    [House Hearing, 107 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      THE CLEAN UP OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE'S BRENTWOOD PROCESSING AND
                              DISTRIBUTION CENTER
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 26, 2002

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 107-178

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                           U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    85-726                         WASHINGTON : 2003
    ____________________________________________________________________________
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    Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    STEPHEN HORN, California             PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    DAN MILLER, Florida                  ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                 DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JIM TURNER, Texas
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    DAVE WELDON, Florida                 JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia                      ------
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma                  (Independent)

                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                         James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
                         Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

                    Subcommittee on the District of Columbia

                    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairman
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia,               DC
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       DIANE E. WATSON, California
                                         STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

                                   Ex Officio

    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                         Russell Smith, Staff Director
                   Matthew Batt, Legislative Assistant/Clerk
                          Shalley Kim, Staff Assistant
               Denise Wilson, Minority Professional Staff Member

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 26, 2002....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Day, Thomas, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal
          Service; Orange, Vincent B., ward 5, Council of the
          District of Columbia; Ted Gordon, senior deputy director
          for public health assurance, District of Columbia
          Department of Health; Dr. Rosemary K. Sokas, Associate
          Director for Science, National Institute for Occupational
          Safety and Health, CDC; and Thomas Voltaggio,
          Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency Region III..     6
        Hegarty, John F., national president, National Postal Mail
          Handlers Union; Alan C. Ferranto, director of safety and
          health, National Association of Letter Carriers; and Roy
          Braunstein, legislative director, American Postal Workers
          Union......................................................    66
        Martin, Louise, president, Brentwood Civic Association; and
          James M. McGee, president, National Alliance of Postal and
          Federal Employees..........................................    98
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Braunstein, Roy, legislative director, American Postal
          Workers Union, prepared statement of.......................    83
        Day, Thomas, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal
          Service, prepared statement of.............................    10
        Ferranto, Alan C., director of safety and health, National
          Association of Letter Carriers, prepared statement of......    77
        Gordon, Ted, senior deputy director for public health
          assurance, District of Columbia Department of Health,
          prepared statement of......................................    19
        Hegarty, John F., national president, National Postal Mail
          Handlers Union, prepared statement of......................    69
        Martin, Louise, president, Brentwood Civic Association,
          prepared statement of......................................    99
        McGee, James M., president, National Alliance of Postal and
          Federal Employees, prepared statement of...................   103
        Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Maryland, prepared statement of...............   109
        Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
          District of Columbia, prepared statement of................     4
        Orange, Vincent B., ward 5, Council of the District of
          Columbia, prepared statement of............................    50
        Sokas, Dr. Rosemary K., Associate Director for Science,
          National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC,
          prepared statement of......................................    28
        Voltaggio, Thomas, Administrator, Environmental Protection
          Agency Region III, prepared statement of...................    39

      THE CLEAN UP OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE'S BRENTWOOD PROCESSING AND
                              DISTRIBUTION CENTER

                                  ----------

                             FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2002

                      House of Representatives,
              Subcommittee on the District of Columbia,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., at
    the Gallaudet University Kellogg Conference Center, Washington,
    DC, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton (acting chairwoman of the
    subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representative Norton.
        Staff present: Russell Smith, staff director; Heea
    Vazirani-Fales, counsel; Robert White, communications director;
    Matthew Batt, legislative assistant/clerk; Shalley Kim, staff
    assistant; Jon Bouker, minority counsel; Denise Wilson,
    minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority
    assistant clerk.
        Ms. Norton. I want to call this hearing to order and
    explain why I am the one calling it to order. The subcommittee
    chair, Representative Morella, of course has every intention of
    being here even now, but the homeland security bill, which has
    some amendments that she has submitted, has been moved up and
    is on the floor as we speak.
        This hearing on the cleanup of the Brentwood postal
    facility and the effects of the tragedy and of the cleanup on
    employees and residents and customers we believe had to go
    forward in any case, particularly considering that cleanup is
    about to begin and that it would seriously inconvenience
    members of the public and witnesses if in light of the schedule
    of the Congress we were to postpone this hearing.
        I must say, I have an amendment as well on the floor that
    has been incorporated into an important set of amendments as an
    amendment to preserve the same level of pay for civil servants
    who get moved, as they now have, when consolidation occurs. I
    also would very much want to be there. The difference between
    Ms. Morella and me is that she is allowed to vote on her
    amendment and I would not be allowed to vote anyway, so we
    thought we would just as well start the hearing.
        But before we take up any business with respect to
    Brentwood, I would ask you to take a moment of silence in
    memory of Joseph Curseen Jr. and Thomas Morris Jr., the two
    Postal Service workers we lost at Brentwood in October.
        Thank you.
        I want to thank our chair, Representative Connie Morella,
    for responding to my request for a field hearing on the
    Brentwood facility and the tragedy that occurred there. The
    Postal Service and District officials have had meetings in the
    Brentwood community, but this is the first congressional
    hearing on Brentwood over which the Congress has jurisdiction.
        I asked for this hearing in the field, as it is called,
    which brings the Congress to the community, rather than the
    other way around, to facilitate attendance by residents and
    employees and to stress the importance of ongoing congressional
    oversight over Brentwood itself. I am grateful to Gallaudet
    President I. King Jordan and the Kellogg Conference Center for
    contributing the excellent space that we are using today for
    our hearing in a beautiful facility located in the ward 5
    Brentwood community not far from the post office itself.
        This hearing comes as the cleanup is set to begin. However,
    there are many questions that remain unanswered following the
    anthrax tragedy. I will be particularly interested today in the
    health effects on employees and residents who may have been
    exposed, on what measures are planned to prevent any recurrence
    of a bioterrorist threat or events, and on what measures will
    be taken to protect the community from the substances to be
    used in the Brentwood decontamination process.
        This hearing also will serve an important purpose if it
    helps to separate fact from conjecture, and if it helps to
    relieve fears among employees and residents. Anthrax is too
    serious a threat for armchair views about cause and effect.
    Even the experts were wrong on anthrax. The underdeveloped
    science led them to focus on the site where the deadly envelope
    was opened, not on Brentwood where it was processed.
        Ironically, no one died or even became ill in the Senate
    Hart Building, but we lost two postal workers and two others
    became seriously ill at Brentwood. The anthrax experience
    encourages caution in our claims concerning what caused or will
    cause what effects. Brentwood teaches us all--experts,
    employees and residents alike--that understanding anthrax is a
    scientific work in progress.
        I am particularly concerned that some employees and
    residents, whether exposed or not, fear that their health may
    be in danger now or in the future. In particular, the
    experience of African Americans in this country with health
    abuses by government officials from forced sterilization to the
    Tuskegee syphilis experiment has left residual doubts
    concerning government assurances during health controversies.
    The Brentwood tragedy did not help to allay such skepticism.
        Yet despite the incomplete scientific understanding that
    led experts to underestimate the dangers of anthrax at
    Brentwood, the only way to get beyond our fears is to seek and
    use the best scientific knowledge available. Therefore, today I
    will ask the Centers for Disease Control to do a controlled
    study to assure that there are no residual effects on the
    health of employees and Postal Service customers now or in the
    future, resulting from anthrax contamination or from substances
    used to decontaminate anthrax.
        There are a number of ways to accomplish this purpose,
    including an epidemiological study of the affected D.C. workers
    and residents here, compared to a comparable population where
    no anthrax contamination occurred. If mortality and health
    results are similar, there would be some reassurance concerning
    the health of the affected population here. If not, we would
    have reason to do further investigation here.
        Brentwood is vastly different from Hart in size,
    configuration, purpose and machinery. However, Hart, where
    Senate offices are located, became the guinea pig for an
    anthrax cleanup. Every precaution was taken and no cost was
    spared there, we are told. The Hart Building has become the
    gold standard for cleanup, detection and prevention. Members of
    the Senate and their staffs and their loved ones and their
    children now go into Hart every day. We must insist that no
    less be done for Brentwood.
        Similarly, Capitol Hill residents were the first whose
    community experienced a biohazard cleanup of anthrax, using
    substances that will be applied at Brentwood. The experience of
    that ward 6 D.C. community with preparation for the cleanup and
    its effects since, should be instructive to the ward 5
    Brentwood community. We must take no chances at Brentwood. The
    Brentwood tragedy revealed just how thin our knowledge of
    anthrax was. We knew too little a year ago and we still know
    too little. For example, the government cannot yet identify who
    sent the letter.
        The price employees paid at Brentwood in loss of life and
    health and in continuing fears, anxiety and dislocation has
    been too high. Today, employees, residents and this
    subcommittee are owed the highest degree of assurance of a safe
    cleanup, followed by a safe facility and a safe community. We
    welcome today's witnesses and will listen with great interest
    their concerns and to the remedies for those concerns.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton
    follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. I would like to remind witnesses that the rules
    of the Committee on Government Reform require that all
    witnesses be administered an oath prior to testifying. I am
    pleased to recognize our first panel of witnesses, the
    Honorable Vincent Orange, Sr., who represents ward 5 and the
    Brentwood community--I see he has not come yet; Thomas Day,
    vice president for engineering, U.S. Postal Service; also
    Dennis Baca of the U.S. Postal Service, environmental engineer
    at Brentwood; Ted Gordon, senior deputy director for public
    health assurance, the D.C. Department of Health; also Dr.
    Vincent Nathan, assistant deputy director for the Environmental
    Health Administration; Peter LaPorte, D.C. emergency
    management; Dr. Rosemary K. Sokas, associate director of
    science, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
    CDC; also Dr. Brad Perkins, chief of meningitis and special
    pathogen branch, division of bacteria and microbic diseases,
    National Center for Infectious Disease Centers at the CDC;
    Thomas Voltaggio, administrator, Environmental Protection
    Agency Region III; also Marcus Aquino, EPA onsite coordinator.
        I would ask the first panel of witnesses if you would stand
    and raise your right hands to take the oath.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Let the record reflect
    that each witness answered this question in the affirmative.
    You may be seated.
        We would like to hear first from Mr. Thomas Day, vice
    president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service.

     STATEMENTS OF THOMAS DAY, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING, U.S.
     POSTAL SERVICE; TED GORDON, SENIOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC
     HEALTH ASSURANCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH;
    DR. ROSEMARY K. SOKAS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE, NATIONAL
       INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CDC; THOMAS
       VOLTAGGIO, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
       REGION III; AND VINCENT B. ORANGE, WARD 5, COUNCIL OF THE
                          DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

        Mr. Day. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton. Thank you for
    this opportunity to speak to you. We look forward to talking
    about the cleanup efforts here at Brentwood, as well as our
    Hamilton processing center in New Jersey. Although he is not
    here, I would also like to thank Councilmember Orange for
    helping us to hold a community meeting in the past on this
    important issue.
        I do have a prepared statement that I am going to submit
    for the record, and as discussed with the staff, I will be
    making a brief presentation. Before I get into that, just let
    me briefly say a few words of thanks and praise to our own
    employees. We do share your concerns about our postal employees
    here at the Brentwood facility, as well as the surrounding
    communities.
        I think as everyone knows, in spite of the anthrax attack
    that took place in October, postal workers around the country
    continued to provide service and do their daily round to get
    the mail delivered. That was especially true in Manhattan, New
    Jersey, Connecticut and here in Washington. Every postal center
    around the country could have been part of that deadly attack,
    and those workers continued to do their jobs.
        We are particularly proud of the efforts of our employees
    here in Washington. Their determination and performance is
    truly outstanding. It is heroic and represents the very best in
    public service. So my personal thanks and praise to each and
    every employee of the Washington, DC, post office.
        Let me now begin my presentation. We began with the initial
    management decisions of the Postal Service going back to
    October. When we became aware of the severity of the situation
    on October 21, we did close and secure the Brentwood facility.
    We relocated workers to surrounding facilities and we began the
    actions to sanitize the facility.
        Congresswoman, as you mentioned, it is important that we
    use the very best and brightest that are available, and we have
    worked with various other Federal agencies listed on the
    chart--Health and Human Services, both the CDC and NIOSH. We
    have worked with the local official in the D.C. Department of
    Health, EPA, OSHA, Department of Defense, and particularly
    AFRRI--Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute. So we
    have reached out to get the very best experts we can.
        In terms of communicating with both the public and our
    employees, again thanks to Councilmember Orange, we did have a
    ward 5 community meeting on March 27. We conducted five
    employee town hall meetings in May. We held a further community
    update on June 27. It is all part of our ongoing commitment to
    the partnerships and working with community employees' unions
    and the leadership teams, particularly the ones set up here in
    the District.
        Let me get into a summary of our anthrax response at
    Brentwood. It is a very big picture--I do not want to get into
    the details. Again, the first thing we did was to seal the
    building. During the process that has gone on in the last
    several months, we have cleaned known hot spots. We have gone
    in there and gotten to the very hottest spots where the
    contamination occurred and gotten them cleaned up.
        The other thing we did was to get materials out of the
    building--basic materials like mail; also the equipment that we
    could remove from the facility was removed, decontaminated, and
    in the case of things like trays that letters are sorted into,
    they were decontaminated and then destroyed.
        In the same timeframe, we have also been working with
    companies that have been under contract now to install the gas
    treatment equipment itself. The next step, of course, that has
    been ongoing is to get everyone trained for that process. We
    are now at the final step, as was announced yesterday, we are
    doing a limited test on Monday to test this process to assure
    that the equipment works properly and does what we expect. We
    believe that will go quite well.
        Assuming it does go well, we will move forward to do the
    full treatment of the facility--the injection or the
    introduction of the chlorine dioxide gas to the facility,
    assuring that is dispersed throughout the building, held at the
    right concentration, temperature and humidity levels, and held
    there for 12 hours. That is the gold standard that was
    established at Hart. We are following the same standard that
    was followed at the Hart Building.
        To be sure that process works as we intend, there is an
    extensive post-treatment testing procedure we will follow. This
    probably has been one of the critical issues we have worked
    with the local District officials on is to determine the extent
    of the testing that should be done in the facility, how many
    and where, to be sure that when the treatment is done, it has
    been effective.
        We have come up with a plan that we believe is
    scientifically valid and will truly indicate that the facility
    has been cleaned. To be clear, if those tests come back with
    anything other than 100 percent killed, then the fumigation
    will not be deemed effective and we will do it again.
        Also, to point out that after the gas is introduced to the
    building, the other part of the process after the 12-hour
    period is to withdraw the gas, scrub it or neutralize it so
    that what you are left with are harmless byproducts,
    essentially salt and water. When we do get that final
    certification from the D.C. health officials that the building
    is clean, we will then begin the process to get the Brentwood
    facility reactivated and back into use.
        What you see before you now is a floor plan of Brentwood.
    The red dots are where we have tested throughout the facility
    and found hot spots. Just to emphasize, we have focused on some
    of those key hot spots. One that I think many people are aware
    of is the machine, DBCS-17, that is a delivery bar code
    sorter----
        Ms. Norton. Could you define ``hot spots''? Does that mean
    anthrax is there?
        Mr. Day. Anthrax positive, yes.
        DBCS-17 was where the mail was first sorted. You can see
    the cluster of positives that came up there. And of course,
    this was government mail, so our government mail section in the
    building also had numerous hot spots. But you can see that they
    are dispersed throughout the facility--just to emphasize, that
    is the need to fumigate the entire facility. A critical aspect
    of this treatment is not just that we decontaminate the
    interior of the building, but that while this treatment process
    is going on, that we need to monitor the air outside the
    building to be assured that none of the chlorine dioxide gas is
    escaping.
        Now, not only are we doing the monitoring, but what has
    been a major activity that has gone on is the contractors have
    spent months sealing every potential escape point in the
    building. I will show you some pictures very quickly of what
    that means. Further, before we introduce actual chlorine
    dioxide, we are going to test that by injecting a neutral
    substance into the building to make sure nothing is escaping.
    But further, when the actual treatment is going on, we will do
    air monitoring.
        This chart you see depicts the radius around the building
    where we will do that. In addition as was done at the Hart
    Building, we will use what EPA calls the TAGA bus that will do
    mobile air monitoring around the facility. We have set an
    extremely low threshold, well below any level of harmful
    effect, that could potentially cause a problem. If we detect
    even at that very low threshold, we will shut down the process.
    We will do continuous air monitoring throughout the treatment.
        Again, let me just go through some pictures to give you
    some visual ideas on what is going on. This is the actual
    chlorine dioxide distribution system. This is actually
    Brentwood itself. It has been assembled on the south side. This
    is the equipment that is also, then, on the north side of the
    building. An idea of what we have done in the interim, early on
    in the process when we first closed down the building, we did
    it on very quick notice, obviously. There was a great deal of
    mail that was inside the facility.
        This is what was on the platform when we shut down the
    building. We have gotten the mail out of there, irradiated it,
    decontaminated it, as well as the equipment you see there. What
    you find now is that the platform is an open area. Two things--
    one, we have decontaminated all those things that were in
    there; and second, what it has done for us is it gives you a
    much more open area to fumigate.
        Also what has gone on, when I talked earlier about the hot
    spots where the anthrax was found, this is the kind of spot
    cleanup that we have conducted on the individual pieces of
    automated equipment. We get right into the machine itself. It
    is not just a surface cleaning of the exterior.
        In sealing the building, what this picture shows you, where
    you have got different things that enter in--pipes, electrical,
    plumbing, whatever around it--the image on the right shows you
    that even within electrical conduit, you go inside there and
    seal that up. You can understand, however, that this is a
    complex process to seal the building. This is a depiction of
    all the skylights that are on the roof. We have also had to
    seal doors, windows, and the platform docks.
        In terms of other cleanup, we have gotten into the ceilings
    and rafters to clean those up with spot cleanup. On a daily
    basis to assure everyone that as these workers to in and do
    this cleanup, there is a control zone where they enter through
    and before they come back out of the building, they go through
    a decontamination area. This is a process that takes place
    virtually on a daily basis.
        The bottom line, and to summarize ongoing actions of the
    Postal Service, we are introducing other safeguards to our
    entire system. Two basic things we are doing is that we are
    working to validate a bio-detection system--a test that is
    going on right now in Baltimore. Our intent is that system,
    when validated, and it looks very good that it will be, that we
    will deploy that nationwide and it will be capable of examining
    a full range of biological threats, and then the other thing we
    will do is vacuuming and filtration systems to protect out
    employees.
        We have decontaminated the mail from both Trenton and
    Brentwood with irradiation. We have worked on emergency
    response plans. The bottom line is we have gotten back to the
    process of getting mailed delivered on a daily basis and doing
    it quite effectively. We want to open the Brentwood facility as
    soon as possible, but we will only do it when we are absolutely
    sure that it is safe and we are ready to go back in there.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Day.
        Mr. Ted Gordon--Dr. Gordon I guess it is--senior deputy
    director of public health assurance, D.C. Department of Health.
        Mr. Gordon. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton.
        I am Theodore Gordon, senior deputy director for public
    health assurance for the District of Columbia Department of
    Health. I am representing Mr. James A. Buford, the acting
    director of the department who is unable to be here today. I am
    also joined by Dr. Vincent Nathan, the assistant deputy
    director for environmental health science, the Environmental
    Health Administration.
        I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present
    testimony to the subcommittee this morning on the department's
    role and its responsibilities in an effort to decontaminate and
    reopen the Brentwood Road mail processing and distribution
    facility located at 900 Brentwood Road, NE, in the District of
    Columbia.
        Last year between October 19 and October 21, four workers
    at the Brentwood facility were hospitalized with inhalation
    anthrax. Two of those workers subsequently died. It is a tragic
    loss to the District of Columbia, and our most sincere
    condolences go out to the families of the victims.
        The U.S. Postal Service and the Department of Health's
    investigations have thus far determined that the letter
    delivered to the Hart Senate Office Building from the Brentwood
    Road postal facility contained bacillus anthracis spores, thus
    contaminating both buildings. As a result, the Brentwood
    facility was closed on October 21, 2001.
        It has become necessary to decontaminate the facility,
    particularly if the facility is to reopen. The Environmental
    Health Administration is responsible for identifying and
    assessing environmental issues and problems, particularly those
    linked to disease, dysfunction and premature deaths. In the
    decontamination of Brentwood postal facility, the Environmental
    Health Administration is primarily responsible for regulatory
    oversight and protecting the health and safety of the
    community.
        The U.S. Postal Service is using chlorine dioxide
    fumigation to decontaminate the Brentwood facility, as was used
    to decontaminate the Hart Senate Office Building. However, this
    is the largest chlorine dioxide fumigation ever undertaken in
    the United States and possibly the world. The processing has
    three steps--one, pre-fumigation planning; two, chlorine
    dioxide fumigation; and three, post-fumigation cleaning and
    reoccupancy.
        To ensure that the District's oversight and monitoring of
    this effort is carried our successfully, the mayor has
    assembled the Brentwood Scientific Advisory Panel charged with
    responsibility for reviewing all documents related to the
    decontamination activities at the site, and to include the
    following--assisting in the development of public information
    fact sheets and media releases; sampling protocols, air
    sampling protocols; waste disposal plans; final clearance
    determinations; reopening determination; and final reports.
        The panel includes distinguished scientists in the field of
    microbiology, engineering, medicine, epidemiology, chemistry,
    toxicology and environmental health; and also members of the
    postal union and ward 5 community, Councilmember Vincent
    Orange, which encompasses the Brentwood facility.
        We have participated in several community meetings to keep
    residents informed of the status of the decontamination
    process. There is nothing more important to the department than
    to protect the health of the District residents. The top
    technical issues of concern to the Department of Health has
    been from the beginning, one, protecting the community through
    the containment of chlorine dioxide gas; two, anthrax
    decontamination effectiveness; three, anthrax wall cavity
    sampling; four, proper chlorine dioxide dose; five, post-
    fumigation anthrax sampling protocols; and six, shut-down
    authority and reoccupancy clearance.
        In this regard, the Department of Health has reviewed,
    along with the National Institutes for Occupational Safety and
    Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the
    Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration, and the Armed Forces Radiobiology
    Research Institute, all results from the sampling and analysis
    plan, the wall cavity sampling and demonstration plan, the
    ambient air monitoring plan, the site-specific health and
    safety plan, the line 17 fumigation remedial action plan, and
    the negative pressure testing plan.
        The Department of Health continues to review all plans
    presented to us to provide advice to the U.S. Public Health
    Service on sound public health science. The Department of
    Health has reviewed and advised the U.S. Public Health Service
    on the dispersion modeling plan for the facility and has issued
    several permits for testing and operation of boilers, air-
    handling units, and negative air pressure systems.
        The Department of Health will be onsite during all phases
    of the process, which will include the presence of EPA's TAGA
    bus, which will be on the mobile or monitoring unit. The U.S.
    Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health
    have consulted on the issuance of a Federal crisis exemption
    permit for the use of chlorine dioxide gas for the fumigation.
    The District has issued individual licenses to all onsite
    applicators who will be handling the gas.
        Finally, the Department of Health co-chairs, along with the
    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, the
    Environmental Clearance Committee. The Environmental Clearance
    Committee is an independent coordinated group of scientists
    with expertise in disciplines relevant to the assessment and
    cleanup of the facility, but independent of the U.S. Postal
    Service.
        It serves as the committee charged with evaluating the
    effectiveness of the facility decontamination, post-fumigation
    measures, and the group will then make a recommendation on the
    appropriateness of reopening the facility. I might add,
    Councilmember Vincent Orange will serve on the clearance
    committee, as well as the two representatives from the postal
    unions who represent the postal workers.
        That concludes my testimony. Congresswoman Norton, I am
    prepared to answer any questions you may have concerning the
    work of the department on behalf of the Department of Health.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you, Dr. Gordon.
        Dr. Rosemary Sokas, associate director for science,
    National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health at CDC.
        Dr. Sokas. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman and members of
    the subcommittee. I want to just start off by saying that NIOSH
    is part of CDC. We deal with worker safety and health. I am
    also happy to say that we have Dr. Brad Perkins here, who is
    from Atlanta; chief, as you know, of the special pathogens
    branch in the CDC's National Center for Infectious Diseases.
        On behalf of the CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substances
    and Disease Registry, I am pleased to describer out role in
    cleanup and safety-related activities at the Brentwood Mail
    Processing and Distribution Center in Washington, DC. The CDC
    and ATSDR are a part of the Department of Health and Human
    Services.
        It is out mission to protect the public's health by
    preventing and controlling injuries, illnesses and
    disabilities, including those that occur from the deliberate
    release of biological agents. Today, I will review CDC and
    ATSDR's response activities at the Brentwood facility following
    last year's anthrax attacks, describe our role in the cleanup
    work being conducted at Brentwood, and discuss safety issues
    involved with the decontamination and reopening of the
    building.
        Among the many responsibilities following the anthrax
    attacks of last fall, CDC and ATSDR have been working closely
    with our Federal, State and local public health partners toward
    the goal of successfully remediating the buildings contaminated
    by the anthrax spores. Our recommendations have been widely
    disseminated to Federal, State and local health and
    environmental agencies and are available at CDC's bioterrorism
    Web site. Our review of the lessons learned from these
    activities is ongoing and will be used to update our
    recommendations for responding to anthrax contamination.
        Of the buildings contaminated from the anthrax attacks last
    fall, the Brentwood facility was the most severely affected. As
    you all know, during October 19 through 21, four postal workers
    from Brentwood were hospitalized with inhalational anthrax, and
    two of these patients died as a result of their exposure. What
    became all too clear was that the letters containing anthrax
    spores which were sent to Senators Daschle and Leahy in the
    Hart Senate Office Building had also contaminated the Brentwood
    facility, which processed mail addressed to zip codes in the
    Washington, DC, area.
        The anthrax-contaminated letters passed through the
    Brentwood facility on the morning of Friday, October 12, 2001.
    The Brentwood facility was closed Sunday, October 21, when the
    first diagnosis of inhalational anthrax in a Brentwood employee
    was made. Beginning Monday, October 22, investigators from CDC,
    the U.S. Postal Service and a postal service contractor began
    evaluating the extent of anthrax contamination there.
        This first investigation showed widespread contamination
    inside the facility, particularly around delivery bar code
    sorter No. 17, which you have already heard. That was the one
    that had processed the spore-containing letters. It also showed
    heavy contamination as you saw on the graph in the government
    mail area.
        During subsequent investigations, CDC, ATSDR, the Postal
    Service and a postal service contractor conducted additional
    surface samplings in the facility to thoroughly characterize
    the distribution of the anthrax spores throughout the facility,
    including areas where workers did not become ill and including
    the building ventilation system. The broader goals of this
    effort were to compare and evaluate the different methods of
    collecting the surface samples and for analyzing those samples
    and to evaluate the effectiveness of cleanup efforts to remove
    spores from the known contaminated surfaces.
        The results of this investigation were shared with the
    workers from the Brentwood facility with Postal Service
    management, the postal worker unions and the District of
    Columbia Department of Health. This information has been
    presented in scientific conferences and incorporated into our
    recommendations, improving our national capacity for present
    and future responses to anthrax.
        Since the completion of that investigation, CDC and ATSDR
    scientists have been working with experts from EPA, the D.C.
    Department of Health, the Postal Service, the Department of
    Defense and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
    to review and provide input into the draft cleanup plans. The
    goal is to provide the Postal Service and the Brentwood
    incident commander and his team of consultants with the advice
    they need to ensure that the cleanup plans incorporate the best
    available protection for each worker and for each member of the
    community. These plans address issues such as the strategies
    for environmental remediation of the facility, the type of
    environmental sampling needed to evaluate the effectiveness of
    remediation, and measures to ensure that workers and the
    general public are protected during cleanup operations.
        In addition, we currently are in discussion with the Postal
    Service about the quality assurance role we will play in
    conducting laboratory analysis of post-cleanup environmental
    samples collected from the Brentwood facility. The D.C.
    Department of Health and EPA are leading a multi-agency panel
    that will review the post-cleanup sampling data from Brentwood
    and advise when it is appropriate to reoccupy the building and
    return it to normal service.
        We participate in this panel. To best protect the workers
    who will reoccupy the facility, decisions need to be based on
    the highest quality data that reflect site-specific findings,
    using the best and most current science and sampling methods.
    That sampling must be thoroughly and rigorously conducted and
    techniques used for sample collection and for cleanup should be
    those shown to be valid and effective. As with the Hart
    Building cleanup, the standard for determining that the
    building is clean should be that samples collected after
    cleanup showed zero detectable anthrax spores.
        As with any other public health problem, it is the goal of
    the CDC to use the best science and technology available to
    minimize the risk of illness and disease to the greatest extent
    possible. It is not possible to eliminate risk entirely or to
    guarantee that a building is absolutely free of risk. But as
    with the successful reoccupancy of the Hart Building, we
    believe that a science-based process can allow workers to
    safely return to Brentwood and normal service to the building
    to safely resume.
        CDC is working with the local health department to take
    other steps at the Brentwood facility such as investigating
    deaths that have occurred over the past 9 months among Postal
    Service employees to determine if there have been more deaths
    than usual or any suspicious deaths that might be related to
    anthrax. Our investigations have not found any factors
    different from what would be expected during a typical year. We
    plan to issue an updated version of this report in the next
    several weeks.
        Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions that
    you have.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Sokas follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Dr. Sokas.
        Administrator Thomas Voltaggio, Environmental Protection
    Agency, Region III.
        Mr. Voltaggio. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton.
        I am Thomas Voltaggio. I am the deputy regional
    administrator of the mid-Atlantic regional office of EPA. I
    also have been the senior regional manager of the EPA workers
    who had decontaminated the Hart Senate Office Building. I spent
    roughly 3 or 4 days a week for about 3 months there,
    implementing what I am gratified to learn has been called the
    ``gold standard.''
        With me is Marcus Aquino, who is our EPA regional onsite
    coordinator at the Brentwood site. We are happy to be here. In
    today's testimony, I will outline EPA's role in the Brentwood
    cleanup operations. I will provide a short description of the
    current activities at Brentwood.
        EPA's responsibilities can be divided into four categories:
    one, an independent authority that is responsible for
    protection of human health and the environment outside the
    facility; No. 2, regulator of chemicals used to kill anthrax
    spores; No. 3, a technical adviser to the U.S. Postal Service
    for the remediation inside the building; and fourth, the
    Federal entity that has the authority and resources to step in
    at any time that the neighborhood is threatened.
        EPA is the national organization whose primary mission is
    the protection of human health and the environment. We are
    responsible, often in partnership with our State counterparts
    and the District in this case, for protecting the air, water
    and the lands. Although the anthrax contamination at the
    Brentwood postal facility is currently well-contained, we
    continue to monitor the situation there closely to ensure that
    the neighborhood is safe.
        That means we are paying close attention to the proposed
    cleanup remedy in the building, while at the same time we are
    making sure the chemicals that are used to destroy the anthrax
    spores are handled properly, and any waste products produced
    during the cleanup operations are disposed of properly.
        All pesticides used in the United States must be registered
    with EPA. We make sure that the products work effectively and
    when properly used pose no undue risk. Not surprisingly, here
    are no chemicals that have been registered to treat anthrax
    spores. Anyone that needs to clean an anthrax-contaminated site
    must get what is known as a crisis exemption from EPA. As an
    example, a crisis exemption was issued to use chlorine dioxide
    gas to fumigate the Daschle office suite in the Hart Senate
    Office Building. The Postal Service owns the Brentwood
    facility, and it is in charge of the anthrax remediation there.
        That means that aside from the regulatory function I just
    outlined, EPA's role inside the fence line is to provide expert
    advice on the many technical issues involved in the cleanup. If
    at any time, however, EPA believes that there is an immediate
    public health or environmental threat that is not being
    appropriately handled by the Postal Service, then we can employ
    our powers as described in the national contingency plan to
    abate any such threat.
        EPA has provided technical consultation about anthrax
    decontamination at the request of several Federal agencies
    ranging from GSA to the State Department, and privately owned
    facilities from Florida to New York, as well as the Postal
    Service facilities in seven States and the District. The
    largest anthrax cleanup has been on Capitol Hill, where the
    contaminated letters that went through Brentwood were directed.
        The cleanup of the Hart Senate Office Building posed the
    largest anthrax cleanup challenge ever undertaken in a building
    thus far. Fumigations with chlorine dioxide gas were conducted
    on December 1 and December 30, 2001. More than 3,000 test
    samples taken after the cleanup showed no remaining viable
    anthrax. On January 22, the Hart Building was reopened.
    Hundreds of employees and thousands of visitors have safely
    used the facility since then, and no one has become ill from
    any anthrax-related exposure.
        It was at the trailer at the closed Brentwood plant that
    EPA scientists demonstrated last fall that chlorine dioxide gas
    would kill weapons-grade anthrax. Chlorine dioxide is a common
    disinfectant. It is used in the water spray that moistens
    fruits and vegetables on grocery shelves. It kills germs on
    contact, yet leaves no hazardous residue. Chlorine dioxide is
    the primary disinfectant used to purify water in cities like
    Los Angeles. It was used at the Hart Senate Office Building and
    is about to be used at Brentwood.
        Last October, EPA Federal on-scene coordinator Marcus
    Aquino was dispatched to Brentwood from our regional emergency
    operations center in Philadelphia. Over the past 9 months, Mr.
    Aquino has been giving advice on subjects ranging from sampling
    methods, various cleanup technologies and their effectiveness,
    ways to ensure the building was properly sealed to prevent the
    escape of anthrax spores, and safety protocols for hazardous
    materials cleanup personnel. As an on-scene coordinator, Mr.
    Aquino is highly trained in hazardous materials cleanup
    procedures.
        Even more importantly, however, he has the full resources
    of the EPA and the entire national response team behind him.
    That means that all the expertise and invaluable experience of
    all the groups associated with the national anthrax cleanup
    efforts are contributing to the Brentwood effort.
        At Brentwood, EPA has issued a crisis exemption to use
    chlorine dioxide gas to conduct a test fumigation of lockers in
    the trailer. A second exemption has just been approved to
    fumigate delivery bar code sorters 16 to 18, better known as
    line 17, which are the most highly contaminated mail sorting
    machines.
        A third crisis exemption request will be needed before they
    fumigate the entire building with chlorine dioxide. For the
    fumigation of line 17, EPA brought together a group of experts
    from the relevant Federal health research and regulatory
    agencies to review the plan which led to a number of revisions.
    This group will also review the results of the fumigation of
    line 17 prior to the fumigation of the entire building.
        During the fumigations of the Brentwood facility, EPA is
    bringing its state-of-the-art mobile air monitoring equipment
    to the site. The TAGA bus, which is the trace atmospheric gas
    analyzer bus, will drive around the building during the
    fumigation, sniffing out any chlorine dioxide in the unlikely
    event that some might escape from the building.
        If as little as 25 ppb--that is ``b'' for billion--are
    detected, an investigation will immediately be triggered. If it
    rises to 100 ppb, the fumigation effort would be shut down.
    This is the same conservative level that is used to protect
    people who work with chlorine dioxide routinely, one that is
    considered safe, and that was used at the Hart Senate Office
    Building.
        EPA and the D.C. Department of Health have established the
    Brentwood Environmental Clearance Committee, an independent
    group of scientists who will review the results of all the
    fumigations. This group will make recommendations on whether
    the facility should be cleared for reoccupancy by postal
    workers. The first meeting is set for next month.
        In conclusion, EPA believes that the Brentwood cleanup
    effort is moving in the right direction. We will continue to
    provide technical assistance to the Postal Service, but
    ultimately we recognize that the health and safety of the
    citizens who live in the Brentwood neighborhood are our
    responsibility. I want to ensure the subcommittee, and most
    importantly the people who live in the community, that EPA will
    continue to provide vigilant oversight of the cleanup
    operations. Your health and safety are our primary
    considerations.
        I would also like to again acknowledge the work of the
    other organizations that are involved in the cleanup effort--
    the Postal Service, the District of Columbia's Department of
    Health and its emergency management agency, the national health
    agencies, especially CDC. They deserve special praise.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I will be happy
    to answer any questions at the appropriate time.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Voltaggio follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you Mr. Voltaggio.
        Councilman Orange, you were not here when I swore in the
    witnesses. I must ask you to stand therefore to be sworn in.
        [Witness sworn.]
        Ms. Norton. Thank you. Let the record show that Mr. Orange
    answered the question in the affirmative. You may be seated. We
    will be pleased to hear your testimony at this time.
        Mr. Orange. Thank you very much.
        Good morning, Congresswoman Norton and distinguished
    members of the subcommittee. I am Vincent Bernard Orange, Sr.,
    the District of Columbia councilmember representing ward 5. I
    am also the chairman of the D.C. Committee on Government
    Operations.
        I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to
    comment on the Brentwood Road mail handling and processing
    facility cleanup. As you know, this cleanup represents the
    largest chlorine dioxide fumigation ever undertaken in the
    United States and perhaps the world. Thus, as you might
    imagine, the residents and businesses of ward 5 where the
    Brentwood facility is located and I are extremely concerned
    about this operation.
        We believe that the ultimate goal is the safety of the
    residents and the employees of the facility and the full
    disclosure as to all phases of the cleanup operation. This goal
    was articulated loud and clear on March 27, 2002 at the first
    town hall meeting hosted by me with respect to the cleanup.
    Over 800 people were in attendance.
        The consensus of the meeting was that the safety of the
    residents and the employees of the Brentwood facility was first
    and foremost. The residents expressed skepticism with the
    Federal Government in their overall approach to the cleanup and
    the accurate disclosure of information.
        We certainly have tried to create a sense of trust and
    cooperation with the Federal Government, in particular the U.S.
    Postal Service who is in charge of this operation. We also
    recognize, however, that the U.S. Postal Service authority is
    not absolute. It has checks and balances and can be overridden
    by the Environmental Protection Agency if certain conditions
    were to exist. On June 27, the U.S. Postal Service held a town
    hall meeting to respond to community concerns and to present an
    overview of their plan of operation. We appreciate the efforts
    that have been made to date.
        However, we are here today to demand strict adherence to
    the 72-hour notification to the public on any test runs of
    fumigation and actual fumigation of the 17.5 cubic feet
    facility in our community. Many residents have made it clear
    that they do not wish to be present in the ward or the District
    of Columbia during the cleanup operation. We would also like to
    know the inventory of chemicals presently located in the ward
    for the operation.
        It is our understanding that the chemicals will be mixed to
    form chlorine dioxide gas to be pumped into the Brentwood post
    office for the decontamination process. The question is, how
    much chlorine dioxide will be onsite? Will it be in excess of
    the 20,000 tons as reported in the Washington Post, or the
    2,000 pounds that has been reported over the past few weeks?
    Are these chemicals being brought into the ward under D.C.
    police and Federal police protection?
        We are told that the current cleanup plan calls for no
    evacuation. What is the contingency plan for evacuation? The
    perimeter for the cleanup is .16 miles. Thus, Home Depot,
    McDonald's, BET, etc., can still operate and street traffic can
    still flow during the cleanup.
        However, if it is determined that the chlorine dioxide
    fumigations is escaping the Brentwood facility, how will the
    businesses, customers and residents be notified in a timely
    fashion? Also, Ted Gordon, who is the senior director for the
    Department of Health, made a good point yesterday. From the
    perspective of the Department of Health and from the sciences,
    it is clearly determined that the operation that has been put
    in place is sufficient.
        But when you look at it from a community perspective and
    you look at it from a public safety perspective, we need to
    ascertain whether or not Brentwood Road should be shut down
    during the actual fumigation process.
        Clearly, the operation as I understand it would probably
    take no more than 24 hours if everything was to go properly, so
    a 24-hour shut-down of Brentwood Road just to make sure that we
    do not have customers in the area if anything goes wrong, that
    we will not have to deal with all the traffic that is coming
    off of New York Avenue or Rhode Island Avenue into that
    particular area. So that would be strictly from a public safety
    community perspective, but I understand from the Department of
    Health and from the science perspective that the plan that has
    been placed on the table is sufficient as well.
        We have been informed that a chlorine dioxide fumigation to
    decontaminate line 17 where the two postal workers who lost
    their lives worked will take place on Monday, July 29. How will
    the results be analyzed? By whom? And when will the results of
    the test run be reported to the public?
        The reporting of the success or failure of this test must
    be in advance of the actual full-scale chlorine dioxide
    fumigation process. We have been told that it may take 5 to 7
    days to actually get the results back. It may take another 2
    weeks to actually analyze those results.
        So looking at that timeframe, we could possibly be into the
    end of August, early September before actual fumigation
    process, and clearly I would think that would be unacceptable
    because now we are into the school year, and to more
    individuals actually being in the community. There is a school
    right down the street at Brentwood Elementary School, where
    noise and school is also utilizing that facility as well.
        So we are hopeful that we will be able to speed up the
    analysis of the test on Monday, and get those results back a
    lot sooner and be able to actually start this process somewhere
    in the middle of August, so we could have this all put to bed
    by September.
        Finally, information is needed on public information fact
    sheets, daily updates and media releases, radio-broadcast
    media. Where will the public information center be located?
    When will the daily updates take place? Is there a Web site for
    immediate updates? Is there an 800 number to call for
    emergencies? All this information I believe is in place, but it
    needs to be broadcast widely so everyone is aware that this is
    how they can make contact with this particular operation.
        I believe I have provided enough insight into the thinking
    of the ward 5 community, the local elected D.C. officials, and
    the city as a whole on the subject matter for this subcommittee
    to take the lead in ensuring the safety and integrity of the
    cleanup process. The old saying that anything that can go
    wrong, will go wrong--are we prepared? At what confidence level
    can the Federal Government answer this question--are we
    prepared? Are adequate contingency plans in place?
        I end my testimony by praying that God leads us and guides
    us through this process without harm to our residents,
    businesses, community and the many workers on this cleanup
    process.
        Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to
    testify before this subcommittee this morning.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Orange follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Councilmember Orange.
        I want to proceed with questions. I am compelled to proceed
    from the remaining, the leftover concerns about health before
    we get to the new concerns that are arising with respect to
    decontamination and to health inside the community. I should
    preface this by saying I have absolutely no compunctions about
    going in Hart. I do not even think about it any longer.
        So I have to say that going into a building as I do
    regularly that was a building where the deadly envelope was
    opened, has not bothered me. I have confidence in what was
    done--so much confidence that I do not think that those--not
    only do I not think about it when I go into Hart, which is
    fairly often, but I think that those who go in Hart each and
    every day no longer think about it. That gives me some
    confidence that we can put this behind us.
        But there is a great difference between Hart and Brentwood.
    Nobody lost his or her life at Hart. Nobody has complained of
    being ill in Hart--at least not that I know of and not that
    anyone in the Congress has been informed of.
        But not long ago, indeed this very month, people woke up to
    read in the paper an article concerning continuing effects from
    Brentwood that I must say surprised me, particularly given what
    I have just told you about Hart. Essentially what this article
    says, and one of the reasons I wanted this hearing to be held,
    is that people cannot rely upon what they read in the newspaper
    for their health. This is an official hearing where we are
    trying to find out what exactly we know and what can be done
    about it.
        Here comes an article in the Washington Times on July 19--
    ``Anthrax Ailments Linger in Some, Recovery Could Require
    Years.'' Dr. Sokas, you have testified about the toxicity. I
    think that was a very wise thing to do. You all clearly are to
    some degree following these workers trying to respond to
    concerns.
        But here is a newspaper article where the quotes are from
    doctors who have--and here I am going to use some of the
    language from the article--they have documented the symptoms in
    a postal inspector from the Brentwood facility in northeast who
    handled anthrax spores mailed to Members of Congress in
    October. However, blood tests on the man failed to detect
    anthrax.
        Now we learn, again in this article--I want to hear from
    the experts--we learn that 60 people seen at Sinai Hospital who
    were in the Brentwood facility, who processed mail there or
    worked there, that at least six of them showed some signs of
    illness. These are reports from their doctors, and their
    doctors are listed here. Again, the Sinai Hospital doctors
    found, and here I am quoting from the article, ``previously
    unreported symptoms of fluid buildup around the heart, hormone
    shifts'' and so forth.
        The reason I think we are taking this seriously is we
    really do not know enough about anthrax. Clearly, from what we
    have learned, I think, unless I hear differently from you, to
    be terribly definitive about this substance. One doctor says,
    basically, I have got one patient who is sick and we cannot
    explain why he is sick.
        Then, of course, a large proportion of folks believe they
    are suffering from the effects of anthrax. The fact is that I
    recognize that when there has been a major problem in a
    facility there will be people who believe no matter what you
    tell them that it really had to have been that. That is why I
    am going to ask you the following. Leave aside the people who
    cannot be convinced.
        The fact is that the average person it seems to me can be
    convinced by scientific studies and the scientific method
    lives. I certainly am a subscriber to the scientific method. I
    do not believe in conspiracies. I believe that conspiracy
    theories will drive people out of this wonderful community. I
    believe one does a disservice if one spreads rumors that I know
    they must--do not believe what they tell you.
        But I also know that there is no way to counter this kind
    of rumor and conjecture except by coming forward with
    definitive information so far as you have it, that people can
    look to as a basis for comparison. When you find that your next
    door neighbor is having symptoms that the doctor says you never
    had before, even though you had regular checkups, and you were
    in Brentwood, then you are going to believe your next door
    neighbor and his doctor, rather than the generic assurances
    from the experts and from the Postal Service that things are
    going to be all right.
        That is why I am asking you if--and her I suppose this is
    directed to Dr. Sokas--if you would be willing to do an
    epidemiological study that would take this population of
    workers and residents who entered the facility and live near
    the city, and compare them to a comparable group of workers in
    a post office environment and residents who use that post
    office, as one way, and I am open to your suggestions as to
    other ways, and this is certainly consistent with the
    scientific method as I know it, as one way to reassure
    residents; or in the alternative, if we find differences, to
    lead us to new studies so that we can protect the health of
    these workers and these residents.
        Dr. Sokas. Congresswoman Norton, we can today assure you
    that we will discuss this with the director of CDC and respond
    to you in a more complete fashion. I believe we have already in
    place enough infrastructure to allow the kind of a study that
    you are describing to happen to take place without much
    difficulty.
        But obviously, we would have to pull together the experts
    from the National Center for Infectious Diseases, as well as
    from the leadership of CDC. I would ask your staff to let us
    know who you would like to be involved with the discussion of
    that kind of work, and certainly we would bring in the other
    agencies, as well as unions, who would be involved. But we will
    commit to developing a proposal and then sharing it.
        Ms. Norton. I very much appreciate that. I would ask the
    chair when she and I can get together to have a preliminary
    meeting with the appropriate actors so that the kind of study
    that I think this kind of event deserves can be done. Of
    course, I ask it in light of the fact that we know still so
    little about anthrax, that to say that there will be no after
    effects is perhaps to say what we cannot stand behind.
        Dr. Sokas. Right. Congresswoman, I would like to say that
    in addition to the head of CDC, obviously the Secretary for
    Health and Human Services would be involved with the decision
    on how that should proceed. I also would like to say that again
    we clearly did not know what we did not know last October, and
    that is the cardinal sin that resulted in tragic deaths. And so
    we are very careful about what we say now in the future.
        We did learn, however, that every piece of information that
    came in over the fall taught us that what was different about
    this was the behavior of the spores; that they had clearly been
    treated; that they clearly were much more readily dispersed
    into the air than the naturally occurring spores that had been
    studied for years.
        Ms. Norton. Well, just a followup on that, the notion of
    what kind of hypotheses to develop is going to be very
    important. The fact is if somebody sends something through the
    mail, it apparently did not occur to the CDC that they were
    sending cow spores. I mean, they were sending military-grade
    spores. They meant to do harm. And if you had in fact
    hypothesized that these were military-grade, then of course you
    might have looked at Brentwood and not simply opened it,
    because then of course the notion of its dispersing would have
    been more apparent.
        I have the greatest respect for CDC for your own work, Dr.
    Sokas, and for American science, frankly. It is because I so
    believe in science that I would like the best science to be
    developed here so that residents can have the state-of-the-art
    science. Look, if there is stuff that nobody knew, we are not
    God.
        But to the extent that mortals can in fact assure us that
    those who have been exposed are not in danger, then people will
    come back into this facility in a way that people may be
    reluctant to do now. I mean, members of the community, you
    might imagine--I speak about Hart, but Hart was not closed for
    almost a year.
        Members of the community see this as a kind of giant tomb,
    and you wonder if you want to walk into that place which was so
    much larger than Hart, and for which there is no precedent for
    cleanup. Again, I think this can be overcome, but I think we
    have to go the extra mile and be terribly proactive in trying
    to do so.
        I would like to ask about time. I am not a critic of the
    fact that it has taken too long. I do not think people would
    have wanted to go in very soon anyway. So I do not say, why
    don't you do it fast. In fact, I say do it slow, just do it
    right.
        But I think we have--we need some sense of what, at least
    roughly, a time line would be, assuming a go on the
    decontamination test you are about to do. How long after that
    go would we get to total decontamination? And according to what
    you know now, how long would decontamination take? Bear in
    mind, Mr. Voltaggio, that even at Hart, because you had never
    done this before, you had to do it more than once because you
    went in and you found that in fact there was still some
    contamination there.
        So I can only ask for your best sense at this time, and I
    understand that nobody can hold you to what no human being
    knows at this time, but I think we have a right to know. Do we
    imagine that this facility will open, for example, in the year
    2003 at all? Are we in for some terribly long-term matter where
    Councilmember Orange has to prepare his community for a long
    period of time to wait and therefore perhaps to have the
    experts come back time and again? What is your best sense of
    the steps and how long the steps will take? Is this Dr. Gordon
    or Mr. Day? I do not know which of you have the best sense of
    that.
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, I can at least start with the
    answer. I would agree with you to say up front that we are
    willing to sacrifice time in order to do this not only safely,
    but with full coordination and notification not only amongst
    agencies, but with the public as well. The tests that will take
    place on Monday really defines how quickly we move forward.
    Let's be optimistic.
        We think everything that we have done to get ready for that
    test that it will be successful, as quickly, and I would agree
    with Councilman Orange, anything we can do to expedite the
    return of those results and the analysis of the results we
    certainly are interested in doing.
        I believe, again assuming success of that test, that we are
    within weeks of being able to do the first full fumigation of
    the building. Now, it is 17 million cubic feet. The caution I
    would say, as occurred in the Hart Building on a smaller scale,
    I do not think we can necessarily assume that the very first
    time we attempt that fumigation that we absolutely with
    certainty can say that is it, we will just have to do it once.
    So the fact that we can begin it in weeks hopefully does not
    necessarily mean it is then finished very quickly.
        Even when the fumigation is completed, it will then--let me
    go back a step because the intervening step between successful
    results from next week's test and beginning the fumigation
    process, again hopefully weeks, are two key issues.
        One, we are committed to do a community meeting before we
    conduct a fumigation, to once and for all clearly outline the
    procedures in terms of any notification that would be required,
    what are the emergency procedures--make clear to the public and
    answer any final questions, and then as agreed, do the final
    72-hour notice before the fumigation would begin. So those are
    other steps that would precede the actual fumigation. Then
    there is the treatment, or the testing that we would have to
    wait for results.
        Finally, I would say in terms of when the building actually
    opens, when we reach that point in time, and I am being a bit
    optimistic, but if we get that done in September and we get the
    clean bill of health, say, by the end of September, early
    October, from the D.C. Department of Health, when we get that,
    that actually then begins the time clock to get the building
    ready to be occupied.
        The fact that it is decontaminated of anthrax does not mean
    we just open the doors. Our plan is to do a full and complete
    renovation. We are going to refurbish offices, carpets,
    furniture, painting, cleanup, venting out the building. We want
    to do that so that when our employees come back to work, and we
    think that will take a couple of months to do it properly, we
    not only can tell you that the building is clean of anthrax and
    been safely decontaminated, but the building really provides
    the work environment that they deserve.
        So even the effective cleanup, when certified by D.C.
    Department of Health officials, there will still be several
    months of renovation that we want to do to get that building in
    the best possible shape.
        Ms. Norton. Mr. Day, while you have the mic, could I ask
    you where have all the workers gone? [Laughter.]
        I would like to know where the workers--first of all, I
    would like to know the number of workers that were there. Where
    are they now? Will all of them be coming back? Will you have
    difficulties attracting workers back? Have you been working
    with the union on a transition to get actual people back in
    that facility?
        Mr. Day. Let me take it in parts. Congresswoman, I can give
    you some very specific numbers and I do not know them off the
    top of my head. On rough order of magnitude, we are talking
    approximately 2,500 people. I can get you more specific numbers
    exactly. They are represented by different unions, so I could
    give you that breakdown as well.
        In terms of where they are, they are working in both the
    stations and branches of the District itself, but the
    processing employees for the most part have gone out to other
    processing centers in the D.C. metropolitan area.
        What we had to do when we shut down the Brentwood facility
    was to re-disperse all of that mail to other centers to
    process. And again, as I was thanking and praising employees, I
    think the amazing story to this is they have gone out, and that
    is obviously a great inconvenience, they have got to go to
    other facilities other than where they normally worked. They
    are working there. They are processing the mail. Quite
    honestly, the capital area was recognized as the best service
    performance in the country.
        So our employees have done an amazing job in a very
    difficult environment. So they are spread around six other
    major processing centers, but again I can give you very
    specific numbers if you would like that.
        Ms. Norton. I wish you would, within 30 days, for the
    record.
        Mr. Day. We can followup.
        Ms. Norton. Is this the largest facility, I know in this
    region, but is it the largest facility in the country?
        Mr. Day. No, ma'am, it is not.
        Ms. Norton. It is not. All right.
        Let me ask about this parameter. When you say things like
    25 ppb and 15 ppb--these sound like enormous disparities, so
    that it is hard for the public to understand whether that is
    good or bad, frankly. I would like to know how you decided on
    what the parameter would be? What happens if some of the gas
    escapes? What effect do you think that would have, given the
    precautions that have been taken?
        I am also interested in the cleaning of the machinery. Do
    you do that with gas or does somebody scrub down the machinery?
    Given the fact that these postal workers were exposed
    apparently from the machinery, the machinery turns out to be
    probably the culprit. I am very interested in that. I wish
    whoever feels best able would tackle those set of questions.
        Mr. Gordon. Congresswoman Norton, the Department of Health,
    along with the Postal Service and EPA, conducted mathematical
    models on the Brentwood facility, taking into consideration the
    worst-case scenario of a major release of gas out of that
    building, and establishing the perimeter of .16 miles. Now, we
    have also taken into consideration----
        Ms. Norton. Excuse me, Dr. Gordon, have you recommended
    that this be done at a certain time of the day or evening?
        Mr. Gordon. We would recommend it be started early in the
    morning throughout the entire day.
        Ms. Norton. On a weekday?
        Mr. Gordon. Our preference would be on the weekend. That is
    a discussion point that we are having.
        Ms. Norton. Does it matter that there is a Home Depot and
    other facilities nearby?
        Mr. Gordon. From a public health science standpoint, we do
    not think that the risk is that great. As in the situation with
    the Hart Building, we did not evacuate businesses. We did not
    evacuate residents.
        Ms. Norton. You did not. This is important to note, because
    if you want to find out how to do it, listen to what they did
    when senators were involved. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Gordon. That is correct.
        Ms. Norton. Now, the testimony here is that businesses were
    not evacuated. Homes were not evacuated. Have there been any
    reports from businesses or homes or residents of any effects
    from the decontamination?
        Mr. Gordon. None whatsoever.
        Ms. Norton. All right. So continue.
        Mr. Gordon. We have established the same safety parameters
    that were established for the senators and Congressmen around
    the Hart Building. In consultation with the U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency, the District of Columbia and EPA set a base
    standard of 25 ppb. Now, let me tell you how that was arrived.
        The Federal occupational safety and health standard for
    worker exposure to chlorine dioxide gas is 1,000 ppb over an 8-
    hour period of time, meaning that you would have to be exposed
    to concentrations of 1,000 ppb over 8 hours to exhibit clinical
    symptomology of ill-health effects.
        Ms. Norton. And that clinical symptomology would be what?
        Mr. Gordon. Respiratory dysfunction, possible skin rash,
    eyes watering, difficulty breathing. Chlorine dioxide is a
    toxicant that is corrosive. Chlorine is corrosive. However, in
    setting a safety standard at 25 ppb, an analogy would be this
    first step in the ceiling, the ceiling being 1,000 parts and 25
    being this step. At the time we did the Hart Building along
    with EPA, we used the TAGA bus and other air monitoring
    equipment that the Department of Health stationed around the
    Hart Building. We detected no levels of chlorine dioxide gas.
    In the event we would----
        Ms. Norton. Not a thing escaped?
        Mr. Gordon. Not a thing was detected at 25 ppb. And if it
    was released at that level, you would not smell it. And if you
    do smell it, it is going to smell like chlorine out of your
    swimming pool. If you are in a swimming pool, that odor of
    chlorine from the pool is the odor that you would detect if
    there was a release. At 25 ppb, you cannot even detect it by
    the human nose.
        We have set a standard I place. If the machinery goes off
    and we have two stationary air monitors on the roof, we have
    the TAGA bus that will be moving around and we have other air
    monitors around the perimeter of the building. In the event any
    of those go off, there will be an immediate shut-down of the
    operation, and to determine where and the location of any leak
    in the building. Therefore, we feel with that standard, that
    safety net, that the community is at very low risk.
        Ms. Norton. What time of the day did you do the--this is
    Mr. Voltaggio--what time of the day and what day of the week
    did you do the decontamination at Hart?
        Mr. Voltaggio. We started it at midnight, and we went
    through the next day, and it was a weekend--Saturday morning
    through the day Saturday is when we did the suite
    decontamination.
        Ms. Norton. I would only ask that you choose a time when
    there are the fewest people there. Dr. Gordon.
        Mr. Gordon. I think the reason why the department----
        Ms. Norton. That is not because I fear, given the testimony
    here, that there would be a health problem. I think one of our
    problems, perhaps our major problems, is to contain fears and
    if having few people around contains fears then why not do it
    that way.
        Mr. Gordon. The other reason why the Department of Health
    is encouraging the Postal Service to start early in the morning
    is that we also know based on the science that if there were to
    be a release of chlorine dioxide gas, if it is released during
    the daytime hours, exposed to the ultraviolet rays from the
    sun, it breaks down very rapidly and is rendered somewhat
    innocuous.
        Ms. Norton. So sunlight helps?
        Mr. Gordon. Absolutely. Absolutely. And that is our
    recommendation on line 17, which we will start actually the
    process of preparation will be Sunday and we have a target
    period starting at 7 a.m., on Monday. Now, we also have a
    weather station that has been constructed and is on top of the
    building. The purpose of that weather station is also to
    determine directional flow of the wind. In the event there is a
    release, we want to know which way it is blowing and which way
    it is going to go, as an additional safety net.
        We think that the necessary steps have been put in place to
    minimize the risk of any endangerment to this community. I must
    add, people need to understand, chlorine dioxide gas is not a
    gas that is flammable. It is not a gas that is going to explode
    like some other toxicants. And as my colleague Tom Voltaggio
    stated, it has been used over the years for decontamination of
    water and fruits and vegetables and foods, and we think it is a
    very acceptable means of sterilizing and decontaminating this
    facility and rendering the anthrax spores innocuous.
        Ms. Norton. Councilmember Orange, you have heard the
    testimony here concerning cautions that are being taken. I
    would like some sense of the gravamen of the concerns of the
    community. The community here, as I understand it, would
    involve people who live in the vicinity and people who use the
    post office. Like the employees, they are going to want to go
    back into that building the way they did before. What are the
    major concerns you are hearing from the community?
        Mr. Orange. Well, I guess the major concern is really
    making sure that full disclosure and all the information is put
    on the table and that it is accurate information. There is some
    concern when you have a full-blown article within the
    Washington Post that has all this information and people digest
    that information and then the experts come back 30 days later
    and say that the information in their article was erroneous.
    Yet that information came from the experts and was reported
    through the Washington Post.
        Ms. Norton. Do you have any information of that kind that
    you----
        Mr. Orange. Yes, for example, the 20,000 tons of chlorine
    dioxide gas that would be brought into the community, and now
    we are saying it is 2,000 pounds. And then when you look at the
    Hart Building and you look at the amount of chlorine dioxide
    gas that was used in the Hart Building, and you do the simple
    mathematics, it does not add up. It appears as though this
    should be more chlorine dioxide gas being utilized at the
    Brentwood facility than what is being put on the table. So the
    community just wants a clear analysis of what is exactly going
    to be put in the Brentwood facility.
        When you look at it in terms of 17.5 million cubic feet
    versus 100,000 cubic feet for the Hart Building, then you would
    say, I mean clearly you would expect there to be more chlorine
    dioxide gas pumped into the Brentwood facility.
        Now, when you talk about the perimeter, and I agree with
    Mr. Gordon and Mr. Day as it relates to the science and the
    health, .16 miles perimeter is probably a safe perimeter. But
    when you bring in the element of the community and then the
    public safety and, like you indicated yourself, containment of
    fears, then you probably would have to expand that perimeter a
    little bit to at least say during the 24 hours of operation
    that you need to shut down Brentwood Road; that you really
    should not have any traffic flowing on that street because that
    provides easy access to the facility.
        What if someone decided that I am going to get a big truck
    that day and I am going to fill it with explosives and I am
    going to drive right into the Brentwood facility because the
    street is open and it is still easy flow. So that is a
    containment of fear.
        We do not have any problems with the tests that are going
    to take place on Monday, and let me tell you why. Because the
    test itself, the gas is going to be pumped into an area that is
    contained by a tent, and the tent is contained within the
    facility itself, so you have an extra layer of containment.
        But when the actual fumigation takes place, that tent will
    not be in place, and then you just have the entire facility,
    17.5 million cubic feet. So I do think that we are getting
    close to all being on the same page. This clearly has been
    helpful, the town hall meeting that took place on June 27, and
    even the presentation that was made here today, and then the
    explanation that has been given by the other experts, but I do
    still believe that we should take the extra step of precaution
    and really discuss and talk about those contingency plans as
    well, so people will feel comfortable that there is in fact a
    contingency plan just in case something goes wrong.
        Ms. Norton. I am going to ask that there be meetings with
    the District on this matter, to do the kind of cost/benefit--
    obviously, this is bending over backward, but I think the
    councilmember has raised a scenario that deserves some
    consideration. Can we straighten out Councilmember Orange's
    point about the amount of----
        Mr. Voltaggio. Yes, I hope I can maybe clarify that some.
    Chlorine dioxide is not brought onto the site. We generate
    chlorine dioxide at the site. What we do bring--we will have
    20,000 tons of material brought on and waste made from the
    process. They will only generate 2,000 pounds of chlorine
    dioxide gas.
        So I think the discrepancy about the poundage I think had
    to do with how much gas actually gets generated versus how much
    material you have to bring onto the site to generate the gas,
    because there is a chemical reaction that takes place in order
    to generate the chlorine dioxide from other materials,
    basically sodium bisufite, hydrochloric acid. We have bleach.
    We have a number of materials that are brought on in order to
    make it. But the chlorine dioxide itself is only 2,000 pounds.
        Ms. Norton. When you are going to wipe those machines--and
    those machines are what interests me, frankly, machines where
    we think the lethal contact occurred--is that going to be with
    pumping gas or are they going to be wiped down or what?
        Mr. Voltaggio. I would throw that to Mr. Day.
        Ms. Norton. Yes?
        Mr. Day. During the processing of the actual fumigation,
    the machines will be operational. They will be running. We want
    to make sure that every aspect of that machine is exposed to
    the gas for total disinfecting. So the equipment will be
    running full-speed, even line 17, the tenting operation we are
    going to do Monday, the equipment will be on and running.
    Nothing will be sitting stationary. Everything will be exposed.
        Ms. Norton. That is important.
        Mr. Day. Congressman, I would just further point out, the
    way our machine, it is automated distribution equipment, the
    way they are designed really for their normal use with
    maintenance, they have lids that open up so what you see is a
    contained machine, but fully capable of opening all those lids
    up so that all the interior portions of the machine will be
    fully exposed.
        Ms. Norton. So it is blowing out anything that is in there.
        Mr. Orange. Congresswoman.
        Ms. Norton. Yes, councilmember.
        Mr. Orange. We just received an answer that there would be
    20,000 tons of chemicals or materials that would be brought to
    the site, and then that will actually be turned into 2,000 tons
    of chlorine dioxide gas. That is precisely the type of
    information that the community wants, because it was put in the
    paper that it was 20,000 tons of chlorine dioxide gas.
        So we are not imagining this number of 20,000 tons, and
    today for the first time we got an explanation for what that
    20,000 tons represents. That is what I am saying--we need a
    clear accurate description of what is on that site, the actual
    tonnage, the actual poundage, and the relationship----
        Ms. Norton. Councilmember, are you saying that there has
    been a problem in getting that kind of communication? Is it a
    problem with the technical terminology? Is it a problem with
    contact? Is it a problem with your office making sure that
    people are in contact with you and the relevant community
    members? Maybe there is a way we can straighten out some of
    that right here now.
        Mr. Orange. I think what it is, is maybe we are talking
    past each other, as opposed to really listening to each other
    and trying to really dissect the information that is made
    available. As I indicated, I keep going back to that Post
    article that says 20,000 tons of chlorine dioxide gas will be
    pumped into this building. And then the experts come back this
    week or a few weeks ago and say, no, it is 2,000 pounds.
        Ms. Norton. That might have been the Post's mistake.
        Mr. Orange. Yes, and it could have been, but it has never
    been corrected. And I am just saying, let's correct that
    information and let's see exactly what chemicals are onsite,
    how those chemicals are brought into that facility and how they
    will exit that facility.
        Ms. Norton. Dr. Gordon.
        Mr. Gordon. Yes, I need to, as the councilman has pointed
    out, I need to correct the record. I have been advised, I said
    1,000 ppb was the OSHA standard. It is actually 100 ppb, and we
    have set the safety net at 25. So I want the record to reflect
    and correct my earlier statement.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you.
        $22 billion, as I understand it--is that what this cleanup
    is supposed to cost?
        Mr. Day. No, Congresswoman--million.
        Ms. Norton. I am sorry--million, $22 million.
        Mr. Day. Yes.
        Ms. Norton. Do you have the cash on hand? [Laughter.]
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, actually, through the good graces
    of Congress and the administration, we did get funds
    appropriated.
        Ms. Norton. I hate to ask this, but whenever government
    does anything, there are, ``cost overruns.'' Suppose it costs
    more than $22 million.
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, we were appropriated initially $175
    million from the White House. Congress approved the White
    House, the president the ability to give funds to agencies. We
    had $175 million initially. Further, we were appropriated $500
    million for emergency preparedness. Our very first----
        Ms. Norton. That is for the United States of America.
        Mr. Day. But what you need to understand, Congresswoman, is
    that our very first priority in the emergency preparedness
    plan, very clear in the plan, is decontamination and cleanup
    and reoccupation of Brentwood and Trenton.
        Ms. Norton. Whatever it costs.
        Mr. Day. Whatever it costs. So, we have other plans. We
    have fully documented how we would spend the $500 million. Our
    commitment is to get this done and do it right. So the funds
    are there.
        Ms. Norton. Dr. Gordon, perhaps you can tell me, is the
    District of Columbia being fully reimbursed for any costs it
    has incurred from this crisis at Brentwood in particular?
        Mr. Gordon. We have not had any direct discussions with the
    Postal Service. However, the city administrator and the mayor
    have instructed us to maintain a catalogue of our time and
    cost, at which time we will request reimbursement from the
    Postal Service.
        Ms. Norton. Let me just ask the Postal Service right now.
    Are you prepared to reimburse the District of Columbia fully
    for any costs it incurs with respect to the Brentwood facility?
    [Laughter.]
        Do not hesitate now, Mr. Day. I mean, you were real quick
    that whatever it costs. It is costing the District of Columbia.
    We did not have anything to do with Brentwood.
        Mr. Day. It is a topic that has not been discussed. We are
    certainly open to the discussion.
        Ms. Norton. Well, I am having that discussion with you
    right now.
        [Applause.]
        Ms. Norton. You have really had the--the Post Office has
    had all of the services of our health department and of every
    other agency of the government that could be useful. The
    Congress, of course, gave you money to deal with whatever your
    expenses were. The expense that the District of Columbia has
    incurred is an expense.
        You cannot assure me that you will reimburse the District?
    You are reimbursing the contractors. The District of Columbia
    is a contractor in this matter. I do not want to get down and
    dirty with money here, but I really am prepared and I would
    like an answer within 30 days as to whether or not you are
    prepared to reimburse the District of Columbia.
        Mr. Day. We certainly can provide the response for you.
    Congresswoman, my only reluctance is, I do not even know the
    scale. So we would just have to discuss it.
        Ms. Norton. You do not know the scale of what the cleanup
    will be either. None of us knows the scale, but you have just
    said you are going to do whatever it takes, and it seems to me
    that was a good answer. Whatever it takes includes whatever the
    District of Columbia has in fact done.
        Mr. Day. I think we can certainly reach an agreement that
    will be work for everyone.
        Ms. Norton. Look, they have to provide chits like everybody
    else.
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, the money was appropriated to us
    from Congress. It was not derived from our revenues. We will
    work to fairly compensate those parties that are part of this.
    We will work it out. I do not see that as a problem.
        Ms. Norton. I am going to take that as a yes and go forward
    from here.
        I must ask about future threats. People are going to walk
    in, and I think they should be reassured, because I know you
    are not going to let either your employees in or residents in
    until you have done all that you have described here.
        Now, that being the case, the question becomes, is
    Brentwood prepared for in case there is a new bioterrorism
    event? Now just a moment--let's try to get an answer here.
    Let's ask. It is one thing to clean the place out. It is
    another thing to prepare for the unknown, and that is part of
    what it would be.
        You of course have a greater sense of what might happen
    now. The Congress now has appropriated all kinds of money. I
    have just gotten for the Washington Hospital Center a promise
    with the first funds already there to build the first
    bioterrorism emergency room in the country. They are going to
    be prepared if we ever need it to hand 100-plus patients per
    hour in their emergency room.
        I have just gotten $10 million for Children's Hospital to
    do the same with respect to children. So if something happens,
    we are getting the medical facilities in place. What we want to
    know is, what is the Postal Service going to do to prevent the
    necessity or using any such medical facilities? How will we
    prevent a bioterrorist attack and how will we know if one is
    occurring in the Postal Service or in Brentwood?
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, what we are dealing with in the
    Postal Service is how would we detect and contain, if there
    were another attack. We have two primary----
        Ms. Norton. Of any substance.
        Mr. Day. Biohazardous substance.
        Ms. Norton. Right.
        Mr. Day. We are also looking at other threats as well. We
    have two primary technologies that we are actively pursuing and
    testing right now that were a part of the appropriation that
    Congress provided. One is called a biological detection system.
    We have worked with various other Federal agencies to develop
    that.
        It is being tested right now in Baltimore, Maryland. Our
    plan is to move forward on that, again assuming the test is
    validated and it is proven effective. Right now, I would tell
    you that will be the outcome. It does look like the results are
    excellent.
        In terms of the ability to detect, it would have very low
    false positives; that it would truly tell you what happened, as
    well as a very low false negative. You do not want systems that
    alert you to something that really is not there. And we have
    put very tight parameters on that and the system looks to be
    very effective.
        We would like to move forward on that, although I will
    throw a caveat into our ability to move forward as quickly as
    possible, and we are looking to even try to award the contract
    in September. Our plan on that is to deploy it nationwide.
        Brentwood, being part of our network, would be there, and
    given the tragedy that they went through would be the very
    first facility, along with Hamilton Township, that we would
    want to put that kind of equipment. So as quickly as we can get
    it, it will be in place.
        The second level of technology we call a vacuuming and
    filtration system. That is to put over our equipment that if
    the event takes place, the anthrax escapes from the mail, we
    detect it, the problem is--and let me just be clear on this--
    the only detection technology that is available you have to
    have an event. It has to escape to be detected. There is no way
    to peer inside mail to see if there is anthrax in there.
        So you find that out very quickly and you contain it, but
    this vacuuming and filtration system covers our automated
    distribution equipment. Right now, the DBCS-17 that everyone
    has talked about is a very open piece of equipment.
        Vacuuming and filtration would create a negative air-flow
    that if an event took place, it would draw those spores away,
    not just anthrax spores, but any hazard that might be placed in
    the mail. I would emphasize the biological detection system is
    done in a way that not only would detect anthrax, but we have
    built it in a way that gives it the ability to detect a range
    of biological hazards.
        Ms. Norton. That will be in place at the time that
    Brentwood is open?
        Mr. Day. No. Going back to the timeframes of when we think
    we can open it, the contractor's ability to get this equipment
    built and functioning, there maybe somewhat of a delay there,
    but that is true nationwide. Right now, we do not have that in
    place.
        Now, anything I can do to get it--again, our effort will be
    to get it in Brentwood and Hamilton first. Anything I can do to
    accelerate----
        Ms. Norton. And ``first'' would mean by approximately when?
        Mr. Day. We think that the equipment will be available late
    next spring.
        Now, the caveat I was giving you, Congresswoman, is,
    working with these companies to build this technology, they
    have been very clear to us, and I know this has been debated in
    Congress, on the issue of indemnification. Because of the
    liabilities that are associated, the legal liabilities, they
    have made very clear to us unless the issue of indemnification
    is rectified, they will not sign a contract with us.
        Ms. Norton. Does the bill pending in the Senate now do
    that, in your judgment?
        Mr. Day. We believe that the legislation pending, I believe
    there are different versions in both House and Senate, we
    believe it will do it, and the vendors we are dealing with
    believe that also. Of course, we have to wait to see what the
    final legislation actually says.
        Ms. Norton. Is this irradiated mail that the Congress is
    now receiving considered safe, and is this the only method now
    available for use in mail coming to secure environments like
    the Congress?
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, I was on the Hill yesterday with
    both House and Senate administrative staff, and there was a
    study completed--I may defer if Dr. Sokas would like to comment
    on it, to try to determine some of the effects that have been
    reported and whether or not it is related to irradiated mail.
    There is an ongoing effort.
        My understanding is that link has not been shown, but again
    I will let Dr. Sokas comment on that. In terms of, is this the
    only way, we continue under guidelines we have had,
    conversations and ongoing dialog with office of homeland
    security, as well as advice in terms of threat from various
    Federal law enforcement agencies, that we need to continue the
    irradiation process.
        It is the only effective way that we have found that can
    decontaminate a biological hazard in the mail. There is some
    discussion right now--I do not know how far you want to get
    into technology--about the effectiveness of electronic beam
    versus an X-ray version, but that is really kind of splitting
    the hairs. It is more of the sophistication of the technology,
    but it is still irradiation.
        Ms. Norton. Yes. Dr. Sokas, did you want to comment on
    that--irradiated mail?
        Dr. Sokas. Yes, we have conducted two different studies,
    one that looked at the postal workers themselves as they were
    opening large bags, and there was some concern identified by a
    Postal Service contractor about degradation of the plastic that
    could cause some carbon monoxide as the large bags were being
    opened--the plastic-covered palettes were being opened. I
    believe that has been taken care of by different work practices
    that would reduce that.
        Ms. Norton. That is not opened. That mail is not opened at
    Brentwood, is it?
        Mr. Day. No, and we have eliminated the use of that
    plastic.
        Dr. Sokas. Right. But the second issue is, as you receive
    mail in office buildings specifically, the people on the Hill
    had a number of complaints. We had industrial hygienists who
    went and sampled the air, as well as the materials, and we had
    physicians who did interview the individuals.
        Our conclusions were that the traces and particles that
    were present were far below those of recognized standards for
    workplace settings, and we did not feel that they were causing
    some of the dry eyes and cough. The concern we mentioned at the
    time in the Capitol was--this was conducted in January, of
    course the humidity was quite low.
        There is some clear differences in terms of the paper dust
    and that sort of thing that happens. We thought that was more
    of a comfort issue that could be rectified, but that was not a
    hazard due to the irradiated mail.
        Ms. Norton. Let me ask one final question. I have had some
    complaints from my constituents. I do not now if Councilmember
    Orange has had such complaints as well. I do not know if they
    continued, but they have to do with delays in the mail in this
    area, with people who have had to pay late fees because they
    did not get their mail on time. Is this still happening? And
    have you taken steps, now that this mail is dispersed
    throughout the region, to avoid the problem of late delivery of
    mail in this area?
        Mr. Day. Congresswoman, there certainly were delays when we
    shut down the facility. There was a backlog of actually
    contaminated mail that needed to be treated. That backlog took
    us quite a bit of time to decontaminate.
        Ms. Norton. Yes, we are still getting some from that, I am
    here to testify.
        Mr. Day. I can't answer to what you are seeing, but let me
    just tell you how long it took and where we got the backlog
    cleaned up. We have continued to irradiate the destination mail
    to the Federal agencies in the District, and it is the zip
    codes 202 through 205 that we continue to irradiate. That
    backlog for letter and oversize mail pieces was cleaned up back
    in the February-March timeframe.
        What was severely backlogged because we were awaiting X-ray
    technology to be activated in New Jersey at the facility we
    used, were packages, and we cleared the backlog of packages
    back in June. We have been in a stable environment in which we
    prepare, mail on the day it arrives here in this area, ship it
    to New Jersey, treat it, turn it around in 24 hours, bring it
    back into the D.C. area, open it, vent it so that any odor or
    any other issues are----
        Ms. Norton. That is congressional mail. What about the mail
    of the average person?
        Mr. Day. The average person----
        Ms. Norton. Whose mail went through Brentwood.
        Mr. Day. So the average person in the 200 zip code range,
    that mail has been redistributed through the area. We use a
    system of external measurement, and as I indicated earlier,
    this area had the highest service numbers in the country, and
    the 200 zip code range being included.
        Ms. Norton. So you believe there is no delay at this time
    resulting from the dispersal of the employees around the
    region?
        Mr. Day. Nothing related to the dispersal of the employees,
    nothing related to irradiation. Certainly anecdotally, anyone
    might have a story of a delayed mail piece, but our service
    measures tell us that we are providing as good a service in
    this area as we did before the unfortunate incident in October.
        Ms. Norton. I want to thank this panel of witnesses. I have
    held you longer because you had more of the answers I think
    that the community and that the Congress needed than perhaps
    others. We very much appreciate your testimony.
        We would now like to call John Hegarty, national president
    of the National Postal Mail Handlers; Alan Ferranto, director
    of safety and health, National Association of Letter Carriers;
    Roy Braunstein, legislative director, American Postal Workers
    Union; also Corey Thompson, APWU safety and health specialist.
        If you would stand and please raise your right hands so
    that you may take the oath.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Please be seated. We are
    pleased to receive your testimony.
        Mr. Hegarty.

      STATEMENTS OF JOHN F. HEGARTY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
       POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION; ALAN C. FERRANTO, DIRECTOR OF
    SAFETY AND HEALTH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS; AND
     ROY BRAUNSTEIN, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS
                                 UNION

        Mr. Hegarty. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton. My name is
    John Hegarty. I am the president of the National Postal Mail
    Handlers Union. I have with me today in reference to Brentwood,
    Cynthia Vines, who is the branch president for the National
    Postal Mail Handlers Union at the Brentwood facility, and
    Richard Collins, who is on the mail security task force for the
    National Postal Mail Handlers Union.
        On behalf of 50,000 union mail handlers employed by the
    U.S. Postal Service, including approximately 500 mail handlers
    who work at the Brentwood Processing and Distribution Center, I
    appreciate the opportunity to testify about the challenges
    currently facing the Postal Service and all postal employees at
    Brentwood.
        As you probably know, the employees represented by the Mail
    Handlers Union are an essential part of the mail processing and
    distribution network utilized by the Postal Service to move
    more than 200 billion pieces of mail each year.
        Mail handlers work in all of the Nation's large postal
    plants and are responsible for loading and unloading trucks,
    transporting mail within the facility, preparing mail for
    distribution and delivery, operating a host of machinery and
    automated equipment, and containerizing mail for subsequent
    delivery. Our members are generally the first and the last to
    handle the mail as it comes into and leaves the postal plants.
        Although I am relatively new to Washington, DC, and this is
    my first visit to the area surrounding Brentwood, I have been
    personally involved in the issues arising from last year's
    anthrax attacks. Indeed, after attending a labor-management
    grievance meeting last October at the Hamilton Township postal
    facility in Trenton, New Jersey, I was one of the thousands of
    postal employees who had to take several months of antibiotics
    in order to ensure my own immunity from anthrax contamination.
    In some small respects, therefore, I know first-hand the fear
    and anxiety that now affects many postal employees.
        My personal experience with the terror of anthrax adds
    personal meaning to what has been and what must continue to be
    our guiding principle, that our paramount concern must be the
    safety and well-being of postal employees, including all mail
    handlers.
        This includes not only ensuring that the Brentwood facility
    is free of anthrax, but also making sure that the employees are
    emotionally ready, willing and able to move back into the
    facility. To this end, the mail handlers union has been an
    active participant in the mail security task force established
    by postal management and including representatives of all
    unions and employee associations, which has been meeting since
    last year to ensure that all reasonable measures are being
    taken to prevent any further infection from anthrax or other
    biological agents.
        We have also been active supporters of the efforts to
    obtain sufficient congressional funding for the cleanup effort
    both here at Brentwood, and at other postal facilities along
    the eastern seaboard. We particularly appreciate the efforts
    made by members of this subcommittee and fervently hope that
    the Congress will continue to provide complete funding for the
    costs imposed on the Postal Service because of the anthrax
    attacks and their aftermath.
        Turning to the present situation at Brentwood, again our
    primary concern must be the health and welfare of the 2,000
    postal employees who work at Brentwood and who, for the past 9
    months, have been scattered around in neighboring postal
    facilities.
        To meet these concerns, the employees at Brentwood must
    know, first, that all levels of government and postal
    management are doing everything possible, using the best
    available science and technology, to ensure that the Brentwood
    facility is fully decontaminated before any worker is asked to
    return; second, that they are being kept fully informed about
    the latest developments, including information about the actual
    cleanup so that there is no misinformation disseminated and so
    that the rumor mill can be put to rest; third, that they have a
    real choice on whether to return, so that employees who are
    experiencing particular fear or anxiety can freely choose not
    to return to Brentwood without any loss of pay or benefits;
    four, that if they return to Brentwood, the employees will be
    carefully monitored for any illnesses or other adverse side
    effects, whether physical or emotional, especially during the
    first few days and weeks after Brentwood is reopened; fifth,
    that the reopening of Brentwood is not the end of our concerns,
    but rather the starting point from which the Postal Service
    will take whatever steps are necessary and use whatever
    technologies are available to ensure that postal employees and
    the mail that they process is safe; sixth, that the elected
    representatives of these employees, meaning the union
    representatives at the local level, are allowed to participate
    in the planning and implementation for each and every step of
    the project that needs to be accomplished at the Brentwood
    facility.
        If these general guidelines are followed, I believe that
    the reopening of Brentwood can be accomplished smoothly and
    successfully. But it is easier to state these guidelines than
    to follow them. For example, Congress not only needs to
    continue its oversight of this cleanup, but Congress also has
    to continue full funding for the cleanup and for all of the
    followup work that must be completed after the facility is
    reopened. Postal management also has to do a better job of
    making sure that complete and accurate information is being
    disseminated to its employees and that questions are answered
    before the rumors start flying.
        The examples could continue, but there is no reason to
    belabor the point. All of the participants must work together
    to ensure the safety and the well-being of the employees at
    Brentwood. Anything less would increase the fear and anxiety of
    these postal employees who have already suffered too much.
        Thank you for your time, and I would be glad to answer any
    questions you might have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hegarty follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Hegarty.
        Mr. Ferranto.
        Mr. Ferranto. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would like to
    thank you for a request for a CDC study that will assure our
    members that they are safe, and not only from anthrax, but from
    the decontamination process as well. We do appreciate that. I
    would like to begin my testimony at this present time.
        Thank you, Chairman Morella and Ranking Member Norton for
    the opportunity to testify on this important subject. My name
    is Al Ferranto and I am director of safety and health of the
    National Association of Letter Carriers. Since September 11th
    of last year, this has been a trying time for all Americans.
        For those of us in the postal community, we have also been
    personally confronted with challenges previously considered
    unimaginable. I am happy to report that the 350,000 members of
    the National Association of Letter Carriers have shown
    remarkable strength in bouncing back from these attacks. We
    know that there are few uniquely American experiences like the
    daily ritual of reaching into the mailbox to get the mail. That
    is why we went to such great lengths to be out on the streets
    and serving the public last fall.
        As you well know, Madam Chair, the initial response to the
    anthrax attacks was chaotic, whether it was in New York,
    Florida, Capitol Hill or the post office. That was due in large
    part to the unprecedented nature of the circumstances. However,
    within the Postal Service, unprecedented circumstances gave
    rise to unprecedented levels of cooperation. The Postal Service
    established a line of communication with all the employee
    organizations, initially meeting on a daily basis to deal with
    events as they occurred.
        The Mail Security Task Force Working Group, as it has come
    to be known, was formed by representatives from all of the
    employee organizations and all relevant departments within the
    Postal Service. At any given time, agencies with expertise in a
    particular area have briefed the group. Once the immediate
    anthrax threat subsided, that structure remained in place.
    While we no longer meet on a daily basis, we get together
    frequently to discuss the latest developments. For the last
    several months, cleanup of the Brentwood facility has been the
    dominant topic in those meetings.
        The NALC recognizes the extraordinary challenges associated
    with decontaminating the Brentwood facility. Whereas the Hart
    Building cleanup dealt with 100,000 square feet, the Brentwood
    Processing and Distribution Center requires covering 17 million
    square feet of space. The good news is that the Hart Building
    gave us a good road map to what to expect during the cleanup.
        We are satisfied that the Postal Service is exercising the
    right level of caution in moving forward, and are encouraged
    that it has not sought to impose artificial or arbitrary
    deadlines, which could lead to irresponsible actions being
    taken. Using the same contractors and the same chlorine dioxide
    approach also provides letter carriers, other postal employees
    and postal customers with the confidence that the cleanup of
    Brentwood will be as good or better than the cleanup of the
    Hart Building.
        As you know, at the initial stages of the anthrax
    situation, some of our members did not feel they received equal
    treatment to other government employees. We will not allow that
    to happen again. We will not let our members return to work at
    Brentwood until we are fully satisfied that it is safe for them
    to do so. For that reason, there has been a high premium placed
    on communications.
        Our local leadership is actively involved in the process.
    These are the people who have the most day to day interaction
    with our rank and file members. NALC Branch 142, under the
    leadership of President Joe Henry, who is here with me at this
    hearing, organized a meeting of our members, as well as members
    of the National Postal Mail Handlers Union at the NALC Branch
    142 union hall.
        They also cosponsored a meeting at the Israeli Baptist
    Church along with the mail handlers and the NAACP, which was
    attended by more than 300 people. President Henry also serves
    on both the Brentwood Reentry Committee and the Scientific
    Review Committee. The Brentwood Reentry Committee includes
    representatives from the other postal unions and various
    departments within the Postal Service itself. The Scientific
    Review Committee is comprised of the D.C. Department of Public
    Health, NIOSH, OSHA and the cleaning team, among others.
        At the headquarters level, sitting on the Mail Security
    Task Force Working Group has allowed us to hear about what the
    Postal Service plans to say to our members so that we can be
    sure they are being provided with the best possible
    information.
        Over the years, the NALC and its members have not been shy
    about letting our voices be heard when we do not like what the
    Postal Service is doing. However, at this point we are
    satisfied that the Postal Service is doing all that it can to
    assure the safety of our members to provide information about
    how the cleanup will take place and to answer any lingering
    questions that our members may still have.
        On March 27, there was a town meeting that a number of
    postal employees attended. Since that meeting, the Postal
    Service has stepped up its efforts at providing information to
    its employees. After the contract was awarded for the cleanup
    of Brentwood site, there were five employee town hall meetings
    conducted on May 16 and May 22. Employees were actually
    provided pay for the time needed to attend them. Our members
    were notified of the meetings through stand up talks on the
    workroom floor and through mailings to their home. Our local
    union leadership also attended the meetings.
        As new information has become available, postal supervisors
    have delivered stand up talks to our members to keep them up to
    date. In addition, a system has been set up that our members
    can ask any questions or raise concerns. There are question
    forms, a toll-free number, communication facilitators at any
    facility where Brentwood employees are located, Brentwood
    update bulletin boards, mailings to homes, town hall meetings,
    and the USPS Web site. Many of the questions gathered through
    these channels are answered in writing and distributed on a
    regular basis.
        Our understanding is that the final step in the process
    will be a review by the Environmental Clearance Committee
    comprised of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Center
    for Disease Control and Prevention, Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration, and the Armed Forces Radiobiology
    Research Institute.
        We look forward to hearing from this committee about the
    effectiveness of the Brentwood cleanup so that we can be
    confident that our members and the public we serve are
    protected prior to the facility being reopened.
        At the time of the attack, there were 242 letter carriers
    working out of the Brentwood facility. We expect that all of
    them, with the possible exception of some of those responsible
    for handling government mail, will go back to work at that
    location. Given the nature of the circumstances, it is
    understandable that some of our members have some anxiety about
    going back to work at Brentwood.
        The Postal Service needs to do its part to make sure that
    our members have every confidence that they are returning to a
    safe and healthy workplace. So far, the Postal Service is
    making that effort. Of course, until the process is completed,
    we will continue to communicate regularly with our membership
    and with the Postal Service.
        Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony, and I
    will answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ferranto follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Ferranto.
        Mr. Braunstein.
        Mr. Braunstein. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. Before I
    begin, I just also want to concur with NALC's statement this
    morning thanking you for requesting CDC to do the study. We
    feel it is essentially important to our membership as well.
        My name is Roy Braunstein. I am the legislative director of
    the American Postal Workers Union. I am presenting APWU's
    testimony on behalf of President William Burrus, who is unable
    to attend personally today.
        Thank you for inviting APWU to testify before this
    committee on the cleanup of the U.S. Postal Service Brentwood
    and Hamilton, New Jersey facilities. On behalf of the 330,000
    APWU-represented employees, I wish to express our deep
    gratitude for your concern.
        The events of September and October 2001 will be eternally
    etched in the history of our country as times of sacrifice and
    courage. The lives of postal heroes Joseph P. Curseen Jr. and
    Thomas L. Morris Jr. were taken by the terrorist act of
    depositing anthrax into the mail stream.
        They are deserving of honor and remembrance. Representative
    Albert Wynn introduced legislation, H.R. 3287, in November to
    rename the Brentwood postal facility in honor of Mr. Curseen
    and Mr. Morris. We believe expeditious passage of the bill
    would be a fitting memorial to them.
        Three other members of our bargaining unit were seriously
    infected by inhalation anthrax and continue their
    rehabilitation 8 months later. More have suffered the
    debilitating effects of cutaneous anthrax with unexpected
    lingering effects. Conducting this hearing demonstrates that we
    remember the heroic sacrifices of all these postal workers.
        Immediately following the discovery that postal employees
    had been exposed to a deadly agent, the postal community
    rallied as one to assure employees and the public that mail
    service would continue and that we would do our very best to
    ensure the safety of the mail. Never in President William
    Burrus' 44 years of postal service had he experienced the level
    of cooperation between management and the employees that was
    exhibited in the aftermath of the anthrax attack. Each course
    of action was discussed and decided on a consensus basis, with
    the overriding goal of safety and security.
        While the loss of our coworkers was fresh in our minds, our
    union refrained from engaging in any finger pointing, except at
    the despicable individual or individuals who used the mails as
    a means of distributing poison. We explained to our members
    that CDC, Centers for Disease Control, the public health
    agencies and postal management acted reasonably given the
    information available at the time.
        Regrettably, the acts of cooperation that marked the
    immediate aftermath of the anthrax attacks have now been
    replaced with bureaucratic posturing and no place for employee
    input. As the level of cooperation gradually diminished, we
    find ourselves on this date in less than a cooperative mode on
    the subject of cleanup, health monitoring and employee
    dislocation. The unions and employees continue to receive
    regular briefings, but decisions have become unilateral, with
    employee concerns subjugated to concerns about cost. Although
    specific plans for cleaning up Brentwood have been completed,
    they have yet to be shared in depth with the union or the
    employees.
        This is unacceptable. The cleanup of the Brentwood-Hamilton
    facilities has been delayed unnecessarily by legal wrangling
    and indecision. Because the employees have not been regularly
    briefed about the process, progress and procedures, they are
    less than confident of the results. I am certain you can
    appreciate the apprehension the employees feel at the prospect
    of returning to the buildings where their coworkers died and
    suffered life-threatening illnesses.
        Early on, we anticipated that every reasonable effort would
    be undertaken to continually express to affected employees the
    appreciation they are entitled to. Yet a series of decisions
    have been made that convey the message that the danger is
    passed and now it is back to business as usual.
        Lingering issues remain over compensation to employees for
    the loss of personal items that were in their lockers when the
    facilities were closed. Reimbursement for computers and union-
    owned items that were located in the facilities has not been
    resolved. The responsibility and cost of transportation from
    Brentwood and Hamilton to the facilities where the employees
    now work has been shifted to the employees.
        Even payment to private medical facilities in Hamilton for
    the treatment of postal employees has been unnecessarily
    delayed. Under normal circumstances, these might be considered
    trivial issues. Under these unique circumstances, the employees
    view them as acts of betrayal.
        From the initial distribution of medication to protect
    against anthrax infection, the APWU has insisted that caution
    be exercised and a comprehensive medical monitoring program be
    put in place. Instead, the employees have faced the blanket
    denial of any lingering medical effect, as they watch more and
    more coworkers expire from mysterious diseases.
        Strong athletic postal workers have been struck down. The
    only message that their coworkers have received have been
    denial. To make matters worse, this message of denial has been
    received via the news media instead of in-plant official
    communications. Yet day after day, these employees continue to
    move America's mail because that is their oath and their
    commitment.
        To date, the promised detection equipment remains just
    that--a promise. In the initial months following the attack,
    the Postal Service was deluged with offers of detection
    equipment, much of which was found lacking in effectiveness.
    Eight months later, the employees have lost confidence they
    will ever be protected from a future attack.
        The decisions to close government buildings while postal
    facilities remained open were explainable given the information
    available at the time of exposure. However, the decision to
    continue to irradiate mail destined for government offices
    after postal employees have been exposed to the mail in its
    original form clearly reveals a two-tier system. Should postal
    employees believe they are expendable, while political
    representatives demand protection?
        Although knowledge of the health effects of exposure to
    irradiated mail is a work in progress, postal employees labor
    on serving their community and their country. How many more
    employees must suffer unexplainable illnesses with no
    alternative but filing workers compensation claims with the
    inevitable bureaucratic denials?
        The employees I am privileged to represent have suffered
    greatly and they deserve better. They are entitled to work in
    facilities that are safe. They are entitled to recognition for
    the sacrifices they have made. The opening of Brentwood and
    Hamilton cleared of all contamination is a reasonable
    expectation. Until the opening, the recognition of a job well
    done would be appreciated.
        There is still a considerable amount to be accomplished
    before the Brentwood facility should be opened. We continue to
    seek involvement at every level to ensure a complete
    understanding of all aspects of the cleanup that would allow
    the APWU to better inform our members who have risked their
    lives and continue to do so in the performance of their jobs.
        In closing, I again want to thank the committee for the
    opportunity to testify on behalf of the members of the American
    Postal Workers Union, and I am willing to address any questions
    the committee may have.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Braunstein follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Norton. I appreciate the testimony. We cannot have any
    understanding of what has happened and what will happen without
    hearing from those who represent the employees at Brentwood. In
    fact, your testimony is a testament to why unions are in the
    public interest. Imagine if there had been no collective
    bargaining at Brentwood when this happened.
        Imagine if the employees were not organized, and the Postal
    Service, who obviously is management and is blamed for the
    matter, in so much as blame can be ascribed to anybody, would
    have been left to somehow deal with its own employees.
        That would have been a completely unachievable goal. So I
    think that--I hope the country is cognizant as it as of the
    importance of having organized employees at the twin towers. It
    was so important--I think even more important to have organized
    employees at Brentwood.
        Now, you have testified--the three of you have testified of
    some degree of labor-management cooperation that one would
    expect in a tragedy of this kind. The unions are to be
    congratulated for being very watchful, without exploiting a
    tragedy. It seems to me you are a case study in how to handle a
    major tragedy.
        At the same time, I would like to have some greater sense
    of what the post office additionally needs to do as we approach
    this critical time. For example, I was surprised to hear Mr.
    Braunstein say that the plans henceforth for the coming period,
    presumably the decontamination and thereafter, have not been
    shared.
        I do not understand that testimony. If you have been having
    regular meetings, is it that they do not know yet what the
    final plans are? Or is there some other reason why there would
    be this lapse on this important issue?
        Mr. Braunstein. Well, if I could, Congresswoman Norton, and
    ask Corey Thompson from APWU to join me here. APWU is not on
    the scientific review committee, and therefore there is more
    than healthy degree of skepticism in terms of what is going on.
        Ms. Norton. On the Scientific Review Committee are others
    who are not scientists?
        Mr. Braunstein. That is correct--other unions apparently
    have been invited.
        Ms. Norton. How many workers are represented by whom here?
    How many workers do you represent? How many workers do you
    represent, Mr. Ferranto? How many workers do you represent, Mr.
    Hegarty? And are any of you on the scientific panel?
        Mr. Hegarty. We represent 500 mail handlers at Brentwood
    and 50,000 mail handlers nationwide.
        Ms. Norton. OK. That is 500--there are about 2,500 there, I
    understand. Mr. Ferranto?
        Mr. Ferranto. We represent approximately 242 letter
    carriers at Brentwood.
        Ms. Norton. OK--500, 200. And you, Mr. Braunstein?
        Mr. Braunstein. We represent in excess of 1,500.
        Ms. Norton. All right. None of you, or no representatives
    from your unions are on the scientific panel?
        Mr. Ferranto. Branch 142, President Joe Henry serves on the
    scientific panel.
        Ms. Norton. How are those choices made? I mean, I should
    not think that there would be any competition among unions on
    that. I mean, how are those choices made?
        Mr. Ferranto. It is my understanding that he was invited to
    be on the committee.
        Ms. Norton. That is all you know?
        Mr. Ferranto. That is my understanding.
        Ms. Norton. Does he share his information with the other
    representatives, other unions?
        Mr. Ferranto. I believe, from talking with Joe Henry, that
    he is--the mail handlers also have a representative on that
    committee.
        Ms. Norton. Are you satisfied with the scientific panel--
    with what the scientific--I mean, Mr. Braunstein, who
    represents the most workers, does not have any sense of what
    the plans are so he cannot reassure the 1,500 workers he
    represents. How are we to get around that problem as we
    approach this--the same for Mr. Hegarty, I guess--as we
    approach this critical juncture?
        Mr. Hegarty. My understanding is that we also have a
    representative on this scientific committee and also that the
    Postal Service is having meetings every Friday with the unions
    to discuss what is going on at Brentwood, etc. Now, I am not
    sure why the APWU is not on the committee. I think that is
    something that postal management would need to deal with with
    the APWU.
        Ms. Norton. Well, maybe we can have--Mr. Braunstein said he
    would be joined by a colleague.
        Mr. Braunstein. Mr. Corey Thompson.
        Ms. Norton. Yes.
        Mr. Thompson. The issue of committees--I was quite
    surprised as I sat there and listened to testimony of I believe
    it was Dr. Gordon, as he mentioned all these plans that had
    been reviewed, none of which we have had the opportunity to
    see.
        Ms. Norton. Have your representatives had the opportunity
    to see these plans? Mr. Braunstein has not. Mr. Braunstein's
    union, the APWU, has not. You are not on the committee.
        Mr. Thompson. That is correct.
        Ms. Norton. Why are you not on the committee and the other
    two are on the committee?
        Mr. Braunstein. That is one of the questions we are trying
    to ascertain today.
        Ms. Norton. We have got to clear this up. Go ahead.
        Mr. Hegarty. Madam Congresswoman, this is Cynthia Vines.
    Ms. Vines is the branch president for the mail handlers union
    at the Brentwood facility and she does serve on the scientific
    committee. I would like to ask her to please address this issue
    briefly.
        Ms. Vines. Good morning. Myself and Mr. Henry were invited
    to sit on the Scientific Review Committee, and we are basically
    observers.
        Ms. Norton. You know you are under oath, even though I have
    not--everyone who comes to the table now is under oath. Go
    ahead.
        Ms. Vines. Yes, we basically sit in on the committee as
    observers to go back and inform the members.
        Ms. Norton. I am trying to find out why two out of three of
    the unions--do you have some information on why--you have
    definitively? Yes. You are definitively telling me that two out
    of three of the unions are on the scientific committee. We have
    had a normally cooperative arrangement with management. Why is
    your union not on the committee? Have you asked to be on the
    committee?
        Mr. Thompson. We are just finding out about a number of
    these committees, and about a number of the plans that are
    currently available. The process at Brentwood is an evolving
    process which, as we get closer to the level of decontaminating
    the facility, then it gives time for the plans to be completed,
    and the written scientific plans to be completed, so the
    committees are being done.
        Ms. Norton. How long has there been a scientific committee?
        Mr. Henry. Congressman Norton, it has been in place now for
    about 3 months, 4 months.
        Ms. Norton. That is a long time. Is there any
    representative of the Postal Service still here? Would you step
    to the table please? At this point, I think I am going to have
    to ask the people who have stepped to the table to stand so I
    can swear you all in. We need to understand this. Would all of
    you stand up--the three people who have come. First, let me ask
    them to stand.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Ms. Norton. Thank you. Please sit. Would the three of you
    please identify yourselves for the record? We will get you a
    seat right away. Sorry. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Henry. Joseph Henry, president of NALC Branch 142.
        Ms. Vines. Cynthia Vines, branch president for Washington,
    DC.
        Mr. King. Mitch King, government relations with the Postal
    Service.
        Ms. Norton. Perhaps you can clear this up for us, Mr. King.
    Why are two out of three of the unions represented on the
    science panel?
        Mr. King. I am afraid that I cannot clear it up for you. It
    is not a Postal Service committee. I understand it was
    organized by the D.C. government.
        Ms. Norton. Is anybody from D.C. government here?
        Mr. King. And other agencies working on the cleanup, and it
    is independent of us, to provide an independent review of what
    is going on.
        Ms. Norton. All right. If the Postal Service is not
    responsible for this, and you say the scientific panel was
    organized by the D.C. government.
        Mr. King. And the other agencies involved working with
    them--but I would be happy to bring this to their attention to
    the extent that I can.
        Ms. Norton. I wish you would. We will, of course, bring it
    to their attention. It seems to me not in the spirit that at
    least from the beginning the Postal Service certainly has
    operated. And I have absolutely no understanding of why the
    union that represents the largest number of employees would not
    be on the scientific community.
        What concerns me most, of course, is what I indicated from
    the beginning, and that is that we need to calm fears before
    fears arrive. Is there any chance that the local president of
    the APWU is on the committee and is not here perhaps?
        Mr. Braunstein. Not that we are aware of, no.
        Ms. Norton. There was some suggestion that perhaps--so you
    should be aware if in fact somebody from your union had been
    invited. We will just straighten that out right away. I mean,
    this is the kind of thing we need--an all-inclusive
    understanding of everything that is happening. The other unions
    do not have anything to do with this. The Postal Service does
    not have anything to do with this, and I cannot imagine why
    this has happened. We are going to find out why and try to
    straighten that out.
        Mr. Braunstein. Thank you.
        Ms. Norton. Of course, I notice that those who have been
    included seem to be less concerned and not to have the same
    issues that you who have not been included----
        Mr. Braunstein. There is a direct correlation.
        Ms. Norton. Direct correlation--that is exactly what we
    want to avoid. If everybody is in on the deal, then it is going
    to go smoothly, otherwise it certainly is not, and I appreciate
    that this has been raised.
        I want to ask whether or not the three union
    representatives here have seen any effects--psychological or
    mental health effects. What I am anticipating is that given the
    long closure of Brentwood, there may be some reluctance of
    people to go back. I do not know. I thought Mr. Hegarty
    testified. I thought that people might have some say on whether
    they go back. I am not sure about that.
        I mean, this is a big facility and I am sure that could
    involve us in some controversy if whole crews of people decide,
    a whole lot of people decide they do not want to go back. So
    first, I suppose I should clear that up first. Is there an
    obligation as far as you know, of workers who were assigned
    there at Brentwood in the first place, to go back once the all-
    clear sign is up?
        Mr. Hegarty. Yes, Madam Congresswoman, I believe there
    would be an obligation under the collective bargaining
    agreement for the employees to return. What I was referring to
    is if there were a limited number of employees who legitimately
    were fearful for their lives and would not be able to return to
    that facility for psychological reasons, that some
    accommodations could be made within the confines of the
    collective bargaining agreement for them to be transferred to
    other postal facilities.
        Ms. Norton. Do you anticipate from what you understand from
    your own members that there will be reluctance to go back to
    Brentwood?
        Mr. Ferranto. Congresswoman, speaking for the National
    Association of Letter Carriers and speaking for Joe Henry, and
    we are also representing the letter carriers up in New Jersey
    that have the same feelings, there is some apprehension with
    some of our members of not returning to Brentwood. When that
    day comes and the opportunity when they reopen Brentwood, we
    will be in discussions with the Postal Service and with our
    members that have those apprehensions and we will try to work
    all those issues out at that time.
        Ms. Norton. Is there counseling or any other mental health
    service now available to help prepare employees to go back to
    work?
        Mr. Ferranto. We have in our collective bargaining
    agreements an employee assistance program, and that is
    accessible to the employees.
        Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Hegarty, did you have a comment on
    that?
        Mr. Hegarty. Yes, Ms. Vines informs me that we are in the
    process of trying to set up some type of counseling outside of
    the EAP where employees would be able to attend counseling and
    receive pay--you know, be on the clock in other words--that
    they would not have to seek counseling on their own time, and
    possibly get some of these issues put to rest. Again, we are
    hoping that with the increase in communication, as I said in my
    testimony, we want to eliminate any rumors that if the cleanup
    is done properly, if all of the appropriate government and
    health agencies along with the Postal Service are satisfied
    that the building is safe, I think that we may alleviate some
    of the fears.
        In my earlier testimony, what I was referring to is if
    there is still a limited number of employees who absolutely
    will not enter that building, I think we should try to find
    some accommodation for them.
        Ms. Norton. This is an issue of transition that I think is
    very important for labor and management to meet head-on very
    early. Anybody can anticipate that the long closure of this
    facility will lead to some concerns. I have virtually testified
    that I do not have the slightest concern, but I cannot blame
    people for wanting some, as I said, nobody died either where I
    work.
        And again, I believe that most of these fears are
    imaginary, but I can understand why they would be imagined. So
    I think that this notion of counseling has to be proactively
    marketed to people because they have to understand if you are
    telling me that under the collective bargaining agreement they
    cannot choose where they work, and of course one can understand
    that.
        Then, of course, people have to be prepared well in advance
    so that they will not be in jeopardy of their jobs or in
    jeopardy of some sanction if in fact they simply believe they
    cannot go there. They have got to get help concerning how to go
    there, and I know the union would make every attempt to do so.
        And if there is anything this committee can do to
    facilitate those services, I wish you would let us know. I
    consider that part and parcel of what the Congress appropriated
    the money for, to make sure that not only the building got
    clean, but that people felt they could go back into the
    building.
        Mr. Braunstein, did you have something?
        Mr. Braunstein. Yes, Congresswoman Norton, in the middle of
    this crisis not only in Brentwood, but in Hamilton Township in
    New Jersey, and also in Wallingford, the general facility in
    Connecticut, the Postal Service has been less than candid in
    certain aspects. You asked the question earlier today to Mr.
    Day whether or not the facility when it would be reopened,
    whether the employees would be relocated back to the facility--
    that part of the question remained unanswered when the
    testimony of the panel was concluded.
        I spent all day yesterday with the New Jersey delegation
    with folks from Hamilton Township, from Trenton, who have just
    been informed that 66 of their members will not have to worry
    about returning to Hamilton Township because the Postal Service
    is taking advantage of the situation of further victimizing the
    victims by permanently reassigning them away from the facility
    when it is reopened.
        Ms. Norton. What would be the reason for that, Mr.
    Braunstein?
        Mr. Braunstein. They claim, at this point, it was an
    unanswered question, again, with Senator Torricelli yesterday
    that they could provide cost savings and they had not committed
    to reopening the facility with the outgoing function in
    Hamilton Township.
        Ms. Norton. Also, they may close the facility altogether.
        Mr. Braunstein. No, they intend to reopen it, but the
    outgoing mail, the originating mail from that area, from the
    Trenton facility and from Trenton city and suburbs may be
    relocated to Kilmer.
        Ms. Norton. Do you anticipate that the full complement of
    workers may not be called back to Brentwood?
        Mr. Braunstein. They have officially notified the union,
    both the Mail Handlers Union and APWU of 66 positions to be
    relocated. That is one problem.
        Ms. Norton. And what would be the reason for that, Mr.
    Braunstein?
        Mr. Braunstein. Because of cost savings, and the
    employees----
        Ms. Norton. But the employees would not lose their job, and
    they save costs by putting them elsewhere?
        Mr. Braunstein. By canvassing all the mail in one
    centralized location, yes--part of the transformation plan the
    Postal Service has put forward. But for them to be pushing a
    transformation plan on a set of employees who are currently
    victimized by being out of their facility since the same
    timeframe as Brentwood is just irresponsible on the part of the
    Postal Service.
        Ms. Norton. Do you think there might be employees who might
    voluntarily want to be relocated?
        Mr. Braunstein. There may be some that would voluntarily
    want to leave, but obviously the Postal Service has taken the
    position that they will take the junior regular employees and
    excess them out. So that is a major concern for our union in
    terms of----
        Ms. Norton. Is that bargainable?
        Mr. Braunstein. Yes.
        Ms. Norton. Obviously, there are some communications
    problems that need--if they arose in Trenton, and we do not
    need to have them in this large-scale here.
        Mr. Braunstein. And you have a problem in Wallingford,
    where the employees were told for months there were trace
    amounts of anthrax, and months later it was revealed that the
    trace amounts they had been working on were 3 million spores,
    which then were cleaned up. But the employees were given false
    information by the Postal Service for a long period of time.
        So the attitude of the employees in Wallingford, the
    attitude of the employees in Brentwood, and the attitude of the
    employees in Hamilton Township are somewhat similar. They are
    not necessarily being given all the information at the proper
    time.
        Ms. Norton. But for those who have been involved, that has
    not necessarily been the case here at Brentwood.
        Mr. Braunstein. But if I may interrupt, the selective
    elimination of APWU from begin on committees of concern so we
    can inform our employees just feeds into this same situation.
        Ms. Norton. It is stupid and we are going to find out why
    that has happened.
        [Applause.]
        Ms. Norton. I know that there have really been concerns
    about this irradiated mail from employees, and as a result I
    suppose of the intervention of the unions and the discussions
    with management, we understand that an additional ventilation
    step was added. I would like to know if since that step was
    added, there have been fewer complaints from employees
    concerning the irradiated mail or not.
        Mr. Thompson. I could address that issue. In fact, I was
    over at the V Street facilities just the other day which
    handles a lot of this, and there were a couple of different
    things that occurred at the time after the V Street employees
    were exposed to extremely high levels of carbon monoxide in the
    original process. That is when they learned to ventilate the
    mail, and that is when they also learned to ventilate the work
    area at that time.
        Since then, they have also learned that the level of
    irradiation that the post office contractors were using was not
    necessary, so they reduced that level also. And yes, the
    complaints on adverse effects and the severity of the adverse
    effects has gone down. But I do draw to your attention that
    there are still adverse effects.
        There have been studies done--NIOSH has done some. There
    has been a review by the Office of Compliance. Each of them has
    not stated that there are no adverse effects. What they
    basically have stated is that whatever they tested for and
    whatever they looked for as a potential cause, they have not
    been able to identify as being a cause.
        I spoke with the people out at the V Street facility--our
    members, a large number of them over different buildings--and
    asked the very question, are you still experiencing adverse
    effects. And they are. Now, we can go back and say that it was
    the dry air in January. Well, we do not have dry air in July in
    the facilities, and we are still seeing the same effects.
        So we have been very diligent and wanting to find out more
    on, is irradiated mail actually causing adverse effects. APWU
    members and many postal workers handle this mail before it is
    irradiated also. So any hazards that are there, they handle
    this mail for prepping it for radiation prior to that, so they
    have that exposure also.
        Ms. Norton. The people who drive the trucks--is it Mail
    Handlers that represents them?
        Mr. Braunstein. No. APWU does. Yes.
        Ms. Norton. What about the people who drive the trucks with
    this irradiated----
        Mr. Thompson. At the V Street facility, there were a couple
    of the truck drivers who have said that they had the same
    issues.
        Ms. Norton. I know whereof you speak because employees on
    the Hill who obviously do not have the same direct exposure as
    your people are having these complaints. We see how much all of
    this is a work in progress, and why we have to demand the
    highest standards--standards beyond anything anybody would
    imagine because we just do not know what we are doing.
        We have heard complaints about the distribution of masks
    and of gloves and of gloves in the right sizes. Is that still a
    problem?
        Mr. Thompson. We still do hear from----
        [Applause.]
        Ms. Norton. Let your union testify for you. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Thompson. We still do hear complaints regarding masks
    and gloves, both on sizes and types. Some people do not fit
    well with one particular type of glove, or the glove that they
    are provided rips as they are trying to put it on. So there are
    still issues there. That is currently a line of defense for
    employees. There is nothing else that is out there to protect
    employees from an exposure.
        Ms. Norton. Well, I can tell you this, Congress surely
    meant the gloves and the masks to be freely available, and that
    part of that money was clearly meant for that. People have been
    very concerned that their own staffs are feeling this, and they
    are several degrees away from this contamination.
        Mr. Thompson. One of the things that we have noticed that
    is difficult with gloves and masks also is people can be handed
    them and provided limited instruction on what their purpose is
    and how to wear them and how they should fit properly, but if
    they are not taught, really taught, what the purpose of those
    protective measures are, they either do not use them or they
    use them improperly, and that has not been good.
        Ms. Norton. Who would do that teaching?
        Mr. Thompson. That is a Postal Service responsibility to do
    that.
        Ms. Norton. Supervisors?
        Mr. Thompson. It would be down to the supervisors.
        Ms. Norton. And you do not think that is being done?
        Mr. Thompson. Well, I think there are still some issues out
    there that it is not being done properly. It is not being
    certified as being done. I hear it all the time. I get calls
    from the locals all the time that they are not trained. I ask
    people when I go out, have you received the training. And as
    much as we get response back that yes, we have trained
    everybody, when you go out and you ask the people, they have
    not.
        Ms. Norton. Well, the Postal Service is in the room. I am
    simply going to ask that those matters be brought to the
    attention of management. I am also going to ask that the notion
    of these gloves, it is not a lot of money, these gloves and
    masks be brought to the special attention of management.
        Mr. King. I will do that. It is my understanding we have
    millions of gloves. There is no problem with supply of gloves.
    I am hearing today, and I am sorry I do not work in the capital
    district, I work at headquarters, but I will make sure that the
    capital district has a sufficient supply.
        Ms. Norton. This may be a question of sizes, and it sounds
    to me only as an issue that requires some attention, not as
    something that the Postal Service would have any problem with.
        My final question would be, now that employees are
    scattered by necessity, how have people adjusted to their
    current assignments? Do you feel that they are ready for
    transition back in? I would like to know about the adjustment
    process, which obviously has to do with the transition process
    back to Brentwood.
        Mr. Hegarty. With Brentwood and with Trenton, thus far some
    employees are happy because they are working in a facility
    closer to their home. Other employees are very disadvantaged in
    that they have to drive an additional 30 or 40 miles in
    addition to a commute that they already had.
        Ms. Norton. Thirty or 40 miles?
        Mr. Hegarty. Yes, yes. Gaithersburg. In New Jersey, they
    have to drive up to South River, Kilmer, etc.
        Ms. Norton. Was there any attempt to help locate people a
    little closer to home, or was that just done----
        Mr. Hegarty. I am not sure what attempts were made. I do
    know that in most instances, the employees allegedly were told
    that they had to follow the mail.
        So in other words if a great deal of the mail that used to
    be processed is now going to be processed in Gaithersburg, then
    ostensibly a commensurate number of employees would travel to
    Gaithersburg to process that mail. The problem that we have had
    is that there have been some breakdowns in transportation.
        Initially, the Postal Service was providing bus
    transportation and also compensating the employees. In other
    words, when they arrived at their old facility, they clocked
    on. They hit the time clock or they were put on a time clock
    and they were on the clock. They would then be transported to
    the alternate facility, perform their work there, be
    transported back, and then clock out again.
        My understanding, and I have the representatives here from
    the facilities, is that is no longer the case. In some
    instances, the Postal Service is not even providing the
    transportation anymore. So the employees are being told that
    you will have to find your own way from Washington, DC, to
    Gaithersburg and you will not be on the clock until you get to
    the facility.
        Ms. Norton. Do you have any information on that?
        Mr. King. I am sorry. I do not have specific information,
    but we would be happy to try to respond for the record.
        Ms. Norton. Would you respond to the record within 30 days
    on that specific question? If transportation was provided
    before, why would transportation not be provided now,
    particularly given the long distances apparently some employees
    have to travel.
        Did you have some further testimony?
        Mr. Ferranto. Yes, Congresswoman. Initially, letter
    carriers were housed in tents in the parking lots when this
    first happened, and then they were relocated to facilities here
    in Washington. So all of our members are currently working in
    Washington, DC. To further answer your question, President Joe
    Henry here has day-to-day interaction with our members and he
    can further answer your question.
        Mr. Henry. I believe your question, Congresswoman Norton,
    is are they ready to make the transition back if that time
    comes. Our employees are no different than Mail Handlers and
    APWU employees. You have some who probably would welcome
    Brentwood opening back up and are ready to go back. You have
    others who certainly are anxious about whether or not it will
    ever be safe.
        As you said when I heard you talk earlier, some people will
    never believe that it is going to be safe to go back in. And so
    you have, but the majority of them are very practical and if it
    opens and if--one of the things I was gratified by today was
    the fact that when you came to our food drive breakfast, you
    said you were going to have these hearings, and indeed they
    have transpired; that the scope of these hearings certainly
    should help to alleviate many of the fears, if indeed
    everything that you are asking to be done here is done.
        Until today, I am sure after this takes place and if
    everything transpires that you asked, there will be a lot less
    people who will have a lot less fears than they have at the
    present time. So yes, you have some people ready to go back,
    and others who are not.
        Mr. Ferranto. Just as a further comment, hopefully there
    will be some hearings before we reenter Brentwood to make sure
    that all the----
        Ms. Norton. Count on it. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Ferranto. OK. And then we will have an opportunity to
    come back together and be together on this.
        Ms. Norton. I think you deserve at least that.
        Mr. Ferranto. That is right. We appreciate that.
        Ms. Norton. Nobody is perfect here, but we have got to
    strive for perfection.
        Mr. Ferranto. And I would just like to add that these have
    been unprecedented times for us, and these are impressive
    events, and we are doing our best to work through them, and
    together we will get there.
        Ms. Norton. Mr. Braunstein.
        Mr. Braunstein. I also would mirror the previous comments.
    Some employees would welcome the return; others would probably
    prefer not to. But it is really going to come down to a
    question of now much information that the union has also
    provided, both at the national and local level, that will
    increase the level of satisfaction and comfort that the members
    will need to feel for them to make an intelligent and proper
    determination.
        Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Braunstein, all men and women are
    created equal. When it comes to Brentwood, all unions are going
    to be created equal and we are going to see that you are
    included.
        Mr. Braunstein. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much to all of these witnesses--
    very helpful testimony.
        Could I ask the final panel to come forward, and I
    apologize that there has been this delay, but I hope you
    understand that this has been a matter of some concern to the
    community and to the employees, and we want to get it all out
    on the table.
        Louise Martin, president, Brentwood Civic Association;
    James McGee, president, National Alliance of Postal and Federal
    Employees. Is Mr. McGee here? Is Ms. Martin here?
        Would you stand and raise your right hands?
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Ms. Norton. Let the record reflect that each witness
    answered the question in the affirmative. You may be seated.
        Ms. Martin, the president of the Brentwood Civic
    Association, I am glad to receive your testimony.

        STATEMENTS OF LOUISE MARTIN, PRESIDENT, BRENTWOOD CIVIC
     ASSOCIATION; AND JAMES M. MCGEE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ALLIANCE
                    OF POSTAL AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

        Ms. Martin. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton and other
    members of the committee. My name is Louise B. Martin. I am a
    resident of the Brentwood Community Association; also a
    resident of--I lost my place. My name is Louise B. Martin. I
    did not forget that. [Laughter.]
        I am a resident of the Brentwood community. My address is
    1340 Downing Street, NE, since 1954, and a Washington resident
    since 1952. I am president of the Brentwood Community
    Association.
        In reference to the cleanup of the postal facility, my
    concern as is most of the neighborhood is the protection of the
    residents--businesses and workers in the post office. I have
    attended every meeting held in reference to and regarding to
    the decontamination of the Brentwood postal facility, after
    which we have discussed this in our own groups as far as our
    knowledge of the process would allow. Still, there remain
    questions about the safety set-up around the perimeter of the
    building during and after fumigation.
        We know the smell of chlorine in the event that some of it
    escapes. However, what about the other three gases being mixed
    with the chlorine? After having read the above, there was less
    concern among some residents that read about and listened to
    the facts about the cleanup of the Hart Building. We are aware
    that the Brentwood facility is much larger, therefore creating
    a larger use of chemicals. That is our concern. Our concern is
    if some of these gases escape, how are they going to contain
    it.
        Since I have been here, I have heard the answers to some of
    the questions. But the sampling is going to be inside. What
    about when they do the full decontamination? I will stop right
    here to answer that.
        Ms. Norton. What about when they do the----
        Ms. Martin. Yes. When they are going to do a sampling on
    Monday, and the gases and whatever they are going to put into
    the building is going to be contained inside. Am I right?
        Ms. Norton. The whole point is to always have the gases
    contained inside, even when they do the whole building.
        Ms. Martin. No, but I mean, pumping it in--from where would
    they pump it in?
        Ms. Norton. Your question, Ms. Martin, simply raises the
    notion that your councilmember did--that there are still
    questions that the community feels it does not have adequate
    answers to. So not to worry, we are going to make sure that you
    get very specific answers to those questions.
        Do you want to continue with your testimony?
        Ms. Martin. No, that is my testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Martin follows:]

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        Ms. Norton. That is your testimony.
        Ms. Martin. That is our concern.
        Ms. Norton. And your concern about the three gases--the
    other gases?
        Ms. Martin. They are supposed to be mixed to make it,
    right?
        Ms. Norton. Yes.
        Ms. Martin. That is what we are concerned about--if it
    escapes and no one knows even when they smell it they do not
    know what they are smelling. Is this coming from the post
    office? If in the event, and we hope that does not happen, they
    would not know. They would not know what it would smell like. I
    am not sure that anybody can answer it.
        Can they answer, because I have heard a lot of unanswered
    questions since I have been sitting here, but I will bet there
    are a lot of questions that I can go back and tell some of the
    people that I did learn today. I have attended all of the
    meetings and read all of the literature, but I did hear some
    things today that they have discussed, and that is whether the
    gases are going to be--because we were under the illusion that
    these gases were going to be missed outside in a tank--you
    know, like in a tank on a trailer and then pumped into the
    building.
        But today, I am hearing something different about the
    sampling. So I assume that the sampling is going to be
    contained inside, and they would do all the rest of it inside.
    That is our concern.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Ms. Martin.
        Mr. McGee.
        Mr. Mcgee. Thank you.
        Good afternoon, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton,
    members of the committee. I am James McGee, national president
    of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees. I
    welcome the opportunity to present the views of the NAPFE on
    the unprecedented effort to decontaminate and reenter a
    facility the size of Brentwood Processing Center of the
    widespread anthrax contamination.
        NAPFE is the Nation's oldest and largest independent black-
    led labor union. We represent thousands of postal workers
    nationwide. Here in the District, we represent hundreds of
    workers at the Brentwood facility and I might add that number
    is some 700 members across all crafts--mail handlers, clerks
    and carriers.
        Throughout its 89-year history, NAPFE has worked to ensure
    the rights of postal and Federal workers to work free from
    discrimination in a safe and secure environment. The challenge
    of the Brentwood cleanup is to ensure a safe environment at a
    time when the Federal and medical authorities know very little
    about the threat involved and are learning as they go along.
        When staffers in Senator Daschle's office opened a letter
    containing anthrax spores on October 15, 2001, the prevailing
    medical wisdom at the time was that postal workers who handled
    the letter were not at risk. This proved to be a tragic error
    for which postal workers Thomas Morris Jr. and Joseph Curseen
    paid with their lives.
        Others experienced the serious illness of anthrax
    inhalation and still countless others have suffered and
    continue to suffer from symptoms that while not recognized as
    being directly related to anthrax, developed after exposure. In
    addition, there have been negative side effects from the
    powerful antibiotics used to protect them from this deadly
    illness.
        Now, at a time when the Postal Service and Federal agencies
    such as the Centers for Disease Control, are suffering from a
    crisis of trust and confidence, the Postal Service undertakes
    the unprecedented cleanup of anthrax contamination in a
    facility the size of Brentwood.
        I thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee for
    convening this hearing at this time to hear from the experts
    planning and implementing the cleanup, and those of us who
    represent workers at Brentwood. It is extremely important that
    postal workers and the public and their representatives learn
    as much as possible about the cleanup effort and be able to
    give their views on the process.
        I commend Councilman Vincent Orange for organizing, and the
    Postal Service for holding meetings to inform the public about
    the procedures. I commend the Postal Service for establishing a
    community information line and for its own line, Brentwood
    Update. The Postal Service and the various health agencies got
    off to a slow start in protecting postal workers from this
    threat, unaware of the dangers involved, but have since worked
    diligently to meet the threats posed by this unprecedented
    danger. I thank them for that.
        However, since the Brentwood cleanup is an experiment, one
    that is not occurring in a vacuum and is putting at risk
    hundreds of lives, the Postal Service and Federal and local
    health authorities have an affirmative duty to reach out to
    postal workers and the public as often as it is necessary to
    address understandable feelings of apprehension at the process.
    While chlorine dioxide was successfully used to decontaminate
    the Hart Senate Building, its efficacy is unproven for the
    cleanup of a building the size of the Brentwood facility and
    with the type of equipment installed there.
        Postal workers are not only distressed that public health
    authorities failed to recognize the risk of anthrax exposure to
    their lives in a timely manner, they are also disheartened at
    the lack of adequate followup after being given cipro and
    doxycycline. Workers were given written advisories at the time
    they received treatment, but feel that little has been done
    since to address their concerns or to track the effects of the
    medications given.
        I urge the Postal Service and the health agencies to
    establish a systematic process where these concerns can be
    addressed. Given the complexity of the cleanup at hand, the
    onus should be on those agencies to actively seek out and
    reassure workers and to actively address complaints and
    concerns. Based on discussions we have had with Brentwood
    employees, it appears the current system that the Postal
    Service and the CDC have in place is inadequate to monitor the
    current health status of employees exposed to anthrax.
        Therefore, we recommend that the Postal Service set up a
    formal ongoing monitoring system of both the immediate and
    long-term consequences of the decontamination of the building
    and health status of employees for as long as it takes for
    workers and the public to feel safe. Understandably, given the
    mistakes of the past, postal workers must feel assured that
    this cleanup will be subject to the same standards used at the
    Hart Building. I am heartened that the Postal Service is
    pursuing a zero-spore standard.
        This process requires teamwork, not only for the Postal
    Service, but with agencies such as EPA and the White House
    Office of Science and Technology Policy, but between the Postal
    Service, its workers and their representatives. The events
    surrounding the anthrax exposure at Brentwood highlighted how
    little health officials knew about how to protect postal
    workers from such a bioterror threat.
        The cleanup of the facility is one of the confidence-
    building measures that the Postal Service and health agencies
    must perform. We are confident that the Postal Service would
    not knowingly put its workers at risk and applaud it for the
    actions it has taken thus far. The Postal Service should not
    miss the opportunity to learn from past mistakes. We urge them
    to set up a formal system of responding to employee concerns
    for all of the circumstances surrounding the anthrax exposure,
    not only for the cleanup.
        We thank you for your attention, and look forward to
    working with all involved on this vital process.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McGee follows:]

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        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. McGee.
        Let me ask both of you whether you are satisfied with the
    level of communication that you have had from the Postal
    Service.
        Ms. Martin. Well, I think the communication that we have
    had has been through the meetings that were called by the
    councilmember.
        Ms. Norton. Has the Postal Service had meetings themselves?
        Ms. Martin. The Postal Service at that time passed out
    question and answers and an explanation of what was going on
    that was very informative to all the people who got them at
    those meetings. These were the meetings that were called by the
    councilperson. Also, I think the post office had a meeting, and
    some of these forms were passed out at their meeting. Those
    were the things that we had discussed.
        There is no answer. I am confident that I do not think they
    have the answer. I do not think they have the answer. They are
    trying to get it. And so, we have to think about what may
    happen, not what they think is going to happen. Like, how are
    they going to let us know when they are going to start, how
    long it is going to take, and will they notify us?
        Ms. Norton. Were you pleased that these door-to-door
    meetings, or this door-to-door--we are told that people will be
    going from door to door during this test. Do you think that is
    the appropriate----
        Ms. Martin. To pass our information to let us know when
    they are going to start?
        Ms. Norton. Apparently. And here, I do not have the full
    details, but they have mentioned that they will be going from
    door to door during the test as a way to communicate to the
    people in the immediate area concerning what is going on. Is
    that an appropriate way to behave?
        Ms. Martin. I think that would be one way--through the
    media, through the papers. Everybody does not listen to
    television, but I think more people listen to television than
    read the papers, so that they will know. But I have heard on
    several of the channels that they were going from door to door
    prior to this preview.
        Ms. Norton. Test, yes.
        Ms. Martin. Yes--that they are having--sampling test.
    Supposedly, I do not know what it is going to be tomorrow or
    Sunday because someone here from that health group said that it
    would be done Monday. So are they going out Saturday? Are they
    going out Sunday?
        Ms. Norton. Mr. McGee.
        Mr. Mcgee. Well, Congresswoman Norton, we are not
    satisfied. We are not included. We have asked to be included so
    that we could provide definitive answers to our members. We
    have not been included in updates and what have you.
        Ms. Norton. You have a different status, I take it.
        Mr. Mcgee. We are not exclusive. We are not exclusive, and
    we understand that. But now we are talking about the health and
    safety of people's lives, and I think that supersedes being a
    part of the collective bargaining. We are recognized by the one
    agency that we should be as a labor union in this country, and
    that is the U.S. Government. We have to report just like
    everybody else.
        Ms. Norton. You are not a part of any collective bargaining
    agreement.
        Mr. Mcgee. No, not in the Postal Service.
        Ms. Norton. In the Postal Service.
        Mr. Mcgee. In the Postal Service. However, we do have an
    exclusive at the one agency responsible for the public health,
    and that is the Centers for Disease Control.
        Ms. Norton. Well, I want to thank both of you for this
    important testimony. We have tried during this hearing to make
    sure we spanned the entire array, yes, including your union,
    Mr. McGee----
        Mr. Mcgee. Thank you.
        Ms. Norton [continuing]. Of those who have any involvement
    in Brentwood, and your testimony has been valuable to us. As we
    hear it, we communicate these matters back to the post office
    to get answers concerning them.
        I want to thank not only these last two witnesses for
    remaining so long and being so patient, but to thank the many
    members of the audience who came, including many employees,
    many residents who are trying to find out for themselves so
    that they can make an independent judgment.
        We think that is the intelligent and careful way to try to
    evaluate what is happening. I appreciate their interest. I
    appreciate the willingness of Gallaudet University and the
    Kellogg Center to donate this facility so that we could have a
    field hearing on this important matter.
        I want to indicate to those who did not testify that the
    record will be open for five legislative days, so that is more
    than 5 days, in order to receive the testimony of anybody else
    who would like to testify. I would like to particularly thank
    our sign language interpreters. This is a hard and important
    job that they do--Pamela Harrison and Tyrone Harper, who
    assisted us during this hearing.
        I would also like to thank our staff without whom this
    hearing simply would be impossible, who do all of the grunt
    work in preparation for hearings like this--Jean Gosa, Denise
    Wilson, Jon Bouker, Cheryl Williams, Doxie McCoy from my staff;
    from the staff of Congresswoman Morella, Russell Smith, Matthew
    Batt, Shalley Kim, Robert White, Heea Vazirani-Fales--all of
    whom contributed to this hearing.
        And let me finally offer the apologies of the good chair of
    the committee who wanted very strongly to be here, and had
    congressional business that made it absolutely impossible for
    her to attend because she had amendments of her own on the
    floor, so that she had absolutely no choice. She does want me
    to indicate that she will look at the record and will work
    closely with me in followup to this hearing. We do not have
    hearings as 1-day shows. We have hearings in order to learn
    what the Congress should do.
        I want to thank those who provided security and who took
    the record for this hearing, and I want to indicate, as I thank
    everyone who attended once again, that this hearing on
    Brentwood past and future is now concluded.
        [Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella and
    additional information submitted for the hearing record
    follow:]

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