    [House Hearing, 107 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
     GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
                            FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
                          INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JULY 2, 2002

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 107-211

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                               WASHINGTON : 2003
    87-016 PDF

    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
    Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    STEPHEN HORN, California             PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    DAN MILLER, Florida                  ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                 DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JIM TURNER, Texas
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    DAVE WELDON, Florida                 JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia                      ------
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma                  (Independent)

                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                         James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
                         Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

        Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
                          Intergovernmental Relations

                       STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                 MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma              CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

                                   Ex Officio

    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
              J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                      Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director
                            Justin Paulhamus, Clerk
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 2, 2002.....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Reardon, James P., fire chief, Northbrook, IL; Raymond E.
          Seebald, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Port of Chicago,
          accompanied by Gail Kulish, Commanding Officer, Atlantic
          Area Strike Team; Edward G. Buikema, Regional Director,
          Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency; and JayEtta
          Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S.
          General Accounting Office..................................    60
        Wilkinson, John D., chief, fire and life safety services,
          city of Evanston Fire Department; Dennis L. Nilsson,
          commander, field operations division, Evanston Police
          Department; Patrick J. Daly, Assistant Special Agent in
          Charge, Chicago Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation;
          Quentin Young, M.D., chair, health and medicine policy
          research group, Hyde Park Associates in Medicine; John R.
          Lumpkin, M.D., director, Illinois Department of Public
          Health; Pamela S. Diaz, M.D., director, emergency
          preparedness and infectious disease control, Chicago
          Department of Public Health, accompanied by John Wilhelm,
          M.D., commissioner, Chicago Department of Public Health;
          Arthur B. Schneider, M.D., professor of medicine, chief of
          the endocrinology section, University of Illinois; and
          David A. Kraft, director, Nuclear Energy Information
          Service....................................................     6
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Buikema, Edward G., Regional Director, Region V, Federal
          Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of.........    77
        Daly, Patrick J., Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Chicago
          Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared
          statement of...............................................    10
        Diaz, Pamela S., M.D., director, emergency preparedness and
          infectious disease control, Chicago Department of Public
          Health, prepared statement of..............................    38
        Hecker, JayEtta, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
          U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of......    88
        Kraft, David A., director, Nuclear Energy Information
          Service, prepared statement of.............................    49
        Lumpkin, John R., M.D., director, Illinois Department of
          Public Health, prepared statement of.......................    24
        Reardon, James P., fire chief, Northbrook, IL, prepared
          statement of...............................................    64
        Schneider, Arthur B., M.D., professor of medicine, chief of
          the endocrinology section, University of Illinois, prepared
          statement of...............................................    46
        Seebald, Raymond E., Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Port of
          Chicago, prepared statement of.............................    68
        Young, Quentin, M.D., chair, health and medicine policy
          research group, Hyde Park Associates in Medicine, prepared
          statement of...............................................    21

      HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL
     GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 2, 2002

                      House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
            Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                           Chicago, IL.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
    room 2525, Dirksen Federal Building, 219 South Dearborn Street,
    Chicago, IL, Hon. Steve Horn (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.
        Present: Representatives Horn, Schakowsky, Biggert and
    Kirk.
        Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief
    counsel; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; Justin Paulhamus,
    clerk; Chris Barkley, staff assistant; Michael Sazonov,
    Sterling Bentley, Joe DiSilvio, and Yigal Kerszenbaum, interns.
        Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
    Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
    Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.
        On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most
    devastating attacks ever committed on U.S. soil. Despite the
    damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple
    this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been more
    united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their
    willingness to protect that freedom. The diabolical nature of
    those attacks and then the deadly release of Anthrax sent a
    loud and clear message to all Americans: We must be prepared
    for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to
    protect this Nation and this people from further attempts to
    cause massive destruction.
        The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the
    need for adequate communications systems and rapid deployment
    of well-trained emergency personnel. Yet, despite billions of
    dollars which Congress has produced in spending on Federal
    emergency programs, there remains serious doubts as to whether
    the Nation is equipped to handle a massive chemical, biological
    or nuclear attack.
        Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively
    Federal, State and local agencies are working together to
    prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the
    great State of Illinois and the good people of Chicago to know
    that they can rely on these systems, should that need arise.
    And we hope it does not happen.
        We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable
    experience and insight will help the subcommittee better
    understand the needs of these on the front lines. We want to
    hear about their capabilities and their challenges. And we want
    to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome
    all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
        We have with us today the ranking member for the minority,
    Ms. Schakowsky. This is her turf and I yield to her for an
    opening statement.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me express
    my appreciation to you for scheduling this hearing in Chicago
    so that we could get the local input that we so desperately
    need in order to craft a plan that will help all of our cities.
    Homeland security really is dependent on hometown security and
    that is what we want to focus on today.
        My blackberry has been going off to announce--that is my e-
    mail--an evacuation that is a drill in Washington right now of
    the Rayburn Building, to make sure that everyone can get out
    there. And there has been a lot of changes that we see every
    day in Washington, DC. But today, we want to know how are we
    doing here at home. The title of this hearing is ``How
    effectively is the Federal Government Assisting State and Local
    Governments in Preparing for a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear
    Attack.''
        Without adequate and appropriate information, direction and
    resources flowing from the Federal Government to the local and
    State authorities, Illinois, Chicago and other cities across
    the State cannot be expected to contribute the resources
    necessary to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack.
        Today's hearing is extremely timely. The FBI's latest
    warning of possible attacks over the Fourth of July holiday
    begs the question ``Are we prepared?'' Have Chicagoland
    authorities received the necessary information, cooperation and
    direction from the Federal Government to guarantee public
    safety or, at the very least, to minimize public risk?
        Has the State of Illinois been provided with what it needs
    from the Federal Government to develop and implement a
    comprehensive emergency preparedness plan? And in turn, are
    those resources making it to the local law enforcement and
    emergency responders who are on the front lines in the effort
    to prevent and respond to terrorist threats?
        We are here to find out the answers to those important
    questions. We are in Chicago today to hear the voices of local
    officials and to make sure their message is heard in
    Washington, DC. A successful blueprint for homeland security
    must begin with input from those on the front line. They are
    the ones who will assure that our 4th of July celebrations are
    safe and secure. They are the ones who will respond first to
    any incident. We cannot secure our Nation without their input
    and expertise.
        Since September 11th, the way we conduct the business of
    national security in this country has changed. Today, our
    Federal, State and local authorities are even more aware of
    potential threats. Additional steps are being taken to protect
    a more alert and concerned public. For most Americans, the
    thought of biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism is, for
    the first time, a real possibility. This is our new normal.
        In Washington, we are deliberating over the President's
    plan to create a massive new Government agency, the Department
    of Homeland Security. The full Government Reform Committee has
    primary jurisdiction over the creation of that department and
    hearings are scheduled next week on Capitol Hill. At each step
    of the way, we will continue to ask important questions,
    including whether this plan will make us safer. We must also
    determine whether critical non-security functions of agencies
    like the Coast Guard and FEMA and the INS will be compromised
    under that plan. We need input from the local level to make
    sure that all of this is done right.
        Today, we are focusing on the possibility of chemical,
    biological or nuclear terrorist attacks. Illinois has more
    nuclear power facilities than any other State. We need to be
    sure that adequate security and contingency plans are in place
    to deal with possible attacks on those facilities. The Federal
    Government has offered considerable resources and information
    to help with that effort and we will need an assessment as to
    how the coordination process on that front is progressing.
        Biological terrorism has already occurred. The Anthrax
    attacks that were delivered through the mail were a wake-up
    call for us to check the state of our public health
    infrastructure.
        As many of our witnesses today will explain, our public
    health system would be challenged in responding to a large-
    scale disaster, either natural or man-made. The capacity of our
    public and private hospitals is strained each year during the
    flu season. A disaster with 10,000 injuries that required
    hospitalization would be very difficult for that system to
    handle.
        The front line of response in most disasters is local
    government. We see this again and again as hurricanes,
    tornadoes and heat waves strike the cities. Local firefighters,
    police officers and emergency medical personnel are the first
    there to tend to those in need. Any response we make now must
    keep in mind that fact. Training, resources, and communications
    are key to disaster response and should be the centerpiece of
    our investment. The majority of that investment should be made
    at the local level.
        Past experiences have shown that our public health system
    is also on the front line. Once the disaster scene is surveyed,
    the injured are moved to hospitals. It is often the case that
    the hospital capacity is reduced by the same disaster. We have
    taken our public health system for granted for some time now
    and it has suffered as a result. We must invest in personnel,
    planning and reserve capacity.
        Again, I want to thank each of our witnesses for taking
    time from their busy schedules to be with us today. I look
    forward to all of your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. And now I yield time for Ms. Biggert,
    a neighbor in Naperville in Illinois and a very hard-working
    Member of Congress. We thank you for being here.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    start by welcoming you back to the ``second city.'' I also want
    to thank you for inviting me to participate in this important
    hearing on Federal, State and local efforts to prepare for a
    biological, chemical or nuclear attack. I am especially pleased
    to be here with my Illinois delegation colleagues to get the
    local perspective on our Federal counter-terrorism efforts and
    to find out how the Federal Government can better serve our
    first responders.
        I also want to take this opportunity to welcome a
    constituent of mine, Captain Ray Seebald of the U.S. Coast
    Guard, Captain of the Port of Chicago.
        Believe it or not, the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office,
    Chicago, is not located in Chicago at all, it is headquartered
    in Burr Ridge, in my landlocked district. Regardless of the
    location of the offices, the Coast Guard has always played an
    important role along Illinois' waterways and in Lake Michigan,
    but since September 11th, the importance of that role has
    become even more obvious.
        I was happy to work with Captain Seebald long before
    September 11th to help secure money for the Coast Guard to
    construct a new Marine Safety station near Navy Pier. With the
    announcement of funds for the new station, Chicago's lakefront
    will become even safer for recreation and commercial traffic,
    but first, we have to get it built. Is that not right, Captain
    Seebald?
        So I am looking forward also to the testimony of many local
    public health officials and the threat posed by weapons of mass
    destruction requires our hospitals and clinics to plan for the
    unthinkable, which can be a daunting task. I hope our local
    public health officials will share with us today what the
    Federal Government is doing right and what it is not doing
    right to help them with this task.
        As a former member of this subcommittee, I remember when
    Chairman Horn last visited Naperville back in 1999, to discuss
    the ways the Federal Government could help States,
    municipalities and even private industry prepare for the Y2K
    bug. As we all know, Y2K came and went without incident. I
    believe catastrophe was avoided because we spent so much time
    and energy planning and preparing for it, and worrying always
    helps a little bit too.
        I can only hope the more time and energy we put into
    planning and preparing for future terrorist attacks, the more
    likely we are to avoid another catastrophe like that of
    September 11th. Unfortunately, we will never know if our
    efforts have been truly successful like we did on January 2000.
    We will not be able to breathe a sigh of relief like we did on
    that New Year's Day. The threat of terrorism is permanent and
    it is constant. But the memory of that fateful September day
    seared in our minds and hearts will always motivate us to try
    any and everything possible to see that it never happens again.
        In this process of planning, preparation and prevention,
    congressional hearings like this one in places other than
    Washington, DC, are extremely helpful. This is especially true
    as the House prepares to consider the President's plan to
    establish a new Department of Homeland Security to protect and
    defend our land and our way of life.
        It is our responsibility as Members of Congress, to ensure
    that the Federal agencies continue to develop a national
    approach to homeland security and that they have the resources
    to do so. That is why we are going to provide funds in fiscal
    year 2003 to identify and confront terrorist threats before
    they can get off the ground.
        In many ways, September 11th was a wake-up call for our
    Nation and we have taken several steps to answer that call. At
    the end of the day, we must take action to preserve the values
    that make the United States the greatest and the most powerful
    country in history and I think that we are.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we now are delighted to have Mr.
    Kirk, a very hard-working member and he has given us a lot of
    legislation which we will be acting on in a few weeks on
    accounting and fiscal problems to increase better things for
    the taxpayers, and we are glad to have him here.
        Mr. Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman
    Schakowsky for having us. I also am very pleased that this is
    the room that I was sworn into the Illinois Bar in, and it is
    good to be back here.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe that September 11th gave us fair
    warning that Chicagoland could be the next ground zero of a
    terrorist attack. We are home to America's tallest building,
    there are more nuclear reactors in Illinois than any other
    State, we are home to the busiest airport in the world and we
    are headquarters to most Federal offices controlling affairs in
    the midwest. We need to do a better job on homeland defense.
        Just a few weeks ago, we gathered 27 police and fire
    departments in northeast Illinois with the White House Office
    of Home Defense and I can say that first-responders there are
    looking forward to the $3.5 billion White House first responder
    initiative when it kicks off next month. The report will be
    received by the Congress later this month detailing how local
    police and fire can apply for these funding streams.
        The key, I believe, is communication. In the District of
    Columbia, as September 11th unfolded, cell phones collapsed
    first, followed by landlines. Some first responders were forced
    to use only four available frequencies in responding to the
    Pentagon fire. One system survived, which is wireless e-mail,
    it handled the whole load, even after a 100fold increase. I
    believe the Federal Government should help upgrade first
    responder communications.
        I am very happy that we are joined here by Chief Jay
    Reardon of the Northbrook Fire Department, but he is also
    President of the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System, which is
    northeastern Illinois' mutual aid society between fire
    departments. It is this organization which can help us respond
    anywhere from a 1 alarm to a 25 alarm fire, which a weapon of
    mass destruction would certainly result in.
        So I applaud you for holding this hearing and look forward
    to the results. And thank you for coming to Chicago.
        Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman.
        We, as you know, are an investigating committee and,
    therefore, we do put witnesses under oath. And so if all the
    witnesses this morning and the people that will support them
    would please stand and raise your right hand.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. The clerk will note all, not just at
    the table but the ones back of the table.
        So we will start then with the panel one, we called it, and
    we are trying to get both the State, the local, the Federal,
    all moving along. We are going to start with Chief John D.
    Wilkinson, Fire and Life Safety Services of the city of
    Evanston Fire Department.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Chairman, if I could just give a
    special thanks to Chief Wilkinson. Because we are so concerned
    about hometowns, I thought we would start with my hometown and
    so both Chief Wilkinson and Commander Nilsson are from
    Evanston, where I have lived for 30 years. Thank you for being
    here.
        Mr. Horn. OK, Chief.

     STATEMENTS OF JOHN D. WILKINSON, CHIEF, FIRE AND LIFE SAFETY
    SERVICES, CITY OF EVANSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT; DENNIS L. NILSSON,
         COMMANDER, FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION, EVANSTON POLICE
    DEPARTMENT; PATRICK J. DALY, ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
      CHICAGO DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; QUENTIN
    YOUNG, M.D., CHAIR, HEALTH AND MEDICINE POLICY RESEARCH GROUP,
       HYDE PARK ASSOCIATES IN MEDICINE; JOHN R. LUMPKIN, M.D.,
    DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; PAMELA S. DIAZ,
     M.D., DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE
     CONTROL, CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, ACCOMPANIED BY
    JOHN WILHELM, M.D., COMMISSIONER, CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
    HEALTH; ARTHUR B. SCHNEIDER, M.D., PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, CHIEF
    OF THE ENDOCRINOLOGY SECTION, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS; AND DAVID
         A. KRAFT, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR ENERGY INFORMATION SERVICE

        Mr. Wilkinson. Well, in a more global sense, Chief Reardon
    will be able to speak to the MABAS portion of it, but our
    experience at the local, basic, first-responding level
    initially from September 11th, that period of time, was
    communication was coming from all directions. We didn't know
    for sure what to believe.
        We do some high-risk analysis in our community, we have
    been doing this for a long time and we have a structure in
    place. But initially, I think we felt lonely, there was not a
    lot of other communication coming down to us. Since then, the
    Government has provided a lot of resources that go into our
    MABAS organizations and our special teams and communications is
    definitely an issue, and that communication problem is still
    there and it is inter-agency, both from law enforcement to fire
    and from various law enforcement and various fire departments
    among themselves. Communication is a big one to overcome.
        What I would like to see and what I am looking for and
    think is coming down the road is preparedness at the actual
    first-responding level. Resources are available to us, we can
    get them, but not as timely as if we had them right at the
    first very responding level. We are using the same technologies
    and the same personnel for situations that could be
    significantly different than they were in the past. And I think
    it is going that way, but speeding that process up in the
    funding so that we can get it to the local level is going to
    make a difference for us.
        We are still maintaining the same services we did before
    plus living under this threat. And the threat is not just an
    international thing either. I mean we have had a number of
    incidents in the United States that were not from any organized
    foreign soil. Oklahoma City was an example that taxed them
    completely. And that is the incident that we are concerned
    about, the one that has no warning. And that potential is out
    there.
        So that is essentially where we are at. Things did not seem
    to work quite as well, things have been I think a little bit
    slow coming, but they are coming, and we still have--at first
    responding level, we need some better education, better
    training facilities. There really are not too many of them out
    there and, of course, the communication issue.
        That is essentially a snapshot as I see it.
        Mr. Horn. Well, thank you very much. You are on the firing
    line and we listen to people that are on the firing line.
        The next presentation is Commander Dennis L. Nilsson, Field
    Operations Division, Evanston Police Department.
        Mr. Nilsson. Good morning.
        On September 11th, we all had a very rude awakening, as
    everybody in this room knows. Myself, like everybody else, the
    first thing we did was we went to a television to see what was
    going on. And then as the realization began to settle in, we
    had to start looking at our home, where we are, what did we
    have to do. We had to start looking at our vulnerability
    immediately because in our community is looking at us, pubic
    safety, police and fire, to reassure that safety and security
    is in fact in Evanston.
        What we started to learn that morning was just what we did
    not know and what we did to have available to us. Evanston is
    very fortunate, we are a well-trained police and fire
    department, but we realize that our equipment that we respond
    with is equipment that we respond to suppress fire and our
    officers are trained to handle crime on the street, crime in
    the home, not terrorism at the level that we were seeing.
        The community looked toward us, when they were coming home
    that night, getting off the public transportation, they were
    actually greeting our officers and thanking them for being
    there. But what we found out was we had nobody to call at that
    time. We were beginning to pool our resources in our city, our
    health department came together, our emergency operations
    center, police and fire and we began to assess what we had
    available to us and what communications we had, how to keep the
    communications open amongst ourselves so that we could provide
    these services to our community.
        So we found out in retrospect and looking back, it has
    already been said, communications is key.
        Training, we are going to need more training. Our police
    officers are trained as crime fighters and problem solvers,
    they are not trained to handle terrorism. Our first responders,
    when they are going to go in, they are going to go in as they
    go into any issue that we go in on, a fire, a call for the
    police, they are going in there pretty much without equipment.
    They are not going in with hazmat suits, so they are very
    vulnerable. So we need to begin to train our police officers on
    how to handle situations and be more aware of these situations,
    because we have never experienced this. In 32 years of law
    enforcement, it was my first experience feeling that we really
    needed more training.
        We need help at the community level to provide extended
    assistance in the event that a critical incident happens that
    goes beyond the agency's ability to sustain long-term
    commitment to the incident, something that goes beyond the
    agency's ability to provide adequate manpower and resources. We
    are well-equipped to handle the day-to-day stuff, but what we
    are looking at now is we are looking at having to handle
    something that goes beyond the day-to-day stuff and something
    that goes on to the extended. We need to bring in other
    resources, we need to know what other resources are out there
    and available to us and we need to begin to pool that
    information so we do not make blind phone calls like we were
    making on September 11th, trying to contact our resources that
    we use on a day-to-day basis, only to find out that they've
    already been over-taxed with calls from other agencies.
        That is basically what we were faced with that morning.
        Mr. Horn. Well, thank you for telling us that tale.
        The next presenter, I want to say that this subcommittee,
    over the last few years, we have depended on those in the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, whether it was Y2K or whether
    it was fraud or whatever. Patrick J. Daly is the Assistant
    Special Agent in Charge, Chicago Division, Federal Bureau of
    Investigation. We thank you for all the help you and your
    colleagues have given us.
        Mr. Daly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this
    opportunity to discuss the FBI's efforts in northern Illinois
    to address the problems of weapons of mass destruction or WMD.
        The mission of the FBI's counterterrorism program is to
    detect, deter, prevent and swiftly respond to terrorist actions
    that threaten the U.S. interests. Director Mueller identified
    the first priority of the FBI as protecting the United States
    from terrorist attack.
        The Chicago FBI covers the northern portion of the State of
    Illinois, it contains 18 counties and has more than 370 law
    enforcement agencies. Chicago FBI has approximately 434 special
    agents and 282 support employees.
        The FBI has developed an enhanced capacity to deal with
    acts of terrorism. This has been accomplished by one,
    increasing number of FBI and task force personnel investigating
    terrorism; two, establishing partnerships with law enforcement,
    first responders and public health communities to combat WMD
    threats; and three, improving information sharing with local,
    State and Federal agencies as well as with the private sector.
        The Chicago FBI has been extremely active in the WMD
    program area with an emphasis on strong liaison with State and
    local agencies. Since 1999, Chicago has participated in more
    than 200 field and table-top exercises with area first
    responders. Chicago has one of eight regional enhanced
    hazardous material response teams composed of FBI special
    agents trained to gather evidence in a contaminated crime
    scene. FBI bomb technicians are also hazmat trained.
        The Chicago Division participated in a terrorism threat
    assessment team consisting of the Chicago Police Department,
    Fire Department and Illinois State Police. This team identified
    key infrastructure components throughout the city of Chicago.
        The Chicago Division recently began an information sharing
    project with Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies
    using the Law Enforcement Online [LEO], Web page. This
    information sharing project is a result of a task force on
    terrorism initiated by the Illinois Association of Chiefs of
    Police and the Chicago FBI after the September 11th attacks.
        The Chicago Terrorist Task Force was founded in 1981 by
    members of the Chicago Police Department, FBI, Secret Service
    and Illinois State Police. Today, member agencies include the
    FBI, Chicago Police, Illinois State Police, Secret Service,
    ATF, INS, Customs, IRS, Postal Inspectors and State Department
    Diplomatic Security. Other agencies providing close cooperation
    with the Chicago Terrorist Task Force include the CIA, FEMA,
    Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Chicago Fire Department,
    Department of Health and Human Services, Illinois Department of
    Public Health, Department of Energy and various local police
    and fire departments.
        The Chicago Division enjoys an excellent relationship with
    the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of
    Illinois. The present U.S. Attorney, Patrick Fitzgerald, is
    recognized for his extensive knowledge of terrorist groups and
    his ability to successfully prosecute them.
        Life has changed for all of us in the United States as well
    as throughout the world. Major acts of terrorism are no longer
    confined to Asia, Europe, the Middle East and South America.
    The terrorists have struck hard within our borders and have
    brought the violence to our neighborhoods, to our citizens, to
    our families, to all of us. We are threatened by a man in a
    cave thousands of miles away and by a former Chicago resident
    named Padilla, who returned to his city and this Nation seeking
    to carry out a plan of mass destruction. We are improving our
    WMD capabilities, our intelligence sharing, our willingness to
    dedicate personnel and resources to this fight. We, the FBI,
    the Chicago Terrorist Task Force, the public safety community,
    the public health community, the military, the intelligence
    agencies and our allied countries are joined in a battle that
    may last years, but the alternative of not entering the fight
    is unacceptable.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we know you have other
    appointments and we thank you for giving us that statement.
        Our next presenter is Dr. Quentin Young, chair, Health and
    Medicine Policy Research Group, Hyde Park Associates in
    Medicine.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Daly follows:]
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        Dr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Again, Mr. Chairman, if I could--also past
    President of the American Public Health Association, former
    medical director, Cook County Hospital and my personal
    physician. [Laughter.]
        Dr. Young. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee, I am really honored to be invited to present to you.
        In contrast to all the other members of this panel, I am
    not a full time professional devoted to defending us in all the
    ways they are. I rather am a physician celebrating 50 years of
    practice in my community, whose life has been punctuated by a
    number of exciting experiences in public health ranging from
    chairing the large department of medicine at our big public
    hospital here to service in the Public Health Service when I
    was much younger. My remarks, Mr. Chairman, will be rather
    global in an effort to talk about public health policy rather
    than what I am not qualified to talk about, the delivery of
    services as my colleagues have been doing.
        To proceed, the Federal Government must be the mainstay of
    public health, including the threats from terrorist sources. As
    such, it is failing to meet its responsibilities in a manner
    commensurate to the challenge.
        The inadequacies and weaknesses of our U.S. public health
    system spring from long-term neglect or policies that do not
    enhance systemic strengths.
        Our national, State and local health agencies are
    underfunded and poorly coordinated. Elementary modern
    capabilities in computer information systems, round the clock
    personnel in place, laboratories of a uniform high quality and
    speedy accessibility, a full public health professional work
    force--are all deficient in various degrees across our country
    and our State.
        These deficiencies are the result of decades of inattention
    and misdirection of resources, stemming from the post-World War
    II focus on the perceived terror of that day--bacteriological
    warfare. Overall our policy decisions produced no practical
    protections against this biological threat. We did buildup
    stockpiles of our own, only to destroy them during President
    Nixon's watch, because they could not be used by us. In the
    latter half of the 20th century, our chronic poor funding and
    narrow policies for public health resulted in our current
    plight. And let me underscore that by saying I am fearful that
    in moving, as we must, to defend ourselves against this new
    unprecedented threat, that we may abandon principles that can
    really protect us. And I will go forward with that.
        In addition to prompt upgrading of our public health
    capabilities--and I am aware that much of the legislation you
    have before you and have already passed attempts to do just
    that--we have several other tasks to achieve optimum protection
    for our people:
        We need a health care system that is financed by an
    insurance benefit that is universal and managed by the
    government in simplest terms, Medicare for all. It may not seem
    responsive to terrorist threats to call for universal health
    care, but as a practicing physician for half a century, I
    assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is crucial to our
    defenses against an unexpected catastrophe.
        We need to untether the directors of our public health
    agencies from the present arrangement of subservience to the
    political incumbent at the Federal, State or local health
    department level. That is the way we do it in this country. My
    distinguished colleague worked for Governor Ryan and the
    Surgeon General for the President. Now it is logical, but we
    need to have more freedom for these crucial professional jobs.
    It would mean a change in the way we have done things over the
    years, but unless we liberate--I use the word advisedly--our
    health system from that political control, which is not
    necessarily negative or obnoxious, but is always subordinate to
    other considerations, we can see at moments like this how
    contrary that can be. And I suggest a separate board like the
    SEC or the FTC could facilitate achievement long term of public
    health objectives at all levels in a coordinated fashion, and
    not be immediately subordinated to the political realities of
    the moment, which are always important.
        Finally, we should foster the development of a supportive
    citizen constituency advocating for a strong public health
    system. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, that is the essence of my
    learning over the decades. We do not have a public health
    constituency in the way we have constituencies for every other
    kind of issue in this country. We have quasi-public health
    constituencies. The American Lung, the American Heart and
    American Cancer support the control of the tobacco scourge--
    public health issue if ever there was one--but I have to return
    to the generalization that we do not have in place on a regular
    basis people who can petition Congress in behalf of the public
    health system in an orderly fashion. We have, in a word, made
    our public health system the Cinderella of our health system.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we now go to the Illinois
    Department of Public Health, its director is Dr. John R.
    Lumpkin. We are glad to have you here.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Young follows:]
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        Dr. Lumpkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee for the opportunity to be here and speak. Today--
    actually just yesterday--our agency celebrated our 125th
    anniversary as an agency. Our agency was created in 1877 in
    response to a threat of yellow fever. Now, just as then, we are
    addressing concerns; this time it is man-made epidemics.
        In 1988, the Institute of Medicine Committee on Public
    Health stated that the current state of our ability to effect
    public health action is cause for national concern and for the
    development of a plan of action for the needed improvements. In
    the committee's view, we have slackened our public health
    vigilance nationally and the health of the public is
    unnecessarily threatened as a result. That report was issued
    and basically went on the shelf. It was not until the events of
    September 11th and the following October 4 disclosure of an
    outbreak of anthrax that we as a Nation began to look and
    identify that maybe we have major problems in our public health
    system, which the Institute of Medicine Committee noted some 14
    years earlier.
        As a result, we have had major increases in funding. The
    $1.1 billion allocated for the public health system is a
    dramatic shot in the arm, one of the largest increases in
    public health funding that we have seen, at least in my
    lifetime and I think perhaps in the history of our public
    health system.
        We have taken this task very seriously and we have moved
    ahead. This funding is crucial to rebuild an eroding
    infrastructure. It is an infrastructure that has to be rebuilt
    not only in large areas like Chicago and the metropolitan areas
    but throughout the State where public health is so important.
        With this funding at the State level, we are establishing
    12 public health regional response planning areas; we are
    hiring 23 emergency response coordinators for local emergency
    response planning areas; we are establishing local health
    department administrative grants for preparedness; we are
    developing an Illinois National Electronic Disease Surveillance
    System; we're hiring 22 regional epidemiologists to enhance
    local regional surveillance capacity at the local level; we are
    increasing the capacity of three State laboratories by hiring
    staff and upgrading laboratory systems; we are developing local
    health department capacity to support the State laboratories
    and to develop surge capacity; we are establishing a hospital
    health alert network so that we can communicate in a much
    faster way with hospitals the way we have already established
    with local health departments; we are enhancing 24/7 flow of
    critical health information to public health partners
    throughout the State at the local level; we are establishing a
    local health department training and education grant to build
    capacity; we are facilitating the development of a model
    regional hospital preparedness plan and providing direct
    funding to hospitals to implement these; and we are
    establishing core preparedness standards for the three-tiered
    facility classification system.
        All these are important enhancements that we are doing with
    the Federal funding and we could not do them without it.
        You have before you a little document that I found as we
    were preparing for our history, the 125th anniversary, and what
    it is is a document from a page of one of the publications we
    had in the 1920's and what it says is ``A full time medical
    health officer prevents disease.'' The interesting thing is
    that, when you look at this, how he is communicating with his
    local people by phone is pretty much the way we do things
    today--telephone and pieces of paper. You see before you this
    blue card, it is how we get reports about infectious diseases
    in this State. We are using 1920's technology.
        With this current round of Federal funding, we are going to
    be able to move into an electronic system--the first phase will
    be implemented by October this year--because of the influx of
    new funding.
        Our public health system has undergone a period of neglect.
    I think it is very important to note that, just as someone who
    is exposed to anthrax is not treated with just one dose of
    medication but is treated for a number of days, we cannot treat
    our public health system with a single infusion of funds. We
    have to make a long-term commitment to continue to fund the
    enhancements, which we believe in this State we are using
    wisely to create a system that will not only help if there is
    an attack, but every single day will help.
        The enhancements we did in the laboratory enabled us to
    better respond to West Nile disease. If we are going to rebuild
    our public health system, we will reap the benefits even if
    there is no further attack, which unfortunately, we do not
    believe is the case.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you, Dr. Lumpkin.
        Next, we have Dr. Pamela Diaz, director, Emergency
    Preparedness and Infectious Disease Control in the Chicago
    Department of Public Health. She is accompanied by Dr. John
    Wilhelm, commissioner, Chicago Department of Public Health and
    Dr. Arthur B. Schneider, professor of medicine, chief of
    endocrinology section, University of Illinois and David A.
    Kraft, director, Nuclear Energy Information Service.
        So we will just go right down the line, Ms. Diaz.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lumpkin follows:]
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        Dr. Diaz. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak
    with all of you today. As noted, I am joined by Dr. John
    Wilhelm, the commissioner of health for the city of Chicago.
        This is a very important subject, as it relates to
    bioterrorism and terrorist acts.
        Since September 11th and the anthrax crisis that gripped
    our country, the city of Chicago has loomed large as a
    potential target for bioterrorism. In recognition of this fact,
    the Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awarded
    the Chicago Department of Public Health $12 million to support
    the development of an integrated system for protecting the
    citizens of Chicago and the surrounding area from bioterrorist
    attack.
        It should be noted that much of the work by the Chicago
    Department of Public Health in this area long predates
    September 11th or the recent CDC award. The Chicago Department
    of Public Health has, over the years been building a strong and
    effective system to detect and monitor outbreaks of routine
    infectious diseases and 2 years ago, direct funding from the
    CDC helped lay that groundwork specifically around
    bioterrorism.
        Today, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, in response to
    infectious diseases, coordinates the Department's activities
    related to bioterrorism in partnership with other city, State,
    regional and Federal agencies. Many of these activities include
    table-top exercises that involve leaders in our health
    department, additionally our fire department, law enforcement
    and other critical first responders. These exercises allow
    leaders to map out strategies for responding to a variety of
    scenarios.
        We have regular meetings of a technical advisory group on
    bioterrorism that is comprised of experts and leaders in our
    community. This group would be called upon to support us and
    for consultation during an emergency.
        We have established a 24-hour a day, 7 day a week call
    system allowing health professionals in the community to
    immediately report suspicious symptoms that may be related to a
    bioterrorist attack or any outbreak of infectious diseases.
        We have developed plans for distribution of drugs, vaccines
    and medical supplies for protection of the public in the event
    of a terrorist attack.
        And most importantly, an enhanced capacity to recognize
    through disease surveillance, and respond to communicable
    diseases of all kinds. Whether the threat of Anthrax or
    Influenza, public health defense depends not on any one single
    strategy, but many functions and disciplines, including
    epidemiology, planning public information and general
    communicable disease control. In other words, the threat of
    bioterrorism calls not so much for new and extraordinary
    strategies to be used once in an emergency that hopefully will
    never happen, but for resources and systems that should be in
    place as part of routine public health functions.
        The challenge is to ensure that adequate resources are
    available to manage a bioterrorist incident, a uniquely complex
    event that would potentially involve the entire city's
    population, its health care system, first responders, the media
    and just about every other institution in the city.
        It should be emphasized that the Chicago Department of
    Public Health has not been putting our programs into place
    alone, but in concert with Federal, State and regional health
    departments. Our department is working to increase
    connectivity, that communications link, through high-speed,
    secure internet technology, our health alert network, with
    other health departments, our city hospitals, and other
    agencies such as our first responder agencies and health
    systems that would be involved in an event.
        Additionally, it should be noted that the Department is
    working to help the City's hospitals prepare for a bioterrorist
    attack using funds from the Health Resources and Service
    Administration.
        And finally, the City has been an active advocate of
    enhancing the State's laboratory capacities for testing for the
    presence of infectious diseases.
        We believe our program demonstrates the value of direct
    Federal funding. Some have argued that all support for
    protection against bioterrorism should be given to States and
    only indirectly to local health departments. Well, when it
    comes to many matters of public health, one size does not fit
    all. The needs of a densely populated socio-economically
    diverse urban center like Chicago and the other cities that
    receive direct funding are not those of smaller more rural or
    suburban locations. Some also have pointed out that
    bioterrorism can occur anywhere, and to be sure, terrorism,
    like infectious diseases, is not confined to the Nation's
    largest cities. But the vulnerability of cities like Chicago,
    and the magnitude and complexity of responding to an attack,
    and containing it, is not determined only by the density and
    size of the population. It is also determined by the physical
    size of the city, the complexity of the city's health care
    system, the socio-economic, linguistic and ethnic diversity of
    the population, the concentration of industry, the presence of
    two large airports like Chicago as well as rail transportation
    and interstate highways and a daily influx of visitors from all
    over the world. These and a host of other factors, make
    containment of an outbreak of deadly disease in Chicago vastly
    more complicated to manage than a similar outbreak in a smaller
    or more rural setting. As only one example of this complexity,
    one might imagine the catastrophic potential of an undetected
    outbreak of highly infectious disease being carried all over
    the Nation and the world as thousands of travelers leave the
    airports in Chicago.
        And finally, we join others in supporting the development
    of the new Federal department, having a coordinating role among
    all Federal departments in terrorism activities.
        As I hope we have demonstrated this morning, the public
    health requirements for bioterrorism preparedness are well
    within the broader routine activities of public health, and
    therefore, caution that the policies, planning and
    implementation of the public health aspects of bioterrorism
    remain within the Department of Health and Human Services, most
    notably CDC and HRSA.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you
    today.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Diaz follows:]
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        Mr. Horn. Thank you. Dr. Wilhelm, can you come here at the
    table.
        Dr. Wilhelm. Good morning. Dr. Diaz actually gave our
    combined departmental testimony.
        Mr. Horn. Well, Dr. Wilhelm, you are a commissioner, and so
    if you would like to add anything, let us know.
        Dr. Wilhelm. The only thing I would emphasize again are the
    points of the complexity of a City such as Chicago and the
    others who receive direct funding--New York City, Washington,
    DC, and Los Angeles. It is extremely important that we use the
    funding to build our everyday systems to control communicable
    disease which are the exact systems that we would be using in
    the event of a bioterrorist attack.
        Mr. Horn. You might want to bring the microphone a little
    closer. Thank you. Technology is slow with congressional
    committees. Go ahead.
        Dr. Wilhelm. My comment was the only thing that I would
    emphasize in the departmental statement that Dr. Diaz presented
    is the importance of direct funding to Chicago as well as the
    other cities--New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles, in
    recognition of the complexity and the density here in these
    major cities. What the funding is doing is it is strengthening
    our everyday systems and collaborations for control of
    communicable disease, which are the same systems that we would
    be using in the event of a bioterrorist attack.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. Dr. Schneider. Dr. Schneider is
    professor of medicine, chief of endocrinology section at the
    University of Illinois.
        Dr. Schneider. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to
    present my comments on the role of potassium iodide, also
    referred to as KI, in the event of a nuclear or radiological
    terrorist attack.
        As an endocrinologist, I care for patients with thyroid
    disease. I have been studying the effect of radiation exposure
    on the thyroid since 1973. The studies have focused on the
    thyroid gland since it is the most sensitive organ to the
    effects of radiation. I have also served on advisory panels for
    a variety of studies, including those occurring in the
    Chernobyl region. Finally, until recently, I was the Chair of
    the Public Health Committee of the American Thyroid
    Association. My comments are also informed by my working with
    the expert members of that association.
        The thyroid gland uses iodine to make thyroxine. Iodine is
    a unique component of thyroxine. As there is relatively little
    iodine in the diet, in order to make thyroxine, the thyroid has
    developed the ability to concentrate it. When the body is
    exposed to radioactive iodine, it is also concentrated in the
    thyroid gland. Giving a large amount of non-radioactive iodine,
    in the form of a KI tablet, can prevent this. The non-
    radioactive iodine saturates the thyroid and largely prevents
    it from taking up the radioactive form.
        While it was known for decades that external radiation
    could cause thyroid cancer, it was not so clear for internal
    exposure from radioactive iodine. This uncertainty was erased
    by the unfortunate outcome of the Chernobyl accident. Among
    exposed children, hundreds of cases of thyroid cancer have
    occurred. Many of these cases have been unusually aggressive
    and some have been fatal. A terrorist attack on a functioning
    nuclear power plant could release radioactive iodine. A nuclear
    explosion would also release radioactive iodine, as did the
    bombs exploded in Japan and the above-ground tests conducted in
    the United States and in the Soviet Union. A dirty,
    conventional bomb or a non-functioning plant may not release
    radioactive iodine.
        Following the Chernobyl accident, KI was widely used in
    Poland. That experience proved its safety and provided an
    important part of the data used to support the guidance issued
    by the FDA and the recommendations of the American Thyroid
    Association and others in favor of distributing KI tablets.
    Based largely on the Chernobyl experience, the American Thyroid
    Association recommends predistribution in a 50-mile radius
    around nuclear plants and stockpiling up to 200 miles.
        I am pleased that both the legislative and executive
    branches of the government have acted and I am also pleased to
    see the growing list of States that have accepted iodine from
    the Federal Government.
        Although there appears to be movement in the State of
    Illinois, the situation is less clear. First, reported comments
    from at least one State official indicate an under-estimation
    of the effects of thyroid cancer. Although often referred to as
    one of the ``good'' cancers to have, on occasion it can be
    difficult to treat and, as I mentioned, it can be fatal.
    Successful treatment includes removing the thyroid gland.
    Living without the thyroid gland is readily managed, but it is
    not without its difficulties and potential dangers. The second
    concern is that Illinois reportedly will use industrial support
    to purchase its supply of KI tablets. The rationale for this is
    not clear and raises the concern that Illinois will have
    policies that differ from its neighboring States and the rest
    of the country.
        I thank you for the opportunity to address you.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you, Dr. Schneider. That is a very helpful
    presentation because we have had a number of worries about the
    iodine.
        And now we have David Kraft, director, Nuclear Energy
    Information Service, and we look forward to your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Schneider follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7016.029

        Mr. Kraft. Thank you. I want to thank the committee for
    opportunity to present today.
        My organization is based in Evanston, Illinois and we have
    been around 20 years. Our purpose is to act as a citizen
    watchdog organization on the commercial nuclear power industry.
    Illinois, as was mentioned earlier, has more reactors than any
    other State. In our opinion, it needs more surveillance and
    watchdogging as well. And I think history has borne that out
    amply.
        My comments today will be different from the previous ones
    you have heard, largely which have been based on public health
    and medical concerns. I want to focus in on the issues of
    energy and infrastructure and how that factors into the
    terrorist threat in the future.
        In trying to get a handle on how I would put my remarks to
    you today, I was thinking back to my experience on September
    11th and that following week after the tragedy. And what
    occurred to me is something that I think you in Congress really
    need to examine from a strategic standpoint. A lot of what you
    have heard today I think is a tactical response to crises and
    emergencies that we are anticipating, but unless we also
    anticipate in a broader sense and a broader scale how our
    society is structured, where it is vulnerable and where we can
    make substitutions, then we are fooling ourselves into thinking
    that we are really protecting the public.
        So what I hope to get across to you today is one concept
    that September 11th has demonstrated. And that is, the way we
    have constructed our technological society makes our
    infrastructure both a target and a weapon. In the past, there
    was a distinction between the two and I think it was much more
    clear cut.
        What we need to take a look at in the future is how our
    infrastructure that we depend on has now become both weapon and
    target and how they can be interchangeable. This is very
    significant. The fact that airplanes were not anticipated as
    weapons of mass destruction certainly does not call for the
    abolition of commercial air transport but what it does say is
    we need to respond in a totally different way to airport
    security or to construction of buildings, and that was
    particularly hammered home when the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission admitted 1 week after the accident that it had
    failed to do the calculations which would demonstrate that our
    reactors could withstand those hits on the World Trade Center
    and the Pentagon. And we are still waiting for the numbers to
    be crunched.
        That is a major shift in thinking and if we are going to
    proceed in the 21st century on a technology-based society, it
    is up to the leadership of this Nation to consider that dual
    role. And when you choose to go down a technological path, you
    had better be prepared for the boomerang.
        Now I am going to get into some of the specifics that I
    have observed in terms of the nuclear power situation and then
    I would also refer you to a report that we produced last
    October and it is available on our Web site, called ``Here
    Today, There Tomorrow: Commercial Nuclear Reactor Sites as
    Terrorist Targets.''
        Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we insert
    that into the record.
        Mr. Horn. Without objection.
        Mr. Kraft. I do have additional copies available and this
    is on our Web site. Regrettably, I mailed this to the Illinois
    delegation last October and because of the anthrax situation,
    you may not have received it. So I apologize for that.
        The second thing that struck me over the weekend as I was
    preparing for these remarks was a comment that Albert Einstein
    supposedly made, and that is that ``A clever person solves a
    problem; a wise person avoids it.'' What I want to get into now
    are avoiding some future problems in a strategic kind of way;
    specifically dealing with nuclear power and with nuclear waste.
        As we have observed situations since September 11th and
    watched the NRC's rather lethargic, uneven response to the
    tragedy, we have to hammer home a few points. The first is that
    if you are going to rely on reactors in the 21st century, you,
    the leadership of this country, must certify to the public that
    those reactors belong in the 21st century and can withstand
    21st century threats. If they cannot do so, they do not belong
    here.
        Shipbuilding changed after the Titanic hit an iceberg. We
    need to make the same kind of shift in the nuclear power
    industry. The set of criteria that is used to make that
    determination is called the design basis for the reactor. I
    would submit to you that the NRC needs to revise, re-examine
    and rewrite the design basis, not only for the future reactors
    that it anticipates so that they can show that they can hold up
    under these threats, but they are going to have to take a look
    at re-examining the design basis for reactors that are
    permitted to operate and who are applying for plant life
    extension for an additional 20 years because these will be the
    reactors that will be selected as future terrorist targets. If
    they cannot withstand the terrorist threat, they must be
    closed.
        We would further point out that the spent fuel pools which
    are a point of controversy both in terms of the Yucca Mountain
    issue coming up, and just the operation of reactors in the
    future, must be significantly upgraded and hardened, from an
    engineering standpoint. Security at reactor sites needs to be
    greatly enhanced, and the sites themselves may actually have to
    be redesigned in order to survive credible terrorist threats in
    the 21st century.
        We think the NRC has failed in its regulatory practices and
    we need to take a look at why that has happened. And again, I
    think it would be useful to look at Einstein's quote to move
    away from an infrastructure that has inherent danger to an
    energy infrastructure that does not have the same dangers that
    nuclear power would have. And this would be to aggressively
    promote renewable energy alternatives, efficiency and something
    that was actually touted very highly in the Bush energy plan, a
    concept called a ``distributed generation,'' so that
    transmission systems are not disrupted.
        I will stop there and be glad to answer any questions you
    might have. Thank you.
        [Note.--The report entitled, ``Here Today, There Tomorrow:
    Commercial Nuclear Reactor Sites as Terrorist Targets,'' may be
    found in subcommittee files.]
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kraft follows:]
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        Mr. Horn. Well, thank you.
        We will have a few questions and then we will move ahead to
    panel two.
        Do any of my colleagues want to ask any questions of the
    panel now? They will be around, but we have four people on
    panel two.
        Go ahead, Ms. Biggert.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Lumpkin, it is nice to see you again and I know that I
    see you on the airplane quite often as you traverse to
    Washington, DC, so I know that you are working to coordinate
    what is happening in the State of Illinois with the Federal
    Government.
        Dr. Schneider just talked about the potassium iodide that
    has been suggested that States have, and I do--could you
    explain what is the policy in Illinois right now in public
    health as far as--what I had heard was that Illinois had not
    made a decision or had not signed on to receiving that or to
    have a stockpile in case something happened.
        Dr. Lumpkin. Well, that is actually not the case. First of
    all, Illinois is one of the few States, if not the only State,
    that has a separate Department of Nuclear Safety, and we have
    had some discussions on the issue of potassium iodide. The
    Department of Nuclear Safety just recently announced it has
    purchased 350,000 doses, which it will be making available to
    the public in the evacuation zone; I think it is a 10-mile zone
    around each of the facilities.
        We have some concerns about that particular process, even
    though we will be making that available, because studies in
    other areas where it has been distributed, indicate that the
    people, after a year, have not been able to find or locate
    those pills. So we are also using State dollars to purchase
    potassium iodide as part of our State pharmaceutical stockpile.
    We are probably one of the few States that has a pharmaceutical
    stockpile. Primarily, we have antibiotics and mark one kits and
    other things for use by first responders in that stockpile, but
    we also will requisition potassium iodide so it will be
    available at the evacuation centers. So really our strategy is
    going to be two-fold.
        We have some concerns about the Federal distribution. For
    instance, there is quite an extensive disclaimer that is
    required to be given to each person receiving potassium iodide,
    disclaimer about the Federal program. We believe that we can
    use State dollars that we get from industry, which is wanting
    us to distribute them, without going to the Federal program,
    and that has been our intent.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you very much.
        And then, Mr. Kraft, I know that we have had a nuclear
    waste problem and have been working on it for quite a while,
    but I certainly do not think we should abandon nuclear power as
    a source of electricity as a result, and certainly 52 percent
    of our electrical power in Illinois comes from nuclear and is a
    clean source of power.
        Given the amount of power generated without any emissions
    and the resulting air quality benefits, nuclear power I think
    has to remain part of our energy supply. And there is research
    that is being done at Argon National Laboratory, which is in my
    district, to reduce the volume and toxicity of nuclear waste
    and it really is pyroprocessing technology and transmutation
    and has really been able to reduce the amount of waste and put
    it into a solid which then can be transported much more safely
    and will also not be a hot--what they call a hot product, for a
    considerably shorter period of time. It actually reduces it to
    300 years instead of 10,000 years.
        Does your organization support such research or are you
    opposed to anything nuclear?
        Mr. Kraft. We do not have any problem with research. We
    would merely ask that, again, are you focusing so narrowly on
    solving an immediate problem that you miss the forest? Some of
    the statements you made, I would take some exception to.
    Nuclear power does produce emissions, it does not produce
    global warming emissions, although as a matter of fact, the
    fabrication of the fuel does. It is the largest producer of CFC
    and ozone layer damaging chemicals on the North American
    continent. But it does produce denoble gases, they are
    routinely released into the atmosphere. You have water
    emissions from the routine operation of reactors and then if
    something goes wrong, you have unanticipated emissions. So to
    say it is emission-free is not quite accurate.
        In terms of your description though of the transportation,
    I think that is an excellent example of the future problem that
    has not been anticipated and which was brought up and reflected
    earlier here today when the reference was made to the
    individual who was interested in making a dirty bomb. Materials
    for the dirty bomb will come from shipments like those that you
    describe, in the future. Just the Yucca Mountain project
    itself, we anticipate over 68,000 shipments going through
    Illinois in a 38-year period.
        This is the infrastructure that you buy into when you
    continue this technology. And to make the claim that we can
    make it 100 percent failsafe and contain all that material,
    especially when you have a determined terrorist threat out
    there that is not managed yet, really I think stretches the
    imagination.
        So we are not opposed to research, we are merely saying for
    your dollar spent, would it be better to get away from a
    technology that buys you into that tar baby or is it better
    spent on a technology that still gives you the electricity that
    you want but does not increase nuclear proliferation, like
    pyroprocessing does.
        So those are the hard strategic questions Congress needs to
    ask before you ask the front line defenders here to pick up the
    pieces of dirty bomb explosions and radiation assaults and
    finally perhaps even----
        Ms. Biggert. The NRC chairman recently referred to the
    security at the nuclear power plants as the gold standard in
    the area of industrial security. Would you agree with that and
    do you think that other facilities pose the same risk or
    similar risk as nuclear and should have that security equal to
    nuclear security?
        Mr. Kraft. The second part of your question; yes, I think
    other industries do have a similar kind of risk. The chemical
    industry could be pointed to, for example, as having that type
    of risk and should be required to have enhanced security as
    well. I cannot speak to direct knowledge of what type of
    security has occurred at nuclear reactors since September 11th,
    but I would welcome it. And I certainly would not want to
    personally challenge it right now. I have spoken with reporters
    who have been onsites just recently--Channel 5 News was out at
    Dresden, and they do report significant improvements in
    security.
        Whether those are adequate, we will not know. But one thing
    I will point out is that the same time the NRC is making those
    boasts, just prior to the 11th, they were allowing--they were
    contemplating allowing the industry to more or less regulate
    itself and test itself on plant security, at a time when they
    knew that those plants failed 50 percent of the force-on-force
    tests----
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you. I do not mean to cut you off, but
    my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kirk.
        Mr. Kirk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, I will
    have to leave in a minute for going out to inspect the new
    aircraft doors that have been installed on United Airlines
    aircraft to prevent access to the cockpit.
        But my mother lives in Evanston, she lives on Main Street
    in Evanston, Chief Wilkinson. How large is the Evanston police
    force?
        Mr. Nilsson. The Evanston Police Department has 162 sworn
    police officers.
        Mr. Kirk. And how large is the Fire Department?
        Mr. Wilkinson. 110.
        Mr. Kirk. 110. So we have got roughly 200 first responders
    in a suburban--if the Sears Tower was hit, a la September 11th,
    or we had a huge fire at Zion, the nuclear reactor, how would
    you be tasked to assist in that effort under the current
    system. Chief Reardon is here, but I am going to put you on the
    spot since you are a front line police department.
        Mr. Wilkinson. OK, there is a structure in place, it is
    relatively--the stricken community makes a request at various
    levels and there is an automatic response then based on that
    request. So if Chicago were to ask for X,Y,Z and we happened to
    be X, we would then respond. It reduces communications down to
    a smaller level and it is a predetermined structure. And we
    respond based on the need of the stricken community.
        Mr. Kirk. Do they call you via telephone, is there a radio?
        Mr. Wilkinson. No, it is done via radio. There is a backup,
    of course, telephone call should there not be a response. The
    central dispatch area then for a MABAS division--we are broken
    up into a number of divisions--will then initiate the call,
    anticipate and wait for a verbal response from the community
    that should be responding. Should they not respond or not be
    able to, they automatically move to the next level and they
    will also back it up with a phone call.
        Mr. Kirk. If we had a fire at Zion, we would have to
    probably evacuate close to 100,000 people, so our need for fire
    and police personnel would be vast. Have you ever been tasked
    to look into how you would respond to a huge downtown
    contingency or a huge contingency at one of our reactors? Has
    Evanston gone through that yet?
        Mr. Wilkinson. We have done it only fortunately at a table-
    top level, and we realize that an initial incident, as it gets
    larger or is large, we have a limited capability in dealing
    with that incident. And until we can get enough resources for
    whatever our needs are, we can only handle so much of that
    incident and we have to accept that there may be losses as a
    result.
        Mr. Kirk. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        It is not so bleak. We have--the reserve manpower for the
    Federal Government is Great Lakes Naval Training Center where
    we have got access to 25,000 people to help out the first
    responders, but chief and commander, thank you for the ground
    truth here. I think we have got a long way to go in where we
    are going.
        Mr. Wilkinson. Yes.
        Mr. Kirk. Thank you very much for having me, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you very much for being here.
        Let me ask the commander and the chief, are there written
    compacts for, say, fire engines and all, so they do not have to
    do it after the fact, but you know what you are doing ahead of
    time. If there is a fire here or a police need there, how are
    we dealing with this in Illinois?
        Mr. Wilkinson. These predetermined responses are broken
    into categories. One would be fire, one would be ambulance, one
    would be hazardous materials, water rescue. They are broken
    into a category. Not to say you could not draw resources from
    more than one category, but it is done by agreement, it is done
    ahead of time. Each community establishes what they feel their
    need for their types of responses would be, communicates to
    these other communities, do you agree to this and if they say
    yes, OK, we go with it. It is done under the Mutual Aid Box
    Alarm System agreement, the generalized contract that everybody
    agrees to, and it is really all predetermined and we can draw
    in a tremendous amount of resources. However, it is designed to
    try and not short anyone else in terms of resources. So
    sometimes, as your incident grows, the travel distance may
    increase, the time of response--you know, various things are
    factors, but it is pretty much all predetermined. Not to say
    that you cannot ask for special equipment any time that you
    want.
        Mr. Horn. I am going to take 2 minutes of my 5 to ask one
    question here and then I will turn over to the ranking member.
        I am interested, Dr. Diaz, and could you explain the plan
    for distribution of vaccines in the event of an outbreak of a
    communicable disease? How are we going to do it in Cook County
    and Chicago?
        Dr. Diaz. I can only speak for the city of Chicago
    specifically. This is an area that we spent a lot of time
    writing a plan and even operationally testing that plan in
    stages. We are currently in the process of a series of staged
    exercises testing that plan. We have looked at our health force
    in terms of our public health work force and we have looked at
    our population. Any plan that is in place for the distribution,
    for instance, of medications or vaccines, one has to take into
    account the number of people that you have to distribute to,
    the work force behind you and the actual mechanism of moving
    the materials. And we have addressed all of those issues in
    fairly great detail. We continue to improve upon that plan as
    it exists.
        What I would comment on is that it is a plan--any plan is
    always a draft plan and one continues to refine. And so we work
    very closely with our Fire Department in terms of
    transportation issues. We have been working with our GIS
    Department in terms of actually mapping down to the
    distributionsites that we have chosen and doing mock ups of
    transportation to those sites and public work force
    distribution across those sites.
        Mr. Horn. Excuse me right there. I am not quite clear, do
    we have doctors and pharmacists, clinics? How are we doing it?
        Dr. Diaz. I was just getting ready to address the work
    force itself. We know our break points in terms of based upon
    how many people we need to give medicine to, how many work
    force individuals we need and have mobilized them within our
    own public health work force. Additionally reaching out to
    other city partners that can provide infrastructure in terms of
    nurses or other work force. And with the Federal moneys that we
    are getting, we are working with other agencies like medical
    societies to bolster volunteers within the pharmaceutical, the
    physicians and nurses, that would help supplement our work
    force if we reached our break point in terms of needing more
    infrastructure and help.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. Five minutes for questioning.
        Ms. Schakowsky. First let me express again my gratitude to
    this panel. I knew it would be worthwhile to come to Chicago,
    but after hearing the testimony, I think that is even more the
    case, to hear from your perspective what we need to be doing at
    the Federal level.
        I wanted to--for some months now, I have been urging the
    State of Illinois to accept the potassium iodide pills and was
    given a number of excuses. One was that people would become
    complacent and would not evacuate, which seemed to be an
    absolutely nonsensical notion. I give the people of Illinois a
    little more credit if they would take the pill and then head
    for the hills. And the other was that it only protects against
    one thing, and that is thyroid cancer, which also seems a
    ridiculous excuse, because that would say we should not take
    flu shots because it only protects against the flu. And finally
    I guess you said today something about a disclaimer or
    something that the Federal Government had.
        It seems to me as the most nuclear State in the country,
    that an offer of free potassium iodide from the Federal
    Government would be one that would be snapped up immediately.
    And I am mystified. Could you explain, Dr. Lumpkin?
        Dr. Lumpkin. Certainly. I think that many of us have
    experience that everything that claims to be free is not free.
    The State has a commitment; it was announced on June 26 that
    distribution to the public will begin this month, that we will
    purchase that and that we have used State dollars to purchase
    it and include it in our pharmaceutical stockpile to be
    positioned at evacuation centers.
        So, I think we have had a lot of discussion within the
    State and certainly we have had input from the congressional
    delegation and, based upon that, the Department of Nuclear
    Safety did change its policy and is now moving forward with a
    distribution to the public within the 10-mile radius and----
        Ms. Schakowsky. Funded by Exelon in part at least. Why not
    by the Federal Government?
        Dr. Lumpkin. Well, we were concerned about the attached
    regulations that were associated with this particular allotment
    from the Federal Government. And so, because we were
    uncomfortable with that, we did move to a separate way to fund
    the purchase. I think the key thing is that the KI was
    purchased. It is a relatively inexpensive medication and it is
    purchased and being distributed.
        Ms. Schakowsky. And the change in view was why?
        Dr. Lumpkin. Well, that change was--again, the Department
    of Nuclear Safety is the lead agency for that. We have had some
    discussions; primarily it was an internal change within the
    Department of Nuclear Safety. I could not really testify to
    what their thinking was.
        Dr. Schneider, is a 10-mile radius in your view sufficient?
    I know in your testimony you indicated more.
        Dr. Schneider. As I indicated, the experience in the
    Chernobyl area would indicate that a 10 mile radius is perhaps
    too small. Childhood thyroid cancer is very uncommon, so when a
    case occurred, it is very likely related to the Chernobyl
    accident. If you look at the map around Chernobyl and look at
    where the cases occurred, you would readily notice that it was
    well beyond the 10 miles. In addition, if you looked at the
    distribution of the released iodine on different days, the
    extent of the spread is also well beyond 10 miles. So I think
    it is well to consider a broader distribution than 10 miles.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Could I ask one more question, Mr.
    Chairman, of our public health officials?
        Mr. Horn. Sure.
        Ms. Schakowsky. The issue of work force capacity, we hear
    in so many different contexts of the nursing shortage and just
    the shortage of health care professionals. Under current
    circumstances, not to mention were there some sort of a medical
    emergency on a grand scale, I would like you just to respond to
    how we will actually, in terms of capacity, respond to a
    biological, chemical or nuclear attack, in terms of our
    capacity in numbers and what we should do about it.
        Dr. Lumpkin. Well, in Illinois, we have had in place an
    emergency medical disaster plan since the early 1990's that
    looks at the State as a whole. This plan was developed in
    response to concern around the New Madrid fault, which could
    hit southern Illinois in a Richter 6 earthquake. That plan
    looks at mobilizing resources from areas outside the incident
    much as was discussed with the MABAS approach--medical
    resources, nurses and physicians. We currently have four teams
    that are in place on call 24 hours a day. We are expanding
    those, we hope, to about 16 teams within the next 12 months of
    physicians, nurses and paramedics who would be able to respond
    immediately if there is an incident in the State. These
    individuals are getting special training in weapons of mass
    destruction.
        After the event occurs, the question is then how do we
    mobilize the resources. We are looking at issues of rapid
    licensure or certification of individuals who come in from
    other States, mobilization of hospital resources; again, the
    major limitation is going to be the work force and using
    volunteers from other States through a system of certification.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we now will go to James P.
    Reardon, the Fire Chief of Northbrook, Illinois and the
    President of the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System and the Vice
    President of the Illinois Fire Chiefs Association. He is a
    member of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force.
        So we are glad to hear from him.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Are we excusing this panel?
        Mr. Horn. We would like some of them, if you could, but
    otherwise you are free. Thank you. But if you would like to
    stay, fine.
        Mr. Reardon.

      STATEMENTS OF JAMES P. REARDON, FIRE CHIEF, NORTHBROOK, IL;
    RAYMOND E. SEEBALD, CAPTAIN, U.S. COAST GUARD, PORT OF CHICAGO,
     ACCOMPANIED BY GAIL KULISH, COMMANDING OFFICER, ATLANTIC AREA
     STRIKE TEAM; EDWARD G. BUIKEMA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION V.
       FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; AND JAYETTA HECKER,
        DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL
                           ACCOUNTING OFFICE

        Mr. Reardon. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today and say
    hello to some old friends that I have not seen for awhile.
        Also, I would like to tell you that since September 11th, I
    have never in my, since 1967, experience had the opportunity to
    work so closely with State and Federal officials from various
    agencies, including some of the individuals sitting at the
    panel here, where not just a working relationship has
    developed, but also I would say a friendship and partnership.
        What I am going to do today, I have two documents which I
    do believe you have, one is a two-page summary and the other is
    a backup document that I will refer to from time to time.
        First, let me talk about MABAS as an introduction. In the
    State of Illinois, there are 40,000 firefighters approximately
    and 1200 fire departments. MABAS, the Mutual Aid Box Alarm
    System, has been around since the late 1960's, and it is the
    structure for the statewide mutual aid plan, which evolved
    January 2001, prior to September 11th and the World Trade
    Center.
        A three inch thick document sits on this CD and although
    fire chiefs may not be able to agree in the State of Illinois
    on the color of a fire truck, we can all agree that this plan,
    it is about time we pulled it together so we can mobilize, as
    Mr. Chairman, your question, a tremendous amount of resources,
    whether it be fire trucks, ladder trucks, squad companies, EMS,
    paramedic transport units, hazardous materials teams--36 in the
    State of Illinois--technical rescue teams of which currently 23
    and eventually will evolve to somewhere over 30, paramedics to
    assist the health system in immunization and prophylaxis type
    treatment for citizens, mobilization of the predeployed units
    that Dr. Lumpkin had referred to; and do so, so we never
    deplete any area any more than 20 percent of its resources.
        We can respond, we will respond. Our limitations are based
    upon the technological equipment. With the new challenge of
    WMD, weapons of mass destruction, and the training and
    education that is needed for the various first responders.
        So we do have a system in place. We will do our darndest to
    serve based upon the limitations.
        And with that, let me talk about a few of the things that
    hopefully you will find of interest and Federal agencies and
    Congress can assist us to do a better job on the street Monday
    through Sunday, and heaven forbid, when the terrorist strikes
    again.
        First, in the State of Illinois, we do not have an urban
    search and rescue team. There are 28 in the Nation, we are
    working extremely hard to develop one using existing
    infrastructure, our 23 technical rescue teams, to develop the
    needed core training requirements. Through the State of
    Illinois' Terrorism Task Force, Matt Bettenhausen, as well as
    Mike Chambliss, from the Governor's Office and Illinois
    Emergency Management, we have been able to receive funding to
    bring the technical rescue teams up to the minimum standards
    and we are heading toward hopefully the direction of putting in
    place a mobilization package that meets all of the FEMA
    requirements for a USAR team. Unfortunately, we have not
    received the support from FEMA in Washington, at least at this
    point in time, and there is a letter in your packet most
    recently received, where it does not appear they are supporting
    the creation of any new teams. We feel in the State of
    Illinois--and this would be a statewide team--certainly city of
    Chicago warrants the need to have one in place here so we can
    mobilize it quickly and get to the business of extricating and
    rescuing people that might be subject to the collapse of a
    structure all the way down to natural disasters such as the
    earthquake threat in southern Illinois.
        Training and education, three points I would like to
    mention from the Federal level:
        First, there are training and education opportunities from
    many, many Federal agencies that can be applied at the local
    level. We appreciate that, but there is no single coordination
    point. What that means is that we are missing opportunities to
    send people to the right training. People are going to the
    training without the local police and fire agencies being aware
    that they are sent. We need a single point of coordination with
    all the Federal agencies and the Federal training so that it is
    kind of a clearinghouse.
        No. 2, we do not have any regional training facilities to
    bring together police, fire, public works, health officials,
    first responders. I think a wise investment, with certain
    criteria from the Federal Government, to establish regional
    training facilities across the United States, certainly here in
    Illinois, using such things as like the Glenview Naval Air
    Station, which is currently closed, but 25 municipal agencies
    have pulled together in a partnership to make that a regional
    training center. An investment would be wise, because without
    the training, we cannot have seamless sustained operations.
        No. 3, in none of the Federal programs is there any--so far
    as we are able to identify--assistance with overtime funding so
    we can send police and firefighters to the training that is
    available. Once we do that, we need to backfill, otherwise
    local levels of service for day-to-day emergencies are reduced.
        Domestic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction equipment.
    A host of items: First, we believe that all the Federal funding
    should go through a single coordination point, preferably in
    Illinois. We can standardize and provide a sustained operation
    in that manner.
        No. 2, interoperability, there are several boards through
    the International Association of Fire Chiefs at the Federal
    level to standardize equipment that we would use out in the
    street in servicing a response to weapons of mass destruction,
    nuclear, biological and chemical. Vendors are selling products
    that I am calling snake oil out there. We need to have those
    validated through a single source so that if we respond to, let
    us say, California, Florida, or they come here, we are all
    using similar or the same equipment; again, for seamless
    sustained operations.
        Technology transfers are critical. FEMA has a grant program
    with a national technology transfer center. We need that
    equipment out in the street and the field. Example that I cite
    in here is some device inside the fire truck or the ambulance
    that would detect, early on, biological, chemical or a nuclear
    release, before we commit first responder troops inside of a
    hot zone where they have little to no chance of survival.
        No. 3, consider adopting a matrix, one is also contained in
    your packet, that standardizes the training, the equipment and
    the roles of first responders, regardless of their capacity in
    police, fire, public works or the health professionals.
        Next, communications interoperability; as I genuinely call
    it a sucking chest wound. We cannot talk to one another. We
    need to be able to send data to one another, we need to look at
    encryption for secure nets so that we can talk with our Federal
    counterparts and our Federal counterparts can talk with us.
        Office of Homeland Defense. We support it. We believe the
    one-stop notion is needed. There are two organizational charts
    in your packet; one is as it is now and the other as proposed.
    The only thing that we see missing that would encourage some
    consideration over is there is no box within the wiring diagram
    or organizational chart that identifies a local advocate of
    government, a liaison that reports near the top or to the top
    that can tell the Director of Homeland Defense that it is
    working at the local level; similar to what was done during
    BRAC when they closed bases and relocated military
    installations.
        Federal process. As you know, local government, we can
    implement stuff pretty quick. That is probably the benefit of
    being smaller than a Federal agency in most cases. However, the
    way we deliver our system is asystematic. We rely on the
    police, they rely on us; public works is a support structure
    for both; the health profession; all of us work together and
    often with a new challenge, we are going to need Federal
    assistance. We need to find a way to have the Federal system
    less bureaucratic and more simplified so the dollars can get
    down to the local level quickly. Without that, we are going to
    have holes in our system. Holes in the system, we cannot do the
    job that people perceive or we're going to be expected to do.
        FIRE Act funding. There has been discussion about including
    the FIRE Act funding as part of the Homeland Defense $3.5
    billion. We disagree, that it should stay separate, both of
    them. The FIRE Act funding was intended to assist in the day-
    to-day delivery of fire, EMS and general emergency management
    services, not domestic terrorism and weapons of mass
    destruction. Combining them will dilute it and will do one of
    two things; either damage our ability to do our job on a day-
    to-day basis or damage our ability to respond and provide
    service during acts of domestic terrorism or both.
        Mutual aid consortiums. In the State of Illinois, we have
    got a plan. I am told it is one of the best in the Nation, that
    we are leading. We should not be penalized for that, we should
    find the incentives created by the Federal Government to
    encourage local municipal consortiums from the standpoint of
    mutual aid, sharing of resources and building on existing
    infrastructures versus creating new ones.
        I think another point is our elected officials, through the
    Federal Government, should receive some exposure to consequence
    management, but more so, clean up and recovery and financial
    recovery actions--lessons learned from September 11th. Any
    community, we know what happened across the Nation, but I think
    any city, their elected officials, if they have experiences in
    that, are going to be more well prepared. And I think if we set
    a national standard, it will become a better way to translate
    that at all levels of government--Federal, local and State--so
    we can work together during times of crisis.
        Finally a local credentialling and accountability system
    that has a national use needs to be achieved so that when
    somebody comes in on the scene of an incident, we are able to
    validate who they are and provide safety and scene
    accountability as to where they are working. I know that the
    Administrator of the U.S. Fire Administration, Mr. Dave
    Pauleson, is working on that. I would encourage your support so
    we can put something like that in place.
        Finally, inside your document is a bullet sheet, a briefing
    page from the International Association of Fire Chiefs. I would
    encourage this committee as well as all of Congress to turn to
    the International Association of Fire Chiefs as an umbrella
    agency that has high credentialling in giving recommendations
    and thoughts to Federal plans so we can all respond together
    and assist the public when we are challenged by our new threat,
    domestic terrorism.
        Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Horn. Well, thank you. You have been very thorough on
    this and there were a lot of things that we have heard in other
    places and there are a lot of things that have not been heard
    and you helped us deal with that.
        I now want to have Captain Raymond E. Seebald, the Coast
    Guard Captain for the Port of Chicago.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Reardon follows:]
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        Captain Seebald. Mr. Chairman, and members of the
    committee, thank you for inviting me and it indeed is a great
    honor to be here today to tell you a little bit about what we
    have been doing in this area and especially what my troops have
    been doing, because I am very proud of them.
        If you would have seen our office this morning, you would
    have seen an office where very few people were there, because
    the majority of our work is actually preventative in nature. We
    go out every day--people are deployed to our vessels and to
    water-side facilities to inspect both security and safety
    areas.
        Right now, there is a security patrol going on. Petty
    Officer Corpus is on board his vessel looking in areas that we
    have pre-identified as high risk areas, and he is looking
    around for potential terrorist targets, people that might be
    observing those facilities and a whole host of activities. But
    he is also looking for whether the lights are properly watching
    on the buoys, whether the other boaters are intoxicated,
    whether our commercial vessels that we also inspect from
    initial days of inspection, whether they are operating properly
    and carrying passengers, more than six people and some are up
    to 900 passengers, whether they are operating properly. So we
    are a multi-mission service.
        We are also a military service and a civil service. Those
    different avenues and the way we can switch back and forth
    really suit well with our new role in homeland security,
    protecting the homeland, because one, we are already quite
    integrated into the police departments, the fire departments
    and the other local responders. We are a local responder
    indeed, along the water side area and in the ports of the
    United States. But we are also able to surge during emergency
    operations. So we have a preventative side, but we also have a
    response side as well.
        In Washington, DC, there is a national response system that
    entertains calls from around the United States for oil,
    hazardous chemical and potential terrorist attacks and
    immediately, within minutes, will notify a Federal coordinator
    if there is a threat to the coastal zone. When I get that call,
    I dispatch my teams and if I am overwhelmed, I can immediately
    call on our special forces, which is our strike team forces,
    and we have three of those strike teams and I am very honored
    and privileged today to say that joining me is Gail Kulish, who
    is the Commanding Officer of the Atlantic Strike Team. She is
    sitting right there in the front row and she will be helping me
    with some of the more technical questions that might come up
    later on. But we are very happy with that capability. That
    capability, that special strike team capability, was employed
    for the anthrax scare and actual discovery of anthrax. Their
    teams were used to go into the area and conduct decontamination
    operations.
        So all of these activities actually take place without any
    Federal Presidential mandate or emergency declaration declared.
    This is under the National Contingency Plan. Each Captain of a
    port is empowered and essentially carries a blank check from
    the President to immediately respond. There are a lot of
    conditions, to make sure it is all legal and we have a bunch of
    lawyers that help us make those decisions. But it provides, and
    we are very empowered to immediately respond and to act in the
    event of oil or hazardous chemical and potentially biological
    impacts as well.
        Now what are we doing on the planning and prevention side?
    I think you would have been very happy to see us as we both
    initiated and facilitated a meeting of all the local responders
    about 2 weeks ago, as we begin stepping through what we believe
    are the most likely scenarios for attack in the Chicagoland
    area and the region. You would have been very happy to see
    FEMA, and most people at this table, at that meeting, including
    the Chicago Fire Department, Police Department, FBI and all the
    local responders. We are not only facilitating those exercises,
    but we are training everyone in what we think is the most
    effective method of approach to these types of incidents and it
    is called the use of the incident command system.
        At the very top of that management system is the unified
    command system and it is a management group at the top that
    includes Federal, State and local representatives. So we have,
    from the Federal entity, Deputy Governor Matt Bettenhausen from
    the Illinois area; from the city of Chicago, Cortez X. Trotter,
    who is in the Office of Emergency Planning, and myself. And we
    all agree on where we should deploy the resources, the amount
    of those resources, in this whole area. And that alone has
    created just a very smooth relationship in terms of how we
    interact at all levels of government.
        And then how to use our resources. If you walked on the
    waterfront, that petty officer that I mentioned earlier, after
    his 4 hour tour on the boat is finished, he would then pass on
    what he observed to the Chicago Police Department, who is out
    there as well in their boats, they are patrolling the same
    areas. After that gentleman finishes, he then briefs the
    Illinois Department of Natural Resource boat that is patrolling
    the exact same area. That is just one operation where we are
    really working closely with local and other State agencies.
        We are also involved with the ATTF and as mentioned
    earlier, the Chicago Terrorist Task Force and we are very
    integrated with all those task force organizations.
        I think I will close and we will be happy to answer any
    questions later, both myself and Gail Kulish. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of Captain Seebald follows:]
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        Mr. Horn. Well, I will tell you, I would like to have
    Commander Kulish now come up to the table because I have a
    couple of questions.
        You are Commanding Officer, Atlantic Area Strike Team. Does
    that include work on containers that come into the harbors and
    that have immigrants in them that are trying to get into the
    United States? Do we have any of those situations here? Because
    we sure do on the west coast.
        Commander Kulish. The National Strike Force responds to
    releases of oil, hazardous materials, biological pollutants,
    contaminants. Containers--we have certainly dealt with a number
    of containers as leakers and sources of hazmat pollutants,
    etc., and we have techniques and the capability to respond to
    those. With respect to the law enforcement aspects of the
    illegal migrants and those other things, the National Strike
    Force would only residually deal with those and turn it over to
    appropriate agencies.
        We are a tactical force for hazmat response.
        Mr. Horn. Well, on the west coast, starting about 10 or 15
    years ago, we had the Coast Guard board the ship that has the
    container, so they cannot pull that game of oh, asylum, that is
    nonsense, and you never see them again unless maybe they are
    flying a plane and hitting a building or something.
        So I am curious, you are saying you do not have too much of
    a problem here then, is that it?
        Commander Kulish. No, sir, I'm just really not the
    appropriate person to address that. In my previous assignments,
    I have done Coast Guard Law Enforcement, boarding
    responsibilities and the Captain of the port has those
    authorities and those resources to board and do board routinely
    and do law enforcement functions. And I can defer to the
    Captain for that.
        Captain Seebald. Yes, each Captain of a port would receive
    a notice from vessel agents when a vessel is about to arrive at
    the United States. And they specify many things and now a new
    law that just thankfully has been passed that allows us 96
    hours to get that information. Before it was 24 hours and
    subsequent to September 11th that law has been extended now to
    the 96-hour rule.
        Agents now provide us with a whole host of information.
        Mr. Horn. Excuse me, let us explain what a 96 rule is.
        Captain Seebald. Yes, sir. Before, foreign vessels had to
    only give us 24 hour advance notice of arrival before entering
    into our ports. And now, subsequent to September 11th, we have
    extended that requirement now to 96 hours and that has been--it
    is in the process of being finalized. That gives us much more
    time now to look at cargoes, the types of people that are on
    board the vessels, the crew makeup and where the vessel is
    coming from.
        And together with that information, we have a matrix that
    helps us identify and target which vessels we do want to go
    aboard. And in this area, when we do decide to go aboard a
    vessel, we do a joint boarding with Immigration, Customs
    Service and other local law enforcement, so that we look at a
    whole host of things that might be a problem on this vessel.
    Recently, only 2 weeks ago, we conducted a boarding like that
    in this area. Unfortunately we did not discover anything, but
    it was--it just goes to demonstrate this interoperability and
    how we are working very closely with other agencies now for
    almost every activity that we do, we conduct in this area.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. That is helpful. Any questions on
    this----
        We have got two more but if you have any on the Coast
    Guard.
        Ms. Schakowsky. I will, but I would like to hear the
    others.
        Ms. Biggert. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?
        Mr. Horn. Sure, please do.
        Ms. Biggert. Captain Seebald, what efforts are you making
    to plan for and respond to the worst case scenario that you can
    envision involving a chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of
    mass destruction in the coastal zone and what are the
    parameters of the coastal zone?
        Captain Seebald. Well, the coastal zone is pretty much
    right at the coast. We share responsibility with the EPA. EPA
    is pretty much inland of the coastal zone and we are anything
    offshore or any significant marine transportation related
    facility that might be right on the coast, we would respond if
    there was a release of oil, hazardous substance from those
    facilities or even if there was an explosion that resulted in
    those releases, we could open the CERCLA fund and begin funding
    a cleanup and response.
        We are, as I mentioned earlier, both with our harbor safety
    committees and harbor security committees, we are stepping
    through what we think is the most likely scenarios. I do not
    really want to get into so much the specifics of those, but 2
    weeks ago, that first exercise was the beginning of that effort
    to look at exactly what we are talking about here and to begin
    planning our responses jointly with both the State and the city
    of Chicago in this area and other safety and security
    committees in other areas where I still have authority.
        Ms. Biggert. How will the Chicago Marine Safety Station
    facilitate the intergovernmental cooperation between your
    agency and the State and the city?
        Captain Seebald. Well, that facility, the one that has been
    funded now, will put all three of us--the Department of Natural
    Resources for the State and also the Chicago Marine Police
    Unit, who we work with every single day--it will put us
    physically in the same building. Once you are physically in the
    same building, all those relationships you had before are only
    going to be improved, and we think it will be not only a great
    place for all of us to be together but right in the area which
    is the highest risk from at least my zone.
        Ms. Biggert. You meet really daily now and it will make it
    much easier.
        Captain Seebald. Yes.
        Ms. Biggert. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. We appreciate all you do, it is a
    wonderful part of our military, as you said, and the civil
    service also.
        Let us go now to Edward G. Buikema, the Regional Director,
    Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]. We are
    glad to see you today too.
        Mr. Buikema. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good morning,
    members of the committee.
        FEMA Region V includes the States of Illinois, Indiana,
    Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and Wisconsin, representing a
    population of approximately 51 million people with the majority
    residing in urban areas. We have significant disaster activity
    within the region, having administered 48 Presidential Disaster
    Declarations within the last 5 years with many events impacting
    multiple States. Presently, four of Region V's six States have
    active major Presidential Disaster Declarations. Illinois'
    declaration is for high winds, tornadoes and flooding and
    encompasses a total of 68 counties. Indiana, Michigan and
    Minnesota have current declarations for flooding.
        To maintain the readiness for large scale disasters,
    including acts of terrorism, regional Federal agencies and the
    States turn to the Federal Response Plan. Under the Federal
    Response Plan, FEMA coordinates a disaster response system that
    involves up to 26 Federal agencies and 12 emergency support
    functions. Each emergency support function has a lead Federal
    agency. Regionally, these emergency support functions have been
    called into action during such disasters as the midwest flood
    of 1993, and the Red River flood of 1997. Other regional
    Federal agencies and our State partners meet at least quarterly
    to share planning efforts, exercise preparedness and response
    plans and devote attention to emergency response coordination
    during specific types of natural and manmade disasters. We call
    that meeting the Regional Interagency Steering Committee and it
    will be meeting again next week here in Chicago.
        The region takes an active role in preparing for a response
    to a terrorism event. FEMA's responsibility is to coordinate
    Federal, regional and State terrorism-related planning,
    training and exercise activities. This includes supporting the
    Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program in which 36 Region V communities
    participate. We are also working with States to build response
    capability and keep them informed of Federal initiatives as
    well as participating in State-sponsored conferences, training
    exercises, task forces and workshops.
        Just last month, the region hosted a Senior Leaders
    Homeland Security Summit which brought together selected
    officials and representatives of the first responder community
    throughout our States. The summit provided a forum for
    discussions of issues relating to the fire service and law
    enforcement, funding for planning, training, equipment and
    exercises, mutual aid agreements and other issues pertinent to
    homeland security.
        All of the States in Region V have implemented proactive
    and aggressive actions in response to the terrorism threats
    that have emerged since September 11th. Many States have
    committed substantial amounts of staff and their own financial
    resources toward preparing for weapons of mass destruction
    events. All States have designated Homeland Security directors.
    Groundwork has been laid or accelerated to develop interstate
    and intrastate mutual aid agreements. Specialized response
    teams are being formed. Legislation is being enacted. Training
    is being conducted. And equipment is being purchased.
        State government has spent millions of dollars directly
    responding to homeland security needs and the anthrax crisis.
    While much has been done, we have only begun to scratch the
    surface of what needs to be done.
        FEMA has recently realigned to establish the Office of
    National Preparedness at the headquarters and regional level.
    The creation of this office is intended to address a long-
    recognized problem--the critical need that exists in this
    country for a central coordination point for the wide range of
    Federal programs dealing with terrorism preparedness.
        The mission and overriding objective of the Office of
    National Preparedness at FEMA is to help this country be
    prepared to respond to acts of terrorism. The effort has three
    major focuses--the first responder initiative; providing a
    central coordination point for Federal preparedness programs;
    and, Citizen Corps.
        First, the first responder initiative. To support first
    responders, the President has requested $3.5 billion in the
    2003 budget. These funds would help them plan, train, acquire
    needed equipment and conduct exercises in preparation for
    terrorist attacks and other emergencies. Right now, we are
    developing a streamlined and accountable procedure that would
    speed the flow of funds to the first responder community.
    Specifically, the funds would be used:
        To support the development of comprehensive response plans
    for terrorist incidents.
        To purchase equipment.
        To provide training for responding to terrorist incidents.
        And for coordinated regular exercise programs to improve
    response capability.
        The President is requesting funds in the 2002 spring
    supplemental to support the first responder initiative,
    including $175 million to be provided to State and local
    governments to upgrade, and in some cases, to develop
    comprehensive emergency operations plans. These comprehensive
    plans would form the foundation for the work to be done in 2003
    to prepare first responders for terrorist attacks.
        FEMA has held listening sessions throughout the country
    with first responders and emergency managers at every level to
    solicit their ideas on the design of grant program and process.
    In addition, we are working to resolve other issues critical to
    the success of this initiative, many of which have been
    addressed this morning:
        National standards for compatible, interoperable equipment
    for first responders.
        A national mutual aid system.
        Personal protective equipment for first responders that is
    designed for long-term response operations and incidents.
        And national standards for training and exercises for
    incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.
        In addition to the right equipment, planning capabilities
    and training, first responders have been telling us that they
    need a single point of contact in the Federal Government. We
    have heard this from other sources too. The Gilmore Commission,
    for example, has pointed out that the Federal Government's
    terrorism preparedness programs are fragmented, uncoordinated
    and unaccountable. In our view, it is absolutely essential that
    the responsibility for pulling together and coordinating the
    myriad of Federal programs designed to help local and State
    responders and emergency managers to respond to terrorism, be
    situated in a single agency. That is why we are so excited
    about the President's calling for the creation of the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        The functions that FEMA performs will be a key part of the
    mission of the new Department of Homeland Security. The new
    department will strengthen our ability to carry out important
    activities such as building the capacity of State and local
    emergency response personnel to respond to emergencies and
    disasters of all kinds. The new department will administer
    Federal grants under the first responder initiative as well as
    grant programs managed by the Department of Justice, the
    Department of Health and Human Services and FEMA. A core part
    of the department's emergency preparedness and response
    function will be built directly on the foundation established
    by FEMA. It will continue FEMA's efforts to reduce the loss of
    life and property and to protect our Nation's institutions from
    all types of hazards through a comprehensive risk-based, all
    hazards emergency management program of preparedness,
    mitigation, response and recovery. It will continue to change
    the emergency management culture from one that reacts to
    terrorism and other disasters to one that proactively helps
    communities and citizens avoid becoming victims.
        By bringing other Federal emergency response assets
    together with FEMA's response capability, the new department
    will allow for better coordination than the current situation
    in which response assets are separated in several departments.
        And just a couple of words about Citizen Corps. The Citizen
    Corps program is part of the President's new Freedom Corps
    initiative.
        This initiative brings together local government, law
    enforcement, educational institutions, the private sector,
    faith-based groups and volunteers into a cohesive community
    resource. Citizen Corps is coordinated nationally by FEMA,
    which also provides training standards, general information and
    materials. We also will identify additional volunteer programs
    and initiatives that support the goals of the Corps.
        In addition to the first responder and Citizen Corps
    programs, we are implementing a number of other important
    related initiatives. These include:
        A training course review. We are working on a complete
    accounting of all FEMA and Federal emergency and terrorism
    preparedness training programs and activities.
        As I mentioned, mutual aid initiatives.
        A national exercise program.
        And finally, assessment of FEMA regional office
    capabilities.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today, I will
    be happy to answer any questions you may have.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
        And our last presenter is JayEtta Hecker, the Director of
    Physical Infrastructure Issues for the U.S. General Accounting
    Office.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Buikema follows:]
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        Ms. Hecker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ms.
    Schakowsky and Ms. Biggert. I am very pleased to be here today.
    I represent the unit of GAO that supports the Congress in
    reviewing not only FEMA but Coast Guard and a whole level of
    body of work and preparedness and it is on the basis of that I
    base my remarks today.
        What I will do is just very briefly summarize the remarks
    that I had and then try to relate it to some of what we have
    heard today, because it has been such a rich and diverse set of
    comments.
        Basically, I have two main points. One is about the
    proposed department and the second is about the strategy that
    is needed to really be the underpinning of it.
        The department, we have called for--GAO--for many months
    and over the course of really years of study of terrorism
    programs. They are too dispersed, they are too duplicative,
    they are overlapping and they are not really very effective.
    There is not even really an assessment of an overall strategy,
    as there has not been one.
        So we have been calling for this integration and this
    establishment of a department. So in that sense, we applaud
    that.
        On the other hand, where we think it raises some concerns
    and may be over-promising or too optimistic is that somehow
    this could integrate everything. It is certainly not a quick
    fix, it will take substantial time and, in our view, additional
    resources to really make it come off, particularly the
    intergovernmental dimensions of it. Pulling all of these
    disparate departments together is a very complex undertaking
    and I think some of the remarks of the Comptroller General,
    looking at the history of the formation of the Department of
    Defense, the Department of Transportation, the Department of
    Energy, bringing together and establishing and benefiting from
    the synergies of common functions, is no quick matter. And yet
    this is a matter of urgency and there should not be any lack of
    realism about the nature of the challenge ahead.
        The second point is that this whole department has to be
    based on a strategy. Just having this notion that somehow we
    are going to collocate all of these disparate departments and
    functions and that will work, in our view is not a strategy.
    Strategy means to define--particularly from an
    intergovernmental angle. There are many dimensions to the
    strategy, but given the focus of the committee, our concern is
    about how to build those effective partnerships with different
    levels of government and the private sector. And we think a
    strategy is where you would see a vision of what is needed. It
    would define the kind of roles that are needed for different
    levels of government, where those roles are partnerships so
    that you have some real accountability and clarity, and would
    move toward real goals and measures and indicators. And
    unfortunately, we do not have that in this arena. And also, it
    would strategically define the appropriate tools because it is
    the kind of tools, whether it is regulation or grants, block
    grants, or targeted grants, that you use affects what kind of
    performance you get, what kind of accountability you get, what
    kind of sustainability you get.
        So with that as a backdrop of the remarks that I had, I
    wanted to just briefly highlight what I think we heard today
    and how many of these themes really were mirrored throughout
    the morning.
        I thought Ms. Schakowsky actually framed a very important
    issue right in your opening remarks, about the challenge of
    integrating many departments that have non-security functions.
    And I think the Coast Guard, which we just heard about that,
    has many other related non-security missions. Sometimes it is a
    good overlap, sometimes it is not. I have been on a tour in the
    New England area, where the fisheries enforcement is down, and
    it is a different arena, it is doing different things and
    basically the resources have been diverted into the harbor. So
    you have combining mixed resources.
        We heard about that from several folks today in the public
    health arena and that is clearly a whole issue about public
    health, how it has been under-funded and how it is really a
    dual use, dual purpose function. And honing in on all of the
    resources and the effort in the department, we have already
    testified, my counterpart responsible for public health, that
    actually this fragments public health programs. These programs
    are currently more integrated in the Department of Health and
    Human Services, and this says no, we are going--because it is a
    State and local preparedness activity--we are going to put it
    in this department. So we have some caution there about the
    fact that there are dual function agencies like in the public
    health arena, like the Coast Guard, like FEMA, which works on--
    this country unfortunately is much more frequently the subject
    of natural disasters and preparedness on an all-hazard basis is
    very important. And that cannot end up being overshadowed by
    this formation of a security-focused department.
        So we have heard a lot about this, as you form the
    department, the mix of this dual use and therefore what is in,
    what is out or what relationships will really be defined for
    the inevitable agencies like the intelligence agencies that are
    left out. So there is a lot of partnership and clarity in this
    proposal that is needed.
        Another whole set of comments was about sustainability. Ms.
    Biggert, you actually brought that in, in your opening remarks,
    how this is a permanent and ongoing challenge. It is not like
    Y2K, when January 1 came and we said whew, this is over. This
    is not over, this is a continuing challenge.
        Dr. Lumpkin talked about the importance of long-term
    sustainability. This is not an effort that we can have a one-
    time effort and we cannot have a Federal Government set of
    programs and promised programs that cannot be sustained. There
    are fiscal shortages at the States and there are at the Federal
    level as well. So a vision is needed for programs that can be
    sustained.
        Then there were some very important points about
    partnership. Chief Wilkinson and Commander Nilsson talked about
    the importance of communications and training and the pooling
    of resources. And that actually relates to targeting, go to the
    States, go to local government to promote the ideal cooperation
    and partnerships and efficient use of resources.
        And I close with your opening remarks, Mr. Horn, and the
    overall theme of today, ``How Effectively is the Federal
    Government Assisting State and Local Governments in Preparing
    for Serious Terrorist Attacks.'' You opened with the fact that
    you have serious doubts. I think there should be serious
    doubts. I think there is inadequate information, and we do not
    have standards to even measure and base conclusions about
    levels of preparedness. CNN did a guide and it is an
    approximation and some cities find that useful. But those are
    not meaningful indicators. FEMA has been mandated for a number
    of years to try to develop measures of preparedness and it is a
    long-term project. We still do not have it.
        So with all this new effort, we do not have the measures of
    what it is we are going toward and how to measure what it is we
    are trying to achieve. So the key issue of the day is that we
    do not know how prepared we are and there are major challenges
    ahead in the formation of this department to have it be
    effective, efficient and to address the many important issues
    that were raised today.
        That concludes my remarks.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:]
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        Mr. Horn. Thank you. We will have 5 minutes for Ms.
    Schakowsky.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Hecker, I think a lot of the questions that you raise
    and the concerns that you raise put everything in an important
    context and a framework. What do they say about field of
    dreams? ``Build it and they will come?'' No, we create it and
    it will work is not necessarily the case and so it is
    important, I agree, to have a strategy.
        The issue that I did raise in my opening statement--and
    others can comment too--the non-security functions, I am very
    concerned about and I am concerned about it from Chicago's
    relationship to the Coast Guard and search and rescue and
    recreational boating and all those things that we are concerned
    about. Concerned about it from the seamless standpoint,
    although I think you made a pretty compelling case on why those
    functions are more consistent than I had originally thought
    about.
        I am concerned about the INS in the Chicago area where we
    have so many immigrants. The service component is a very
    different mission from the law enforcement component and right
    now the entire INS is scheduled to go in.
        There is an argument that some will make that this is the
    government gravy train right now, and if you do not get in it,
    you are out of it altogether, and that might be rationale
    enough to say let us put all the functions in, because if
    something is going to give, it is not going to be the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        And so I am wondering if you are going to in a systematic
    way--GAO in a systematic way is going to be looking at these
    non-security functions to help guide us in what may be a better
    organizational structure or make some recommendations about all
    the things you said, the goals and measures and indicators and
    appropriate tools, etc.
        I am concerned in our rush to do this, that we do not take
    these things into consideration.
        Do you want to respond, or any of the others respond--the
    Coast Guard or FEMA.
        Ms. Hecker. I can briefly answer that. When the Comptroller
    General testified last week, he laid out a set of criteria to
    try to assist the Congress in their deliberations of how you
    assess what is in, what is out. And he talked about a set of
    criteria that could be used. This is moving so fast that we
    have not been asked to try to apply those criteria ourselves to
    some of those departments, but I am sure at your request or any
    committee, we would work with you to try to do that. I know the
    schedule in the House is short and there is a vote in the next
    few weeks or at least that is the schedule. So this is moving
    very quickly.
        I think the upshot of the Comptroller General's concern was
    yes, this is urgent, but there is also merit in moving
    cautiously. And it is not for us to speak to the agenda that
    the Congress has set, but these are very significant questions
    and even though, of course, there can be refinements like there
    was for years with the DOD or other areas, the importance of
    this is to at least get the ideas correct and the concept
    correct because we cannot have any lost time here. When you
    think of the whole TSA activity and the aggressive schedule
    thereon, nobody can lose a beat here. So getting the right
    parties involved in some of these combinations and thinking
    through some of the multiple relationships--I know in the area
    of the Coast Guard, one of the issues we raised is the kind of
    financial flexibility that might be given to the department
    head. You know, if they can move resources around, you are not
    really sure whether in fact a lot of competing functions can be
    sustained, particularly with the administration promising that
    this is no new resources. You have got to steal it from
    somewhere. There are no resources on State and local
    coordination, there is a mission and there is a promise that
    will be a big commitment, but there are no resources, it is
    just a box off of the new Secretary. So is it just going to
    pull together people from all of these conglomerate departments
    that do some of that? It is just not thought through yet and
    it--in my opinion, I think it merits more consideration by
    Congress of what is in, what is out, what the terms are, what
    the expectations are. We would be happy to help in any way we
    can.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Let me just get a comment though if I could
    from Captain Seebald. You know, we are concerned in the Chicago
    area about the Coast Guard. Do you have those concerns as well
    and how do you plan to address them?
        Captain Seebald. As a result of September 11th, we did have
    to shift some of our resources away from more of our safety
    role to more of our security role. But as a result of bringing
    on additional reservists and moving additional resources, and
    thankfully due to the $209 million supplemental that was
    passed, the first supplemental, we were able to what we think
    is to annualize that effort. And the President's fiscal year
    2003 budget is a first step in a multi-year annualization of
    that new effort. And we think over the 3-years, we will be able
    to adequately both absorb the homeland security mission and
    then adequately execute our search and rescue missions and all
    the other missions that we have.
        But certainly falling short of that budget, we would
    definitely be impacted.
        Also in homeland security, we think because we are the
    leaders and we are the first responders in the coastal zone
    that we must remain intact. We must remain both a military and
    a maritime and multi-mission organization and the Coast Guard
    must retain its entire mission portfolio.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
        Mr. Buikema. I would just like to respond to your question
    on behalf of FEMA and really I guess talking about the concept
    of emergency management in general, especially with respect
    to--you mentioned a non-terrorism type mission that FEMA has.
        And certainly right now there are four active Presidential
    Disaster Declarations ongoing in this region. But I think it is
    important to note that whether it is terrorism or whether it is
    pretty much any other kind of emergency or disaster, the
    functions that have to be performed by government are similar.
    There are certain things such as communication and cooperation
    and coordination and command and control that whether it is a
    hazardous materials incident or a tornado or a terrorist event,
    government has to come together and coordinate and speak with
    one voice and try to speak off the same sheet of music, if you
    will.
        So some of the basic concepts and theories of emergency
    management are based on relationship building and the
    communication and coordination aspect that will be present
    whether it is a flood or a terrorist event.
        So in many respects, this proposal blends in beautifully
    with FEMA's mission and allows us to strengthen those
    relationships with our other Federal partners as well as with
    State and local governments.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
        Mr. Horn. The other----
        Ms. Biggert. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Buikema, you mentioned in your testimony that FEMA is
    assessing the capabilities of its regional offices. Do you
    think that there will be--is it the plan to develop different
    capabilities within each of the regional offices, or simply
    ensure that each regional office has the capability to respond
    to an emergency?
        Mr. Buikema. More the latter, Ms. Biggert. Basically FEMA
    has a number of response teams and response elements and plans
    and procedures that can be enacted and implemented in the event
    of a disaster emergency. This has been an ongoing process but
    especially new focus has been placed on this since September
    11th and our region just went through this process a couple of
    weeks ago and it was a peer assessment. In other words, folks
    from outside the region came in and took a look at our
    capabilities and our strengths and our weaknesses and it is a
    very valuable exercise, if you will, because it allows us then
    to address any weaknesses and proactively try to strengthen our
    capability to respond.
        Ms. Biggert. Is there--I think that you might have answered
    this, but you know, FEMA, the culture of FEMA really is to
    react and to respond to terrorism or other disasters. How--are
    you changing the culture of the agency when it proactively
    helps the community citizens to avoid becoming victims?
        Mr. Buikema. Actually, FEMA has been a strong proponent of
    mitigation or prevention for many years now. There has been a
    lot of emphasis on prevention, an attempt to break the cycle,
    if you will, and I will use flooding as an example, where too
    many homes and structures perhaps are built in hazard areas
    such as flood plains. An event occurs, a flood occurs, which
    may or may not, depending on the circumstances, ultimately lead
    to a major disaster declaration and assistance from the Federal
    Government, and then subsequent to that another flood occurs in
    this cycle.
        So FEMA has been very aggressively, for a number of years,
    working with State and local governments to try to prevent
    that. Every time a Presidential Disaster Declaration is
    declared, a percentage of the Federal funds that come into a
    State are set aside for hazard mitigation grant program
    dollars. For example, in Illinois, if my facts are correct,
    over 3,000 homes have been bought up by the State of Illinois
    with Federal and local money and removed out of the flood
    plain, as an example of the way to prevent future disasters
    from occurring.
        Ms. Biggert. Thank you for that clarification. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Horn. Thank you. I appreciate the presentations all of
    you have given. It is going to be very helpful and I thank you
    for coming here.
        I want to now thank that people that arranged this
    particular hearing: J. Russell George, the staff director and
    chief counsel is back there; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff
    director on my left and your right; Rosa Harris is from the
    General Accounting Office on loan to the subcommittee and very
    responsible for this particular hearing; Justin Paulhamus is
    our majority clerk and does a great job and he is at the end of
    the table and he is going to have to be the dust-up guy for the
    rest of Chicago. And then Michael Sazonov, a subcommittee
    intern; Sterling Bentley, another subcommittee intern; Joe
    DiSilvio, an intern and Yigal Kerszenbaum is another intern.
        The minority staff; David McMillen here is behind me, a
    professional staff member; and Nadem L. Schaume is the deputy
    chief of staff, press secretary for Representative Schakowsky.
    And their help was great to us and Leslie Kohn, her district
    director in the Chicago office, and John Samuels, legislative
    director, Office of Representative Schakowsky.
        And we are also particularly caring about his giving us
    this fine chamber, and that is Chief Judge Charles Kokoras. And
    Joe Quomo is the General Services Administration Site
    Coordinator. Joe Navit is the courtroom technician. And Ulga
    Koloson is the administrative assistant to the chief judge. And
    not last, but he is going to see us in Omaha and that is Bill
    Warren, court reporter. That is a tough job when you are
    getting all of you and getting it in the right place. So thank
    you very much.
        And with that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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