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(III)
THE STATE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2001

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Smith and Biden.

Senator SMITH. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. We convene this subcommittee hearing on European Affairs, and our purpose today is to take stock of the NATO Alliance and to examine the objectives that should define its agenda over the coming years.

It is an appropriate time to examine these issues here in Washington. We have a new Congress, a new President and in 2 years the Alliance will convene a summit meeting in Prague. It is essential to define today what the Alliance can and should do during this period to further the vision of Europe that is undivided, free and secure.

We have with us today two very distinguished panels to address these questions. The first panel will feature General Wesley Clark, a man who truly needs no introduction to this chamber. As the Supreme Allied Commander from July 1997 to May 2000—one of the Alliance’s most crucial periods—he served as NATO’s top military officer. General Clark presided over the enlargement of the Alliance, participated in the revision of NATO’s strategic concept, its basic security document, commanded NATO forces during Operation Allied Force and oversaw NATO’s peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The second panel will consist of Dr. Jeffrey Gedmin of the American Enterprise Institute where he directs the highly influential New Atlantic Initiative, and Dr. Ron Asmus, from the Council on Foreign Relations. Ron served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1997 to 2000.

All of our witnesses are well-qualified to address this morning’s subject and I appreciate their willingness to share their views with each of us this morning.

I can think of no relationship more crucial to America’s national security than our partnership with Europe with the NATO Alliance as its institutional cornerstone. It is our Nation’s most important global relationship. When working together, America and Europe constitute a partnership that is globally dominant in all key respects, economically, politically, and militarily.
As we look back at the last decade, we can firmly state that the Alliance has been a stunning success. It began the decade by winning the cold war. It has expanded the zone of peace, cooperation and democracy in Europe through NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace. It effectively used its military might to check the carnage and the brutality the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was inflicting upon peoples of the former Yugoslavia.

As NATO enters a new decade I believe that our new President faces an equally challenging task.

Despite the Alliance's success President Bush will have to renew the confidence of our European allies in American leadership and in the role that NATO must play in transatlantic security affairs.

Regrettably, ongoing efforts to create within Europe, a security identity and capability separate from the Alliance, could, and I do emphasize could, adversely affect NATO's ability to exercise effectively that central role. It is, therefore, imperative for the United States and its allies to pursue the European Security and Defense Policy [ESDP], if it must go forward, evolves in a manner that is fully integrated with NATO and does not become, in essence, a decoupling impulse in transatlantic affairs.

A second priority of the new administration must be to convince our European allies for the need for shared missile defenses, thereby making missile defenses an initiative that reinforces transatlantic solidarity. I have been impressed with both Mr. Bush's commitment to missile defense and by his commitment to engage and consult our allies fully on this matter.

Our allies must not forget that NATO's security has been assured for over 50 years largely due to the U.S. commitment to sustain a technological advantage over its adversaries. When Europeans ask the United States to forego this technological edge on the battlefield, they risk jeopardizing both Allied security and Allied cohesion.

Finally, one of the most important pillars of the European/Atlantic relationship has been the unifying vision of a Europe undivided, democratic and secure. Translating this vision into reality is the best way to ensure peace and stability in the transatlantic arena.

A Europe divided into two tiers of security and economic prosperity, one secure and rich, the other unprotected and poor, is a recipe for instability and conflict. For this reason, the declined momentum of NATO enlargement over the last three and a half years has been worrisome. At the last summit the Alliance stalled the enlargement process even though at least one candidate country, such as Slovenia, and perhaps others met the standards set by the newest and even some of the older members of the Alliance.

Consequently, the Alliance's open door policy today stands on wobbly legs. Procrastination is no longer a sufficient alternative to invitations; and, NATO's open door policy will not be credible in the absence of invitations at the Alliance's 2002 summit.

I strongly endorse the efforts of the Vilnius Nine, the nine Central European democracies seeking NATO membership, to renew the momentum behind NATO enlargement. I challenge our new administration to lead the effort to build a new and powerful consensus in support of enlargement.
And, I challenge our European allies to support vigorously and to work to achieve the inclusion of new members into NATO. It is my hope that no later than NATO’s next summit, the Alliance will issue membership invitations to those Central European democracies which are ready to make a net contribution to its security and responsibilities. Let me underscore one critical point, when the Alliance makes its determination as to which states to invite to accession negotiations, it is imperative that the Baltic states be assessed with the same criteria as are applied to any other European democracy. Indeed it is my firm belief that the Alliance can only benefit from a Baltic dimension within its ranks.

To conclude, I cannot think of a more important step designed to enhance transatlantic security and reaffirm the commitment of the United States and our European allies to the transatlantic Alliance than to bite the bullet on the issue of enlargement.

Now before turning to our distinguished panelists, it’s a privilege to be seated here with my friend and colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chairman, I share your view about the quality of this panel and I think our first witness, to use an overworked phrase in this place, is a great American. He knows more about NATO, at least in my view, and is more qualified to speak to it than anyone we could have before us today. Ron Asmus has also played a very key role in this country’s alliance matters. He was one of, as you point out, the Clinton administration’s main architects of NATO enlargement and today, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are productive members of the Alliance in no small part because of his effort. He also helped negotiate the relationship between NATO and the ESDP, the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy. Our third witness has also been an important player in the nonprofit world, directing the New Atlantic Initiative of the American Enterprise Institute. Jeff has been someone we have called on more than once here in this committee and I am delighted that he is willing to come back.

Mr. Chairman, it is a cliche to say that NATO is the most successful alliance in history, but it is a cliche that is both true and worth repeating, because I fear that many of our colleagues underestimate NATO’s importance and the need for a continued American leadership to keep the Alliance strong. I don’t think you will be offended if I say General Clark and I had a brief word prior to the start of the hearing. I have attended so many conferences over the last 28 years on whether NATO is in trouble, is there a crisis? I haven’t paid much attention to the alarm bell sounded by many for the last couple of years. I do think there is a mood change, both here and in Europe, that I think is not particularly healthy, about the need for NATO, the composition of NATO, and the relationship of NATO to any European initiatives. I am concerned that some of the initiatives that individually, are arguably well-founded, but taken in the aggregate, raise more problems for our relationship with NATO.

The new administration has been less than enthusiastic in at least its verbal assertions relative to KFOR and SFOR and our involvement in the Balkans. The only talk that has taken place thus far has been talk that related to diminishing our involvement. Al-
though that has not occurred since the President has been sworn in, as my recent trips to the Balkans demonstrated, people are literally waiting with bated breath to find out what this administration is likely to do.

And indicated to you to before, Mr. Chairman, I hope in their assessment and reassessment of our position that is underway that they speak sooner than later because silence is getting almost as dangerous as assertions of drawing down our forces. The ESDP is obviously another concern that you mentioned for NATO, and that comes from the other side of the Atlantic. Until recently I had not worried too much about it because the Europeans’ track record in meeting defense commitments has been on the whole somewhat wanting. But I think they set their headline goals at a low enough level that they will be able to meet those goals, and appear to have made some significant change in their security circumstance without having done so.

What worries me is first, coordination between NATO and ESDP and second, that meeting these headline goals will exhaust the will of the parliaments in those countries to meet the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which they signed onto a couple years ago. Put differently, I can foresee NATO in several years having a technological gap between the United States and almost everyone else that could widen to the point where we would be the only member capable of 21st century war-fighting, while the Europeans would be relegated to peacekeeping operations. It seems to me that it wouldn’t be a very healthy alliance, and not one that would provide a lot of cohesion in the next two decades.

So in addition, the President moving very cautiously—to his credit—on his commitment to national missile defense it yet is another area of stark division at least at this point between the United States and Europe as well as the deafening silence about our open door policy on expanding NATO further. There’s a lot of reasons for us to pay attention to what our witnesses have to say today because I will conclude by saying there are even some on this side of the Atlantic, in this body, who question the preeminence of NATO as the building block upon which most of our strategy is built.

We hear time and again, some of our colleagues talking about the fact that the combined GDP of Europe is larger than the United States. Shouldn’t they do more and shouldn’t we be less involved and so on and so forth. There’s really a quiet debate going on in this country about whether or not we are and should remain a Europe power. It’s the single most important debate we are going to undertake and I pray God that it is resolved in the direction that we must, we must remain a European power. I don’t know how you could do that without men and women in uniform on the ground, and in an organization that is viewed as vibrant and relevant by our European friends.

But, although there’s much more to say, there’s much more to listen to, and so what I will do is cease and desist at this moment, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to hearing from our three witnesses.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. And General before we turn the mike to you, I would like to recognize three
individuals who are with us today that deserve recognition. First is Jean Kirkpatrick, who is on the front row behind us. I think everyone knows her role in our country's history over some important foreign policy issues. She was the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations holding the rank of a Cabinet member in the Reagan administration. She is also known for her frank defense of the interests and values of the United States and the West in that post. And, she was also one of the first to publicly call for the enlargement of NATO's membership and has been an advocate of additional expansion. We welcome you Madam Ambassador to this hearing.

Also from abroad we have two guests from Romania. The Minister of Defense, Ioan Pascu, we welcome you, sir and also the Romanian National Security Advisor to the President, Ioan Talvic. We welcome both of you gentlemen here.

General Clark, the mike is yours. We're anxious to learn from you.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK, FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

General Clark. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Biden, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today concerning the state of NATO and the challenges ahead as we look forward to the 2002 summit. I have prepared a written opening statement, which has been submitted and I won't go through all of that, but let me just say first, I'm very grateful to the members of the subcommittee for the support that they have given to me personally and for their support for the many achievements of NATO over the past decade.

I think the members of this subcommittee and the leaders in the U.S. Congress and the Senate need to take credit also for the many achievements of NATO. I think NATO has proved itself over the decade of the 1990's probably to be the most adaptive, innovative and responsive of the many multinational and international institutions. We've reached out to former adversaries in Partnership for Peace and in Permanent Joint Council on NATO Enlargement.

We've created a new strategy and a command structure. We created new forces and capabilities and when necessary NATO acted in Operation Deny Flight and in the implementation force for the Dayton agreement and again Operation Allied Force and KFOR to operate Kosovo and prevent ethnic cleansing there. Today we remain engaged on the ground. But I do feel that NATO is at a crossroads today, a crossroads that emerged at the end of Operation Allied Force. And we have not moved effectively off that crossroads yet.

The source of the challenge is diverging interests, Europe and the United States, or at least a perception of those interests. On the one hand European statesmen profess a desire to follow through on their vision of an integrated united Europe. They wanted to have a common foreign security policy and how can they have that policy without some means to implement it? And on the other hand they profess allegiance to NATO as the primary institution for collective defense in Europe on this side of the Atlantic, as Senator Biden referenced, there are still questions.
I personally believe that the United States must anchor its security in the strongest possible partnership with Europe, but there are many who believe that we have interests elsewhere, interests what would be sufficient to justify reducing our obligations and commitments to Europe and broadening it looking elsewhere, westward or southward, or in some way reducing the perception of the United States as a European power. And these sets of perceptions are being played out in the discussion of the European Security and Defense Program.

I think that greater European contributions to their own security and defense are a political imperative on both sides of the Atlantic. But what is at issue is how this will actually be managed, and what it means. The discussion thus far has been primarily at the technical level, but the technical discussions are masking some fundamental political divergences. The technical discussions have been about transparency and whether the European Union would begin discussions on security issues without sharing those discussions with NATO. They have been about planning structures and whether the European Union would have its own command and staff organizations that could help plan and do estimates to inform policymakers or would they rely on NATO command and staff planning organizations.

But these mask a fundamental policy problem, I think for the United States and for Europe, and if it could be dealt with at the political level, we would be so much stronger. The fundamental question at the political level is whether the United States will be there, in Europe, when there are security challenges. Will we be there? If we will always be there, then really what is the need for the European Security Rapid Reaction Force. And on the other side, the question to the Europeans has to be, will you really rely on NATO first? In all matters of security? Do you really mean it when you say that if NATO acts then there is no need for the European Union to act separately?

It is always said with the assumption that it would be the United States, which would prevent NATO from acting, but of course NATO is an Alliance of 19 sovereign nations. Any one of these nations could, in some particular case, determine that it is not in their interests or in the interest of others in Europe that NATO would be in charge and they could block a NATO as well as the United States. So there is this fundamental issue. This is an appropriate time for a new political understanding, transatlantic, which would see Europeans and Americans renew the pledge that they are bound together in defense and in security issues, that together we can move the world and separately we cannot.

And so, that is the fundamental crossroads that we are at. Now, appreciating this crossroads and working with it is complicated by three other issues. First, we have got to deal with the Balkans. That is where we are operationally committed. NATO has to succeed. Succeeding there means American leadership and that means keeping the United States committed not only in policy, but also on the ground. Second, we’ve got to deal with the issue of missile defense. Missile defense is a divisive issue in the Alliance, but I think it is wrong to suggest that missile defense is a tradeoff for
ESDP, as some have: “If you accept our American national missile defense, we will accept your ESDP.”

No, these aren’t tradeoff issues. These are each fundamental issues that need to be understood. I think the United States is going to go ahead with missile defense, but I think that missile defense has to include protection for Europe. I think it has to include European participation. I think it has to be connectable to broader frameworks and I think there has to be a strong, complete case made for the movement into missile defense, including both why we need it, what the technologies are and their capabilities and finally, what is the structure of global, strategic stability that we seek to gain by moving in this direction?

And finally, there is the question of NATO enlargement and our relationship with Russia. I do believe that NATO enlargement is the issue that the Alliance must face before the summit in 2002. The promises are no longer enough. We got through the 1999 summit with the promise of the open door. Now, nations in Eastern Europe expect to be invited to join. The promise of NATO membership is the strongest positive incentive that we can offer these nations for reform, for Westernization. NATO membership is the strongest action we can take to project stability and security eastward. So I think it is time that the Alliance moved forward on this issue. There are a number of arguments in favor of it. There are some against it. I have outlined many of these in my prepared statement, but I come down on the need to enlarge NATO and I think that an enlargement should move forward with the states that seek NATO membership, and it should include a Baltic dimension.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Clark follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK

NATO: FACING THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

Mr. Chairman, Senators, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today concerning the state of NATO, and the challenges ahead as we look toward the 2002 Summit.

Since departing Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in May, 2000, I have continued to follow the issues associated with NATO, Europe and our security challenges in the region, and have also had opportunity to reflect upon many of the circumstances and challenges ahead. It is privilege to share these thoughts with the Committee.

NATO today is at a crossroads. At stake is its prominence in Trans-Atlantic security issues and, ultimately its future. This crossroads is formed by the convergence of a changing European environment and changing US strategy. This is not the first time that NATO’s future has been in doubt, and once again, some observers are pointing out the differing interests of Allies separated by the Atlantic. Once again pundits are finding issues of such potent political significance that they could shake the Alliance off its foundations. And, once again, the issues are complex, nuanced, and in some ways relatively abstract.

At the end of the Cold War, NATO lost its potential adversary, the Soviet Union. With the end of the Soviet threat, and the relentless growth of Soviet military power from which it was derived, many observers questioned the rationale for NATO’s existence. In Europe, long time Gaullists and other, revived their dreams of a Europe free of superpower influence, or at least, domination. Some in positions of authority indicated to American policy makers that henceforth, Europeans demanded the right to take greater control of their own European matters. As these sentiments were emerging, Yugoslavia was breaking apart in civil war and aggression. Several of our European allies found themselves committed on the ground in former Yugoslavia with significant elements of their armies under the United Nations aegis engaged in a difficult peacekeeping mission.
At the same time the United States was more or less content to sit back and watch the European and UN effort struggle with the hard realities of Balkan strife. We were fascinated by the potential and risks of democratization and reform in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, some were citing the 1990’s as the time to reorient the U.S. focus westward, recognize our growing interests in the Pacific, and strengthen the U.S. economic and security presence there. Others were simply reacting to the end of the Cold War and the thirst for a peace dividend by encouraging the United States to reduce its overseas commitments and deployments.

Consequently, in 1992, consistent with the spirit of European integration expressed in the European Treaty at Maastricht, the EU also adopted the so-called Petersberg tasks as the capabilities required from a European security and defense force. These tasks ranged from simple humanitarian operations to difficult problems of peace enforcement well beyond the aggregate capabilities of European forces at the time.

During the early years of the Clinton Administration, as our Allies struggled with the situation in the Balkans, we made clear our reluctance to shoulder similar burdens on the ground with them, giving strong ammunition to those who sought to argue that in the wake of the Cold War, the Americans could not be depended on to help resolve every problem of European security. It was only as the UNPROFOR mission began to fail in Bosnia that we accepted the obligation through NATO to assist our allies on the ground, if they needed to extract their forces. Subsequently, then, we found the will to commit up to 25,000 U.S. troops alongside our Allies in helping to enforce the Dayton agreement for Bosnia.

But by then the momentum for greater European influence had begun to build, and the notion of a European Security and Defense Identity became embedded in NATO planning. In the 1996 formulation, the ESDI was recognized as “separable but not separate” forces and elements. A specified set of duties for the European Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe was mandated, duties which would enable him to become the strategic or operational commander for a European-only operation. And underlying this effort was the phrase “should the Alliance as a whole not be engaged.” As some Europeans interpreted it this was the code for the U.S. to be able to opt out of European efforts.

Sure enough, in 1997, as chaos descended on Albania following the collapse of a pyramid investment scheme, there was a requirement for a force to enter to help stabilize the situation. The U.S. and other Allies agreed that the Alliance would not supply this force. The European force was not ready. Therefore the coalition force that entered Albania in Operation Alba was almost totally Italian and was under Italian command. But the signal had been sent again: the U.S. would not always participate in crisis situations in Europe.

With the implementation of the European common currency imminent, the United Kingdom leaders met with the French at St. Malo in December, 1998, and announced their intent to accelerate effort to implement a European-only force. This agreement was occurring as the United States was pushing the establishment of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, a major NATO effort to reinvigorate the force goals—force planning process after the defense cutbacks of the early 1990’s. Even before the Kosovo air campaign, it was a political imperative on both sides of the Atlantic that the Europeans had to do more to strengthen their own defensive capabilities.

Conflict in Kosovo, and NATO’s Operation Allied Force further heightened public appreciation of Europe’s lack of modern air to air and air to ground capabilities, as well as deficiencies in intelligence gathering, strategic communication, and logistics. The conflict also generated intense transatlantic tensions due to differing interests and strategies for the conflict, although NATO demonstrated remarkable cohesion and succeeded in imposing its conditions on Yugoslav President Milesevic. The tensions lingered. For the first time, in the aftermath of the war, we saw European aspirations for an independent force expressed following the European Summit at Cologne in July, 1999.

After concerns were raised, many Europeans pulled back somewhat from the ambitions laid out at Cologne. But by December, 1999, at the Helsinki Summit, the European Union adopted the headline goal of a 60,000 strong deployable European only force. Major issues surrounding the force were left unanswered, but for the first time it was a mark on the wall. To many Europeans the rhetoric associated with the announcement of the headline goal was essential in persuading their publics to support the necessary additional defense resources. But not a few commented privately that it was the start of something more, a European capacity to act independently of NATO, in pursuit of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. There
was even quiet talk in some of the smaller countries that this might be the start of a European Army.

Over the past year, as NATO troops have remained engaged in Kosovo and Bosnia, much of the intellectual energy of the Alliance has been distracted by the need to reconcile the sometimes competing agenda of greater European integration in the security area with the recognition that NATO is and must remain for the foreseeable future the preeminent institution for European Security and Defense. Currently, the European force has been defined to include sufficient staying power for one year's deployment, so that well over 100,000 troops will be needed. Arrangements are also being made to provide the kinds of specialized police units, like the Italian Carabineri, necessary to assist in the projection of law and order in emergencies, and various discussions are underway to augment European intelligence collection and logistics capabilities. In eleven EU countries, defense budgets are or are projected to increase in nominal terms. And European leaders, especially the EU High Commissioner for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Dr. Javier Solana has repeatedly assured that NATO will be called on first when there is a crisis. Only if NATO chooses not to become involved will the EU act independently, he has said.

While additional capabilities are most welcome, concerns remain about how these European capabilities can be reconciled with NATO. Will NATO be included in all the security dialogue on a transparent basis from the outset? Or will circumstances conspire to present NATO with an emerging crisis to which it must respond but could have headed off with prior engagement? Will the European Union build up redundant planning capabilities, which confound the ability to respond effectively in a crisis? Or will the EU be content to rely on the NATO planning procedures in order to facilitate common appreciation of emergent situations? And what if it is not the U.S. but a European power, which desires that NATO not be engaged in meeting a security challenge early on and thus blocks consensus for NATO action?

While these discussions have continued at a largely military-political-technical level they have masked a growing unease at the political level. The fundamental questions on which the Alliance's future depends are these: Will the European Union truly make NATO its institution of first choice for meeting European security needs? Will the U.S. pledge, and follow through, always to participate when there is a security challenge to Allied interests? If the answer to either of these questions is no, then further problems for the Alliance are inevitable.

As NATO has been working the intricacies of the institutional relationships, other issues also need tending. Among these are the continuing NATO engagement in the Balkans, the European response to the U.S. decision to proceed with a limited Missile Defense, and the question of further enlargement of the Alliance.

NATO's continuing operational challenge in the Balkans is the most urgent issue confronting the Alliance. In Bosnia, something more than 20,000 NATO troops including 4,000 Americans remain engaged in the enforcement of the Dayton Agreement. Procedures are in place to assess progress, and in accordance with the completion of requirements, reduce the levels of forces in place. However, there is continuing European angst, in the wake of the election campaign, that the U.S. may peremptorily begin withdrawals of its forces there or otherwise reduce its levels of engagement.

In Kosovo, the tensions associated with the bitter relationships between Albanians and Serbs continue, with a small number of hard-core fighters among the Albanians who seem determined to intimidate and expel the remaining Serbs and open a conflict in southern Serbia adjacent to Kosovo. The international presence there of some 37,000 troops, including approximately 6,000 Americans, is vital to preserving stability in the province. The American role is particularly important, since the Albanians view the Americans as more supportive than other troops.

In both areas the international community and NATO need to move on three general directions: first, to maintain the necessary troop dispositions and commitments (or as the Europeans have said, “all in together, all out together”); second the NATO forces in both countries must continue to take an active role in maintaining security and supporting the civil implementation effort; and third, with the influence gained by the continuing commitment of American forces, the Administration must take the lead in insuring effective civil implementation. In Bosnia, this means disenfranchising and removing from office those opposed to the agreement, strengthening the institutions of the central government, moving effectively against crime, corruption and the war criminals, promoting the return of all refugees and displaced persons, and bringing the separate armed forces under unified civilian control. Bosnia-Herzegovina needs to become one independent state. In Kosovo, there is an urgent need to move ahead with province-wide elections and define a political process with Serbia, which will provide at least substantial autonomy, as well as democracy,
to the province. The international community may well decide that it cannot close the door on eventual independence of Kosovo. But what it must do is generate movement toward political resolution at this time.

The debate in Europe on the U.S. decision to proceed with a Missile Defense promises to be painful. To many Europeans the case for Missile Defense has simply not been made. Moreover, any discussion will meet counterarguments from Russia and the European left. A positive outcome to the “consultation” will require three essentials. First, a strong case must be made for the need for Missile Defense. It must include assumptions about the threat, discussions of technological capabilities, and consideration of the new shape of global strategic stability if missile defenses come into play. Second, Europe’s defense and industrial needs must be taken into account in the eventual program. Europe must be protected, and European firms must receive technology and manufacturing contracts for the program as it proceeds. Conversely, however the European contribution to the program must be affordable. Third, the system must be “connectable” to other efforts elsewhere, to avoid creating the impression of drawing new lines in Europe.

Finally, there is the question of enlarging NATO and the consequent impact on relations with Russia. The simple truth is that nations of Eastern Europe believe that NATO has promised enlargement, not merely “keeping the door open.” NATO enlargement is perhaps the strongest positive incentive in Eastern Europe for reform and Westernization. But enlargement is a controversial question for the Alliance. Russia will not like to see NATO enlargement, especially not if it entails any of the Baltic countries, and though all Western political leaders insist that Russian objections will not prevent NATO from accepting any particular new member, Russian objections will no doubt remain a factor. There are also a number of other concerns raised by those who are skeptical of enlargement. Some suggest the prospective new members simply aren’t ready militarily. Others cite their lack of the appropriate “culture” for membership in NATO. Still a third argument is to refer to Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic and cite the need for more time for the Alliance to absorb these new members.

But NATO must be very clear-sighted in assessing the enlargement issue. We said explicitly for the first round that military readiness wasn’t a substantial factor in the invitation to join. In fact, the three new members are all moving forward with their plans and adaptation, though not always as rapidly as some in NATO would like. Despite the anguished U.S. debate in 1997-98 about the cost of enlargement, the record shows that we have in fact paid nothing extra for the enlargement. And during the Kosovo air campaign the three new members bore their responsibilities bravely despite extraordinary difficulty. As for Russia, it will be time for the Alliance to act on its previous prescription that NATO enlargement, bringing peace and stability to Eastern Europe will actually benefit Russia.

At the 2002 NATO Summit, it is my belief that NATO must invite new members, and these invitees must include a Baltic dimension of at least one Baltic country, perhaps more. Steering this issue will be the responsibility of the United States. European countries are more concerned about EU enlargement. Some have even suggested informally that Baltic state membership in the EU would provide these countries sufficient security as to obviate the need for NATO membership. Baltic leaders have clearly rejected that idea, noting that EU members of NATO still regard the Alliance as vital for their security. If NATO is to remain viable, reliance on the EU for collective defense arrangements must be avoided. So, too, must situations where NATO member forces might be drawn into commitments, which NATO would then have to address. NATO enlargement is thus critical to maintaining NATO’s relevance and effectiveness, as well as American leadership in critical transatlantic security issues.

NATO has served for over fifty years as the bedrock of stability and security in the EuroAtlantic region. It is an institution initiated and led by the United States. It remains for farsighted and courageous American leadership to steer NATO safely through the difficult issues ahead.

Senator Smith. Thank you, General. I wonder how you respond to those critics of Baltic inclusion who say that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia would just be too much of a burden and an Article V commitment that we’re not likely to keep? How do you respond to that?

General Clark. Well, I think there are three basic answers to this. First of all, we’re not in a state of war today or near war with
Russia. So, we have never said that military capabilities per se were the sine qua non for admittance into NATO. They are not.

Second, there are those who would say that the European Union, if these countries are admitted, would take care of them and so they are not needed, but I can't imagine a crisis involving the Baltic states that wouldn't affect the security of Europe. And if it affects the security of Europe, it would affect the security, not only of European Union members, but it would affect American security as well. And so to me, the Baltic dimension is a necessary precondition for moving stability and security eastward in Europe.

And finally, I think there are measures that these nations are taking to help secure themselves, to help defend themselves and I think that we can provide a very important psychological as well as physical dimension of security if we bring them into NATO, thereby helping promote stability in this region.

We need to do this sooner rather than later. When I look at Russian actions and their desires to extend their definition of security—a zone of weak buffer states around them—and regain the preeminence of the former Soviet Union, then it gives a sense of urgency that we want to craft the outlines of European security and stability sooner rather than later. There is not so much to be gained by delay here.

We have delayed. We have worked with Russian perceptions, and yet Russian perceptions have hardened anyway, partly for bargaining positions, partly because of their own domestic reasons, partly because the people in charge in Russia today. So the move of NATO with the Baltic dimension is essential to show the outlines of a peaceful, integrated, stable Europe, which can then draw Russia in, in a constructive fashion.

Senator SMITH. Speaking about Russia, what is your sense as to how it is evolving? Senator Biden and I were in Paris with President Clinton, when the NATO/Russia Founding Act was signed. I do not think Moscow has lived up exactly to the terms of that agreement. How do you assess the evolution of Russia and its future relationship with NATO? I have actually heard Russian officials express interest in NATO membership, but it does not seem like it is evolving that way. What is your thought on that?

General CLARK. I think the current leadership in Russia views its security very much in cold war terms. They look for a strategic sphere of influence. It is—they have never been reached by the wave of democratization, the openness that swept across Eastern Europe. These are people who still see things in traditional ways and are setting about reforming their security buffers. There is heavy-handed and underhanded intimidation and effort across Eastern Europe today to reestablish Russian influence, through the purchase of utility systems, or various private enterprises. I get reports of young men with bags of money showing up looking to buy into traditional arms industries and curry favor in some countries in Eastern Europe. We know what Russian threats have meant to Georgia for example. And so what we see is a broad pattern of Russia attempting to assert itself in a traditional way.

Senator SMITH. And that doesn't include joining NATO?
General Clark. It does not include NATO. It's a 19th century balance of power, spheres of influence conception of security. It is out-of-date today.

Senator Smith. Am I wrong, General, as we look at ESDP, in thinking that the fundamental ingredient that must be introduced is the integration of ESDP’s command and control structure into that of NATO. If it is separate, we have got a problem and I think Senator Biden and I have a problem keeping support for NATO in the U.S. Senate, at least that's the way I see it evolving, but if they set it up within the NATO command structure, this could be a very workable thing. It does not seem to me that that is the way it is evolving. I wonder if that is your view as well?

General Clark. Well, there's a tug of war going on inside the European Union today on what the outlines of ESDP will eventually turn into. There are some who are very candid in saying they want a European army. They want not only their own staff, but their own command and control and the ability to take independent operations. There are others who say that they want this to be a means of strengthening the Europeans' contribution to NATO. So, the outcome of that is going to be important, but I think regardless of how that turns out, I think the United States can shape this debate in important ways.

The issue is whether or not we believe that we will always be there. I was at a recent security conference and discussed this issue with Javier Solana, who is the High Commissioner for the Common Security and Foreign Policy. I asked Dr. Solana, when do you—you say you will always come to NATO first. If that is the case, why would you ever then need a European security force if the United States is always going to be there? He said in 1997, you weren't there. Italy went into Albania alone. NATO would not participate, would not lead it. We have that to overcome. So it is not just a technical problem of who is in command. It is fundamentally a political problem of how committed are we to European security.

Senator Smith. Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. General, you talked about divergent and diverging interests in Europe. Talk to us a little bit more about that. What interests, from the European perspective, do you see as divergent? In other words, how are their interests diverging from ours in their view?

General Clark. First, NATO as an alliance of sovereign nations. So every nation has its own individual interests, and, as you know, in Europe if you go from Britain to France to Germany to Italy to Spain, you will always hear the interpretation of events and the forecast of the future from that nation's interpretation. They are all a little bit different. There is a strong historical legacy among these countries, but I think what has emerged is there is a common interest in European integration.

The European Union became an economic organ that was designed to minimize competition and promote economic well-being and preserve that the social structures that supported the democracies in these countries. It has moved into the foreign and security policy and in doing so it brings divergent European national interests and it is having a great difficulty. But just to name a few dimensions of differences, generally the Europeans don't agree with
the American policy in the Persian Gulf. They would have favored a looser sanctions regime, more collaboration with the Iraqis, getting trade in and trying to work against the Iraqi regime by turning its own people against it through Westernization, a different view than we had.

Generally, they are more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause than the Americans are. They take a different view toward Russia than the Americans do. And as a couple of people have told me, they are working very hard to bring Russia onboard. Russia is their neighbor and they want to be its best friend. So, these stresses and strains give them the incentive to have a common policy that is somewhat distanced from the United States.

Senator Biden. I find it interesting that when I speak to American policymakers they point out that if the United States wishes to go forward with a major initiative that it is always able to essentially force its view on NATO, and is able to prevail. You hear that discussion now with regard to the national missile defense debate; that they will accept it, and they probably will if we insist. But one of the things that has concerned me off and on for the last 10 to 15 years has been that they may attempt leadership because it’s unavoidable; because it’s so obvious that we are so predominant.

But I find an increasing respect for our judgment in Europe when you speak with our European counterparts. Not just in France, but in other countries as well, people are questioning our judgment and demonstrating an increasing unwillingness to follow that judgment. Iraq is an example that you pointed out, and Russia is clearly an example. Which leads me to, what I find to be a conundrum. We are trying to get the Europeans to, in effect, stay the course on a NATO that has worked very well for a long time in absence of an immediate threat.

There is no concern today about the Fulda Gap being overrun and Western Europe falling. And so, as we try to deal with the diminished threat and the need, in our view, for a further cementing of this Alliance, we find divergent views on issues, for example enlargement.

But, whether I am in France or Belgium or Spain or Italy or Germany talk of the Baltics becoming members of NATO is by and large very much at odds with their view of expansion and where it should take place, if any takes place. They view the Baltics as not defensible. They would be lost if there was a conflict very quickly, and they view it as a stick in the eye to the Russians, going back to our differing views as to how important it is to have the acquiescence of—or at least not the open hostility of—Russia.

And so, I think it is going to be very difficult for any President from this point on, including this President, to meet the two requirements. First, How do you pull Europe together without us pulling out figuratively or literally, and yet pursue policies, which seem, on the surface, at odds with the consensus today among Europeans. You have talked about being in Germany at the conference a month or so ago. That was the first one I have missed in awhile, but the reports I got were there were very different views on everything from national missile defense, to Iraq, to the Middle East, to Russia, to expansion.
I wonder whether you have any advice as to how this administration threads that difficulty? Let's assume we pass a resolution in the U.S. Congress saying to admit the Baltic States to NATO or at least one that is ready. I think one clearly is ready or very close. And we go on record as supporting a national missile defense although undefined and we attempt to maintain sanctions on Iraq. You sat there and negotiated with these folks for a long time. I watched you during the whole Kosovo undertaking. Talk to me about that.

General CLARK. Well, I think that all of the issues you cite are issues that potentially push Europe to take more seriously the European Security and Defense Policy. They are divergent interests, but that doesn't mean that the United States can't lead in addressing those issues. It's a question of how we lead and so my recipe for that is first, you have to have a general inclination of where you want to go. There is only so much diplomatic capital that you can expend. You have to figure out where to push hardest, then you have got to listen to their concerns and you've got to take their concerns into account.

They have legitimate concerns on Russia. They do not want to see a return to polarization in Europe, nobody does, but the offsets to Russia cannot be given through NATO. They are from a broader context of international trade, international economics, reform and other issues that go beyond a strict security dimension. The United States has to offer some of those ideas to the Europeans if it says it is inclined also to seek Baltic membership.

On national missile defense, the United States has to incorporate European concerns and reservations. European nations do not want a disruptive debate like occurred in the early 1980's on zero/zero option, to rip apart their domestic consensus today in favor of ESDI and NATO. So, we have an obligation, if we are going to move in this direction, to provide information, to provide ideas, to provide a framework in which our actions make sense—or our proposed actions make sense. In other words, we have got to have consultation and dialog, but I think that all of these issues are workable if we approach them that way, if we have a clear direction, if we are willing to have a give and take on the details and the timing and circumstances and if we have the ability to come forward in scenarios that are of concern to the Europeans. They want to see American leadership, but they also want to see respect for their own concerns. They have to see that and we have to give it to them.

Senator BIDEN. My sense is, and I realize my time is up, that the last thing in the world that even the French would like to see is us decide that we wanted out of NATO. I mean they have been able to have it rhetorically both ways for a long time, but my time is up.

Senator SMITH. I would like to followup on that Senator Biden. I had occasion to go to make a speech at the Davos Conference in Switzerland and in connection with that trip, I had a French Minister tell me that they wanted ESDP because they wanted a European superstate and the European superstate needs a foreign policy and a foreign policy isn't meaningful if it isn't backed up by a military component and that's why he made the point ESDP's com-
mand structure must be outside of NATO. I have thought about that and wondered.

Senator Biden. What did the Germans think about that?

Senator Smith. If that is where it is going to go, I think that will undercut support for NATO in the U.S. Senate, and I just throw that out. That is my experience here, but if that is the case, do we not really need to rethink when NATO comes into play and it is not even a hypothetical. Take Bosnia for example, had this structure existed prior to American intervention in Bosnia, I do not know how President Clinton ever could have won support in the Senate to send forces into Bosnia as part of the NATO operation and it seems to me then NATO’s role becomes strictly an Article V, tanks going through the Fulda Gap kind of an organization and maybe that’s where it is going to go. I do not know, but it just seems to me that those are the stakes that we are playing with because the details, as I understand the direction they are on, takes us apart. Am I wrong?

General Clark. No, you are not wrong. That is why I say that we need to get this out of the technical details and up to the political level. The details keep taking us further and further apart. Where this ends up is with—it is what one of the Europeans said to me, well, do you not understand that is the difference between security and defense. In other words, you know let the European Union handle the problem when it is emerging and only if it blows up would you call NATO in, but you see that is what precisely we do not want to have happen.

Senator Smith. Well, this Minister specifically said we may want to go into Rwanda, and we want the ability to do that and if they do, then that would be a specific problem, I think, if our country did not want to go into Rwanda.

General Clark. The Africa case is the easiest case to justify a European collective force for, but if I could set that aside for a second and deal with the fundamental issue which you raised, take the case of a country in the Baltics that has been invited to join the European Union. Now if there is political turmoil there, if there is some pushing and nudging and some threats from across the border, would we expect the European Union to provide the security reassurance for that Baltic country? This is what I have been told by Europeans that they expect the European Union to do.

Now, who would do this in the European Union? Would Britain and France send their troops, a small delegation, some observers to reassure people there and if they did, what would that say then about NATO? And if you think back to 1995 and how we got involved in Bosnia, it was because we had the troops of our NATO allies on the ground and in trouble and the President made the decision that, if they came to us and asked for a NATO plan to help them extract themselves in the failure of UNPROFOR that we would go in there with up to 25,000 American troops.

And then the logic was, well if you are willing to do that, then why not use the American troops to stop the fighting and get a peace agreement? And so, we would find ourselves, in the case of the Baltics or some other region, in which the European Union were to lead in dealing with a crisis, then having to follow up with NATO without the benefit of the NATO engagement in the first
place to head off the crisis. And so to me the issue is not technical, it is more fundamental than that. It is that NATO enlargement must keep pace with the European Union enlargement. And every effort the Europeans make to strengthen their own forces is perfectly fine and welcome, but we should always be there with them when there is a security challenge and it should be dealt with through NATO and not the European Union.

Senator Smith. As a practical matter, and I am going to turn it over to Senator Biden, but as a practical matter, Turkey has already raised an issue on this whole proposal. As a practical matter I do not see a real welcome mat for Turkey into the European Union so where does this go? I mean how do you reconcile these conflicting memberships? And frankly it is the only leverage Turkey has in the European Union is its NATO trump card. Maybe they need to work it out, but frankly if we undo NATO, I wonder if the discipline remains in Europe to preserve the rapprochement of these ancient hatreds?

Let us say what happens when NATO is a diminished organization and Greece and Turkey have a problem, do they have a mechanism, a psychological mechanism of NATO to say, we have got to work this out, we are allies, we cannot go to war. Do those things become more probable. It just seems to me a whole world of new insecurities are developed when NATO's role declines. Am I wrong in that?

General Clark. No, you are not wrong. I agree that we need to preserve and strengthen NATO's role in Europe. European nations need to do more and they can do more and some have said that the ESDP is only a mechanism for rallying the support of finance ministries and public opinion to help them do more for their defense. Well, that's well and good, but in that case, we need to be sure that it is strengthening NATO, not providing an alternative to NATO.

Senator Biden. I have been somewhat cynical about this, General. At the time—I facetiously point out that you are to blame for this whole thing, but I want to explain how. One of the things I did not anticipate as a consequence of our significant show of capability in Kosovo was the extent of the embarrassment and resentment it caused in European capitals. I was stunned by how profound it was.

It was in France. It was a group of Europeans and Americans, all NATO members, sending people to that particular conference, to discuss the Balkans and I facetiously said at the time that I think this should really be renamed the Three P program not the ESDP—or ESDP and the three P's stand for procurement, procrastination and pride. Obviously that was offensive to some who heard it. All who heard it I suspect.

I was at a closed meeting with a group of high-ranking members. As a matter of fact, I think Ambassador Kirkpatrick was there as well.

It was in France. It was a group of Europeans and Americans, all NATO members, sending people to that particular conference, to discuss the Balkans and I facetiously said at the time that I think this should really be renamed the Three P program not the ESDP—or ESDP and the three P's stand for procurement, procrastination and pride. Obviously that was offensive to some who heard it. All who heard it I suspect.

But it seems to me that we may have had something start off here that may get out of hand because I really do not think that at the very outset, with the exception of some of the French, there is any idea or notion that there is going to be a totally independent European force capable of unity and capable of maintaining in a
united Europe the military arm of the foreign policy of a united Eu-
rope. I think we’re a long way from there. 

And I watch how the Italians and the Germans dance around the
French and it is a fascinating little tribal dance that goes on, which
is understandable, by the way. I sound like I am belittling it and
I am not. There is a genuine desire to have a healthy environment
in which Europeans can view themselves as Europeans, but there
are still some stark differences that exist within Europe. The likeli-
hood of this essentially European army to enforce a European for-
eign policy that is a result of a united Europe, may be a dream of
some people. Maybe if it worked as well as it sounds, it would be
a good thing, but I think we are a long way from there. 

What I find sort of creeping into this on both sides of the Atlantic
is this notion that somehow this thing that started off at 50 to
60,000 rapid deployment forces might turn into something that is
like taking the multiple National Guards in the United States of
America, all brave and noble and participating in all our engage-
ments and saying they are the totality of the U.S. military. Even
if that were its desire to be this European military it is far from
being able to fulfill that function.

But back in 1998 there was a Defense Authorization Act we
passed here and it had a provision in it that limited U.S. participa-
tion in a combined joint task forces to air, intelligence, and logis-
tics—no ground forces. I am the only person who voted against that
for that reason out of a hundred Senators. And the reason is that
I see unintended consequences flowing from these discussions that
on the surface do not have the capacity to meet the stated tasks
and yet they are taking on a life of their own now, which takes me
back to where I will end.

My dad has an expression. My dad is 85 years old, very well-read
man, high school-educated man and always interested in foreign
policy. My dad made a comment to me, which I have heard him
make a number of times over my lifetime, not too long ago when
he came to listen to a speech I made with a group of real experts—
myself excluded—at the University of Delaware on the Middle
East. Afterwards, he said to me, “Joe you know, if everything is
equally important to you nothing is important.” I hope this admin-
istration makes a judgment, a gradation of what they find to be the
most important initiatives that are at odds with the consensus at
the moment in Europe.

I watched you have to work out compromises relative to bomb-
ning missions at the front end of the Kosovo undertaking that were nec-


ecessary. The idea that you could just go in and say this is an alli-
ance, but here is the deal. Chirac does not get to say anything. It
does not work that way. So, this is the sort of heavy lifting we are
heading into right now. We have had people, and not just because
she is sitting there, like Ambassador Kirkpatrick and others in
other administrations, who have understood the—a more global
view of this.

I had so many questions I would like to ask you, but I do not
want to trespass more on your time. But I hope the message that
comes out of what we are beginning to try to focus on here is that
this is pretty complicated stuff and we are at a pretty dicey spot
right now. In one meeting, I will not mention his name, a very
high-ranking Frenchman during a real debate we were having about an issue in a closed meeting turned to me and said, “well you imperialists.” And I looked at this gentleman and said, I beg your pardon, I said I have not heard that since I met with Brezhnev as a young Senator. Imperialists? I am worried that the rhetoric is likely to escalate in a way that is not very helpful.

I think we should be focusing on what it is that does unite us. And I think, for one, were I asked, I would suggest that there be an awful lot of spade work done with our European friends, individually, not just collectively, on what it is that we believe our priorities to be and why they are priorities. What we are willing to get in the line on, what we are willing to compromise on, and what we are willing to talk about. Like I have said, there are a lot of people in this body, and a lot of people in this country, as there are in Europe, who understandably think the danger has passed. The idea of us needing to be a European power is much less relevant than it was 10 years ago and moving toward greater irrelevance. That somehow, we should focus our attention on other parts of the world and so, I think this is going to take an awful lot of concentration.

It has to be led by the administration. I am neither openly optimistic or pessimistic about this. I am anxious and waiting to see what priority they place on some of these things. But I will conclude by saying that you could not say, in my humble opinion, that we are going to reduce our troop presence in the Balkans. And, if Russia does not accommodate changes in the ABM, we will unilaterally abandon the ABM Treaty and at the same time, we are going to consider greater use of force in imposing sanctions in Iraq and somehow think you are going to get these other pieces taken care of. I am not suggesting that we should back off on what our interest is. I am suggesting that we should be cognizant of the fact that although I do not think NATO will break up tomorrow or the next day, I think this is all incremental. It is all incremental, but it is awful hard to staunch the bleeding once it starts. This is the first time in my career of 28 years of dealing with this, and I do not profess to be the expert that either you or Ambassador Kirkpatrick or our other witnesses are, but I have hung around long enough to know this one is real. This dilemma with NATO right now is real. It is not merely a matter of political theatrics, which we have observed off and on over the last 30 years. I thank you for your time and knowing you as I do I am sure you are going to be available for us to pick your brain and seek your advice as this unfolds.

General CLARK. Yes, I will. Could I have just a word in response to that? I am concerned about the rhetoric and I do believe that in advance of the capabilities. The tenor of the discussions, the ideas that are advanced have a weight of their own in diplomatic affairs and that is why it is so important to get this dialog right. It seems to me the dialog has to have two fundamental tenants. No. 1, we do want the Europeans to do more. We welcome it. We encourage it.

If it’s a 60,000-man force that can go over there and stay for a year, that’s wonderful, if you are going to add carabineri and gendarmerie capability, that’s even better, if you want logistics and in-
telligence, great, all of that is important. Please do it. But second, that the United States will be there with Europe to deal with its security as well as its collective defense issues. We want to be consulted. We want to engaged. We believe NATO is the right forum and we, America, take you Europeans up on your pledge that if there is trouble, NATO will be the first institution turned to and if we follow on those courses, I think we can use this to strengthen NATO.

Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman I have been very careful to give the new administration time and not be critical, in large part because they are just working their way through a lot of this. But that is also why I said I hope we do not remain silent too long on what value we place on NATO and what value we place on our participation, including ground forces, with NATO in the Balkans. I think that is the strongest message this President could send right now because literally everywhere I go in Europe they wonder what is going to happen. The question is, do we have reason to question whether you will be there and to them there is an immediate, precise example.

It is the Balkans right now. There are folks there, so this can only come from the President. It cannot come from Congress. And I think that the President, as he gets his sea legs here and gets underway, there will be a very, very strong, unequivocal statement about us being a European power and that we plan on staying. NATO is a cornerstone and we're in to the end in the Balkans. I think that will do an awful lot to affect—presumptuous of me to say this—affect the debates in parliaments in other countries and with your former counterparts at the NAC.

General Clark. I think that's exactly right.

Senator Smith. Thank you, General. We appreciate your sharing your experience and perspective with us this morning. We are better for it. We will now call forward our second panel, which will be Jeff Gedmin and Ron Asmus. They have already been introduced. So, we will invite them to come forward and speak to us.

Dr. Gedmin, we'll start with you.

STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY GEDMIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NEW ATLANTIC INITIATIVE, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Gedmin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you both and I thank the committee for the invitation. I too have a prepared statement, which I will submit for the record and I would summarize briefly for you. If I may start, I would like to try to tie a few things together. Senator Biden, you said that, according to the good wisdom of your father, if everything is equally important nothing is important and I think that that relates to something you said, Senator Smith at the beginning that we in the United States have had and continue to have or want to have, a preferred relationship or option for the Transatlantic Alliance. We have many alliances, many partnerships and they're all important, but this is particularly important to us and something I think is changing, Senator Biden. I think you are right. I think there is a mood change. That is the expression you used.
I think that you can look at our behavior, our policies over the last decade and you can pick and choose areas where we have made mistakes and it has cost us capital and credibility, but I also think that regardless of what we have done or what we would do the conditions are changing and I cite three things. It is an objective fact that the cold war is over and they, our West European friends, are less dependent on us. I think that changes the quality of the relationship. Two, generations are changing. Well, they will always change. But the Helmut Kohl generation is gone. That generation that had this point of reference or orientation that had to do with airlift, care packages, Marshall Plan, that orientation that led them to believe or know when in doubt or conflict, the Americans were always on the right side and we stand by them. That orientation is gone and last, but not least, the European Union is a very different sort of animal.

It has long ceased being a common market, but it is becoming increasingly political. So, where does that leave us? I just want to set up the brief comments that I make to you. I think the relationship is being renegotiated, especially from the West European side. And I think that we may be running into a conflict over visions, on what the relationship should look like in the future. Back to the great wisdom of your father, I was in Berlin recently at a conference, I objected, half-jokingly, half-seriously, to the conference organizers for the language in the program. It frequently mentioned the world emancipation, ESDP, the Euro, et cetera, emancipation. I said we Americans have thin skin. That hurts us a little bit. Why do you feel like you need to be emancipated from us?

I also objected, half-jokingly, half-seriously, to the conference organization that began at the top of the program with a panel on the European Union and North America, the second panel, the European Union and Russia, the third panel, the European Union and the Middle East. I raised my hand and I said well, that doesn't make us feel special. A German parliamentarian raised his hand and said, well, relax, we love you Americans. It's just a fact that we love others equally. And I said, we don't. We have a preferred option for the transatlantic relationship. It is a prism through which we see a lot of things important that we do within Europe and the world and if you are starting to view the relationship in different terms, we ought to have a very frank, candid, conversation about it now.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, four very brief points in summarizing my statement. Two points have to do with unfinished business in the Alliance and two about business ahead. First point, the Balkans, President Bush has signaled that he desires a change in policy. It may, mind you, even make sense to review policy for many reasons, including the fact that Mr. Milosevic is gone, but I would urge us to continue the following: No. 1, whatever we do in the Balkans, we view it in the context of our grand strategy toward Europe. Two, that we do not do anything that leads to or could reignite the crisis, including the reduction of our military commitments. Third, if we do consider reducing our military commitments, I think it would be a grave mistake if we did it in such a way that damaged our standing in the Alliance. General Clark said to me before we began today that in his view
we cannot lead the Balkans and lead the Alliance and I think there is a lot of truth to that. And finally, I would just point out that we have intervened twice in the Balkans in a decade. We have invested billions of U.S. dollars and risked thousands of troops and at end of the day in my view some U.S. presence, we could argue how much and where and for what, but some U.S. presence is a modest overhead cost for a contribution to security and peace in the region. That is point one.

Point two, unfinished business, that has to do with what we have already discussed this morning, NATO enlargement. It is the completion of Europe. You, Mr. Chairman said Europe whole and free, that is morally and strategically still important to us. If that is true I think we have a lot to do with the Western allies because there are some points of division. I think it is absolutely critical that each and every member who joins the Alliance should be qualified, should value and make the Alliance stronger.

But I would also say, as I have said about the Balkans, that we ought to look at NATO enlargement in the context of our grand strategy toward Europe. And in this context I hope that we will consider, as conditions permit, the biggest round possible at the summit in 2002. I would also point out as a footnote that, as Zbigniew Brzezinski points out, that with all the problems and frictions that we have in the Alliance today NATO enlargement is still one project upon which we generally agree and I think that is important.

But two points, Mr. Chairman, about business ahead. First missile defense, we have moved in this country toward a common assessment of the threat. President Bush has committed to moving forward with development and deployment of missile defense and I think that is exactly the right thing to do. Now I think the right thing to do is ask ourselves not that we move forward, but how we move forward because it ought to be done in the context of a healthy alliance that grows stronger and not weaker.

There are many concerns that our West European allies have. One, and probably atop the list, is the Russians. Now sometimes I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I am curious what Russia, our West European allies are worrying about. As you know, the Russians proposed last week to work jointly on missile defense. It is not the first time. President Putin was already pitching a version of the idea last summer, but it is also true that when the Russians are not proposing to work together on missile defense, Moscow is spending inordinate amounts of time ridiculing the rationale for such a system.

Defense ministry spokesmen have said that the true missile threat is actually nil, that U.S. threat scenarios represent a fantasy of American defense planners. And according to President Putin, not so long ago, the missile threat, and I quote, “Which Americans mention does not exist today and will not exist in the foreseeable future.” I think we do need to engage the Russians, but we should harbor no illusions about the mischief that the Russians are trying to conduct. And I think it is a welcome sign that many West European leaders from George Robertson at NATO to Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister of Germany, thus far have refused to be swayed by such mischievous Russian behavior.
Still, I think there is a lot that we have to do. I think the United States needs to undertake a major campaign of engagement and public diplomacy with our allies to discuss missile defense and it should include in my view the following three issues: One, a continuing and robust conversation about our threat assessment. Two, an explanation of why we believe ballistic missile defense carries far more benefits than potentially harmful side effects. And finally, an explanation of how prudent steps toward ballistic missile defense will be compatible with sensible arms control and non-proliferation policies.

I was disappointed, Mr. Chairman, that Prime Minister Blair, during his recent visit to Washington, did not take the opportunity to show leadership on the issue. I confess to you, I expected more from America’s oldest and staunchest ally, not least of which because our new President Bush went out of his way it seems to me to offer a strong and clear support for a project near and dear to Prime Minister Blair’s heart, and that is the European security and defense policy or the European Rapid Reaction Force.

This is my final point, I will be brief, a few observations. I believe that now we should spend far less time debating the merits and modalities of the European Rapid Reaction Force. Not because it is unimportant, it is, but there are important items on the transatlantic agenda that deserve great attention. NATO expansion, missile defense. I would like to add a new approach to Iraq with the ultimate goal of removing the dictator Saddam Hussein from power. We have made our arguments about ESDP and Rapid Reaction Force, build capabilities, not just institutions, we have said. Pursue defense in a way that strengthens NATO and does not undermine the Alliance.

But today, in my judgment, the debate has become overly acrimonious and unnecessarily counterproductive. I agree with Senator Biden, if I heard him correctly, that the debate to some measure is largely theoretical because we are still asking, will our European friends put up the money and build the capabilities? Now, Mr. Chairman, please do not misunderstand me. I continue to share reservations about the European defense project. You and Senator Helms wrote recently in a letter to the Daily Telegraph in London that you worried about, and I quote from your letter, “The true motivation behind ESDP, which many see as a means for Europe to check American power and influence within NATO.” I share this concern.

When French President Jacques Chirac says, for example, that European defense will develop quote, “In complete harmony with NATO.” I ask what kind of NATO he and others are thinking about. Some of us believe that an effective NATO thrives on American leadership, that without this leadership, NATO will lose its effectiveness for action and become an institution where inaction, passivity, and lowest common denominator politics are the order of the day.

Others, Mr. Chairman, contend that leadership is domination and that American dominance is a problem. That is why I believe various annexes to the Nice Treaty speak of things like an EU strategic partnership with NATO. Each organization dealing with itself—with each other on an equal footing. That NATO show total
respect, I quote, “For the autonomy of EU decisionmaking” or why the French general chief of staff testifying before Assembly Nationale said that one annex to the Nice Treaty was specifically worded to rule out, and I quote, “Any interpretation that would give NATO a decisionmaking priority in their reaction to crises.”

In a word, Mr. Chairman, with the increase of Euro-nationalist and Euro-Gaullist tendencies across the continent, I believe that there are still serious questions about the direction of European integration in general. As Henry Kissinger wrote recently, quote, “Many advocates of European integration are urging unity as an exercise in differentiation from, if not opposition to, the United States.” There are questions that remain. Will the European defense policy add ships, guns or aircraft or will it simply decouple important assets from the Alliance and contract them to Brussels? Will, as my colleague Richard Pearl puts it, the European defense speak with a British or a French voice?

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I was told that Prime Minister Blair had not read any of the annexes to the Nice Treaty, that when he confronted some of the controversial passages later, he quipped that such language did not really mean anything, that nobody was really suggesting that Europeans create structures separate and independent from NATO. It reminds me, Senator Smith, of the line from the British editor, Charles Moore, about European integration. Each and every time a strange and seemingly imprudent proposition is put forward by certain EU elites, an official steps forward to answer critics by saying, quote, “Of course nobody is suggesting that” and low and behold, observes Charles Moore, 6 months or a year later, “nobody,” it turns out, is getting his way again.

Mr. Chairman, no, let us not loose our critical voice. I would only like to suggest, whatever we do with the European defense force and our criticism of it, let us make sure it is not counterproductive. Sometimes, as we well know, if we oppose it, the others want it even more. Mr. Chairman, thank you and be happy to take questions or listen to Ron's testimony and join the discussion now and then.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gedmin follows:]

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JEFFREY GEDMIN**

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. It is an honor to have the opportunity to discuss with you the state of America's most important partnership. I would like to address briefly four particular issues today, all of which have considerable bearing, in my view, on the current and future health of the Atlantic Alliance. I have a prepared statement, which I submit for the record. I would be pleased at this time to summarize my statement before answering any questions you have.

1. **UNFINISHED BUSINESS**

a. **The Balkans and Southeastern Europe**

President Bush has indicated that he would like a change in U.S. policy toward the Balkans. It is appropriate to review U.S. policy. The ouster of Slobodan Milosevic last October opened a new chapter in the story of the region. There are new opportunities for democracy, economic development and regional cooperation across Southeastern Europe. Of course, the challenges are still formidable. The new Serb leadership has rejected the idea of turning Slobodan Milosevic over to the UN
tribunal in The Hague. Belgrade has shown little interest in bringing to justice other leading war criminals, like Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader and Ratko Mladic, the former commander of the Bosnian Serb army, who resides in Belgrade. In fact, Serbian President Milutinovic, an indicted war criminal, continues to hold office. Alas, it’s also true that while these men were among the most notorious perpetrators of atrocities, many other Serbs served as willing executioners.

Until the “de-Slobodification” of society properly begins, political, social and economic reform in Serbia will move slowly. Serbia needs to move from war to peace; from a communist ethos to democratic practice; and from the malign and lethal nationalism of the Milosevic era to a new period of liberal values, habits and behavior. All this will take time.

Serbia is not the only country in the throes of a difficult transition. Kosovo and Montenegro, both legally still part of the Yugoslav Republic, continue to seek independence. There are those who argue that it’s time to end the dissolution and begin the process of Western integration. I firmly believe that the prospect of Western integration is essential to the future stability and security of this part of Europe. At the same time, though, I question whether meaningful steps toward Western integration can begin if the process of dissolution in the region is not yet complete. Mr. Chairman, the status of Montenegro and Kosovo are inconvenient and complex topics that defy simple solution. I’d argue, nevertheless, that these problems are unlikely to go away and, if mishandled, especially in the case of Kosovo, could lead to an expansion of violence and a return to instability in the region.

What role should the United States play? Whatever options Western policy pursues, I would urge us to consider our own evolving role in the Balkans in the context of American grand strategy toward Europe. Specifically, if the United States decides to reduce the scale of its military commitments, I believe it is essential that we do so in such a way that such steps do not re-ignite a crisis in the area. We intervened twice in a decade in the Balkans, deploying tens of thousands of troops and investing billions of dollars. I view the continuation of some U.S. presence in the Balkans as a modest overhead cost to protect our investment and contribute to the region’s overall stability.

I also believe, Mr. Chairman, if the President decides to reduce U.S. military commitments in the Balkans, that we do so in such a way that we do not diminish our standing within the Alliance. In this context, I welcomed the statements made by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who has said that the U.S. has no intention to cut and run from the Balkans. Similarly, I was pleased to hear Defense Secretary Rumsfeld earlier this month at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich, where he said that the U.S. “will not act unilaterally, or fail to consult our allies.”

b. The Completion of Europe: NATO Enlargement

Mr. Chairman, I’ve just said that I believe that U.S. engagement in the Balkans should be viewed in the larger context of America’s grand strategy toward Europe. A central part of that grand strategy, in my view, should be the completion of Europe. I believe it’s in our national interest to promote the process of broad Euro-Atlantic integration that we began after the Soviet Union’s collapse a decade ago. The United States will be best suited to face the challenges of the next decades if “Europe” includes not only our West European allies, but also the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe; and that in time this new Europe is able to join the United States in sharing responsibilities for the new risks that we all face. Admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO was a step in the right direction.

Of course, Euro-Atlantic integration should be driven by twin engines: the enlargement of NATO and the European Union (EU). Unfortunately, the EU has not yet opened its doors to anyone from the former Soviet bloc. It’s clear that the EU’s strategic priority remains “deepening,” not “widening.” This agenda began a decade ago with preoccupation over adopting a single currency for the West European group. It continues today with considerable energies being devoted to the development of a West European Rapid Reaction Force. I do hope that the EU moves forward with enlargement. The EU is an important economic and political institution. Inclusion in the EU will help the Central and East Europeans consolidate their democratic progress and accelerate economic development throughout the region. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the United States will continue to encourage, albeit gently, our West European friends to open up the EU.1

1 It’s regrettable to see how, for instance, American support for Turkey has often back-fired. Elmar Brock, a German Christian Democratic member of the European parliament, recently said that the EU should admit Turkey the same day the United States takes in Mexico as the 51st state. Klaus Haensch, a former President of the European Parliament, argued recently that
As for NATO, the Alliance convenes its next summit in 2002. In Washington, we’ve entered into a period of quiet, informal predebate on what shape the next round of enlargement should take. I would urge us, Mr. Chairman, to begin consultations with our Allies as soon as possible. We want to avoid the frictions and bruised feelings we encountered last time, when our West European Allies felt that the United States did not properly consider their own preferred candidates for enlargement. Membership to NATO must be contingent, of course, on the preparedness and qualifications of each individual candidate. There must be a compelling case, moreover, that the inclusion of each and every candidate adds value and makes the Alliance stronger.

I’d also urge us to consider NATO enlargement, though, in the broader context of what we want to achieve. That should be, in my judgment, an expanded and revitalized Alliance, which should serve as the basis for a new strategic partnership. We’re all talking about, I concede, is not easy. It is not inexpensive; nor is it without risk. But NATO enlargement is not a gamble, Mr. Chairman. It’s a sound investment. I am fully convinced that the investment will pay for itself many times over. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that the continuing process of NATO enlargement also happens to be one major and constructive project about which we and our current allies generally agree, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has pointed out. With all the arguments and frictions we currently have, it’s right to remember the important things we still share in common.

2. THE AGENDA AHEAD

a. Ballistic Missile Defense

President Bush has argued that we need to come to terms with the new strategic environment in which the United States and its Allies find themselves today. A central concern of the new administration is that the United States become equipped to defend its people and forces against a limited, but deadly ballistic missile attack, whether the attack is deliberate or caused by an accidental launch.

The ballistic missile threat continues to be a primary threat facing the United States. There are currently 13,000 ballistic missiles in the inventories of 37 states today. Whether short- or long-term, ballistic missiles are a cost-effective system capable of delivering their payload to a target with a high probability of success. What’s more, if the United States has no means to defend itself, our adversaries will also be able to use ballistic missiles as a means of blackmail and coercion. This would pose a danger to the United States—and our closest allies. Imagine if Slobodan Milosevic had possessed ballistic missiles capable of reaching Athens or Rome. Would the fragile coalition that fought the war in Kosovo have managed to hold together for those 78 days?

The United States is committed to developing and deploying missile defense systems that will protect the American people and our forces. The U.S. has also expressed its willingness to assist friends and allies to deploy such defenses. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, our allies have expressed their concern about American plans. A central concern has to do with their worries about the reactions of Russia. Sometimes I wonder which Russia they are worrying about. The Russians proposed last week a joint European defense system. Not for the first time, of course. President Putin was already pitching a version of the idea last summer. But it’s also true that when the Russians are not proposing to work together on missile defense, Moscow is spending inordinate amounts of time ridiculing the rationale for such a system. Defense ministry spokesmen have said that the “true missile threat” is actually “nil”; that U.S. threat scenarios represent a “fantasy” of American defense planners. According to President Putin not so long ago, the missile threat, “which Americans mention... does not exist today and will not [exist] in the foreseeable future.”

I believe that we should engage the Russians about our plans for missile defense—just as we need to consult our allies. At the same time, though, we should be clear. The Russians understand missile defense. They know that our plans are not directed against them. What the Russians fear, of course, is that the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems will extend and consolidate America’s military and technological advantage. Mr. Chairman, some Europeans fret about missile defense for the very same reasons. Karl Lamers, foreign policy spokesman for the German Christian Democratic Union, recently objected to American missile

American support of Turkey for EU membership was an attempt by Washington to weaken the European Union. From the conference “Balancing Transatlantic Relations: Europe and the United States in Global Politics.” Berlin, January 27/27, 2001. Sponsored by the Aspen Institute and the Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF), Bonn.
defense on the grounds that it would enhance our current leadership status in the world to a position in which we would become outright "rulers of the universe." Naturally, the United States cannot choose to abdicate its responsibility to defend itself because others are worried that we may become stronger in the process. I am encouraged by the fact that our European partners—from NATO Secretary General George Robertson to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer—have refused to be swayed by mischievous Russian behavior over missile defense (or misguided sentiment in their own countries). I also appreciate the fact that, through careful study and consultations, the gap on threat assessment seems to be closing between America and Europe.

What the United States still needs to undertake, however, is a major public diplomacy campaign that opens up with our friends and allies a fuller discussion of ballistic missile defense. We need ballistic missile defense—in the context of a strong and healthy alliance. This discussion should include (1) a robust conversation about our threat assessment; (2) an explanation of why we believe that ballistic missile defense carries far more benefits than potentially harmful side-effects; and finally (3) an explanation of how prudent steps toward ballistic missile defense will be compatible with sensible arms control and non-proliferation policies.

I was disappointed, Mr. Chairman, that Prime Minister Blair did not use the opportunity of his recent visit to Washington to show his own leadership on the issue. William Hague, leader of the opposition in the United Kingdom, had argued last month that "America's oldest and staunchest ally" should "co-operate with the United States to the best of our ability as it develops and build its weapons shield." Mr. Hague also argued for cooperation on an Allied missile defense system. I hope Mr. Blair will reconsider his deep ambivalence about ballistic missile defense and join the United States in leading a constructive conversation with our other allies on the issue. If conducted properly and in the right spirit, this effort should lead to a serious and deep strategic dialogue that looks forward on a range of issues—and breaks down the categories of old Cold War thinking about arms control and deterrence that continue to dominate far too much of our transatlantic discourse today.

b. The European Union's Rapid Reaction Force

Mr. Chairman, let me add that I was also disappointed by Prime Minister Blair’s recent reluctance to support ballistic missile defense, because President Bush had gone out of his way to offer such strong and clear support for a project that is so near and dear to the British Prime Minister’s heart. That is, Europe’s own Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the European Rapid Reaction Force.

I’d simply like to say here, Mr. Chairman, that I believe that we should now spend far less time debating the merits and modalities of the European Rapid Reaction Force. It is not unimportant. But there are other important items on the transatlantic agenda—issues like expanding NATO; pursuing, in cooperation with our allies, ballistic missile defense; and, if I might add, containing—and I hope with the new administration now in place—removing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power.

The arguments by American skeptics about the West European defense project have been made. Build capabilities, not just institutions, we have said. Pursue European defense in a way that strengthens NATO and does not undermine the Alliance. But today the debate has become overly acrimonious and counterproductive. It’s counterproductive in part, Mr. Chairman, because the European Rapid Reaction Force is still today a largely theoretical matter. As the Economist wrote recently, “the EU-led force to be assembled by 2003 is ... likely to be severely hobbled in its formative years by political and military growing pains, and by European governments’ reluctance to put up money.” While the British government recently published a budget that foresees the first real increase in defense spending since the end of the Cold War, both Britain and France face serious defense budgetary pressures. Germany, moreover, Europe’s largest economy, will reduce military spending by $10 billion over the next four years.

Mr. Chairman, please do not misunderstand me. I continue to share your reservations about the European defense project. You and Senator Helms wrote recently in a letter to the Daily Telegraph in London that you worried about the “true motivation behind ESDP, which many see as a means for Europe to check American power and influence within NATO.” I share this concern.

When French President Jacques Chirac says, for example, that European Defense will develop “in complete harmony with NATO,” what kind of NATO is he thinking about? Some of us believe that an effective NATO thrives on American leadership;

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that without American leadership, NATO will lose its effectiveness for action and become an institution where inaction, passivity and lowest-common-denominator politics are the order of the day.

Others contend, however, that leadership is domination; and that American dominance is a problem. That is why, I believe, Annex VII of the Nice Treaty speaks of the EU’s “strategic partnership” with NATO, a partnership in which “each organization will be dealing with the other on an equal footing.” The document demands, moreover, that NATO show “total respect of the autonomy of EU decision making.” It’s why Gen. Jean-Pierre Keiche, the French chief of staff, has testified to the Assemble Nationale that Annex I to the Nice Treaty was specifically worded to rule out “any interpretation that would give NATO a decision-making priority in the reaction to crises.”

In a word, Mr. Chairman, with the increase of Euro-nationalist and Euro-Gaullist tendencies across the continent, I believe that there are still serious questions about the direction of European integration in general. As Henry Kissinger wrote recently, “many advocates of European integration are urging unity as an exercise in differentiation from, if not opposition to, the United States.” Within this context, there are questions about ESDP. It’s not yet clear whether European defense policy will add ships, guns, or aircraft; or whether it will decouple important assets from the Alliance and contract them to Brussels. Nor is it clear whether European defense is to speak, as my colleague Richard Perle puts it, with a British or a French voice. I’m told, Mr. Chairman, that Prime Minister Blair had not read the text of the annexes to the Nice Treaty; that when he was confronted later with controversial passages he quipped that such language didn’t really mean anything; that nobody was really suggesting that the Europeans create structures separate and independent from NATO. It reminds me, Mr. Chairman, of a line from British editor Charles Moore about European integration. Each and every time a strange and seemingly imprudent proposition is put forward by EU elites, an official steps forward to answer critics by saying, “Of course, nobody is suggesting that . . .” And lo and behold, observes Charles Moore, six months or a year later “nobody,” it turns out, is getting his way.

No, Mr. Chairman, let’s not lose our critical voice. I’d only like to suggest that we establish priorities. That is, so long as European defense remains largely theoretical—and at least some Atlanticist members of NATO truly believe that ESDP is a step toward burden-sharing—I believe that we should concentrate our energies on the most immediate challenges at hand and not find ourselves lost in unproductive acrimony where it can be avoided.

Mr. Chairman, again thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I’d be happy to answer any questions you have.

Senator SMITH. Before we go to Ron, I do want to ask, I think you were implying what I am about to say, you were disappointed with the exchange between Prime Minister Blair and President Bush because it seemed like to get along they were going along. And in just going along without some understanding of the details and the implications of the details, we are going away. Is that about what you were saying?

Dr. GEDMIN. That’s exactly what I was saying.

Senator SMITH. Dr. Asmus.

STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS, SENIOR FELLOW, EUROPE STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. ASMUS. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today. I realize you have invited me to talk about the problems we face in the Alliance, a conversation we have already begun. But before we continue that conversation, I would like to take this opportunity to

3 John Bolton, nominated by the President to become Undersecretary for Arms Control in the new administration, was described by the French press agency (AFP, February 24) as “America’s most outspoken opponent of plans for a European army free of US influence and NATO control.” (my emphasis).

congratulate the committee, Senator Helms, yourself, and Senator Biden on the leadership you provided during the last decade, which was one of the most crucial periods in Alliance history. I want to make sure that we do not get so caught up in the challenges we face today that we forget about what we have accomplished.

The 1990s were a truly historic period. We initiated some of the most far-reaching changes in NATO since the days of Truman and Acheson. We enlarged our membership and our missions and we went to war and prevailed in the Balkans. That was a breathtaking transformation of the Alliance. It did not happen by accident and it was not inevitable. It took leadership and it took people leading, including yourselves and the committee. As someone who had the privilege of serving under the last administration and working with the committee, I wanted to thank you and your staff. It was not easy. Sometimes we disagreed, but I think the policies that resulted were better as a result.

Where are we today? We are in a period, and I think this is what you have been saying, Senator, of transition and redefinition of the U.S./European relationship that is similar to the late 1940’s and 1950’s. And we are halfway through the transformation of Europe from the old divided Europe to a new Europe that is twice as big in terms of size and the number of countries. We are also halfway through the transition of NATO from an old U.S.-West European alliance focused against the Soviet threat to a new alliance between the United States and Europe as a whole trying to deal with new threats.

Having embarked on this expedition, we are like the guys who started out climbing a mountain and are halfway to the peak. We are slightly winded, and are taking a break. Some of us want to push on to the top and others want to take a longer break; and still others are looking not quite sure they are happy they went on this expedition in the first place and wondering whether it was perhaps better to have stayed at home.

I belong to those who believe that the vision is the right one, that we need to remain ambitious and push ahead and get the job done. I believe we have a window of opportunity both to shape the peace in Europe and to define the terms of a new strategic relationship with Europe for the next century. That is the political challenge we face and it is not going to happen unless we take the lead.

As I look ahead, I think this administration faces four challenges in NATO. The first is the completion of Europe and NATO enlargement. The second is rebalancing the transatlantic relationship by strengthening the European component without tearing the broader relationship apart which is ESDI and ESDP. The third is the reorienting and retooling of the Alliance in order to ensure that we actually have capabilities to do what we say we should be doing. And the fourth is Russia.

I would like to touch on the first two of these: enlargement and ESDP. We have said that our goal is to create a Europe whole and free and that NATO should remain the defense arm of this new Europe. We have also said that EU and NATO have parallel and reinforcing roles in integrating the eastern half of the continent. If NATO is the vehicle for collective defense and the EU is the vehicle for the political and economic integration of these countries.
The implication of those statements is that both institutions at the end of the day should enlarge to embrace the eastern half of the continent. The question is, how do we manage this process to effectively project stability to those parts of Europe that are not yet secure and simultaneously ensure that this larger Alliance remains politically cohesive and militarily effective? As you know, we have constructed a process within NATO. In the run up to the NATO summit in Prague, 2002, we will be reviewing the next steps in the process.

Two factors will be important. The first will be the performance of the candidate countries. By the next summit we will have completed two cycles of the MAP [membership action plan] process which should provide a set of data to judge how those countries are performing in key areas. We should await those results before getting into the debate on the packaging of the next round. The second question is: what are we trying to accomplish strategically with the next round? There are three issues on the table and three options. One would be for NATO to focus on the two remaining Central European countries not included, Slovenia and Slovakia. Both countries are doing well. Their inclusion is not likely to be controversial. Such an approach would allow NATO to check the box. But in my view it would not address any of the key strategic issues in Europe, nor would it ensure that NATO is locking in freedom and peace in the areas where they are most at risk. It would be low risk, but also low payoff.

The more challenging and interesting questions are, what are we going to do about the Balkans and the Baltics? It is in these two areas that NATO has the potential to positively shape the new map of Europe.

Regarding the Balkans, I think we, the United States, must realize that Europe will never be whole, free and secure so long as southeastern Europe is unstable and insecure. That is why it is essential—for all the reasons that General Clark and Jeff have laid out—that we remain engaged in Bosnia and Kosovo. Expanding NATO to countries like Bulgaria and Romania who stood with us during the Kosovo crisis would be the logical extension of a strategy to stabilize the region and integrate it.

The question will be performance and whether these countries have performed well enough to deserve an invitation when we get to the point of making such decisions in some 18-months time. But in many ways, as you know, Senator, the most controversial issue is the Baltic states. Here the issue is not really performance. The Baltic states are generally recognized as being among the great success stories of the post-Communist transformation. The issue is the strategic; namely, is it in our interest to bring one or more of these countries in despite well-known Russian objections? I believe the answer to the question is yes—for moral, political and strategic reasons.

Morally, these countries should not be discriminated against today because they were illegally annexed by the then Soviet Union a half-century ago. They should not be punished now because they were punished then. The line drawn by Hitler and Stalin, two totalitarian dictators, and never recognized by the United States during the cold war, can hardly guide our policy today. Politically,
Northeastern Europe has been a success story, but part of the reason it’s been a success story is that the prospect of NATO and EU enlargement has served as a magnet to help these countries make the right decision to do the right thing.

If we now remove that perspective, we run the risk of undoing the stability we have recreated. Moreover, there is also a question of political principle. This is something I know that you on the committee care deeply about. We have said that states should be able to choose their own alliances, that security in Europe should be indivisible and that NATO is about creating a Europe whole and free. We have said that Russia will not have a veto. As Americans we pride ourselves as a country that stands by its friends. The Baltic issue is a litmus test of all those principles and whether we really mean what we have said.

Finally, I also believe there is a case to be made that it is strategically in the U.S. interest to bring these countries into NATO in order to lock in the security and stability of this region. Of course we must always ask ourselves the following question: Would we go to the defense of those countries if they were threatened? I believe in the case of the Baltic states the answer to that question already today is yes. I can’t imagine that the President of the United States would not respond if there was a crisis.

When I was a student studying strategy I was always taught that the best security guarantee is the unambiguous and credible one. And NATO and the United States is the only—-we are the only institution that can provide it. For all these reasons I believe it is critical that the next round of enlargement have a Baltic dimension.

Now, let me turn briefly to ESDI and ESDP. When I was in the State Department, I was the negotiator on many of these issues. I was and still am often asked whether all the Sturm and Drang swirling around these issues is justified or misplaced, and whether this is a technical “insiders issue” for policy wonks, or whether it is the kind of grand strategy and high stakes we are talking about here. I think it is both.

As you have asked, Senator, one of the questions we Americans often pose is: what has motivated Europe to take this step? And I think the truth is that the motivations are mixed. It is, in part, simply the next step in the European integration project that is now encompassing the foreign policy domain and articulating the logical goal of having European military capabilities to back up a common foreign policy. For some countries, it is primarily about using Euro-pride to get European countries to spend more on defense. For others it is, as General Clark said, a reaction to their sense of humiliation by our dominance and their impotence in Bosnia and Kosovo. I hope we can perhaps come back to this in the question-and-answer period.

For still other Europeans, however, it is about organizing Europe more effectively to counter what they think is overwhelming U.S. influence and better standing up to policies on our part that they disagree with. We should have no illusions about this mix in motivations. The question is, how can we pursue a policy to maximize the chances that it comes out right?
The set of issues we were wrestling with in the Clinton administra-
tion was a relatively narrow one of how we would work out an
arrangement so that the EU might act in a crisis when NATO has
opted not to act; what the modalities would be for the EU to be
able to draw on NATO assets in such a scenario and how we would
consult, including with those non-EU NATO countries, such as Tur-
key or Norway. I actually believe that the deal that is on the
table—although I understand that sometimes the language is unin-
telligible unless you have been through the ups and downs of all
these negotiations—is not bad and that our equities are protected.

While there are still some outstanding issues I would prefer to
have greater clarity on, this is not a deal we should walk away
from. It is a deal we should close, but close on the right note and
with the right details. But the broader, and in my view, more im-
portant issue is this: is ESDP the first step in renegotiating the
terms of the U.S./European strategic dialog and partnership for the
next century? And are we setting the right pattern here. What is
going to be the primary framework we will use when we interact
and cooperate with Europe on strategic issues? Is it going to be the
traditional NATO framework? Or is it going to be the U.S./EU
framework with all the competition and rivalry we currently have
on trade issues? Or is it going to be some new hybrid that we are
now creating? The NATO and EU worlds are, for the first time,
clashing and coming together; and we are renegotiating how we are
going to work together on strategic issues And we are all waiting
to see whether and how the two institutional cultures and ap-
proaches can be reconciled.

Are we going to take the NATO model of transatlantic coopera-
tion and expand it to include these new strategic issues? Or are we
going to go more in the direction of the “United States versus Eu-
rope” model of how we have traditionally interacted with the EU?
Frankly, we do not yet have the answer to that question. I think
this is the political issue that General Clark referred to. It is one
that we should focus on in the years ahead.

In my view, the best way to manage this is to follow some pretty
straightforward principles. First, we have historically supported
European integration because we believe it creates a more peaceful
Europe and that a stronger and more self-reliant Europe will be a
more capable and effective partner of the United States. I think
that premise remains correct.

If we are honest, we want and need a stronger Europe. The basic
problem we face today is that Europe is too weak, not too strong.
And the best way for Europe to become stronger is via European
integration. So, we should make it clear that we support a strong,
integrated Europe, particularly because all too often our reservations
on ESDP are misinterpreted as a secret American desire to
keep Europe down.

But second and equally clear, we have been interested in insur-
ing that European integration is and remains pro-Atlanticist. We
want European integration to bring us closer together, not drive us
farther apart. I believe the vast majority of Europeans want that
as well. But this is also why getting the details right is so impor-
tant. There is no contradiction between being supportive in prin-
ciple of a strong Europe and a strong ESDP, but vigorously work-
ing the details so that they come out right, which is what I think the right policy is. The clearer we are on our support in principle, the greater our credibility is, when it comes to negotiating these important details.

Third, at the end of the day, the most important thing is not only to have the bureaucratic mechanisms right or the right words on paper. It is to ensure that we actually agree on the big picture, on the problems and on the solutions. If we agree on that, we can make all this stuff work. But if we don’t agree on the problem or the solution, then the best words on paper and the right mechanisms will not help us. I think the key question is whether we can again make the kind of political commitment to hammer out common policies and strategies on the three, four, or five top strategic issues the U.S. and Europe face today—like we did toward the Soviet Union during the cold war?

The reality is that, we did not always agree on how to deal with Russia in 1949 when we created NATO. But we made a political commitment to hammer out a common strategy. And people like me spent their careers arguing and fighting with our allies until we finally hammered out a common strategy that we implemented. What bothers me today is that so much of our energy is spent focused on what we are going to do when we do not agree as opposed to using our political capital and time and energy in coming up with a better way to ensuring that we do agree. I’d like to come back to General Clark’s statement: it is very important that we say we are going to be there with our allies. If we are going to be there, a lot of these details are not important because those scenarios will never come to pass.

Mr. Chairman, I have not talked about NMD. A lot of other people have. It is obviously a key issue and how it is handled will have a key impact on NATO. But I hope my statement here has underscored that NMD is not the only issue and that there are other key issues on the U.S./European and NATO agenda. hope very much that NMD, as important as it is, will not crowd out or undercut this broader agenda we have been talking about here today.

We are in the midst of perhaps the most important far-reaching transition in NATO’s history. And while we have laid the foundation for this transition, we are at a turning point. We have to get it right, which means we have to be investing in this Alliance and not taking it for granted or allowing it to drift. I think if we look 4, 8 years out at the end of the decade, it is an open question as to whether we will look back and say we completed the transition we started 7 years ago and we completed the unification of Europe, and have a solid NATO with new missions and capabilities. Or whether future historians will look back and say that this was the beginning of a transatlantic divergence that only got bigger over time. The challenge this administration faces is to make sure that it comes out the first way and not the second.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Asmus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before the Committee today to discuss the state of the North Atlantic Alliance. I realize you have invited me here today to discuss the current problems and challenges facing the Alliance. Before we turn to those, however, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Com-
mittee—in particular Sen. Helms, Sen. Smith and Sen. Biden—on the leadership you provided over the last decade during one of the most crucial periods in NATO’s history. Sometimes we get so caught up in the debates and problems of the moment that we lose perspective on what has been accomplished.

The 1990s were a historic decade for the Alliance. Under U.S. leadership, we initiated some of the most far-reaching changes in NATO since the days of Truman and Acheson. NATO has been transformed from a U.S.-West European alliance directed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War to an alliance with a Europe that is becoming whole and free stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In addition, we decided that NATO should be able to meet new threats to common allied interests from beyond the Alliance’s immediate borders. NATO forces went to war for the first time in the Alliance’s history in the Balkans to stop genocide and to create the conditions and framework for peace and the integration of Southeastern Europe into the European and trans-Atlantic mainstream.

That was a breathtaking transformation. It didn’t happen by accident, nor was it inevitable. It happened because people had a vision and exerted leadership—in the Administration as well as in the Congress, and most specifically in this Committee. As someone who had the privilege of serving under the last Administration and working with the Committee, I would like to thank and congratulate you. None of this was easy. And we did have the occasional argument. But we would not have been successful without the leadership and support provided by this Committee.

Looking back upon this period, historians will ask: why did the U.S., after the end of the Cold War, not only not withdraw from Europe but instead expand NATO’s members and missions? The answer is threefold.

First, having triumphed in the Cold War, we recognized that we had to shape the peace. We had a unique chance to fulfill the vision of Truman, Acheson and Marshall of Europe whole and free in alliance with the United States, to lock in democracy and freedom and to ensure that all of Europe would never again fall back into old geopolitical rivalries, nationalism and conflicts that have dominated its bloody history. We decided the U.S. should remain a European power and help do for the eastern half of the continent what we did for the western half in the early post-war period—namely to extend the security umbrella and institutions that would make integration and reconciliation possible. And we recognized, albeit belatedly, that we could not have a Europe whole and free if war and genocide were raging in Southeastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia. We therefore decided to use diplomacy backed by NATO force to bring that conflict to an end.

Second, we recognized that NATO had to change if it was to successfully tackle these challenges. The logical consequence of a new Europe was a new NATO—one based on the same core values and principles of the founding fathers of the Alliance but adapted to meet the new challenges and post-Cold War threats we face. As Senator Lugar put it at the time, the Alliance had to go “out of area or out of business” because that is where the new problems were. So we decided it made sense to expand NATO’s members and missions as part of a strategy of creating a new and broadened trans-Atlantic community able to defend itself against new threats.

Third and finally, we realized that Europe remains as important to the U.S. as it did during the Cold War, albeit for a different set of reasons. Our two continents are more integrated than at any time in history. There is no part of the world with which we have more in common politically; with which we invest and trade more; and with which we have a closer military relationship. The U.S. may be the world’s only global superpower but we, too, need allies. And the reality is that Europe is our geopolitical base, the part of the world with which we have the most in common. In an increasingly globalized world, alliances and the ability to put together coalitions of like-minded countries with common interest is essential. We are in Europe today not only as a protector but as a partner. The longer-term challenge is whether, as Europe is increasingly unified and secure, we can take the principles, culture and habits of Atlanticism and create the kind of close U.S.-European cooperation we need to address a new set of broader strategic challenges beyond the immediate confines of Europe.

Now, where are we today? We are in a period of transition and redefinition of the U.S.-European strategic relationship not unlike the period in the late 1940s and 1950s. We are half way through Europe’s own transformation from the divided continent of the Cold War to a new unified Europe twice as big in terms of numbers and space. We are also half way through NATO’s transition to an Alliance that reflects this new Europe and has reoriented itself to deal with the new threats we are most likely to face. Having embarked on this expedition, we are like the guys who started out climbing a mountain, are now half way to the peak and slightly winded. Some want to push ahead to get to the top; others want to stop and take
a break and perhaps consider a course correction; and there may even be a few who are not sure whether it would not have been better to stay home.

I belong to those who believe we know our goal and that we need to remain ambitious, push ahead and get the job done. The vision we have is the right one and our job is not yet complete. We need to act judiciously but keep our eye on the ball.

We have a window of opportunity to shape the peace in Europe and to define a new strategic relationship with Europe for the 21st century at a time of peace and prosperity. But there is also the political challenge. Having served in government, I know that none of this happens by itself or by osmosis. It happens, if at all, because leaders and countries take the initiative to create relationships and capabilities that they can then draw on when challenges arise.

Looking ahead, this Administration faces four critical challenges in our relations with Europe, and in NATO. They are:

*The completion of Europe.* Our goal is to create a Europe whole and free, based on the principles of equal and indivisible security. This is the best way to ensure that war and conflict become as inconceivable in the eastern half of the continent as they have become in the western half. NATO enlargement has been an integral part of our strategy to overcome Europe’s Cold War divide and achieve this goal.

The Bush Administration should, in my view, continue the policy established by its predecessor and overwhelmingly supported by this Committee in order to take the next step in achieving that vision.

The great achievement of the last decade happened in Central Europe. It is now not only free but safe. When I was in school we were taught that Central Europe was where the great wars came from. When I studied in Europe as a young man, a trip to Warsaw, Prague or Budapest was still an exotic and slightly dangerous journey behind the Iron Curtain. My son will travel to Europe and visit these cities as easily as my generation visited Paris, Munich or Florence. He will never think twice that countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary used to be separated from us by barbed wire and great armies. I call that progress. The question now is whether we will continue that progress when it comes to the rest of Central Europe, the Balkans and the Baltics.

*Reorienting and retooling the Alliance.* During the last decade the U.S. and its European allies made a great deal of progress in terms of reorienting the Alliance politically and conceptually to deal with potential new threats to the territory and interests of NATO members. We signed up to a new strategic concept and a long list of initiatives ranging from the Defense Capabilities Initiative to the WMD Initiative designed to build the corresponding capabilities to handle a new spectrum of threats. NATO has to be able to do what it says. And let us be clear: we are talking about the capabilities to be able to respond to new Article V as well as non-Article V threats. As a member of the team that negotiated NATO’s strategic concept, I always kept in front of me a copy of the Senate resolution of ratification from the NATO enlargement debate drafted by this Committee. It was the benchmark we set for ourselves and achieved in terms of the kinds of capabilities we want the Alliance and our European allies to develop over time.

*Rebalancing the Trans-Atlantic Relationship.* The U.S. needs a strong and coherent Europe as a partner in Europe and beyond. Our basic problem is that Europe today is too weak and insular, and the asymmetry in the U.S.-European relationship is not healthy for either side. While the U.S. is and will remain a European power, we need a stronger European pillar in the Alliance that is willing and able to assume more responsibility and burden for its security and for defending the common interests of the Euro-Atlantic community. The U.S. should pursue a strategy to encourage Europe to grow into a broader foreign policy and security role in order to rebalance the trans-Atlantic relationship and to foster a great sense of European responsibility. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), if developed and implemented properly, can be a vehicle for building a stronger European partner and rebalancing the trans-Atlantic relationship.

But ESDP also has the potential to undermine the trans-Atlantic relationship if mishandled. The challenge is to make Europe stronger without making the Alliance weaker. And the danger is that the EU, in an effort to strengthen European integration and cohesion, will end up importing the seeds of rivalry and competition that could undercut the trans-Atlantic relationship and to foster a great sense of European responsibility. The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), if developed and implemented properly, can be a vehicle for building a stronger European partner and rebalancing the trans-Atlantic relationship.

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But ESDP also has the potential to undermine the trans-Atlantic relationship if mishandled. The challenge is to make Europe stronger without making the Alliance weaker. And the danger is that the EU, in an effort to strengthen European integration and cohesion, will end up importing the seeds of rivalry and competition that could undercut the trans-Atlantic relationship over time. We need to be clear: ESDP is not only or just some technical bureaucratic question of how we decide whether NATO or the EU should take the lead in some modest future peacekeeping operation. It is a microcosm of a much bigger strategic issue, namely whether we, on both sides of the Atlantic, can reconcile the European integration project as represented by the EU with a new post-Cold War Atlantic project and create a new model of trans-Atlantic cooperation to more effectively address future crises.

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But the reality is that all too often the commitment to create these new capabilities exists on paper but is not implemented. The problem is not a lack of good ideas but the lack of political will and resources to ensure that these programs are implemented and that NATO can do what it has committed itself to. It takes time to reorient military establishments and create new capabilities. And we are fortunate that we do not face immediate threats that require us to engage these new capabilities immediately. But threats can arise faster than we can create capabilities. And the allies must spend and invest more in defense if we are to meet these challenges. Otherwise there is a real danger that the Alliance will become increasingly hollow and be unable to fulfill its commitments. We also need a trans-Atlantic defense industrial strategy that allows us to create capability together rather than driving us apart.

The fourth challenge is Russia. Over a decade ago NATO and Russia each declared that they no longer considered each other adversaries. Since then NATO and Russian forces have served together in the Balkans, we have signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act and created the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) to establish a consultative and cooperative relationship between NATO and Moscow. Looking back, I think it is fair to say that the NATO-Russia relationship turned out better than the critics predicted but not as well as some of the proponents had hoped. The critics said we could not enlarge NATO and pursue NATO-Russia cooperation at the same time. Yet we did. Other critics said that the Founding Act and the PJC would give Russia a de facto veto over NATO decisionmaking. It did not, as was made amply clear by NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo which the Alliance pursued despite vehement Russian opposition.

At the same time, proponents of NATO-Russian cooperation—a category in which I include myself—had hoped to build a web of practical cooperation that would over time demonstrate to Russians, especially the Russian military, that NATO was not the enemy and that they could themselves derive benefits from cooperation with the Alliance. Unfortunately, that has not happened either. And Moscow’s decision to essentially freeze NATO-Russian cooperation after the war in Kosovo, as well as the rise in anti-Western and anti-American attitudes more generally in Russia, suggest that it may take time before Russia is prepared to seriously engage with NATO again. For its part, NATO’s offer of expanded cooperation still stands.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to discuss any of these areas today. In my written comments I have been asked to focus on the first two challenges: NATO enlargement and ESDP. Let me start with NATO enlargement. The United States has said that our goal is to create a Europe whole and free and that NATO should remain the defense arm of this new Europe. We have also said that we believe that the EU and NATO have parallel and reinforcing roles in terms of integrating the eastern half of the continent with the West. NATO is the vehicle for the extension of a security guarantee and the EU the primary vehicle for the political and economic integration of these countries. Finally, we have said that at the end of the day the membershps in these two institutions should converge while recognizing that the respective time lines may be different and that there will be countries that, for their own historical reasons, may decide not to join one institution or the other.

The logical implication of this is that both NATO and the EU should at the end of the day enlarge to the eastern half of the continent from the Baltic to the Black Sea as these countries embrace our values, meet our standards and as we conclude that their inclusion into Western institutions serves our own strategic interests. In parallel, both the EU and NATO will be seeking to build cooperative and close relations with countries like Ukraine and Russia who are key actors in European security but are each, for the foreseeable future, in their own distinct categories for a variety of reasons.

The question therefore is how we manage the transition to this enlarged NATO, project stability to those parts Central and Eastern Europe that are not yet secure and simultaneously ensure that this larger Alliance remains politically cohesive and militarily effective. We have constructed a process within the Alliance to manage this process and to treat each country individually. We established two benchmarks to guide future decisions on enlargement: do countries meet our values and standards and is their inclusion in the Alliance’s strategic interests? The Alliance is committed to review the process of enlargement at its next summit in Prague expected at the end of 2002. While the U.S. will not have to make any decisions until early next year, the debate on enlargement is likely to start this spring and summer and that the President will in all likelihood have to set the direction of future U.S. policy sometime next autumn.

One key factor that should shape future U.S. policy will be the performance of the current candidate countries. At the last NATO summit in Washington, we created the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to provide more targeted assistance and
reviews for these countries. By early 2002 we will have completed two full cycles of the MAP process which should provide an excellent foundation for which to judge the performance of these countries.

The other key question is what we hope to accomplish strategically with a second round of enlargement. Several options are on the table. One would be for the Alliance to focus on the two remaining Central European countries not included at the Madrid summit:

Slovenia and Slovakia. Both countries are doing well in terms of meeting NATO standards, and their inclusion is not likely to be controversial. While such an approach would allow NATO to “check the box” on enlargement, however, it would not address any of the key strategic issues in Europe or ensure that NATO is playing a major role in shaping the emerging European security landscape and architecture. It would be low risk but also low payoff.

The harder strategic questions revolve around what to do about the Balkans and the Baltics. It is in these two areas that NATO has the potential to positively shape the new security map of Europe and to make a real step forward toward our goals. Regarding the Balkans, we must realize that Europe will never be whole, free and secure so long as Southeastern Europe is unstable and insecure. That’s why it is essential that the U.S. and NATO remain engaged in Bosnia and Kosovo. The best exit strategy is an integration strategy. Expanding NATO to countries like Bulgaria and Romania, who stood with the Alliance during the Kosovo crisis, would be a logical extension of a broader strategy to stabilize southeastern Europe and to help integrate it into the European and trans-Atlantic mainstream. The question is one of performance and whether we feel these countries have made sufficient progress in terms of meeting our standards. NATO is, after all, not a charity or a club. It is a military Alliance and involves the most serious commitment a country can enter into. This is a judgment the U.S. will have to make as we get closer to the Prague summit in 2002.

In some ways the most controversial issue is the Baltic states. Here, the issue is not first and foremost performance. The Baltic states are generally recognized as being among the greatest success stories of the post-communist world in terms of political and economic reform. Anyone who has been to these countries will know that they share our democratic values and are also among the most pro-American in Europe. Having lost their freedom and independence in the past, they are now strongly committed to defending it. It is true that the Baltic states are small and still weak in the defense realm as they have had to build militaries from scratch. But their defense reform plans are solid, having been drawn up with the advice of the U.S. military, and they are on track in terms of building a modest but real military capability commensurate with their size. It will take time but they are showing a growing commitment to reach these goals.

Each of the Baltic states must meet the same standards as other candidates—and they should be treated as individual countries, not as a bloc. But the real issue is the strategic one—is it in our interest to bring one or more of these countries into NATO despite well-known Russian objections? I believe the answer to that question is yes for moral, political and strategic reasons. Morally, these countries should not be discriminated against today because they were illegally annexed into the then Soviet Union a half century ago. They should not be punished now because they were punished then. The line drawn by Hitler and Stalin, two totalitarian dictators, and never recognized by the United States during the Cold War, can hardly serve as a guide for U.S. policymakers today. That is why President Clinton signed the Baltic Charter—to send a clear message that we consider the Baltic states to be part of our vision of a Europe whole and free, that they would not be discriminated against for reasons of geography and history, and that our goal was to create the conditions under which these countries would one day walk through NATO’s open door.

Ten years ago many commentators warned that the Baltic sea region could become a source of instability in Europe. Instead, the Baltic sea region has become one of Europe’s great success stories. The fact that things have turned out so well thus far is because the Baltic countries have done the right things in terms of reform, dealing with their minority issues and in trying to build regional cooperation, including with Russia. This positive dynamic has been created in part because the prospect of NATO and EU membership has served as a powerful magnet and incentive. If we were now to go back on these pledges and remove that perspective, it would run the risk of undoing the very stability we have created.

There is also a question of political principle, something I know this Committee cares about. We have said that states should be able to choose their alliances. We have said that security in Europe should be indivisible and that NATO enlargement is about creating a Europe whole and free. We have also said that Russia will not
have a veto over NATO decisions. And we have said that performance will be re-
warded. As Americans, we pride ourselves as a country that stands by its friends.
The Baltic issue is a litmus test of whether we will stand by those principles in
practice.

Finally, it is also in our strategic interest to bring these countries into NATO. 
When it comes to a country joining NATO we must always ask ourselves the fol-
lowing question: would the United States go to the defense of that country if it were 
ever threatened? I believe that in the case of the Baltic states the answer to that 
question already today for the United States would be yes. As the Baltic states join 
the EU it will become inconceivable that other European members states would not 
come to the defense of a fellow EU member as well. If we are to assume such a 
commitment, it should be done right. As a student of strategy I was always taught 
that the best security guarantee is an unambiguous and credible one. NATO is the 
only institution that can provide that kind of guarantee. For all of these reasons, 
it is critical that the next round of enlargement have a Baltic dimension.

I understand that Russia opposes further enlargement in general and to the Bal-
tic states in particular. It does so because it still considers the Baltic states to be 
part of its sphere of influence. That is part of the reason why we have to bring them in. 
While we should take Moscow’s attitude into account, we cannot let anachro-
nistic thinking about spheres of influence in their policy determine our policy. In-
stead, we should make it crystal clear to Russia that enlargement, including to the 
Baltic states, is going to happen, that it is designed to create stability in the region 
and that we will listen to their concerns and address them where and where we
think it is appropriate, but they will not determine our policy. Over the longer-run, I 
believe that Baltic membership in NATO will actually lead to improved Enlitic-Rus-
sian ties. Once they are secure, the Baltics will become more interested in cooper-
ing with Moscow. And when the issue of their place in the new European order 
is settled, Moscow will then accept this new reality and eventually normalize its rel-
lations with these countries—as it has with those countries that joined NATO dur-
ing the last round of enlargement.

Let me turn briefly to ESDI and ESDP. I am often asked whether all the Sturm 
and Drang swirling around these issues is justified or misplaced, and whether this 
is a technical insider’s issue for policy wonks and bureaucrats to resolve or a first 
tier strategic issue requiring high level attention. My answer is that it is both. The 
origins of the current debate go back to the early 1990s when our allies, fully sup-
ported by the U.S., decided to build a European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. That debate was given a 
major impulse in the mid-1990s when French President Jacques Chirac made his 
initial decision in 1995 to seek a rapprochement with NATO. This led to the agree-
ment reached at the June 1996 NATO Ministerial in Berlin—the so-called “Berlin 
arrangements”—which was essentially NATO’s attempt to update the Berlin agree-
ments to accommodate these changes in the EU and to create a new NATO-EU relationship and mechanism.

Americans often ask: what motivated Europe to take this step? As often is the 
case in the real world, the motivations varied. In part this is simply the next step 
in the European integration project that is now encompassing a common foreign and 
security policy and articulating the logical goal of having a European military capa-

itly to back that up. For some countries it is primarily about using what they call 
Euro-pride to get European countries to spend more on defense, thereby strengthen-
NATO. For others, it is a reaction to U.S. policy in Bosnia and Kosovo and un-
certainties over whether Washington will always be available to help in future 
crises. Finally, for some Europeans this project is about organizing Europe more ef-
fectively to counter what they think is overwhelming U.S. influence in Europe or 
to simply be able to better stand up to U.S. policies they think are wrong or mis-
guided.

In large part the debate over the last three years has focused on what has been 
the so-called “Berlin plus” arrangements—i.e., the relatively narrow issue of when 
and how the EU might choose to act militarily in a crisis when NATO has opted not 
to get involved, the modalities for the EU being able to draw on NATO assets in
such scenarios, a new mechanism for NATO-EU consultations and how non-NATO European countries will participate in this process. Starting with the Washington summit in the spring of 1999, we have negotiated a series of understandings in the NATO context with our allies, and the EU has negotiated a set of agreements among EU members, that have resolved many but not yet all of these issues involved. We are in agreement that NATO remains the vehicle for collective defense, that NATO as well as the EU will have an important role to play in future crisis management missions and that the EU should have the capability to act, and to draw on certain NATO assets, when the Alliance cannot. We have not yet resolved the issue of how to ensure that non-EU NATO allies are as fully involved as possible in this process.

But there is a broader and, in my view, more important issue here. This is the first step in negotiating the terms of a new strategic dialogue and relationship between the U.S. and the EU that is likely to grow in importance carry over into other areas in the years ahead. And the issue is whether the framework we will use in dealing with these new challenges will be the traditional NATO framework, the traditional U.S.-EU framework or some new hybrid. In many ways the NATO and EU are as different as their very different cultures and rules of the road, are now clashing for the first time. And we are all waiting to see whether and how the two can be reconciled. The terms of the NATO-EU relationship—the degree of closeness, transparency, and consultation—are likely to create a pattern that will carry over into other areas of U.S.-European foreign and defense cooperation as well. Are we going to be able to export the traditional close cooperation and collaboration of trans-Atlantic framework into these new areas and issues? Or are we going to import the competitive and at times confrontational parts of the U.S.-EU relationship into our security dialogue? Frankly, we do not yet know the answer to this question.

In my view, U.S. policy should be guided by a couple of straightforward principles. First, we have historically supported European integration because of our belief that it will create a more peaceful Europe and that a stronger and more self-reliant Europe will be a more capable and effective partner. That premise is and remains correct. We want and need a stronger Europe. Indeed, the basic problem we face today is that Europe is too weak. We want Europe to assume greater responsibility in Europe and, over time, to become a strategic partner beyond the continent’s immediate confines. The best and perhaps only way for Europe to grow into such a broader role and partnership is via European integration, including stronger role for the EU and a common foreign and defense policy. It is important, therefore, that we state our support for a strong and integrated Europe as clearly as possible. All too often our reservations on ESDP are misinterpreted as a secret American desire to keep Europe weak and impotent.

Second, we need to be equally clear that we have an interest in ensuring that European integration is pro-Atlanticist. Our support is not blind or unconditional. We want European integration to bring us closer together, not drive us further apart. That is why getting the details right is so important. There is no contradiction between strongly supporting ESDI and ESDP in principle, and also being rigorous in ensuring that it is implemented in a fashion that strengthens the trans-Atlantic link. Indeed, the closer we are in our principle support, the greater our credibility when it comes to negotiating the important details. That is what we tried to do in the last Administration when we articulated the so-called three D’s: no decoupling, duplication or discrimination.

Third, the most important thing at the end of the day is to have a common view of the problem and the solution. We can create the right words on paper or the best bureaucratic mechanisms for consultation, but if we lack agreement on the bigger picture and the right policies it will not work. And the best way to ensure that we agree on the same policy approaches is to maintain the closest possible ties cross the Atlantic and to create institutions and processes that bring us together and compel us to find a common approach.

That is what we did in NATO in dealing with the Soviet Union for over fifty years. We did not have a common view of how to deal with Moscow when NATO was formed. But we created a system and backed it up with a political commitment to de facto compel us to argue and work out our differences until we did. Part of the problem in the Alliance today is that we spend too much time focused on and preparing for what we are going to do when we disagree, and not enough time on how to ensure that we can agree and work together. Instead, we should be looking at ways to adapt or build new structures across the Atlantic and with the EU that ensure that we are on the same wavelength in dealing with new challenges in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I have not yet mentioned National Missile Defense (NMD). It is obviously a key issue in the U.S.-European relationship and how it is handled will
have a major impact on NATO. I recognize the growing threat we face from rogue states, the need to better defend ourselves and our allies from such threats in the future as well as the need to reconceptualize how we think about offensive and defensive systems and strategic stability in the future. There is no better issue that highlights NATO's own need to retool than the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMID) threat.

But I hope my statement here today has also underscored that we have other key issues on the U.S.-European agenda as well, and that NMD, while important, should not be allowed to crowd out or undercut the agenda I have laid out today. A healthy strategic Alliance with Europe is as important for the United States as ever before. We are in the midst of perhaps the most important and far-reaching transition in NATO's history. While the foundation for this transition has been laid, we must continue to lead and to invest in this Alliance if we want this transition to come out right and the Alliance to be as strong and effective in dealing with the problems of the future as it has been in dealing with the challenges of the past.

Senator Smith. Ron, Jeff, I think you called them annexes that Prime Minister Blair was not familiar with or had not read that were antithetical to the kind of NATO that you say—you are familiar with the details of what they are close to agreeing on actually would be workable. I think that is what I understand you to say, Ron.

Dr. Asmus. I left the administration in February so I have not followed the ins and outs of the debate in the run up to the Nice Summit as closely as I used to, but I think that if you went to Europe today and somehow could take the public opinion poll of the political elite, the parliaments and said, I think the vast majority of Europeans, would say, look we realize that we are in this together with the Americans, and that when the Americans want to be involved we much prefer to act with the Americans. I think there is a consensus on this. Where I think there are different views in Europe is the degree to which they feel the need to assert and organize themselves because they feel their views are different from ours. There is a real divide among European countries in terms of how close they want to be to us and how much distance they desire. We have tried to build a coalition within NATO and to encourage those countries in the EU who are pro-Atlanticist to steer this project in a direction that is pro-Atlanticist. I doubt if any Prime Ministers of Europe actually have read the Nice annexes and I'm not sure how important they are.

Senator Smith. Well, they are important if nobody gets in charge——

Dr. Asmus. Senator, what is important is that, when we sit down with our NATO allies, that the language is clear and that we as NATO and the EU have a system and set of structures that work. And I believe, based on my knowledge from having been a part of the process and having talked to people since I left, that there are still some very important details that need to be ironed out, particularly when it comes to Turkey and its concerns.

But I also believe that we have firmly anchored NATO's right of first refusal in this document in a way that is adequate for U.S. interests. There are a series of political understandings that we should be comfortable with on the technical level. I am not familiar with all of the Nice annexes. I am not saying they are not impor-
tant, but I would look at the language that we in NATO have negotiated and that everyone else has signed up to.

The best way for us to get this grand project—Europe—steered in the right direction and docked safely in the right port is, in my view, for us to be clear that our goal is a strong Europe with a close relationship to the United States; that we support European integration but want it to be pro-Atlanticist. I think we win hands down, if you take that argument to Europe. But we have to be careful that our criticism is not used both by people who have a definite agenda to say, see the Americans, their real agenda is to keep Europe impotent, weak, and to dominate us.

Frankly, part of the problem here is that the United States has had such a phenomenal decade of growth and innovation in technology that we sometimes underestimate how overwhelming we seem in Europe. I remember a conversation we had when I was in the State Department with Secretary Albright and Deputy Secretary Talbott. We were having a heart-to-heart with a senior official of one of our closest European allies, one of those honest talks where we throw everyone else out of the room and say, what the hell’s really going on here. Why are we seen as this big hegemon and what is your advice on what to do about it. And this person, who both of you know, but whose name I won’t reveal said: “be firm but nice.”

It sort of captured the current mood: they want us there, they want our leadership, they are feeling dominated by us and they are trying to organize themselves to get their act together. And there are different views in terms of how much distance or closeness they want. The quality of American leadership, as I think both of you have suggested, is going to be key because if we get it right, they will stay with us.

Senator Smith. At the end of Jeff’s testimony, I expressed disappointment in the Blair/Bush meeting in that it seemed that to get along they were overlooking details, but maybe you are telling me I should not be disappointed because they were really looking at the grand political objective of keeping it together, then we will work on the details.

Dr. Asmus. I think that the views of the government of Prime Minister Blair and our own are almost identical on ESDP and ESDI. We do not have a problem with the British view on this. As someone who served the Clinton administration, I was perfectly comfortable to see President Bush essentially reaffirm continuity in this area. I think we have got to nail down the final details, and I do not want to say they are not important, because they are. But I think, particularly as you consider about what the committee can ans should focus on, I believe the bigger political question is, how we ensure that when we sit down and deal with the four or five top questions with our allies, we agree not only on which committees or panels should discuss, but what we want to do. In some ways, that is the harder challenge we have to creatively think about.

Some people will say well, we will never agree on an issue like Iraq, or we will never agree on how to handle Russia. Baloney. We did not agree on Russia many times in the last 50 years, but we had a political commitment. We disagreed with Margaret Thatcher on Russia, but we had a political commitment and a system that
forced us to hammer out a common strategy. We need to keep and build that system to expand and to address these new issues as well. I come back to my earlier question of what the right framework will be. Is it going to be the transatlantic framework that we turn to in order to resolve these issues? Or is it going to be the EU/U.S. framework? Or is it going to be something new? We are setting a precedent and creating a pattern, so in addition to working out the details at the level of assistant secretaries, we also have to consider the bigger strategic picture.

Senator SMITH. Ron, you have given us a very helpful suggestion and I want to try it out on both of you and that is to see this issue from a European perspective, which is America is this hegemon and is dominating everything and that we need to be big enough to allow them some elbow room to feel their way awhile and work out the details and not be distracted by the annexes that say to me, well this is where we diverge and this is where we come apart. Maybe we should withhold judgment. Is that what you are saying?

Dr. ASMUS. Well, I think that the people who have succeeded me at the State Department should be tough as nails in negotiating the details and getting them right. Politically, I think we have to be generous in terms of recognizing Europe’s vocation and effort to build an integrated Europe that can be a partner. The two are not contradictory. Most people understand the argument that we have learned the lesson of the last century of history, namely that when the United States and Europe stick together we get a lot done and we are both safer.

Similarly when we go separate ways, in contrast, neither of us is as successful. I think we will still win that political battle. It does not mean you cannot fight hard when it comes to these EU annexes. That is what people like me do for a living and should continue to do. We should continue to defend our interests and, frankly, I do not think the Europeans will hold it against us. They expect us to fight hard on the details. But as Americans we sometimes have to step back and look at the bigger picture, and think about our longer-term stake in helping Europe succeed. The greatest danger to our interests would actually be that this European project would fail and Europe would fall back into a cycle of greater recrimination, finger-pointing and more weakness. We need a stronger Europe. If done right, ESDP can help build a stronger Europe in partnership with us—but, again, we have got to get the details right.

Senator SMITH. And without this vehicle, they may not fund it, they may not be as committed to it.

Dr. ASMUS. That is true. We will see—I mean, the argument that using Euro-pride to increase defense budgets will work is still a hypothesis that remains to be proven. I am willing to give it a try because I am willing to give anything a try to get them to spend more money on defense, but let’s see what the results are. I do think we have to be very careful about is that we do not articulate our concerns in a way that contributes to a sort of backlash against us in Europe.

Senator SMITH. I am going to turn to Senator Biden now, but I am going to ask in the second round as to NATO expansion and
different ways of doing it, big bang theory or some others that are out there and get your recommendations.

Senator Biden. I would suggest you keep going, Mr. Chairman, but maybe the few questions I have sort of follow on from what you have just been talking about. You know there is an old expression, “be careful what you wish for, you may get it.” I must tell you, Jeff, my greater concern is what is going to happen here if the Europeans succeed in the modest headline goal of 50 to 60,000 forces. I think that is just going to play a sort of drum beat among a number of Republicans and a minority of Democrats who are basically either unilateralists or isolationists saying Europe can take care of it—they have their own force. That is what worries me the most because then I think things begin to unravel.

Good news, from my perspective at least, I just picked up off the Net: Secretary Powell, speaking in Brussels today. Powell said the United States would participate in whatever action NATO believed is necessary to ensure that alliance. The United States would continue its presence in the region as long as NATO knows, “The United States is committed to peacekeeping in the Balkans,” he said. “The simple fact is we went in together and we’ll come out together.” I think that is a very strong and very useful statement for him to make.

And Dr. Gedmin, I want to acknowledge that the points you made about the generational changes that have taken place in Europe and here. But it seems to me, and I wonder what your view on this is, that there is one overriding truism that almost all Europeans of all generations still understand and that is that Europe has not reached a point yet in a matter of significant crisis where one nation among them could lead. Where there is a likelihood that could another Desert Storm could be organized by the French or the Germans or the Brits or anyone and I do not mean to belittle any one of those countries and I am not talking about it in terms of their physical capability.

Assume they had the capability to do it. It seems to me there still is a realization among all generations of Europeans that, although the direction is important and unification of Europe is a goal that is worthy of being pursued and the United States’ role should be diminished relative to that, that the bottom line is, there ain’t one guy in the outfit that they think could handle it. I have never heard any German say, well, you know, if this really got down to us having to pull together, we would follow the French. Nor have I heard the French saying, by the way you know since the Germans have a more powerful military, we would follow the lead of the Germans. So I find that there is a counterbalancing weight here that injects reality into this, which takes me to where Ron is about it being important what we say and how we say it. It is very important what the detail is, but we should be generically supportive. Could you comment on my observation?

Dr. Gedmin. By all means, Senator. Thank you. I agree with your assessment. Bismarck once said “that every alliance has its horse and its rider.” You have to have a leader in the pinch when you are in a crisis and I have many questions about how a common foreign security policy in any foreseeable future would work militarily in a crisis, forget about capabilities, but politically because
they do not have a natural leader. It remains to be seen whether they are going to continue to accept American leadership in the future even if it is the best thing for them. That is what you are suggesting.

But Senator Biden, you said earlier this afternoon the sky is not falling, NATO is not collapsing, that is absolutely right. I think what we are trying to do is discern trend lines and that is where we are disagreeing on emphasis and trend lines among us. Ron and I included. A couple of general observations to this, No. 1, I think we Americans do have this hegemon problem. We have to have priorities with our allies.

We cannot go each and every time and beat upon them about each and every thing. I think we have to have a lighter touch and we have to understand in this renegotiation they are going to have relative more power on some things and we are going to have less. We want burden-sharing, but they want power-sharing and they are going to get a little bit. You know we are giving them the keys to the car and they want to drive and they do not want a curfew. Well, we have to live with that a little bit.

Now, at the same time, I quibble a little bit with some of the things Ron says. Examples, no, we do not want a weak Europe. We want a strong Europe and I am always a little bit mystified that Europeans say you are using things to keep us down and I am mystified because, if we were on things like ESDI, would we bother them so much about capabilities? Would we not say, and build institutions for the next two decades, guys, if we wanted to keep them down? No, we are doing what is right. We are telling them build capabilities.

No one here, on right or left, wants Europe to be weak. The question is what kind of Europe will be strong? Now, I myself have questions and reservations about Ron’s model. That is the prominent European model, that is a deeply integrated Europe where liberal democratic nation-states cede more and more sovereignty to centralized supernational institutions in Brussels. Will that make for a stronger Europe? I am not sure. For them, or in partnership for us, I have grave doubts.

Now, I do not think we should oppose that because it is their business how they organize themselves and if we oppose it, it is the kiss of death and that is completely counterproductive and completely inappropriate. But it seems to me we ought to ask questions along the way, be skeptical and pose things that we are concerned about, here are things that I am concerned about in trend line. No one in Europe today will say that ESDP is aimed at weakening NATO. That is the politically correct answer. It will strengthen NATO and so I want to ask questions like, how will it strengthen NATO? What is your vision of NATO? What is your vision for America’s role in NATO?

I will give you one example and then I will stop in this round. Concrete, theoretical to date, but I would bet my house that this discussion is coming. The formation of a European caucus in NATO. Now today, you ask, Senator Smith. They will say, nobody is suggesting that. I bet my house nobody is going to be working on this in the next couple of years. A European caucus in NATO, what does that mean? There is a valid point of view why there
should be a European caucus in NATO. I had a British visitor the other day say to me, of course, that is what we are about. We are going to get that eventually.

And I said, why? Well, security is like trade. When you Americans sit down with us on a bilateral basis, you are the big guy. You have the advantage in that negotiation. When we organize ourselves as a block, we create leverage. We even the playing field, they are entitled, fine, it is a transaction. But I would like us to ask the question now not later. If such a development came to be, how would that change the character, quality, functioning of NATO, political support for NATO here. Example.

Senator Biden. I am not sure that that is not a construct that does not already reflect a reality. The truth of the matter is that when we take actions, whether there is a literal caucus or not within NATO a European caucus there is a practical European caucus within NATO right now, and there always has been. We have been able to deal with it, but I am less concerned about it, and it drives Dr. Haltzel, sitting behind me, crazy. Every time he wants me to focus on ESDP I say do not worry about it. And he looks at me and says what the hell are you talking about?

The reason I do not worry about it is that ESDP will not be in my lifetime or even my son’s lifetime. It will not be in his lifetime when France, Germany and England have ceded such sovereignty to an organizational structure that they will in fact be speaking with one voice on matters of national security.

I cannot fathom that occurring and so, for them to strive is fine by me. Today you privately go to the same meetings. We attend some of the same meetings. The Germans will walk out and say I know we have got to say this for the French, but you understand we are with you, do you not? And the Italians will say, you know gee, we have got other fish to fry with the French and we are going to do this, but keep on doing what you are doing.

I just think that the idea that you are going to have even the major powers in Europe all on the same page, in a way that is somehow anathema to our interests, is not very likely. But that is just an explanation to you, and for the record, why I am mostly concerned about the detail. One place I take some issue with Wes Clark, I am very concerned about the detail. I am very concerned about the command and control structure. I am very concerned about whether or not there are organizational structures that give leverage that preempt action taken. That concerns me a great deal.

I am less concerned about getting sort of a uniform declaration of purpose, a new, or enlightened, or refined, or updated notion of what the Alliance is than I am about the detail. But I have spoken enough and I really appreciate both your testimony and I am going to cease.

Senator Smith. Thanks, Senator Biden. Gentlemen, just a final question on NATO enlargement, the possibility of it and the right approach to achieve it, does either of you have a recommendation? I have been kicking around this idea of the big bang and the Vilnius Nine and let them in and then work out, the full accession status. That is one approach. The other is just to take Slovenia and maybe one other and just keep it going. I do not know whether it
is more difficult to do that or the other in the U.S. Senate in terms of ratification, but I wonder if you have a recommendation as to the right approach?

Dr. Asmus. I know I have been thinking a lot about this, Senator, as I know you have. Today, unlike the early 1990's, we have a clearer sense of the contours of the Europe we are talking about and the countries we want to include in our community—I think it is the Vilnius Nine plus maybe Finland, Sweden or Austria if they revisit the issue of non-alignment. Perhaps best way to manage this process is to find the right way to articulate that at end of the day, NATO is defending Europe and this Europe consists of these countries, plus or minus those countries who will opt to stay out for their own unique reasons; or those countries that are so far away from qualifying that they're on a different timeline.

The reality is that the first round of enlargement about Central Europe. It was about Solidarity in Poland in 1981, 1956 in Hungary, and the Prague Spring in 1960. This next round is about defining Europe as a whole. What does Europe whole and free really mean? In my mind, it means that NATO, at the end of the day, will go from the Baltic to the Black Sea. And the time has come to articulate that and let all these countries know they are going to come in. While not losign the performance principle.

We have to keep benchmarks and incentives so that these countries continue to move in the right direction without setting the bar so high that we make it impossible for them to meet it. So where I come out is we should say, for example that by the end of the decade, we want to have completed the job of overcoming the division of Europe and that we would like both the EU and NATO to have enlarged to as many of these countries that meet our standards and are qualified. We should then work our way back maintain the performance principle, and look at how we initiate a process in 2002 that would take us there by end of the decade.

Senator Smith. And when does the Article V guarantee attach? At the beginning or at the end?

Dr. Asmus. I think the Article V guarantee starts when the parliaments of the NATO-members, including the U.S. Senate, vote. I think that given the strategic environment, we can live with a period of a couple of years as we bring these countries in and monitor their progress.

Senator Smith. I rather like that actually, because I think we need to say to the world that we are serious and give the world time to adjust to the goal of the Transatlantic Alliance, which I think is entirely noble.

Dr. Asmus. Senator, I would like to come back to the point of doing this with the Europeans, not against them or over their concerns. Europeans have a pretty clear view of what Europe is. All these countries have been invited to join the EU, for example. If we can find a way of—while respecting NATO and EU autonomy and independence and the decisionmaking process—articulating the view that at the end of the day that we are talking about a community of countries, that we know what those countries are and we want EU-NATO enlargement to converge and dovetail, that would be a noble achievement. Each institution will make its own
decisions, but the goal is to bring the two processes together and to have alliance between Europe whole and free with the United States.

Once you get that goal and vision right and once you start taking misguided ideas about spheres of influence and gray zones off the table, then the management of whether Latvia or Slovenia or Estonia or Slovakia is in or not in 2002 becomes an easier political problem to deal with because you have answered the strategic question.

Senator SMITH. Jeffrey, you have got the final word.

Dr. GEDMIN. Thank you, Senator. Then I will split the word in two, but I will be brief. Senator Biden, you are right. Militarily, crystal clear—I just want to repeat my point, which I do not think I have convinced you yet but I will keep working on in weeks to come. This business is political in my view and it is a trend line in my view. You’re right a caucus already exists. I simply asked the question, how formal and institutionalized can that become and still be in our interests? Concrete, the devil is in the details. I would bet you a good dinner in Paris, that in our near future Europeans are going to address how this common foreign security policy will work. I am out of ESDI. I am—bigger picture now—

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand what you are saying Dr. Gedmin. And some already argue, yeah, we do not have a natural leader. You know you do maturity voting on certain issues. There will be restrictions.

Let me give you a concrete example of why we ought to be asking questions. We just bombed Iraq with Britain. The French did not like it, others did not like it, we bombed Libya in the 1980’s. The French did not like it, others did not like it. I would hate to see us in a situation where we are not today, but I am just speculating, where we go bilaterally to an ally and say we need you, are you with us? And they say we are just outvoted. Outvoted? It is in your interest. Well, we signed up to something we think on balance gives us more benefits than disadvantages and on this one you cannot use our bases and we are not flying with you.

I think that is important, but that is what I meant by the detail. In other words, what it is that they actually signed up to. I am just reluctant, Jeffrey, to ask questions I do not want the answers to right now. In other words, I do not think there has been a maturation in their thought process as to where that is and I do not want to force them to an answer now. I think in the abstract, they will be more inclined to give an answer that we do not like to satisfy the sense of unity within Europe than they would if we did not ask the question.

Senator SMITH. Throw depleted uranium into that mix.

Dr. GEDMIN. Can I just tell you something that is not abstract? The Germans and French, as you know, we share things with the British in intelligence and vice versa that we do not share with the others, history, culture, temperament, analysis, institutional patterns. We do. The Germans and French, by and large, want a more deeply integrated Britain within Europe. And I can tell you that the Germans and French do not like the special relationship stuff and they are going to tell the British when you are in with us,
more integrated, what the Americans give you, you share with us and the Brits are going to have to make some pretty hard choices between us and them.

The other point, and I will let Ron then conclude on NATO enlargement, Senator Smith, I would just point to one thing Senator Biden broached earlier. I think the Baltic countries are the most interesting thing. NATO enlargement is interesting and important. We ought to do it. We ought to make it as full as makes sense, but I think that is where the rubber meets the road within the Alliance and within the context of the relationship with Russia.

And I think we had better think hard and work really hard now and not later to make sure that we are working with the Russians to avoid any pretext they have about Russian minority concerns or others. And we ought to work with the Europeans on how it is we think we can do this and not damage the relations with Russia, but that is the big issue I think.

Dr. Asmus. Senator, as someone who was in the trenches fighting the European caucus or would-be caucus, I just wanted to offer a comment. If we are in close agreement with the Europeans, this is not a problem. The reality is, you know, these are fairly transparent organizations. When I was at the State Department, I knew what was discussed in most of these EU meetings within minutes of them concluding my cell phone was ringing and several European allies who were attending these meetings were briefing me on what was being discussed. And more than half of those countries agreed with us, if not two-thirds of them. They would not agree to a common EU position because they wanted to take this issue to the NATO forum to keep their options open and where we would be involved could vote.

Second, there are those countries in Europe who think they have too much America, and those who do not think they have enough America. Many of the countries seeking to join our institutions want more, not less America. I think that if my French counterparts were here testifying, they would have a long story about how difficult it is to build a European caucus because so many of these countries want to do this with us, not without us.

We cannot prevent the Europeans from having dinner together before a NATO meeting to coordinate their views. What you can do is make sure we are on the same wavelength.

Senator Biden. What you can do, if I understand Jeff, is that you can impact whether or not there is a formal written agreement with the Brits, with the Germans and the French saying whatever you get we get as opposed to them having dinner and asking and I think there is a distinction with a difference. There used to be a song when I was a kid in high school. It was called “Timing.” Tick-a-tick-a-tocka, timing is the thing and that is it. This is all about timing as far as I am concerned. When to ask these questions? What answers you want to get? I do not like asking people questions when I know I am going to get the wrong answer now, when I have a chance to maybe affect what their answer may be. That is the only generic point I was trying to make.

Senator Smith. Gentlemen, we thank you very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]