    [House Hearing, 107 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                 HOMELAND SECURITY: PROTECTING STRATEGIC PORTS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
                       VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
                                   RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 AUGUST 5, 2002

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 107-222

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                WASHINGTON : 2003

    87-700 PDF

    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    STEPHEN HORN, California             PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    DAN MILLER, Florida                  ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                 DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JIM TURNER, Texas
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    DAVE WELDON, Florida                 JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia                      ------
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma                  (Independent)

                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                         James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
                         Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

     Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
                                   Relations

                    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             TOM LANTOS, California
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    DAVE WELDON, Florida                 DIANE E. WATSON, California
    C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

                                   Ex Officio

    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
                  R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
                               Jason Chung, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on August 5, 2002...................................     1
    Statement of:
        Frank, Patricia, commissioner, Hillsborough County, FL; Chris
          hart, commissioner, Hillsborough County, FL; Steve Lauer,
          chief, Florida Domestic Security Initiatives, Florida
          Department of Law Enforcement; and Chief Deputy David Gee,
          Hillsborough County, FL....................................    58
        Hecker, JayEtta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Team,
          General Accounting Office; Jack Bulger, Acting District
          Director, accompanied by Denise Crawford, area Port
          Director, Tampa, U.S. Customs Service; and Ronald Johnson,
          Port Director, Tampa, Immigration and Naturalization
          Service; James Baldwin, Director, north Florida Customs
          Management Center, U.S. Customs Service; Captain Allen
          Thompson, former captain of the Port Marine Safety Office,
          Tampa, U.S. Coast Guard, accompanied by Captain James
          Farley, Captain, Port of Tampa; James F. Jarboe, Special
          Agent in Charge, Tampa, Federal Bureau of Investigation;
          James G. Butler, Deputy Under Secretary, Marketing and
          Regulatory Programs, accompanied by Mary Neal, Assistant
          Deputy Administrator for Agricultural Quarantine
          Inspection, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; and
          Carl Davis, Director of Operations, Tampa, U.S. Department
          of Agriculture; and Gary Dykstra, Southeastern Regional
          Food and Drug director.....................................   102
        Williamson, George, port director and CEO, Tampa Port
          Authority; Stephen White, president, Maritime Security
          Group; Willie Tims, Jr., vice president, IMC Phosphates MP,
          Inc.; Thomas Hindle, president, CTL Distribution; Arthur
          Savage, president, A.R. Savage and Sons, Inc.; and Janet
          Kovack, corporate community affairs specialist, CF
          Industries.................................................    11
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Baldwin, James, Director, north Florida Customs Management
          Center, U.S. Customs Service, prepared statement of........   144
        Bulger, Jack, Acting District Director, Tampa, U.S. Customs
          Service, prepared statement of.............................   129
        Butler, James G., Deputy Under Secretary, Marketing and
          Regulatory Programs, prepared statement of.................   169
        Davis, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State
          of Florida, prepared statement of..........................     8
        Dykstra, Gary, Southeastern Regional Food and Drug director,
          prepared statement of......................................   174
        Frank, Patricia, commissioner, Hillsborough County, FL,
          prepared statement of......................................    61
        Gee, Chief Deputy David, Hillsborough County, FL, prepared
          statement of...............................................    81
        Hecker, JayEtta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Team,
          General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...........   105
        Hindle, Thomas, president, CTL Distribution, prepared
          statement of...............................................    36
        Jarboe, James F., Special Agent in Charge, Tampa, Federal
          Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of.............   158
        Kovack, Janet, corporate community affairs specialist, CF
          Industries, prepared statement of..........................    45
        Lauer, Steve, chief, Florida Domestic Security Initiatives,
          Florida Department of Law Enforcement, prepared statement
          of.........................................................    68
        Savage, Arthur, president, A.R. Savage and Sons, Inc.,
          prepared statement of......................................    39
        Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............     3
        Thompson, Captain Allen, former captain of the Port Marine
          Safety Office, Tampa, U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement
          of.........................................................   151
        Tims, Willie, Jr., vice president, IMC Phosphates MP, Inc.,
          prepared statement of......................................    29
        White, Stephen, president, Maritime Security Group, prepared
          statement of...............................................    20
        Williamson, George, port director and CEO, Tampa Port
          Authority, prepared statement of...........................    14

                 HOMELAND SECURITY: PROTECTING STRATEGIC PORTS

                                  ----------

                             MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 2002

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs
                           and International Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                             Tampa, FL.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m.,
    Tampa Port Authority, 1101 Channelside Drive, Tampa, FL, Hon.
    Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Shays and Putnam.
        Also present: Representative Davis of Florida.
        Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
    counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; and Jason
    M. Chung, clerk.
        Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
    Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and
    International Relations, entitled, ``Homeland Security:
    Protecting Strategic Ports,'' is called to order.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses and guests and, to
    someone who lives in Connecticut, tell you that it is a
    pleasure to be in Tampa, to have our committee be here at the
    invitation of the vice chairman of the committee Mr. Putnam.
        It is also a pleasure, Mr. Davis, to be in your district
    and to have you participate today.
        The globalization of just-in-time trade brings bustling
    economic vitality to America's ports. Ninety-five percent of
    international goods entering the U.S. flow through these vital
    trade nodes, representing fully 25 percent of our gross
    domestic product.
        But the growing pace and volume of that trade also brings
    growing vulnerabilities. Containers listed as holding high-tech
    machinery can also contain smuggled nuclear material for use in
    a dirty bomb. Sailors who slip away from their ships could be
    delivering orders to activate an al Qaeda cell.
        In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, tightening
    security at ports and borders stalled the movement of parts and
    equipment essential to economic activity and growth. We learned
    a disrupted port means a badly disrupted economy. It was a
    lesson not lost on would-be terrorists.
        A qualitative not a quantitative approach is required to
    improve port security. Various estimates about the tiny
    fraction of imports actually inspected could be reassuring, not
    frightening, if we could be sure that the right ships and
    warehouses were being inspected, those posing the most risk.
    Knowing that is a matter of intelligence at ports of origin, of
    diligence in the search for anomalies in a sea of routine trade
    data, and a vigilance in engaging high-risk cargoes before they
    reach the dockside. Tension between tighter security and faster
    commerce is inevitable.
        Our witnesses today all understand that tension, and they
    are trying to strike a balance that will result in safer and
    more productive ports. As evidenced by our lengthy witness
    list, it is a complex job involving numerous governmental and
    private entities. We appreciate their willingness to join us
    today, and we look forward to their testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.002

        Mr. Shays. At this time the Chair would recognize Mr.
    Putnam.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
    you for your leadership on this issue and for allowing the
    subcommittee to conduct the field hearing here in Tampa.
        The Port of Tampa is the largest port by tonnage in the
    State of Florida. In fact, Tampa handles almost as much cargo
    as Florida's other 13 deepwater seaports combined. The port is
    Florida's largest seaport and handles nearly half of all
    seaborne commerce that passes through the State. It is the 12th
    largest cargo port in the Nation, and with several homeported
    passenger vessels, it has become a major cruise port.
        Now, Florida finds itself in the position of being a
    sentinel State on a variety of issues. We are a major tourist
    destination. We are the gateway to the Western Hemisphere for
    north-south trade routes. We are uniquely situated to
    unfortunately bear a large brunt of the drug trade, illegal
    narcotics as well as humanitarian issues. So when you talk
    about the role of the Coast Guard or the role of the seaports
    or the role of the Federal agencies in Florida, it is a very
    unique situation that you are talking about.
        In these seaports we have over 600 laws that have to be
    enforced, 500 different trade agreements that have to be
    enforced and interpreted, and in attempting to do that we have
    60 different Federal agencies sometimes working together,
    sometimes not. In the aftermath of September 11th, I believe
    that the Congress and this Nation has spent a great deal of the
    resources and time and energy in effect closing the barn door
    after the horse is out. We have focused the vast majority of
    our attention on airport security at the expense of seaport
    security, and in creating the Department of Homeland Security,
    which the House passed before the district work period, we
    focused--we attempted to bring together all of the agencies
    that we might have a seamless border security department.
        And in order to do that, we have to acknowledge and
    recognize the critical vulnerabilities that lie in our
    seaports. In this port alone we have 50 percent of the
    hazardous cargo that comes in and out of Florida right here. It
    extends way beyond the greater Tampa area.
        As someone who represents a substantial portion of the
    interior portion of the State, with industry such as phosphate
    and citrus that are dependent upon being able to move goods and
    services, it has a tremendous impact on us. It has a tremendous
    impact on the environment. We have the headquarters of Central
    Command and Special Operations Command at MacDill which pose
    unique vulnerabilities in and of themselves. And we have a
    substantial civilian population on Davis Island and Harbour
    Island, literally a stone's throw from tank farms for
    petroleum, for grain, and for ammonium nitrate.
        So this port, Mr. Chairman, gives you a unique sampling of
    the issues that all of our Nation's seaports face, particularly
    those that are commercial. Our subcommittee has done an
    outstanding job, I believe, of focusing on our strategic
    seaports, those that the military depends on for rapid
    deployments of troops and material overseas.
        What this hearing, I believe, can accomplish is allowing us
    to build a body of evidence and a record to take back to our
    colleagues who may not represent seaports and may not represent
    major commercial hubs, to prove to them that homeland security
    needs are not only in our airports, and they are not only on
    our northern and southern borders. Our east coast and our west
    coast are substantial vulnerabilities, and we have proof of
    that with situations such as 4 years ago when we intercepted
    two Scud missiles that had been imported into the Port of Long
    Beach, made it through all of the systems, made it through all
    of our agencies, made it through all of our safeguards, and
    ended up in the hands of a private weapons collector.
        Those types of vulnerabilities have to be plugged, and the
    gaps in our homeland security, particularly in our seaports,
    and particularly along our coastal areas, have to be addressed.
    And we are very fortunate to have a number of industries and
    stakeholders and user groups and the whole patchwork of Federal
    agencies who are here today who can give us some insight into
    how we can best do that at the Federal level.
        But the important issue is that it is a Federal problem.
    Florida has done an outstanding job of preparing a port
    security plan, but they need Federal help. They need additional
    resources, they need additional funds, and we need additional
    priority given to seaport security.
        And so I appreciate the opportunity that you are giving
    this community in the Tampa Bay area and these stakeholders to
    be able to showcase what we are doing right and have an
    opportunity to learn how we can be more smart, use better
    technologies and more efficiencies to continue to be the hub of
    commerce for this hemisphere, and take a great leap forward in
    terms of the security that we provide our citizens and
    stakeholders.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the leadership on this issue.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. I continue to learn from
    you every time you speak, and feel very blessed that you are
    the vice chairman of this committee.
        I would welcome, again, Congressman Jim Davis, and ask
    unanimous consent that he be permitted to sit with the
    subcommittee and participate fully in these hearings. Without
    objection, so ordered.
        And, Mr. Davis, again, thank you for your hospitality.
    Wonderful to be in your district.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
    chance to join you. And thanks again for bringing your
    committee here, along with Adam as your vice chairman. Your
    presence, as Adam mentioned, underscores this is not just a
    local and State issue, it is indeed a national issue.
        It has been my privilege to serve with Chris Shays on the
    Budget Committee and to work very closely with him in a long,
    hard-fought, successful battle for campaign finance reform.
    Chris Shays has an earned reputation for speaking his mind and
    tackling difficult national issues. It is our hope today,
    Chris, to arm you with some compelling information about the
    present and future successes of this port as an economic engine
    for a multitude of congressional districts, and the needs that
    Adam highlighted.
        I am going to mention a few other facts as well. This port
    is estimated to have an annual economic impact of $10.6
    billion, affecting 93,000 people's jobs. I think it is fair to
    say the Port of Tampa represents one of the most strategic and
    critical assets of the entire State of Florida. Highlight some
    other examples that Adam Putnam alluded to: Fifty percent of
    the motor fuel, gasoline and jet fuel coming to the State of
    Florida comes in through this port, including the fuel provided
    to the Sarasota, Ft. Myers, and Orlando airports, as well as
    CENTCOM at MacDill Air Force Base. This port encompasses 2,500
    acres.
        There is a clear funding shortfall, Mr. Chairman. As I am
    sure you would expect, we have tried to do everything we can
    here at home through funding, through local devices, and as
    well as the State, but we still have a shortfall of $12 million
    even after having recently earned a very successful grant of
    $3.5 million from the Transportation Security Administration.
        I put in a request for $1 million in the Transportation
    Subcommittee for some funding for this particular port for
    information, technology, but the most critical item, Mr.
    Chairman, for this port and for the entire State of Florida,
    will be the level at which we fund the Transportation Security
    Agency Seaport Security Grant Program. Last year that program
    distributed $92 million in response to requests of over $700
    million from around the country, and I think it is fair to say
    that no State has as much at stake as the State of Florida
    does, and thus fully funding that program this year as part of
    creating the Department of Homeland Security.
        So I look forward to the testimony, and I appreciate the
    fact that you have made a trip here and brought your
    subcommittee, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Jim Davis follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.003

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.004

        Mr. Shays. I would ask unanimous consent that all members
    of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement
    in the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for
    that purpose. And without objection, so ordered.
        I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
    permitted to include their written statements in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
        And I would like to thank our second and third panel.
    Usually we have government officials go first, particularly
    Federal. That is the protocol. And the Federal officials have
    willingly agreed that they would listen to the port users
    first, the State and local second, and then be able to comment
    on what they have heard. And I just appreciate their
    willingness to allow that, us to proceed in that way.
        I would also say that we sometimes have three panels,
    clearly, but we don't usually have 17 witnesses. I have been
    very liberal in the past with allowing people to go over 5
    minutes, but this is what we are going to do. Jason is going to
    be having a clock be a 5-minute clock. It will be turned red.
    We are going to leave the red on. We usually flip it over. When
    we get a minute past that, he will just put his finger up for
    me, and I will start to do a gentle tap. So you can kind of go
    6 minutes. But with all due respect, given that we have 17
    witnesses, I think you would understand why we need to move it
    along.
        And I would also thank Mark Stuart, who is our official
    reporter. Mark, you are allowed to put that in the transcript,
    and say that I think we only have one transcriber. He is the
    one person here I am certain is working today. And so we will
    have a quick break between each of our panels to allow his
    fingers to relax.
        Let me welcome our first panel. Our panel consists of Mr.
    George Williamson, who is port director and CEO of the Tampa
    Port Authority; Mr. Stephen White, who is president, Maritime
    Security Group; Mr. Willie Tims, Jr., vice president, IMC
    Phosphates MP, Inc.; Mr. Thomas Hindle, president, CTL
    Distribution; Mr. Arthur Savage, president, A.R. Savage and
    Sons, Inc.; and Ms. Janet Kovack, corporate community affairs
    specialist, CF Industries.
        Now, we swear our witnesses in because we are an
    investigative committee. I think you know that. So we will ask
    you to rise and raise your right hand. I will say that we do it
    with all of our witnesses. There is only one who has escaped
    that, and that was Senator Byrd, and the reason he wasn't sworn
    in is I chickened out.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Shays. Note for the record that all of our witnesses
    have responded in the affirmative.
        I am sorry, but we do have some seats up front if some
    would like to sit up front. If we have any students who are
    here, they could sit in the three chairs there. Anyone who is a
    student here is welcome to do that.
        Well, let us begin. I would like you to--Mr. Williamson, to
    proceed, and we will just go right down the list, and then Mr.
    Putnam will start off with questions and then Mr. Davis, and
    then I will have some questions to add. So let us begin.

     STATEMENTS OF GEORGE WILLIAMSON, PORT DIRECTOR AND CEO, TAMPA
      PORT AUTHORITY; STEPHEN WHITE, PRESIDENT, MARITIME SECURITY
      GROUP; WILLIE TIMS, JR., VICE PRESIDENT, IMC PHOSPHATES MP,
       INC.; THOMAS HINDLE, PRESIDENT, CTL DISTRIBUTION; ARTHUR
       SAVAGE, PRESIDENT, A.R. SAVAGE AND SONS, INC.; AND JANET
     KOVACK, CORPORATE COMMUNITY AFFAIRS SPECIALIST, CF INDUSTRIES

        Mr. Williamson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Congressman Putnam and Congressman Davis. Always great to see
    you. And thank you for providing us this opportunity to chat
    with you today, for allowing the Port of Tampa to host this
    field hearing here in our new public facility here.
        I will say this, that enhancing port security impacts our
    agenda at the Port of Tampa unlike any other issue that we have
    had to face both logistically and financially. And I would like
    to add to a couple of the statistics that were pointed out,
    because you are absolutely right on the money about the Port of
    Tampa. It is the largest port in the State of Florida, handles
    the most tonnage. It is the 12th largest in the Nation and so
    forth.
        But, if I may for just a second, I would like to speak for
    the entire Tampa Bay port area, because we have two additional
    ports, Port Manatee and the Port of St. Petersburg. Together
    the three ports encompass 150,000 jobs, and that economic
    impact moves up from 10.6 to about $12 billion when we put it
    all together. So this area is really rich in the maritime
    activity.
        As you spoke quite truthfully, the amount of energy
    products that come to this port are enormous. Last year we
    handled 17 million tons of energy products that came through
    this port alone, the Port of Tampa. And our economy depends on
    a continuous flow of these fuel products as local storage
    capacity is limited to about 7 days. And as you know, we are
    the largest port in the world for the shipment of fertilizer
    and fertilizer products.
        Historically the mandate for port authorities has been to
    oversee commercial development and expansion of their
    respective ports with a focus on job creation in and around the
    immediate port area. Interestingly, in 1999, well before the
    events of September 11th, the State of Florida began to explore
    an entirely new role for seaports, and that was overseeing and
    implementing massive new security measures.
        Florida seaports have worked together in a unified manner
    to move forward, perhaps with the most advanced security
    planning of any port security in the United States. There are
    an awful lot of people to thank for this, including the
    Governor's Office of Drug Control and the FDLE. But I would say
    that when--by the time September 11th happened, Florida
    seaports were 18 months ahead of the rest of the Nation in
    preparing for unprecedented security challenges posed by those
    events.
        We have already begun, for example, a badging process that
    involves criminal background checks not only here with the FDLE
    in the State of Florida, but also through the FBI. We want to
    know who is working in this port, who is coming in and out, and
    do all of that for the purpose of access control.
        The crux of what we are facing today, I think, is brought
    out by the title of this discussion, and that is facilitating
    trade and securing seaports. Tampa handles today 12,000 truck
    movements through its port. If you add in the port of Manatee,
    we handle 15,000 trucks a day through dozens of marine
    terminals.
        The Port of Tampa alone encompasses 2,500 acres sprawling
    all over Hillsborough County, which requires 30 miles of new
    fencing to comply with State standards. As you pointed out,
    half of the State's hazardous cargo moved through this port,
    and much of the port is located near major population centers
    in and around downtown Tampa. And we are situated just several
    miles from MacDill Air Force Base. We are one of America's
    fastest growing cruise ports, expecting over 700,000 passengers
    this coming year.
        What happens at the Port of Tampa affects the entire Tampa
    community, but this diverse commercial portfolio so vital to
    our State's economy presents profound security challenges. The
    stability and viability of the seaport's enterprise will be
    jeopardized if security measures are implemented that
    significantly impede the flow of commerce.
        Just to give you an example, if we stopped each one of our
    trucks--this was a study done by the Florida Department of
    Transportation--if we stopped each one of the trucks entering
    port for just 3 minutes to verify who they are and where they
    are coming and check their badge, that type of thing, we will
    have a 21-mile backup within 3 hours. Clearly we have to use
    technology to be able to push these trucks, identify them, and
    move them quicker and quicker and quicker in and out of the
    port without endangering security.
        Mr. Shays. I am a pretty impressionable person. Do you
    literally mean 21 miles?
        Mr. Williamson. I believe that number is correct, sir, from
    the Department of Transportation.
        And Tampa, like other Florida ports, has embarked on
    unprecedented security upgrades; hard costs for infrastructure,
    such as lighting, fencing, surveillance systems, access control
    will move in the order of about $17 million. In addition to
    that, recurring annual soft costs for additional security
    personnel are expected to run $5 million a year.
        Let me put that in perspective for you. On an annual basis,
    generally the port brings to the bottom line about $6 million,
    after paying for all of its costs. So what happens is that the
    other dollars go directly into security, and there are very few
    dollars left over for the infrastructure that we are required
    to do for cranes, warehouses, berths, docks, that kind of
    thing.
        I can't overemphasize the need for outside funding. We are
    using every penny that we have to make sure that we comply with
    all of the State standards. We have received some support, and
    we were certainly interested in having some more.
        I see my time is about up, but I would like to thank you
    for this opportunity to tell you that we appreciate the work
    that you have done, and we certainly hope that you can provide
    us with some ad-
    ditional funding in the future years in Congress. Thank you
    very much.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Williamson. Between our two
    Florida members and you, I think you have set us up well.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Williamson follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.005

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.006

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.007

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.008

        Mr. Shays. Mr. White. You live where?
        Mr. White. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am from the
    great State of Connecticut.
        Mr. Shays. Among this group, Mr. White, you are first among
    equals.
        Mr. White. Thank you, sir.
        So as I mentioned, my name is Stephen White. I am the CEO
    of the Maritime Security Group, again from the great State of
    Connecticut. Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to
    participate in this hearing today.
        Most of my comments today, and my testimony, are based on a
    survey that my group made for the Connecticut Maritime
    Association in the spring of 2002. The survey sought to ask the
    opinion of the maritime industry for their comments on
    legislation proposed at that time.
        The threats and the vulnerabilities to the seaport we view
    as vulnerabilities to the cargo ships. We are cargo-ship-
    centric from that point of view, and we view the cargo ship,
    because it is big and ponderous, and is unable to defend
    itself, and it has only probably 20 to 25 crewmen onboard, as
    the center of the insecurity of the seaport.
        So if you consider that the ship is sitting in the center,
    then around that will become the port facility, which is also
    very unlikely to be able to defend itself as probably a storage
    facility. Then around that the third ring would be the seaport,
    which has to be a primary ring of security for the seaport
    environment. The further ring is what is--what the Customs have
    now identified as the area where the cargo is actually loaded,
    and the Customs Department, we applaud them in pushing the ring
    of security out to where the cargo is being loaded.
        So ships are unable to defend themselves, but they can
    carry weapons, and the weapons can be introduced into the ship
    either knowingly or unknowingly by people, could be crew
    members, could be in the cargo, or could be in terms of goods
    and services. So the primary job of the ship is to find out who
    is coming and who is leaving the ship.
        The role of government agencies is something different. A
    number of government agencies, we think, has a role to the
    security itself. And seaports are very complicated, and they
    have a lot of different jurisdictions, a lot of different
    government agencies. For cargo there is Customs and
    Agriculture, there is Seafarers, there is INS, there is the
    Coast Guard, DEA, and there is a range of local responders who
    need to be brought into the picture should an incident occur,
    so they need to be tied in early on.
        Now, if you consider that security is awareness,
    prevention, response and consequence management, then what we
    have is a problem of managing the agencies. We have got to
    organize them in such a way that they will communicate with
    each other, and then we have to train them in their jobs of
    communication and practice what they are doing through drills.
        In our survey we identified that the most important issue
    facing maritime industries was getting reliable information
    from the myriad of government agencies. Second most important
    was the need to avoid dealing with multiple government
    agencies. Third, we asked the industry who should be in charge
    of maritime security. They said, unanimously, the Coast Guard,
    because the Coast Guard is the one that they know.
        So this all took place before the Department of Homeland
    Security was initiated by the President, but now that we see
    that it is come into the forefront, it seems to satisfy these
    needs that have been brought about. So we would like to see the
    Department of Homeland Security have a strong mission in port
    security. We would like to see it include the Coast Guard.
        Our survey also identified that the industry is concerned
    that new rules should balance security with cost. And there--
    there is a big worry--I think Mr. Williamson was correct in
    pointing out this is a big worry among our users. Time is
    money, and anything we do to slow down the industry is going to
    negatively impact it.
        What are the challenges facing the government agencies?
    Well, our survey identified that one of the concerns was that
    the United States would go off on its own track after having
    recommended legislation to the international community, with--
    the United States would go off on its own track, which it has
    done before. We believe that terrorism is an international
    problem. Maritime security, because the maritime industry is a
    global industry, has to be dealt with with international rules.
        Our survey also identified that the biggest threat to the
    maritime environment was the dry box container. Securing a
    seaport against the threat of weapons in a dry box container is
    a daunting task. Again, we applaud the Customs Department on
    their great initiatives, the CSI and the CTPAT initiative,
    which basically pushed the boundaries out away from the
    seaports of the United States.
        So, in conclusion, I would like to sum up by saying that
    organization and communication among government agencies is a
    key to security. There is a need, a strong need, for an
    international approach. The rest of the countries can follow.
    There is a need for economic common sense to prevail. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. White.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]
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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Tims.
        Mr. Tims. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
    speak before you, and to Representative Davis and
    Representative Putnam. And I spent time in the great State of
    Connecticut, lived there for several years, so I hope that
    gains me a few points.
        Mr. Shays. It definitely does. Why did you leave?
        Mr. Tims. My wife.
        My name is Willie Tims, and I am a Hillsborough County
    resident, and vice president of environmental health, safety
    and security for IMC Phosphates Co. in Mulberry, FL. Today,
    however, I am speaking on behalf of several phosphate companies
    that have a presence in the Port of Tampa.
        America grows on Florida phosphate. Phosphate is a natural
    product that is essential for home gardeners and farmers across
    the country, and also around the world. Ninety percent of
    phosphate from Florida is used in agricultural products such as
    crop nutrients and animal feed supplements, while the
    remainder, of course, is used in a variety of consumer goods
    from soft drinks and light bulbs to vitamins and other consumer
    goods.
        Florida produces 75 percent of the U.S.' demand for this
    essential product and 25 percent of the world's supply. In
    2001, Florida companies produced more than 13 million tons of
    phosphate and related products, primarily for the agricultural
    industry. The phosphate industry is one of Florida's largest
    and oldest, tracing its roots back to the late 1800's. Today
    the industry employs a little bit more than 6,000 Floridians
    with an annual payroll and benefits totaling more than $400
    million. These employees empower an industry that generated
    more than $975 million in State mining taxes since 1971,
    including $32 million in 2001 alone.
        Florida phosphate industry generated $131.4 million in
    property tax and $14.9 million in sales tax last year. Though
    the industry's most important market is domestic, phosphate
    exports plays a major role in the industry viability and
    Florida's economy. The phosphate industry provides the No. 1
    export from the Port of Tampa. During 2001, the Port of Tampa
    reported 39 countries as phosphate export destinations. China
    was a major export destination with 1.7 million tons of
    phosphate chemicals, followed by Australia, Japan and Brazil.
        According to Enterprise Florida, Incorporated, fertilizer
    was one of the State's leading export commodities with a 2001
    value of more than $1 billion. The International Fertilizer
    Institute Association reported that during 2000, the United
    States accounted for 52 percent or world trade in phosphate
    fertilizers. The 2001 figures are still in preparation;
    however, we still believe that our share is expected to remain
    essentially constant.
        Our presence at the port and our ability to operate our
    terminals in Tampa are essential to our continued business
    success. Four phosphate companies, IMC Phosphate, Cargill Crop
    Nutrition, CF Industries, and Farmland Hydro operate within the
    jurisdiction of the Tampa Port Authority. Those terminals
    encompass more than 1,000 acres of property and employ more
    than 600 people full time, in addition to a number of part-time
    and contract workers. All of these facilities operate under
    risk management practices established under the 1990 Clean Air
    Act.
        Since September 11th, a number of heightened security
    measures have been implemented to strengthen applied controls
    and to enforce existing security measures to proactively
    mitigate potential threats. Some of these measures include
    facilities added approximately 3,000 feet of chain-link
    fencing, augmented by additional passive deterrence measures
    such as barbed wire and concertina wire, the installation of
    barricades and supplemental measures at critical traffic
    points. Additional closed-circuit television cameras were added
    to an existing electronic surveillance system. Concrete
    bollards and gates were added to further secure all rail and
    car access. These areas are tightly monitored by facility
    personnel to prevent breaching of security areas during rail
    car transfers into and out of our facilities.
        Access control requirements mandated by the seaport
    security standards are in place and maintained by port
    authority security. All tenants of the port are required to
    submit to a fingerprint-based State and national criminal
    history economic. After completing the background
    investigation, all authorized employees are provided with
    identification badges limiting access to specific port areas.
        I am going to skip through--looking at the time here--and
    point out that we work very closely with a number of local and
    State law enforcement agencies, from the Hillsborough County
    Sheriff's Office, to the Tampa Bay Police Department, the FBI,
    the U.S. Customs Service, and also U.S. Immigration and
    Naturalization Service.
        Many of these agencies, along with several port tenants and
    the port authority, participate in the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety
    Committee. This committee meets regularly to coordinate matters
    between the interested parties. These meetings are well
    attended and are very useful in communicating security
    information about the port.
        The committee has reviewed presentations from security
    consultants on a variety of topics ranging from antiterrorism
    and force protection to underwater robotic vehicles for use in
    port inspection.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Tims. I realize that 5 or 6
    minutes doesn't do justice to what we do need to say, but it is
    a good start. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Tims follows:]
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        Mr. Shays. Mr. Hindle.
        Mr. Hindle. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to be here today. My name is Tom
    Hindle. I am the president of CTL Distribution. We are a wholly
    owned subsidiary of Comcar Industries, who is the fifth largest
    privately owned trucking company in the United States.
        We have interests in Florida at 2 points primarily. One is
    Jacksonville, where we do a minor amount of business to the
    tune of only 108 loads a year. But in the port of Tampa, we do
    an annual load count of 215,000 loads a year, with an annual
    revenue in excess of $20 million. That $20 million is one-third
    of our nationwide revenue that our trucking company generates.
        The commodities we haul to and from the Port of Tampa are
    molten sulphur, sulfuric acid, DAP, water, caustic soda,
    anhydrous ammonia, GTSP, phosphoric acid and coal.
        In the Port of Tampa each day, CTL alone averages 590 loads
    in and out of the port, utilizing 187 different drivers. The
    drivers that we have assigned to the Port of Tampa No. 308, and
    they are used exclusively for shipments from and to the Port of
    Tampa. The interesting part, in trying to get together this
    group of 308 drivers, we employ 17 different nationalities that
    are represented in a cross-section of our drivers.
        Sixty-nine percent of our local industry shipments, which
    averages 860 loads a day, come to or from the Port of Tampa.
    The average of 860 loads a day--we can haul in excess of 1,000
    loads a day, and again 69 percent access the port.
        We have had some challenges to date. The challenges to date
    are with the initial impact of the access control and badging
    system. To date we have had poor utility of our assets,
    tractor-trailers and drivers. We have experienced diminished
    revenue. We have seen a reduction in our available DOT log
    hours. And per the DOT hours of service regulation, time must
    be logged as on-duty not-driving, which hinders our drivers'
    productivity. We therefore have to supplement our drivers with
    increased miscellaneous pay for these delays in the access
    control badging system, which results in reduced driver
    earnings, diminished service to our valued customers, and with
    the new port security measures, the initial cost of driver
    background checks has increased 374 percent.
        We anticipate that once we get past the initial access
    control badging system and all of the problems inherent in
    that, that the overall impact to CTL is yet to be determined.
    We have a small terminal in the port called Detsco. We closed
    that effectively on August 1. Our reason for closing the
    facility, it did in excess of $400,000 a year in revenue, but
    the impending cost of security with 24-hour guards, lighting,
    fencing improvements would exceed $150,000 a year. The return
    on investment was not prudent for us to continue.
        We are also going to proceed to equip 139 of our power
    units, our tractors, with a Qualcom system. We currently use
    company radios in local operations, but because we do embrace
    security, we want to equip all these tractors with positioning
    systems so we can tell at any moment where each and every truck
    is.
        We expected that the ongoing cost of the additional badging
    of 308 drivers a year--and unfortunately in our industry we
    experience 120 percent turnover, so you can see how you can
    multiply those costs.
        Mr. Shays. Explain the 120 percent. I'll ask later.
        Mr. Hindle. To summarize, I would like to say that we
    appreciate all of the initiatives the port has taken. We are
    only optimistic that the unknown efficiencies regarding port
    access will be resolved in the not too distant future so we can
    provide service to our customers and retain a level of
    profitability. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Hindle.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hindle follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7700.021

        Mr. Shays. Mr. Savage.
        Mr. Savage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members.
    Welcome to Tampa. My name is Arthur Savage. I have been asked
    by the Tampa chapter of the Propeller Club of the United States
    to speak to you today.
        As a past president of the Tampa Chapter of the Propeller
    Club, I commend you on your decision to include Tampa in your
    hearings, and the Propeller Club as an attendee. The Tampa
    chapter is one of the oldest and most active in the country,
    representing a cross-section of port industries. Its members
    are from shipyards, terminals, ship chandlers, ship pilots,
    port authorities, tugboat companies, ship agencies, and
    admiralty attorneys to name but a few. The diversity of our
    membership gives us the opportunity to both hear and express
    views of the port community, providing a forum with great depth
    and breadth.
        The purpose of this hearing, ``to examine the impact of
    efforts to secure seaports from terrorist attack on the free
    and uninterrupted flow of trade,'' is both well defined and
    needed. While the securing of our seaports is of utmost
    importance, if not properly done it can be ineffective,
    expensive, and, in fact, a burden, and drive the cost of
    trading with the United States up, making it noncompetitive.
        One of the greatest strengths of our country is trade, of
    which nearly all international trade travels through our
    seaports. We believe, therefore, that part of your purpose that
    focuses on the free and uninterrupted flow of trade should be
    your guiding light when developing your goal of securing our
    seaports.
        I am also the president of A.R. Savage and Sons, a 57-year-
    old ship agency and ocean freight forwarder that represents
    ship and cargo interests that trade in and out of the ports of
    Tampa Bay. Our agency deals with a maze of different government
    agencies in order for a vessel to enter the port, be cleared to
    load or discharge, and get them out on their voyage in a safe,
    expeditious manner, and at a cost competitive to our domestic
    and international competitors.
        Some of the difficulties are on a local level as well.
    Tampa Bay has three separate port authorities, three Customs
    districts, with half of the terminals being on port property
    and governed by the port authorities, and the other half being
    private.
        An example of the complexities involved on a foreign-
    flagged vessel coming from a foreign port with a foreign crew
    is that we now have to deal with Federal, State and local
    agencies, ranging from the U.S. Coast Guard, to U.S. Customs,
    to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Agriculture
    and the local port authorities to name but a few.
        Since September 11th, in addition to all of the other
    operational arrangements necessary to coordinate the arrival of
    a vessel, we now must send pertinent information regarding the
    vessel, her crew and cargo 96 hours prior to arrival to the
    U.S. Coast Guard for them to investigate, with other government
    agencies. After their research, we either get permission for
    the vessel to enter port, or it is denied. Rather than creating
    more bureaucracy for us to wade through, this solution uses
    existing assets, forces them to coordinate their collective
    efforts to assess potential risk to the port prior to allowing
    the vessel in port. I believe this represents a timely,
    effective solution to protect our ports without additional
    expense or cumbersome bureaucracy.
        I believe the ports of Tampa Bay, with its cohesive port
    community and proactive efforts to address security and safety,
    are a model for other ports in the United States to follow. Our
    community has had a marine advisory council in place for
    decades to address navigational and safety issues on Tampa Bay.
    Today, it solicits input, disseminates it, and provides that
    information to the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee through a
    seat on the board, which also includes the Propeller Club and
    various other industry and governmental agencies. Having this
    in place along with its committees has allowed us to address
    issues intelligently, proactively before they are problems.
    This in large part is why the ports of Tampa Bay are so safe
    and efficient to call.
        A glaring example of our proactive efforts was evident
    after September 11th. At the request of the U.S. Coast Guard
    Captain of the Port, this agency was able to simply convene its
    existing port security committee to provide the forum to make
    prompt and effective security assessments and suggestions to
    Federal, State and local authorities in a timely and cost-
    effective manner. As a result of this valuable resource being
    in place, steps were taken to protect our ports long before
    other ports could react.
        Trade is why ports exist. U.S. ports are among the most
    expensive in the world. This is largely due to a high
    percentage of the costs which are related to the plethora of
    government regulations imposed on companies, such as
    employment, environmental, taxes, permitting, licensing,
    building, etc. Already we are hearing of additional costs that
    will be related to additional security, when most of the
    physical security measures that we have seen put in place will
    have little or no effect on deterring a determined terrorist.
    They are effective, though, in burdening the customers,
    employees and vendors who derive their livelihoods from the
    port.
        I believe that we have capable and willing agencies in
    place to deal with this threat. Untie their hands, give them
    resources, break down the barriers, eliminate redundancies and
    promote communication. The last thing we need is more
    bureaucracy or agencies to further confuse the already
    complicated system of defending our Nation and Constitution.
        We also hope that the Committee on Government Reform aimed
    at dealing with this threat will listen to the industries
    affected. They are our most valuable asset. Thank you very
    much.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Savage follows:]
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        Mr. Shays. I am reluctant to draw you to the 6-minute
    closure because you are providing a little bit of controversy.
    That always makes the hearing more interesting.
        Mr. Savage. I am open for questions.
        Mr. Shays. Ms. Kovack, you will close us out? Then we will
    start with questions.
        Ms. Kovack. Thank you. Let me say that I was born in
    Stamford, CT, but moved down here as a child. So I really
    didn't have a say, but do I love Tampa as well.
        Mr. Shays. You were born in a very important city. Welcome.
        Ms. Kovack. Again, I want to thank you, Chairman Shays,
    Congressman Putnam, and other members of the National Security
    Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to testify today.
        I also will be testifying on behalf of the Propeller Club
    of Tampa concerning the importance of securing our seaports
    efficiently and effectively, while at the same time preserving
    unimpeded transportation, streamlined and standardized
    regulations, and economic incentives for our maritime
    industries to remain globally competitive.
        My name is Janet Kovack, and I am a resident of
    Hillsborough County, FL. I am here today to speak to you as a
    longtime member, current vice president and spokesperson for
    the Propeller Club of Tampa. I am also a community affairs
    representative for CF Industries, Inc., a North American
    farming cooperative with distribution facilities located in the
    Port of Tampa.
        The Propeller Club of the United States was formed in
    November 1927 as a national trade organization whose mission is
    to support the maritime industry. In May 1929, the Propeller
    Club of Tampa was chartered as the fifth individual member club
    in the Nation, or port No. 5, and remains today one of the most
    active clubs in the U.S. with a membership of approximately 350
    individuals representing 195 public and private sector
    interests associated with the maritime industry or region.
        Our mission is to develop a better understanding of the
    maritime industry for all ports in the Tampa Bay area, which
    comprises the three counties of Hillsborough, Pinellas and
    Manatee, and incorporates the respective ports of Tampa, St.
    Petersburg and Manatee.
        The organization's maritime support and education occurs
    through professional dialog and development among the various
    businesses, professions and agencies connecting the maritime
    industry within our ports. We have achieved this goal and
    fostered public understanding of both the value and importance
    of the ports community through monthly meetings, special
    events, newspapers, letters, position papers, media
    involvement, governmental relations, as well as through the
    participation on related boards and initiatives associated with
    maritime activities, such as our seat on the Tampa Bay Harbor
    Safety Committee, and our two seats on the executive committee
    for the Southeast Regional Propeller Club Board of Directors.
        On the issues of seaport security and trade before us
    today, the Propeller Club of Tampa is uniquely suited to
    providing a broad, balanced perspective due to the diversity of
    our maritime interests. We recently polled our membership in
    order to receive feedback from the maritime community on these
    important issues. I will attempt to summarize their input,
    which was received in the form of comments, questions,
    concerns, and potential solutions to the daunting tasks of
    effectively protecting our seaports while efficiently serving
    both local and national interests in supporting rather than
    impeding valuable maritime commerce.
        First, on the subject of economics, every port interest in
    this country today is undoubtedly looking toward Congress for
    support funding to accomplish the mandate of port security. Our
    members would like to ensure that these security measures are
    necessary, meaningful, effective and focused on real threats,
    while at the same time ensuring that these measures are
    efficient, cost-effective, and not redundant.
        Because most of the maritime or maritime-related companies
    already function on tight margins in a highly competitive and
    global economy, they are insistent on cost identification and
    accountability. And most importantly, they want to ensure the
    continued unimpeded transportation of goods and services
    necessary to maintain both a viable economy and a healthy
    maritime commerce.
        Second, Propeller Club members are concerned about the
    redundancy and layers of bureaucracy associated with
    governmental operations and activities. Our members would like
    to see a consolidation of State, local and Federal requirements
    and regulations. Some of their suggested solutions include the
    standardization of all port security requirements, with
    particular emphasis on the implementation of universal badging,
    parking permits, background checks, dock access, including
    adequate time to perform tasks related to vessel maintenance,
    security infrastructure such as fencing, and security
    personnel.
        Also, many of the members believe that there could be
    possible benefits to the utilization of more sophisticated
    technology such as smart cards versus the current picture
    badging, and the use of underwater cameras to monitor possible
    suspicious activity during vessel unloading rather than SCUBA
    divers.
        Further, port businesses are concerned about how the cost
    of security measures will ultimately be borne. We believe
    Federal funding must be an important component to meeting the
    cost challenges posed by facilitating trade while securing our
    seaports. To aid the subcommittee's review and evaluation of
    such port security issues, we would appreciate the opportunity
    to provide a written summary of the comments received from our
    survey, and we would be pleased to seek further input from the
    maritime community to assist in researching beneficial
    solutions to these complex issues.
        In closing, the Propeller Club of Tampa is proud of our
    service in the surrounding maritime community, especially our
    participation with the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee and
    the U.S. Coast Guard to implement our ongoing strategic plan.
    We will continue to work in concert with the Tampa Bay Port
    Authority, the U.S. Coast Guard, other Propeller Clubs
    throughout the United States, and the Navy League to achieve
    mutually beneficial security goals for the entire Tampa Bay
    area port community.
        The ports of Tampa Bay offer a laudable model for other
    port communities for what public-private cooperation and
    partnership can achieve, and we stand ready to assist Congress
    in its efforts to secure thriving seaports and maritime
    business.
        On behalf of the Propeller Club of Tampa, I would like to
    thank you for your consideration of our comments. The Propeller
    Club and the Tampa Bay port community stand ready to partner
    with you in this very important endeavor. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Kovach follows:]
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        Mr. Shays. I am going to have the Members have
    approximately 10 minutes, you know, between 5 and 10, because I
    think 5 minutes, we can't followup questions as well. So we
    will start with you, Mr. Putnam, and again, I thank all of the
    witnesses.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to begin with Mr. White. Mr. White, we have
    heard testimony most recently from Ms. Kovack, whose
    constituents have advocated the consolidation of State, local
    and Federal officials, and an emphasis on greater technology,
    in particular smart cards and things such as underwater
    cameras.
        In your testimony you say that additional burdens would
    include requirements to man stern-facing radar, monitoring of
    surveillance cameras and requirements for additional patrols.
    For many cargo ships, ``the concept of security while in port
    presently only includes the notion of keeping an eye out while
    other work is done.'' And you go on to say that in the end we
    feel that with the exception of controlled ship access, ship's
    security should be apportioned to the seaport and not left in
    any great measures to the devices of the ship itself.
        What responsibility do you believe the ship should have?
        Mr. White. I think that the ship ought to have the primary
    security for making sure what is on and what is not on the
    ship, and that ought to end it right there.
        I don't think the ship--you don't have want to have the
    ship with guns on it. You don't want to have the ship burdened
    with additional responsibilities. The ship's job should be to
    make sure who is on and who is not on the ship.
        Mr. Putnam. Mr. Savage, as someone in the shipping
    business, would you like to elaborate on that?
        Mr. Savage. I would concur with that. The matter of the
    operation of a ship and, when it is in port, tending to the
    cargo operations, need to be the focus of a ship. When you are
    handling dangerous cargoes, that focus needs to be singular.
    Likewise, I don't think that the ship has the opportunity to
    govern who comes on the docks and comes alongside those ships.
    It needs to know that it is coming to a secure pier.
        Mr. Putnam. Mr. Tims or Ms. Kovack, how much has the
    phosphate industry spent since September 11th in additional
    security requirements?
        Mr. Tims. Representative Putnam, in terms of having the
    exact number in terms of moneys spent, I don't have that
    directly before me. But, as I indicated during my testimony,
    each of us have certainly added additional measures in the form
    of additional monitoring equipment, as far as cameras. We
    improved perimeter security. We erected additional barricades.
    We are not talking in terms of just thousands or tens of
    thousands. It is more in the 50- to $100,000 range, if not
    higher.
        Mr. Putnam. Ms. Kovack.
        Mr. Kovack. Thank you, Congressman Putnam.
        I can't speak for the other phosphate companies, but I know
    that we have spent quite a bit of money in the Port of Tampa
    helping to refence our facility that was already fenced for
    requirements, added monitors and cameras, and that our terminal
    manager is in the audience and could answer that question. But
    just alone, our costs have been over what Mr. Tims expressed.
        Mr. Putnam. Well, just in your testimony you added 3,000
    feet of chain-link fence, Mr. Tims, additional closed-circuit
    television, concrete gates, additional employee training, all
    things that are beyond the scope of mining and producing high-
    quality fertilizer, obviously additional burdens that you have
    taken on. So I will ask Mr. White or Mr. Savage if it would
    appear that in this changed world everyone is taking on,
    unfortunately, additional costs, additional responsibilities,
    sympathizing with the fact that we need to make sure that they
    are coordinated and are smart, don't you think that there is a
    role for shippers to play in additional security beyond just
    maintaining the ship?
        Mr. Tims. Let me add this. The numbers that I used
    represented a cumulative number for CF Industries, IMC, along
    with Cargill. That was just not only IMC. So it was a
    cumulative number for the phosphate industry.
        Mr. Putnam. I understand.
        Mr. White.
        Mr. White. I understand your point. Our survey shows that
    the people in the ship industry believe that they should share
    in the cost. The point is that the ship is large, the crew is
    small, so that I think the most realistic position for the ship
    security is that the ship be responsible for who is on and who
    is not on the ship. It should be the job of the port facility
    and the port--the seaport itself to find out who is having
    access to the pier, to guard against any other kind of
    terrorism from the outside.
        It is impossible for the ship to secure itself with
    anything more than who is on and who is not on the ship.
        Mr. Putnam. Mr. Williams, what percent of the ships that
    come through the port are flagged U.S. vessels?
        Mr. Williamson. I couldn't tell you that exactly, but I
    would say at least 50 percent of them.
        Mr. Putnam. So half are not U.S.-flagged vessels?
        Mr. Williamson. Correct.
        Mr. Putnam. What percentage of the crews that come through
    are non-U.S. citizens?
        Mr. Williamson. Generally only those on non-U.S.-flagged
    ships.
        Mr. Putnam. So basically half again.
        Mr. Savage, you raised some interesting points that I think
    it is important that we flesh out in this panel so that we can
    be better prepared for the next panels dealing with State,
    local and Federal officials.
        There appears to be agreement in the shipping industry and
    in the port community that we do a pretty lousy job of
    communicating within the agencies and coordinating. You
    mentioned that there is redundancies. Do you have any specific
    recommendations for ways that we can improve our port security
    across these 60 different agencies, and do you believe that the
    creation of the Homeland Security Department is a step in the
    right direction or a step in the wrong direction?
        Mr. Savage. That is a loaded question. But I don't know the
    details of what is happening in the Homeland Security
    Committee. I do know that we have some very, very good Federal,
    State and local agencies that we work with here, and they are
    all working together in a very cohesive manner. There isn't a
    lot of barriers. There is good communication, and, as a result,
    a day after September 11th, this port was ready to defend
    itself. All of the agencies had come together through an
    already existing Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee Subcommittee
    called the Security Committee that was already put together,
    and it allowed us the venue to address these things. And I
    would submit that you should use that as a model as to how the
    rest of the Federal Government should work. It was in place. It
    had already taken proactive measures to address security
    things, even though Tampa has not had a history of any security
    problems.
        We went ahead and put that in place, and it was there. It
    was ready. When the Captain of the Port needed to pull this
    community together, it took one phone call in asking everybody
    to rally together. They were there, they responded, and we have
    not had an incident.
        Mr. Putnam. It wasn't intended to be a loaded question. I
    got the impression from your testimony that when you said
    rather than creating more bureaucracy, we should be a little
    bit smarter about it, but you also say that Tampa is a model.
    So I want to make sure that we are fleshing this out so that we
    can----
        Mr. Savage. I contend that we have done a good job about
    it. I think that we have very, very capable agencies in place,
    and that is where I mentioned, untie their hands. The U.S.
    Customs Service and Immigration in this office is dramatically
    undermanned, yet they still do a good job. They do--they are
    really good at catching the bad guys, not letting them off the
    ships if they come in.
        Again, all of those groups are reviewing the issues related
    to a ship prior to allowing it to come into port, and I think
    that is a key.
        Let's remember, we would not have had a terrorist incident
    if we would not have let those people in the country in the
    first place. I think prevention, as we are doing today in our
    port, is going to take care of the majority of the problem. And
    if these groups can work together, then I don't think the
    interior has much to worry about.
        Mr. Putnam. How frequently does the port conduct emergency
    drills? Mr. Williamson.
        Mr. Williamson. I can probably let the Coast Guard answer.
    We do a number of drills. The Coast Guard, the Emergency
    Management Service does drills. We have our ammonia drills that
    go on a quarterly basis. So there is a number of them, but they
    take place quite frequently.
        Mr. Putnam. Do you believe that it should be a trade
    priority to standardize port protocols, inspections, locks and
    seals for cargo containers? Should that be built into our trade
    negotiations in the future?
        Mr. Williamson. I think that is going to be a difficult
    thing to do. You are talking about international trade here. If
    you can get there through the IMO or something of that nature--
    it would be a wonderful thing if you could accomplish that--I
    think it will be difficult because of the dispersement of
    containers and the activities of it around the world. But I
    think any form of standardization that we can domestically in
    this country is a good thing.
        The issues that we have here with badging, we have 14
    deepwater ports. They all have to have a separate badge. We
    have worked together in Tampa Bay, but for the trucking
    companies, for example, just getting a badge, if they go to six
    or eight ports with their trucks, they have to have a badge for
    each one of them. Those are the types of things that we are
    talking about redundancy, and we need to get better and smarter
    and better technology to allow them to have better movement.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. We can have a second round if we need it.
        Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williamson, because our port is so unique in being a
    bulk cargo port as opposed to containerized cargoes, which most
    of the ports, I am sure, the chairman has seen, are there any
    unique aspects of the security issues to us that we haven't
    already discussed?
        Mr. Williamson. I don't think that there is anything
    especially unique about us. I think that the dispersion of all
    of the activities over 2,500 acres is important. The nice
    thing, I suppose--I suppose, about a lot of bulk traffic is it
    is--while it may seem easier to conceal things inside 60,000
    tons of phosphate, at the same time it is hard to do that when
    you are loading it at 5,000 tons an hour. I think the
    difficulties that we have here are that we have competing
    industries that are not on port property that are not
    necessarily, at this point in time anyway, required to have the
    same types of security that the port tenants are required to
    have.
        Having said that, most of them are responsible corporate
    citizens and are following in the part of what the port is
    requiring, but there are competitive issues there. One group
    pays a lot of money for security; the other one doesn't. So
    these are some of the things that we need to work out in the
    long term.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Would any of the private sector folks
    like to comment on this point, whether you have had any issues
    in terms of competition by virtue of costs you have embedded in
    your infrastructure that perhaps your others didn't?
        Mr. Tims. One of the biggest concerns that we have had is
    that recently there was an opportunity to apply for funding for
    security measures. Now, the Port of Tampa was very fortunate to
    receive funding, and we were certainly supportive of that, but,
    as far as I know, none of the private companies that applied
    for any of this grant-type funding received any money. And we
    have incurred quite a bit of cost just upgrading our security.
        I would certainly urge that as we take a look at homeland
    security, that measures be taken to provide some sort of a
    funding for private companies for the additional costs that we
    have had to incur for increasing our security.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. One of the points that Janet Kovack
    made which I thought was very important is we need to be
    focused on credible security risks and not perceived risk. Are
    all of you confident that you have been able to develop a
    competent assessment of risk in ascertaining what the security
    issues are and how to prioritize them as far as need, or is
    there additional information the Federal Government or somebody
    else or--or technical assistance ought to be providing to you
    in the future?
        Mr. Williamson. Speaking on behalf of the port, I think
    that is somewhat of a moving target, depending on how the
    actual threats may ultimately develop. I think at this point we
    have had several risk assessments done by several agencies, the
    Coast Guard, with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office and
    others, and we have a fairly good confidence of what is out
    there and what we need to protect.
        The infrastructure has been focused on the hazardous
    materials, the cruise ships, but we have to stay ever vigilant.
    As things change, we may need additional assessments.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. One of things that strikes me about
    the testimony is I believe virtually every member of the panel
    in the private sector agreed that the process that you have set
    up with the St. Pete and Manatee port authorities, Tampa Bay
    Harbor Safety Committee, is a good process and is producing
    good outcomes. That is powerful and not always heard, that you
    all are working so closely together. And I have also heard each
    of you testify you are convinced as to the need that Mr.
    Williamson has claimed for additional funds and the fact that
    the Federal Government should assist.
        What about with respect to the Coast Guard? They are very,
    very busy these days. We are going to hear from Captain
    Thompson, who unfortunately, I think, may be moving down to
    Miami. I don't know if I got that wrong. I am sure you are
    working closely with them as well. I know they believe they
    need additional funds. I will certainly say that. Any comments
    you all would make in terms of their workload, whether we need
    to be providing them additional support to help them work with
    you to help you do your job?
        Mr. White. I would like to say that I think the Coast Guard
    is a wonderful organization. They have been considered a less
    than first class agency for a number of years, and they deserve
    a lot of funding and a lot of credit, and they should lead the
    charge in the seaports.
        If they, in fact, are to take on the larger role, then some
    of the other roles that they already have a great deal of
    trouble policing will need to be beefed up as well. So, yes, I
    think they need a tremendous amount of funding.
        Mr. Savage. If I may, Congressman Davis, I concur with that
    100 percent. We deal with the Coast Guard on a daily basis. In
    addition to their other roles of drug interdiction, air-sea
    rescue and marine safety, this new security is asking a
    tremendous amount upon them without much additional resources.
        We have three Coast Guard offices in the Tampa Bay area,
    and they have very small crews, and anything that can be done
    to help them do their job in terms of resources and cooperation
    from other agencies I think would help.
        Mr. Williamson. I would echo those sentiments, Congressman
    Davis. The Coast Guard has provided some terrific leadership
    with Captain Thompson, Commander Ferguson. They have been there
    from the beginning. They have been on top of the situation.
    They have kept the whole community informed and together, and
    they certainly and clearly need additional funds for more
    platforms on the water and for more crew and people to handle
    all of the responsibilities they have been charged with.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. My last question is the same with
    respect to both the Customs Service and the Border Patrol. I
    know from personal experiences in my office, the Border Patrol
    was heavily undermanned before September 11th. I am sure that
    they have had additional responsibilities imposed upon them
    that we would all strongly support. Any observations that you
    would like to share about how those two agencies are doing
    handling the workload and what we as Federal officials should
    be cognizant of?
        Mr. Williamson. I would just start off by saying that they
    also could use additional funding. Customs in particular does a
    terrific job with the few resources that they have. We move 52
    million tons through this port, plus or minus, on an annual
    basis. That is an awful lot of freight. The difficulty of
    sifting through all of that is too much for what they have got
    to do in addition to some of the other security measures that
    are involved in. Even down at the cruise terminals, I think
    that they can use all of the help that they can get.
        Mr. White. As I mentioned before, our survey identified the
    dry box containers as the biggest single hole in the seaport
    security area, and the Customs Department is the one that is
    going to try to figure out how to find out what is in these
    boxes. This is a tremendous effort. They need a lot of
    additional resources. I think a lot of it is going to have to
    be done smarter, computer-based. Some of the initiatives that
    Customs has already started are excellent initiatives, but they
    need support, they need people, they need funding.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Mr. Chairman, just to close with two
    comments. The first is that the comment about the overlapping
    State, local and Federal rules, I would be very interested in
    hearing where the problems lie there and how we can address
    them. And I urge you to put that through this committee process
    you have mentioned as well.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions. Thank you.
        Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
        Let me just set up this question by saying to you that our
    committee held 19 hearings before September 11th on terrorist
    activities, on the whole issue of homeland security. If we were
    to put basically a card for every government department or
    agency, we would have 99 that somehow are involved in homeland
    security.
        And also say to you that I certainly believe, and I think
    many of our committee members believe, it is not a question of
    if, but when, where and of what magnitude we will face an
    attack by terrorists, at least an attempt, using chemical,
    biological, radioactive material or nuclear weapons, heaven
    forbid. So that we think we are in a race with terrorists to
    shut them down before they use the weapon or attempt to use a
    weapon of mass destruction.
        I would like to first understand, and I throw it open to
    any of you to answer the question of compare bulk-type delivery
    of goods that we see in this--these ports here versus a
    container. I have a hard time visualizing the kinds of threats
    when we have bulk material. So be a terrorist for a second and
    describe to me what represents an opportunity.
        Mr. White. I would like to take a shot at that. The problem
    with cargo ships is that they are tremendous, and they have
    small crews, as I pointed out. So anywhere in one of those
    large ships--some of the spaces in these large ships don't get
    visited very often by crew members. So anywhere in a ship is a
    place to hide a weapon. So anybody who gets on the ship at the
    last port or the port before the last port and puts a weapon in
    with a remote-controlled triggering device has a bomb that is
    directed into the seaport.
        Mr. Shays. Well, the worst-case scenario would be a nuclear
    weapon in the hull of a ship. So there is no difference between
    a bulk ship or a container ship in that regard.
        Mr. White. In that regard they are all tremendous, and they
    have a tremendous number of spaces and places to hide.
        Mr. Shays. In terms of explosive material, if the bulk
    material is explosive, then clearly a detonating device there
    could be pretty catastrophic?
        Mr. White. That is correct. The additional complications
    with the container ship is that they have got these containers
    that just come neatly on board, whereas on a dry bulk ship,
    somebody would have to actually sneak something through. But
    the container, you bring the container on board, since we don't
    know what is in the containers, it is easy.
        Mr. Shays. Right. I am hearing you on the container. I
    guess what I wanted to develop is what are the ships that carry
    bulk material that could be highly explosive? You are not
    telling the general--you may be telling the general public, the
    committee something we don't know, but you are not telling the
    terrorists.
        Mr. White. For example, some of the ships have explosive
    cargoes, LNG ships, could be chemical carriers, petroleum
    carriers. There is a lot of explosive cargoes that travel on
    the waters. But a ship that is transporting phosphates could
    have a bomb, a dirty bomb, a nuclear weapon, any kind of a
    bomb, which I understand can be made quite small these days.
        Mr. Shays. Not just explosive material, but potentially
    contaminated material? I am looking here. Help me out, folks.
    Give me examples of what could be explosive material or
    potentially material that, if it was in a plume, would be a
    chemical that could be very harmful to the general public. Mr.
    Williamson.
        Mr. Williamson. I think the obvious example here in our
    community is anhydrous ammonia. We have several tanks of
    anhydrous ammonia. If they were attacked, those plumes could do
    some real damage to the Tampa community.
        Mr. Shays. What is real damage?
        Mr. Williamson. I think the last study I saw was several
    hundred thousand people could be taken out with that in a short
    period of time, in a matter of minutes.
        Mr. Shays. So, you know, just trying to set up and try to
    make sure that we are--you know, don't have our heads in the
    sand in terms--because there hasn't been something caused
    necessarily by a terrorist since they have chosen other
    targets. The thing that drives us pretty crazy in public policy
    and government is that we begin to try to think like a
    terrorist, and you can give yourself nightmares. But that is
    obviously a vulnerability that we have to anticipate, and,
    therefore, the likelihood may be small, but if, in fact, it
    happens, the consequence could be large. So we then have to
    work out a plan to deal with that.
        Mr. Savage, give me a sense of--you know, untie their hands
    is something I am going to ask you about, because that doesn't
    mean anything to me, because I don't know where their hands are
    tied. So I am going to have you walk through where people's
    hands are tied.
        But help me understand what you consider balance. But first
    I am going to ask you, tell me what is the worst thing that you
    think could happen in the Port of Tampa or the other two ports
    in this area.
        Mr. Savage. The scenario that Mr. Williamson just explained
    to my understanding is the worst-case scenario. The probability
    of that worst-case scenario happening is pretty improbable.
        Even if you did blow an ammonia ship in half, that ammonia
    is held in four to five different holds. Would they all be
    ruptured? Would the wind be in the correct direction to get to
    the populace to create an inhalation hazard that would knock
    out downtown Tampa during the middle of a workday? It is all
    pretty improbable.
        Mr. Shays. The danger I have heard is the next day you have
    people very fearful. But this is my general philosophy. You
    tell the American people the truth, and then they have you do
    the right thing. And because of the terrorist threat, that is
    why we have wiretapping laws that are changed, that is why we
    have invaded somewhat the attorney/client privilege, that is
    why we have talked about tribunals, that is why we have made
    arrests.
        When we made these arrests, we put potential terrorists on
    defense rather than offense, but they are in a position now as
    we let people go to reorganize the cells, can come out of
    hiding and so on. The cells do exist. So tell me what we are
    doing right now, Mr. Savage, because I happen to believe that
    are you right, but I don't understand what it means. What does
    it mean? What are we doing right now that is not effective,
    because it is just dumb to require anything that isn't
    effective.
        Mr. Savage. These security badges. My 8-year-old son could
    copy one of these and walk into the port tomorrow. Miles and
    miles of 8-foot fences. Do you think that is going to deter a
    determined terrorist? Absolutely no effect. I think in
    identifying the threat, it is not the American worker that is
    going in and out of the port, it is these guests that are
    coming in and out of the country.
        Mr. Shays. You said something that I just have a real big
    problem with. Do you make an assumption that terrorists
    wouldn't choose to be employed for a year or 2 before they
    might potentially do something harmful?
        Mr. Savage. Certainly could. Certainly could. That is why I
    endorse this effort. I do not agree that this is necessarily
    the best solution, because it is so easily copied. Likewise,
    you know, an 8-foot fence, I would rather see the $3 million
    that the port spent on things like that go into a new crane or
    a new warehouse. If it is behind the checkpoint, what purpose--
    --
        Mr. Shays. Tell me how the new crane or the new warehouse
    is going to protect the people of Tampa.
        Mr. Savage. Excuse me. I am always trying to promote
    commerce, but, in addition, we have Coast Guard boarding these
    high-risk vessels prior to entering the port. As I mentioned,
    the 96-hour prenotice that we have to give before the ships are
    allowed in, I think that is key. Don't let the threat in the
    port if it is a perceived threat. And we are doing that with
    existing resources. It isn't costing any additional money to
    the industry. But at the end of the day, we have--we have to
    make sure that these agencies do have the resources to do that
    additional work, because, again, they are doing a tremendous
    amount of additional work with no additional people, no
    additional funding or anything like that.
        Mr. Shays. What does ``untie their hands'' mean?
        Mr. Savage. I go to resources again. I think that our
    agencies--you know, there is a lot of overlap. If we could
    eliminate some of those redundancies and give them the
    resources to go out there and do the investigations to monitor
    what is going on in the port, they can be more effective.
        Mr. Shays. OK. You mentioned that--I'm sorry to--ask you
    these questions because you just mentioned them. I want to
    pursue them a second. Three ports, three Federal Customs
    districts.
        Mr. Savage. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Maybe I will get to asking others how--would it
    be a wise thing for these three ports to become one district,
    or is that--is that an economic question, or just an
    impractical question on the whole host? Is this like New York
    and New Jersey, they have a port authority? Is this--is this a
    political issue? Is there any reason to want to be one? Maybe
    others could jump in.
        Mr. Savage. I would defer to George here in a second, but I
    think my point here is that there is a bunch of different
    agencies that we have to deal with here. In Tampa we have
    brought them all together under the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety
    Committee. And in using the example of post-September 11th----
        Mr. Shays. Is St. Petersburg----
        Mr. Savage. St. Pete has a seat. Manatee has a seat. Tampa
    has a seat. Navigational interests, a number of the
    environmental interests, safety groups and everything. So
    rather than trying to deal with each one of those separately,
    they all have a seat and have a say. And as to bringing them
    together, that is something----
        Mr. Shays. One of the things that I will be asking the next
    panel, I want to know potentially how much different government
    agents could go on a ship looking for a particular interest
    that they have, and then potentially what is the value of how
    the Homeland Security Department may enable people to do cross
    kinds of concerns here to have some of those kinds--my light is
    on. I know that we do have three panels, but I do want to make
    sure that we pursue any questions. I know there--do you want to
    answer a question, too?
        Mr. Williamson. No. I was going to followup on that one and
    say that the idea of putting Customs together is a Federal
    issue. We are not really here discussing putting all of the
    ports together necessarily, as the ports of Tampa Bay complex,
    but you can combine Federal agencies if you wish without any
    impacts to the community. A number of ports have done that.
        Mr. Shays. Right. Do you want to followup?
        Let me just check here. I feel in some cases that we are
    being caught by the fact that we have so many panels, because I
    would like to ask--I don't know if it is you, Mr. White, who
    talked about the four rings.
        Mr. White. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. Just give some importance to the concept of
    your--it is the ship, the dock, the seaport, the port of
    origin. Which represents the most important ring?
        Mr. White. Well, the concept of the rings is to try to say
    that you--you don't want to--as a--if you are trying to plan
    the whole notion of security, you don't want to make the ship
    absolutely secure and then make the port facility absolutely
    secure and then make the seaport secure, because you are
    building in a redundancy. So that the basic unit of security
    ought to be the seaport. That is where the emphasis ought to be
    put, rather than the port facility and rather than the ship.
    The real place to go is push it out beyond the seaport, which
    is where the cargo loads. That is where we want to head,
    Because once we can do that, you have nipped it in the bud.
        Mr. Shays. The same concept in an airport, where if we
    could check people before they actually walked in the airport,
    even the crews, we wouldn't have to keep checking along the
    way.
        Mr. White. Well, the other thing is that if you can
    eliminate as many things as you can, you know certain people,
    let them go through. You--if you qualify, prequalify, a lot of
    containers that are coming through the port because you are
    assured that the systems are going to catch a problem, then
    your defenses can apply to what is left, so you can concentrate
    on what you haven't already prechecked. So you narrow the range
    of vulnerability.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Hindle, quickly. You mentioned 120 percent
    turnover in truckers, drivers. And would 80 of those drivers be
    consistent and the last 20 just constantly turn over, or how
    many of that 100--if you had 100 drivers, how many of those 100
    drivers are actually with you year in and year out?
        Mr. Hindle. Less than 20 percent, and the other 80 percent
    cycle. And so to keep 308 drivers involved in port, we have to
    hire 370 every year.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Well, one last question to you, Mr. White.
    Were you the--were you the one who said maritime security has
    to abide by international rules?
        Mr. White. Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Shays. And your concept is that there needs to be
    uniformity from port to port to port and certain expectations
    form port to port to port?
        Mr. White. Yes, within the United States and also in the
    world community, because of the fact that you have got the same
    ships going all of the way around the world, because you need
    to have the same expectations of the ship coming into the port.
    If there is going to be a problem when there is a ship
    involved, the ship needs to know--the ship needs to know now
    how to interface with the port, what is expected of the ship,
    what is going on in the port. He needs to have a set protocol.
    So I think the whole notion of set protocols for all seaports
    is very important.
        Mr. Shays. I am going to ask each of you this final
    question, but I am looking for a quicker answer. I want to know
    what is the most important thing we can do in a port to improve
    security. I want to know what is the most difficult thing, and
    that--the most difficult challenge that we face. And those
    could be two different answers, to live in the spirit, frankly,
    that Mr. Savage raised about let's make sure it works.
        Mr. Williamson. I think really the most important thing to
    do is to make sure that we have the funding to do what we want
    to do. A lot of this has to do with just the eyes and ears once
    you have built the infrastructure.
        Mr. Shays. Most challenging thing facing our ports?
        Mr. Williamson. I think the most challenging thing is to
    make sure that we stay vigilant on this issue, because it won't
    go away.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Mr. White.
        Mr. White. I would say the most important thing we can do
    is bring the multiple government agencies down into one
    manageable unit. And I think the Department of Homeland
    Security are----
        Mr. Shays. What is the biggest challenge?
        Mr. White. Dry box container, to figure out what is inside
    it.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough.
        Mr. Tims.
        Mr. Tims. I think the most important thing is centralizing
    activities associated around homeland security and making sure
    that in terms with private industry, particularly those like
    the phosphate industry, can receive some sort of agency
    funding.
        I think probably the most difficult thing to do is to make
    sure that with all of the wonderful governmental and law
    enforcement agencies that we have, that we try and streamline
    things to make it easier for them to move quickly. I think we
    have a good system here that has served us well.
        Mr. Shays. Let me move on. Mr. Hindle.
        Mr. Hindle. The most important thing from a trucker's
    viewpoint is to make sure that all of those 308 drivers
    satisfactorily pass the fingerprint examination so we don't
    have the wrong drivers getting into the port to start with.
        Mr. Shays. Make sure that happens on a timely basis.
        Mr. Hindle. Yes. The most challenging thing is once we do
    have the system up and running properly is to get the trucks in
    and out of port on a timely basis, like Gore mentioned earlier.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Savage.
        Mr. Savage. I would agree with the centralized government
    concept, but I think it needs to go a step further and develop
    those deterrents with industry. Nobody knows the cargoes, the
    terminals, and the personnel issues better than industry. And I
    think that it should be a concerted effort to develop those
    things together, but also to make sure, once the solution is
    given, that you all provide the funding to cover it.
        Mr. Shays. Two most important things. What is the most
    difficult thing?
        Mr. Savage. I would concur with Mr. White. I think that
    containers do present a very big problem, and we have to know
    what is coming in on those things before they get into the
    interior.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Ms. Kovack, I didn't have questions for you, but I
    appreciate your statement. What would be the most difficult and
    the most challenging?
        Mr. Kovack. I think one of the most challenging is to
    identify what is reasonable, especially for water access
    security and for dock security, as far as who is responsible
    for security guards on the dock.
        Mr. Shays. And the most important thing?
        Mr. Kovack. Most important thing. I would agree with George
    Williamson, that funding is what is going to put all of those
    mandates in place.
        Mr. Shays. I am prepared to release you.
        Do you have a question?
        Mr. Putnam. Just very quickly, probably for Mr. Savage,
    because you have given us the most practical advice from the
    standpoint of a user.
        Does it concern you that we have a small airport whose
    approach and takeoff is several dozen feet above a petroleum
    tank farm?
        Mr. Savage. No.
        Mr. Putnam. No concern?
        Mr. Savage. We have dealt with that. We have Air Force
    loaded tankers going over the port every day. The amount of
    explosives that a small plane could deliver would not be a
    threat to the majority of our hazardous facilities.
        Mr. Putnam. OK.
        Mr. Savage. I don't know that for sure.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you all. You all have been great. Thank
    you very much.
        We will go to the next panel. We are going to roll. We are
    taking the second panel right now.
        Mr. Putnam [presiding]. The subcommittee is ready to
    welcome our second panel. The second panel is represented by
    Commissioner Patricia Frank; Commissioner Chris Hart; Mr. Steve
    Lauer, chief of the Florida Domestic Security Initiatives for
    the Florida Department of Law Enforcement; and Chief Deputy
    David Gee with Hillsborough County as well.
        We welcome you to the subcommittee. As with the first
    panel, we will need you to please rise and raise your right
    hand.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Putnam. Note for the record that the witnesses
    responded in the affirmative.
        As with the first panel, we will do our best to maintain
    the 5-minute rule, with the 1 minute runoff. And we will begin
    with you, Ms. Frank. Welcome.

       STATEMENTS OF PATRICIA FRANK, COMMISSIONER, HILLSBOROUGH
    COUNTY, FL; CHRIS HART, COMMISSIONER, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FL;
      STEVE LAUER, CHIEF, FLORIDA DOMESTIC SECURITY INITIATIVES,
     FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT; AND CHIEF DEPUTY DAVID
                      GEE, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FL

        Ms. Frank. Thank you very much, Chairman Shays, Vice
    Chairman Putnam, and I know my Congressman Jim Davis was here
    earlier. We do appreciate your being in our county, and it is
    an honor to have been invited to speak to you.
        When Hillsborough County reached the 1 million population
    mark in the year 2001, there was cause to celebrate. It marked
    our leap in a statistical class shared by only 34 other
    counties in the United States and ranked us as the fourth most
    populous county in Florida. We hailed the milestone in annual
    reports and speeches, boasting about our thriving economy, our
    healthy tax base, desirable community, and attractive
    destinations. Then came September 11th.
        Several months ago, in anticipation that Federal
    antiterrorism funding will work its way to local governments,
    I, as chairman of the Emergency Policy Group and chairman of
    the Board of County Commissioners, convened an interagency
    meeting to assess the needs, the security needs and priorities
    of local law enforcement, rescue agencies, hospitals, the
    aviation authority, and, of course, the port authority.
        I have given a copy of that report to Chairman Shays, and
    if the other members of the committee would like it, we would
    be happy to furnish it.
        With startling clarity, we have come to realize that many
    of the very assets we trumpeted, including a centrally located
    metropolitan area served by three interstates, 75 miles of
    shoreline, the largest seaport in the State, and MacDill Air
    Force Base, are also our greatest vulnerabilities.
        Through the testimony of previous speakers, you now have a
    clear idea of the size and importance of the Port of Tampa. The
    numbers are impressive. The port is a major economic engine in
    west central Florida, impacting 93,000 jobs and accounting for
    an economic impact of $10.6 billion.
        As you have heard, Tampa handled more than 47 million net
    tons last year, as much tonnage as all of the other 13
    deepwater ports in Florida combined. The port is also becoming
    a major player in the cruise market, handling more than 500,000
    passengers in 2001. Clearly any action that would partially or
    fully disrupt normal operations at the Port of Tampa would be
    disastrous, but to stop at these statistics would paint only a
    partial picture.
        The Port of Tampa is not a microcosm, but is part of a much
    larger community that could be dramatically affected by the
    seconds that it takes for terrorists to attack. Consider the
    big picture, if you will. The Port of Tamps rings the eastern
    boundary of downtown Tampa. Within downtown's 750 acres are 6.5
    million square feet of office space in buildings as tall as 43
    stories, 51,000 workers, the convention center, and 2,400 hotel
    rooms. The main administrative headquarters for Hillsborough
    County and the city of Tampa governments are located downtown,
    as well as the courts of the 13th Judicial District, the U.S.
    District Court for the Middle District of Florida and other
    Federal offices.
        Rounding out the landscape are the four-theater performing
    arts center, the 21,000-seat Ice Palace, the port's
    headquarters, the cruise terminals, a brand new shopping
    district, and, adjacent to this building, the Florida Aquarium,
    which hosted 600,000 visitors last year.
        Separated from the port by a mere channel's distance are
    the residential communities of Harbour Island and Davis Island.
    On Davis Island is located the sprawling Tampa General
    Hospital, a Level 1 trauma center. Nearby are the densely
    populated neighborhoods of South Tampa. Within approximately a
    1-mile radius of the port are approximately 4,100 businesses
    employing some 112,500 people.
        Now consider this: By volume, more than 50 percent of the
    hazardous materials that enter or leave the State of Florida
    are handled through the Port of Tampa. The port is one of the
    largest exporters of phosphate in the world, and the top
    foreign import last year was ammonia, used in processing that
    phosphate.
        A 1995 study by the local emergency planning committee
    modeled what could happen in the event of a catastrophic
    release from the 75-million-gallon CF Industries' anhydrous
    ammonia storage tank located in the center of Hooker's Point.
    Their projection: At least 20,000 people would be impacted in
    the immediate adjacent areas of Palmetto Beach, Harbour Island,
    Davis Island and other communities. Within the study's 10-mile
    vulnerability zone, some 200,000 people could be impacted. Even
    with a state-of-the-art warning system, many of these people
    would have little or no notice of the disaster. The human toll
    could be incomprehensible.
        Ironically, because of its proximity to the port, Tampa
    General Hospital, one of the hospitals most equipped to handle
    the casualties, would be locked down in such an event.
    Depending on the wind and other weather conditions, an ammonia
    cloud could dissipate in just a few hours.
        But what about an event that could render buildings,
    businesses, and other operations near the port unusable for
    days, even weeks? Based on studies and historical data, we can
    project the impact on those 4,100 businesses within the 1-mile
    radius of the port would be up to $68 million in lost payroll
    in just 1 week's time, and that doesn't begin to touch lost
    productivity. It is not unreasonable to expect that some
    businesses could not survive the disruption. Some employers,
    including county government, have alternate relocation plans.
    Even so, implementing those plans could be difficult.
        I think you have received a copy of my comments. I know my
    time is over, but what I am trying to say to you is that we
    have a potentially very disastrous situation here without
    Federal funding to assist us in equipping this community for
    anything that could happen. We could be extremely vulnerable,
    and it would be a very unhappy scene. Thank you.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Commissioner Frank. We appreciate
    your needs assessment for Hillsborough County. And without
    objection, we will enter it into the record at this point.
    Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Frank follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Commissioner Hart, you are recognized. Welcome
    to the subcommittee.
        Mr. Hart. Good afternoon, Representative Putnam, and Mr.
    Chairman and Representative Davis. Thank you for being here
    today and offering me the opportunity to testify before your
    committee.
        I am elected at large to represent the people in
    Hillsborough County and residents of our three cities of Tampa,
    Plant City, and Temple Terrace. I wanted to thank you for being
    here today, because since the events of September 11th, I know
    that I have testified before a number of congressional
    committees regarding both transportation and homeland security
    not only affecting my community, but also America's deeply held
    concerns, in my role of the leadership of the National
    Association of Counties. However, today I am most appreciative
    that you have taken the time to host this meeting at the Port
    of Tampa specifically on port security, clearly because the
    port has a major impact on our community's economy and the
    Tampa Bay region as well.
        Since the horrific events of September 11th, I have served
    on a Homeland Security Task Force in Washington, DC. In this
    capacity I work closely with Governor Tom Ridge, Transportation
    Secretary Norm Mineta, other Cabinet members and Members of
    Congress in addressing both emergency actions, legislation and
    funding for local and national-level security concerns dealing
    with terrorism, transportation, and the public safety.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my remarks on one
    primary area, the role that county government plays in
    management of security and actions taken to enhance seaport
    security.
        Hillsborough County has developed an integrated strategy.
    In fact, our Chair, Commissioner Pat Frank, has provided that
    to you, so we will be a little bit redundant in this regard.
    But we have developed an integrated strategy in collaboration
    with our three cities, the school board, the State's public
    health department, all public and private hospitals, the
    regional water supply authority, sea, air and ground
    transportation organizations, and most assuredly including all
    first responders, and MacDill Air Force Base to include and
    address the extensive security needs of our area.
        We estimate the hard cost impact conservatively here in
    port at $17 million. The Port of Tampa is one of the most
    critical elements. I have attached a copy of Hillsborough
    County's needs assessment for your review. I would suggest that
    it can be a useful guide or model for other communities in
    America.
        Now, one final recommendation for your consideration. The
    U.S. Department of Transportation has an Aviation Security
    Advisory Subcommittee consisting of business and governmental
    leaders appointed by the Secretary of Transportation. It is my
    considered judgment that Congress should strongly consider
    creating a transportation security advisory committee that
    would include maritime and port security as a key component, as
    well as addressing the need for an intermodal approach to
    security. The members of this public-private committee could be
    appointed by either the Secretary of Transportation or by the
    President of the United States. Its specific charge would be to
    make transportation security recommendations to the President
    and to Congress.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. Thank you and
    your committee for this opportunity to testify before you
    today. I look forward to your questions.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Commissioner.
        Mr. Lauer.
        Mr. Lauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative Shays,
    Mr. Davis, it is a pleasure to be here today on behalf of
    Governor Bush, and also on behalf of Commissioner Tim Moore of
    the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. It is a great
    privilege to have you here and to thank you personally for the
    efforts you have taken in supporting Florida in our approach to
    securing our seaports.
        My actual involvement in this began back about 1999 when I
    retired from the Marines Corps and came to the State of
    Florida. I was privileged to work as the deputy to the--in the
    Office of Drug Control, and was one of the individuals who was
    responsible to move this Seaport Security Act that Florida
    passed through the legislature. Subsequently, I moved to the
    Department of Law Enforcement, where I actually conducted with
    a team of individuals the assessment, the initial assessment
    under that law for each of our public seaports.
        On November 27th of last year, I was appointed to my
    current position as the Chief of Domestic Security Initiatives
    for Florida. And so my background kind of leads me to want to
    discuss with you a lot about the Port of Tampa, which is very
    critical to the State of Florida.
        Let me speak for a moment about the State of Florida. Of
    course the Florida Department of Law Enforcement is not in the
    business of seaports and commerce, but the impact of Florida's
    seaports is enormous: $47.6 billion in trade in 2000, 64.5
    percent of Florida's entire international trade, $3 billion in
    direct expenditures in cruises, from the cruise industry, 11.8
    million passengers, 15 cruise lines; the three largest cruise
    seaports in the world, 2.5 million shipping containers, 265,000
    jobs statewide.
        Florida's seaports deserve to be protected. The Seaport
    Security Act which came into effect on July 1, 2001, was the
    first effort to do that, in fact the first act to mandate
    minimum security standards in the ports, and they are minimum
    security standards.
        We conducted the assessments of each of the ports according
    to that law in the fall of 2001, immediately following the
    attacks on September 11th. The initial impetus to protect our
    seaports was against drug smuggling and against cargo theft. 50
    percent, in 2000, of all of the cocaine coming into the United
    States came through Florida seaports. That is an enormous
    figure and requires protection.
        That connection to narcotics, as I will mention in a
    moment, continues in this respect. Under domestic security,
    Governor Bush demanded and we immediately undertook the
    creation of a domestic security strategy that encompassed a
    holistic view of the entire State of Florida. Seaports are an
    integral part of that. Governor Bush created seven regional
    domestic security task forces. There is one here in Tampa,
    which Commissioner Moore as the Crisis Manager will execute
    that responsibility.
        Under domestic security we view two primary areas of threat
    or vulnerability in our seaports. The first are those things
    that are on the seaport, that are vulnerable. We consider the
    cruise terminals and the cruise vessels to be first and our
    hazardous materials storage to be second in that effort. We
    believe that the measures that have been taken to date, in
    particular the protection of those particular high value
    assets, have been significant and correct.
        Our partnership with the Coast Guard in the protection of
    the cruise vessels is particularly important because you see
    there a true partnership between the Coast Guard responsibility
    on the seaside and our responsibility in the State on the land
    side. That coordination and cooperation has created we believe
    the safest cruise industry in the world.
        The second area of vulnerability is that of pass-through,
    the things that pass through our seaports. This area we believe
    is a primary concern for ours because of the ability of people
    who want to do harm to the United States to use existing
    smuggling networks, smuggling organizations to move things
    through Florida, and these are things that we know have--in
    Colombia as an example that have connections to terrorists, to
    terrorism, the ability of them to use or others to use these
    existing networks that exist today across the State of Florida
    and have been in existence roughly 30 years. That is a
    vulnerability and a key that we would like to see assistance
    from the Federal Government.
        We are particularly concerned with our ability to work with
    you, our Federal partners, concerned in this sense. We are
    doing a great job at the local level, at the Seaport Security
    Committee you have heard discussed here today. We are doing
    great work, but gaps exist. We strongly support the creation
    and development of a Department of Homeland Security as a means
    to better coordinate all of those efforts on the seaport.
        You will hear again after this panel multiple Federal
    agencies that are responsible. I would like to leave you with
    this thought. Seaport security in the State of Florida is local
    security. The background against which all of our Federal
    partners work on our seaports is against local security
    measures taken by a seaport for local guards, for cameras, for
    gates, for access control, for badges, for background checks of
    local police officials, uniformed officers, all paid for by the
    revenues from that seaport or by the citizens of that
    community, and the creation of that department and its
    integration in the sharing of information across these
    requirements is critical to our success.
        I want to thank you for all that you have done, the support
    that Congress has given to us, particularly the award of the
    $19.2 million for our seaport in recognition of the significant
    efforts that Florida has taken, and look forward to working
    with you in partnership. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lauer follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Mr. Lauer. Looking forward
    to your answers to several of our questions, and we certainly
    appreciate the work that have you done on this. Obviously you
    are a pioneer in seaport security with regard to the drug and
    narcotics level, but certainly has other benefits as well.
        You are recognized. Welcome to the subcommittee.
        Mr. Gee. Good afternoon, Chairman Shays and subcommittee
    members. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today
    about protecting the Port of Tampa from terrorist attacks. For
    the purposes of this open hearing, I have restricted my
    testimony, both written and verbal, to general concerns about
    port security. Specific threat assessment information, which
    includes data unique to the Port of Tampa, has been compiled by
    our staff and can be provided to you at a later time should you
    request it.
        The Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office employs over 2,800
    people and provides service for more than 666,000 residents of
    unincorporated Hillsborough County. The agency is responsible
    for a jurisdiction of over 900 square miles. It is ranked the
    eighth largest suburban county law enforcement agency force
    staff in the Nation.
        Since the terrorist tacks of September 11, 2001, the agency
    has redirected substantial resources to provide improved
    security to the Port of Tampa and also Tampa International
    Airport.
        In July 2002, through contract with the Port of Tampa, a
    16-deputy Security Unit was deployed to the port. This unit of
    specially trained sheriff's deputies provided 24-hour
    enforcement services to areas of the port under the control of
    the Tampa Port Authority.
        In addition to the 16 deputies assigned as a land-based
    port Security Unit, this agency has redeployed eight deputies
    into waterborne patrol assignment. These eight deputies, which
    represent more than 60 percent of our Marine Unit, provide 24-
    hour patrolled waters surrounding Tampa Bay in the Port of
    Tampa, and assist the U.S. Coast Guard with enforcement of
    restrictions placed on dock and vessel access. Although greatly
    improving patrol and security of county waterways, redeployment
    of personnel into domestic security assignments negatively
    impacts the number of deputies available to respond to calls
    for service.
        To further support these deployments to the Port of Tampa,
    this agency has allocated up to 13 additional deputies at a
    time to full-time homeland security assignments. These deputies
    conduct security assignments, attend intelligence and security
    briefings, present domestic security programs to the community,
    and provide increased antiterrorism investigative services and
    support to Federal and local and State agencies.
        In addition to personnel redeployment, we have redirected
    other resources to provide improved port security. After
    September 11th, the Sheriff's Aviation Unit began routine
    flyovers of port properties. Additionally, the Sheriff's Office
    purchased an additional helicopter which when delivered will be
    equipped with a gyrocamera remote surveillance system to
    provide real-time surveillance for port and other locations.
        We are in the process of obtaining specialized emergency
    response equipment and a new automated fingerprint
    identification system through State and Federal grants. This
    system will allow Federal and local agencies to rapidly
    ascertain the identity of persons arrested at the port and
    throughout Hillsborough County.
        In order to continue assisting the U.S. Coast Guard with
    24-hour patrols, we are working to purchase two new dedicated
    port security vessels. In addition to the law enforcement
    personnel, interagency cooperation is essential to the war on
    terrorism. Through these collaborations with others, our law
    enforcement agencies work together to establish effective
    terrorism prevention and response strategies.
        I would like to end my remarks today by addressing the
    challenges that Hillsborough County faces in planning for and
    implementing Port of Tampa security enhancement measures.
    Securing the port's large and diverse perimeter from
    unauthorized penetration is one of Hillsborough County's
    greatest domestic security challenges. As we all know, no
    terrorist operation is successful without outside assistance.
        The Port of Tampa was designed long before anyone
    envisioned the need for security requirements that we are
    discussing today. Prior to the events of September, all of the
    port's main access roads were completely unmonitored and open
    to the public.
        As detailed in my agency's written testimony, the port has
    substantial and varied points of entry via land, water and sea
    and air. Securing the port's many avenues of access and
    monitoring and controlling its flow of operations is an
    extremely formidable undertaking. Although there have been
    significant improvements to port security, there are three
    areas that substantial resources must continue to be
    redirected: Local law enforcement personnel, communications and
    information systems technology, and multiagency planning and
    training. It is essential that my agency be able to hire
    additional deputies if we are going to be able to devote
    adequate manpower to terrorist prevention and response
    initiatives while at the same time providing basic public
    safety services to Hillsborough County's residents.
        Beyond personnel, the events of September 11th make clear
    that communications, sharing information, and coordination of
    response activities are essential to effective crisis
    management. Within Hillsborough County, Federal funding is
    needed to establish reliable, effective information sharing
    systems, and to facilitate ongoing multiagency planning and
    training exercises.
        Only through adequate staffing, effective information
    sharing, and expanded training can Hillsborough County's
    emergency management and response agencies prevent or minimize
    the large scale loss of life and property which can conceivably
    result from a terrorist attack on the Port of Tampa.
        Chairman Shays and members of the committee, it has been my
    pleasure to speak to you today. I thank you on behalf of
    Sheriff Henderson, who is out of town, and look forward to
    working with you in any matters of national security.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gee follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Chief Deputy Gee. We
    appreciate your presence here today. And we will have a 10-
    minute round of questions, beginning with Chairman Shays.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        If I could expose my ignorance, but then be able to put
    something in perspective. My understanding, in Hillsborough
    County you have seven commissioners, is that right?
        Ms. Frank. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. You are both executive and legislative, as well?
        Ms. Frank. We are executive and legislative, but on the
    other hand, we have a County Administrator who carries out the
    operations. He is the administrator of the operation.
        Mr. Shays. You are the chairperson.
        Ms. Frank. Yes. I have been for 3 years.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Hart, how long have you been a commissioner?
        Mr. Hart. This is my 8th year.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Lauer, to understand, you are as domestic--
    Chief of Domestic Security, does that mean that you basically
    have homeland security responsibilities in the State of
    Florida?
        Mr. Lauer. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. It is focused just--not just as a small just,
    but it is focused primarily on homeland security?
        Mr. Lauer. Yes, sir, it is.
        Mr. Shays. And Deputy Chief, you are the chief operating
    officer of the Sheriff's Department as well as responsible for
    homeland security?
        Mr. Gee. Essentially that is correct. I am the chief
    operating officer. We have an elected sheriff who is out of
    town today. He is the regional chairman for the State of
    Florida for the homeland security effort in the State of
    Florida.
        Mr. Shays. I am sorry, I should have gotten this, but does
    Hillsborough County include all three ports or just Tampa?
        Ms. Frank. No, just Tampa.
        Mr. Shays. So do you interface? Do you interface, Mr. Hart,
    with the other commissioners? Are we talking about one other
    county or two counties, the other two ports?
        Mr. Hart. It is Pinellas County and Manatee County.
        Mr. Shays. So three counties?
        Mr. Hart. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Are you all working collectively, all three
    counties, to look at this issue or are you basically looking at
    your own particular ports?
        Mr. Hart. We started looking collectively within our
    community, and have opened it up, as both separately through
    the Port Authority and their working relationships in security,
    but through our process of saying if there are other counties,
    adjacent cities that would like to collaborate with us--for
    example, Pinellas County would like to work with us on
    communications for interoperability. We also have medical
    agreements with hospitals. Pasco County Sheriff is a
    reinforcement for mutual aid. He would like to work with us. We
    are currently working on other areas as well.
        Mr. Shays. Ms. Franks, would you add anything to that?
        Ms. Frank. No. But I would say that of course we want to
    cooperate with other entities. But there is very definitely a
    division.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough. In the State of Connecticut we have
    no county governments ironically, so we have no even regional
    approaches quite often when it would be helpful.
        Chief, in reading your bio it--I am getting to a point
    here, you will understand what I am getting to. But it says the
    Chief is deputized as a U.S. Marshal, and is a member of the
    FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. He is commissioned as a U.S.
    Customs Officer at DEA and is the agency's liaison to Customs
    Service.
        So are you all of those things?
        Mr. Gee. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. Now, explain to me the impact of being a
    deputized U.S. Marshal and as a member of the FBI Joint
    Terrorism Task Force and commissioned as a U.S. Customs Officer
    at DEA and liaison to Customs. I want to understand, is that
    important and why and is that typical?
        Mr. Gee. Well, some of those initiatives, the Customs
    Service initially was part of the drug initiative in this area,
    part of the Blue Light Task Force where the Customs Service,
    going back a number of years, commissioned local law
    enforcement officers and gave them authority under Federal
    statutes to enforce certain customs laws.
        Obviously a lot of times there are more of us out there at
    night in our Marine Unit than there would be maybe Customs
    officers. And we had the ability to board vessels under certain
    circumstances and these things and to enforce drug laws. And of
    course now things are a little different.
        Mr. Shays. Do you need U.S. Marshal status in order to
    board a ship, or once it is in your local----
        Mr. Gee. No. The U.S. Marshal status has to do with the
    Joint Terrorism Task Force, with the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation. That is related to homeland security and to our
    terrorism initiative. That enables us to participate with the
    Federal Government in these investigations. I am the liaison
    between our agency and the FBI.
        Mr. Shays. Some Federal employees do not have the ability
    to make arrests, some departments, agencies do not have the
    ability to carry firearms. This is not because you lack certain
    powers in your county responsibilities, correct; you have all
    of the power to make arrests and so on?
        Mr. Gee. Right. What essentially it does is it gives us the
    ability to share information that normally you wouldn't give to
    local law enforcement.
        Mr. Shays. You are more apt to get Federal information. One
    of the initiatives that Mr. Putnam and the rest of the
    committee has done is in one of our hearings we basically
    learned that the FBI was not sharing data with the INS or the
    State Department when they were considering allowing visas.
    Pretty shocking.
        Then the other issue that our committee became very
    involved in is being able to allow a commissioner, allow a
    State official, allow a county or local official to be plugged
    into intelligence information that might be helpful in dealing
    with terrorist issues, and kind of gets me to this point here.
        Customs is going to board a ship and look for stuff,
    things. INS is going to board and look for people. The Ag--
    Department of Agriculture is going to come aboard to look at
    animals as well as crops. The FDA is going to potentially--I
    make an assumption--is going to come on board, the Coast Guard,
    the DEA.
        One of the things that we are hoping happens--well, excuse
    me, more than hoping, we are determined to see that it
    happens--is that the Customs and the INS have the ability to, I
    was going to say cross fertilize, but that wouldn't be the
    right word, to have the ability to--but have the ability to do
    each other's jobs. And I just want to make sure that the local
    and State folk are plugged into this issue.
        And maybe, Mr. Lauer, maybe you can talk to me about the
    challenges that exist and the incentives you would like to see
    or legislation or whatever to make sure there is integration
    and so on. Maybe it is not a problem.
        Mr. Lauer. It is a problem. It is a problem across all
    seaports. It is a problem of knowing who is doing what and when
    they are doing it. We have attempted to resolve that problem
    through the formation, and in the law to require that each port
    have a seaport security committee. Through the Department of
    Law Enforcement we have created a subcommittee to that which
    brings the enforcement agencies together, on a monthly basis
    roughly, in which they bring, whether it is DEA or FBI or INS
    who has an enforcement responsibility, so that they are able to
    talk across their boundaries. That works to a point.
        I think the--what we have on our seaports is, as you have
    witnessed here, is a very strong cooperation at the local
    level. I think the difficulty that we all have in dealing with
    our Federal counterparts is the number of their
    responsibilities that go back to Washington. The lack of local
    coordinators across for each of these local agencies is a
    difficulty in enforcement.
        And if there were to be--in answer to that, I would say
    that we would encourage--if and when the Department of Homeland
    Security is formed, that they encourage this creation of
    regional or local leadership of the local Federal agencies that
    are down here, for all of them, simply an inspector and Customs
    manifest to report back to Washington, an investigator has a
    chain back to Washington. The lack of that local integration I
    think is something we would like to see coordinated better.
        Mr. Shays. That is the message that we have heard in other
    hearings that we have had.
        Mr. Chairman, I would just like to put on the record,
    because I know there has to be some interest and concern on
    this issue, I am absolutely convinced, just based on the work
    that we have done, that the Coast Guard will play a much more
    influential role under a Department of Homeland Security, not
    forget its other responsibilities. But if you were--if the
    Coast Guard were a business and you were looking to make a
    smart investment, you would invest in the Coast Guard, because
    their mission clearly will be more better recognized and the
    resources that will go to them I think will be quite
    significant.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, sir. The gentleman from Davis
    Island, Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. When the State passed a very good law
    mandating these assessment plans which you helped develop, how
    did the State envision that the various port authorities would
    fund the improvements that were called for?
        Mr. Lauer. There was no mandates to fund them. We looked
    initially to the fact that--two ways: One, to the TOPS fund,
    transportation outreach, which is the first funding that was
    provided; second, through Federal funding. In 2001, the
    legislature budgeted and Governor Bush signed into law the TOPS
    fund for $7 million to begin the appropriation of funding
    toward these improvements.
        The ports, seaports identified about $45 million worth of
    improvements required to meet the minimum standards. We went
    into that session in 2001 with a general agreement that the
    State would seek $34 million of that funding. So roughly 75
    percent of it would be funded by the State over the course of 2
    or 3 years. The remaining 25 percent would be left to the ports
    to fund.
        The $7 million was funded, as I said, and this year there
    is an amount of funding, about $10 million, that comes to them
    for economic development from Seaport Transportation and
    Economic Development funds. Those FSTED funds granted
    flexibility to the seaports for the next 2 years to fund these
    either for economic improvements or for security improvements
    on the seaport, in essence trying to mirror what the Federal
    Government has done with FAA funding to airports. It allows
    them now for 2 years to fund a combination of either economic
    or security improvements on the seaports.
        My role was initially to try to find that $34 million worth
    of funding for the seaports. So far we have funded less than
    the $34 million, $19 and $7 so far.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. So the State only put in $7?
        Mr. Lauer. The State put in $7 in 2001. The Federal
    Government just funded the $19 million.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. So the State essentially, and I know
    you can't speak for the Governor and the legislature, but the
    State basically forced the ports to choose between funding
    their economic development and funding security, at least in
    this year's appropriation?
        Mr. Lauer. I don't know if I would say they forced them to
    do so. They gave them the option. They gave them flexibility.
    The intent of that flexibility was so that could move forward
    in providing some of the funding that was necessary.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Would you speculate that perhaps the
    State might be more aggressive in funding, for example, if--as
    you probably know very well, one of the best uses of Federal
    dollars is to leverage State and local dollars. And we don't
    know what this is going to look like, but it might require some
    State and maybe local matching money. What are the chances the
    State will more aggressively fund security, particular one-time
    nonrecurring revenue needs of the ports in the future?
        Mr. Lauer. I think the State has demonstrated that they
    would, and they will try to find that kind of funding. If we go
    to a State match, I would encourage that from the Federal
    Government, that we put that match in kind, as well as in
    dollars, give them some option to do that, because all of the
    seaports, and I think this was unique in Florida, across all of
    the seaports in Florida, none of them waited for someone to
    tell--to give them money to do this.
        All of them moved forward and did some of this on their own
    in a good faith effort, and I think particularly as a result of
    the requirements of domestic security and protecting their
    seaports and their communities all of them went forth in good
    faith and did some things. The Florida Ports Council has
    reported that all of our seaports have put some $30 million
    into these kinds of measures since September 11th. I do not
    have those figures for you, so I can't break that out. But the
    issue was, is that, yes, the State government and Governor Bush
    and the legislature has shown they intend to assist the
    seaports in doing this, and have focused, particularly in my
    efforts, primarily on trying to find those funds from the
    Federal Government that we can.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Did you get a chance to hear the
    testimony earlier from Mr. Savage about the ID badges? Is that
    a problem that you are aware of? What is the State doing? Is
    there anything the Federal Government can be doing to come up
    with a more foolproof identification system?
        Mr. Lauer. Yes. Two things. One, the issue of the ID badges
    has always been integral to security and access to the seaport.
    I think that one of the key things we have to keep in mind is
    that the ID badges are one part of what we term a very holistic
    view of seaport security.
        It is one measure that is taken among many others to ensure
    that this individual has a right to be on the port, has the
    right to access, get access to restricted access area, to do
    business on the seaport.
        The three ports that you have here have a unique
    arrangement, and they have a common set of ID cards. So the
    same card will work in each of the three ports that exist here.
    One of the difficulties for the entire State going to that
    level is the differences in the way the seaports allow or don't
    allow waivers to the felony background restrictions that the
    law puts in place. The law put in place a series of checks of
    certain felony backgrounds that restrict you from working on
    the seaport within 5 years of your release from incarceration
    or supervision of whatever that felony might have been.
        The law also allows the seaports to create a waiver
    process. Some seaports have said there is not going to be any
    waiver process after January 1, 2002. Others have said there
    will be. And one of the main difficulties in a common card, and
    the Florida Ports Council has taken leave of the seaports today
    to try to resolve this issue, is that a port which does not
    allow a waiver may not want to allow access to an individual
    who has that felony background that has been waived by another
    port.
        I don't know that the Federal Government has a role in
    that, except perhaps in the area that we talked about trucks
    and the idea that the trucking industry would like to see a
    common set of badges across all of the ports. We support that
    initiative and would like to see a common set of badges.
        The difficulty is the background checks and other things
    that are mandated by Florida law come into effect as well in
    those background, felony background restrictions. I think that
    if we are, and I think we are all working toward this, I have
    spoken to the trucking industry on several occasions, to
    indicate that we want to see that occur and we will work with
    the seaports to try and make that playing ground level.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Deputy Chief Gee, in your written
    testimony you referred to the possibility that the Sheriff's
    Office would provide what sounded like a community-based
    policing to the port. Would that be through the COPS program?
        Mr. Gee. Well, that is our vision. We have actually asked
    for 10 positions through what was previously the universal hire
    COPS program. But it is--we are planning on using them a little
    different. We are actually going to try to tailor their duties
    to homeland security. We are certainly hoping--that is probably
    the biggest issue for us is capital and those type of things
    are things that we can get grants for from time to time. You
    can buy a helicopter, you can come up with the money. But for
    local law enforcement to take 15 or 16 people and redirect them
    to different areas is very difficult. We are being reimbursed
    for the port right now, the Port Authority. But, long term--we
    have minimal amount of people down there truthfully. So we are
    hoping that a program like that redirected toward homeland
    security would help us form a homeland Security Unit,
    essentially.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Now, I know that your office is one
    of the leaders in the country in using the COPS program very
    successfully. Is the COPS program written in a way that would
    currently allow you to use these men and women for homeland
    security?
        Mr. Gee. We have spoken to them and we have sent it to
    them. We have tried to tailor it where it does fit. I think it
    is possibly questionable. We think that we have a chance where
    it could pass the way it is. But certainly it was not the
    original--it is not in the original spirit of what it was when
    it started up, you know, a number of years ago. There are some
    differences. We are hoping that we will get some variance on
    that.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Last question for the two
    commissioners, Commissioner Frank, Commissioner Hart. I know
    both of you all have at least served on the Port Authority and
    are very familiar with it. Is there anything further the county
    or the Port Authority can do to fund these expenses is my first
    question.
        The second is, if you are forced to choose between
    spending, say, your own economic dollars for security, what is
    going to be the ultimate impact of that?
        Ms. Frank. Well, let me say that the Port Authority has a
    taxing authority that is permitted, and that budget goes to the
    County Commission as well as the Sheriff's budget goes to the
    County Commission.
        I know that Chairman Shays said that he does--is not
    familiar with county government. But it--the county is the
    umbrella organization through which these budgets flow.
        We have restricted the money that is raised by property
    taxes that the port levies to capital projects which enhance
    the ability of the port to economically grow.
        Only these last 2 years, last year and then it will be
    another year, have we made the exception, and sitting on the
    Port Authority, I of course supported this. And we have spent,
    the port has raised about $5 to $6 million out of property
    taxes for security purposes.
        We anticipate that probably we will have to raise another
    $8 million in property taxes to support security. So we are
    doing a fair share of the financing of the security of the
    port. But, you know, everyone is stressed these days. It
    becomes difficult, because the county has needs also that deal
    with security. We run the Emergency Preparedness Organization,
    which is quite effective and hasn't really been discussed much
    here today. But that is a composite body of representatives in
    the three cities, the Commissioners and the Sheriff's Office.
    Ordinarily we would be preparing for hurricanes. But we also
    have a part to play in the security issues.
        Mr. Hart. That was an excellent question, and I think that
    Chairman Frank answered it as specifically as anyone could
    representing Hillsborough County. There is another aspect as it
    relates to some of the policy questions that Chairman Shays was
    asking, and that Mr. Lauer answered.
        It depends on whether you are talking about a push system
    or a pull system, whether you are talking about it in terms of
    offense or defense. First and foremost, I think we all know
    that acts of terrorism are local events, period, that if local
    government can't handle it then we ask the State and/or Federal
    Government to come in. Nobody is standing there waiting to
    assist us anywhere in America.
        FEMA is as close as Atlanta. You are talking about a staff
    person. You are talking about somebody that is good at writing
    checks as they watch the home float down the river. But you are
    not talking about somebody that is going out on the offense. So
    we have got to take a look at our national policy from the
    standpoint of both the offensive side, but I think, as Mr.
    Lauer said, when they create the office of--Department of
    Homeland Security, what part of that recognizes what happens in
    local government, where regions do work together as we have
    crafted in the State of Florida, and how can we be more
    responsible to be sure of the public safety.
        There are no easy answers. I think as a first cut we have
    all done the best we can. Right now, as you know, there is some
    $700 million hanging in 2002 dollars, sitting in Washington
    unallocated.
        Part of what we did to put our needs assessment together
    was to say, OK, we have put a plan together. Governor Ridge,
    will you help us? But meanwhile you have got issues which I
    think are as weighty when you are talking about what the threat
    is of bioterrorism. Because when you talk about a port, my
    experience from combat is you never see or hear the bullet that
    kills you. So what comes in on a ship, by a person, by grain,
    by livestock, our agricultural connections or people
    connections and our health could be what is actually
    transported instead of us perhaps looking for some terrorist
    that fits a physical description.
        So you have asked a good and tough question. We are simply
    answering that within our ability at every opportunity right
    now.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Thank you, and thank you for your
    work.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Congressman Davis.
        You're basically ahead of your time with the Governor's
    Office of Drug Control preparing the statewide security
    assessment of Florida. That was under your direction, correct?
        Mr. Lauer. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Putnam. The key finding and observations with regard to
    the Port of Tampa were that it was, among other things, wide
    open with no access control, no picture IDs, no background
    checks, no police presence, inadequate fencing. Nonintrusive
    INS technology with U.S. Customs was virtually nonexistent.
    Public roads ran through the port. Little evidence of security
    initiatives integrated into the port master plan, and the
    shrimp docks are isolated and highly vulnerable to smuggling
    activity.
        That was in September 2000. Obviously the world has changed
    since then. So beginning with you, Commissioner Frank, where
    would we be today based on these findings? How have we handled
    many of these deficiencies?
        Ms. Frank. Well, many of those have been taken care of. The
    fences have been raised, the security identification passes,
    all of those have been accommodated. But they were really
    designed more for the pre-September 11th precautions. And this
    is a different situation.
        Unfortunately, I think we have spent some money that we
    shouldn't have spent if we had to look at the way we should do
    it now. I think some of these things, and I agree with some of
    the comments that were made by the users of the port that they
    may not be as productive.
        I recently had a talk with one of the generals out at
    MacDill Air Force Base several days ago. He was indicating to
    me the very sophisticated perimeter surveillance that they have
    instituted out at MacDill. I would like to know what that is. I
    hope that the committee will look at that because he was quite
    impressed with it. And probably far more effective than just
    raising a couple of feet of fencing.
        So I think there are new techniques out there that are
    being addressed for specifically the terrorism security
    situation that we should look at. We have many, many things to
    do.
        Mr. Putnam. Commissioner Hart.
        Mr. Hart. Representative Putnam, I don't think there is
    much I can add to that. I think that the dilemma is at the
    local, State and Federal level we have got historic stovepipes.
    We have got to figure out how to better communicate, how
    interoperability procedures would be routine and not something
    of just a special act so that in fact during our charge for
    day-to-day living we are improving our ability to have a
    society here that better serves and not just focuses on this.
        And yet we don't want to scare the public, but we have got
    to be vigilant on this issue and somehow keep it before us, and
    a public that is very easy to now turn to the fall football
    schedule as their highest priority.
        Mr. Putnam. Mr. Lauer and Chief Deputy Gee, do you believe
    that you are appropriately kept in the loop and informed with
    regard to intelligence sharing and threat and risk analysis
    from the appropriate intelligence agencies in Washington? Has
    that improved?
        Mr. Gee. From my agency standpoint, yes. I know there were
    problems across the country. I can tell you locally with this
    office, and we primarily deal with the FBI on that aspect, we
    did not have those issues here. And since then they have taken
    steps to issue these clearances to those people to keep them in
    the loop. Certainly it is always a need-to-know basis, but we
    have not experienced what maybe other agencies across the
    country have.
        Mr. Putnam. Mr. Lauer.
        Mr. Lauer. I think that I would concur with that at a local
    level across the State. Everywhere that there is one of our
    regional domestic security task forces, its Federal partners
    are members. The FBI is a member of our task force and we are a
    member of their task forces. I think the key issue for access
    has been security clearances and the difficulty in getting
    security clearances to all of those individuals that may need
    them. I think if we can clear the backlog of security
    clearances, I think we could greatly improve where we are
    today. But in no way should we leave with you the impression
    that at the level where the rubber meets the road down here at
    the local level, that all of these agencies are cooperating
    well and we are getting information that is meaningful.
        Mr. Putnam. Has the State of Florida, under your office,
    conducted an internal study, an internal risk analysis of
    Florida's 14 ports, in terms of ranking them by vulnerability
    or risk?
        Mr. Lauer. It is possible of the 12 active ports. Two of
    the 14 are not active public seaports today. I did not rank
    them 1 through 12, And I deliberately chose not to do so. Part
    of that is for competitive purposes. We changed--in fact, you
    will see in the 2000 we changed our assessment of the ports
    into high risk and low risk, medium risk to Tier 1 and Tier 2,
    to take out the stigma that your port is greatly at risk versus
    another port. We wanted to make the distinction that our Tier 1
    ports are our largest economic engines in the State and
    therefore needed to be protected accordingly.
        Our Tier 2 ports were those which had less economic
    activity, but had no less need to be protected. And so the
    issue of a ranking, 1 through 12, seemed to us to be
    counterproductive in the sense that all of our ports needed to
    be equally protected or have access to equal protection.
        I will say that in the order of things that were needed on
    the seaports that our first priority has been those things that
    address access control. And so, for example, when the current
    list of priorities went forward for Federal funding, for the
    $93 million that was just released, from the State of Florida's
    perspective the access control at gates here at the Port of
    Tampa and the gate system at Port Everglades were the top two
    considered for the State to be a requirement.
        What ultimately happened in that process was Tampa received
    $2 million on their $8 million request, and Port Everglades did
    not receive any based on other factors that occurred at the
    Federal level.
        But I think that what we have done is try to assess what
    each port needs in particular, and to try address, in priority,
    those ports in term of our largest economic engines and then
    move them down from Tier 1 and then our Tier 2 smaller ports.
        Mr. Putnam. So there is some prioritization of need?
        Mr. Lauer. Absolutely.
        Mr. Putnam. The industry panel pointed out that they
    desperately needed some standardization, some standard protocol
    and even internationally. But what I believe I heard from this
    panel, perhaps from you, Mr. Lauer, was that we can't even get
    Florida's active seaports to standardize background checks,
    treatment of felons, access control, etc.; is that correct?
        Mr. Lauer. No, I think we have a standard. The problem is
    getting the standards met. There is a standard for all of those
    things. There is a standard for getting a badge on a seaport.
    All of those standards are in effect. There is a standard for a
    fence. I think the key is that in the particular issue of
    whether or not all 12 ports can have the same badge, all of our
    ports are absolutely independent agencies, there is no central
    agency that controls the seaports.
        Mr. Putnam. There is no standard?
        Mr. Lauer. There is a State standard.
        Mr. Putnam. But there is no standardization, they are not
    all up to standard?
        Mr. Lauer. That is correct.
        Mr. Putnam. So while the industry, very rightfully I think,
    would like to see us have an international protocol, the
    highlight of how difficult that is is that Florida can't even
    do it, correct?
        Mr. Lauer. Well----
        Mr. Putnam. How difficult----
        Mr. Lauer. The difficulty is making--getting the standards
    in effect. But I think the key is that Florida has created the
    standards that the ports are being assessed against. I think
    that is really a key feature that we don't want to have missed,
    is that we have a set of standards and the ports are being
    assessed against those every year to bring them up to that
    standard of effectiveness.
        Mr. Putnam. Commissioner Hart, you mentioned something I
    think is very important, the need for an intermodal approach.
    You know, all of our ports are obviously connected to major
    interstates, they have rail lines, generally have--are in close
    proximity to airports. Is there a functioning body currently
    that brings together the expertise from air, rail, land, and
    sea to help you and your fellow commissioners create an
    emergency response plan?
        Mr. Hart. I specifically focused on transportation. At the
    Federal level, though, working with Governor Ridge, he has
    accepted recommendations we have made by the National
    Association of Counties to form that type of group so that all
    of those organizations and interests are talking to each other
    and coming up with a national approach for the very reasons we
    were discussing earlier.
        We don't believe you can have one approach, but therein is
    the issue. Every State has got--just like we have a
    Constitution, every State has a Constitution that is different.
    In Connecticut they don't have counties. Until today, I didn't
    know so many people had ever been to Connecticut.
        Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Putnam. Yes.
        Mr. Shays. I have been thinking about this. When Florida
    wants the best and the brightest, they call on Connecticut.
        Mr. Hart. Mr. Chairman, I think we also found that very few
    people are born here.
        But on a serious note, what we have said is we ought to
    have, you know, guidelines and approach, and there in each
    State, and there in--because each community has got to respond,
    and it has a different capability, it will respond to its
    threat or perceived threat based on its ability and capability.
        But we can't narrow ourselves to just thinking about a
    port, because it is going to connect to roads and rail, and
    trucks, and then other places you are going to see other
    different robust passenger service. Who is checking Amtrak
    going under Grand Central Station? We are doing a great job of
    looking at air, but these are all connected because people and
    goods and services are connected by transportation systems, and
    that is why we must have an intermodal approach to what we do
    for--at least some consistency or threat of continuity that we
    can get buy-in from all of the parties.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Commissioner. Congressman Davis, any
    further thoughts for this panel?
        Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. No question, but just to thank our State folk
    and our county folk and our law enforcement people. I know that
    you all have a very difficult task, and 5 years ago homeland
    security was something that happened in Great Britain and not
    the United States.
        So it is interesting how we adapt, and I think the State of
    Florida is very fortunate to have all four of you.
        Mr. Putnam. With that, we will excuse the second panel and
    take a 5-minute----
        Mr. Shays. One last comment. The chairperson usually get an
    opportunity.
        Ms. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to stretch your
    time, but I think there is one point that I would want to make
    that I find extremely important, and it is piggybacked on what
    Colonel Gee said. Communications is the answer, and I think we
    have great gaps in communications. We don't have systems that
    are able to talk with one other. That is why you can't
    coordinate a lot of things. Much of it is the communications
    system itself, and if there were any need in terms of improving
    that, it would be very helpful, because you have one police
    department that may not be able to get messages from another
    police department. That has happened here.
        Now it is not that way right now, but we do have gaps, as
    you will see from our booklet.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Commissioner. We will
    excuse the second panel, take a 5-minute break, and the
    committee will stand in recess until 3:40.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Putnam. The subcommittee will reconvene. We have a
    large third panel. We want to give everyone plenty of
    opportunity to be heard. I would ask that anyone who is
    accompanying someone who is testifying to please sit in the
    front row, and if you are in the front row if you could please
    make room for accompanying witnesses, and when we swear in the
    panel I would ask all of those who are accompanying a witness
    stand and be sworn as well if you intend to give testimony or
    assist in answering a question.
        Very well. As with the first two panels, we will swear in
    this third panel. So if the witnesses and those accompanying
    the witnesses will please rise.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Putnam. Note for the record the witnesses and those
    accompanying the witnesses responded in the affirmative.
        It is a pleasure to welcome to the subcommittee a very
    distinguished panel. Ms. JayEtta Hecker, Director of the
    Physical Infrastructure Team from the General Accounting
    Office; Mr. Jack Bulger, Acting District Director of
    Immigration and Naturalization Service, who is accompanied by
    Mr. Ronald Johnson, Port Director for Tampa INS; Mr. James
    Baldwin, director of North Florida Customs, accompanied by Ms.
    Denise Crawford, area port director for Tampa, welcome. Captain
    Allen Thompson, former Captain of the Port Marine Safety
    Office, U.S. Coast Guard; Mr. James Jarboe, Special Agent in
    Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tampa office; Dr.
    James G. Butler, Deputy Under Secretary of the Marketing and
    Regulatory Programs for APHIS, USDA, who is accompanied by Ms.
    Mary Neal, Assistant Deputy Administrator Ag Quarantine INS,
    APHIS; and Mr. Carl Davis, Director of Operations for USDA in
    Tampa; Mr. Gary Dykstra, Southeastern Regional Food and Drug
    Director for Food and Drug, who is accompanied by Mr. Leon Law,
    supervisor for the Tampa Resident Post, FDA.
        With that we would recognize Ms. Hecker for 5 minutes. You
    have a 1-minute rollover, and hopefully we can keep our opening
    statements tight so we have time for questions.

          STATEMENTS OF JAYETTA Z. HECKER, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
     INFRASTRUCTURE TEAM, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; JACK BULGER,
    ACTING DISTRICT DIRECTOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DENISE CRAWFORD, AREA
    PORT DIRECTOR, TAMPA, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE; AND RONALD JOHNSON,
     PORT DIRECTOR, TAMPA, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE;
       JAMES BALDWIN, DIRECTOR, NORTH FLORIDA CUSTOMS MANAGEMENT
      CENTER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE; CAPTAIN ALAN THOMPSON, FORMER
      CAPTAIN OF THE PORT MARINE SAFETY OFFICE, TAMPA, U.S. COAST
     GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN JAMES FARLEY, CAPTAIN, PORT OF
    TAMPA; JAMES F. JARBOE, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, TAMPA, FEDERAL
        BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; JAMES G. BUTLER, DEPUTY UNDER
     SECRETARY, MARKETING AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS, ACCOMPANIED BY
      MARY NEAL, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR AGRICULTURAL
       QUARANTINE INSPECTION, ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION
     SERVICE; AND CARL DAVIS, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, TAMPA, U.S.
       DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; AND GARY DYKSTRA, SOUTHEASTERN
                    REGIONAL FOOD AND DRUG DIRECTOR

        Ms. Hecker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Very pleased
    to be here today. And I will provide a report, really, on the
    outstanding work that GAO has been doing on port security. We
    have been doing this on our own initiative. So this is really
    the first time that we are reporting that.
        The work that we have done involves looking at eight major
    ports, including three here in Florida, because of the
    leadership activity on the part of Florida. We also have talked
    to and looked at records and programs of all of the major
    Federal agencies and looked at State and local government
    activities in those eight ports. So we really have a broad base
    of knowledge to really comment on the three issues that we are
    focusing on today.
        One is the vulnerabilities of ports. This is nationally.
    Second, what kind of initiatives have been taken at the
    Federal, State and local level? And, finally, what are some of
    the key challenges that remain?
        Now, what I will do is just give you the answer to those.
    You kind of have the answer in the summary of my statement, but
    I will highlight that quickly and then try to weave together
    some of the comments we have heard today and how that connects
    to some of the challenges that we outlined in our statement.
        Basically the answer to the issue of vulnerability is that
    ports are very vulnerable, they are inherently vulnerable. Some
    are more vulnerable than others. I think we have heard that
    Tampa is among the more vulnerable. The very nature of it, the
    expansive nature, how open it is, how hard it is to secure, the
    volume of goods and people going through the port. There are
    fundamental challenges not only for things coming through the
    port, but of course the port as a target itself. There are a
    lot of attractive targets at this port and, unfortunately, many
    others.
        So the vulnerabilities are pretty consistent across the
    board. All of the ports that we visited had significant
    vulnerabilities. We went to two of the ports that had received
    the Defense Threat Assessment review of their status, and all
    of those had serious problems, and, unfortunately, they weren't
    being actively corrected. So the vulnerabilities are there.
        The second issue then we had was what is being done about
    it? Clearly post-September 11th there has been an enormous up-
    tick in activity at all of the Federal agencies, at all of the
    local agencies. You have heard it all today. There is clearly
    an awareness that this is a very significant threat and that
    people need to work together, resources are needed, substantial
    change in the attitude that everything is just to facilitate
    free-flow, that there has to be some balance now with the
    security issues.
        So the initiatives are many. We number them throughout. Go
    through the range of initiatives. Florida, as you heard today,
    really is one of the lead States. It is really, as we
    understand it, the only State that is really ahead of the game
    in having State standards, trying to implement them, trying to
    enforce them. So the Federal Government has a lot to learn from
    Florida.
        There are also very different local initiatives. Again, you
    have heard some of that today. So the issue of initiatives is
    people got the message. This is a very serious situation. And
    there are very few people who are not aware of it and not
    taking some steps.
        The concern, though, is that these initiatives don't amount
    to anywhere near addressing the magnitude of the problem or
    really moving us toward secure ports. They are in the right
    direction. They are the right kind of initiatives. But the
    challenges that we see remaining are substantial to really
    implement and make effective those kind of improvements to the
    security of the port.
        The challenges that we outlined, and it is interesting, you
    have heard them all today, they are not really a surprise. The
    issue of standards. How to define them, how to apply them, how
    to enforce them. Very complicated issues there. And this is
    everything from the access rules and the height of the fence
    and where the fence has to be, waterside protection, as well as
    landside, airside. We heard a question--that was your
    question--about the planes going over. So what are the
    standards? How well will they be enforced? How consistently?
        The second challenge is resources. Almost universally we
    heard concerns about where the resources is going to come. I
    think Representative Davis asked a lot of important questions
    about the State role, the local role, the private role. That
    really is an important issue of how the costs get shared, not
    just what are they. And, frankly, we don't know. We have no
    idea what the total cost will be. But the issue of the cost
    sharing and the appropriate cost sharing is an interesting one.
        And the final concern is getting all of these partners
    working together. I think you have heard the challenges to make
    that work here. There are local partnerships. There are of
    course all of the Federal partnerships which are anything but
    resolved by the creation of the Department of Homeland
    Security. They still have to figure out how to work together in
    the department, and they still have more parties outside the
    department than in. So the Federal house is not in order
    instantaneously by establishment of the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        And then we also heard another whole dimension of
    cooperation and partnerships internationally, really building
    effective agreements with trading partners and commercial firms
    to really find and explore an efficient way to bring about the
    kind of security that we need in our Nation's ports.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bulger, you are recognized. Welcome to the
    subcommittee.
        Mr. Bulger. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me here
    today to address you on behalf of the U.S. Immigration and
    Naturalization Service. I am pleased to appear before you today
    along with so many of our Federal agencies, as well as various
    State and local agencies, Tampa Port Authority, local industry
    representatives and other stakeholders to discuss seaport
    security.
        The Florida District of INS has developed and maintained
    several aggressive enforcement operations aimed at preventing
    the smuggling of aliens, terrorists, criminals and contraband
    into the United States at our ports of entry. One of the most
    significant actions to date has been the establishment of the
    first terminal inspection operations for cruise ships at our
    Florida seaport locations, including here at the Port of Tampa.
        Developed with cooperation between the industry and INS,
    these new facilities are designed to resemble international
    airport style inspection areas. This new approach has allowed
    us to facilitate travel, while we also increase our enforcement
    efforts as arriving cruise ship passengers are now more
    quickly, but also more thoroughly inspected by INS personnel.
        INS has also taken measures to enhance security regarding
    the inspection of crew members on cruise ships. We have
    strengthened our policies to limit more strictly any waivers of
    documentary requirements to better track deserters and
    absconding crewmen, and to require security guards to ensure
    that any nonadmissible crew do not disembark. These policies
    and our cruise ship facility enhancements create a more secure
    seaport while at the same time facilitating travel.
        In addition, we are very pleased with the partnership we
    have developed with the State of Florida under the auspices of
    the domestic security task forces that we have heard spoken
    about earlier today. This is an opportunity, unique in INS, and
    the first in the country, in which State and local law
    enforcement officers will be designated as Immigration and
    Naturalization Service officers.
        There are now 35 local and State law enforcement personnel
    who are undergoing a 6-week training program at the FDLE in
    Orlando. Now, the training is being conducted by INS personnel
    from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. At the
    conclusion of that training next week, these 35 officers will
    be designated as U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
    officers. They will work under the supervision of INS
    personnel, and we feel that the effective force multiplier that
    they will provide will allow for greater coordination and
    cooperation as these domestic security task force operations
    attempt to make our ports more secure.
        This is an opportunity for us that we see--we are seeing a
    great deal of interest around the country as other States
    discuss the possibility of emulating this very important
    initiative.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks in
    the interest of brevity.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bulger follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Baldwin, welcome to the subcommittee.
        Mr. Baldwin. Thank you vice-chairman Putnam, Representative
    Davis. Thank you for this opportunity to testify here today. A
    formal statement is a matter of the record, so I will summarize
    what I have here today.
        Since September 11th, Commissioner Bonner's top priority
    for the Customs Service has been responding to the continuing
    threat at our seaports, our airports and our land borders. Our
    highest priority is doing everything that we reasonably and
    responsibly can to keep terrorist and terrorist weapons from
    entering the United States.
        Coupled with this priority are our efforts to ensure that
    legitimate trade and commerce carries on with as minimal amount
    of impact as possible. Today I would like to describe some of
    the steps Customs has taken to secure our Nation's seaports
    while balancing the flow of legitimate commerce.
        Since the attack, Customs has operated a Level 1 alert
    across the country, including at the seaports. Level 1 requires
    a sustained, intensive antiterrorist-related inspection of
    travelers and goods at every port of entry. Because of this
    continuing threat, we remain at Level 1 this day, and will
    continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
        To help ensure that Customs develops a coordinated,
    integrated counterterrorism strategy, Commissioner Bonner
    established a new Office of Antiterrorism in the Customs
    Service. In addition, the Office of Border Security has been
    established to provided real-time tactical information on
    targeting techniques for travelers and cargo. This office
    serves as a single point of contact for events that take place
    in the field.
        Our efforts to security American seaports from the threat
    of terrorism must go beyond fortifying our own ports. From
    every perspective, all nations must realize how global trade
    will be impacted should a catastrophic event occur.
        As mentioned earlier by this committee, the vast majority
    of world trade, about 90 percent, moves in containers, much of
    it being carried by ocean-going vessels. Nearly half of all
    incoming trade to the United States, about 46 percent, arrives
    by ship, and most of that in containers.
        In an effort to ensure that legitimate trade is not
    compromised, Customs has established the Customs Trade
    Partnership Against Terrorism, which we call CTPAT. This
    program builds on our past success in security models with
    Customs and the trade industry that were designed to prevent
    legitimate cargo shipments from being used to smuggle illegal
    drugs.
        Members of the trade community are now working to tighten
    up security throughout their supply chains to prevent the
    exploitation by terrorists. Since September 11th staffing here
    in Tampa has increased and increased throughout the Nation. We
    have augmented Tampa with approximately six inspectors whose
    positions have been given under the auspices of seaport
    security alone.
        The ability to target effectively is paramount to our
    ability to be able to intercede, interdict weapons of mass
    destruction. Timely, accurate and complete information is vital
    to homeland security, and it should be mandated to be provided
    in advance of all cargo importations and in-bond shipments.
    There is current legislation now, such as S. 1214, which takes
    a major step to where we ultimately need to be.
        Customs believes that it must do everything possible to
    push our line of defense outwards. Thus, we employ what we call
    defense-in-depth strategy; essentially our perimeters of
    security are at the point of origin. Pushing our security
    outwards will allow Customs to be more proactive to potential
    threats, to stop them before they reach us, and to expedite the
    flow of low-risk commerce across our borders.
        A critical element of Customs' overall defense-in-depth
    strategy is the Container Security Initiative, which we call
    CSI. The CSI places U.S. Customs personnel in the world's major
    shipping ports to identify, prescreen those containers that
    post the highest risk of containing terrorists and terrorist
    weapons before they are shipped to the United States.
        The core elements of CSI are, first, establishing
    international security criteria for identifying containers that
    pose high risk for terrorist or terrorist weapons; second,
    maximizing the detection technology that we use to prescreen
    containers, and the third, developing and deploying smart
    boxes. Those are boxes of secure containers which have
    electronic seals which will indicate to Customs and the
    carriers or the importers that the container has been tampered
    with.
        CSI is well underway. Through agreements with the
    governments of Canada, we have started the process of screening
    500,000 containers that are destined to the United States each
    year from Montreal, Vancouver and Halifax.
        We also have agreements in place now with the Netherlands,
    France, Belgium, and Singapore. Customs is actively working to
    pursue with other nations, at least the 20 top ports in the
    world in terms of volume of cargo and tonnage. Targeting is one
    form of our technology used by Customs, but we also have a
    number of technologies that we use here in Tampa. For example,
    we have the vehicle and cargo X-ray inspection system which is
    called VACIS, which allows us to x-ray a container to determine
    if there is any anomalies in those containers prior to opening
    the containers. The VACIS not only allows us to expeditiously
    examine the container, but also provides a greater level of
    security for the inspectors involved in the examination.
        There is also two mobile x-ray vans here in the area Port
    of Tampa for use in the seaport environment in the tri-port
    area. In addition, all of our uniformed personnel in this area
    have been assigned radiation detection pagers that they wear.
        As you can see, current technology available is of utmost
    importance to the Customs Service. We look forward to the
    Automated Commercial Environment, which we call ACE.
        Terrorists have already exploited one key component of our
    transportation system. It is not unthinkable that they will
    seek to target others. I will conclude my remarks with that.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Baldwin follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Mr. Baldwin.
        Captain Thompson, welcome.
        Captain Thompson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Putnam,
    Mr. Davis and distinguished members of the committee. It is a
    pleasure to appear before you today to discuss Coast Guard
    homeland security and securing seaports.
        I am Captain Allen Thompson, Chief, Marine Safety Division,
    7th Coast Guard District, and past Captain of the Port, and
    Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Office, Tampa. With me today
    is Captain James Farley. He is the current Captain of the Port
    in Tampa and responsible for Coast Guard Marine Safety Division
    on the West Coast of Florida.
        On behalf of the Commandant, Admiral Thomas Collins, I
    thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today. Let me
    begin by echoing and reinforcing the Commandant's support for
    inclusion of the Coast Guard in President Bush's proposed
    Department of Homeland Security. My experience on the front
    lines of our homeland security efforts have convinced me that
    we must take this important step to improve coordination
    between the various agencies that secure our borders and
    transportation systems.
        Closer quarters with the our colleagues at Customs, INS,
    Animal and Plant Health Services and Transportation Security
    Administration will help the Coast Guard improve its
    performance as the lead Federal agency for our maritime
    homeland security. In the Tampa Bay region, and on the West
    Coast of Florida, three major Coast Guard commands, Marine
    Safety Office Tampa, Group St. Petersburg, and Air Station
    Clearwater are responsible for maritime law enforcement and
    other Coast Guard missions.
        The Captain of the Port responsibilities include
    maintaining the safety and security of nearly 380 miles of
    coastline contained in three of Florida's 14 deepwater ports,
    Tampa, Manatee, and St. Petersburg, and many more port-related
    facilities. In this region, our Nation's 10th largest port and
    Florida's largest deepwater port, 50 percent of all of the
    hazardous material and half of Florida's fuel enter through
    Tampa Bay. More than 4,000 commercial ships call on this port
    and this region every year, and over 650,000 passengers embark
    from the Port of Tampa.
        Following the attacks of September 11th, we took several
    steps to enhance the safety of marine transportation systems
    and security at our ports. First and foremost, we started
    controlling the movement of all traffic in our ports and
    waterways. We focused on high-risk vessels, including tankers
    carrying gas, oil and chemicals. We also focused on vessels of
    high interest, with a concentration of passengers. These are
    high capacity passenger vessels, cruise ships and ferries.
        Furthermore, we identified and developed security schemes
    for significant physical security infrastructure such as
    bridges, power plants, MacDill Air Force Base and the nuclear
    power plant in Crystal River. To more effectively utilize
    available resources and carry out the port security mandates,
    the Coast Guard commands established a Unified Marine Safety
    and Security Task Force, Western Florida.
        This structure gave us the opportunity for seamless
    coordination and execution for all of our port security
    operations and traditional missions. These efforts provided
    long-term stability, sustainability and enabled the Coast Guard
    and other agencies to perform the traditional missions.
        As we look forward and since the attacks, we have
    strengthened the relationship with Federal, State and local law
    enforcement agencies. We engage all regional intelligence
    networks and are actively involved in the U.S. Attorney's Joint
    Antiterrorist Task Force as well as the three Florida
    Department of Law Enforcement Regional Domestic Security Task
    Forces on the West Coast of Florida.
        I would be remiss if I did not note that the government
    agencies' efforts to improve maritime security in the region
    received outstanding support and cooperation from the maritime
    community and was enhanced by the superb forum provided by the
    Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee. I firmly believe that a
    viable Harbor Safety Committee or similar type organization
    will be paramount in facilitating trade and securing our
    seaports in the future.
        We do face significant challenges in the future. All ports
    in this region are projecting significant growth and are
    involved in numerous projects of expansion. With this increased
    growth comes increased vulnerability.
        Our port security efforts have relied heavily on the use of
    over 100 select reservists recalled to support maritime
    homeland security. Over the past month, we have been forced to
    reduce those numbers and allow them to return to their families
    and their jobs. Nearly 2,300 Coast Guard Auxiliary in the
    region have also answered the call and a surge of activity has
    provided even greater support than the normal support we have
    come to rely on daily.
        We could not have provided or maintained this high level of
    support without the support of our reserve and auxiliary
    forces. This brings into sharp focus our current need for more
    full-time active duty personnel.
        Also, we have experienced a tremendous surge in the use of
    our small boats, cutters and aircraft. Current port security
    operations, combined with our traditional missions, have pushed
    the resources nearly to the breaking point. Additional funding
    to maintain and repair these existing resources is greatly
    needed as funding is to acquire new equipment.
        The Coast Guard is committed to continuing the protection
    of our Nation against terrorist threats as well as maintaining
    our maritime law enforcement mission.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and for
    your continued support of the Coast Guard, and I will be
    available and pleased to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Captain. And for the
    chairman's benefit, I note in your resume that you are a
    graduate of the Coast Guard Academy in New London, CT.
        Captain Thompson. I will say that I had an excellent
    opportunity of living in Connecticut on two occasions, in my
    time at the Academy and also when I went back to be a member of
    the staff of the Academy. And being a Southern lad, I find that
    Connecticut brings some great things to fruition. But I do like
    Florida.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Special Agent Jarboe.
        Mr. Jarboe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Shays,
    Representative Davis. I would like to briefly go over the
    written statement that I previously submitted to the committee.
        As we have all seen and we all know, there are numerous
    threats that are out there on the horizon for us. The domestic
    and foreign intelligence services are working jointly to track
    those threats, report the threats and make sure that
    information is disseminated appropriately.
        Intelligence bulletins have been disseminated when
    warranted, giving our law enforcement comrades specific
    information, at least as specific as we had it, about what
    threats might be out there, what they should watch out for.
        I think we are all aware in this current world that the
    weapons of mass destruction represents a real threat to ports
    and all of our society.
        We have approximately 16 million visitors to the Tampa
    area, with approximately 40 million visitors to the Orlando
    area. Large number of visitors allows for folks to blend in
    that might want to do something of harm to us.
        As we have all been told from numerous panel members
    before, the Port of Tampa holds approximately 50 percent of all
    of Florida's hazardous materials. It is an extremely large
    port, it is adjacent to populated areas and is accessible by
    land, sea and air.
        The anhydrous ammonia plants that are near the port and in
    the port have an excellent safety record, but that does not say
    that they are not vulnerable to attacks by terrorists. High
    volume traffic in the port can provide a cover of movement for
    illicit goods. We have bulk and containerized cargo freighters,
    fishing vessels, recreational boats, tugs, cruise ships, all of
    which can be exploited by would-be terrorists.
        To address these concerns and vulnerabilities, law
    enforcement community, State, local, Federal, together with the
    private sector, the Fire, Rescue, HAZMAT, Florida Emergency
    Management, have all combined prior to September 11th and
    certainly more intensely after September 11th to work together
    to address these issues.
        The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, which is here in
    Tampa, also has a branch in Orlando and in Brevard County,
    where Port Canaveral is, has an outreach program comprised of
    contingency plan development, training seminars, table top and
    field exercises and threat assessments. Over the last 4 years,
    there have been over 60 weapons of mass destruction terrorism
    presentations presented, with 17 table top and full field
    exercises.
        In June 1999, Florida Emergency Management hosted a
    statewide WMD terrorism summit under a grant from FEMA. This
    was used to connect Federal, State, and local counterparts from
    both the crisis and consequence management areas. It is
    important to note that both crisis and consequence management
    folks have to work hand in glove when we have a crisis to make
    sure of a smooth functioning and quick resolution.
        In March 2000, there were 17 agency, countywide field
    training exercises regarding terrorism, takeover of an
    anhydrous ammonia facility here in the Port of Tampa. The
    results of that and lessons learned were distributed to all
    agencies to better bolster their abilities. There was an
    exercise planned in November 2001 for the Tampa area; however,
    that was the canceled due to the events of September 11th.
        The FBI regularly participates in numerous task forces,
    working groups to ensure that information and knowledge is
    shared. The FBI heads the Terrorism Subcommittee of the Port
    Security Working Group, which is headed by the U.S. Coast Guard
    as the overall leader.
        I think the key to future success and prevention of
    terrorists attacks in the Port of Tampa and anywhere in this
    country lies in three areas. One, we must obtain correct and
    good intelligence. We must analyze that intelligence and, most
    critically, we must share that intelligence, both horizontally
    within the Federal Government and vertically down to the State
    and local governments, to make sure that everyone knows what is
    and what is not a threat.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I conclude my remarks and would be
    happy to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jarboe follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Butler, welcome.
        Mr. Butler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    subcommittee, for the opportunity to be here today to discuss
    the Department of Agriculture's role in seaport security and
    trade facilitation.
        As you know, the USDA's Animal Plant Health Inspection
    Service safeguards agricultural and natural resources of the
    U.S. from foreign animal/plant pests and diseases. As part of
    this mission, APHIS stations plant protection quarantine
    officers at U.S. ports of entry. PPQ officers have the
    authority to inspect all agricultural products.
        At animal import centers, APHIS veterinarians check animals
    in quarantine to make sure that they are not infected with any
    foreign pests or diseases before allowing them to enter the
    country.
        At seaports as well as airport terminals and border
    inspection stations, PPQ officers inspect internal conveyances
    and baggage of passengers for plant and animal practices that
    could harbor pest or disease organisms. PPQ officers inspect
    ship and air cargo, truck freight, packaged mail and foreign
    mail from foreign countries. APHIS enforces strict import
    regulations designed to prevent introduction of potentially
    devastating pests and diseases into this country.
        All agricultural products brought into the U.S. must be
    declared without exception. Travelers are given the opportunity
    to declare their items both orally and in writing. When PPQ
    officers discover any agricultural product that is not
    declared, they can assess penalties. All confiscated products
    are examined by our officers and destroyed.
        The events of September 11th forever changed the context in
    which we do our work. In the past the focus of most of our
    efforts have been to prevent and deter unintentional
    introduction of pests and diseases into our country. But the
    very real potential of intentional threats of agriculture
    production, our food supply, have required us to do much more.
    We have been working closely with our Federal agencies, State
    agriculture departments, academia, and the agricultural sector
    on many fronts to secure and strengthen planning and
    preparedness.
        Since the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United
    Kingdom and the events of September 11th, USDA has
    significantly augmented efforts to prevent both the accidental
    and potential introduction of foreign agricultural pests and
    diseases. APHIS has hired and is continuing to hire additional
    inspection veterinary personnel at U.S. ports of entries.
    Additional detector dog teams, consisting of beagles and their
    handlers, also play an important role in this activity. One of
    these detector dog teams is here in Tampa checking passengers
    and airline and maritime cargo.
        Our PPQ officers at the borders have remained on heightened
    alert. Through the present fiscal year 2003 budget proposal and
    supplemental appropriations by the Congress, we continue our
    border protection efforts well beyond today. Our border
    protection personnel will be at their highest alerts ever, and
    investments in areas of research, laboratory upgrades and
    security will enhance our ability to prepare and respond to
    potential threats on American agriculture.
        Beyond our internal efforts, we have expedited our work
    with U.S. Customs Service to implement and automate INS
    targeting systems. We have collaborated with research
    universities, State agriculture departments, stepped up
    development of rapid detection systems, expanded our network of
    diagnostic laboratories, strengthened pest and disease
    surveillance, better secure and strengthen our laboratories and
    improve our emergency preparedness.
        Nevertheless, we continuously improve to strengthen our
    protection of U.S. agriculture and our food supply. On July
    26th, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5005, which
    would create the new Department of Homeland Security. That
    includes APHIS inspectors and a unified border inspection
    force. This move, which we fully support, affirms the critical
    role of inspections of agricultural cargo and advances in
    international passengers. With one unified border inspection
    force, we hope to see a multiplier effect on our ability to
    exclude threats to the United States, whether that threat is
    FMD or weapons of mass destruction.
        I would note that agriculture import regulations would
    continue to be set by our APHIS inspectors based on sound
    science as they always have been. Thank you for this
    opportunity.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Butler follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Dr. Butler.
        Mr. Dykstra, welcome to the subcommittee.
        Mr. Dykstra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Putnam
    and Representative Davis. Delighted to be here this afternoon
    to represent FDA.
        Just for the record, though, I wanted to inform you that I
    have never lived in Connecticut. I do have a brother that lives
    in Manchester, CT, if that gets me any points.
        Mr. Shays. It does.
        Mr. Dykstra. I am Gary Dykstra. I am FDA's Regional
    Director here in the Southeastern United States. I welcome the
    opportunity to inform the subcommittee of FDA's efforts to help
    ensure that FDA-regulated products coming through the Port of
    Tampa are safe and not used as potential vehicles for terrorist
    acts while minimizing the impact on the free flow of trade
    through this port.
        Let me briefly describe FDA's general procedures for
    handling imports in the Port of Tampa. Every FDA office that
    has responsibilities for reviewing import entries or conducting
    investigations related to imported articles works through the
    local Customs office, which has the primary responsibility for
    border security.
        FDA is very pleased with the level of cooperation that we
    have been able to achieve with Customs here in Tampa. Our FDA
    Tampa Resident Post enjoys a good working relationship with the
    U.S. Customs Service representatives here in Tampa. Since
    September 11th and subsequent events there is even closer
    communications with Customs, especially to target suspect
    terrorist activities, particularly using imported products.
        There is a greater sensitivity and review of potential
    terror vehicles or contaminated products by FDA. Following
    September 11th, FDA's port security concerns have also been
    focused on the deliberate contamination of FDA products, either
    at the port, en route to, or at the importer's premises.
        FDA is responsible for all foods, drugs, cosmetics, medical
    devices and radiological products with the exception of meat
    and poultry, which is the responsibility of USDA.
        Medical devices and radiological products and
    pharmaceuticals predominately enter through Tampa, while foods
    predominately enter through other Florida ports. The entries
    coming through Tampa tend to be more technologically complex
    and generally require more time to review than do foods.
        As you know, FDA's import computer system, known as OASIS,
    screens most of the FDA-regulated products within minutes so
    products can move into domestic commerce with little delay.
        OASIS is an automated system for processing and making
    admissibility determinations to ensure the safety, efficacy and
    quality of foreign origin products for which FDA has regulatory
    responsibility. Systems security controls protect the
    confidentiality of the proprietary trade information involved
    in these government industry electronic transactions. OASIS is
    complimentary to FDA's regulatory system of approvals and
    domestic and foreign inspections, which all protect American
    consumers in relation to imported goods.
        Also, FDA evaluates 100 percent of the import filers
    annually to ensure that they are all properly reporting the
    Customs codes for the products they are importing and the
    integrity of the reporting system.
        The Port of Tampa receives approximately 25 to 30 FDA-
    related entries per day. Most of these are medical devices or
    drugs. These types of entries are more complicated than food
    entries, and they require more review and data checking.
        To further enhance the efficiency of FDA import operations
    in the Port of Tampa and in our Florida district, beginning
    this October the Florida district will reorganize its
    investigations branch. Currently the Tampa-based consumer
    safety officers working in imports routinely travel to Orlando
    and Port Canaveral. After the reorganization, they will cover
    only Tampa. This will result in these consumer safety officers
    having additional time to examine more incoming products and
    collect more samples.
        As I indicated, FDA is in a supporting role to Customs and
    other Federal agencies in ensuring seaport security. Our focus
    is on FDA-regulated products that enter through those ports.
    While our public health mission has not changed since September
    11th, it has certainly been redirected and heightened with
    respect to imported products.
        The fiscal year 2002 counterterrorism budget supplemental
    authorized 655 new hires for FDA's field offices. When all of
    those new hires are on board, FDA anticipates that
    approximately 420 will be either stationed at border locations
    or will be working specifically on imports. Regardless of their
    specific physical locations, FDA anticipates that all new hires
    will be trained in both import and domestic operations.
        There are many other provisions of the new legislation
    passed by Congress under the new Bioterrorism Act of 2002 which
    FDA will be enforcing right now.
        Of these many other provisions of the legislation that will
    help ensure the safety of imported products, many provisions
    require regulations, and FDA is conducting a transparent
    implementation process for this new legislation. Meetings with
    stakeholders already have taken place, and dockets for public
    comment already have been established.
        FDA's mission is to protect the public health and ensure
    the safety and effectiveness of FDA-regulated products entering
    this country. We will continue to work with Customs and the
    other agencies in striving to ensure that FDA-regulated
    products move through the import system in an expeditious
    manner.
        I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have
    with regard to FDA's operations here in Tampa.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dykstra follows:]
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        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Mr. Dykstra. I want to
    thank everyone on the panel for being so wonderful about
    adhering to our 5-minute limit. It is not always an easy thing
    to do. We will begin with questions from our host Congressman,
    Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Baldwin,
    you mentioned that you had recently added six new inspectors,
    if I heard you correctly. How is your workload right now? How
    well are you doing in keeping up, given the tools you have to
    work with?
        Mr. Baldwin. Right now here in the Port of Tampa, these six
    positions were specifically designated for seaport security. We
    have about 80 inspectors or 80 Customs personnel in the tri-
    port area. We are trying to work smarter. We are utilizing the
    nonintrusive technology that we have. We are also trying to
    examine things as the Customs Service at the points of origin.
    So we are just trying to work smarter.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. By that you mean new forms of
    technology?
        Mr. Baldwin. We had some outside in terms of the VACIS
    machine. I think the lightning may have shut that down. Because
    of lightning, we have x-ray vans that are in place, working
    toward possibly getting those smart boxes with the container
    and the seal. But the whole key to all of this for us is having
    the quality and the quantity of manifest information available
    so that we can do our targeting without impeding the flow of
    legitimate commerce.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. By that you are referring to
    cooperation from incoming vessels, as far as giving them--
    giving you their manifests sufficiently in advance so that you
    can review the contents?
        Mr. Baldwin. Correct.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. How is that going?
        Mr. Baldwin. So far we are doing good. We are probably in
    the high 80's or so in terms of automated manifest system. But
    all of our manifests are screened by Customs inspectors and are
    put through our targeting systems.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Captain Thompson, same question to
    you in terms of workload, level of service, in terms of
    balancing security, and also limited interference in terms of
    the flow or timing of commerce.
        Captain Thompson. In response to the question, it has
    really been a challenge because we have been operating at surge
    capacity since September 11th. This has only been possible
    because of our auxiliary support, our reserve support and
    outstanding support from the various counties and local law
    enforcement agencies, Hillsborough County, Manatee County as
    well.
        Looking out at the budget years, we are looking to receive
    in this greater Tampa Bay area for the three major Coast Guard
    commands eight new billets this fiscal year and 10 next fiscal
    year. But it will still be a challenge because homeland
    security is a significant issue when you look at the
    characteristics of the Ports of Tampa, Manatee and St.
    Petersburg.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Can you give us a sense of proportion
    as to what you believe to be the extent of your needs in
    relation to the 8 or 10 you just mentioned?
        Captain Thompson. I think when we look at billets and
    assignments, I think we need to look at the characteristics
    from the port assessment. Once we finish the port assessment
    that the Coast Guard has undertaken, where we do the first 55
    strategic and military ports, and of those, and Tampa will be
    in that first 12, I think that we will have a very, a more
    realistic approach as to what will be the force package that we
    need to bring for port security in our region.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. I have a comment and perhaps some of
    you all may want to comment as well. Tomorrow the President is
    going to sign the fast track bill, or trade promotion bill,
    which I strongly supported and I believe we all supported. One
    of the reasons I was such a strong supporter is because it is
    going to break down barriers and open markets into Central and
    South America for imports and to some extent exports. It is
    also going to make the job of each of you more challenging in
    terms of the quantity of workload and the types of issues you
    are going to have to deal with.
        Have you given any thought yet as to how that is going to
    affect your job? These trade agreements are not going to be
    negotiated any time soon, but things are going to start moving.
    What should we at least be thinking about with you as to how we
    adequately prepare to use that as an opportunity and not
    another set of problems?
        Mr. Baldwin. I guess I go back, not to sound like a broken
    record, but I kind of go back to our defense-in-depth strategy
    and the fact that we need automated information to be able to
    target, considering whatever the volume of it may be. Adding
    more resources is always welcome and we are appreciative of the
    resources that we have already received from Congress this year
    and for next year.
        But working smarter at it, using our intelligence, using
    our nonintrusive technology is really the key for us in doing
    some of those exams at the point of origin and working with the
    trade, as we mentioned in the CTPAT. This is getting them to
    strengthen their supply chain. We have had a number of them who
    have signed up and coming on board. If we can strengthen those
    links, we think collectively that will help us.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. You would add to that, as you
    mentioned earlier, to make sure that we use these trade
    agreements to assure that people that are importing into our
    country are following standards and using systems that aren't
    compatible with yours?
        Mr. Baldwin. Correct.
        Mr. Dykstra. FDA would echo that as well. We feel that the
    information that is crucial, getting early information from
    these countries, from the exporters in these countries, again
    that the new bioterrorism legislation will allow us to get a
    lot of that kind of information so that we can both protect the
    public health and also move the freight.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Mr. Butler.
        Mr. Butler. The Department of Agriculture certainly sees
    this as a keen opportunity. As our Secretary reminds us
    frequently, 96 percent of the world's consumers live outside of
    our borders. That is why it is important that APHIS has
    maintained personnel worldwide to be sure that our sanitary and
    phytosanitary conditions are met as we import products and we
    deal with challenges, diseases such as foot and mouth disease,
    all around the world. So we have our personnel all over the
    world, preclearance opportunities for these countries wanting
    to export to us, and for opportunities for us to export our
    products in other parts of the world.
        Ms. Hecker. I might just add, obviously I am not an agency
    that has direct response the way that these agencies do. But
    the challenge of the relationship between the negotiations in
    the WTO and the kinds of negotiations and agreements that are
    needed in the World Customs Organization and the International
    Maritime Organization are interesting parallels to the
    overlapping jurisdictions we have at our national level, that
    we have international diversity of negotiating bodies. And
    while there is an effort underway of both Customs and the Coast
    Guard to work collaboratively with the Customs Organization and
    the IMO, whether at the end of the day some challenges impede
    that progress in pushing out the border will ultimately be an
    international negotiating challenge.
        So it is another dimension of that international arena and
    how hard it really will be for the ideal to push those borders
    out and have those kinds of agreements, because lots of
    countries are going to feel very differently about that. We
    hear there is already some pushback for Customs placing agents
    over in European countries. They are not so pleased about it.
    So there is challenges there.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Chairman Shays.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. How do you react when you hear that
    another country isn't so pleased with having us inspect at the
    port of exit? Maybe I can ask Customs that.
        Mr. Baldwin. I wasn't aware of that. I know that we are in
    negotiations with a number of countries. As I mentioned, the
    Netherlands, Singapore, Canada have all signed up to date,
    France. I wasn't aware of any----
        Mr. Shays. But if a country was reluctant, what would your
    reaction be?
        Mr. Baldwin. I kind of leave it to the negotiators. I don't
    have a fast answer for you.
        Mr. Shays. Any other reaction from anyone on this panel?
    What should our position be?
        Ms. Hecker. In the long run the position is to try to do
    this multilaterally. Doing this bilaterally is not going to
    work. So to understand the different views of different
    countries, I mean just like in trade agreements, bilateral
    agreements buy you a little. But it is the multilateral
    agreements that really get the free flow of trade.
        Mr. Shays. Is it unreasonable for a country to want to make
    sure, particularly those that are in a container, to want to
    have some sense of what is going in that container before it
    really arrives in our port? Does that strike any of you as
    unreasonable?
        Just note for the record shaking heads. No one has spoken.
        I want to be clear, because I am not. Who is most capable
    here? I don't mean most capable, but who could help me
    understood potentially how many Federal agencies have a legal
    right to board a ship?
        Captain Thompson. Everyone at this table. From the
    standpoint of Coast Guard, Customs, INS, and probably FBI, DEA.
    And so I would probably say minimum 15 to 20. Agriculture.
        Mr. Shays. So why couldn't we make sure that we--if for
    instance, I will just take the two. Let me just take three. INS
    basically is looking for potentially illegal aliens. What else
    would INS be looking for?
        Mr. Bulger. That is essentially it.
        Mr. Shays. Customs is looking for illegal products,
    contraband, so on. What else?
        Mr. Baldwin. Illegal aliens.
        Mr. Shays. But INS wouldn't be looking for potential drugs
    or so on?
        Mr. Bulger. Well, our primary responsibility is the people.
    If in the course of inspecting them we encounter some
    contraband, we certainly refer it then to Customs or
    Agriculture if it is an agricultural product.
        Mr. Shays. Does INS have the ability to make arrests on the
    spot and to seize whatever is there that is illegal?
        Mr. Bulger. Only in those locations where our inspectors
    are cross designated as Customs officers. Those locations are
    primarily on the land border.
        Mr. Shays. Walk me through that. Why wouldn't that be the
    case? That seems pretty stupid, frankly. But, you know what, I
    say that with some conviction and then I find there is logic to
    it.
        Mr. Bulger. Historically, the boardings, and we are talking
    about ship inspections here, the boardings have been done in a
    team environment where there are both INS and Customs officers
    as part of that boarding team.
        Mr. Shays. So in that case you just notify the Customs
    person and they would come by. But in the case where you might
    be on the ship, do you go on the ships uniformly together or do
    you sometimes go separately?
        Mr. Bulger. No, it is a boarding team generally that goes.
        Mr. Shays. Tell me who is part of the team.
        Mr. Bulger. INS, Customs, often Agriculture is part of that
    team, and in some instances the Coast Guard.
        Mr. Shays. What is the Coast Guard's responsibility?
        Captain Thompson. Coast Guard's responsibility falls in
    several areas: Ships, people as well as cargo, looking at a
    navigation standpoint. We go on board to make sure that they
    meet the various international standards for licensing of the
    crew, making sure that they are in accordance with the various
    international standards. We look at the integrity of the ship
    from the standpoint of its operating systems, firefighting
    systems, life saving systems. We move forward, including the
    integrity of the vessel.
        Finally, we also look at cargo from the standpoint of
    storage patterns of cargo, illegal drugs, illegal aliens. So we
    look at a very broad range of activities on board the vessel.
        Mr. Shays. Are INS, Customs, Agriculture, Coast Guard
    cross-trained so that they can do the work of the others?
        Mr. Baldwin. Not to my knowledge totally as a whole force.
    But there are areas where we work vice versa with Agriculture
    and with Immigration.
        Mr. Shays. When you board a ship, how often do you--is
    there a key number of folks per each government agency?
        Mr. Baldwin. No.
        Mr. Shays. How do you decide what ships to board?
        Mr. Baldwin. For Customs purposes it is based on targeting,
    where the ship is coming from, where it has loaded cargo----
        Mr. Shays. So some ships you may not board?
        Mr. Baldwin. Right.
        Mr. Shays. If they figured out your profile, isn't it
    possible that they would be able to use your profile against
    you?
        Mr. Baldwin. Well, we also do compliance boardings where we
    randomly board vessels.
        Mr. Shays. So you have a profile, which makes sense. If you
    can't board every one you need that profile. Is that profile
    generally known?
        Mr. Baldwin. No, because it is--it can change based on
    targets. Some of the vessels that we board are for narcotics,
    not the same vessels we board for terrorism risk.
        Mr. Shays. Does DEA board? Are they part of the team?
        Mr. Baldwin. Negative.
        Mr. Shays. Who is responsible for looking for narcotics?
        Mr. Baldwin. Customs is.
        Mr. Shays. I tend to think that I might be guilty of making
    an assumption that there is a lot of turf when it comes to the
    different agencies. In other words, we have this
    responsibility, you don't threaten this. To what extent is
    there turf and when is the worst example of it?
        Captain Thompson. I will jump in on that one.
        Mr. Shays. Let me just say, candidness is required. I mean,
    because this is--what is at stake here is something so serious
    that we can't--we can be polite with each other, but we need to
    have an honest dialog or you waste our time down here, frankly.
        Captain Thompson. When you look at turf, I think because of
    limited resources, you are not allowed to really look at turf
    very long. I mean, if I can save a boarding by sharing or using
    some information that Customs or someone else can provide me,
    then I can take that resource and place it somewhere else. I
    mean, one of the things that has taken place in this particular
    area that we have looked at are the various boarding documents,
    the various information that we collect as agencies, and what
    is the common thread of that information that can be shared
    among those agencies that will minimize the amount of time, 1
    hour, an hour and a half, to have a Coast Guard inspector on
    board. Trying to reduce redundancies throughout the agencies is
    really a reasonable approach, and I think, at least in the
    greater Tampa Bay area, that approach has paid some dividends.
        Mr. Shays. Anybody else?
        Mr. Bulger. Yes, Congressman. I spent the first 20 years of
    my career on the Northern border. And I will admit that on
    occasions, particularly in the dead of winter, you know, there
    were some turf battles that went on because there wasn't much
    to do in some circumstances.
        When I came to Florida 6 years ago, I realized that there
    the turf was growing so fast, and there was so much of it, that
    we, all of law enforcement all together had a hard time keeping
    it mowed.
        Mr. Shays. Anybody else?
        Mr. Jarboe. In 23 years of doing this business, it is
    quite, from my perspective, it is not so much an agency turf
    issue, it is a personality issue. I have dealt with agencies
    where the personalities were such that would not allow for a
    close, cohesive working relationship. I have dealt with those
    same agencies with different personalities, and it has been a
    very good, beneficial working relationship.
        So I don't think it is the agencies per se that is the
    problem. I think it is some of the personalities within the
    agencies that cause the problem.
        Mr. Shays. But right now no one has the ability to be first
    among equals and say let's flock it off, we will do the
    following, correct?
        Mr. Jarboe. Each agency head is responsible.
        Mr. Shays. They are autonomous. So technically if they
    don't want to cooperate, that is it, there is no cooperation.
        Mr. Jarboe. If they absolutely refuse to cooperate, that is
    a major problem.
        Mr. Shays. Your testimony is that is infrequent, but when
    it happens it is more based on personality rather than the
    culture of the organization?
        Mr. Jarboe. That is correct. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Go ahead.
        Mr. Bulger. I would say that it would be the U.S. Attorney
    who would assume that role in the event that there were some
    disputes between agencies about whose turf was who, that
    ultimately these things are directed toward criminal
    prosecution, and that is----
        Mr. Shays. Well, I think that is true in a case where you
    have something to prosecute. But if you don't have someone
    looking or finding something to prosecute, then I don't see how
    the Attorney would come into play. Do you want to argue that
    point or not?
        Mr. Bulger. Well, I don't know if I want to argue it. But
    what I would say is that the role that the U.S. Attorney plays
    in coordinating among the agencies, the special agents in
    charge, and ensuring that we don't have overlapping
    investigations, that we cooperate, and in many instances
    operate in a task force environment, I think fosters, you know,
    that sense of cooperation. And I think the U.S. Attorney, in my
    experience here, has played a key role in establishing that
    atmosphere.
        Mr. Shays. May I proceed a little bit longer, Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Putnam. You may.
        Mr. Shays. If in my office three people are in charge, my
    theory is no one is in charge. So ultimately I have one person
    in charge. And I say if there is a screw-up, it is your fault
    ultimately. So--and my logic wants to apply that to five
    different people from five different agencies boarding. I want
    to know ultimately who is in charge of that boarding party. Who
    would be?
        Mr. Baldwin. Right now, I guess, Mr. Chairman, it would be
    determined by the issue. If it was illegal aliens, we would, as
    he mentioned before, and vice versa, if Customs went on board
    and found illegal aliens, we would notify INS.
        If we went on board that vessel and we noticed that there
    was some safety issues during our boarding process, we would
    contact the Coast Guard. If we noticed that there was some
    plants or quarantine type issues that might be on this vessel,
    we would notify the Agriculture Department.
        So depending on which issue, and I may not have answered
    your question.
        Mr. Shays. You did. Do all of you have arrest powers?
    Anybody here not have arrest powers, your people? All your
    people have arrest powers? Correct? Of those accompanying our
    witnesses up front, who would like to take the podium and just
    make a comment to any of the questions I have asked? Anybody?
        Let me just conclude. GAO, how do you react to what you
    have just heard?
        Ms. Hecker. It has been our experience in just this review
    that there is ambiguity existing right now about who is in
    charge of port security. We have most people, including the
    Coast Guard, saying they are defining the standards, they may
    write regulations, they are conducting the port security
    assessments, they are the leader there.
        But you have got TSA which was established, the
    Transportation Security Administration was established, and
    they were given a very broad role to manage all transportation
    security. Their comments when we shared our draft statement was
    we are the ones who are writing the regulations, they are not
    Coast Guard regulations.
        The issue of the standards, the move toward national
    standards on the security of containers, there is a joint task
    force, it is cochaired, not your model, by Transportation and
    Customs. How well they are working together, you know, one is
    working with the IMO, the other is working with the World
    Customs Organization. It is ambiguous.
        And I am not sure, I think in my remarks, I think you
    weren't here, that it is resolved by the creation of the
    Department of Homeland Security that we have someone who is
    ultimately in charge. I think issues remain even with that
    reorganization.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
    leeway.
        Mr. Putnam. If we do have time after the questions for
    this, we would like to take public comment or questions
    depending on the level of interest. So we want to let people
    who are still with us know that, so that you can be thinking
    about whatever questions you may want to present.
        Mr. Shays. Could I ask in that regard, how many people
    would seek to make a question or make a point, or ask a
    question in the audience? Could they raise their hand? How many
    would like that? We have one, two. So there may be one or two
    more. So that we would--that works.
        Mr. Putnam. Was there anyone accompanying the witnesses--
    there was a little bit of fidgeting. Does anybody want to add
    anything to the chairman's questions?
        Mr. Shays. I certainly would not be--you wouldn't be
    disagreeing with your superior. But may I also say it is a
    pleasure to have young people in this hearing, and I just--I
    welcome our two young friends to my left who is close to this
    dais here and appreciate both of you being here. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
        Let me begin with APHIS. According to a USDA Inspector
    General report from 2000 regarding vulnerabilities and
    weaknesses which increased the risk of prohibited ag products
    in the United States, the report found that inspectors did not
    inspect cargo ships timely upon arrival and inspected the
    baggage of only 25 percent of internal passengers arriving by
    air, and only 1 percent of passengers arriving on cruise ships.
    Inspectors also did not assess fines as a deterrent against
    airline and cruise ship passengers found to have prohibited
    items found in their possession, select samples of perishable
    cargo for inspection, but instead allow the brokers to select
    the samples.
        Now, keeping in mind that in Florida, according to a
    University of Florida study, over the last 20 years there has
    been one inspection per month that has been established in this
    State, we have spent since 1995 half a billion dollars fighting
    citrus canker, are we any better at detecting plant pest and
    diseases than we were?
        Mr. Butler. I hope so, Mr. Chairman. We are making an
    improvement. Obviously the Congress is providing us additional
    resources for that. We are looking at all types of technology,
    including some of our most dependent technology; that is,
    detector dogs. We know that we have an opportunity for
    improvement.
        Mr. Putnam. Are we catching more than 1 percent of the
    passengers coming off those beautiful cruise ships out here?
        Mr. Butler. I do believe we are.
        Mr. Putnam. Do you know what percentage we are getting?
        Mr. Butler. I do not.
        Mr. Putnam. How many dog teams are here now?
        Mr. Butler. One.
        Mr. Putnam. How many at the airport?
        Mr. Butler. One for Tampa.
        Mr. Putnam. One in the whole city of Tampa?
        Mr. Butler. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Putnam. Does he work some days here and some days
    there?
        Mr. Butler. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Putnam. So how many in the State, which has one of the
    highest volumes of international travel?
        Mr. Butler. I would refer to the folks here locally to
    answer that question.
        Mr. Putnam. Anyone know how many beagle brigades that we
    have in the State?
        Mr. Davis. My name is Carl Davis. I am the Director of
    Operations here at USDA.
        Mr. Putnam. Did we swear you in earlier?
        Mr. Davis. No, I am sorry. I thought maybe--no, you did
    not.
        Mr. Putnam. Why don't we get you when we do public comment?
    We will come back to APHIS. Customs.
        I want to followup on what Chairman Shays said. You have
    select criteria for determining which ships to board with the
    interagency team?
        Mr. Baldwin. Correct.
        Mr. Putnam. How frequently does this interagency team board
    ships?
        Mr. Baldwin. This is for Customs boarding of ships. I mean,
    whether or not Agriculture or Immigration chooses to select a
    ship, we may not choose the same ships.
        Mr. Putnam. Now, you told Chairman Shays that on occasion
    you all have an interagency team made up of INS, Customs, and
    Agriculture and sometimes Coast Guard that boards vessels. How
    frequently do you do that?
        Mr. Baldwin. I do not have an answer for you.
        Mr. Putnam. Does someone with you have the answer to that?
        Ms. Crawford. Denise Crawford, the Area Port Director for
    Tampa. More times than not. Certainly we can provide specific
    detailed information for you how often we do this together. But
    typically we do have, when we say it is a boarding team, it is
    not the same four people show up. The assignment of
    Immigration's responsibilities, of Custom's responsibilities,
    the ships that we are going to board for our purposes we will
    be there. Agriculture, Immigration would go through their same
    process. And generally, we are all there together when we do
    have a ship boarding that is of interest.
        Mr. Putnam. How often is there a ship boarding of interest?
        Ms. Crawford. I would say several times a week certainly,
    sometimes more. Again, I can provide you information on our
    ship arrivals, the boarding officers from the various agencies
    at a later date.
        Mr. Putnam. Do you know when the last time an interagency
    team, Coast Guard, INS, Customs boarded a ship to inspect it?
        Ms. Crawford. I can't tell you right now. This morning we
    had the Jubilee in. That was a cruise ship. Immigration is
    there, Customs. So we have a normal pattern to a lot of the----
        Mr. Putnam. Not that often, though, if we don't know when,
    though, right?
        Ms. Crawford. You asked for the last time. I certainly can
    tell you several times a week. I can provide you specific
    information if that is what you would like.
        Mr. Shays. Inspecting the cruise ship is not a team all of
    the time, correct?
        Ms. Crawford. No.
        Mr. Shays. Is that being responsive to his question?
        Ms. Crawford. I was trying to give an example of the last
    ships that I know that was in today, it was a passenger ship.
        Mr. Shays. But the question he asked is when did the whole
    team come together and board a ship? If you don't know, does
    anyone here know?
        Captain Thompson. One that came to mind, I have been in the
    Port of Tampa since the 12th of July. We have other vessels
    that arrive. Depending on the issues that come forward, then
    either the Coast Guard, Customs, INS or an Agriculture team
    will go out. That is coordinated between our various units and
    operations officers. So at least I would say from the Coast
    Guard perspective, we probably do that a couple, maybe three or
    four times a month, where we will board with another agency on
    a particular problem.
        Mr. Shays. This is testimony that you are giving under oath
    here, and we have indication that may not happen often, and
    that it is not all that coordinated. So I would like to know if
    that information is accurate or not. So I was kind of, you
    know, feeling pretty calm until I heard the answer to the
    question.
        Captain Thompson. I will provide more detailed information
    on that. But I will say generally during my tenure as Captain
    of the Port that during the month or during a quarter, there
    will be several boardings with either a member of Customs or
    INS regarding a particular vessel that may be arriving in the
    port.
        Mr. Shays. Three or four times a month. How many ships come
    in here?
        Captain Thompson. 4,500 visits a year, 350 vessels per
    month, thereabouts.
        Mr. Shays. So basically 1 percent.
        Captain Thompson. Roughly.
        Mr. Putnam. Reclaiming my time, is it several--is it 3 or 4
    times a month or is it several times a week?
        Captain Thompson. A lot depends--I don't have that specific
    information with me. Depending on the issue from the standpoint
    of whether it is a navigation problem or drug problem, etc. But
    I do know that there are times when we are coordinating between
    the units where a team from one, maybe not all four or five
    will go out, but one or two of the agencies will be together to
    go out for a particular team.
        I think it has happened more than we realize from the
    standpoint of that assignment.
        Mr. Putnam. Let's take it one agency at a time. How
    frequently does INS board a ship?
        Mr. Bulger. Every foreign arrival and every coastwise
    vessel that has aliens detained onboard.
        Mr. Putnam. Say that again.
        Mr. Bulger. Every arrival from foreign----
        Mr. Putnam. Any foreign flag ship, which is 50 percent.
        Mr. Bulger. Every vessel coming from overseas is inspected
    in person by INS officers. In addition to that, we board every
    vessel that is sailing coastwise that happens to have aliens
    detained on board.
        Mr. Putnam. OK. When you inspect every vessel that is
    sailing from a foreign port, that can be an American or a
    foreign flag vessel if they left a foreign port.
        Mr. Bulger. If they left a foreign port and arrived in
    Tampa.
        Mr. Putnam. How frequently does Customs board a ship to
    inspect it?
        Mr. Baldwin. I do not have an answer, but I can provide an
    answer.
        Mr. Putnam. What percentage of the cargo is inspected at
    the Port of Tampa by the Customs Service?
        Mr. Baldwin. I do not have an answer. But I can get an
    answer and provide it to the committee. I did not come with
    those statistics.
        Mr. Putnam. Do you have--well, do you have a ballpark?
        Ms. Crawford. About 20 percent of the containers are
    examined here.
        Mr. Shays. I am just wondering, should I be concerned that
    you don't know the answer to that question? In other words, you
    have got so many ships coming in in a month, I would like to
    think that it would be something that you would have a pretty
    good idea because you know how you use your resources. How
    would you know what your needs are if you couldn't tell us? I
    mean, maybe it is an unfair question, but it doesn't strike me
    as an unfair question.
        Tell me if it--why it would be an unfair question not to
    know that, because my mind would say it would be kind of like I
    know how often, how many hearings I have a week or a month. You
    know, I can give you an estimate.
        Mr. Baldwin. Mr. Chairman, it is not that I don't know the
    answer. I don't have the answer available to me. I did not
    bring it with me. I do not have it committed to memory. But I
    can get the information.
        Mr. Johnson. I am Ron Johnson, local Port Director for INS.
    During fiscal year 2001, INS boarded 1,030 vessels. That is how
    many our inspectors boarded. So far this year, which is not
    counting July statistics, just through June, we boarded 841
    vessels. That is projected over the enter fiscal year to be
    about 1,121, which would be up 8 percent over last year.
        Mr. Putnam. How long does it take to inspect a vessel?
        Mr. Johnson. It varies anywhere from half an hour to 2
    hours. I would say the norm would probably be about 45 minutes.
        Mr. Putnam. But you are only doing three a day?
        Mr. Johnson. We are doing three a day that are arriving
    from foreign. OK? In the past 10 months we have also boarded
    numerous vessels coming from coastwise locations where there
    have been crew detained on board.
        Mr. Putnam. Let me get back to Customs. You put an awful
    lot of faith in your manifests. According to the report of the
    Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in the U.S.
    seaports, which did an audit of the manifest compliance, 53
    percent of the manifests reviewed either reported an undercount
    or an overcount of containers on board that ship.
        That is a fairly disturbing discrepancy, considering it
    only takes one weapon of mass destruction in one container in
    one ship, and over half of the ship's manifests were inaccurate
    of those audited. What are we doing to improve our manifest
    technology?
        And, second, what backup does Customs have, if you base all
    of your criteria or a substantial portion of your criteria on
    which ships to board, if that is based on manifests that is not
    accurate, what other criteria do you have that would be a
    little bit more solid footing?
        Mr. Baldwin. Well, it is also based on where the vessel is
    coming from, what cargos are on board. We also do compliance
    exams. We do what we call landed quantity verifications, call
    them LQVs, in which we send teams of people to the vessel, and
    we will do everything on the vessel with our nonintrusive
    technologies, the gamma rays, inspectors with the pagers, based
    on our targeting of these vessels.
        So it is not just relying on the manifest, but also going
    out and relying on the inspector's expertise looking at boxes,
    because if it has been painted, the doors have been tampered
    with, that will not show up on the manifest.
        So we are also out on the piers examining these containers
    as they come off of the vessels.
        Mr. Putnam. For every ship?
        Mr. Baldwin. Not for every ship.
        Mr. Putnam. For what percentage of the ships?
        Mr. Baldwin. I do not have the number. I can provide it to
    the committee.
        Mr. Putnam. Is your point of origin for the ship, is that
    information, does that information derive from the manifest?
        Mr. Baldwin. Yes, it does.
        Mr. Putnam. So if 53 percent of the manifests are
    inaccurate on what is in the ship, why wouldn't you make--why
    couldn't someone reasonably assume that someone attempting to
    conceal the point of origin would not also lie about its point
    of origin?
        Mr. Baldwin. It is not just the shipping documents. We also
    get the information from the shipping agents. These are the
    representatives here who represent the shipping company. They
    provide us with this information. And, again, as a multilayer
    approach, we are also doing examinations in compliance with
    those, and have people out there doing landing quantity
    verifications to ensure what is coming off is coming off.
        We don't do every vessel. There is no--I don't know if we
    have enough resources to do every vessel and still continue to
    maintain a flow of legitimate trade.
        Mr. Putnam. Most studies show it is about 1 to 2 percent is
    what is physically inspected. Is that still the case?
        Mr. Baldwin. I do not have that number. We have increased
    the number of exams based on terrorist threats, but I do not
    know the percentage. Because it is really based on risk. We are
    really trying to focus based on targeting and risk.
        Mr. Putnam. Are you familiar with the situation that
    occurred in Miami earlier this year where a Venezuelan naval
    vessel was being used for commercial purposes and was able to
    come into the channel, be docked at the Port of Miami, and it
    was a foreign nation's naval vessel with deck mounted weapons?
        Mr. Baldwin. No, I am not.
        Mr. Putnam. That was reported in the media and by National
    Guard when they were doing port security.
        There has been a--Mr. Bulger, one of the members of the
    Port Security Committee indicated that earlier this year there
    was a--in reviewing the assets for this port, it was revealed
    that INS had more boats than people to man them, and the Coast
    Guard found themselves in a situation with more people than
    boats, but there was an INS regulation that prevented Coast
    Guard personnel from operating INS equipment. Is that--are you
    familiar with that? Is that something that Congress needs to
    change or is it administrative? Are you familiar with that
    situation at all?
        Mr. Bulger. No, we don't have any boats.
        Mr. Johnson. I think you are confusing INS with Customs.
    INS does not have any boats.
        Mr. Bulger. INS doesn't have any boats here in Tampa.
        Mr. Putnam. Does Customs? Could I have mistaken it for
    Customs?
        Mr. Baldwin. Customs does have boats. But I am not aware of
    any incident.
        Mr. Putnam. Do you have a regulation that would prevent, if
    you had a shortage of personnel but equipment, do you have a
    regulation that would prevent interagency coordination where
    the Coast Guard could use your equipment?
        Mr. Baldwin. I do not know. I am not aware.
        Mr. Putnam. OK.
        Ms. Hecker. We have done some review of the various forms
    of the Department of Homeland Security legislation. In one of
    the versions in an attempt to preserve the nonsecurity
    functions of the Coast Guard, it has specific language that
    they will not be allowed to share anything with anyone. So the
    whole point of putting these agencies together is potentially
    undermined by language that says they can't share assets or
    equipment or people.
        Mr. Putnam. The Coast Guard is who you are referring to?
        Ms. Hecker. That is correct.
        Mr. Shays. But that didn't make it to the floor of the
    House.
        Ms. Hecker. That is in the Senate version.
        Mr. Shays. Well, that is the Senate.
        Mr. Putnam. Special Agent in Charge Jarboe, threats to
    shipping, threats to ports have been around for sometime. In
    1985, Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro after
    smuggling weapons aboard. In 2000 the USS Cole was attacked in
    port. Acting on information obtained from al Qaeda suspects,
    the FBI began a nationwide canvas of U.S. scuba diving shops.
    The search was based on intelligence reports that al Qaeda
    operatives were taking scuba training in order to launch
    bombing against ships, power plants, bridges and other
    shoreline targets.
        Despite that, according to the Interagency Commission on
    Crime and Security in U.S. seaports, the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation's investigation, ``considers the present threat
    of terrorism directed at any U.S. seaport to be low, even
    though their vulnerability to attack is high.''
        Is that still the position of the FBI?
        Mr. Jarboe. I would have to check with our headquarters
    folks who put out those threat assessments on what is high and
    medium and low. We have looked at how we assess, the verbiage
    that we use, low, medium and high, so it is not misconstrued.
    There is a specific unit back at headquarters that puts those
    out. Since leaving there several months ago, I am not privy to
    what their current status is. So I can't answer that. But we
    can get that answer for you.
        Mr. Putnam. Please do. And Mr. Dykstra, you mentioned that
    Tampa is not really, in terms of FDA jurisdiction over foods,
    Tampa is not a major port for those types of imports, but for
    medical devices it is, particularly radiological devices?
        In light of the new threat from radiological weapons, dirty
    bombs, certainly there are a number of medical devices,
    machinery, radiological devices that contain radiological
    components that could be used for making a dirty bomb. Are
    those devices tracked and monitored as first world medical
    practices upgrade and their old equipment, old MRI machines and
    old x-ray machines are sent somewhere else? Is that tracked by
    some agency of government, is it the FDA?
        Mr. Dykstra. Generally it is not the FDA. It is the atomic
    energy people, NRC, that tracks a lot of that stuff. We simply
    monitor the import of these kinds of devices. They have to
    comply with our laws as well as the NRC requirements if they
    have radioactive materials in them.
        Mr. Putnam. Presumably you are the agent for the NRC at the
    ports, or do they use someone else?
        Mr. Dykstra. We are not their agent at the ports, and how
    they track that material, particularly if it is surplused in
    some way, I have no idea how they do it.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you. Any followup questions?
        Mr. Shays. Thank you. What I am--in listening to the
    questions that the chairman asked you, I have a little
    uneasiness, and the uneasiness is that the system doesn't quite
    work the way it is being described to us, though you want it to
    work that way. Because I don't see logically how this works if
    there is not a criteria.
        So I would like to know from each of you, one, if there is
    a criteria for deciding what ships, and if I asked you what it
    was, if you would be able to tell me. And so if we can just go
    down the list. Is there a criteria? If I asked you what it is
    to decide what ships, would you be able to tell me what the
    criteria is?
        Mr. Bulger. Yes, Congressman. Every ship arriving from a
    foreign port of entry is inspected, is boarded by INS officers.
        Mr. Shays. So every ship is boarded by INS?
        Mr. Bulger. Yes. That is correct. In addition to that,
    every ship that is coming coastwise where there has been an
    alien crewman detained on board or alien stowaway detained on
    board, we board that vessel as well.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Baldwin.
        Mr. Baldwin. Yes, sir. It is based on risk, the likelihood
    that vessel could be carrying contraband, terrorism or weapons
    of mass destruction.
        Mr. Shays. How would you define risk? That is the criteria.
    Is there a criteria that describes risk?
        Mr. Baldwin. There is no specific criteria. There is just a
    number of different factors that we use to determine it.
        Mr. Shays. And are those in writing? If I asked you later
    on to supply that, would that be in writing?
        Mr. Baldwin. Some is and some are not, because of the law
    enforcement sensitivity of the issue.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Captain.
        Captain Thompson. Yes, sir. First and foremost, there are
    port safety controls which is targeted by country. There is
    compliance inspection boardings as well as safety boardings and
    port security boardings. And one of the main criterias of a
    vessel, particular of a first port of call, depending on what
    the cargo on the vessel is carrying, as well as the various
    international and documents, is there compliance with the
    timeframe of those certificates of issuance. So there are about
    four or five criterias that we go through and we make a
    determination to board.
        Also, depending on which particular port the vessel arrives
    at. Through our marine information system, did the vessel
    arrive at Charleston or some other port and that boarding has
    been conducted, we will see that information and then we still
    have to make a determination whether to board or not, sir.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Jarboe, do you board ships? Not as a general
    rule?
        Mr. Jarboe. We do, but not as a general rule. If we had
    specific investigative or intelligence information that there
    was something on a ship, then we would board. And usually,
    well, almost----
        Mr. Shays. You are not looking. It is when you have a lead
    or a suspicion?
        Mr. Jarboe. No. When we board ships there is specific
    information that we are looking for. It is in conjunction with
    either Coast Guard, Customs, or INS, one of the other agencies
    here.
        Mr. Butler. We do. What I would really like to do is have
    our local representative answer the detailed question on that.
    I personally do not know.
        Mr. Shays. Fair enough. Would you answer that question,
    ma'am? Thank you.
        Ms. Neal.. Mary Neal, Department of Agriculture. It is our
    policy to board foreign arrival vessels upon arrival.
        Back to the question on teams, each agency does receive
    individual time of arrival information, and it does happen that
    we arrive at the vessel at the same time and generally there is
    a general boarding party.
        But the concept of team is not one that is exercised.
        Mr. Shays. What does that mean?
        Ms. Neal. I mean that there is--in other words, that one
    group doesn't always go on board a ship together. That is what
    I mean by team.
        Mr. Shays. Thank you.
        Mr. Putnam. Ms. Neal, you are the head of the Tampa port?
        Ms. Neal. No. I am the Assistant Deputy Administrator for
    Agricultural Quarantine Inspection at the national level.
        Mr. Putnam. Based out of Washington?
        Ms. Neal. Yes.
        Mr. Putnam. OK. I will save my question for the local
    person.
        Mr. Shays. Mr. Dykstra.
        Mr. Dykstra. Generally, FDA does not board ships. However,
    if a ship, such as a large fishing trawler is doing some sort
    of manufacturing on that ship, canning of tuna or salmon, we
    generally go aboard those ships using the Coast Guard
    authorities.
        We do a lot of this up in the Alaskan waters.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Now, tell me then, you all have your
    criteria. You have all said that you follow the criteria. You
    all have said basically you board every ship, which is
    confusing to me. Maybe I misunderstood.
        Captain Thompson. No, sir. I do not board every ship.
        Mr. Shays. The Coast Guard does not?
        Mr. Baldwin. No.
        Mr. Shays. Just every ship----
        Mr. Bulger. Every ship arriving from foreign.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Bulger, are you confident that every
    ship that arrives from overseas is inspected by INS?
        Mr. Bulger. Yes, I am.
        Mr. Shays. OK. Now, just help me sort out. What is unique
    then about--tell me what the criteria is, and it should be the
    same for all of you. If I asked you to write it down on a piece
    of paper, I should be able to have everyone say the same
    answer. What is the criteria when it is a team effort?
        Mr. Baldwin. Mr. Chairman, are you asking what would be the
    criteria?
        Mr. Shays. What is the basis for deciding which vessels to
    board with the team?
        Captain Thompson. Mr. Chairman, from the Coast Guard
    perspective, I need a clearer definition of a team because, in
    essence, when I look at a boarding; i.e., a team boarding, if I
    have a compliance issue that requires Customs or someone else
    to come out, that my inspector and one of Customs' inspectors
    are going out as a team, depending on that particular issue was
    compliance, safety, port security, port safety control.
        So that would be the guidelines. I am not sure that we do
    get together--we do not get together as a team of agencies and
    say we will set this criteria to go out and board these
    particular vessels from a port security standpoint. I think we
    use your guidelines and our regulations based on the various
    requirements and then if by chance it crosses two
    jurisdictions, then that----
        Mr. Shays. Let me just tell you what I am hearing you say.
    What I thought--that there were certain ships that all--that
    collectively all of you made sure you all boarded and you
    boarded as a team. And, what I asked Ms. Crawford--when Ms.
    Crawford made a comment to boarding a cruise ship, she
    described one or two do it together, therefore it is a team.
        When I was just asking to understand that, she wasn't
    claiming that was then, as I heard her, this so-called team
    effort. So I am beginning to wonder if there is this team of
    more than three or four or five, and I am beginning to think
    that there isn't, and that is--you know, maybe I am just
    talking about something that is totally insignificant, maybe I
    am, you know, going nowhere, headed in no direction and don't
    realize it.
        But in my own mind it struck me that sometimes you would
    want to collectively work as a team to have it be intense and
    in the process of doing that you all would be cross-trained so
    that you can share different parts of the ship and be sensitive
    as to what to look for, and then you would have a pretty
    comprehensive look at the ship, and those would be a few, but
    ones that would be triggered by something. But now I realize
    that there is no team in that sense. So I just invented
    something that doesn't exist.
        Captain Thompson. I am not sure you invented something that
    doesn't exist, Mr. Chairman. I think when it comes to a
    particular issue on a particular vessel, if we receive some
    information that would require the various agencies to go out,
    we would go out as a team. But I think we still fall on our own
    jurisdiction. There is not a coordinating effort, you might
    say, where we will look at so many vessels per month and all of
    the various agencies will descend on that particular vessel,
    sir.
        Mr. Putnam. Will the gentleman yield?
        Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. If more
    than one agency boards the same vessel for each of their own
    individual reasons, it would only be by coincidence, not
    because the local agency heads got together and decided that
    they needed to coordinate an inspection effort; is that
    accurate?
        There is a lot of nodding heads in the back, but nothing up
    front.
        Captain Thompson. Unless there was some driving issue or
    circumstances that says we need to have, i.e., Coast Guard,
    Customs to focus on this particular vessel.
        Mr. Baldwin. Or through some of the committees that we have
    there was a special operation that was put in place.
        Mr. Putnam. Absent a special unique circumstance that no
    one can remember the last time that occurred, the only time
    that more than one agency would board the same vessel would be
    by pure coincidence; is that accurate?
        Mr. Baldwin. Yes.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you.
        Ms. Crawford.
        Ms. Crawford. Well, I just want to make sure that I did not
    leave any confusing statements from what I had said earlier.
        Mr. Shays. Let me just say, we are not in a rush just
    because you are standing up, take your time. And I am going to
    say something else. I know we are all, you know, coming from
    the same basis. You all are professionals. You all work hard to
    do a good job. So these questions aren't intended to suggest
    something other than our trying to understand how a system
    works. Some of it can be that we haven't given the right
    training, some of it can be that we haven't given the right
    resources. There are a whole host of things. We are not lobbing
    rocks across this table to that table. Just want that
    understood. Thank you.
        Ms. Crawford. Well, while I can't, unfortunately, provide
    you with how many ships and the number of times that Customs
    has boarded those ships, I can tell you that the cooperation we
    have here on the local level is a great one. As Captain
    Thompson said and others, if we were to have specific targeted
    information, and we wanted to make sure that we have every
    agency covered or we needed force multipliers, we certainly
    pick up the phone, we coordinate and say, hey, this is one that
    we need to address.
        On a normal occurrence, Customs has its requirements that
    it would meet, Immigration its own, Agriculture, and any other
    Federal agency that has an interest in a particular ship. Yes,
    in fact, and I think I said earlier and I will clarify now, we
    may not ever have a boarding team that consists of the same
    individuals at the same time who have met, got in cars together
    and shown up.
        But boardings occur on a cooperative basis based on the
    needs of the agencies. And it is--yes, maybe ``by
    happenstance'' was the best word that I heard from Congressman
    Putnam.
        Mr. Putnam. How is that, therefore--if it is by
    happenstance, how is that therefore cooperative?
        Ms. Crawford. We know when we have an issue. We are looking
    out for Customs issues. If when we are looking at that we see
    something that maybe Agriculture is interested in, we want to
    make sure that they are aware of some item that they want to
    clarify, Immigration the same thing, we would reach out and
    make sure the others were aware of that. They do the same for
    us.
        But on a normal day, taking care of your own organization's
    responsibilities, we do board the vessels we board, as Mr.
    Baldwin says, for Customs. While every foreign vessel is
    subject to boardings, inspections, etc., we choose based on a
    variety of factors which ones meet a high risk or happen to be
    a random type of boarding to do those cross-checks.
        Mr. Putnam. You are the Port of Tampa for Customs. How
    often do you meet with your equivalent at INS, USDA, Coast
    Guard, and FDA?
        Ms. Crawford. We have monthly FIS meetings. They have been
    in existence--I have been here 2 years. They started shortly
    after that. We meet, Agriculture, Immigration, Customs, Border
    Patrol on occasion, when we have a special interest, and we had
    a meeting with Coast Guard when they were assisting Immigration
    in enacting their new policy to help--when we were going to
    have detained crew on board and they were working with INS a
    little closer, we called Coast Guard into those meetings. But
    we have monthly FIS meetings.
        Mr. Putnam. What does that mean, FIS?
        Ms. Crawford. Federal Inspection Service.
        Mr. Putnam. Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. I just want to make a point. I
    haven't heard anything that causes me any problems here. I
    know, I want to say to Chris and to you, I know from talking to
    a lot of these folks, people who work with them, there is a
    very good working relationship here.
        I just wanted to say I think this has been a very
    productive hearing. What I am hearing reminds me of the analogy
    of police, fire and rescue showing up at the scene of an
    accident. These are professionals. They are sometimes working
    side by side and sometimes they are not. They are just doing
    it, and it is not terribly formal. But it doesn't need to be,
    and that is consistent with my understanding of how these
    agencies work together.
        It is only as good as the tone that is set by the leaders
    here. And so that is what I am hearing, Mr. Chairman. I am not
    hearing a problem. I am hearing a system that may not work in
    every community but I think has served this community well. And
    another example of that you heard earlier was that Tampa Bay
    Harbor Safety Committee, which I really think, Mr. Chairman, is
    a model, that got together with the plan that was adopted. So
    that is just my 2 cents.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr Davis.
        Mr. Shays. I know that we have some folks from the
    audience, I think four of them want to testify. I think what I
    am hearing is that we don't have a model to deal with
    terrorism, that we have a model that we have worked to deal
    with maybe drug inspection, and that we have a model that says
    two can communicate, and we have a model that says we
    periodically get together, a monthly get-together. And all of
    those things are encouraging. But it strikes me that we don't
    have a model for a comprehensive look at a ship at the same
    time with every one involved, focused primarily on the concern
    of terrorism.
        That is kind of what I am hearing, and while I wouldn't
    debate whether it is--I would suggest that it is a
    vulnerability.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Shays. Any member of the public
    wishing to speak, please line up at this microphone here. I
    want to thank our third panel. I would ask you to stay, because
    there is a pretty good chance that you may be needed to answer
    any questions or deal with any issues raised. So any member of
    the public who wishes to speak, please line up at the podium
    and we will give each person 2 minutes.
        Please open by introducing yourself, and if you are
    representing an organization or an association or business,
    please state that for the record as well.
        Mr. Rubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Mike Rubin.
    I am the Vice President of the Florida Ports Council. I just
    wanted to followup on two questions that you both asked Steve
    Lauer, one of them being the credentialing issue and the other
    on funding.
        With respect to the credentialing issue, we have reached a
    standardizaqtion in the State. Our next step issue is really on
    a technology level. As you may know, TSA right now is currently
    trying to develop some can kind of nationwide credentialing
    from a transportation standpoint, and they are looking at the
    type of cards to use, a smart card, whether it be prox readers,
    whether it be mag stripe, that kind of thing. That is really
    our next step from a statewide level.
        The gentleman showed you a plastic card, which as you may
    know is not very good because you can't use it for access
    control type gates, you can't use it for information storage,
    you can't use it for a whole host of things.
        From a State of Florida standpoint, our State legislature 2
    years ago passed a requirement for individuals working in
    restricted access areas on seaports, that they receive a
    background check, and if they pass that background check they
    can receive an ID card. We have done that. It has been a
    difficult process, because we do have a number of truckers that
    go from one port to another port. We are trying to accommodate
    those. We are using a Memorandum of Understanding between the
    seaports. So if you receive an ID card at Port of Tampa, you
    then go to the Port of Manatee and say I have been background
    checked, I need to get an ID card.
        Now, you will still have to get a printed ID card at that
    port, because we haven't reached the stage where we have one ID
    card yet. We certainly want to work cooperatively with TSA,
    because we don't want to have a system that you are going to
    adopt federally that doesn't work on a statewide system.
        With respect to funding, we had two issues. We had a
    statewide mandatory type issue. It was a mandate issue which
    certain of the legislature didn't put into place, but we also
    had issues after September 11th for augmentation of Federal
    type forces. As you may know, the security industry is huge in
    this State. Coast Guard had to take a number of their
    resources, move it up to New York or other areas. And as
    augmentation from our local seaports, we would have difficulty
    bringing in the cruise ships here.
        Looking at the numbers, we had a whole host of questions.
    But looking at the cost factors, including referring law
    enforcement type costs on the water, which is something local
    government seaports have never done, on the water type law
    enforcement, we ran about a $100 million stage, with $20 of
    that being a recurring cost. That number continues to grow as
    the consultants and everybody starts to look at it and
    everybody starts dealing with it.
        And I would be happy to answer any questions.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Sansom. I would like to just mainly say thank you.
    Dixie Sansom, Canaveral Port Authority over on the East Coast
    at Port Canaveral. And I would like to say mainly from our
    standpoint of seaports throughout Florida, that we appreciate
    you all taking the time to be here. As Mike pointed out, the
    Florida seaports did not sit on our hands after the legislature
    passed it, and say aw, a song we have all heard, it is an
    unfunded mandate. We took the legislation, we went forward with
    it and did the best that we could with the resources that we
    had. We are very proud of that effort.
        Speaking of being proud, we are very proud, we are proud
    that we have five members of the Florida delegation on the
    House Government Reform Committee. I think that is a tribute to
    Florida and also the fact that our delegation, regardless of
    where they live or what party they are in, they work together,
    they listen, they are very accessible, and you all have super
    staff as well that worked with us.
        One thing that I would just like to point out, Port
    Canaveral has over 1.5 million passengers going through our
    port alone. We are a very compact port. Our main cargo is
    people, and we move--70 percent of our revenue is passengers.
    30 percent is cargo. And most of that cargo, a great deal of
    that cargo are agriculture, citrus-related products.
        I would just like to say that we have at Canaveral an
    outstanding team that includes Agriculture, Customs, INS, as
    well as the U.S. Air Force and Navy, because we have the 45th
    Space Wing right next to us and a naval Trident base, not to
    mention the Kennedy Space Center. We look forward to helping
    you all from the standpoint of any of our Florida seaports, or
    any of the other seaports in whatever we can do to help you in
    the efforts that you are making to help us.
        Thank you again for coming down.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Kovack, welcome back.
        Mr. Kovack. Thank you. I really appreciate this permission
    to speak freely. I really think that to be diplomatic and
    politically correct sometimes you just need to say what the
    issues are. And I just wanted to specify some of my comments.
        One of the things that I think is a problem is the security
    personnel on dock unloading. When we talk about, you know,
    terrorism, if you were going to, say, take an 83-year-old
    woman, you take her aside, you are missing the terrorist. I
    think the same is true with the seaside as well. We are doing a
    good job on the landside, but for instance it is now up to the
    private individuals to hire security guards.
        Now, how trained they are is--you know, you get them from a
    security company. They come on. There are multiple personnel on
    the dock. So say if you have two ships unloading an anhydrous
    ammonia and a petroleum ship, you just tell the security guard
    I am with the petroleum ship, or I am with the anhydrous ship.
        From my understanding, it is a U.S. Coast Guard regulation,
    and so the Port Authority says that it is, you know, the
    responsibility of the private industries. We are all trying to
    work through this together. But at one time you can have as
    many as four security guards out there, and the reality is that
    you need some coordination there.
        Also, as far as the boom side, in Miami the Coast Guard has
    provided booms that go behind these vessels. Well, I think that
    is important because if a cigarette boat or something is trying
    to attack from the sea, you have to have a point where they
    cross that and then it becomes an issue. I don't know if that
    is going to happen here in Tampa as well.
        But if it were a Coast Guard unloading requirement for
    private industries, literally we would only have to provide
    security guards while offloading. So the reality is that ship
    would have no security guard in the interim. But, again,
    private companies are trying to work together. But it seems
    like it would be better to have highly trained, concentrated
    security personnel.
        And finally, I guess my other comment is what is
    reasonable? And there was a bill by EPA, 1602, that was just in
    front of Congress, or is coming in front of Congress. It
    actually talked about corporate liability. The reality is if
    anybody wants to get in an airplane and fly into any structure,
    they can do that. And the reality is everyone is doing the best
    that they can, government and industry together.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much. Our last speaker to bring
    us in for a landing. Sorry, two more.
        Mr. Davis. My name is Carl Davis. I am the local USDA
    Director of Operations here. I just wanted to say that we have
    had a dog detector team here in Tampa since last August. So we
    are going on a year now. This team consists of one trainer, one
    handler and one beagle. And we attempt to make that team
    available for every single foreign arriving aircraft at the
    Tampa International and St. Petersburg International.
        In addition to that, the team works cruise ship passengers
    as well. So we have one team here--to try to answer your
    questions about the rest of the teams in the State, as I
    understand, there are 16 allotted positions in Miami, beagle
    teams in Miami. I don't think they are all filled right now. I
    think there is approximately 10. Right now I don't know exactly
    how many are in Orlando because that is not my area of
    responsibility, but I think there is at least one there.
        Mr. Putnam. To clarify, the beagle team in Tampa inspects
    every international flight that lands at Tampa International
    and every foreign flag ship that comes into the Port of Tampa
    Seaport?
        Mr. Davis. No. It is available for every single foreign-
    arriving aircraft at Tampa International Airport.
        Mr. Putnam. Is present?
        Mr. Davis. The dog also works passengers on foreign
    arriving cruise ships. The dog is not trained to work cargo. It
    is a passenger dog that detects agriculture contraband in
    passenger luggage. This is what this dog is trained for,
    primarily for work in an airport environment, in a maritime
    cruise ship environment, and it is very effective, very
    effective.
        Mr. Davis of Florida. Is one dog enough to handle the
    workload you just described?
        Mr. Davis. For here in Tampa, yes; that is, one dog is
    sufficient for what we see here in Tampa.
        Mr. Putnam. Measured against what?
        Mr. Davis. Measured against the passenger loads that you
    see in Orlando or Miami or LAX or JFK.
        Mr. Putnam. But what percentage of--it doesn't inspect
    every plane. I think--so if 100 percent is too much----
        Mr. Davis. Let me try to explain our situation here in
    Tampa. Normally we have approximately--we never have more than
    two or three foreign arriving flights a day, and normally they
    are not in the clearance room at the same time. So the dog has
    the opportunity as the passengers are picking up the luggage to
    sniff almost every bag, 100 percent of the bags. That may not
    be the case in other airports, but we have that luxury here in
    Tampa.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Lemon. My name is Nolan Lemon. I am Public Affairs
    Specialist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and I will
    try to attempt to answer a couple of questions from earlier.
        From an agency standpoint, we approach it from a degree of
    risk, and our resources are managed in those regards in terms
    of high degree of risk. So say, for example, when the different
    agencies arrive at a vessel, we may not have the same risk
    factors on an arriving vessel. Agriculture may--from our
    standpoint, we may have a vessel arriving from an area that we
    consider high risk to agriculture, based on the incidence of
    pests and diseases, agriculture pests and diseases that occur
    in that country. However, it may not be a country of high risk
    to Immigration or Customs and vice versa. So you are not--you
    may not necessarily have a high degree of presence for every
    single vessel arriving, every single foreign arrival.
        And to match the concerns of the different agencies, we do
    work cooperatively. If the U.S. Customs Service finds something
    that is agriculturally related they will contact us. And we
    have had situations in the past, particularly in Miami, which
    is a high-risk area for us because of its proximity to high
    risk areas, as well as the amount of traffic that is coming
    into Mimai, so we have had situations where we have been
    alerted by U.S. Customs Service about mismanifested cargo that
    was being smuggled in. And just as here in Tampa, they do meet
    on a monthly basis to voice their concerns.
        For us in particular, one of the things that is very
    difficult for us is managing the resources, because as you
    said, sir, having a--if you have 100 percent degree of risk,
    how can we take the biggest chunk out of that 100 percent? We
    can never approach zero. But we want to manage our resources in
    such a way that we can get the biggest bite out of that 100
    percent as possible.
        For us, we have passenger clearance at the international
    airports. And when we weigh this in conjunction, in
    relationship rather, to passengers on international cruise
    vessels, most of the ship stores are U.S. stores. So in terms
    of risk, it is a lower risk for us, because those ship stores
    are originated from the U.S. and not from a foreign country.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much. Parting thoughts, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Shays. I would like to thank some people. I would like
    to thank the Tampa Port Authority, and I would like to ask
    forgiveness when I read your names. John, I won't read titles
    since there are a number, but John Thorington, Bruce Hoffman,
    Luis Viamonte, Denise Mackey, Ken Washington, Barbara
    Heisserer, Richard Dixon, George Gorsuch, Linda Lutes, Steve
    Fidler, Captain Jimmy Griffin. From the Coast Guard, Dennis
    Tea, Robert Wyatt, Scott Ferguson, James Rarley and Brenda
    Trumbull.
        This has been a fascinating hearing, and I know my
    committee has had a tremendous amount of cooperation. I am a
    little suspect that they did choose to come a few days early to
    this hearing, but then, again, Florida is a nice place to live
    and work. I admit that.
        Mr. Putnam. I am very sorry. We had one more person. Please
    come back.
        Ms. Newcombe. I am Roberta Newcombe with a commercial
    company that is selling software to some of the Florida ports,
    looking to solve landside and waterside surveillance. And one
    of the concepts that I just want to leave the committee with is
    the Department of Defense has a wonderful saying, situational
    awareness, and that the security being controlled around the
    ports also has to be mitigated up toward first and local
    responders.
        And if you look to the Department of Defense, in their
    command and control centers they have a proven philosophy about
    how to make the agencies work to solve the event. And the
    software that--I don't want to talk much about our software,
    but the concept is very important that you look to the
    Department of Defense for situational awareness and how an
    enterprise-wide solution is a better concept.
        For example, Port of Tampa has private tenants. They have
    local law enforcement, and they have all of those agencies. And
    you need to make sure that infrastructure filters up; so as the
    event occurs and becomes more and more of a challenge, that it
    goes right up the chain of command. I will use that situation
    with the Port of Miami.
        The response from someone very high up in Florida was they
    were on a cell phone trying to figure out what was going on.
    And I really don't think that long term is the type of
    infrastructure for a long-term solution for security to really
    address things.
        Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, we always say here in Florida,
    Damn Yankees, anybody that came to Florida after you do. That
    is one of the reasons why so many of your constituents are
    here. So we are ready for you to move down here, but you need
    to help make our port a little more secure first.
        Mr. Putnam. We certainly want to recognize our official
    reporter, Mark Stuart, who has been working very hard for us.
    We appreciate the Port of Tampa's hospitality, and the
    hospitality for the morning boat tour. I want to thank the
    committee staff and my staff and particularly our chairman, who
    made this subcommittee hearing possible.
        It is always refreshing to get out of Washington and have
    some hearings. It is even more refreshing when you can breath
    the purified air of Florida sunshine and the wonderful
    environment that we have down here. I want to thank all of our
    witnesses, particularly Panel III.
        We want to thank Christian Spinosa and Courtney Putnam for
    joining us up here, and with that, the subcommittee stands
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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