[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 2, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-211
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
87-016 PDF
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director
Justin Paulhamus, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 2, 2002..................................... 1
Statement of:
Reardon, James P., fire chief, Northbrook, IL; Raymond E.
Seebald, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Port of Chicago,
accompanied by Gail Kulish, Commanding Officer, Atlantic
Area Strike Team; Edward G. Buikema, Regional Director,
Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency; and JayEtta
Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S.
General Accounting Office.................................. 60
Wilkinson, John D., chief, fire and life safety services,
city of Evanston Fire Department; Dennis L. Nilsson,
commander, field operations division, Evanston Police
Department; Patrick J. Daly, Assistant Special Agent in
Charge, Chicago Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Quentin Young, M.D., chair, health and medicine policy
research group, Hyde Park Associates in Medicine; John R.
Lumpkin, M.D., director, Illinois Department of Public
Health; Pamela S. Diaz, M.D., director, emergency
preparedness and infectious disease control, Chicago
Department of Public Health, accompanied by John Wilhelm,
M.D., commissioner, Chicago Department of Public Health;
Arthur B. Schneider, M.D., professor of medicine, chief of
the endocrinology section, University of Illinois; and
David A. Kraft, director, Nuclear Energy Information
Service.................................................... 6
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Buikema, Edward G., Regional Director, Region V, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of......... 77
Daly, Patrick J., Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Chicago
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared
statement of............................................... 10
Diaz, Pamela S., M.D., director, emergency preparedness and
infectious disease control, Chicago Department of Public
Health, prepared statement of.............................. 38
Hecker, JayEtta, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...... 88
Kraft, David A., director, Nuclear Energy Information
Service, prepared statement of............................. 49
Lumpkin, John R., M.D., director, Illinois Department of
Public Health, prepared statement of....................... 24
Reardon, James P., fire chief, Northbrook, IL, prepared
statement of............................................... 64
Schneider, Arthur B., M.D., professor of medicine, chief of
the endocrinology section, University of Illinois, prepared
statement of............................................... 46
Seebald, Raymond E., Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Port of
Chicago, prepared statement of............................. 68
Young, Quentin, M.D., chair, health and medicine policy
research group, Hyde Park Associates in Medicine, prepared
statement of............................................... 21
HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 2, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Chicago, IL.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2525, Dirksen Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street,
Chicago, IL, Hon. Steve Horn (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Present: Representatives Horn, Schakowsky, Biggert and
Kirk.
Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief
counsel; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; Justin Paulhamus,
clerk; Chris Barkley, staff assistant; Michael Sazonov,
Sterling Bentley, Joe DiSilvio, and Yigal Kerszenbaum, interns.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.
On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most
devastating attacks ever committed on U.S. soil. Despite the
damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple
this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been more
united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their
willingness to protect that freedom. The diabolical nature of
those attacks and then the deadly release of Anthrax sent a
loud and clear message to all Americans: We must be prepared
for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to
protect this Nation and this people from further attempts to
cause massive destruction.
The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the
need for adequate communications systems and rapid deployment
of well-trained emergency personnel. Yet, despite billions of
dollars which Congress has produced in spending on Federal
emergency programs, there remains serious doubts as to whether
the Nation is equipped to handle a massive chemical, biological
or nuclear attack.
Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively
Federal, State and local agencies are working together to
prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the
great State of Illinois and the good people of Chicago to know
that they can rely on these systems, should that need arise.
And we hope it does not happen.
We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable
experience and insight will help the subcommittee better
understand the needs of these on the front lines. We want to
hear about their capabilities and their challenges. And we want
to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome
all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
We have with us today the ranking member for the minority,
Ms. Schakowsky. This is her turf and I yield to her for an
opening statement.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me express
my appreciation to you for scheduling this hearing in Chicago
so that we could get the local input that we so desperately
need in order to craft a plan that will help all of our cities.
Homeland security really is dependent on hometown security and
that is what we want to focus on today.
My blackberry has been going off to announce--that is my e-
mail--an evacuation that is a drill in Washington right now of
the Rayburn Building, to make sure that everyone can get out
there. And there has been a lot of changes that we see every
day in Washington, DC. But today, we want to know how are we
doing here at home. The title of this hearing is ``How
effectively is the Federal Government Assisting State and Local
Governments in Preparing for a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear
Attack.''
Without adequate and appropriate information, direction and
resources flowing from the Federal Government to the local and
State authorities, Illinois, Chicago and other cities across
the State cannot be expected to contribute the resources
necessary to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack.
Today's hearing is extremely timely. The FBI's latest
warning of possible attacks over the Fourth of July holiday
begs the question ``Are we prepared?'' Have Chicagoland
authorities received the necessary information, cooperation and
direction from the Federal Government to guarantee public
safety or, at the very least, to minimize public risk?
Has the State of Illinois been provided with what it needs
from the Federal Government to develop and implement a
comprehensive emergency preparedness plan? And in turn, are
those resources making it to the local law enforcement and
emergency responders who are on the front lines in the effort
to prevent and respond to terrorist threats?
We are here to find out the answers to those important
questions. We are in Chicago today to hear the voices of local
officials and to make sure their message is heard in
Washington, DC. A successful blueprint for homeland security
must begin with input from those on the front line. They are
the ones who will assure that our 4th of July celebrations are
safe and secure. They are the ones who will respond first to
any incident. We cannot secure our Nation without their input
and expertise.
Since September 11th, the way we conduct the business of
national security in this country has changed. Today, our
Federal, State and local authorities are even more aware of
potential threats. Additional steps are being taken to protect
a more alert and concerned public. For most Americans, the
thought of biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism is, for
the first time, a real possibility. This is our new normal.
In Washington, we are deliberating over the President's
plan to create a massive new Government agency, the Department
of Homeland Security. The full Government Reform Committee has
primary jurisdiction over the creation of that department and
hearings are scheduled next week on Capitol Hill. At each step
of the way, we will continue to ask important questions,
including whether this plan will make us safer. We must also
determine whether critical non-security functions of agencies
like the Coast Guard and FEMA and the INS will be compromised
under that plan. We need input from the local level to make
sure that all of this is done right.
Today, we are focusing on the possibility of chemical,
biological or nuclear terrorist attacks. Illinois has more
nuclear power facilities than any other State. We need to be
sure that adequate security and contingency plans are in place
to deal with possible attacks on those facilities. The Federal
Government has offered considerable resources and information
to help with that effort and we will need an assessment as to
how the coordination process on that front is progressing.
Biological terrorism has already occurred. The Anthrax
attacks that were delivered through the mail were a wake-up
call for us to check the state of our public health
infrastructure.
As many of our witnesses today will explain, our public
health system would be challenged in responding to a large-
scale disaster, either natural or man-made. The capacity of our
public and private hospitals is strained each year during the
flu season. A disaster with 10,000 injuries that required
hospitalization would be very difficult for that system to
handle.
The front line of response in most disasters is local
government. We see this again and again as hurricanes,
tornadoes and heat waves strike the cities. Local firefighters,
police officers and emergency medical personnel are the first
there to tend to those in need. Any response we make now must
keep in mind that fact. Training, resources, and communications
are key to disaster response and should be the centerpiece of
our investment. The majority of that investment should be made
at the local level.
Past experiences have shown that our public health system
is also on the front line. Once the disaster scene is surveyed,
the injured are moved to hospitals. It is often the case that
the hospital capacity is reduced by the same disaster. We have
taken our public health system for granted for some time now
and it has suffered as a result. We must invest in personnel,
planning and reserve capacity.
Again, I want to thank each of our witnesses for taking
time from their busy schedules to be with us today. I look
forward to all of your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. And now I yield time for Ms. Biggert,
a neighbor in Naperville in Illinois and a very hard-working
Member of Congress. We thank you for being here.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
start by welcoming you back to the ``second city.'' I also want
to thank you for inviting me to participate in this important
hearing on Federal, State and local efforts to prepare for a
biological, chemical or nuclear attack. I am especially pleased
to be here with my Illinois delegation colleagues to get the
local perspective on our Federal counter-terrorism efforts and
to find out how the Federal Government can better serve our
first responders.
I also want to take this opportunity to welcome a
constituent of mine, Captain Ray Seebald of the U.S. Coast
Guard, Captain of the Port of Chicago.
Believe it or not, the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office,
Chicago, is not located in Chicago at all, it is headquartered
in Burr Ridge, in my landlocked district. Regardless of the
location of the offices, the Coast Guard has always played an
important role along Illinois' waterways and in Lake Michigan,
but since September 11th, the importance of that role has
become even more obvious.
I was happy to work with Captain Seebald long before
September 11th to help secure money for the Coast Guard to
construct a new Marine Safety station near Navy Pier. With the
announcement of funds for the new station, Chicago's lakefront
will become even safer for recreation and commercial traffic,
but first, we have to get it built. Is that not right, Captain
Seebald?
So I am looking forward also to the testimony of many local
public health officials and the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction requires our hospitals and clinics to plan for the
unthinkable, which can be a daunting task. I hope our local
public health officials will share with us today what the
Federal Government is doing right and what it is not doing
right to help them with this task.
As a former member of this subcommittee, I remember when
Chairman Horn last visited Naperville back in 1999, to discuss
the ways the Federal Government could help States,
municipalities and even private industry prepare for the Y2K
bug. As we all know, Y2K came and went without incident. I
believe catastrophe was avoided because we spent so much time
and energy planning and preparing for it, and worrying always
helps a little bit too.
I can only hope the more time and energy we put into
planning and preparing for future terrorist attacks, the more
likely we are to avoid another catastrophe like that of
September 11th. Unfortunately, we will never know if our
efforts have been truly successful like we did on January 2000.
We will not be able to breathe a sigh of relief like we did on
that New Year's Day. The threat of terrorism is permanent and
it is constant. But the memory of that fateful September day
seared in our minds and hearts will always motivate us to try
any and everything possible to see that it never happens again.
In this process of planning, preparation and prevention,
congressional hearings like this one in places other than
Washington, DC, are extremely helpful. This is especially true
as the House prepares to consider the President's plan to
establish a new Department of Homeland Security to protect and
defend our land and our way of life.
It is our responsibility as Members of Congress, to ensure
that the Federal agencies continue to develop a national
approach to homeland security and that they have the resources
to do so. That is why we are going to provide funds in fiscal
year 2003 to identify and confront terrorist threats before
they can get off the ground.
In many ways, September 11th was a wake-up call for our
Nation and we have taken several steps to answer that call. At
the end of the day, we must take action to preserve the values
that make the United States the greatest and the most powerful
country in history and I think that we are.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we now are delighted to have Mr.
Kirk, a very hard-working member and he has given us a lot of
legislation which we will be acting on in a few weeks on
accounting and fiscal problems to increase better things for
the taxpayers, and we are glad to have him here.
Mr. Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman
Schakowsky for having us. I also am very pleased that this is
the room that I was sworn into the Illinois Bar in, and it is
good to be back here.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that September 11th gave us fair
warning that Chicagoland could be the next ground zero of a
terrorist attack. We are home to America's tallest building,
there are more nuclear reactors in Illinois than any other
State, we are home to the busiest airport in the world and we
are headquarters to most Federal offices controlling affairs in
the midwest. We need to do a better job on homeland defense.
Just a few weeks ago, we gathered 27 police and fire
departments in northeast Illinois with the White House Office
of Home Defense and I can say that first-responders there are
looking forward to the $3.5 billion White House first responder
initiative when it kicks off next month. The report will be
received by the Congress later this month detailing how local
police and fire can apply for these funding streams.
The key, I believe, is communication. In the District of
Columbia, as September 11th unfolded, cell phones collapsed
first, followed by landlines. Some first responders were forced
to use only four available frequencies in responding to the
Pentagon fire. One system survived, which is wireless e-mail,
it handled the whole load, even after a 100fold increase. I
believe the Federal Government should help upgrade first
responder communications.
I am very happy that we are joined here by Chief Jay
Reardon of the Northbrook Fire Department, but he is also
President of the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System, which is
northeastern Illinois' mutual aid society between fire
departments. It is this organization which can help us respond
anywhere from a 1 alarm to a 25 alarm fire, which a weapon of
mass destruction would certainly result in.
So I applaud you for holding this hearing and look forward
to the results. And thank you for coming to Chicago.
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman.
We, as you know, are an investigating committee and,
therefore, we do put witnesses under oath. And so if all the
witnesses this morning and the people that will support them
would please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. Thank you. The clerk will note all, not just at
the table but the ones back of the table.
So we will start then with the panel one, we called it, and
we are trying to get both the State, the local, the Federal,
all moving along. We are going to start with Chief John D.
Wilkinson, Fire and Life Safety Services of the city of
Evanston Fire Department.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Chairman, if I could just give a
special thanks to Chief Wilkinson. Because we are so concerned
about hometowns, I thought we would start with my hometown and
so both Chief Wilkinson and Commander Nilsson are from
Evanston, where I have lived for 30 years. Thank you for being
here.
Mr. Horn. OK, Chief.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN D. WILKINSON, CHIEF, FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY
SERVICES, CITY OF EVANSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT; DENNIS L. NILSSON,
COMMANDER, FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION, EVANSTON POLICE
DEPARTMENT; PATRICK J. DALY, ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
CHICAGO DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; QUENTIN
YOUNG, M.D., CHAIR, HEALTH AND MEDICINE POLICY RESEARCH GROUP,
HYDE PARK ASSOCIATES IN MEDICINE; JOHN R. LUMPKIN, M.D.,
DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; PAMELA S. DIAZ,
M.D., DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE
CONTROL, CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, ACCOMPANIED BY
JOHN WILHELM, M.D., COMMISSIONER, CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH; ARTHUR B. SCHNEIDER, M.D., PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, CHIEF
OF THE ENDOCRINOLOGY SECTION, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS; AND DAVID
A. KRAFT, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE
Mr. Wilkinson. Well, in a more global sense, Chief Reardon
will be able to speak to the MABAS portion of it, but our
experience at the local, basic, first-responding level
initially from September 11th, that period of time, was
communication was coming from all directions. We didn't know
for sure what to believe.
We do some high-risk analysis in our community, we have
been doing this for a long time and we have a structure in
place. But initially, I think we felt lonely, there was not a
lot of other communication coming down to us. Since then, the
Government has provided a lot of resources that go into our
MABAS organizations and our special teams and communications is
definitely an issue, and that communication problem is still
there and it is inter-agency, both from law enforcement to fire
and from various law enforcement and various fire departments
among themselves. Communication is a big one to overcome.
What I would like to see and what I am looking for and
think is coming down the road is preparedness at the actual
first-responding level. Resources are available to us, we can
get them, but not as timely as if we had them right at the
first very responding level. We are using the same technologies
and the same personnel for situations that could be
significantly different than they were in the past. And I think
it is going that way, but speeding that process up in the
funding so that we can get it to the local level is going to
make a difference for us.
We are still maintaining the same services we did before
plus living under this threat. And the threat is not just an
international thing either. I mean we have had a number of
incidents in the United States that were not from any organized
foreign soil. Oklahoma City was an example that taxed them
completely. And that is the incident that we are concerned
about, the one that has no warning. And that potential is out
there.
So that is essentially where we are at. Things did not seem
to work quite as well, things have been I think a little bit
slow coming, but they are coming, and we still have--at first
responding level, we need some better education, better
training facilities. There really are not too many of them out
there and, of course, the communication issue.
That is essentially a snapshot as I see it.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you very much. You are on the firing
line and we listen to people that are on the firing line.
The next presentation is Commander Dennis L. Nilsson, Field
Operations Division, Evanston Police Department.
Mr. Nilsson. Good morning.
On September 11th, we all had a very rude awakening, as
everybody in this room knows. Myself, like everybody else, the
first thing we did was we went to a television to see what was
going on. And then as the realization began to settle in, we
had to start looking at our home, where we are, what did we
have to do. We had to start looking at our vulnerability
immediately because in our community is looking at us, pubic
safety, police and fire, to reassure that safety and security
is in fact in Evanston.
What we started to learn that morning was just what we did
not know and what we did to have available to us. Evanston is
very fortunate, we are a well-trained police and fire
department, but we realize that our equipment that we respond
with is equipment that we respond to suppress fire and our
officers are trained to handle crime on the street, crime in
the home, not terrorism at the level that we were seeing.
The community looked toward us, when they were coming home
that night, getting off the public transportation, they were
actually greeting our officers and thanking them for being
there. But what we found out was we had nobody to call at that
time. We were beginning to pool our resources in our city, our
health department came together, our emergency operations
center, police and fire and we began to assess what we had
available to us and what communications we had, how to keep the
communications open amongst ourselves so that we could provide
these services to our community.
So we found out in retrospect and looking back, it has
already been said, communications is key.
Training, we are going to need more training. Our police
officers are trained as crime fighters and problem solvers,
they are not trained to handle terrorism. Our first responders,
when they are going to go in, they are going to go in as they
go into any issue that we go in on, a fire, a call for the
police, they are going in there pretty much without equipment.
They are not going in with hazmat suits, so they are very
vulnerable. So we need to begin to train our police officers on
how to handle situations and be more aware of these situations,
because we have never experienced this. In 32 years of law
enforcement, it was my first experience feeling that we really
needed more training.
We need help at the community level to provide extended
assistance in the event that a critical incident happens that
goes beyond the agency's ability to sustain long-term
commitment to the incident, something that goes beyond the
agency's ability to provide adequate manpower and resources. We
are well-equipped to handle the day-to-day stuff, but what we
are looking at now is we are looking at having to handle
something that goes beyond the day-to-day stuff and something
that goes on to the extended. We need to bring in other
resources, we need to know what other resources are out there
and available to us and we need to begin to pool that
information so we do not make blind phone calls like we were
making on September 11th, trying to contact our resources that
we use on a day-to-day basis, only to find out that they've
already been over-taxed with calls from other agencies.
That is basically what we were faced with that morning.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you for telling us that tale.
The next presenter, I want to say that this subcommittee,
over the last few years, we have depended on those in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, whether it was Y2K or whether
it was fraud or whatever. Patrick J. Daly is the Assistant
Special Agent in Charge, Chicago Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation. We thank you for all the help you and your
colleagues have given us.
Mr. Daly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity to discuss the FBI's efforts in northern Illinois
to address the problems of weapons of mass destruction or WMD.
The mission of the FBI's counterterrorism program is to
detect, deter, prevent and swiftly respond to terrorist actions
that threaten the U.S. interests. Director Mueller identified
the first priority of the FBI as protecting the United States
from terrorist attack.
The Chicago FBI covers the northern portion of the State of
Illinois, it contains 18 counties and has more than 370 law
enforcement agencies. Chicago FBI has approximately 434 special
agents and 282 support employees.
The FBI has developed an enhanced capacity to deal with
acts of terrorism. This has been accomplished by one,
increasing number of FBI and task force personnel investigating
terrorism; two, establishing partnerships with law enforcement,
first responders and public health communities to combat WMD
threats; and three, improving information sharing with local,
State and Federal agencies as well as with the private sector.
The Chicago FBI has been extremely active in the WMD
program area with an emphasis on strong liaison with State and
local agencies. Since 1999, Chicago has participated in more
than 200 field and table-top exercises with area first
responders. Chicago has one of eight regional enhanced
hazardous material response teams composed of FBI special
agents trained to gather evidence in a contaminated crime
scene. FBI bomb technicians are also hazmat trained.
The Chicago Division participated in a terrorism threat
assessment team consisting of the Chicago Police Department,
Fire Department and Illinois State Police. This team identified
key infrastructure components throughout the city of Chicago.
The Chicago Division recently began an information sharing
project with Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies
using the Law Enforcement Online [LEO], Web page. This
information sharing project is a result of a task force on
terrorism initiated by the Illinois Association of Chiefs of
Police and the Chicago FBI after the September 11th attacks.
The Chicago Terrorist Task Force was founded in 1981 by
members of the Chicago Police Department, FBI, Secret Service
and Illinois State Police. Today, member agencies include the
FBI, Chicago Police, Illinois State Police, Secret Service,
ATF, INS, Customs, IRS, Postal Inspectors and State Department
Diplomatic Security. Other agencies providing close cooperation
with the Chicago Terrorist Task Force include the CIA, FEMA,
Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Chicago Fire Department,
Department of Health and Human Services, Illinois Department of
Public Health, Department of Energy and various local police
and fire departments.
The Chicago Division enjoys an excellent relationship with
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of
Illinois. The present U.S. Attorney, Patrick Fitzgerald, is
recognized for his extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and
his ability to successfully prosecute them.
Life has changed for all of us in the United States as well
as throughout the world. Major acts of terrorism are no longer
confined to Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America.
The terrorists have struck hard within our borders and have
brought the violence to our neighborhoods, to our citizens, to
our families, to all of us. We are threatened by a man in a
cave thousands of miles away and by a former Chicago resident
named Padilla, who returned to his city and this Nation seeking
to carry out a plan of mass destruction. We are improving our
WMD capabilities, our intelligence sharing, our willingness to
dedicate personnel and resources to this fight. We, the FBI,
the Chicago Terrorist Task Force, the public safety community,
the public health community, the military, the intelligence
agencies and our allied countries are joined in a battle that
may last years, but the alternative of not entering the fight
is unacceptable.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we know you have other
appointments and we thank you for giving us that statement.
Our next presenter is Dr. Quentin Young, chair, Health and
Medicine Policy Research Group, Hyde Park Associates in
Medicine.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Daly follows:]
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Dr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Schakowsky. Again, Mr. Chairman, if I could--also past
President of the American Public Health Association, former
medical director, Cook County Hospital and my personal
physician. [Laughter.]
Dr. Young. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I am really honored to be invited to present to you.
In contrast to all the other members of this panel, I am
not a full time professional devoted to defending us in all the
ways they are. I rather am a physician celebrating 50 years of
practice in my community, whose life has been punctuated by a
number of exciting experiences in public health ranging from
chairing the large department of medicine at our big public
hospital here to service in the Public Health Service when I
was much younger. My remarks, Mr. Chairman, will be rather
global in an effort to talk about public health policy rather
than what I am not qualified to talk about, the delivery of
services as my colleagues have been doing.
To proceed, the Federal Government must be the mainstay of
public health, including the threats from terrorist sources. As
such, it is failing to meet its responsibilities in a manner
commensurate to the challenge.
The inadequacies and weaknesses of our U.S. public health
system spring from long-term neglect or policies that do not
enhance systemic strengths.
Our national, State and local health agencies are
underfunded and poorly coordinated. Elementary modern
capabilities in computer information systems, round the clock
personnel in place, laboratories of a uniform high quality and
speedy accessibility, a full public health professional work
force--are all deficient in various degrees across our country
and our State.
These deficiencies are the result of decades of inattention
and misdirection of resources, stemming from the post-World War
II focus on the perceived terror of that day--bacteriological
warfare. Overall our policy decisions produced no practical
protections against this biological threat. We did buildup
stockpiles of our own, only to destroy them during President
Nixon's watch, because they could not be used by us. In the
latter half of the 20th century, our chronic poor funding and
narrow policies for public health resulted in our current
plight. And let me underscore that by saying I am fearful that
in moving, as we must, to defend ourselves against this new
unprecedented threat, that we may abandon principles that can
really protect us. And I will go forward with that.
In addition to prompt upgrading of our public health
capabilities--and I am aware that much of the legislation you
have before you and have already passed attempts to do just
that--we have several other tasks to achieve optimum protection
for our people:
We need a health care system that is financed by an
insurance benefit that is universal and managed by the
government in simplest terms, Medicare for all. It may not seem
responsive to terrorist threats to call for universal health
care, but as a practicing physician for half a century, I
assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is crucial to our
defenses against an unexpected catastrophe.
We need to untether the directors of our public health
agencies from the present arrangement of subservience to the
political incumbent at the Federal, State or local health
department level. That is the way we do it in this country. My
distinguished colleague worked for Governor Ryan and the
Surgeon General for the President. Now it is logical, but we
need to have more freedom for these crucial professional jobs.
It would mean a change in the way we have done things over the
years, but unless we liberate--I use the word advisedly--our
health system from that political control, which is not
necessarily negative or obnoxious, but is always subordinate to
other considerations, we can see at moments like this how
contrary that can be. And I suggest a separate board like the
SEC or the FTC could facilitate achievement long term of public
health objectives at all levels in a coordinated fashion, and
not be immediately subordinated to the political realities of
the moment, which are always important.
Finally, we should foster the development of a supportive
citizen constituency advocating for a strong public health
system. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, that is the essence of my
learning over the decades. We do not have a public health
constituency in the way we have constituencies for every other
kind of issue in this country. We have quasi-public health
constituencies. The American Lung, the American Heart and
American Cancer support the control of the tobacco scourge--
public health issue if ever there was one--but I have to return
to the generalization that we do not have in place on a regular
basis people who can petition Congress in behalf of the public
health system in an orderly fashion. We have, in a word, made
our public health system the Cinderella of our health system.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we now go to the Illinois
Department of Public Health, its director is Dr. John R.
Lumpkin. We are glad to have you here.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Young follows:]
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Dr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee for the opportunity to be here and speak. Today--
actually just yesterday--our agency celebrated our 125th
anniversary as an agency. Our agency was created in 1877 in
response to a threat of yellow fever. Now, just as then, we are
addressing concerns; this time it is man-made epidemics.
In 1988, the Institute of Medicine Committee on Public
Health stated that the current state of our ability to effect
public health action is cause for national concern and for the
development of a plan of action for the needed improvements. In
the committee's view, we have slackened our public health
vigilance nationally and the health of the public is
unnecessarily threatened as a result. That report was issued
and basically went on the shelf. It was not until the events of
September 11th and the following October 4 disclosure of an
outbreak of anthrax that we as a Nation began to look and
identify that maybe we have major problems in our public health
system, which the Institute of Medicine Committee noted some 14
years earlier.
As a result, we have had major increases in funding. The
$1.1 billion allocated for the public health system is a
dramatic shot in the arm, one of the largest increases in
public health funding that we have seen, at least in my
lifetime and I think perhaps in the history of our public
health system.
We have taken this task very seriously and we have moved
ahead. This funding is crucial to rebuild an eroding
infrastructure. It is an infrastructure that has to be rebuilt
not only in large areas like Chicago and the metropolitan areas
but throughout the State where public health is so important.
With this funding at the State level, we are establishing
12 public health regional response planning areas; we are
hiring 23 emergency response coordinators for local emergency
response planning areas; we are establishing local health
department administrative grants for preparedness; we are
developing an Illinois National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System; we're hiring 22 regional epidemiologists to enhance
local regional surveillance capacity at the local level; we are
increasing the capacity of three State laboratories by hiring
staff and upgrading laboratory systems; we are developing local
health department capacity to support the State laboratories
and to develop surge capacity; we are establishing a hospital
health alert network so that we can communicate in a much
faster way with hospitals the way we have already established
with local health departments; we are enhancing 24/7 flow of
critical health information to public health partners
throughout the State at the local level; we are establishing a
local health department training and education grant to build
capacity; we are facilitating the development of a model
regional hospital preparedness plan and providing direct
funding to hospitals to implement these; and we are
establishing core preparedness standards for the three-tiered
facility classification system.
All these are important enhancements that we are doing with
the Federal funding and we could not do them without it.
You have before you a little document that I found as we
were preparing for our history, the 125th anniversary, and what
it is is a document from a page of one of the publications we
had in the 1920's and what it says is ``A full time medical
health officer prevents disease.'' The interesting thing is
that, when you look at this, how he is communicating with his
local people by phone is pretty much the way we do things
today--telephone and pieces of paper. You see before you this
blue card, it is how we get reports about infectious diseases
in this State. We are using 1920's technology.
With this current round of Federal funding, we are going to
be able to move into an electronic system--the first phase will
be implemented by October this year--because of the influx of
new funding.
Our public health system has undergone a period of neglect.
I think it is very important to note that, just as someone who
is exposed to anthrax is not treated with just one dose of
medication but is treated for a number of days, we cannot treat
our public health system with a single infusion of funds. We
have to make a long-term commitment to continue to fund the
enhancements, which we believe in this State we are using
wisely to create a system that will not only help if there is
an attack, but every single day will help.
The enhancements we did in the laboratory enabled us to
better respond to West Nile disease. If we are going to rebuild
our public health system, we will reap the benefits even if
there is no further attack, which unfortunately, we do not
believe is the case.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Dr. Lumpkin.
Next, we have Dr. Pamela Diaz, director, Emergency
Preparedness and Infectious Disease Control in the Chicago
Department of Public Health. She is accompanied by Dr. John
Wilhelm, commissioner, Chicago Department of Public Health and
Dr. Arthur B. Schneider, professor of medicine, chief of
endocrinology section, University of Illinois and David A.
Kraft, director, Nuclear Energy Information Service.
So we will just go right down the line, Ms. Diaz.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lumpkin follows:]
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Dr. Diaz. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak
with all of you today. As noted, I am joined by Dr. John
Wilhelm, the commissioner of health for the city of Chicago.
This is a very important subject, as it relates to
bioterrorism and terrorist acts.
Since September 11th and the anthrax crisis that gripped
our country, the city of Chicago has loomed large as a
potential target for bioterrorism. In recognition of this fact,
the Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awarded
the Chicago Department of Public Health $12 million to support
the development of an integrated system for protecting the
citizens of Chicago and the surrounding area from bioterrorist
attack.
It should be noted that much of the work by the Chicago
Department of Public Health in this area long predates
September 11th or the recent CDC award. The Chicago Department
of Public Health has, over the years been building a strong and
effective system to detect and monitor outbreaks of routine
infectious diseases and 2 years ago, direct funding from the
CDC helped lay that groundwork specifically around
bioterrorism.
Today, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, in response to
infectious diseases, coordinates the Department's activities
related to bioterrorism in partnership with other city, State,
regional and Federal agencies. Many of these activities include
table-top exercises that involve leaders in our health
department, additionally our fire department, law enforcement
and other critical first responders. These exercises allow
leaders to map out strategies for responding to a variety of
scenarios.
We have regular meetings of a technical advisory group on
bioterrorism that is comprised of experts and leaders in our
community. This group would be called upon to support us and
for consultation during an emergency.
We have established a 24-hour a day, 7 day a week call
system allowing health professionals in the community to
immediately report suspicious symptoms that may be related to a
bioterrorist attack or any outbreak of infectious diseases.
We have developed plans for distribution of drugs, vaccines
and medical supplies for protection of the public in the event
of a terrorist attack.
And most importantly, an enhanced capacity to recognize
through disease surveillance, and respond to communicable
diseases of all kinds. Whether the threat of Anthrax or
Influenza, public health defense depends not on any one single
strategy, but many functions and disciplines, including
epidemiology, planning public information and general
communicable disease control. In other words, the threat of
bioterrorism calls not so much for new and extraordinary
strategies to be used once in an emergency that hopefully will
never happen, but for resources and systems that should be in
place as part of routine public health functions.
The challenge is to ensure that adequate resources are
available to manage a bioterrorist incident, a uniquely complex
event that would potentially involve the entire city's
population, its health care system, first responders, the media
and just about every other institution in the city.
It should be emphasized that the Chicago Department of
Public Health has not been putting our programs into place
alone, but in concert with Federal, State and regional health
departments. Our department is working to increase
connectivity, that communications link, through high-speed,
secure internet technology, our health alert network, with
other health departments, our city hospitals, and other
agencies such as our first responder agencies and health
systems that would be involved in an event.
Additionally, it should be noted that the Department is
working to help the City's hospitals prepare for a bioterrorist
attack using funds from the Health Resources and Service
Administration.
And finally, the City has been an active advocate of
enhancing the State's laboratory capacities for testing for the
presence of infectious diseases.
We believe our program demonstrates the value of direct
Federal funding. Some have argued that all support for
protection against bioterrorism should be given to States and
only indirectly to local health departments. Well, when it
comes to many matters of public health, one size does not fit
all. The needs of a densely populated socio-economically
diverse urban center like Chicago and the other cities that
receive direct funding are not those of smaller more rural or
suburban locations. Some also have pointed out that
bioterrorism can occur anywhere, and to be sure, terrorism,
like infectious diseases, is not confined to the Nation's
largest cities. But the vulnerability of cities like Chicago,
and the magnitude and complexity of responding to an attack,
and containing it, is not determined only by the density and
size of the population. It is also determined by the physical
size of the city, the complexity of the city's health care
system, the socio-economic, linguistic and ethnic diversity of
the population, the concentration of industry, the presence of
two large airports like Chicago as well as rail transportation
and interstate highways and a daily influx of visitors from all
over the world. These and a host of other factors, make
containment of an outbreak of deadly disease in Chicago vastly
more complicated to manage than a similar outbreak in a smaller
or more rural setting. As only one example of this complexity,
one might imagine the catastrophic potential of an undetected
outbreak of highly infectious disease being carried all over
the Nation and the world as thousands of travelers leave the
airports in Chicago.
And finally, we join others in supporting the development
of the new Federal department, having a coordinating role among
all Federal departments in terrorism activities.
As I hope we have demonstrated this morning, the public
health requirements for bioterrorism preparedness are well
within the broader routine activities of public health, and
therefore, caution that the policies, planning and
implementation of the public health aspects of bioterrorism
remain within the Department of Health and Human Services, most
notably CDC and HRSA.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you
today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Diaz follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. Dr. Wilhelm, can you come here at the
table.
Dr. Wilhelm. Good morning. Dr. Diaz actually gave our
combined departmental testimony.
Mr. Horn. Well, Dr. Wilhelm, you are a commissioner, and so
if you would like to add anything, let us know.
Dr. Wilhelm. The only thing I would emphasize again are the
points of the complexity of a City such as Chicago and the
others who receive direct funding--New York City, Washington,
DC, and Los Angeles. It is extremely important that we use the
funding to build our everyday systems to control communicable
disease which are the exact systems that we would be using in
the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Mr. Horn. You might want to bring the microphone a little
closer. Thank you. Technology is slow with congressional
committees. Go ahead.
Dr. Wilhelm. My comment was the only thing that I would
emphasize in the departmental statement that Dr. Diaz presented
is the importance of direct funding to Chicago as well as the
other cities--New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles, in
recognition of the complexity and the density here in these
major cities. What the funding is doing is it is strengthening
our everyday systems and collaborations for control of
communicable disease, which are the same systems that we would
be using in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. Dr. Schneider. Dr. Schneider is
professor of medicine, chief of endocrinology section at the
University of Illinois.
Dr. Schneider. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to
present my comments on the role of potassium iodide, also
referred to as KI, in the event of a nuclear or radiological
terrorist attack.
As an endocrinologist, I care for patients with thyroid
disease. I have been studying the effect of radiation exposure
on the thyroid since 1973. The studies have focused on the
thyroid gland since it is the most sensitive organ to the
effects of radiation. I have also served on advisory panels for
a variety of studies, including those occurring in the
Chernobyl region. Finally, until recently, I was the Chair of
the Public Health Committee of the American Thyroid
Association. My comments are also informed by my working with
the expert members of that association.
The thyroid gland uses iodine to make thyroxine. Iodine is
a unique component of thyroxine. As there is relatively little
iodine in the diet, in order to make thyroxine, the thyroid has
developed the ability to concentrate it. When the body is
exposed to radioactive iodine, it is also concentrated in the
thyroid gland. Giving a large amount of non-radioactive iodine,
in the form of a KI tablet, can prevent this. The non-
radioactive iodine saturates the thyroid and largely prevents
it from taking up the radioactive form.
While it was known for decades that external radiation
could cause thyroid cancer, it was not so clear for internal
exposure from radioactive iodine. This uncertainty was erased
by the unfortunate outcome of the Chernobyl accident. Among
exposed children, hundreds of cases of thyroid cancer have
occurred. Many of these cases have been unusually aggressive
and some have been fatal. A terrorist attack on a functioning
nuclear power plant could release radioactive iodine. A nuclear
explosion would also release radioactive iodine, as did the
bombs exploded in Japan and the above-ground tests conducted in
the United States and in the Soviet Union. A dirty,
conventional bomb or a non-functioning plant may not release
radioactive iodine.
Following the Chernobyl accident, KI was widely used in
Poland. That experience proved its safety and provided an
important part of the data used to support the guidance issued
by the FDA and the recommendations of the American Thyroid
Association and others in favor of distributing KI tablets.
Based largely on the Chernobyl experience, the American Thyroid
Association recommends predistribution in a 50-mile radius
around nuclear plants and stockpiling up to 200 miles.
I am pleased that both the legislative and executive
branches of the government have acted and I am also pleased to
see the growing list of States that have accepted iodine from
the Federal Government.
Although there appears to be movement in the State of
Illinois, the situation is less clear. First, reported comments
from at least one State official indicate an under-estimation
of the effects of thyroid cancer. Although often referred to as
one of the ``good'' cancers to have, on occasion it can be
difficult to treat and, as I mentioned, it can be fatal.
Successful treatment includes removing the thyroid gland.
Living without the thyroid gland is readily managed, but it is
not without its difficulties and potential dangers. The second
concern is that Illinois reportedly will use industrial support
to purchase its supply of KI tablets. The rationale for this is
not clear and raises the concern that Illinois will have
policies that differ from its neighboring States and the rest
of the country.
I thank you for the opportunity to address you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Dr. Schneider. That is a very helpful
presentation because we have had a number of worries about the
iodine.
And now we have David Kraft, director, Nuclear Energy
Information Service, and we look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider follows:]
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Mr. Kraft. Thank you. I want to thank the committee for
opportunity to present today.
My organization is based in Evanston, Illinois and we have
been around 20 years. Our purpose is to act as a citizen
watchdog organization on the commercial nuclear power industry.
Illinois, as was mentioned earlier, has more reactors than any
other State. In our opinion, it needs more surveillance and
watchdogging as well. And I think history has borne that out
amply.
My comments today will be different from the previous ones
you have heard, largely which have been based on public health
and medical concerns. I want to focus in on the issues of
energy and infrastructure and how that factors into the
terrorist threat in the future.
In trying to get a handle on how I would put my remarks to
you today, I was thinking back to my experience on September
11th and that following week after the tragedy. And what
occurred to me is something that I think you in Congress really
need to examine from a strategic standpoint. A lot of what you
have heard today I think is a tactical response to crises and
emergencies that we are anticipating, but unless we also
anticipate in a broader sense and a broader scale how our
society is structured, where it is vulnerable and where we can
make substitutions, then we are fooling ourselves into thinking
that we are really protecting the public.
So what I hope to get across to you today is one concept
that September 11th has demonstrated. And that is, the way we
have constructed our technological society makes our
infrastructure both a target and a weapon. In the past, there
was a distinction between the two and I think it was much more
clear cut.
What we need to take a look at in the future is how our
infrastructure that we depend on has now become both weapon and
target and how they can be interchangeable. This is very
significant. The fact that airplanes were not anticipated as
weapons of mass destruction certainly does not call for the
abolition of commercial air transport but what it does say is
we need to respond in a totally different way to airport
security or to construction of buildings, and that was
particularly hammered home when the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission admitted 1 week after the accident that it had
failed to do the calculations which would demonstrate that our
reactors could withstand those hits on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon. And we are still waiting for the numbers to
be crunched.
That is a major shift in thinking and if we are going to
proceed in the 21st century on a technology-based society, it
is up to the leadership of this Nation to consider that dual
role. And when you choose to go down a technological path, you
had better be prepared for the boomerang.
Now I am going to get into some of the specifics that I
have observed in terms of the nuclear power situation and then
I would also refer you to a report that we produced last
October and it is available on our Web site, called ``Here
Today, There Tomorrow: Commercial Nuclear Reactor Sites as
Terrorist Targets.''
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we insert
that into the record.
Mr. Horn. Without objection.
Mr. Kraft. I do have additional copies available and this
is on our Web site. Regrettably, I mailed this to the Illinois
delegation last October and because of the anthrax situation,
you may not have received it. So I apologize for that.
The second thing that struck me over the weekend as I was
preparing for these remarks was a comment that Albert Einstein
supposedly made, and that is that ``A clever person solves a
problem; a wise person avoids it.'' What I want to get into now
are avoiding some future problems in a strategic kind of way;
specifically dealing with nuclear power and with nuclear waste.
As we have observed situations since September 11th and
watched the NRC's rather lethargic, uneven response to the
tragedy, we have to hammer home a few points. The first is that
if you are going to rely on reactors in the 21st century, you,
the leadership of this country, must certify to the public that
those reactors belong in the 21st century and can withstand
21st century threats. If they cannot do so, they do not belong
here.
Shipbuilding changed after the Titanic hit an iceberg. We
need to make the same kind of shift in the nuclear power
industry. The set of criteria that is used to make that
determination is called the design basis for the reactor. I
would submit to you that the NRC needs to revise, re-examine
and rewrite the design basis, not only for the future reactors
that it anticipates so that they can show that they can hold up
under these threats, but they are going to have to take a look
at re-examining the design basis for reactors that are
permitted to operate and who are applying for plant life
extension for an additional 20 years because these will be the
reactors that will be selected as future terrorist targets. If
they cannot withstand the terrorist threat, they must be
closed.
We would further point out that the spent fuel pools which
are a point of controversy both in terms of the Yucca Mountain
issue coming up, and just the operation of reactors in the
future, must be significantly upgraded and hardened, from an
engineering standpoint. Security at reactor sites needs to be
greatly enhanced, and the sites themselves may actually have to
be redesigned in order to survive credible terrorist threats in
the 21st century.
We think the NRC has failed in its regulatory practices and
we need to take a look at why that has happened. And again, I
think it would be useful to look at Einstein's quote to move
away from an infrastructure that has inherent danger to an
energy infrastructure that does not have the same dangers that
nuclear power would have. And this would be to aggressively
promote renewable energy alternatives, efficiency and something
that was actually touted very highly in the Bush energy plan, a
concept called a ``distributed generation,'' so that
transmission systems are not disrupted.
I will stop there and be glad to answer any questions you
might have. Thank you.
[Note.--The report entitled, ``Here Today, There Tomorrow:
Commercial Nuclear Reactor Sites as Terrorist Targets,'' may be
found in subcommittee files.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kraft follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well, thank you.
We will have a few questions and then we will move ahead to
panel two.
Do any of my colleagues want to ask any questions of the
panel now? They will be around, but we have four people on
panel two.
Go ahead, Ms. Biggert.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Lumpkin, it is nice to see you again and I know that I
see you on the airplane quite often as you traverse to
Washington, DC, so I know that you are working to coordinate
what is happening in the State of Illinois with the Federal
Government.
Dr. Schneider just talked about the potassium iodide that
has been suggested that States have, and I do--could you
explain what is the policy in Illinois right now in public
health as far as--what I had heard was that Illinois had not
made a decision or had not signed on to receiving that or to
have a stockpile in case something happened.
Dr. Lumpkin. Well, that is actually not the case. First of
all, Illinois is one of the few States, if not the only State,
that has a separate Department of Nuclear Safety, and we have
had some discussions on the issue of potassium iodide. The
Department of Nuclear Safety just recently announced it has
purchased 350,000 doses, which it will be making available to
the public in the evacuation zone; I think it is a 10-mile zone
around each of the facilities.
We have some concerns about that particular process, even
though we will be making that available, because studies in
other areas where it has been distributed, indicate that the
people, after a year, have not been able to find or locate
those pills. So we are also using State dollars to purchase
potassium iodide as part of our State pharmaceutical stockpile.
We are probably one of the few States that has a pharmaceutical
stockpile. Primarily, we have antibiotics and mark one kits and
other things for use by first responders in that stockpile, but
we also will requisition potassium iodide so it will be
available at the evacuation centers. So really our strategy is
going to be two-fold.
We have some concerns about the Federal distribution. For
instance, there is quite an extensive disclaimer that is
required to be given to each person receiving potassium iodide,
disclaimer about the Federal program. We believe that we can
use State dollars that we get from industry, which is wanting
us to distribute them, without going to the Federal program,
and that has been our intent.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you very much.
And then, Mr. Kraft, I know that we have had a nuclear
waste problem and have been working on it for quite a while,
but I certainly do not think we should abandon nuclear power as
a source of electricity as a result, and certainly 52 percent
of our electrical power in Illinois comes from nuclear and is a
clean source of power.
Given the amount of power generated without any emissions
and the resulting air quality benefits, nuclear power I think
has to remain part of our energy supply. And there is research
that is being done at Argon National Laboratory, which is in my
district, to reduce the volume and toxicity of nuclear waste
and it really is pyroprocessing technology and transmutation
and has really been able to reduce the amount of waste and put
it into a solid which then can be transported much more safely
and will also not be a hot--what they call a hot product, for a
considerably shorter period of time. It actually reduces it to
300 years instead of 10,000 years.
Does your organization support such research or are you
opposed to anything nuclear?
Mr. Kraft. We do not have any problem with research. We
would merely ask that, again, are you focusing so narrowly on
solving an immediate problem that you miss the forest? Some of
the statements you made, I would take some exception to.
Nuclear power does produce emissions, it does not produce
global warming emissions, although as a matter of fact, the
fabrication of the fuel does. It is the largest producer of CFC
and ozone layer damaging chemicals on the North American
continent. But it does produce denoble gases, they are
routinely released into the atmosphere. You have water
emissions from the routine operation of reactors and then if
something goes wrong, you have unanticipated emissions. So to
say it is emission-free is not quite accurate.
In terms of your description though of the transportation,
I think that is an excellent example of the future problem that
has not been anticipated and which was brought up and reflected
earlier here today when the reference was made to the
individual who was interested in making a dirty bomb. Materials
for the dirty bomb will come from shipments like those that you
describe, in the future. Just the Yucca Mountain project
itself, we anticipate over 68,000 shipments going through
Illinois in a 38-year period.
This is the infrastructure that you buy into when you
continue this technology. And to make the claim that we can
make it 100 percent failsafe and contain all that material,
especially when you have a determined terrorist threat out
there that is not managed yet, really I think stretches the
imagination.
So we are not opposed to research, we are merely saying for
your dollar spent, would it be better to get away from a
technology that buys you into that tar baby or is it better
spent on a technology that still gives you the electricity that
you want but does not increase nuclear proliferation, like
pyroprocessing does.
So those are the hard strategic questions Congress needs to
ask before you ask the front line defenders here to pick up the
pieces of dirty bomb explosions and radiation assaults and
finally perhaps even----
Ms. Biggert. The NRC chairman recently referred to the
security at the nuclear power plants as the gold standard in
the area of industrial security. Would you agree with that and
do you think that other facilities pose the same risk or
similar risk as nuclear and should have that security equal to
nuclear security?
Mr. Kraft. The second part of your question; yes, I think
other industries do have a similar kind of risk. The chemical
industry could be pointed to, for example, as having that type
of risk and should be required to have enhanced security as
well. I cannot speak to direct knowledge of what type of
security has occurred at nuclear reactors since September 11th,
but I would welcome it. And I certainly would not want to
personally challenge it right now. I have spoken with reporters
who have been onsites just recently--Channel 5 News was out at
Dresden, and they do report significant improvements in
security.
Whether those are adequate, we will not know. But one thing
I will point out is that the same time the NRC is making those
boasts, just prior to the 11th, they were allowing--they were
contemplating allowing the industry to more or less regulate
itself and test itself on plant security, at a time when they
knew that those plants failed 50 percent of the force-on-force
tests----
Ms. Biggert. Thank you. I do not mean to cut you off, but
my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kirk.
Mr. Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, I will
have to leave in a minute for going out to inspect the new
aircraft doors that have been installed on United Airlines
aircraft to prevent access to the cockpit.
But my mother lives in Evanston, she lives on Main Street
in Evanston, Chief Wilkinson. How large is the Evanston police
force?
Mr. Nilsson. The Evanston Police Department has 162 sworn
police officers.
Mr. Kirk. And how large is the Fire Department?
Mr. Wilkinson. 110.
Mr. Kirk. 110. So we have got roughly 200 first responders
in a suburban--if the Sears Tower was hit, a la September 11th,
or we had a huge fire at Zion, the nuclear reactor, how would
you be tasked to assist in that effort under the current
system. Chief Reardon is here, but I am going to put you on the
spot since you are a front line police department.
Mr. Wilkinson. OK, there is a structure in place, it is
relatively--the stricken community makes a request at various
levels and there is an automatic response then based on that
request. So if Chicago were to ask for X,Y,Z and we happened to
be X, we would then respond. It reduces communications down to
a smaller level and it is a predetermined structure. And we
respond based on the need of the stricken community.
Mr. Kirk. Do they call you via telephone, is there a radio?
Mr. Wilkinson. No, it is done via radio. There is a backup,
of course, telephone call should there not be a response. The
central dispatch area then for a MABAS division--we are broken
up into a number of divisions--will then initiate the call,
anticipate and wait for a verbal response from the community
that should be responding. Should they not respond or not be
able to, they automatically move to the next level and they
will also back it up with a phone call.
Mr. Kirk. If we had a fire at Zion, we would have to
probably evacuate close to 100,000 people, so our need for fire
and police personnel would be vast. Have you ever been tasked
to look into how you would respond to a huge downtown
contingency or a huge contingency at one of our reactors? Has
Evanston gone through that yet?
Mr. Wilkinson. We have done it only fortunately at a table-
top level, and we realize that an initial incident, as it gets
larger or is large, we have a limited capability in dealing
with that incident. And until we can get enough resources for
whatever our needs are, we can only handle so much of that
incident and we have to accept that there may be losses as a
result.
Mr. Kirk. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
It is not so bleak. We have--the reserve manpower for the
Federal Government is Great Lakes Naval Training Center where
we have got access to 25,000 people to help out the first
responders, but chief and commander, thank you for the ground
truth here. I think we have got a long way to go in where we
are going.
Mr. Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Kirk. Thank you very much for having me, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much for being here.
Let me ask the commander and the chief, are there written
compacts for, say, fire engines and all, so they do not have to
do it after the fact, but you know what you are doing ahead of
time. If there is a fire here or a police need there, how are
we dealing with this in Illinois?
Mr. Wilkinson. These predetermined responses are broken
into categories. One would be fire, one would be ambulance, one
would be hazardous materials, water rescue. They are broken
into a category. Not to say you could not draw resources from
more than one category, but it is done by agreement, it is done
ahead of time. Each community establishes what they feel their
need for their types of responses would be, communicates to
these other communities, do you agree to this and if they say
yes, OK, we go with it. It is done under the Mutual Aid Box
Alarm System agreement, the generalized contract that everybody
agrees to, and it is really all predetermined and we can draw
in a tremendous amount of resources. However, it is designed to
try and not short anyone else in terms of resources. So
sometimes, as your incident grows, the travel distance may
increase, the time of response--you know, various things are
factors, but it is pretty much all predetermined. Not to say
that you cannot ask for special equipment any time that you
want.
Mr. Horn. I am going to take 2 minutes of my 5 to ask one
question here and then I will turn over to the ranking member.
I am interested, Dr. Diaz, and could you explain the plan
for distribution of vaccines in the event of an outbreak of a
communicable disease? How are we going to do it in Cook County
and Chicago?
Dr. Diaz. I can only speak for the city of Chicago
specifically. This is an area that we spent a lot of time
writing a plan and even operationally testing that plan in
stages. We are currently in the process of a series of staged
exercises testing that plan. We have looked at our health force
in terms of our public health work force and we have looked at
our population. Any plan that is in place for the distribution,
for instance, of medications or vaccines, one has to take into
account the number of people that you have to distribute to,
the work force behind you and the actual mechanism of moving
the materials. And we have addressed all of those issues in
fairly great detail. We continue to improve upon that plan as
it exists.
What I would comment on is that it is a plan--any plan is
always a draft plan and one continues to refine. And so we work
very closely with our Fire Department in terms of
transportation issues. We have been working with our GIS
Department in terms of actually mapping down to the
distributionsites that we have chosen and doing mock ups of
transportation to those sites and public work force
distribution across those sites.
Mr. Horn. Excuse me right there. I am not quite clear, do
we have doctors and pharmacists, clinics? How are we doing it?
Dr. Diaz. I was just getting ready to address the work
force itself. We know our break points in terms of based upon
how many people we need to give medicine to, how many work
force individuals we need and have mobilized them within our
own public health work force. Additionally reaching out to
other city partners that can provide infrastructure in terms of
nurses or other work force. And with the Federal moneys that we
are getting, we are working with other agencies like medical
societies to bolster volunteers within the pharmaceutical, the
physicians and nurses, that would help supplement our work
force if we reached our break point in terms of needing more
infrastructure and help.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. Five minutes for questioning.
Ms. Schakowsky. First let me express again my gratitude to
this panel. I knew it would be worthwhile to come to Chicago,
but after hearing the testimony, I think that is even more the
case, to hear from your perspective what we need to be doing at
the Federal level.
I wanted to--for some months now, I have been urging the
State of Illinois to accept the potassium iodide pills and was
given a number of excuses. One was that people would become
complacent and would not evacuate, which seemed to be an
absolutely nonsensical notion. I give the people of Illinois a
little more credit if they would take the pill and then head
for the hills. And the other was that it only protects against
one thing, and that is thyroid cancer, which also seems a
ridiculous excuse, because that would say we should not take
flu shots because it only protects against the flu. And finally
I guess you said today something about a disclaimer or
something that the Federal Government had.
It seems to me as the most nuclear State in the country,
that an offer of free potassium iodide from the Federal
Government would be one that would be snapped up immediately.
And I am mystified. Could you explain, Dr. Lumpkin?
Dr. Lumpkin. Certainly. I think that many of us have
experience that everything that claims to be free is not free.
The State has a commitment; it was announced on June 26 that
distribution to the public will begin this month, that we will
purchase that and that we have used State dollars to purchase
it and include it in our pharmaceutical stockpile to be
positioned at evacuation centers.
So, I think we have had a lot of discussion within the
State and certainly we have had input from the congressional
delegation and, based upon that, the Department of Nuclear
Safety did change its policy and is now moving forward with a
distribution to the public within the 10-mile radius and----
Ms. Schakowsky. Funded by Exelon in part at least. Why not
by the Federal Government?
Dr. Lumpkin. Well, we were concerned about the attached
regulations that were associated with this particular allotment
from the Federal Government. And so, because we were
uncomfortable with that, we did move to a separate way to fund
the purchase. I think the key thing is that the KI was
purchased. It is a relatively inexpensive medication and it is
purchased and being distributed.
Ms. Schakowsky. And the change in view was why?
Dr. Lumpkin. Well, that change was--again, the Department
of Nuclear Safety is the lead agency for that. We have had some
discussions; primarily it was an internal change within the
Department of Nuclear Safety. I could not really testify to
what their thinking was.
Dr. Schneider, is a 10-mile radius in your view sufficient?
I know in your testimony you indicated more.
Dr. Schneider. As I indicated, the experience in the
Chernobyl area would indicate that a 10 mile radius is perhaps
too small. Childhood thyroid cancer is very uncommon, so when a
case occurred, it is very likely related to the Chernobyl
accident. If you look at the map around Chernobyl and look at
where the cases occurred, you would readily notice that it was
well beyond the 10 miles. In addition, if you looked at the
distribution of the released iodine on different days, the
extent of the spread is also well beyond 10 miles. So I think
it is well to consider a broader distribution than 10 miles.
Ms. Schakowsky. Could I ask one more question, Mr.
Chairman, of our public health officials?
Mr. Horn. Sure.
Ms. Schakowsky. The issue of work force capacity, we hear
in so many different contexts of the nursing shortage and just
the shortage of health care professionals. Under current
circumstances, not to mention were there some sort of a medical
emergency on a grand scale, I would like you just to respond to
how we will actually, in terms of capacity, respond to a
biological, chemical or nuclear attack, in terms of our
capacity in numbers and what we should do about it.
Dr. Lumpkin. Well, in Illinois, we have had in place an
emergency medical disaster plan since the early 1990's that
looks at the State as a whole. This plan was developed in
response to concern around the New Madrid fault, which could
hit southern Illinois in a Richter 6 earthquake. That plan
looks at mobilizing resources from areas outside the incident
much as was discussed with the MABAS approach--medical
resources, nurses and physicians. We currently have four teams
that are in place on call 24 hours a day. We are expanding
those, we hope, to about 16 teams within the next 12 months of
physicians, nurses and paramedics who would be able to respond
immediately if there is an incident in the State. These
individuals are getting special training in weapons of mass
destruction.
After the event occurs, the question is then how do we
mobilize the resources. We are looking at issues of rapid
licensure or certification of individuals who come in from
other States, mobilization of hospital resources; again, the
major limitation is going to be the work force and using
volunteers from other States through a system of certification.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we now will go to James P.
Reardon, the Fire Chief of Northbrook, Illinois and the
President of the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System and the Vice
President of the Illinois Fire Chiefs Association. He is a
member of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.
So we are glad to hear from him.
Ms. Schakowsky. Are we excusing this panel?
Mr. Horn. We would like some of them, if you could, but
otherwise you are free. Thank you. But if you would like to
stay, fine.
Mr. Reardon.
STATEMENTS OF JAMES P. REARDON, FIRE CHIEF, NORTHBROOK, IL;
RAYMOND E. SEEBALD, CAPTAIN, U.S. COAST GUARD, PORT OF CHICAGO,
ACCOMPANIED BY GAIL KULISH, COMMANDING OFFICER, ATLANTIC AREA
STRIKE TEAM; EDWARD G. BUIKEMA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION V.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; AND JAYETTA HECKER,
DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Reardon. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today and say
hello to some old friends that I have not seen for awhile.
Also, I would like to tell you that since September 11th, I
have never in my, since 1967, experience had the opportunity to
work so closely with State and Federal officials from various
agencies, including some of the individuals sitting at the
panel here, where not just a working relationship has
developed, but also I would say a friendship and partnership.
What I am going to do today, I have two documents which I
do believe you have, one is a two-page summary and the other is
a backup document that I will refer to from time to time.
First, let me talk about MABAS as an introduction. In the
State of Illinois, there are 40,000 firefighters approximately
and 1200 fire departments. MABAS, the Mutual Aid Box Alarm
System, has been around since the late 1960's, and it is the
structure for the statewide mutual aid plan, which evolved
January 2001, prior to September 11th and the World Trade
Center.
A three inch thick document sits on this CD and although
fire chiefs may not be able to agree in the State of Illinois
on the color of a fire truck, we can all agree that this plan,
it is about time we pulled it together so we can mobilize, as
Mr. Chairman, your question, a tremendous amount of resources,
whether it be fire trucks, ladder trucks, squad companies, EMS,
paramedic transport units, hazardous materials teams--36 in the
State of Illinois--technical rescue teams of which currently 23
and eventually will evolve to somewhere over 30, paramedics to
assist the health system in immunization and prophylaxis type
treatment for citizens, mobilization of the predeployed units
that Dr. Lumpkin had referred to; and do so, so we never
deplete any area any more than 20 percent of its resources.
We can respond, we will respond. Our limitations are based
upon the technological equipment. With the new challenge of
WMD, weapons of mass destruction, and the training and
education that is needed for the various first responders.
So we do have a system in place. We will do our darndest to
serve based upon the limitations.
And with that, let me talk about a few of the things that
hopefully you will find of interest and Federal agencies and
Congress can assist us to do a better job on the street Monday
through Sunday, and heaven forbid, when the terrorist strikes
again.
First, in the State of Illinois, we do not have an urban
search and rescue team. There are 28 in the Nation, we are
working extremely hard to develop one using existing
infrastructure, our 23 technical rescue teams, to develop the
needed core training requirements. Through the State of
Illinois' Terrorism Task Force, Matt Bettenhausen, as well as
Mike Chambliss, from the Governor's Office and Illinois
Emergency Management, we have been able to receive funding to
bring the technical rescue teams up to the minimum standards
and we are heading toward hopefully the direction of putting in
place a mobilization package that meets all of the FEMA
requirements for a USAR team. Unfortunately, we have not
received the support from FEMA in Washington, at least at this
point in time, and there is a letter in your packet most
recently received, where it does not appear they are supporting
the creation of any new teams. We feel in the State of
Illinois--and this would be a statewide team--certainly city of
Chicago warrants the need to have one in place here so we can
mobilize it quickly and get to the business of extricating and
rescuing people that might be subject to the collapse of a
structure all the way down to natural disasters such as the
earthquake threat in southern Illinois.
Training and education, three points I would like to
mention from the Federal level:
First, there are training and education opportunities from
many, many Federal agencies that can be applied at the local
level. We appreciate that, but there is no single coordination
point. What that means is that we are missing opportunities to
send people to the right training. People are going to the
training without the local police and fire agencies being aware
that they are sent. We need a single point of coordination with
all the Federal agencies and the Federal training so that it is
kind of a clearinghouse.
No. 2, we do not have any regional training facilities to
bring together police, fire, public works, health officials,
first responders. I think a wise investment, with certain
criteria from the Federal Government, to establish regional
training facilities across the United States, certainly here in
Illinois, using such things as like the Glenview Naval Air
Station, which is currently closed, but 25 municipal agencies
have pulled together in a partnership to make that a regional
training center. An investment would be wise, because without
the training, we cannot have seamless sustained operations.
No. 3, in none of the Federal programs is there any--so far
as we are able to identify--assistance with overtime funding so
we can send police and firefighters to the training that is
available. Once we do that, we need to backfill, otherwise
local levels of service for day-to-day emergencies are reduced.
Domestic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction equipment.
A host of items: First, we believe that all the Federal funding
should go through a single coordination point, preferably in
Illinois. We can standardize and provide a sustained operation
in that manner.
No. 2, interoperability, there are several boards through
the International Association of Fire Chiefs at the Federal
level to standardize equipment that we would use out in the
street in servicing a response to weapons of mass destruction,
nuclear, biological and chemical. Vendors are selling products
that I am calling snake oil out there. We need to have those
validated through a single source so that if we respond to, let
us say, California, Florida, or they come here, we are all
using similar or the same equipment; again, for seamless
sustained operations.
Technology transfers are critical. FEMA has a grant program
with a national technology transfer center. We need that
equipment out in the street and the field. Example that I cite
in here is some device inside the fire truck or the ambulance
that would detect, early on, biological, chemical or a nuclear
release, before we commit first responder troops inside of a
hot zone where they have little to no chance of survival.
No. 3, consider adopting a matrix, one is also contained in
your packet, that standardizes the training, the equipment and
the roles of first responders, regardless of their capacity in
police, fire, public works or the health professionals.
Next, communications interoperability; as I genuinely call
it a sucking chest wound. We cannot talk to one another. We
need to be able to send data to one another, we need to look at
encryption for secure nets so that we can talk with our Federal
counterparts and our Federal counterparts can talk with us.
Office of Homeland Defense. We support it. We believe the
one-stop notion is needed. There are two organizational charts
in your packet; one is as it is now and the other as proposed.
The only thing that we see missing that would encourage some
consideration over is there is no box within the wiring diagram
or organizational chart that identifies a local advocate of
government, a liaison that reports near the top or to the top
that can tell the Director of Homeland Defense that it is
working at the local level; similar to what was done during
BRAC when they closed bases and relocated military
installations.
Federal process. As you know, local government, we can
implement stuff pretty quick. That is probably the benefit of
being smaller than a Federal agency in most cases. However, the
way we deliver our system is asystematic. We rely on the
police, they rely on us; public works is a support structure
for both; the health profession; all of us work together and
often with a new challenge, we are going to need Federal
assistance. We need to find a way to have the Federal system
less bureaucratic and more simplified so the dollars can get
down to the local level quickly. Without that, we are going to
have holes in our system. Holes in the system, we cannot do the
job that people perceive or we're going to be expected to do.
FIRE Act funding. There has been discussion about including
the FIRE Act funding as part of the Homeland Defense $3.5
billion. We disagree, that it should stay separate, both of
them. The FIRE Act funding was intended to assist in the day-
to-day delivery of fire, EMS and general emergency management
services, not domestic terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. Combining them will dilute it and will do one of
two things; either damage our ability to do our job on a day-
to-day basis or damage our ability to respond and provide
service during acts of domestic terrorism or both.
Mutual aid consortiums. In the State of Illinois, we have
got a plan. I am told it is one of the best in the Nation, that
we are leading. We should not be penalized for that, we should
find the incentives created by the Federal Government to
encourage local municipal consortiums from the standpoint of
mutual aid, sharing of resources and building on existing
infrastructures versus creating new ones.
I think another point is our elected officials, through the
Federal Government, should receive some exposure to consequence
management, but more so, clean up and recovery and financial
recovery actions--lessons learned from September 11th. Any
community, we know what happened across the Nation, but I think
any city, their elected officials, if they have experiences in
that, are going to be more well prepared. And I think if we set
a national standard, it will become a better way to translate
that at all levels of government--Federal, local and State--so
we can work together during times of crisis.
Finally a local credentialling and accountability system
that has a national use needs to be achieved so that when
somebody comes in on the scene of an incident, we are able to
validate who they are and provide safety and scene
accountability as to where they are working. I know that the
Administrator of the U.S. Fire Administration, Mr. Dave
Pauleson, is working on that. I would encourage your support so
we can put something like that in place.
Finally, inside your document is a bullet sheet, a briefing
page from the International Association of Fire Chiefs. I would
encourage this committee as well as all of Congress to turn to
the International Association of Fire Chiefs as an umbrella
agency that has high credentialling in giving recommendations
and thoughts to Federal plans so we can all respond together
and assist the public when we are challenged by our new threat,
domestic terrorism.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you. You have been very thorough on
this and there were a lot of things that we have heard in other
places and there are a lot of things that have not been heard
and you helped us deal with that.
I now want to have Captain Raymond E. Seebald, the Coast
Guard Captain for the Port of Chicago.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reardon follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7016.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7016.036
Captain Seebald. Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me and it indeed is a great
honor to be here today to tell you a little bit about what we
have been doing in this area and especially what my troops have
been doing, because I am very proud of them.
If you would have seen our office this morning, you would
have seen an office where very few people were there, because
the majority of our work is actually preventative in nature. We
go out every day--people are deployed to our vessels and to
water-side facilities to inspect both security and safety
areas.
Right now, there is a security patrol going on. Petty
Officer Corpus is on board his vessel looking in areas that we
have pre-identified as high risk areas, and he is looking
around for potential terrorist targets, people that might be
observing those facilities and a whole host of activities. But
he is also looking for whether the lights are properly watching
on the buoys, whether the other boaters are intoxicated,
whether our commercial vessels that we also inspect from
initial days of inspection, whether they are operating properly
and carrying passengers, more than six people and some are up
to 900 passengers, whether they are operating properly. So we
are a multi-mission service.
We are also a military service and a civil service. Those
different avenues and the way we can switch back and forth
really suit well with our new role in homeland security,
protecting the homeland, because one, we are already quite
integrated into the police departments, the fire departments
and the other local responders. We are a local responder
indeed, along the water side area and in the ports of the
United States. But we are also able to surge during emergency
operations. So we have a preventative side, but we also have a
response side as well.
In Washington, DC, there is a national response system that
entertains calls from around the United States for oil,
hazardous chemical and potential terrorist attacks and
immediately, within minutes, will notify a Federal coordinator
if there is a threat to the coastal zone. When I get that call,
I dispatch my teams and if I am overwhelmed, I can immediately
call on our special forces, which is our strike team forces,
and we have three of those strike teams and I am very honored
and privileged today to say that joining me is Gail Kulish, who
is the Commanding Officer of the Atlantic Strike Team. She is
sitting right there in the front row and she will be helping me
with some of the more technical questions that might come up
later on. But we are very happy with that capability. That
capability, that special strike team capability, was employed
for the anthrax scare and actual discovery of anthrax. Their
teams were used to go into the area and conduct decontamination
operations.
So all of these activities actually take place without any
Federal Presidential mandate or emergency declaration declared.
This is under the National Contingency Plan. Each Captain of a
port is empowered and essentially carries a blank check from
the President to immediately respond. There are a lot of
conditions, to make sure it is all legal and we have a bunch of
lawyers that help us make those decisions. But it provides, and
we are very empowered to immediately respond and to act in the
event of oil or hazardous chemical and potentially biological
impacts as well.
Now what are we doing on the planning and prevention side?
I think you would have been very happy to see us as we both
initiated and facilitated a meeting of all the local responders
about 2 weeks ago, as we begin stepping through what we believe
are the most likely scenarios for attack in the Chicagoland
area and the region. You would have been very happy to see
FEMA, and most people at this table, at that meeting, including
the Chicago Fire Department, Police Department, FBI and all the
local responders. We are not only facilitating those exercises,
but we are training everyone in what we think is the most
effective method of approach to these types of incidents and it
is called the use of the incident command system.
At the very top of that management system is the unified
command system and it is a management group at the top that
includes Federal, State and local representatives. So we have,
from the Federal entity, Deputy Governor Matt Bettenhausen from
the Illinois area; from the city of Chicago, Cortez X. Trotter,
who is in the Office of Emergency Planning, and myself. And we
all agree on where we should deploy the resources, the amount
of those resources, in this whole area. And that alone has
created just a very smooth relationship in terms of how we
interact at all levels of government.
And then how to use our resources. If you walked on the
waterfront, that petty officer that I mentioned earlier, after
his 4 hour tour on the boat is finished, he would then pass on
what he observed to the Chicago Police Department, who is out
there as well in their boats, they are patrolling the same
areas. After that gentleman finishes, he then briefs the
Illinois Department of Natural Resource boat that is patrolling
the exact same area. That is just one operation where we are
really working closely with local and other State agencies.
We are also involved with the ATTF and as mentioned
earlier, the Chicago Terrorist Task Force and we are very
integrated with all those task force organizations.
I think I will close and we will be happy to answer any
questions later, both myself and Gail Kulish. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Captain Seebald follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well, I will tell you, I would like to have
Commander Kulish now come up to the table because I have a
couple of questions.
You are Commanding Officer, Atlantic Area Strike Team. Does
that include work on containers that come into the harbors and
that have immigrants in them that are trying to get into the
United States? Do we have any of those situations here? Because
we sure do on the west coast.
Commander Kulish. The National Strike Force responds to
releases of oil, hazardous materials, biological pollutants,
contaminants. Containers--we have certainly dealt with a number
of containers as leakers and sources of hazmat pollutants,
etc., and we have techniques and the capability to respond to
those. With respect to the law enforcement aspects of the
illegal migrants and those other things, the National Strike
Force would only residually deal with those and turn it over to
appropriate agencies.
We are a tactical force for hazmat response.
Mr. Horn. Well, on the west coast, starting about 10 or 15
years ago, we had the Coast Guard board the ship that has the
container, so they cannot pull that game of oh, asylum, that is
nonsense, and you never see them again unless maybe they are
flying a plane and hitting a building or something.
So I am curious, you are saying you do not have too much of
a problem here then, is that it?
Commander Kulish. No, sir, I'm just really not the
appropriate person to address that. In my previous assignments,
I have done Coast Guard Law Enforcement, boarding
responsibilities and the Captain of the port has those
authorities and those resources to board and do board routinely
and do law enforcement functions. And I can defer to the
Captain for that.
Captain Seebald. Yes, each Captain of a port would receive
a notice from vessel agents when a vessel is about to arrive at
the United States. And they specify many things and now a new
law that just thankfully has been passed that allows us 96
hours to get that information. Before it was 24 hours and
subsequent to September 11th that law has been extended now to
the 96-hour rule.
Agents now provide us with a whole host of information.
Mr. Horn. Excuse me, let us explain what a 96 rule is.
Captain Seebald. Yes, sir. Before, foreign vessels had to
only give us 24 hour advance notice of arrival before entering
into our ports. And now, subsequent to September 11th, we have
extended that requirement now to 96 hours and that has been--it
is in the process of being finalized. That gives us much more
time now to look at cargoes, the types of people that are on
board the vessels, the crew makeup and where the vessel is
coming from.
And together with that information, we have a matrix that
helps us identify and target which vessels we do want to go
aboard. And in this area, when we do decide to go aboard a
vessel, we do a joint boarding with Immigration, Customs
Service and other local law enforcement, so that we look at a
whole host of things that might be a problem on this vessel.
Recently, only 2 weeks ago, we conducted a boarding like that
in this area. Unfortunately we did not discover anything, but
it was--it just goes to demonstrate this interoperability and
how we are working very closely with other agencies now for
almost every activity that we do, we conduct in this area.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. That is helpful. Any questions on
this----
We have got two more but if you have any on the Coast
Guard.
Ms. Schakowsky. I will, but I would like to hear the
others.
Ms. Biggert. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?
Mr. Horn. Sure, please do.
Ms. Biggert. Captain Seebald, what efforts are you making
to plan for and respond to the worst case scenario that you can
envision involving a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of
mass destruction in the coastal zone and what are the
parameters of the coastal zone?
Captain Seebald. Well, the coastal zone is pretty much
right at the coast. We share responsibility with the EPA. EPA
is pretty much inland of the coastal zone and we are anything
offshore or any significant marine transportation related
facility that might be right on the coast, we would respond if
there was a release of oil, hazardous substance from those
facilities or even if there was an explosion that resulted in
those releases, we could open the CERCLA fund and begin funding
a cleanup and response.
We are, as I mentioned earlier, both with our harbor safety
committees and harbor security committees, we are stepping
through what we think is the most likely scenarios. I do not
really want to get into so much the specifics of those, but 2
weeks ago, that first exercise was the beginning of that effort
to look at exactly what we are talking about here and to begin
planning our responses jointly with both the State and the city
of Chicago in this area and other safety and security
committees in other areas where I still have authority.
Ms. Biggert. How will the Chicago Marine Safety Station
facilitate the intergovernmental cooperation between your
agency and the State and the city?
Captain Seebald. Well, that facility, the one that has been
funded now, will put all three of us--the Department of Natural
Resources for the State and also the Chicago Marine Police
Unit, who we work with every single day--it will put us
physically in the same building. Once you are physically in the
same building, all those relationships you had before are only
going to be improved, and we think it will be not only a great
place for all of us to be together but right in the area which
is the highest risk from at least my zone.
Ms. Biggert. You meet really daily now and it will make it
much easier.
Captain Seebald. Yes.
Ms. Biggert. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. We appreciate all you do, it is a
wonderful part of our military, as you said, and the civil
service also.
Let us go now to Edward G. Buikema, the Regional Director,
Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]. We are
glad to see you today too.
Mr. Buikema. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good morning,
members of the committee.
FEMA Region V includes the States of Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin, representing a
population of approximately 51 million people with the majority
residing in urban areas. We have significant disaster activity
within the region, having administered 48 Presidential Disaster
Declarations within the last 5 years with many events impacting
multiple States. Presently, four of Region V's six States have
active major Presidential Disaster Declarations. Illinois'
declaration is for high winds, tornadoes and flooding and
encompasses a total of 68 counties. Indiana, Michigan and
Minnesota have current declarations for flooding.
To maintain the readiness for large scale disasters,
including acts of terrorism, regional Federal agencies and the
States turn to the Federal Response Plan. Under the Federal
Response Plan, FEMA coordinates a disaster response system that
involves up to 26 Federal agencies and 12 emergency support
functions. Each emergency support function has a lead Federal
agency. Regionally, these emergency support functions have been
called into action during such disasters as the midwest flood
of 1993, and the Red River flood of 1997. Other regional
Federal agencies and our State partners meet at least quarterly
to share planning efforts, exercise preparedness and response
plans and devote attention to emergency response coordination
during specific types of natural and manmade disasters. We call
that meeting the Regional Interagency Steering Committee and it
will be meeting again next week here in Chicago.
The region takes an active role in preparing for a response
to a terrorism event. FEMA's responsibility is to coordinate
Federal, regional and State terrorism-related planning,
training and exercise activities. This includes supporting the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program in which 36 Region V communities
participate. We are also working with States to build response
capability and keep them informed of Federal initiatives as
well as participating in State-sponsored conferences, training
exercises, task forces and workshops.
Just last month, the region hosted a Senior Leaders
Homeland Security Summit which brought together selected
officials and representatives of the first responder community
throughout our States. The summit provided a forum for
discussions of issues relating to the fire service and law
enforcement, funding for planning, training, equipment and
exercises, mutual aid agreements and other issues pertinent to
homeland security.
All of the States in Region V have implemented proactive
and aggressive actions in response to the terrorism threats
that have emerged since September 11th. Many States have
committed substantial amounts of staff and their own financial
resources toward preparing for weapons of mass destruction
events. All States have designated Homeland Security directors.
Groundwork has been laid or accelerated to develop interstate
and intrastate mutual aid agreements. Specialized response
teams are being formed. Legislation is being enacted. Training
is being conducted. And equipment is being purchased.
State government has spent millions of dollars directly
responding to homeland security needs and the anthrax crisis.
While much has been done, we have only begun to scratch the
surface of what needs to be done.
FEMA has recently realigned to establish the Office of
National Preparedness at the headquarters and regional level.
The creation of this office is intended to address a long-
recognized problem--the critical need that exists in this
country for a central coordination point for the wide range of
Federal programs dealing with terrorism preparedness.
The mission and overriding objective of the Office of
National Preparedness at FEMA is to help this country be
prepared to respond to acts of terrorism. The effort has three
major focuses--the first responder initiative; providing a
central coordination point for Federal preparedness programs;
and, Citizen Corps.
First, the first responder initiative. To support first
responders, the President has requested $3.5 billion in the
2003 budget. These funds would help them plan, train, acquire
needed equipment and conduct exercises in preparation for
terrorist attacks and other emergencies. Right now, we are
developing a streamlined and accountable procedure that would
speed the flow of funds to the first responder community.
Specifically, the funds would be used:
To support the development of comprehensive response plans
for terrorist incidents.
To purchase equipment.
To provide training for responding to terrorist incidents.
And for coordinated regular exercise programs to improve
response capability.
The President is requesting funds in the 2002 spring
supplemental to support the first responder initiative,
including $175 million to be provided to State and local
governments to upgrade, and in some cases, to develop
comprehensive emergency operations plans. These comprehensive
plans would form the foundation for the work to be done in 2003
to prepare first responders for terrorist attacks.
FEMA has held listening sessions throughout the country
with first responders and emergency managers at every level to
solicit their ideas on the design of grant program and process.
In addition, we are working to resolve other issues critical to
the success of this initiative, many of which have been
addressed this morning:
National standards for compatible, interoperable equipment
for first responders.
A national mutual aid system.
Personal protective equipment for first responders that is
designed for long-term response operations and incidents.
And national standards for training and exercises for
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
In addition to the right equipment, planning capabilities
and training, first responders have been telling us that they
need a single point of contact in the Federal Government. We
have heard this from other sources too. The Gilmore Commission,
for example, has pointed out that the Federal Government's
terrorism preparedness programs are fragmented, uncoordinated
and unaccountable. In our view, it is absolutely essential that
the responsibility for pulling together and coordinating the
myriad of Federal programs designed to help local and State
responders and emergency managers to respond to terrorism, be
situated in a single agency. That is why we are so excited
about the President's calling for the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security.
The functions that FEMA performs will be a key part of the
mission of the new Department of Homeland Security. The new
department will strengthen our ability to carry out important
activities such as building the capacity of State and local
emergency response personnel to respond to emergencies and
disasters of all kinds. The new department will administer
Federal grants under the first responder initiative as well as
grant programs managed by the Department of Justice, the
Department of Health and Human Services and FEMA. A core part
of the department's emergency preparedness and response
function will be built directly on the foundation established
by FEMA. It will continue FEMA's efforts to reduce the loss of
life and property and to protect our Nation's institutions from
all types of hazards through a comprehensive risk-based, all
hazards emergency management program of preparedness,
mitigation, response and recovery. It will continue to change
the emergency management culture from one that reacts to
terrorism and other disasters to one that proactively helps
communities and citizens avoid becoming victims.
By bringing other Federal emergency response assets
together with FEMA's response capability, the new department
will allow for better coordination than the current situation
in which response assets are separated in several departments.
And just a couple of words about Citizen Corps. The Citizen
Corps program is part of the President's new Freedom Corps
initiative.
This initiative brings together local government, law
enforcement, educational institutions, the private sector,
faith-based groups and volunteers into a cohesive community
resource. Citizen Corps is coordinated nationally by FEMA,
which also provides training standards, general information and
materials. We also will identify additional volunteer programs
and initiatives that support the goals of the Corps.
In addition to the first responder and Citizen Corps
programs, we are implementing a number of other important
related initiatives. These include:
A training course review. We are working on a complete
accounting of all FEMA and Federal emergency and terrorism
preparedness training programs and activities.
As I mentioned, mutual aid initiatives.
A national exercise program.
And finally, assessment of FEMA regional office
capabilities.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today, I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
And our last presenter is JayEtta Hecker, the Director of
Physical Infrastructure Issues for the U.S. General Accounting
Office.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Buikema follows:]
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Ms. Hecker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ms.
Schakowsky and Ms. Biggert. I am very pleased to be here today.
I represent the unit of GAO that supports the Congress in
reviewing not only FEMA but Coast Guard and a whole level of
body of work and preparedness and it is on the basis of that I
base my remarks today.
What I will do is just very briefly summarize the remarks
that I had and then try to relate it to some of what we have
heard today, because it has been such a rich and diverse set of
comments.
Basically, I have two main points. One is about the
proposed department and the second is about the strategy that
is needed to really be the underpinning of it.
The department, we have called for--GAO--for many months
and over the course of really years of study of terrorism
programs. They are too dispersed, they are too duplicative,
they are overlapping and they are not really very effective.
There is not even really an assessment of an overall strategy,
as there has not been one.
So we have been calling for this integration and this
establishment of a department. So in that sense, we applaud
that.
On the other hand, where we think it raises some concerns
and may be over-promising or too optimistic is that somehow
this could integrate everything. It is certainly not a quick
fix, it will take substantial time and, in our view, additional
resources to really make it come off, particularly the
intergovernmental dimensions of it. Pulling all of these
disparate departments together is a very complex undertaking
and I think some of the remarks of the Comptroller General,
looking at the history of the formation of the Department of
Defense, the Department of Transportation, the Department of
Energy, bringing together and establishing and benefiting from
the synergies of common functions, is no quick matter. And yet
this is a matter of urgency and there should not be any lack of
realism about the nature of the challenge ahead.
The second point is that this whole department has to be
based on a strategy. Just having this notion that somehow we
are going to collocate all of these disparate departments and
functions and that will work, in our view is not a strategy.
Strategy means to define--particularly from an
intergovernmental angle. There are many dimensions to the
strategy, but given the focus of the committee, our concern is
about how to build those effective partnerships with different
levels of government and the private sector. And we think a
strategy is where you would see a vision of what is needed. It
would define the kind of roles that are needed for different
levels of government, where those roles are partnerships so
that you have some real accountability and clarity, and would
move toward real goals and measures and indicators. And
unfortunately, we do not have that in this arena. And also, it
would strategically define the appropriate tools because it is
the kind of tools, whether it is regulation or grants, block
grants, or targeted grants, that you use affects what kind of
performance you get, what kind of accountability you get, what
kind of sustainability you get.
So with that as a backdrop of the remarks that I had, I
wanted to just briefly highlight what I think we heard today
and how many of these themes really were mirrored throughout
the morning.
I thought Ms. Schakowsky actually framed a very important
issue right in your opening remarks, about the challenge of
integrating many departments that have non-security functions.
And I think the Coast Guard, which we just heard about that,
has many other related non-security missions. Sometimes it is a
good overlap, sometimes it is not. I have been on a tour in the
New England area, where the fisheries enforcement is down, and
it is a different arena, it is doing different things and
basically the resources have been diverted into the harbor. So
you have combining mixed resources.
We heard about that from several folks today in the public
health arena and that is clearly a whole issue about public
health, how it has been under-funded and how it is really a
dual use, dual purpose function. And honing in on all of the
resources and the effort in the department, we have already
testified, my counterpart responsible for public health, that
actually this fragments public health programs. These programs
are currently more integrated in the Department of Health and
Human Services, and this says no, we are going--because it is a
State and local preparedness activity--we are going to put it
in this department. So we have some caution there about the
fact that there are dual function agencies like in the public
health arena, like the Coast Guard, like FEMA, which works on--
this country unfortunately is much more frequently the subject
of natural disasters and preparedness on an all-hazard basis is
very important. And that cannot end up being overshadowed by
this formation of a security-focused department.
So we have heard a lot about this, as you form the
department, the mix of this dual use and therefore what is in,
what is out or what relationships will really be defined for
the inevitable agencies like the intelligence agencies that are
left out. So there is a lot of partnership and clarity in this
proposal that is needed.
Another whole set of comments was about sustainability. Ms.
Biggert, you actually brought that in, in your opening remarks,
how this is a permanent and ongoing challenge. It is not like
Y2K, when January 1 came and we said whew, this is over. This
is not over, this is a continuing challenge.
Dr. Lumpkin talked about the importance of long-term
sustainability. This is not an effort that we can have a one-
time effort and we cannot have a Federal Government set of
programs and promised programs that cannot be sustained. There
are fiscal shortages at the States and there are at the Federal
level as well. So a vision is needed for programs that can be
sustained.
Then there were some very important points about
partnership. Chief Wilkinson and Commander Nilsson talked about
the importance of communications and training and the pooling
of resources. And that actually relates to targeting, go to the
States, go to local government to promote the ideal cooperation
and partnerships and efficient use of resources.
And I close with your opening remarks, Mr. Horn, and the
overall theme of today, ``How Effectively is the Federal
Government Assisting State and Local Governments in Preparing
for Serious Terrorist Attacks.'' You opened with the fact that
you have serious doubts. I think there should be serious
doubts. I think there is inadequate information, and we do not
have standards to even measure and base conclusions about
levels of preparedness. CNN did a guide and it is an
approximation and some cities find that useful. But those are
not meaningful indicators. FEMA has been mandated for a number
of years to try to develop measures of preparedness and it is a
long-term project. We still do not have it.
So with all this new effort, we do not have the measures of
what it is we are going toward and how to measure what it is we
are trying to achieve. So the key issue of the day is that we
do not know how prepared we are and there are major challenges
ahead in the formation of this department to have it be
effective, efficient and to address the many important issues
that were raised today.
That concludes my remarks.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. We will have 5 minutes for Ms.
Schakowsky.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hecker, I think a lot of the questions that you raise
and the concerns that you raise put everything in an important
context and a framework. What do they say about field of
dreams? ``Build it and they will come?'' No, we create it and
it will work is not necessarily the case and so it is
important, I agree, to have a strategy.
The issue that I did raise in my opening statement--and
others can comment too--the non-security functions, I am very
concerned about and I am concerned about it from Chicago's
relationship to the Coast Guard and search and rescue and
recreational boating and all those things that we are concerned
about. Concerned about it from the seamless standpoint,
although I think you made a pretty compelling case on why those
functions are more consistent than I had originally thought
about.
I am concerned about the INS in the Chicago area where we
have so many immigrants. The service component is a very
different mission from the law enforcement component and right
now the entire INS is scheduled to go in.
There is an argument that some will make that this is the
government gravy train right now, and if you do not get in it,
you are out of it altogether, and that might be rationale
enough to say let us put all the functions in, because if
something is going to give, it is not going to be the
Department of Homeland Security.
And so I am wondering if you are going to in a systematic
way--GAO in a systematic way is going to be looking at these
non-security functions to help guide us in what may be a better
organizational structure or make some recommendations about all
the things you said, the goals and measures and indicators and
appropriate tools, etc.
I am concerned in our rush to do this, that we do not take
these things into consideration.
Do you want to respond, or any of the others respond--the
Coast Guard or FEMA.
Ms. Hecker. I can briefly answer that. When the Comptroller
General testified last week, he laid out a set of criteria to
try to assist the Congress in their deliberations of how you
assess what is in, what is out. And he talked about a set of
criteria that could be used. This is moving so fast that we
have not been asked to try to apply those criteria ourselves to
some of those departments, but I am sure at your request or any
committee, we would work with you to try to do that. I know the
schedule in the House is short and there is a vote in the next
few weeks or at least that is the schedule. So this is moving
very quickly.
I think the upshot of the Comptroller General's concern was
yes, this is urgent, but there is also merit in moving
cautiously. And it is not for us to speak to the agenda that
the Congress has set, but these are very significant questions
and even though, of course, there can be refinements like there
was for years with the DOD or other areas, the importance of
this is to at least get the ideas correct and the concept
correct because we cannot have any lost time here. When you
think of the whole TSA activity and the aggressive schedule
thereon, nobody can lose a beat here. So getting the right
parties involved in some of these combinations and thinking
through some of the multiple relationships--I know in the area
of the Coast Guard, one of the issues we raised is the kind of
financial flexibility that might be given to the department
head. You know, if they can move resources around, you are not
really sure whether in fact a lot of competing functions can be
sustained, particularly with the administration promising that
this is no new resources. You have got to steal it from
somewhere. There are no resources on State and local
coordination, there is a mission and there is a promise that
will be a big commitment, but there are no resources, it is
just a box off of the new Secretary. So is it just going to
pull together people from all of these conglomerate departments
that do some of that? It is just not thought through yet and
it--in my opinion, I think it merits more consideration by
Congress of what is in, what is out, what the terms are, what
the expectations are. We would be happy to help in any way we
can.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me just get a comment though if I could
from Captain Seebald. You know, we are concerned in the Chicago
area about the Coast Guard. Do you have those concerns as well
and how do you plan to address them?
Captain Seebald. As a result of September 11th, we did have
to shift some of our resources away from more of our safety
role to more of our security role. But as a result of bringing
on additional reservists and moving additional resources, and
thankfully due to the $209 million supplemental that was
passed, the first supplemental, we were able to what we think
is to annualize that effort. And the President's fiscal year
2003 budget is a first step in a multi-year annualization of
that new effort. And we think over the 3-years, we will be able
to adequately both absorb the homeland security mission and
then adequately execute our search and rescue missions and all
the other missions that we have.
But certainly falling short of that budget, we would
definitely be impacted.
Also in homeland security, we think because we are the
leaders and we are the first responders in the coastal zone
that we must remain intact. We must remain both a military and
a maritime and multi-mission organization and the Coast Guard
must retain its entire mission portfolio.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Buikema. I would just like to respond to your question
on behalf of FEMA and really I guess talking about the concept
of emergency management in general, especially with respect
to--you mentioned a non-terrorism type mission that FEMA has.
And certainly right now there are four active Presidential
Disaster Declarations ongoing in this region. But I think it is
important to note that whether it is terrorism or whether it is
pretty much any other kind of emergency or disaster, the
functions that have to be performed by government are similar.
There are certain things such as communication and cooperation
and coordination and command and control that whether it is a
hazardous materials incident or a tornado or a terrorist event,
government has to come together and coordinate and speak with
one voice and try to speak off the same sheet of music, if you
will.
So some of the basic concepts and theories of emergency
management are based on relationship building and the
communication and coordination aspect that will be present
whether it is a flood or a terrorist event.
So in many respects, this proposal blends in beautifully
with FEMA's mission and allows us to strengthen those
relationships with our other Federal partners as well as with
State and local governments.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. The other----
Ms. Biggert. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Buikema, you mentioned in your testimony that FEMA is
assessing the capabilities of its regional offices. Do you
think that there will be--is it the plan to develop different
capabilities within each of the regional offices, or simply
ensure that each regional office has the capability to respond
to an emergency?
Mr. Buikema. More the latter, Ms. Biggert. Basically FEMA
has a number of response teams and response elements and plans
and procedures that can be enacted and implemented in the event
of a disaster emergency. This has been an ongoing process but
especially new focus has been placed on this since September
11th and our region just went through this process a couple of
weeks ago and it was a peer assessment. In other words, folks
from outside the region came in and took a look at our
capabilities and our strengths and our weaknesses and it is a
very valuable exercise, if you will, because it allows us then
to address any weaknesses and proactively try to strengthen our
capability to respond.
Ms. Biggert. Is there--I think that you might have answered
this, but you know, FEMA, the culture of FEMA really is to
react and to respond to terrorism or other disasters. How--are
you changing the culture of the agency when it proactively
helps the community citizens to avoid becoming victims?
Mr. Buikema. Actually, FEMA has been a strong proponent of
mitigation or prevention for many years now. There has been a
lot of emphasis on prevention, an attempt to break the cycle,
if you will, and I will use flooding as an example, where too
many homes and structures perhaps are built in hazard areas
such as flood plains. An event occurs, a flood occurs, which
may or may not, depending on the circumstances, ultimately lead
to a major disaster declaration and assistance from the Federal
Government, and then subsequent to that another flood occurs in
this cycle.
So FEMA has been very aggressively, for a number of years,
working with State and local governments to try to prevent
that. Every time a Presidential Disaster Declaration is
declared, a percentage of the Federal funds that come into a
State are set aside for hazard mitigation grant program
dollars. For example, in Illinois, if my facts are correct,
over 3,000 homes have been bought up by the State of Illinois
with Federal and local money and removed out of the flood
plain, as an example of the way to prevent future disasters
from occurring.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you for that clarification. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. I appreciate the presentations all of
you have given. It is going to be very helpful and I thank you
for coming here.
I want to now thank that people that arranged this
particular hearing: J. Russell George, the staff director and
chief counsel is back there; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff
director on my left and your right; Rosa Harris is from the
General Accounting Office on loan to the subcommittee and very
responsible for this particular hearing; Justin Paulhamus is
our majority clerk and does a great job and he is at the end of
the table and he is going to have to be the dust-up guy for the
rest of Chicago. And then Michael Sazonov, a subcommittee
intern; Sterling Bentley, another subcommittee intern; Joe
DiSilvio, an intern and Yigal Kerszenbaum is another intern.
The minority staff; David McMillen here is behind me, a
professional staff member; and Nadem L. Schaume is the deputy
chief of staff, press secretary for Representative Schakowsky.
And their help was great to us and Leslie Kohn, her district
director in the Chicago office, and John Samuels, legislative
director, Office of Representative Schakowsky.
And we are also particularly caring about his giving us
this fine chamber, and that is Chief Judge Charles Kokoras. And
Joe Quomo is the General Services Administration Site
Coordinator. Joe Navit is the courtroom technician. And Ulga
Koloson is the administrative assistant to the chief judge. And
not last, but he is going to see us in Omaha and that is Bill
Warren, court reporter. That is a tough job when you are
getting all of you and getting it in the right place. So thank
you very much.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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