[Senate Hearing 107-18]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-18
REVIEW OF THE ANTI-DRUG CERTIFICATION PROCESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-540 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL NELSON, Florida
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Aronson, Hon. Bernard William, managing partner, ACON
Investments; and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Washington, DC............................... 38
Beers, Hon. R. Rand, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Certification decision memo, March 1, 2001................... 29
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 20
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, prepared
statement...................................................... 5
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., (R-NY), U.S. House of Representatives.. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., U.S. Senator from Iowa................ 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, U.S. Senator from Texas.............. 10
Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, (D-TX), U.S. House of Representatives..... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Statements submitted for the record:
Drug Strategies, Mathea Falco, president, Washington, DC..... 43
Washington Office on Latin America........................... 47
(iii)
REVIEW OF THE ANTI-DRUG CERTIFICATION PROCESS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Lincoln D.
Chafee presiding.
Present: Senators Chafee, Biden, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, and
Bill Nelson.
Senator Chafee. The hearing will come to order.
Today the Foreign Relations Committee meets to receive
testimony on and discuss the so-called anti-drug certification
process. This law requires the President to eliminate most
forms of U.S. foreign aid and oppose international development
loans for a nation deemed not to be cooperating fully with the
United States in its anti-narcotics efforts.
Until the mid-1980's, the U.S. Government's linking of
anti-drug policy to foreign policy largely involved little more
than the granting of discretionary authority to the executive
branch. Congress became frustrated with the State Department's
unwillingness to confront governments of foreign countries that
were major sources and conduits of illegal narcotics.
So in 1986 Congress passed a $1.4 billion comprehensive
anti-drug abuse law. Provisions of this law require the
President to impose economic sanctions, including the denial of
U.S. foreign aid to any nation that is not cooperating fully in
our anti-drug efforts. I would note that this law passed the
Senate by a vote of 97 to 2, without objection to establishment
of this certification process.
So today, 15 years later, where do things stand? It can
certainly be said with accuracy that the drug certification law
has drawn the attention of governments abroad. Cooperation
abroad with the U.S. anti-drug efforts has increased markedly.
But this law also has generated resentment among nations who
view the process as overbearing and perhaps arrogant,
particularly given that the U.S. is a substantial drug-
consuming nation.
In short, the law has, some might argue, hindered the
conduct of our foreign policy. A review of the most recent
listings of major certified and decertified nations is
illuminating. On November 10, 1999, President Clinton listed 25
major drug-producing and drug transit countries. Then on March
1, 2000, of these 25 majors he certified 19 and decertified 6.
Then of these six decertified countries, he waived sanctions on
four for national interest concerns. That left just two
countries on which the law's sanctions were applied,
Afghanistan and Burma, certainly nations that are not major
beneficiaries of U.S. aid regardless of the drug issue.
This experience strikes me as more of an exercise in
process and of limited effect on our policy. It is also likely
one of several reasons why a consensus seems to have developed
that alternatives to this process ought to be given a very
close look.
I do hope today's hearing will give us an opportunity to
fully explore these proposed changes to current law, and I do
look forward to the expert witnesses who will provide
testimony.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
first of all thank you for hosting and holding this very, very
important hearing on an issue that has consumed a great deal of
the Congress' attention over the last decade and a half, the
certification issue, and rightly so, given the tremendous
interest there is in this country with the devastating effects
of narcotic consumption. Sixteen thousand lives are lost every
year in this country in drug-related deaths. Obviously, we as
representatives of our various constituencies reflect a desire
in this country to do something about this, do something about
this to try and reduce the pain and suffering associated with
this problem.
It was out of that frustration that this legislation was
born a decade and a half ago. It is important, I think, at this
juncture with a new administration, a new government in Mexico
that has committed itself, at least rhetorically, to addressing
this issue, that we examine whether or not there is a better
way of dealing with the issue of cooperation among producing,
money-laundering, transit, consuming countries, all of those
nations that are involved in one aspect or another of the drug
business.
So I think this is very worthwhile that we are gathering
here today. We are going to hear from some very, very good
witnesses this morning. I am pleased particularly that we have
so many interested Members of Congress. Senator Grassley and
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison I know are going to be before us;
Representatives Ben Gilman and Silvestre Reyes, the head of the
Hispanic Caucus and my good friend, who I had the privilege of
testifying with the other day before the Congressional Black
Caucus. I am pleased to be with you again here this morning.
So, Mr. Chairman, we have held hearings from time to time
on this issue of counternarcotics cooperation with respect to
specific countries. We have not for some time looked at the
issue of the certification process itself, and that is what you
are going to do and that is why I think this is worthwhile.
I believe it is important to do so. This is a procedure, as
I said, that has been in effect since the mid-eighties. The
annual certification process has from time to time provoked a
great deal of controversy and debate in both the House and the
Senate. Presidential determinations with respect to whether a
particular country had cooperated fully in any given year were
challenged in the Congress, but never overturned.
Senator John McCain and I offered legislation a few years
ago to get rid of the certification process and try and come up
with something new. Senator Paul Coverdell of Georgia had
proposed some alternative ideas that we were never able to
enact into legislation, but I thought were very intriguing. The
congressional controversy and sometimes highly critical debate
did cause significant friction in the bilateral relationships
with respect to the country of concern where the debated
certification was occurring, usually Mexico.
I would not suggest for one moment, Mr. Chairman, that the
threat posed by illicit drug production and consumption-related
crimes is not very, very serious. The international impact is
serious and of great concern to all of us. However, of even
greater concern to me personally are the effects it is having
here at home. Last year Americans spent more than $60 billion
to purchase illegal drugs. Nearly 15 million Americans 12 years
of age and older use illegal drugs, including 1.5 million
cocaine users, 208,000 heroin addicts in the United States, and
more than 11 million smokers of marijuana.
This menace is not just confined to inner cities or the
poor. Illegal drug use occurs among members of every ethnic and
socioeconomic group in the United States. The human and
economic costs of illegal drug consumption by Americans is also
enormous. I mentioned already, 16,000 people die annually as a
result of drug-related deaths. Drug-related illnesses, death,
and crime cost the United States approximately $100 billion
annually, including the cost of lost productivity, premature
death, and incarceration.
This is an enormously lucrative business. Drug trafficking
generates an estimated revenues of $400 billion a year
annually. The United States has spent more than $30 billion in
foreign interdiction and source country counternarcotics
programs since 1981. Despite impressive seizures on the border,
on the high seas, and other countries, foreign drugs are
cheaper and more readily available in the United States today
than they were two decades ago when we began an intensive
effort in this area.
For much of that time, the annual certification process has
been in effect. Clearly, whatever else one thinks about
certification, one must conclude that it has not been the
silver bullet with respect to eliminating America's supply or
demand for illicit drugs.
Over the course of the 15 years that the certification
procedures have been in effect, there have been only minor
modifications to the statute. I believe the time has come to
make an assessment as to whether it continues to further our
national security and foreign policy objectives. Is it really
doing the job with respect to promoting effective international
cooperation to combat illicit drug production, sales, and
consumption, or could we develop some other means that would
better serve our interests in this important area and the
interests of our allies who seek to cooperate with us in this
regard?
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have introduced legislation to
suspend the grading aspects of the certification. I have done
so, Mr. Chairman, to create an atmosphere of some goodwill in
which President Bush can discuss with other heads of state from
Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, ways to improve international
cooperation among producing, transit, and consuming nations.
During the 2-year suspension period, the Congress would
continue to receive detailed reports with respect to what is
being accomplished in the areas of eradication, interdiction,
extradition of drug kingpins, efforts to combat money-
laundering, et cetera. Moreover, the President has the option,
should he choose, to continue the certification process with
respect to a country or countries if he determines that this
would further bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with
respect to that nation or nations.
Mr. Chairman, I have visited a number of these countries
over the years and I have met with many heads of state,
particularly those in our own hemisphere. I have yet to have a
conversation with one of them that thought that our
certification process was helpful to them in their national
efforts to develop and sustain meaningful and effective
counternarcotics programs.
Perhaps it is time at least to listen to whatever proposals
they might suggest to do a better job in this area. We lose
nothing by trying and a great deal by making the effort.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for hosting
this committee hearing this morning. I am looking forward to
hearing from our colleagues. As I mentioned earlier before they
arrived, members all have a deep interest in the subject
matter, worked hard at it for a number of years. I am anxious
to hear their thoughts on the subject matter and other members
of the committee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Senator Chafee, for
holding this hearing. I also want to welcome our distinguished
panel of witnesses, Senators Hutchison and Grassley and
Congressman Gilman and Congressman Reyes. I have had the
privilege to work with several of my colleagues, including
Senator Hutchison, and I will talk more about her colleague
Senator Phil Gramm, with whom I am introducing legislation
today on this very subject, actually re-introducing it.
We have all been working hard to try and come up with a
solution. Senator Feinstein has teamed with Senator Hutchison,
I have teamed with Senator Gramm, and Senator Dodd has
introduced legislation.
I really want to say to Senator Helms, who is not here, I
appreciate this hearing because I thought it would be important
to hear all these various proposals. I think we need some
changes, although I do respect Congressman Gilman's points that
he is going to make, I think quite eloquently because I have
read his written testimony, on behalf of the current process.
But I believe for the last several years we have really had
no good options before us when it comes to this process. I
think that became apparent in our annual debate over the
certification of Mexico's efforts in combating illegal drugs.
Certifying Mexico has been very difficult to do in light of the
upsetting statistics showing that Mexico is a major point of
production and transit for drugs entering the United States.
Coming from California, and I know I speak for all the
border states, this is a horrific problem for our children, for
our families, for our people. I continue to be concerned about
the influence of powerful drug cartels in Mexico. In fact, in
1998 I joined 44 other Senators in voting in favor of
decertifying Mexico. I want you to know that was a very
difficult vote for me, because Mexico is our friend. But I
think when you have a friend you should not lie to your friend.
You should be honest. So for me it was really hard to say I can
certify that there is really no problem.
That is what we really care about today, to see if we can
come up with other options for dealing with this situation.
Right now we have the worst of all worlds, where we either have
to turn our back on a problem or we humiliate a friend. That is
just not a good choice.
I would ask unanimous consent that my entire statement be
placed in the record. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just spend
a minute talking about the legislation that Senator Phil Gramm
and I have reintroduced, the same legislation we introduced
last year. We hope it will lead to a more honest and realistic
way of addressing the international drug problem. We will
replace confrontation with cooperation. We are encouraging
nations to join the United States in fighting drugs, but we
would eliminate a process which strains our relations with our
friends such as Mexico.
Our legislation would exempt from the certification process
those countries that have a bilateral agreement with the United
States regarding the production, distribution, interdiction,
demand reduction, border security, and cooperation among law
enforcement agencies. So in other words, what we are saying to
countries is, join with us, sign a bilateral agreement with us
on all these areas, and then you will not have to be subjected
to the certification process. But we do not do away with the
United States process, because we think it is a hammer that is
unfortunately needed if a country turns its back on this offer
from the United States to work in a cooperative way.
So again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I look
forward to reaching some consensus on this so we can move
forward.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER
Senator Chafee, thank you for holding this hearing on the drug
certification process. I want to welcome our witnesses on the first
panel this morning, Senator Hutchison, Senator Grassley, Congressman
Gilman and Congressman Reyes. It is a pleasure to see all of you this
morning. I am so pleased to see how much interest there is in this
important issue.
Over the last several years, Congress has had no good options when
it comes to the certification of major drug producing and drug transit
countries. This has been most apparent in our annual debate over the
certification of Mexico's efforts in combating illicit drugs.
Certifying Mexico has been very difficult to do in light of the
upsetting statistics showing that Mexico is a major point of production
and transit for drugs entering the United States. I have also been, and
continue to be, concerned about the influence of powerful drug cartels
in Mexico. In fact, in 1998, I joined 44 other Senators in voting in
favor of decertifying Mexico.
Nevertheless, I join many of my colleagues in the belief that the
certification process does not work as it was intended. In some cases,
what we have now is the worst of both worlds. The certification process
subjects some of our closest allies and trading partners to an annual
ritual of finger-pointing and humiliation rather than supporting mutual
efforts to control illicit drugs.
Today, Senator Gramm and I are reintroducing legislation which we
hope will lead to a more honest and realistic way of addressing the
international drug problem. By replacing confrontation with
cooperation, we are encouraging nations to join the United States in
fighting drugs while eliminating a process which strains our relations
with allies such as Mexico.
Our legislation would exempt from the certification process those
countries that have a bilateral agreement with the United States.
These agreements would have to address issues relating to the
control of illicit drugs--including production, distribution,
interdiction, demand reduction, border security, and cooperation among
law enforcement agencies.
This alternative will give both countries a way to work together
for real goals with real results. Make no mistake, this will not give
Mexico or any other country a free pass on fighting illicit drugs. On
the contrary, our bill encourages the adoption of tough bilateral
agreements. It specifically spells out issues that must be addressed in
the agreements.
We specifically require the adoption of ``timetables and objective
and measurable standards.'' And, we require semi-annual reports
assessing the progress of both countries under the bilateral agreement.
If progress is not made, the country returns to the annual
certification process, which involves the possibility of sanctions.
It is sure sign of the importance of this issue that we now have
several bills to get us out of the drug certification quagmire. It is
particularly important to those of us from border states, which are hit
so hard by the traffic in illegal drugs.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have recently
visited Colombia with the Armed Services Committee and I was
struck by several things and I learned a lot. The first thing I
was struck with was not not only are we fighting the
narcotraffickers, but the United States interests are clearly
entwined with trying to keep an elected democracy viable and
not taken over by the drug lords.
So that the United States clearly had in its interest in a
country like Colombia not only fighting the drug traffick, but
also helping the government remain viable as an elected
democracy.
The other impression that I came away with, having gone
into two air strips that were carved out of the jungle in
southern Colombia, was that we are starting to be effective in
our spraying of Roundup, in my judgment not enough, yet they
have pulled out of a place called Putumayo, which is the major
production of coca. But even if we are effective there, it is
going to pop up someplace else, if not in Colombia maybe across
the border in Ecuador or down in Brazil or wherever.
So as we approach this--and I know the subject of this
hearing is the certification process, but I think we have got
to constantly remind ourselves that we have got to do something
about the demand side of the equation, about trying to help our
children be educated as to the dangers of taking drugs, and
then when they do get hooked trying to help them through
treatment and rehabilitation.
So one of the reasons I am so happy to be on this committee
is for this very subject. I find commonality on this subject
with the Armed Services Committee, on which I serve also. So I
am looking very much forward to this very distinguished panel:
my old friend Congressman Gilman that I had the privilege of
serving with; and of course I was back in the House in the days
when Senator Grassley was even back there. So I am delighted to
be here and hear your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. I should point out, by the way, that both
Senator Chafee and I preceded Senator Nelson by about a week,
along with Senator McCain and Senator Fred Thompson and Senator
Hagel, who made the same, I think followed the same trip to
Colombia and Ecuador and down to Trace Ischenis and into the
Lanandrea military base and the Monta facility in Ecuador. I
think we found it very worthwhile as well, and I am sure we
will bring that up here today, and some of the points Senator
Nelson raised are very legitimate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Thank you, Senator
Nelson.
Senator Grassley, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM IOWA
Senator Grassley. Thank you very much. Glad to be with you.
Do you want me to start, then?
Senator Chafee. Yes, please. Lead off.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Senator Chafee. Thank you,
Senator Dodd and all of our colleagues, including those who are
here to testify.
Today is that annual date that the President must submit
his findings on the counterdrug cooperation efforts. That
process obviously is somewhat controversial or we would not be
here today for this hearing or with the different ideas to
change it.
Before discussing my bill, S. 376, I want to say a few
things about the controversy surrounding the certification
process. I begin by quoting the basic law of the mid-1980's,
chapter 8, Foreign Assistance Act: ``International narcotics
trafficking poses an unparalleled transnational threat to
today's world and its suppression is among the most important
foreign policy objectives of the United States.
``Under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and
under the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking
in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, parties are required
to criminalize certain drug-related activities.'' Then
continuing to quote: ``International narcotics control programs
should include as a priority goal the suppression of illicit
manufacture of and trafficking in narcotics drugs, money-
laundering, and precursor chemical diversion.'' The
international community should provide assistance, where
appropriate, to those producers and transit countries which
require assistance because, quoting again, ``effective
international cooperation is necessary to control the illicit
cultivation, production, and smuggling, trafficking in, and
abuse of narcotic drugs.''
The law empowers the President to conclude international
agreements to implement these objectives. It then requires a
method of accountability, and that is what this process is
about. What the law says in summary is that we acknowledge that
international production and trafficking are bad, that the
United States and other countries have obligations under their
own laws and under international laws to stop production,
trafficking, and use, and that it is reasonable and responsible
to expect these countries and others to be accountable for
those efforts, even if they do not want to be and do not like
it.
There seems to be, however, some dissatisfaction with these
expectations. We hear charges of unfairness, of unilateral
decisionmaking, of living in a glass house. While I understand
that some are unhappy, I do not think it is time to throw the
baby out with the bath water. I do not believe that the
circumstances that led Congress some 14 years ago to establish
this standard have substantially changed. If anything,
production and trafficking are worse. The criminal
organizations engaged in these activities have grown more
powerful and bolder.
Our obligations to protect and defend the people across the
country is no less real or demanding. The need for tough
responses and tough-mindedness about those responses remains a
call upon our best efforts.
I do not believe that the need for accountability is any
less today than it has ever been. The United States, with
others if possible, without if necessary, must be a leader in
ensuring that we and others are taking adequate steps to meet
our obligations. This is not some philosophical discussion. It
involves what we propose to do about something very basic that
is happening across the land. Drug availability and use are
causing direct and real harm today, right now, in our homes,
schoolyards, neighborhoods, in our hospitals and on our
streets.
Most of the drugs that do this harm are from overseas. They
are produced and trafficked by major criminal gangs. In some
cases those activities are aided and abetted by foreign
governments or corrupt officials with them. This is not
something that we can or should ignore, overlook, or make
excuses for. We do not do this in respect to our battle against
terrorism and the state support of state terrorists, and we
should expect no less when it comes to drugs.
I repeat the words from the law. This is one of our most
important political, foreign policy objectives.
That being said, I do believe that we can make some changes
in the current certification process. The changes I propose
will retain the important accountability aspects while
retooling efforts to be more effective. Our goal should not be
to spend time debating the certification process. We need to
spend our time in doing something about the problem it is meant
to address.
I also believe, in part a result of certification, that
other countries now take the need to deal with drug trafficking
more seriously. It is important to take that fact into account.
That is why Senator DeWine and I offer S. 376. A quite simple
approach. It replaces the current three-tiered certification
decisionmaking process with a single determination. My proposal
requires a decertification notice only. There is no more
``major list.'' The focus is on the international bad actors.
This parallels what we do with state support of terrorism.
By doing this, we focus attention then on the bad guys. We keep
the important accountability aspect of our law. We keep the
useful reporting process. We keep the leverage with bad actors
that is one of the most useful features of the law.
But the change gives us a chance to reduce the tension with
some of our friends and allies over the process. It gives us
some Zantac for the foreign policy heartburn that we seem to
have had with many administrations; and it gives us a 3-year
trial period to see how it works.
I believe these changes offer us a good chance to retain
the usefulness of certification, and so I would thank the
committee for their kind attention to my proposal.
[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK GRASSLEY
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the committee for holding this
important hearing. Today is the first of March, the annual date for the
President to submit his findings on international counter drug
cooperation. This certification process lately has become somewhat
controversial. Today's hearing, as I understand it, is to examine this
process and several bills to change it now before the committee.
Before I discuss my bill, S. 376, and the changes it proposes, I
want to say a few things about the certification process and the
controversy that now accompanies it.
Let me begin by quoting briefly from the original law that created
the certification process back in the mid 1980s. Chapter 8 of the
Foreign Assistance Act reads, in part, as follows:
International narcotics trafficking poses an unparalleled
transnational threat in today's world, and its suppression is
among the most important foreign policy objectives of the
United States.
Under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and
under the United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking
in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, parties are required
to criminalize certain drug-related activities. . . .
And following from this:
International narcotics control programs should include, as
priority goals, the suppression of illicit manufacture of and
trafficking in narcotic . . . drugs, money laundering, and
precursor chemical diversion. . . .
The international community should provide assistance, where
appropriate, to those producer and transit countries which
require assistance
Because . . .
Effective international cooperation is necessary to control
the illicit cultivation, production and smuggling of,
trafficking in, and abuse of narcotic . . . drugs.
The law empowers the President to conclude international agreements
to implement these objectives. It then requires a method for
accountability.
What the law says, in summary, is that we acknowledge that
international production and trafficking are bad. That the U.S. and
other countries have obligations under their own laws and under
international law to stop production, trafficking, and use. And that it
is reasonable and responsible to expect this country and others to be
accountable for those efforts. Even if they don't want to be and don't
like it.
There seems to be, however, some dissatisfaction with these
expectations. We here charges of unfairness. Of unilateral decision
making. Of living in glass houses. While I understand that some are
unhappy, I do not think it is time to throw the baby out with the bath
water.
I do not believe that the circumstances that led Congress some 14
years ago to establish this standard have substantially changed. If
anything production and trafficking are worse. The criminal
organizations engaged in these activities have grown more powerful and
bolder. Our obligations to protect and defend the people across this
country is no less real and demanding. The need for tough responses and
toughmindedness about those responses remain a call upon our best
efforts.
I do not believe that the need for accountability is any less today
that it has ever been. I am also of the opinion that the U.S.--with
others if possible, without if necessary--must be a leader in ensuring
that we and others are taking adequate steps to meet our obligations.
This is not some esoteric discussion about airy philosophical
ideas. It involves what we propose to do about something very basic
that is happening across this land. Drug availability and use are
causing direct and real harm today.
In our homes, schoolyards, and neighborhoods. In our hospitals and
on our streets. Most of the drugs that do this harm come from overseas.
They are produced and trafficked by major criminal gangs. In some
cases, those activities are aided and abetted by foreign governments or
corrupt officials in them.
This is not something we can or should ignore, overlook, or make
excuses for. We do not do this in respect to terrorism and state
support for it, and we should expect no less when it comes to drugs. I
repeat the words from the law, this is one of our most important
foreign policy concerns.
That being said, I do believe that we can make some changes to the
current certification regime. The changes I propose will retain the
important accountability aspects while retooling certification to be
more effective. Our goal should not be to spend time debating the
certification process. We need to spend our time in doing something
about the problem it is meant to address.
I also believe, in part a result of certification, that other
countries now take the need to deal with drug trafficking more
seriously. It is important to take that fact into account.
That is why I offered S. 376 along with Senator DeWine. What it
does is quite simple. It replaces the current three-tiered
certification decision making process with one determination. My
proposal requires a decertification notice only. There is no more
``Majors List.'' The focus is on international bad actors. This
parallels what we do with states that support terrorism. By doing this,
we focus attention on the bad guys. We keep the important
accountability aspects of the law. We keep the useful reporting
process. We keep the leverage with bad actors that is one of the most
useful features of the law. But the change gives us a chance to reduce
the tensions with some of our friends and allies over the process. It
gives us some Zantac for the policy heartburn we seem to have had with
Administrations. And it gives us a three-year trial period to see if it
works.
I believe these changes offer us the best chance to keep
certification and retain its usefulness. I want to thank the committee
for its time and attention.
Senator Chafee. I would like to thank the distinguished
Senator from Iowa and welcome the distinguished Senator from
Texas.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Chafee, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say that I think it is very encouraging that so many
members are now really involved and interested in this issue.
Many of us have worked for several years to try to come up with
an alternative process that would promote mutual cooperation
and respect and result, rather than this certification process
which has not really done the job that we wanted it to do.
The certification process has the alternative of giving an
A for cooperation, an F for noncooperation, or an F with a
waiver like a social promotion. That is not really a good--at
least it has not been a process that has produced the results
of significantly lowering the drug trafficking and the number
of illegal drugs that are coming into our country.
So I would ask the committee to move forward and keep all
of the people in mind who have bills introduced. We now have
four. The legislation that I offer this year has Senators
Feinstein, Domenici, Kyl, Sessions, Graham and Bingaman.
Senator Boxer and Senator Gramm, Senator Dodd and his group,
and Senator Grassley all have very good nuggets. If we can work
together, this would be enough that we could actually make a
difference.
I think we are seeing a new day in Mexico. President Fox
has taken significant steps to eliminate corruption. He fired
or transferred 45 of 47 customs inspectors along the U.S.-
Mexico border. In the first month of this year, 150 tractor-
trailer trucks containing contraband were stopped by Mexican
customs officials. That is in 1 month. Last year for the entire
year, only 38 tractor-trailers were stopped for contraband.
So I think President Fox is certainly showing that there is
a new day in Mexico and I think that we should take this
opportunity with our partner to see if we can do something that
would promote mutual cooperation.
One of the things that I would suggest is a multilateral
approach, where we develop through our multilateral
institutions--the Organizations of American States, other
treaty organizations--systems which insist on accountability
and cooperation to win the war on drugs. A nation that fails to
meet acceptable international standards should be subject, not
to sanctions just from the United States, but from the
international community.
These sanctions and the mechanism should be harsh and
swift. All nations must know that failure to work cooperatively
in the drug war has consequences.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would just hope that you would take my
legislation, the other three pieces of legislation. Let us all
have a part in the discussion, and I hope you will mark up a
bill, go to the full Foreign Relations Committee, and let us
stop certification before we have the same situation next year
and let us show President Fox and the others that are grappling
with this problem that there is a different approach, we want
it to be cooperative, but we want it to have results. I think
that is all of our goal.
Thank you very much.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator, and we will try and
work together as we go forward on this.
The distinguished Congressman from New York, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM NEW YORK
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
I want to thank our panelists who are here today, the
committee members, and we welcome this opportunity of sharing
some thoughts with you on the annual drug certification
process. I am pleased to join our panelists, Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison, Senator Grassley, and Congressman Reyes, who are
here sharing their views.
I am here to participate because I am a Member of Congress
who strongly supports the current law on the certification,
among many other Members of Congress. Our annual drug
certification is a simple process, straightforward, but often
misunderstood. It simply requires that 30 or so major drug
producing and major transit nations like Mexico, before they
receive any direct United States aid and-or support for their
multilateral loans, must demonstrate that they are fully
cooperating with us in fighting drugs, which have been
destroying our communities and particularly our young people
here at home.
Historically, I note that this annual drug certification
approach has been overwhelmingly supported by American
taxpayers. The U.S. Conference of Mayors under Mayor Daly of
Chicago, who at the local level can do nothing about the
international trade that targets our communities, has strongly
supported this process in the recent past.
Our Federal Government has the lead responsibility in
stopping drugs coming from abroad. The local mayors have wisely
seen the annual drug certification as a key and a powerful tool
for the Federal Government in its primary role in helping to
protect their communities and citizens from those drugs which
originate overseas.
Surprisingly, a Wall Street Journal poll reported not too
long ago that 65 percent of the Latin American people also
favor U.S.-imposed sanctions on countries which do not do
enough to combat illicit drug production and trafficking. Our
Hispanic neighbors know that the United States must undertake
serious steps to address these serious problems of illicit
drugs.
Many of us in the Congress who were around when drug
certification was developed by the Democratic Congress for a
Republican President in 1986 continue to believe that it is not
too much to ask for any nation's full cooperation in fighting
drugs before we provide American taxpayer assistance to that
nation. Along with the majority of American taxpayers, I think
many of us see eye to eye on that issue.
For years here in the Congress before 1986 we all heard
good words and lofty promises from many of the foreign
governments about their promised cooperation on the supply side
in their interdiction efforts, but all we got at that time were
words until drug certification came along. Only then did the
major producing and transit nations know that our Nation was
serious and we were prepared to withhold our aid if need be.
As Senator Nelson has noted, there is no question that our
Nation needs to do a great deal more in solving the demand
problem. We welcome that challenge and we are spending billions
of dollars on demand reduction here at home and doing our share
on that front.
Drug certification has been a valuable tool in our supply
side arsenal, an equal part of the battle against drugs. As we
all know who have been in the battle for far too long, we must
simultaneously reduce both supply and demand and do it at the
same time. It helps to keep drugs out of our Nation in the
first place by reducing supply.
Moreover, as we address demand here at home, we must not
ignore the impact that an unlimited supply of cheap, pure and
addictive drugs from abroad has had in creating new, as well as
sustaining, demand at home. That is precisely what drug
certification is intended to address. For example, on the
supply side Colombian-led drug dealers who were providing free
samples of their heroin to our young people here at home in the
early nineties helped initiate the current Colombian heroin
crisis in the Eastern United States, according to our own DEA
experts.
Today Colombia is cooperating in eliminating the opium in
the Andes before it ever arrives on our shorelines. Bolivia,
Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Thailand are also cooperating
and making substantial progress at eliminating illicit drugs
from their nations which previously targeted our Nation.
We receive that cooperation, not just due to drug
certification, but as part of it. They began doing more and
more to cooperate with us in our common struggle when they
recognized that we were serious in our efforts. Accordingly, I
am urging our Congress, urging this Senate committee, not to
unilaterally disarm ourselves by doing away with our annual
drug certification process.
This vehicle, which was once described by the Clinton
administration's Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics Control, Randy Beers, who is here with us today, and
I quote him as saying: ``It is a policy tool which is
controversial, not because it has failed, but because it is
working.'' That was Randy Beers' statement. Other Clinton
administration drug-fighting officials have said the same thing
and I certainly fully agree with them.
Whether the proposal we are considering, whether those
proposals that we are considering today are to do away with our
own certification process and replace it with an OAS
multilateral evaluation system or suspension of the
certification process for a number of years, or other proposed
reforms as some in the Senate have proposed, I urge our
respective bodies to stay the course, make no change in current
law. As Senator Grassley has noted today, let us not throw out
the baby with the bath water.
The OAS system has no teeth, no sanctions, and its ratings
are often the lowest common denominator of the performance of
each nation's individual efforts in fighting drugs.
The utilization of our annual drug certification tool
geared to U.S. aid should not be abandoned because it makes
some of our nearby neighbors and foreign allies uncomfortable
or embarrassed. The American taxpayer and the people of Latin
America know better, as was underscored at our recent
international conference on drugs in Bolivia just last week,
which I had the opportunity of attending. International
cooperation in fighting drugs is essential for all of us to
succeed, and I think all of our constituents recognize that.
Let me just note that when we were attending an Atlantic
conference that was organized by former President Carter not
too long ago the President of Bolivia sat alongside me at that
meeting and he whispered over to me that without the threat of
decertification his government would never have enacted the
laws of asset seizure, money-laundering that they truly needed
to fight drugs. Today, as we all know, Bolivia is about to
become free of illicit coca and remove the stigma of
association with the cocaine business for that country.
I urge our colleagues, the United States must lead in the
international fight against illicit drugs that clearly
threatens not only our national security, but the national
security of too many other nations. Drug certification has
provided us with an extremely powerful tool in that struggle.
We must be prepared to tell it like it is about what other
nations are doing or not doing to help in our national fight to
reduce supply in this serious threat from illicit drugs from
abroad.
It is essential that we protect our young people and our
communities by using and leveraging our foreign assistance
wisely and effectively, and let us make use of every available
tool in doing that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Representative Gilman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN GILMAN (R-NY)
Thank you, Senator Helms. I welcome this opportunity for sharing
our thoughts on our annual drug certification process. I am pleased to
have been invited to participate in this hearing as one of those of us
in the United States Congress who strongly and unabashedly supports the
current law on certification.
Our annual drug certification is a simple and straightforward
process, but much misunderstood. It simply requires that those 30 or so
``major'' drug producing and ``major'' transit nations like Mexico,
before they receive direct U.S. aid and/or our support for their
multilateral loans, must demonstrate that they are fully cooperating
with us in the fighting drugs which are destroying our communities and
our young people here at home.
Historically, I note this annual drug certification approach has
been overwhelmingly supported by our American taxpayers. The U.S.
Conference of Mayors under Mayor Daley of Chicago, who at the local
level can do nothing about the international trade that targets their
communities, has strongly supported this process in the recent past.
The federal government has the lead responsibility in stopping
drugs coming from abroad. Our local mayors have wisely seen the annual
drug certification as a key and powerful tool for the federal
government in its primary role in helping to protect their communities
and citizens from those drugs which originate overseas.
Surprisingly, as a Wall Street Journal poll showed not too long
ago, 65 percent of the Latin American people also favor U.S. imposed
sanctions on countries which do not do enough to combat illicit drug
production or trafficking. Our Hispanic neighbors know the U.S. must
undertake serious steps to address such a serious problem as illicit
drugs.
Many of us in the Congress who were around when drug certification
was developed by a Democratic Congress for a Republican President in
1986, continue to believe that it's not too much to ask for any
nation's full cooperation in fighting drugs before we provide American
taxpayer assistance to that nation. Along with the American taxpayers,
we see eye to eye on this front.
For years here in the Congress, before 1986, we all heard good
words and lofty promises from foreign governments about their promised
cooperation with us on the supply side and interdiction efforts. But
all we got were words until drug certification came along. Only then
did these major producing and transit nations know that we were serious
and were prepared to withhold our aid, if need be.
The United States needs to do even more in solving its demand
problem, and we welcome that challenge. We are spending billions on
demand reduction here at home, and doing our share on that front. Drug
certification is a valuable tool in our supply side arsenal--an equal
part of the battle against drugs. It helps to keep drugs out of our
nation in the first place.
Moreover, as we address demand here at home, we must not ignore the
impact that an unlimited supply of cheap, pure, and addictive drugs
from abroad has in helping to create new, as well as sustaining, demand
at home. That is what drug certification is intended to address.
For example, on the supply side Colombian-led drug dealers who were
providing free samples of their heroin to our young people here at home
in the early 1990's, helped initiate the current Colombia heroin crisis
in the Eastern United States, according to our own DEA experts.
Today, Colombia is cooperative in eliminating the opium in the
Andes before it ever gets here. Bolivia, Peru, Dominican Republic and
Thailand are also cooperating and making great progress in eliminating
illicit drugs from their nations which targeted our country. We
received this cooperation not just because of drug certification, but
as a part of it. They began doing more and more to cooperate with us in
our common struggle, when they recognized that we were serious.
Accordingly, I urge the Congress not to unilaterally disarm
ourselves by doing away with our annual drug certification process.
This vehicle was once described by the Clinton Administration's
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Control, Rand
Beers, as ``a policy tool which is controversial, not because it has
failed, but because it is working.'' Other Clinton Administration drug
fighting officials have said the same thing. I fully agree with them.
Whether the proposal is to do away with our own certification
process and replace it with an OAS multilateral evaluation system or
suspension of the certification process for a number of years, or other
reforms, as some in the Senate have proposed, I urge our respective
bodies to stay the course and make no change in current law. The OAS
system has no teeth, no sanctions, and its ratings are often the lowest
common denominator of the performance of each nation's individual
efforts in fighting drugs.
The use of our own annual drug certification tool, geared to U.S.
aid, should not be abandoned because it makes some of our nearby
neighbors and foreign allies uncomfortable or embarrassed. The American
taxpayer and the people of Latin American know better. International
cooperation in fighting drugs is essential for all of us to succeed,
and our constituents recognize that.
The United States must lead in the international fight against
illicit drugs that clearly threatens our national security. Drug
certification has provided us a powerful tool in that struggle.
We must be prepared to ``tell it like it is,'' about what other
nations are doing or not doing to help our country's fight in this
serious threat from illicit drugs from abroad. It is essential that we
protect our young people and our communities by using and leveraging
our foreign assistance wisely and effectively.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Congressman Gilman.
The distinguished Congressman from Texas, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM TEXAS
Mr. Reyes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you and Senator Dodd, as well as members of the
committee, for inviting me to be here this morning. I am
honored to be sitting here with three of my distinguished
colleagues: Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senator Chuck
Grassley, and Congressman Ben Gilman. I welcome the opportunity
to be here and testify on the annual drug certification
process, which I believe has outlived its usefulness and should
be eliminated or dramatically changed.
I speak from a unique perspective, one which I believe no
other Member of Congress has. I am not a career politician. I
am not an academic who has analyzed data, nor have I consulted
with scholars or think tanks. I was born, raised, and worked,
and today continue to live on our Nation's border with Mexico.
I have firsthand knowledge and experience of our Nation's war
on drugs, because I spent more than 26\1/2\ years of my life on
the front line of that war as a Border Patrol agent enforcing
our Nation's immigration and narcotics laws. For 12 of those
26\1/2\ years, I was the Border Patrol Sector Chief in McAllen,
Texas, and El Paso, Texas.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the most
important lesson that I learned while working on the border is
that to be successful in our fight against drug trafficking we
must help Mexico reform its police apparatus as well as its
legal and judicial systems. If the United States and Mexico are
to stop drug smuggling, we must cooperate and work in an
environment of mutual understanding.
Because about 60 percent of the cocaine on the streets of
the United States passes through Mexico, its cooperation is
vital to any counterdrug effort that we impose. Merely
criticizing Mexico achieves nothing. The U.S. consumes more
than $5 billion a year in illegal drugs. We should own up to
our responsibility and stop trying to blame others.
Indeed, a recent survey found that 46 percent of Americans
believe that Americans are indeed responsible for the problem
of illegal drugs in the United States. However, interestingly
enough, 50 percent of those same Americans believe that the
certification process should be made tougher. They believe that
we as a country are responsible for creating the demand, but we
need to punish foreign nations for our problem.
We should not continue to use the certification process as
a forum to vent frustrations that we as a Nation feel about the
devastating impact of drugs on our communities and
neighborhoods. The Mexican Government every year bristles at
the annual certification process, viewing it as an affront to
their nation and an infringement on their sovereignty. The
former Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Jesus Reyes-
Heroles, refers to this certification process as ``the most
stressful period each year in the relationship between our two
great nations.''
This stress does not in my view enhance the cooperation
essential to defeat this mutual scourge. We must continue to
build upon the kind of process we have seen in the last few
years. The United States policy of judging the drug-fighting
efforts of other countries is counterproductive and must be
changed if we are to have any real impact on the international
drug trafficking scenario.
We must develop a process in which we engage our partners
through cooperation rather than confrontation. Today I am going
to introduce legislation modeled after Senator Dodd's bill,
which suspends the certification process for 2 years. The
legislation states that ``It is the sense of Congress that the
President should convene a conference of the heads of state of
major illicit drug producing countries, major drug transit
countries, and major money-laundering countries to present and
review drug reduction and prevention strategies for each of
those countries.''
My legislation will ask the President to come up with an
alternative to the annual certification process by November 1,
2002.
Mr. Chairman, today I am encouraged at the direction which
this debate is heading. It is quite a contrast from the
ugliness associated with this debate 4 years ago, when
legislation was introduced to actually decertify Mexico.
President Bush has indicated that he will review the
certification process and congressional leaders like my good
friend Senator Hutchison and Congressman Jim Kolbe have
introduced bills to suspend or waive the process.
Last week I and eleven Members of the Congressional
Hispanic Caucus met with President Fox and members of his
administration in Mexico City. Among the many issues we
discussed was the issue of certification. I believe there is a
real commitment from President Fox and his administration to
the fight against drug trafficking. Moreover, President Fox
fully understands the dangers involved in this partnership and
simply expects from us a commitment to that partnership.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with all
of you to come up with an alternative that is productive rather
than confrontational, because I believe that the President and
Congress can come up with a workable solution.
I want to thank you again for giving me this opportunity to
testify this morning and I would be pleased to answer any of
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Representative Reyes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SILVESTRE REYES (D-TX)
Thank you Chairman Chafee and Senator Dodd for inviting me to be
here this morning. I am honored to be sitting here with three of my
distinguished colleagues, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Senator Chuck
Grassley, and Congressman Ben Gilman. I welcome the opportunity to be
here and testify on the annual drug certification process, which I
believe has outlived its usefulness and should be eliminated.
I speak from a unique perspective, one which no other Member of
Congress has. I am not a career politician. I am not an academic who
has analyzed data, nor have I consulted with scholars or think tanks. I
live on our nation's border with Mexico. I have first-hand knowledge
and experience of our nation's ``war on drugs.'' I spent more than 26
years of my life on the front line of that ``war'' as a Border Patrol
agent, enforcing our nation's immigration and narcotics laws. For 12 of
those 26 years, I was the Border Patrol Sector Chief in McAllen, Texas
and El Paso, Texas.
The most important lesson I learned while working on the border is
that to be successful in our fight against drug trafficking, we must
help Mexico reform its police apparatus as well as its legal and
judicial systems. If the U.S. and Mexico are to stop drug smuggling, we
must cooperate and work in an environment of mutual understanding.
Because about 60% of the cocaine on the streets of the United States
passes through Mexico, its cooperation is vital to any counterdrug
effort. Merely criticizing Mexico achieves nothing.
The U.S. consumes more than $5 billion a year in illegal drugs. We
should own up to our responsibility and stop trying to blame others.
Indeed, a recent survey found that 46 percent of Americans believe that
Americans are responsible for the problem of illegal drugs in the U.S.
Interestingly enough, 50 percent of those same Americans believe that
certification should be made tougher. They believe that we as a country
are responsible for creating the demand but we need to punish foreign
nations for our problem. We should not continue to use the
certification process as a forum to vent the frustrations we as a
nation feel about the devastating impact of drugs on our communities.
The Mexican government bristles at the annual certification
process, viewing it as an affront to their nation and an infringement
on their sovereignty. The former Mexican Ambassador to the United
States, Jesus Reyes-Heroles, refers to the certification process as
``the most stressful period each year in the relationship between the
two nations.'' This stress does not, in my view, enhance the
cooperation essential to defeat this mutual scourge.
We must continue to build upon the kind of progress we have seen in
the past few years. The United States policy of judging the drug-
fighting efforts of other countries is counterproductive and must be
changed if we are to have any real impact on international drug
trafficking. We must develop a process in which we engage our partners
through cooperation rather than confrontation.
Today, I am going to introduce legislation modeled after Senator
Dodd's bill, which suspends the certification process for two years.
The legislation states that it is the sense of Congress that the
President should convene a conference of the heads of state of major
illicit drug producing countries, major drug transit countries, and
major money laundering countries to present and review drug reduction
and prevention strategies for each country. My legislation will also
ask the President to come up with an alternative to the annual drug
certification process by November 1, 2002.
I am encouraged at the direction this debate is heading. It is
quite a contrast from the ugliness associated with this debate four
years ago, when legislation was introduced to decertify Mexico.
President Bush has indicated that he will review the certification
process, and Republican leaders, like Senator Hutchison and Congressman
Jim Kolbe, have introduced bills to suspend or waive the process.
I look forward to working with all of you to come up with an
alternative that is productive rather than confrontational. I believe
that the President and the Congress can come up with a workable
solution. Thank you again for asking me to testify this morning and I
will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. You have got
what they say in the Army, boots on the ground time.
Mr. Reyes. Yes, I do.
Senator Chafee. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. I am
going to ask unanimous consent my opening statement be placed
in the record, if I may, and summarize it very, very briefly.
I, like Chairman Gilman, was here, as a matter of fact was
a co-author of this legislation that we are talking about
changing. I just want to set the record straight on a few
things. No. 1, at the time we introduced the legislation we got
zero cooperation from any head of state. The Mexican head of
state would not even talk to us. The Colombian head of state
would not talk to us. No one would discuss this issue with us.
It was considered our problem.
The truth is it is demand-driven. But I find it kind of
fascinating. If you apply the logic of suggesting that because
it is demand-driven we should not hold those who are supplying
and those who accommodate it as accountable, then we might as
well decide that organized crime that is spawned in the United
States of America, that is involved in the drug trafficking,
should not be held responsible; it is a demand problem.
I do not find it a demand problem when in my State of
Delaware Colombian heroin now which is 94, 95 percent pure, is
given out for free by organizations that go through and are
coordinated out of Colombia and out of Mexico and given free to
high school kids. Now it is a demand problem.
This is a disease of the brain. Once in fact you get hooked
on drugs, it is a disease of the brain. It is not something you
are able to control. So when an organization comes along and
concludes that they are going to give out free samples to kids
who are below the age of being able to make judgments about
whether or not they should go out on a date or not and then
says, well, this is a demand problem, it is our problem, and we
are not going to hold any other nation accountable, I think
that is garbage. I think that is absolute garbage.
I would point out a second thing, that once we did this,
once we did this, it has caused serious problems, but now we
actually have cooperation. Mexico would not even talk to us in
1978, in 1981, in 1983, would not even talk to us about the
corruption of their system and what was going on, would not
even discuss it with us. I got all these lectures about how
this is only our problem, it is a gringo problem, nobody
else's.
Since this has been put into place, it has worked in fits
and starts. I am prepared to change it, unlike the chairman. I
am prepared to sign on to Senator Dodd's bill. But I do not
like this revisionist history about how none of this made any
sense at the time we did it in the context in which we did it.
I strongly take issue with that.
The third point that I would make is that it is time to
give these leaders a chance. Guess what, we now have someone in
Mexico who is serious, not a corrupt leader, not a corrupt head
of state, which we often dealt with the previous 20 years.
So this is a different world. Fox is serious, putting his
life on the line, as is, I might add, Pastrana putting his life
on the line. So now we have people who are serious about it,
and I am willing for one to say: Now you are serious, you have
been serious, now your elected leaders are taking real chances.
Pastrana has taken more chances in Colombia, literally putting
his life on the line to clean up everyone from the police
department to their military and going after the paramilitary.
He deserves a break, in my view. Fox deserves to have a
breather here.
So I am prepared to lift this for 2 years because it is not
working now. I admit it is now counterproductive. But I
respectfully suggest, everybody go back and remember, remember
what kind of responses we got from Mexico when you, Congressman
Reyes, were on the line there, doing a job I would not take on
a bet. God bless you. As my mother would say, no purgatory for
you, straight to heaven, nothing in between.
So I do not want us to get into this thing where somehow
this is merely, merely a consequence of an avaricious drug
market here that is born by the lack of discipline on the part
of the American people and the unwillingness of the American
Government to do anything about it, et cetera. This is an
economy, a drug economy, that has in fact a relatively small
group of people who are inclined to seek it, but has an
incredibly sophisticated marketing apparatus.
We sit here and say we do not want the cigarette companies
to put Joe Camel on a pack. Well, go look, as you well know
better than I do, Congressman, look at the way they package
everything from LSD these days all the way to heroin. They even
have their own colors. This is packaging.
So to suggest that people do not do anything about those
who are packaging and aiming at our kids is to me--and I am not
saying you suggested that--to me absolutely makes no sense. If
you apply that logic, criminal organizations here who are
totally home-grown--by the way, more marijuana comes out of
California than any other part of the world. That would be like
saying, OK, here is what we do, those organizations
distributing that, you know, let us not focus on them, let us
focus on the kids what are using it and get them.
By the way, the last point I will make and I will stop: I
have every single year since the drug czar legislation was
written issued a lengthy report, and a study on drugs in
America. Every single one of those years I have pushed for more
and more support for dealing with the demand side.
It is true, the criticism I think is absolutely true, until
recently we have as a Congress been unwilling to pay serious
attention, and I say recently, the last 4 or 5 years, pay
attention to the demand side. It is the place we should be
expending a great deal more of our money. The reason I am
prepared to spend less money on interdiction is because it does
not work very well, not because it is immoral to attempt to do
it, not because we are offending other nations not because of
anything else, but because you do not get the biggest bang for
the buck.
So again I will conclude by saying, I make no apologies for
having coauthored this and written this in the first instance.
I think it did have an effect. It has had an effect. It has had
some negative effects, but by and large it has been much more
positive than it has been negative. I respectfully suggest we
would not be here unless we embarrassed other nations, as they
view it, by focusing on this.
I remember meeting with the President of Colombia in 1978,
I believe it was, and saying: You will change your mind when
one thing happens, when you become drug addicted. You cannot be
a grower and a transit place without your own country getting
addicted. Guess what is happening in Mexico now. Guess what is
happening in Mexico now. So now Mexico is a lot more focused
than it was before, not only because it has a decent leader,
not only because it has a leader who I think is committed to
this, but also because, guess what, they have got themselves a
demand problem, and it is growing.
So I am prepared to join Senator Dodd and the Congressman
in his bill to call for that waiver, because the single most
important part of this--and I will cease and desist; it would
have been easier if I had read my statement. It would have been
shorter, but, as you can tell, I feel kind of strongly about
this. I have been doing this for 20 years with as much energy
as anybody who has ever worked in this place, and I am
frustrated.
The thing that Senator Dodd is proposing and you are
proposing, Congressman, is the key. That is the call for the
nations involved in this to get together and try to come up
with a genuinely serious approach, because I respectfully
suggest Chairman Gilman is generally correct about the
Organization of American States and what they have done so far.
So I think this gives us a chance. We will find out who is
serious. We will find out who is not. I think the two leaders
in Colombia and in Mexico warrant this opportunity, and I am
willing to sign onto it.
But I do not accept the notion that this was a bad idea at
the outset.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.
Mr. Chairman, 15 years ago, I joined several other colleagues in
co-authoring the law to require the annual certification of counter-
narcotics performance by foreign nations.
For my part, enactment of the law was necessary to send a wake-up
call. It was necessary, in my view, to push the major drug producing
and transiting countries to take our concerns about the drug issue
seriously. It was also necessary to force Congress and the Executive
Branch to review, on a systematic basis, the counter-drug performance
of our allies and our adversaries.
I still believe it is reasonable for the United States to require
aid recipients to cooperate on narcotics control. I still believe that
there is a value to forcing the Executive Branch and Congress to review
the state of international cooperation on an annual basis.
I still believe, finally, that certification is a useful--if
imperfect--diplomatic tool. Even the State Department, which prefers to
confront foreign nations privately rather than publicly, conceded in
last year's international narcotics report that ``though controversial,
throughout the 14 years it has been in effect the certification process
has proved to be a powerful policy instrument . . . [a]s uncomfortable
as it may be for all concerned, it is a healthy process.''
All that said, I have an open mind about alternative proposals. And
I'm willing to take a time out, as Senator Dodd's bill would provide,
as we search for those alternatives.
The Dodd bill does not get rid of certification entirely--it
permits the President to keep the certification process for certain
countries if he believes it is useful to do so. If the Dodd bill
becomes law, the burden would still be on Senator Dodd to pass a bill
for permanent repeal.
The main reason I am willing to suspend the process is that one
major rationale for it--to prod major narcotics producing natons to
take action--seems unnecessary at this time. The two most significant
nations from which drug trafficking to this country occurs--Colombia
and Mexico--have presidents who are clearly committed to working
closely with us to address the drug problem.
Two other countries in the hemisphere which had been major
producers of coca--Bolivia and Peru--have also made significant strides
in reducing drug cultivation.
Suspension of certification does not mean that we are going to stop
paying attention to the actions of foreign nations in combating
narcotics cultivation and trafficking. Under the Dodd bill, the State
Department will continue to issue its annual report on narcotics.
Congress will continue to monitor the situation closely.
Also, the Organization of American States has begun work on a
multilateral mechanism in which nations of this hemisphere will jointly
assess each country's record. The process will be showcased for the
first time at the Summit of the Americas in April.
Though it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of this
mechanism, I believe it holds some promise in fostering greater
cooperation among the nations of the region.
In closing, I welcome this debate. I commend Senator Dodd for
starting it, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing
today.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could say
something here, because California was mentioned.
Senator Biden. I did not mean----
Senator Boxer. No. California was mentioned, and I think it
should be mentioned when I talk about this because it is our
kids that are suffering probably more than anybody else because
of where we are. But I want to make a point. I agree with my
friend, if we did not do this certification and hold the threat
of decertification we perhaps would have no progress whatsoever
and, we were talking before, we have made a little.
The point is, I think the Dodd bill goes too far. The bill
that Senator Gramm and I have keeps the certification system in
place if a country will not sign a bilateral agreement with us
and make measurable progress. So I think my colleague ought to
take a look at that one, because I think it is a little
tougher. We do not do away with certification, because I do
agree. No one could have said it better than you did.
You know, it is like your kids. In my case, they are quite
grown now, but when they were little they complained,
complained, and complained about pointing out the error of
their ways, but in the end it was a good thing. Here is the
point about this. This is about equals, not kids. But we need
to work together, because we have got the demand problem and
they have got the supply problem and now, as Senator Biden
points out, they are starting to get the demand problem.
We are equals. We have to work together. That is why we
offer this bilateral agreement.
I just want to put a couple of facts on the record. Today
three million drug users are in need of treatment now, but they
cannot get it because they do not have money to pay for it and
we do not have it. Some 2.1 million are receiving treatment.
Now, there is nothing worse than someone finally deciding to
kick a habit and going to the county health department or
wherever they have to go and being told, come back in 3 months,
you are on a waiting list. By then, God knows what could
happen, what crimes could be committed.
Senator Biden. Ninety more crimes.
Senator Boxer. And they lose the desire to kick the habit
or they may die. We do not know. So the fact of the matter is,
as Senator Biden has said, we need to do more. That does not
mean that you do not blame the people who are pushing the
stuff. It all has to happen. We need a balanced plan. It is
what Senator Nelson said before, Senator Biden, you arrived at
the hearing. He made the point about looking at everything.
Congressional Research Service says that reduction of
supply accounts for 66 percent of the Federal anti-drug control
budget, 66 percent. So we really do not have a balance and we
need to do more on all ends. But I am really glad we are having
this hearing because there is a lot more than meets the eye to
all of this. I think Senator Biden put this all into
perspective. Certification has its problems, but it caught
everybody's attention. We now have to make some changes in it,
but let us not, in my opinion, throw the baby out with the bath
water. I agree with the Honorable Ben Gilman on that point.
I hope we can come up with some compromise that keeps some
vestiges of the certification and still takes a little from all
of our bills on the rest.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Yes, Congressman Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. I might just ask for a few more minutes. I have
to return to a hearing we are conducting in our House
International Relations Committee.
Senator Chafee. We appreciate your patience, yes.
Mr. Gilman. I want to thank the gentlelady, Senator Boxer,
for the comments she made. I want to commend Senator Biden for
his outstanding service over the years in fighting the drug war
and Senator Boxer for what she is doing in California.
We struggled to get the drug certification measure adopted.
Senator Biden led that effort in 1986. It was a Democratic
Congress and a Republican President, as I noted before.
Senator Dodd. A Republican Senate, too, by the way.
Mr. Gilman. Yes, a Republican Senate.
But it was a worthy effort because it accomplished a great
deal. How well we remember how important it was then to make
the countries who were not listening to us turn around and
start working with us. I think that should be enough of a
lesson to us, that countries who did not want to cooperate
started cooperating because we withheld aid.
Why should we be paying taxes and giving tax money to
countries that are not cooperating with this serious problem? I
urge my colleagues, give that a great deal of consideration.
For the 30 years that I have been involved in fighting the drug
war, we find there are five essential elements, five
battlefields, and we have got to reduce supply and demand
simultaneously.
We do that by starting with the drug producing nations.
They have to eradicate, they have to provide alternative crops.
Then when it gets into the supply routes, we have to interdict
and we have to provide intelligence to help in interdiction.
Then when it reaches our shorelines, to make certain that our
enforcement officials have the wherewithal to do the job to put
the drug traffickers behind bars. Then on the demand side,
educate our young people by all means to prevent the
utilization of narcotics, teach them how deadly these illicit
drugs are, that they are not recreational, and then to treat
and rehabilitate.
Eradicate, interdict, enforce, and then reduce demand by
education, prevention, and treat and rehabilitate. This
certification tool is an important tool in all of that, because
we are telling the drug producing nations, we are asking them:
Cooperate with us, but if you do not cooperate then we are not
going to give you any Federal assistance. Is that too much to
ask? I think that is something that all of our taxpayers would
like to see us do.
I thank you for this opportunity, and I want to thank our
colleagues on the committee for focusing attention on this very
important issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, if I could make a couple comments.
Senator, did you have something?
Senator Hutchison. Do you all have votes going?
Mr. Reyes. I have got a vote, and I just wanted to make a
couple of comments particularly about Senator Biden's comments.
The first one is I think it is a mistake if we do not look at
the issue of drug trafficking and the drug problem and fighting
it on three different levels. We have got to fight it on the
interdiction level, the education level, and the treatment
level.
Any one of those components that you slight, you are
slipping away from a balanced approach to fighting it. As the
Senator was talking there about his frustration and perhaps a
frustration shared by others here this morning in terms of what
brought about the certification process and the fact that he
referred repeatedly to Mexico would not talk, I was thinking
about the many times that I as a chief received cooperation at
the local operational level from many fine and outstanding
Mexican colleagues that were on the front line of fighting
drugs, that were making those kinds of sacrifices.
The sacrifices that I am talking about are, purely stated,
getting killed, getting killed because they would not succumb
to corruption, because they would not look the other way. You
know, one of the things that I think we should keep in
perspective is the terrible price that Mexico has paid as a
country while engaging in this fight with us against drug
trafficking. You know, we have seen a man of the church gunned
down in Guadalajara. We have seen repeatedly prosecutors that
are either killed outright or disappear. We have seen police
officials that get killed, their families intimidated, families
get killed.
I am speaking from my own personal experience from being on
the border and fighting. So I think it is useful to have a
process that puts us all in the mix, because just to simply
point fingers and just to simply manifest our frustration
directed at a single country or a single portion of the problem
does us no good. I think we have to have a balanced approach. I
think we have to have the wisdom to know that we are all in
this together.
The certification process was well intended and has brought
about a lot of the benefits that people have spoken about. But
it is time to modify it. It is time to use it for something
other than just a bully pulpit to just bash a segment or a
country or a frustration that we feel. That is what I am
saying.
I think the true wisdom in this is to understand that we
are in it together, to understand that in order for it to
continue to be successful we have to modify it. Third and I
think most important of all is to understand that we must be
flexible from a public policy. I was saying--I do not know if
you were in here, Senator, when I said it--but you know, there
are two arenas that we need to understand we are engaged in.
There is a political arena, which is the one that produced the
frustration that you articulated so well a few minutes ago; and
then there is the operational arena. That operational arena is
where I think we sometimes lose sight of not just the
commitment individually that Mexican law enforcement and
prosecutors and others make to the effort, but that also we
have to be mindful that we need to continue to fund and
support.
So again I appreciate that opportunity. I think the
perspective that I bring is one of 26\1/2\ years of being
there. So I will be glad to discuss any of these experiences
with you in the hopes that we can have a public policy that
works for all of us. That is the most important thing, because
today we are frustrated because of the scourge of drugs and the
impact that they are having on all our neighborhoods, Mexico
included and Latin America included as well.
So thank you again for the opportunity.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Congressman, Senator, anything to add? Are you preparing to
leave?.
Senator Hutchison. Yes, unless there were any questions I
was going to leave.
Senator Dodd. No, just to say, I mentioned earlier before
you came in, Kay, that Senator Hutchison and I have worked
together closely on this issue for the last few years, and she
cares about it very, very much and brings, obviously, a
tremendous experience with a border state like Texas, not
unlike Congressman Reyes, who deals with this issue in a very
direct way all the time.
I am hopeful in the next few weeks here we will be able to
develop a piece of legislation that everyone can feel very
comfortable with. I do not want to take up the time. We have
got other witnesses to come and the Senator has to move on.
Obviously, one of the problems is in a sense that today is
March 1, is the certification day, so we will have to slip, I
guess, on the proposal you have made because of the 1-year. We
are already into the year, so we would have to modify, I guess,
the dates on that, which you may want to comment on.
Second, just to make note of the fact that I am for the
suspension. Obviously, we keep in place--I do not want to get
into a debate here, but we keep in place the President's right
to decertify, in a sense to make notice of where we are getting
cooperation and where we are not. So it does not eliminate the
entire process. It merely eliminates the congressional process
for 2 years. We can still have the President, President Bush,
make determinations about the cooperation we are receiving with
any number of nations that are involved in the business of
narcotrafficking.
My concern would be now, and this would be the challenge,
that this 2-year suspension is designed to generate some real
effort. We can do so much up here, but the administration has
really got to take this up now. If it is merely just buying
some time so we do not have an embarrassing foreign policy
debate for 2 years and then ask for an extension for another
year and one after that, this will have been nothing more than
just an interim period and we will be right back where we were
before.
So I know your close ties and I know some of them are here
in the audience, so, taking advantage of your presence, and
maybe you would like to comment on that, whether it is the 1-
year that you have recommended or the 2 years that we have
recommended. I suspect we both agree that that period of time,
whatever it is, better be used very effectively if we are going
to come up with an alternative that means something.
Senator Hutchison. I agree with you. I would be very
disappointed if we do not have something in concrete that is
different and workable at this time next year. So I believe
that your 2 years was not meant to be a full 2-year moratorium,
but rather to give us the time to do something that would be
workable.
Senator Dodd. One Congress, yes.
Senator Hutchison. So in my legislation it requires the
President to have a plan in place by June 30 and report to
Congress with that plan. I would like to see us have a
multinational approach rather than a binational approach with
our other country neighbors and friends.
Senator Dodd. I agree.
Senator Hutchison. So I would just like to ask the chairman
of the subcommittee to consider calling a kind of a working
meeting with those who want to participate, and I would say
looking at the sponsors of each of our bills, and let us talk
about what we would really like to propose. I would like to
move legislation right away and have something that can go to
the President and bring the White House into our working
meeting and see what they would propose as well. Let us hammer
something out and do it this year and send it to the President,
so that we have a process in place that we think will be more
workable, rather than, as we have in the last 4 years, as
Senator Dodd knows, come to the deadline, not liked the
alternatives, tried to forge a consensus, and we have not been
able to, so we wait another year. That is not acceptable today.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator.
I guess we have had some good ideas put forth here, and
some divergence of opinions. I think that it is a good
suggestion to have a working meeting and get together. We
appreciate that suggestion. Thank you for your time and
patience.
Now I would like to welcome the Honorable Rand Beers,
Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs of the State Department. Good morning.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. RAND BEERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Beers. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Senator Dodd, Senator
Biden, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the narcotics
certification mechanism and the President's certification
decisions for this year with the committee. As has been
indicated before, we are focused here on certification, which
is a supply side issue, and that is appropriate, but I also
would like to take note, in light of several Senators'
comments, that this administration, as indicated by both
Secretary Powell and President Bush and others, fully supports
the efforts to reduce demand within the United States, and this
discussion should not take away from the importance of that
purpose and the need to move forward and to do a better job in
that regard as well.
Certification is a straightforward procedure. Every year
the President must certify that governments of the major drug
producing and transit countries have cooperated with the United
States or have taken adequate steps on their own to meet the
goals and objectives of the international standard that most
countries signed onto, the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention.
If the President does not certify a government, it is
ineligible for most forms of U.S. assistance, with the
exception of humanitarian and counternarcotics aid. The United
States is also obliged to vote no to any assistance loans in
the multilateral development banks for countries that are
denied certification.
Most governments are now aware that U.S. law requires the
President to provide this annual assessment of counternarcotics
cooperation. Many resent what they describe as a unilateral and
subjective assessment of their performance with no reciprocal
accountability from the United States. I would point out,
however, that each determination is the product of a year-long
consultative process. We have worked with our partners to
establish realistic mutually acceptable goals for certification
evaluation purposes based on the goals and objectives of the
United Nations convention.
The relevant benchmarks are established by mutual consensus
and the factual basis for any judgment is clearly set forth in
the certification determinations. Though certification
throughout its 15-year existence has proven to be an effective,
if blunt, policy instrument for enhancing counternarcotics
cooperation.
Prior to the March 1 deadline for certification each year,
we have seen countries introducing legislation, passing laws,
eradicating drug crops, and capturing elusive drug kingpins.
The timing is no coincidence. These countries know that their
actions will have an impact on the President's certification
decisions. They also know what the U.S. expects from them.
Over the past several years, we have made the
administration of the certification process more transparent.
As I indicated, each spring after the decisions are announced
our embassies give a formal demarche to each country explaining
the prior year's decision and working with those countries to
set benchmarks for the coming years. The benchmarks become the
standards by which the country is reviewed in the following
year's process.
Throughout the year, the embassy goes back to the
governments to discuss progress and barriers in meeting the
benchmarks, supplemented by high level U.S. Government visits.
When the President finally makes these decisions on the 1st of
March, there would be no government taken by surprise.
That said, we are aware that there is a growing sense among
some in Congress that there may now be more effective
approaches to strengthening international drug cooperation.
Several different bills recently have been introduced in the
Senate that would change the certification process in some way.
While I have long supported certification and believe that it
is a useful tool, we should not hesitate to investigate other
ways to encourage cooperation on counternarcotics.
Recent years have seen a dramatic shift toward greater
cooperation in this area and certification or any alternative
should reflect the evolving international environment in an
effort to strengthen that cooperation. One of the most
encouraging developments is the multilateral evaluation
mechanism, or MEM, a peer review system for assessing
individual and collective performance mandated by the 1997
Summit of the Americas. Developed by the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission and the Organization of American
States, the MEM involves an intensive review by a group of
independent experts of information submitted by the 34 OAS
member states about their anti-drug efforts.
The MEM process provides a consensual framework for a frank
exchange of views and an evaluation and recommended remedial
action. While the process is still evolving, the MEM seeks to
cover national and regional compliance with international norms
and treaty obligations. This parallels the goals and standards
of the U.S. certification process and could potentially make
our unilateral process an anachronism in the Western
Hemisphere.
We in the administration are reviewing the legislation
recently introduced in the Senate that would revise the
certification process in some way. We believe that it is
appropriate to consider how the current process might be
altered to reflect the changes in the international situation
that have occurred since narcotics certification was first
introduced.
That said, any regime that might modify or replace
certification should have an enforcement mechanism to ensure
continued international cooperation. Moreover, if there were
efforts to suspend the certification process we believe the
President must retain in the interim the power to decertify or
sanction individual countries using the standards of the
current process. We do not believe that there should be
exemptions for individual countries or regions at this time.
Future carve outs, however, may be appropriate for regions
where there is a mutually acceptable and credible mutual
evaluation process in place and working.
I know that all of us, both in the administration and in
Congress, are interested in developing the best and most
effective mechanisms to counter the threat of international
narcotics trafficking, whether that be through the
certification process or some other procedure, and I look
forward to working with all of you to that end.
Now, as required by law, on the 1st of March and determined
by the President of the United States, I have the following
announcement to make. The following countries that were
identified on the 1st of November of last year have been
certified: Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Laos,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand,
Venezuela, and Vietnam.
The following two countries, Cambodia and Haiti, were
decertified with a national interest waiver; and the following
two countries, Afghanistan and Burma, were decertified.
Sir, that concludes my testimony. I would be happy to
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beers follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. R. RAND BEERS
COUNTERNARCOTICS CERTIFICATION
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
narcotics certification mechanism and the President's certification
decisions for this year with the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and
Narcotics Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Certification is a straightforward procedure. Every year the President
must certify that the governments of the major drug producing and
transit countries have cooperated with the U.S.--or have taken adequate
steps on their own--to meet the goals and objectives of an
international standard that most countries have signed onto, the 1988
UN Drug Convention. If the President does not certify a government, it
is ineligible for most forms of U.S. assistance, with the exception of
humanitarian and anti-drug aid. The U.S. is also obliged to vote ``no''
to any assistance loans in the multilateral development banks for
countries denied certification.
BACKGROUND
The certification process is a statutory requirement. In 1986, the
Congress--frustrated by what it perceived at the time as reluctance on
the part of the State Department to take effective measures against the
governments of drug source and transit countries--introduced the drug
certification process. It requires the executive branch to identify the
major drug producing and transit countries and impose sanctions on
those that do not cooperate with us--or take adequate steps on their
own--in meeting international drug control goals. The law provides a
waiver for those countries which, because of their vital interest to
the United States, should be exempted from the sanctions related to a
denial of certification.
Most governments are now aware that U.S. law requires the President
to provide this annual assessment of counternarcotics cooperation. Many
governments resent what they describe as a unilateral, subjective
assessment of their performance, with no reciprocal accountability from
the United States. I would point out, however, that each determination
is the product of a year-long consultative process. We work with our
partners to establish realistic, mutually acceptable goals for
certification evaluation purposes, based on the goals and objectives of
the UN Convention. The relevant benchmarks are established by mutual
consensus and the factual basis for any judgment is clearly set forth
in the certification determinations.
Though controversial, throughout its 15-year existence the
certification process has proved to be an effective, if blunt, policy
instrument for enhancing counternarcotics cooperation. Prior to the
March 1 deadline for certification each year, we have seen countries
introducing legislation, passing laws, eradicating drug crops, and
capturing elusive drug kingpins. The timing is no coincidence. These
countries know that their actions will have an impact on the
President's certification decisions. They also know what the U.S.
expects from them.
Over the past several years, we have made the administration of the
certification process more transparent. Each spring after the decisions
are announced, our embassies give a formal demarche to each country,
explaining the prior year's decision and setting benchmarks for the
coming year. The benchmarks become the standard by which the country is
reviewed in the following year's process. Throughout the year, the
embassy goes back to the government to discuss progress and barriers in
meeting the benchmarks, supplemented by high-level USG visits. When the
President finally makes his decisions on March 1, there should be no
government taken by surprise.
That said, we are aware that there is a growing sense among some in
Congress that there may now be more effective approaches to
strengthening international counterdrug cooperation. Three different
bills have recently been introduced in the Senate that would change the
certification process in some way. While I have long supported
certification and believe that it has been a useful tool, we should not
hesitate to investigate other ways to encourage cooperation on
counternarcotics. Recent years have seen a dramatic shift towards
greater international cooperation in this area, and certification, or
any alternative, should reflect the evolving international environment
in an effort to strengthen that cooperation.
MULTILATERAL EVALUATION MECHANISM
Over the past decade the international community has intensified
its collective efforts to counter illegal narcotics production,
trafficking, and abuse, moving away from finger-pointing and toward
greater emphasis on shared responsibility. One of the most encouraging
developments is the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism or ``MEM,'' a
peer review system for assessing individual and collective performance,
mandated by the 1997 Summit of the Americas. The MEM was developed by
the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the
Organization of American States (OAS).
The MEM involves an intensive review by a group of independent
experts of information submitted by the 34 OAS Member States in a
detailed questionnaire breaking down the components of their anti-drug
efforts: their policies, strategies, and programs. The experts'
findings were reviewed and approved at a Special Session of CICAD in
December 2000 and the OAS formally released this first, baseline report
on February 2. Having participated in the CICAD Special Session, I was
struck by the frankness and openness of the discussions about national
policies and programs that were prompted by these objective preliminary
evaluations. With the baseline study completed, the second phase of
evaluation will include follow-up on the initial recommendations as
well as the addition of other, more qualitative, indicators that will
probe more deeply into performance.
The MEM process provides a consensual framework for such frank
exchanges of views, as well as critical evaluation and recommended
remedial action. While the process is still evolving, the MEM seeks to
cover national and regional compliance with international norms and
treaty obligations. This parallels the goals and standards of the U.S.
certification process and could, potentially, make our unilateral
process an anachronism in the Western Hemisphere. The proof will, of
course, be in the actions governments take to address the gaps or
weaknesses in their anti-drug efforts that have been identified by the
MEM. We believe, however, that most governments will be more responsive
to constructive criticism offered by a community of nations after an
objective and collaborative process, than to requirements imposed by a
subjective, unilateral process accompanied by the threat of sanctions
for non-compliance.
PENDING LEGISLATION
We in the Administration are reviewing the legislation recently
introduced in the Senate that would revise the certification process in
some way. We believe that it is appropriate to consider how the current
process might be altered to better reflect the changes in the
international situation that have occurred since narcotics
certification was first introduced. Any regime that might modify or
replace certification should have an enforcement mechanism to ensure
continued international counternarcotics cooperation. If there were
efforts to suspend the certification procedure, we believe the
President must retain in the interim the power to decertify or sanction
individual countries using the standards of the current process.
We do not believe that there should be exemptions for individual
countries or regions at this time. Future carve-outs may be
appropriate, however, for regions where there is a mutually acceptable
and credible multilateral evaluative mechanism in place.
CERTIFICATION DECISIONS FOR 2001
(See attached Decision Memo below.)
SUMMARY
I know that all of us--both in the Administration and in the
Congress--are interested in developing the best and most effective
mechanisms to counter the threat of international narcotics
trafficking--whether that be through the certification process or some
other procedure--and I look forward to working with you to that end.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MARCH 1, 2001
Presidential Determination
No. 2001-12
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Subject: Certification for Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug
Transit Countries
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(A) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the ``Act''), I hereby
determine and certify that the following major illicit drug producing
and/or major illicit drug transit countries have cooperated fully with
the United States, or have taken adequate steps on their own, to
achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances:
The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, People's Republic of China,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, India,
Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 490(b)(1)(B) of
the Act, I hereby determine and certify that, for the following major
illicit drug producing and/or major illicit drug transit countries that
do not qualify for certification under section 490(b)(1)(A), the vital
national interests of the United States require that assistance not be
withheld and that the United States not vote against multilateral
development bank assistance:
Cambodia and Haiti.
Analysis of the relevant U.S. vital national interests and risks
posed thereto, as required under section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is
attached for these countries.
I have determined that the following major illicit drug producing
and/or major illicit drug transit countries do not meet the standards
for certification set forth in section 490(b):
Afghanistan and Burma.
In making these determinations, I have considered the factors set
forth in section 490 of the Act, based on the information contained in
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 2001. Given that
the performance of each of these countries has differed, I have
attached an explanatory statement for each of the countries subject to
this determination.
You are hereby authorized and directed to report this determination
to the Congress immediately and to publish it in the Federal Register.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, sir, very much.
My question relates to the multilateral evaluation
mechanism that was mandated by the 1997 Summit of the Americas.
Is there a similar mechanism for those countries outside the
hemisphere?
Mr. Beers. Sir, as a result of the 1998 U.N. General
Assembly special session, there was mandated coming out of that
session a requirement to develop such a mechanism. The
Committee on Narcotics and Drugs of the U.N. General Assembly
has met on that issue. It has begun a process to create
something similar on a global basis. But it is far, far from
being at a stage even of the multilateral evaluation mechanism
within the Western Hemisphere. That in fact was used as the
model for the look on a global basis of a similar mechanism.
Senator Chafee. It might be noted that not quite half of
the countries that were certified but nonetheless on the list
are from outside the hemisphere.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Chafee. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Beers, for your work, by the way, over the
years in this area. We appreciate your continued involvement
with it.
That change, by the way--in this year's list there are two
changes on it from last year; is that correct?
Mr. Beers. That is correct, sir.
Senator Dodd. Why do you not identify the change for us?
Mr. Beers. Last year Paraguay received a national interest
waiver and Nigeria received a national interest waiver. This
year they are judged to be certified.
Senator Dodd. The law actually says ``fully cooperating.''
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. As we all know, that is the word that
oftentimes attracted a lot of debate, because, while there is a
lot of cooperation, sometimes to get full cooperation is always
where the lines can get drawn, I suppose. It makes it more
difficult to some degree.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir. There is clearly judgment involved in
each of those decisions.
Senator Dodd. We appreciate the effort you make to do so.
Just a couple of points. One, you know we have introduced a
bill, and I do not know whether the administration at this
point is prepared to talk about specific pieces of legislation.
But I think you sort of outlined what we have tried to describe
here and that was the suspension for a Congress. I use the
Congress because by the time Congress gets up, you get a new
administration in place--we do not even have a lot of the
officials to be named to be confirmed yet who would be dealing
with these issues. So my concern is that we are going to lose
probably 6 or 8 months just getting personnel in place before
you try and put together a proposal.
But in the meantime, we keep and allow the President to do
exactly what you have described. So I am not going to ask you
to endorse a particular piece of legislation, but we have been
listening carefully to your ideas and thoughts on this process
as we try to come up with a new scheme and a framework, and I
appreciate it.
Two questions. One, a lot of criticism has been raised
about international organizations and their efforts and how
successful or unsuccessful they have been, particularly the OAS
and the U.N. What have they been doing in your mind and are
their programs something that we could look to to build on or
replace that ought to give us any encouragement at all? Or in
your observation--and use your own language here, obviously--
have the OAS and U.N. efforts in this area been a failure?
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir. To answer those questions, if I
might just specifically answer your alluded-to first question.
We are not going to comment on any of the specific bills at
this particular time, but we do certainly remain open to
discussions on any and all of them and hope that this committee
and other work will coalesce into a single proposal, if you
will, that we could then be in a position to take.
Senator Dodd. Well, it would be helpful to know what the
administration feels about it. None of us want to go ahead and
draft something and then have you object to it. So obviously it
would be important that you indicate whether we are heading in
the right direction or the wrong direction on various ideas.
Mr. Beers. That is why the core of this position is that we
would like to retain an enforcement mechanism of some form in
any final form that this might take. But we are open to
discussing how we get from here to there.
With respect to the international organizations, let me
speak first about the OAS. As a result of the 1998 Summit of
the Americas in Santiago, which then directed the OAS to
actually begin the process of developing the multilateral
evaluation mechanism, I participated in the negotiations of the
final framework that was to be used for the evaluation. It took
more than a year to come up with. We then created the system of
creating international experts independent of governments to
actually go through that review.
By all of our estimation, those of us who participated in
this process, it was a true example of the changes that have
taken place in the hemisphere first, as indicated earlier. We
do not talk about producers and consumers in the same way that
we used to, in the same confrontational way. We talk about it
being a hemispheric problem, about all of us having the problem
and all of us needing to work together, and shared
responsibility is the sort of foundation of all of that
discussion. That is the way it proceeded.
That said, no one, no one, would say that what we did in
terms of the first year's evaluation represents yet a fully
functioning, credible multilateral evaluation mechanism. We
laid down a benchmark, if you will. We looked at what nations
were doing, we looked at what nations were planning to do. We
made some judgments about that, the experts did, and then the
OAS endorsed those recommendations.
We are going to take several years for this process to
mature to the kind of system that in fact would be a credible
replacement for certification. But it is a process that I think
is working, and I say that from personal experience, and we
should be supportive of that process as it moves forward.
With respect to the United Nations, as I indicated in
response to Senator Chafee, it is much further away, but we do
have programs of credible cooperation with the U.N. system and
with other international partners in the U.N. context. The one
that I would point to now, which is still in the early stages,
though, is an effort to focus on Afghanistan as a major heroin
producing country, not so much for the United States, but
certainly, for the European Union and states of the former
Soviet Union.
There is indication now that the ban that the Taliban have
put on the production of opium poppy may in fact be working in
the sense that there may not be as much opium poppy growing in
Afghanistan today at this point in time as there was last year.
But I would also say that that is very much the beginning of a
process. There was so much overproduction in years past that
there are huge stockpiles.
Senator Dodd. That may be the only positive thing you can
say about the Taliban, by the way. If someone was trying to
find something positive you could say about the Taliban, you
have told me. But the things they do that are terrible would
outweigh----
Mr. Beers. They are horrible, but on this issue and with
U.N. pressure on them we may be seeing some progress. I do not
want to claim victory by any stretch on that, but we may be
seeing some progress. It will be interesting over the years
ahead to see if in fact that U.N. sanction, that U.N. look at
Afghanistan, in fact may lead to some success there.
Senator Dodd. Get some results.
Two quick ones. My time is up. I unfortunately am not going
to be able to stay, and I want to apologize to Bernie Aronson,
my friend, if I do not stay for his testimony. He has been
sitting here patiently. I know what he has to say. I read his
comments. Two quick things.
No. 1 is, there have been some proposals that just would
take Mexico out of the loop for the obvious reasons, here our
neighbor, new administration. My concern about that is the
potential problems we create with other allies in the
hemisphere by sort of separating one out and leaving others in
and creating its own sort of tensions. I wonder if you would
comment on that.
No. 2, I have been down in Colombia here the last few days
with Senator Chafee, and Senator Biden has been down several
times I know of, I think, in the last year. Senator Nelson was
down with Carl Levin and others after we were down, the week
after we were down. I always felt that the concern--we
decertified Colombia back in 1996 and 1997. When I look today
at the paramilitary, the FARC members that move back and forth,
and this narcobusiness now in Colombia, which it is hard to
separate the lines--everybody seems to be in the business one
way or another--that that period, that 2 years when we
basically decertified Mexico, we sort of, we almost created a
vacuum in which a lot of this began to happen.
Now, it did not all happen at once. But I am curious just
from your observations whether or not, looking back now
retrospectively, whether or not that decertification, which for
the Samper government obviously created some serious problems,
but sort of walking away in a sense did not in some way
contribute to the problems we are seeing today in that nation,
the magnitude of the problems we are seeing.
Mr. Beers. Sir, first with respect to the Mexico issue, as
I indicated in my prepared and oral remarks, we also do not
favor any singling out for exemption of any individual country,
for exactly the reasons that you allude to. It is more problem
overall than it is benefit for that individual country perhaps.
With respect to the issue of Colombia, you pose a very
interesting question and I am sure people will disagree about
this for some time to come. I would first focus on the fact
that during the period of decertification the level of
cooperation between our DEA and the Colombian national police
and the level of effort on the part of the Colombian national
police increased a great deal. It was during this same period
that the Colombian national police in fact became an
organization within Colombia that came to be viewed as a
credible police organization, as opposed to a corrupt
organization.
Now, obviously a lot of that is dependent upon General
Serano and his leadership of that organization at that time.
But I certainly have the impression, and I think a number of
others do, that he was given a free hand to do that because of
the extreme pressure that had been put on the Government of
Colombia by the fact that they were decertified.
So cause and effect? I am not sure. But I certainly would
not concede the point that in fact decertification was what led
to the increased effort on the part of the Colombian national
police and it was that increased effort that built the
foundation for the level of cooperation that we are in fact
able to undertake today and that the absorptive capacity of
Colombia for the Plan Colombia supplemental might not be today
what it is if it had not been for that ramping up of
cooperation with the Colombian national police during that
timeframe.
Senator Dodd. Very good.
I have taken more time than I should and I apologize. Mr.
Chairman, I thank you, and please forgive me if I do not stay
for the rest of the hearing.
We thank you. We look forward to your soon cooperation on
this. We do not have a lot of time on this thing.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. So we are interested--if we are going to do
something in a 2-year framework, you better do it fairly soon,
because then you are not going to meet--you are going to have a
self-fulfilling prophecy of failure on this and that is not
going to serve anyone's interest. So we would appreciate as
soon as possible to hear back on some of these ideas that are
out there and any recommendations you would make, so we can put
something together here fairly quickly and present it to our
colleagues.
Mr. Beers. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Rand, thank you, by the way, for your service. It took the
longest time to get the State Department to pay attention to
this issue. As you know, I have been the thorn in the side----
Mr. Beers. Certification has had a value, sir, if only
within the State Department.
Senator Biden. I have been a thorn in the side of the State
Department on this issue for 15 years or longer. I think you
have done a really fine job.
I would like to followup on the question that Senator Dodd
just asked you. It is true and it can be argued that it is
possible that by decertifying, some domestic programs, some
programs that would aid the domestic economy of Colombia were
hurt and theoretically that could have had some negative impact
upon the economy and upon the psyche even of the Colombians.
But I would point out that people who say that there has
been no progress, maybe I have been doing this too long and
maybe you have been doing this too long, but I remember the
days when we would sit here and the Medelin Cartel and the Cali
Cartel were things of which movies were made and where billions
of dollars were exchanged and they literally controlled entire
areas of Colombia. Now a different group controls entire areas
of Colombia.
I want to remind everybody--you know better than I do--that
it literally took the purging of the entire national police
force, close to 5,000 people, to put together what no one ever
thought would happen. If we had had this debate, this
discussion, in 1992 about Colombia and said, you know, by the
year 2000 they are going to have basically eliminated the Cali
Cartel and the Medelin Cartel and, by the way, it is going to
be the police force in Colombia that is viewed as the good guys
and they are going to be the ones what people are going to look
to and we will look to, I think most people would have thought
you and I certifiable.
But that is what has happened. That is what has happened.
Now, not everything is perfect, but what has happened is there
has been tremendous progress. I think that if we got some
leaders of the various countries we are talking about in
private, you will find they may tell you that they needed our
threats to be able to carry out their initiatives.
If I could make an analogy, one leader in the last several
months--and I have been meeting with a lot of these folks--
indicated to me that the thing he most wanted done was to get
American generals and the Joint Chiefs of Staff literally to
come to his country and sit down with his military and say:
Hey, fellows, here is the deal.
What we keep forgetting is some of these very countries
that we have talked about having put such a burden on by this
process, we are able to allow that leadership occasionally, and
it has worked occasionally, to say the devil made me do it; I
do not want to have to do this to you folks; I do not want to
have to purge you; I do not want to have to not appoint so and
so and so and so and so and so in charge; but look, if I do we
are not going to get the following assistance; so as good
citizens of whatever country, step down.
But yet the debate persists here, and it is the only
thing--I do not think there is anything I have disagreed with
Senator Dodd on in the 20-some years we have worked together
except the emphasis, the emphasis on where our pressure comes
down. Is it a net negative or a net positive?
But let me get to my question, and that is that one of the
things I have been impressed with in recent visits to the
region is the astounding progress Peru has made and the
astounding progress that Bolivia has made in terms of
cultivation. Now, that could all turn tomorrow. This thing
could just flip tomorrow. But there has been significant
assistance from the U.N. on those initiatives.
One of the reasons why Colombia is where it is today is
because it used to be, as you know better than I do, it was the
place where the coca leaf was turned into cocaine. Now it is
the place where the coca leaf is grown as well as turned into
cocaine as well as exported. Part of that is because other
countries have acted in a way effectively to shut down their
production.
So my question is this. As it relates to the producing
countries--and right now Mexico is more a transiting country
than a producing country--as it relates to the producing
countries, it seems to me we are approaching an opportunity, an
intersection here, where if we follow through on what we did
not follow through on on the Andean Project, when George the
first was President, if we did that, if we act--I did not mean
that facetiously. It came off the wrong way. How do you say,
the former President Bush? The first George, OK.
He had an Andean plan where crop substitution, trying to
invigorate the copper mines, trying to build infrastructure
that would not, meaning roads and highways and water systems,
et cetera. But the commitment waned.
I think our biggest failing on dealing with the producing
countries has been our unwillingness to provide and seek among
our allies and friends more support for the economic side of
the equation for these countries. You may recall, at the very
moment we really had made a dent and the Colombians had made a
dent on production and export out of Colombia and the region,
what did we do? We let the International Coffee Agreement
collapse. And we cut off their ability to sell cut flowers in
the United States, their two single biggest industries and
exports to the United States. We got into a fight with them.
So while we were trying to keep cocaine off our streets, we
got in a fight because coffee prices were rising too high in
the supermarkets. So we instead crushed--not crushed; wrong
word--we impacted negatively on their one cash crop that we do
not mind having exported to us, coffee, and we impacted on, as
related to our accusation of unfair trade practices, on their
cut flower industry, which is a gigantic industry to them and
to us.
I find that counterproductive. Now, it is not the same
circumstance now. So it is a very long prelude to a short
question. Do you think we can, and if you do should we, be
emphasizing, as relates to Colombia in particular but also the
whole Andean region, so we do not let this success in Peru and
Bolivia escape us, provide more economic assistance? Were I
President, I would be asking our NATO allies, who also are the
victims of this--victims; are the recipients of this export--to
be sitting down and saying, you do not like Plan Colombia that
much, how about let us come up with Plan Andean and us come up
with several billion dollars to help them begin to transform
their economy and put these folks to work, who we are putting
out of business by the fumigation process?
Talk to me just a little bit about that, Rand. And I will
cease, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Beers. Thank you for this opportunity, and I truly do
mean that. As you, I too have been around for a long time,
through several administrations, from both sides of the aisle,
and I do believe that this is the best opportunity that we will
ever have. It is not so much that it is new ideas, but that it
is ideas whose time has, I hope, finally come. But, as has been
our problem in so many instances, it is not something that we
are going to solve at a single stroke or in a single year. It
is going to have to be a process that we all agree or have
agreed to begin.
Senator Biden. If you will allow me, or on the cheap.
Mr. Beers. Or on the cheap. I was getting to that point
too, sir.
Senator Biden. OK.
Mr. Beers. I believe that we are going to have to do that.
I think that the Plan Colombia supplemental represented an
excellent start, but it is only 1 year's worth of funding. As I
said yesterday two floors below, this administration will come
forward with a package which will be significant, which will be
regional, which will be more devoted to alternative development
and social programs and economic assistance than the preceding
package was.
We have heard you and we have heard others in that regard.
It will reach out internationally again and make exactly the
points that you have made, sir, in terms of economic assistance
in partnership with international donors.
If I might, just one brief historical comment. One of the
dilemmas that we had with respect to the earlier aid package
that was put forward during the first Bush administration was
that Colombia, because of the state of its economy, was too
rich to be an aid recipient. So while we did do
counternarcotics assistance, we did not do at that particular
point in time any economic assistance.
But I think one of the problems, if I can look back
historically on that period, was we did not persist with that
effort.
Senator Biden. And I am not casting blame on anybody.
Mr. Beers. That is not casting blame on either the Bush
administration or the subsequent Clinton administration. It is
simply that we sort of did not finish the job. We only began
the job. I think that if there is a lesson to be learned from
that point in time, it is that this is not a short-term and it
is not an inexpensive proposition. We have to look seriously
and we have to look over time at trying to deal with this
process.
If we do and if we do it in a comprehensive and integrated
fashion--and your comments about trade policy intersecting with
counternarcotics policy and creating a dysfunctionality are
absolutely on the mark. This is a policy approach which has to
be comprehensive across the range of U.S. and international
policy toward this region, and we have to look at all of those
decisions.
Senator Biden. Rand, I think you and I and a few others
finally have everybody's attention here--I mean this
sincerely--because of a confluence of certain things that have
happened, some of them very good, like the two new leaders in
Mexico and Colombia.
Mr. Chairman, I know I have gone over my time and I will
cease with this. I truly welcome, as the ranking member of this
committee, your interest in this issue and this subcommittee. I
hope that we all understand, though, that no matter what we do
on the certification or decertification process, no matter what
we do on significant increases in my Judiciary Committee and
the Health committee dealing with making sure that we provide
more treatment and education, that we finally figured out--
Congressman Gilman said they are the pieces. I think the pieces
have changed slightly.
The way to deal in my view with the producing countries is
not only to put them in a position which we have focused on of
late, of giving their counternarcotics capability a reasonable
shot, and they have been reluctant to do that until recently,
but also deal with, help them deal with their internal economic
problems that allow for--if you study Colombia, if you study
any of these countries, you realize that they end up where they
are in large part because of dysfunctional systems they have,
because of dysfunctional societies relating to access to
opportunity within those societies.
There is a lot we could do to be helpful now that there are
leaders emerging from those countries who see this not through
a single prism, not through a single lens. So I hope we think
about, when we think about the notion of producing countries,
not only whether or not we give them more time as it relates to
decertification, not only give them more assistance as it
relates to helping them on the enforcement side of the
equation, but also go to them now at a time and undercut, for
example, the FARC, undercut the ELN, by going in and giving
them significant assistance relative to the wide disparity in
income opportunities in those countries.
There are things we can do that I think will give us a
better shot of gaining hold of this. But as you know, Rand--and
you and I have had this discussion--the last 4 years, including
the Clinton administration, the last 5 years, to get anybody's
attention here in the Senate or in the House or in the
administration to do something bold about dealing with our drug
problem, it has not been there.
In the late eighties and the late seventies when I wrote
this legislation, I could have asked for a zillion dollars and
everybody would have given it. Anything we asked for we got,
because everybody was--every poll in America showed the No. 1
problem people were concerned about was crime and drugs, and so
we got it.
It is kind of like, it is like cutting grass. You have got
to keep cutting it, you have got to keep cutting it. You cannot
cut it once and say, I got it down now and now I can go home.
So I hope, Mr. Chairman, I can work with you and others,
many others on both sides of the aisle, to come up with a
comprehensive notion and support the administration, because I
believe this is something President Bush understands. I believe
this is something that he is interested in. I hope this is
something that he will be willing to use his leadership to
follow through on, because we have a real opportunity right
now, a real opportunity.
I thank you for your time.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Biden. Yes, we have to
keep cutting the grass.
Senator Biden. That is right, you really do. It is like
what is going on in law enforcement now. We are talking about
cutting the budget for the crime bill. Give me a break. We got
crime down 8 years in a row, an average 7 percent a year, and
people go: OK, we got that done now; we do not need another
100,000 cops; we got that finished; we do not need to do any
more.
It amazes me. But it is like cutting the grass. You let it
go now--there is no way we can spend less money. We have to
spend more money to deal with these problems. The moment you
spend less money, I promise, that grass grows.
Senator Chafee. We will also be having hearings on, as Mr.
Beers said, the administration's proposal on expanding Plan
Colombia, whether it is an Andean plan or something along those
lines. There will be other opportunities.
Thank you so much for your time and testimony.
Mr. Beers. Thank you, sir.
Senator Chafee. I would like to welcome the Honorable
Bernard Aronson, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs.
STATEMENT OF HON. BERNARD WILLIAM ARONSON, MANAGING PARTNER,
ACON INVESTMENTS, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Aronson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you for your patience. Good morning.
Mr. Aronson. Good morning. Given the lateness of the hour,
maybe I will just make a few comments if I could.
Senator Chafee. I look forward to them.
Mr. Aronson. First of all, I want to commend you and the
committee for holding this hearing. In my experience, usually,
we pay attention to Latin America when there is a crisis and we
are trying to put out a fire. I think you and the committee are
trying to be preemptive and take advantage of an opportunity,
and I commend you for that.
If you listen to the discussion it seems to me there is a
large degree of consensus, which I think bodes well for your
chances of shaping legislation. There is a consensus that
narcotics production, distribution, and transit is a national
security threat to countries in the region and has to be dealt
with and that interdiction plays a role. There is clearly a
consensus that we have to do more on the demand side.
I think there is a consensus that we need accountability in
the certification process, and I applaud the fact that in
Senators Dodd and McCain's bill the reporting requirements and
the designation of major suppliers and transit countries
continue.
But there also seems to be a consensus that certification
is a tool and that we ought to take a look at it and see if we
can perfect it. That is what I understand the 2-year hiatus to
be. So let me suggest a few thoughts about how to perfect it
and what you might do with the 2 years.
In my experience, one of the problems with certification is
that the choice is all black or white. You either do it and
invoke the full level of the sanctions or you do not. I think
if we had a longer time to debate Colombia, both sides were
right; decertification had a positive effect, but it also
helped create a vacuum into which the FARC and others took
advantage.
So one suggestion I would have would be to provide a menu
to the President which he could use and to offer more sanctions
than currently exist. For instance, one of the greatest
sanctions the United States has in Latin America--this may come
as a surprise--is to lift the visas of those who are engaged in
the drug trade or are suspected, or are not cooperating. I
think that ought to be a tool in the certification process that
the President might use alongside economic sanctions. So you
might maintain the economic benefits and lift the visas of 100
people in the Congress, police, army, and the business
community who are drug traffickers. It has an effect when it is
a visa to the United States.
A second suggestion I would make to use this 2-year hiatus
is to review something that we began in the first Bush
administration, which was drug summits with producing and
consuming countries. We started in Cartagena in 1990 with Peru,
Bolivia, and Colombia. We went to San Antonio and included
Mexico. I think it takes some of the sting out of the
certification process if we first bring the countries involved
in on the development of the standards and we set goals for
them and us that they are part of formulating.
It is the old saying that is good advice for the executive:
if the Congress is not in on the takeoff they are not going to
be in on the landing. I think the same is true on a common drug
strategy. So I think that is another thing that the executive
should consider doing. Those drug summits send a message and
reinforce certification.
Third, I would strongly associate myself with those who
have made the point that we have to stay the course. I was part
of the original Andean drug strategy. We spent some money, and
we charged up the hill, and then we charged back down again.
That does not work.
I think Senator Biden is dead right both about domestic law
enforcement and international law enforcement. This is a long-
term struggle to defend democratic institutions and the rule of
law. Interdiction is important because if we do not interdict
then countries are going to become criminalized and they are
going to be Lebanized and they are going to be taken over by
criminal gangs, and it is not just drugs we are going to face,
it is going to be immigration trafficking, and gun trafficking,
and there will be hell to pay.
Interdiction has to be part of it, but we cannot fight this
war like Desert Storm. I think we have gotten impatient as
Americans. This is like World War II, where you take an island
and then you take another island, and it is a long, drawn-out
struggle, and it has to continue. I totally agree with that
point.
I think the 2-year extension is a good one. As I understand
it, the President would still have discretion to invoke
certification if he thought that was necessary. I think that
ought to be a part of the bill, including the sanctions. But,
again, if you create a Chinese menu of sanctions that the
President can use, he does not have to either send a nuclear
missile or do nothing. He can pick and choose, or she can pick
and choose, and he can invoke sanctions for 3 months and then
lift them. Then, it seems to me you have the leverage that is
correctly needed. I think Senator Biden and Congressman Gilman
are right, if you do not have leverage and consequences you are
not going to have any teeth in this. But if it is simply a
blunt instrument, you are put in the position of either using
something that is too heavy or doing nothing.
So, I think some process where we set goals for ourselves
as well as Latin America, where we are held to standards, too,
so there is more dignity in the process would be an important
change in certification. I believe also the President should
have a lot of discretion about whether to invoke this or not
and it is not mandatory, a range of sanctions that he can pick
and choose among, invoke, or take back if there is a positive
response. In Colombia, if we had decertified perhaps for 6
months, but waived economic sanctions and lifted visas for 100
people, it might have had the same incentive effect, but it
would not have destabilized Colombia at a very difficult time
that others have taken advantage of.
I think if we can build some bipartisan trust and a working
consensus with the administration, I think we can do what the
committee wants to do. I applaud it again for doing so: which
is to perfect this instrument and to make it more useful, but
it has to be part of a larger strategy.
I would just remind the committee that, with regard to
Colombia, there is nothing you could do right now that would
help create economic alternatives more than to expand and renew
the Andean Trade Preferences Act. Colombia right now is
disadvantaged because the good work you did with regard to the
Caribbean Basin on textiles and apparel now disadvantages
Colombia because they are behind, and they are going to lose
several hundred thousand jobs unless the Congress moves in the
same direction with regard to the Andean countries.
I also agree with Senator Biden's point about our allies. I
think Europe is still practicing a kind of denial about this
issue, like we did 20 years ago. It is a huge consumption
problem there. I think with regard to Plan Colombia they are
sort of missing the forest for the trees. Part of our agenda
for the G-7 and other groupings ought to be to enlist Europe
and Japan in reaching out and providing aid, and providing the
same kind of trade preferences.
I think an Andean Trade Preference Act that included the
European Union, the United States, Canada, and Japan would be a
powerful instrument to help these countries as we wage this
battle. But it has got to be a broader strategy and it has to
be a long-term strategy. We get very impatient as Americans,
but look at how many years it took us to take down our own
mafias in this country. It took 50 years. Everybody knew the
Mafia controlled the Fulton Fish Market and the cement trade
and the garbage-hauling in New York City, but until we
developed the RICO statute and the will to take them on they
operated in our countries, too, and we are a heck of a lot
richer and better organized than some of these countries in
Latin America.
So I think we need to have the will to do this right and to
do it on a bipartisan basis.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much once again. Very well
said.
You were talking about Andean trade. Getting off the
subject of certification would you care to comment on the Free
Trade Area of the Americas? Is that also beneficial?
Mr. Aronson. It is extremely beneficial, and I hope that we
can also resolve this legitimate domestic debate about the
terms of trade. When we were moving forward with the vision of
extending free trade throughout the hemisphere, we empowered
all the reformers, all the good guys. They had leverage to take
tough decisions internally to open up their economies because
there was a great prize to be gained, which was access to our
market.
When we retreated from that, we undermined the reformers.
Now the cohesion and the sort of momentum that we had where the
hemisphere was moving together toward a common goal has been
dissipated, and you see a heck of a lot more centripetal forces
in the region. Frankly, Latin America has a lot of troubles
these days. The Andean region has never been in more trouble
politically and socially and in terms of national security in
the last 50 years, and it does affect us.
So I think we should move forward with the FTAA. I think
that there is a decent bipartisan compromise to be struck on
labor and the environment, if we have goodwill and are truly
committed to finding a compromise we could that would allow us
to have fast track, which has now been renamed ``trade
promotion authority.''
But I think we need to get going on that as well, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Chafee. I do think that trade policy does affect
narcotics and the specific focus of today's hearing.
Mr. Aronson. There is no question about it. What Senator
Biden and others said is correct. Largely on the growing side,
these are campesinos. They do not make the money. They are in
many ways exploited. The people who grow coca leaf in these
regions are very poor people, and in many cases they do not
want to be in the drug trade. But you cannot take away the
trade they have to feed their families and put nothing in its
place and expect them to stay out of the drug trade.
They will grow coca leaf--if that is the only licit crop,
if that is the only place where they can get the product out,
if that is the only place where there is a transportation
network, which is true in many regions in Colombia. So I think
we have to have a broad strategy that recognizes that this is
defending democratic institutions and building democratic
institutions, it is extending alternative development, it is
taking down these criminal enterprises.
I agree with the Senator also on the Medelin Cartel. I
remember when Newsweek ran a cover story and said they were the
``Kings of Cocaine,'' they were untouchable, they were all 15
feet tall, they were more powerful than the state, and they
listed 50 of them. Virtually everybody on that list is either
in jail or has gone, not to purgatory, but wherever they should
have gone. And they were taken down with a strong effort by
Colombians and with a lot of help from the United States.
Senator Chafee. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Bernie, thank you very much. I appreciate
your being here.
Just one thing that I--there are many things that I have
overlooked, but one of the things that I have overlooked in as
much time as I have spent on this, and I did not realize its
potential significance, was the lifting of visas. You and I
both know there are certain people in some of the countries we
have mentioned where we have asked the leadership to make
difficult decisions to purge them, jump over them, let them go,
et cetera, sometimes on our own advice, and then we turn around
and we give them visas and they are dining in Miami, they are
up in New York for a play.
I must tell you, I underestimated the significance of
denying visas to those 10 or 100 people in the various
countries. You do not have to do it now, but at your leisure I
personally would like to know, and maybe the committee as a
whole would, too, if you were in my spot who would you be going
to in this administration to make the case and how would we be
drawing up that list?
In other words, it is an area that I am a little like
that--they used to have the joke about Texas. It is not about
Texans. I am like that guy from Texas who said: I do not know
much about art, but I know what I like. Well, this is the one
area I really have not looked at. I personally, and maybe the
committee as a whole, could use some very specific advice on
how we get--and maybe the administration is already looking at
it, in fairness to them--how we get to the point where in the
near term we take some of these leaders off the hook by denying
visas to some of the very people we have said are a problem.
Mr. Aronson. Senator, I totally agree with you. There is a
former Colombian general right now who was purged from the
Colombian military who meets with Carlos Castana, the leader of
the paramilitaries, and supports their activities, and he has a
visa to the United States. The signal it sends is that somehow
it is a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Mr. Aronson. Conversely, when you take it away the signal
is this guy is no good.
But I would suggest that the committee look at a whole
range of sanctions that you could build into a certification
process, like visas, like asset seizures, like going after
assets in the United States, like proscribing their business
activities from any form of U.S. assistance or participation.
It is very similar to the debate you have been having up
here about economic sanctions. It is such a blunt instrument
when you wield it on an entire society, many of the victims are
people what do not deserve it. Yet you want to find a way to
target the people you want to target. It seems to me that you
take some of the sting out of the certification process, or
some of the difficulties, in addition to all these other
mechanisms we have talked about like multilateral mechanisms,
putting ourself under the microscope, if you came up with a
whole range of sanctions, such as visas, targeting assets, and
maybe some others that we have not thought about, you laid them
out and let the President choose among them. Then he might say:
I am not going to stop OPIC and Eximbank and IMF for Colombia
at a time when it is fighting for its life against guerrillas,
but there are 250 people who are complicit in the drug trade
who are going to get sanctions, whom we are going to make them
pariahs internationally, whose assets we are going to attach,
and that would have as much effect.
Senator Biden. Would you be willing to work with me on
that, drawing up such a list with Brian and myself, to actually
sit down and do that?
Mr. Aronson. Sure. In my experience, those kinds of lists
are a lot easier to put together than people think. I think we
always know.
Senator Biden. I think you are right. I must tell you,
though, it has just been recently in a couple conversations
over the last 6 months with some of the folks what are making
these hard calls and they look at me and say: But Joe, general
so and so is in town. What does that say back in wherever?
Mr. Aronson. Exactly.
Senator Biden. Well, thank you, Bernie. I will call you.
Mr. Aronson. Happy to do it.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much for your time and
testimony.
Mr. Aronson. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. We look forward to working with you in the
future.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATHEA FALCO, PRESIDENT, DRUG STRATEGIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to have the opportunity to submit
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee on the utility of the
certification process.
I am President of Drug Strategies, a non-profit research institute
that promotes more effective approaches to the nation's drug problems.
My own interest and expertise in international drug control policy date
to my service as Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics Matters from 1977-1981.
Drug Strategies has played an active role in the debate over
certification and the debate about the trajectory of U.S. international
drug policy more generally. In 1995, I published an article on the
certification process in Foreign Affairs. In 1997, I chaired the
Council on Foreign Relations Task Force responsible for the report
Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy.
In 1998, Drug Strategies published Passing Judgement, a review of
certification's implementation and impact. For the report's release, we
convened a major media forum featuring Members of Congress; key U.S.
and Latin American government officials; and journalists from leading
newspapers and magazines in the United States, Mexico and Colombia. The
Century Foundation commissioned Drug Strategies' Senior Research
Associate, John Walsh, to conduct an in-depth analysis of certification
and possible alternatives. I would be happy to furnish all of these
materials to your committee.
When Congress debated the legislation that created the
certification process in 1986, the House Foreign Affairs Committee
cautioned against expecting too much from a sanctions approach, noting
that
U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to increase their
antinarcotics efforts are ultimately limited by the difficulty
of dealing with sovereign countries, the boundaries of U.S.
leverage, the competition of other U.S. national security
interests, and by the lack of a persuasive U.S. domestic
commitment and effort. Experience has demonstrated that
politically attractive solutions such as ``cutting off foreign
aid'' or vastly increased funding for international narcotics
activities will contribute only marginally to combating this
problem. (International Narcotics Control Act of 1986: Report
to Accompany H.R. 5352, Report 99-798, 1986).
Fifteen years later, the Committee's words have been repeatedly and
resoundingly confirmed. A charitable assessment of certification would
find that it has proven irrelevant. A more accurate appraisal is that
certification has proven detrimental, in both practical and symbolic
terms. Intended to improve foreign cooperation with U.S. drug control
efforts, certification has instead become a stumbling block to
cooperation. Enacted to underscore U.S. resolve in confronting drugs,
certification has helped perpetuate the myth that foreign supply rather
than demand for drugs in our own communities is at the heart of
America's drug problems.
Despite its failures as a policy, the certification process
persists because many Members of Congress still find it to be
politically advantageous. The drug issue's potency in electoral
politics (or at least its perceived potency) means that certification
is not treated as some more or less arcane foreign policy matter or as
a dry, technical matter of executive branch oversight. Instead,
certification has become an annual platform for sounding tough on
drugs--by attacking the administration, other countries, or both.
BUILDING ON SHAKY PREMISES
Certification's policy failure extends directly from the flawed
premises on which it was built. The 1986 certification legislation was
rooted in bipartisan confidence in the supply-side approach to drug
policy. Stepped-up drug control efforts in drug producing countries and
at the border would translate into higher drug prices and reduced drug
use at home. ``Winning the war on drugs,'' according to Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski's House Ways and Means Committee, meant that ``the problem
must be attacked at its source. . . . Increased pressure on foreign
governments and increased enforcement at the border should
substantially diminish supplies and drive up prices.'' (International
Drug Traffic Enforcement Act: Report to Accompany H.R. 5410, Report 99-
794, 1986).
Second, certification was based on a willingness in Congress to
employ unilateral economic sanctions, and a belief in their
effectiveness in pressuring other governments to do as the United
States wished. If certain drug source countries were reluctant to
control illegal crop production and smuggling activities, then,
according to the House Ways and Means Committee, ``Greater economic
pressures must be brought to bear on such countries.'' (Report 99-794,
1986). The dual operating assumptions behind the certification
legislation are that (a) the United States, with the threat of economic
sanctions, can compel other countries to curb drug production and
exports, and (b) if other countries would only do more to curtail drug
supplies, our drug problem would be diminished.
A PAPER TIGER
Neither of these premises has proven valid. As the House Foreign
Affairs Committee foresaw, the leverage that the threat of
decertification was meant to provide has never materialized. In the
vast majority of cases, the threat is hollow, because of three key
factors.
1. For certain targeted countries, such as Afghanistan and
Burma, the sanctions entailed by decertification are
essentially redundant. U.S. relations with such countries are
already frayed, and little if any economic aid of any sort is
at stake in the certification process. In the 14 years of
certification decisions, just five countries--Afghanistan,
Burma, Iran, Nigeria and Syria--have accounted for almost all
of the decertifications issued. Only three other countries have
ever been decertifled: Panama (1988 and 1989); Laos (1989); and
Colombia (1996 and 1997).
2. Even for the majority of targeted countries who are not
already considered pariah states, the sanctions actually
triggered by decertification amount to far less than the
rhetoric implies. The President can continue providing drug-
related assistance (economic, military and police aid) to
countries that have been decertified. Humanitarian aid--such as
disaster relief, food, medicine, and refugee assistance--is
also exempt from suspension. Successive U.S. administrations,
for example, have considered virtually all bilateral aid to
Colombia to be drug-related, leaving little at risk of
suspension in the event of decertification. Colombia received
$56 million in U.S. aid in 1996 and another $82 million in
1997, despite having been decertified both years.
Decertification requires the United States to vote against
any multilateral development bank (MDB) loans to the designated
country. U.S. opposition to MDB loans for a decertified country
is unconditional; no exemptions are made for loans to meet
basic human needs. But the significance of the U.S. vote
depends on the U.S. share of voting power (largely a function
of capital contributions) and on the voting rules of the
particular multilateral bank. Only in the Inter-American
Development Bank's (IDB) concessional Fund for Special
Operations (FSO) do U.S. voting power and the voting rules
combine to make a U.S. ``no'' vote tantamount to a veto. Among
the 14 Latin American countries currently subject to
certification, only Bolivia and Haiti are restricted to FSO
loans and would therefore be directly affected by a U.S. ``no''
vote were they to be decertified. The other 12 countries are
eligible for the IDB's ``ordinary capital'' loans, which are
not vulnerable to a U.S. veto. For example, despite being
decertified in 1996 and 1997, Colombia received 18 World Bank
and IDB loans totaling $930 million. In 1996, the country was
awarded more in MDB loans ($676 million) than in five of the
previous nine years, a period when Colombia was always
certified, either fully or under the vital national interests
provision. In sum, for most countries neither the MDB nor the
U.S. aid sanctions are nearly as significant as they might
appear at first glance.
3. Where U.S. relations with a given country are considered
so important that decertification is never considered a real
option--despite the negligible sanctions that are actually
entailed--the threat of decertification rings especially
hollow. The extraordinary case of Mexico illustrates the
failures of certification. Although the actual sanctions
triggered by decertification would be barely perceptible in
Mexico, and although Mexico has always been certified as
``fully cooperating,'' Mexicans detest the certification
process itself as a hypocritical ploy on the part of U.S.
politicians to blame Mexicans for America's own failure to cope
with its drug problems. Other Latin Americans join Mexicans in
questioning Washington's moral authority to judge other nations
when U.S. demand for drugs fuels the illegal trade. Mexico's
apparent impregnability as far as decertification is concerned
does not diminish Mexican contempt for the process, even as the
double standard gives credence to the claims of the governments
of smaller Latin American countries that the process is
basically unfair. (Mexico is the United States' second largest
trading partner. In 1999, total U.S.-Mexican trade was more
than double the total U.S. trade with all the other 13 Latin
American nations subjected to certification that year.)
Proponents of decertifying Mexico contend that unless the
U.S. government shows that it has the will to deny
certification to Mexico, cooperation will remain
unsatisfactory. But if the United States were to decide that
the risks of antagonizing Mexico by denying certification were
justified, there is little reason to believe that Mexican
antidrug cooperation would improve as a result. The sanctions
triggered by decertification pose little threat to Mexico: Very
small amounts of U.S. aid are at stake, and U.S. opposition
cannot prevent approval of World Bank or IDB loans to Mexico. A
decision to decertify Mexico would have to count on the
political embarrassment of the situation to prod Mexican
officials into line with U.S. priorities. Mexican contempt for
the certification process, combined with the political need to
avoid even the appearance of bowing to U.S. pressure, point to
an outcome of less cooperation, not more.
A FLAWED STRATEGY
The certification process was devised as a tool to enhance the
performance of the United States' supply-side approach to drug policy.
Does the overall strategy in which certification is embedded make
sense? If the supply-side strategy is fundamentally ineffective, then
even perfect fidelity in implementing that strategy--including maximum
cooperation from foreign governments--will not deliver the desired
results.
The appeal of a supply-side approach to drug policy is undeniable.
Focusing on drug production overseas provides an easy way to sound
``tough'' on drugs by excoriating foreign governments. The supply-side
approach is also attractive because it appears to be logical: The
easiest way to stop drug abuse would be to eliminate drugs before they
get to the United States. According to the State Department's Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) budget
presentation for fiscal year 1999, ``By stopping drugs from ever being
produced or reaching our shores, INL programs probably deliver the
largest returns of any federal anti-drug program.''
The primary purpose of U.S. interdiction and international drug
control programs--on which the United States has spent more than $33
billion dollars since 1986--is to raise the price and reduce the
availability of illegal drugs in the United States. By now, we should
certainly expect there to be some evidence that the supply-side
strategy works to make drugs more expensive and less available. In
fact, despite our efforts, heroin's average U.S. retail price has
fallen by 45 percent since certification was enacted, while the price
of cocaine has dropped by 42 percent. Nor do supply-side efforts seem
to have lowered availability. High school seniors in 1999 perceived
crack cocaine to be just as available as seniors perceived it to be in
1987 (in both years, 41 percent of seniors considered crack to be
``fairly easy'' or ``very easy'' to get). Over the same period, the
proportion of high school seniors who see heroin as ``fairly easy'' or
``very easy'' to get has risen from 24 percent to 32 percent. In the
face of considerably escalated U.S. supply-side efforts since
certification went into effect, the key measures of success have
plainly been headed in the wrong direction.
These dismal results suggest that the supply-side strategy is
itself seriously flawed, and that the alluringly simple logic of
``going to the source'' is belied by a more complicated reality. Four
major obstacles severely limit the potential of international supply-
control initiatives to reduce U.S. drug problems.
1. The idea that eliminating drug production in foreign
countries would stop drug abuse at home overlooks the fact that
illicit drugs can be produced in the United States as well. For
example, domestic production accounts for an estimated one-
quarter to one-half of U.S. consumption of marijuana, by far
America's most widely used illicit drug.
2. Drug crops can be grown cheaply almost anywhere in the
world, and America's annual drug demand can be supplied by a
relatively small growing area. A 30 square mile poppy field--
about the area of northwest Washington, D.C.--can supply the
U.S. heroin market for a year. The annual U.S. demand for
cocaine can be met from coca fields extending about 400 square
miles, roughly one-third the area of the State of Rhode Island.
In reality, of course, drug crop cultivation is not
conveniently located in one place. Farmers have strong economic
incentives, to shift, expand or modify cultivation as required
to protect their livelihoods. Enforcement directed at growers
tends to disperse cultivation to ever more remote areas, making
detection and eradication even more difficult.
3. Interdiction may achieve impressive tactical successes
against drug traffickers, but these efforts are overwhelmed by
the volume of drug production. Drugs are now so plentiful that
even the largest seizures have little impact on drug
availability in the United States. Traffickers quickly move on
to new sources, shipments and routes. As U.S. Coast Guard Vice
Admiral Roger Rufe, Jr. explained to reporters in 1997: ``When
you press the balloon in one area, it pops up in another. . . .
It's a market economy; with demand as it is in the U.S., they
have plenty of incentive to try other routes.'' For example, in
the late 1980s, intense interdiction efforts in southern
Florida and the Caribbean pushed cocaine traffickers to switch
to routes through northern Mexico, where they formed
partnerships with Mexican trafficking organizations. The result
has been wealthier and bolder traffickers in Mexico, but no
diminution in the drug flow. New smuggling routes are
practically without limit, whether in the Amazon jungle or at
the U.S. border. This is especially so for a country intent on
easing the barriers to legal trade: Each year an estimated 436
million people enter the United States by land, sea and air;
116 million motor vehicles cross U.S. borders; and more than
nine million shipping containers and 400 million tons of cargo
enter U.S. ports. The amount of cocaine estimated to come
across the U.S.-Mexico border each year would fill only six
trucks--yet more than 3.5 million trucks and rail cars cross
the border annually.
4. The price structure of the illegal drug market ensures
that even the most successful overseas drug control operations
will have minimal impact on U.S. prices. Almost 90 percent of
the price of drugs on U.S. streets is the result of the value
added due to the risks of distributing and selling drugs after
they enter this country. The total cost of cultivating,
refining and smuggling cocaine to the United States accounts
for less than 15 percent of retail prices here. As one Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) official has explained, ``The
average drug organization can afford to lose as much as 70
percent to 80 percent of its product and still be profitable.''
As a consequence, even the most effective eradication and
interdiction campaigns in producer countries have little, if
any, effect on U.S. drug prices.
STATE OF THE DEBATE
The inherent obstacles to supply-side drug policy have been
discussed for years. Detailed accounts have been published by RAND, the
Council on Foreign Relations, and the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO), as well as in the academic literature. For example, a 1988 RAND
analysis concluded that, ``Increased drug interdiction efforts are not
likely to greatly affect the availability of cocaine in the United
States,'' primarily due to ``the small share of total drug distribution
costs that are accounted for by the smuggling sector.'' A 1994 RAND
report found treatment to be ten times more cost effective than
interdiction in reducing cocaine use in the United States, and twenty-
three times more cost-effective than source country drug control
programs. U.S. government publications have also described some of the
basic obstacles to supply-side success. The GAO has reported to
Congress on the speed with which drug traffickers adjust to enforcement
pressures. The CIA and the State Department published the proceedings
of a 1994 conference on the economics of the drug trade that featured a
presentation of how the illegal drug market's price structure limits
the value of antidrug operations at the ``source.'' In short, analysis
that raises basic questions about current policy--and a growing body of
supporting evidence--have been in the public domain for some time, and
readily available to Members of Congress and their staffs.
Yet, the recurring debates in Washington over international drug
policy show barely a trace of this fundamental critique. Having raised
expectations about what can be accomplished through supply-side
polices, officials are now loathe to tell voters that in fact very
little has been achieved. The key question for policy makers should be
whether the evident lack of success to date stems from inadequate
implementation of an otherwise sound policy or whether the poor results
reflect more fundamental strategic flaws. But policymakers have not
addressed whether the strategy is appropriate, arguing instead that
success simply requires more resources, more time, and better
coordination. Operational problems--faulty coordination, lack of
continuity, and resource constraints--may contribute to the policy's
poor record, but they are not decisive, even when taken together.
The certification process has not improved the track-record of
supply-side policy in meeting its own goals: U.S. drug prices--which
supply-control policies backed by the certification process were
supposed to push higher--have instead declined. Policymakers have
focused on how U.S. supply-side policies might be better implemented;
the annual Congressional debates surrounding particular certification
decisions are now a staple of this discussion. But the debates over
certification have always been limited by the implicit assumption that
U.S. supply-side policy can achieve its objectives. Unfortunately, that
policy suffers from elemental flaws, which limit interdiction and
international drug control programs to a marginal role, at best, in
U.S. efforts to reduce drug abuse. Certification compounds the problems
inherent in the supply-side approach by reinforcing the notion among
policymakers and the American public that foreign governments can play
a decisive role in reducing drug abuse in this country.
______
WOLA WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA
EXERPTS FROM ACROSS THE SPECTRUM CALL FOR REFORM OF THE ANNUAL DRUG
CERTIFICATION PROCESS
(January 30, 2001)
``Congress should end the requirement that U.S. Presidents annually
certify Mexico's cooperation with its anti-narcotics efforts. In 1997
and 1998, President Bill Clinton certified a non-compliant Mexico while
not certifying Colombia, despite evidence that efforts in both
countries did not merit certification. Such dual treatment is an
irritant to hemispheric relations and undermines the effectiveness of
the certification process.''
Stephen Johnson, The Heritage Foundation
U.S.-Mexico Relations: No More Business as Usual, July 20, 2000
``Recommendation: Undertake a full-scale reassessment of anti-drug
strategy at home and abroad, with a view toward devising a more
effective and better coordinated approach that our neighbors will be
able to support as allies. This might include streamlining and
clarifying the chain of command regarding narcotics policy,
recalibrating the increasing imbalance in Latin America and the
Caribbean between the U.S. military and civilian law enforcement
institutions in the drug war, and pursuing options related to an annual
hemispheric `cooperation' certification process proposed at the
Santiago Summit.''
North-South Center
The Case for Early and Sustained Engagement with the Americas:
A Memorandum to the President-Elect and His Foreign Affairs/
National Security Team, December 2000
``The OAS, with strong support from the United States, has now
developed a promising multilateral procedure for assessing anti-drug
efforts by every nation in the hemisphere. Replacing U.S. certification
with the OAS procedure would enhance cooperation regionwide--and should
be a high priority for the new administration [in] Washington.''
Inter-American Dialogue
A Time for Decisions: U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,
December 2000
``At an absolute minimum, we should immediately end the arrogant and
hypocritical congressionally mandated annual `certification' of Latin
American countries by which we judge how well they are fighting our
drug use problem.''
William Ratciff, Hoover Institution
Undoing ``Plan Colombia,'' December 27, 2000
``Certification is bad drug policy, bad foreign policy, and bad for our
national conversation on both. First, it sends mixed signals to other
countries about the rewards or punishments for their efforts in the war
on drugs. Second, while cast as a means to increase cooperation, the
process repeatedly fosters conflict. Third, and most importantly,
certification symbolizes and reinforces a misguided broader U.S.
international drug policy that aims to stop the supply of illegal drugs
from entering the United States.''
Bill Spencer, Washington Office on Latin America
Failing to Make the Grade: The Case Against U.S. Drug
Certification Policy, February 1999
``Now the theory of the certification may be fine, but I think the
practice is seen primarily as one of threatening punishment, which
seems to me a dubious way to solicit voluntary and enthusiastic
cooperation. If the threat is followed by actual decertification, it
builds enormous hostility and resentment generally, not only in the
decertified country, which, again is hardly conducive to the goals we
are pushing.''
General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President
George Bush Sr. Hearing before the House Committee on
International Relations, April 29, 1998
``The primary measure of success for the United States has been
reductions in foreign opium, coca and marijuana production. Reductions
would presumably lead to higher drug prices in the United States, which
in turn would prevent new drug use and drive addicts into treatment.
However, annual worldwide opium production has doubled in the past
decade, while coca production has nearly doubled . . . The
certification process--by focusing on one aspect of often complex
bilateral relationships--can distort the management of U.S. foreign
policy.''
Drug Strategies
Passing Judgement: The U.S. Drug Certification Process, 1998
In a letter to Senator Christopher Dodd supporting legislation to
suspend certification: ``Wanted to confirm that the Administration
supports the Dodd-McCain legislation on international drug cooperation.
Believe your thinking supports U.S. drug policy by recommending a
mechanism that would allow us to make fundamental improvements in the
way we cooperate with major drug producing and transit countries. At a
minimum, your bill promises to remove a major cause of foreign policy
friction, especially with Latin American and Caribbean countries . .
.''
Barry McCaffrey, then-Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, July 16, 1997
In a letter to Senator Christopher Dodd supporting legislation to
suspend certification: ``We believe your amendment would allow the
Administration to develop and implement a new multilateral strategy to
stem the flow of illegal narcotics. We believe the passage of this
amendment will lead to a more effective multilateral effort in the war
against drugs.''
Samuel L. Berger, then-National Security Advisor to President
Clinton, July 16, 1997
``The criteria are vague and inconsistently applied, while the
punishments are often more apparent than real. More important, the
process itself is corrosive in its effects on U.S. relations with other
countries, which often have a complex of problems that cannot be
effectively addressed by this type of intervention.''
Council on Foreign Relations
Rethinking International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S.
Policy, 1997
``The certification process whereby the U.S. government rules on the
anti-narcotics efforts of drug-producing or drug-transit countries is
at the heart of (the drug) war. Certification is an arbitrary and
hypocritical exercise.''
L. Jacobo Rodrigues, Cato Institute
Time to End the Drug War, December 3, 1997