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ARE WE LISTENING TO THE ARAB STREET?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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ARE WE LISTENING TO THE ARAB STREET?

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Putnam, Gilman, Schrock, Tierney, Allen and Watson.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel; Thomas Costa, Professional Staff; Joseph McGowan, Fellow; Jason M. Chung, Clerk; Jarrel Price, Intern; David Rapallo, Minority Counsel; and Earley Green, Minority Assistant Clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. The Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations hearing is called to order.

On September 11, many Americans got their first glimpse of the hostility and resentment harbored by some against our people and our culture. Others have known for decades that a toxic antipathy often dominates the so-called Arab Street of Middle East public disclosure. Left unrebutted, anti-American invective invites others to translate animus into deadly action.

So the war against terrorism must also be fought with words. Public diplomacy, our efforts to understand and inform and influence foreign publics, plays an indispensable role in arming the soldiers of truth against the forces of fear and hatred.

Over the past year, the State Department has increased the reach and frequency of both broadcast and Internet information on U.S. policy against terrorism. The new, more aggressive approach seeks to counter anti-American content polluting the global news cycle with a positive message Secretary of State Powell recently described as the right content, right format, right audience, right now.

But there are those who believe we came too late to the battle for Arab hearts and minds and continue to lose ground to apparent unsophisticated opponents hiding in caves. Like the stereotypical ugly American tourist, critics claim we have only upped the volume, shouting the same culturally tone-deaf slogans at an audience that neither understands the language of Western thinking nor trusts the source of the message.

Public diplomacy works at the intersection of language, culture and modern communications media. Translating the subtleties of

ideology and idiom can be a perilous crossing, with truth the potential hit-and-run casualty.

To be heard on the Arab Street, we must first listen and recognize the social, economic and political context inhabited by our target audience. Failure to listen to Arabs in Arabic is one element of the intelligence failure that led to September 11.

One significant barrier muting the American message of freedom and hope with which many Arabs appear inclined to agree is the perceived disconnect between our words and our actions in the Middle East. Heard through the filter of strong U.S. support for the state of Israel and its people, American statements on Arab security and religious tolerance engender only skepticism and mistrust in many audiences. However simplistic or unjustified that perception is, the reality confronted by U.S. public diplomacy in the region confronted by—however simplistic or unjustified, that perception is the reality confronted by U.S. public diplomacy in the region. It cannot be ignored.

To discuss the effectiveness of efforts to understand and influence perception of the United States in the Arab world, we welcome distinguished witnesses from the State Department, academia, a noted public opinion survey firm, and the media. They bring an absolute wealth of knowledge, experience and insight into the subject. We appreciate their time, and we truly look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Chairman
Room B-372 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Tel: 202 225-2548
Fax: 202 225-2382
GROC.NS@mail.house.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/

Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
October 8, 2002

On September 11th many Americans got their first glimpse of the hostility and resentment harbored by some against our people and our culture. Others have known for decades that a toxic antipathy often dominates the so-called "Arab Street" of Middle East public discourse. Left unrebutted, anti-American invective invites others to translate animus into deadly action.

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"Public diplomacy," our efforts to understand, inform and influence foreign publics, plays an indispensable role in arming the soldiers of truth against the forces of fear and hatred.

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However simplistic or unjustified, that perception is the reality confronted by U.S. public diplomacy in the region. It cannot be ignored.

To discuss the effectiveness of efforts to understand and influence perception of the United States in the Arab world, we welcome distinguished witnesses from the State Department, academia, a noted public opinion survey firm and the media.

They bring a wealth of knowledge, experience and insight to this subject. We appreciate their time and we look forward to their testimony.

Mr. SHAYS. At this time I would recognize my colleague, Mr. Allen from Maine.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to it.

I wanted to welcome both of our first two panelists, and Ambassador Ross and Harold Pachios. Harold Pachios, in particular, is a practicing lawyer of great distinction in Portland, Maine, a longtime friend of mine, and a person who has a distinguished career, both in the public and private sector, and very glad to have you here today.

This is a particularly important subject, given the nature of the debate in the House and Senate this week, because we are considering the most solemn of challenges, whether or not to authorize the sending of our young men and women into harm's way. It is—part of that debate has to do with the consequences of what—the consequences of an action against Iraq. It is—in the context of dealing with that issue, it is fundamentally important that we understand the Middle East as thoroughly as we can.

One thing we do understand is that the population—just as in this country, the population in other countries may have a different view at any one time than the leadership, than the government in power at that particular moment, and, therefore, it is critically important that our actions be developed with an understanding to the possible reaction of what is sometimes called the Arab Street. But that may be too general, because the population may react differently in different countries.

In this context public diplomacy, the art of trying to understand and influence populations in other countries, not just the government in power, becomes critically important, and that is why I think that this hearing is particularly timely. I am very pleased that the chairman decided to hold it today. And as I said before, I do look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time the Chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for conducting this important hearing at this time, since we are so engaged with crucial matters involving the Arab States.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought Americans to the realization that young men filed with hatred of the United States could, with limited training and guidance, become focused instruments of mass terror, willing and able to kill thousands of Americans. Soon thereafter we grew more aware of another baffling fact: Prevailing sentiment in the Arab and Muslim world explained away the attacks in an absurd collection of conspiracy theories, and viewed them as an inevitable, even justifiable, reaction to American hegemony.

I, this morning, was at a briefing by the Secretary of Defense, and as we walked through the Pentagon, we saw some of these posters that were displayed in Iraq immediately after the September 11, indicating that America was being paid a debt that they owed to America.

We must act decisively to counter this view of America and close the gap that is widening every day between our Nation and the Arab and Muslim world. It is clear from a number of public opinion surveys conducted across Arab and Muslim countries that there is much resentment, much anger and mistrust toward our Nation.

Our Nation, while certainly will not—must not change its policies on the basis of Arab public attitudes, our diplomacy must find a way to better persuade the people of the region to support, or at least acquiesce to, our policies and understand our policies.

Public diplomacy is about taking our message to the Arab Street. It doesn't mean altering, though, American policy to make it easier to sell. Yet in projecting our message toward the region, we must be especially mindful that if the Arab Street does not take our message seriously, or harbors its deep-seated mistrust of the message that we are attempting to convey, that they will most certainly not receive our message. Accordingly, it is essential that we design our public diplomacy to be especially careful how we convey our messages.

This also requires a conclusive and deliberate effort by the governments of the region to officially and publicly repudiate the purveyors of anti-Americanism, governments who in the past have championed the spread of anti-Americanism as a means to deflect criticism of their own misrule, as is the case in so many of the Arab lands.

Mr. Chairman, at no other time has the issue of public diplomacy been more important to review, and we thank you for bringing this before us. We thank the witnesses, too, for taking the time and the effort to help us with their knowledge and experience in public diplomacy, and I hope the hearing will provide some insight in how we can better address this hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Schrock.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding these hearings at probably one of the most crucial times in our history.

I think your statement and Mr. Gilman's statement says it all. I think most conflicts are created because of a failure to communicate.

I was a public affairs officer in the Navy for 24 years. That is what I did for a living. I sometimes wonder if we do it as well as we should.

So your presence here today is very important, very timely. We appreciate you coming, and hopefully we can all walk away from here learning something that will help solve some of the problems we are facing now any maybe avoid other problems that could be created because we don't communicate well.

So thank you very much for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman.

At this time the Chair would recognize Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Right now in the Middle East, more than 50 percent of the population is under 25, as I am sure has been discussed here, but unemployment is also over 30 percent. Many are uneducated, and those that have an edu-

cation often can't find decent work. The result is a population that is disaffected and without hope.

It is imperative that we root out terrorism and that we remain vigilant in all ways to defend against it, but I am afraid that won't be enough. The world has changed, so our perception of and our attitude toward the rest of the world must also be revised and expanded.

We must move forward and dedicate ourselves to changing the hearts and minds of those who have been taught to hate us. Accomplishing this will not be easy. An important component of reversing the tide of hatred and distrust that currently prevails in the Arab world is our public diplomacy initiatives. We must continue to support and properly fund international broadcasting programs, and realize that such outreach is an integral part of the United States foreign policy planning.

International broadcasters have the ability to provide objective and accurate news about America and the world to millions of people living in these disaffected Arab societies. Their work is critical to advancing American interests, but we must also remember that it is crucial to understanding their own world. A free media is the vehicle toward a free society and helps promote regional understanding. For example, a hostile Arab youth equipped with credible information is less like to be armed for battle against a perceived enemy.

Mr. Chairman, it is so important that we endeavor to liberate the Arab world and promote freedom overseas; that we do not forget to do so at home. We must practice what we preach. We must not suppress divergent opinions, and we must not mistake well-grounded opposition to a unilateral preemptive war for a lack of patriotism. Specifically as we debate how the administration should proceed with Iraq, we must make sure we have an actual debate. It is imperative that as we reveal ourselves to the Arab world, what we show them is something that is open, democratic and tolerant of all views.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on this matter.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman for his statement.

Mr. Putnam, I understand that you do not have a statement, but would want to recognize—the Chair would want to recognize that the vice chairman is here as well. And all of these Members before you have been very active on this committee, and I am, as cairman, very grateful for their tremendous work that they have done here.

I would also just want to say that we are going to have a number of days of debate, and Members of Congress will be voting their conscience on this issue, and there will be very different views expressed, but I think we will all do ourselves proud on this issue.

At this time I would like first to take care of some business and ask unanimous consent that all mmbers of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I would ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statement in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

At this time we will recognize the first panel. We have a panel of three. I will say to all three panels that we are usually fairly generous on the 5-minute rule and allow you to roll over another 5 minutes, but it is not intended to allow you to go 10; it is to allow you to go over 5. And given that we have some academicians, I am particularly concerned about this issue.

To start on our first panel we have Ambassador Chris Ross, U.S. Department of State; and we have Harold C. Pachios, chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. And we will note for the record, Mr. Pachios, that to Mr. Allen you are first among equals on this panel.

At this time, if you could stand, I will do as we always do and swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record that our witnesses have responded in the affirmative, and, Ambassador, welcome, and look forward to your statement. Thank you.

STATEMENTS OF CHRIS ROSS, AMBASSADOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND HAROLD C. PACHIOS, CHAIRMAN, U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Mr. ROSS. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is a great pleasure to be here today to join you in exploring the complex and challenging subject of Arab public opinion, or the Arab Street, and how we are engaging the Arab world to build a better understanding of America's politics, policies, priorities and values.

Those of us who practice public diplomacy appreciate the very high interest that Members of Congress have shown in public diplomacy, both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, through a series of hearings and proposed legislation. We also appreciate the attention that the advisory commission and various foundations and other private organizations have shown in the development of public diplomacy at this critical time.

The term "Arab Street" is misleading on several counts. First, there is not a single Arab Street, but many. Whether expressed through angry street demonstrations in Gaza, a disputatious call-in show on an Arab satellite station, or in a sober editorial in a Pan-Arab newspaper, Arab public opinion is diverse, dynamic, and responsive to shifting circumstances.

One overriding issue, however, crosses all boundaries in the Middle East: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This fact does not mean that we cannot productively engage Arab publics on other subjects. On the contrary, it is vital that we do so. But it does mean that we must always recognize that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the prism through which other issues, including our position on Iraq, are perceived and understood on the Arab Street.

The Arab Street matters, but it is neither omnipotent or nor impotent. This point has been a source of confusion before the Gulf War, and in the run up to the military campaign in Afghanistan, there were predictions that massive demonstrations could topple

governments friendly to the United States. When they didn't materialize, many concluded that the Arab Street carried limited political clout. Both views are flawed.

Arab governments are skilled at coping with dissent or working to suppress it when it appears threatening. At the same time, Arab leaders recognize that they must be sensitive to public opinion, especially when it embodies deeply held convictions about values such as faith and honor.

That said, one of the conundrums of the Arab Street is the dynamic of its news media, which are often government-controlled, and which frequently engage in negative stereotypes, disinformation and outright demonization of the United States and of Israel.

Every American Embassy in the region, as I can attest, devotes considerable time to rebuttals of such unfounded accusations and attacks in the media. Such accusations and attacks are all the easier to disseminate now that the information revolution has reached the Middle East. Internet use is growing, and satellite television has become the chief means through which much of the Arab population gets its news, including incessant and often inflammatory images of violence between Palestinians and Israelis.

How do we go about accurately gauging public opinion in the Middle East? First, our embassies routinely report on media comment in their host country. We also conduct public opinion research and polling through the Department of State's Office of Research, and we draw upon the findings of such private firms as Gallop, Roper and Zogby. All of these reports are analyzed and distributed widely throughout the foreign affairs community and among foreign policy decisionmakers.

In engaging the Arab Street, our chief responsibility is to make sure that people understand our policy for what it is, not what others say it is. This means engaging in a robust program of policy advocacy by making senior officials available for media events at home and abroad, distributing policy statements to Arab opinion leaders, and responding swiftly and decisively to unfounded charges in the Arab media.

Recent polls in the Arab world show that suspicion and hostility toward the United States are widespread. They are fed not only by unbalanced media coverage, but also by inflammatory Friday sermons at certain mosques and contentious educational materials and instruction.

But when we look more deeply, we can see that Arabs and Americans share certain fundamental values; among them love of family, faith, education, generosity and achievement. That is the rationale for our forthcoming Muslim life in America initiative which will encompass Websites, publications, posters, radio and TV spots, parallel print treatments, speakers and other exchanges. We believe that this initiative will help counter the myth of America as anti-Muslim and present a truer picture of faith, family and achievement in the United States.

More broadly, we are attempting to reach a larger, more diverse and younger audience in the Arab world through expanded exchange programs, augmented television programming, a new magazine, a renewed emphasis on English teaching and American stud-

ies, and fresh Websites. In parallel, the board of broadcasting Governors Has inaugurated a highly successful radio broadcast, Radio Sawa, that has captured significant audiences.

Mr. Chairman, we are engaged with the Arab Street because attitudes matter. Words and images have consequences, and over time, any foreign policy requires the understanding and support of peoples and nations. The Arab Street can be a formidable obstacle to building that support, but through recognition of our common interests and shared values, we believe that the Arab public can become an ally in our common quest for freedom and opportunity.

Even if this goal is ambitious, we still want to strengthen our engagement and our dialog with Arab publics to the point that it becomes possible for us to discuss our policy differences on the basis of our common humanity and values, not on the basis of an enmity that is so strong that it empowers those who would resort to violence and terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I will be happy to take questions at the appropriate time.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ross follows:]

Ambassador Christopher Ross

Special Coordinator for Public Diplomacy
United States Department of State

Hearing on

The Arab Street

Tuesday, October 8, 2002

Committee on Government Reform

Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran's Affairs and International Relations

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U.S. House of Representatives

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you here this morning. It is vital that we understand the complex role that public opinion in the Middle East – the Arab Street – can play in the shaping and conduct of our foreign policy in the region.

Many Streets

First, we must recognize that there is not one Arab Street, but many. Whether expressed through orchestrated, angry street demonstrations in Gaza, or sober editorial opinion in a UAE newspaper, Arab public opinion is diverse, dynamic, and highly responsive to shifting circumstances.

All politics are local, in the old adage, and the Arab world is no exception. The impact of public opinion in Egypt is quite different from such public expressions in Jordan, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia.

In some states, the Arab Street constitutes a severe constraint on the government's room to maneuver. In other instances, government controls ensure that public opinion can either be ignored or manipulated without overly limiting the government's ability to act.

The issue that crosses all boundaries in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is the prism through which all other issues are perceived and understood.

This fact does not mean that we cannot productively engage Arab publics on other issues and other subjects. To the contrary, it is vital that we do so. But it does mean that we must always recognize that the Arab-Israeli conflict remains an omnipresent foreign policy issue as we engage Arab publics.

Power and the Arab Street

The Arab Street matters, but it is neither all-powerful nor irresistible. Western news media, in particular, have had difficulty in maintaining a balance on this point, wavering in their understanding of the power and constraints that operate on Arabic public opinion.

Before the Gulf War in 1990, and in the run-up to the military campaign in Afghanistan last year, there were frequent predictions that Arab masses would rise up in huge demonstrations and topple governments friendly to the United States. Then, when such dire predictions proved wildly untrue, there were claims that Arab public opinion possessed little political weight and could be safely ignored.

Both views are flawed. Arab governments have many tools to deflect, co-opt, and suppress dissent, especially if perceived as threatening. On the other hand,

Arab leaders recognize that they must always be sensitive to public opinion, especially when it embodies deeply held convictions about values and faith.

A recent study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy states, that during the Gulf War period: "Within most Arab countries, the balance of opinion was broadly consistent with official policy."

Arab states that joined the coalition all had greater or lesser majorities that condemned the occupation of Kuwait and, albeit reluctantly, supported military action. In Jordan and Yemen, which remained outside the coalition, the majority sympathized enough with Iraq to oppose any kind of military action.

Deflection, Demonization, and Satellite Television

For the United States, one of the conundrums of the Arab Street is the dynamic of its news media, often government-controlled, which nevertheless frequently engages in negative stereotypes, disinformation, and outright demonization of the United States and the West.

Balanced, incisive news coverage and commentary are not hard to find in the Middle East. In many countries, however, editors of the mainstream press do not exercise their gate-keeping roles in ways that we would consider professional or fair.

In certain instances, we face the politics of deflection, whereby internal dissent is channeled into safer international venues. Government-controlled media suppress domestic criticism and anger, but tolerate, even encourage the deflection of public frustration toward international issues – where the United States and its policies can be attacked without constraint.

The problem is not solely a criticism of, or even anger toward U.S. policies. It is the harnessing of that energy into anti-American sentiment through rhetoric that is inflammatory and has a reckless disregard for the truth. The Arab media's role in perpetuating the grotesque myth that the attack on the World Trade Center was a CIA-Mossad conspiracy, or that 4,000 Jews were warned to stay away on September 11, are two examples.

Another key to understanding the Arab Street is the impact of the Information Revolution, which is hitting the Middle East along with a second, demographic revolution.

- In Egypt, as in much of the Middle East, 35 percent of the population is under 15 years of age.

- Estimates are that almost five million people in the Middle East now use the Internet – a huge increase over the past five years.

- Sixty percent of Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank have access to satellite television.
- Seventy percent of the population in the Gulf states get their news via satellite TV.
- Uncensored television coverage of the second Palestinian intifada – meaning uncontrolled by national governments – is drawing the largest Arab audiences in history.

The new independent media outlets such as ***al Jazeera*** are both good news and bad news from our perspective. The good news is that, as competitive, hungry media operations, they are eager for news and features. That means opportunities for the United States – whether through interviews or other kinds of coverage – to convey important messages about our country and its policies.

The bad news is that these operations are not above the same kinds of excesses and unbalanced news coverage that we have seen in the government-controlled media.

Understanding the Arab Street

Our first responsibility in engaging the Arab Street is to understand it – and to link our findings to the policymaking process.

To accomplish this, we employ all the standard tools of diplomacy and social science. A daily task at every embassy is to review and report what media in the country are saying. This reportage is collected, summarized, and distributed widely throughout the foreign affairs community.

(Such Analyses can be viewed at our Foreign Media Reaction Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov/products/medreac.htm.)

We also conduct surveys of public opinion through the State Department's Office of Research, drawing as well upon the international polling of Gallup, Roper, Zogby, and other public opinion research firms.

Engaging the Arab Street

Whether we engage government leaders or Arab publics, our first responsibility is to make sure they understand our policy for what it is, not what others say it is.

This means distributing the texts and statements of our senior foreign-policy officials to foreign government officials, news media, and other opinion leaders. Wherever possible, we do this in Arabic.

It means building on the model of the Coalition Information Centers, established as the Afghan military campaign began, to provide the coordination and flexibility necessary to respond quickly and authoritatively to events – in short, to master the global 24-hour news cycle.

It means responding swiftly, through our embassies, to misinformation and unfounded charges in the media. And it means using opportunities – whether via television or the lecture hall – to make our case directly, without the filter of the local news media.

Building on Shared Values

We are also engaged in a number of longer-term, public-diplomacy initiatives.

Recent headline-making polls concluded that suspicion and hostility toward the United States is widespread in the Arab world. The perception of reflexive support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians is one factor; but there are also general views that the United States is immoral, anti-religious, and anti-Muslim.

Yet when we look more carefully beneath these dismaying findings, we discover that the Arab and Muslim nations, in fact, share deeply held values of family, faith, education, and generosity with the United States.

And a recent Zogby international poll found that majorities in countries throughout the Middle East continue to respect and admire the American commitment to democracy and freedom.

When we find ways of changing the subject to these shared values, we do indeed find ourselves able to enter into a more productive dialogue with our Arab interlocutors, to establish greater trust, and to open clearer channels for discussing policy issues.

That's the rationale for our current "Shared Values" initiative, which makes use of posters, print ads and print publications, Web sites, exchange programs, and short TV messages. We believe this advocacy campaign will help puncture the negative myth of America as anti-Muslim, and present a truer picture of religious tolerance and freedom in the United States.

Similarly, we know that expanded people to people exchange programs with the Arab world mean more face-to-face encounters that can be truly transforming. Moreover, the opportunity for Americans, in turn, to experience the rich, diverse cultures of the Middle East can be transforming as well.

We seek to establish with the Arab Street a dialogue that replaces slogans and stereotypes with understanding and trust.

Partnerships and Youth

We know that we cannot conduct a sustained, broad-scale information campaign in the Middle East alone. Many of our messages about Americans and the values we represent can best be delivered by third parties. We are, for example, working with nongovernmental organizations such as the Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU), a key partner in our "Shared Values" effort.

We are also exploring ways in which we can partner with U.S. universities, NGO's, and corporations overseas, recognizing that the local presence of such institutions and companies in the Middle East is often one of the most tangible ways by which local people learn about and come to understand this country.

It is imperative, in a post-September 11 world, that we use all the tools at our command to reach larger, more diverse, and younger audiences– including e-mail publishing, more Arabic-language Web sites, digital video conferencing, print publications, and the State Department's American Embassy Television Network, as well as all the various exchange programs at our disposal such as Fulbright, professional and citizen exchanges, and educational partnerships.

A dramatic example of this was Secretary Powell's February 2002 appearance on MTV's forum for global youth, where he tackled a wide range of subjects, from HIV/AIDS to a question about America as the "Great Satan." (Far from being the "Great Satan," Secretary Powell responded, "we are the Great Protector.")

We should note that the Broadcasting Board of Governors recently inaugurated Radio Sawa, a 24-hour, Arabic-language service that mixes music and news. Radio Sawa is clearly attracting a new, younger audience with its format of American pop music and Arabic pop music. Sawa is a major source of news for audiences under 30, broadcasting news in Arabic twice and hour, 24 hours a day. It is quickly gaining credibility with its audience with balanced and objective reporting. Among the station's target audience in Amman (individuals between the ages of 17 and 28) when asked "What station do you listen to most for news?", 33% said they listed to Sawa. The station carries speeches and other actualities of President Bush, translated into Arabic, as well as interviews with U.S. policy makers, such as Secretary of State Powell.

The Challenge of the Arab Street

We are engaged with the Arab Street because attitudes matter; words and images have consequences; and, over time, any foreign policy requires the understanding and support of those peoples and nations it touches.

Whether we are seeking a path to peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, sustaining the global coalition against terrorism, or mobilizing international action to eliminate Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, the Arab Street can be a formidable factor.

However, with perseverance and creativity, and with a recognition of our common interests and shared values, we believe the Arab publics, which share a deep yearning for peace and freedom, can become invaluable allies. Even if this goal is ambitious, we still want to strengthen our engagement and our dialogue with Arab publics to the point that it becomes possible for us to discuss our policy differences on the basis of our common humanity and our many common values, not on the basis of an enmity that is so strong that it empowers those who would resort to violence and terrorism.

Mr. SHAYS. I don't usually comment on statements before we get into questioning, but I think you got us off on the right foot here. I think it was a very thoughtful statement that is very helpful for the rest of this dialog. Thank you.

Mr. Pachios, nice to have you here. Thank you very much.

Mr. PACHIOS. Thank you very much for asking me to testify. I have been on the United States Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy for several years and have been chairman for 3 years. The Commission, as you know, has been around for about 50 years. It is the only entity in the U.S. Government that is exclusively dedicated to public diplomacy. It is a citizen commission, seven members, bipartisan, appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate. And I can tell you for the years that I have been on the Commission, not much attention has been paid to the Commission or its reports. One or two come out every year.

It wasn't very interesting reading to most people before September 11. So there have been, however, several Mmbers of the House and a few Members of the Senate that have been very interested in it, and some of them are in this room, and we are grateful for that interest.

Since September 11, of course, there has been enormous interest in public diplomacy. This has been very, very helpful, because between the end of the cold war and the early 1990's, and September 11, 2001, our apparatus for conducting public diplomacy around the world was reduced in content, reduced in resources, and, frankly, when September 11 occurred, we were in a much worse position to communicate our views to the world than we were 10 years earlier.

Recently Graham Fuller met with the Commission. He is the former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA and an Arabist who lived many years in the Middle East; like my colleague Ambassador Ross, fluent in Arabic and very knowledgeable about the area. When Mr. Fuller came to speak at our hearing, he had just returned from a State Department tour of the Gulf States, and he said, I have never felt such an extraordinary gap of separate worlds, hermetically sealed one from the other, that you almost have to go through an airlock to get from one to the other.

That might have been some hyperbole in this statement, but the fact is that after all of these years in the Middle East, he came back very, very concerned, as others have.

Now, it is not all bad news. The administration has gotten off to a good start on translating American principles and compassion into the vernacular of Muslim countries. The Secretary of State is making public diplomacy a priority for Ambassadors and embassy staff, and I would add that this particular Secretary of State has a better understanding and more of a commitment to public diplomacy than any of the others that I have observed, and that is a major plus.

The Middle East Radio Network is off to a good start. Arabic language Websites print publications, special citizen and journalistic exchanges with countries in the Middle East have all been established to set the record straight on the United States, but more must be done to engage large numbers of people in these countries.

Prior to its consolidation into the State Department, USIA was, as I observed it, fairly agile and tactical. They could reinvent themselves there, and they did. It was more—I think the USIA was more like the Marines and the Special Forces than the Regular Army. However, the Commission agreed with the decision to move USIA into the State Department because we believed that it would make public diplomacy an integral part of foreign policy planning, and we thought that was important. Frankly, it was off in left field.

But the State Department is a very large and inflexible bureaucracy, and even the simplest matters sometimes require layers of bureaucratic approval. It is not an environment where people act on their own and take any degree of management risk, more often than not. So notwithstanding the fact that Secretary Powell is one of the strongest managers and leaders the Department has had in recent decades, putting public diplomacy planning and programing in the midst of this very bureaucratic apparatus has, in fact, resulted in some problems.

So we think to achieve greater flexibility in our public diplomacy infrastructure, we need to place greater responsibility in the field, on the Ambassadors, embassy public affairs officers and Foreign Service nationals. The State Department needs to give them the leeway to develop and implement country-specific programs. It is my impression that all too often we have had a cookie-cutter approach to public diplomacy activities in our missions abroad. To achieve this, the State Department needs to recruit and train the right people.

My years of inspecting and evaluating USIA and State Department operations in the public diplomacy field have taught me that we have some good people doing it, a lot of adequate ones, and some people who are just not very good at the business of communications.

Two years ago Mark Grossman told me that the State Department was spending $75,000 a year on recreating Foreign Service officers. Compare that with what the Department of Defense spends to recruit. That needs to change. I would also like to point out that all of the courses in public diplomacy and communications offered by the Foreign Service Institute, where we train our Foreign Service officers, could be completed in 3 days. Now, I understand that Under Secretary Beers and Ambassador Ross told me yesterday that is all changing, and that they are working hard on the recruiting end and the training end. It does need to change. They ought to be commended for it.

The Commission has issued a report recently, and we made several recommendations, but I think three are probably highlighted more than the others. First is that we fully support the implementation of the White House Office of Global Communications. There is some controversy in some quarters about that, but we think it is important to centralize the message in one place.

The Press Secretary in the White House has traditionally—the press office has traditionally coordinated a lot of the domestic information activities in the government among all of the departments, in fact, and the same thing ought to happen with respect to the message that we send abroad. So we are very supportive of that.

Second, we believe that the involvement of the private sector in public diplomacy is very important. As I pointed out, the government's public diplomacy infrastructure is bureaucratic and resistant to change. To effectively communicate with foreign populations in the information age, public diplomats need to be flexible and agile. So much more work, I think, needs to be done in working through the private sector and NGO's to meet our public diplomacy objectives.

And we agree with Ambassador Ross that Radio Sawa so far is off to a very good start and is very important in adding that other dimension to public diplomacy. It has always been a long-range process, exchanges, information programs, and so forth, and now we need to reach masses more and more effectively, and Radio Sawa is a very good first step in doing that.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you as well.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pachios follows:]

Harold C. Pachios
Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
Testimony before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations
October 8, 2002

Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I am grateful for the opportunity to talk about public diplomacy. I was appointed to serve on the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy eight years ago. During the period prior to 9/11, I found that how this nation informs and influences foreign audiences was of little interest to anyone, except for the people at the former United States Information Agency and a few of us who were semi-professionally engaged in it.

September 11 and our current interest in Iraq changed all of that. Now it is a hot topic. Americans have become painfully aware of the lack of understanding - - indeed, misunderstanding - - between our world and the Arab world; between our world and much of the Islamic world.

Recently Graham Fuller met with the Commission. He is a former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, and an Arabist who lived many years in the Middle East. When Mr. Fuller came to speak at our hearing he just returned from a State Department tour of every Gulf state. He said, "I have never felt such an extraordinary gap of separate worlds, hermetically sealed one from the other, that you almost have to go through an air lock to get from one to the other." In other words, we are not reaching our target audience.

Now, all is not bad news. The Administration has gotten off to a good start on translating American principles and compassion into the vernacular of Muslim countries. The Secretary of State is making public diplomacy a priority for ambassadors and embassy staff. A Middle East radio network, Arabic language Web sites and print publications, and citizen and journalist exchanges have all been established to help set the record straight on the United States. But more must be done to engage large numbers of people in these countries who are dealing simultaneously with Arab fundamentalism and the introduction of a free and unregulated press.

Prior to its consolidation into the State Department, the United States Information Agency was agile and tactical. It was more like the Marines than the Army. The Commission agreed with the decision to move USIA into the State Department because we believed it would make public diplomacy an integral part of foreign policy planning. But, the State Department is a large and inflexible bureaucracy. Even the simplest of matters sometimes require layers of bureaucratic approval. Not withstanding the fact Secretary Powell is one of the strongest managers and leaders the department has had in recent decades, centralizing public diplomacy planning and programming in the midst of this very bureaucratic apparatus has resulted in problems.

To achieve greater flexibility in our public diplomacy infrastructure we need to place greater responsibility in the field – on the Ambassadors, embassy public affairs officers and Foreign Service nationals. The State Department needs to give them the leeway to develop and implement country specific programming. It has been my impression that all too often we have a cooking cutter approach to public diplomacy activities in the field.

To achieve this the State Department needs to recruit and train the right people. My years of inspecting and evaluating USIA and State Department operations have taught me that we have some good ones, a lot of adequate ones and some people who are just not very good at the business of communications. Two years ago we were told that the Department of State spends $75,000 a year on recruiting Foreign Service officers. That needs to change. I would also like to point out that all of the courses in public diplomacy and communications offered by the Foreign Service Institute could be completed in merely three full days. That too must change.

To effectively communicate with foreign audiences, especially those in the Middle East, we need to define our public diplomacy campaign. To put it bluntly, we should not be in the business of getting people to love us. We will never win that war of words. We should, however, try to help the world understand us.

This nation has sound policies. We need to illustrate to the global community the process by which these policies have been crafted. Additionally, we need to demonstrate that it is okay to disagree with these policies, without resorting to drastic measures. In this nation, people disagree with the government's policies all the time. Let's explain to the world that the freedom of dissent is the benefit of living in a free democracy.

The United States supports many of the governments in power in the Middle East. Millions of young people are their subjects, coming of age with the want to change their world and society, for the better or worse. Many of these young people negatively view the United States and its policies at the political level, not as a cultural society, but on policy. To explain our strategies and communicate with new strategic populations requires a new public diplomacy paradigm.

It is important to keep funding our long-range programs like exchanges and cultural initiatives, but public diplomacy is no longer just long-term. In the past few years it has meant getting the message out rapidly. And it has meant reaching the masses with messages, rather than just elite opinion makers. Because of the communications revolution, we need to invest in new approaches.

To immediately improve our communications efforts in the Middle East, I recommend three steps:

1. Fully Implement the White House Office of Global Communications – The White House already coordinates communications across agency lines to reach a number of large domestic audiences. The same attention should now be given to international audiences. When possible, foreigners should receive one cohesive message from the U.S. government. The newly announced White House Office of Global Communications is the proper place to coordinate this message. An office having such a coordinating structure can identify broad public diplomacy goals and coordinate communications strategies.

The Office of Global Communications should provide strategic direction and themes to the U.S. agencies that reach foreign audiences, while relying on the Secretary of State to provide tactical and strategic coordination of the diplomats overseas. The office must draw on many agencies and Americans to convey a few simple but powerful messages.

2. Greatly increase the involvement of the private sector in the government's public diplomacy efforts – The government's public diplomacy infrastructure is bureaucratic and resistant to change. To effectively communicate with the foreign populations in the information age, public diplomats need to be flexible and agile.

Achieving this goal requires the government to spend more on opinion research. Currently, the State Department only spends about $5 million on polling for the entire world. To put that in perspective, Mike Bloomberg spent more than $10 million on polling for his New York mayor's race.

When the State Department gets access to the public opinion analysis, it needs to have the proper talents to develop messaging, creative materials and distribution techniques to get the information out. The government has a lot to learn from the entertainment, advertising, public relations and political campaign industries. Support, insight, and critical judgment from the private sector are all essential for creating effective U.S. public diplomacy.

3. Expand broadcast efforts like Radio Sawa – The Broadcasting Board of Governors has done an outstanding job of employing public opinion analysis and proven private sector expertise in launching the government's new Middle East radio network, Radio Sawa.

Radio Sawa is already the number one station in Kuwait and Jordan. By combining a mix of pop music and news, Radio Sawa is attracting the important youth masses who the United States needs to connect with in the critical Arab market.

As the government continues to explore future broadcasting initiatives, Radio Sawa should be examined and used as a model for gaining access to important youth populations.

This is not to say that the Sawa model is a cure all for the entire world. In many markets, like Communist China, it may be more effective to continue traditional VOA broadcasts that exclusively feature information and news.

New thinking and new structures call for a new public diplomacy paradigm, not new millions of dollars. Nevertheless, we cannot do more to address the significant resentment and misunderstanding of the United States without the necessary resources and structural modifications. Nothing short of immediate and sustained action is required. If we are serious about repairing the world's perception of our motives and values, as we must be, it is essential that we revitalize America's public diplomacy with the intelligent allocation of resources, and a framework designed to maximize its effectiveness.

Thank you. I am now happy to take your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. We are going to start with Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman, in January 2002, the General Accounting Office Report: Foreign Languages. Human capital approach needs to correct staffing and proficiency shortfalls, and goes on to point out that five public diplomacy positions in Pakistan were held by employees without a useful level of language proficiency.

And I have before me an article from the San Diego Union Tribune of October 7th saying that before the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, one of the plotters was captured on tape discussing how to make explosives, but he spoke in Arabic, and the FBI didn't translate the phone conversation until after the explosion. And lapses highlighted a chronic shortage of linguists—I am reading from the article—and translators in U.S. intelligence agencies.

The FBI, CIA and NSA said that they made strides toward closing those gaps, but key members of our congressional panel say the problem is still glaring, hampering an agency's ability to monitor and infiltrate terrorist groups.

What do you have to say about those major lapses in the ability of people in public diplomacy and in intelligence not having the ability to know what is going on among our Arab people?

Mr. ROSS. Mr. Gilman, thank you for that very important question.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. ROSS. I had the pleasure to welcome you in Damascus many years ago. At the time I was working with the Syrian Government entirely in Arabic. It is very important, a very important tool.

The lacks that the GAO cites exist. They are due to a number of factors. In the specific case of public diplomacy, the drastic reduction of resources that occurred over the past 10 years, as cited by Chairman Pachios, resulted in a reduction of recruitment, a reduction of training, not to mention a reduction of programs, and the number of Arabic speakers at a fully fluent level dropped dramatically to the point that in September 2001, when the Department of State began looking for someone to appear as the American face on Arab satellite stations, they had to look to those of us in retirement, myself included, and I was brought back to do that in those early months.

The Secretary has placed a tremendous emphasis on renewed recruitment. He has given a very significant share of that recruitment to the public diplomacy function, and in order to prepare the new entrants linguistically, we are encouraging the Foreign Service Institute to beef up its language training, as well as its professional training in public diplomacy.

Arabic is a hard language. It takes a good 2, 3, 4 years to learn to a level of proficiency that would permit a professional discussion, and one of the obstacles to be overcome is the hesitation of many people to take time out as it were from their career to learn such a language, but we are working hard to change that perception.

Mr. GILMAN. Would our other panelist like to comment on that?

Mr. PACHIOS. Just briefly, Congressman.

I went out to Damascus at the time that Chris was Ambassador there. And this was, I think, 1997 I was there. They were spending—they had a budget, allocated by USIA at the time, $675,000

for all public diplomacy activities in Syria. Most of that was used to pay rent for the American Center, which was apart from the embassy, had a library, and the salaries of Foreign Service nationals. And I was appalled. At the same time we were spending a few million for public diplomacy activities in the U.K. So there was—we had our priorities, I think, in reverse.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we readjusted those priorities?

Mr. PACHIOS. I would say not completely, but I don't know whether Ambassador Ross would agree with me.

Mr. ROSS. Certainly. In the aftermath of September 11, we have redirected resources to the Arab and Muslim world in a significant way.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope so.

Now, that same report that I was reading said that intelligence and language experts say it would take years for our government to meet its needs for linguists and translators. Are we doing anything to try to beef that up?

Mr. ROSS. We are recruiting intensively among those who are already studying Arabic at universities. That is a start. We already have a number of people who are completely fluent in Arabic by virtue of their family origins, but this is still far short of the need. And this is a need felt not only by the Department of State, but, as you suggested, by other government agencies such as the FBI. It is a governmentwide problem, and we need to pay a lot of attention to it.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, it seems to me that this is very basic in our needs. If we are going to do public diplomacy, we ought to at least understand the language and be able to fluently use that language to overcome some of the obstacles out there. And I hope that both of you gentlemen will encourage whoever is in charge of getting linguists, people who are well versed in language, to move forward.

Mr. Ambassador, what is the Shared Values Initiative, and what organizations have partnered with the Department to promote that initiative? It almost seems to me that when we did away with the USIA, we were really at fault in taking away some of our basic needs of communicating, and now we are trying to piecemeal putting that together. What are your thoughts, gentlemen?

Mr. ROSS. Mr. Gilman, the Shared Values Initiative is an effort to build on values that have been identified as common to Americans and to Arabs. The various polls that have been done demonstrate that love of family, respect for faith, respect for education are all common values, and one of the strategies we have adopted to narrow the gap of misunderstanding with the Arab world has been to place a focus on these shared values through a campaign that is to begin in a few weeks after some months of preparation.

It is a campaign that is a multimedia, total communication campaign, based on TV and radio spots, press placements, speakers, various forms of videoconferencing and the rest to try and bring Americans and Arabs closer together and to demonstrate that the United States is not hostile to the Arab and Muslim worlds, but indeed wishes to continue working very closely with them.

Mr. GILMAN. Which organizations are helping us with that shared value?

Mr. ROSS. We consulted widely within the Muslim-American and Arab-American communities in proceeding, and one particular Pakistani-American came forth and organized a group that is working particularly closely with us. This group is the Council on Arab and Muslim—American-Muslim Understanding. And it will be sending speakers out to the region during this campaign to help reinforce the messages of shared values that I described.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you want to comment on that, Mr. Pachios?

Mr. PACHIOS. No. Just one brief comment, and that is that I think you were right that when we did away with USIA and placed all of this in the Department of State, that there was some rough months that occurred after that, because this was not highly valued, this kind of business was not highly valued in the State Department. It was a different mindset.

And, frankly, I have always thought—I am a civilian. I am not a government employee. I have done this for a number of years. I have always thought that—and I think you all can identify with this—people who have run for political office and who have tried to reach out to constituents and get them to understand what they are doing and get them to understand their positions, they are well equipped to communicate in the way we ought to be communicating with foreign populations.

That is the same business. We are trying to get people to understand policies, just the way all of you do in your own constituencies. And I think we need to emphasize those kinds of qualities and that kind of experience, frankly, more than we have.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

And Mr. Chairman, if you will with me, one more question.

What is the role of this new White House Office of Global Communications?

Mr. SHAYS. I need a short answer.

Mr. RAUSSER. Yes, sir. The White House Office of Global Communications is meant to provide a means of ensuring that the President's priorities in foreign policy are accurately reflected in the field of public diplomacy. And the Office of Global Communications is also meant to offer opportunities wherein the President's very powerful voice can be used in support of public diplomacy.

So it is a way of linking the highest office in the land with the world of public diplomacy and to help coordinate the work of public diplomacy. That is done, in fact, by several agencies.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank my colleague.

I just want to say I realized as you were asking your questions, Chairman Gilman, that this may be one of the last hearings that you do before this committee, and I want to say to you personally on behalf of the other committee members that you are a model.

You are one of the most gracious men that I have ever worked with, and one of the most thoughtful. And when you ask for more time, I could never say no to you. But thank you for not taking advantage of it.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words.

Mr. SHAYS. You are welcome. You are very loved by these Members of the Congress and, hopefully, by your constituents.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say that Mr. Gilman is loved by his constituents given the number of times he has been returned to the House.

Mr. Ambassador, the Zogbys in particular, but others also, tell us that it is not the American people that are hated or disliked by the Arab community, but it is American policy. And it seems that one way to break through that is to engage people in the community, and that means to go on the opportunities that they may have in television stations, radio stations and participate in them and listen, and have a dialog, and explain what the United States' policies are.

Have we increased the number of occasions that we take advantage of to do just that? And who are the individuals—if we are having these language problems, are we sending other people with interpreters, are we sending the same people over and over again? Are we having any concerted, coordinated effort to engage in that way so that there is at least a feeling of openness and exchange and listening going on?

Mr. ROSS. Mr. Tierney, certainly since September 11, there has been an intensive and coordinated effort to provide senior officials for appearances for media events of all kinds, with both the electronic and print media in the Arab world. To the extent possible, we have drawn on those who mastered Arabic well enough to make public appearances of that sort. But in many cases senior officials have appeared in English, and fortunately, the electronic media have a set of rather good interpreters who can carry the message forward in Arabic.

It has been an intensive effort, and you are right, a lot of policy explication needs to be done. We need to be sure that as people react to our policy, they are reacting to the reality of our policy and not somebody else's version of that policy. We need to be sure that people understand the context of our policy, the way it came about, the reasons that it came about. This is often lacking in—in the shorthand versions of our policies. And so policy explication at all levels of public diplomacy, from the Secretary of State down to those working in the field as public affairs officers, information officers, etc., policy explication is the No. 1 priority at this point.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

And in following on that thought, Mr. Pachios, and then Ambassador Ross, you talked, Mr. Pachios, about the need for flexibility in getting our message out or whatever, but it seems to me there is tension between that and making sure that the message we get out is consistent and truly represents the administration's position. And that—so you have the bureaucracy on one side trying to make sure that everything is approved all the way up so it is the same, because we all know, as well-intended as the media is, that sometimes they extrapolate out a message or give it an interpretation that the original speaker may or may not like, but, as that passes through different channels, you have more risk, I guess, of it being misinterpreted or misstated.

So how do you reconcile that tension between wanting to have some control to make sure that your message actually gets out

there and the flexibility that you need in the field to have enough people getting out there with it?

Mr. PACHIOS. That is a good question. I can't reconcile it. It is a tension that will always exist. But I do think that we need to take some more risks, and we need to make sure that we have in the field Ambassadors and professional Foreign Service staff who are good enough to minimize the mistakes and let them carry the ball more, instead of having to phone back to Washington on so many issues.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it is a communication and education process within your own team, and then letting them have some flexibility on that?

Mr. PACHIOS. Ambassador Ross is an expert in this.

Mr. ROSS. Having been out there for a number of years, I can say that one of the most effective functions of the Bureau of International Information Programs, which is now in the State Department, is to provide materials to Ambassadors and other embassy staff to draw on in explaining and defending American policy.

Currently Presidential and secretarial speeches, for instance, get translated into all of the relevant languages and sent out immediately so that they are available out there for our practitioners in the field to draw upon, and that is—that is the basis from which individual spokesmen appearing on the various media abroad work from.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Pachios, the recommendations and the advice of your Commission before September 11, 2001, and after, has it been significantly different, or are people just listening more?

Mr. PACHIOS. They have not been significantly different. I point out to people that if you took all of the Commission's reports—this is a bipartisan Commission—if you took all of the Commission's reports between 1988 and the year 2000, and then compared what was recommended there with all of the reports that have been written since September 11, Council on Foreign Relations, CSIS, all of the—everybody else that has commented on this, you wouldn't find anything new. Radio Sawa is new. That is different.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Schrock.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Pachios, for your opening remarks. I want to—I think Mr. Gilman's line of questioning hit the nail right on the head, and I want to follow through on that a little bit about language proficiency. But I am not sure I understand what the Department is doing to meet the Arab language proficiency skills. If the personnel who engage the folks in the Arab world can't speak the language, how can they be effective?

What are we doing to recruit them? Is recruiting a problem? Is it that we are not spending enough money? As Mr. Pachios said, we have to spend money on our campaigns to communicate with the constituents. I spent $125,000 a week in my last campaign just on TV. You don't spend half of that trying to recruit people. And I think—where is the problem? Is it something we are doing wrong here? Is it something you are doing wrong that you are not requesting of us? And how do we recruit correctly, because, as I said, com-

munications is the name of the game. How do we go about doing that?

Mr. ROSS. I will attempt to get for the subcommittee a fuller response from our Bureau of Human Resources, but my understanding is that the Secretary has placed a great emphasis on reinvigorating the process of recruitment, and there is a special interest in finding candidates who already have some degree of hard language skills, whether it be Arabic or Chinese or another.

Within the career, there are increasing opportunities for language training, and the picture is perhaps not as bleak as one might assume. There are a great many Foreign Service officers who speak Arabic to the level of being able to conduct a private business session, a private exchange.

It is somewhat different when you get on television. Your level of Arabic has to be a good, better than that, because of the pressures and the intensity of the event. In every embassy in the Middle East, there are several officers who do master Arabic in whatever function they have been placed. They are always available to help the mission as a whole, when the use of Arabic is essential.

As I said, the critical shortage is in—is at the level of being able to appear on television and to do it fluently.

Mr. SCHROCK. Well, I can tell you, one of the—two of the tours of duty I had I was required to take Arabic, and it was brutal. I mean, it was the most difficult thing I ever did, so I can certainly understand that.

Do you have a comment on that, Mr. Pachios?

Mr. PACHIOS. No. I would just say that I am delighted that the committee members are focusing on this issue of recruitment and training. I met with Ambassador Ross and the Under Secretary yesterday, and they are as well. So it is critical.

Mr. SCHROCK. One of the—we always hear that they hate us, they hate us, they hate us. I have never been able to get anybody to answer completely why they hate us, which makes me wonder, are we really responding to the untruths that we hear in some of the Arab media that creates that level of hate that communicating correctly would solve, if that makes sense? I don't understand why—are we doing as much as we can to present the other side?

Mr. ROSS. I think that—to ask why do they hate us is perhaps to oversimplify the situation. In the months after September 11, I took two trips to the Middle East, spoke to an extremely wide variety of individuals ranging from high school students through all of the levels into senior government officialdom, and nowhere did I find hate. I found a lot of anger and mistrust.

I think the proportion of those who actively hate is very small and is most dramatically represented by the likes of Osama bin Laden. But the vast majority of people in the Arab world, in fact, as the polls have shown, admire and respect a great many things about our country. They admire our educational system, our technology, our medical sciences, the opportunities that exist in this country. And by and large, when you probe, you get the answer that, I don't like some of your policies.

And the issue keeps coming back to policies. Of course, that, too, from the Arab perspective is an oversimplification, because the policies that they don't like derive from the American people and

their elected representatives. So the attempt to draw a distinction between the American people and American policies is a little bit specious.

But that is how virtually every Arab whom I spoke to on these two trips did express his or her feelings. I admire a great many things about the United States, but their policies give me trouble. And in that context, that is where our function of policy explication continues to be so important. To the extent the problem is their understanding of policy, we are attempting to improve that understanding.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Gilman handed me something, as I asked that question, from Zogby that their conclusion is that America is not hated; in fact, many things about Americans are viewed favorably. It is only American policy that creates negative attitudes among Arabs and Muslims. It is American policy; that means it happens here in Washington, it happens on Capitol Hill, happens in this room, that is me.

How do we solve that? We need to have people like you tell us how we can solve that, because if we are stepping into to the muck and mire of this thing, and we don't realize that we are doing that, unless we know we are doing it, how we can solve it, then it is my fault. I would like to share it with the other 434 Members as well, but it is up to us to make sure that our policy isn't creating these problems.

Mr. ROSS. Our central task is to make sure that our policies are clearly understood and that the context for those policies is clearly understood. Once that is done, differences may well continue to exist. Inasmuch as policy positions reflect interests, and American policies are American policies, we are not going to change them because someone finds fault with them somewhere. They reflect our own reading of our own interests, and we have to live with the fact that in some cases, the—the differences over policy are unbridgeable.

Mr. SCHROCK. The policy could be correct, but the interpretation over there is——

Mr. ROSS. That is one element, but even when the other side understands our policy completely, they may still disagree.

Mr. PACHIOS. I would just like to add that the experts will say that 80 percent of selling something is listening. Salesman go and they ask questions, and they listen. Tell me your problems. And I am not an expert on the Middle East, as Ambassador Ross is, but I know a little bit about human nature, and I think when people perceive that you are not listening, that you are not feeling what they feel, they get very frustrated.

And I think that is part of the problem. We cannot communicate with people until they're convinced that we are listening and that we sense what their trouble is.

Mr. SCHROCK. That is where we have got to get the money to recruit the right people to get that communication skill down pat so we do it correctly. I agree with you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

At this time we can have Ambassador to Ambassador, Ambassador Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, and the gentlemen who have been speaking. I came in a little late. I didn't hear your statement, but I have been reading it, and some thoughts come to mind. And I would like to make these statements and then end with a question and then have your comment.

In the State of California, and I represent Los Angeles, there has been a movement for decades on English only. That movement gave a very negative message to the people who came over the border. And the first thing that struck me after September 11, is that people really misunderstand us, they hate us, and why. We have never really taken time to understand their culture, their beliefs and their religions, and to be able to convey to them in their language.

One thing I learned living in Japan and taking Japanese is that there are many English phrases that don't even translate. We miss a lot in translation. So we don't send the right messages when we say English only. It is like, if you don't speak our language, then don't speak. I think that is one thing.

Cultural diversity. In the current crisis that we are facing, who are the people that you see speaking about you and to you? They are not faces that look like you. Colin Powell was the only one, and he got pushed to the margin. So the people who are sending the messages over TV, that I am sure they monitor second by second, are faces that look different than theirs.

I understand that through the State Department there was a project, I think Louis Stokes started it several years ago, that went to the historically black colleges and selected high-potential students, brought them into the State Department.

I think Louis Stokes started it several years ago, that went to the historically black colleges and selected high potential students, brought them to the State Department. They learned Farsi and other languages, and they could be very instrumental. So cultural diversity is not displayed well through our media. When we rattle our sabres, does that not send a message that we want to go ballistic, rather than go diplomatic? You can comment on that.

And then how do we educate? Every time I go to a temple in my district and I try to deal with this struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians and say there are innocent people on the other side, I get taken on for that. And I really believe that there are innocent people on the other side who have no idea about American policies and they don't hate us. But the rhetoric is so high about how they do. So how do we educate them?

And let me just say that I don't see a clear policy in dealing with the Middle East. Right now, the policy is to go in and strike first and get rid of the bad guys. I don't hear a clear policy. Are we going to do nation-building? Are we going to really care about these people after we go in and take the bad guys out? Are we going to try to reach understandings? Are we going to get down to the grassroots? And I don't hear a clear policy.

And finally, let me say is it our alliance with Israel that creates negative impressions? So I have a lot of issues that trouble me in trying to think through a policy for America. As one of the Members of Congress voting, that I'm very troubled. I mean, it is causing some sleepless nights, since we are in the process of voting on

a resolution now. So if you can comment on these issues I raised and the one question at the end, is it our alliance with Israel, I'd appreciate it. Thank you so very much.

Mr. ROSS. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. This is a culturally diverse country. That is one of its enormous strengths. I am a Greek American. I enjoy that heritage tremendously, as I am sure other Americans of other backgrounds enjoy theirs. I think it is an aspect of our country that we must build on that; we must use to the maximum extent possible in representing ourselves overseas.

The Secretary of State has shown a great deal of interest in this issue. He would like the diplomatic service to reflect all elements of American society to the greatest degree possible, whether that be on any basis you wish, on the issue of language is a very important one there. The Secretary of State is also very conscious of the importance of tone in talking to other people. It was mentioned earlier that Chairman Pachios mentioned that Arab populations seem to feel a need that someone is listening, someone is understanding, someone has some empathy for them. This can be conveyed to a certain extent by the tone one uses in speaking, not by some drastic change of policy.

There is a great deal to be said for speaking softly, and I personally am of that school. Our policy in the Middle East is clearly a policy that seeks to work for the peace and well-being of all peoples there. This is a very difficult time. The level of violence, counterviolence, terrorism that has existed between Palestinians and Israelis for the last couple of years, has made it very difficult to pursue the search for a political settlement.

We remain actively engaged to try and bring the level of violence down and to end the acts of terrorism. But it will take a major effort to rekindle the political process that, in the end, is the only way to achieve any kind of mutually agreed settlement between Palestinians and Israelis. We are very conscious of the fact that on both sides, innocent people are paying a tremendous price for the continuation of the violence and the terrorism.

So it is certainly something that we are focused on. We do not have a policy of striking first and asking questions later. As you know, the President has taken no decision on how to proceed with regard to Iraq. You have heard his successive speeches on this subject, and I think the administration is proceeding in a careful way as it moves forward.

Ms. WATSON. If you could address the question I raised about our alliance with Israel. Is that pre-determining for Arabs, the United States position, and if they're anti Israel, do we suffer from that attitude?

Mr. ROSS. I think that the Arab governments regard our special relationship with Israel as a strength because in the work of peacemaking over the years, we have been able to work with the Israeli government in the process. I think the issue is far more—the degree to which we are seen to be actively involved in the search for peace and for the time being, there being no active political process, we are perceived as being relatively in active.

I think the day that it becomes possible openly to work for a political settlement, the attitudes on the Arab side will be mitigated

and people will, as they have in the past, see our special relationship with Israel as an advantage in the work of building peace.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Recognize the vice chairman of the committee.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Pachios. If I—please correct me if I misunderstood you, but I believe that you just said that our special relationship with Israel is largely viewed as an advantage, or will be viewed as an advantage. Is that what you just said?

Mr. ROSS. The Arab governments, in general, recognize that in any peace settlement, Israel must participate, and they recognize that our special relationship with Israel enables us to play a very important mediating role.

Mr. PUTNAM. I just wanted to point out that according to the Zogby poll, the rejection of America's pro Israel tilt is nearly unanimous. Asked whether they approved the U.S. Government policy toward the Palestinians, just 1 percent of Kuwaitis, 2 percent of Lebanese, 3 percent of Egyptians and Iranians, and 5 percent of the Saudis and Indonesians say yes.

And if, according to your previous testimony, our policy in the Middle East toward Arabs is even when, as you put it, people thoroughly understand how we arrived at that decision, they still disagree, we have a tall order in communicating, as I see our policy toward Israel not changing any time in the near future, and our support being unflinching and steadfast.

So therefore, recognizing the unflinching support of the United States toward Israel, and the unflinching opposition of the Arab world toward our position, could you please elaborate on how we are going to overcome that obstacle?

Mr. ROSS. In the 7 years that I was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, we worked very hard with all the Arab parties to achieve a comprehensive peace. In that peace-making contact with the Syrian government, with which I was working very closely at the time, and which is, by no means, an easy partner, the Syrian government made a distinction between a special relationship and a tilt.

Mr. PUTNAM. But what about the Syrian people? The people who are the targets, the audience of this public diplomatic effort that we are here to discuss today?

Mr. ROSS. In the context of peacemaking, as they saw us positively engaged on the road for peace, I did not find a Syrian public opinion that opposed our relationship with Israel. Our problem today is that there is no active search for peace in the way that we knew it in the 10 years following Madrid, and when that is absent, then attitudes tend to harden, tending to go in many different directions.

Mr. PUTNAM. Let me just continue, if I may. I hate to cut you off, but we only get 5 minutes, and I just want to move on to another question. In a study that the United Nations did, the Arab Human Development Report of July of this year, the report written by Arabs for Arabs points out these statistics: Arab societies and their current 280 million people are being crippled by a lack of political freedom, the repression of women and isolation from the world of ideas. 65 million adult Arabs or 23 percent of the population are illiterate. Two thirds of them are women.

In the next 8 years, its population will go from 280 million to 450 million. 20 percent of those people live on less than $2 per day, and 40 percent of them are under 14. Well, then, a Nation like the United States where the largest childhood nutrition problem is obesity, do you think that there might be something deeper than the progress of the Arab peace process in their resentment, or their envy of the United States as the world's last economic cultural diplomatic and military hegemon, for lack of a better term?

Mr. ROSS. Historically there hasn't been that kind of societal envy or resentment. I think as the figures grow in the categories that you mentioned, that is very possibly going to emerge as yet other element in this equation. Arab society, as I have experienced it, does have safety nets that continue to work, the extended family being one of them. So $2 a day for a family of 10 is different from $2 a day for a single individual. It is a worrisome picture and the statistics that you cite demonstrate the magnitude of the problem.

Within our limited resources, we are trying to do something to correct some of these phenomena, but in the end, it is going to take a very enormous effort on the part of many, many parties to deal with the kinds of situations that you are describing.

Mr. PUTNAM. The report further points out that Arab intellectuals are fleeing a stifling and repressive political and social environment, and half of Arab women are unable to read or write, and the mortality rate is double that of Latin America and quadruple that of East Asia. How are we communicating and how are we fashioning a message when half of the population is illiterate?

If you're a woman, you have no economic opportunity and perhaps are unable to read or comprehend the messages that we are broadcasting or transmitting. Furthermore, as Mr.—as the gentleman from Virginia pointed out in terms of resources, he spent $125,000 a week to communicate to one 435th of this country. We're dealing with an entire region, and as you pointed out in your testimony, there are many Arab streets. So how many different messages are we communicating?

Mr. ROSS. On the issue of illiteracy, the fact that it is as widespread as the report indicates, has heightened our determination to make increased use of the electronic media, particularly television and, to some extent, radio, Radio Sawa, being our principal tool in that regard. Radio and television reach out to illiterate populations. On the issue of women, and their role in society, we have a very active womens' program within our limited means in our exchange program.

At this point, 48 percent of our exchange grantees are women. Given the magnitude of the problem, a lot more needs to be done there. But there is an active interest in improving the position of women in society.

Mr. PUTNAM. My question, my third question was whether, as you pointed out, there are many Arab streets. How many different messages do we communicate?

Mr. ROSS. Our message has to be a consistent message throughout the region. The nature of modern media, if, for no other reason, dictates that this be so. You can't speak to one population saying one thing and another saying another. However, our embassies on the ground are able to fashion this consistent message in terms

that are most relevant and most directly meaningful to individual audiences. But the core message has to remain the same.

Mr. PUTNAM. Well, both of you have referenced political campaigns talking about enormous, enormous-sized nations and someone running for Governor, much less someone running for president, doesn't run the same commercial in Harlem as they do in south Arkansas or in Kentucky or in Central Florida. You have different methods, different messages for different populations even within a nation. And when you look at the diversity within these nations, the different religious factions, the tribal elements, there has to be some tremendous diversity to communicate the core message in a variety of different ways.

We're putting an awful lot of emphasis on younger people through Radio Sawa, the Internet, television. In populations where 20 percent live on less than $2 a day, how many have a TV, a radio or access to the Internet?

Mr. ROSS. Radio and television are virtually universal, despite the poverty, and this is true because families collect among themselves to buy a set that may serve five, 10, 15 people. Televisions are often placed in cafes and other public places. Radio is omnipresent. The Internet, to this date, remains a very limited phenomenon, although in some Arab countries it has acquired quite a foothold. But what we note from the figures is that it is a growing phenomenon. It is going to penetrate over time.

For the moment, however, radio and television are the principal means of communication to the widest possible number. And satellite television is particularly significant. Again, hearken back to my days in Damascus, when you climbed up the mountain adjacent to Damascus and looked over the city, which was largely apartment buildings, the entire city was covered in satellite dishes. Every building had five or six or seven on it.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank the gentleman. Recognize myself for my 10 minutes. I have lots of different emotions. I just really have enjoyed this panel. I have enjoyed the questions that my colleagues have asked. As a former Peace Corps volunteer, I have ingrained in me the sense that you need to understand cultures and I will just quickly say that when I was in Brussels recently, I was walking down the aisle or down the hallway, and people were coming outside the doors, coming in 90 degrees and running right in front of me and crossing me, making me stop and looking at me like I was rude. And I found myself saying these are rude people.

And then the next day, I was driving a car—I was driving in a car, and they were explaining to me the rules when you drive a car in Brussels. And that is, that a 90-degree—a person coming in from a side street has the right of way and can literally come in front of a car coming down a straight road. And I thought, well that explains the connection that I had with people cutting me off. And when I knew that, I looked at it differently and realized that to them, I was the rude person and they,in fact, weren't being rude at all.

I just didn't understand that when you walk down and someone comes to your right even at 90 degrees you stop and let them go. So there has been a lot of talk about the speaking side, but I want

to put a little emphasis on the listening side. I'm told that ingrained in me as well that—not that I always practice it, is that you listen, you learn, you help and then you lead. You know, and that sense to me is that you then take action.

I will also say to you that I have some real biases against the Arab community that I have to deal with, its treatment of women and so on. I can go on. I was touched, Doctor, Ambassador Ross, by your comments about—first off I agree with you. There is no one street, and I am almost a little embarrassed that we called it that, but it was a good title. It is obviously a very robust society. But I understand that to the Palestinian—excuse me, to the Arab world now speaking as one, we appear, in many cases, to be immoral, anti religious and anti Muslim.

We—I was impressed by thinking about in Muslim nations that we share certain values of family, faith and education and generosity. And it seems to me that when we sort out these problems that we have that we need to focus in on what binds us together, and then try to sort out our differences. But one thing I know is going to happen is we are not changing our policy about Israel. If anything, September 11 has made me feel more sympathetic toward Israel, more understanding that there are not good terrorists and bad terrorists. There are terrorists.

And an embarrassment that our country has not stood up to terrorism. When I was in Turkey meeting with them about the—those in the Kurdish community that have been very active in terrorism, and that their complaint to us was that in France, the terrorist organization in Paris has their headquarters. And yet they've lost 30,000 people. I have to start with this premise that certain policies simply aren't going to change. And I start with the premise that our failure to stand up to terrorism has also had an imprint on the Muslim world.

And I would like either of you to tell me if I am wrong in my general belief that the—am I wrong in my general belief that allowing our embassy employees to be held hostage for 444 days was an absolute outrage, and that the Muslim world began to look, and I say Muslim world collectively, at a great nation not willing to protect its diplomats and not willing to speak out for them and not willing to treat this as what it was, a terrorist act, or certainly, an act of war? I go down from Germany, our failure to respond to the killings of our soldiers in Germany by terrorists, the Hezbollah and what they did in—to our Marines in the barracks in Beirut, and the fact that no one was held accountable.

No one basically in leadership was held accountable for the bombings in Saudi Arabia. No one really was held accountable for the bombings of our embassies in South Africa. No one was held accountable for the Cole, what happened with the Cole. No one. And when the President said at one event I attended, he said I was wondering, I keep thinking what were the terrorists thinking. And then the thought, they probably thought we were going to sue them and we smiled.

But, you know—so I guess what I want to say is there are lots of ways we send messages, and I want you to speak to the concept of our failure to address terrorism, and what message that sent. And I would like to ask both of you.

Mr. ROSS. I think you are absolutely right on the issue of terrorism. Historically, it has proven a rather difficult phenomenon to counter and to combat, but I think the current approach of seeking out terrorists, wherever they may be, and dealing with them appropriately is the right posture. The Tehran hostage crisis was a very sad chapter in our presence in the region. I, myself, was present in the embassy and I was assigned to the embassy in Beirut the day it was bombed and lost many friends there. I know the costs of terrorism, and I think a firm response is fully justified.

Mr. SHAYS. But I'm talking more than justified. What message does it send to the—to that part of the world when a great Nation like the United States is willing to, I mean, did that win us friends? When they saw us fail to respond to the deaths of nearly 300 Marines, did we win friends that way? Did we win friends by turning the other cheek? I need to know that. If you tell me we won friends, I want to know how we won friends.

Mr. ROSS. No, I don't think that we won friends, Mr. Chairman. I think on the contrary, people began to assume that they could take pot shots of various kinds at the United States, and that there would be no reaction or no significant reaction. And I think as I say, our current posture is a much sounder one.

Mr. SHAYS. One of the things the Israelis say to me is that you are trying to impose your western thought on our Middle East dispute. And one of the things they have said to me and to others is you will not be able to impose a settlement. We will have to come to grips with in. But I think of something even as what seems as horrific as tearing the—and I am speaking now of what the Israelis are doing, of literally destroying the homes of the families whose children have been suicide bombers.

And to my western thought, that seems pretty unusual, and somewhat questionable. Until I put it in the perspective of asking myself, why would anyone in the Arab community accept $25,000 for the death of their son who had killed innocent children and innocent adults? And so I have a hard time—and I realize that world is different, very different. I would like to ask you, Mr. Pachios, would you care to comment on the question I asked?

Mr. PACHIOS. I don't—my colleague, Ambassador Ross, was in the counterterrorism for a while, so he is an expert, I am not. But I would like to say that your comments about listening are correct. Your comments about combatting terrorism are correct. But there is some commonality here. We're not the only people on the planet that are affected and threatened by terrorism. Most of the countries in the western world are concerned about terrorism, and terrorism, frankly, is counterproductive in those countries where it's carried, out and they know that and there is a lot of suffering.

So there is a message there, that terrorism benefits no one. But if we listen, maybe we can get to the roots of this. There is the feeling that if you don't have tanks and jet aircraft like the United States and its allies have, that you don't have anything but human bodies. And I think we have to get to the bottom of that and listen and then respond. Unless we hear them, we have no message to give them that is meaningful.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just take a quote that you said. To put it bluntly—Mr. Pachios, this is your comments. I'm sorry. To put it

bluntly, we should not be in the business of getting people to love us. We will never win the war of words. We should however try to help the world understand us. And I would like you to elaborate on that.

Mr. PACHIOS. Well, I wish Congresswoman Watson were here, because I would respond to what she said. We are a very diverse country and we're the freest country and the most diverse country in the history of this planet. And people do know that. And they know that—and we need to put our policies in context. It is the result not of a few people gathering in a room and saying OK, let's support Israel and here's why. It is representative of what our country is all about. These policies evolved. And sure, there are interest groups, there are different constituencies, and our policy is reconciled and it becomes a policy for our country.

We need people to understand that. If people—policy is made different any most Middle Eastern countries. It is made differently. And so we have to explain our policies in context; that this is the result of what happens in a very free society with a lot of diversity. And this policy is the product—and if you—you may not agree with it. You will never agree with it. But understand what motivates it and how it comes about.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I know we have to vote. I think we're going to have three votes, so I might suggest to the witnesses that they may want to get something to eat and we would go to the next panel, and we probably will be coming back around 10 after 12. I think that is probably when it is going to be. I will say to you one more comment. When I was in Jordan speaking to a leader in Jordan, he was saying you Americans don't understand how our community views a leader. When times are bad in the United States, they blame you as a leader.

When times are bad and when we're in a crisis in our own country we turn to our leaders. And he was trying to explain to me how, in an ironic sort of way, the incredible suffering that was being visited upon the Iraqis, where I would think it would make people turn against Saddam, it made them turn toward him. In our country we would have been out of office like that. Well, obviously we have a different system of government but that is another factor. Appreciate both of you.

I would like to ask if you have anything that you want to put on the record, maybe you felt needed to be put on the record, for instance, Mr. Pachios, you wanted to comment to Ms. Watson. I didn't know you were so shy that you wouldn't have just jumped in. So assuming that you are shyer than ambassador Ross, is there anything you want to put on the record that needs to be put on the record?

Mr. PACHIOS. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. All set?

Mr. PACHIOS. I think we're all set. I just disagreed with the fact that people don't know that we're diverse, clearly they know we're diverse and people around the world, you know there is the old saying, go home American and take me with you. And I think she's wrong on that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well I am happy you put that on the record. Ambassador, any last comment?

Mr. ROSS. Just again to express appreciation for the interest that the Congress has shown in public diplomacy and the support that it's provided.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, you see an interest. We know this battle against terrorism is both social, political, economic as well as military. I don't think that's as evident to the American people that we in government know that. I think it will become more and more evident and your work is very valuable. It's underutilized. Both of your work is under utilized, and I hope your work becomes more prominent.

Thank you both very much. You were excellent witnesses. We're adjourning—we are recessing. Excuse me. Don't put adjourned down there or I'll be dead here. We are recessing and we may be back by 12, but it may be 10 after.

[Recess.]

Mr. SCHROCK [presiding]. Thank you for your patience. But the votes—we have to do votes once in a while. So we'll proceed. The chairman will return in a short period of time, but he asked that I start this hearing with panel 2. And welcome to all of you.

We have—it is this afternoon. We have Mr. John Zogby, who is the president and CEO of Zogby International; we have his brother, Dr. James Zogby, who is the president of the Arab American Institute; Dr. Shibley Telhami, who is a professor of government and politics, Maryland university; Dr. Daniel Brumberg, associate professor of government, Georgetown University, and Dr. R.S. Zaharna, who is assistant professor of public communications, American University. Up the street here? Where I got my degree. I wanted to make sure it was the right one. As is traditional we swear in our panel so if you would please rise, we'll do that.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SCHROCK. Please note for the record that the witnesses responded in the affirmative. I think we will just begin our discussions today with Dr. Zogby, or Mr. Zogby.

STATEMENTS OF JOHN ZOGBY, PRESIDENT AND CEO OF ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL; DR. JAMES ZOGBY, PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE; DR. SHIBLEY TELHAMI, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, MARYLAND UNIVERSITY; DR. DANIEL BRUMBERG, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; AND DR. R.S. ZAHARNA, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity. And let me say that after almost 2 decades of polling the American street, in the last 2 years we have polled extensively Arab public opinion, and I think it is very, very important that we make that differentiation. We're not talking about the street. We're talking about real people.

I would like to call your attention to the report that appears on the table of an earlier poll that we had taken this year. The report is entitled "Arab Nations' Impressions of America poll." I hope that people will take it and read it because there are some starting findings here. We were obviously taken aback by the events of September 11, and also by a poll that was done by our colleagues, another

polling firm that tried to answer the question, why do they hate us? Having traveled pretty extensively and often into the Arab world and Muslim world, that was not the impression that we had had about Arabs in general; that generally they don't hate us.

And so we conducted an extensive poll back in March and early April. And we asked them on a scale of very favorable, somewhat favorable, you now how we talk, to very and somewhat unfavorable what their views were of the American people, of American science and technology, American movies and television, American freedoms and democracy, American products. And in every case, close to majorities or majorities were favorable to those aspects of American life, people and culture.

The breaking point, however, was when we asked specific questions about American policies toward Iraq, toward the Arab nations in general, toward Palestine and the Palestinians the numbers just fell off a cliff, to single digits, in fact. And so essentially they love us, but they don't like our policy. And very important point that needs to be made. Among the most startling findings of the poll, and this is where the opportunity is, I believe, for American policymakers, is that contrary to every myth that I had had or that others had written about, about the demographic boom in all of these countries, about solid majorities in all of these countries being people under 25 years of age, and that these are the street Arabs and the most dangerous element in Arab society, on the contrary, to the degree of 12 to 15 points in each case, the 18 to 29-year-olds that we polled had more positive attitudes toward America than any other age cohort.

When we added to the mix those who had access to satellite TV, those who had access to the Internet, which incidentally borders on around 28 do 30 percent who have access to the Internet, not Internet capacity at home, but Internet capacity in cafes and among friends and so on, the numbers went up even further among those who said that they like us and have favorable views, which led, I think, to the obvious conclusion that there is an age cohort that need not be dangerous to the United States and the interests of the west.

There are common bonds of culture. There are ways, tools that we can communicate to them via the Internet, and via satellite TV. And so I just want to set the stage then for the more detailed poll that we just conducted on Arab values, Arab feelings, which my brother is going to address, but just simply to suggest to you we will be polling in this region more and it is the policy and that should not be dismissed. It is the policy that alienates Arabs and especially young Arabs at a time when we can win them over, when we can build bridges instead of burning down bridges. I thank you for the opportunity, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Zogby.

Mr. SCHROCK. Dr. Zogby.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, the book that John just referred to is called What Arabs Think, and it's just out and its values, beliefs and concerns of people in 8 Arabs countries. The book was important, I think, to do because at this point, too often discussions that take place in this country about the Arab world and about what Arabs think is based on anecdotal evidence, kind

of intellectualized prejudice, I call it. One takes an observation, generalizes the observation into a conclusion, and depending upon the bias of the person makes that conclusion into this is what Arabs are, this is what they think.

It's sort of the same kind of street observations that one gets here in the States, you want to know what they're like? Well, one of them came into my store today and then becomes an observation based on a single anecdote, which is blown up into something much larger. As a result, Arab opinion is dehumanized referred to as the Arab street, generalized, treated as an object usually of scorn and therefore dismissed. The fact is that there is Arab public opinion just as there is American public opinion, and thanks to the Arab Thought Foundation, we were able to go into eight Arab countries and do a detailed assessment of what Arabs think.

I think it's important that we pay attention because unfortunately, up until now, our conversation with that region has been a conversation with the deaf. And that actually goes both ways, we're talking and not hearing what they're saying back to us. They're talking to us and not hearing how we're receiving it. You know, the cartoon "Non Sequitur," it begins with a husband and wife and the wife says something and it's what she said and how it was heard. I listened to the President last night. I know how he was heard here. The question we need to be asking ourselves is how was he heard there, and if the message is not being received well, then we need to take a look at how we're presenting ourselves and what is behind the disconnect.

What we learned in our polling is that at the end of the day, Arabs are people like us. They go to bed at night thinking about their kids. They wake up in the morning and worry about their jobs. The No. 1 concerns what matters most, their civil rights. What comes next is health care. What's interesting is that what comes after that is Palestine. But at the very bottom of the heap, just like for us is the question of foreign policy. Palestine is not a foreign policy question. It is a personal, almost existential defining issue. It is a tragedy happening to people just like them.

And what, therefore, is an extension of that and intriguing is when you ask them how they feel about other countries in the world, the measure of their value of other countries is how those countries impact them, not unlike Americans, who will make their determination on the favorability and unfavorability of other countries using a very similar standard.

The lowest, therefore, for the Arabs is Israel because Israel is doing a very bad thing to Palestinians. Right after that is the United States. And after that is the U.K. toward the top of the heap are countries like France and Canada and Germany who they perceive having a different relationship with them. When we ask questions about how they feel about these countries, or in particular, with regard to the United States, we say what should the United States do to improve its relations, about a third to a half say treat the Palestinians better, or treat us better, or respect our rights and be more fair and balanced to us.

I think the question of listening and hearing and therefore responding with language that people understand is so critical to this discourse. And I must say that there are those in both the Advisory

Commission on public diplomacy as well as those who are involved in the effort at the State Department understand that. They are restricted, of course, by the question of policy and the domestic debate here in the United States.

But when the domestic debate here in the United States impedes on our ability to pursue critical foreign policy objectives, then I think we need to take another look at how we go about both the conversation here at home and also the policy that results from the conversation. It is making the Middle East a more dangerous place for us, and I think it is at that point I will end my remarks and be happy to ask actually that your Impressions of America Poll in its entirety be submitted for the record. I think it would be an important piece of information for other members to consider. And I thank you for the opportunity to speak.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you doctor. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

Zogby International
Polling/Market Research
Public Relations Services
Marketing Strategies

May 2002

Dear Friends,

Zogby International conducted a 10-nation poll in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim world in March and early April.

I thought you would like to see the results because it counters several myths about the region:

— generally Arabs and Muslims hold favorable views of American products, movies, television and education, science and technology

— significantly, those who are between the ages of 18-29 have the most positive views of American culture and people

— access to satellite television and the internet are major factors in promoting a favorable feeling toward America

These and other findings are not only contrary to the conventional wisdom; they offer hope for the development of an improved relationship between the U.S. and the people of the Middle East.

I hope you find it useful. Please feel free to contact me if you need more analysis or data at john@zogby.com.

Sincerely,

John Zogby
President

1750 Genesee Street
Utica, New York 13502-5418
Phone: (315) 624-0200 Fax: (315) 624-0210
E-Mail: mail@zogby.com
Web Page: http://www.zogby.com

Zogby Research Canada
1-877-GO-2-POLL
(1-877-462-7655)

1600 K Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: (202) 429-0022

Zogby International Presents: April 19, 2002

Arab Nations' "Impressions of America" Poll

Introduction

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Americans became painfully aware of the gap in understanding between our world and much of the Arab world. Front page headlines and newsmagazine cover stories asked "Why do they hate us?' Pundits and scholars across the ideological spectrum offered answers that ranged from the serious to the silly. Some suggested that the behavior of the attackers was not aberrant, but characteristic of Islam and its followers. They suggested that the West and Islam not only are different, but are inevitably headed toward a clash. Others suggested that "they" hate our democratic values, our superpower status, our wealth, and our people. Still others noted that it was our policy of unquestioning support for Israel, our denial of Palestinian rights, and our collaboration with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East that was behind "their" alienation from "us."

It was in this context that Zogby International launched its own poll of 10 countries from March 4 through April 3, 2002. Our objectives were simple:

- To determine how adults in Arab and Muslim/non-Arab countries feel about specific items relative to the American people and culture.
- To ascertain whether or not these adults differentiate between their feelings toward the American people and culture, on one side, and American policy in the Middle East region.

In short, we sought to discover what Arabs really do think of the United States and the various manifestations of America that impact their lives.

Our methodology was simple. We conducted face-to-face interviews in five Arab nations — Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Face-to-face interviews were also conducted in three non-Arab Muslim nations — Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan.

To establish a proper context for our results, we also conducted face-to-face interviews in France and Venezuela.

We have, over the years, developed a unique expertise polling in several Middle Eastern countries. We have polled on the television habits of residents of five Arab countries; attitudes toward the economy and variety of social and

ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL
1750 GENESSE STREET
UTICA, NY 13502
TEL: (315) 624-0200 OR 1-877-GO-2-POLL
FAX: (315) 624-0210
HTTP://WWW.ZOGBY.COM

JOHN ZOGBY
PRESIDENT

JAMES ZOGBY
SENIOR POLITICAL ANALYST

political issues in some of these same countries; on the future of information technology in the region; and on detailed voting behavior in the elections in Iran and Israel.

Building on this experience, this poll was specifically designed to learn about attitudes towards "Americans"— not "America" in general, but on the many different ways that our country manifests itself in the world and interacts with its people.

If we grant the conventional wisdom, somewhat expressed in the Gallup poll, that "America" is viewed unfavorably, the question we sought to answer was what factors, if any, drive this unfavorable attitude.

It is worth noting that we continue polling in the Middle East region. In fact, we are currently in the field conducting an extensive study for the Arab Thought Foundation. That effort is a seven-nation poll that examines in depth issues on the identity, values, and belief in the contemporary Arab world.

The following pages highlight the key results of our study in a series of graphs and prominent reporting in the media following its release.

Key Results

The Zogby Arab Nations' "Impressions of America" poll was specifically designed to learn about attitudes concerning the many different ways America manifests itself in the world and interacts with the world's people, particularly those in the Arab world.

If we grant the conventional wisdom that America is viewed unfavorably in the Arab world, the question this study sought to answer was what factors, if any, drive this unfavorable attitude.

These are the key results from the five Arab nations surveyed (Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and U.A.E):

1. In all five Arab countries, those polled have a high regard for American science and technology. In most instances, the majorities who are positive are overwhelming, ranging from 86% favorable to 12% unfavorable in Kuwait, to Saudi Arabia's 71% to 26% ratio.

2. Majorities in all countries are also favorably inclined toward America's democracy and freedom, ranging from Kuwait's 58% favorable to 39% unfavorable, to 50% to 44% in U.A.E..

3. By and large, attitudes toward the American people are split (somewhat paralleling American attitudes toward Arabs). While there are net negative feelings toward the American people in Egypt (35% to 47%) and Saudi Arabia (43% to 51%), majorities of Kuwaitis and Lebanese are favorable — including 63% of Kuwaiti nationals. In the U.A.E., a plurality are favorable at 43% to 42%.

4. American movies and television are well received by majorities in all countries. The highest approved ratings were found in U.A.E. and Lebanon (64% each).

5. American-made products are viewed favorably by majorities in all five Arab states with Lebanon (72% favorable to 25% unfavorable) and U.A.E. (68% to 27%) leading. While over 50% are favorable in the other three countries, there are substantial minorities who are unfavorable in Egypt (45%), Saudi Arabia (44%), and Kuwait (39%).

6. American education receives high grades in all countries (especially Lebanon, 81% and U.A.E., 79%). In every Arab country, the youngest polled are most enthusiastic about American education. Those with the highest percentages of Internet access are most positive in all the countries.

7. Incredibly low marks are given everywhere for United States policy toward the Arab nations and toward the Palestinians. The United States is only given single-digit favorable ratings on its dealings with the Arab nations by every Arab nation (except U.A.E. where it is 15%, driven mostly by the large numbers of non-U.A.E. citizens included in the poll). In all countries, more than nine out of 10 are unfavorable.

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8. On U.S. policy toward the Palestinians, the numbers are even lower. Notably, the negative ratings are at least nine out of 10 in every Arab nation.

9. In every country, the "Palestinian issue" is viewed as "the most" or "a very important" issue facing the Arab world today. The range on this is from two in three in Saudi Arabia up to four in five in Lebanon and Egypt.

10. Those polled in every country indicate that they would overwhelmingly react more favorably toward the United States if it "were to apply pressure to ensure the creation of an independent Palestinian state." This includes 69% in Egypt, 79% in Saudi Arabia, 87% in Kuwait (91% of Kuwaiti nationals), 59% in Lebanon, and 67% in U.A.E. (76% of Emiratis).

11. Almost every Kuwaiti national (98%) says that they supported the "American-led effort to free Kuwait." But the consensus ends there. It drops to 69% among non-citizens living in Kuwait.

12. If the United States is looking for support in the war against terrorism, it will find it hard to come by in the Arab street. There is no majority support in any of the Arab countries.

13. Significant differences appear among age groups and levels of Internet access and access to satellite TV. In every Arab country polled, the youngest groups (18–29 years of age) are substantially more positive to American products, people, and values than the other age groups. Indeed, youth appears to be a factor as negativity grows with age. The same holds true for those with satellite TV and Internet access in the Arab countries — those with it are most positive toward American freedom and democracy, American movies and television, American-made products, and American education. The same cannot be said for those polled in the non-Arab countries.

14. There was no observable gender gap in any of the countries polled.

15. Our conclusion: "America" is not hated. In fact, many things about America are viewed favorably. It's only American policy that creates negative attitudes among Arabs and Muslims.

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Graphs and Analysis

- *Arab opinion distinguishes between aspects of American life and culture and American foreign policy, viewing the former favorably, the latter much less so.*

1. Favorability towards U.S. Freedom and Democracy and U.S. Arab Policy



- *While some observers consider large Arab youth populations to be a factor contributing to regional instability and radicalization, our results show that young Arabs are more likely to be favorable towards the American people.*

2. Favorability towards the American People in Five Arab Nations by Age



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- *The frequent correlation of Internet access and satellite television subscriptions with favorable attitudes towards the American people shows that these media can offer the means for the United States to get its message across to succeeding generations in the Arab world.*

3. Favorability towards the American People in Five Arab Nations by Internet Access



4. Favorability towards the American People in Five Arab Nations by Satellite Television Subscription



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Appendix A. – Media Highlights

BusinessWeek online

It's Not Americans That Arabs Hate

A new poll suggests that their positions are more nuanced: It's U.S. policy they really despise. The Administration should take note

APRIL 15, 2002
WASHINGTON WATCH
By Richard S. Dunham

In early March, a Gallup poll of people in 10 Islamic nations sent shock waves across the U.S. Clear majorities of Muslims in all the countries thought U.S. military action in Afghanistan was unjustified. Many denied that Arabs had carried out the September 11 attacks. Even in supposed American allies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan, large numbers of Muslims described the U.S. as unfriendly, untrustworthy, and easily provoked.

"Why do they hate us?" the Sunday talk shows agonized. "Ingrates!" America-firsters wailed. But while the Gallup survey set off alarm bells, it also raised important questions for American policymakers who are trying to figure out how to better communicate to the Islamic world.

What is it that Muslims -- and Arabs in particular -- so dislike about the U.S.? What do they like about America? And how do policymakers use the latest available technologies, from satellite TV to the Internet, to leverage the positive views of the U.S. to counter the negative?

THUMBS-UP ON CAPITALISM. Some of those questions have been answered in a second poll of Arab and Muslim nations, this one conducted by Zogby International. The findings are fascinating, and if the Bush Administration is smart it will study the results closely for clues on how to improve America's image in the Middle East and beyond.

Zogby surveyed residents of five Arab nations (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon), three non-Arab Islamic countries (Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia), and two others (France and Venezuela) for comparison purposes. The bottom line: While they have overwhelmingly negative reaction to U.S. policy positions, Arabs and Muslims are not opposed to all things American.

Indeed, Arab and Islamic countries are more enthusiastic about old-fashioned Yankee capitalism than they are about American concepts of freedom and democracy. Most Muslims think highly of U.S.-made products, particularly American technology, scientific advances, and American films and TV. The U.S. education system also earns high grades. "In essence, they don't hate us," says pollster John Zogby, who is of Lebanese-Christian descent. "They don't hate what we're about."

HOORAY FOR HOLLYWOOD. One example: Despite the image of Iran as a hotbed of anti-Americanism, Iranians think highly of American culture, according to the Zogby poll. While their government was described by President Bush as being part of an "axis of evil," Iranians are among the most likely to say hooray for Hollywood: 75% say they like to watch American movies. In contrast, the French are the most likely to just say *non* to U.S. entertainment exports.

Clearly, expanded commerce is a way to improve U.S. relations in the Middle East. Building on the Jordan free-trade agreement negotiated by former President Clinton and signed into law by Bush would be a good first step. James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute and brother of the pollster, credits the U.S. business presence in Kuwait with nurturing a very positive view of America -- far more positive than in neighboring Saudi Arabia, which segregates U.S. citizens.

It's in America's interest to figure out ways to use

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government programs to minimize the risks to U.S. companies willing to expand their operations in the region. The U.S. needs to be seen as more than a thirsty importer of oil and quiet exporter of military weapons. High-tech products and Hollywood production values could be part of the answer.

NET-SAVVY FREINDS. Another positive sign for the Bush Administration: Younger Arabs are more favorably disposed toward the U.S. than their elders, according to Zogby. This includes 66% of those under age 30 in Lebanon (vs. 56% of those over 50) and 54% in Saudi Arabia (vs. 35%). This is particularly heartening because more than half of the Arab population is under 21 years old.

The finding also goes against the conventional wisdom that large numbers of younger Arabs hate Americans because of their anti-U.S. indoctrination. The White House might want to study this finding closely and develop a policy for helping to bring more economic stability -- and eventually prosperity -- to the impoverished region.

More good news: Arabs and Muslims who use the Internet are far more favorably disposed toward America than their low-tech neighbors and relatives. In Egypt, 72% of Net-savvy citizens view U.S. freedom and democracy favorably, while just 42% of non-Web users do. In Saudi Arabia, 63% of those with Net access rank the U.S. positively, while 43% of nonusers do. The message to Bush is clear: Do whatever it takes to increase Internet usage in the Middle East while spreading America's message in a factual way on the Web.

FRUSTRATED. Even with these glimmers of hope, there are clear trouble spots. The rejection of America's pro-Israel tilt is nearly unanimous. Asked whether they approve of U.S. government policy toward the Palestinians, just 1% of Kuwaitis, 2% of Lebanese, 3% of Egyptians and Iranians, 5% of Saudis and Indonesians, and 9% of Pakistanis say yes. "It's not our values, it's not our democracy, it's not our freedom...it's the policy they don't like," says James Zogby. (Support for U.S. policy in Europe doesn't appear to be much greater, to be sure. The Zogby poll found it's just 12% in France.)

Millions of Arabs young and old are disillusioned by the Israeli-Palestinian violence and frustrated by the inability of the U.S. to prod the parties toward a final settlement that yields an independent Palestine. Indeed, hatred of Israel runs deep. And, as the Gallup Poll so dramatically indicated, misinformation runs high in the Middle East.

It will be very difficult to reeducate many Muslims who have been taught vicious, profane lies about the Jewish religion and the Israeli nation in their schools and in their state-controlled press. Improved American relations with the Arab world doesn't have to mean a diminished commitment to the survival and prosperity of Israel, however.

As Bush has said, now is the time to act. And as the Zogby Poll shows, the audience may be a bit more receptive than Americans had previously thought.
Dunham is a White House correspondent for *BusinessWeek*'s Washington bureau. Follow his views every Monday in Washington Watch, only on BusinessWeek Online
Edited by Douglas Harbrecht

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Islam's Split-Screen View of the U.S.

Survey in Muslim Nations Shows Hatred of Policies But a Love of the Culture

By JIM VANDEHEI

WASHINGTON—Muslims in the Arab world largely dislike U.S. foreign policy, but a significant number of them enjoy American popular culture, a new poll has found.

Contrary to perceptions that Arab and non-Arab Muslim nations hate everything American, the Zogby International poll, to be released today, found widespread Muslim approval of this country's consumer products, movies and television programs. For instance, 75% of Iranians polled and 54% of Kuwaitis surveyed have a favorable view of American movies and television shows. But only 1% of Iranians and 6% of Kuwaitis polled said they back U.S. policies toward Arab nations and Palestinians.

The results of Zogby's latest "Impressions of America" survey are derived from face-to-face interviews with what Zogby describes as "randomly selected" people, conducted in March and early April in five Arab nations and three non-Arab Muslim nations. Zogby said the data carry a margin of error that varies, depending on the country, by three to 4.5 percentage points.

The View From Afar

While few of those surveyed have a favorable view of U.S. policy toward Arab nations, attitudes toward Americans in general are more mixed.



Source: Zogby International

While leading a global war against terror, Mr. Bush has worked with Britain and other nations to better explain what he sees as U.S. altruism. He has highlighted foreign aid and offered more of it, and talked frequently of U.S. humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

But Zogby's numbers suggest that those efforts have done little to allay hostility toward the U.S. "They don't hate us, but the policy does appear to be taking its toll," says John Zogby, the Utica, N.Y.-based pollster who oversaw the survey.

An overwhelming majority of those surveyed was critical of U.S. foreign policy. From Egypt to the United Arab Emirates, fewer than one in 10 offered a favorable view of American policy, dominated by a global crackdown on terrorism and peace talks in the Middle East.

In Pakistan, however, where the U.S. has been heavily engaged, 20% of respondents had a favorable view of U.S. policy. While the number is low, it does suggest that Washington can win more support when it works closely with nations and follows through on promises of aid.

"It's enough to suggest we may be doing some relationship building," said Mr. Zogby.

Moreover, people in all eight countries surveyed, save Iran, said they would react more positively to the U.S. if Mr. Bush were "to apply pressure to ensure the creation of a Palestinian State." For instance, nearly six in 10 Lebanese interviewed said they would view the U.S. more favorably if Mr. Bush stepped up efforts to create a Palestinian State.

Secretary of State Colin Powell is in the Middle East trying to negotiate a settlement that could lead to the creation of one. But Mr. Bush has been widely criticized in the region for standing firmly behind Israel and failing to intercede forcefully enough to broker a peace deal.

It's unlikely Mr. Bush will take an approach tough enough to satisfy people in the region, where the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is the only foreign-policy issue that matters, said Richard Murphy, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Syria. "That will continue to be a point of grumbling in the Arab world," he said.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2002 A15

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1750 GENESSE STREET
UTICA, NY 13502
TEL: (315) 624-0200 OR 1-877-GO-2-POLL
FAX: (315) 624-0210
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Mr. SCHROCK. Dr. Telhami. Did I say that right?

Mr. TELHAMI. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to address——

Mr. SCHROCK. You need to have your microphone on.

Mr. TELHAMI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to address sort of what drives public perceptions of America in the Arab world especially, and the Muslim world broadly. And also secondarily, whether that really matters for U.S. policy in the Middle East. There are people who think it shouldn't matter because after all, we have authoritarian governments who can simply disregard public sentiment and have succeeded in the past, and therefore will in the future so we can ignore public sentiment and deal with governments and not worry about public opinion.

So let me address both of these issues. I think it is true that the attitudes of radical groups like al Qaeda and those people who make up al Qaeda and its backbone support hate America, not only for its policies, but also for its values. No question that there are people who are intolerant in the region who do constitute political movements that are incompatible with American interests.

But it is also obviously true that the vast majority of the people in the region do not see America through that prism. When they think of America, they're not thinking about western values and their resentment of America is mostly based on American policy, not American values. Certainly, every poll has shown that to be true. And to the extent that we have these interesting historical episodes where America has not always been disliked in the Middle East. They were historically in fact, America had a favorable rating in the Middle East for much of its history until the past 25 years or so.

And certainly, when you think about Middle Eastern attitudes to toward other western countries, they have favorable rating toward a number of western countries, and those countries that have favorable ratings are those whose policies are perceived to be favorable to them. There is no question that it is a policy issue, not a value issue at the level of the public. Al Qaeda aside, which is a problem that has to be confronted separately, and I think there is no daylight between us and al Qaeda. But I think that is not true about the general public in the region.

Now what are these policy issues that matter for most people? And I think here it is clear that the vast majority of the public in the Middle East is frustrated with a political system that they see as unfavorable to them, which they seem to have no role to play. With all that comes with that, an authoritarian political order, hardship, loss of hope, and foreign policy, and they see the United States as the anchor of that political system which is disadvantageous to them. But no issue, no issue is as important in the perception of the region as the Palestinian-Israeli issue. It is the prism through which most people in the region see the world. It isn't that's the only reason they resent America.

And frankly, when you look at the world, we have to remind ourselves that America unfortunately is resented not only in the Middle East, but in countries and regions that have little to do with the Middle East, such as Latin America and Asia. And in that sense, the resentment of America in the Middle East is not espe-

cially different from many other parts on a number of issues. But the added value of the passion of resentment is largely related to the Arab-Israeli issue.

And we have to understand that issue for most people is not about foreign policy, as Jim said, but about identity.

There are a number of reasons for it over the past half of a century. Why the collective consciousness the collective political consciousness of Arabs is, in large part, formed in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and especially to the Palestinian issue. If you look at the psychology of generations, successive generations of Arabs since World War II, the defeat of 1948, the war of 1956, the defeat of 1967 the war of 1973, major wars that over which people paid a heavy price and that, in fact, brought down dreams of collective Arab aspirations, most of which were linked to the issue of Palestine and Israel.

And so there is a collective scar in the region that is one of humiliation related to the Arab-Israeli issue, and the Palestinian issue remains an open wound, because now it is visible. They are the ones who are mostly dying among Arabs and who are seen on television through the news media every single place.

And so when people form opinions about the United States today, they largely see the United States through that prism, through the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have two headlines today in our newspapers about the Middle East, one about the President's important speech on Iraq and on terrorism, and the other was about the death of 12 Palestinian in Gaza. We are correctly, in our public discourse, focused on the President's speech. That is the one that is going to be consequential for us. What is consequential in the region, what people are reporting, and the passions are being formed, largely through the second story, that it is a secondary story to us. So they see us through a different prism, and we have to keep that in mind. In that sense, that is a central issue in the attitudes.

Now, the second point I want to address is the extent to which that matters at all. It is clear that governments in the region have been able actually to repress the public and to overlook the pressure that emanates from the public on foreign policy. And I think they have survived and they have been able to build institutions that have been robust, and I don't think that most of them are threatened by things like revolutions, are few and far in between in history. They don't happen very often. But, frankly, most of them are stressed to the limit, and they don't want to be tested even if they know most likely they will survive.

But beyond that, we have to remind ourselves of what the consequence will be. When we ask governments, like the Government of Jordan, to go against its strong public opinion to support our policy on issues like Iraq, for example, where there is pervasive opposition across society against such a war, when we ask them, support us, we are saying, disregard your public. And when they come to us and say, we can only do that by being more repressive, because that is the only way we can put down the dissent, make sure the demonstrations don't challenge our authority, make sure that we can do what we need to do in supporting a war, we have to understand that the consequences of disregarding public opinion in

the formation of our policy and dealing with governments is the perpetuation of the very repression that has fueled much of the terrorism phenomena in the region. We have to be very conscious of that.

And my worry, Mr. Chairman, is not so much that there would be revolutions in the Middle East tomorrow if there is a—if we pursue policies that disregard completely public opinion in the region, but that there will be passionate opposition and intensification of the sense of humiliation. That will unfortunately fuel the terrorism phenomenon that we are trying to fight. Thank you very much.

Mr. SCHROCK [presiding]. Thank you very much, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Telhami follows:]

REGIONAL RELUCTANCE

BY SHIBLEY TELHAMI

San Jose Mercury

Perspectives Section

Sunday, September 22, 2002

The international crisis over Iraq has changed drastically in just two weeks. After months of talk of unilateral American action against the government of Saddam Hussein, including a possible war to dislodge it from power, President Bush, in an important speech, took the issue to the United Nations. Within days, Iraq accepted the unconditional return of international arms inspectors.

Although the possibility of war with Iraq in the coming months remains high, these recent events have altered the calculations of the United States, Iraq, the Arab states and the United Nations. They have increased the chance of a broad international coalition for a possible war, in case Iraq defies international resolutions, while at the same time making such a coalition less likely if Iraq continues to cooperate.

And that has complicated matters for the Bush administration, which still wants a strong U.N. resolution holding out the threat of war, but is running into resistance from allies. Included in that group are Arab states that could be key to the U.S. ability to wage war, if it comes to that. Despite Vice President Dick Cheney's recent statement that "moderates throughout the region would take heart" at an Iraqi "regime change," the strategic reluctance of Arab states to support an American-led war on Iraq should not be underestimated.

Arab countries did, in the end, reportedly prod Iraq to accept inspectors, and Saudi Arabia went so far as to say it might allow the United States to use bases there to launch a war if Iraq defied the United Nations. But the reality is that the leaders of those countries remain terrified of war. Arab leaders do fear Saddam, as the Bush administration has said. But they fear even more their own people's opposition, possible postwar chaos in Iraq and increased American power in the region.

The rapid-fire changes in the Iraq crisis started after influential GOP leaders -- including former Secretary of State James Baker -- urged U.N. involvement. Some congressional leaders also began pushing publicly for a multilateral approach. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan increased the pressure when he warned, just before Bush was to address the United Nations, that there is no substitute for the legitimacy bestowed by the Security Council.

Political calculations

Speaking only one day after the emotional anniversary of the Sept. 11 horror, the president in turn challenged the United Nations to enforce its resolutions. Although he issued no ultimatum to Iraq, he clearly laid the ground for a new U.N. resolution in the coming weeks that would give such an ultimatum, backed by the threat of force.

The president's speech had an impact on the calculations of many members of the Security Council and others with special interest in the Iraq issue, such as the Arab states. The strongest case that the United States could make against Iraq was not that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Others in the international community have more advanced capabilities, including India, Pakistan and Israel. The difference is this: Iraq contracted to remove its weapons of mass destruction after its 1991 defeat, and was obligated to cooperate with U.N. inspectors and to implement U.N. resolutions.

By focusing this time on Baghdad's violation of these resolutions, President Bush succeeded in challenging the Security Council into action. But some of the countries that eventually lent the United States support may have acted not because the president convinced them Saddam was an immediate threat, but because they were frightened by the prospect of a unilateral American military campaign without the cover of international legitimacy.

While the United States stands to lose much international support if it acts alone, the authority of the United Nations would also be severely undermined.

In the days that followed President Bush's U.N. speech, the pressure on Iraq to accept the return of inspectors without delay mounted. Security Council members, such as France and Russia, which had been urging multilateral action to end the crisis, found it harder to resist introducing a new tough resolution that could lay the ground for possible war with Iraq. And Arab leaders, who had been universally opposed to a unilateral American campaign against Iraq, also felt they could not resist U.N.-mandated action. These changed positions, coupled with extensive diplomatic efforts to persuade Iraq to readmit inspectors quickly, may have convinced the government of Saddam Hussein that the tide was shifting.

Saddam then, last week, said the inspectors could come back unconditionally, and the surprise move led to almost immediate squabbling between America and its allies about whether any new resolutions were needed.

Regardless of the outcome of that debate in the coming weeks, it is important to understand that opposition in the Middle East to war with Iraq -- whether U.N.-sanctioned or not -- is widespread and is based on strategic and political calculations. Arab leaders worry above all about the possible disintegration of Iraq, or continued instability emanating from Iraq, and they do not find American assurances to the contrary credible. They see the task of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and preventing meddling by regional rivals as potentially overwhelming.

While most in Iraq may be happy to rid themselves of Saddam, others may not; no ruler governs alone, and many in the state's extensive power structure and the factions associated with them

will be fearful if the government falls. The prospect of revenge by repressed segments of society will be high, and the factionalism that characterizes Iraqi society will most likely be accentuated.

The Kurds in the north will push for maximum autonomy, and the prospect of a Kurdish state would concern Turkey, which has its own large Kurdish population. The majority of Iraq's Shiites, meanwhile, would want friendly religious and cultural ties with Iran. That could clash with U.S. objectives of confronting Iran and add to Iraq's instability.

But Arab leaders' worries don't stop there. They also fear a sustained U.S. presence meant to prevent such chaos. If the United States commits to the deployment of the necessary military, political and economic resources to assure Iraq's stability, many of Iraq's neighbors, and others in the region, fear a possible American military and political dominance that would then include Iraq in a way that alters the strategic picture to their disadvantage.

Governments in the region generally favor preventing Iraq from becoming a nuclear power, especially under Saddam. Even gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates that fear Iran more than they fear Iraq and worry about weakening Iraq too much, support measures to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including reinstating international monitors. But some of those same states also worry about overwhelming American power in the region (and in Syria's case, Israeli strategic dominance).

One of the biggest reasons for regional reluctance to support an American military effort to topple Iraq's government is concern for public opinion. Although states in the region remain very powerful in their domestic control, no state can fully ignore public sentiment in the era of the information revolution. What is the public sentiment in Arab countries?

First, most people don't understand that U.N. resolutions are the basis of the policy to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, so they see that policy as an American strategy intended to prevent only Arab states from acquiring such weapons.

Second, those who understand the role of U.N. resolutions raise questions about "double standards" in applying them, always with examples from the Arab-Israeli conflict. And they ask, in any case, why it is that the United States, not the United Nations, should make the ultimate decision authorizing a war.

Third, while some almost wish for an Arab country to have a nuclear deterrent, even if it is possessed by Saddam, most don't believe that it is likely. They see Iraq to be helpless, and see the entire focus on this issue as tactical, intended to justify America's desire to keep Iraq in a box, or to justify a possible war on it. This view has intensified in recent months, with the public in the region increasingly resentful of American policy, and seeing the United States as dominating the decisions at the United Nations.

Fourth, there is continued empathy with the suffering of Iraq's population and a prevailing assumption that U.N. sanctions, not the Iraqi government, are to blame.

Weighing interests

Ultimately, most states in the region do not see Iraq as currently posing a serious enough threat to them to warrant a war that could significantly alter the regional environment and present them with hard choices internally and externally. Certainly not all of Iraq's neighbors have the same calculations, and the interests of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council -- including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates -- are different from those of Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iran. And there are differences even within the GCC.

Most Arab states, however, see U.S. policy on this issue as being driven by domestic politics, or by strategic designs to consolidate American dominance or secure Israeli interests. The real issue is whether they have to accommodate the United States, because opposing U.S. actions could leave them at a disadvantage if war becomes inevitable. They expect the United States would inevitably score a military victory, and no one wants to be on the losing side.

Even if some Arab states ultimately decide that joining forces with the United States is in their best interest -- despite the risks -- we should have no illusions: Most states and publics in the region dread the prospect of war. If it is waged, they prefer that it has international cover, but they prefer that it not be waged at all.

SHIBLEY TELHAMI is Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development at the University of Maryland and senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. His newest book, "The Stakes: America and the Middle East," will be published in November. He wrote this article for Perspective.

Mr. SCHROCK. Dr. Brumberg.

Mr. BRUMBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be here. I will read a short statement, then if I have a couple of minutes, I might add a few remarks that touch also on the written testimony I provided this morning.

The purpose of my testimony today is to transcend the highly politicized debate about the roots of Arab hostility to the United States by providing a systematic analysis of this complicated phenomenon. This analysis is based on the distinction between Islamists and Arab nationalist ideologues as one circle of concern; their immediate audiences and university professional and religious institutions, another circle of concern; and a third circle, the wider Arab populace.

At the core of these three circles are political activists and ideologues whose hostility to the United States is informed by an ideology of resentment. Many, although all Islamists, some of whom been educated in the science and medical faculties of American and Western universities, view some aspects of American culture and society as threatening to the moral, social and political cohesion of the Islamic community.

The second circle consists of the immediate audience of these ideologues. This audience is made up of university students, professionals in law, academia, medicine, engineering and other vocations. These men and women interact through networks that operate within and across professional syndicates, labor unions and other semiofficial institutional arenas. While some of the second circle are potential recruits for the first, many, if not most, are ideological fence-sitters. Whether they join up or not is a function of many factors, not least of which is the Palestinian issue and the fate of Iraq.

The outer circle to which Shibley referred to, to which Dr. Zogby referred to, is constituted by the bulk of Arab society, men and women whose chief concern is making a living, feeding their families, or simply surviving. While members of this third circle sometimes echo the xenophobia of Islamist ideologues, their world views are not founded on an ideology of resentment.

That said, many of these young people do constitute a potential mass base who, under conditions of regional or domestic strife, can be mobilized by Islamists, because such mobilization comes in irregular cycles, the sudden cresting of which cannot be long sustained. Such spontaneous moments of mass protests rarely pose a dire threat to the very existence of Arab regimes. Still, the cumulative effect of such protests has been to widen the legitimacy gap between Arab regimes and the population.

In the short and medium term, the United States can do little about the inner core of Islamist and Arab nationalist ideologues who preach anti-Americanism if the overall domestic and regional context that helps them sell their resentment to the wider populace is not static. Such contextual factors must be addressed in ways that do two things: reduce the leverage of anti-American activists, and increase the leverage of those who share our values and share our concerns.

How do we go about this? Here substantial progress toward resolving the Palestinian-Israel conflict is essential. Over the last few

years, especially since the collapse of the Oslo peace process, Arab young people have been fed a daily diet of horrific images of Palestinian young people dying in the streets of Gaza and Ramallah. That these images have sometimes been manipulated by Pan-Arab satellite television stations such as Al-Jazeera and/or by governments is true, but long before such manipulation, Palestine had become the No. 1 issue for millions of Arabs, especially literate, middle-class Arabs living in the urban arenas of Cairo, Rabat, Amman and Damascus.

While there will always be other social, economic and educational and political factors that threaten Arab youth and make them vulnerable to anti-American ideologues, a lasting two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will help take the wind out of the sails of those who trade in hatred and resentment.

Given the centrality of the Palestine issue to the Middle East, we must recognize that an American-led campaign to topple Saddam Hussein will deepen anti-American resentment, even if it eventually leads to the creation of a pluralistic government in Iraq. Faced by mounting protests, Arab regimes will repress, thus widening the gap between government and populace. This dangerous dynamic cannot be mitigated unless the United States focuses attention on the Palestine-Israeli conflict.

Finally, over the long term, there are a host of other issues that must be addressed. As the authors of the recently published Arab Human Development Report acknowledge, progress on revamping Arab educational systems and a push for a genuine, as opposed to cosmetic, democratic reforms are vital. So, too, are economic reforms that gave non-oil-producing states a means to increase private sector production in ways that benefit the wider society.

Still over the short term such reforms may also exacerbate rather than reduce anti-Americanism. This is an important point. Economic reforms often deepen unemployment and social equity, at least at the outset. Democratization tends to mobilize Islamists, while educational reform will also be resisted and opposed by Islamists.

Given the short-term side effects produced by the long-term medicine of such reforms over the next 12 months, American policymakers must concentrate on redefining the wider political environment. This project cannot succeed unless the administration pushes for peace and democracy in Israel and Palestine, as strongly as it is mobilizing for a regime change in Iraq. Absent such an effort, the United States may win the battle, but lose the war.

And let me just finally add, very quickly, that my statement this morning goes over a lot of other issues that I did not mention in my testimony. I do think that we need to focus on the question of Saudi Arabia, the production of hate speech, the question of anti-Semitism. I think these are very important issues.

I think the question of Al-Jazeera, as I discuss in my written testimony, is very important. I think Al-Jazeera has tended to manipulate a crisis and exaggerate it and distort it. Willfully or not, it has been an avenue by which certain kinds of hate speech have been spread. These are all important factors, but if Al-Jazeera did not exist, if it was just CNN, if it was just BBC, the images of the

Palestine-Israeli conflict broadcast to the TV stations of millions of young people in the Arab world would be there day in, day out.

Until the United States decides that Palestine is as important as Iraq, I don't think that all of the talk about public diplomacy, learning Arabic and all of the rest of it will make as much difference as we would like. Thank you.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brumberg follows:]

Arab Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Complex Encounter

Dr. Daniel Brumberg
Associate Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University
Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Prepared for: Congress of the United States, House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
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Summary

Any analyst seeking to explain the relationship between Arab public opinion and American foreign policy must recognize the highly politicized nature of the topic. Pro-Israeli institutions acknowledge that Arab public opinion is hostile to the U.S., but often insist that such hostility reflects deeply ingrained cultural or religious attitudes. "They hate us because they hate us" goes the refrain. Those who speak from a pro-Arab or pro-Palestinian perspective often assert that such hostility is largely a consequence of U.S. foreign policy, and in particular the failure of the Bush administration to play the role of honest peace broker in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Solve that conflict in a fair and just manner, they argue, and much of the anti-Americanism reflected in the Arab press, the speeches of religious leaders, and in recent polling data, will subside.

The purpose of my testimony today is to transcend this politicized debate by providing a more systematic analysis of the roots and implications of Arab hostility towards the United States. My analysis is based on a distinction between Islamist and Arab nationalist ideologues, their immediate audiences in university, professional and religious institutions, and the wider Arab populace. While this model simplifies a complex reality, I believe that grasping the relationship between these three concentric (if idealized) circles of influence and interaction is essential.



At the core of these three circles is a group of political activists and ideologues whose hostility to the United States is informed by an *ideology of resentment*. Islamist political activists, many of whom have been educated in the science and medical faculties of Western universities, believe that many aspects of American culture and society threaten the moral, social and political cohesion of the Islamic community (*umma*). Their ideology of alienation is more about identity and power than any pragmatic problem such as the Arab-Israeli dispute. Indeed, for many (although not all) Islamists, this conflict is not about a clash of two nationalisms that is amenable to the logic of diplomacy; rather, it constitutes a non-negotiable dispute between Muslims and Jews.

The second circle of influence consists of the immediate audience of these political/ideological leaders. This audience is made up of university students pursuing religious and secular studies, as well as professionals in law, academia, medicine, engineering and other vocations. These men and women regularly interact through networks that operate within and across professional syndicates, labor unions and other semi-official institutional arenas. While some of these people are potential recruits for the first circle, they are not necessarily irrevocably committed to the ideology of resentment. In short, this second circle consists of *ideological fence sitters*. Whether they join up or not is a function of many factors, not least of which is the question of Palestine (first and foremost), and the fate of Iraq as well. I shall return to these points below.

The outer circle constitutes the bulk of Arab society, i.e. men and women whose chief concern is making a living, feeding their families, or simply surviving. While many members of this circle may echo some of the xenophobic themes espoused by Islamist or Arab nationalist ideologues, their world-views are not *founded* on an ideology of resentment expressed by professional ideologues. That said, and particularly where unemployment is rife, many of the young people in this third circle constitute a potential mass base who, under conditions of regional or domestic crisis, might be mobilized (and manipulated) by Islamist or Arab nationalist leaders. Because such mobilization comes in irregular cycles – the sudden cresting of which cannot be long sustained – such spontaneous moments of mass protest rarely pose a dire threat to the very existence of Arab regimes. Still, the cumulative effect of such protests has been to substantially widen the legitimacy gap between Arab regimes and the populace.

My thesis is this: in the short and medium term there is not much the U.S. can do about the inner core of Islamist and Arab nationalist ideologues who preach anti-Americanism. Their ideology is likely to persist regardless of what American officials say or do. Yet domestic and regional context that helps Islamist ideologues *sell their resentment* to the wider population is not static: such contextual factors must be addressed in ways that reduce the *leverage* of anti-American activists.

How can we best reduce their leverage? Here there is no doubt that substantial and rapid progress towards resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is essential. Over the last few years, especially since the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process, Arab young people have been fed a diet of horrific images of Palestinian young people dying in the streets of Ramallah and Gaza. That these images are manipulated by pan-Arab satellite TV stations such as *al-Jazeera* to increase anti-Americanism, and/or by governments to detract attention away from their domestic shortcomings, is surely true. But long before such manipulation, the Palestine issue had become the number one issue for millions of Arabs, especially literate, middle or lower middle class Arabs living in the urban arenas of Cairo, Rabat, Amman, Damascus and Kuwait City. While there will always be other social, economic, educational and political factors that render Arab

youth vulnerable to anti-American demagogues, a lasting two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will go a long way to taking the wind out of the sales of those who trade in hatred and resentment.

Given the importance of the Palestine issue in the Middle East, we must also recognize that an American-led war to topple Saddam Hussein is bound to deepen anti-American resentment, even if such a war sets the stage for the creation of a reasonably pluralistic and stable government in Iraq. Unless the Bush Administration demonstrates in word and especially in deed that it is as fully committed to democracy and self determination in both Israel and Palestine as it claims to be committed to democracy and self-determination in Iraq, the U.S. may win the battle but lose the war.

Beyond the question of Palestine and Iraq, there are a host of other issues that over the long term must be addressed. As the authors of the recently published *Arab Human Development Report 2002* acknowledge, progress on revamping Arab educational systems, and a push for genuine – as opposed to contrived – democratic reforms, are essential.[i] So too are economic reforms that give non-oil producing states the means to increase production in the private sector in ways that benefit the wider society. But it is critical to keep in mind that in the short term the very quest for economic, political and educational reforms may exacerbate rather than reduce anti-Americanism. Economic reforms often deepen unemployment and social inequity, democratization (at least during its early stages) tends to mobilize *illiberal* Islamists rather than secularists or liberal Islamists, while educational reform will be resisted by many (although not all) Islamists. Given that the short term side effects produced by the long term medicine of political, economic and educational reforms, over the next twelve months American policy makers must concentrate their efforts on redefining the wider political environment of the Middle East. This project cannot succeed unless the administration pushes for peace in Israel and Palestine as strongly as it seems to be mobilizing for regime change in Iraq.

The Evidence: Public Opinion in the Arab and Wider Islamic World

Overall, public opinion polls conducted in the Arab and wider Islamic world reflect an unfavorable view of the U.S. among Muslims. For example, a Gallup poll held *after* 9/11 with over 9,000 Muslims in Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia produced the following results: 53 percent of those questions indicated unfavorable opinions of the U.S, while 22 percent held favorable opinions. Fifty-eight percent of those questioned had unfavorable views of Bush, compared with 11 percent who held positive views. Moreover, while 67 percent held that the 9/11 attacks were unjustified, 77 percent held that the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan was unjustified, a view that may be explained partly by the fact that 61 percent stated that they did not believe that Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks.

Similarly, a poll undertaken by Zogby International during Winter and early Spring 2002 highlighted the generally negative view that Muslims throughout the Islamic world have of the U.S. Unfavorable ratings of American foreign policy of over 70 percent and as high as 88 percent were found in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Iranian and even Kuwait. In the latter case 86 percent of those polled indicated an unfavorable rating, a shocking result given the role of the U.S. played in liberating Kuwait during the 1990/91Gulf

[i] *Arab Human Development Report, 2002*, (New York: United National Development Programme, 2002).

War. Moreover, such views transcend policy issues. Substantial minorities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the U.A.E. and Indonesia held negative views of American democracy. Similarly, substantial minorities of up to 48 percent held negative views of American people (47 percent in Egypt, 33 percent in Lebanon, 42 percent in the UA.E., 48 percent in Iran, and 41 percent in Indonesia), while in Saudi Arabia, 51 percent indicated negative views.

While troubling, the key question is whether such findings reflect a deeply ingrained cultural religious or even ideological chasm between "American" and "Islamic" civilizations or cultures, and/or whether they reflect responses the American policies and/or responses to other domestic or regional conditions that, if changed, might induce a more positive view of the United States. On this critical question the polling data provides some insights. Negative views of American foreign policy are much higher than negative views of American people or culture. Moreover, the data makes clear that American policy towards the Palestinian issue is a critical factor in such negative views. As the summary of the Zogby International poll states, "in every country but Iran, the 'Palestinian issue' is viewed as 'the most' or 'very important' issue facing the Arab world today." Indeed, in Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Pakistan, it is the most important issue. Moreover, "those polled in every country except Iran would overwhelmingly react more favorably toward the U.S. if it 'were to apply pressure to ensure the creation of an independent Palestinian state.'" Respondents in Egypt (69 percent), Saudi Arabia (87 percent), Kuwait 91 percent), Lebanon (59 percent), the U.A.E. (76 percent) and Indonesia (66 percent) demonstrated the central role of American policy towards the Palestinian issue in their overall views of the U.S.

A more recent ten nation Zogby survey, released September 17, 2002, recapitulated the above findings, while also accentuating the role of American policy towards Iraq in shaping the views of Muslims towards the U.S. The poll not only demonstrates that strong majorities in all ten nations oppose a U.S. attack on Iraq; the poll also suggests that their impression of the U.S. "would substantially increase...if the U.S. were to end sanctions against Iraq." At the same time, majorities favor American movies, television and products, particularly in Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Indonesia. This finding once again suggests that Arab attitudes are largely a function of particular conditions and policies and not a reflection of an essential cultural gap between the U.S. and the Arab Islamic world.

While the above surveys suggest that context and policy shapes public opinion rather than culture or ideology, these polls are not designed to weigh the level of commitment of different groups to a particular ideology or opinion. It is critical to distinguish between broadly held opinions on the one hand, and deeply ingrained ideologies or world-views on the other. Those who hold the latter are full (or part time) political entrepreneurs: they exploit domestic, regional and global crises to "sell" their ideology of resentment to their immediate audiences, and in so doing, try to attract support in the populace at large. These ideologues need political leverage to be effective, and on this score, this is no doubt that they have gained considerable sway from the persistence of both the Palestinian-Israeli and Iraq-U.S. conflicts.

We must tackle three questions:

1) Where do these ideologues come from?

2) What conditions help them sell their resentment to their immediate audience and to wider public?

3) And what can be done to undermine their leverage?

Circle Number One: The Paradoxical Roots of Islamist Ideologues

The ideology of resentment expressed by radical and even many mainstream Islamists does not have any one primary source or cause. In the wake of 9/11, the American press was filled with stories about the role that the *madrassa* and other Islamic educational institutions play in promoting anti-American views, and even anti-Semitism. But such institutions, particularly those that promote a "jihadist" world view, are not ubiquitous in the Islamic world. They are found in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, less so in Indonesia and Malaysia, but are not widespread in Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia. (Indeed, in the latter two countries efforts have been made to advance a more secular and tolerant Islamic vision). As for Iran, the effort to force-feed Islamic dogma through the educational system has produced a climate more *favorable* to American culture. Islamic education is thus one factor, but it is hardly the sole or central force responsible for anti-Americanism.

Indeed, Islamist ideologues are not the products of a purely Islamic culture or religious upbringing. Analyses of radical Islamists in Egypt reveal the following profile: they come from middle class or even upper middle class homes, received some early traditional Islamic education but were then educated in non-religious, public schools. Many obtained college and graduate degrees in engineering, physics and medicine. In some cases, they pursued graduate studies in Britain, Germany, France and even the U.S. Yet their experiences overseas – where they often isolated themselves from Western culture while nevertheless encountering it on a daily basis – reinforced their disdain for the "materialist" or "decadent" West. Thus, subsequent training and ideological indoctrination in Pakistan or Afghanistan constituted the icing on a multi-layered and very contradictory cake. Islamist ideologues spurn Western culture, but in their efforts to render the nuances of Islam into a comprehensive "Islamic ideology," they have borrowed from Western ideologies on the left and the right of the political spectrum. Al-Qaida's activists exemplify this phenomenon. Mohammad Atta and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri advanced militant doctrines and tactics that echoed the ideologies and tactics of radical left while they dreamt of an Islamic international.[ii]

Circle Number Two: Mosque, Syndicate and Network

The ideology of resentment championed by many Islamist ideologues is not only a distinctly modern phenomenon, it is also transmitted via forms of communication, mobilization and interest representation whose very existence derives from the contradictory effects of globalization and even political liberalization. To grasp this phenomenon we must get past simplistic notions of the "Arab Street." Islamist ideologues are not only educated professionals who bare the imprint of the West and the East; they interact through a host of professional and party organizations that are part and parcel of civil society in the Islamic world. Over the last few years professional syndicates or associations representing lawyers, doctors, engineers, academicians, public sector bureaucrats and workers have increasingly come under the control of Islamists. This dynamic is especially pronounced in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and to some extent Morocco. In these countries, the weakness or near irrelevancy of formal political parties leaves opposition political activists with two avenues of organization: professional

[ii]On al-Zawahiri, see Lawrence Wright, "The Man Behind Bin Laden," *The New Yorker*, September 16, 2002, 56-85.

syndicates and associations – many of which are funded by the state – and the mosque. The two arenas are not mutually exclusive; Islamists organize through informal networks that cut across the traditional arena of the mosque and the modern arena of the professional syndicate or association in ways that facilitate the mobilization of young people in both arenas.

Globalization and political liberalization have abetted this dynamic. Internet access, capital flows, satellite television (see below), travel between the Muslim diaspora in Europe and their home countries in the Middle East, all of these markers of globalization have enhanced the capacity of Islamist ideologues to sell their message to their immediate audiences in universities, professional syndicates, and other arenas.[iii] Political reform has also enhanced the stature of *mainstream* Islamists who, while spurning the use of violence, nevertheless advocate nativist ideologies that depict American cultural influence as a "invasion" *(ghazwa)* that is corrupting and dividing Muslims. The vast majority of these Islamists are also opposed, in principle, to any two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because, they argue, any such peace would legitimate the existence of a Jewish state in the heart of the Muslim *umma* or community.

Because these Islamists articulate the anger and alienation of Muslim youth, and because they have add at their disposal a network of mosques and professional institutions that facilitate the mobilization of these youth, they have emerged as the most vocal *legal* opposition throughout the Arab world. In Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait and most recently Morocco, Islamists have secured strong pluralities in parliamentary elections. Moreover, because the "liberalized autocracies" of the Arab world have not encouraged the existence of credible alternatives to illiberal, anti-Western Islamism, they have tended to create a bi-polar competitive field in which state and Islamism are in both open conflict and sometimes in implicit cooperation. The rulers of Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen and even Egypt have variously tried to silence, repress, co-opt or echo Islamists depending on the level and nature of the threat they pose. While the strategy of co-optation has sometimes discredited mainstream Islamists – the case of Algeria illustrates this point very clearly – it has also given Islamists room for maneuver that their secular competitors usually lack. This too has enhanced their capacity to sell their ideology to their immediate audience and to the wider populace as well.

The American press has devoted much time to the destructive consequences of such regime-led efforts to mimic, co-opt or manipulate the anti-Western or anti-Jewish content of Islamist ideologies, symbols or slogans. Yet the nature and scope of the problem has sometimes been misunderstood. There is no doubt that in Egypt, the Palestinian Authority – and certainly Saudi Arabia – rulers have played this game. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Yemen, Kuwait and Jordan, although it is less pronounced. The consequences have been especially unfortunate for the *Palestinians* since the demonization of Israel, and Jews more generally, has undermined support in both Israel and Palestine for a two-state solution.[iv]

[iii]Here we must emphasize the close link between Islamist radicalism and the experience of alienation and estrangement that many Islamists have gone through as a result of their experiences in the Muslim diaspora of the United States and Western Europe. See Jonathan Raban's "My Holy War,: What do a Vicar's Son and a Suicide Bomber Have in Common?" *The New Yorker*, February 4, 2002, at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?020204fa_fact. Radical mosques, such as Finsbury Park mosque in London, have played a key role in providing an institutional home to alienated radical Islamists in Europe. See Alan Cowell, "At a Mosque in London, bin Laden Is Hailed as a Hero," *New York Times*, September 13, 2002.

[iv]For example, in Kuwait, the mainstream Islamic Constitutional Party (ICI) – an organization

Still, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, state promotion of anti-Jewish stereotypes is largely a key – if dirty – element of regime propaganda. As it rises and falls in concert with the downs and ups of the Arab-Israeli peace process, its effects would be mitigated by a Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty that was endorsed by Arab leaders. As for Saudi Arabia, here the problem is more complicated and the consequences more severe. The alliance between a clerical elite influenced by the legacy of Wahhabi fundamentalism, and the al-Saud family – whose chief concern is survival and legitimacy – means that the regime must *both* tolerate and contain a certain level of Islamist resentment ideology. While maintaining this tricky balancing act became harder after the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990, the heart of the problem lies in the dualistic nature of the modern/traditional Saudi state. Because that state is here to stay, the problem must be tackled via a combination of educational reforms and wise political leadership, one that insists upon the abandonment of all hate speech while taking practical steps to dry up the "private" funding of *madrassa* schools within and beyond the Arab world.

The Third Circle: The Broader Arab Populace

The Arab world currently has a population of some 200 million, about 5 percent of the world population. Some sixty percent of this population is under the age of 20. While illiteracy rates have declined significantly, 65 million Arabs are still illiterate. Moreover, many of those who have received a basic high school or college education do not have the skills to obtain jobs that provide economic and personal security. This means that the potential universe of recruits to the ideology of resentment espoused by Islamists and Arab nationalists is very large indeed. Young people who are frustrated, bored or angry, and who tend to get their news from satellite TV stations rather than a responsible, professional press, are particularly vulnerable to the simplistic slogans of Islamist demagogues, and to the daily images of strife in various quarters of the Islamic world. This is why Arab satellite stations, particularly *al-Jazeera*, have played an important role in shaping the consciousness of Arab young people.

In drawing attention to the role of *al-Jazeera* I am not suggesting that this station has manufactured or invented the news. If this particular station did not exist, Arabs would still see images of violence on the West Bank and Gaza, or elsewhere, broadcast via CNN, BBC, and other global or regional satellite networks. The globalization of news means that one way or another the images of a riot that occurs this afternoon on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem will find their way to the living rooms of tens of thousands of young people in Rabat, Cairo or Jakarta in a matter of minutes. Thus the actual context is an issue of great importance.

That said, having watched hours of *al-Jazeera,* I have no doubt that this station has framed the news in ways that portray black and white, evil versus good images of complex conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Moreover, by regularly hosting extremist ideologues whose racist views merit no more attention than do the racist or anti-Muslim views of "White Power" or extreme-right wing Christian groups in the U.S., *al-Jazeera* has muddled the

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that is represented by independent Islamists in the parliament– has readily promoted anti-Semitic attitudes. In a publication widely distributed by on if the ICI's sister organization s– the Soviet for Social Reform–we are told that the "goal of globalization...is to melt away all doctrines, thoughts and ideas so nothing remains other than repressive, Jewish, Western, materialist thought." See *Al-Awlama fi Mizan al-Islam* (Globalization in the Scales of Islam), (Kuwait: *Jam'iat al-Islah Al-Ijmtima'i,* 2001), p. 11.

boundaries between fact and fiction. If many Arab young people today still believe that Arabs were not behind the 9/11 attacks – or worse yet, that Israelis or Jews organized it – this fantastic belief can partly be attributed to the failure of *al-Jazeera* to aggressively discredit a conspiratorial mind set that animates such beliefs.

The vulnerability of Arab youth to anti-American and anti-Jewish conspiracy theories is also due to other factors, not least of which is the absence of participatory forms of government that give young people a sense that they can control or at least influence their futures. As I have noted above, liberalized autocracy is designed to give elites a way of venting frustration. But it is no substitute for effective democratic institutions that mediate between the state and the populace in ways that represent the latter's views in a responsible and orderly fashion. The widespread perception in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine that governments are fake institutions that have no links to the daily realities of the populace feeds a sense of despair and hopeless that prepares the groundwork for ideologies of resentment towards other cultures, religions, or even nations.

While the combined effect of economic despair, failed political systems, and the globalization (and partial distortion) of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has increased the leverage of Islamist ideologues, it is doubtful that this combustible formula poses a dire threat to the existence of Arab regimes. Because most young people are busy trying to survive, because they do not regularly participate in interest associations of one kind or another, and because Arab regimes control "the street," young people are available for rapid mobilization in street protests, university demonstrations, or mass marches. But such spontaneous outbursts are difficult to sustain and can be suppressed. Thus while an American led war to topple Saddam Hussein would trigger violent protests throughout the Arab world, unless the campaign gets bogged down in a protracted war that produces high civilian casualties rates, Arab regimes would survive.

But at what cost? Despite (or perhaps because of) the sudden rhetoric for support of Arab democracy coming from some quarters of the administration, it is likely that Arab regimes would become more *rather* than less autocratic in the wake of a war in Iraq. Confronted by a growing challenge from their Islamist opponents, they would close what few doors they have already opened. The successful establishment of some kind of pluralistic democracy in Iraq – if this were at all possible – would not deter this deliberalizing dynamic. After all, images of Khatami and his reformist allies in Iran or Hamid Karzai and his followers in post-Taliban Afghanistan have not made one iota of difference in the Arab world. Iraq may be much closer to home – a brother Arab state. But since the roots and logic of autocracy are local, they will survive and endure the creation of an American-backed post-Saddam government.

What is to Be Done?

Foreign policy and public relations (PR) are not the same thing. The word "diplomacy" conflates them, but if the U.S. is to develop an effective strategy for countering anti-American (and anti-Christian or Jewish) sentiment in the Arab world, it will have to focus less on "PR" and more on foreign policies and the regional context in which policies are implemented.

The critical question is how to design policies that reduce the *political leverage* of Islamist and Arab nationalist ideologues? Let me suggest a few short, medium and long term ideas.

In the short term we must address the regional conflicts that have created fertile ground for the purveyors of hate language. The most important of these is the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

No effort to remedy any other source of regional instability – such as Iraq – will succeed unless the administration clearly signals that it is as committed to democracy and peace in the Palestinian-Israeli arena as it claims to be in Iraq. In making this point I am not equating to the two conflicts, nor suggesting that the U.S. can or should approach the two arenas in the same way. Nor, for that matter, am I arguing that Washington should postpone dealing with Iraq until it has resolved the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But what I am suggesting is that Arab and Muslim public opinion will turn even more hostile absent a concerted effort by the administration to make it clear in word and (most of all) deed that it will follow up any military campaign in Iraq with a *concerted* peace campaign in Israel and Palestine.

In the medium term the U.S. must also address those government and media elites who have cynically traded in the hate speech and conspiracy theorizing. The U.S. has every right to make clear to our allies in Egypt, Palestine and elsewhere that while criticisms of Israeli or American policy are legitimate, the use of racist hate language is not. In making this argument, we also need to remember that we have allies in the Arab world. Secular liberals and liberal Islamic thinkers, journalists and professors have bravely challenged hate speech in newspaper columns in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt , as well as in prominent London-based Arab dailies such as *Al-Hayat*. Islamist liberals are an especially important asset, as they reject the xenophobia of their fundamentalist rivals yet speak in the name of Islam.

Another key element of any medium-term strategy should be an effort to engage the editors and producers at *al-Jazeera* in a critical dialogue about the nature and consequences of its reporting on international affairs. Here, I do not agree with those who argue that we should simply ignore *al-Jazeera*. It is far too big and influential to be dismissed, and there are no likely competitors on the horizon that can emulate its scope of coverage or influence. Instead, American journalists, diplomats, policy makers, and academics should scrutinize its programming and editorial policies to identify those programs that give advocates of hate speech a podium to spread their ideology. We should bring our concerns directly to the producers, writers and TV journalists at *al-Jazeera*, and where possible, encourage an unfettered and sober debate between serious Arab and American thinkers and policy makers. The upcoming October 19 and 20, 2002 conference in Doha, organized by the Government of Qatar and the Brookings Institution, is a good example of this kind of critical engagement: covered by *al-Jazeera*, if broadcast without interference (i.e. *not* choreographed), might provide one of the first televised fora in which Americans, Arabs and Muslims from the wider Islamic world can debate the major issues affecting U.S.-Muslim relations in a productive manner. If successful, this kind of event should be repeated every four months, switching venues between the U.S. and the Arab world.

On a very different level, efforts should also be made to increase society-to-society exchanges between professionals, students, and journalists in the Arab world. American NGO's that work in areas such as human rights, women's rights, press freedoms, and democratic development are engaged in such efforts, but much more needs to be done. Moreover, exchanges of professionals concerned with nonpolitical issues of health, environment, drug addiction and the like would draw greater attention to many issues which are not politically controversial, but which nevertheless concern citizen activists in both the Islamic world and the U.S. Again, such exchanges already exist, but they should be greatly expanded. How this can be accomplished in the context of recent changes in visa policy is a tricky question. But if the "war on terrorism" is to succeed, it cannot and should not make such society-to-society exchanges harder to initiate and sustain.

In the long term the U.S. should promote educational, economic and political reforms that

help Arab reformists reshape national environments in ways that make it harder for anti-American ideologues to sell their wares. In regards to education, the issue is not so much hate speech – although this certainly should be addressed wherever such speech is promoted in text books and other educational media – but rather, the overall weakness and irrelevancy to the modern world of Arab education systems. Rote learning, a focus on patriarchal or patrimonialist values, a celebration of "Islamic" forms of government that are said to be culturally distinct from and even opposed to universal values of democracy and freedom, these are just some of the weaknesses in Arab education. That said, such changes cannot be imposed from without: we can help, but they must be initiated and pursued by Arab education reformers themselves.

Economic reforms that build market economies that make individuals and businesses masters of their own fate are essential. Thus far, economic reforms have been partial and, with few exceptions, have not touched the large public sector industries that dominate many Arab economies. Unwilling to rock the boat, Arab leaders have increasingly relied on oil rents or other forms of external payments to subsidize their economies rather than transform them. This cannot go on forever, particularly since it is expected that by 2010 the Arab world will have a population of 459 million! Still, it must be noted that in the short and even medium term, structural economic reforms create their own costs in terms of increased unemployment, higher market prices (until increased production is obtained), and devaluation of local currencies. Unless Western nations are willing to help Arab leaders create and fund vigorous social safety net programs that target the weakest elements of the population, economic reforms in the short term may produce more rather than less instability.

Finally, democratic reforms that transcend the state enforced boundaries of liberalized autocracy are also necessary[v]. If illiberal Islamists have been the first to benefit from political liberalization, this is partly because they represent well organized pluralities (*not* majorities) whereas their secular or non-Islamist rivals lack the means to organize their interests. The promotion of effective, competitive party systems that limit the capacity of illiberal Islamists to impose their views is thus essential. Moreover, unless legislatures are given real authority to represent organized constituencies rather than merely debate and rubber stamp the policies of governments, "democracy" will continue to be viewed as a fake institution designed to prop up autocracy. Still, there should be no illusions as to the short term costs of real democratization. The comparative advantage enjoyed by illiberal Islamists today will remain for some time, and thus the U.S. may have to live with election results that give voice to opposition forces that are hardly pro-American. The creation of multi-party coalitions can help limit the consequences of such Islamist gains. But since democracy by definition entails an element of uncertainty, the U.S. must be prepared for a bumpy ride if it is serious about promoting substantive democratic reforms.

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[v]Brumberg, "Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4, Oct. 2002.

Mr. SCHROCK. Dr. Zaharna.

Ms. ZAHARNA. Thank you, Congressman. It is always good to see an AU alum, and especially one that was in the Navy in PA, and I will be talking about communication.

Sir, I have already submitted my testimony for the record. What I would like to do here is briefly highlight five challenges that the American public diplomacy faces in the Arab world. I phrase them in term of mindsets, or ways of thinking. And I would like to conclude with the important role that Congress plays as the representative of the American people in American public diplomacy.

First, mindset is—think relationships. Most Americans think of communication in terms of sending messages. It is the old send a message, receive a message model. Similarly, discussion of American public diplomacy has focused on America's message and its image. America focuses on sharpening its message, coordinating it, reshaping it, packaging it, selling it. In the Arab world, communication is primarily about building relationships; cultivating, solidifying and defining relationships.

American executives often complain that they must spend hours and some days having coffee before they start business. It is not that we like coffee so much, but relationships are the cornerstone of activities in the Arab world.

So I want to say, if America wants to strengthen communication with the Arab world, think the about building relationships instead of conveying or relaying messages.

Second, think eye level. And I mean this in two ways. First, even though America is a superpower, we cannot diminish the power of others. As a superpower, we speak in terms of threats. We immediately put others on the defensive. We may win the compliance of a country's leader, but we may alienate a country's people. If we look at others in the eye, we realize that they are just as proud of their culture and tradition as we in America are of ours.

Second, if we want to talk to the people in the street, we must speak to their reality on the ground. The Arab world is not information-deprived, but policy-sensitive. We are a superpower. They hear us. The whole world hears us. And when what we say in terms of American public diplomacy doesn't match what they see in terms of American foreign policy, then we have a credibility problem.

In the Arab world American policies—and they have used the word "policy"; I want to say weapons, because the direct consequence of American policies are weapons. American weapons speak louder than American words.

Three, think two-way. Most Americans tend to view listening as doing nothing. Communication means talking. After September 11, America has been doing a lot of talking, but with few results. The far more powerful component in the communication equation is not talking, but listening. And I am reminded of a prayer of St. Francis: Seek to understand if you wish to be understood.

I know, and I am glad you returned, Congressman Shays, that is exactly what you are doing here today. That is why I applaud your efforts. The better we understand others, the more likely that they will understand us in return.

No. 4, the mindset. Think crisis diplomacy. When it comes to the Middle East, we are not dealing with traditional public diplomacy, but what I call crisis public diplomacy. Traditional public diplomacy focuses on the long-term strategies. They are usually cultural, educational, and it is usually for a friendly or neutral public.

Crisis public diplomacy, on the other hand, means communicating simultaneously with multiple publics, some favorable, some hostile, and it is in a rapidly changing, highly visible, politicized environment. And a crisis, the best way to rally American public support is to identify and demonize a foreign target.

Unfortunately, the best way to alienate a foreign public is to demonize and threaten one of their own. And there is—this is especially true in the Arab world. There is even a saying about that in terms of, my brother, my cousin, I against the strangers.

Crisis public diplomacy calls for new strategies in communicating with both the Arab and the American public simultaneously.

Finally, think Congress. When we think about American public diplomacy, we need to think about the American Congress. Most discussion of American public—public diplomacy focuses on the State Department, the White House and ignores the Congress. Yet America's representatives here at home are an important face abroad. From the vantage point outside of the United States and particularly in the Arab world, Congress has always played a major role in shaping American public diplomacy. The actions and the decisions of the American Congress have a direct impact on the people of the Arab world. I urge you and your committee to explore this uncharted terrain more so that the Congress itself can fully realize its role in shaping American public diplomacy.

Sir, I thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Zaharna follows:]

American Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World
A Strategic Communication Analysis

R.S. Zaharna
American University

Key Points

- The U.S. launched an aggressive military and political campaign without any corresponding strategic communication initiative addressing the affected publics.
- The U.S. needs to strengthen its public diplomacy in this age of instantaneous and uncontrolled global communication.
- The U.S. has a credibility problem regarding its policies in the region that is undermining the effectiveness of its message.

During a national press conference President Bush, speaking about American efforts to reach Arab and Muslim audiences said, "we are not doing a very good job of getting our message out." This may be the American understatement of the 21st century.

Following the events of September 11, Americans were consumed with shock, grief and anger. Understandably, the magnitude of the events, coming less than a year into his presidency, caught the Bush administration off guard. In that respect, the communication initiative focused on the American public was quite remarkable. Within a period of 72 hours, Bush dramatically changed his communication persona from folksy governor of a large state to a leader of international stature, he responded to the emotional mood of his national constituency, and most significantly, he managed a delicate balancing act between the immediate calls for military action and the patience needed to conduct a complex overseas military operation. Judging from opinion polls, congressional action, and media reports, Bush succeeded rallying the majority of Americans around his agenda. The communication strategy worked.

If harnessing American support was first on the communication agenda, garnering international support was second. In this regard, British-American communication is notable. Given the high number of British casualties suffered in the New York attack, the British public could have held the U.S. responsible for the deaths of British citizens on American soil. Instead, Bush rapidly sought to transform an American tragedy into an international cause and used the British audience to connect to Europe at large. In his address to Congress, Bush included a direct appeal to the British public. Further, in a dramatically visual alignment of power, British Prime Minister Tony Blair attended Bush's address, sitting next to the American president's wife. Similarly, in a reciprocal break with custom – this time on the British side – Queen Elizabeth, with the American ambassador at her side, witnessed the playing of the American national anthem during a moving ceremony of the changing of the palace guards.

The American-British communication represents perhaps the epitome of effective public diplomacy. First, the communication appears two-way or reciprocal, rather than simply one way with America dictating its policy to others. Second, the communication has been highly symbolic, reflecting a keen understanding of cultural sensitivities and national symbols. Third, the communication appears to be emotionally congruent with the public mood; "amazed," "surprised" or "stunned" are not part of the vocabulary of the relationship. Finally, the communication appears to be truly public, representing not only an exchange between the leaders of two countries, but the people as well.

If the shared cultural and linguistic heritage of the British-American communication pattern offers the ideal in public diplomacy, the American communication with the Arab and Muslim world represents -- to paraphrase Bush's understatement -- the less than ideal. It also helps illustrate the specifics of where the U.S. stumbled.

First, the communication has been primarily one-way. America announced its intentions to go after the terrorists and those who harbor them, stating "You are either with us or against us." Such ultimatums are often perceived as threats and initiate a cycle of defensive communication in which the audience is immediately cued to get their guard up. Defiance, not cooperation, is often the response.

Second, the communication revealed little understanding of the significant cultural and national symbols of the region. When Bush said in a press conference that he was "amazed there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about," he illustrated the mirror phenomenon in communication. When one is not understood by the other, it is often an indication that one does not understand the other as well. This is clearly the case in the administration's communication. There was the used of the word "crusade" at the outset. Then came American efforts to silence the pride of the Arab world, the Al-Jazeera news network. Now, America intends to continue its military operation during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan despite the highly religious overtones the conflict has already absorbed.

Third, the communication of American officials appears conspicuously out of alignment with the public sentiment in the region. If this is being done deliberately, it is a high-risk communication strategy. Such strategies often backfire. If American officials are unaware of how incongruent their communication is, this is worse. America becomes vulnerable to a cascade of politically adverse "surprises." American officials then wonder how such "intelligence failures" occurred.

Finally, the communication has remained at the level of heads of states. In keeping with the traditional diplomacy of the past, America has focused its efforts on securing the support of the leaders in the region, leaving those leaders the task of securing the support of the people there. Instead of being able to rally their people, more and more these leaders are alienating themselves from their publics. The more America shifts its communication burden onto these leaders, the more vulnerable they become. The loss of American-allied regimes may well be the ultimate cost of America's public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world.

Learning Communication Lessons the Hard Way

Key Points

- The lack of a communication strategy allowed America's opponent to take control of the U.S. message.
- The U.S. has not tailored its messages to address the audience's cultural and political sensibilities.
- U.S. policy in the region represents a major credibility hurdle that, left unaddressed, will continue to undermine American communication efforts.

In a recent editorial, American Ambassador Richard Holbrooke captured the sentiments of many officials in Washington, "How can a man in a cave outcommunicate the world's leading communications society?" The irony is that it is precisely because Osama bin Laden is perceived as *a man in a cave* that he is able to communicate effectively with the people in his region. This perhaps one of the many cues eluding American officials and the lessons from this distorted communication exchange.

The first critical lesson in crisis communication is the need to get the message out quickly to the affected publics. By seizing the communication initiative, one can help minimize the spread of rumors that inevitably emerge in a volatile emotional climate. In a crude but effective way, Osama bin Laden, through his taped message to Al-Jazeera, realized the fundamental importance of public diplomacy in this age of instant global communication. He took his message directly to the affected publics.

In contrast, the need for America to communicate its intentions appears to have come as an afterthought to its massive military and political initiatives directed at the region. In the days immediately following the attacks against the U.S., it became readily apparent that the U.S. would seek military retribution. This message was further underscored politically by high-ranking American officials shuttling around the globe to build an international coalition. It was not until after these military and political initiatives were initiated, that the administration recognized the need to communicate to the affected public.

By failing to seize the communication initiative, America lost control of its message. In communication, perception – not reality – is what matters. Perception is what makes spin possible despite an abundance of facts or logic. From the American perspective, it was clearly a "fight against terrorism." In contrast, from the perspective of those on the other side of the ocean targeted for attack, America appeared to be gearing up for a full-fledge assault on the Muslim world. The common denominator of all the targets was "Muslim country." American rhetoric had frequently interchanged terrorism with radical Islam in its past communications. The

negative perception of hostile American intentions was solidified by the way the U.S. president framed the conflict: "You are either with us or against us." In short, us against them.

Once the U.S. defined the conflict as "us" versus "them," it was not that difficult for bin Laden to frame the message, or what the conflict was about. He used one of the most powerful tools of persuasion: identification. What Holbrooke and others missed is that it is precisely because bin Laden is perceived as a lone man in a cave – the epitome of the underdog – that he was able to use that image to woo support. The more the U.S. demonizes bin Laden, the more he will emerge as an icon symbolizing the struggle of the weak against the strong.

A second important facet of public diplomacy is the need to adapt one's message to reflect the cultural sensibilities and needs of foreign audiences. America cannot communicate with foreign publics the same way that it communicates to Americans and expect to be understood by non-Americans. Intercultural communication does not work that way.

For Americans, facts, figures, rational and logical arguments are the way one builds a compelling persuasive case. Dispassionate objectivity is contained so as not to weaken the validity of the facts. In the Arab world, emotional neutrality, in an emotionally charged context, can be perceived as deception. If one hides their emotions, what else are they hiding? The choice of National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice was perhaps the worst choice for America to try to recoup its message. Trained as a Soviet-American specialist, Rice speaks in the language and manner of one superpower to another. Her tone alone was enough to alienate the audience.

The man in the cave demonstrated a clear understanding of his audience, thus it is not that surprising that his audience understood his message. It is that mirror phenomenon again. When one thoroughly understands the audience, the appropriate tools, strategies and tactics almost define themselves. More important than speaking in Arabic, bin Laden spoke in the cultural style that spans wider than the Arabic-speaking world. He spoke to evoke feelings, not logical explanations. He used the simple imagery of metaphors that resonates with the personal experience of an uneducated public. He tapped into historical references in a region steeped in history. He harnessed the power of religious symbols that worked as emotional cues to spark his audience to action. And, he did it in a cave.

The third critical lesson is credibility. Credibility is the cornerstone of effective persuasion. America has a credibility problem. Technically, it is a source credibility problem, which means no matter how many times the Pentagon changes the name of the military operations or the color of food packages or how many interviews the White House gives to foreign correspondents, there will still be a problem. Namely, America as a source is not believable.

America's credibility problem stems from the perceived duplicity between American ideals and American policy. From the perspective of the people in the region, what America says it stands for – justice, liberty, freedom, human rights, equality, fairness – is not reflected in its policies.

One hears repeated reference to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraqi sanctions. The reason they haunt the U.S. message is because both resonate strongly with people's perceptions of American duplicity. What America does, through its policies and practices in the Iraq and Palestine, speaks louder than all of the official statements coming out of Washington. Until America addresses its policy in the region, American efforts to intensify its message are more likely to hurt than help.

Developing a Communication Strategy for the U.S.

Key Points

- The U.S. must substantially upgrade its efforts in public diplomacy to complement its foreign policy and military objectives.
- The U.S. must take the initiative to reframe its message taking into account the diversity and cultural sensibilities of its Arab and Muslim audience.
- The U.S. must address its credibility problem; American rhetoric must match American policies and practices in the region.

Public diplomacy has come of age. In this era of instantaneous global communication, the official voice of governments has been reduced to a factor of one – among many voices. The U.S. and other governments can no longer rely solely on official communication channels. In an era of increasingly vocal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which are active on a number of global issues, the policies of the U.S. and other government are more likely to be questioned than accepted. Finally, in an era when international crises are increasingly the norm rather than the exception, the U.S. and other governments are vulnerable to the power of rumors and misperceptions unless they have a crisis communication plan in place ready to respond. America public diplomacy needs all of the above.

In order to reach its public diplomacy goals, the U.S. will need to master the tools of intercultural and public communication. In an international crisis situation America will be fighting on two communication fronts. America's first priority is communicating domestically, gaining and retaining the support of the American people for its foreign policy objectives. The second front is the affected publics of other countries. America cannot communicate with non-Americans in the same way it communicates with Americans. More important than the overcoming linguistic hurdles are the cultural nuances that shape the efficiency and effectiveness of a message. More intercultural training is needed and that intercultural awareness needs to be visually demonstrated in official American communication.

An often neglected aspect of public diplomacy is the research or information gathering side of a target audience. American officials clearly have a need to develop a better understanding of its audience in the Arab and Muslim world, however, it may explore more creative methods rather than relying on public opinion polls as is characteristically done with the American public. Public opinion polling is critical for devising effective communication strategies, however, when used to develop policies they can be perceived as manipulative. A subtle, but an important, distinction.

American public diplomacy will also have to be creative in selecting the communication channels to reach affected publics. The mass media can be a double-edged sword. In the American experience, the mass media has been a highly effective and credible tool for reaching the public. As one network slogan suggests, "More Americans get their news from X Network, than from any other source." In the Arab world, more people get their news from their neighbors or people whom they know. After a long history of government censorship and control of the mass media, people are incredibly sophisticated in reading between the lines and deciphering credible facial expressions. If America relies primarily on the mass media to get its message out, it may find its message further distorted on a mass media scale.

Finally, America must address its source credibility problem, namely the perceived incongruence between America ideals and American policies. If America is concerned about peace in the Middle East, it must actively work to restore the Middle East peace process. If America is concerned about human rights, it needs consistency in its censorship. If America is sincere in its efforts to halt aggression, it must work vigorously to halt all forms. The worst thing that could happen at this stage is if America, in its goal to stop the spread of terrorist aggression, becomes itself labeled as the "aggressor." This distinct possibility would be the greatest travesty to those who lost their lives on September 11, 2001.

Public diplomacy alone cannot address America's credibility or image problem in the region. For that, American officials may need to reassess its policies so that they reflect the best of America to others. No amount of spin in public diplomacy will compensate for an American foreign policy that negatively affects others. In communication between peoples, actions still speak louder than words.

Mr. SCHROCK. Before I relinquish the chair to the chairman, I am going to ask a couple of questions. I wrote something down that Dr. Telhami said. He said the United States had positive ratings until the last 25 years or so. That kind of shocked me. Can you help me understand that?

And, No. 2, I notice that you had a—I gather this is an article from the San Jose Mercury News. I am very familiar with the San Jose Mercury News. That is where my parents live, and my dad sends me every clipping that he can find on this subject. But in there it says, despite Vice President Dick Cheney's recent statement that moderates throughout the region would take heart at an Iraqi regime change, the strategic reluctance of Arab States to support an American-led war on Iraq should not be underestimated.

We hear all of the time in committees, especially on House Armed Services Committee, that there are other nations just praying that we do this to get a regime change in Iraq, and that the Iraqi people want the same thing, too. I would like to get comments on that.

And I am curious. One of you, and I can't remember who, you were talking about the speeches that Mr. Bush has made. And, of course, I, like a lot of Americans, watched the speech that Mr. Bush made last night. I know how Ed Schrock from Virginia Beach, VA, U.S.A., perceived it. But I guess I would be curious to know how you all think the Arab nations looked at that, because, obviously, based on what your testimony has been here, it is totally different. So I would be curious to know what your comments would be on that. The 25 year thing really interests me.

Mr. TELHAMI. Well, let me begin. You have heard, actually Mr. Zogby, an interesting poll, which showed, for example, that while there is resentment of U.S. policy, in fact, when you think about France, now there is a favorable rating of France in the Arab world because they think of French policy as being positive. Obviously, France represents Western values.

But if you look actually historically, and this is interesting, right after World War I, when President Wilson sent a commission to the Middle East to find out what the people in the Middle East wanted, and, in fact, the vast majority of the Middle East wanted independence, but if they had to have a mandate from the League of Nations, which they believed was probably going to come, they preferred above all, of all the powers of the world, they preferred the United States of America, because they saw America as a positive force, nonimperialist state that favored self-determination. But the French rank last in their thinking.

To put that historically, to see how the game shifted from France being at the bottom and the United States being at the top, now it is the other way around in the thinking, now what has happened over the century?

In part it is obvious that we are now more of a superpower involved in the Middle East, and I think that role clearly shapes perceptions globally in the Middle East. No question that the French imperialism ended in the region after World War II, and our role in terms of being the superpower, the most involved superpower in the Middle East, clearly has helped shape that opinion.

But it is also true, even after we became more engaged in the Middle East, that at various stages we have had more favorable ratings throughout the past 25 years, depending in large part on how people assess our ability to move the process forward. I think if you look back in the 1990's, in fact, not looking far, right after the Iraq war of 1991, I think people bought into the possibility of a political order backed by the United States, that is based on a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and economic development and political change.

And, frankly by the end of that decade, that paradigm collapsed. It collapsed not only because the Arab-Israeli negotiations collapsed, that is the most visible sign of it through the Camp David negotiations, but also because the change that was promised at the beginning of that decade never materialized. And because it was seen as a decade of Pax Americana, it is Pax Americana, it is the United States that is actually seen to be responsible for the collapse of that dream.

And so it is really a function of what transpires. If you look, by the way, and I—if I may just expand one point. I said in my testimony that we have to look at the attitudes from the Middle East toward the United States in global perspective. We have to remind ourselves always it is not just Arab and Muslims who now have a resentment of American foreign policy, it is pervasive across many regions.

In fact, even the degree of violence against America has not been more—has not been stronger in the Middle East than in other regions. Al Qaeda, which is a problem that has been horrific and we have to deal with it, it is a global problem, it has roots in the Middle East, it has to be addressed separately. If you put that problem aside for a moment and you look at the pattern of violence against America in the Middle East, you find the Middle East has not led in terrorism against America or in terms of frequency of terrorism, period, globally. So while, in fact, there is a resentment toward America in the Middle East even now, and certainly in the past two and a half decades, that resentment has not been so passionate that it has resulted in more terrorism than in other places around the globe.

Mr. SCHROCK. Let me ask you, Doctor, in the next 25 years the media has really come into its own as well, and they pay more attention to these issues. Could that be a reason for some of the positive ratings decline?

Mr. TELHAMI. No. The 25 years, I am really specifically referring to the 1967 war.

Mr. SCHROCK. OK.

Mr. TELHAMI. I think that war resulted not only in the collapse of the Pan-Arab movement and the defeat of Arab States, but it really resulted in the American presence in a visible way, both in terms of the alliance with Israel, the alliance then with Iran, with the Shah, the government in Iran, and, in essence, the United States became much more directly involved in regional politics, and as a consequence—and usually an ally of governments that are not Arab, Israel and Iran, throughout that period. And clearly that defined to a great extent the attitude of Arabs on issues that matter most to them, because the issues of Iran and the Gulf and Israel

in the Arab-Israeli core clearly were important, broad political issues for the Arab world, and the United States was seen to be on the wrong side for much of it, not so much during the Iran-Iraq war.

Mr. SCHROCK. I would like to hear—the comment I had about how the Arabs might have perceived the speech that President Bush gave last night, I know how I perceived it. Members here know how they perceived it. I would be curious in your reaction to how you think the Arab world perceived it. Dr. Zogby.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I was the one who made the observation, and let me elaborate. The language that the President used was very evocative and very meaningful to people in this country, but in the Middle East, just as the President's words are viewed in context here, and the context being a person whom many Americans came to believe as someone they could trust, someone who stood strong and tall against terrorism and made America feel strong, in the Middle East he is also viewed in context, and, therefore, the words are judged in context. But that context is of a longer duray, similar to the one that Dr. Telhami was referring to, that is the growing sense of values as projected in the region, but, more recently, just the developments of the last several months.

The President gave a very strong speech on April 4th where he laid down markers for Israelis and Palestinians. A few weeks later, the Israelis had not met the mark, but Sharon was a man of peace. And about the best we can muster to deal with some of what Israel has been doing is that their actions are not helpful.

There is a—there is an asymmetry—I refer to it this way—there is an asymmetry of power in the Middle East. America and Israel have it, and the Arabs don't. But there are two other asymmetries. There is an asymmetry of compassion and an asymmetry of pressure. From the American side, we give pressure to the Arabs and Palestinians, and we gave compassion to the Israelis.

The headlines that Dr. Telhami referred to in today's paper were instructive. There is no way that if a similar attack had occurred in Israel, that the reaction would have been as muted as it was from our own administration. The concern that we are presenting to the Arab world today, our concern for the freedom of the Iraqi people, doesn't ring true to them. It doesn't. Our sense of being a liberator does not ring true to them. And I think that we have to take seriously the fact that these are real people, with real feelings and real concerns. And as Dr. Zaharna noted, if we understand them, they will better understand us, because our language will be different when we speak to them, and it may just be that our policy changes as well.

It is—may not be the easiest way to mobilize American public opinion, but it may be that what we lose in our ability to mobilize and inflame American public opinion may very well make us more secure by helping us reach a better understanding with people in the Arab world and build a stronger base for values, for our relationships, and a more secure environment for our friends in which to operate in that very troubled region right now.

Mr. SCHROCK. Do I hear you saying that you don't agree with Vice President Cheney's comments that moderates throughout the region want a regime change?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Look, this regime is not respected. It is feared, and many have anger toward it. But their anger toward it is matched in many places by an anger toward us. In many ways people view the equation this way, stuck between the anvil represented by the regime of Saddam Hussein and the hammer represented by America. They see the Iraqi people having been—you know, been cornered and beaten both ways.

And so, no, absent broader regional support, broader regional engagement, we are not viewed as the people to go in and change that regime. Do they want him gone? I think that is true, although we never asked the question. But we have asked people the question about their attitude toward that regime in earlier polls, and people are not favorable.

But they are not favorable toward America leading a unilateral strike. In fact, when we asked the question in an earlier poll, would they support that, the numbers went through the floor. And actually when we asked the reverse question, would they support America ending unilateral sanctions and reintegrating Iraq into the region, the numbers went through the roof. It was interesting that the same numbers came from Kuwaitis and came from Iranians, two countries that fear Saddam, as that came from Egypt and came from Saudi Arabia.

It is important to understand that there is a—a real problem that we are having in the region right now, and it is largely based, I think, on this question of the disconnect between the values we project and the policies we pursue as they apply to Arab people.

Mr. SCHROCK. OK. Thank you.

Ms. ZAHARNA. Could I reinforce Zogby? In terms of just the disconnect that he was just talking about, on the back page of the Washington Post, on the very back, it talks about the bill's language on Jerusalem as a break from U.S. policy, and we put that on the back, and it is very easy to miss. In Al Quds, it was not only the top one, and I didn't print it out in the color, but it was in red. So they took—this was a major issue. And we put it on the very, very back, and Jerusalem, which was, some have cited, in terms of starting the whole intifada the most recent one, one is on the back, and one is on the top, and in red, a big red headline.

So just that reinforcing that disconnect.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I thank all of you for your testimony.

Let me allow you to play Secretary of State for a little while in that region, because I would like to hear from each of you, what do you think the most immediate things the United States could do in terms of its policy to change the dynamic in the Middle East? And you can start maybe with Dr. Zaharna and work from right to left.

Mr. BRUMBERG. Well——

Mr. TIERNEY. Or we could skip right over Dr. Zaharna and go to Dr. Brumberg, I guess.

Mr. BRUMBERG. Playing Secretary of State here for just a moment, I think that what we could do, if we assume, which I think is a fairly good assumption, that some sort of action in Iraq is inevitable—how broad that is is not clear, but if some sort of an action is inevitable, I think the most important thing we need to do is

make it clear that we are willing to invest as much political, economic capital in addressing the issue of Iraq as the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and to make that clear time and time again, and moreover, beyond words and deeds, by following up any action in Iraq with a concerted effort to bring about a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem.

If these things are not clearly set out as goals, and if we don't act on them, I really think that any victory in Iraq will be short-lived. So if I were the Secretary of State, I would be working on step two, which is to address the Palestinian-Israeli theater.

Mr. TIERNEY. What step exactly would you be looking at in terms of showing or exhibiting that you are moving in that direction? If you are going to step two, to focus on the Palestinian-Israeli question, what overt act would you signal so that people would interpret that you were serious about that?

Mr. BRUMBERG. I would push for real political reform in the Palestinian community as a prelude to final negotiations of the peace process. We have talked about values of democracy. The President has talked about a democratic Palestine, a Palestinian state, many times. What does that mean? I think that we have to link that to an active engagement in the peace process. This must be something that we are going to do in the wake of any action in Iraq, and it has to begin with serious discussions of real reforms in the Palestinian community; not just cosmetic reforms that are meant to divert attention from the peace process, but which are linked to the peace process.

Mr. TELHAMI. I view the major threat that the United States faces today to be the threat of al Qaeda, and global terrorism connected to al Qaeda. If that is the case, then I think one has to address the priorities related to the Middle East from that perspective,and I think that perspective should include two aspects of that phenomenon. One aspect is, in fact, the organizers, the suppliers, the al Qaeda and its operatives, who have to be confronted, and the United States is doing that. But the second side is what I call the demand side. Why is it that these groups succeed in recruiting so many members, in playing to public opinion in the region, in raising funds?

And that is really the issue, because if, in fact, there are motivated people, if there is a demand side out there to be recruited, then if you close one shop, including al Qaeda even in Afghanistan, then some other supplier is going to go out there trying to compete to meet that demand.

And the real issue then is what is that demand side of terrorism that we have to address? And here I think there is no question in my mind that much of that demand is related to a collective sense of humiliation in the region, absence of hope, and in large part connected to a political order that is not promising, and the absence of a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And to my mind, the best way to address that demand side is to make the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace a priority in American foreign policy, and to work with governments, not only an American responsibility.

Arab governments are going to have a lot of burden on their shoulders. They are going to have to change. We know the difficulty of not—one of the frustrations of the—in the region has to

do with the failure of the promises of the 1990's after the Gulf War, and people are not going to live on hope of promise, they want to see results.

And clearly the United States is going to have to find a way to work with these governments. I am of the opinion that while these governments have been part of the problem, they have to be part of the solution. We can't ignore them. We have to find a way that is mutually beneficiary to us and to them. Pressure them, yes; reassure them to reform, focus on the economy. They have a lot of interest and reasons why they must change for their own good, not just for us. Otherwise they are not going to be able to survive, they are not going to be able to meet the growing demand, the horrible economic conditions that they face, and, therefore, they have their own built-in incentives. But, to me, these two issues are much greater, much—potentially much greater threat to us than the immediate threat that Iraq possess.

Mr. TIERNEY. Dr. Zaharna.

Ms. ZAHARNA. Yes. What I would like for in terms of communication is a special envoy—I take it you are looking for something concrete—a special enjoy that would be of the stature to go over and work with the Palestinians on that problem. There has been a lot of focus on the Israeli side. The Palestinians are not getting their message out, and they are not thinking that they are heard. This would be a way to build the ties between the two.

And we have done that with Sudan. And I think it would be a way, because the long term it is going to be building the relationship. And also we are looking toward—in terms of building with the Palestinians, and also in terms of educating the American public, and also the Palestinian public. We talk about educating the Palestinians about American ideas.

I think also facilitating the Palestinians to put some of the burden that they have got to get their message here, they have got to be better at communicating with the Americans.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Mr. Congressman, the President's vision is right, but no steps toward implementation. Markers were set, markers were missed, and nothing was done. Too much of the burden was placed on the party that is least capable of doing anything about it.

I was involved with the peace process back during the last administration as well. I ran a project that was called Builders for Peace.

Mr. SHAYS [presiding]. Could you just—you said too much burden was put on the party that——

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. The Palestinians. I was going to explain that. The fact is I was involved in a project called Builders for Peace. We were to promote economic investment. This is before there was a Palestinian Authority actually in place. Impediments to investment were so severe, we could not get product in or product out, because Palestinians to this day never controlled ports, never controlled access and egress through Jordan or Egypt, and so the result is that it was a captive market that stayed under Israeli control.

Jobs for Palestinians remain day labor jobs in Israel at very dirt-poor wages, and so even a year out, after the peace accords were

signed, the Palestinian economy had already dropped below where it was during occupation. Palestinians were poorer after peace than they were during the period of occupation; less employed, less hopeful, lost more land. Settlement size almost doubled in the 8, 9 years after the peace accords were signed.

We have to recognize that, and today, when people hold free elections, be democratic and develop a multiparty democracy—I guess they could have a multiparty democracy because they are living today in 52 little bantu stands where they can't communicate from one place to another. So I guess you could set a little party up in each place. But that is not what I think we need. If we want to help people become democratic, if we want to help institutions build, then we have to get the occupation off their back, plain and simple. We have to set markers and be serious about them and apply them both evenly.

The compassion gap that I mentioned and the pressure gap has to be closed. We have to show the same compassion for Palestinian victims that we show for Israelis and apply the same pressure to Israel that we do to the Palestinians. The simple fact is that we haven't. Therefore, look, how many times have we talked about the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians? What has been done since March to help translate that committee to help the humanitarian concerns and make it real?

This area is becoming like Somalia today. We are talking about bags of rice and corn meal to a people who have food. Food is being grown in the West Bank right now. They can't get it from market to town because of the curfew. That simply is unacceptable. People can't travel from the village outside of the city into the city to be able to shop because of the curfews that are closed down.

So the—the simple fact is that if we are going to do it, we have got to do it and do it right. I think if we were to put pressure on Israel, real public pressure from the President of the United States that says, I said it, I mean it, and I want this to happen this way, it would foster very important discussion in Israel, and it would also force a very interesting discussion in the Arab world.

We would actually create—we would be supporting those in Israel who want peace, because there is a very lively debate. There is a livelier debate in the Knesset than there is in this Congress. They talk about it much more seriously than we do. There are pros and cons debated every day. It doesn't happen here. And the fact is, is that if we did help foster that debate and provide the guarantees for security and said to the Israelis, as President Clinton used to say, you take the risk, we will back you up—but we let them go for a year and a half. More people died, people lost hope, and we lost the respect that we had in the region because of that.

And so lay down markers, translate what we say into very real commitments that change the situation on the ground, give people hope, let them know that we are serious and real, and I think it would go a long way to improving our relationship with people in the region, and I think it would help foster a very lively and important and very productive debate on both sides of the line.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

First of all, God help us all if a pollster ever became Secretary of State, even for a day. But, since you asked, I have had the good fortune of sitting down with some of the public diplomacy people, particularly these who are working on communications strategy, and I am pleased with some of the efforts that they have made to build bridges to find common values and common messages that can be shared back and forth. But I recall in my one of my earlier conversations back in March or so, when we were talking about what is the No. 1 thing that can be done, I led with the notion that everyone here at the table has said, that the No. 1 issue among Arabs of all ages is Palestine. And they said, well, let's cast that aside for 1 second and move on to others. And I said, no, that can't be cast aside. That is premier; it is first and foremost in the minds of Arabs. It is the policy. It is the policy that alienates us from the Arab world.

As a historian, I know that not some, but all of our greatest foreign policy successes have come through multilateral action and not alone. And so in that vein, I would say, let's not undermine the United Nations. Let's not undermine various multilateral agencies and efforts that we can work through.

So in that sense, first of all, on the matter of Iraq, I don't believe that the American people who feel so insecure right now on so many other things want to go to war. And so instead, what I would suggest is that we move to censure, that we move to isolate, that we move to embarrass this barbaric regime, but that we not go to war, because that could just explode in so many ways.

Mr. TIERNEY. If I can interrupt you. How do you do that, without getting back to the problem that we talked about earlier of people over there feeling that they are not being respected and treated with disdain if you single out one country and you start to do just that?

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. I don't think you necessarily have to single out one country, because there are others that we can censure as well. But the President clearly has, you know, an obsession right now on Iraq. Then clearly the President ought not to do it alone and ought not to be talking about war at this point in time.

And I say that from a domestic political standpoint. American people do not want to go to war. Let me just get off on that for 1 second. If you ask them about committing thousands of ground troops, hundreds of American casualties, thousand of American casualties, would you send your son or daughter to fight this war, support for this war goes down. It goes down dramatically. It is nowhere near a majority or a consensus.

So very simply we have to deal with this regime in some way. I think that we can win support by bringing the rest of the world together with us, but not going to war. The same thing holds true, I think, on Palestine and Israel. Do not undermine the United Nations. The United States is viewed in the Arab world favorably, as Dr. Telhami has pointed out, as a traditional bastion of freedom, democracy, self-determination, and all of the ideals that they identify with and we identify with. However, when we are viewed then as just simply listening to the call of domestic political advantage and selfish interest, we lose that advantage in the Arab world and many other places.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. This is a great panel. Wonderful to hear your comments. I missed some of the opening statements, but I was fascinated by——

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. We can repeat them again for you.

Mr. SHAYS. I bet they would almost be identical.

I want to ask a number of questions, but first let me ask you, Dr. Telhami, the Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, that is your chair. I was depressed when Sadat was killed, twice; first when he was murdered, assassinated, destroyed, obliterated, and second when I saw no grief in Egypt.

I need to have you explain to me why the people in Egypt didn't grieve.

Mr. TELHAMI. You know, Anwar Sadat was a great leader. Great leaders are people who go against people in the short term because they understand the strategic responsibility that they have. And, in fact, I have done a 20-year study of conflict and cooperation in the Middle East, and what is depressing about that 20 years, which is not different from other regions, by the way, is that despite the fact that when the parties are worse off the day after they engage in violence, they don't learn to stop it. In fact, the only thing that becomes normalized over time is revenge and tit for tat, and cooperation doesn't emerge, even though both sides are worse off.

The only time they break out of that cycle is when you have bold leadership, and bold leadership is rare. Bold leadership in some ways is politically irrational in the short term, because you are going against your public opinion, and that is why it is so rare. And there are some people who have done it in the Middle East. Sadat was one of them. Rabin, to give him credit in Israel, also was one of them. Both of them ended up dead, killed by their own countrymen.

And that actual depressing example takes me back to a question that was raised during the Camp David negotiations, when Carter brought Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin to Camp David to negotiate. Anwar Sadat told Menachem Begin, there are some things that I cannot do. I cannot compromise on some issues because my public would not let me do that. And Menachem Begin snapped and said, what public? You are essentially a dictator. You can control your public opinion. You have your own television stations. You tell your people what to believe, and they believe. You, you told them that the Soviets were their friends before they believed you. Now you tell them that America is your friends, they believe you. So you can ignore your public opinion.

Unfortunately, the reality was that Anwar Sadat could not simply ignore his public opinion, and his legacy remains. He paid with his life. But the truth of the matter is that the peace treaty remained. It survived despite the change in personalities. What he did had an enduring impact on the strategic relationship between Egypt and Israel that survives to this day.

Now, in terms of his own popularity in Egypt, I think down the road in the 1990's, his popularity was regained when it looked like peace between Israel and Egypt and the rest of the Arab world was inevitable, when there was a promise of hope, there was a revival

of Sadatism in Egypt. There were books written about his legacy and how people misinterpreted him.

One of the men who now serves in prison, Egypt's Omar Abdel Rahman, was a critic of Sadat at the time, wrote a book saying, you were right, Mr. President, before. So ultimately, if the course takes you where it is supposed to, people come around and see that you were right.

And, by the way, when he came back from Jerusalem on that remarkable visit, when he went to Jerusalem and broke the ice and created the change in the psychology and went back to Egypt, there were hundreds of thousands of Egyptians who welcomed him back home, despite all of the odds, that they trusted that the President was doing the right thing even if others opposed him.

So it isn't exactly true that he didn't have much support, but clearly didn't have as pervasive a support as, for example, his predecessor Nasser, who inspired more hope, but didn't lead his people to peace.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. That was a very interesting answer. And we allowed you to go a little longer, given that you are representing his chair. Very interesting answer.

This document here, Dr. Zogby and Mr. Zogby, is it based upon the poll that was done in May?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. No. There are two separate studies.

Mr. SHAYS. If I talk about the May study, does it somewhat correspond—do the statistics here still hold validity?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. They still hold.

Mr. SHAYS. On 14. You said significant differences appear among groups and levels of Internet access and access to satellite TV. In every Arab country polled, the youngest groups of 18 to 29-year-olds age are substantially more positive to American products, people and values than the other age groups. Indeed, youth appears to be a factor as a negative—as negativity grows with age. The same holds true for those with satellite TV and Internet access in the Arab countries. Those with it are most positive toward American freedom and democracy, American movies and television, American-made products and American education.

The same cannot be said for those polled in the non-Arab countries. Now, that fascinates me.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. It fascinated us.

Mr. SHAYS. Because we have been told that the discontent with the United States is with the youth. Now, maybe it is 18 and younger. And yet we have been told another thing, that TV has just devastated people's opinion of us. In fact, I am reminded of Shimon Peres' comment to us when we visited him recently. He said, television makes despotism impossible; it makes democracy intolerable. And yet you are saying that TV has actually—well, tell me the implications and tell me the opportunities.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I referred to a concept in my remarks that you were not here for. I called it intellectualized prejudice. Basically it is using big words to be a bigot. The observation that you noted unfortunately is just that. It is taking an anecdote or taking what is a perception or even a biased observation.; it is generalizing it into some kind of high-flown description of something that they want to see exist, that unfortunately for them doesn't exist in reality.

The simple fact is, from all of our data in that poll and in the later poll that is in this book, What Arabs Think, shows that younger Arabs, and younger Arabs who watch satellite television, and younger Arabs who have Internet access, in fact like America better, like our values more, like our products more, and are more open to a number of aspects about who we are and what we offer.

It also shows——

Mr. SHAYS. That blows me away.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. It also shows that they are just as angry as those who are older and those who have no Internet access and no satellite TV access to our policy. That was another interesting observation that I think we found in that poll, is that when we compared satellite television watching with anger over policy toward Palestine, there was no difference. It was across the board.

And so satellite television as a factor does not create anger. And you know it—I often thought that—remember, we had a Kerner Commission, because after urban riots in this country, the question was, what is going on? We need a Kerner Commission about anti-American violence in the Middle East, because I think we would learn a lot if we did a clear-headed, objective study of why we are in the situation that we are in right now. We would find some interesting things.

I think our book goes some ways to helping understand that reality, but still more needs to be done. The fact is, is that back in the old days, it used to be said that there were outside agitators came in and stirred up trouble. No one ever accepted paternity. No one ever accepted responsibility for why people are upset. The Israelis didn't do anything wrong. It was those outsiders, those Islamists who came in. Well, where did they come from, and where did their message come from, and why does their message resonate?

Mr. SHAYS. You are losing me. What is your bottom line?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. My bottom line is, is that there are indigenous causes to these problems that create—people are angry in the Arab world about Palestine because Palestine is something to get angry about it. If you watch it on television or don't watch it on television, you know about it, and you are angry about it. You are angry about the country America that is perceived by them as supporting the bad things that are happening to the Palestinian people.

And so if we want to change the policy, don't look to the messenger, the TV that creates—that presents the message, look to the problem that is being created on the ground for why people are angry. They are angry about something very real. People are getting killed, people are getting hurt, and they don't like it, and they want to stop it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, let me just be clear about one thing. I don't want my government to do a darn thing until the terrorism stops. And if terrorism is supposed to bring our government to do something, that would be the absolute opposite of what I think our response should be.

So terrorism gets us to then make concessions and do things? That would be the exact opposite. And so for—I am hearing this message that somehow we need to put pressure on Israel, and I

am—I am thinking of the kid's hand, not connected to the body, on the wall next to a bus that was blown out, and I am thinking—I have a hard time thinking that I want my government to enter this dialog, a big problem with that right now.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Mr. Congressman, with all due respect, I understand that. I understand that. But understand that the perception on the other side, what they are seeing, the hand that they are seeing severed is the young Palestinian child. They are seeing the story as it——

Mr. SHAYS. Explain to me, how does a parent justify accepting $25,000 because their child blew up innocent civilians? Tell me in the mindset, because that is like a big disconnect for me.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. It is a huge disconnect for all of us.

Mr. SHAYS. It would be a shame for me to think that my child had done that, no matter how oppressive our environment.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. If you want an answer, I would be happy to try to help you with that.

Mr. SHAYS. I want a short one.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I will tell you. If you begin with the assumption, and I hope that you would agree with me on this, that they are people like us, something terrible has happened in that culture that has created this problem, that has fed this problem, and that today leads to the conclusion you point to, the profound alienation and the profound disconnect with what we view and why they in their heart of hearts view as normal.

What makes a kid make his parents proud? He brings home a wife, and he has grandchildren, and he gets a job.

Mr. SHAYS. Hold on 1 second, because you are not going to be responsive. My response to that, and then you can answer, is that it is a cultural difference, that it is a religious difference that makes people view the world differently, and it is not just hard economic times, with all due respect, or oppression.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Congressman, if they had—if a young person had a job and the hope of a job, if he had the hope of a future and the opportunity to do what every normal person in the world wants to do, including them, which is bring home kids, and food to put on the table for those kids, and provide a future for his family, which is what our polling shows they want for themselves, he would do it. But absent a job, when you have 70 percent unemployment, and it has been sustained over a long period of time, and you are a young person with no job and no prospect of a job, therefore no prospect of a family and no prospect of children, what you do—what happens and what has happened in that situation is that evil people with an evil ideology which says to them, you want to make your parents proud and make your people proud and be somebody, you can kill yourself and take some people with you—there is a cult of suicide that has developed out of this despair, and if we do not address the root causes and make radical transformation on the ground that opens up opportunities of hope and can change the very lives people live, we will be seeing the consequences of this for years to come.

Mr. SHAYS. I think we have seen the consequences for a long time. One of my senses is that we have seen the consequences be-

cause we haven't stood up, and we have made terrorists almost seem like they have a sacred cause. And so my——

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Far from it.

Mr. SHAYS. That is my view.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I would not agree that they do. They do not. But we have to—as the Kerner Commission tried to find the root causes, we have to do the same.

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, I am going let everyone on this panel have plenty of time to speak. I just want to explain that to you. I am going to let you have as much time. We are told that we have to be out of here at 3 o'clock. We are just going to move. We will go somewhere else if we are kicked out of this room, because we are not going to stop until we all have an opportunity to make some points.

Doctor, did you want to make a point?

Ms. ZAHARNA. I don't want to justify terrorism. What I want to do is it seems like it is Palestinians and not Palestinian-American we are always trying to talk through the prism of this conflict. And as we see with the prism of the conflict, and there is a balance between what the Israelis are saying and then what we are saying.

And what I would hope in some of the dialogs or some of—when we say the listening is just to call a blank slate, that Palestinians can be heard just on the Palestinian flat base.

And I know that you have said that you visited Israel, and have you had the chance to visit the camps?

Mr. SHAYS. No, I haven't. I am scheduled to do that after—some time, let me just say. I am scheduled to do that. But what I am wrestling with is—is the concept that terrorists should lead us to interact with terrorists. So we interact with some terrorists, and we don't interact with other terrorists. I have a rough time understanding why we would have a dialog with terrorists.

Ms. ZAHARNA. Not all Palestinians are terrorists.

Mr. SHAYS. No. That is true. But until the terrorism stops, and the terrorists they support stop, how do we justify? Walk me through that.

Ms. ZAHARNA. I want to say that they have been calling the violence—the U.S. policy was negotiating. Whenever there was tension in the region, the United States moved to negotiations. And this time when it started in September 2000, this was one of the first times that United States, instead of—when tensions mounted, the United States stopped and said, we will not negotiate under violence. And previously, whenever there was tension or violence, that was the first thing that the United States did was to move in, try to calm down the situation.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe that was a mistake, because the lesson was if you do violent acts, then we are going to negotiate. I don't get that.

Tell me about the Middle East. If I were trying to impact, from a Palestinian standpoint, tell me why civil disobedience would not be more oppressive and result in the—I just don't understand.

Ms. ZAHARNA. I would like to come back, but I will give it to Dr. Telhami.

Mr. TELHAMI. I think that I wished that it was used. I think it would be more effective, personally. I think that would have been

the course to go. Unfortunately it wasn't. I think the President takes a very important and correct position in rejecting terrorism for any reason, by any group. I think the killing of civilians is unacceptable for any cause, even legitimate causes. I think that is the correct moral position to take.

I think the issue is not whether it is the right moral position to take. It is a question of how do we make it less likely to take place.

I mean, how do we reduce the occurrence of terrorism? We have a problem. We all agree that we need to reduce it. And the question is how do we make it work. How do we do it? And we have to keep in mind two things that we cannot ignore. One is that the trouble is not just that we have people who are willing to commit terror. That's bad enough. But there are people who also support it. Even those who are not willing to do it themselves. And if you look among the Palestinians, there is a lot of support for it. And that's disturbing.

But when we look at how both Israeli and Palestine attitudes are on issues that are immoral, you find that after the collapse of hope with negotiations, more Palestinians supported terrorism than before, and more Israelis, almost half have come to support an option of expelling all Palestinians from their homes. That is disturbing. But it's a reality. And that reality doesn't mean that all those—those Israelis are all awful people. They are, their hearts are hardened by the fear of the daily realities.

When an Israeli is afraid to send their kid to school because they're afraid they're going to be blown up by a bomb, it hardens your heart. And when a Palestinian lives under 24 hour curfews and their kid's blown up in some bombing, it hardens your heart. It's a reality. It's unfortunate it's depressing, but it's a reality. We can't ignore that. That makes terrorism more likely. It makes violence more likely. Good people turn into bad people.

People are always divided, and we have to understand that historically, and we have to, therefore, address that. We have to address how we win the hearts, how we sway people from going bad instead, and make them go good. That's an issue that we have to address. And frankly, terrorism is not an ideology or a political coalition like communism. It is an immoral instrument. It is an immoral means used by different groups for different ends. We should delegitimize it. In order to defeat it, you must delegitimize it. You can't destroy it by just killing some people or destroying some groups or closing some shops. You have to render it illegitimate.

Societies that condone it, societies that accept it have to agree that it's an illegitimate means. But you cannot establish legitimacy and illegitimacy alone. And you can't do it without getting a dialog with the societies, without having a moral say. It is a moral position. It's not really a practical position. It's a moral position that we take.

Mr. SHAYS. May I say something? You're somewhat repeating yourself and I want others to be able to answer as well. I mean, you've made your point. Is there a new point you want to make?

Mr. TELHAMI. Yes. And the point is that because it is a moral position to take, it is very important for us to be consistent. And we should consistently condemn Palestinian terrorism as unacceptable. But we should also condemn when there are Palestinian vic-

tims. We have to because this is a moral position that we must take. And therefore——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you though, when a terrorist goes into a civilian's home, a Palestinian terrorist goes into a civilian home and shoots from that home and there are civilians there are the Israelis to fire back or just simply take the shots.

Mr. TELHAMI. No, I think there is a difference between deliberate attack and nondeliberate attack, absolutely.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me—let the others respond and we will come back to you, Doctor. Excuse me. Both doctors.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. I wanted to go back to the original question that you asked Mr. Chairman, and that was in the poll the finding about the 18 to 29-year-olds. Frankly, that was contrary to every myth that I was led to believe and it was mind-shattering. I think the question becomes how do we reach them, or maybe more importantly, how do we insure that we don't lose them. And what they told us, they told us, I think pretty loud and clear, that they want to see us for what we always were, American science and technology, American freedom and democracy, American movies and television, all of the things that we represent, not American policy.

But the response that is heard is the well, we're not going to do anything else but dig in. We're going to hold fast to where we are. We're not going to change. We're not going to respond to this, we're not going to respond to that. We are going to be what we are. I just suggest to you that's the very kind of language that risks losing this group of people. And I don't want to lose them.

Mr. SHAYS. I know what you just said. But not going to change what? No, we're not going to change a policy that says terrorism cannot be accepted. Terrorism cannot be negotiated with. If you're saying that is a consistent policy that is frustrating to people, it's not frustrating to me.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. No. American one-sided support for Israel is the problem.

Mr. SHAYS. Yeah. I remember years ago wrestling with the fact that when Israelis wanted to help take the Palestinians out of the camps so they could live better and build homes, they were condemned by the U.N. because the U.N. wanted to keep them in the camps. I will never ever forget that because it was clear that they were left there to be a sore to be dealt with. And we know the one thing that will never happen, the one thing you're not going to have the right of return, and that's the one thing that Arafat didn't agree to. He had everything he could possibly have wanted except the right of return. If right of return is the basis you will never have peace.

How can Israel, a democracy, allow for right of return? It won't happen. You wanted to make comments?

Mr. BRUMBERG. I just wanted to add a few points. I don't think we want to get into a debate about the roots of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict here. But I do believe it's important to keep in mind that the vast majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza polling consistently shows this, support a two-state solution. Even the vast majority on the West Bank and Gaza support a two-state solution. Polling show us that Hamas and Islamic Jihad get 15 to 20 percent. That's been consistent.

Now, even with those polls, the same polling results show us that the longer, and the less possible a peace process becomes, the more support goes for violence, and that's a very unfortunate phenomenon. But that's not contradictory. Now, the real question is what to do with the Palestinian leadership, because the Palestinian leadership made a critical error in deciding that for one reason or the other, it could play that card, that it would ignore or downplay its implicit alliance with Hamas.

This was a terrific mistake. We now know that. There has to be a serious political reform. But the real question is what is the purpose of political reform. When our administration and the Israelis talk about political reform, when they insist on cracking down on terrorism, when they insist on reforming the security apparatus and the Palestinian authority, What is the purpose behind that? If the purpose is linked to the clear way to the peace process, whose end goal is a two-state solution, I think we can manage the issue of terrorism and decrease support for terrorism. We have to be articulate, clear and we have to act on our goals.

Mr. SHAYS. Anybody want to make a comment? Anybody on this comment?

Mr. TELHAMI. Well, just on the issue of the right of return, I think you're absolutely right, Congressman. I think that obviously, you know, the whole notion of a two-state solution is that you would have this solution based on two states reflecting nationalist movements, and Israel would have to be a state that is a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, and that means that every single solution including that, the solution to refugee problem has to be compatible with that. And I think most people who have looked at this issue understand that.

And I think personally, when that sort of solution is on the table, that brings both a robust Palestinian state and a robust Israel with a Jewish majority is put on the table. I think that the public in both places would support such a solution.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Mr. Congressman, can I leap in?

Mr. SHAYS. Yeah, definitely. Yeah.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Uhm, I heard you well. And I heard your——

Mr. SHAYS. Excuse me 1 second, please. I'm sorry.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I heard you well, and I heard your disbelief at that being a Palestinian concern, the right to return that is.

Mr. SHAYS. No, I mean—I know—excuse me. I know it's a very real concern.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Let me just talk to you a minute. The conversation we might better have in confidence, but let's just do it anyway because you raised it.

Mr. SHAYS. No. Let me just make this point. It's important you let me know, it is a concern and I have explained to you that in my judgment, it will never happen.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Yeah.

Mr. SHAYS. So, should we give up? Don't try to convince me this should happen because it won't happen.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I'm not going to try to convince you anything, other than to understand that in acknowledging that, you're dealing with real people with real human needs and real human concerns, every bit as real as the concerns of Jews, every bit as real

as the concerns of Congressman Shays. These are people with homes. I spent time with them in the camps in Lebanon when I was doing my dissertation research in the 1970's; old ladies still wearing the key around their neck, having photo albums of the House that they had in 1948 and pointing to where the grandfather was buried. And then a picture that was taken just a few years earlier by a Swiss journalist who'd gone there and showed that the House changed.

So my point is you want to deal with how we communicate. Understand that when you communicate with them, if you don't recognize from the get-go that the hurts they have are real, just like the hurts that American Jews and Jews who escaped Nazi Germany had are real. Not the same. Don't go somebody writing there an article about Zogby created a parallel between whatever. I'm not.

What I am saying is that real people with real hurts need to have those hurts understood if you're going to communicate to them. What we have done is we have shown excessive compassion to the Israeli side, and no compassion to the Arab side.

You asked why the President's speech doesn't resonate. That's one of the reasons why it doesn't resonate. Because in our political discourse and in our rhetoric, that legislation she held up about Jerusalem, I mean, honest to God, the Congress that passed that bill could be charged with criminal negligence for putting lives at risk because what we said to them is we don't give a damn how you feel, and as a result of that, we put American lives and interests at risk because these are real people with real fears and concerns and they say you don't care about us and how we feel.

That's the problem, and that's the point. Want to change the discourse? Change the feeling of how you feel about them. We wrote the book what Arabs think for one reason to try to have people here understand in this country these are real people. They go to bed at night worried about their kids, wake up in the morning thinking about their jobs and fear what is happening to them and what we're doing. They want to like us. They're afraid that our politics stands in the way of us dealing with them as real people.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your patience.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think the questions and the answers have been great. But it brings us to a point. I would agree with you that the politics in this country around that issue are just abominable, and I think that probably one of the most disastrous foreign relations things that's happened in some time has been the 18 months of total abject just avoidance of the—or disdain for dealing with the middle eastern situation I think that just exacerbated everything to appoint now where we're in very, very difficult straits. So my question is this to anybody that wants to address it.

Can the United States still be seen as a fair arbiter in that situation, or has it gone in your opinions, beyond that point where people would trust them to be a mediator or arbitrator and try to come to some resolve. And if not the United States, then who and what role would the United States play.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Mr. Congressman, they love our freedom and democracy. They love our science and technology. They love our movies and culture. They love our people. They hate our policy. I mean, I can't be more clear than to say, of course, we can be an

honest broker. They like us. They're disappointed by us. I—let me just repeat this mantra.

Mr. SHAYS. So if I hear what you're saying, they would trust a sudden change in course and see that as being real as opposed to being disingenuous.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. There's a reservoir of goodwill, and I'm afraid that if we poison that reservoir of goodwill, we're going to lose these 18 to 29-year-olds. I don't want to lose them, period.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Shibley is right. You never reward terrorism, but what you try to do is dry up the swamp where it's created, and not simply feed it so that it becomes more infested. What John just said, listen and listen well. Everything we do is directed at making the situation more intolerable instead of making it less intolerable. It's not surrendering to terrorism. It is strengthening our friends and our allies.

It's building a broader coalition. It's making America stronger and more respected. It's making our people more secure. It's making the Middle East more receptive and responsive to our values and who we are. It's making the world a better place for America to operate in. And I want our values projected. But as it stands right now, if our values are the barrel of a gun, those are the values being projected. I don't think that's the message we want to be sending.

And if it's either our gun or the Israeli's gun, that's how people are looking at us. We can win this war. But we win this war by being the best that we can be and projecting the best that we want the world to see us as we want ourselves to be seen in the region rather, and that will only come when our policies correspond to our values, the values that they respect in the region, but they just don't see being available to them. The minute we change course and say a different thing to them, they will respond almost immediately because that's how much they want to hear different from us.

Mr. TELHAMI. Congressman, if I may, I think that when you look at public attitudes and also elite attitudes toward American policy, and we think about what is it that we could change that would make them trust us, I don't think it's their abandonment of the commitment to Israel.

I think most people in the Arab world actually understand that the U.S.-Israeli relationship is special. And it's not going to change. And there is an American commitment to the security and survival of the state of Israel. And I don't think that ultimately is any longer a barrier to a relationship between the United States, and the Arab world, the commitment to Israel.

I think people have accepted that. I think the real issue is whether we have that plus a projection of caring for their problem in a way that would bring about an end to that conflict between them. And the reality is that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been an obstacle to American policy in the Middle East. We've understand that, that there is the commitment to Israel on the one hand, and our interest in the Arab world on the other means that whenever there is tension between the two, we're in trouble. And there is no avoiding that. And that's why it's become an axiom of American policy since the mid 1970's.

It is in our interest, and our vital interest to bring about Arab-Israeli peace. And we have—we can't ignore the issue because we're not bystanders. We can't say we forget it because we are involved. We are involved because by virtue of being committed to Israel, it means that whenever there is a need, we will be there including at the United Nations, including vetoing U.N. resolutions, including going against members of the Security Council. But when Israel is on the top and the Arabs are paying the price as it happens in the Palestinian areas, then we're going to be blamed for supporting Israel.

The only way to reduce that tension is for us to bring about a robust Arab-Israeli peace, not to abandon Israel but to bring about Arab-Israeli peace. That's why I think you find a lot more resentment where there is disengagement. You find a lot more support where there is engagement. In the 1990's, you heard grumblings of bias in American foreign policy. They never stopped.

There's always accusation of bias even when the United States is actually liked and people wanted to be involved despite these accusations of bias. But in the 1990's, people believed that the United States really was in the process of bringing about Arab-Israeli peace. It was coming to an end. And they were willing to put aside a lot of differences, including on Iraq. Iraq policy, even in the 1990's, wasn't especially popular in the Arab world even though it wasn't a war policy. Sanctions were never popular in the Arab world. But the tension and resentment were highly reduced and put aside because there was a sense that we're finally on a train that is first going to bring about Arab-Israeli peace, and then we're going to address a lot of other issues. We don't have that now.

Ms. ZAHARNA. I want to say that I'm one of the few that vacations in Gaza Strip, and I happened to be there when the F–16s were dropping bombs. And I wanted to say in terms of what Mr. Zogby was saying in terms of the poll, there is hardening of the heart, or you feel you have nothing to lose, but at the next moment, there is a tremendous love of the American people, the American ideals, the American model, the American technology that can do spirit, or if you don't have grace, you make it, the hard-working so there's a tremendous love of that which makes the pain double.

One, it's American weapons destroying and two, what happened to American values? The one thing I'm loving the American people, I'm loving all of this. And then I'm getting this great disappointment and frustration. And so that's the disconnect between the policy and I think, I mean, it's not—from our perspective, if somebody bombed me, I'd be upset and that would be it for life. But there is such a reservoir, an admiration that where there is a hardening of hearts one way, there's also an openness another way.

Mr. BRUMBERG. Congressman, I want to add one point here, and that is that if the United States uses the political capital now in the way that the Clinton administration did, it will recoup a lot of the lost hope in the United States that we've talked about today. This is not a—this is far from a lost cause, and there's an enormous opportunity for President Bush there before him, particularly if he is able to prevail and if he does pursue a war on Iraq and he is able to prevail. He could potentially have enormous political capital.

We began to reshape the Middle East after the first Gulf War. Shibley spoke about this. And the question is are we prepared to do that? And are we ready to use the political capital to do that. And that is really the question. It is not too late to pursue an initiative.

Mr. TIERNEY. I want to thank all the members of the panel. You've been very interesting and enlightening and I think it's been a great exchange. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing them here today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Let me just followup on that question. Who do we speak with? Who does the administration speak to in the Palestinian community? There is dialog. As you know, Israelis are meeting with people privately, I mean, this concept that there isn't dialog is a little crazy. It's not public dialog, and every one of you up there knows it, I think. There is dialog between the Israelis and Palestinians. There is dialog between the United States and Palestinians. We don't know who we have a public dialog with. Who is that public dialog with?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Yasser Arafat.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. This is the man when I was there that had ordered the weapons from Iran. And he doesn't fit your description of a terrorist?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Mr. Congressman, look, we can have this discussion, but I'll tell you——

Mr. SHAYS. Does he fit your description of a terrorist?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. He fits my description of the person who is the president of the Palestinian Authority.

Mr. SHAYS. Does he fit your description of a terrorist?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. A person who has made some mistakes, real mistakes in how he's conducted himself in that capacity but is viewed by the Palestinians, is viewed in the rest of the Arab world as having a legitimacy that we dare not deny, just as when we recognize Ariel Sharon as the elected leader of Israel and deal with him, despite the fact that Arabs have a very different view of him.

You don't get to pick who your enemies are and you don't get to pick who you deal with to make peace.

Mr. SHAYS. So elected terrorists we deal with. Unelected terrorists we don't.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Well, you know, I would have said that Palestinians have used terrorism and I've condemned it. And I, like Shibley, I wrote an article a while back on nonviolence, and I think it would be very important for the Palestinians give up this stupid weapon because it is demeaning to them, but also deadly to Israelis.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Zogby, all I'm asking is this question.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Right. Talk to Yasser Arafat.

Mr. SHAYS. You don't think this is a sincere question obviously.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. I do.

Mr. SHAYS. The sincere question is, I have a problem of understanding if we talk to terrorists or we don't. And I guess what I want to know and the answer is yes. If they're they're an elected terrorist, we talk to them. If they're not elected, we don't.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. No. That's not the—but that's not the way you define the equation. The way you define the equation is do you

want peace between Israelis and Palestinians. And if you want peace between Israelis and Palestinians, you return to the process as it was but apply a more significant kind of pressure to bring about a conclusion.

I believe if President Clinton had put on the table the offer he made in the last 3 weeks a year out and sold it to both sides, we wouldn't be doing what we're doing right now. I also believe if President Bush had picked up on it and followed through with it, we would not be where we are right now. But all the people we're talking to, are people who wouldn't stand for 5 minutes if Yasser Arafat pulled the rug out from under them. He's not the person who stands in the way of us dealing with moderates. He's the person who stands between us and extremists who want him dead as much as they want the peace process dead.

And don't forget. There is an infrastructure there, not of terror, but of civil society that the Israelis have spent the last 18 months destroying. They didn't bomb Hamas headquarters. They bombed the Palestinian police stations. They bombed prisons. They bombed checkpoints where Palestinians were operating. They destroyed the physical infrastructure of the authority and then looted the ministries in April and May, and don't forget, the purpose of it was to make certain that the Palestinian Authority did not survive, so that we'd be back to ground zero.

Mr. SHAYS. The sad thing is that Israel decided to give back land to the Palestinians under the basis that their elected leader, Arafat would use his security forces and make sure that terrorists did not operate out of them. Instead he took money that he got and bought terrorist weapons and didn't do what he had committed to do and left no choice, but the Israelis to go back and get those terrorists. That's the sad reality. But we're not going to get beyond, I guess, this point. The answer that you gave me though, is Arafat is a terrorist, but we need to talk to him because he's elected.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. That's not the answer I gave you.

Mr. SHAYS. Well I mis—he is a terrorist, or he isn't a terrorist?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. No, I don't consider Yasser Arafat a terrorist. And I can see the stories in the hate press tomorrow because we've got it here too, you know.

Mr. SHAYS. No, because they might be deserved. Because when I was in Israel and the information I have seen, both classified and unclassified, leaves no question whatsoever that all the weaponry ordered from Iran was paid for by the Palestinians, ordered by Arafat.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. It was really stupid.

Mr. SHAYS. No, stupid is a dumb thing to say. No, that's what's stupid.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. It's interesting. I wrote an article at the time called Stupidity and Chutzpah. It was stupidity for the Palestinians to have ordered it. It was chutzpah for the Israel to have displayed it as they did when what they didn't lay out for us were not these stupid guns that the Palestinians ordered but were the F–16s, the Apache helicopter gunships and the tanks that are far more lethal and have been used with far greater lethality than anything that the Palestinians have done.

You're right. You're absolutely right. They should have pursued non violence and they still should pursue non violence. But remember that the number of Palestinians killed, civilians and children, far exceeds anything that the Israelis have suffered. Do not judge this by one standard alone. Look at it in terms of the totality and if an America wants to win, then what we have to do is view both sides with the same degree of compassion. If you look at one side with compassion and the other side only as a side—no, I know. Rush it and hurry it up and get it over with. But you are wrong, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. No, Dr. Zogby, no I'm trying to be very respectful.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. But your answers continue to go on and on and you're just being repetitious, and so that's why I'm interrupting you.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Sometimes repetition is the mother of learning. But I tried. I've failed. I'm sorry. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. No. The challenge for some of us is that we happen to believe that when you negotiate with terrorists, you're doing the exact opposite of what you should do. Let me ask you this: Why is it hard for democracy to grab hold on the Middle East?

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. It is actually beginning to develop——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask some other folks, then you will be able to——

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. Sure.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Brumberg.

Mr. BRUMBERG. This is an enormously complicated and interesting question you've raised. Paradoxically most regimes in the Arab world are not despotic. What they've done is used a level of political liberalization and openness to really stave off democratization. So they're very adept at maintaining a kind of liberalized autocracy that proves very useful, and in so doing they have fragmented their oppositions and created a durable sort of autocracy that can only be dismantled through a long-term process that has to begin not simply from below but also from above.

And certainly, in terms of U.S. aid programs and the kinds of programs we have directed to the Arab world in the last 10 years, some of which I'm quite familiar with, most of our aid programs have been devoted to tinkering with these systems, but not getting at the core of the autocracy and how it functions. In many respects the United States has been quite happy to live with that kind of liberalized autocracy. Many of our allies in the Arab world, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, maintain those sorts of systems.

So one of the answers is that we have to begin to look at the whole foundation of that system and how it can be changed over time, and whether we're willing to indulge in the kinds of pressure and encouragement, carrot and stick that would be required to change those systems. There's a lot of rhetoric now from the administration about the idea of democracy. There's a rhetoric which suggests that once we prevail in Iraq we'll go on elsewhere to promote democracy. I find that intriguing, but I'm not sure we're actually committed to it. But if we are, it's going to bring us back to this issue of how to do it in Palestine.

And on this question, I have to say that I differ somewhat with our colleagues at this table. I do think that in many respects, Arafat is a spent force. He's made some critical errors, and I think the debate in the Palestinian community is most important because there he's viewed as somebody—finally a debate has emerged—he's viewed as somebody who's made a lot of critical errors and there's talk about new leadership. And we do have to nurture that. That doesn't mean by the way that Arafat will be irrelevant to the process. But he probably will never have the pivotal role he might have had once.

So if we're talking about democratization and we're talking about political change, is the United States willing to encourage it or not? In Palestine and elsewhere? It's a central question.

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor Zaharna.

Ms. ZAHARNA. Why is democracy not——

Mr. SHAYS. Why doesn't democracy grab hold in the Middle East? What is there about the culture and the people and so on where democracy just doesn't seem to be something they strive for and work for?

Ms. ZAHARNA. I've studied the culture but I don't know that it's inherent in the culture. And in terms of specifics, there was during the first intifada in 1987, there was a lot of what the United States would call civil society.

Mr. SHAYS. I'm not just talking just in Palestine. I'm talking about throughout the Middle East. I don't count many democratic governments and I'm just asking why and it helps me understand how we interact and how we're viewed. I'm just curious as to why you feel there are so few nations in this area throughout the world where democracies have bloomed forth. Why don't they bloom forth in the Middle East? And why is that a hard question? There must be a reason.

Mr. TELHAMI. I can take that.

Mr. SHAYS. I want you to tell me. Why don't you think that's happening?

Ms. ZAHARNA. I want to give a technical answer in terms of in-groups and out-groups and cultural analysis. But the fact is that there was and we haven't nurtured it. We've squashed it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. TELHAMI. Congressman, I think it has been a very unfortunate and frustrating reality in the Middle East that democracy has not flourished as much as it should have and as much as the people deserve. I mean, I think that one of the depressing issues pertaining to the reality in the Middle East is that we have authoritarian governments that have made life difficult for their own people, much more than for us frankly. I mean, it is—the people deserve more. I think if you look at this in terms of our—I'm a political scientist, and when we look at how change occurs and when does it occur, you find that when you start on a path, it is very difficult to break away from it.

The path was begun unfortunately, after the colonial era of governments being installed. There were authoritarian governments. And when governments are in power, they don't give it up very easily. It's very, very hard to deviate from that. There is a cultural issue. It's not a Middle Eastern cultural issue per such, but a tradi-

tional cultural issue. The Middle East also is not an industrialized—if you look at the—if you look at how democracy took place in Europe and the western world, it was really followed a change economically, mostly through industrialization, the role of the individual, the emergence of individualism.

All of that certainly is not the case economically in the Middle East. I think the economy and politics go hand in hand, and frankly they need to change the economic system before they even change the political system. I think they go hand in hand.

Mr. SHAYS. There's the general view that as a society tries to compete economically, not in terms of selling oil, just taking something out of the ground, but tries to compete economically it has to educate its people. It has to create a sense of freedom and so on. And is it likely that part of the reason why we're seeing a religious schools, folks in that way as away to try to avoid that potential——

Mr. TELHAMI. Well, Congressman, I think that there is no question that they need to change the educational system and the economic system. And many of them understand that and there has been some change at various stages, a debate that's been going on. And I think that's the area where, in fact, we can be helpful because it is in their interest. They've come to understand that it's a problem for them. These governments understand that the economy is a disaster. The unemployment and the pressure from the public, the growing population are going to bring them down anyway. And so they want a change. They need to change.

That's an area where our—we have common interest with them. We can work with them to change, and then bring along political change. But I want to say that even on this issue, we shouldn't underestimate the role of foreign policy in perpetuating repression. Let me give you an example of that. I think when you look over the past couple of decades, when we have a choice like we have had in 1991 or a choice that we've had like as we do now, pertaining to Iraq, or a choice that we have pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, when we ask governments to do things that are not popular, and we always do, for a variety of reasons that we've discussed. They can only do it in one way. They can only do it in one way and that is by resisting the public. And in order for them to deal with the—their incompetence and inability to deliver the aspiration of the public pertaining for example to the Palestinian-Israeli issue, which has been humiliating to the people, they can't do anything about it, and the governments aren't doing a thing about it, either good or bad.

They are not doing anything about it. And that obviously, we want them to support us in our policy. We certainly want to discourage them from going to war. And in that regard, we overlook the fact that they have to be repressive. And if you think about the sort of challenge that these states face today, vis-a-vis the public, they're going to have to unleash the security services for the next many months in the hundreds of thousands to be able to make sure that demonstrators don't overthrow them, to make sure that university demonstrations aren't going to pour into the streets.

To make sure that nobody is plotting and so forth. And that obviously, is—you can only do it through repression. So we have to

deal—we have to understand there's a connectedness between the foreign policies issues and the perpetuation of repression that we have to overcome.

Mr. SHAYS. So you're clearly not saying that—how many countries in the Arab world are there and how many are democratic?

Mr. TELHAMI. There are——

Mr. SHAYS. 22 countries.

Mr. TELHAMI. There are varying degrees, varying degrees of political liberty across the Arab world but there is no western democracy in the Arab world.

Mr. SHAYS. I didn't misunderstand you did I? I'm smiling because I hope I didn't.

Mr. TELHAMI. No.

Mr. SHAYS. You're not suggesting that they are not democratic because of our foreign policy.

Mr. TELHAMI. No, what I said is I gave you all the reasons why they're not democratic, including the path they're in, including the fact that governments. But I said in addition is that let's not underestimate the role of foreign policies in perpetuating that rather than helping it forward.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Zogby, what do the Arab—what kinds of poll did you find or reading when the Saudi government, at one time the per capita wealth of the Saudi government per capita was 24,000. Now it's about 7,000. And yet the Saudi government has realized extraordinary income from oil. So it is not an issue of resources. Explain to me what the average Saudi thinks of their own government and why they think whatever they think about their own government.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman, there are limits to the ways that we can ask questions over there. That's certainly not one way that I would have done it. What I can tell you is that we've asked a lot about economic issues and concerns and there is a growing disgruntlement among Saudi people, rank and file that it's palpable in some areas in Jiddah in southwestern Saudi Arabia. There is borderline anger about the way the economy is being run.

Mr. SHAYS. Do they blame the United States?

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. What I do want to say though is that this is a process question as well. Each time we've gone in there to poll Saudi Arabia, about a dozen times now, we've been able to push the envelope a little bit further in terms of the kinds of questions that we can ask, and so I'm seeing to some degree, more and more openness and willingness to allow our kind of work sort of a prefigure to democratization.

Mr. SHAYS. So the bottom line is it's hard to get a sense of Saudi attitudes in a fair poll because you're restricted by what you can ask.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Hardly. We can't ask about the job performance of the Crown Prince. But we can ask about your status in life. Are you better off than you were 4 years ago? Will you be better off 4 years from now? And there are rumblings.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir.

Mr. JAMES ZOGBY. But numbers are fairly high on the optimism side and also on the satisfaction side, I mean surprisingly so. And

among young people, as we've noted before, Saudi young people are more satisfied and more optimistic than Saudi old people. Let me say—let me just say about the question, though, Congressman. The per capita income issue is a function of a couple of factors. One is that there's been a huge population growth and second is that overall oil revenues have gone down. But in addition to that, Saudi Arabia has invested literally hundreds of billions of dollars in building a massive infrastructure in the country, and also don't forget, paying for and supporting our involvement to defend them in the last Gulf War.

Those are factors that—in fact, where there is resentment, there is resentment about the amount that was paid that way. There also is, to be very honest, resentment about issues involving corruption and lack of movement on some levels that people care about. I would suggest to you that one of the ways you work with friends is you help move friends forward when they're ready to move forward and even when they're not you sort of edge them forward.

And I think that to just finish the point that Shibley was making that I think is an important one. We don't have full-fledged democracies in the Middle East. But what we do have is looking at this as Americans, countries that are friends that are beginning to move that we can help them move and actually we can help the process, in several Gulf countries, there are progressive developments.

We need to be moving them forward and not making life more difficult for them. I think that we've had a public diplomacy effort, not a public diplomacy effort, but actually through the Department of State, we've had the Citizen Exchange Programs. They need to be enhanced. We have other programs that involve training programs. They need to be worked on. I think that some of the programs that many of us have participated in which are—when they had elections in Jordan they asked us to bring over people who could do campaign training. When they had women's issues in some countries, they asked us to bring Arab American women there to help talk about how women in the Arab community and America move forward. There are ways we can help and I don't think we've actually done enough of that kind of programmatic work that would help make some of the incremental movements that would be very beneficial to us.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Could I just add one quick point?

Mr. SHAYS. Sure.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. I don't want our role confused here. My understanding of the mandate for this hearing was that we were to present Arab public opinion and not to advocate for any government, not to advocate for any position on issues but simply to relate what we've heard and try to honestly interpret that. That certainly, I believe has been my function here, and so I don't want there to be any misunderstanding that my role has been here as a pro Arab advocate of some sort. I'm interpreting what we've seen having done quite a few polls over there.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that's clear. And you have been all of you have been wonderful witnesses. Is there anything before we close up here?

Mr. TIERNEY. No. Just to again thank you, to reiterate that. Everybody has been a good witness, and I hope that nobody perceives your role to have been other than that. It's been very helpful.

Mr. SHAYS. I would concur. I would also just allow each of you to have a closing comment if you'd like, anything that you want to put on the record. Thank you very much, all of you. Appreciate your being here.

Mr. JOHN ZOGBY. Can I just say that Joseph and Celia Zogby who came from Lebanon about 95 years ago would be very proud for the last hour and a half. I just wanted to enter that into the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for saying that. I'm proud of your contribution and I'm proud of this ability to have dialog, so thank you. We'll go to our next panel and our last panel and they have been very patient.

Our last panel is Yigal Carmon, president of the Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], as we call it; Laurent Murawiec, former senior international policy analyst, the Rand Corp.; and Hafez Al-Mirazi, I'm sorry. Mirazi. I'm going to ask you three to stand and we'll swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I'll say to you that usually we learn the most from the third panel, even though you all wait the longest. You have a chance to think of what you really want to tell the committee and we're delighted you're here.

And so we will take in the order we called you. And thank you again for your patience and thank you for being here. So we're starting I guess with you, Mr. Carmon.

STATEMENTS OF YIGAL CARMON, PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE; LAURENT MURAWIEC, FORMER SENIOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP.; AND HAFEZ AL-MIRAZI, WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF, AL JAZEERA WASHINGTON OFFICE

Mr. CARMON. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am tempted to——

Mr. SHAYS. I have to just tell you something. We—I met with you in your office in Jerusalem and you were prone to give explanation and then digress to another one. So I'm going to hold you to time here. I just want to warn you up front, OK.

Mr. CARMON. I know, and I'm tempted to leave out the presentation I prepared and just——

Mr. SHAYS. No, no. If you follow your presentation you might stay on time. It's just additional testimony.

Mr. CARMON. Well, because this can be read later and I have——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me say this to you. I'm sorry. We'll start over again. You say whatever you want. Your statement will be a permanent part of the record. You make the points you think you need to make.

Mr. CARMON. I think I would rather make some points relating to the previous panels because this was an issue that was—that reflects a lot of what the Congressmen are considering. And what I have to say can be read later.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. We'll start the clock now. Here you go.

Mr. CARMON. Yes. So let me relate first to a few questions. Why was Sadat murdered? It wasn't because of the peace process. The assassins who were Islamist said it was because of the—of what he did with regard to enlarging the rights of women and his general approach with regard to social issues. A lot of—you asked the first panel about the influence of the impact of no answer on the part of the United States to the challenge of terrorism. And I want to remind you that not only wasn't there an answer to terrorism, but the American Embassy in Damascus was stormed by government-directed mob and there was no answer to that. It was absolutely stormed.

If we had been in another period the United States would have declared war on such a country. The wife of the Ambassador was rushed to a security room and the whole embassy was stormed. Nobody even remembers that. This is an unprecedented event in the history of international relations as far as I remember. A lot was mentioned here about the Palestinian cause as the reason for whatever happens or the attitude toward America.

So let me quote the distinguished Arab editor of the paper Ashakalaset, who wrote in English and the Arab news, it's a newspaper that in the 7 years that he has monitored the publications of al Qaeda, he has never seen the Palestinian issue as a major thing in factor at all at that time. And later on, I would like to read to you I will conclude my notes by reading to you from a poem that was written by a poet here in the—well, actually he lives in England, but it was published here in the United States that refers to this same problem. And I will leave it for later on.

People talked here about the situation in the territories as if there has never been Camp David. I don't want to relate to that, but one thing, the count of suicide is 1,500 years old. It is not a result of the curfew that was placed on the Palestinians as a result of the intifada, and that followed Camp David. There were suicide attacks in the 3 years after the beginning of Camp David before the Likud came to power in Israel, namely at the time where the late Mr. Rabin and Mr. Perez were in power.

These were the years of hope and before anything happened to subvert the direction and in these years there were terrorist attacks and the P.A., the Palestinian Authority did nothing. You were talking about the use of weapons Abu Masin, who is second in command in the PLO, said publicly to Arab papers that it was wrong to use weapons. And what happens next is Arafat working hard to subvert any possibility of him being a prime minister within the reforms.

Two other people in the Palestine Authority opened their mouth against that policy, a prior previous minister, Abi Lamah, another one near Zuher Al Manassah, and they were shot. They were shot at their homes. This is why they are now quiet. I wanted to mention one thing that came up in the last moment of the last panel. We heard from Mr. Zogby that they are not free to ask any question they want. I think that polls where the—those who conduct them are not free to ask whatever they want are totally invalid. This is part of the problem of the democracy in the Middle East or the lack of democracy.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that this deserves a special panel, and you have part of the answer in the fact that the distinguished witnesses in the last panel who admitted that there are dictatorships and dictators in the Middle East at the same time said don't touch Saddam Hussein.

I would like to conclude by reading to you from this poem, and I will mark one thing at the end of it. It is taken from an Arabic language paper, Al-Watan, that says about itself that it's a national weekly Arab American newspaper published in Washington and San Francisco and Los Angeles and New York, whose mission is to provide Arab and Muslim Americans with the most current, valuable, reliable and informative news of political economy. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. Is this printed in English or is it printed in——

Mr. CARMON. Yes, it was in Arabic. No it's in Arabic. But here is the poem. Yes, I am a terrorist. The west cries in fear when I make a toy from a match box. While they, the west, make a gallows of my body using my nerves for rope. The west panics when I announce 1 day that they have torn my galabia, while it is they who have urged me to be ashamed of my culture, and to announce my joy and my utmost delight when they violate me.

The west is sorely grieved when I worship one God, in the stillness of the prayer niche. While from the hair of their coattails and the dirt of their shoes, they need 1,000 idols that they set atop the dung heaps made of the titled ones, so that I become their slave and perform amongst them the rituals of flies and he—they will beat me if I announce my refusal. If I mention among them there are fragrance of flowers and grass, they would crucify me, accusing me of terrorism. Admirable are old actions of the West——

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Carmon——

Mr. CARMON. It's finishing in 2 minutes.

Mr. SHAYS. I just don't understand what you're reading. It makes no sense to me.

Mr. CARMON. OK. This is the poem that talks about the clash between the Middle East and the west.

Mr. SHAYS. What do you hope that I learn from this?

Mr. CARMON. OK. There is—if I can continue, it talks about the clash with the west, not one word about Israel, not one word about the Palestinians.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And so that illustrates what point, as far as you're concerned?

Mr. CARMON. That it's not about the Palestinian cause.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And that's your basic point here that terrorism is not about——

Mr. CARMON. In reference to what the last panel has said, that's my main point. Of course, there is the presentation which I guess you will have time to read.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carmon follows:]

Yigal Carmon

President, The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)

October 8, 2002

House Committee on Government Reform

Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

What Makes the Arab Street Rage?

Analysis and Policy Recommendations

Understanding any conflict among ethnicities, peoples, or states – a conflict that can erupt over any specific issue – requires first and foremost a thorough examination of its historic and ideological origins, and of how widespread and deeply rooted it is among the populations involved. Such an understanding is the only proper basis for shaping effective policies to resolve it.

An examination of the roots of a conflict must address three main aspects: 1) the media, which provide the dimension of the present and the here and now; 2) the educational systems, particularly the schoolbooks, which provide the dimension of the future; specifically, the values, ideals, and aspirations conveyed to the next generation; and 3) the religious institutions, which in most places throughout the world provide the dimension of an accepted higher moral system.

MEMRI is an example of this model at work. It monitors, translates, and analyzes media, schoolbooks, and religious sermons and edicts of the Middle East. It offers a diagnosis, rather than merely identifying symptoms. Although it focuses on a particular conflict, it demonstrates the proper way to approach and understand any conflict.

Focusing on those three aspects, MEMRI examines the historical and ideological roots of the political-religious conflict pitting Arabs and Muslims against the West and Israel. It looks at how widespread and deeply rooted the conflict is among the populations involved, and it presents this information to legislators, the administration, the media, and the public at large. MEMRI bridges the language gap between the Middle East and the West by making its translations of Arabic available in all Western languages. Only when such information is available and easily accessible can it be utilized in public debate, leading to the consolidation of policy recommendations.

What influences the Arab street?

The Arab street is exposed to a mostly government-controlled media; it is exposed to government educational systems, government and non-government religious institutions, Friday sermons, and to *fatwas* (religious edicts) requiring believers to act in certain ways. You can find examples of translations and analysis in your MEMRI folders. I also recommend visiting our Web site at www.memri.org.

What comes out of all these sources is an unceasing onslaught of hatred and incitement against America and the West, and against the Jews and Israel. A threadlike but persistent and unyielding stream of moderate, liberal, and progressive voices is also heard; albeit mostly coming from outside the Middle East but also in the Middle East

itself, where intellectuals put themselves at risk by speaking out. This particular stream is one which we devote special attention to in our Reform Project, and which we translate extensively.

Let me cite a few examples:

If you would be kind enough to open MEMRI's Hill Report, which you will find in your folder. On page 6, you will see the Arab media's response to President Bush's State of the Union address, in which he is compared to Hitler. On page 5 you will find excerpts from a speech by Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who also compared President Bush to Hitler. On pages 7 and 9, you will see examples of the Egyptian government media, claiming that America's treatment of Al-Qa'ida prisoners is worse than Hitler's treatment of his Christian and Jewish "rivals," and that the US, Israel, and Turkey are the "real Axis of Evil." On page 7, you will see an example of an Egyptian columnist stating that "Guantanamo is the real Auschwitz."

Conspiracy theories are also common in the Arab media. For example, on page 27 of the Hill Report you will see an article published in a Palestinian Authority weekly which claimed that the CIA and FBI carried out the September 11th attacks. In fact, we devoted an entire study to this subject matter, titled A New Antisemitic Myth in the Middle East: The September 11 Attacks were Perpetrated by the Jews, which is also included in your folder.

Another example is Saudi official Abdallah Bin Matruk Al-Haddal, a Saudi preacher from the Ministry for Islamic Affairs, who appeared on the Al-Jazeera television channel in January praising Osama bin Laden, while blaming the Jews for the September 11th attacks. The entire transcript can be found on our website.

Jordanian Prince Hassan bin Talal offers the more rare but most important example of the liberal voices in the Arab world. On our website you will find article he wrote for the London-based Al-Hayat daily, which outlined his vision of a modern Islamic state that respects pluralism, diversity, women's rights, and the separation of church and state.

What is to be done? How can America and the West counter this situation? What are the main policy recommendations?

First, it is essential to look at the whole picture. A comprehensive approach must be adopted recognizing that all three areas must be addressed: the media, the educational system, and the religious institutions.

Second, we should realize that this is a battle, and battles cannot be won through public relations campaigns. Much of the hatred of America stems from misinformation, and misinformation is fed to the Arab street by government and non-government institutions. This must be countered on two levels: While it is important to deal with the consequences of these institutions' activities – i.e. the misinformation that they spread – it is much more effective, and more urgent to deal with the institutions themselves. Here, a PR approach must give way to a confrontational approach.

Let me give you a few examples:

When in October 2001 Ibrahim Nafi', editor-in-chief of Egypt's most important government daily newspaper Al-Ahram, who was appointed to his post by his country's president, wrote that the U.S. was dropping genetically altered food aid in areas full of landmines in Afghanistan, he was inciting any Egyptian on the street who puts his trust in his media and his government against these inhuman Americans.

There is no need for a PR campaign to explain to Mr. Nafi' that he was deliberately lying. He knows it. It is a matter of common sense that when someone's reputation is damaged to the extent that his and others' safety is jeopardized, he does not need a PR remedy, but a good lawyer. America's reputation is constantly being damaged, and what is needed in such cases is not a PR campaign to explain - as in the aforementioned case, that

the US was dropping food to help the refugees – but a good team of lawyers, or the equivalent of this on the level of bilateral government relations, to make this editor pay for what he has done.

Criticism of a particular US policy is, of course, acceptable. But what Al-Ahram did was not criticism, but rather spreading of lies that endanger American lives. At the very least, Nafi' must have issued a retraction. More importantly, he should have been deterred from repeating his actions. If he does not stick to the facts simply because they are the truth, he should stick to the facts because America gives Egypt $2 billion a year in aid – not counting emergency grants to rescue it from financial collapse, as occurred this year.

In March of this year - after MEMRI released an article from the Saudi government daily Al-Riyadh which claimed that Jews use teenagers' blood for Purim pastries - the State Department, Congress, and the office of the President protested. The editor retracted and fired the university professor who had written the article. The Egyptian editor Nafi', however, did nothing of the kind; in fact, not only has he himself spread the same blood libel a couple of times, but when this summer he was subpoenaed by French authorities over that issue, he mobilized the intellectual and political elite of Egypt and other Arab countries in support of his "right" to spread such hatred.

America must fight these dangerous lies in the media. It must confront every such lie published in the papers – as the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, David Welch, did in an article in the same major Egyptian paper – Nafi's paper – in response to the upsurge in conspiracy theories blaming the FBI and the CIA for September 11. Just like the Voice of America did on September 25th, after reading another blood libel from the Saudi media translated by MEMRI, when VOA criticized the Saudi government for "incitement to hatred." This is most commendable.

The revolution now taking place at the Voice of America, which is enlarging and expanding its activities in the Arab world, is an outstanding accomplishment. Its board should be commended. Radio Sawa is also an excellent professional endeavor. I recommend that the distinguished members of the committees invite VOA board representatives to present their new operation.

Congress has a big role to play in this sphere, not only by exposing and debating the misinformation and incitement in the Arabic media, but also by initiating legislation promoting change. This should not be done only from Capitol Hill. Just as Congressman Burton visited Saudi Arabia to demand change, other U.S. legislators should go directly to the Arab and Muslim world and demand change. These congressmen and women should attempt to make themselves heard in the Arab media. The distinguished head of the Al-Jazeera television channel in Washington is here with us today. I am sure he would be interested to have them appear on his channel's program "From Washington." This is precisely its goal; to have the voices from Washington be heard by its extraordinary viewership of tens of millions all over the Arab world.

What values are schoolbooks in the Arab world conveying to children?

Let me again cite a few examples: MEMRI conducted a study of the new Palestinian schoolbooks (which you will find in your folders) – schoolbooks written by the Palestinians themselves (not the schoolbooks they inherited from Jordan or Egypt), in an endeavor that took 5 years with European funding and with international professional help, including that of UNESCO. We found that these books teach 10 year olds, for example, that "the noble soul has two goals: death and the desire for death." Also that the books teach that human species are distinguishable by the width of the nose – a racial concept that was used by the Nazis and was long ago discarded by science. Where were the experts – UNESCO included – when this appalling thing took place? Shame on them!

Another example of where reform is needed is in Syrian schoolbooks. MEMRI's study of Syrian schoolbooks found that a sixth-grade text taught children of the merits of acts of martyrdom (as you well know, the concept of martyrdom is precisely what motivated the September 11 attacks). The textbook teaches: "Martyrdom is a

continuation of life and life's most noble and pure form. Martyrdom is merely a qualitative transformation from one chapter of narrow life to a much broader unlimited life. Martyrdom is eternity and the martyr is eternal and alive forever and ever."

MEMRI's textbook project is now in full swing, and is about to examine Saudi and Egyptian schoolbooks. For example, the following lesson for fifth-graders on Islam in the Saudi schoolbook Al-Hadith (The Prophet's oral traditions). The book teaches: "There is only one truth (the religion of Islam) and all other religions are false." In the instructions to the teacher which accompany that statement, students are told that those who do not leave their false religions and become Muslims are destined to burn in hell. The same destiny awaits a Christian or a Jew who dies before converting to Islam. The students are asked to mark a "yes" or "no" to the following questions: 1) "The Islamic religion is the road to heaven," and 2) "Other religions bestow eternal damnation on the adherent."

Let me cite another example from a ninth-grade Saudi textbook titled Al-Hadith. Under the heading "The Victory of Muslims over the Jews," the text cites a very well-known Islamic tradition [Hadith] named "The Promise of the Stone and the Tree," which tells of what will happen on the Day of Judgment. The tradition is attributed to Abu Huraya, one of the Prophet Muhammad's companions. According to the tradition, the Prophet Muhammad said: "The hour [the Day of Judgment] will not begin until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. A Jew will [then] hide behind a rock or a tree, and the rock or tree will say, 'O Muslim, O slave of Allah! There is a Jew behind me, come and kill him!' – except for the *gharqad* [box thorn], for it is one of the trees of the Jews." This quote is accompanied by a number of statements for discussion in the classroom, such as "It is Allah's wisdom that the struggle between Muslims and Jews shall continue until the Day of Judgment." and "The Hadith brings forth the glad tidings about the ultimate victory, with Allah's help, of Muslims over Jews." Questions for class discussion include "With what types of weapons should Muslims arm themselves against the Jews?" and "Name four factors leading to the victory of Muslims over their enemies."

Here is a chilling example we found on the Saudi-based IQRAA television satellite channel (you will find a copy of the video in your folder). We will now show a very short clip, in which a three year-old toddler named Basmallah is questioned about what she was taught. She hates Jews, she says, because as Allah said in the Koran, "they're apes and pigs." After viewing this video, Senate Majority Leader, Tom Daschle, and the state Department both issued statements criticizing this incitement.

What can be done to improve education in the Arab and Muslim world?

America must fight lies and incitement in Arab and Muslim schoolbooks in two ways. The first way is direct, by offering support for self-initiated efforts to develop new schoolbooks. Congress can be instrumental in such an endeavor, with allocations for new curricula and schoolbooks more suitable for the 21st century and its universal values.

The second way is indirect, through international bodies such as UNESCO – although this organization's record of activity in this regard is not sterling, as demonstrated by the results of their involvement in the development of the Palestinian schoolbooks. But UNESCO's approach can be changed.

What can be done in the religious sphere – the hate-filled sermons, the preaching in the mosques, and the *fatwas* decreeing that committing murder is acceptable, even obligatory?

In your folders you will find a recent study that MEMRI released about sermons in Saudi Arabia. These sermons consistently support *Jihad* against the West and violence against Jews, and speak out against equality for women.

In Egypt, as you will find on pages 45 and 47 of the Hill Report, religious authorities at the prestigious Al-Azhar University, the oldest Islamic institute of higher education in the Middle East, also have declared *Jihad* against the West. The Saudi-owned London-based Arabic daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported two weeks ago that the State Department's request to see the university's curriculum was turned down. But the fact that it began dealing with the problem is most commendable. Nothing was done regarding a *fatwa* that was issued by the Islamist sheikh Hamed 'Ali of Kuwait a few months prior to September 11 stated that it was religiously legitimate to hijack a plane and crash it into an important target to cause maximum casualties.

Because change in the sphere of religion can come only from within, no non-Muslim can assume a role in changing internal Islamic affairs.

But there is a way to help it happen, by supporting moderate Muslims – and there are many – in their struggle to win over their fellow believers. America can encourage all moderates in the Arab and Muslim world. MEMRI's focus is not only on translating their writings, but also on a number of special projects – among them the Reform Project (if you open your Hill Report in your folder between pages 50 to 56, you will find many examples). This project is dedicated to producing a yearly report of intellectual profiles of the liberal voices in the Arab and Muslim world, who stand up and call for reform of Arab religion and education (as well as in society, and politics). One such voice, whom I would recommend be invited to testify before your distinguished panel is Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Al-Ansari, dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at the University of Qatar, who recently said "...We must examine our curriculum, and evaluate our educational methods. We must reexamine our education and our media. This will be the right beginning for the fight against the culture of terrorism."

As President Bush stated at West Point in June 2002, "the peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation, and their governments should listen to their hopes." This statement was followed by the words of a senior State Department official, who said "What the United States can effectively do is open up the public space for debate and help moderate voices be heard."

Let me concur with both of these statements. This struggle is not a struggle about whose values are better. It is not a struggle to impose Western ideas. It is not a clash of civilizations. It is a struggle for the plain truth, and for values that are shared by all mankind.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you. Thank you.

Mr. Murawiec.

Mr. MURAWIEC. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that I am greatly honored to be called upon to testify in front of you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. It is an honor to have you, sir.

Mr. MURAWIEC. Thank you. The Arab street is a myth. Did we speak of the Berlin street under Hitler? Of the Moscow street under Brezhnev or of the Beijing street when—under Mao? In fact, most Arab countries are dictatorships of one form or the other. Tribal theocratic despotism like Saudi Arabia socialist military regime based on terror, like Syria, Iraq, or the Palestinian Authority or military bureaucratic autocracy like Egypt. Dictatorships have no street because if you take to the street you're probably dead.

Why is the Arab street only conjured up when a position to America is the matter? Have I ever heard any Arab leader express the word, well I have to reform my wicked ways lest the Arab streets topple me. Dictatorships brook no politics or public opinion. The freedom they allow is the freedom to grumble and not much.

In fact, when large populations are ready to explode in raging frustration because they have no job, no future, no serious income, because if they're not part of the ruling clan or tribe or clique, they'll be crushed by the local cop, the local bureaucrat because the entire landscape is corrupt, let's make it short. People are ready to explode. But there is one type of target which is allowed. You are told that the west, the United States, and Israel, you are told by the official press, radio and TV, it's fine to scream at them and demonstrate. You will not be clubbed or locked up or tortured in prison if you do.

Of course, you won't be the one to decide when and where you demonstrate. You may be given little flags and signs and even floats if the matter is really important and if CNN has been alerted to the imminent time and place of that spontaneous demonstration.

So what's the Arab street? It's a cliche that has gained currency because Arab dictators wanted us—wanted to be able to project upon the world's screen and image of the dangerous irrationality, the lurking violence, the explosive potential of the very populations that they keep in shackles and poverty.

Under communism, Brezhnev repeated all the time be nice to me or else the hard liners will edge me out. This is the same kind of process at work. And we're told now look I'm a moderate. If only you do my bidding the Arab street will not become angry. In fact, or so I believe, that fabled street is a cul-de-sac. Its pedestrians are turned on and turned off at will. If the Arab dictators were so keen to listen to the men in the street, well, they wouldn't be dictators.

So I think that people who speak so much of the Arab street should really pay more attention to the Arab in the street who's a rather different kind of a creature. But at any rate, as far as we're concerned we shouldn't hold the Arab world to different standards than we hold the rest of the world. There shouldn't be double standards, indeed, I have heard that in the last couple of hours. So democracy should be no less of a standard than the rule of law and accountability and transparency and all the rest of it. There is something wrong if double standards are so applied.

And since the people of the Middle East are therefore not able to organize themselves or to acquire an expression and to give it a corporate forum, this is a result of Arab independence after 1945. There used to be—there used to be and I think we should insist on that a powerful force in the Arab world that developed in the early 19th century that called for modernization, westernization for the rule of law and economic progress.

That idea was called an-Nahda, the renaissance and it flourished from Beirut to Alexandria and Cairo. It was liberal, it was democratic, it was secularizing it was looking west. The fact that it has been censored, repressed, banned, jailed, tortured and very often exiled doesn't mean that it's disappeared. Voices of freedom, in fact, can be heard from the Arab world although they often arise from United States or European territory, which doesn't make them unauthentic or out of touch with the Arab people.

Such people speak from here because there would be silence to death if they spoke from there. And that voice, I would propose to you, needs American support and American commitment to make itself heard. The vast number of people in the Arab world yearn for the very kind of freedom that America represents, are begging America to be true to itself. They are not armed with the cruelty of the tyrants or the cynicism of the terrorists of the mob. And they appear to be defenseless in their countries.

In fact, I believe them to be our truest allies in Arab Middle East and ultimately our only allies there. They're begging us to stop listening to the street and listen to them. We've witnessed something extraordinary in the Muslim world on September 12, 2001. Thousands upon thousands of inhabitants of Tehran took to the street to spontaneously demonstrate their sympathy for the United States. We witnessed the joy in the streets of Kabul after U.S. forces forced out the Talibans.

What held true for Tehran and for Kabul will hold true, I believe, elsewhere. And if I may, sir, add a few points of comments to what I heard during the day as you say this is the advantage of the latecomer, I would say, that the asymmetry in America policy toward various forces in the Middle East is real, but it's the asymmetry that exists between friend and foe. After all, it is not Israel that collaborated with the KGB for 40 years. It is not Israel that was attacking American imperialism throughout the post war. So maybe there is a reason for double standards. I will not treat my friend the way I treat my foe.

Second, people say our policy is hated. Now, is the policy right or wrong? If the policy is right, perhaps it is hated, but it is right. And I was reminded of this phrase by Winston Churchill: In war the point is not to be loved, it is to be right. I should think that this holds true now as it did then.

Last, I would like to add that I have heard a lot today about feelings and the hurt of people, etc. This may well be true, and I believe it is very often true, but this is not a policy analysis. This is an appeal to emotionalism. It is an appeal to victimhood, and it is a matter of not looking at oneself. It is, is my policy right? Has it

been right? I have been wronged? Did I do wrong? I should be able to look at myself in order to project new policy.

I think this holds for all of the aspects that are in discussion today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murawiec follows:]

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OCTOBER 8, 2002 HEARING
"ARE WE LISTENING TO THE ARAB STREET?"
LAURENT MURAWIEC

The Arab Street is a myth.

We should not be listening to a myth.

Did we speak of the "Berlin Street" when the German dictator paraded hundreds of thousands to his drums?

Did we speak of the "Moscow Street" when Red Square was trampled by Russian crowds under Stalin's watchful eye?

Did we speak of the "Beijing Street" when millions of Red Guards brandished the Little Red Book?

Most Arab countries are dictatorships of one form or the other: tribal-theocratic despotism, like Saudi Arabia, or Islamic-Socialist-military regime based on terror, such as Syria or Iraq, or the Palestinian Authority, or a military-bureaucratic despotism like Egypt.

Dictatorships have no "street" because he who takes the street in an unauthorized fashion is promptly and assuredly beaten, arrested, sometimes tortured and jailed for that sole reason.

Why is the "Arab street" solely invoked when opposition to the West is the matter, and never when Arab dictators are in question? How often do we hear leaders express worry, "I have to reform my evil ways, lest the Arab Street topple me"?

Dictatorships brook no politics - they brook no public opinion - no freedom of speech, of association, of the press or anything else.

The only freedom allowed in the major Arab countries is the freedom to grumble a little bit - within very clearly-marked out limits. Don't grumble about Saddam, about Assad,

about the Saudi Royals. Grumble about some obscure bureaucrat, that's allowed, or about a general situation. Grumble when you are at the café playing backgammon, but grumble in a convoluted way that will not put you in harm's way - or informants' ears.

You are ready to explode in rage and frustration because you have no job, no serious income, no future unless you're part of the ruling clan or tribe or clique. You're crushed by the local cop, the local bureaucrat, the entire landscape is corrupt, you have to pay *baksheesh* for every piece of official business, housing is miserable, the schools are overcrowded, services are collapsing or inexistent. The mighty are arrogant and overbearing. You are ready to explode.

But there's one type of target that's allowed: the West, the U.S., Israel. You're told - by the official press, radio and TV - that it's fine to scream and demonstrate against them. You will not be clubbed, locked up or tortured in prison if you do. But, watch out! You will not be the one to decide when and where and how. The government, the police, one or the other intelligence service, the media (the official media or the tolerated media) will do that for you. You will be mobilized for the purpose and the occasion. You may be given flags and signs and even floats if the matter is deemed really important, and if CNN has been alerted to the imminence, time and place of the spontaneous demonstration It feels good to be able to scream hatred, once in a while. That's what scapegoats are for.

So - what is the "Arab Street"? It is a cliché that has gained currency because the Arab dictators wanted to be able to project upon the world screen an image of the dangerous irrationality, the lurking violence, the explosive potential of the self-same population they keep in shackles and poverty.

The Communist version was Brezhnev's ever-recurring warning, "be nice to me or else the hard-liners will edge me out!" On Mayday, or any day, the masses obediently showed up in the streets. Likewise, the dictators tell us, through the cameras of CNN: "Look, I'm a moderate. If only you do my bidding, the *Arab Street* will not grow angry." In the Arabs world, where "the street" is complacently put on display once in a while, the "mass-based organizations" of the ruling parties (Iraqi Ba'ath, Syrian Ba'ath, but the same

goes for Egypt, for instance) have the task and function to mobilize the fettered population in this way.

That fabled "street" is a cul-de-sac. Its pedestrians are turned on and turned off at will. If the Arab dictators were so keen to listen to the man in the street - or the mob in the street, rather - they would not be dictators. If anything, there are many, many streets in the Arab world, not all of which speak the ugly voice of hatred and destruction.

We should discount this concept altogether.

The idea of an Arab "Street" has a corollary: that the Arab world cannot and should not be held to standards similar to those that hold in the rest of the world. Of course, to exonerate the Arab world from such standards is a nasty form of racism. "These people, really, they cannot hack it, can they?" There are and there should be no double standards.

There is an extraordinary gap between public and published opinion in the Arab world. The tradition especially in Sunni Islam is that people should submit to political power, should accept patiently just about any outrage, insult and injury from the ruler, because any form of rule is better than anarchy. This is what Sunni theologian and jurists have repeated for more than a millennium. This is what practice has sanctified.

Since most Arab countries became independent, ca. 1945, their history has been an unending parade of coups and counter-coups, political assassinations and putsches, riots and demonstrations. Power is monopolized by one clique or tribe or clan, outsiders preventively persecuted, terror imposed as a method of government. *That is the nom, the standard, the way things are.* Violence is not the continuation of politics by other means - in the Arab Middle East violence is politics and politics is violence.

The voice of people is therefore not able to organize itself, to acquire an expression and a corporate form.

But before the Cold War sanctified partnerships with dictatorships and the courting of dictators, before it was accepted that genuflecting in front of oil derricks was the only way of securing energy supplies, before short-sighted deals were made - there was a powerful force in the Arab

world that had developed from the early 19th century, to call for modernization, Westernization, for the Rule of Law and economic progress. That idea, once called *an-Nahda*, renaissance, flourished from Beirut and Alexandria and Cairo. It was a liberal, a democratic, a secularizing idea.

The fact that it has been repressed, censored, banned, jailed, tortured and exiled does not mean that it has disappeared. Voices of freedom can be heard from the Arab world, though they often arise from the territory of the United States or Europe. This does not make them "inauthentic" or "out of touch with the people." They speak from here because they would be silenced by death if they spoke from there.

This voice needs American support and American commitment to make itself heard. The vast numbers of people in the Arab world who yearn for the very kind of freedom that America represents are begging America to be true to itself: since they are not armed with the cruelty of the tyrant, with the cynicism of the terrorist, with the brutality of the mob, they appear to be defenseless. But they are our truest allies in the Arab Middle East, and, ultimately, our only allies. They are begging us to stop listening to "the street," and listen to the hearts and minds.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me, and especially the title of that hearing, I believe that we need it very badly, especially in Washington: Are We Listening to the Arab Street?

I would like to also remind you, my fellow panelists and the audience here, that this Arab Street I haven't actually inhabited since 1983. I have been living in Washington since that time, and I spent in Washington, DC, more years than I spent in any other city in the world, including my country of origin, Egypt.

I also spent more years working for the U.S. Federal Government at Voice of America Radio than I spent working in any other media outlet, including my current employer, Al-Jazeera Satellite Television, which I joined 2 years ago as Washington bureau chief.

I was asked once by a veteran U.S. journalist how I felt about the transition from VOA to Al-Jazeera, and my answer was, when I was an editor and broadcaster at VOA Arabic Service, my focus was on how to give an Arab context to stories created in an American-influenced newsroom based in Washington.

However, as a journalist and talk show host at Al-Jazeera, my focus now is the reverse. I have to explain American and U.S. positions and give an American context to news stories that is heavily influenced by the Arab perspective, originated in a newsroom in our headquarters in an Arab capital, Doha, Qatar. Of course, after September 11 much of our coverage has originated also from Washington, DC, and has come out of the United States.

Although most people here in the United States might only know Al-Jazeera as the station that was carrying the bin Laden tapes, they are unaware, maybe because of the language barrier, that we have carried live more of President Bush's speeches than any of the three major U.S. networks; ABC, CBS and NBC. Just last night when these three networks declined to carry the President's speech on Iraq, Al-Jazeera was broadcasting it live with simultaneous translation into Arabic.

Not only that, but we put together a panel consisting of an Arab-American professor and a former U.S. Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Dr. Martin Indyk, to provide live commentary and analysis before and after the President's speech. And maybe after also I read the statement, I could answer some of the questions that was—about the Arab reaction to President Bush's speech on Iraq yesterday.

One of the nice comments from Mr. Indyk, that he observed that there was no single word or mention in his speech about democracy in talking to the Iraqi people, and his explanation was not to scare the minority Sunni in Iraq that the democracy might mean the rule of majority, which is the Shi'ites. And also I observed it in that discussion that the President did not mention at all or put some words for the Arab, neighboring Arab countries or the Arab leaders what they ought to do or ought not to do, as if he is not using Iraq or dealing with Iraq in a regional context or perspective.

I would like to go back to the title of these hearings: Are We Listening to the Arab Street? I might take issue with the phrase the "Arab Street"; of course, not for the same reason that my fellow panelist Mr. Murawiec raised, but because it tends to give the impression of a radicalized Arab youth spilling out into the streets.

I prefer instead to think of our audience, which is estimated to be more than 35 million, as the Arab living room, because this phrase creates a more accurate and human picture of the majority of our viewers, who are educated and middle-class professionals with families. Most importantly, they include many Arab-Americans who are voting citizens here in the United States.

If you need to know how the Arabs feel about the United States, you can just visit any family in your district, or in Detroit, MI; Brooklyn, NY; or for that matter here in the Washington suburbs.

Arab resentment of the United States is only driven by U.S. foreign policy, not by American values. On the contrary, the frustration stems from the realization that the U.S. Government, in their eyes, does not apply the American values of freedom and liberty for all when it comes to the Middle East. We see this in what is perceived as the U.S.-tolerated, if not condoned, occupation of Palestinian land by Israel. We see it also in U.S. support for authoritarian regimes and undemocratically elected leaders in the Arab world who are also welcome in Washington as long as they serve the short-term interests of the U.S. Government.

The Arab Street, Mr. Chairman, like the American Street, reacts to pictures and footage of human suffering. We witnessed how CNN's broadcasting footage of U.S. soldiers' bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the Somali capital, affected and outraged the American public opinion. In turn the administration had to withdraw its troops from Somalia, despite the political wisdom of staying there. We have witnessed also the effect of CNN footage on the American Street after the Serbian shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo, which resulted in U.S. public pressure on the administration to intervene in the Balkan crisis.

The Arab governments are no different in their reactions to the outrage and pressure felt from the public when they see footage of human suffering of the Palestinians as a result of the occupation, the human sufferings of the Iraqis as a result of sanctions.

I would also like to mention that Al-Jazeera has been consistent in carrying pictures of Israeli pictures of victims of suicide attacks as well as those of Palestinian victims of Israeli attacks. The problem that is not perceived by the United States, of the U.S. media here, is that based on numbers, there are, on a daily basis, more victims on the Palestinian side than on the Israeli side. This is reflected in the amount of images that we put out.

Unlike any other Arab TV channel, Al-Jazeera routinely gives Israeli Government officials the chance to appear on our network in order to explain their positions. In addition, I have just hosted, a few weeks ago, one of my fellow panelists here, Mr. Yigal Carmon, to discuss the work of their organization, MEMRI. The fact that he served for 22 years in the Israeli military intelligence was only mentioned in the context of his neutrality in monitoring the Arab media.

Because we invite Israeli guests, we are routinely criticized by some Arab government-controlled media outlets and are accused of being front for either the Israelis or the Americans. Some also cartoonists in the Arab media put King David star over the heads of anchors in Al-Jazeera, as if they are sending a message that in whose behalf are we talking.

In fact, the criticism of these media outlet is mostly reflective sometimes of the government resentment toward Al-Jazeera for daring to air opposition views, thus providing that all politics are really local.

Some of those outlets accuse Al-Jazeera of being anti-Egyptian or anti-Saudi and so on whenever we broadcast the views that the government did not agree with. This is understandable in a government-controlled media environment, but it is not understandable, to me at least, to see free and independent U.S. media reacting in the same way and same manner toward Al-Jazeera and accusing us of being anti-American for broadcasting views that the U.S. Government does not approve of. Ironically, the same news media that applauded and praised Al-Jazeera before did that for its role in democratization and carrying popular and dissenting—unpopular and dissenting views of many Arab authoritarian governments.

Al-Jazeera's mission has always been the same, to cover both sides of the story. People who are good at telling the American side of any story should make themselves available to Al-Jazeera and other foreign media the same way they make themselves available to the American media every Sunday. Indeed, we might say that the Sunday talk shows could basically be viewed as preaching to the converted.

After 9/11, we were given interviews by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice, and other U.S. senior officials. However, except for a second interview that I conducted with Secretary Powell, we have not met with any one of them again.

It is particularly important to have sustained exposure to senior U.S. officials and Congressmen, not just in times of crisis. On the contrary, in those times, times of crisis, it might almost be too late for a constructive message to be conveyed. We cannot expect that a new U.S. public diplomacy campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Arab people, or even the French, but they could help in damage control capacity simply by highlighting the positive, if they have any, in foreign—in U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world that is perceiving that policy to be biased and based on double standards.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, emerging independent and free media outlets in the Arab world, regardless of their shortcomings or unpopular perspectives or mistakes, including Al-Jazeera, should be encouraged by the United States as the leader of the free world and instead of pressuring the governments in the region to crack down on these outlets for short-term political convenience.

Thank you very much again for this invitation.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

This is going to be an interesting dialog that we are going to have. I think as I hear our three panelists, two would probably be more inclined to think the same way here, but that was different on the panel before this one.

Let me ask each of you your reaction to the Zogby poll that surprised me and said that between 18 and 29-year-olds, there was basically a positive feeling for American products, people and values than other age groups. I would have thought that would have been,

and we were told that would have been, the age that was the most unhappy.

Should I have been surprised? Were you surprised and so on? Why don't we start with you first.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Well, if you mean by your remark Mr. Telhami's remark about the last 25 years?

Mr. SHAYS. No. I am referring to the Zogby poll that said significant differences appear among age groups and level of Internet access and access to satellite TV. In every Arab country polled, the youngest groups, 18 to 29 years, are substantially more positive on the American products, people and so on.

In other words, we seem to be doing better with that age when we have been told continually that the young were those most angry with the United States and, we thought, most inclined to not think very positively of us.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is consistent with what I said in my statement, that the frustration comes from high expectation. That same group that has high expectation of American values that they adore and admire, they feel when it comes to the politics of the region and the politics of their own country, it is not applied.

But when they watch the debate in the United States, especially that group, that they have the English language, ability to read U.S. or American newspapers, watch CNN, and follow the debate or enjoy the entertainment industry product, they appreciate that. But the frustration is mainly about when they apply these kind of values, freedom and liberty for all, to their own. And this is where the frustration comes from.

Mr. SHAYS. One last question before I go on. Does American TV bring discredit to us in the Arab communities, or it is neutral, or is it—in other words, when they see the programs that they see, do they think ill of the United States, particularly this generation?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Well, American TV here I always like to make a distinction, at least for my audience.

Mr. SHAYS. I am talking about what is broadcast to overseas.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Well, the effect and influence of American TV overseas, I could assume—still I have lived in Washington, as I mentioned, for almost two decades—is not that big effect. Maybe the effect of the CNN is there. The effect of the Internet is more than the American TV on that audience.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. MURAWIEC. Well, since the results of those polls seem quite eerily to correspond to the political views of the polster, as we heard earlier, I tend to slightly distrust and perhaps disbelieve the results of the poll.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, let me ask you this. Maybe he was responding to his own poll, and then—I mean—let's give him—so let's—OK. I mean, in other words, he was responding to his own poll. He said that he was surprised by it.

Mr. MURAWIEC. It seems to me that the entire thing is tautological. If I may expand on that, we are told and were just told again by my distinguished neighbor that it is Arab resentment and, Arab frustration that are the cause of the problem.

Mr. SHAYS. Speak to the first part of the question. The first part of the question was, among their youth there seems to be more respect for the United States than the other generations. And I thought it would be the other way around, and so did others.

Mr. MURAWIEC. Sir, I have no particular—nothing enlightening to say on that. I do not know.

Mr. SHAYS. So you weren't surprised by that? You just distrust the poll; is that what you are saying?

Mr. MURAWIEC. I look at it with great skepticism.

Mr. SHAYS. You look at it because you view the poll that they were prevented from asking questions that they needed to ask, that in—in other words, they weren't able to ask the right questions?

Mr. MURAWIEC. That is the first point, which the polster was honest enough to report himself. There is another one, which if I—I wasn't sure whether I was hearing advocacy or a poll. And since the results of both seem to coincide completely, I thought, gee, here is a poll that is aimed at demonstrating a political thesis, and I am not sure that it represents anything in reality.

In other words, the instrument seems to be perfect to measure what the polster wants to measure rather than any form of reality.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Carmon.

Mr. CARMON. Well, polls in the Arab world, which is under dictatorships, are totally invalid. And I think that Mr. Zogby had a slip of the tongue to admit that he wasn't free to choose his questions, not that he would choose any other. But, in any case, I don't know any respectable university that will take a poll, a poll in which the polster was limited in asking questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, he did point out that he couldn't ask questions about the royal family, but that wasn't the question that was being asked, so he didn't ask the question about the royal family. But in terms of the questions he did ask, he didn't imply that he was limited.

Mr. CARMON. Well, but science is about more than that. It is not that in this field you can ask and that field you can't. This is not serious. This is not a poll. This is not scientific work. It is simply totally invalid.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me ask you, Mr. Carmon, about Al-Jazeera in terms of, you know, for instance, the President's speech was on last night. What is your reaction to this station that is seen by how many, 35——

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Over 35 million.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you—that strikes me as an extraordinary large number of people. As compared to CNN in the area, how would that compare? In the same net places that you compete, do you get more audience, do you get less?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. Well, I would assume that we have more audience, at least in our target area, which is the Middle East and North Africa, 22 Arab countries. We are talking about more than 280 million population, about 300 million.

But, also, the—this is an Arabic language channel.

Mr. SHAYS. CNN does not have Arabic?

Mr. MURAWIEC. They just started a Website in Arabic on CNN.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What do you think about the station, because you listen to what they say in Arabic?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. We haven't sent him the honorarium yet.

Mr. CARMON. Al-Jazeera is a unique phenomena in the Arab world, new and unique. It follows the—the Western kind of media, and it is—it answers, like other channels that we know in the West, to the public sentiments. It reflects them, it answers to them, and in that respect it reflects much of the hatred. But unlike other media outlets in the Arab world which are government-controlled, they are not government-controlled, and this doesn't mean that they do not reflect a lot of government-controlled sentiments, but they themselves follow a Western type of media.

I have heard criticism of Al-Jazeera that their new approach stops at the border of Qatar and does not touch on their own government, and this is true. However, their approach of other countries is absolutely free, and they suffer a lot of repression, and their representatives are arrested in many places, and they are intimidated in many ways, and still they are not—I think that we should not—as important as Al-Jazeera is, we should focus more on—because Al-Jazeera is one, with all that immense viewership, we should focus on the government-controlled media all over the Arab world, which is one of the elements that makes the Arab Street for what it is.

The Arab Street is influenced by the media, by the education systems, which are also government-controlled, and by the religious institutions that are partly government-controlled and partly non-government-controlled. These are the forces that shape the Arab Street, and they are all conveying an onslaught of hatred to the United States, and, of course, there is also a threadlike stream of liberal voices that come mostly from outside of the Arab world, but also from within it, and it is persistent, it is unyielding, but it is a minority.

So I would really recommend that we focus on those who need change. Al-Jazeera does not need change. Insofar as they need it, they are progressing all of the time. But what needs change in the Arab world is the government-controlled institutions, be it media, education systems, and religious institutions.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me get into that in a little bit.

Mr. Murawiec, please, what is your response to Al-Jazeera?

Mr. MURAWIEC. I think that the development of Al-Jazeera in the last few years is a sign of the times. It is a rather positive one, because it has breached the monopoly in media that each national dictatorial government in the Arab world used to enjoy, and it is a contribution to the creation of real pluralism of information in the Arab world. And so we would need five or six of them, rather than just one, because one tends to turn into a monopoly again. So there ought to be more, and I think there ought to be major U.S. efforts at having Arabic language broadcasts that wouldn't be stale or propaganda or plainly silly or just pop music, but that would convey what the Arab world actually needs to hear.

And with all due respect, it is not necessarily an interview a week with the secretary of this or the secretary of that the Arab world needs to hear. I have a proposal to make. There are some individuals in the Arab world whom I consider to be downright heroic, who have had the extraordinary courage of criticizing their own societies. A number of them live in this country. One was born

a Lebanese Shi'ite. He is Mr. Professor Fouad Ajami. Another one was born an Iraqi Shi'ite. He is Mr. Conan Makea. Couldn't find anywhere—how about Conan O'Brien? There is quite a number of others. The list is really long.

I would like for an American broadcasting organization to broadcast translations of their forbidden books in Arabic or Persian or Urdu or whatever might be the case, and to make these available to the Arab public. I would like such a broadcasting effort to address women in the Arab world, which—who are the great hope of the Arab world and of the liberation of the Arab world.

So I do think, to come back to your question from which I have strayed, that this is—Al-Jazeera is a very welcome first breach in a monopoly, and that much more needs to be done.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. CARMON. If I may, in our work we focused on the liberal voices in the Arab world and outside of it. And there are quite many, and they—we have a reform, or what we call a reform project, where we compile their intellectual biographies, and we are going to have hopefully also a conference soon enough about that, and the yearly guidebook to all of those voices that need to be heard, that need to be supported by Americans, by Congress, by the administration.

The way to go about many things about reforming their world is to support these voices. I concur with what Dr. Murawiec's remarks in his presentation, this is the way to go to support the liberal voices, both inside and outside the Middle East.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Are any of you doctors, and I have been calling you Misters here, or are you all Misters? There is no doctor?

Mr. MURAWIEC. I am a plain Mister, but I thank my neighbor.

Mr. SHAYS. I have such respect for people who take the time to earn their doctorate that I would never want to not give them their due respect.

I would like to know a little bit about the President's speech last night as to how it was portrayed on your station, on your network, rather, and then how you—how it was dialogd afterwards.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. If you would permit me, if I could mention something before we pass that, into the discussion on the President's speech and the Iraq issue.

There is a need also, especially in the Congress side, and on the U.S. side, to be vocal in condemning the hatred language and the hatred speech when it comes in the American media or for distinguished religious leaders in the United States, because that gives the higher moral ground, and gives it model and the encouragement for people on the other side to do the same.

We have witnessed, I mean, three very famous and distinguished religious leaders in the United States bashing Islam in the language that if we replaced or substituted the name of the Prophet of Muslims and put Moses or Jesus or we put Jewish in instead of Muslims, nobody would have accepted that or tolerated that. We have witnessed on CNN Franklin Graham considering Islam as a wicked religion.

On FOX, Pat Robertson talking about Mohammed as a wild-eyed fanatic; Jerry Falwell on CBS, last Sunday on 60 Minutes, considering Mohammed as a terrorist. And the interviewer is soliciting

more about him, and saying, you mean that he is a model for the rest of the Muslims, as Jesus was a model and Moses was the model?

This kind of hatred speech and hatred language, when we don't say anything about it, and when he don't have here moral courage and moral condemnation, again, as to this kind of language, whatever the followers of that hatred speaker is or the numbers of them or how many electronic messages or mail messages are sent to the Congressmen who would condemn them. This is very needed in order also to pressure on the other side and tell them that you have to speak out against this kind of language or this kind of hatred.

Back to your question about the speech on Iraq. Of course the—it was ironic for us that the President saved some of the remarks in the 25-minute speech, maybe he spent about 10 or 7 minutes, talking to the Iraqi people. I hope that he was considering Al-Jazeera is carrying it live, although we decided that like few hours before.

Mr. SHAYS. What time would that have been?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. That was not prime time. It was 4 a.m., 3 a.m. over there. 8 p.m. here would be 3 a.m. the next morning over there. However, we had our reporter, our correspondent in Baghdad ready to give us some kind of a reaction, what would the Iraqi media would be interested in, or what would attract their attention in a speech like that.

He tried to do his best. Of course, we know that we cannot expect a correspondent in Iraq or in many other capitals to be as free as in my case, or someone in London or even in Cairo, Egypt, to suppress their views about what do they think the Government of Iraq would react to.

The same reporter, just 2 weeks ago, his credentials and press accreditation has been suspended for 10 years—for 10 days, because the Iraqi Government considered his language as very similar to the Western propaganda that is used against Iraq. Al-Jazeera decided not to take any story from the Baghdad bureau, not from any other reporter, until we did from the reporter that we decide, and in 5 days they canceled, and they allowed him to talk again.

I would go back to the lack of any mention, as Dr. Indyk in his analysis of the speech after he finished mentioned, that attracted his attention, no single word, while he was talking to the Iraqi people about democracy. And his explanation was maybe not to scare Sunnis that are supporting Saddam, that he belongs from democracy and pluralism of Shi'ites coming as a majority over there. That could be an explanation. The other explanation, that the majority of our viewers would think of that democracy is the last thing that the President of the United States care about when really he speaks about to the Iraqi people, or it is for political convenience, he is not using it.

The other thing is that no mention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the case for his father or for Jim Baker in 1991, that always there is a sense of what is the main issue and the main problem over there in the area. And in order to disarm the Iraqi President from using the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinian argument of the

Israeli occupation, the Baker-Bush or Bush-Baker administration took the initiative in the Middle East conference that followed the Gulf War in 1991.

We are lacking that right now, and without really addressing that conflict, there is no way to move ahead.

And I will stop here because, really, there is not much that we could have figured out what would be the reaction on the other side.

Mr. SHAYS. Would there be interest in your running that again during a time when more people are more likely to watch it? I mean, I think it is terrific that you ran it live, but would you be running it again, the President's speech again?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. We had a news story about it. We kept running that news story until 4 p.m. this evening, with also a reaction, like the reaction of Congressman Dennis Kucinich, since he belongs to Cincinnati, Ohio, to Ohio, and how interesting would be the reaction to Congressman from the same State.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just ask you, though, Mr. Kucinich, for instance, doesn't favor us moving into—well, I don't want to portray his position, because I would want to do him justice, but I believe that he would tend to have tremendous reservations about moving forward.

And would you have had others, and do you have other Members of Congress on? I mean, could you list me 10 people, Members of Congress, that you would have on?

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. We try on daily basis. This is an open invitation for the record, not only for you, Mr. Chairman, but really for all of the members of the subcommittee or the House, that we would really love to have them speak on any other issues, like on the issue of Jerusalem. That was a very explosive one. We tried with about 10 Congressmen who were—that issue of Jerusalem, very dear to them, and they insisted—some of them insisted on putting the provision that created a lot of the controversy and the problems for the President in that foreign appropriations bill.

We tried with all of them, Mr. Lantos' office, Mr. Ackerman's and others, and their time didn't permit them to come. But, of course, we will welcome any of them.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Carmon, tell me about MEMRI and what your task is, and try not to spend too much time describing this, because you love this organization so much. I seem to be poking on you a little bit.

Mr. CARMON. Well, understanding any conflict which may erupt on any specific issue involves understanding its roots, ideological and historical. And to go to the roots, you need to go to the three main aspects: the media, which represents the present; the education systems, which represent the future, the values, the ideals that are conveyed to the next generation; and to the religious institutions that represent the higher moral—accepted higher moral system.

This is exactly what we do. This is a model at work. We deal with the Middle East, but this could be applied to any conflict of any—in any place in the world. Go to the media, to the education, to the religious institutions, and you will get the roots and the

way—the only way for which you can devise an effective policy. And this is what we are doing, for about 4 years.

We translate, we monitor and translate the Arabic and Farsi media. We study and analyze them. We study the education systems.

Mr. SHAYS. So you are focusing primarily what is said in Arabic in the media.

Mr. CARMON. And Farsi.

Mr. SHAYS. And Farsi. And education as well as religion?

Mr. CARMON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. What is the thing that alarms you the most, and which one of these institutions do you have the biggest concern of?

Mr. CARMON. Well, all three, in fact, because they are all mostly government-controlled. And in this respect, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the recommendations I am happy you mentioned, appearing—to my colleague, Mr. Hafez Al-Mirazi—is appearing on—on Al-Jazeera, Congressmen and others.

There is a notion that developed after September 11 that it is a matter of PR, that they hate us and we have to have a better PR. This is not about better PR. This is a battle that should take other roots, because it is, in its most part, government-controlled. When does one need PR? When he sells some product when it is not good, he may make up for it with some PR. But when his reputation is damaged falsely, he doesn't need PR. And it is damaged to the extent that his life is jeopardized and his peoples, then he needs a good team of lawyers, or the equivalent of it, in international relations to stop it.

Let me give an example. When the editor of Al Ahram, the main paper in Egypt, who is appointed by the President of this country, writes that the Americans are dropping genetically altered food in order to damage the—in Afghanistan, and not only that, they drop it into mine fields——

Mr. SHAYS. Now, where was that printed?

Mr. CARMON. In Al Ahram, in the main paper in Egypt, and by the editor in chief. You don't need better PR to stop him from spreading such lies.

Mr. SHAYS. Give me another example. I mean, that is a very vivid one. Give me another example.

Mr. CARMON. Another example is when he—which was—in which steps were taken, because my recommendation is to take more confrontational approach to deter this media from doing so.

When, in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Riyadh daily published a blood libel, claiming—alleging that Jews are putting blood of non-Jews, Christians, Muslims in the holiday pastries, which, of course, creates hatred that endangers lives, the State Department, the Office of the President and the Congress protested, and the result was that the paper—the editor apologized, retracted, fired that columnist, who happened to be a professor of university. There are results that—there are things—for instance, when the American ambassador to Egypt took on the Egyptian media for spreading lies, such as the FBI and CIA are responsible for September 11, not only the Jews, but also the Afghanis, this was an approach that bore results.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this question. So in the process of translating this, do you try to do it on a daily basis?

Mr. CARMON. Yes. We do it on a daily basis.

Mr. SHAYS. Then you provide that information to a variety of——

Mr. CARMON. We provide it to legislators, to administration, to the media, to the public at large. We do it in all European languages, and Russian as well. We try to provide the—to bring the inner world, Arab world and Muslim world to a certain extent, to the knowledge. We try to bridge the gap of language to have people know.

At one point I said that a legislator will read the editorial in Al-Ahrim the same way that he reads it in the New York Times, with the morning coffee. Once he reads the words, he reads—he hears the idioms, the wording, the idea, he understands. And, of course, if he reads what is said in the education system—let me give you two examples. The Palestinian education system, which was schoolbooks that were created in the period of peace, not—after the Shah, which—books were—that were developed after the peace with international professional help, including UNESCO, and they teach kids that the noble soul has two goals, death and the desire for it.

The Syrian education system tells boys of 10 years old the merits of martyrdom, that are qualitative—move from a narrow life to a wider life, more intensive life, etc. There was—martyrdom was the concept that motivated those who attacked the United States on September 11. This needs to be changed.

The education books of Saudi Arabia are a shame. They preach hatred to Christianity, and they say that all—I could quote, but it is all in my presentation, and it will be on the Website. We are now at full swing with studying other—we did the Palestinian schoolbooks and Syrian; we are doing now the Saudi and the Egyptian.

Now, in the Saudi schoolbooks there is hatred toward Christianity, terrible hatred. This is—and we should remember that the Saudis, too, according to their own testimony in a paper in English, not even in Arabic, Hymen Nekheim, spread billions of dollars to spread this education to the whole world, from the east coast of America—from the west coast of America to the east coast of China.

Mr. SHAYS. One of the Egyptian princes was asked about their school textbooks and acknowledged that they had language which was pretty outrageous. And that confrontation was a good one, because they at least pledged—he pledged that they would—that he was pretty shocked by it, not that he didn't know, but at least publicly acknowledging that he was pretty shocked by it, and that it would change.

So that would seem to conform to your point.

Mr. CARMON. Mr. Chairman, confrontation works. If only the United States would fight for its reputation for not being hated, it will not be hated so much. The problem is that this is a new phenomenon, and the Voice of America, what it does now is a new phenomenon. Radio Sawa is a new phenomenon. The approach of Mr. Welch to take on—the American ambassador in Egypt to take on the Egyptian media is a new phenomenon.

In the past, as I have mentioned before, the storming of the embassy in Syria, of the American Embassy, got no response at all.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I have basically asked the questions that I have wanted of all of you. I will tell you that I am absolutely convinced that we need to monitor what is said in the Arab community and languages other than English, and we need to be aware of it. I do think it needs to be confronted when we see the outrageous statements that do exist, particularly, as you point out, in government-controlled—I mean, we have a better opportunity to speak out, because it is, in fact, government-controlled, and government-induced.

I will also say that I leave this hearing having a better feeling of Al-Jazeera than I had, because even, frankly, among two potential adversaries, they acknowledge that you are on the cutting edge in a community in which risks are taken, and obviously why you still are conscious of your audience and play to your audience. And I would probably see some programs there that—I would see some programs that anyone would think that I was complimenting, because I wouldn't, but I know in our own society, I mean, we had 20 hearings before September 12th, and we could hardly get anyone to pay attention.

At the same time, we spent months talking about a Senator—a Congressman named Gary Condit on what he knew, when he knew, and what he did and what he didn't do. And we were dissecting it in small little pieces month after month. So, I think all societies tend to present their programs to what they perceive are the interests of society.

Which—I am going to say again, I am sure there are, I know there are, programs that I would be horrified to see, but I am delighted to know that there is some real attempt to provide disagreement and challenge and conflict in that audience, and I congratulate you for that.

I am going to ask each of you if you have closing comments that you want to make before we adjourn.

Mr. AL-MIRAZI. I just would like to thank you again for the appreciation of the work of Al-Jazeera or any other Arab independent media; that, as I said, even in some of the government-controlled media, we hear the voices of wisdom, we—as we do have the radicals in the same newspaper. Al Harim has so many people really that have their own objective and honest views that they put out, and the—and that should not take the views of the radicals of—the distorted views should not deny others in the same Arab media credit of what they are doing on a daily basis.

The idea of monitoring hatred and incitement, as it was in Oslo even agreement or in Wye River agreement to have a commission, a U.S.-Arab-Israeli commission to monitor that should be across the board, Mr. Chairman, not only monitoring the Arab media, but monitoring, as I mentioned before, the examples of the—of Mr. Robertson or Mr. Falwell or others.

We should have a commission that would monitor the three in the American side, on the Arab side and the Hebrew newspapers. And we don't have to even publicize it or to create more reaction and problems, at least on the policy level, that could be discussed and draw the attention of each government or try to reach out to the media outlet itself if it is an independent media, not to reach it through the government, in order to assure the independence of

that media and the respect that we are not going to crack down on the government in order to crack down anew.

That is very important. The—as I mentioned, when we hear Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld, talking about the so-called occupied territories, that doesn't help for our own audience, because the administration itself knows exactly what is occupied territories, what is not occupied territories. Once we use the language of that, the language of the Judea and Samara for the West Bank and Gaza, as if we are giving a religious or Biblical countenance to occupation—also, that one we should be careful of, because when—once we say the so-called territories, or discuss the legitimacy of occupation after 1967, we open the door for the radicals on the Arab-Muslim side to say, in the meantime the so-called Israel.

And let's open the subject before 1967 or 1948. Let's, for the sake of what has been achieved so far, move on, and let's not go back to these kind of overbidding on each other.

So I would like just to say monitoring should be for all, and we should not make the impression for the Arab people or Arab writers that they are only in the defensive or accused, and they have to prove their earnings every day.

We would like them to be civilized in the discussion, as much as we would like Israeli writers and different outlets to be, and American also, op-ed writers, to be sensitive to cultures. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MURAWIEC. Yes, sir. I would like to point out that there is a giant difference between the Arab world in general and the Western world in general. The media in the West are not controlled by the government. They are pluralists. When outrage occurs in Western media in this country, in particular a lot of outrage directed at the outrage appears in the media, which is what happened in the instances quoted by the gentleman next to me.

The Arab world is very much mired in archaisms, which I think is a fundamental source of conflict. That is why, when one talks of the Arab Street and cannot talk of the American Street. There is no American Street. There is an American Congress, and that is the giant difference. And if I may bring that up as the—recall what the—the title of the hearing was.

And therefore, I don't even think that the remarks, the reported remarks, of Secretary Rumsfeld were terribly inflammatory. In fact, they opened the door to no radical writer, because no radical writer ever needed any door to be opened to him in the Middle East. For the last 50 years the notion that there was no Israel, but this Zionist entity was the mantra in the entire Arab press.

So, therefore, I think that it is important to see things in perspective historically and apply history in this kind of judgments, including to the media. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. CARMON. Inasmuch as America is fighting for its security, should they fight for its reputation? This will lessen the hate toward America. And it is not about PR, it is about confrontation. It will change things. And if I may conclude by offering a 2½-minutes video to show what is to be fought.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say to you, I am not sure I want to do that. I am not sure I want to end up—this is a pretty hateful video

of a young girl who is 3 years old who spews hatred. I am not going to end the hearing that way. Let me—I understand, though, that this is being taught. It is pretty outrageous. And we will have it as part of the record.

You all have been very patient with this committee. You have been very articulate. You have been very insightful, all three of you, and you have added tremendously at least to the knowledge of the committee, and I thank you for it.

I really appreciate all three of you being here. It is an honor to have all three of you. We are just going to put on the record—we need to place two items in the record, two articles by Dr. Daniel Brumberg, and we will put those articles in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Democratization in the Arab World?

THE TRAP OF LIBERALIZED AUTOCRACY

Daniel Brumberg

***Daniel Brumberg** is associate professor of government at Georgetown University and a visiting scholar during the 2002–2003 academic year at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. His most recent contribution to the* Journal of Democracy *was "Islamists and the Politics of Consensus," which appeared in the July 2002 issue.*

Over the past two decades, the Middle East has witnessed a "transition" away from—and then back toward—authoritarianism. This dynamic began with tactical political openings whose goal was to sustain rather than transform autocracies. Enticed by the prospect of change, an amalgam of political forces—Islamists, leftists, secular liberals, NGO activists, women's organizations, and others—sought to imbue the political process with new meanings and opportunities, hoping that the "inherently unstable" equilibrium of *dictablandas* would give way to a new equilibrium of competitive democracy.[1]

It is now clear, both within and far beyond the Middle East, that liberalized autocracy has proven far more durable than once imagined.[2] The trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait is not just a "survival strategy" adopted by authoritarian regimes, but rather a *type* of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization.[3] And while several of the authors who write about the Middle East in this issue of the *Journal of Democracy* argue that political liberalization is moving forward, Jillian Schwedler's essay on Yemen and Jason Brownlee's article on Egypt—as well as the recent experience of Jordan—suggest that in fact *deliberalization* may be underway.

Perhaps these states will join the ranks of Bashar Assad's Syria, where the door was opened a crack and then quickly closed, and countries such as Iraq, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, where the rulers have never

risked even the most controlled liberalization. Certainly, the outrageous August 2002 decision of Egypt's Supreme Court to uphold the conviction of Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his young colleagues appears to support the notion that Middle East regimes are becoming less rather than more autocratic. Yet what we are witnessing is probably *not* a return to full authoritarianism, but rather the latest turn in a protracted cycle in which rulers widen or narrow the boundaries of participation and expression in response to what they see as the social, economic, political, and geostrategic challenges facing their regimes. Such political eclecticism has benefits that Arab rulers are unlikely to forgo. Indeed, over the next few years Bahrain and Qatar may swell the ranks of Arab regimes dwelling in the "gray zone" of liberalized autocracy.[4]

In the Arab world, a set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social, and geostrategic factors has created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, and partial openness. The weblike quality of this political ecosystem both helps partial autocracies to survive and makes their rulers unwilling to give up *final* control over any strand of the whole. But there is more to the story than wily rulers and impersonal "factors," for the governments of Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and even Egypt receive a degree of acquiescence and sometimes even support from both secular and some Islamist opposition groups. Such *ententes* can take the form of arrangements that give oppositionists a voice in parliament or even the cabinet, and may also involve a process of "Islamization" by which the state cedes some ideological and institutional control to Islamists.

This ironic outcome reminds us that while liberalized autocracies can achieve a measure of stability, over time their very survival exacts greater and greater costs. Because they have failed to create a robust *political* society in which non-Islamists can secure the kind of organized popular support that Islamists command, these hybrid regimes have created circumstances under which free elections could well make illiberal Islamists the dominant opposition voice, leaving democrats (whether secularist or Islamist) caught between ruling autocrats and Islamist would-be autocrats. Hence the great dilemma in which substantive democratization and genuine pluralism become at once more urgently needed and more gravely risky.

While the solution to this dilemma may lie in gradualism, any reforms worthy of the name must address the weakness or even absence of political society in the Arab world. This will mean promoting independent judiciaries; effective political parties; competitive, internationally observed elections; and legislatures that represent majorities rather than rubber-stamp the edicts of rulers. Such changes will demand bold initiatives from Arab rulers, as well as U.S. readiness to support a policy of democratic gradualism whose purpose is to help liberalized autocracies carefully move beyond the politics of mere survival.

While it is true that the Arab world boasts no democracies, some of its autocracies are decidedly less complete than others. To understand this variation, and to grasp why some partial autocracies are better than others at sustaining survival strategies, we must ask how the rulers perceive the threats they face, and we must look at the institutional, social, political, and ideological conditions that tend to intensify or reduce such threats. The importance of threat perception lies in the very logic of partial autocracies: To endure, they must implicitly or explicitly allow some opposition forces certain kinds of social, political, or ideological power—but things must never reach a point where the regime feels deterred from using force when its deems fit. If a regime can keep up this balancing act, reformists within the government will find it easier to convince hard-liners that the benefits of accommodation outweigh the costs. Conversely, where it is hard to make this case, rulers will prefer total autocracy. As to the conditions that encourage a choice in favor of one or the other, these can be summarized as follows: States that promote competitive or *dissonant* politics will tend to feel surer that Islamist ambitions can be limited and so will be more willing to consider accommodating opposition, while states that promote hegemonic or *harmonic* politics will tend to invite more radical "counterhegemonic" Islamist opposition movements whose presence increases the expected cost of political liberalization.

The Dead End of Hegemony

Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are total autocracies whose endurance is often attributed to three conditions, each of which bears a word of comment. The first, oil money, is necessary but not sufficient: Some other Arab countries receive oil income but are not *total* autocracies. The second condition is the "harmonic" foundation of legitimacy: Total autocracies spread the idea that the state's mission is to defend the supposedly unified nature of the Arab nation or the Islamic community (the danger that Islamists might "outbid" the regime on the second score should be obvious). The third condition is the hegemonic reach of state institutions: Total autocracies create powerful organizations whose main job is to absorb or repress rival political voices. Here too there is a potential danger for the regime. As the ambivalent alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahabi religious establishment shows, state control of Islamic institutions is both central to this hegemonic strategy and a threat to it. Because Islam is a transcendent religion that can never be fully coopted, governments must cede some autonomy to state-supported religious institutions or elites, thereby raising the prospect that elements of the religious establishment could defect to the Islamist opposition.

To deter this and all other possible rebellions, total autocracies have large and brutal security agencies. Yet the more force is used, the longer

grows the list of revenge-seeking enemies—a drawback that is especially acute when the rulers belong to ethnic or religious minorities (in Syria, Alawites; in Iraq, Sunni Arabs). Harmonic ideologies and their pretenses of "Islamic" or "Arab" unity may aspire to hide such narrow power bases, but the reality of minority rule is apparent enough, further alienating key religious groups and making the expected costs of reform that much higher.

One way out of this vicious circle might be to emphasize instrumental over symbolic legitimacy—by handing out more oil rents to key groups, for instance. Such strategies have obvious limits. An alternative (or complementary) approach is to rob your neighbor's bank, as Iraq tried to do by invading Kuwait in 1990. But barring such desperate measures, some leaders might conclude that a limited political opening is worth the risk. After all, what value is there in maintaining decades of hegemonic rule if the instruments of domination cannot be used to ensure the ruling elite's continued good health?

This was certainly the motive behind Algeria's dramatic political opening in 1989. At the time, Algeria was a classic harmonic state. For nearly 30 years, its generals and ruling-party hacks had been absorbing all potential opposition into a quasi-socialist order that celebrated the alleged harmony of "the Algerian people." Islamic leaders and institutions were drafted into this hegemonic project, thereby ironically ensuring that, in the wake of liberalization, populist Islam would emerge as *the* counterhegemonic force. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and its revolutionary—if nebulous—vision of an Islamic state galvanized an estranged generation which had come to believe that the rhetoric of unity spouted by the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) was mere window-dressing for the corrupt rule of a minority that was more French than Arab, or more Berber than Muslim. Despite this growing estrangement, in 1991 the FLN foolishly wagered that it could reproduce its hegemony through competitive elections. While a proportional system might have limited the FIS's electoral gains and thus made some kind of power sharing possible, the FIS's revolutionary ideology created so grave a perceived threat that no such arrangement could likely have survived the military's quest for total certainty, or the preference of many secular would-be democrats for the protection that the generals promised.

This illusory quest for safety set the stage for a civil war that has claimed some 100,000 lives. In the wake of this disaster, Algeria's leaders tried to put together a power-sharing system in which the identity claims of Berbers, secularists, Islamists, and (implicitly) the military would be recognized, institutionalized, and perhaps negotiated. But the mixed system that was born with the 1997 parliamentary elections produced mixed results. It certainly provided unprecedented opportunities for elites with opposing ideologies to pursue dialogue.[5] But to give such a system

credibility, regimes must promote genuine (even if circumscribed) representation, while leaders must project an understanding of the populace's elemental fears and aspirations. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika got off to a good start in 1999, but the high abstention rate in the 2002 parliamentary elections suggests that much work remains to be done if the regime is to consolidate whatever gains it can claim.

Algeria's recent experience suggests that leadership and political learning can play a role in helping regimes and oppositions to exit autocracy, but the lesson seems lost on some. Syria's brief opening is a case in point. When President Bashar Assad assumed the reigns of power from his late father in June 2000, observers wondered if the son would honor his public promises to open up the system.[6] The answer was clear by the autumn of 2001, when some liberal intellectuals were arrested for holding informal meetings to discuss democracy. Thus was the door slammed shut on the briefest Arab-world political opening to date.

What did Assad fear? His security chiefs probably convinced him that the tiniest reform was a slippery slope to oblivion. While the regime had decimated its radical Islamist opposition in 1982 by massacring 10,000 citizens in the town of Hama, and while it had coopted some businessmen from the Sunni merchant elite, a combination of economic crisis, anger at corruption, and a growing contempt for "Baathist socialist" ideology and Assad's contrived cult of personality all gave the regime reason for concern.[7] In the face of these and other worries, the new president could not pin his hopes on a few liberal intellectuals with no organized following. These knowns and unknowns, as well as the imposing shadow of his late father, proved far more relevant than Bashar's optometry studies in London or his exposure to the Internet. With oil rents still flowing in, it seems a wonder that it took so long for him to conclude that full autocracy was the only option.

While Tunisia's President Ben Ali has reached a similar conclusion, the origins of total autocracy in his country differ from those in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Syria. Instead of oil money and ideology, there is Ben Ali's obsession with power and the determination of business interests and the ruling elite to emulate the Asian model of state-driven, export-oriented industrialization. With a small population whose well-educated workers and professionals include a large percentage of women, Tunisia had significant constituencies *within and outside* the regime that chose not to contest the "nonideological" hegemony of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD). The spectacle of the bloodshed next door in Algeria helped to cement this tacit consensus against rocking the boat.

By the late 1990s, the effort to create an "Asian-style" economic miracle in North Africa had run into many obstacles, not least of which has been the regime's abuse of civil and human rights. Moreover, in the absence of accountability and the rule of law, state-driven industrialization was feeding rent-seeking and corruption.[8] By 1999 there was clearly

a demand for political opening, but the voting that year ended with the RCD controlling 92 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and Ben Ali winning another term with a claimed mandate of 99.4 percent of the vote. Islamists remained banned, revealing the regime's continued anxieties about threats from that quarter. Since then, Ben Ali has rammed through a set of constitutional amendments to extend his term from four to six years and arrested human rights activists, thereby signaling his determination to maintain total power.

Why "Dissonance" Is Good

Total autocracy is the exception rather than the rule in the Arab world. Most Arabs live under autocracies that allow a measure of openness. Three factors have generated and sustained such regimes. First, the rulers of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon have not tried to impose a single vision of political community. Instead, they have put a certain symbolic distance between the state and society in ways that leave room for competitive or *dissonant* politics. By not nailing the state's legitimacy to the mast of one ideological vessel with a putatively sacred national or religious mission, they have helped to short-circuit the growth of counterhegemonic Islamist movements. Second, partial autocracies are *nonhegemonic*. Within limits, they allow contending groups and ideas to put down institutional roots outside the state. This ensures competition not only between Islamists and non-Islamists, but among Islamist parties as well. The more such contention there is, the likelier it is that rulers will risk an opening. Third, partial autocracies have enough economic development and competition to free the state from obsessive concern with any single interest, class, or resource. In many such regimes, for instance, one finds public-sector employees and bureaucrats vying with independent professionals and private businessmen for the state's political and economic support.

Such economic and political dissonance facilitates the juggling act that is central to regime survival. Rulers of liberalized autocracies strive to pit one group against another in ways that maximize the rulers' room for maneuver and restrict the opposition's capacity to work together. Yet such divide-and-rule tactics also give oppositionists scope for influence that they might not have in an open political competition that yields clear winners and losers. Consensus politics and state-enforced power sharing can form an alternative to either full democracy or full autocracy, particularly when rival social, ethnic, or religious groups fear that either type of rule will lead to their political exclusion. In Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and to some extent Egypt, the peaceful accommodation of such forces depends in part on the arbitrating role of the ruler.

No ruler is completely autonomous in relation to society. The kings of Morocco and Jordan may have a better perch from which to arbitrate

conflicts than do Arab presidents, whose fates are usually tied to a ruling party or its interests. But since both monarchs derive their legitimacy at least *partly* from their purported lineage ties to Mohammed, they are, as Abdeslam Maghraoui notes, at once modern leaders of a nation *(watan)* and traditional patrons of the Islamic community *(umma)*. Similarly, while Egypt's rulers long ago distanced themselves from the Arab-nationalist rhetoric of Gamal Abdel Nasser, they have not fully repudiated the basic ideological premises of the populist state that he founded. The legitimacy of the Egyptian state still rests partly on its role as a defender of communal Islamic values.

That the rulers of some liberalized autocracies are both the chief arbiters within society and the major patrons of religious institutions is central to these regimes' survival strategies. As arbiters, those who hold power in Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan use cultural, religious, and ideological dissonance to divide the opposition. As patrons of religion, these same powerholders use their ties to Islamic institutions to limit the influence of secular political forces. Over time, this Islamization strategy has led to acute dilemmas. For in their efforts to coopt conservative Islamic ideas these regimes have hindered the creation of alternatives to the illiberalism that is characteristic of *mainstream* (and not merely radical) Islamism.

Consider the case of Egypt, where indulging Islamist sensibilities is an old art form. With parliamentary elections looming in the fall of 2000, the culture minister, backed by the top religious authorities at the leading state-funded Islamic university, banned the obscure Syrian Haidar Haidar's novel *A Banquet for Seaweed* on the grounds that it dangerously departed from "accepted religious understanding" and threatened "the solidarity of the nation." Having thus defended the faith, the government then shut down the very opposition newspaper that had exposed the offending book![9] However cynical, the move made perfect sense. The political party that published the paper had close ties to the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, and the state was out to underscore its own role as the supreme arbiter of matters Islamic (for good measure, the authorities had two hundred Muslim Brothers arrested). In a stinging judgment that actually understates the problem, Max Rodenbeck observes that the cumulative effect of actions like this has been to "compel an 'orthodoxy' that is both amorphous and restricted, preventing Islamist thought from moving beyond denunciation of heresy and repetition of formulas from the Koran."[10] Even El-Wasat—a party led by Islamists who advocate a more pluralistic vision of Islam—has had its application for party certification repeatedly turned down. Egypt's rulers are not interested in promoting a liberal Islamic party, either because they fear that radicals might capture it or because they do not want a successful liberal Islamist party to ally with secular parties in ways that might undermine the regime's strategy of survival through a delicate balancing act.

Variations of this Islamization strategy can be found in other regimes

which, unlike Egypt's, permit legal Islamist parties. Partial inclusion is a more useful way of buttressing liberalized autocracies because it requires Islamists to renounce violence, act openly, and most importantly, play by what are ultimately the government's rules. Yet the Islamists may reap advantages, since even limited participation in parliaments or cabinets gives them means to extend their influence. Following the 1991 unification of North and South Yemen, for example, the General People's Congress (GPC) became the ruling party by cutting a deal with the tribal-cum-Islamist Islah party, whose religious wing thereby gained control of public education. Indeed, in 1994 President Ali Abdallah Salih "gave money to Sheikh Abdel Meguid al-Zindani, an Afghan veteran and former associate of Mr. Bin Laden's, to build Al Eman University on government land near Sanaa."[11] Still, once the deal with Islah had served the purpose of marginalizing the South, the GPC engineered an election in 1997 that ushered many of Islah's Islamists out of parliament while leaving the tribal members with their seats. More recently, the government has tried in the wake of September 11 to assert more control over Islah's schools.

By comparison with other hybrid regimes, Yemen's experience is unique. While a patrimonialist vision of authority colors public education in much of the Arab world, there is little evidence that the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait promote a particularly radical or anti-Western vision of Islam. Yet neither do they imbue their curricula with anything like liberal democratic values. Absent such a positive effort, the state-sponsored "traditional" view of Islam (with its emphasis on state authority and the claims of community) will remain vulnerable to the allure of radical Islam. Periodic attempts to placate Islamists by unleashing state-subsidized clerics against "apostates" can produce the same result. Apart from the danger that such efforts may backfire—as they did when the ceding of the Jordanian education ministry to Islamists in 1994 provoked an uproar from liberals—over time Islamization strategies undercut the careful juggling acts at the heart of regime survival strategies.

The Need for *Political* Society

One way of escaping the dilemmas created by partial autocracies might be to advocate liberal Islam. But no leader has embraced this option, for obvious reasons. Liberal Islam, moreover, constitutes a limited intellectual trend that has thus far not sunk organizational roots in Arab societies. Nor have civil society organizations been able to pierce the armor of liberalized autocracy. On the contrary, in Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan the sheer proliferation of small NGOs—riven by fierce ideological divisions and hamstrung by official regulations—has made "divide and rule" easier.

By themselves, civil society organizations cannot make up for the lack of a functioning political society, meaning an autonomous realm of self-regulating political parties that have the constitutional authority to represent organized constituencies in parliaments.[12] Autocratic rulers know this, of course—their survival strategies are designed to *prevent* the emergence of any effective political society. Partial autocracies use patronage as well as laws governing parties and elections to stop opposition elites from creating organic political parties. As a result, most Arab-world political parties are better at negotiating with powerful rulers than at articulating the aspirations of each party's disorganized followers. Under such conditions, apathy reigns, while elections rarely attract more than 35 percent of the potential voting public.

As for legislatures, constitutions hobble rather than bolster their authority, as does the lack of a rule of law (which is not the same thing as a state that makes lots of laws). Such constitutions are rife with loopholes that "guarantee" freedoms of speech and assembly so long as such liberties do not infringe upon "national" or "Islamic" values. Indeed, what used to be said of the old Soviet Constitution can be said of most Arab constitutions: They guarantee freedom of speech, but not freedom *after* speech. Arab "reformers" since Anwar Sadat have been great advocates of "a state of laws," by which they have meant laws passed by compliant legislatures and upheld by compliant judges in order to legitimate the regime's survival strategies. Such laws not only inhibit democratization, they give legal sanction to forms of economic corruption that only further delegitimate the so-called capitalism of liberalized autocracies.

Because the absence or presence of political society is largely a function of official policy, it will not emerge unless Arab leaders redefine the relationship between citizen and state. Sadly, it is now clear that the new generation of leaders in Jordan and Morocco are not up to this task. Indeed, insofar as survival strategies have increased the perceived costs of democratization while not providing for effective economic development, the young kings of these lands have shown themselves unwilling or unable to cross anxious hard-liners in the military, the security forces, and the business community. Thus while Morocco's King Mohamed VI spoke early on of shifting to a "new concept of authority," he soon fell back on one of the hoariest defenses of partial autocracy, pleading lamely that "each country has to have its own specific features of democracy."[13]

"Reform" versus Democratic Gradualism

If an exit from liberalized autocracy to competitive democracy is improbable, can we detect movement in the opposite direction? As noted above, events in Egypt and Yemen as well as Jordan—where there has

recently been a crackdown on the press—seem to suggest that the answer is unfortunately "yes." This "deliberalizing" trend, as Jason Brownlee calls it, has at least four causes. First, there is the decline in external rents. This process has pushed regimes to adopt the kinds of structural economic reforms that they had previously skirted in their efforts to accommodate key constituencies. But such reforms have not produced enough "winners" to defend them successfully under conditions of open political competition, so rulers see a need to clamp down on previous political openings. Second, there is the growing influence of *mainstream* Islamism. Radical Islamism may be declining in some quarters of the Arab world, but Islamist movements that seek *peacefully* to advance illiberal cultural projects by playing according to the rules of partial autocracy are getting stronger.[14] Although these movements may not command electoral majorities, the disarray besetting secular democrats means that Islamists would certainly win at least powerful pluralities in any open election. Third, the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process has not only given Islamists across the Arab world a powerful symbol, it has also facilitated the forging of ideologically heterogenous alliances between secularists and Islamists that rulers find increasingly threatening.[15] Finally, in the context of a U.S.-led war on terrorism that requires the support or good will of many Arab leaders, Washington has until very recently evinced a certain tolerance for democracy.

Yet past experience suggests that the deliberalizing trend we are seeing is an inflection point in a long-term cycle. Perhaps the current shift toward tightening will be more protracted than previous ones, but in the longer run rulers and oppositionists are unlikely to forgo the advantages that partial autocracy offers to both. Even in Jordan, with its volatile combination of a Palestinian majority whose most effective leaders are Islamists, a new king who is still establishing his authority, a fragile economy, and the looming prospect of a U.S.-led regional war, it is unlikely that either King Abdullah or the Islamists (who won 20 of the parliament's 50 seats in the 1999 elections) will give up a tradition of uneasy but mutually beneficial accommodation.[16]

Indeed, while Egypt and Jordan may be moving, for the time being, in a more authoritarian direction, there is some evidence that liberalized autocracies might be growing *more* rather than less common in the Middle East. As Michael Herb notes, in 1999 and 2000, respectively, the leaders of Qatar and Bahrain initiated political openings after years of full autocracy. Bahrain will hold parliamentary elections in October 2002 while Qatar will hold parliamentary elections to replace its 35-member Consultative Council in 2003.[17] Morocco, which will be holding parliamentary elections as this article goes to press in September 2002, might also expand the boundaries of liberalized autocracy by creating more space for Islamist opposition. It is not a coincidence that all these countries are monarchies. Arab monarchs have more institutional and

symbolic room to improvise reforms than do Arab presidents, who are invariably trapped by ruling parties and their constituencies. That said, and as I have argued, not all monarchies are equally capable of promoting political reform. Totalizing monarchies that rule in the name of harmonic ideologies—one thinks of the House of Saud—engender radical oppositions and thus are unlikely to countenance more than the slightest opening.

There is no doubt that one factor pushing Arabs to engage in even modest political openings is that oil just does not pay the way it used to.

As for kings who rule partial autocracies, those who serve as both arbiters of the nation and spokesmen for the Islamic community find themselves constrained by the very Islamic elites whose teachings the kings often echo or encourage. As Abdeslam Maghraoui notes, Morocco's Mohamed VI might confront this paradoxical fact of life as a result of the coming elections. If the Islamist Justice and Development party makes major gains in the upcoming election but does not overplay its hand by rejecting membership in a multiparty majority coalition that limits its ideological reach, Morocco might follow the lead of other Arab states by allowing for partial inclusion of Islamists in a mixed system. But if the Islamists score a large victory and then challenge the king's *religious* authority, Morocco's leaders may eventually decide to move toward less rather than more political openness.

There is no doubt, as Jean-François Seznec observes, that one factor pushing Arab regimes to engage in even modest political openings is that oil just does not pay the way it used to. With external rents declining, the implicit bargain by means of which rulers bought popular acquiescence in return for various forms of petroleum-funded largesse has fallen on hard times. Yet we should be careful not to lapse into structural determinism, for social, institutional, and ideological factors can raise or lower the expected costs of political change in dramatic and unexpected ways.

None of this excuses partial autocrats, of course. After all, they have embraced only such "reforms" as *hinder* the emergence of an effective political society. Moreover, because their survival strategies have often boosted Islamists rather than an expanded political arena as such, these rulers have sustained a cycle of conflict, stalemate, and reform. This makes it hard for even reformers with the best of intentions to envision a different future, and easy for the most cynical to rationalize their opposition to anything deeper than cosmetic reforms. Given the paucity of will and the imposing constraints, there is not likely to be much substantive change until the United States presses its Arab allies to transcend an involuted gradualism whose small steps trace the sad contours of an

unvirtuous circle rather than the hopeful lineaments of a real path forward. Such a policy of *democratic gradualism* must not only push for the creation of effective political parties, representative parliaments, and the rule of law; it must also be accompanied by international support for effective monitoring of local and national elections. Without international observers, the silent pluralities of the Arab world—large groups of people who often have little sympathy for illiberal Islamism—will never be able to make their voices heard.

NOTES

1. Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transition," in Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1992), 109. Przeworksi argues that "what normally happens is . . . a melting of the iceberg of civil society which overflows the dams of the authoritarian regime." While he later observes that "liberalization could substitute for genuine democratization, thereby maintaining the political exclusion of subaltern groups" (111), the thrust of his conceptualization is that transitions move forward or back to reach a new equilibrium.

2. Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 5–21. Carothers (9) notes that "of the nearly 100 countries considered as 'transitional' in recent years, only a relatively small number—probably fewer than 20—are clearly en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization."

3. For several excellent discussions of this phenomenon see the essays in the section on "Elections Without Democracy?" by Larry Diamond, Andreas Schedler, and Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way in the April 2002 issue of the *Journal of Democracy*. These articles highlight the *exceptional* character of democratic transitions.

4. Thomas Carothers, "End of the Transition Paradigm," 9. He defines the "gray zone" as one in which regimes are "neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy."

5. The interviews that I conducted in Algiers in May and June 2002 with members of the 1997 parliament, Islamist and non-Islamist alike, suggest that political learning beyond the merely tactical level took place.

6. See Scott Peterson, "The Grooming of Syria's Bashar al-Assad," *Christian Science Monitor*, 13 June 2002; Susan Sachs, "Bashar al-Assad: The Shy Young Doctor at Syria's Helm," *New York Times*, 14 June 2000. See also "Democracy Glimpses at Syria's Parliament," 27 June 2000, *Arabia.com (http://www.arabia.com/article/print/0,4973,23698,00.html)*.

7. Bassam Haddad, "Business as Usual in Syria?" MERIP Press Information Note 68, 7 September 2001.

8. Christopher Alexander, "Authoritarianism and Civil Society in Tunisia," *Middle East Report*, October–December 1997 *(http://www.merip.org/mer/mer/mer205/alex.html.)*

9. The party was the Labor Socialists and its newspaper was *Al-Shaab*, which in fact got Haidar's book wrong. See Max Rodenbeck, "Witch Hunt in Egypt," *New York Review of Books*, 16 November 2000, 39. The quotes condemning Haidar come from

Al-Azhar University's Islamic Research Academy and can be found in the first note to Rodenbeck's essay.

10. Max Rodenbeck, "Witch Hunt in Egypt," 41.

11. "Yemen's Religious Academies: From Defender of the Faith to Terrorist," *Economist,* 1 June 2002, 48.

12. See Manuel Antonio Garretón and Edward Newman, eds., *Democracy in Latin American (Re)Constructing Political Society* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001).

13. Lisa Anderson, "Arab Democracy," 55–60. Quote from page 58; originally cited in Roxanne Roberts, "Morocco's King of Hearts," *Washington Post,* 23 June 2000.

14. See Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002).

15. See Dina Shehata, "The International Dimensions of Authoritarianism: The Case of Egypt," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 28–30 August 2002.

16. Citing the current political situation in the region, King Abdullah has once again postponed parliamentary elections, which were scheduled for the fall of 2002. It should be noted that the elections were first supposed to be held in November but were postponed because of the second Intifada. Clearly, the failure of the peace process has reinforced the regime's fears about the consequences of further liberalization.

17. The recent decision by the main opposition groups in Bahrain to boycott the parliamentary elections due to the government's failure to address concerns over the narrow boundaries of political reform indicates that a transition to liberalized autocracy is far from inevitable.

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Policy Brief

S U M M A R Y

The increasingly popular idea in Washington that the United States, by toppling Saddam Hussein, can rapidly democratize Iraq and unleash a democratic tsunami in the Middle East is a dangerous fantasy. The U.S. record of building democracy after invading other countries is mixed at best and the Bush administration's commitment to a massive reconstruction effort in Iraq is doubtful. The repercussions of an intervention in Iraq will be as likely to complicate the spread of democracy in the Middle East as promote it. The United States has an important role to play in fostering democracy in the region, but the task will be slow and difficult given the unpromising terrain and lack of U.S. leverage over key governments. ■

Democratic Mirage in the Middle East

Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne, Daniel Brumberg

Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

From within the Bush administration and on the editorial pages of America's major newspapers, a growing chorus of voices is expounding an extraordinarily expansive, optimistic view of a new democratizing mission for America in the Middle East. The rhetoric has reached extraordinary heights. We are told that toppling Saddam Hussein would allow the United States to rapidly democratize Iraq and by so doing unleash a democratic tsunami across the Islamic World. Some believe that a pro-democracy campaign in the Middle East could produce a democratic boom comparable in magnitude and significance to the one produced by the end of the Cold War.

It is good that the question of democracy in the Middle East is finally receiving serious attention. Although the United States has, over the years, offered tepid encouragement for political reform in the Arab world and funded some democracy aid programs there, past efforts were timid, erratic, and not reinforced at senior diplomatic levels. For far too long, Washington coasted on the complacent and erroneous assumption that the stability of the autocratic regimes of the Middle East could at least protect U.S. national security. Now the pendulum has swung. U.S. officials no longer see these regimes as bulwarks against Islamic extremists, but consider them responsible for the discontent that fuels terrorism and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, for the financing of extremist groups. But obstacles to democracy in the Middle East are many and go well beyond the autocratic nature of the present regimes to span a host of economic, sociopolitical, and historical factors. These realities do not mean the Middle East will never democratize or that the United States has no role to play. But they do mean that the path will be long, hard, and slow and that American expectations and plans should be calibrated accordingly.

Democratizing Iraq

It is hard not to feel the attraction of the tsunami idea—the tantalizing notion that with one hard blow in Iraq the United States can unleash a tidal wave of democracy in a region long known for resistance to such change. But can it? The United States can certainly oust Saddam Hussein and install a regime that is less repressive domestically

Marina Ottaway is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is the author or editor of more than ten books on comparative politics, including the forthcoming *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Carnegie Endowment, January 2003).

Thomas Carothers, who directs the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a leading specialist on democracy promotion and is the author of several books and many articles on the subject, including *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Carnegie Endowment, 1999).

and less hostile to U.S. interests. But democracy will not soon be forthcoming.

Experience in other countries where the United States has forcibly removed dictators or helped launch major post-conflict democratic reconstruction indicates a strong need for caution. In Haiti, for example, the 1994 U.S. invasion and the subsequent large-scale reconstruction effort have not led to democracy but instead political chaos, renewed repression, and dismal U.S.–Haiti relations. In post-Dayton Bosnia, the truly massive international reconstruction effort has produced peace and some socioeconomic gains, but only a tenuous political equilibrium that even six years later would collapse if international forces pulled out. Panama post–U.S. invasion might be construed as a more positive case, with post-Noriega politics having achieved some degree of pluralism. But Panama already had some genuine experience with pluralism before Noriega rose to power and even so Panamanian politics today, though not dictatorial, are still mired in corruption, public disillusionment, and fecklessness. It should be noted that all these countries are small, making even forceful intervention manageable. Iraq, with its 23 million inhabitants, would require an intervention on a totally different scale.

The example of Afghanistan is especially sobering. Despite widespread optimism of the initial post-Taliban period and the Bush administration's ringing promises to lead the democratic reconstruction, the political situation in Afghanistan today is troubled and uncertain. The administration's failure to back up its promises with a genuine commitment to Afghanistan's reconstruction will badly undercut similar promises made about Iraq.

Like Afghanistan, Iraq is a country torn by profound ideological, religious and ethnic conflicts. Before democratization can even begin, the United States would have to assemble a power-sharing agreement among ethnic Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Muslims. Because no obvious leader is waiting in the wings and the exiled Iraqi opposition is chronically divided, Washington would have to provide the political and, most importantly, military and security infrastructure necessary for holding a new government together. In short, the United States would have to become engaged in nation building on a scale that would dwarf any other such effort since the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after World War II. And it would have to stay engaged not just years, but decades, given the depth of change required to make Iraq into a democracy. Thus far the Bush administration has given no indication that it is ready to commit to such a long-term, costly endeavor. All this does not mean that Iraq can never become democratic. But the idea of a quick and easy democratic transformation is a fantasy.

Tsunami?

Equally doubtful is the idea that a regime change in Iraq would trigger a democratic tsunami in the Middle East. The notion that the fabled "Arab street" would respond to the establishment of a U.S.-installed, nominally democratic Iraqi regime by rising up in a surge of pro-democratic protests, toppling autocracy after autocracy, and installing pro-western, pluralist regimes is far-fetched. No one can predict with any certainty what the precise regional consequences of a U.S. action would be, but they would likely have as many or more negative than positive effects on the near-term potential for democracy.

For example, an invasion would very likely intensify the anti-Americanism already surging around the region, strengthening the hands of hard-line political forces. Autocratic Arab regimes that refused to support the American war effort could benefit from a wave of Arab nationalism and find their position strengthened, at least for a period. Domestic advocates of reform would come under suspicion as unpatriotic. Conversely, by supporting the invasion, several autocratic regimes, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might win a reprieve from any new U.S. pressure to democratize.

The formation of a new, more moderate regime in Iraq would unlikely have the inspi-

rational effect some predict. Many Arabs, rather than looking to Iraq as a model, would focus on the fact that Iraq was "liberated" through western intervention, not by a popular Iraqi movement. One powerful current in today's regional discourse emphasizes liberation from excessive western interference in Arab affairs more than liberation from undemocratic leaders.

As to possible ramifications for the future of Palestine, Ariel Sharon's government in Israel would likely view an American invasion of Iraq as an invitation to skirt the statehood issue. Unless the Bush administration shows the political will to push now for a two-state solution—a very unlikely scenario given the close links between Israeli hard-liners and administration hawks—victory in Iraq would more likely postpone than advance the creation of a democratic Palestine.

Domino democratization does sometimes occur, as in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. But while external influences may increase the chance of an initial change in government, what happens next depends on internal conditions. This was certainly the case in the former Soviet Union, where what at first seemed like a wave of democracy petered out in the face of deep-seated domestic obstacles. Today most former Soviet republics are autocracies.

Conditions Matter: Middle East Realities

Even if the United States ousted Saddam Hussein and vigorously pursued political reform in the region, democratic results would be highly unlikely. Such a policy would certainly shake up the region, but the final outcome in each country would owe much more to domestic factors than to the vigor of U.S. and European reformist zeal. One of the lessons of more than a decade of democracy promotion around the world is that outsiders are usually marginal players. They become the central determinant of political change only if they are willing to intervene massively, impose a de facto protectorate, and stay for an indefinite, long term. No matter what happens in Iraq, such forceful intervention is unthinkable in most Middle East countries.

The Middle East today lacks the domestic conditions that set the stage for democratic change elsewhere. It does not have the previous experience with democracy that facilitated transitions in Central Europe. Even Egypt, which in the early part of the twentieth century had a national bourgeoisie committed to the values of liberal democracy, opted for autocracy fifty years ago. Quite a few countries in the region—Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco among them—are liberalized autocracies whose leaders have skillfully used a measure of state-monitored political openness to promote reforms that appear pluralistic but function to preserve autocracy. Through controlled elections, divide-and-rule tactics, state interference in civil society organizations, and the obstruction of meaningful political party systems, these regimes have created deeply entrenched ruling systems that are surprisingly effective at resisting democratic change.

Nor has the Middle East experienced the prolonged periods of economic growth and the resulting dramatic changes in educational standards, living standards, and life styles that led Asian countries like Taiwan and South Korea to democratic change. The picture is instead one of socioeconomic deterioration. Even in the richest oil-producing countries, oil export revenues are no longer sufficient to subsidize rapidly growing populations at previous levels. The population of Saudi Arabia, for example, was less than six million in 1974 at the time of the first oil boom, but it is now sixteen million and growing at one of the highest rates in the world. Through state control of the economy, furthermore, regimes have purchased the support, or at least the quiescence, of key sectors of the citizenry.

Moreover, countries of the Middle East do not benefit from a positive "neighborhood effect," the regional, locally grown pressure to conform that helped democratize Latin America. On the contrary, neighborhood

Amy Hawthorne, an associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment, is a specialist in Arab politics. She helped design democracy promotion projects in the Middle East for the International Foundation for Election Systems and is the author of a forthcoming monograph on U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East.

Dan Brumberg is a visiting scholar in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment and associate professor of government at Georgetown University. He has written widely on political reform and change in the Middle East, including *Reinventing the Sultan: Democracy, Islam, and the Struggle for Reform in Iran* (University of Chicago, 2001).

norms in the Middle East encourage repressive, authoritarian regimes.

Beyond these daunting obstacles, at least three issues complicate the achievement of democracy in the Middle East:

Islamism. The issue is not whether Islam and democracy are incompatible in an absolute sense. Like Christianity and Judaism, Islam is far too complex a religion, with too many schools of thought, for the question even to make sense. Rather, the issue is the existence in all Middle Eastern countries, and indeed in all countries with a substantial Moslem population, of both legal and clandestine political movements that use illiberal interpretations of Islam to mobilize their followers. Since these "Islamist" movements enjoy considerable grassroots support and local authenticity, they are most likely to benefit from democratic openings. Truly free and fair elections in any country of the Middle East would likely assure Islamist parties a substantial share of the vote, or possibly even a majority, as would have happened in Algeria in 1992 had the elections not been cancelled. Democratization ironically raises the possibility of bringing to power political parties that might well abrogate democracy itself. This is a different version of the old Cold War–era fears: communist parties in Western Europe and elsewhere would come to power through elections only to impose radical change. However, continuing to exclude or marginalize Islamist political participation would doom democracy by silencing a voice that resonates with an important segment of the public. Doing so would only provide governments with a justification for maintaining excessive controls over the entire political sphere, thereby stunting the development of other popular forces. Many governments, such as those in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, and Yemen, have tried to skirt this dilemma by giving Islamists a chance to participate in politics while at the same time preventing them from actually assuming political power, but this solution also augurs poorly for democracy.

Conflict with Israel. Resentment against the state of Israel, particularly against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, creates a measure of solidarity between Arab leaders and their citizens that is exploited regularly by autocrats to deflect attention from their own shortcomings. Until there is a two-state solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that gives security and dignity to both parties, resentment will infuse all aspects of Arab politics and obscure the question of democracy.

Perceptions of the United States. There is a widespread perception in the Middle East that the Bush administration is embracing the cause of democracy promotion not out of real commitment, but because doing so provides a convenient justification for American intervention in Iraq and the acceptance of the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank. Unconditional support of Israel, combined with the Sharon government's publicly stated objective of deferring Palestinian statehood, feeds a widespread feeling that the U.S. government cannot be trusted. America's long

The U.S. should promote democracy in the Middle East recognizing that quick change is a mirage. The goals must be modest, and the commitment long term.

support of Arab autocracies adds to this perception, thus undermining its credibility as an advocate of change in the Middle East.

Beyond the Mirage

The United States should promote democracy in the Middle East recognizing that quick change is a mirage. The goals must be initially modest, and the commitment to change long term.

The core elements of a democracy-oriented policy are not hard to identify: sustained, high-level pressure on Arab states to respect political and civil rights and to create or widen genuine political space; clear, consistent pressure on Arab states to carry out pro-democratic institutional, legal, and constitutional changes; and increased democracy aid that bolsters democracy activists, engages seriously with the challenge of political party development, nurtures efforts to develop the rule of law, supports serious proponents of pro-democratic institutional reforms, and supports a growing range of civil society actors, including moderate Islamists.

In the past several months, the State Department has started to frame such an effort and commit new funds to it. This new policy framework will require considerable additional high-level attention and wider support within the administration if it is not to be a futile quick fix. A serious program of long-term support for Middle East democracy would need to follow these guidelines:

- **Do not reflexively attempt to marginalize Islamist groups.** Differentiate instead between the truly extremist organizations that must be isolated because they are committed to violence and those amenable to working legally to achieve their goals. Develop strategies to encourage political processes in which moderate Islamists, along with other emerging forces, can compete fairly and over time gain incentives to moderate their illiberal ideologies. To do this, the United States needs to acquire a much better understanding of the relevant organizations in each country. It will not be

A New Enthusiasm . . .

"The violence and grief that troubled the Holy Land have been among the great tragedies of our time. The Middle East has often been left behind in the political and economic advancement of the world. That is the history of the region. But it need not and must not be its fate. The Middle East could write a new story of trade and development and democracy. And we stand ready to help."

—President Bush, dispatching Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Middle East, April 4, 2002

"When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes. A truly strong nation will permit legal avenues of dissent for all groups that pursue their aspirations without violence. An advancing nation will pursue economic reform, to unleash the great entrepreneurial energy of its people. A thriving nation will respect the rights of women, because no society can prosper while denying opportunity to half its citizens. Mothers and fathers and children across the Islamic world, and all the world, share the same fears and aspirations. In poverty, they struggle. In tyranny, they suffer. And as we saw in Afghanistan, in liberation they celebrate."

—President Bush, commencement speech at West Point, June 1, 2002

"If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis—a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections. The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people, they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it, the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq. . . . The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond."

—President Bush, addressing the United Nations, September 12, 2002

And a Rising Chorus . . .

"In a matter of only a few years, Palestine will be one of two new Arab democratic states. The other neonatal Arab democracy will be Iraq. These unthinkable developments will revolutionize the power dynamic in the Middle East, powerfully adding to the effects of the liberation of Afghanistan to force Arab and Islamic regimes to increasingly allow democratic reforms. A majority of Arabs will come to see America as the essential ally in progress toward liberty in their own lands."

—*Michael Kelly.* Washington Post. *June 26, 2002.*

"What if the United States were as serious about saving the Arabs from corrupt autocrats and radical Islam as it once was about saving the world from communism? What if the tools of the cold war—selective propaganda, open support for dissidents, covert support for opposition political movements and sanctions—were put to use to promote Arab democracy and moderation?"

—*Susan Sachs.* New York Times. *June 30, 2002.*

"Recently President Bush demanded democratic reform from the Palestinians. Washington should support similar demands for the entire region. For too long, America embraced corrupt and autocratic Arab leaders, asking only that they accommodate Western oil needs and not make excessive trouble for Israel. As a result, too many young Arabs now identify the United States more readily with the repressive dictators it supports in the Middle East than with the tolerant democracy it practices at home. Islamic terrorist groups are adept at manipulating their anger and despair."

—*Editorial desk of the* New York Times. *July 4, 2002.*

"The administration cannot rely on local leaders who show no commitment to democratic change to be the instruments of that change. Nor can it rely on a now-discredited peace process to overcome the political hatreds and cultural backlash that roil the region. Only a level and clarity of American commitment to democratic change that forces choices upon reluctant partners will calm an ever more deadly conflict."

—*Jim Hoagland.* Washington Post. *August 1, 2002*

continued next page

easy and it entails some risk. But the only means of containing dangerous extremist groups without perpetuating wholesale repression is to open the door of legal political activity to the more moderate organizations.

■ **Do not overemphasize support for westernized nongovernmental organizations and individuals with impeccable liberal credentials but little influence in their societies.** Democracy promoters need to engage as much as possible in a dialogue with a wide cross section of influential elites: mainstream academics, journalists, moderate Islamists, and members of the professional associations who play a political role in some Arab countries, rather than only the narrow world of westernized democracy and human rights advocates.

■ **Don't confuse a "sell America" campaign with democracy promotion.** The U.S. government has launched a major public relations campaign to burnish America's image in the Arab world. Whatever the value of this much-discussed effort, it has little to do with the politically nuanced task of pressuring governments on human rights and institutional reforms, and of supporting key civil groups and the like. Movement toward democracy and movement toward a more positive view of American culture and society are not synonymous.

■ **Do not support lackluster institutional reform programs—such as with stagnant parliaments and judiciaries—in lieu of real political reform.** Push the liberalized autocracies of the region, such as in Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, and Lebanon, beyond the superficial political reforms they use to sustain themselves. This will require pressuring such states to undertake true political restructuring, allow the development of political parties, and open up more space for political contestation.

■ **Account for major differences in political starting points and potential for political change. Shape policies accordingly.** Be clear about the goal in each country: regime

change, slow liberalization, and democratization are not the same thing. Policies to achieve one goal are not necessarily appropriate for the others. In particular, a sudden regime change would probably make democratization a more remote prospect for many countries because it would too quickly tip the balance in favor of the groups that are best organized and enjoy grassroots support, Islamist organizations in most cases.

■ **Review carefully everything we have done so far in the region in the name of democracy promotion.** The United States has spent more than $250 million on democracy programs in the Middle East in the past decade with little impact. Understanding the weaknesses of these prior efforts is particularly important in Egypt and the Palestinian territories, recipients of the largest amounts of such aid. Democracy assistance must not translate into more patronage for Arab governments or, conversely, support for organizations that are truly marginal in their own societies.

The idea of instant democratic transformation in the Middle East is a mirage. The fact that the Bush administration has suddenly changed its mind about the importance of democracy in the Middle East has not changed the domestic political equation in any country of the region. Furthermore, the United States has limited leverage in most Arab countries. In other regions, the United States, together with Europe and international organizations, often used the lever of economic assistance to force political reform on reluctant governments. But oil-rich countries do not receive aid. Poor countries in the region do, but the United States can hardly afford to use this aid as a weapon for political reform without jeopardizing other interests. The United States already wants a lot from Arab states. It wants help in the war on terrorism. It wants their oil. It wants cooperation in finding a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It wants access to military installations to wage war on Iraq. It cannot afford to antagonize the very regimes whose cooperation it seeks. The United States will be forced to work with existing regimes toward gradual reform—and this is a good thing. If a tidal wave of political change actually came to pass, the United States would not be even remotely prepared to cope with the resulting instability and need for large-scale building of new political systems. ■

"Change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world, just as change in China will transform Asia."
—*Joshua Muravchik*, New York Times, *August 19, 2002.*

"We should instead be talking about using all our political, moral, and military genius to support a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples of the Middle East from tyranny. That is our real mission, the essence of the war in which we are engaged, and the proper subject of our national debate. . . . And just as a successful democratic revolution in Iran would inspire the Iraqis to join us to remove Saddam, it is impossible to imagine that the Iranian people would tolerate tyranny in their own country once freedom had come to Iraq. Syria would follow in short order."
—*Michael Ledeen*, Wall Street Journal, *September 4, 2002.*

"So I am for invading Iraq only if we think that doing so can bring about regime change and democratization. Because what the Arab world desperately needs is a model that works—a progressive Arab regime that by its sheer existence would create pressure and inspiration for gradual democratization and modernization around the region."
—*Thomas Friedman*, New York Times, *September 18, 2002.*

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for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Mr. SHAYS. And I think we will adjourn this hearing. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]