer at least one indicted war criminal to The Hague Tribunal,
release the Albanian prisoners of war in Serbian jails, cooperate with
the Dayton Agreement, and educate the Serbian people about the crimes
against humanity that were committed in their name. Otherwise, $100
million in American aid ostensibly will be cut off and the United
States will also withdraw its support for IMF and World Bank loans to
Serbia.
The Albanian American Civic League urges the Bush administration
not to back down from its original demand that Slobodan Milosevic be
extradicted to The Hague and allow the transfer of another indicted war
criminal in his place. The Civic League is concerned about the
Administration's apparent willingness to certify Belgrade whether or
not it recognizes the authority of the International War Crimes
Tribunal and complies with the set of demands that were delivered to
the Kostunica government by U.S. Ambassador William Montgomery last
week. This is reminiscent of the failed policy of appeasement toward
Serbia that enabled the country, under the Milosevic regime, to rise to
power on a platform of anti-Albanian racism, to brutally occupy Kosova
for ten years, and to wage four wars of conquest in Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia, and Kosova that left more than 350,000 dead and more than two
million homeless.
If we do not want to lose the prospects for resolving the Balkan
conflict and unifying Europe, then the Kostunica government's access to
more American aid and to international financial institutions should be
contingent on its demonstrating a genuine commitment to democracy and
the rule of law by meeting the following conditions:
All Albanian prisoners of war must be released immediately
from Serbian jails and returned to Kosova. Serbia must also
begin the investigative work necessary to giving a full
accounting of the missing Kosovar Albanians. America's oft-
lamented ``lack of leverage'' over Belgrade is at an end, and
so now is the time to rectify the Clinton administration's
mistake in dropping the provision in the war-ending agreement
that would have guaranteed the release of all Kosovar Albanian
prisoners of war. Indeed, if we certify Serbia without first
securing their release, we will lose the only real leverage
that we have ever had to free 500 or more innocent men and
women.
There can be no shelter for war criminals. The Kostunica
government has repeatedly denounced the International War
Crimes Tribunal in The Hague as ``anti-Serb'' and refused to
turn over Slobodan Milosevic and other indicted war criminals.
If the United States is serious about reinforcing the rule of
law, then Serbian war criminals, beginning with Slobodan
Milosevic and including Bosnian Serb commanders Radovan
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, must be apprehended and brought to
The Hague for trial. America's decision in this matter will
reveal the level of our commitment to opposing genocide and
dramatically impact our ability to bring a just and lasting
peace to the Balkans, to prevent future conflicts, and to build
respect for human rights around the world. It is now widely
understood that the major reasons why democracy remains
illusive in postwar Bosnia is the West's failure to confront
war crimes, allowing war criminals and their accomplices to
maintain their political and economic power. The same is true
in Serbia, where Milosevic's cronies have retained their
control over large sectors of the economy and the military, and
the result has been rampant official corruption, the spread of
organized crime, and continuing violence against minority
populations.
Serbia must begin a ``de-Nazification'' campaign to end a
century of anti-Albanian and anti-Muslim racism, apart from
which there will be no stability in the Balkans. The Kostunica
regime could constructively initiate such a program by publicly
acknowledging Serbia's responsibility for war crimes and by
apologizing to the victims in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosova. To
date, there has been no acknowledgment of any kind by President
Kostunica and his colleagues of the atrocities and mass murder
committed by Serbia during the Milosevic era. This failure has
fueled reprisal killings by Albanians and stymied efforts to
bring interethnic reconciliation to Kosova.
Serbia must honor its stated commitments in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and help bring peace and democracy to this fragile
nation. The Kostunica government's continuing financial and
moral support for Serbian separatist leaders in Republika
Srpska is destabilizing Bosnia and undermining the full
implementation of the Dayton Accords.
In order to bring an end to the conflict in the Presheva
Valley, Serbia must cease its historic repression and violence
against the Albanians of Presheva, Medvegja, and Bujanoc,
recognize their civil and human rights, and enable them to
participate meaningfully in both municipal and central
governments, the police, and the judiciary.
Serbia must come to understand, and the Kostunica government
must accept, the new reality of Kosova and Montenegro. The new
reality is that both Kosovars and Montenegrins refuse to come
back under Serbian rule and have chosen to exercise their right
to self-determination, just as the other constituent units in
the former Yugoslavia did in the 1990s. Instead of continuing
to assert its authority over Kosova and Montenegro, Serbia
should work to develop constructive bilateral relationships
with its neighbors.
Unless Serbia makes a real effort to meet these conditions,
ultranationalist forces will prevail inside the country and regional
stability will be threatened. And unless Serbia makes a radical change
in the direction of compliance with the conditions for certification in
the next two weeks, the Albanian American Civic League believes that
the Bush administration should cut off aid to Belgrade.
______
PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK KOSZORUS, JR., PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
HUNGARIAN FEDERATION OF METROPOLITIAN WASHINGTON, DC
Although the Serbian and Yugoslav governments have made some
progress in the area of human rights, they have not complied with the
three conditions for American assistance, including in the area of
minority rights. Nonetheless, humanitarian assistance and assistance to
promote democracy in municipalities should be provided, especially for
the beleaguered province of Vojvodina. In addition, a comprehensive
policy that would promote regional security and stability should also
be developed and implemented.
THE 2001 FOREIGN OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE ACT (THE ``ACT'')
Pursuant to the Act, U.S. assistance and other forms of support can
be made available to Serbia after March 31, 2001 only if the President
determines and certifies that Yugoslavia is (1) cooperating with the
International War Crimes Tribunal; (2) abiding by the Dayton Accords to
end Serbian support for separate Republika Srpska (i.e., Serb)
institutions; and implementing policies in respect for minority rights
and rule of law. The certification (and other) requirements of the Act
do not apply to humanitarian assistance or assistance to promote
democracy in municipalities. While meaningful progress is lacking as to
all three benchmarks, this statement will focus on the deficiencies
relating to the third benchmark, particularly with respect to the
Hungarians of Vojvodina.
VOJVODINA
Vojvodina is one of two provinces in the Republic of Serbia which
along with Montenegro forms the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Vojvodina occupies the northern one-fifth (8,348 sq. miles) of the
country's territory, bordering Hungary in the north, Croatia in the
west, Bosnia-Herzegovina in the southwest, Serbia proper in the south,
and Romania in the east. The province has 2.2 million inhabitants of
which 57 percent are Serbs, 17 percent Hungarians, 5 percent Croats, 3
percent Slovaks, 2 percent Montenegrins, 2 percent Romanians, 1 percent
Ruthenians, and 13 percent others. These numbers are based on the 1991
census and have likely changed during the Balkan wars in the 1990's.
BACKGROUND
Prior to World War I Vojvodina was part of Hungary for
approximately 1,100 years, with the exception of 200 years of Turkish
occupation (1526-1699/1718). That occupation resulted in the
depopulation of the area. Thereafter, the Habsburgs began to repopulate
the area with German and Serb settlers and the Hungarians also began to
resettle in the region. In 1910 the 1,320,000 inhabitants included 30.2
percent Hungarians, 25 percent Serbs, 23 percent Swabian Germans, 10
percent other South Slavs (including Croats, Bunjevci, Sokci), and 10
percent others (Romanians, Slovaks, Ruthenians). It is unlikely that
this region would have become part of Yugoslavia had Woodrow Wilson's
principle of self-determination been respected. It was not and the
Paris peace treaties awarded Vojvodina to the newly created Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929).
The Serbs began an aggressive Serbianization process that, among
other things, radically altered Vojvodina's ethnic composition in the
20th century. As soon as Vojvodina was transferred to Yugoslavia, they
moved tens of thousands of Serb families into Vojvodina, dispossessing
the original residents.
This was repeated after World War II when twenty to thirty-five
thousand Hungarian men and boys were massacred between October and
December 1944. An additional 40-50,000 Hungarians fled this terror. The
massacres were done ostensibly in retaliation for the execution of
3,300 Serbs and Communists by renegade Hungarian officers in the winter
of 1941-42. In addition, three hundred thousand Germans were either
expelled or exterminated and their property given to a new wave of Serb
colonists.
VOJVODINA UNDER MILOSEVIC
A third wave of ``ethnic cleansing'' took place under Milosevic:
tens of thousands of Serb families poured in from Kosovo, Croatia, and
Bosnia, while some hundred thousand Hungarians and Croats fled the
forced mobilization and intimidation. The ethnic structure of Vojvodina
has thus been significantly altered--international treaties
notwithstanding--through forced or state-sponsored relocation, in favor
of the Serbs, as noted in the statistics noted above.
In 1988 Milosevic's Serbian parliament, supported by populists
rallies financed by Serb nationalists, destroyed the province's
autonomy when it illegitimately overturned the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution which guaranteed legislative, executive, and judicial
powers to both Vojvodina and Kosovo, including equal representation
with the six republics in the federal collective presidency. As noted
by the March 15, 2001 RFE/RL Newsline, ``[d]estroying the two
provinces'' autonomy was an important step in the consolidation of
Milosevic's power.'' For Vojvodina this has resulted in total
domination by Belgrade. For instance, beginning twelve years ago,
Belgrade has appointed not just judges and police chiefs but factory
managers, hospital directors, and even school principals in Vojvodina,
thereby violating every precept of local self-government.
Despite years of intimidation, Vojvodinians consistently and
peacefully voted against Milosevic, demonstrating their deep commitment
to democracy. In fact, the decimated minorities and those Serbs whose
historical roots are in Vojvodina have not resorted to violence. They
merely want autonomy, both territorial for the province (indeed,
legislative, executive, and judicial) and ``personal'' autonomy (in
education, the media, publishing, and cultural institutions) for
members of the ethnic minorities.
SERBIA HAS NOT SATISFIED THE THIRD BENCHMARK OF THE ACT
Serbia has disappointingly fallen short of satisfying the third
benchmark of the Act. Echoing Milosevic's ``unification of Serbia''
rhetoric, newly elected federal president Vojislav Kostunica's party
intends to reorganize the remaining state, but keep Vojvodina under
Serbia's control. This ab initio precludes any meaningful autonomy.
When the new provincial assembly (with comfortable majority by the same
18-party coalition that won the federal and the Serbian elections)
appointed a new board for Vojvodina's five-language public TV and radio
stations, Belgrade promptly reminded them that the decision ``belongs''
to the Serbian parliament. It conveniently ``overlooked'' the fact that
the building housing the media originally belonged to Vojvodina before
it was illegally expropriated by Milosevic in 1989.
Even after the new Serbian republican government was sworn in, with
ethnic Hungarian leader Jozsef Kasza as one of its Deputy Prime
Ministers, the Serbian Constitutional Court in February ruled that the
names of cities, towns, and villages must be displayed in Serbian only.
This decision negated recent decisions by democratically elected
municipal governments to erect multi-lingual signs. Ethnic political
parties and independent intellectuals have condemned this latest
display of majoritarian intolerance by Serb nationalists.
Zoran Djindjic admitted in Novi Sad that the restoration of
Vojvodina's autonomy is ``not a priority'' for the new government. RFE/
RL Newsline, March 15, 2001. The same issue reports that Dragan
Veselinov, head of the pro-autonomy Vojvodina Coalition, responded by
pointing out that the new government's attitude toward Vojvodina is no
different from that of Milosevic's Socialists or Vojislav Seselj's
Radicals. Id.
In sum, all three conditions, including respect for minorities and
minority rights, must be satisfied before aid is provided under the
Act. This, unfortunately, has not occurred. At the same time it must be
recalled that Vojvodina suffered devastating economic consequences as a
result of NATO's intervention in 1999: all three bridges in the capital
of Novi Sad were destroyed while none were touched in Belgrade. The
country's only two oil refineries are located in Vojvodina and they
were heavily damaged. Moreover, Vojvodinians, including the Hungarian
community, have amply demonstrated their unflinching commitment to
democracy and peace.
Accordingly, the province should receive assistance under the two
exclusions of the Act, namely, humanitarian assistance and assistance
to promote democracy in municipalities. This aid should be directed to
support NGO's, the local school system, the independent media, and
municipal governments in Vojvodina, especially since they have received
little support in the past compared to Belgrade-based organizations.
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO FACILITATE DEMOCRACY, STABILITY AND SECURITY
AND TO FORESTALL AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
Beyond the immediate question of assistance programs, the United
States should adopt imaginative and forward looking policies toward the
region instead of reacting to crises, requiring the commitment of
American troops to drawn out military and non-military assignments.
This would require a comprehensive approach that is not necessarily
wedded to the status quo, but one that is designed to facilitate
genuine democracy, stability and, therefore, regional security.
As noted above, the United States should unequivocally support the
restoration of Vojvodina's autonomy as well as the regional autonomy of
the various ethnic groups of the province. It should support the
legitimate demands of a peaceful population, and not ignore them just
because an immediate crisis or imminent threat to peace is not looming.
Autonomy is the sine qua non of genuine democracy, stability and
security in the context of the Balkans; it is the desired goal.
Thus, a reorganization of the current Yugoslav state (consisting of
the republics of Serbia and Montenegro and the provinces of Vojvodina
and Kosovo) must respect and adequately reflect the vastly different
historic heritage of each of these entities. The status quo is not
acceptable, however, and either Vojvodina must be granted rights it
previously enjoyed as an equal federal unit of Yugoslavia or
Vojvodinians will seek independence that will place them on equal
footing--as Montenegro's President Milo Djukanovic suggests.
Decentralization of Serbia would be meaningless without real federal
status for Vojvodina.
What if Belgrade refuses and continues to pursue intolerant and
discriminatory policies toward ethnic minorities--policies that fuel
disputes, tensions and violence and could threaten the peace? Graham
Fuller, former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at
the CIA, astutely observes that the ``simple reality is that in the
next [21st] century minorities will be increasingly unwilling to live
within borders--to which they have been arbitrarily assigned by
history--when conditions seem intolerable. More than ever before they
will demand a voice over what peoples will rule them and how.'' He then
points out that if the ``states cannot provide good governance, their
minorities'' may seek ``to gain maximum autonomy or independence.'' In
other words, he foresees the unwillingness of minorities ``to put up
with gross misgovernance in a world rife with talk of democratization,
globalization, civil society, human rights, porous borders and growing
U.N. norms. How long can we expect that minorities will indefinitely
accept unacceptable status quos?'' The Washington Post, ``More
Kosovos,'' April 4, 1999.
In the context of Yugoslavia, Professors John J. Mearsheimer
(University of Chicago) and Stephen Evara (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology) assert that the ``history of Yugoslavia since 1991 shows
that ethnic separation breeds peace, while failure to separate breeds
war.'' The New York Times, ``Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing,'' April
19, 1999). This separation does not have to result in the further
dissolution of Yugoslavia. Rather than a centralized state, the Swiss
model could be applied whereby each national group has its own
autonomous self-governing unit free of domination by another,
intolerant ethnic group. Janusz Bugajski has gone even farther by
suggesting that the ``only viable short and long-term solution . . . is
sovereignty, independence and statehood for the Republic of
Vojvodina.'' ``The Republic of Vojvodina,'' reprinted in Hungarian
American Coalition News, June 2000.
In the final analysis, whether peace and stability will
characterize the Balkans will depend to a large extent on Belgrade and
the vision and leadership exercised by the West. As William G. Hyland,
former editor of Foreign Affairs who also served in the Nixon and Ford
administrations, suggested the United States ``should take a page from
history and do what the European leaders did in the last century--
convene a European summit conference, as the Great Powers did in 1878
at the Congress of Berlin; then as now the purpose would be to redraw
the map of the Balkans and avoid an all-out war.'' The Washington Post,
``On to a Big Table,'' March 31, 1999.