

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2001

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Brownback, Thomas, and Wellstone.

Senator BROWNBACK. The hearing will come to order. In keeping with the new mode of doing things on time, we are going to start this hearing on time. I am delighted to have the panel we have to day to testify on the issue of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This subcommittee has held a number of hearings on this topic, but this is a new administration. I think it is a chance for us to discuss some of the policy options that are presented before the United States today, this being the third President to confront Saddam Hussein, hopefully we will get a chance this time to address the root cause of the problem, that being Saddam Hussein himself.

Senator Kerrey, welcome back. We are delighted to have you here. Congratulations on your wedding and new job. We are glad to have you here with your new colleagues. Mr. Perle, delighted to have you here again, and Dr. Halperin and Mr. Cordesman, delighted to have both you gentlemen join us as well.

As we all know, this hearing will provide an opportunity to discuss the future of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Allow me to pose a question that I hope you will help us answer, and that is, is Saddam Hussein better off today than he was 10 years ago at the end of the gulf war? To my mind, the clear answer is yes, Saddam Hussein is better off today than he was at the end of the gulf war.

The evidence is piling up that Saddam has reconstituted his illegal weapons programs. Two defectors from the regime have told British press that Saddam has a small nuclear weapon. I have not been able to independently verify that charge, but the straws are in the wind.

Further, there is ample evidence, both public and otherwise, that Saddam is using the cover of a legally allowed missile program to work on longer range missiles that could eventually deliver weapons of mass destruction, and of course officials at UNSCOM were never willing to consider Saddam's assertion that he has these chemical and biological weapons programs. It certainly is logical to

assume that in the absence of inspectors for over 2 years he has seized the opportunity to beef up his WMD programs.

For our part, according to press reports about Secretary Powell's trip to the Middle East, the administration now supports using the existing sanctions and instituting so-called smarter sanctions, and I look forward to discussing this with the Secretary next week.

As we listen to all this talk about smarter sanctions, I have to wonder whether we can put the horse back in the barn at all. The sanction regime and the international coalition against Iraq have been completely unraveled. The steady stream of international flights, kicked off by the Russians and the French, have headed into Baghdad since August without monitoring or inspection. The Chinese are working illegally in Baghdad without fear of repercussions, and press reports indicate that oil is once again flowing in the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline to the tune of 150,000 barrels per day.

The profits from those illegal transfers of oil go straight into Saddam's pockets. To top it off, U.S.-British strikes on Iraqi air defense targets 2 weeks ago, intended to protect allied pilots from increased Iraqi threats, drew fire, not only from the usual suspects, but also from the Arab states we are ostensibly protecting, and are our partners on the Security Council.

I think we need to face it, Saddam has won a good portion of the propaganda war. He is and remains a ruthless despot who refuses to spend all he is allowed for his people's well-being. Notwithstanding, the United States seems to be blamed for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

Now, what do we do? Will we get inspectors back into Iraq? What sacrifices on sanctions will need to be made to get them in, and will any such inspections be worth those sacrifices? I rather doubt it. We are going to have to bite this bullet. After 10 years, sanctions have not achieved their intended goal, denying Iraq weapons of mass destruction being the goal that we intended to achieve.

If that remains our goal today, and I certainly hope it does, then we need to ask whether any refinement to these sanctions systems will achieve that goal, and I would certainly like to hear our panel's opinions on that question.

I believe that any tradeoff for weakening sanctions must be a more robust U.S. policy toward Iraq. The Republican platform in 2000 called for the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act and support for the Iraqi opposition. I, along with many of my colleagues, have long supported that policy, and hope the administration will work toward it. The threat that Iraq poses to its own people and to the decent nations of this world will remain for as long as Saddam Hussein is in power.

To my mind, there is only one answer to solving this problem, and the answer is, Saddam Hussein, and getting him out of power. What do we do? Well, we make several suggestions here, and I look forward to those from our panelists. One, I think we can use the resources at our finger tips in the form of a drawdown and economic support to bolster the opposition and to fully implement the Iraq Liberation Act. We have Dr. Chalabi here with the Iraq National Congress. I am delighted to note your attendance in the audience as well.

Second, we should stop spending money on conferences for the opposition and begin to train them, when necessary, even to arm them. We unilaterally should declare the southern no-fly zone will be a no-drive zone as well, and we should expand our rules of engagement, including to target WMD sites and potentially other targets as well.

Those are several policy suggestions that I would put forward as we seek a more expanded and robust policy toward Iraq, and we seek to deal with the root problem, which is Saddam Hussein.

That is a start. I look forward to what our panelists have to say, and their comments about what we should be doing toward a new U.S. policy toward Iraq.

With that, I will turn to the ranking member, Senator Wellstone. We are delighted to have you join us here.

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]

[News Release—March 1, 2001]

BROWNBACK CHAIRS HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

WASHINGTON, DC.—U.S. Senator Sam Brownback chaired a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing today on U.S. policy toward Iraq. A portion of Senator Brownback's remarks from the hearing follow.

"This hearing provides an opportunity to discuss the future of U.S. policy toward Iraq," Brownback said. "Allow me to pose a question that I hope you will help us answer: Is Saddam Hussein better off today than he was ten years ago, at the end of the Gulf War?" To my mind, the clear answer is: "Yes, Saddam Hussein is better off."

"The evidence is overwhelming that Saddam is reconstituting his illegal weapons programs. Defectors from the regime have told the British press that Saddam actually has two small nuclear weapons. I have not been able to independently verify that charge, but the very possibility is alarming.

"Further, there is ample evidence, both public and otherwise, that Saddam is using the cover of a legally allowed missile program to work on longer range missiles that could eventually threaten those far beyond his borders with weapons of mass destruction. And of course, officials at UNSCOM have never believed Saddam's assertion that he had destroyed his chemical and biological weapons programs.

"It is certainly logical to assume that in the absence of inspectors for over two years, he has seized the opportunity to improve his WMD programs.

"For our part, according to press reports about Secretary Powell's trip to the Middle East, the administration now supports easing the existing sanctions and instituting so-called 'smarter sanctions.' I look forward to discussing this proposal with Secretary Powell next week.

"As we listen to all this talk about 'smarter sanctions,' I wonder whether we can put the horse back in the barn. The sanctions regime and the international coalition against Iraq have completely unraveled. Since August, a steady stream of international flights—kicked-off by Russia and France—have landed in Baghdad, without monitoring or inspection. The Chinese are working illegally in Baghdad without fear of repercussions, and press reports indicate that oil is once again flowing through the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline, at a rate of 150,000 barrels per day. The profits from those illegal transfers of oil go straight into Saddam's pocket.

"To top this all off, U.S.-British strikes on Iraqi air defense targets two weeks ago, intended to protect allied pilots from increasing Iraqi threats, drew fire, not only from the usual suspects, but also from the Arab states we are ostensibly protecting and from our partners on the Security Council.

"We must face it, Saddam has won the propaganda war. He is a ruthless despot who refuses to spend all that he is allowed to for his people's well-being. Nevertheless, the United States is blamed for the suffering of the Iraqi people.

"What can we do in response? Will we return our inspectors to Iraq? What sacrifices on sanctions must we make to get them in? And will any such inspections be worth those sacrifices? I doubt it.

"We are going to have to face the fact that after ten years, sanctions have not achieved their intended goal of denying Iraq weapons of mass destruction. If that remains our goal today—and I certainly hope it does—then we need to ask whether

any refinement to this sanctions system will achieve that goal. I would like to hear your opinion on this question.

“If we weaken our sanctions we must strengthen other aspects of U.S. policy. The 2000 Republican Platform called for the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act and support for the Iraqi opposition. I, along with many of my colleagues, have long supported that policy and hope the administration will work to advance it.

“The threat that Iraq poses to its own people and to the decent nations of this world will continue as long as Saddam remains in power. To my mind, there is only one way to deal with this problem—to get rid of Saddam. This is how I propose we start this process:

- We should use our available resources (in the form of drawdown and economic support) to bolster the opposition and fully implement the Iraq Liberation Act.
- We must stop spending money holding conferences for the opposition and begin to train and, when necessary, arm them.
- We ought to unilaterally declare that the southern no-fly zone will be a no-drive zone as well.
- We should expand our rules of engagement to include WMD targets and potentially other targets as well.

“This is where we should begin. I look forward to hearing what you think,” Brownback said.

Senator Brownback is chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Witnesses at the hearing included: the Honorable Bob Kerrey, President, New School University, New York, NY; the Honorable Richard N. Perle, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, Washington, DC; Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC; Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all of our panelists, and a special hello to Senator Kerrey. It is good to see you here, Bob.

I want to thank all of you for being here, and I think this is a really important time to look very closely at our policy in Iraq. The chairman and I have worked together on a variety of different bills. I do not know how much in agreement or disagreement we are. This is a time when we go through some important rethinking.

Let me just say at the beginning there is one obvious point of agreement, which is that I think Saddam Hussein truly one of the most dangerous individuals in the world, there is no question about that in my mind, and therefore a major, major challenge. I am pleased that the administration is going through a reevaluation of our policy.

A year ago, and I think Secretary Halperin might remember this, I posed several ideas to the Clinton administration about how we might look at the existing sanctions regime, and my idea was that we would have a stricter monitoring on weapons-related activity, but that maybe what we would do is look at the economic sanctions and think about more flexibility, and I would like to include that letter in the record if I could, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BROWNBACK. Without objection.

[The letter referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, DC, March 22, 2000.

President WILLIAM J. CLINTON
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

As the UN Security Council continues to press to ensure Iraq's compliance with its international inspection obligations, and officials of your administration actively review policy options on Iraq, we are writing to express our deep concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis there, and to urge greater US efforts at the United Nations to address it.

We have been heartened by recent press reports that you are considering ways to ease the devastating effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi people. Although the current oil-for-food program (expanded under Security Council Resolution 1284, adopted in December, 1999) provides for some infrastructure repairs, as a temporary relief program it cannot adequately provide the longer-term planning and investment required to restore Iraq's civilian infrastructure to a level necessary to meet even the most basic civilian necessities. Those longer-term infrastructure improvements, coupled with expanded and accelerated humanitarian relief, are key to addressing the ongoing crisis.

We recognize that Iraq poses a series of complex problems. On the one hand, we are confronted with the Iraqi government's persistent refusal to meet its international obligations with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as well as its record of wholesale human rights abuses. On the other, the comprehensive UN sanctions regime has contributed to a humanitarian crisis that has seriously affected the health and well-being of millions of innocent Iraqis. It is clear that the policies of the Iraqi government have greatly compounded and magnified the humanitarian crisis, and that the government does not intend to make the welfare of its civilian population its priority. While the Iraqi government bears the lion's share of responsibility for the unnecessary civilian suffering due to its refusal to comply with the UN weapons inspection program—a refusal underscored by recent widespread, though largely speculative, media reports about its possible efforts to rebuild certain of its WMD capacities—this does not excuse the international community from its own humanitarian obligations.

As one distinguished international human rights monitoring group recently observed, "The Iraqi government's callous and manipulative disregard for its humanitarian obligations is not something the Security Council can reasonably expect will change. Rather, it is a reality the Council must take into account in deciding the appropriate means of securing the government's compliance with its disarmament demands."

The Iraqi government has proven indifferent to the suffering of its own people; we cannot afford to be similarly indifferent. Thus we believe that the administration should take urgent steps to better reconcile enforcement of its disarmament objectives in Iraq with its obligation to minimize harm to innocent Iraqi civilians and to ensure protection of their most basic rights.

The Security Council's own report last year on the deteriorating humanitarian situation; the comprehensive UNICEF survey on child health; and reports from other relief agencies in the field, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), make clear that a public health emergency persists in many areas of the country, and that efforts under the oil-for-food program to alleviate these conditions have been woefully inadequate. Indeed, a senior ICRC official recently warned that the increasingly precarious situation in the public infrastructure posed an imminent threat to the survival of those hospitals still functioning.

We believe it is critical that we do what we can now to address directly this public health emergency. This requires restoring Iraq's civilian economic infrastructure in order to bring child mortality rates and other public health indicators back as close as possible to the levels that existed prior to the embargo. With this in mind, we strongly urge your administration to take the following initiatives:

First, in the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee, push to implement immediately the recommendations of the report of the Council's humanitarian panel last March. Many of these recommendations, such as pre-approval of humanitarian items and using oil-for-food funds to purchase local Iraqi products and to hire and train Iraqi workers and professionals to undertake civilian infrastructure repairs and maintenance, are in Resolution 1284, but are conditioned on further steps by the Council or the Committee. We are pleased to note that the Sanctions Committee has begun the preapproval process for humanitarian items and urge you to take steps to ensure that these measures are implemented without further delay.

Second, take all necessary steps to persuade the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee to take more seriously its acknowledged obligation to monitor the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, especially on vulnerable sectors of the population such as children and the elderly. If necessary, we believe you should press for an independent monitor such as a Special UN Rapporteur to assess the impact of the sanctions and the effectiveness of the oil-for-food program in addressing that impact, and to scrutinize the practices of the Iraqi government with respect to dis-

tribution of aid to its own people. You should also insist on greater transparency in the deliberations and decisions of the Sanctions Committee. While we recognize there may be circumstances in which decisions of the committee must remain internal matters, we believe its decision-making process should be made more transparent, and thus less susceptible to charges of politicization.

Third, we urge you to press the Security Council to establish an international criminal tribunal mandated to investigate, indict, and prosecute Iraqi leaders and former officials against whom credible evidence exists of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Such an initiative will at a minimum help enforce the continued political isolation of the government, even as steps are taken to lessen the economic isolation that has impoverished much of the population. It represents the kind of targeted sanction that should be directed against those responsible for those Iraqi policies we want to change. In addition, we believe you should press for multilateral steps to further isolate regime officials by freezing any of their remaining assets abroad, restricting their travel and that of their family members, increasing political and diplomatic pressure on any nations who may be allowing, directly or indirectly, transfers of sanctioned materials, and taking any other similar steps you deem necessary.

Finally, we urge you to endorse a relaxation and restructuring of the economic embargo on Iraq, while continuing and even tightening where possible strict prohibitions on military imports. Such a restructuring would permit import of a broader range of non-military goods in order to allow the revival of the civilian economy. We recognize that an important goal of the present sanctions is to block the government's access to foreign exchange which could be used to finance imports for military and weapons-development purposes. We support that objective, but we do not believe the current approach is justifiable, or even sustainable. Instead, we believe the administration should, while maintaining current commercial and military flight restrictions, work with its Security Council partners to establish a new regime. Some variation of a proposal made recently by Human Rights Watch, which would make Iraqi imports liable to inspection at all major ports of entry, seems to us worthy of consideration. We recognize that some new expense would be required by such an effort, and would assume that it would be funded out of Iraq's export revenues, just as UNSCOM expenses have been since 1991.

Rather than a system geared primarily to deciding what to allow in, the efforts and resources of the international community under an alternative approach like this would be redirected primarily to keeping out of Iraq military goods and products likely to be used for military purposes. While the current lists of prohibited items—from the Missile Control Technology Regime, the Schedules of Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies and the Munitions List of the Wassenaar Arrangement, for example—should be maintained, relaxing import restrictions on certain categories of civilian-use items not on such lists would be an important step. Maintaining close yet transparent Security Council scrutiny of contracts to import items that have dual-use applications, coupled with a strong end-use monitoring regime, would further help. We assume such an approach would require development of an expanded list of items which, once the general category is licensed for import, need not be further approved by the Sanctions Committee, but rather only by the Secretariat under its routine review process. Of course, this would have to be coupled with an end-use monitoring program which includes UN monitoring teams on the ground, in order to prevent diversion of such items for nefarious purposes.

This new approach does not represent a fail-safe means of containing Iraq's proliferation threat, or ensuring compliance with relevant Security Council obligations. But we must point out that neither does the present arrangement. Baghdad still has access to limited amounts of foreign exchange, and we understand that there are no border inspections of goods entering the country except, ironically, those already cleared by the Sanctions Committee. We understand further that any such changes to the current regime would require a considerable investment, politically as well as financially. There is no painless or cost-free way of addressing the Iraq's government's unwillingness to abide by its disarmament commitments. The point is that the pain and cost should not continue to be borne primarily by millions of ordinary innocent Iraqis.

Mr. President, you and Secretary Albright have repeatedly observed that our quarrel is not with the Iraqi people. We agree. But regrettably our Iraq policy has too often had its most devastating impact on those Iraqis who bear no responsibility for the policies that we are trying to sanction, and change. We have an obligation, under the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not to destroy or undermine the right of a people to an adequate standard of living, freedom from hunger, and the highest attainable standards of health. For this reason we

urge you to adopt the recommendations we have made in this letter, which in our view strike a better balance between legitimate non-proliferation concerns and those involving our humanitarian obligations to the people of Iraq—and may even be more effective in securing Iraq's eventual compliance than the current arrangement.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

PAUL D. WELLSTONE,
United States Senator.

RUSSELL FEINGOLD,
United States Senator.

Senator WELLSTONE. Secretary Powell last week I think has raised some important questions, and his idea, as I understand it, of a stronger international effort to block Iraqi imports of arms and other military items, coupled with an easing of nonmilitary items and a more flexible approach to items that serve civilian needs I think could form the basis of a new international consensus on Iraq sanctions, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will get into a discussion of what I think is a very important question.

Look, first of all, I am not the expert, and second of all, this is far from simple, and you have got a government that has not been willing to comply with, at least for 2 years, plus now, any arms inspection, you have got a government that is involved in widespread and brutal human rights abuses, and there is no question that this is a real challenge.

But I do think that there are questions that can be raised about the sanctions regime, and I also want to just pose two other questions as we engage in some hopefully hard thinking about Iraq. One of them is, we have been doing this—the policy of overflying Iraq has been in place now for years. It puts our pilots in danger on a daily basis, but I do not think it has changed the Government of Iraq's behavior at all, and I know that Senator Kerrey has been outspoken, as you have, Mr. Chairman, in support of the Iraq Liberation Act, but I think we ought to think very carefully about whether or not we want to provide lethal military weapons to the Iraqi opposition.

I mean, if we do so, we risk overcommitting ourselves and leading the opposition to believe that the United States military will intervene if its fledgling efforts should falter, and I think the question we have got to deal with—and Senator Kerrey is always very direct. He is known for that, but are we prepared to rescue the Iraqi opposition—I mean, I think we need to deal with that question in this hearing—or are we prepared to let it die again?

Now, if the current Government of Iraq should implode, we should be ready to move ahead with a generous assistance package to help Iraq develop a vibrant and democratic society, but by most informed accounts the opposition appears to be splintered, and weak, and may have little realistic chance of removing Saddam Hussein from power.

I welcome again Senator Kerrey, Mort Halperin, Tony Cordesman, and Richard Perle to the hearing, and I look forward to your views, and I think really this committee, this is very timely, very important, and I really look forward to the discussion we are going to have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE

I welcome this hearing on our policy toward Iraq as the Administration initiates a comprehensive review that could have far-reaching consequences for U.S. relations with the Arab world. The beginning of a new Administration is an appropriate time to review our policies and, where necessary, to recraft them in a way that meets the changing political and humanitarian concerns in the Middle East. A year ago, in the midst of the Clinton Administration's own Iraq policy review, I posed several ideas about how to apply the existing sanctions regime more flexibly while preserving strict monitoring of any weapons-related activity. I would like to insert into the Committee record a copy of the letter I wrote to the President outlining those ideas.

In this regard, Secretary Powell's trip last week to consult with our friends and allies in the Middle East was an extremely important initiative. The ideas that he discussed—a stronger international effort to block Iraqi imports of arms and military-related items coupled with an easing of non-military items and a more flexible approach to items that serve essential civilian needs—could form the basis of a new international consensus on Iraq sanctions. I hope that this hearing will help us put these ideas into perspective.

Iraq poses a series of complex questions for policy makers. On the one hand, we are confronted with the Iraqi government's persistent refusal to meet its obligations with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as well as its record of wholesale human rights abuses. At the same time, the comprehensive UN sanctions regime has contributed to a longstanding humanitarian crisis that has seriously affected the health and well-being of millions of innocent Iraqis. It is clear that the policies of the Iraqi government have greatly compounded and magnified the humanitarian crisis, and that the government has not made the welfare of its civilian population a priority. Even so, it has long seemed to me that a new approach on sanctions which allows much greater flexibility in the sanctions regime for obviously humanitarian goods and for certain dual use goods makes a lot of sense.

It is true that the Iraqi government bears the lion's share of responsibility for unnecessary civilian suffering due to its persistent refusal to comply with the UN weapons inspection program. This refusal is underscored by widespread media reports about Iraq's possible effort to rebuild certain of its WMD capacities. However, the callous behavior of the Iraqi government does not excuse the international community from its own humanitarian obligations.

I believe that we ought to explore further Secretary Powell's initiative, refine it, and see if constructive alternative approaches can be developed in place of the current stalemate. We need some hard thinking on Iraq. Our policy of overlying Iraq has been in place for years and puts our pilots in danger on a daily basis but has not changed the government of Iraq's behavior. I know that Senator Kerrey has been outspoken in his support for the Iraq Liberation Act, but we need to think carefully whether to support providing lethal military weapons to the Iraqi opposition. We risk overcommitting ourselves and leading the opposition to believe that the United States military will intervene if its fledgling efforts should falter. Are we prepared to rescue the Iraqi opposition? Are we prepared to let it die again?

If the current government in Iraq should implode, certainly we should be prepared to move ahead with a generous assistance package to help Iraq develop a vibrant and democratic society. But, by most informed accounts, the opposition appears splintered and weak and may have little realistic chance of removing Saddam Hussein from power.

I welcome Senator Kerrey, Mort Halpern, Richard Perle, and Tony Cordesman to the hearing today and look forward to hearing their views.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Wellstone.
Senator Thomas.

Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will look forward to it also. Therefore, I will pass to let the panelists begin. Thank you.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. I think this is your first time back to the Senate, Bob. The first witness up will be Hon. Bob Kerrey, former Senator from the great State of Nebraska, second best basketball team in the states between Kansas and Nebraska, and current president of the New School University in New York. Bob, welcome back. We are delighted to have you here.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. KERREY, PRESIDENT, NEW SCHOOL UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

Senator KERREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Wellstone, Senator Thomas, it is good to see all of you again. It is nice to have a chance to come back, especially to talk on this particular subject. Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement that is a bit mangled, but I would like to ask unanimous consent that it be put in the record, and I will try not to drag this out too long.

First, I would observe that on Monday we had the opportunity to watch a very moving ceremony in Kuwait with General Schwarzkopf and Secretary Powell and former President Bush celebrating the 10-year anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait. That liberation occurred on 26 February, 1991. Two days later, on the 28th, yesterday, we celebrated the cease-fire of that rather remarkable 208-day occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and the driving of the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait was celebrated quite correctly as a remarkable demonstration of power used for good in a multilateral, multinational way.

My guess is, starting that from scratch today people would say it cannot be done, it could not be done, et cetera, but it was a rather remarkable accomplishment.

Well, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, a lot has happened in the decade since, and I do think it is important to look at that history. I am not going to go through all of the details, but I would like to describe five important things that have happened in the last 10 years that I think are enormously relevant to the discussion and help frame the debate for what we are going to do going forward.

First, after that cease-fire was declared, Iraq agreed to allow United Nations weapons inspectors to verify that Iraq had destroyed its capacity to manufacture biological and nuclear weapons. Until verification was complete, the United Nations Security Council voted to enforce external sanctions that would permit Iraq to sell oil for food and medicine that they needed for domestic consumption.

The time it was estimated to get this done was in months if Saddam Hussein cooperated, and what has come to be quite common practice, he confounded expectations by interfering, by harassing, and in the end banning the weapons inspectors from the territory. Now, reliable intelligence, I say to this committee, has confirmed the reason for Iraq's behavior. It is quite simply, they want to maintain a robust program to develop weapons of mass destruction.

The second thing that needs to be considered over the last 10 years is that Iraq has maintained a policy so hostile to human rights, especially for the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shia in the south, and I would say, Senator Wellstone, I think if you stop those no-fly operations we would have Kurds dying in the north and Shias dying in the south, and they are alive today as a consequence of those no-fly zones being maintained.

No dissent is possible inside of Iraq. Thousands have been imprisoned, tortured, and executed for opposing the current regime. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, with or without sanctions, the 20 million people of Iraq deserve to have the United States of America on the side of their freedom.

Third, we have sustained a military effort to contain Iraq, and that military effort has cost us lives. U.S. and British pilots fly almost daily, as Senator Wellstone observed, to enforce the no-fly zones in the north and in the south, but Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we have also maintained a presence at the Dahran military installation in Saudi Arabia, and the significance of that is that this installation, part of our containment policy, was the target of a truck bomb attack on 25 June, 1996, that killed 19 U.S. airmen. It was cited by Osama bin Laden as a reason for attacking U.S. Embassies in Africa on August 17, 1998, that killed 11 Americans and over 200 others. Our military presence was cited again when the USS *Cole* was attacked on October 12, 2000 in the Port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors.

I point this out, Mr. Chairman, because when the debate occurs as to whether or not military force is needed, do not forget that we already have a very expensive military operation in place today. The question is not, should we have a military operation. The question is, how should that military operation be deployed?

Fourth, when he signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law on October 31, 1998, President Clinton began the process of shifting away from the failed policy of using military force to contain Iraq to supporting military force to replace the military dictatorship of Saddam Hussein with a democratically elected government and, although our support for opposition forces has been uneven at best, this new policy is still current law.

Fifth, Mr. Chairman, opponents of establishing our policy objective as liberation of the people of Iraq use a number of effective arguments, and I would like to cite them, because I would like to also refute them. They say, we would never get the support for a military operation. They say that democracy will not work in Iraq, that Arabs are not capable of governing themselves. They say finally that the opposition forces lacks the legitimacy and capability and in particular the most visible organization, the Iraq National Congress, lacks the coherency and ability to get the job done.

Well, Mr. Chairman, I am very much aware that these arguments gather force when they are not answered, so I would like to answer all three. First, these arguments are little more than excuses, in my view, designed to keep us from doing what we know we should do, and we know what we can do if our will is strong.

The argument against military force encourages us to ignore the hundreds of millions that we spend every single year to contain Iraq, and the 47 American lives that have already been lost to enforce this containment policy.

The argument that Arabs cannot govern themselves is racist. It encourages us to ignore a million Arab-Americans who exercise their rights when those rights are protected by a constitution and law, and the argument against the Iraq National Congress [INC] is little more than a parroting of Saddam Hussein's propaganda.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am very much aware that domestic and international support has been steadily eroding for continuing sanctions against Iraq, let alone a new military strategy to end the nightmare of this dictatorship. I have watched with growing sadness as Iraq has exploited the public's

lack of memory, the Clinton administration's silence, and the world's appetite for its production of 4 million barrels of oil a day.

I have read the reports of Secretary Colin Powell's return to Kuwait this week, and the difficulty that he is having convincing our allies that we must stay the course in opposing the Iraqi regime. I have read proposals by informed commentators to try to get the best deal we can at this point, including one by Mr. Tom Freidman that would offer an end to sanctions and U.S. recognition in exchange for allowing U.S. inspectors to verify weapons of mass destruction are not being built in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I urge you not to go along with the flow. This flow of public opinion in my opinion will lead us in the wrong direction. The United States should push back hard in the opposite direction, and the reason, Mr. Chairman, is simple. Saddam Hussein's Iraq represents a triple threat to us, to our allies in the region, and to the 20 million people who have the misfortune to live in a country where torture and killing of political opposition has become so routine it is rarely reported.

Iraq is a threat to us because they have the wealth and the will to build weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, and nuclear. Since the end of the gulf war in 1991, Saddam Hussein has lied and cheated his way out of the inspection regime and has succeeded in convincing too many world leaders to overlook the danger he opposes to them. Iraq is a threat to allies in the region because Iraq has displayed no remorse, and no regret for its invasion of Kuwait. Instead, they continue to justify their illegal act and condemn the U.S.-led effort which forced them to surrender the territory to their neighbor after inflicting inestimable damage to Kuwait.

The Iraqi Government is a threat to their own people, especially the Kurds in the northern provinces and the Shia in the south. Mr. Chairman, without our willingness to maintain no-fly zones in the north and south, thousands more innocents would have died from Iraqi military assaults. It is by no means clear-cut that Iraqi civilians are suffering as a consequence of our sanctions. What is clear-cut is that the Iraqi people are suffering as a consequence of Saddam Hussein's policy of diverting United Nations money away from needed food and medicine to rebuilding his palaces and his military.

So Mr. Chairman, I come here today to urge you to stay the course, join with President Bush, and tell him to imagine returning to Baghdad himself 10 years from now to celebrate the liberation of Iraq. In my view, it is possible. In the view of the Iraqi people, the people living in the region, and the people of the United States of America, it is also desirable.

So what, specifically, can we do? Well, let me just offer modestly, in the spirit of bipartisan foreign policy, and in the words of a group of now senior Bush administration officials who wrote the letter to President Clinton in 1998, there are three things that would be the beginning of the end of Saddam Hussein's reign of terror. First, we should recognize a provisional Government of Iraq based on the principles and leaders of the Iraq National Congress that is representative of all the peoples of Iraq.

Second, Mr. Chairman, we should restore and we should enhance the safe haven in northern Iraq that would allow a provisional gov-

ernment to extend its authority there, and establish a zone in southern Iraq from which Saddam's ground forces would also be excluded.

Third, we should lift the sanctions in the liberated areas.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, these three moves in my view would signal that the United States of America will not yield ground to the world's worst and most dangerous dictator, and we would send a signal to the people of Iraq that we will not be satisfied until they are free to determine their own fate.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you again for your invitation to hear my views.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kerrey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. KERREY

Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, thank you for this invitation to testify on the question of what United States policy should be regarding Iraq.

This week marks the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait on February 26, 2001. On February 28, 1991, a cease fire was declared. The world had witnessed a breath-taking exhibition of U.S. led coalition power that ended the 208 day Iraqi invasion.

A lot has happened in the decade since. The detail of that history is terribly important for those who want to understand what we should do today. I will not take time to review all this detail but will summarize five points I believe are most important:

First, following a cease fire Iraq agreed to allow United Nations weapons inspectors to verify that Iraq had destroyed its capacity to manufacture chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Until verification was complete the United Nations would enforce external sanctions that permitted Iraq to sell oil for food and medicine. The time needed to complete this inspection would have been a few months, if Saddam Hussein cooperated. As has come to be common practice Iraq confounded expectations by interfering, harassing and finally banning the weapons inspectors from its territory. Reliable intelligence has confirmed the reason for their behavior to be simple: They want to maintain robust programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Second, Iraq has maintained a policy so hostile to human rights—especially for the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shia in the south—that no dissent is possible. Thousands have been imprisoned, tortured, and executed for opposing the current regime. With or without sanctions the 20 million people of Iraq deserve to have the United States on the side of their freedom.

Third, we have sustained a military effort to contain Iraq and that military effort has cost us lives. U.S. and British pilots fly almost daily to enforce a no-fly zone in northern Iraq that has saved the lives of Kurds and a no-fly zone in southern Iraq that has saved the lives of Shia. We have also maintained a presence at the Dhahran military installation in Saudi Arabia. This installation was a target of a truck bomb on June 25, 1996, that killed 19 U.S. airmen. It was cited by Osama bin Laden as a reason for attacking U.S. embassies in west Africa on August 7, 1998, that killed 11 Americans and over 200 others. Our military presence was cited again when the U.S.S. *Cole* was attacked on October 12, 2000, in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors. So when the issue of military force is debated do not forget that we have an expensive military operation in place now. The question is not should our military be used; the question is how.

Fourth, when he signed the Iraqi Liberation Act into law on October 31, 1998, President Clinton began the process of shifting away from the failed policy of using military force to contain Iraq to supporting military force to replace the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein with a democratically elected government. Although our support for opposition forces has been uneven at best this new policy is still current law.

Fifth, opponents of establishing our policy objective as liberation of the people of Iraq have used a number of effective arguments to keep the status quo in place. They say we would never get support for a military operation. They also say that democracy won't work in Iraq, that Arabs aren't capable of governing themselves. Finally, they attack the legitimacy and capability of the most visible organization, the Iraqi National Congress. But these arguments are little more than excuses designed to keep us from doing what we know we should do and can do if our will

is strong. The argument against military forces encourages us to ignore the hundreds of millions spent each year to contain Iraq and the 47 American lives lost since containment began. The argument that Arabs cannot govern themselves is racist and encourages us to ignore a million Arab Americans who exercise their rights when they are protected by constitution and law. The argument against the I.N.C. is little more than a parroting of Saddam Hussein's propaganda.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee I am very much aware that domestic and international support has been steadily eroding for continuing sanctions against Iraq let alone a new military strategy to end the nightmare of this dictatorship. I have watched with growing sadness as Iraq has exploited the public's lack of memory, the Clinton administration's silence, and the world's appetite for its production of 4 million barrels of oil a day.

I have read the reports of Secretary of State Colin Powell's return to Kuwait this week and the difficulty he is having convincing our allies that we must stay the course in opposing the Iraqi regime. I have read proposals by informed commentators to try to get the best deal we can at this point including one by Mr. Tom Friedman that would offer an end to sanctions and U.S. recognition in exchange for allowing U.S. inspectors to verify that weapons of mass destruction are not being built in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee I urge you not to go along with the flow of public opinion. The United States push back hard in the opposite direction. The reason is simple: Saddam Hussein's Iraq represents a triple threat to us, to our allies in the region and to the 20 million people who have the misfortune to live in a country where torture and killing of political opposition has become so routine it is rarely reported.

Iraq is a threat to us because they have the wealth and the will to build weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological and nuclear. Since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 Saddam Hussein has lied and cheated his way out of the inspection regime and has succeeded in convincing too many world leaders to overlook the danger he poses to them. Iraq is a threat to allies in the region because they have displayed no remorse or regret for their invasion of Kuwait. Instead they continue to justify their illegal act and condemn the U.S. led effort which forced them to surrender the territory of their neighbor after inflicting inestimable damage to Kuwait.

The Iraqi government is a threat to their own peoples especially the Kurds in the northern provinces and the Shia in the south. Without our willingness to maintain no-fly zones in the north and south thousands more innocents would have died from Iraqi military assaults. It is by no means clear-cut that Iraqi civilians are suffering as a consequence of sanctions. What is clear cut is that the Iraqi people are suffering as a consequence of Saddam Hussein's policy of diverting United Nations monies away from much needed food and medicine to rebuilding his palaces and his military.

So, I have come here today to urge you to stay the course. Join with President Bush and tell him to imagine returning to Baghdad ten years from now to celebrate the liberation of Iraq. In my view it is possible. In the view of the Iraqi people, the people living in the region and the people of the United States of America it is also desirable.

What specifically can we do? In the spirit of bi-partisan foreign policy and in the words a group of now senior Bush administration officials used in a 1998 letter to then President Clinton here are three things that would be the beginning of the end of Saddam Hussein's reign of terror:

1. Recognize a provisional government of Iraq based on the principles and leaders of the Iraq National Congress (INC) that is representative of all the peoples of Iraq;
2. Restore and enhance the safe haven in northern Iraq to allow a provisional government to extend its authority there and establish a zone in southern Iraq from which Saddam's ground forces would also be excluded;
3. Lift sanctions in the liberated areas.

Mr. Chairman and members of the foreign relations committee these three moves would signal that the United States will not yield ground to the world's worse and most dangerous dictator. And we would signal to the people of Iraq that we will not be satisfied until they are free to determine their own fate.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. Thank you for the powerful statement and the clarity of it, and I look forward to having a good discussion on these points as we go on through.

Mr. Cordesman, let us hear your testimony next if we could. Thank you for joining us.

**STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE
CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I do have a formal statement which I would appreciate it if it could be incorporated into the record, but I would make only a brief statement.

Senator BROWNBACK. It will be included in the record.

Mr. CORDESMAN. I think I should preface my remarks with the fact that you cannot have an Iraq policy that works without a new policy in dealing with the Arab-Israeli peace issue, without rethinking your policy toward Iran, and without broadening our diplomacy, which has focused in the last 2 years almost exclusively on the peace process to consider how you can buildup a stronger basis of support in the southern gulf.

But if I may address your question, is Saddam better off today, the answer is yes, in some ways. There is one area where he is clearly not better off. If you look back at the rate of arms imports that he had until the embargo in mid-1990, by now he would have spent anywhere from \$22 to \$45 billion on arms imports. He has not had any major imports of arms since mid-1990, although there has been smuggling, and some technology transfer.

In spite of demonstrations of prototypes, there has been no serial production of a single major weapons system within Iraq. There has been the assembly of some T-72 kits. I think we have only to think what would happen in the United States if we froze the technology base for 10 years, if we could not have reacted to the lessons of the gulf war, and if our military establishment consisted of worn equipment that was used in the Iraq-Iran war, in large part, before it was certainly worn in the gulf war.

In terms of weapons of mass destruction, it is an unfortunate reality that during the gulf war we had only a limited number of successful strikes on these facilities. Nevertheless, the gulf war forced UNSCOM into Iraq, and we should not discount what happened. Several billion dollars' worth of manufacturing facilities, weapons, and technology, was physically destroyed.

As you pointed out, however, his technology base remains. It is virtually certain that he has had a decade in which to improve that technology base. Certain key aspects of that base, particularly the production of centrifuges and advanced biological weapons, could never be traced by UNSCOM, which raises further questions about UNMOVIC. He has the stockpiles to probably create a significant break-out capability, and rapidly deploy some of these weapons.

In economic terms, the benefits to him are clear. Since 1990 economic sanctions have eroded to the point where Iraq has at least \$1 billion worth of uncontrolled income from smuggled petroleum exports. Its legal oil revenues in 2000 are estimated at roughly \$22 billion, which is about 90 percent higher than they were the previous year, and 170 percent higher than the year before that.

It is clear even from reports that focus on the hardship of the Iraqi people that he is succeeding in controlling how these imports of humanitarian goods and medical goods are used. They are going to the elite. They are going to urban areas. They are not going to the Shiites, they are not going to the center, and they are not going to the Kurdish population that is not in the Kurdish security zone. It is equally clear that consumer goods, some of them luxury goods, are going to the elite around Saddam, to senior officers in the Republican Guards, and to the security forces.

As a result, I believe that we should refocus actions to concentrate on long-term efforts to ensure Saddam cannot import conventional weapons, and that technology and equipment to produce weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the phrase, "smart sanctions," is not by itself a policy, even in dealing with Iraq, and there are seven areas where I believe we are going to have to change that policy.

First, we will never have consensus that restricts the flow of arms and military technology to Saddam Hussein. There are too many suppliers. There are too many types of dual-use items. There are nations, North Korea, Russia, and China, which have cheated on every arms control agreement that they have participated in. To make smart sanctions work at all, there are two price tags, and they still will not ensure any kind of leak-proof regime.

One is a massive intelligence effort to trace what is happening on the part of supplier nations and entities. The other is something we have not been good at in the past, confrontational diplomacy that will really go to countries which violate any controls and confront them and possibly sanction them under other laws targeted to deal with these specific imports. It is very easy to talk about intentions, but the whole history of proliferation is that broad agreements simply fail.

Second, I think we should come to grips with the fact that at this point in time, even if we could get UNMOVIC back into Iraq, and Saddam has shown no signs of the willingness to permit this, it might well do more harm than good. The history of similar regimes, particularly the IAEA, even when we had inspections, was that they were willing to basically certify Saddam was in compliance by saying they could not find evidence he was not in compliance. We have not had aggressive inspections since early 1997 and, quite frankly, I do not believe a U.N. regime would get the political support to have such inspections. Furthermore, I think it is simply too late to find the dispersed cells and operations which have been built up since the mid-1990's.

Where I do disagree with Senator Kerrey and, I think, others of the panel, is I do not believe that focusing on the Iraqi opposition is no more than a forlorn hope. It would be nice if it could develop military capabilities. It would be nice if it had the support of the countries in the region. It would be nice if it had resonance inside Iraq. I do not believe it has that support. I think the other panelists here disagree with me, but for many of the people in the region, they are a tool that would divide Iraq, and certainly the Saudis and the Kuwaitis have raised issue to me at some length. The Turks fear them as a way of dividing Iraq and creating a Kurdistan.

I wish, again, this situation was different. I recognize that at this point in time the United States has major problems in generating the kind of patient, systematic, covert effort to develop internal opposition that might work. Unless we do this, however, I think we will find ourselves legislating the funding of a forlorn hope.

Fourth, as has been previously mentioned, I think we made a massive foreign policy mistake in not confronting Saddam and in not refuting the lies that he told over a 10-year period. I can think of only two statements from the State Department that ever systematically attempted to explain what was happening under oil for food, and who the true cause of many of Iraq's problems were. One was a glorified publicity release, and the other was a page-and-a-half long.

In contrast, every day, Saddam has fought for the minds of the Arab world. He has been able to capture the hardship issue. He has been able to find, among people who do not understand Iraq, many supporters that blame the United States and sanctions for actions which are more those of Saddam than any impact of the U.N. Unless we are willing, now, to try to recover smart sanctions will simply be a step forward toward no sanctions, and the question really is, can the State Department have that kind of effort.

Fifth, and I say this in my testimony, the United States must think now about the future of Iraq's Kurds. I was in the U.S. Embassy in Iran in the early 1970's. I watched the United States support the Shah of Iran in using the Kurds as a political tool. I watched them abandoned after the Algiers Accord. I think we must have a clear policy toward autonomy, clear demands as to what Kurdish rights should be.

And to go back to the no-fly zones, I would absolutely agree that if we withdrew from Turkey, we withdraw from any protection of the Kurds, and whether the result is an immediate occupation and slaughter, or the kind of more patient and systematic killing which Saddam has used on other occasions, those are the only two alternatives.

Sixth, we talk about smart sanctions, but I have not heard anything about energy. In our projections we say, in the Department of Energy, we want Iraq's production capacity to increase from roughly 2.8 million barrels a day today to 6.2 million in 2020, and we see Iraq as a critical component of our future energy strategy. It is far from clear that that makes sense, but somebody has got to resolve the issue.

Finally, we need to revitalize the other aspects of military containment. One key goal is to improve and maintain the forward presence rapid-deployment capabilities and war-fighting capability we have today.

Another goal is to stop preaching. We have got to stop issuing strong statements and then not following them up with decisive military action. The best description I can give of military options under the Clinton administration was that the President spoke stickily and carried a big soft. I wish there were some better or nicer way to put it, but we need a formal doctrine that states our "red lines," that states quite clearly what we demand in terms of gulf security, that we will remain committed to military contain-

ment and close commitment with our gulf allies as long as there is threat from Iran and Iraq.

We need to define the kind of Iraqi action that would lead us to launch military action and, if Iraq does take such action, we need to strike so hard and so decisively that the military and political costs to Saddam will outweigh the political propaganda gains he makes from small pinprick strikes. In short, we would be much better off if we struck once every 2 years in ways which have a crippling impact on some part of Saddam's military machine, than through endless, pointless missions against air defense targets he can reconstitute.

We also have to persist to the point where we are successful. What we did on September 16 was to carry out half a strike with no followup. We did not send a message of decisive action. Our message, I suspect, to Iraq and the gulf was we may have hit a third of our targets. That is not victory.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cordesman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

IRAQ AND AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A decade ago, under a different President Bush, we emerged out of a major foreign policy crisis in the Middle East with the most advantageous position we had had since World War II. We had led a broad coalition to victory against Iraq. In the process, we demonstrated that we could be a strong and reliable friend of the Arab world, and we created many of the conditions that made a search for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace process possible. We created the conditions for military containment of both Iran and Iraq, we had the firm support of our European allies, and we built bridges to Russia and China that allowed us to act together in dealing with peace and security issues in the Middle East.

We now face a foreign policy crisis in the Middle East under another President Bush that Secretary Powell's visit can only begin to deal with. Part of that crisis is not of our making. The Middle East is all too correctly described as a region where nations, "never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." Its leaders also tend to repeat the mistakes of the Bourbon dynasty in France, of which it was said, "They forgot nothing and they learned nothing." We have, however, made many serious mistakes of our own, and much of our present foreign policy crisis in the region is the result of self-inflicted wounds.

IRAQ AND THE BACKLASH FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

Iraq is one key area where we made such mistakes, but Iraq cannot be discussed without touching upon the Arab-Israeli conflict and our policy towards Iran. In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we face months and probably years of backlash from the failure to create a peace between Israel and Syria and between Israel and the Palestinians. It may not be fair, but all sides blame the US for the failure to reach a peace over the last two years. The Arabs feel that the US tilted far too much towards Israel, and was not an honest broker. Many Israelis feel that the US rushed them into concessions that simply led to more Syrian and Palestinian demands and which could have compromised Israel's security. Both sides give us much of the blame for the Second Intifada, and in many Arab eyes we are almost as much to blame for each Palestinian casualty as Israel.

Even in the eyes of some of our most sophisticated Arab allies, and the leaders of their countries, they feel we rushed a peace process forward as part of President Clinton's effort to redeem himself, we failed to consult, we did not listen to warnings that we played with fire in trying to force compromises across basic differences in goals and values, we created false expectations, and we had no exit strategy to deal with failure. There is a feeling that President Clinton acted as a political opportunist, and there is broad resentment of the tendency of senior officials like Secretary Albright to issue moralistic pronouncements and ignore the need to consult and listen.

The end result is that Saddam Hussein has a powerful new weapon to use against the US, as do Iran's hard-liners and every extremist in the Middle East. Nations outside the region can play the peace and Second Intifada cards against us, as nations like France, China, and Russia do. In Saddam's case he attacks every moderate Arab regime as the ally of the US, and therefore the ally of Israel. He provides cash payments to every Palestinian casualty of the Intifada at a time no Arab moderate regime has kept its promises of aid to the Palestinian Authority, and he couples the hardships of the Palestinians to the hardships of his own people.

Is this fair? Of course not! All sides in the region are far more to blame for their problems than we are. Should we tilt towards the Palestinians at the expense of Israel? Never! We will score no lasting successes, and earn no enduring gratitude, by favoring one set of allies at the expense of another and those who truly oppose us and our values cannot be appeased.

What we can do, however, is to change the context of our policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in ways that Secretary Powell may already be attempting. First, we can get out of the middle and stop trying to force the pace. We can actually stop and seriously listen to our allies in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia as well as Israel. We can pay serious attention to the views of Europe, and try to bring Russia actively back into the peace process.

Second, we can clearly define our policy towards Israel. We can make it clear that no amount of threats or outside pressure will block the flow of aid and our commitment to Israel's security. At the same time, we can make it equally clear that our commitment is to Israel and not to the government of the day. Hopefully a unity government will emerge in Israel that will continue to seek an end to violence and which will act prudently and pursue peace. If, however, the Sharon government moves towards extremes, does not sincerely support the search to end violence and a move back towards a peace process, and offers the Palestinians and Syria no way out, we should react accordingly. We should clearly and openly oppose it on these issues without reducing our strategic commitment to Israel in any way.

More broadly, the Bush Administration can provide added humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. It can also firmly oppose the kind of political opportunism that seeks to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem before there is a peace, or which tries to legislate that the same Palestinian leaders we need in trying to end the violence should be treated as terrorists.

IRAQ AND US POLICY TOWARDS IRAN

Iran is another key player in this strategic game. It is a counterweight to Iraq, and its moderates and the faction that supports President Khatami offer some hope that Iran will evolve to the point which it plays a constructive role in the region. This does not mean that the US should tilt towards Iran to counter Iraq. We should, however, realize that the same steps we should take to revise our policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict will undercut the hard-liners and extremists in Iran. We should not soften our diplomatic opposition to Iran's opposition to the peace process and Israel's very existence, support of the Hizbollah and violent Palestinian extremists, to Iran's proliferation, and to Iran's build-up of its military capabilities to threaten the flow of shipping and oil through the Gulf.

At the same time, we recognize that President Khatami and his-supporters do represent a major political shift, and take every valid opportunity to create correct diplomatic relations and a government-to-government dialog. We should support the Saudis, other Southern Gulf states, and Europe in trying to create relationships that encourage moderate Iranian behavior.

We should allow the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to sunset and revoke the executive orders that block trade and energy investment in Iran. These sanctions have not affected Iran's behavior in any way. They have cut us off from Iran's moderates and business class, they have strengthened hard-liners in demonizing us, they have encouraged Iran to proliferate, and Iran has steadily increased its real arms imports and military expenditures since they were passed. Strategically, they have limited Iran's ability to maintain and expand its energy exports at a time when an increase in world oil production capacity is critical to limiting the rise in energy costs.

IRAQ AND THE NEED FOR NEW US POLICY OPTIONS

This brings us to Iraq, and we need to recognize that there are no easy and quick solutions. To begin, we need to understand that no other nation in the world believes that Saddam Hussein's tyranny is fragile, or will support us in military adventures to overthrow his regime, even if we are willing to attempt them. No regime in the region trusts Saddam or is free from fear of him, but key allies like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey regard the Iraqi opposition outside Iraq as weak, divided,

and venal. They record the support that the Congress and Clinton Administration gave to movements like the Iraqi National Congress as a political farce that has little real support beyond Washington's Beltway and the lobby of the Dorchester Hotel. They fear these games could drag them into dangerous and unpopular military adventures, divide Iraq in ways that would favor Iran's hard-liners, and end in a "Bay of Kurdistan" similar to the Bay of Pigs. Many other Iraqis who do oppose Saddam also regard the Iraq Liberation Act and its selective aid to part of the opposition as the kind of overt US support that labels all outside opposition as traitors.

There is a good case for mounting a systematic covert operation to try to overthrow Saddam's regime. There is an equal case for working with our allies—particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—to say that we would waive reparations and debt repayments if a new regime overthrew Saddam. We should also work with our regional allies to find some common approach to Iraqi Kurdish autonomy that we can advocate to protect the Kurds. The plain truth of the matter, however, is that Saddam's regime is not fragile or unpopular with Iraq's military, security forces, and elite. Saddam also now has enough revenue from smuggle oil exports and his manipulation of oil for food to buy all of the support he needs. His supporters now live in relative luxury and economic sanctions hurt only the Iraqi people.

This says a great deal about the future of sanctions. We have absolutely no chance of unifying the UN Security Council around revitalizing economic sanctions or creating support for controls on energy investment in Iraq. France, China, and Russia will oppose us and so will every Arab state and developing nation. Regardless of what Iran, Jordan, the Kurds, Syria, and Turkey say, they also will not crack down on Iraqi petroleum smuggling. Here, the Clinton Administration has also left the Bush Administration with a devastating legacy.

The Clinton Administration never took an effective lead in trying to really make oil for food work and to ensure that the plight of the ordinary Iraqi was eased. It made few efforts to counter Saddam's endless propaganda effort to exploit the hardship of his own people, and the efforts it did make were so sporadic and lacking in depth as to be totally unconvincing. Few in the Arab world know that nearly half of the flow of goods under oil for food have been held up or manipulated by Saddam's regime.

It is simply too late to win this aspect of the battle for the minds of the Arab world, although the Bush Administration has every incentive to carry out a systematic effort to refute Saddam's charges, make it clear that he is the principal problem in oil for food, and that he systematically lies about the causes and scale of Iraq's health problems, infant mortality, and other social problems.

The US can still, however, work with its allies to make sanctions what Secretary Powell has called "smart," or "narrow but deep." Many nations will join us in opposing any lifting of the sanctions on Saddam's arms imports, and imports of dual-use items to make conventional weapons, missiles, and weapons of mass destruction. Other supplier and exporting nations will join in if they receive the ability to make energy investments, can carry out wide ranging civil trade, and can exploit other business opportunities. Arab leaders can justify such efforts to their people both on the selfish grounds they aid their national security and on the broader grounds they prevent Saddam from diverting funds away from Iraq's true economic needs.

There are several key components to a new US approach to dealing with the US foreign policy crisis in the Middle East. First, US must redefine its military position in containing Saddam. The US must make it clear that its military presence in the region is tailored only to deterring military adventures against the Kurds and other states, is the minimal force required, and works in consultation with Turkey and our Arab allies. It must repeatedly explain the size and role of our forces in depth, and it must explain every military action in equal depth. The day we could simply announce air strikes as part of enforcement of the No Fly Zones is over. So is the day we could trivialize our military action or describe them as business as usual. Even the best Pentagon briefings—and they have generally been horribly vague and inadequate—are not a substitute for leadership from the President and Secretary of State on this issue, or for detailed consultation with our allies. Moreover, when we act, it should be for a clear purpose and so decisively that it truly deters Saddam, and not be at a level where any military damage we do is offset by Saddam's ability to use it for propaganda purposes.

Second, we should not give up totally on resuming UN inspections and bring UNMOVIC back into Iraq. However, we must not have any illusions and continue to treat Iraqi proliferation with the Clinton Administration's "benign neglect." In the real world, it has been three years since UNSCOM could really carry out effective inspections and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) never really challenge Iraq as effectively as it should. UNMOVIC may be a useful deterrent to open, large-scale Iraqi action but it does not have the leadership or international support

to really carry out effective inspections and find the kind of covert cells and new Iraqi efforts developed over the last three years. If anything, UNMOVIC could simply become the political cover for a UN effort that said it could find no evidence of Iraqi efforts. We need to decouple the containment of Iraq's proliferation from the issue of UN inspection. We need to provide a comprehensive picture of what Iraq is doing and the risks involved, and make it clear that inspection is not going to be an answer to sustained military containment. If we do not, we will send mixed and ineffective signals, and we may well see the UN turned into a tool that will give Saddam a false blessing and a license to proliferate.

Finally, we should recognize that key Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia feel irritated and neglected. They cannot openly express their contempt for the Clinton Administration, but they feel it deeply. They see the last few years of President Clinton's efforts to rush forwards towards a final Arab-Israeli peace settlement as the act of an opportunist who pressures them for his own political advantage. They feel they came under intense pressure from his Secretary of Energy to increase production and cut oil prices, reacted by making quiet concessions, and were then embarrassed in public while he tried to run for Vice President. They feel the US ignored Saudi efforts to create an institutionalized dialogue between importers and exporters that could help create fair and stable prices. They feel Clinton's Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense lectured them, rather than consulted, and never really listened. The Saudi's also feel Clinton's trade representative deliberately ignored their efforts to join the WTO. We do not need to sacrifice a single US interest to consult with our Gulf allies, listen to them, and engage in a balanced diplomacy that gives them the priority they deserve. Secretary Powell has already advocated such a balanced diplomacy and he is all too correct in doing so.

THE SPECIFIC STEPS WE SHOULD TAKE IN IMPROVING OUR POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ

Secretary Powell's call for "smart sanctions" against Iraq is long overdue, and can help to correct a critical weakness in our foreign policy. It was clear by the mid-1990s that broad economic sanctions were not going to bring down Saddam Hussein, halt Iraqi efforts to proliferate, or cripple the ability of Iraq's military and security forces to repress the Kurds, put down Iraq's Shi'ite opposition, and threaten Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It was equally clear that they continued to impoverish the ordinary Iraqi, and block Iraq's economic development.

Nearly half a decade later, sanctions have eroded to the point where Iraq has over one billion dollars of uncontrolled income from smuggled petroleum exports. Its "legal" oil revenues in 2000 are estimated at \$21.6 billion, which is 89% higher than in 1999, and more than 170% higher than in 1988. Saddam can now use a combination of this income and the holes in the controls on the UN oil for food program, to buy the loyalty of his power elite, the security forces, and Republican Guards.

It makes good, and long overdue, sense to refocus the sanctions effort to ensuring Saddam cannot import conventional arms and the technology and equipment to produce weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it is equally clear that "smart sanctions" are not enough and that the Bush Administration could easily repeat some of the most chronic failures of the Clinton Administration. The US needs more of a strategy than can fit on a bumper sticker, and more thought than can fit in a fortune cookie. To be specific, "smart sanctions" can only work if they are part of the following seven major changes in US policy towards Iraq:

- *First, the US must be prepared to confront potential and actual suppliers.* It is uncertain that the US can get even pro forma Security Council agreement to refocusing sanctions in ways that give them real teeth. The waters and borders of Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey are not going to be sealed, and dual-use items and military spare parts are notoriously hard to police. It will take a massive intelligence effort and confrontational diplomacy with suppliers, and the nations on Iraq's borders, to make "smart sanctions" work. Talk and good intentions are cheap; effective action is difficult and costly.
- *Second, the US must come to grips with the failure of the UN inspection effort and the fact UNMOVIC might do more harm if it did return to Iraq than good.* Effective UN inspection really halted in late 1997, and Desert Fox did virtually nothing to really inhibit Iraq's effort to proliferate. Iraq has had years to create an effective network of cells and dual use efforts to develop a break out capability in chemical and biological weapons, improve its nuclear weapons designs, and develop a missile program. UNMOVIC is still banned from Iraq, but if it did return, it might well operate under so many political constraints that it would end up certifying Iraqi compliance, rather than act as an effective deterrent to Iraqi action. The Clinton Administration dodged this issue for its last

two years in office, but “smart sanctions” require a clear and detailed plan of action.

- *Third, the US must face the reality of the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi opposition, shift to a long-term covert operations effort, and focus on the continuing need for military containment.* The Bush Administration threatens to repeat the mistakes of the Clinton Administration and Congress, and go on backing weak and unpopular elements of the Iraqi opposition like the Iraqi National Congress. These movements have no meaningful support from any friendly government in the region, and they have no military potential beyond dragging the US into a “Bay of Kuwait” or “Bay of Kurdistan” disaster. The Turks fear them as a way of dividing Iraq and creating a Kurdistan, and the Arabs fear them as a way of bringing Iraq under Shi’ite control and/or Iranian influence. Worse, they are no substitute for a major covert effort to overthrow Saddam from within, and overt US funding of such movement tends to label the Iraqi opposition as US sponsored traitors. We need to understand that containing Iraq is far more important than legislating the funding of a forlorn hope.
- *Fourth, the US must launch an active truth campaign to confront Saddam on oil for food and all of the other issues where he relies on lies and exploitation of tensions in the region.* The Clinton Administration committed a massive foreign policy mistake by failing to engage Saddam over his lies and propaganda. Aside from some sporadic and truly inept press efforts, it allowed him to capture Arab and world opinion in lying about the problems in oil for food and the true causes of the suffering of the Iraq people. It did not engage him actively on human rights inside Iraq, his attacks on Iraq’s Shi’ites, his continuing claims to Kuwait, or his threats to Iraq’s Kurds. It postured about palaces to the American media, and allowed Saddam to turn UN reporting into a propaganda defeat. “Smart sanctions” will not work without a massive and continued truth campaign to fully explain the true character of the Iraqi regime that is tailored to Gulf, Arab, and world audiences.
- *Fifth, the US must think now about the ultimate future of Iraq’s Kurds.* The erosion of sanctions poses immediate threats to Iraq’s Kurds. While the Clinton Administration chose to ignore it, Iraq has been “cleansing” oil-rich areas in Northern Iraq of Kurds and forcing them into other areas or the Kurdish security zone. It is not clear we can prevent this, but getting support for “smart sanctions” and protecting the Kurds means we need a clear US policy on the future of the Kurdish security zone and a definition of Kurdish autonomy that will set policy goals to protect the Kurds while defusing fears Iraq will divide or break up.
- *Sixth, the US must have a clear energy policy towards Iraq.* Iraq is a nation that has some 11% of all the world’s oil reserves and that has not had any coherent energy development efforts since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. US government projections call for Iraqi oil production capacity to more than double from around 2.8 million barrels a day to 6.2 million barrels in 2020. These increases in Iraq’s oil exports are also critical to any hope of its economic development. Massive energy investments are required, and take years to a decade to pay off. They also can provide the Iraqi regime with major new resources. “Smart sanctions” must be coupled to a clear energy development policy.
- *Finally, the US must revitalize the other aspects of military containment.* The true subtext of a “smart sanctions” policy is that we will need a major forward military presence, rapid deployment capability, and war fighting ability to check an Iraqi attack on Kuwait or threat to use weapons of mass destruction indefinitely into the future. The Clinton Administration spoke stickly and carried a big soft. It “nickel and dimed” its use of force to contain Iraq, issued a series of abortive threats over UN inspections, launched Desert Fox, and then halted it before it could be effective. Two years of pin-prick strikes over the “No Fly Zones” have done as much to give Saddam a propaganda victory as they have to hurt his air defenses.

We need a formal Bush Doctrine that states our redlines, that says quite clearly that Gulf security and the continued flow of oil is a vital US national security interest, and that we will remain committed to military containment and close cooperation with our Gulf allies as long as there is a threat from either Iraq or Iran. We need to define the kind of Iraqi action that will lead us to launch military action, and if Iraq takes such action, we need to strike so hard and so decisively that the military and personal cost to Saddam is so unaffordable that any political propaganda gains he makes are minor in comparison. The one round of half-successful strikes the Bush Administration launched on February 16th is Clintonesque at best.

“Smart Sanctions” require a clear Bush Doctrine and a clearly defined commitment to decisive force.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you for that strong statement. I will look forward to further discussion with you.

Dr. Halperin, thank you for joining the committee. We look forward to your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN, SENIOR FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. HALPERIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure for me to be here. I have a written statement that I would like to ask to be made a part of the record, and I would like to summarize it and try to particularly talk about points where I either disagree or have an additional element to bring to bear than what we have heard so far.

Senator BROWNBACK. If you agree with some of them, too, you can mention that.

Dr. HALPERIN. I start, I think, where all of the witnesses are, and where I think all of you are as well. That is to say, Iraq is a serious threat. Its leadership is committed to conventional aggression and conventional pressure. Its leadership remains committed to developing weapons of mass destruction and if we fail to contain that, it poses not only a direct threat, but a threat to our containment of nuclear weapons policy as a whole. We cannot succeed in the nonproliferation policy if we do not succeed in stopping the Iraqi program.

Third, I think our other policies in the Middle East are at risk as long as we do not have an Iraqi policy that has the support of the Arab countries, and inevitably interacts with their dislike of our policy in the Middle East peace process and, I think, undermines our effectiveness in both areas.

Finally, an area that has not been mentioned, but to me is of great concern, is if the Iraqi sanctions are seen to fail it will undercut one of the most important instruments of policy in the police cold war period, and that has been our ability to persuade the Security Council to impose sanctions in situations where we thought that was in our interests.

We were able to do that in Libya, for example, and finally get the trial of the terrorists who we believe blew up the airplane. We were able to get it against Serbia and Yugoslavia, and it played an important role in the change of regime there, and we have been able to get it in other situations as well.

My fear is that, as these sanctions erode, people are coming to understand that there is no legal mechanism to enforce these sanctions, and that if other countries choose simply not to obey them, that they can, in fact, get away with it. My fear is that not only will we wake up one day and discover that the Iraqi sanctions are gone, with, I think, very serious implications for Iraq policy, but that it will become increasingly difficult in the future to persuade countries to honor other sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council.

These sanctions are often dangerous for the countries in the region. They are always expensive for the countries in the region, because they lose trade and they lose income. They have nevertheless

felt a legal obligation to do so, and I think the undercutting of that would have very serious repercussions for American policy. So I think whatever we do as we move forward, we need to keep in mind the broader implications of what is at stake if we allow these sanctions to fail.

I think that the differences that we have in this panel and in general in the country about Iraq policy is not about how dangerous Saddam Hussein is, it is not about the threat that he poses, it is not about the importance of containing him, but it is about what we should do about that. I think that turns on different assessments of what is feasible, and those assessments do not turn on any secret information.

My sense is that inside the government and inside the intelligence community there is as much disagreement about the feasibility, for example, of getting rid of Saddam Hussein by supporting the opposition, as there is in the public as a whole. This seems to turn as much on people's temperament and what they would like to believe than it does on any concrete facts.

Now, as I detail in my prepared statement, and I will not go into here in detail, I think the most dangerous option is one of continuing to drift, of continuing to allow the sanctions to slowly erode while we try to keep them together, of continuing efforts to bring back the inspectors, which I think simply will not lead to the inspectors being brought back in, of continuing military operations, which has already been suggested does not do very much—it is one thing to maintain the principle firmly of the no-fly zones and to make it clear that we will not permit military operations. It is another to continue to fly in ways that do not seem to send any clear message, clearly does not have any impact on Iraqi military capability.

And yet this both undercuts support for the policy in the region and runs the risk that American lives will be taken for no precisely clear purpose. So I think we need to look at alternatives, and I think that there are two basic options.

One is to try to get agreement within the Security Council, particularly among the P-5, and with the countries in the region, on a new regime that would remain in place until there was a fundamental change in the Government of Iraq, and that, I think, would have several elements.

First, I think it would require that we drastically reduce the list of items that Iraq is prohibited from importing only to weapons themselves and to real dual-use items. In return, seek agreement, which I believe we could get, that the control over Iraqi revenues for the oil they are permitted to sell, to make sure that these expenditures do not go for the unauthorized items, comes in place and remains in place until there is a fundamental change in policy.

Second, I believe we need to recognize that a return of U.N. inspectors is very unlikely and, as has already been suggested, even if it occurred, it is not clear that it would do very much good, given that they clearly will not have the freedom that we want, and also that they have had time to hide their weapons programs some place else.

Instead, I think we need simply to in effect say to the Iraqi Government that these sanctions will continue until you find a way to

persuade the international community that you have abandoned your efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.

I do not believe that Iraq could do that absent a fundamental change in the regime and a putting in place of a very different kind of government. So my view is that this set of sanctions needs to remain in place until there is a change in government, but that we ought to put the onus on Iraq, rather than continuing these ineffective efforts and, I think, ultimately futile efforts to bring back inspectors.

In the case of the no-fly zone, what I think we need to do is maintain clearly our assertion of the right to do it, but also to make clear what our red lines are, that we will not permit the Iraqis to move north, that we will not permit them to move against the people in the southern part of their country, or to mobilize against Kuwait or any other country. If they do that, we will respond not with the kind of very limited military action we have done regularly, or even the kind of stepped-up military action that we saw a week or so ago, but with serious and decisive military action of a kind that would, in fact, materially affect the capability of the Iraqi military forces.

I think we should try, and I think we could succeed in getting agreement from the countries whose bases we would need for those operations, that this changed posture would have the support and their agreement that decisive military action would take place if any of these red lines were crossed.

Finally, as part of this I think we need to try to cut down on the smuggling, which puts in the hands of the Iraqi leadership funds that they could use for their own purposes, and which is the most dangerous trend that is now developing.

We saw in the press that Secretary Powell has raised this issue with the Syrians and, I believe, is part of the kind of change in policy that I have suggested here, that we could get agreement from the countries that have been running pipelines outside the embargo, to bring those sales within the U.N. system so that we control what Iraq does with the money.

In order to get the support of other key countries, including the Russians and the French for this, I think we also ought to consider whether some of the funds that Iraq brings in is used to pay off their very large debts to foreign countries, including in particular, France and Russia. I think it is no accident that the French and the Russians have been pressing for a relaxing, if not elimination of the embargo, and that these countries are very countries to which Iraq owes a great deal of money.

I think it is not inconsistent with the embargo to begin to divert some of the funds to pay off those debts, not only to those countries, but to many other countries, as part of the set of things that the U.N.-impounded money is used for.

As everybody has said, I think there can be no doubt to anybody who looks at it objectively that the embargo plays no significant role in the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Iraq has enough money from the U.N. food for peace program, it has enough money from the illegal smuggling program, to deal with those problems. It is clear that the leadership prefers to spend its money on statues, on

palaces, and on weapons, and that you could give them a lot more money and the problem would not change.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that we have paid a significant price because people believe that somehow that we are at fault, I do not believe more clever public diplomacy will solve this problem. I think that a clear willingness to let Iraq spend money on many other things is the key to beginning to turn this problem around.

Now, as we have heard before, and I am certain we will hear from the last panelist, there is an alternative policy, and that is to arm the opposition and to try to get rid of the current regime quickly. I think there is no doubt that it would be in our interest to do so. I think one can raise serious questions about whether we should have done it when we had the chance to do so, when we had an overwhelming army in the field, and we had defeated the Iraqi military force, but I do not think we should allow ourselves the luxury of believing that somehow this can be done on the cheap.

If we arm people and put them in the country, if we declare and support the creation of safe zones in the north or in the south, we have to mean it, and that means we have to be prepared to commit as much military force as it will take to hold those zones against an attack, and it means we cannot wait until they are attacked.

We do not have forces now in the region that can deal with that. We twice now encouraged people to act and then stood there while they were attacked, and I believe we should not have done it either of those times, and I believe we should not do it again.

If we are serious about this, it means a buildup of American military forces, maybe not to the level of the Persian Gulf war, but significantly more than we now have, and it means that we have to decide in advance that an attack on those forces is the equivalent of an attack on the United States and we are ready to go back to war against Iraq.

Now, I do not believe the American people are ready to support that. I do not believe the Congress is ready to support that, but if the administration is persuaded that that is the route to go, I think before we start arming people who are going to need our military support, we need to have that debate. We need to make that decision. Since I continue to believe that the Constitution requires the Congress to authorize us to go to war, I think we need a Resolution of the Congress that says that we are prepared to protect these people and to go to war to defend them.

I would welcome that debate. I think people would at the end of the day say that the American interests are not such that we ought to do that, but the policy of containment that I have outlined is more prudent and more consistent with our interest, but what I think would be a disaster would be to once more encourage people to rise up and then to stand there and watch them be slaughtered.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Halperin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN

Mr. Chairman: It is a great privilege and a pleasure for me to testify once again before this very distinguished committee. I first had the opportunity to appear before this committee when it conducted far ranging hearings on China in 1966. I believe that we are as urgently in need now of a serious debate on Iraq, as we were then on China, and I commend this committee for holding these hearings.

There can be no doubt that what happens in Iraq and how we manage the process of developing a consensus in the international community on Iraq is of enormous importance to American and international security. This is so for at least four reasons.

First, as we learned dramatically a decade ago, Iraq has both the intention and the capability to threaten its neighbors. There is no reason to think this has changed. If Iraq were to conclude that the United States were no longer willing to use force to protect its interests in the Gulf, it would be sorely tempted to press its neighbors. Preventing conventional aggression by Iraq and maintaining the military relations necessary for us to respond effectively if deterrence fails, must be a high priority for the United States.

Second, Iraq poses a direct and immediate threat to our non-proliferation policy. An Iraq with missiles and nuclear or biological weapons would pose a threat to all nations within its reach, including Israel. Moreover, our efforts to extend the principles of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the arc of states in this area would be fatally undercut, if we are unable to prevent Iraq from developing such weapons in the face of very explicit United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Third, our efforts to maintain support for the Middle East Peace Process among the states of the region and to have their assistance on other critical issues, including the price and supply of oil, critically depends on our securing the support of the nation's of the region for our Iraq policy. It is not only that the embargo will continue to erode if it lacks support in the region, but it is also the case that our ability to continue to have the support that we need on other issues will be jeopardized if we pursue a policy towards Iraq which lacks support in the region.

Finally, if we permit the Iraqi sanctions to continue to erode in the face of a clear Security Council mandate, we run the grave risk of undermining the respect for Security Council sanctions, which have served American interests well in many parts of the world.

One of the most important and positive developments of the post-cold war period, was the willingness of the Security Council to use its powers under Chapter VII to impose economic sanctions on states for a variety of infractions of the basic norms of international law and the willingness of almost all states to abide by these rules. We need to remember, however, that there are no effective means to force states to comply with such embargoes and that they often do so at significant economic cost. If the Iraq sanctions simply fail it will be much harder to get the Security Council in the future to impose such sanctions and to get states to obey them.

I start with these points, Mr. Chairman, to underline two basic themes. There can be no question that the stakes are high in how we deal with Iraq. Where there are differences of view, and surely there are, regards how to accomplish these specific goals in ways which are compatible with other world-wide interests. The differences of opinion about what the United States should do in regard to Iraq reflect much less disagreements about the threat posed by Iraq, than differences about how effective different courses of action might be. This reflects the genuine difficulty in ferreting out the facts and interpreting them. I do not believe that disagreements result from differing access to classified information. People with full access disagree with each other as much as they do with those who rely entirely on unclassified information.

I believe that there are three options that are likely to compete for adoption as the Bush Administration reconsiders Iraq policy. The first would be a continuation of the recent trends. The second would involve a refocusing of the sanctions. The third will give higher priority to attempting to replace the current regime. In short, I believe that the first option will inevitably end in disaster, and the third simply cannot be implemented successfully. This leads me to support the second option of focusing on the Iraqi program to develop weapons of mass destruction and its capacity to threaten its neighbors.

Over the past several years there has been a steady erosion in the key elements of our current Iraq policy:

- We have gone from demanding sweeping changes in Iraq, beyond the end of the program to develop weapons of mass destruction, before we would agree to end the embargo, to making ending the weapons of mass destruction program essentially the sole criteria.
- We have gone from demanding the right of UN inspectors to go everywhere to having no inspectors.
- We have gone from severely limiting how much oil Iraq could sell to permitting Iraq to sell as much oil as it can pump.

- We have gone from severely limiting what Iraq can buy with the funds that it gains from its oil sales to permitting it to purchase a much larger—but still very limited—range of items.

And at the same time, as President Bush has noted, the embargo is becoming less and less effective as more oil is sold outside the proscribed UN sanctioned scheme. While the changes that have been made move us closer to what other countries, especially France, Russia and our allies in the region want, there has not been a corresponding increase in support for our Iraqi policy. On the contrary, support continues to decline. Incremental changes simply erode our position without gaining more support for what remains in place.

If we continue down this path Iraq will be able to buy more and more goods within the sanction system, and will have more and more funds from sales conducted in violation of the UN Security Council embargo. One day we will wake up and the whole world will know that the sanctions are no longer working and many more states will feel free to ignore them. The results will be disastrous not only for our Iraq policy, but for our ability to employ UN sanctions in other situations and to have states feel that they have an obligation to act consistent with UNSC resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Despite these clear dangers, the pressures within the government to make only incremental changes in policy are so strong that it will take an act of will with substantial Congressional and public support to move decisively.

Part of the task is to illuminate what the real options are. That is why these hearings are so important and why I very much welcome this opportunity to lay out the option which I believe is most consistent with American interests.

Our concerns about Iraq relate primarily to its effort to develop weapons of mass destruction and to threaten the use of force against its neighbors. If we are to have any chance of keeping the alliance against the current Iraqi regime together we must focus on these concerns. In order to do that we should do the following:

- Drastically reduce the list of items which Iraq is prohibited from purchasing only to weapons themselves and to real dual use items which would directly contribute to development of weapons of mass destruction. In return seek UNSC agreement to have the UN sanctions committee continue to control the revenue Iraq receives for its oil sales so that it can prevent expenditures on these few unauthorized items.
- Recognize that efforts to persuade Iraq to permit effective UN inspections on its territory are very unlikely to succeed. Instead, focus on securing an agreement among the P-5 that the controls on expenditures will remain in place until Iraq either permits full inspection or finds some other affirmative means to persuade the UNSC that it has abandoned its effort to develop weapons of mass destruction or to threaten its neighbors with conventional aggression.
- Without abandoning our claimed right to enforce no fly zones in the north and the south, curtail routine flights while restating our red lines in a clear and unambiguous manner, so that Iraq does not venture into the north, mobilize against Kuwait or the population in the south of the country, or threaten any other country in the region. Seek firm assurances from our friends and allies in the region that bases would be available for military operations, should we determine that Iraq is resuming its efforts to develop and deploy weapons of mass destruction or is mounting military operations.
- In light of these changes, seek support from states in the region for efforts to curtail the embargo-violating oil exports and to help curtail illegal smuggling in and out of Iraq. We would be able to argue that these can no longer be justified on humanitarian grounds since the UN would now be permitting Iraq to spend funds on all activities that might alleviate the current suffering of the Iraqi people.

In order to increase the attractiveness of this package to Russia and France we should consider permitting, or even requiring, that Iraq use some of its revenue from the sale of oil, to pay its existing debts to other nations including these two members of the UNSC. Our friends and allies in the region should find it easy to support this package since it will be clear that the embargo cannot be responsible for the continued suffering of the Iraqi people. Of course, that is the case now, since the Iraqi regime has at its disposal sufficient resources, both from the authorized sales and from the illegal sales, to do whatever is necessary to deal with the humanitarian tragedy in that country. The leadership prefers instead to use the funds for its own pleasures and for weapons. However, this new approach should reduce the criticism that the embargo is responsible for the humanitarian crisis.

I believe this approach would gain the needed support of states in the region and of the UNSC and that it could be sustained over a long period of time until there is a change in the Iraqi regime.

Of course, many believe that we should not wait for such change to occur on its own, and that we should instead implement the stated policy and goal of regime change by vastly increased support to the Iraq opposition.

There can be no doubt that American and, indeed, international security interests, would be advanced if the current regime in Iraq were to be replaced by one which was more committed to meeting the obligations which Iraq undertook at the end of the Persian Gulf War. The question is only whether there are means to do that which are consistent with other American interests and priorities and which could get the necessary support from the American people and from other nations. I do not believe that there are such means.

Certainly we have the conventional military power to defeat the Iraqi Army and occupy that country. There was a fleeting moment at the end of the Gulf War when it was plausible that the United States would use its military power to change the Iraqi regime. There is no longer any such possibility. Unless Iraq threatens a new act of aggression, the American people would not, and should not, support such an effort, nor would our allies and friends provide the necessary bases and support.

Thus, those who want to remove the current regime advocate not an American military operation, but rather a "covert operation." I do not believe there is any real option that involves only a covert operation. As in many previous situations, the real aim of the covert operation would be to try to compel the United States to use military force to rescue an operation which was failing. Indeed, most of the Iraqi opposition groups which seek the weapons to launch operations inside of Iraq warn us that they will expect American military support.

Anyone advocating a serious and determined effort to change this regime in the short run by covert force, bears a very heavy burden of demonstrating that such an effort has a real chance of success without massive American military action. Otherwise we run a grave risk of once again abandoning brave Iraqis, who rise up in the mistaken belief that we will defend them, or find ourselves dragged into a war that we cannot sustain.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this opportunity to present my views and stand ready to answer the questions of the committee.

Senator BROWBACK. Thank you, Dr. Halperin, for your comments.

Secretary Perle, we are delighted to have you before the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. PERLE. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to participate. I had prepared a list of issues that I thought, taken together, would help in an orderly discussion of what American policy toward Iraq should be. One of the consequences of speaking last after three intelligent presentations is, one is bound to be repetitive or disagreeable, and I intend to be both.

The question has been posed and answered already: Is Saddam stronger now than he was 10 years ago? I think everybody agrees that he is. I think he is stronger than he was at this time 2 years ago, and I am almost afraid to ask the question whether he is stronger than he was 2 days ago, but I feel bound to say, he probably is stronger than he was 2 days ago, because what has been presented in recent diplomatic efforts is not an indication of American strength but an indication of American weakness.

That is to say, the clear impression has been created that the United States intends to relax the sanctions on Saddam. We can call them smart sanctions if we like, but what they will look like to the people of the region and, I think, the world, is a weakening

of American resolve in the face of pressure on those sanctions, which is evident to everyone.

Does Saddam now have weapons of mass destruction? Sure he does. We know he has chemical weapons. We know he has biological weapons. We have been unable to ferret them out and find them. We could not do it when we had inspectors on the ground. We will not be able to do it if the inspectors return.

How far he has gone on the nuclear weapons side, I do not think we really know. My guess is it is further than we think. It is always further than we think, because we limit ourselves, as we think about this, to what we are able to prove and demonstrate and, unless you believe that we have uncovered everything, you have to assume there is more than we are able to report, and that is the history of these things, so I am sure Tony Cordesman would agree that every time you eventually get behind the lines you discover there was more there than you thought.

How can we end his program to deliver weapons of mass destruction, to develop them and the means of delivering them? Well, I do not think we can, as long as Saddam is there. As long as he is in control of the territory and has sufficient financial and technical resources, he will continue to work at the development of those weapons.

We cannot learn much, in my view, in the absence of U.N. inspectors. I do not think we would learn much if the U.N. inspectors were there. Even if the U.N. inspectors were there and free to operate in an effective manner, and the history suggests and the arrangements previously agreed to suggest that if inspectors were permitted to return, they would be under such constraints that their likelihood of their finding anything at all is very slim.

After all, Saddam has had plenty of time to destroy the data base on which we once depended and, without intelligence of a kind that we can get independent of the inspectors, there is really very little that inspectors could do on the ground, so I do not think we would get any additional confidence if inspectors returned.

I mention that because the suggestion has been made that we would welcome Saddam back into the community of civilized nations if he only agreed to U.N. resolutions providing for inspections. I think that would be a great mistake. Any agreement to inspections would be tactical and disingenuous, and the ticket to civilization should not be as cheap as that.

Needless to say, the return of inspectors would hardly justify the normalization of relations with a man like Saddam. In fact, I do not believe we ought to even aspire to normal relations with a man who rules the way Saddam Hussein rules. There is nothing wrong with distinguishing between those national leaders with whom we wish to have normal relations and those who are beneath that minimal standard.

Beyond the weapons of mass destruction, which I think we all agree is proceeding to develop, how should we regard the view that Saddam has been contained all these years during which we all agree the situation has gotten worse? Well, containment became a slogan rather than a policy some years ago. Contained maybe in the sense that Tony Cordesman referred to.

He has been unable to buy weapons on the scale that he might have been able to buy weapons otherwise, but there was a parade, a military parade in Baghdad just a few days ago, and he demonstrated a thousand tanks, which I think is roughly double the number he had at the end of Desert Storm, so he has managed to double his tank force despite the constraints. Clearly, he would have done more if he had been able to do more, so in that rather narrow sense you could say that his military ambitions, at least for conventional forces, has been contained, but that is about all you can say.

The sanctions I think everyone agrees are not working in the sense that they have not produced a significant change or, indeed, any change in Saddam's policy, in his ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction, in his defiance of U.N. resolutions and the United Nations itself. They have been portrayed as damaging to the people of Iraq. I think everyone on this panel agrees that the suffering of the Iraqi people is being inflicted directly by Saddam Hussein himself. The food that could be dispersed under the existing program is not being dispersed. The same thing is true of medicine. Money is piling up in Saddam's bank. He is using the privation of his own people as a means of propaganda.

Now, the point has been made this morning, and I think the Secretary of State has been attempting to argue this on his recent mission abroad, that we should organize the sanctions differently in order to make them more effective, and one of the things that he means by that is that smuggling activities should be legalized. We are not doing a very good job of controlling drugs, so let us legalize the drugs. That is rather analogous to that. But there is oil moving through a pipeline from Syria. That is smuggling, and Saddam has access to the money, so let us make it legal.

The problem first of all is not money. Saddam has the money that I believe he needs to do what he is doing clandestinely, and since nobody envisions allowing him to spend that money openly on weapons, you have got to ask, what difference is it going to make to his program if the amount of money available to him is reduced? It is far from obvious, but the fact is that putting money into the U.N. program is no guarantee that it is kept from Saddam.

Saddam has a variety of means that I have not heard discussed by which he siphons money out of the United Nations programs. It includes everything from front companies that do business with the United Nations that are, in fact, Iraqi proprietary companies, to the standard techniques that are used all over the world to evade restrictions on capital movements and the like, where imports are approved by the United Nations, invoices paid, and significant fractions of the money come back secretly to the regime.

So Saddam, even within the United Nations program, is able to acquire all the money that he can usefully spend, in my view, on his clandestine program to achieve weapons of mass destruction, so at the end of the day you have to ask yourself, what is smarter or better about smarter sanctions? They are weaker sanctions, to be sure. They are intended to reshape opinion in the Arab world, by which I think we should mean the street, because Arab leaders are a good deal more sophisticated than we sometimes give them credit for, and they understand perfectly well what is going on, but we

want to reshape the image in the street of the United States as punishing the innocent civilians in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I come to the conclusion after all of this that we do not have an effective policy now. The changes that are being talked about will be no more effective than we have had in the past, that we will not be safe from the eventual development of the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction against us, against our friends and allies in the region, against our troops in the field, as long as Saddam Hussein is in power. The risk will continue until the day he is removed from office.

Therefore, it seems to me worth concentrating our efforts on the one policy that could actually work, and that is the removal of Saddam from power. Now, it is not easy. I concede, it is not easy, but neither is it reasonable to characterize it as hopeless.

For one thing, before characterizing any ambitious program, one ought to look at it carefully, and I have been struck by how much of the comment about the prospects for success is based not on any serious study, not on any serious analysis, not on sitting down with the opposition to Saddam, who are prepared to risk their lives by returning to Iraq and be mobilized within Iraq, but on pure assumption, pure speculation.

I keep hearing about Iraqi opposition sitting around hotels in Mayfair. Who are we talking about? It is not true. It is simply false. I spent the last 15 years getting to know the Iraqi opposition, and when people in the comfort of their homes and offices in Washington, DC deride the Iraqi opposition for sitting around hotels in Mayfair, when they have been in Iraq, when they are eager to return to Iraq, when they have seen their closest friends and associates and family murdered in Iraq, seems to me unfair to them and an unreasonable conjecture about their motives.

So the question remains of their abilities. What can they do? You know, I suspect if the sort of derision that is heaped on the opposition today had been around in the early days of our history, we would still be a British colony. I am sure there were people who said, those Americans are never going to get organized. They are divided. The people in Virginia cannot agree with the people in Massachusetts.

I do not mean to oversimplify this, but the fact is that when you spend the time to understand the opposition, and when you look at plausible opposition strategies, the picture that emerges is very different from the dismissive view that we have heard out of the Clinton administration for the last 8 years.

It is an opposition that has pulled itself together, that has a structure within which it meets and takes decisions. It is an opposition that has made clear its intention to abandon weapons of mass destruction and embrace democratic principles. It is an opposition that is eager to return to Iraq and, most of all, it is an opposition that in the past was able to organize itself in a major part of the country that was beyond the control of Saddam Hussein. Over a third of the country was, until 1996, outside Saddam Hussein's control.

Now, Mort Halperin has repeated the specter that if we want to do anything at all for the opposition we have to be prepared to mount a military operation. I think he said it might be less than

Desert Storm, 1/2 million men, and I do not know what strategy he is looking at, but I can tell you what strategy I think it makes sense at least to consider, and that is this:

That is, to support the Iraqi opposition, to support the Iraqi National Congress in reestablishing its presence in parts of Iraq that are not under Saddam's control. That can be done, and it can be done quickly. It requires some agreements with the two Kurdish groups in the north, and it requires some work in the south, but it can be done quickly. It can be done before the next hearing of this subcommittee on this subject, of that I am absolutely certain, and if they cannot do it, then we will know very quickly that they cannot do it, but I believe they can.

That political presence is a direct challenge to the legitimacy of Saddam's rule, and every change in situations like this begins with that. It happened to Ceaucescu, it happened to Milosevic, and it will happen here, too. The moment people see there is an alternative, the moment that that veil of invincibility is pierced, there is a political dynamic that takes place, and anyone who has ever run for office knows how quickly things change, the moment it looks as though you can stand up and oppose the power that dominates.

So the establishment of a political presence, coupled with broadcasting and publishing so that Saddam would lose his monopoly over the flow of information could lead again, as it did in 1995, in 1996, to a situation in which Saddam would be politically challenged very fundamentally and, at that point, if he wished to take military action, he would have to move his forces in a way that would present us with very attractive targets.

I have heard it said today that we ought to go after serious targets. Mort Halperin said we should go after serious targets. I cannot imagine a more serious target than a column of tanks attempting to root out dissidents in the south who are clamoring for a change of regime.

Do we always have to abandon our friends? Of course we do not. They were abandoned in his administration. He did not have anything to do with it, I understand that, but there is nothing inevitable about abandoning your friends and allies, and to say we will not even try because the last lot did not have the guts to stick with it seems to me a recipe for defeatism. It is defeatism.

So I think there is a great deal that can be done with the opposition. I think those of us who have been privileged to know the opposition have come to appreciate and understand that potential.

The Congress clearly has recognized it in the action it has taken before, and I hope that you will encourage the new administration to take a new look, to sit down with the opposition and talk about the ways in which, beginning with the establishment of a political presence and leading ultimately to a political challenge to Saddam Hussein, to which, if he makes a military response, we have available assets in the air to protect that opposition, I hope you will urge the administration to consider that course, because none of the other things that are under consideration, no matter how hard we try to persuade ourselves about improved sanctions or smarter sanctions, none of them are going to end the threat from Saddam Hussein.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I do not have a prepared statement. For the convenience of the subcommittee I have listed on this page the key issues which, in my view, must shape any American policy toward Iraq. I will try to cover each of them in a short opening statement.

1. Does the regime of Saddam Hussein pose a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies? How does the magnitude of that threat today compare with what it was a decade ago at the end of Desert Storm? What about this time two years ago? How about last year?
2. Does Saddam Hussein now possess weapons of mass destruction? How much do we know about his programs with respect to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons? Are any such programs proceeding?
3. How can we end Saddam's programs to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them?
4. In the absence of U.N. inspectors, how much can we expect to learn about these programs?
5. Would a return of U.N. inspectors give us confidence that Saddam's programs would be terminated and that any weapons of mass destruction he may now have would be surrendered?
6. Would a return of inspectors justify the normalization of relations with Saddam?
7. Beyond weapons of mass destruction, what should we think of the claim that Saddam is "contained?"
8. Are the present sanctions working? Can they be made more effective?
9. Can we—should we—rebuild the coalition that opposed Saddam following the invasion of Kuwait?
10. Can we have confidence in the U.N. administration of programs affecting Iraq?
11. Can we secure ourselves, our forces in the field and our friends and allies in the region as long as Saddam is in power?
12. What are the prospects for removing Saddam's regime from power?
13. How can we work with the INC to bring about a change in the Iraqi regime?

Senator BROWNBACK. This is an excellent discussion, and a good starting point. Let us run the clock here 10 minutes, and then we can bounce back and forth in a couple of rounds.

One of my frustrations with what it seems like has taken place at least the last 5 years in U.S. policy toward Iraq has been this lack of resolve, this kind of drift, just, well, we would like to have him out of there, but we are not really sure how we would do that, nor are we willing to really take the steps to get Saddam Hussein out of office.

You each are talking about some different steps, and I think all of you expressed frustration with where we are today in our policy toward Saddam Hussein, and I want to use this policy toward Saddam Hussein rather than Iraq. I think that is a different issue.

All of you appear to support changing somewhat the rules of engagement on our air targets, if I am hearing you each correctly. You are being critical of, or several of you are being critical of the targeting we have done to date, and all of you would support a more robust rules of engagement on air, on our targets for our air, our airplanes and the British airplanes. Is that a correct reading of each of your positions? Mr. Cordesman.

Mr. CORDESMAN. Senator, I think it would not be mine. I think you have to be very careful about saying rules of engagement for aircraft. What you would then mean is the daily aircraft we fly

would presumably do even more, every time they were illuminated, or they saw a movement in ground-based radars, to engage individual systems or find some daily proxy to attack. We backed away from that last summer. Let me note that the rules of engagement have already changed.

But the problem is, these changes do not really do anything. At the end, virtually the entire Iraq air defense system remains. Saddam can provoke an attack at the time and place of his choosing. He can often do it in an area which produces collateral damage, or serves his own political purposes.

I think the real issue has to be that if you are going to attack at all, you must attack with sufficient force so you do him real damage. That does not mean daily, or new rules of engagement. It means that you allow a cumulative process of Iraqi action to build-up. You use this as a reason, and then you strike to the point where you take out a significant percentage of his air defense assets, or you strike at your targets like Republican Guards headquarters. I do not think you can fix any aspect of the no-fly zone patrols by simply saying, this is strengthening day-by-day rules of engagement.

Senator BROWNBACK. I do not think I am quarreling with you on this point. You are saying, though, that we should, when we respond, respond much stronger and on much clearer, bigger targets, is that correct?

Mr. CORDESMAN. Much more selectively and much more rarely. Go in hard, take the political cost, which is roughly the same as if you conducted a minor strike, wait, and then hit him again if he reconstitutes. But, do not do this in some sort of rigid game where he can pick the way in which we respond and when we do it.

Senator KERREY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is extremely important—and it may be some modification of the no-fly protocols can be changed, but I think it is extremely important that we not enter into a process where it basically is the equivalent of a mission creep.

I think what is needed is not only a fundamental reassessment, but hopefully a bipartisan declaration from Congress, and that is why I very much appreciate, Mr. Chairman, both you and Senator Wellstone have stayed and listened to us yak on as we have done, because what is needed is a bipartisan force that says, we want to have the same experience we had when Kim Dae Jung, Nelson Mandela, Václav Havel, and Lech Walesa came to a joint session of Congress and said, “thank you for liberating us.”

All four of them came to the American people and said—and I agree with what Mort is saying, and I also agree with what Tony is saying, you cannot do this on the cheap, and if you just let this creep along because we think, well, we want to use more force with our pilots, we may lose a few pilots, and then the American people will say, what is this all about, I did not realize the mission had changed.

I think it is very important for us to say, we believe in the liberation of Iraq, and if we believe in the liberation of Iraq, in my view, our will equals feasibility. I completely agree with Morton. By the way, it was not just in the Clinton administration. The first time we called them up to arms was during the Bush administration,

and we did not provide them with cover, and they died as a consequence.

We call on them to be courageous, and then we do not back them up, and it happened in two administrations. That cannot be allowed to happen this time, and I hope that you can get to a point—I believe that if we recognize the provisional government and protect that provisional government in the north, and we lift the sanctions in the area we are protecting, I have absolutely no doubt that the various factions are going to be able to work together, that if they will see that the United States of America is open, sincere, and is going to stay the course, I have no doubt that our will will equal feasibility and will produce a liberation, and will produce a celebration in Baghdad that is comparable to others that we have celebrated in the latter part of the 20th century.

Dr. HALPERIN. Let me make two comments. First, I think when we look at these comparisons we need to understand that this is a regime that is much more ruthless than the ones that ultimately we helped to liberate. This is a regime that still lives on absolute terror, in which there is no space at all for any kind of not only opposition, but civil society of any kind, in the areas that Saddam Hussein controls, so I think the process of getting rid of this kind of regime is very different than the South African Government that ultimately was displaced and the Central European Government.

Senator BROWNBAC. What about Milosevic?

Dr. HALPERIN. Milosevic I think was as dangerous to our interest, but life in Belgrade under Milosevic was nothing like life—I mean, there were independent radio stations. They tried to close them down and they went on the Internet.

Senator KERREY. That does not tell us anything.

Dr. HALPERIN. It tells us it is going to be much harder.

Senator KERREY. But it does not tell us it is not feasible. The question is, do we want to get the job done, and if we want to get the job done, it becomes feasible.

Dr. HALPERIN. I agree.

Senator BROWNBAC. Actually, my point here, and if I could ask you—

Senator WELLSTONE. Would you tell this witness here to please behave himself?

Senator BROWNBAC. It seemed like toward Milosevic we decided we do not want this guy in power, and that was projected, and that was projected around the world. It seems like, toward Saddam Hussein we are kind of going, we do not like this man in power, but we are not willing to then go ahead and, OK, here is the steps, then, you take to show the will that the United States needs to.

Dr. HALPERIN. I think the rhetoric has been the same about both of them. I think the difference was, it was a lot easier to get rid of Milosevic than it is Saddam Hussein, and I think it comes to the question of military force.

Now, Richard says that if we encourage these areas and the tanks start moving, that is a very tempting military target, and one that we can attack. That is true, but I think the history of air power is that you do not completely stop tank operations, or other ground operations, with military power.

We saw that with Milosevic. The destruction in Kosovo continued and was brought to an end only because Milosevic finally was forced to give up, not because our bombing raids stopped him from killing people, and I simply do not think we can count on either the threat of air power or the actual implementation of air power.

I am not suggesting we not do it. I think we ought to have that debate, but the debate I think has to accept that if he moves, we bomb, and if the bombing does not work, we intervene with ground forces, and that means having the ground forces there before he moves, because if we wait to start sending in the ground forces after we discover again that bombing does not stop tanks, you destroy a lot of tanks but you do not stop them from killing people, it is going to be too late for the people who are being killed.

Senator BROWNBACK. I understand, and we have been down that road before.

Richard.

Mr. PERLE. Mort wants smart sanctions, I want smart weapons. We have both been in the Pentagon, but he was there before me.

With the really smart weapons we now have the capability, in situations like the military situation that would exist in Iraq, to do really quite extraordinary things with air power, to hit the targets at which we aim almost all the time, and to do so without significant risk to our own pilots, particularly in a situation where we control the air, and so there is no comparison between the air operation that we faced in Kosovo, in my view, and the kinds of air operations that would be required in the Iraqi desert, dealing with columns of armor moving over a very thin road network and through narrow defiles and passes in the north.

This is ideal territory for air warfare, as we saw during Desert Storm. You saw the roads and the highways, so the potential for air power is vastly greater. I am not saying you will never need any ground force, but we are not talking about a Desert Storm scale of activity.

Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Wellstone.

Senator WELLSTONE. Let us continue with this discussion. I want to get back maybe at the end of my time to sanctions. Mort, I just want to quote from part of your testimony, then bounce this off of everyone, starting with you. You say, "anyone advocating a serious"—and this is the issue we are focused on—"a serious and determined effort to change this regime in the short run by a covert force bears a very heavy burden of demonstrating that such an effort has a real chance of success without massive American military action."

Now, for each of you, starting with you, Mort, do you think that the Iraqi opposition can undertake a major successful operation without the United States being a part of this, or being dragged in, or however you want to put it, and do you think the American people would support such an effort? That is, I guess, my question initially for each of you.

Dr. HALPERIN. I do not believe that they could sustain the safe havens without substantial American military force, and I guess I am less optimistic than Richard is, that if they were left in these safe havens, which they occupied, as I said, a substantial portion of the country earlier on, I do not believe it has the same kind of

impact as we see in political elections, or even as we saw in politics in Eastern Europe because of the nature of this regime.

I believe it is a pure totalitarian regime that remains in power based on the worst kinds of terrorism, and therefore I think, while a miracle can always happen, that if we go into this, we have to go into it with the notion that there is going to have to be a substantial American military involvement, and that air power alone is not likely to be enough, and whether it is a smaller land force, as Richard suggests, or a bigger one that I suggest, at least some of the people in this administration would want to be sure that it succeeded. I think we have to assume that.

I would also have to say that while I think one should never rely entirely on experts, it is not true that this administration—I mean, the past administration and, I assume, the one before that, did not look at the hard question of whether you get rid of Saddam Hussein by supporting the opposition, and the people who get paid to do that in various agencies of the government reached the conclusion that you could not. Now, they may be wrong, but it is not the case that people just dismissed it without taking a look at it.

Senator WELLSTONE. The other part of my question for you, and each of you, is, I asked you whether or not you thought this could be done without major American involvement, both air and ground, and you said you would need that. Would you advocate such a policy?

Dr. HALPERIN. I do not advocate it, because I think the cost to the United States and the cost to our relationships with other countries, and the cost to our ability to use the Security Council for other purposes, would outweigh the value. I would like to get rid of this man, but I think that cost is not worth it.

Senator WELLSTONE. Senator Kerrey.

Senator KERREY. I would answer unequivocally yes, it is worth it. It is worth the price, and by the way, the opposition forces are not asking for the kind of American intervention that Mort is advocating. I do think he is quite right that we have to make certain that we are not going to start and then stop again. We have to understand, we have got to go the distance.

Senator WELLSTONE. But my question was whether or not you think this opposition can undertake this effort without, in fact, major involvement by us.

Senator KERREY. We have a major involvement. Nineteen Americans were killed at Khobar Towers in June 1996. Why? They were killed because we are in Saudi Arabia. Why are we in Saudi Arabia? To contain Iraq.

In 1998, 11 more Americans were killed in West African Embassies. Why? Because Osama bin Laden wants us out of Saudi Arabia. And 17 more were killed—what I am saying, Senator, is, we have a significant military operation in place right now, and we are taking casualties.

The question is not, are we going to have a military operation. The question is, what is the mission, what is the objective, and I am saying with great respect that I believe the mission should change from containment to replacement to liberate the people of Iraq, and I believe it is entirely feasible for us to do it, and I think the payoff is enormous, 20 million people of Iraq liberated.

Senator WELLSTONE. So your position is, you go from containment to replacement, and it would be Iraqi opposition forces, but it would also necessitate major involvement by us militarily, and we should do that? I am just trying to be clear.

Senator KERREY. I think it would take a continuation of military involvement. It is not new military involvement. The point I am making is, we are taking casualties today, Senator. We have at least—we have several hundred million dollars of expenditures right now on the line to try to contain, so I am saying it is a false choice to say that what I am talking about to liberate Iraq would require new military operation. It would require a different kind of planning and a different military operation than the one we have right now, but it is not a military operation versus none today.

Senator WELLSTONE. You know how you can do this—the last word I get and that is not fair to you, and then move on to others, but just so you respond to this, and then I promise to move on, but really, it certainly—I mean, if we are talking about air strikes and ground troops, that seems to me to be rather different. Yes, we have a military presence. This seems to be a rather different order from where we are right now, yes?

Senator KERREY. It certainly—if you say that my current mission is to contain, we have taken 47 casualties and we have spent several billion dollars in order to contain over the last 10 years and, as Tony says, we have gotten benefit out of it, and if you want to liberate, it is going to take a different military operation than the one we have in place right now.

But Senator, if we end up with a bipartisan effort coming out of Congress, go to the opposition and ask them, what is the definition of will? What is the definition of what they want out of the American people?

They will not say that they need a massive military intervention in order to be able to carry this off. They are asking for much different. They are asking for recognition of a provisional government. They are asking that we protect that provisional government in the north. They are asking we lift the sanctions in those liberated areas, and they believe, and in fact they came relatively close in the past once before during the Clinton administration, when we pulled back. We did not provide the follow-on support because of the very reason you are saying.

Mr. PERLE. Senator, I do not want to propel us into an argument about the advice that led to the policies of the past, but let me just say that one of the documents that purports to be definitive with respect to the quality of the opposition, prepared by an organization I will not identify, is short on facts, but one of the facts it purports to relate to the reader is that the head of the Iraqi National Congress travels with 26 bodyguards.

Now, he happens to be in the room, and he is surrounded by no bodyguards at all. That is the quality of the expert advice that we have been given for years, and if this committee wants a really interesting and challenging assignment, it would be to review the last 30 years of expert advice on the gulf from the institutions on which we have come to rely.

There is some history here, and the history important. In 1995, the Iraqi opposition in the north of Iraq planned a military oper-

ation from which United States support was withdrawn at the last minute. They thought it was too late to terminate the operation altogether, and it was initiated. It resulted very quickly in the destruction of two Iraqi divisions. This was with very little support from the United States, and none at all at the crucial moment.

In 1996, when Saddam Hussein moved into the north, only after securing the agreement of one of the Kurdish factions, and without that agreement they could not have moved unopposed into the north, when Saddam Hussein did that, he did it because the defections from his own military forces were mounting in such numbers that he understood he had to act.

Now, unhappily, at that moment we did not have the will, we did not have the resolve, we did not have the determination to exercise the air power we had which in modest application would have, I believe would have ended Saddam's regime then and there.

This is not as daunting a prospect as people say it is, and it is true Saddam is brutal beyond imagination. It is also true that men who rule like that earn enemies in the millions, and when things begin to turn, they can and do turn very fast.

This war, if it happens, this liberation of Iraq, if it happens, will be conducted principally by Iraqis both from the armed forces joining the political opposition in the north and south, with a little bit of help from American air power.

Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Cordesman.

Mr. CORDESMAN. The problem is that we often end up attacking the opposition when we should be noting that Saddam is a strong and competent tyranny with a core of very effective military forces which are heavy, well-armored, which have fought well against much better organized opponents at the regional level.

I think we sometimes forget how different the gulf war was relative to what happened in the Iran-Iraq war. Because of that, I do not believe that you can create an effective military opposition without massive American participation. I think you would have to have forces based in Turkey and defensive forces in terms of their ability to operate really out of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait does not have the basing capability that would approach several wings.

You would need a massive battle management support. It would not be an extension of what exists today in the no-fly zones. You would have to be prepared, frankly, to deal with the consequences of what happens if the opposition should lose, and I strongly suspect they would lose. I have heard many reports of defections and weaknesses and assassination attempts and coup d'etat attempts, and I have listed quite a number of them in my books, but the fact is, he is still there, and at least some of those coup d'etat attempts never happened.

The other thing that we have not talked about and has to be borne in mind is, are we really talking about unilateral war? Are we going to bring Turkey along into this equation? Is Saudi Arabia going to play, in spite of its stated fear of division? What is Kuwait really going to do?

The last time I was in Kuwait talking to the opposition—and I am afraid the history of that conference was not a happy one—I was talking to someone who claimed to be a commander in the Su-

preme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. In listening to his call for American air support—and coming from an Iranian-backed opposition this was interesting—it was quite clear he may have been well able to launch small attacks inside southern Iraq, and carry out pinprick attacks on the regime. But, he had absolutely no idea whatsoever about what it meant to actually confront a modern force and to deal with air power.

And let me note, there has to be an aftermath to military action. We have found out the hard way that unless you have an almost unified opposition arise, you have a massive exercise in nation-building, so when you begin with the military dimension you had better be prepared to go on with all of the economic and other aid required, something we have not done in Bosnia, and something we certainly have not done in Kosovo, and if we are going to set a precedent, so be it, but it will be the first one.

Senator BROWNBACK. It is troubling to me that we are sitting here saying, I wish we could do this, I wish we had done that, but if we continue on the current course we are on right now, if we go into smart sanctions, which a couple of you have noted you deem as a start toward no sanctions, toward just loosening up what is taking place, we are further eroding the sort of resolve, and we are probably just a few more years down the road from just saying, oh, what the heck, let us just kind of dribble out of the region and Saddam stays, which is what I think most of our Arab allies in the region have concluded is actually what is going to take place anyway.

U.S. resolve loosens, weakens over time, we are here in the neighborhood, we have to take the brunt of any fight, and if you guys are not going to show resolve with this, then we are certainly not going to poke a stick into Saddam Hussein's eye.

That is why I think right now is really such a key time for us. We have got a new administration, and one that has to make this choice, and I think the choice they make now determines where things end up within a couple of years, and we could make choices now on policy toward Iraq, U.S. policy toward Iraq that may take a couple of years in their implementation to be successful, but they could ultimately, I believe, put us in a position where Saddam is out of there.

It is not a 6-month strategy. I think it is a multiple-year strategy, but it is one of those forks in the road where, OK, we are going to take a much more aggressive, robust position now, knowing that it is not going to produce the solution we want in 6 months, but it will, we hope, in 3 years, or we could stay on this one we are on right now which just kind of dribbles down until we get occupied with something else, and eventually we start pulling people, aircraft out of Saudi Arabia and we start focusing in different areas, and we just do not go anywhere further forward.

I would hope all of you would actually work with us at this point that we take the more robust approach now, where we have a new administration in, and that we would all conclude together, as we, I believe, have at the panel, that Saddam Hussein is the problem, the regime that is currently in control is the problem, and now is the time for us to take a different approach.

I would welcome your input at our offices, I am certain that Paul would as well, of what that different approach would be, but more

importantly input toward the administration of saying, we will need to come together on this as a country if we are going to implement this policy.

And I think, Dr. Halperin, what you note is correct, there are costs associated with this, or difficulties associated with this. I think long term there are far more difficulties associated with the route we are currently on than picking a new one, that we can fill a cavity now or we can pull a tooth later, that this is the time to act and it will be much less costly on that.

That will be my final comment. I do not know, Paul, if you had anything further you wanted to add, or the witnesses would care to state.

Dr. HALPERIN. Senator, I agree with you that we cannot afford to continue to drift. I think there are two disastrous policies. One is to continue to drift, and the other is to start support for the opposition that we are not prepared to carry forward, but I think there are two real policies, one is the one of deciding we are going to get rid of him and support the opposition to the degree that that is necessary. I do not see how you do that over 3 years, because I do not think this can be a slow process.

Richard is right, you have got to do something decisive and be prepared to back it up. I do not see a sort of gradualism here that does any good, but I do think there is an alternative.

I do not believe that moving to a different set of sanctions of the kind that I have outlined inevitably means we are getting out. What I think it means is that we establish something that is permanent and something that will have the necessary support both in the region and with the U.N. Security Council, not to stop everything, but to put Saddam Hussein in a position where he cannot engage in conventional military operations either in his country or beyond it, and where his ability to expand his weapons of mass destruction program is not eliminated, but contained, and that we then confront them with a classic containment situation, which I think we could sustain as long as we have to.

I think, in other words, we can go to a new form of containment which is sustainable.

Senator WELLSTONE. Mort, I gather that—and I do not want to take time away from Secretary Perle or Mr. Cordesman, but I gather in some ways what you just said goes back to the distinction that Senator Kerrey was trying to draw between containment—you are talking about a different policy of containment. You do not want to go with drift versus what he called replacement, am I correct?

You are saying, as unhappy a prospect as it is, the containment, a different kind of containment is a policy that you think is workable and sustainable, and I think Secretary Perle has a different—I mean, let me try and just take 5 more minutes and draw out your perspective. I do not want to preclude you.

Mr. PERLE. I think the distinctions will be lost on most observers between containment and containment mark 2. It is bound to be viewed—

Senator WELLSTONE. I knew he would say something like that, Mort.

Mr. PERLE. We may not be as far apart as Mort thinks. I think Mort has not looked at—and correct me if I am wrong—at ways in which a policy of support to the opposition could entail containment of risk, so that one would begin—I mean, Mort referred to arming the opposition. He did not hear anything about arming the opposition from me, that the usual perception is we are going to start issuing weapons to the opposition and invite them to march toward Baghdad. That certainly is not my concept. It is not General Downing's concept. It is not the concept of the opposition figures that I have consulted with.

Our views differ, but my own view is that you start with a return of the opposition to the north, to the north and parts of the south that are not under Saddam's control. I do not think there is a lot he can do about that in the near term, and he might not even be motivated to do a lot about it in the near term.

As they begin to gather political strength, eventually they become a political challenge of some importance. We could talk then about what you would need in terms of military resources from outside and from inside, and what you could expect to get from defections from the Iraqi forces, what might even be there, latent now, underground because there is no external support of any kind, not even financial external support, but I think you could contain the risk in the sense that if the political operation did not appear to be succeeding, then you would not necessarily take the next step.

One of the things that I think has discouraged people from looking at options in this area is the sense that a decision to support an opposition strategy is the decision to launch an attack against Baghdad, and that looks pretty daunting under current circumstances. I certainly would not recommend that.

But the opposition themselves are prepared to risk their lives. They make judgments, have to make judgments every day about how much protection they require and how much risk they are prepared to take, and they believe there are feasible options in which they can engage, and I think we do not have to accept a 2 or 3-year scenario to take those first steps.

Senator WELLSTONE. You know, Mr. Chairman, I want to hear from Mr. Cordesman before we finish, but I was thinking about this testimony, which I think has been very important, but it is not as important as it should be if it is just a hearing and that is it.

One of the things we might do, because we have been apart on this, is we might—the staffs get together and see exactly what area of common ground we have. We should go through the same exercise as this discussion, and I will tell you, this committee, I think we should.

The other thing is, I really believe we should, this committee, we should put together a whole set of hearings on this issue, the whole question.

Mr. Cordesman started out earlier saying “I do not think you can decontextualize this from what is happening with Israel and in the Middle East, and what was once the peace process, and where are we heading.” I think we ought to do a whole set of hearings and just stay with it, and I am committed to doing that, and we could work together on it. I think it is really important to do.

By the way, I would like to thank all of you in advance. Thank you.

Mr. CORDESMAN. Senator, a very few quick points. One thing I think we all agree on is that people really need to understand that smart sanctions will at best only work if you have strong and decisive military containment. Strong and decisive military containment means military action, and the willingness and demonstrated ability to protect Kuwait, the Kurds, and halt any major deployment of weapons of mass destruction.

If we do not have that commitment, smart sanctions are, indeed, a road to no sanctions. I do not believe the Bush administration would make that choice, but it is a point to remember.

I do not believe the opposition today can be made strong or popular enough to overthrow Saddam. I do not necessarily disagree with what Richard has said, but any effort to support the opposition has to be very well contained, without military adventures, without creating the equivalent of a Bay of Pigs. I do not believe you can create a Contra movement, which was not universally popular, as I remember it, in Congress on a bipartisan basis.

But more than that, we have forgotten the fact we cannot act in a vacuum. This is not some game board. What about Turkey? What about Saudi Arabia? What about Jordan? What about Syria? What kind of structure of alliances does it take to really make this work, as distinguished from having Saddam use it to discredit the opposition as tools of America, and use it to gain popularity in the Arab world, and you had better answer all of those questions before you start anything that you may not be able to finish.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. That is all well-put. We will work together, and let us see if there are things we cannot come up with together. I do not detect the disagreements that I guess I thought I would coming in here. Maybe there is on tactics or thoughtfulness, maybe, of when you go in you cannot move one piece of this chessboard without impacting four or five other chess games you have got going on at the same time, and those have to all be considered.

It has been an excellent discussion, particularly at an important time for the country, and in looking at a new policy position here. We appreciate very much your attendance.

The record will remain open for the requisite number of days to make changes, if you desire, in your testimony. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

