[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 22, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-225
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
87-891 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director
Chris Barkley, Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on August 22, 2002.................................. 1
Statement of:
Ganske, Hon. Greg, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Iowa.............................................. 2
Gilchrist, Mary J.R., director, University of Iowa Hygienic
Laboratory; Christopher G. Atchison, associate dean for
public health practice, College of Public Health,
University of Iowa; Dr. Manjit Misra, director, seed
sciences, Iowa State University; Richard Hainje, Director,
Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency; James F. Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Paul L.
Posner, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic
Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office..................... 67
Leach, Hon. James, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Iowa.............................................. 3
Pate, Paul D., mayor of Cedar Rapids; Ned Wright, director,
Linn County Management Agency; Chief Stephen C. Havlik,
Cedar Rapids Fire Department; Douglas A. Feil, director,
environmental training programs, Kirkwood Community
College, Cedar Rapids, IA; and Bruce Lacy, nuclear business
assets manager for Alliant Energy, Duane Arnold Energy
Center, Cedar Rapids, IA................................... 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Atchison, Christopher G., associate dean for public health
practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa,
prepared statement of...................................... 78
Bogner, James F., Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of..... 115
Feil, Douglas A., director, environmental training programs,
Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA, prepared
statement of............................................... 40
Gilchrist, Mary J.R., director, University of Iowa Hygienic
Laboratory, prepared statement of.......................... 70
Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of. 102
Havlik, Chief Stephen C., Cedar Rapids Fire Department,
prepared statement of...................................... 31
Misra, Dr. Manjit, director, seed sciences, Iowa State
University, prepared statement of.......................... 95
Pate, Paul D., mayor of Cedar Rapids, prepared statement of.. 8
Wright, Ned, director, Linn County Management Agency,
prepared statement of...................................... 15
HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
----------
THURSDAY, AUGUST 22, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Iowa City, IA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m., in
the Main Lounge, Iowa Memorial Union, University of Iowa, Iowa
City, IA, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Leach and Ganske.
Staff present: Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director;
Christopher Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee; Michael
Sazonov, staff assistant; Meghan Gutierriez and Curt
Mercadante, Dr. Ganske's Staff; Bill Tate, Mr. Leach's Staff;
Norine Zamastil, University of Iowa.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.
On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most
devastating attacks ever committed on the U.S. soil. Despite
the damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to
cripple this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been
more united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their
willingness to protect that freedom.
The diabolical nature of these attacks and then the deadly
release of anthrax sent a loud and clear message to all
Americans: We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have
the mechanisms in place to protect this Nation and its people
from further attempts to cause massive destruction.
The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the
need for adequate communication systems and rapid deployment of
well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of
dollars in spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain
serious doubts as to whether this Nation is equipped to handle
a massive chemical, biological or nuclear attack.
Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively
Federal, State and local agencies are working together to
prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the
great State of Iowa and the good people of the cities such as
Iowa City and Cedar Rapids to know that they can rely on these
systems, should the need arise.
We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable
experience and insight will help the subcommittee better
understand the needs of those on the front lines. We want to
hear about their capabilities and their challenges, and we want
to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome
all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
I'm delighted to have with us, and without objection they
will be in full matters on this particular subcommittee, and
they are Mr. Ganske and Mr. Leach. No State has two statesmen
like these two gentlemen, and Iowa should be very proud of both
gentlemen.
And I will start with Mr. Ganske and then Mr. Leach.
The first statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. GREG GANSKE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF IOWA
Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you and the House Subcommittee on
Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations for coming to Iowa to examine how
the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments
prepare for potential terrorist attacks involving biological,
chemical or nuclear agents.
This is the latest of many steps taken by our Government to
respond to these threats. My own House Energy and Commerce
Committee passed legislation based on a bill I introduced in
the House, along with my colleague, Senator Bill Frist in the
Senate, which the President later signed into law.
Mr. Chairman, on September 11, 2001, the world witnessed
the most devastating attack ever committed on our soil. Ever
since September 11th and the anthrax attacks on the U.S.
Capitol, Americans are, rightly so, concerned about the threat
of biological and chemical warfare.
The threat of further chemical and biological agents is
real. The ease with which biological and chemical agents can be
concealed and their potential to effect large segments of the
population beyond those initially exposed only increases their
appeal to terrorists.
A terrorist attack using a deadly agent could kill or
sicken millions of Americans. Many countries have developed
biological warfare capabilities in spite of the fact that there
are treaties against it.
While the Center for Disease Control designates 36
different pathogens or germs as extremely dangerous, we are
most threatened by about 10 to 15 agents. These agents share
the ability to be easily produced, stored and can cause
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of deaths. The most
commonly known agents on that list are anthrax and smallpox.
It was my opinion that before September 11th there was no
hospital in this country capable of handling an epidemic.
Whether we're talking about Johns Hopkins in Baltimore or the
University of Iowa Medical Center here in Iowa City--and, Mr.
Chairman, I want to point out how appropriate it is to have
this type of hearing in Iowa City, with its high concentration
of health care providers and services--our local hospitals have
no excess capacity to handle massive numbers of sick patients.
In fact, many hospitals do not have the expertise to detect a
biologic attack rapidly enough to effectively limit the
dispersion.
We need to be able to monitor our air, water, land and
fellow humans to promptly detect infection. Once detected, we
need resources to treat the disease by containing outbreaks and
treating affected people. We need medicines and vaccines to
combat these biologic agents.
Recognizing these threats, last year, Senator Frist and I
introduced the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act both in the House
and the Senate. This legislation strengthened our Public Health
infrastructure and enhanced our national security in the wake
of the events of September 11th.
Congress used our bill as a template for the bioterrorism
protection legislation that President Bush signed into law this
past June. The new law strengthens Public Health preparedness,
enhances controls on biologic agents and protects our food,
drugs and drinking water supplies.
It authorizes increased funding through grants to States,
local governments and other public and private health-care
facilities to improve preparedness, to enhance laboratory
capacity, to educate and train health-care personnel and to
develop new drugs, vaccines and therapies. It also increased
funding for the CDC and established a national data base of
dangerous pathogens and biologic agents.
This bioterrorism bill is much needed, but I should point
out that it is the first step in addressing this. It is a bill
that authorizes the expenditures. Today, Congress is dealing
with the funding of that bill that isn't allowed.
Mr. Chairman, as a Nation, we're taking steps to prevent,
detect and respond to those attacks, those potential attacks.
We recognize that it is always best to plan for the worst and
hope for the best.
As the old adage reminds us, an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure. As a physician, I know that very well.
However, even with extensive spending on Federal programs, I
think there still remains a serious concern about the threat of
a chemical, biological or nuclear attack.
I'm anxious to learn today from fellow Iowans strategies
that they think will help us to prevent such a catastrophe.
There is an old joke, with the saying, ``I'm from the
Federal Government and I'm here to help.'' But in this hearing,
we are here to help and to learn from you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for coming to Iowa.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
The other gentleman from Iowa we're delighted to have here,
Mr. Leach.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF IOWA
Mr. Leach. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to
welcome you here to this town.
As many of you know, Steve is a former college president
and one of the most distinguished Members of our body.
I will only make a very brief set of comments. One, if you
take the Twentieth Century, it was largely about three
phenomenons: war, science and communication.
We know about the first world wars that have ever occurred
on the planet, we know about the shrinking of the globe in
terms of communications. And then, in terms of science, we have
the dual dimensions of splitting the atom that has brought us
nuclear energy. It's also brought us the capacity to destroy
people through weapons. Likewise, symbolically, splitting the
gene has brought us the greatest new techniques of treating
illness, but it's also brought us weapons of war. And the real
challenge is how we are prepared to deal with both the nuclear
and the biochemical issues.
I will conclude by saying that it's truly important that
America be prepared in the medical sciences. This is far more
significant than any kind of nuclear shield.
It is also really important that we deal with the causes of
people wanting to develop these weapons. So, in a dual sense,
we've got to be concerned with understanding as well as for
preparedness for people who don't understand each other.
So this hearing is largely about preparedness, it's a very
important hearing, and I appreciate Congressman Horn coming to
this State as well as a series of other stops around the
Country to develop a congressional response to the issues
before us.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentlemen, and we will now begin with
the presenters.
This is an investigating committee, so let me examine a few
things here. We're going to ask each presenter, as a group, to
have an oath, affirmant for the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, in a minute.
We are delighted that you've been here. Your papers are
excellent that we've seen and looked at at 12 midnight or 2
a.m., because we moved around, and then we see some of these
documents, and it's been excellent in Kansas and other places
that we've been.
Iowa is sort of a green carpet of soybeans and corn and
everything. And as one person said, he finally found a farmer
that's smiling, and this is the year.
So we're delighted to have the Mayor of Cedar Rapids here,
Honorable Paul D. Pate.
And, if you will, all of you, raise your right hands.
OK. Clerk will note that the six members have taken the
oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. We'll start with Mr. Pate, and then we'll just go
right down the line.
When I call your name, under our rules, your full document
is automatically put in the record at that point, and we would
like you to summarize somewhere between 5 minutes and 10
minutes to give us the feeling. We've all read it--the staff,
myself, so forth and we're glad to have the Mayor.
And so, Mayor Pate, the floor is all yours.
STATEMENTS OF PAUL D. PATE, MAYOR OF CEDAR RAPIDS; NED WRIGHT,
DIRECTOR, LINN COUNTY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; CHIEF STEPHEN C.
HAVLIK, CEDAR RAPIDS FIRE DEPARTMENT; DOUGLAS A. FEIL,
DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING PROGRAMS, KIRKWOOD COMMUNITY
COLLEGE, CEDAR RAPIDS, IA; AND BRUCE LACY, NUCLEAR BUSINESS
ASSETS MANAGER FOR ALLIANT ENERGY, DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER,
CEDAR RAPIDS, IA
Mayor Pate. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Leach and
Representative Ganske, and distinguished guests.
As mentioned, I am the Mayor of the city of Cedar Rapids.
First, let me thank you for holding this hearing here today.
This topic is important to the Heartland and in particular to
communities the size of that which I am the Mayor.
We all know, many of the terrorists who struck on September
11th of last year entered into the air system through airports
in areas smaller than those in major, metropolitan areas,
places much like the Cedar Rapids-Eastern Iowa Airport.
We appreciate the efforts made at the Federal level to help
secure airports, but many of the mandates have come without
funds. For example, staffing the law enforcement officer at the
Eastern Iowa Airport 16 hours each day from May 10, 2002
through December 1, 2003 will cost us $300,917. The
Transportation Security Administration has only allocated
$27,404 in reimbursements due to the rejection of the $5.1
billion in funding designated in the Supplemental Spending Bill
as contingency emergency.
The Eastern Iowa Airport also anticipates added security
costs of $586,240 for vehicle inspections from September 11,
2001, through September 30, 2002. Their costs have only been
reimbursed through April 2002.
For this, and other reasons that follow, I'm asking for
more Federal assistance through funding and more freedom at the
State level to direct those funds to communities.
In our community, we realize that we are an important part
of the food production process also. In watching and listening
to and reading the news each day, this point is echoed across
the country. The breadbasket of this Nation is in need of
additional money for protection of the resources we provide to
the world through value-added agriculture. As farm fields are
of great importance, the companies and infrastructure that
process those raw products are just as important.
Not a day goes by in any metropolitan area that you don't
hear a siren. Sometimes those sirens are false alarms; but,
many times, the sirens mean there's a life hanging in the
balance. People are more mindful than ever of air traffic above
them and the ground traffic around them.
Our children see the world differently. Their teachers
teach about life skills differently. Schools and communities
have been forced to reassess their ability to perform in a
disaster situation.
Whether it's from a fire, an automobile accident or other
medical emergency, all too often, our men and women in police,
fire and EMS are called to someone's last, best hope of
survival. These people are part of the front lines, the first
responders that will take action in the case of a terrorist
attack.
Companies, big and small alike, local, State and Federal
Government agencies have reallocated precious resources based
on what used to be a worst-case scenario, what could become a
stinging reality.
During the U.S. Mayors Conference summit in January of this
year, I visited Ground Zero. It was a very sobering experience,
to say the least. It was humbling to see both the destruction
and the dedication in New York and at Washington.
One thing came through loud and clear from that visit,
though: By refocusing on public safety, our communities have
refocused on one of the essential goals of every governmental
body--the safety and security of the individual.
What we are talking about today is the next step. From
Iowa's Emergency Management Division through local fire and
police department officials, from the proposed National Mass
Fatalities Institute in Cedar Rapids to information provided
from the point of view of the HAZMAT community, all these
messages talk about one thing that is key to making everything
work: preparedness.
From our homes to our city halls, preparedness is the key
to efficient, timely and effective action and reaction. By
making our communities safer in so many different ways, you
make them more productive. Our towns become more inviting
places to live, build businesses and grow. It's not even about
new rules or legislation. It's about funding.
By taking all that you hear today back to Washington, you
will take information away that benefits all our communities.
It's a strong investment in the future.
Cedar Rapids has the only municipally operated helicopter
fleet in the State. In the 30 years that the Cedar Rapids
Police Department's Aviation Department has been in operation,
it runs from Minneapolis to Kansas City, to the Mississippi
River on the East, and by Iowa's borders with Minnesota and
Missouri. This area is home to approximately two-thirds of
Iowa's population.
The helicopter fleet, and the officers that operate and
maintain it have been key in apprehending individuals with
Federal and State warrants and prison escapees, as well as
locating missing children and adults. The Cedar Rapids Police
Department helicopter fleet assisted in 5,548 calls and
directly enabled 130 arrests through the end of July of this
year.
The fleet has responded to nearly 3,000 calls and directly
enabled 124 arrests throughout Eastern Iowa.
The helicopter fleet played a key role in rescue efforts
surrounding the severe flash flooding in our area June 4th that
damaged more than 500 homes in the Cedar Rapids area alone.
Thanks to dedicated rescue personnel and resources like the
helicopter fleet, everyone was evacuated safely from homes
surrounding the flood waters.
The maintenance crew also maintains the St. Luke's Hospital
LifeGuard, or MediVac, helicopter. In addition, the events of
September 11, 2001, make the necessity of this fleet that much
more apparent.
Cedar Rapids Police Department has increased air patrols
and surveillance over the Duane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa's
only nuclear power facility. This has created a situation
whereby the already aged fleet is being additionally taxed.
Also, patrols have increased over the water pollution
control and the water treatment facilities as well. These
facilities serve not only Cedar Rapids but much of the metro
area.
The city of Cedar Rapids needs $5.1 million in Federal
funding to replace the police department's helicopter fleet,
which is nearly obsolete. These funds will assist in purchasing
and equipping three new helicopters. We are close to being
forced into a situation where these helicopters will be
cannibalized in order to utilize parts that are out of
production. I would just note that these are Vietnam-era
helicopters, 1968 and 1969.
Each time the President, Vice President or cabinet
officials travel to Eastern Iowa, our helicopters are called on
to provide protection; and for all these missions, we cannot
charge the appropriate community or governmental entity for
time or resources, because the helicopters are military
surplus, and Federal Rules prohibit us from recouping the costs
from what is a mutual-aid response on the part of the city of
Cedar Rapids.
As a parting comment, I want to inform you that the city of
Cedar Rapids and the Linn County Board of Supervisors have
provided and pledged nearly $1 million to fund a home for the
National Mass Fatalities Institute in our city. This operation
serves to aid in the coordination of activities, to protect
public safety and to respond in the case of a catastrophic
event.
Federal funding for this operation is necessary. It will
benefit people nationwide through the cost effectiveness of
staff and resources to serve our country.
Ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you for what you do
in deliberating over these issues and the funding connected
with them. Much of it goes unnoticed, because no one sees the
attack that never occurred or notices the life that was never
in jeopardy.
But we trust that because of the efforts you may have made
here to learn today by listening, we will be a more safe and
secure community, State and Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to share these remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pate follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
And we now have Ned Wright, the Director of the Linn County
Management Agency.
Mr. Wright.
Mr. Wright. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, Congressman Ganske and Congressman Leach. Thank
you for the opportunity to speak before this congressional
subcommittee.
As you stated, I am Ned Wright, I'm the Director of
Emergency Management for Linn County, Iowa. My comments will
address the perspective of this committee from a local level.
My comments are my own and from my counterparts in the Iowa
Emergency Management Association.
The front line on the war on terrorism is right here at the
local level. Lives will be saved or lost based on the initial
response by local government assets. No matter what the program
that is in place at the Federal or State level, the actions
that will make a difference are at the local level.
The basic principal of emergency response is, whatever the
incident, the local jurisdiction will be the first on the
scene. No matter what State and Federal resources are
systemically available, it takes time to get these resources to
the incident. The better prepared a local jurisdiction is to
handle any event, the safer the community will be. This is not
to say that State and Federal resources are not needed and that
they don't do an outstanding job. They're just not always
readily available.
In the Midwest, our communities are protected by a
partnership of paid and volunteer organizations, different
systems but both professional in their own way. If we were to
have an act of terrorism against any of our communities, the
call for response will be met by all. This is a fact of life
here, and we must ensure that the training and preparedness
needs of full-time departments are met with the same vigor as
those of our volunteer departments. This is a total-force
concept.
My counterparts and I are at the bottom of a big funnel as
we address homeland security issues. It appears that at the
Federal and State level, staffing for homeland security is
growing. Policy and program initiatives are rolling off the
presses. Speeches are being made, charts and graphs are
everywhere, but at the end of the day, have any of these
programs and initiatives made any first responder better
trained, equipped or prepared to respond to the next event?
We hear of the billions of dollars coming out of Congress
to fight the war on terrorism. We're just starting to receive
our nickel. As we approach the anniversary of September 11th,
we are getting reports from researchers and consultants on what
happened, what went right, what went wrong, and what could have
been done better.
I wonder how much money was spent to tell us what the
police and fire did and did not do after the fact, and if that
money had been spent to train and prepare these heroes, what a
difference this could have made.
We at the local level are responsible for the safety of our
people, not the State and not the Federal Government. At the
end of the event, when State and Federal resources return to
their home locations, I am the guy who will see my friends and
neighbors at Wal-Mart or at church. I'm the one who is asked
why or why not something happened. I'm the one that's
responsible for coordinating their safety, and I take that job
very seriously. We must do all in our power to reverse the
efforts in the war on terrorism and to fix the local problems
before we expand the efforts at the State and Federal level.
We are starting to see funds become available, but we are
the last ones at the table. Since we are the front line, the
soldiers in this effort, we need to be heard and listened to
about our needs. We at the local level know what we need to do.
We just don't need our hands tied and hindered from doing what
we know is right.
One size does not fit all. What works in New York City and
Los Angeles may not be appropriate for Cedar Rapids and Iowa
City. Congress needs to listen to our needs, and I appreciate
you doing that by your visit here today. The Federal agencies
responsible to you for these homeland security programs need to
get out of Washington and to get out here and see what is
needed and see how the existing programs are working before
designing new ones.
The State's first priority should be to get all local
communities adequately staffed and provided with resources even
though the local public can not see the need. Remember, no
matter how great a comprehensive program is in Washington or in
Des Moines, it will not be successful until local resources are
available to put that program into place.
In my written presentation, I allude to working hard in
Linn County to address chemical, biological, and radiological
issues. Much of our efforts have come from the bottom up and
not the top down.
My community leaders have made a commitment to protect the
public by supporting the efforts of the Emergency Management
Agency in coordinating community-wide training, education and
preparedness efforts. My dream would be that the other 98
counties would enjoy the same support and resources.
But, at the same time, I must be the first to acknowledge
that much of our success is based on the strong bond of
partnership of over 25 years with the Duane Arnold Energy
Center, which is Iowa's only nuclear power plant. Through their
continued efforts and resources, we are one of the best
prepared communities in the Midwest. Other Iowa communities are
not so fortunate.
We built on our successes, and that's why this community
has initiated many of the early terrorism preparedness programs
and other similar programs, because we knew what we needed to
do to be prepared.
As an example, we developed a model Mass Fatalities
Incident Response Plan that led to the establishment of the
National Mass Fatalities Institute, and we were one of the
first mid-sized communities to address biological preparedness.
I hope you will see that no matter what programs are
developed at the Federal and State level, unless the local base
is strong and solid, you cannot build on a successful homeland
security program. Our mission has always been to protect our
public from any hazard from tornadoes and floods to chemical
releases and airplane crashes, and now we face terrorism as
well.
We will continue to do the best that we can with the
resources we are provided. We only ask that you respect the
local government to know what is best for each of our
communities and to support these efforts that we feel are the
best for our community.
Through this support, we will be strong, and we will be
prepared to respond to any emergency event, recover from that
emergency and continue growing as a strong and vital community.
We will be the backbone of our strong Nation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we appreciate that, Mr. Wright,
right from the grass roots.
Keith Erickson is the director of the Linn County
Department of Public Health. So we have the Management Agency
and the Public Health aspect.
Mr. Erickson. I am Keith Erickson, Director of Linn County
Public Health, located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I appreciate this
opportunity to present testimony on how the Federal Government
is assisting State and local governments in preparing for a
potential attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear
agents at this Field Hearing of the Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations from a local Public Health perspective.
Concerns of the local Public Health officer:
Local Public Health infrastructure must be strengthened in
order to adequately respond to potential terrorist attacks,
especially when involving biological agents. The Public Health
infrastructure must be based upon core Public Health functions
and the essential Public Health Services.
This will involve training and supporting the current work
force, hiring additional Public Health workers: for example,
epidemiologists, Public Health planners, Public Health
educators, information technology specialists, and improving
electronic surveillance systems, laboratory capacity and
improving local facilities.
Funds allocated for this purpose will have to be dual use
so as to respond not only to man-made acts of terrorism, but
also to respond to the natural occurrence of emerging
infectious diseases. This dual use is important in maintaining
a high level of readiness and proficiency. The increased
capacity and capability to do disease surveillance, an
epidemiologist on a daily basis will prepare us to respond in a
timely fashion to a bioterrorism event.
Be reminded that the threat of agroterrorism in Iowa is
significant. Any surveillance system must involve agriculture
and veterinary medicine.
The anthrax events and hoaxes after September 11, 2001
demonstrated the need for Public Health to respond on a 24-
hour/7-day-a-week basis. Indeed, the expectation of our
community partners, including fire, law enforcement, HAZMAT and
emergency management personnel, is that Public Health will be
actively involved in a biological event, even though we are
organized on an 8-hour/5-day-a-week operation.
In our local jurisdiction, we have been conducting
emergency management drills for more than 25 years because of
the Duane Arnold Energy Center, a nuclear power plant in Linn
County. These drills, FEMA training and Nuclear Regulatory
requirements have prepared Public Health and our community
partners to respond to a nuclear event. This has provided a
template for action to respond not only to nuclear but chemical
and natural disasters as well.
This was clearly demonstrated in July 1985, when Toxic
Tuesday, a chemical fire at the old Sewage Treatment Plant,
caused the evacuation of thousands of citizens from Cedar
Rapids in the middle of the night. These experiences should be
incorporated into any biological preparedness plans in the
future.
And I just want to show you the headlines from the Cedar
Rapids Gazette which talks about mass evacuations in Cedar
Rapids. I know the Congressmen remember this.
I'd also piggyback on what the Mayor said. You'll notice
the helicopter up here. I was in that helicopter. That was made
available to Public Health to lay out the coordinates to
coordinate the evacuation, and I thank the city of Cedar Rapids
for making that available.
Funding for these activities should be split into two
systems: one to the State to address all 99 counties in a
coordinated regional effort, and one directly to the
metropolitan statistical areas of Iowa, based upon need.
It is important that allocation of these funds be
population-based, available when needed, and based upon a
national set of goals and objectives with appropriate
accountability.
There are more than 3,000 local Public Health agencies in
the United States. The National Association of County and City
Health Officers is the national voice for local Public Health.
I would urge that you listen to this voice in regard to
domestic preparedness and bioterrorism.
In summary, we have an unprecedented opportunity to
strengthen local Public Health infrastructure so that it has
the capacity to respond to both emerging infectious diseases
and terrorist attack involving biologic, chemical or nuclear
agents in a timely fashion. Provide local agencies with the
resources to hire, train and support a Public Health work
force, and we will protect the public's health.
Thank you for this opportunity to present this testimony.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. That's very helpful.
We now have Chief Steve Havlik of the Cedar Rapids Fire
Department.
We're glad to have you here, Chief.
Chief Havlik. Thank you.
Thank you, distinguished members of today's subcommittee
hearing, for allowing me to testify today. I would like to take
this opportunity to express some thoughts and concerns related
to weapons of mass destruction.
We at the Cedar Rapids Fire Department are very grateful
for the assistance we have received from the Domestic
Preparedness Program sponsored by the Federal Government. These
programs have given our Department the opportunity to
participate in various training opportunities that have
heightened our organization's awareness and capabilities. The
training received has given us the ability to expand upon what
we believe is a strong chemical response capability.
Hazardous material response for our organization
historically has been responding to incidental spills and
leaks. We must now be prepared to address multi-dimensional
hazards. Assistance from the Federal Government has allowed us
to initiate the mandated procedures and training. This will
help us better respond to incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction.
We have been privileged to be the beneficiary of a grant
from the Department of Justice. This grant has provided Cedar
Rapids Fire Department with some of the essential equipment
needed to evaluate and respond to a possible terrorist attack.
Aside from providing more opportunities for procurement of
necessary equipment, there exists an increasing need for
resources to maintain and buildupon our current capabilities.
There are two very important issues we are currently
addressing: What will be the funding source to provide for
proper maintenance and upkeep for the equipment furnished, and
how can we address the needed staffing costs associated with
required training programs?
There are appreciable costs associated with maintaining
specific pieces of instrumentation. These expenditures will
have to be budgeted for in the future. For example, replacing
sensors and consumption of calibration gas is an ongoing
requirement and can be an expenditure of approximately $1,000.
Ultimately, the most urgent need is providing adequate
staffing levels while personnel are engaged in training for
response to these types of incidents.
As part of our bargaining agreement, we compensate our
personnel for their scheduled time, as well as additional time
outside the normal work schedule. The training that is provided
requires significant time beyond scheduled-duty assignments.
Budgetary constraints have made it very challenging for
departments such as ours to adequately fund for personnel costs
for weapons of mass destruction training. As Fire Chief, I'm
often faced with a difficult dilemma. I can ask our responders
to participate in training utilizing our own personal
resources, or I can cut response capabilities below mandated
staffing levels to provide training time. Consequently, this
has directly affected our ability to provide the manpower to
properly respond to other emergencies.
Oftentimes, our personnel go to great lengths to
participate. Our firefighters have incurred personal costs as
well as making family sacrifices to assure their participation
and attendance. As Fire Chief, it is difficult to consistently
ask members to make these sacrifices.
Being located in the Heartland, agriculture is paramount to
our economy. Many of the agricultural-based industries use and
store chemicals. These chemicals enable them to process their
product in a cost-effective manner. Fortunately, technology,
innovation, and a strong commitment to process safety
management have led to a responsible co-existence in our
communities.
Unfortunately, recent events have demonstrated that certain
individuals and groups, extreme in their views and cold-blooded
in their actions, can impact us in ways we never imagined.
Iowa is one of the largest storers of chemicals that are
toxic by inhalation. The chemical hazards that are inherent
with an agricultural economy must be addressed and
contingencies formulated to properly protect the public. When a
bona fide threat is apparent, it is absolutely necessary for
information to make its way to the jurisdictional agencies.
When a potential chemical threat exists, a formal
communication conduit must be assured. This enables us to move
confidential information into the hands of responders without
obstructions or delays. Communicating and sharing information
such as publishing alerts on a secure, data- sharing network
would prove invaluable to responding personnel.
Decontamination remains a broad challenge. Responders need
to comprehensively address the possibility of a nuclear,
biological or energetic device in conjunction with a chemical
event. These devices pose labor- and equipment-intensive
circumstances. This type of terrorist activity presents unique
challenges to the conventional decontamination process.
Assistance is needed to provide decontamination equipment that
is lightweight, mobile and has the ability to decontaminate
large numbers effectively and efficiently.
Additionally, assistance is needed for equipment that can
perform in inclement weather and has capabilities to handle
nonambulatory victims. Equipment with these characteristics is
available through several manufacturers. However, they are
cost-prohibitive for our agency due to budget constraints at
this time and in the foreseeable future.
Once properly equipped, our local responding agencies
remain faced with logistical and communication hurdles.
Cooperation and integration of response efforts within multiple
agencies are very much needed. This includes initial response
and advanced medical care, as well as assistance from Public
Health agencies.
To ensure a coordinated response, teamwork, communication
and interagency training need improvement. Ultimately, this
takes time, money and resources to reach the needed level of
capability.
Once again, I'd like to thank you for allowing me to offer
this testimony to this subcommittee. Hopefully, I've
communicated the compelling need to provide the vital resources
that will support our current and future capabilities. These
resources will better help us prepare for and respond to
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Chief.
[The prepared statement of Chief Havlik follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Our next presenter is Douglas A. Feil, director,
Environmental Training Programs, Kirkwood Community College,
Cedar Rapids, IA.
Mr. Feil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to
address you on what our Nation's Federal Government is doing
and has not yet had the opportunity to do to assist State and
local governments in preparing for potential terrorist attack.
Kirkwood Community College has developed a partnership with
our city, local industry, the county, and the county Emergency
Management Agency and several of Kirkwood's federally funded
training programs.
The goal of the partnership is to build and operate a
multi-use Community Training and Response Center to prepare and
direct our community's response to real and potential terrorist
attack and provide a training space for several Kirkwood
programs that have a national constituency.
The proposed center will provide an emergency operation
center for Linn County area and office space for the Linn
County Emergency Management Agency. It will also provide office
space for the ``first in the Nation'' CDC-funded National Mass
Fatalities Institute that has a mission to prepare communities
to respond to and recover from mass fatalities incidents.
This institute provides advanced-level response training to
prepare our emergency planners and responders to plan for and
respond to disasters.
The center will also provide classrooms, computer lab and
auditorium for the Hazardous Materials Training and Research
Institute. The purpose of this federally funded institute is to
promote worker protection and the maintenance of a clean and
safe environment through education and training. This includes
training on response to and the cleanup after a nuclear,
chemical or biological attack.
Since 1987, HMTRI has trained over 120,000 workers with our
network of 80 partner colleges across this Nation.
The center will also provide office space for CRADLE, an
innovative recordkeeping and student assessment center created
in direct response to the distance conferencing, education and
training needs of the region driven by homeland security
issues. We will soon be of the ability to record and track
those prepared to assist in a local, State or national
emergency.
The mission of the Community Training and Response Center
is to draw upon the unique strengths of the organizations it
houses in order to prepare communities across the country for a
skilled response to emergency situations and provide facilities
for a coordinated response to real emergencies in Eastern Iowa.
The Community Training and Response Center will be a $4
million, 16,000-square-foot hardened facility to be built on
the Kirkwood Community College campus. The center will leverage
resources of college and community operations that have similar
missions. In the center, they will share common facilities and
equipment to create an efficient and effective regional
response that brings benefits to the college, industry, the
city, the county, the State and the Federal Government.
At the local level, the efficiency and effectiveness of
this approach has been recognized, and 50 percent of the $4
million facility cost has already been pledged. Now the Federal
Government has an opportunity to assist the State of Iowa and
our local governments in funding the final 50 percent of the
project.
All of the facility's users have similar missions that
naturally complement each other. Their personnel have similar
skills that can support the missions of all users in a time of
need. Each organization is a ``best practices'' showcase. Co-
locating the operations maximizes the best qualities of each
while effectively using taxpayer money. The organizations will
provide a synergy of time, talent and resources for the
betterment of the local community and the Nation.
We ask you to support Federal funding of this multi-use
emergency response and training facility for Eastern Iowa and
our country. We believe this dual-use facility serves as a
model for other communities focused on preparing for terrorist
attack.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feil follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. We now have our last presenter of this
panel, and that's Bruce Lacy, the nuclear business and assets
manager for Alliant Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center.
Thanks for coming, Mr. Lacy.
Mr. Lacy. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak.
I apologize that, given the period of time in which I knew I
was going to be here today, I didn't have an opportunity to
give you some paper to read along with, but--I represent the
owners of the Duane Arnold Energy Center and those people who
are responsible for its operation, Iowa's only electric
generating plant that received its energy from the splitting of
the atom. We've been a safe and reliable part of the electric
energy infrastructure here in Eastern Iowa since 1974, and I
wanted to speak directly to the issue of the security of our
facility and the role that we have in the community.
First off, I'd like to say I appreciate very much the prior
comments acknowledging the role that we have played supporting
the community in the development of emergency preparedness.
Local, county, State, Kirkwood, all of these are people that
we've been working with for nearly two decades in terms of
emergency preparedness, and we're proud of our role in that.
Specifically regarding security at our nuclear facility,
security is not a new issue for us. It was in the late 1970's
that security became a major function. Some of you who are
familiar with the community for more than two decades might
remember the date when the Duane Arnold plant didn't have
guards, didn't have fences, didn't have Jersey barriers, things
like this.
That all started showing up in 1979. And we have
systematically made improvements both in the physical design of
security measures and in the staffing ever since then. I think
a very good example of that is the bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut. That resulted in the initial placement of
Jersey barriers around the plant that supplemented the already-
existing fences and professional security force that we had. So
we were already very well prepared prior to September 11th.
But nothing is ever perfect, nothing is ever good enough.
September 11th taught us all messages; and after September
11th, we, like everybody else, further improved. It's just, the
platform from which we were starting at the nuclear plant was
already much higher and much better established than virtually
any other facilities around the Nation.
And I speak in that regard on behalf of all of the
commercial electric generating plants in the Nation. It's
something that we as a Nation can be proud of.
We take our responsibility very seriously.
Some of the improvements that we've made, I will not go
into detail on that, but we have increased our staff. We've
increased certain types of physical barriers associated with
the power plant. In a short quote from our security director at
the plant, I like to think in terms of the four D's.
The first D is to deter. And by being well prepared, you
deter people from even thinking about coming to your facility
and doing something wrong.
Second, for those who are unwise and not deterred, then you
want to detect them. We've done various things that will allow
us to detect hostile parties much earlier than what we were
prepared to detect before.
Third, you want to defend the facility. By the addition of
staff and various measures, we've further enhanced our ability
to defend the facility.
And, last, and the most serious point is, should you fail
on the first three D's, be prepared to defeat on the fourth D.
We've made improvements in all of these areas associated
with our power plant.
I would like to offer the commercial U.S. electric
generating industry as a model for the Nation in terms of
preparedness, both before and after September 11th, and as a
model of cooperation with our local communities, again,
appreciating the earlier remarks on this panel for what has
been accomplished in Eastern Iowa, and I would say that is no
exception across the Nation to other communities that have
nuclear power plants in their midst.
As Congress goes forward, I strongly ask that you rely on
the best information available regarding the types of potential
threats that you want to direct resources and help to.
In the case of my own industry, I am very well aware that
it is easy to be misunderstood. That the electric generating
activities that take place at our facility are just one of many
aspects of nuclear-related issues that might take place around
the country, but that we should not make decisions based on
fear or manipulation of facts in our response and that, as the
Congress has the opportunity to set forth policies, programs
and provide resources, that not be done in a manner that is
discriminatory, again, based on fear or inappropriate
perception.
Now, those of us who own the plant and are responsible for
the operation of the plant, we take great responsibility and
feel great responsibility in this to ensure that it is a safe
and securely operated facility.
I want to say that we're very proud of the people--it's
ultimately people, as I'm sure everybody on this panel would
agree--it's ultimately people that make the difference. We have
a lot of outstanding people that we should be proud of at our
power plant, both in the operation of the facility and in the
security of the facility.
I'm very pleased at the cooperation and the coordination of
local, State and Federal, all levels; and I'm confident that
the people who live in our community will not be subjected to
any threat of terrorist attack associated with activities at
our facility based on what we were doing before September 11th,
based on the things that we've done after September 11th and
probably, most fundamentally, on the commitment that we all
have to always learn and always seek a better way.
As time goes on, we're going to learn and we're going to
even further improve, if we're going to keep our community
safe, as part of the community.
So, in conclusion, we're counting on Congress to direct the
public resources and the public policy in the direction most in
need of help; and it appears to me that is for our local, State
and Federal infrastructure.
I'm not asking for any money. Based on rational and
objective, well-thought-out considerations of the threat, and I
commend you to recognize, again, the outstanding example of the
industry that I'm part of, the commercial nuclear electric
generating industry in this Nation, be seen as a model for
success not just in communities with nuclear plants but
communities that may have other issues that require an equal
level or comparable level of attention.
I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to speak
today.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you. And now that we've got the
individual statements, we're going to turn to questions, and
each Congressman will have 10 minutes for questioning, and
we'll rotate it until everybody is exhausted. We still have a
panel two to come with some very exciting things.
So, the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Leach, the senior member,
the one we all go to to get advice, so--he's sort of Socrates.
Mr. Leach. Thank you, Steve.
Let me say, as I'm sitting and listening to this group, I'm
really struck by the high degree of professionalism. I'm also
struck by the notion that we have this society in which there
are differing levels of Government. You have local government,
State government and National Government, and then different
elements.
And I am really impressed with Linn County. I must tell all
of you what a wonderful degree of thoughtfulness you've put
into where you are.
And then, to a College President/Chairman, let me say that,
last year, Kirkwood Community College was rated the No. 1
community college in the United States; and we're very proud of
the College in many areas, but you are now becoming a leader in
a particular area, in preparedness.
And then, interestingly, when we think about these levels
of government--and this is going to apply to the next panel--
America also needs some regional responses. That is, there's a
local response, a national response, a State response.
As I look at the Kirkwood proposal, it's basically one that
is a regional or national dimension. In fact, your Mass
Fatalities Center is a national program. Your other efforts in
the preparedness area really fit into a regional context.
So, in terms of suggestions, for the report of this
subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore the
regionality dimension of preparedness in programs like
Kirkwood's, and potentially certain things in the State
laboratories I think can be considered in a regional dimension
as well as a State dimension.
In fact, when we go with the issues of communication, we
all know there--sometimes within agencies, and we had a problem
within the FBI with that information going upstream and
downstream and how it's being treated, then, between agencies.
But the community colleges, as, again, symbolized by
Kirkwood, and symbolized by the State of Iowa with certain
commitments the State has made, have the best communications
between institutions of any in the country. And I think that's
a model that also ought to be a part of--although it's kind of
implicit in your particular approaches.
But I really have one precise question, and that relates to
the Kirkwood issue, and that is, just what is it that you're
requesting from the Government in terms of funding, in the near
term and then on a sustaining basis?
Mr. Feil. In the near term, we have proposed this $4
million facility. Our local, State, county and industry have
come up with a pledge of 50 percent of that.
We are looking for assistance, either directly from the
Federal Government or through the State, an additional $2
million to build this facility that will both provide the
emergency response capabilities within the area and provide
training within the region.
In a long-term basis, we are looking for continual
assistance in funding both our National Mass Fatalities
Institute and the various programs that the Hazardous Materials
Training and Research Institute and CRADLE have in training,
and we assist community colleges across the Nation to provide
training in their own, say, backyard, in their own localities,
and we have community colleges from across the Nation that come
to us, and we share Iowa's resources with them, and they take
them home to share with their community; so we are looking for
assistance there over a long-term basis.
Mr. Leach. I appreciate that.
And I would also say to the chairman, again, as you
prepared in your report, there are aspects that are deeply
scientific and deeply health care related----
Mr. Feil. Yes.
Mr. Leach [continuing]. At a theoretical level in
preparedness; but the community college system in the United
States, which is unique in the world, is probably the best
system in potential for training at the practical level of
local communities, and I think it's something that we shouldn't
lose sight of and we ought to be looking for benchmark kinds of
approaches.
And as I look at what Kirkwood has been developing, I'm
exceptionally impressed as a national model, not simply as a
local model.
Before my time expires, I just want to ask one question of
Mr. Lacy.
You've given a very strong statement about what your
facility in Palo has done in terms of security, and you've
mentioned you are not looking for Federal funds, but are there
things that Congress and the executive branch can be doing that
could be helpful to your facility and your kind of facility at
this time?
Mr. Lacy. Thank you very much for that question. And, yes,
indeed, there are some suggestions that I would offer there.
We understand and accept that we have a responsibility to
provide some level of protection at our site. I understand that
there's debate by some as to whether that should be changed. I
would say that there needs to be Federal legislation, not only
just for our facility, but maybe other facilities, where people
are expecting a law enforcement-type capability associated with
the facility. Then we need Federal legislation to support
authority for some kind of law enforcement function at the
site, and that does not exist right now for our facility.
I think a second area has to do with background
investigations of personnel. Frankly, given the regulatory
regime and the state of Federal laws, it's easier for a gun
dealer to do a background investigation on somebody than it is
for us. I believe that deserves legislative attention.
And a third area where I believe Federal activity would be
appropriate, and this may be the most difficult of all, is the
Homeland Security Office and their issuance of threat
advisories. I think there's opportunity there and probably some
legislative support appropriate for them to help them issue
more meaningful threat advisories.
I mean, there's kind of a limit to the number of times that
you can say you need to have things at the highest, the most
high, the very high, the absolutely high. Somehow or other,
that needs to be turned into a more meaningful thing.
And for whatever facilities that the Nation feels it needs
to provide individual protection as we accept responsibility
for at our nuclear electric plant, the Federal legislation
needs to be respectful that we can't expect those individual
facilities to be prepared to defend against things that are
fundamentally acts of war. At some point, an act of war becomes
a national issue, not a local issue.
So those are the suggestions that I would offer.
Thank you very much for the question.
Mr. Leach. Thank you, Mr. Lacy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
And now we'll yield 10 minutes for questioning by your
other fine Congressman, and that's Mr. Ganske.
Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.
You know, I detected something of a common theme from all
of your testimony, and that was, please give us help, but watch
out for the unfunded mandates.
Is that fair to say?
I see the Mayor of Cedar Rapids nodding his head in full
agreement right there.
The way that we wrote the Bioterrorism Preparedness Bill
was designed to do so. We have a proviso that for a State to
apply for grants, then there needs to be a State preparedness
plan.
So I was disappointed to find out just before the hearing
that Ellen Gordon, the Homeland Security Advisor for the State
of Iowa, did not show up today--apparently she had some
conflicts, although she had apparently indicated she would be
here previously--because I was interested in getting some
information from her on how the State Bioterrorism Preparedness
Plan is coming along? I mean, is it adequate, is the State
getting cooperation from the localities, are the localities
getting input into the State, is there any way that we can help
in that regard?
Now, as I mentioned before in my statement, we have
actually budgeted about $4.4 billion for these types and other
types of grants that you're looking at applying for. We need to
go through an appropriations process, we need to get that money
into the pipeline.
But it's important for you, as we've gotten some indication
from this afternoon, that you are also making progress in terms
of your analysis of what your needs are.
Chief Havlik, I must say that I was very impressed with my
visit recently to the Cedar Rapids Fire Department. The level
of commitment of the men and women that you have working in
that department, Mayor, I think they're doing a great job.
And, Mr. Lacy, you're working with them, and others have
mentioned--Mr. Wright, for instance--the fact that Cedar Rapids
has been a little in the forefront of some of this planning
simply because you have a nuclear power plant located, really,
right up to the city limits for metropolitan Cedar Rapids.
Mayor Pate, maybe you can tell me, it seems to me like that
nuclear power plant is located closer to Cedar Rapids than just
about any other power plant in the United States. Is that an
accurate impression?
Mayor Pate. I'm not sure how every plant is in the country,
but it's distinctly close to us, and it's been a significant
partner in our efforts to respond with good planning.
And, if I could, Congressman, I just want to give credit
where it's due. I think, as Mr. Wright mentioned, it was a
template for us; but, you know, we, as an emergency management
group collectively, do continually drills.
I'm trying to think--this year alone, we did the airport,
in response, you've done the smallpox, three nuclear power
plants, an earthquake; so, you know, we're continuing to drill
and drill and drill and try to prepare for what might come our
way.
Mr. Ganske. Would anyone on the panel like to address this
particular question?
Mr. Horn. I think Mr. Erickson.
Mr. Ganske. Mr. Erickson, you were nodding your assent
about the proximity of the power plant?
Mr. Erickson. I believe that if you take the 10-mile EPZ
that runs down the middle of First Avenue in Cedar Rapids, and
since it splits the city, you have to take the whole city, so
that means there's a greater population within a 10-mile EPZ of
a nuclear power plant at Duane Arnold than any other facility
in the country.
Mr. Ganske. In the country?
Mr. Erickson. Yes.
Mr. Ganske. Mr. Lacy, I have to ask this question, because
I've toured the power plant. I know that you're running out of
storage capacity. Do you have an opinion on what we should do
with that spent nuclear fuel, and what would be the safest
thing to do with it?
Mr. Lacy. Yes, If I might just supplement the two prior
responses. The Duane Arnold Energy Center does not have the
largest population, although it certainly has one of the
largest, so, I--not to contradict, but I think we're No. 10 or
something like that. I think there are nine other facilities
that have a higher populated area than we do. But, certainly--
--
Mr. Ganske. The proximity is very close.
Mr. Lacy. Yes, certainly, proximity and high population.
And I think that's a strong motivation for us, as our role in
the community, for this cooperation that we talk about on that.
With regard to the used fuel that has been safely stored at
our facility since we started up in 1994, we are developing
additional storage capability at our site for the safe storage
of that fuel, and that storage will be just as safe there as it
is in our existing facility at the site.
I want to commend the U.S. Congress for their action
approximately a month and a half ago supporting the President's
decision to go ahead and develop a permanent repository for the
storage of used fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. And while I
will always state with confidence that the fuel on an interim
basis is safely stored at our facility, we're talking about
decades of interim storage.
If you're going to look at centuries of permanent storage,
consolidation at a single, well-designed, well- secured site is
something that is absolutely the right thing to do. It's
something that we as a Nation are fortunate that we have the
opportunity to go forward on, so I want to thank the Congress
for their support in that area.
Mr. Ganske. Mayor Pate, you were talking about several
infrastructure needs for Cedar Rapids. Are you in the process
of putting together a list of those needs in preparation, for
presenting grant proposals for the additional spending that we
will provide from the Federal Government?
Mayor Pate. Actually, Congressman, we've already done that
and submitted it to our Iowa congressional delegation for their
review, and we'll be following up with that.
In fact, I'll be in Washington I believe the 9th or 10th of
September--I don't have a calendar in front of me--in an effort
to reinforce some of these costs and priorities, and I'll make
sure that a copy is forwarded to your special attention, too,
but it itemizes, goes through several of the items I mentioned
here, goes into more detail on the National Mass Fatalities
Facility and, of course, some of the other expenses that we're
incurring right now.
The Fire Chief didn't go into a lot of detail, but we've
spent--and I'm sure other fire departments have--extensive
amount of money on response to anthrax calls when that was
going on, and those were costs we absorbed internally, and,
again, trying to better prepare for those things, those costs
are there, and I'll make sure that those are clearly spelled
out for you and the rest of the delegation.
Mr. Ganske. Chief Havlik, you have a vehicle there, I
believe, in your department that is able to respond to
chemical-type contaminations. Can you describe that a little
bit?
Chief Havlik. Well, it's actually a converted pop truck/
vehicle that we've converted into our Special Operations Unit,
and it contains all our hazardous material, all our high- and
low-angle, confined space, water-rescue equipment, so it's
really a very specialized vehicle. It covers a lot of different
areas in our department, but we do use it quite a bit, and we
actually would like to get something a little newer and a
little bigger that we could actually--we have got so much
equipment, we don't have room for it in that vehicle, but it is
very versatile, does a good job for us. You'd be surprised how
many special-operations calls we do have in a city with,
obviously, the river running through it and so forth, so--it's
a very good vehicle and it gets quite a bit of use.
Mr. Ganske. Now, in Japan in 1995, in a subway, there was a
chemical attack using serin gas. Let's just say that there were
a terrorist attack at some major gathering in Cedar Rapids, and
so you were called to respond, and you got there and you saw an
awful lot of people on the ground. What would you do? How would
you activate the community services to handle 50, 60, 100
people that could be injured at one time?
Chief Havlik. Well, first of all, we would initiate an
incident command system which we use exclusively on the fire
department, and we would get all the players involved that
would be able to make choices. Maybe somebody from the council,
Linn County Health, police department, fire, all the
departments, Ned Wright from EMA, all the departments that
would have input, and get together in one spot so we could make
decisions based on the events that were happening.
We have some equipment, some monitors, that we've received
from the Federal Government--actually, a Department of Justice
grant. We would be able to take this equipment and, hopefully,
identify the product that we're dealing with. That would be the
first step, identify what it is.
And then we have some resources. We should be able to find
out what we need to do, how far we need to evacuate, what
resources we need to take care of that situation.
But any time something like that is released, it's going to
cause some major problems. The main reason there, it's going to
take awhile just to identify what the product is.
But we do have some equipment that we just received, and
we've been playing with it a little bit, and it's some stuff
that's definitely going to help us identify the product and
help us determine what to do.
Mr. Ganske. So would your special team show up in full
contamination suits?
Chief Havlik. Yes. We have the Level A, Level B, all types
of suits. We have a very excellent HAZMAT team, and they would
definitely show up, and they would be the ones to actually try
to mitigate the situation.
Mr. Ganske. How many people would be in a team like that?
Chief Havlik. Well, they go in in teams of two, but we have
about 35 members in our department that are cross-trained in
all the different disciplines I mentioned, so we have a pretty
good-sized HAZMAT team, and we have some excellent equipment
also.
Mr. Ganske. But, really, what you're pointing out is that,
when a team of two arrives, and you may have a room like this--
--
Chief Havlik. Sure.
Mr. Ganske [continuing]. You're going to need a lot of
help, you're going to need pull people out, get extra people
there, you're going to need to have additional equipment. You
can't just call people in and have them contaminated as well.
Chief Havlik. Right.
Mr. Ganske. You're talking about what hospitals have told
us, on a physical plant level, as well as personnel, and that
is that you need additional help to be able to handle what we
would call a surge.
Chief Havlik. Yes, I agree.
Mr. Ganske. Not just a truck turning over and having some
chemicals----
Chief Havlik. Yes. Our HAZMAT people, our technicians,
would be able to go inside the business or where the truck
turned over and actually try to mitigate that, but we're going
to need people in the other zones to take the people as they
come out to decontaminate them and so forth, so it is a very
labor intense-type situation to handle something like that.
Mr. Ganske. Now, has anyone talked about our National Guard
involvement in any of this?
Mr. Wright. Congressman, just speaking from that, we have
been working with our civil support team in Des Moines, and
they participated in our smallpox exercises and our other
training.
But, as I mentioned, they're several hours away, and a lot
of the things that we're looking at right now is ensuring that
even though these--support is there, we've got support not only
in Des Moines and Kansas City and other places within this
total response system, but for the first several hours, this is
a local responsibility.
One of the things that we've been doing is training using
all of our resources, not only within the city and the county,
to be able to meet these things, to ensure that our first
responders--and when we talk ``first responders,'' sometimes
we're talking about law enforcement, fire and EMS, but we're
also talking about the Red Cross, Emergency Management, Public
Works, so there's a lot of people that would be coming into
play on this. And we're looking at the resources to provide
training from across the board, not just for the entry teams.
We have been training and preparing and equipping our two
hospitals, because we knew that they also needed that, whether
it was weapons of mass destruction, but, as we mentioned, all
the chemicals that we have here. We're really looking more at a
potential target being the chemicals that we already have
existing just being released into the public, not something
such as the Oklahoma City, where it was brought into the
community.
But we are looking at training across the board, and we are
using Kirkwood and other opportunities that we have to spread
that training around; and through our mutual aid, we've got 20
fire departments in Linn County, three of which are paid, the
rest are volunteers. We are trying to make sure that those,
which was the second wave, are also trained, because it does no
good for them to also get to a scene and not have the proper
equipment. If they can just look at it from afar, that doesn't
do any good.
So that's one of the efforts we're looking at, is to
provide those resources across the board just because of the
risks that we have in our community.
Mr. Ganske. I thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Does Mr. Leach have any other further questions?
Mr. Leach. No.
Mr. Horn. OK. We will now, then, have the panel 2 come
forward: Dr. Mary J. R. Gilchrist, Director, University of Iowa
Hygienic Laboratory; Christopher G. Atchison, Associate Dean
for Public Health Practice, College of Public Health,
University of Iowa; Dr. Manjit Misra, Director, Seed Sciences,
Iowa State University; Richard Hainje, Director, Region VII of
the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency; James F.
Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau
of Investigation; and then our wrap-up person which we always
use, and that will be Mr. Paul L. Posner, the Managing
Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues, U.S. General
Accounting Office, which reports to the Comptroller General of
the United States, has a very fine group here and all around
the country, and we ask them to say, are we missing anything.
So that will be panel two.
If you will stand up and raise your right hand, we'll have
you take the oath. And any staff that go with you, just bring
them in, too, so we don't have to go through this again.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. The clerk will note that all six witnesses have
affirmed.
So we will start here with Dr. Gilchrist, and we're
delighted to have you here.
STATEMENTS OF MARY J.R. GILCHRIST, DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
HYGIENIC LABORATORY; CHRISTOPHER G. ATCHISON, ASSOCIATE DEAN
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH,
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA; DR. MANJIT MISRA, DIRECTOR, SEED SCIENCES,
IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY; RICHARD HAINJE, DIRECTOR, REGION VII OF
THE FEMA, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; JAMES F.
BOGNER, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, OMAHA DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION; AND PAUL L. POSNER, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUDGET ISSUES, STRATEGIC ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Gilchrist. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of
the Iowa delegation, thank you for this opportunity to provide
testimony regarding the Federal role in support of local and
State preparedness for bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and
nuclear terrorism.
The University Hygienic Laboratory, which I direct, is a
member of the LRN, the bioterrorism response network instituted
by the CDC and the Association of Public Health Laboratories.
The Laboratory Response Network was formed during the years
1999 through 2001, when we met our first real challenge dealing
with anthrax letters and many thousands of hoaxes and perceived
threats. We were modestly funded during those years of
preparation.
Our laboratory was funded for $100,000 last year to meet
the threat of bioterrorism. One industry alone told us that we
had saved them ``millions of dollars,'' because our testing
kept their assembly lines running when questionable powders
were detected on devices and parts.
Because we served our local populace, we stretched
ourselves far beyond capacity. We would not expect a remote
laboratory serving many jurisdictions to have done as well. I
recognize and honor the Federal Government for its wisdom in
making bioterrorism response a local issue for the
laboratories.
Across the country, the LRN tested thousands of specimens
and allayed much fear and panic, but it did not serve our
populace fully. In Iowa, those who were not well served must
balance our success stories. Because we had limited resources,
law enforcement and local communities evaluated each case and
ruled out powders that did not constitute a credible threat.
We understand that some powders that were not tested, while
not a real health threat, caused panic and shutdown of assembly
lines at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's good
to note that our funding has been increased by some 15 fold, to
approximately $1.5 million this year, and we are hiring
additional staff so we can provide broader testing. We were
lucky that our wake-up call involved few who were truly ill,
and we managed to minimize fear and panic in the situation of
perceived threat that swept our country.
The Government was wise several years ago when it abandoned
its concept of solely providing regional laboratory support and
instead funded bioterrorism response laboratories in each
State. Capacity for local response to bioterrorism is critical.
When airlines shut down or refuse to carry specimens perceived
to be risky, a laboratory must be available within driving
distance of a few hours.
No matter the means of transport, the turnaround time would
be increased if regional laboratories were instituted for any
subset of the testing. Now, our laboratory is called a regional
laboratory for surge capacity, but we don't displace the
capacity of the local laboratory for basic testing.
I'm concerned that we need smallpox testing in our States.
In the event of a smallpox threat, every rash will be suspected
to be a case of smallpox. Specimens sent out of State will mean
increased turnaround time and costs of health care to those who
are ill or exposed. Moreover, fear will be prolonged beyond
need. We must be able to do the testing locally.
I have great concern about the need to bring local capacity
to the States for the detection of chemical and nuclear
threats. When a powder is found, its identity as a biological,
chemical or nuclear agent is not obvious until it has been
tested. Even if labeled as anthrax, it might be a chemical
agent or a mix of biological and chemical and even nuclear
materials.
The capacity for detection and identification of the three
types of agents should be present in each lab for at least two
reasons:
Firstly, it may not be possible to split a small specimen,
and tandem testing in different facilities would require too
much time.
Second, a mixed specimen would risk the safety of the
laboratory people who could only identify one type of agent and
could not safely handle the other types.
The responsibility for testing for chemical agents is split
at the current time. The EPA has primary responsibility for
testing for chemical agents and environmental samples, and the
National Center for Environmental Health takes the lead if the
material is a clinical specimen such as blood or urine.
The matrix in which the specimen occurs, e.g., blood or
soil or water, may play some role in the extraction of the
sample, but the identification of the chemical is unified by
the need for sophisticated instrumentation that will identify
the agent, whether from environmental or clinical samples.
Currently there is no program in place to test environmental
samples, and this is a major gap.
The NCEH has begun the process of placing testing in
localities by providing funding to 5 pilot States and planning
grants to 25 States that are planning to be engaged in
biomonitoring in the future.
I advocate that the LRN concept be expanded to include
chemical testing and nuclear testing. The food laboratories of
the Nation have asked to join the LRN, as have many others. Let
us make this testing universal so that in the event of an
outbreak, chaos does not reign, because the type of test that
is done dictates where the specimen must be delivered and the
identity of the laboratory where the result is available.
Thank you very much for your interest in the laboratory
component of our response to terrorism.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gilchrist follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. We appreciate it.
Maybe some of you didn't hear, because you weren't here at
the first panel, but we have a little problem here on the
flights. Our 6:30 flight has been canceled to get us to Denver,
where we've got a hearing tomorrow, and we must make the 5
o'clock flight; and we can leave it in good hands, but it's a
little difficult; and so, whence I mentioned to the first
panel, the minute I put your name on there, that's--a full
statement is already in the record at that point, and we need
to just simply summarize it. We can't read it, and we've got to
talk from the heart. Much better anyhow.
So, Christopher Atchison, associate dean for public health
practice, College of Public Health at the University of Iowa.
Mr. Atchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
If the goal of terrorism is to disrupt a society, there's
little question that an assault on America's Heartland would
have a significant effect not only on the region but on the
Nation. As the former Director of the Centers for Disease
Control, Dr. Jeff Koplan has said, ``Either we are all
protected or we are all at risk.''
Today I suggest the need for clearer guidance from the
national level and will identify some strategies that should be
considered.
Today's discussion should not be limited to the efforts of
the last 11 months. Indeed, Congress took a major step well
before September 11th. The Public Health Improvement Act, House
Resolution 2494, which I believe Congressman Ganske referred
to, established the national policy of ``reasonable
capacities'' for Public Health across the Nation.
Subsequently, the Centers for Disease Control, working
through the Association of Schools of Public Health,
established centers for Public Health preparedness. My school,
the University of Iowa and its College of Public Health, is one
of 15 of these centers, and we have been working diligently at
our task for more than a year in bringing people together to
meet this challenge.
For example, on April 8th of this year and in this very
room, we hosted a conference on bioterrorism where both Senator
Tom Harkin, who has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to
our Nation's Public Health system, and our own Congressman, Jim
Leach, gave clear evidence of their desire to see our agenda
succeed.
We've also established several mechanisms, such as a train-
the-trainer model involving over 65 individuals from different
professions around the State, in a concerted effort to bring
them together to have a coordinated preparedness plan.
However, our experience is making clear other important
objectives, and I want to bring these to the committee's
attention.
First of all, we need to promote overall preparedness
through an outcomes orientation. Funding for bioterrorism
preparedness is currently being distributed through multiple
national agencies and multiple programs within many of those
agencies.
However, maximum coordination between all responders is
essential for timely identification and response to a threat.
This goal can best be accomplished if there's a clearly
established national set of goals and objectives and
competencies which will serve as a coordinating point for all
preparedness-related grant and training programs.
Schools especially need more information on where the
practice community wants our educational resources to be
directed and the outcomes of those educational offerings.
Second, we need to assure a comprehensive research
capacity. The Nation's response to last fall's anthrax assault
demonstrates how front-line Public Health professionals face
unknown challenges due to the mutation of biologic agents. Yet
according to Dr. Gregory Gray, who is a partner in our Public
Health Preparedness Center, and quoting him here, ``With the
increasing threats of bioterrorism so real, our negligence to
conduct routine surveillance for noninfluenza causes of
influenza-like illnesses seems tragic.''
We recommend that a national network of influenza-like
illness surveillance be established. Such a system would
provide earlier detection of naturally occurring emerging
viruses and also provide warning in times of covert
bioterrorism acts.
Third, we must assure the availability of and
accountability for an appropriately trained Public Health work
force. Establishing national standards would provide the
strategic framework for coordinating this Public Health work
force. However, it does not establish the assurance that those
who would be in the work force are adequately prepared to carry
out their responsibilities.
In their strategic plan for the Public Health work force,
CDC has laid out a comprehensive agenda for preparedness. This
document should be evaluated by Congress and serve either as
the framework for progress or lead to one that will.
Second, CDC's strategic plan stresses the need for
incentives, including credentialing or certification of the
Public Health work force. If there are no standards and
documentation of baseline capacity, there is little ability to
assure the appropriate distribution of the Public Health work
force development resources.
Congress should also take steps to ensure that funding
going to the States for terrorism and Public Health
preparedness is coordinated with and supports the extension of
resources like the preparedness centers to every State.
Fourth, we should promote an atmosphere of continuous
learning. Threats to the health and strategies to address those
threats are continually evolving, and we must be committed to a
strategy of continuous learning. However, it does not appear
that this common-sense approach is always governing our
preparedness efforts. Allow me to give an example summarized
from a local Health official who submitted testimony to us in
Iowa:
Our county was visited by the Office of Inspector General,
which conducted a nationwide study for the Department of Health
and Human Services about State and local Health Departments'
ability to detect and respond to a bioterrorism event.
Our Department inquired about having access to the results
of the survey we participated in and were told that they would
not be made available. I feel this would have helped our
Department in planning and development to share this
information, truly an opportunity wasted.
This example provides a final perspective on the challenge
we face. The emergence of biologic threats through terrorist
activity should not change Public Health's responsibility for
the health of the public. Public Health officials must be seen
as essential partners not only in the health system's response
to terrorism but in the public safety response as well.
Thank you for this opportunity to contribute to this
important endeavor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Atchison follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. That's very helpful.
Dr. Misra, can we get a good summary? We've got your paper,
and we need to move a little, so--it isn't our problem, but you
know airlines----
Dr. Misra. OK, I'll--yes.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. And small parts of the Nation, they
just decide to quit, so----
Dr. Misra. And you need to be there early.
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Dr. Misra. Yes, I will then summarize from my heart.
Mr. Ganske spoke about monitoring the air, water and soil
for human pathogens. Mr. Leach spoke about splitting the atom
and technology that has revolutionized agriculture. I'm also
here to tell you that those are wonderful and good things.
We also need to pay attention to the plant pathogens and
pests that can be a target of agroterrorists. That's the
summary, the gist of my talk, and what we need to do is to work
on four areas:
One is the rapid detection technology. The other is the
information technology. The third is the genetic technology
that Mr. Leach talked about. The fourth is seed science and
technology. Being the Director of Seed Science, I must speak a
little bit on seeds.
Let me begin with that, seeds. United States is the largest
producer and consumer of seeds in the world. And because of
that position we have, seed can be a target of agroterrorists.
The important thing about this is, we are not speaking of loss
of human life here but loss of public confidence in our export
and economic decapitation that can come due to the export of
everything being shut down.
The USDA very recently funded a plant laboratory diagnostic
network, which is a wonderful thing and a slow beginning step
toward this, but we need a seed laboratory network. There are
approximately 150 seed laboratories in the country, and they
are not networked.
A lot of these plant disease pathogens and pests can have
the very symptoms of those can be observed in the seed- testing
operations. The USDA very recently designated Iowa State
University to manage a national seed health system, so we have
infrastructure, we have the capacity, and we have the interest
to develop a seed security program.
There is quite a bit of new technology, such as
nanotechnology, spectroscopy, and micro-electro-mechanical
technology, which can be used for sensing the air, water and
soil that Mr. Ganske spoke about. Also for plant pathogens and
pests.
Further, what we need to do is to integrate these
technologies with information technology so that whatever we
find is transmitted in real time to the Federal officials and
officials who can take action.
The other thing that is quite important is that this
information must be very truthful and valid information.
Otherwise, it can also create a problem in creating fear in our
consumers.
So, combining the information technology with the sensing,
detection technology in the real time is something that needs
to be done.
Regarding genetic technology, what we need to do is to
develop fingerprinting for these plant pathogens and pests that
are exotic that we do not want to be introduced here in a
deliberate, mischievous manner. The one example that comes to
mind is soybean rust. Soybean rust has created havoc in Africa
and has been detected in Brazil, and there is quite a bit of
concern that it can appear in our agriculture.
So, how do we develop some of this technology for detecting
such kind of microorganisms and microtoxins that can create
problems for our food safety and security? Each year, Iowa is
near the top of the Nation in production of corn and soybeans.
Iowa State University has a strong tradition of serving and
protecting U.S. Agriculture.
Our unique strength is that we have extensive collaboration
with USDA laboratories which are the germ plasm resources and
also quite a bit of genetic research that is going on on
campus.
So these collaborations form a crucial partnership for
bringing resources to protect our plant agriculture.
You will notice that I did not speak too much on animal
agriculture. That is deliberate. Our concept paper that we
submitted to the Iowa delegation integrated animal agriculture
and plant agriculture issues, but, very fortunately, we have
received quite a bit of attention and funding and resources for
animal agriculture.
Mr. Horn. Well, if you send that to us, we'll be glad to
put it in the record at this point.
Dr. Misra. I'll be glad to do that.
So my request is that we need significant attention to the
plant agriculture.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Misra follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Now, we have Richard Hainje, Director of FEMA in
the Region VII. He and I have been following each other into
how many States now? Because you've got quite a big
jurisdiction.
Mr. Hainje. We're up to three so far.
Mr. Horn. Yeah.
Mr. Hainje. In a former life, I was chairman of a Senate
tax committee in the State legislature, so when the chairman
tells me to hurry up, here we go.
Thank you, Chairman Horn, Representative Ganske and
Representative Leach, for the opportunity to testify today.
I'm pleased to be with you to discuss the challenges facing
emergency managers and first responders in their efforts to
better be prepared to respond to acts of terrorism.
FEMA provides the management expertise and financial
resources to help State and local governments when they are
overwhelmed by disasters. The Federal Response Plan forms the
heart of our management framework and lays out the process by
which interagency groups work together to respond as a cohesive
team to all types of disasters.
The Federal Response Plan's success is built by using the
existing professional disciplines, delivery systems and
relationships among the participating agencies of the plan.
The national strategy for homeland security proposed by
President Bush builds on the experience of the Federal Response
Plan to develop one all-discipline, all-hazard plan to cover
events of national significance and clarify the roles and
responsibility of different levels of government.
FEMA takes an active role in preparing to respond to a
terrorism event. Prior to September 11th, the President tasked
the FEMA Director with creating the Office of National
Preparedness. The mission of the Office of National
Preparedness is to provide leadership in coordinating and
facilitating all Federal efforts to assist State and local
first responders in emergency management organizations with
planning, training, equipment and exercises.
To further these efforts, the President has requested $3.5
billion in the 2003 budget to support first responders. In the
recently passed 2002 Spring Supplemental, Congress provided
FEMA with $100 million for State and local governments to
update and enhance existing emergency operation plans.
The funds for the planning initiative will be allocated to
the States and other State-level entities on the basis of
population. These comprehensive plans will form the foundation
for the work to be done in 2003 to prepare first responders for
terrorist attacks.
The unique challenges that a biological or chemical
scenario would present to the first responder community point
out the need for effective planning. With the covert release of
a biological agent, the first responders could be physicians or
animal control workers instead of the traditional first
responders.
Across the Government, we are working to enhance our
ability to detect biological attacks, better link the Public
Health and emergency response communities and training
equipment traditional to first responders to respond to
bioterrorism.
The President's proposal to create a Department of Homeland
Security would strengthen the linkages that are critical to our
capacity to respond to terrorism. Furthermore, the structure of
this newly proposed department recognizes that FEMA's mission
and core competencies are essential components of homeland
security.
Terrorism presents tremendous challenges, and in recent
years, we've made great strides in our efforts to increase
cooperation between various response communities.
I have a few more comments, but I would like to just
summarize and thank you for the opportunity to be here in Iowa,
where I have seen many great examples of cooperation, State,
local and Federal.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hainje follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well, we appreciate that, and with your
legislative background, that helps us all.
Now we have another fine person that follows us around,
James Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
The FBI has done wonders with various things that this
subcommittee has done, generally with the Y2K situation, which
was difficult 2, 3 years ago, and has also been very helpful in
getting with the intelligence in relation to law enforcement at
local areas. They've worked very good to get that growing.
Thank you.
Mr. Bogner. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman Horn and
members of the subcommittee.
The previous mission of the FBI was generally considered to
be investigate criminal acts and terrorist acts after they had
occurred; but since September 11th, we understand, and Director
Mueller, our Director, has ensured that we understand that our
mission is now to prevention, too. It's more important to
prevent an act than investigate it after the fact.
In that regards, we have shifted a substantial number of
resources to that end. Director Mueller has provided Congress
with a reorganization plan which you have approved, and we are
putting that plan into effect. We are doing that in Iowa, as
well as the rest of the country, and shifting a substantial
number of resources to fight counterterrorism, not only the
prevention side, training side, but the many components of
fighting terrorism.
One component in that regard is forming a joint terrorism
task force. We have done that in the States of Iowa and
Nebraska. I am responsible for both States. For our area, we
chose one team or one joint terrorism task force but divided it
into five teams, regional teams.
We did that because, in discussing this issue with about
171 law enforcement officials throughout the two States, we
fully understood that it's very difficult for the law
enforcement officials in one part of the State of Iowa to let
their resources go, to conduct investigations, and work with us
in other parts of the State or, in fact, another State.
So our intent is to ensure that they are able to be
responsive to their region in this State with our help and with
the other Federal and State authorities there.
Training is another very important component, and it's
important to conduct that training at all levels and have full
interaction with all of the partners, and we are a full partner
in that.
There are training sessions going on not only that we put
on, the U.S. Attorney's office puts on through their
antiterrorism task force within the State of Iowa, but, also,
the Department of Justice, the Office of Domestic Preparedness
is a frequent visitor to Iowa and helps with those exercises.
One of the things we've also learned post September 11th is
that I think previously, we concentrated on the exercises on
preparation for single incidents. I was assigned to Oklahoma
City in 1995, and so I understand the full impact of that
particular incident, but what we are dealing with in this
century is multiple incidents.
And so, in our training sessions, we have shifted focus to
not only looking at one problem and trying to deal with that
but multiple problems, as we saw with the mailbox pipe bombs
which occurred over a five-State area that we had to deal with.
So that's very important in the shift in focus, and not
only that, but the coordination of resources to deal with
multiple events occurring within a short period of time. It's
also important to develop those plans, response plans,
communication plans not only at the Federal level, the State
level, local level and integrate all of those.
We have all found new partners that we didn't necessarily
rely upon in the past, because we have had these new challenges
of the nuclear, biological and chemical agents introduced into
the criminal acts.
And so we continue to form those new partnerships, train
with them and develop contingency plans with them.
I'd be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bogner follows:]
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Mr. Horn. OK. Let us get Mr. Posner to give us some thought
to what we didn't do. He's the Managing Director of the
Strategic Issues for the Budget Matters of the U.S. General
Accounting Office and reports to the Comptroller General of the
United States, a very excellent person, Dave Walker, and he
also has a 15-year term, so nobody can mess with him, including
the President, the Congress and everybody else. He's got a very
good group, and we're delighted to have you here today, if we
can get out of town.
Mr. Posner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I think I'm the only member of this panel who shares
your interest in making that 5 o'clock flight.
We've heard today valiant efforts at all levels to address,
really, a novel, unique threat. We've also heard, just to
reflect, that each level is stressed, because the challenge
really goes beyond one level of government, one actor in our
system. The scale, the size, the complexity, the consequences
simply are something that every level of government and the
private sector have got to figure out ways to work together.
I mean, in some respects, integration is the next step
following enthusiasm; and what we really need is a national,
not a Federal, set of initiatives. We need to overcome stove
pipes within the Federal Government. Over 40 Federal agencies
are involved in this problem. That's what the Department of
Homeland Security is partly addressing. We have multiple
players at State, local, regional levels of government.
State and local governments are absolutely critical to
anything we do at the national level in this area. Beyond just
first responders, which we've heard a lot about, on page eight
of our statement, we go through the six major priorities of the
President's Homeland Security Strategy; and each one of them,
you've got to address and work with State and local
governments. The Federal Government simply does not have the
resources, for example, to address security of drivers'
licenses, a critical element of counterterrorism protection.
The Federal Government does not hire 650,000 policemen like
the State and local communities do, who are really out there,
close to the local issues.
The Public Health community is absolutely critical to
protecting the Nation against bioterrorism. Largely, that's a
function of State and local leadership.
So, fundamentally, we have to figure out ways to gain State
and local involvement in this issue through partnerships, and
there are clear opportunities from the Federal standpoint in
gaining State and local involvement and engagement and from the
State and local standpoint in gaining money and expertise, but
there are also risks. There are risks that the Federal
Government might find its money devolved and substituted for
State and local funds.
Local governments face the risk of new Federal mandates, as
we've heard today, in such areas as drinking water and port
security and other areas that they used to own almost
exclusively are now gaining new national attention.
And there's a risk in public accountability of having many
players involved in, say, airport security. When you think
about how many different players are involved in securing
airports, you have the TSA; you have the FAA; you have the
State governments and local governments responsible for
perimeters; you have the National Guard; you have the airlines.
So the question is, who does the public turn to when something
goes wrong? That's a critical issue in partnerships that we all
have to face.
We've seen much evolution in the past year of roles and
responsibilities in this area. We've seen at the Federal level
not only the Office of Homeland Security Strategic Plan but the
proposed department. At the State and local level, we've seen
tremendous change already in work we're doing, looking at local
level. Regional compacts are starting to be discussed, mutual-
aid agreements.
King County, Washington, for example, in Seattle, is
working through a county plan involving over 40 local
governments within the county, so it's not just a Federal
issue, as we've heard today. It's State and local governments,
really, taking initiatives on their own.
And in some ways, we are kind of evolving, in an ad hoc,
pragmatic way, a national strategy without the benefit of,
really, a comprehensive kind of overview in this area.
What we need in this arena is, as we've heard, we have too
many needs chasing too few resources, and that's a common
problem as well. In this regard, we need to make sure that
whatever we do as a Nation, not just the Federal Government,
the State and local governments, is addressing clear goals that
we all can agree on and that we have clear measures that assess
how are we doing, and we don't really have those yet at the
national level, and we really need to start getting on with
that task. Partly, it's involving how much is enough security
and how will we know it when we get it.
We also need to ensure, particularly from the Federal level
as well as States and local governments, that whatever we do in
the area of funding is well targeted, that the Federal money in
fact goes to enhance things that otherwise wouldn't be done at
the State and local community.
We've heard lots of needs that are really beyond the
resources here, and we need to build in protections as we
design these grants to ensure that those grants in fact go to
promote the highest value. And so we need to make sure that we
design accountability provisions to make sure that we at the
national level have some comfort that's happening.
So, fundamentally, the challenge is to integrate, to
capitalize on the advantages that each level brings, the
initiative and values of the local level, the coordination of
the States and the regions in this country, and then the
expertise and funding at the national level.
And I would add that what we really do want is
institutional capacity and leadership at the Federal level. One
of the odd things is, just as the interest in intergovernmental
relationships has increased, why, we no longer have the one
institution we used to have that met and hashed over these
things.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations went
out of business a number of years ago, where Governors, mayors,
county executives, State legislators and Federal cabinet
secretaries would get together periodically with a very good
staff to address these issues in concert comprehensively. We
need to think about how we can, at the Federal level and the
national level, have that kind of debate, and we need personal
leadership.
Epitomized most directly, as I was talking to the chairman
earlier, by Harold Seidman, a person who many of us knew very
well in Washington, just passed away this week, was a former
major management leader at the national level, an OMB in the
National Academy of Public Administration, was a mentor to many
of us in showing us the way of how you respond to national
challenges with humility, compassion, intelligence and wisdom,
and his leadership will be sorely missed.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, and I'm delighted that you mentioned
that statement. I'm sorry that he's passed away. So thank you
for mentioning him. He deserves it.
We will ask the gentlemen, Mr. Leach, Mr. Ganske, as to
what questions, please feel free, just any one of the
presenters.
Mr. Leach. First, Dr. Gilchrist, I'm very impressed with
your long-term leadership of the State Lab and also of your
commitment to the State Lab system, and I think it's the
bedrock of communications to a State.
But I'd like to ask both you and Dr. Atchison about, do we
have too much concentration at the CDC? And by that, I mean,
the CDC, which I consider to be one of the truly wondrous U.S.
Government institutions, is kind of like a pentagon for a given
kind of security; and what happens if there's vulnerability? Do
we have adequate backup? And should there be more
decentralization?
And there was an example of Dr. Misra, I mean, in the field
of aspects of agriculture, that Iowa State has been designated
as the Seed Health Center for the Nation. And so, as we look at
various new diseases or new threats, should there be a
decentralized approach where the State of Iowa might have a
specialization, the State of New Hampshire another
specialization, or is that totally impractical? And do you have
any sense for that?
Ms. Gilchrist. Thank you for that question.
When September 11th happened last year, the CDC did close
down, because they understood that the last plane that ended up
in Pennsylvania was heading toward Atlanta. They came back to
work, they worked very hard.
They have one of the few biosafety Level Four facilities
that currently stand in the Nation. We have one in the military
in the beltway region of the United States, which is also
somewhat vulnerable to--perhaps focused in an area that might
be closed down.
The IH agency has announced they're going to fund the
building of about four new biosafety Level Four facilities to
be distributed around the Nation and that they will be used not
just for research but will be converted to diagnostic
facilities as soon as it is necessary, if it would become
necessary.
In terms of then assessing, do we have enough distributed
capacity, I think it's a very good question. I would advocate
that we tend to increase the biosafety Level Three capacity in
each of our States and improve it as much as we can. We need to
assess that. We need to have some really wise decision trees to
be made about, what's your initial and immediate surge
capacity, what is your long-term surge capacity?
We're concerned about the distribution of smallpox
diagnostics to the States. We believe that the military may
have some analyses that would be good to be shared and
distributed to the States. We would like to see the States
receive that type of diagnostics if, and only if, they are
accurate--adequately accurate to be performed there and don't
create some sort of a security or safety issue, and we think
that's feasible.
So I hope I've adequately answered my part of it.
Mr. Leach. Dr. Atchison.
Mr. Atchison. I think that it's more a question of role. I
think the CDC has demonstrated its responsibility in serving
the cutting edge of the research, particularly around
infectious disease and the steps that need to be undertaken in
order to identify and respond to infectious diseases. I don't
believe that should be diminished. I don't think having too
much knowledge in one place is bad. I think, rather, what I'm
trying to articulate is the need to ensure that knowledge is
appropriately distributed to people at the front lines.
And I would submit that the one distinction that
bioterrorism perhaps brings to the debate over the threats that
we face through a terrorist activity is that it is a public and
private system; that it involves physicians and other health
professionals at the very, very front line who may not have, as
a routine matter of governmental exchange of information,
opportunity to participate in conferences and the other things
that seem akin to government service.
We need to establish a system, then, that extends the
knowledge forward from CDC to those people at the front lines,
and I think that's what they're trying to do with the Centers
for Public Health Preparedness. The CDC, as leader, States
maybe in a tactical way, looking at, how are we organized to
ensure that it's distributed across the State effectively. And
then the good kind of local implementation that you heard of
discussed here from Cedar Rapids, we need to have that same
kind of capacity in every village and town across our country.
Mr. Leach. Let me just conclude, because I know the
chairman has time constraints, but I'm very impressed with the
movement of the University of Iowa into the Public Health
domain and in the way it has with the Public Health School, I
think that really has a lot of implications for sharing of
knowledge.
Also, we are extremely grateful for what, Mary, your lab
has done in the last year; and as we look at these alternatives
for the future, where the Federal Government has made a very
minor contribution to some planning options, I'm for the
maximum options. I hope that we can go forth on that basis.
Your lab does fabulous work, and it's fabulously important, and
it's got to be supported.
Ms. Gilchrist. Thank you from--everybody in our laboratory
wished they could have been here to hear it.
Mr. Leach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Iowa, Dr. Ganske.
Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, this is typical for hearings in Washington.
Sometimes you get the most interesting testimony on the last
panel. Nobody's around, everybody has left, but I really
appreciate this panel's testimony.
Maybe I can ask an interesting question that would make the
people who have left already wish that they had stayed.
Dr. Gilchrist--and I'll try to be brief, Mr. Chairman. I
know you need to catch a plane.
Mr. Horn. Take your time.
Mr. Ganske [continuing]. In an emergency situation, could
you use the military or VA Laboratories to augment the existing
capacity here at the State level?
Ms. Gilchrist. We're doing everything we can to distribute
that type of responsibility and technology. You have security
issues, and you have safety issues, and you have expertise
issues, so it has to be thought out very well. The anthrax
strain that we had in our lab was reputed to be the Ames
strain, and people were very worried about us having it, and
the National Guard surrounded our building for 6 weeks as a
result of it.
So not every hospital laboratory in the country can contain
that----
Mr. Ganske. That wasn't exactly what I was talking about,
for the National Guard to----
Ms. Gilchrist. There's a move to localize everything you
can distribute. I've always said, distribute it as close to the
patient as you can get it, and it's a challenge, it's a big
challenge. We'll do the best we can.
Mr. Ganske. All right. How many labs are there in Iowa that
can test for nuclear agents?
Ms. Gilchrist. I would say very few. Our laboratory is
actually testing for a number of other States, because we have
expertise that they don't have. And I would assume that there
are research laboratories; I would assume that in Palo, they
have that type of capacity.
Our staff that do this type of work could tell you even
more about it than I can, but I would say it's a handful. We
need, at a minimum, to be prepared for that.
Mr. Ganske. How about chemical agents?
Ms. Gilchrist. You have the little black box-type devices
that can be used----
Mr. Ganske. Right.
Ms. Gilchrist [continuing]. For agents 1 through 10; and if
it's not agents 1 through 10, what do you do?
Minnesota is the source of two cases that were interesting
during September 11th, and one was a greasy suitcase going
around on the baggage delivery carousel that shut down the
airport, because it had oozing stuff coming out of it.
They took it to the Health Department laboratory, and they
finally got a call from somebody who was missing a suitcase,
and he said it's Ethiopian curry butter, and, you know, the FBI
said, ``I don't believe it.''
So the Lab tested it, they went to the Ethiopian
restaurant, and they got some Ethiopian curry butter, and they
put them both in the instrument, and they determined that it
was Ethiopian curry butter, and the airport opened up again.
That's what we had a lot of last year.
Mr. Ganske. Right.
Ms. Gilchrist. We were identifying things that aren't in
the little box. The little box sometimes, in Minneapolis, told
them it was cyanide when it was a minuscule amount of cyanide,
shut down the restaurant, you know.
Mr. Ganske. Well, if we had a bag come off a plane in Des
Moines, Iowa, and it had something oozing out of it, and
somebody made a phone call and said, ``We're worried about
this,'' now, there would be ways to test it--I know there are
lots of labs that have mass spectometry, etc., that could test
what the compound is; but if they were worried about a chemical
terrorist agent, I don't know that they'd really want to take
that in and do that.
Is that the problem, part of the problem?
Ms. Gilchrist. That's definitely part of the problem. Each
of these is a new challenge. You have to figure out how to
extract it from something. It may also extract the suitcase
material, you know. So you need relatively high levels of
sophistication. There probably are a few laboratories----
Mr. Ganske. What you're saying is, we don't have very much
here in Iowa, and we need more capability.
Ms. Gilchrist. Right. Our laboratory would be probably near
the top of the list or at the top of the list of capabilities
that could do it, because we do soil, water, air and clinical
specimens, but we would sometimes be challenged also.
Mr. Ganske. All right. We'll probably finish this up in
about 10 minutes. So I just want to--is it--Dr. Atchison, am I
pronouncing your name correctly? Or Atkinson?
Mr. Atchison. Yeah. And, please, it's Mr. Atchison, like
Atchison, Kansas.
Mr. Ganske. OK. Some of my physician colleagues say that
they would like to be able to vaccinate themselves and their
families for smallpox, and other Public Health officials say
no. Maybe we only vaccinate first responders, emergency people,
but not the general public; and then if something happened,
we'd put a ring around this area geographically and then we'd
vaccinate everyone.
Do you have an opinion on that? [Laughter.]
That you can give us in about 60 seconds.
Mr. Atchison. Well, as a nonphysician, I hesitate to make
a----
Mr. Ganske. Well, go ahead, take a stab.
Mr. Atchison. OK. I believe at this point, the threat, the
risk is appropriate to a ring vaccination strategy; and I'm
satisfied that Dr. Quinlisk, from the State Health Department
who has articulated her opinions on this, is speaking from the
point of view that seems to be prevailing across the infectious
disease community at this time.
Mr. Ganske. OK.
Mr. Chairman, I have one additional question.
Mr. Horn. Certainly.
Mr. Ganske. And this will be directed to Messrs. Hainje,
Bogner and Posner, and that is this:
If each of you could give Congress and President Bush one
suggestion for organizing our new Department of Homeland
Security--maybe you've had a chance to see what we've passed in
the House, maybe you haven't, but--if you had just 30 seconds
each with President Bush, general or specific, what would you
suggest in terms of our creation of this Department?
Mr. Hainje. I'll go ahead and go first.
I'm sure that I would suggest that the final product be an
organization that would develop a one-plan approach to major
disasters, acts of terrorism, to address as many of the
scenarios as possibly can be addressed in one plan. You can't
have--you can't do the exact same thing for each type of
incident; but, for example, the Federal Response Plan that
exists now has emergency support functions.
In some cases, FEMA is just a facilitator and Public Health
is the issue, and they're able to facilitate basically the
business side of attempting to deal with an issue, and Public
Health does their expertise. At other times, we bring in
others.
Mr. Ganske. So you would like something uniform and simple.
Mr. Hainje. It is suggested in the strategy that there
would be one plan.
Mr. Ganske. OK.
Mr. Hainje. I'm not sure if it's in the legislation itself,
but the one plan I think would be an excellent idea.
Mr. Ganske. OK. Mr. Bogner.
Mr. Bogner. Well, I know our Director has met with
President Bush and Governor Ridge on a regular basis and
provided input to him. I'm not familiar with all of the
intricacies regarding the plan and division of the work. I
think that is going on at that level, and so I'll defer to our
Director.
Mr. Ganske. No. Now, look, this is your chance. Nobody is
going to say you're doing something wrong if you--is there any
one thing, when you've been thinking about this, that strikes
you as being exceedingly important so that if you were there on
Air Force One with the President and you've got 30 seconds, do
you have--have you thought about it? Is there anything that has
struck you in particular that would be important?
Mr. Bogner. I think the two most important areas are
absolute coordination of activities and accountability. Whether
it be for the investigation, prevention or the overall homeland
security issue, accountability is the key, so that whether it's
the President or the citizens of the United States, know who's
in charge of that particular segment of it and who is
responsible for coordinating it and making sure that it gets
done.
Mr. Ganske. Mr. Posner.
Mr. Posner. Well, I'll repeat what we have said--my boss
has said, which is, let's not have management be the stepchild
and the afterthought. Let's put management up front here,
because that's where the devil is going to be.
So let's have a deputy secretary for management right up
front in the creation of the Department. That's No. 1. Someone
who is a professional, who is appointed possibly for a fixed
term, with possibly a contract with specific performance goals,
and then let's think about creating those performance goals and
not just articulating a bunch of initiatives, but let's try to
baseline where we are and where we want to go.
Mr. Ganske. I thank you.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you.
And particularly that last part, Mr. Posner. Your boss and
me, we've talked about management. And last year, the
appropriators that deal with the Department of State did put in
a secretary for management, and the new one that is going
through the Senate now, and we need to get that back in, and it
is similar to the Department of State. Otherwise, it's just
going to collapse.
And we thank you, all of you, for coming, and we're sorry
we're rushed a little bit, but we're trying to also solve some
of the problems of Colorado.
I'd like to thank the people here that helped us the most
in terms of their staff:
Mr. Ganske's staff, Meghan Gutierriez, and then Curt
Mercadante.
And Mr. Leach's staff, Bill Tate, and then Norine Zamastil
of the University of Iowa, and the University staff, in
general, from the desks on.
Then we have the staff director and acting, to my right and
your left--she's had her hands full on this trip--Bonnie Heald.
And Chris Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee.
And Michael Sazonov, staff assistant, has been very
helpful.
And our court reporter has had a tough day, I'm sure. It's
very difficult when you have a lot of speakers, you've got
echoes in the chamber and everything else, but, boy, there she
is, right on the spot, so we thank Bev Herring for being here.
Appreciate it.
And with that, gentlemen, if there are no other questions,
we are now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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