[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PRIVACY VS. SECURITY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-166
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
85-122 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairman
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia, DC
------ ------ DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Russell Smith, Staff Director
Howie Denis, Professional Staff Member
Matthew Batt, Clerk
Jon Bouker, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 22, 2002................................... 1
Statement of:
Barnes, Johnny, executive director, American Civil Liberties
Union, National Capital Area; Ronald Goldstock, American
Bar Association; and John Woodward, Jr., RAND.............. 57
Patterson, Kathleen, chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Council of the District of Columbia; Margret Nedelkoff
Kellems, deputy mayor, Public Safety and Justice, District
of Columbia government; Charles Ramsey, chief, Metropolitan
Police Department, District of Columbia; and John Parsons,
associate regional director, National Capital Region,
National Service........................................... 13
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Barnes, Johnny, executive director, American Civil Liberties
Union, National Capital Area, prepared statement of........ 60
Goldstock, Ronald, American Bar Association, prepared
statement of............................................... 69
Kellems, Margret Nedelkoff, deputy mayor, Public Safety and
Justice, District of Columbia government, prepared
statement of............................................... 40
Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 4
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 10
Parsons, John, associate regional director, National Capital
Region, National Service, prepared statement of............ 33
Patterson, Kathleen, chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Council of the District of Columbia, prepared statement of. 16
Ramsey, Charles, chief, Metropolitan Police Department,
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 24
Woodward, John, Jr., RAND, prepared statement of............. 78
PRIVACY VS. SECURITY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Constance A.
Morella (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Morella and Norton.
Staff present: Russell Smith, staff director; Heea
Vazirani-Fales, counsel; Matthew Batt, legislative assistant/
clerk; Robert White, communications director; Shalley Kim,
staff assistant; Howie Denis, professional staff member
(Davis); Jon Bouker, minority counsel; and Earley Green,
minority assistant clerk.
Mrs. Morella. Good morning. I am going to call the
Subcommittee of the District of Columbia hearing to order. Our
issue today is privacy versus security, electronic surveillance
in the Nation's Capital. I want to welcome everybody who is
here.
I am going to ask that my opening comment, in its entirety,
be included in the record because I am going to give an
abbreviated version. Thank you. Without objection.
We live in the video age. Police forces, including the
Metropolitan Police Department, are increasingly employing
video surveillance, both to deter crime and to catch criminals.
The Metropolitan Police Department is in the process of
establishing the most extensive surveillance network in the
United States; a system that could ultimately include more than
1,000 cameras, all linked to a central command station
accessible to not only the District police but the FBI, the
Capitol Police, the Secret Service, and other law enforcement
agencies.
The existence of such a network raises many questions.
Among them, does the prevalence of cameras inhibit our privacy
rights? Are those cameras effective in deterring or solving
crimes? And, perhaps most urgently, who gave permission for the
implementation of this system, and where are the policies
governing its use?
I believe there has been an unfortunate lack of public
debate on these issues. Even supporters of electronic
surveillance concede that police departments should only use
these cameras if there is a widespread public desire for such
technology.
There is clearly no consensus the District of Columbia for
or against these cameras, because the public only learned about
their existence after they had been put in place. Citizens must
have confidence that electronic surveillance is not going to
infringe on their rights, including what Justice Louis Brandeis
described as our most precious rights, the right to be left
alone.
We saw the dangers of moving too quickly with this
technology when the District had its problems with the faulty
red light cameras, and the due process issues now being raised
regarding the speeding cameras.
I understand the Metropolitan Police Department now has 13
closed circuit cameras of its own linked to its joint
operations command center, and it is working on linking the
center to several hundred existing cameras in public schools
and subway stations.
There are also plans to connect the center with hundreds of
regional natural traffic cameras. One of the biggest concerns
that I have is that once this system is in place, it will be
too tempting for the police not to use it to its full force. It
is the old camel's nose story, or maybe we should say the
camera's nose. Once the camel gets his nose under the tent,
pretty soon the rest of the camel will be under the tent. And
once the police have cameras that can see anywhere in the city,
pretty soon the police will be using those cameras to look
anywhere in the city.
In London, a camera system initiated to combat IRA
terrorism has sprouted into a network with an estimated 2\1/2\
million cameras. The average Londoner is caught on film about
300 times a day, and no terrorists have been caught by the
cameras' use.
Does the Nation's Capital want to build such a system? I
have heard Chief Ramsey say no, that this is a system designed
to be event-specific, to be activated only during threats of
terror or large public events. But Mayor Williams had said
publically that the city should follow the lead of cities such
as London which use the cameras to enhance day-to-day policing.
The chief has said the Department will consider installing
cameras in neighborhoods that have problems with drug markets
and the like.
Obviously, some guidance, maybe legislation from the Mayor
and the Council of the District of Columbia is needed to
establish how extensive this camera network should be and what
safeguards are necessary to protect privacy rights.
The policymakers must give clear direction to the police.
Congress, too, may have to step in and ensure that this
technology does take--does not take away our right to be left
alone, as it has in the past when privacy concerns have become
an issue. This is especially true given the testimony from the
U.S. Park Service, which is planning to place cameras at the
monuments on our National Mall.
We have two panels today, one that will primarily focus on
the District's own surveillance system, and one that will be
able to broaden the discussion a little further into the
Constitutional and legislative questions. We did invite several
others to testify, including the Capitol Police and Justice
Department, but they declined, saying they had no role to play
in the discussion of the District's surveillance network. And
the British Government doesn't let government officials testify
before Congress, so we were unable to get someone who could
speak with firsthand knowledge about London's experience.
In concluding my remarks, I wanted to say that our Nation's
Capital stands as an ultimate symbol to American freedom. Since
taking the chairmanship of this subcommittee 15 months ago, I
have worked with Congresswoman Norton on many issues, but
perhaps no single one as frequently as trying to keep this city
safe, open and accessible to the residents, businesses, and 19
million tourists who come here each year.
I have said before that we cannot turn the District into
Ft. Washington. It matters not whether that fortress is built
with an impenetrable ring of concrete barriers or with an
unregulated network of digital cameras.
It is now my pleasure to recognize the ranking member,
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes-Norton, for her opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella
follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Thank you, Ms. Morella. I appreciate the
leadership of our chair, Connie Morella, in focusing our
subcommittee on important issues of privacy raised by security
threats and technology that have been become a special concern
since the September 11th attack.
The surveillance cameras at issue were initiated before
September 11th, however. Initially they were not used because
of terrorist threats to security, but for law enforcement
purposes at national events where lawlessness from
demonstrators and others sometimes occurs.
Thus, it seems clear that as technology becomes available,
government, like the rest of us, gravitate toward its use.
However, government is not like the rest of us. Government is
not like citizens with a new toy. There are deeply felt
cultural norms and critical constitutional limits on how public
officials may carry out their work, even responsibilities as
important as public safety. For Americans, where cameras that
view residents should be placed is not merely a security issue.
Personal privacy and the right to be left alone, especially
from interference by government, is an identifying
characteristic of what it means to be an American.
Nevertheless, much of what we have focus on today is
uncharted territory. Our subcommittee is one of the first in
Congress to investigate surveillance cameras that are used for
security purposes, perhaps the very first.
Such cameras in the District present a particularly
difficult case for arriving at the appropriate balance in a
society like ours. As the Nation's Capital, the District is a
presumed terrorist target. And as the use of the surveillance
cameras here, even before September 11th, shows, the city also
is the formal site for many national and international events
that have the potential to generate harm to residents and
visitors and damage to property.
The cameras are now connected to the District's joint
operations command center. And I want to especially commend
council member Kathy Patterson, chair of the City Council's
Committee on the Judiciary, for promptly calling witnesses and
for planning further hearings concerning the surveillance
cameras. The city's first hearing has uncovered important
information and already is leading to remedial action.
This subcommittee has larger Federal concerns that affect
not only the District, but the Nation. Even the District's use
of surveillance cameras was motivated not by District matters,
but by security needs at national and international events. And
already the District system is trending toward other Federal
uses that may rapidly become significantly greater than local
involvement.
Initially at least five of 13 locations are to Federal
sites. Already three more Federal agencies may be seeking
connections. There is no way to avoid the conclusion that in
the new era of global terrorism, the District's cameras
surveillance system is inevitably already part and parcel of
the Nation's homeland defense.
As such, the surveillance is likely to be imitated in other
locations, especially in the many jurisdictions where there is
a Federal presence. The need to assure greater security in the
Nation's Capital and elsewhere, especially following September
11th, is beyond debate.
Today, however, we will want to know more about the uses to
which the system is being and could be put, how and when the
system is used, its limits, its known benefits and dangers, and
what the surveillance has accomplished so far.
As perhaps the first such surveillance system in the
country, there is a heavy burden on the users to set the
appropriate example and to do it right. However, public
officials here are caught in a dilemma not of their own making.
Like other officials throughout the country, they are being
asked to respond to the unknown with no precedence to guide
them.
I believe that it is both unfair and dangerous for the
national government to ask local and State officials to figure
out the plethora of complicated issues involving security,
privacy and openness no society in the history of the world has
had to face without any Federal guidance.
However, the Federal Government itself faces the same
complicated challenge, to protect the people while maintaining
their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The example that the
Federal Government is offering leaves much to be desired.
Federal officials are quickly throwing up new approaches and
systems from shutdowns, barricades and public exclusion to
camera surveillance, wholesale round-ups and electronic
surveillance, without regard to the Fourth Amendment or other
constitutional protections, and without notice and public
hearings or even any public explanation.
Civil libertarians are right to question much about this
response, and public officials are right to revitalize their
responsibility to protect the public with new and increased
seriousness.
However, both the general public and public officials need
more explicit guidance from the Federal Government. Yet
Homeland Security Director, Tom Ridge, has all he can do simply
to catch up to an increasing set of new demands created by
September 11th, most of them just beginning to take on the
basics, such as calibrated alerts, and the security safeguards
that are necessary to fully reopen National Airport.
Because both the local and Federal Governments face the
same dilemma, it is particularly unjustifiable that nearly all
of the Federal officials invited to testify today have
declined. They are the Office of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Capitol Police, and the U.S. Secret Service, particularly since
most of the new security needs or requirements are Federal in
origin.
The least that Congress is entitled to is the kind of
testimony that can be presented without injury to national
security. When even that testimony is withheld, complaints from
administration agencies concerning any legislation that results
will be unavailing. I believe that a more cooperative and
forthright approach that faces these dilemmas head-on together
trying to find solutions is what is needed to help sort out the
conundrum of at once opening the society and closing down
terrorism.
I will shortly be introducing the Open Society With
Security Act, along with a Senate sponsor. The bill would
authorize a Presidential commission to bring together the best
minds in the society to investigate how our country can meet
the high standards necessary to effectively fight the dangerous
menace of international terrorism while accommodating and
affirming the central American values of privacy, openness and
public access.
Like the Kerner Commission, the Open Society With Security
Commission would help us to chart a safe course through deep
waters, without surrendering the very values that lead us to
insist upon defending our country and our way of life.
We can do better than blunt and often untested and
ineffective instruments that crush our liberty. I spent my
early years at the bar as assistant legal director for the
national ACLU, and today I have responsibilities for national
security as a Member of Congress. My experience in both roles
has reinforced my confidence that American ingenuity is ready
for the new challenge of winning the struggle against dangerous
and dogmatic terrorism, while maintaining and enriching the
free and open democratic society that virtually defines our
country.
I welcome today's witnesses and appreciate their testimony.
I am certain that when we have heard them, all of us will be in
a better position to find the appropriate solutions. Thank you,
Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton
follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. I am going
to ask our first panel to come forward, please. Before they are
seated, if you will continue to stand so I can administer the
oath that is the tradition before this full committee and
subcommittee.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mrs. Morella. The record will reflect affirmative response.
We have for our first panel Kathleen Patterson, chairwoman
of the Committee on the Judiciary, the Council of the District
of Columbia. Welcome, Ms. Patterson. We also have our police
chief, Charles Ramsey, chief of the Metropolitan Police
Department of the District of Columbia. And we have John
Parsons, associate regional director, National Capital Region
of the National Park Service. Margret Nedelkoff Kellems, Deputy
Mayor for Public Safety and Justice of the District of Columbia
is on her way, and when she arrives, we will swear her in and
listen to her testimony. You are all veterans of this
subcommittee and other subcommittees and committees, and so I
would request that again you keep your comments to about 5
minutes, and the entire testimony that you submit will be
included in the record and that will give us a chance to ask
this first panel questions. So we start off with you,
Chairwoman Patterson.
STATEMENTS OF KATHLEEN PATTERSON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; MARGRET
NEDELKOFF KELLEMS, DEPUTY MAYOR, PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT; CHARLES RAMSEY, CHIEF,
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; AND JOHN
PARSONS, ASSOCIATE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
NATIONAL SERVICE
Ms. Patterson. Thank you very much. And good morning. Thank
you. As you noted, I am council member Kathy Patterson. I
represent Ward 3 and I serve as chair of the council Committee
on the Judiciary which has oversight responsibilities for the
Metropolitan Police Department and criminal justice issues
generally.
Deputy Mayor Kellems and Chief Ramsey will, I am sure, give
you an overview of what is in place today in the District in
terms of video surveillance employed by the Metropolitan Police
Department's Synchronized Operations Command Center, and I am
here to share the perspective of the legislature.
First, surveillance, including photo surveillance, is a
longstanding and legitimate tool for law enforcement in the
District of Columbia, as it is elsewhere. The D.C. Code, for
example, includes a definition of the term ``law enforcement
vehicle'' that includes surveillance as a law enforcement
activity. The more recent Drug-Related Nuisance Abatement Act
of 1999 permits a court to issue an order to abate a nuisance
that would include, ``use of videotape surveillance of the
property and adjacent alleys, sidewalks or parking lots.''
And our courts have long had the authority to issue
warrants for electronic surveillance in connection with crimes
and offenses committed within the District of Columbia.
What is at issue today, as you both have noted, is whether
technology itself has blurred or even moved the line between
what is longstanding and legitimate law enforcement use of
surveillance and what is an unwarranted and potentially illegal
violation of privacy rights. Surveillance cameras mounted on
District buildings now can monitor the movements of individuals
up to and including creating images that can be scanned into a
computer and used much as fingerprints are used today.
It is fair to say that are two distinct and divergent
reactions to this use of technology: Those who fear a loss of
privacy and those who see ready advantage in the use of cutting
edge technology as a crime fighting tool. Many District
residents have expressed concern about the potential intrusion
into their lives and space. Guy Gwynne, on behalf of the
Federation of Citizens Associations of the District of
Columbia, testified before the Council Committee on the
Judiciary in February as follows.
We have Federal and State laws against wiretapping with
heavy penalties. Obviously we cannot omit having the same sort
of citizen protection extended to the new technology and its
largely undefined legal status.
The Federation recommends legislation to define the legal
use of surveillance, including protecting privacy and security
of file tapes, and civil and criminal penalties for anyone who
abuses a surveillance system.
Another witness before the Judiciary Committee in February
was Mara Verheyden-Hilliard, who defends a group of
demonstrators who have demonstrated in the District of Columbia
on international economic policy, and notes that the police
department has been surveilling such demonstrations for quite
some time, including demonstrations in 2000 and 2001.
At the same council hearing, the ACLU provided research
information that I am sure their testimony will provide to this
committee today in terms of experiences elsewhere.
I have summarized the viewpoint of the District residents
who are concerned about surveillance cameras. Others support
the concept wholeheartedly and want to know what they can do to
bring cameras into their own neighborhoods. They want
surveillance technology as a potential deterrent to
neighborhood crime. I would note that 6 years ago the parents
of the junior high school my children attended raised their own
money to install closed circuit television as a security
measure. Since that time D.C. public schools have installed
video monitoring systems in 20 elementary schools, 56 junior
and senior high schools, with broad support from parents and
residents.
The school system is moving forward to having such systems
in place in all of the city's schools, paid for in part with
Federal Emergency Preparedness funds. The council of the
District of Columbia adopted emergency legislation earlier this
month to require that guidelines drafted by the police
department come to us for review.
This is clearly an issue calling for extensive and wide-
reaching public discussion, and I anticipate further public
hearings on the issue. The council as a body has not taken a
position on the use of surveillance, and I suspect we will, as
a group, be of the same two minds I am reflecting in this
testimony, concern with privacy rights and concern with use of
technology to the maximum extent possible to promote public
safety.
Having seen what is available at the police department's
operations center, it is easy to understand the potential use
of such surveillance; its use, for example, in a city-wide
evacuation; its use in responding to a major fire or any other
large scale emergency.
The use in protests is another matter. The potential use of
image scanning is yet a more difficult issue. I would like to
underscore that it is my responsibility and that of my
colleagues and Mayor Williams to find the appropriate balance
between privacy and public safety and to establish that balance
in public policy.
I would also respectfully suggest that this committee and
this Congress also needs to take up the issue, and I am
delighted to hear Congresswoman Norton mention legislation to
provide a national debate on this issue. We all have our work
cut out for us in discussing and debating how and whether we
use advances in technology, for what purpose and with what
result.
Thank you very much and I would be happy to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Patterson follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Patterson.
And you have been concise, and I note that you have
extrapolated from your submitted written testimony. Pleasure to
have you with us as always.
Chief Ramsey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ramsey. Good morning, Madam Chair, Congresswoman
Norton, members of the subcommittee staff and guests.
In recent weeks an awful lot has been written about the
Metropolitan Police Department's use of closed circuit TV or
CCTV. Much of the reporting has been factual. Regrettably, some
of it has been less than accurate, and I applaud the
subcommittee for calling today's hearing, and I thank you for
the opportunity to inject not only the facts, but also some
perspective into this discussion.
Let me state up front that the Metropolitan Police
Department welcomes public scrutiny for our policies and
programs. Our joint operations command center remains an open
book, accessible to news reporters, law enforcement officials
and political leaders from across the country and around the
world.
When the ACLU and others expressed concern about our use of
CCTV, we invited those groups in for a demonstration and
meeting. The bottom line: We welcome public debate, but we ask
that the debate be based on facts, not on conjecture.
Fact No. 1. The Metropolitan Police Department is using
CCTV in public spaces only in a limited legal and responsible
manner. We are not running a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week video
monitoring operation. The joint operations command center is
activated only during major events in our city: Large
demonstrations, Presidential inaugurations and the like, or
during periods of heightened alert for terrorism such as the
weeks immediately following September 11th and during the
Olympic Games in Salt Lake City.
During other times, including right now, the center is not
operational. Our use of CCTV is need-driven, when there are
specific threats and tangible public safety benefits from
activating it.
Another misconception is that our department has a vast
network of hundreds of cameras at our disposal at any moment.
We do not. Our current system includes approximately a dozen
cameras, mounted on buildings in downtown D.C. and focused on
high-risk targets for terrorism, including the National Mall
and public spaces outside Union Station, the White House and
the Capitol.
During times of heightened alert, the cameras gave us a
clear real-time view of those potential targets without having
to dedicate police officers on the ground to this type of
monitoring activity. Our use of CCTV is legal. The cameras
monitor only public spaces. There is no audio overhear
capability in our system. As such, we are not engaging in
electronic surveillance as defined in law.
And, finally, the use of CCTV is sensitive to the privacy
expectations of individuals. When our cameras are operational,
they generally focus on broad public spaces, not on individuals
within those areas, and we do not employ any type of face
recognition technology.
Fact No. 2. The Metropolitan Police Department is working
to link our joint operations command center with other public
agency closed-circuit television systems that monitor public
spaces, but we have no interest in linking with privately
operated networks that monitor private space.
We are particularly interested in linking with the traffic
cameras operated by transportation agencies in D.C., Maryland
and Virginia, giving us real-time information on traffic flow
and bottlenecks during major events or evacuations. We have
already successfully tested a linkage with the CCTV system
operated by the D.C. Public Schools. This type of real-time
visual information would be extremely valuable in responding to
a Columbine-like incident. And we have begun discussions with
Metro about linking with its video system in stations and
platforms.
In all of these instances, there is one critically
important safeguard: Access to these systems is controlled by
the agency that operates the cameras, not by the Metropolitan
Police Department.
With the public schools, for example, there are strict
protocols governing access to their CCTV system. Only the
schools, not the police department, can activate the system,
and only the schools can allow us in.
With respect to privately operated video networks, the
Metropolitan Police Department is not linking with such systems
now, nor do we have any plans to do so. We have absolutely no
interest in peering into the private activities of anyone.
Fact No. 3. The Metropolitan Police Department is very
carefully evaluating any expansion into neighborhood-based
cameras. Currently we are able to access a camera mounted near
the corner of Wisconsin Avenue and M Street Northwest in the
Georgetown commercial-entertainment district. That camera was
purchased by the business and professional community which then
approached our department about monitoring the public space
images from a community policing center in Georgetown. Our
department agreed to this request in part because we want to
evaluate the operational feasibility and public safety benefits
of a neighborhood-based camera.
In recent weeks our department has received several
inquiries from our community groups requesting CCTV in their
neighborhoods to help combat robberies, thefts and other street
crime. We are carefully studying the issues involved, including
cost, scope and length of operation, resources needed to
monitor the cameras, and privacy issues.
With any neighborhood-based installations, there are
certainly principles that we would follow. First, any cameras
would have to target a specific crime problem for which CCTV
technology may be beneficial.
Second, there would have to be extensive dialog with the
community about the deployment of cameras and widespread
community support for their use.
Fact four. As technology has advanced, our policies and
procedures have not always kept pace. One of the concerns
raised by ACLU and others, and shared by myself and other MPD
leaders, was that policies and procedures governing our use of
video were not as specific and formalized as they should be.
Who could activate the command center, who controls the
cameras, what images would be recorded, if so, how long would
the tapes be retained?
These are legitimate issues that need to be clarified. Over
the last month our department has initiated a fast track
process to develop now policies in this area. We are currently
finalizing a new department directive for the Mayor's review
and approval on the use of CCTV. The development of stronger
policies and procedures will not only enhance public confidence
in the system, but also safeguard against any possible abuses.
And, finally, the Metropolitan Police Department does not
view CCTV as a panacea in achieving either neighborhood safety
or homeland security. It is just one more tool that can support
these efforts. Our intention is not to somehow transform
policing in our city from a neighborhood-based community
policing strategy into one that hinges on CCTV.
This technology, when used properly, can support community
policing. But I know it will never replace community policing.
We are in a unique time, in a unique city, a city that faces
not only serious crime problems, but also the very real threat
of terrorism. And the Metropolitan Police Department has the
unique responsibility of protecting not only our residents, but
also the millions of people who come to our Nation's Capital
every year to work, to visit, to petition their government.
Given the enormous challenges we face, I would argue that
it would be irresponsible for us not to use every legal tool at
our disposal, including video technology, to help protect our
city, and ultimately our democracy. We will continue to use
these tools judiciously, responsibly, openly, and with strong
public oversight. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramsey follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Chief Ramsey. John Parsons, the
Associate Regional Director of the National Capital Region of
the National Park Service. And then we will give you a chance
to catch your breath, Ms. Kellems. Thank you.
Mr. Parsons. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and Mrs.
Norton. I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of
the Department of Interior on the issue of privacy and security
with respect to the use of electronic surveillance in the
Nation's Capital.
The National Park Service is privileged to have the
responsibility for managing some of our Nation's most treasured
symbols, including ones in the monumental core of Washington,
D. C. The monumental core includes the Washington Monument, the
Lincoln, Jefferson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorials, the
White House complex, and the Korean War Veterans and Vietnam
Veterans War Memorials.
For several years the National Park Service, with the
guidance of the U.S. Park Police, our urban law enforcement
arm, has been working on enhancing security in and around the
heavily visited monumental core. Numerous studies have been
conducted by the National Park Service and its consultants in
recent years to assess potential threats to the sites in the
monumental core, the level of security present and actions that
should be taken to increase security and thus minimize the risk
of danger to those who visit these structures.
One recommendation, which is common to nearly all of the
studies, is the use of closed-circuit TV, a 1999 study of the
Booz-Allen-Hamilton which focused on terrorist threats and
recommended the installation of CCTV in all of the monuments
and memorials within the monumental core.
Although the process of planning the CCTV system and
obtaining funding for it had begun prior to September 11th, the
installation of this technology became a higher priority after
the tragic events of that date.
Installation of CCTV at sites in the monumental core is
part of a larger effort to increase security at National Park
Service sites that may be at high risk for terrorist activity
for which the administration is seeking substantial increases
in the fiscal year 2003 budget.
The budget requests include an increase of $12.6 million
for the U.S. Park Police in Washington, DC, and New York City,
to fund additional recruitment classes, equipment and overtime.
It also includes approximately $13 million at the
Washington Monument, $6.2 million at the Lincoln Memorial and
$4.7 million at the Jefferson Memorial for vehicle barriers,
security lighting, and associated improvements. And it includes
an increase of $6.1 million for increased security at park
units across the country that are national icons as well, such
as the Statue of Liberty, Independence Hall, the Arch of
Western Expansion in St. Louis, and Mt. Rushmore.
The National Park Service is not currently using any CCTV
in the monumental core area. However, within the next 6 months
we plan to have CCTV installed at six sites, the Washington
Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, the Jefferson Memorial, the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the Korean War Veterans Memorial and
the FDR Memorial.
Park Police personnel will continuously monitor these
cameras as a Park Police facility. The current plan calls for
the images to be recorded on a continuous loop which will
record over itself after a yet-to-be determined period of time.
Recording the images will allow the police to save any that
are needed for evidentiary purposes. The estimated cost of this
system is approximately $2 to $3 million. The National Park
Service plans to use cameras monitored by the U.S. Park Police
only in public areas where there is no expectation of privacy.
The images that are recorded would be used only for valid law
enforcement purposes. At this time the National Park Service is
planning to install CCTV only in the monumental core area. We
do not have any plans to use any other type of surveillance
technology such as facial recognition types of CCTV.
The U.S. Park Police operate in New York City and San
Francisco as well as Washington, DC. In New York, the Park
Police have cameras in place on Liberty Island and in the
Statue of Liberty that are monitored on a continuous basis with
a loop recording system. Park Police personnel in the New York
field office are working on plans to upgrade the entire
security system in the vicinity of the Statue of Liberty,
including using digital CCTV.
In San Francisco, the Park Police have not installed any
cameras and do not have current plans to do so. However, the
Golden Gate Bridge Authority utilizes numerous cameras on that
facility which is directly adjacent to our park.
In summary, we see CCTV as, used appropriately, as a cost-
effective and nonintrusive way to monitor and protect larger
areas than would able to be protected with available personnel.
It is thus an important tool that can help the National Park
Service safeguard the national treasures under our stewardship
and the people who visit them.
Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my testimony. I would be
happy to answer any questions I may have stimulated. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parsons follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Parsons. We will get to the
questions in a few moments, but right now I would like to swear
in Margret Nedelkoff Kellems, the Deputy Mayor of Public Safety
and Justice. If you would stand and raise your right hand, Ms.
Kellems.
[Witness sworn.]
Mrs. Morella. Thank you. Affirmative response. And now we
would love to hear your comments.
Ms Kellems. Good morning, Chairwoman Morella and
Congresswoman Norton. Please accept my apologies for being late
this morning. I am Margret Nedelkoff Kellems, the Deputy Mayor
for Public Safety and Justice. I thank you for convening this
hearing on a very high profile and often misunderstood topic of
the District's use of CCTV as a tool for ensuring the public
safety.
I would like to take just a few minutes to outline the
Mayor's priorities and concerns regarding the use of this
powerful tool, and what steps we are taking to ensure that our
practices are judicious and relative to our needs.
Chief Ramsey has already discussed the specifics of the
current operation of the system and the policies and procedures
that MPD is drafting to govern its operation. Mayor Williams
has consistently identified neighborhood safety and qualify of
life among his top priorities for his administration.
Since the events of September 11th, homeland or, in this
case, hometown security has taken on a new significance,
particularly in our Nation's Capital. Mayor Williams continues
to stress that in our pursuit of these goals, we must take
great pains not to unduly impact the personal privacy interests
of our citizens, the many people who work in our city, and the
more than 20 million visitors who visit annually.
CCTV is not a new law enforcement tool. In fact, law
enforcement has been using CCTV for years as a means of
collecting criminal evidence. As you may well imagine, without
CCTV, MPD would not have nearly the success it has had in
closing down many of the drug markets that impact our city.
Of course, what we are talking about today is substantially
different than using video technology in targeted law
enforcement efforts, and we appreciate the opportunity to
discuss this issue in an open forum with you today.
As CCTV has moved to the forefront as an effective tool in
ensuring the public safety and protecting against threats to
our city, Mayor Williams has committed to an open dialog and
discussion of the benefits and concerns on both sides of the
issue. We recognize that engaging all of the stakeholders in
the development of our system, both the security experts and
those seeking to protect our privacy rights, is the only way we
will come to an acceptable result that everyone can live with.
The Mayor has been very clear, and all of the stakeholders
agree, that the primary objective of this system is to enhance
public safety during major events, times of heightened alert,
and actual emergencies, whether or not they are terrorism-
related.
During these times, law enforcement resources are our most
valuable commodity in terms of ensuring safety and peace. CCTV
is tremendously useful in helping us allocate and manage those
resources effectively. Instead of relying on radio call-in
information from officers scattered around the event or the
city, officers whose field of vision is limited to their
immediate surroundings, CCTV allows us to monitor large and
distant areas quickly and unobtrusively. That information
allows us to redirect officers, know where reinforcement is
needed, and anticipate where we might need other types of
equipment or response.
This information assists in protecting the public as well
as our first responders. In fact, the utility of CCTV at major
events was proven before September 11th. MPD leased video
technology equipment during the IMF World Bank demonstrations,
the inaugural, and even the NBA All Star game to assist in
resource deployment during those events.
Based on those successes and in anticipation of the planned
IMF World Bank meetings and demonstrations scheduled for the
end of September last year, MPD began the development of a
small video network capability in its joint operations command
center.
Since September 11th, MPD has expanded the video network to
approximately one dozen cameras focused on areas of potential
terrorist threats, and has been pursuing linkages with the
video systems operated by area transportation departments and
Metro.
Even while we pursue the use of CCTV in these kinds of
situations, Mayor Williams has asked MPD to explore the
possible future uses of technology for controlling crime on a
daily basis. Of course, that is a big step from where we are
now, and there are many, many issues that must be considered
and evaluated before we move forward. Questions regarding
individual privacy rights as well as important operational
concerns like the location of the cameras, how they are
monitored and by whom and from where, are the video feeds tape-
recorded for evidence, and how long and for what purposes are
those tapes maintained, would have to be worked out in great
detail, and MPD is already engaged in that process.
It is important to note that CCTV is not intended to be a
primary neighborhood policing tool. There is no substitute for
the security offered by the presence of officers patrolling the
neighborhoods themselves. That said, we must be responsive to
the public concerns about the potential uses of CCTV once that
capacity is in place.
Several neighborhoods have requested that cameras be
installed in their communities, hoping that it would have a
deterrent effect on criminal activity, and perhaps even assist
in capturing and prosecuting criminals. Certainly there will be
disagreement among different communities regarding the
appropriateness of CCTV.
Bear in mind that at the core of MPD's policing philosophy
is respect for the interest of its communities. Chief Ramsey's
Partnerships in Problem Solving model has as its core value
that police are to work with the communities to solve problems
together in a way that is acceptable to all involved.
But the fact remains that in some places, in certain
communities, stores or at ATM machines and around government
buildings, for example, video monitoring equipment has helped
control crime and convict criminals. Mayor Williams has
instructed us to assess the benefits and burdens of these
implications to determine whether, on balance, CCTV as a
community crime fighting tool is effective, even as we move
increasingly more patrol officers onto the streets to work with
the our citizens in their neighborhoods.
Chief Ramsey has explained more fully the times, locations,
deployment of these cameras, but I want to reemphasize that the
cameras are an extraordinary tool for extraordinary times. We
are not monitoring the streets of the District around the clock
and listening in on people's conversations. We don't even have
the capability to do that. We are not tracking the movements of
individuals around town or in private buildings. We don't have
the capability to do that. Nor are we using video to identify
individuals such as through biometric imaging. We don't have
the capability to do that, either. Rather, this is a prudent,
limited and legal use of video technology in support of our
goal of ensuring peace and public safety during extraordinary
times. Mayor Williams believes that we owe it to our residents,
workers and visitors to be vigilant, innovative and careful in
how we pursue that goal. Therefore, we monitor a limited number
of public spaces during special events or at times of
heightened alert as announced by the Federal Government.
As Chief Ramsey has explained, MPD is currently finalizing
its operating policies and procedures for those uses for the
Mayor's review.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be
happy to answer your questions. And again I apologize for being
late.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kellems follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Ms. Kellems. I am going to ask
you, as I start the round of questioning for about 5 minutes
and we will rotate, to answer as succinctly as you can so we
can get as much information as we can in a short time.
First of all, to Councilwoman Patterson. The council has
approved, I think it was emergency legislation requiring the
submission of policies and procedures for the system for
approval. I am curious about when you will be receiving those
policies and procedures. Even more than that, what standards
will the council use in evaluating the adequacy of the policy
and procedures, especially for the public areas that involve
Federal facilities in the Nation's Capital area.
And then, connected to that, does the council plan to
consider any legislation adopting standards for the use of
stored video information that would be gathered through
electronic surveillance?
Ms. Patterson. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I believe that Chief Ramsey has indicated that the
department is developing draft guidelines for use of the
technology. It is those guidelines that the council, by
emergency legislation, asked to come to the council for active
review.
I am not sure what the timeframe is. I know that the chief
had indicated a 30-day turnaround time in meeting with the ACLU
during the tour of the facility that he mentioned. In terms of
what we will then do, I anticipate that we will consider
whether it is appropriate to do legislation, and I think it may
well be.
I would just note that our own citizens are a bit ahead of
us. As I noted in my testimony, the Federation of Civic
Associations came up with a list of issues that they would like
to see addressed in legislation, including civil and criminal
penalties for abuse, and providing for destruction of tapes not
being needed for evidence and such. I think these are issues we
should look at.
As to standards, I am not familiar with the two sets of
national standards that I understand have been developed. But I
am delighted to know that they exist, and we will certainly be
reviewing the ABA standards and the other standards that have
already been developed on these issues to see what we may learn
from those standards.
Mrs. Morella. I would like to ask, following up on that,
Chief Ramsey, has the Metropolitan Police Department reviewed
the standards that were recommended by the American Bar
Association or the guidelines that are recommended by the
Security Industry Association and the International Association
of Chiefs of Police? For instance, both recommend that notice
be given to subjects that they are under surveillance. That
ties in with the committee input and what are we doing about
letting the community know when they are going to be under
surveillance.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am. In addition to that, we also have
gotten guidelines that are being used in other countries to try
to take a look at best practices as it relates to the use of
CCTV as we draft our own policies. We do have a draft directive
now. I have seen that. I sent it back for further work. And it
is being staffed now by other members of the department,
including our general counsel, and I hope to get that back
within the next couple of days, and then we will be getting it
over to the Mayor's Office and to the council.
So, yes, there is a lot that we are reviewing and looking
at. Just yesterday the Mayor's Office, the deputy mayor,
myself, the Mayor, the U.S. Attorney, spoke with officials from
Sydney, Australia and talked a lot about their policies and
their guidelines, and they have sent that to us to review as
well. So we are really reaching out as far as we can to look at
best practices.
Mrs. Morella. So you believe that you will have some kind
of policies that you will be recommending and practices that
you feel are appropriate that you will be submitting to the
Mayor and the Council.
That will include how your community--how you advise the
community.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Morella. It just seems to me that's a very important
facet, that people are not taken by surprise and have
justification.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Morella. Right now I think you said you have 12.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am. We have 12 cameras that are owned
by us. They are primarily locations we feel we need to keep an
eye on in the light of terrorist threat is primarily what we're
concerned about right now. And we also had some problems early
on, if you recall, about having officers actually assigned to
certain locations. What this does is act as a force multiplier,
it allows us to be able to keep an eye on certain areas that we
feel are very vulnerable but not having actually to put an
officer there.
Mrs. Morella. What Federal agencies have allowed you to
install cameras on your facilities to survey public areas?
Mr. Ramsey. Well, I'd have to get back to you with a
complete list. I know one of our cameras is mounted on the
Department of the Labor, the roof of the Department of Labor
right next door to us at 300 Indiana Avenue. We can get a very
good shot of the Capitol from there as well as the Washington
Monument. Union Station is another location where we have a
camera mounted. The Old Post Office, that's right, the Old Post
Office. I do have a list here that I can provide to you.
Mrs. Morella. I think you've given us a list, Chief Ramsey.
I'm curious about who in those agencies granted permission, and
is there any written agreement among the agencies of how the
cameras would be used and how long it will be stored, anything
like that?
Mr. Ramsey. I don't believe there's any written agreement,
ma'am. And I would have to check with Steve Gaffigan who heads
my Office of Quality Assurance to find out who specifically
they spoke with there, but we did get permission prior to
putting any cameras up.
Mrs. Morella. We would be interested in that, too, that
gets into the policies and procedures for it. My time has
expired. I'll get you on my next round, Mr. Parsons and Ms.
Kellems. So now I defer to the ranking member for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask how these cameras first became
known to the public?
Mr. Ramsey. Actually, ma'am, they became known during the
April 2000 IMF World Bank demonstrations when we first used it.
Ms. Norton. No, no, no. That's not my question. I'm trying
to get at something else. I want to know when they became
known. For example, when Ms. Patterson first knew of these
cameras. I mean, I would consider her an example of the public
knowing as opposed to the police department.
Ms. Patterson. I appreciate that.
Ms. Norton. How did you come to know about it?
Ms. Patterson. I think I could--I know the extent of the
capacity from a tour that I did of the police command center
fairly recently within the last 6 months, the center that
became operational right after September 11th.
Ms. Norton. I'm talking about the surveillance of citizens.
Ms. Patterson. I became aware of that in the course of
concerns expressed by some of the demonstrators in 2000 and
2001. They expressed concerns about the issue. But in terms of
knowing----
Ms. Norton. Of course, that's during a demonstration. I'm
talking about the use of cameras, the use of the network to
surveil people who are not involved in demonstrations. When did
the council--when was the council put on notice that this was
happening?
Ms. Patterson. I'm not sure we have to date been put on
notice that precisely what you described is happening. Because
it's my understanding from the deputy mayor and the chief that
we are not as a matter of course using the technology apart
from major events.
Ms. Norton. Well, that brings me to my next question. The
chief testifies that we're using this in major events. We're
going to use it in an emergency. Mr. Parsons testifies that the
Park Police personnel will continuously monitor the cameras at
a Park Police facility. These are, of course, cameras that go
into our command center. Ms. Kellems command, as you may well
imagine, without video surveillance MPD would not have had
nearly the success it has had in closing down many of the drug
markets that impact our city. Mayor Williams has indicated that
this city should have a system such as the one they have in
England with--and, of course, that involves 2.5 million
cameras.
I'm real confused here about what appears to be the
difference in Federal policy, city policy. I'm confused about
the notion of notice. It's one thing to--it's one thing for
demonstrators to find out they're being surveilled. It's
another thing for the council to be given a tour. It's another
thing to have notice and comment so that ordinary members of
the public can know about what amounts to a major step that it
seems to me people are at least entitled to know about before,
not after the cameras are already set up in spots. First I see
policy differences, and next I want to know why there was no
notice and comment before this was done.
And finally, Ms. Kellems, you need to explain what the
Mayor wants to do, since you represent him, whether we're on
our way to London and a video on every corner. Please don't
include 9th and East Capitol by where I live, by the way. Save
yourself some money on my plot. But go ahead.
Ms. Kellems. I'll start and I'll let the chief speak to it.
I, of course, can't speak to the Federal policies about how
often they're going to be using these and monitoring these.
Ms. Norton. But you haven't coordinated that with them. You
heard his testimony today. And so what they do, they can do as
much as they want to with your system.
Ms. Kellems. Sorry, it's their system and they're doing
this independently. We have, on occasion when we've brought up
our command center for major events, asked if we can access
their feeds. We do not have this on a normal ongoing basis. We
don't monitor their system at all. They monitor it separately.
Ms. Norton. What is the relationship between their system
and your system?
Ms. Kellems. They're separate.
Ms. Norton. No relationship to the command center?
Ms. Kellems. We have the ability when we want to access
their system to do that, which we have limited to public events
and vice versa. We do not have our command center up and
running and monitoring their feeds except during major events.
Ms. Norton. Go ahead.
Ms. Kellems. As for the comment about the drug market, I
can let the chief explain it more fully. I was speaking in
generalities that I probably shouldn't have. Those are not
mounted, permanent CCTV cameras. I was speaking to the use of
video technology when the police are engaged in an activity
around a particular drug market. That is a very different type
of technology, and those feeds are not going into our command
center. I was just referring to the use of video generally.
The Mayor's position is that to the extent these are useful
tools, he would like MPD to give him some advice and do some
research on how they're used other places, and London is among
them. As the Chief mentioned, we were speaking with the folks
from Sydney, Australia last night. Their policy is exactly the
opposite of ours. They do not use them for major
demonstrations, they use them in crime hot spots. They claim,
and they are sending us the information, that has been an
effective deterrent tool. But we're very much in the
investigative point. We have not moved into using these on a
regular ongoing basis or using these in the neighborhoods at
this point.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Parsons, on the basis of what evidence have
you decided that 24/7 around-the-clock surveillance is
effective?
Mr. Parsons. We are convinced by studies and consultants
that these icons of democracy are high targets for terrorist
activities. And that is the sole reason that have made the
decision to go forward with planning for these cameras.
Ms. Norton. My time is up.
Ms. Patterson. Madam Chair, could I respond to that portion
of the question that was directed to the council, with your
leave?
Mrs. Morella. Not on my time, but yes, go ahead.
Ms. Patterson. Thank you very much. There is an issue, I
think, between what is operational practice by law enforcement
and what is public policy where the legislature, on behalf of
the public, needs to be involved. And I think you might find a
distinction of opinion even on this panel on where that line is
drawn.
The council, I think it's clear, should not sign off on an
individual video stakeout of a corner drug market, but the
council should sign off on what is our policy for maintaining
videotapes from demonstrations, for example. So I think there
is a little tension here in terms of what belongs to the
policymakers and what is day-to-day law enforcement operations.
Ms. Norton. Of course, there were no policies in place
whatsoever when this surveillance first began. And there is no
written policy in place as we speak.
Ms. Patterson. Right.
Mrs. Morella. I think that is critically important that we
bring it all together and find out how one links to the other,
the nexus. Chief Ramsey, did you want to quickly comment on
that one?
Mr. Ramsey. I just think it's a very important point to
note that to date we haven't been recording anything. And we
haven't because we don't have the policies in place. So this is
simply observation at this point in time. They're not being
recorded. We have the capacity for recording, but we have not
recorded. And I just think that's a very important point to
make. Because we understand the sensitivity.
I don't disagree with council member Patterson that the
role of the council is to help us and to pass legislation that
helps set some of these guidelines so that we can safeguard
against abuse. That's what we're trying to do now with draft
policies, reviewing all the literature that's out there now
around how different cities and, indeed, different countries
handle these very, very sensitive issues. But we have not
recorded anything nor will we until we get a policy in place.
Mrs. Morella. Did you record during the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund----
Mr. Ramsey. No, ma'am. No, ma'am.
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Parsons, on that issue, what does it mean
as you stated in your testimony that images will be recorded on
a continuous loop?
Mr. Parsons. Continuous loop means a device that can be
recorded over itself after a period of time. Continuous loop
tape.
Mrs. Morella. So you are recording.
Mr. Parsons. Well, at the current time we have no cameras
installed.
Mrs. Morella. You are planning to.
Mr. Parsons. We're still in the planning stage. That is our
intent, yes.
Mrs. Morella. What standard do you plan to use to determine
when the recordings will be erased? I know you told me you
haven't done it yet, but when you do, what are you going do to
in terms of how long you're going to keep them and when they
will be erased?
Mr. Parsons. This is all part of the planning process. We
haven't really come to the point of determining that.
Mrs. Morella. I think it's probably a good thing that we
have this hearing now, too, because we can kind of prompt you
to see why you need to work together in partnership to see what
is--I mean, for instance, as we get back to the Metropolitan
Police Department, is the Federal Government at the monumental
core going to link up with the command post, the command center
in the District of Columbia? Is that something you're thinking
about?
Mr. Parsons. That would be our intent, yes.
Mrs. Morella. That would be the intent, that it would be
connected. Let me ask you, also, since you've talked to
Australia and London and other countries, how effective are
cameras in combating crime or preventing terrorism? What were
the results of the research that you may have read about or
undertaken? Do you believe that cameras are a deterrent to
crime? And if that, in fact, is the case, can we expect that
there will be a reduction? We've been reading a lot about crime
in the newspapers recently. Will there be a reduction in crime
where they are deployed?
Mr. Ramsey. Well, if I may, certainly cameras are not a
panacea. They're not going to end all of our problems. But one
thing that we learned yesterday in our conversation with
officials from Sydney, 10 percent of their arrests are the
result of their CCTV system, 10 percent of all their arrests.
That's a lot. And last year, if my memory serves me correct,
and I was taking notes yesterday, so hopefully I took good
notes, but 735 assaults, arrests for assault were made last
year as a result of these cameras. Again, that is, I think,
something that we have to pay attention to. Again, these are
street assaults that are taking place. Again, as far as we're
concerned--I'm sorry, that was 783 assaults since January 2000.
So that actually covers a 2-year span. I just found my notes
from last night. But they did say that 10 percent of the
arrests that they make come from that system.
So, again, does it stop all crime? No. Do they have it
posted? Absolutely, right in the neighborhood, clearly posted.
This neighborhood uses video CCTV. And we would be looking to
do the same here, is have it posted.
Mrs. Morella. You know, jumping into another subject that
you reminded me of, there are no postings right now in the
District of Columbia for any of your traffic surveillance
cameras. I've heard from constituents and District of Columbia
residents who said I had no idea that this was an area with
surveillance cameras.
Mr. Ramsey. Ma'am, if I may, the red light cameras are
posted. The photo radar right on our Web site, we put the
locations of where we're going to be working. There is no way
to put a sign up because those are mobile units. But we do post
it on our Web site.
Mrs. Morella. For exceeding the speed limit, some of those?
Mr. Ramsey. We actually post where we're going to be.
Mrs. Morella. I guess people aren't looking. I'm going to
start looking myself now.
Mr. Ramsey. They aren't looking at the Web site, and in
some cases they're not looking at their speedometer, either.
Mrs. Morella. I have people who have contacted us and said,
you know, I got this $100 ticket and I didn't even know that I
was exceeding the speed limit. How do I appeal? Do I appeal a
camera that records there?
The District's Department of Transportation plans to
install 100 traffic cameras around the District. I would like
to direct this question to Deputy Mayor Kellems. Does the
District plan to link those cameras to the system?
Ms. Kellems. We'd like to. Those cameras are intended for
traffic management particularly during an emergency. But we'd
like to use them at all times to just sort of manage our
terrible traffic situation here. We're planning to put them at
major critical intersections and some of the commuter routes in
and out of the city.
We think it would be useful to have that if we had, for
example, an incident like we had on September 11th when we're
trying to evacuate most of the people from downtown or they're
self-evacuating, that would be useful information. It's police
officers and National Guard who are usually deployed to the
intersections to manage the traffic.
Mrs. Morella. My time is expired, but, Mr. Parsons, did I
hear something about 700 new cameras that would be employed in
the District of Columbia that would include areas where the
Park Police has jurisdiction?
Mr. Parsons. We are.
Mrs. Morella. Like Rock Creek.
Mr. Parsons. We have been approached by the Department of
Public Works with a map of the city that shows, as we
understand it, 700 cameras. Very few of those are on Park
Service jurisdiction. They would monitor traffic up along Rock
Creek to the zoo, for instance, Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway.
We're just in the preliminary stages but my understanding was
700 cameras.
Mrs. Morella. Who gives authority? I don't know from whence
the authority for establishing these cameras comes, different
authorities? And do they ever come together or is that
something we're going to be looking at in the near future?
Mr. Ramsey. Ma'am, as far as law enforcement goes, we do
come together on a regular basis. In fact, this afternoon
through the Council of Governments I'm participating in a
meeting of all the regional law enforcement agencies around our
regional emergency response plan. And we talk about a variety
of issues including being able to work together through our
joint command center. So there is ongoing dialog.
And I think it's important to maybe clear up one issue as
well. Our goal is to tap into existing CCTV networks. But in
order to do that, we just can't just start surfing the area and
looking for images. We have to have the cooperation of the
other agencies. The schools are a good example. If they don't
turn on their switch on their side, we can't get that feed. And
we would only do it in the event of an emergency inside a
school.
Mrs. Morella. So you can tell them to do it, and they
should report to you.
Mr. Ramsey. Right. We can ask them and request and they
would more than likely be making the request of us, quite
frankly. Those areas during a time of a terrorist threat, our
agencies would get together and we would provide access to one
another automatically because of the nature of the threat so
they could get our feeds, we could get their feeds. But we're
in a state of heightened alert, and it would make sense to do
that.
Mrs. Morella. Would you use a criminal justice coordinating
council?
Mr. Ramsey. That is certainly another vehicle that could be
used. It hasn't yet, but it certainly could be used in that
fashion. Although many of the agencies that are represented in
this CJCC aren't necessarily those agencies that would have
camera networks.
Mrs. Morella. You know, it would be awfully helpful to this
subcommittee if you could in some way give us some kind of a
chart to show how this all works out. Maybe you could all work
together in doing that.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Morella. I now recognize Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. The Chair's reference to
the CJCC is a very important one because even though not all
the agencies are included, essentially what you will have in
this city is the beginning of a model for what is going to
happen elsewhere, and it may become a model for how people
coordinate.
Let me make my position clear. I think you are on the horns
of a dilemma. And I think you are trying your best to sort out
this situation. In the process, it seems to me, the difficulty
I have with what the Mayor said about London and the rest of it
is that he does not show the appropriate balance. It does seem
to me that every step of the way the second question has to be
said, how do I limit this, how do I control this. And that is a
concern I have about the testimony here. I don't hear that part
of the equation being raised except through the council
hearings.
I want to ask who has paid thus far for the D.C. cameras
and for the link of the D.C. cameras to the Federal facilities,
the White House and so forth, who has paid for that and out of
what funds, out of what part of the budget did it come.
Mr. Ramsey. The funding came from our capital IT as well as
our capital, I guess, facilities funds, you would call it, has
funded this thus far, not from our local budget.
Ms. Norton. Do you expect that the homeland--that--we got a
rather handsome homeland security amount. Do you expect that
this future funding will be coming out of homeland security
funding?
Ms. Kellems. I think that would be an appropriate use of
it. In fact, the cameras we were referring to from the
Department of Transportation were funded through the Federal
appropriation for emergency preparedness.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Parsons indicated that essentially what is
being done here is to surveil public spaces, not individuals.
Mr. Parsons, since you are surveilling public spaces and not
individuals--that is somewhat comforting--what exactly are you
looking for?
Mr. Parsons. These cameras we are planning for would be
inside the chamber of the Lincoln Memorial, for instance, and
also focused on the entry stairways.
Ms. Norton. This is important. You're inside.
Mr. Parsons. Correct.
Ms. Norton. All right.
Mr. Parsons. And focusing on the approach stairways. It
will simply be there to anticipate anything that could occur on
a 24-hour basis.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Parsons, is the Park Service also working
on rules and guidelines that would help your personnel know
how, where, when, etc?
Mr. Parsons. Certainly as it relates to how long we're
going to keep this information, yes.
Ms. Norton. And how long are you going to keep this
information?
Mr. Parsons. We're not there yet. But certainly this
hearing has brought us to the realization that we need
standards and policies.
Ms. Norton. You're absolutely right about how long you're
going to keep the information, where they should be--the reason
I ask, Mr. Parsons, is you indicated that apparently different
Federal facilities have different policies. You went down a
list of park department facilities, some of which--some of whom
were using, some of whom were not. So there is obviously not
any uniformity within the Federal Government. Do you intend
that all Park Service facilities will have the same view of
these----
Mr. Parsons. That's our objective, yes.
Ms. Norton. Do you anticipate that eventually all Park
Service monuments will have these cameras throughout the United
States?
Mr. Parsons. I don't believe so. Only those that have been
identified as a high threat.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask about the schools? Excuse me, Chief
Ramsey had----
Mr. Ramsey. Ma'am, I just wanted to add one thing from
MPD's perspective. Right now in our draft policy we're looking
at 72 hours as a period of time if anything was recorded that
would be kept unless there was some criminal activity, which
would then--we would obviously maintain it longer for evidence.
We are looking at--and yesterday we found that in
Australia, for example, they keep theirs for 21 days. Why?
Because they want a period of time if there is an audit or
something there for people to review the tapes. We fully
support an audit process, and that's going to be part of our
directive and something we work with the council on to see to
it that it takes place in our system as well. I believe that if
someone calls and says, hey, we want to see the tapes from a
given day, we just hold those tapes. So I don't know if you
need to really hold them 21 days or not, but I think we need to
have a timeframe that is sufficient for review by interested
parties that want to review it and not keep them too long. So
that is where we're at as far as our policy goes.
As far as what we'd be looking at if a truck pulled in
front of Union Station in an area where trucks aren't supposed
to be and is left unattended, we can get on the phone and call
security there and say, hey, you better go check out that truck
and dispatch a scout car because it could possibly be a truck
bomb. That's the kind of thing we're looking for, unusual or
suspicious activity that would necessitate the dispatching of a
scout car to check it out further.
Ms. Norton. Almost inevitably then the police department is
going to be sharing this information with Federal authorities,
almost inevitably.
Mr. Ramsey. Absolutely, ma'am, because the Union Station
example, we wouldn't dispatch a scout car unless there was some
reason why we couldn't reach the security that is already at
Union Station. And that's part of your plan with the
legislation you moved around the cooperative effort between
agencies. They're part of that agreement. They would respond to
that request.
Ms. Norton. My time has passed.
Mrs. Morella. We both seem to be on the same wave length,
Congresswoman Norton and myself. Picking on up on what you
said, Chief Ramsey, who would be the interested parties?
Mr. Ramsey. That is something that, ma'am, it could be the
council, it could be ACLU, it could be you, it could be someone
who wants to take on--we would have to work that out through
some kind of process where we would agree that some group could
come in and spot-check and take a look and see what we're
doing. We're not trying to hide anything here.
Mrs. Morella. And, actually, I really meant it just the
opposite. Is there going to be some criteria you will establish
to gain access? You wouldn't want anyone who was just curious
to have access to these records.
Mr. Ramsey. Absolutely, it would have to be.
Mrs. Morella. You said you keep these records or the camera
tapes for 72 hours.
Mr. Ramsey. That's the draft policy right now. We haven't
been recording. But the time span we're looking at right now or
at first blush was 72 hours. That's not saying that there was
any--anything about 72 hours that was--I mean, I've seen some
policies that 96 hours--yesterday we learned 21 days. We need
to find something that's reasonable here, work with the
council, if they find it reasonable and all parties find it
reasonable, and then put in place a mechanism where if there
were someone who were the auditor, let's say, to come in and
periodically review these tapes, there would be sufficient time
for them to be able to do it and we would simply hold it.
Mrs. Morella. And to Mr. Parsons and the Park Service, I
have a feeling that you're going to say this is work in
progress, because I would ask what standards will you use to
ensure privacy rights are protected when you install the
cameras at various facilities?
Mr. Parsons. I'm afraid I'm going to have to give you the
same answer.
Mrs. Morella. So it's good that I pose it for the record,
too, that you can look into the privacy concerns. But I will
also pick up on we're going to have in our next panel
imminently the American Bar Association, and we have already
talked a little bit about the fact that they have come up with
some standards. I wonder if you're familiar with them. Do you
plan to use them when you're installing the security devices at
the monumental core and the park sites?
Mr. Parsons. No, we have not studied them at all.
Mrs. Morella. OK. Great. Then you really have an agenda
before you. I hope that you will report back, I hope all of you
will report back to this committee, knowing that what we're
trying to do is achieve a balance. This was really kind of a
fact-finding hearing because we think it's exceedingly
important to know where, why, how long, standards, privacy,
community input. And so, Ms. Norton, that was really my final
question.
Ms. Norton. Just a few more questions, Madam Chair. Chief
Ramsey, I have staunchly defended your red lights here in the
Congress and another one of my committees. I was quick to
indicate that you have saved lives in some substantial numbers,
that people in the District have clamored for them because
people were being hit by cars and otherwise injured, and
because you had limited the system so that, of course, you took
only a picture of the license plate. There were some valid
criticisms, the council raised those, the criticisms of who was
running it, how people got paid. You're attending to that.
That's the kind of model of what we'd like to see here. Nobody
expects us to get it all right in the first time. No society
has used these kinds of cameras before. The real question is
limits and protections.
I'd like to ask about the use of the cameras now. I was
comforted that you used them during the Winter Olympic games,
you used them during times when there were clear--there was a
clear need. There has been an attack. And I'm not willing to
assume there will never be another attack. I wonder if you are
looking to use the cameras when they are specifically--in a
specific emergency, whether you are coordinated now with the
Federal Government's new color-coded alert system, so that we
all know when an alert--what an alert means?
Mr. Ramsey. There was, I believe it was a 60-day period for
comment with this particular system that Governor Ridge laid
out for us just a week or so ago. We are looking at that. I
don't have any, you know, cutting edge comments around it,
quite frankly. I think the more important issue is that we all
be on the same page.
Ms. Norton. That's really my only question. When they come
to an understanding of the notice and comment page--by the way,
they did it the right way. They did notice and comment so we
all know about this so you can have a say. At that time you
will calibrate yours to the Federal.
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask you, Chief, about an example you
gave that is intentioned with the notion of emergency use only.
You talked about an emergency at Union Station and you would be
able to send somebody there. Well, that indicates consistent
use of the cameras of the kind that the Park Service is doing
as opposed to use of the cameras only in emergencies. So are
the cameras, for example, at Union Station, which I take it are
our cameras, are they going to be on the same 24/7 basis that
the Park Service cameras are?
Mr. Ramsey. No, ma'am. I was referring--and I apologize for
the lack of clarity. I was speaking in terms of when the
cameras are activated during this period of time, should we
observe this kind of activity, then we would do that. Otherwise
the cameras would not be on. Today, for example, the joint
command center is being used for training for our crime mapping
which has no camera capability at all, but it's our new crime
mapping system. We have crime analysts in there learning how to
use the new system. So it's really a multipurpose room, not
just for CCTV.
Ms. Norton. I must ask about the schools. First of all, if
these are going to be hooked up to schools, does that mean
we're going to have a camera in every classroom, in every
auditorium and in every hallway? How could we possibly hook
these up to schools?
First let me ask Ms. Patterson, how were they used at your
daughter's school?
Ms. Patterson. The closed circuit TV at Alice Deal Junior
High School that was put in place in 1996 was a security
measure so that you didn't have to have people walking all over
the school grounds at any particular time just as you do at any
kind of closed circuit television security system in a public
building, to enable one person to sit at a bank of cameras and
see the full exterior of the school. Since that time the school
system has moved to that kind of technology, I believe, through
the junior and senior high schools first and then moving into
the elementary schools.
I'm not familiar with what is planned for cameras internal
to the buildings of the D.C. public schools, although I know
they do at least have one camera inside the office of the
school system. So I'm not quite sure what they're intending to
do on the interior of buildings.
Ms. Norton. Perhaps Chief Ramsey or Ms. Kellems could tell
us what your intention is with respect to schools in
particular.
Mr. Ramsey. If we were to have a Columbine-like incident,
we would request the ability to be able to tap into their CCTV
system.
Ms. Norton. Their existing system?
Mr. Ramsey. Their existing system that they have in the
school. And that would help us know where the gunman was
located in the school, for example. Where do we need to get
kids out, what are the evacuation routes that would be best
taken in light of where the incident is occurring versus where
students could be safely evacuated. What routes should our cars
take approaching the scene? If the gunman is in the northeast
corner of the building, we don't want our cars coming in from
the northeast because they--the sniper fire. So it would help
us to be able to isolate the incident a lot easier than having
our emergency response team go in and having to do a physical
search to get the information an hour and a half later that
they could have gotten in moments.
Ms. Norton. This is an important distinction. If these
cameras exist, we're talking about halls, we're talking about
the kind of cameras that are already in use. We're not talking
about an add-on bunch of cameras in schools.
One of the dilemmas we face here, I'll say finally, is
that, to take the Union Station example, if the chief had the
manpower to put 100 cops there to look, then nobody would say
that there was anything wrong with that kind of surveillance.
If what we have instead is a camera that replaces the 100 cops,
the dilemma we face is, is that any different. We know that
because it is surveillance there are some differences.
One of the standards we might use is to try to equate as
far as possible the kind of surveillance that police ordinarily
do with the kind of surveillance we're talking about here. If
anything, the kind of surveillance that my neighborhood
policeman does is probably more invasive. He probably looks at
my face, he probably remembers things about me. But we are used
to him. This is considered a part of ordinary law enforcement.
What we're going to have to come to grips with is what
difference it makes when we make this cosmic leap and whether
we need special safeguards in light of that kind of leap.
I thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. I want to
thank you for being here. I do want to ask you to report back
to us with regard to the standards that you are establishing,
even as you consider them, your time schedule, policies, and
public input opportunities and plans. And we would appreciate
that. We'll also get to you some questions about the red light
cameras which we didn't feel was the focus of this hearing
today.
But I do want to thank all of you for being with us, Ms.
Patterson, Ms. Kellems, Chief Ramsey, Mr. Parsons, and I'm
going to ask that there be a 5-minute recess and then we'll get
to our second panel. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Mrs. Morella. I'm going to call back into hearing our
second panel as we resume the subcommittee hearing. Thank you
again for your patience, too, and for being here. Johnny
Barnes, executive director of the American Civil Liberties
Union of the National Capital area, Ronald Goldstock of the
American Bar Association, and John Woodward, Jr., of RAND. So
gentlemen, may I ask you to stand and raise your right hand
also to be sworn in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mrs. Morella. Thank you. Again, affirmative responses by
all of the panelists. So, again, if you would proceed about 5
minutes each with your testimony. And I think you probably
noted that we alluded to some of the points that you're going
to be bringing out with the previous panel, which demonstrates
that your testimony was very, very helpful. So we'll start off
then with you, Mr. Barnes. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF JOHNNY BARNES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA; RONALD GOLDSTOCK,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; AND JOHN WOODWARD, JR., RAND
Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm delighted to be
here in these familiar surroundings, Congresswoman Norton. I
gave roughly a quarter of a century of my life as a staff
person to Congress sitting behind those seats in which you all
sit very often. I can assure you that the perspective from this
seat is very different.
You have my testimony I'd like to include in the record in
its entirety, and I'll summarize.
Mrs. Morella. Without objection, it will be.
Mr. Barnes. The ACLU believes the District should abandon
its plans to establish a British-style system of surveillance
cameras. There are five compelling reasons that drive our
belief.
Surveillance cameras are not effective at fighting crime.
They don't work well. Surveillance cameras reduce resources for
placing police into neighborhoods where they are needed. The
money can be better spent. Surveillance cameras undermine
individual privacy and are inimical to our way of life. We have
Times Square in America, not Tienemen Square.
What are we doing to our icons of democracy? Surveillance
cameras should not be contemplated without the permission of
those they impact. Such permission has not been granted by the
people of D.C. nor by their elected representatives, the D.C.
Council.
Surveillance cameras are subject to great abuse. Young and
minority citizens already face the burden of profiling by the
police. They should not have to carry the additional weight of
being singled out, tracked and traced by the camera's eye,
simply because of their age or the color of their skin, and for
no other reason. And women should not face the additional
indignity of leering eyes peering through the lens of a camera.
Yet that is the sad legacy that is being left where these
cameras have been tried in other places around the world and
across the United States.
I'll briefly expand on these five reasons.
Cameras do not make us safer. Instead they give the public
a false sense of security. As you noted, Madam Chair, despite
2.5 million cameras in England, including the 150,000 cameras
in London, where the average citizen is filmed 300 times a day,
the murder rate in that capital city is at record levels, and
street robbery, the very crime these cameras are supposed to
prevent, will soar to 50,000 in this year alone.
Madam Chair, cameras don't catch crooks. Cops do. That is
why Detroit, after a decade and a half, and other cities, many
other cities throughout the United States, have abandoned this
adventure of surveillance cameras. Surveillance cameras require
an upfront investment in technology and require ongoing
maintenance. In addition to monitoring the video screens,
police officers must be pulled off the street and put into the
video control room. A camera can't stop a mugging or a murder
in progress on the streets. A police officer can. The use of
video surveillance cameras goes far beyond a change in the
style of life as we know it. The use of these cameras will
change the Constitution as we know it. The terrorists are
winning.
No longer will we feel free to sunbathe in our backyards
because helicopters mounted with cameras can fly over and film
residential neighborhoods. They are already equipped to do
that. I believe, Madam Chair, those are additional cameras
beyond the dozen or so to which Chief Ramsey referred.
No longer will we be able to have the expectation of
privacy in a restaurant in Georgetown. Merchants there have
asked to join this network of cameras. Let me just say, Madam
Chair, I believe already you're making a difference. You're
having an impact with this hearing. Because the
representations, unsworn, not under oath, that have been made
in recent weeks and months have been inconsistent with some
made today. And so, as you point out, this hearing and hearings
that will follow is effective in flushing out the facts and
getting to the truth. Perhaps because we've had different
spokespersons, the inconsistency is there. But it is there.
So powerful are these cameras that they can film a belt
buckle a mile away. So strong is surveillance technology that
some allow the viewers to see through clothing. We first
learned of these cameras when we read in The Wall Street
Journal on February 13th that the plan for their use, ``go far
beyond what is in use in other American cities.'' That's Mr.
Gaffigan, the gentleman who's coordinating the program with the
metropolitan police department. On that same day, Access
Communications, the Australian firm that constructed the
District's new system, told us that this system would be used,
``in support of every-day policing.'' That's what the firm that
constructed the system said in a press release.
General sweeping surveillance of all of us, rather than
particular specific surveillance of those among us who act on
terror, who commit crime. Mayor Williams confirmed that in an
interview on March 8th in The Washington Times, and Chief
Ramsey, the following day, March 9th repeated the assertion
that the District would have a British-style system.
This hearing is very important, and the hearings that will
follow are very important. We need answers. Is this system
designed to help prevent terrorism or catch terrorists, or is
this system to be used for general law enforcement? When will
the system be on? Who will monitor it? Will the system use
biometrics? Where, how long, and by whom will recording be
kept? Will there be laws and regulations governing this system?
We need a body of laws, a set of regulations, not policy
guideline.
Today we do not know all of the answers to those questions.
Without this and other hearings to explore these issues,
tomorrow may be too late.
Finally, the abuse. Law enforcements have stressed this.
Perhaps if Chief Ramsey or Assistant Chief Gainer monitored the
system on a daily basis, we would more likely trust them. But
the muddy history of this Nation has given rise to far too many
occasions where the courts and our legislatures have enforced
and imposed controls because law enforcement could not be
trusted.
The young black attorney who knew his rights was
nonetheless stopped and searched on a major highway because the
police had a written memo, a policy guideline profiling,
allowing profiling of young black men as probable drug dealers
when they're in rental cars driving along I-95. D.C. police
lieutenant followed and sought to blackmail gay men who
frequented certain establishments, and law enforcement says
trust us. Imagine the damage to lives and in other situations
this could have caused if bad apples in law enforcement had the
additional power of the camera's eye. These cameras will watch
all of us, not just those bent on crime.
I close with a bit of history and perhaps an admonition
that I believe presents interesting comparisons, if not
striking similarities. In 1790, a Congress seeking security
from a ban of Pennsylvania militiamen, sacrificed liberty and
enacted article 1, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitution,
the District clause. More than 200 years later, because of that
provision, we still have a British-style system in the Nation's
Capitol. I know you're sympathetic to that cause, Madam Chair.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barnes follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnes. Very well
presented. I am now pleased to recognize Ronald Goldstock of
the American Bar Association. Thank you for being here, Mr.
Goldstock.
Mr. Goldstock. I am the chair of the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section Standards Committee and
past chair of the section. I am pleased to have the opportunity
to share with you the fruit of our labors from the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards Committee. Typically, ABA standards, which
are ABA policy, have been used extensively by courts and
practitioners, and we are particularly pleased with its use in
establishing legislative and regulatory policy.
The task force on technologically assisted physical
surveillance [TAPS] that developed the standards we're
discussing today was, I believe composed of the type of people
that Ms. Norton suggested be on her proposed national
commission. They included prosecutors and defense attorneys,
academics, members of the judiciary, police, privacy advocates,
and liaisons from a number of interested entities who worked
very closely with the committee, entities like the FBI, NSA,
NACDL, major chiefs of police, NLADA, and the Individual Rights
and Responsibilities Section of the ABA.
The task force considered a variety of issues--
``illumination and telescopic devices'' from flashlights to
satellite surveillance, ``detection devices'' from heat
emanating from homes to x-rays at airports and ``tracking
devices'' from car beepers to implanted chips.
We also looked very carefully at video surveillance, and in
doing so, tried not to limit our analysis to present
technology. We considered that anything that we could think of
was possible, and we devised standards with that in mind. The
standards consider a variety of possibilities.
If the video surveillance is of private activity or
conditions, then we would require a warrant. Indeed, we would
go beyond the Constitutional requirement of a search warrant,
and require an eavesdropping warrant in such cases.
If the surveillance were to be long term overt
surveillance, I think primarily the type that you're talking
about today, then the decision to do so would have to be made
by a politically accountable law enforcement officer or another
relevant politically accountable individual--the Mayor, for
example.
If the purpose of that surveillance, long-term overt
surveillance, were investigative, then there would need to be a
determination by that politically accountable individual that
the surveillance would be likely to achieve a law enforcement
purpose.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of such surveillance
were merely deterrence, then it would require that notice be
given prior to the time that the surveillance was installed,
and notice be given while the surveillance was operating, and
that there would be hearings before and during the surveillance
so that the public would have a chance to comment, make known
their views and a determination based upon those views.
Obviously, if it is going to be a deterrent, there would
have to be notice, otherwise deterrence would not work. If the
surveillance were short term and covert, then there would need
to be a determination that a legitimate law enforcement
objective could be met. In such a case, the decision could be
made under those circumstances, that is to say, short term,
covert, by an officer who was not necessarily politically
accountable because presumably the investigative demands would
require that it be done immediately, it be done for a short
period of time, but that it cease upon the attainment of its
objectives.
We suggest all of this in the context of general
principles, that there be no targeting in a discriminatory
fashion, that there be an attempt to use less intrusive means
before video surveillance is used, and that transactional data,
the recordings themselves, be destroyed pursuant to some policy
that was developed by the law enforcement authorities and the
political structure, so that there wouldn't be the type of
abuses that Johnny Barnes suggested. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstock follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Goldstock. And as I mentioned,
as I introduced this panel, we have alluded to your ABA
standards in our previous panel.
Mr. Goldstock. I assume that the standards, either in black
letter or completely will be made part of the record.
Mrs. Morella. Indeed they will. Without objection, so
ordered.
Mr. John Woodward, Jr., of RAND. Thank you for being with
us, Mr. Woodward.
Mr. Woodward. Thank you, Chairwoman Morella, Ranking Member
Norton, and members of the Subcommittee on the District of
Columbia. I am honored to participate in these timely hearings
to discuss electronic surveillance. In the interest of time I
will focus my testimony on policy options for Congress to
consider and concerns related to future use of video
surveillance and other technologies.
Let's briefly establish the legal status quo by asking does
the use of this technology violate legally protected privacy
rights? The District of Columbia's proposed use of video
cameras to monitor public places does not appear to run afoul
of the protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution,
specifically the unreasonable search provision of the fourth
amendment. Congress, of course, is free to provide greater
privacy protections than those found in the Constitution.
Thus we next need to ask what options can Congress pursue
with respect to government use of surveillance cameras. It
seems Congress has three broad policy choices: First, prohibit
the use; second, regulate; third, take no immediate action
pending further study. Congress could decide that the use of
surveillance cameras is so dangerous to citizens in society
that the law should prohibit it. In other words, the law could
treat surveillance cameras as a form of technological heroin to
be outlawed.
The counter argument is that surveillance cameras are not a
form of technological heroin, because unlike heroin their use
benefits the individual and the community.
Specifically, the community must maintain public safety. To
fulfill this essential duty, law enforcement must monitor
public places. This age old concept is the rationale for the
police officer on the beat. To extend the analogy, a
surveillance camera can be viewed as a form of mechanical
police officer that watches or records events occurring in
public places, places in which a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Congress could decide to regulate the use of surveillance
cameras in many ways. Most notably Congress could enact time,
place or matter restrictions. For example, Congress could
restrict government's use of surveillance cameras to the
duration of a planned protest, time; to monitor only those
sensitive locations deemed susceptible to attack, place; and to
prohibit continuous video recording, manner. Or, as an
alternative, Congress could require prior judicial branch
approval for the technologies used.
The third option is for Congress to continue studying this
issue, remaining poised to act. More and better public policy
research on the use of the technology, its security and privacy
implications as well as the effects of regulation is needed.
One controversial issue that Congress may consider concerns
what the government does with the data it collects. The
recording capability can be helpful for criminal investigations
in the form of post event analysis. For example, it is good
that we have a videotape of Mohammad Atta at the screening of
the Portland, ME airport at 5:45 a.m., on September 11, 2001.
It is bad that the Washington Metro CCTV system did not have a
recording capability on June 10, 2001, when an assailant
fatally shot Metropolitan Transit Officer Marlon Morales at the
U Street Station.
If surveillance data are recorded, however, then policies
for data retention, data security and auditing, along with
penalties for misuse should be considered. Transparency and
active oversight should help build citizen support.
Both the public and private sectors are making growing use
of electronic surveillance technologies, as well as other
emerging technologies that can gather information about us,
thereby significantly increasing the potential privacy
invasions.
These developments do not necessarily mean that big brother
is alive and well. Rather, those same technologies can be used
to protect citizens' rights; for example, with respect to the
use of video cameras. In 1991, a bystander videotaped the
arrest of Rodney King. This video allowed many Americans to see
for themselves what otherwise would not have been seen.
Currently many police departments have installed cameras on
squad cars to video certain traffic stops and similar events to
show that officers satisfy legal requirements. In the near
future, a citizen wearing a mini camera on her jacket lapel may
be able to effortlessly video her encounters with law
enforcement or anyone else and wirelessly transmit the
information to wherever she desires.
In conclusion, we should be mindful of technologies that
may invade our privacy. It is wise to monitor their development
to forestall potential abuses. We should also, however, ensure
that perceived or potential threats to our privacy do not blind
us to the positive uses of video surveillance. Rather than
acting hastily, it might be better to first try to develop
thorough answers to questions about the use of surveillance
cameras, as this hearing has tried to do, to determine the
cameras' impact on public safety as well as the policy and
social concerns they raise.
Thank you for inviting me to share my thoughts with you. I
am happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woodward follows:]
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Mrs. Morella. Thanks. I want to thank the three of you for
appearing before us and so succinctly giving us a synopsis of
your work on this issue.
I am going to ask some questions that would be directed
actually to all of you. I am wondering, first of all, have any
jurisdictions that have installed electronic surveillance
systems adopted the standards that were recommended by the ABA?
You are probably the first one to have a response to that, Mr.
Goldstock.
Mr. Goldstock. Yes. I don't know of any.
Mrs. Morella. Anybody know of any? OK. When did you come
out with them, as a matter of fact? I know it was--2 years was
your task force, as I recall?
Mr. Goldstock. In 1999.
Mrs. Morella. 1999?
Mr. Goldstock. Yes. They came out toward the end of 1999.
Mrs. Morella. Great. Well, it is a very interesting that
nobody knows about any jurisdiction that has utilized that
work.
OK. Would you say that the recording of the images and the
use of recorded images and data bases poses the greatest risk
to civil liberty? Any of you want to comment on that? I mean,
is having it in data bases a real threat?
Mr. Barnes. Absolutely, Madam Chair, because what we will
be exposed to in that case is this idea of mission creep and
how far will it go. Will persons who have done other things
considered to be wrongs in society be excluded because they
didn't pay a traffic ticket, or they didn't pay a judgment to
the courts?
The collection of information and the storing of
information about individuals is a very dangerous thing. Let me
just say that I know of an example of a bank that got the
information, the health information about their patrons and
those who were suffering from cancer. They called in their
notes. In other words, you are about to die, give us our money.
So there are many abuses that flow from the storing--the
collection and storing of this kind of data.
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Woodward.
Mr. Woodward. Chairwoman, if I may followup. Is the
recording of the images and storing them in a data base the
greatest risk? I am reluctant to give it an order of magnitude.
I think it is certainly a risk that deserves the attention of
Members of Congress.
I think Mr. Barnes' concern about function creep or mission
creep is well placed. That is sadly an example that we see from
history with much use of data that is stored.
There frequently are other reasons found why that data can
be used in ways never intended, with the Social Security number
being a great example. I would also add, I think another
concern that Members of Congress will face in the future, you
will have this data. If you decide to store it, and there may
be very, very good and compelling reasons why you want to store
the data. For example, it may be very helpful for criminal
investigation, post-event analysis work. At the same time you
will see growing technologies that can also collect information
about people, that might become interlinked in a type of
surveillance network that I think could be profoundly troubling
for many of us in society.
And I would also add that it is not the public sector that
has this monopoly on the use of these technologies by any
means. This is also something that you will see extensively in
the private sector.
So I think you have rightly called this hearing to focus
attention on this. I think that this will continue to be an
issue that will occupy much of your attention as policymakers.
Mrs. Morella. What do you think about the 72 hours that
Chief Ramsey mentioned for keeping that material?
Mr. Woodward. Ma'am, this is in reference to the
Metropolitan Police Department's draft regulation that would
call for a 72-hour storage period?
Mrs. Morella. Right.
Mr. Woodward. I think that there definitely needs to be a
time limit as far as how long the data is going to be stored. I
don't have enough specific knowledge of the situation that
Chief Ramsey and his colleagues face as to why they came up
with the 72-hour figure, but it seems to me a good start.
Mrs. Morella. OK. And you mentioned the--you both mentioned
mission creep. And you mentioned technology coming on line so
quickly. I mean, the idea of having a little camera on our
lapel as we are out in the evening or in certain areas. How do
we guard against it? What do we do to guard against it? Whoever
would like to answer that. With so much new technology coming
on line.
Mr. Barnes. Yes, Madam Chair. Again, I think we need a body
of laws and a set of regulations just as we have with respect
to search warrants, with sanctions and criminal sanctions and
civil penalties for abuse. And there have been abuses, well
documented, well reported. I think that is the best way.
The concern is that this has been a unilateral action by
the executive branch cutting out the legislature, cutting out
the courts. And the genius of our system of separation of
branches is that we do have checks and balances. And that is
why the courts and the legislature need to be involved. We need
a body of laws, a set of regulations if we are to have those
cameras at all.
Mr. Goldstock. It seems to me that we are talking about a
number of different things and they have to be answered
separately. One question is: What government can do, what they
are allowed to do and whether or not that should be regulated
by laws, by the Constitution, by policy, by regulations. All is
a matter that we need to think about.
The second is government's access to private data bases.
There are huge data bases that are built up both commercially
and in other ways. Every time you use an Easy Pass to go
through a toll or go into a parking lot there are records
maintained that can be retrieved. We need to know what the
government ought to be able to obtain and under what
circumstances private companies or entities can share their
data with law enforcement. Huge retailers ask you for your
telephone number when you make a purchase, collect data about
you, send you packages in the mail. They know where you live.
All of that exists. Links can be made internally within those
retail stores. They can be provided to law enforcement either
on their own design or by request of law enforcement. We ought
to be thinking about how we are going to regulate that.
Finally, it seems that there is the possibility of
violations of law by individuals, whether or not it would be a
crime, for example, for somebody to broadcast a picture or
overhear a communication, and that obviously is subject to law.
Currently eavesdropping laws regulate some of that; and there
might otherwise be other laws as the capabilities and
technology increases.
But I think these are incredibly complex issues that need
to be studied, and to suggest that there is a simple answer I
think is probably incorrect.
Mrs. Morella. OK.
Mr. Woodward. May I add to that, Chairwoman Morella? With
respect to mission creep, I think it is important to point out
that mission creep itself should be really viewed as a neutral
term. That is, one person's mission creep might be another
person's worthwhile mission advance.
And let me try to give you an example. In the testimony I
heard earlier, it seems to me that the Metropolitan Police
Department currently proposes using video surveillance for
special events, special occasions, and the Chief gave examples.
Well, it might be that over time that instead of just using
the surveillance on a limited basis, the community might want
to use it more on a regular basis, normal daylight hours for
regular standard law enforcement purposes. With the use of
special cameras that have a night vision capability, you can
see how that could be expanded to a 24/7 capability, that the
surveillance could become wider, it could become deeper, etc.
But I think you might be faced with the question of what do
you do when the community, be it the local community or at the
State level, or at the national level, actually approves this
use, and wants this kind of mission extension, if you will. And
to give you an example, some of us might think, well, it is
really silly to use video surveillance to deal with a problem
we have of people who are smoking illegally in certain public
areas and we are going to train the surveillance cameras on
that area to try to identify those people so that we can
prevent this practice and we can cite the people who are
committing the infractions.
But it is difficult if you have a community that goes
through public debate, engages in the democratic process and
decides, well, in our community we have a real problem with
people who want to smoke illegally in public areas and we want
to stop it. It is difficult. Some might look at that and say,
well, that is really a silly and unwarranted use of the
technology. But to others who are exercising their democratic
rights, they might see it as something they really want to
stop. So I think it is a very difficult issue.
Mrs. Morella. Well, the difference is mission creep versus
mission enhancement. It is all in what you call it. Great.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Woodard, when you get into the notion that
the community can decide that it wants cameras for any purpose,
there is a consensus, you and I would have a deep disagreement
with that because there is a Constitution of the United States
and I can imagine all kinds of things that there is a consensus
about that would not pass constitutional muster, I think and I
hope.
Mr. Barnes, it is clear as you opened your testimony that
the ACLU is trying not to be a bunch of Luddites that simply
oppose the cameras wherever they are found, that you recognize
that the cameras exist, that the cameras for many uses have not
been struck down by courts yet, that they have been challenged.
But you say that we should abandon--I am sorry, that the
District should abandon plans for a British style system, which
of course is a wholesale system. In light, by the way, of that
opening in your testimony, let me indicate that your reference
to profiling suggests to me that we are talking about exactly
the opposite of profiling. Profiling is honed in on specific
individuals because of certain characteristics. Here we are
talking about wholesale profiling.
Everybody is a target. It is hard to know which is worse,
for everybody or some of us. But I do see, as I listen to the
testimony of all three of you, the willingness to try to work
this through, to come to some--to recognize that it is
difficult to come to some kind of solution that all could
embrace.
Mr. Goldstock, my commission is a little broader. Your
commission, I want to compliment the ABA. I didn't know of your
work. I want to compliment the ABA for getting out in front of
this issue. You seem to have been focused on surveillance
cameras. The reason mine is broader is that I would hope that
the Presidential commission obviously wouldn't be involved in
regulations, would provide general guidance across the board on
how to meet--how society remains open. It includes things well
beyond surveillance, because there are so many approaches being
thrown up.
Nevertheless, your work, I think it would even be important
to what it is I would like to have done. I mean, my commission
is going to have on it not only lawyers and security officials,
but philosophers and historians and psychologists and
architects, people who can bring to bear the society so that we
can have some balance here. And your work will be important,
it, seems to me, if the commission is ever established.
I would like to see whether or not there could be any
agreement among those of you seated at the table on the
framework for an accepted policy. Mr. Goldstock's testimony
mentions technique capable of doing what it purports to do,
trained officers solely for specified objectives, terminated
when the objective is achieved, notice, deterrence, if there is
deterrence, notice so that everybody knows what is happening as
well, maintaining or disposing of those records, written
instructions, etc.
I see something approaching the components of an acceptable
policy. And if I could add to that, the testimony from the city
about audits so that one could in fact see if in fact what is--
what you said should happen is happening. No data base. Could I
ask you whether the components I have just named are, as far as
the three of you are concerned, the framework toward an
acceptable policy? If not, what should be added? Or is there
some other approach you would suggest?
Mr. Goldstock. I would say yes. I don't have any problem
with it.
Ms. Norton. I used yours because it laid out some. I added,
of course, one or two from D.C. and I would like to ask Mr.
Barnes, who I think very usefully raised these issues in our
city, whether or not the ABA policy, plus some of the things
that the District may be doing now that the matter is public,
could form the framework for an acceptable national policy?
Mr. Barnes. Well, Congresswoman, as you note, our position
is that we don't believe the cameras serve any useful purpose.
But, as you also note, some cameras are in place. Others
perhaps are contemplated. We would suggest that if there is to
be some system, that a body of laws in a set of regulations,
certainly those put forth by the American Bar Association reach
many of the concerns that we have.
And we would be happy to work with others in trying to
shape and mold a body of laws and set of regulations that
reflect a concern about civil liberties.
Ms. Norton. Yes. I appreciate that, that response. Mr.
Woodward.
Mr. Woodward. Yes, Congresswoman Norton. I think you
cited--I was trying to keep a checklist, and I think I got most
of them. I think you mentioned that the legal framework should
have something like notice, or people should have notice that
these surveillance cameras are being used in a particular area.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Two kinds of notice. Notice to let us know
so that we can comment on whether they should be used and
notice that they are there.
Mr. Woodward. Right. I think you need both, basically. I
think it is very important to iron out your policies or your
regulations that concern this whole issue of data retention.
What you can keep in a data base. Similarly with data security,
an auditing function as well as some kind of oversight
mechanism.
I think also you mentioned the idea of penalties for
misuse. I think it is appropriate for the Congress to look at
criminal and civil penalties, because you certainly want to
deter that kind of behavior. I think also the important aspect
to this is transparency and getting input from the community as
far as what is the right way to work this process.
Now, transparency of course is always difficult; how much
transparency. But I know that I have considered many ideas, and
I include in my written testimony the idea that the operations
of these video surveillance cameras could be made known to the
community by broadcasting some of their activities on a public
access channel or on a Web site so people could literally see
that this is what our government is doing in these areas.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. My time is up. I only have a few
more questions.
Mr. Goldstock. Let me just make one thing clear, That the
ABA policy regarding notice, relates to overt long-term
surveillance. If the surveillance were being used for an
investigative purpose, if they knew there was goals to be a
break-in to a liquor store, obviously you wouldn't be giving
notice.
Ms. Norton. That is with a warrant?
Mr. Goldstock. No. Without a warrant because it was on a
public street but focused in on a particular area for
investigative purposes.
Ms. Norton. Probable cause, and therefore the----
Mr. Goldstock. No.
Ms. Norton. The cop is not just there in front of
somebody's liquor store. What do you mean?
Mr. Goldstock. What I mean is if the police, for example,
had information that a group of burglars or robbers were
breaking into liquor stores, and there weren't a sufficient
number of cops to be around protecting everybody, you might
want to set up cameras at a variety of stores in that
neighborhood aimed directly at the stores. That would not
require a warrant. But you wouldn't want to give notice because
the object was investigative rather than deterrent.
Ms. Norton. Would Mr. Barnes comment on that hypothetical?
Mr. Barnes. Well, if I may, Congresswoman, I feel obliged
to say, because I may not get another opportunity, that I have
worked with both of your staffs and you have excellent staffs.
I think the hypothetical is a specific situation involving
a particular circumstance. And the trouble we have with the
surveillance cameras is that they are general and sweeping. And
I think that as a standard would also be important, to focus on
particular situations, specific circumstances not unlike we do
with Fourth Amendment procedures.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton.
You all heard in the first panel that the Council has
passed emergency legislation that requires that the
Metropolitan Police Department submit policies and procedures
governing the use of the surveillance and asking for approval.
Do you think that approach is going to be sufficient to
ensure that there will be some regulation of the system,
adequate regulation of the system, or is that just a beginning?
Mr. Barnes. Well, again, Madam Chair, we believe that the
effort to put some controls and guidelines need to go far
beyond the police issuing some statements about what it might
do or will do. It needs to be etched in the law and have the
force and effect of the law.
And there needs to be an opportunity for those who are
victimized by abuses to have access to the courts to enforce
that law and those regulations. So we need more than policy
guidelines.
Mrs. Morella. OK. I know you want to comment on that. But
maybe under the umbrella question, do I hear the three of you
saying: We really do think that Congress should at some point
come in with standards, policies, procedures, auditing devices,
and sanctions?
Are you saying there should be legislation that is drafted
to address what you have presented to us in terms of the
problems that could be inherent with camera surveillance?
Mr. Goldstock. I think that the ABA standards could be the
basis of legislation. I think it would work quite well. I think
the legislation, as you suggest, is only the first step. In
addition, there has to be training and transparency and
auditability and accountability and oversight. I think--and I
think I am in agreement with Johnny Barnes on this--that in
fact the real issue here isn't the initial policy, although I
think that is important. It is consistency. It is in
demonstrating to the public that the policies are being adhered
to, that there aren't abuses, that if there are issues that
come up, they are attended to. That maybe there should be a
change in legislation or policy if there are consistent abuses
and that the legislation standards and regulations change to
meet current needs and current technology.
I think that is what is critical. This is an ongoing
process. It is not the beginning, formulating a manual and then
stopping there. This is a continuing process and I think that
is what is necessary.
Mrs. Morella. Should it be Federal, or should it be
jurisdictional?
Mr. Goldstock. Well, I think the broad guidelines ought to
be Federal. I think--the same way it is in electronic
surveillance. But the electronic surveillance statutes, for
example, lay down bare minimums, and different jurisdictions
decided within that, they ought to make changes and be more
restrictive, and I think that is the same kind of policy that
would work here as well.
Mrs. Morella. So kind of bare minimums allowing for some
flexibilities and customizing for different areas. Mr.
Woodward.
Mr. Woodward. Yes, Chairwoman. I think you are at a
starting point. You could look to Federal regulatory framework
for at least how you want Federal agencies to use the
technology. And then you might want to consider, should we also
include State, local, tribal government use of the technology
as well.
One other point I would urge you to consider, and I think
we have seen it as far as the testimony presented this morning
before you. It seems to me there is a lot of disagreement as to
how effective surveillance cameras are in terms of preventing
crime, detecting crime, investigating crime, and countering
terrorism. It seems to me that we have heard different
knowledgeable people offer different perspectives on that
point.
It just seems that one area Congress might want to further
investigate is to try to determine some answers. I realize it
is very hard to develop the metrics so that you can get answers
to questions. Well, is this technology really cost effective
and so on? I do understand that there has been a lot of
reference made to the United Kingdom's use of surveillance
cameras by their government agencies. I just wanted to call the
subcommittee's attention to the fact that the Parliamentary
Office of Science and Technology, which is a very, very rough
United Kingdom equivalent of your own Congressional Research
Service, will be issuing a report in the very near future I
understand on the topic of surveillance cameras.
Now, that might have some helpful insights as far as how
the United Kingdom Parliament perceives the use of the
technology in that particular case. And also I would just note
from an international perspective that our neighbors to the
north in Canada have taken a rather different approach in some
ways to the use of surveillance cameras to monitor public
places. Privacy Commissioner Radwanski has issued a letter.
Although it doesn't have the force of law, he outlines his
comments and his views of how the technology should and should
not be used. And apparently there is a disagreement among
various lawmakers in Canada as far as what the policy will be
there concerning government use of surveillance cameras for
public areas.
Mr. Barnes. May I just quickly add to that, Madam Chair? I
want to join with Mr. Woodward. I think it would be useful to
find out whether or not these systems have been effective in
other places. Again, I know of a report that came out of
Sydney, Australia, and Chief Ramsey referred to certain data
from Sydney, Australia in December 2001 that indicated that
these cameras had helped with one arrest every 160 days.
That is different than what the Chief told us. So it would
be, I think, a useful exercise to find out the effectiveness of
those cameras.
Mrs. Morella. How long have they had it in London? I don't
remember----
Mr. Barnes. In England the system was first put in place
following the IRA bombing in 1994. Second one in 1995. And then
when the little 4-year-old was kidnapped it just proliferated.
And Sydney, Australia, I am not sure how long they have had it.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think it was Mr. Goldstock that mentioned the necessity
for consistency. I was troubled by even the Interior Department
testimony. Mr. Parsons sensed that various Park Service
facilities, that is only one department of the government, were
essentially on a case-by-case basis.
We saw what happened in this city when Federal agencies
proceeded on a case-by-case basis and barricades went up, all
kinds of rights were violated. Parking meters off--when it came
to some Federal agencies, not bothered with respect to others,
violation of District law with respect to barricades.
The point of consistency does lead me to believe that some
Federal action guidance of some kind is necessary. The case--we
work brilliantly in this country on a case-by-case basis. But
that assumes that there is a law or a basis by which to judge
the case by case.
And how we go about that in--if we are the Federal
Government, it becomes problematic. At the very least it does
seem with me with respect to Federal facilities there is an
obligation. We probably should begin there, because we are just
learning, before we begin to tackle our national
responsibilities.
Would you agree that if we were going to proceed in some
kind of Federal policymaking, that we should proceed first with
Federal facilities, and do you think that should be a matter of
law or some kind of executive order or central guidance?
Mr. Goldstock. Well, it seems to me that the Federal
policy, whether it be for Federal facilities or even for local,
be minimum standards. It seems to me that is what can be done
the best, to have a sense of consistency throughout the country
and to put into place the kinds of policies and formulations
that you agree exist after hearings and these studies.
But it does seem to me that there ought to be a great deal
of flexibility with respect to individual incidents and the
questions of whether or not there are particular needs in
particular jurisdictions, either because law enforcement is not
broad enough or hasn't enough people that they have to enhance
their resources. There may be particular problems that exist.
I should also say that in considering this, it is not clear
to me that it is always privacy versus law enforcement.
Sometimes there can be an accommodation between the two. As Mr.
Woodward suggested, cameras in police cars can have a salutary
effect on the relationship between police and the public.
It seems to me cameras that record certain events can clear
innocent people, when witnesses testify to things that aren't
accurate and the cameras demonstrate it. Better evidene leads
to pleas and gets rid of cases fairly early if there is
documented evidence of the criminal activity that might
otherwise be fought.
So it may be possible, for example, not to have any
conflict where there is an indication that cameras are up, but
in fact they are not working, they act purely as a deterrent,
without any compromise of personal privacy. So, you know, I
think there is room for a wide range variation.
Ms. Norton. The variation you suggest suggests that if
somebody doesn't put some limits on what those variations may
be that they will be all over the map.
Mr. Goldstock. That is right. I think the limits should be
there. I think that is what Congress should be doing. It is
minimum standards and limits. You can operate between certain
guidelines, and then you have to make determinations based on
your own particular needs just where you are going to be.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Barnes.
Mr. Barnes. Of course, Congresswoman, the Mayor and D.C.
council have the authority to set standards and limits with
respect to the Metropolitan Police Department. But we have
also--we also know that the Secret Service is there, the Park
Service, U.S. Marshals Service. The Park Service, you know, Mr.
Parsons testified. So there are areas that are purely within
the purview of the Congress in terms of legislating and
providing some guidance to the Federal agencies. But we would
of course prefer the local government to provide that guidance
to the Metropolitan Police Department.
Ms. Norton. At the very least, I think the District should
proceed, and perhaps they can--what they do can be instructive
to anything that the Chair and I might agree upon.
Look, the District has the largest police force per capita
in the United States; that is even if you don't count the
Federal police here, has always had a very high crime rate. As
I speak, you know, there has been a spike in crime in one
neighborhood, and people are calling for more cops.
One wonders--I am back to my example--that there is a
certain point at which 10 cops we have no objection to. But one
camera that does what 10 cops would do we do. I hate to put
another law professor hypothetical to you, but at some point
one has to come to grips with the fact that at least in some of
the instances we are talking about; for example; Mr. Parsons
gave a very hard case, because there is no question that you
could have a park policeman right there inside the Washington
Monument, they are looking for somebody who would go and put
some kind of explosive device there, and one way to do it is to
station yourself a police officer there.
I will give you another example. I am in discussions with
the House on their closing the stair--West Front stair, hideous
thing to do. This is one of the great history vistas. It really
goes back to L'Enfant. I am in discussions about opening it up
at least some of the time, and we are getting somewhere on how
to do it.
Now, what I have suggested is you could put a police
officer--it would be a Capitol police officer there for the
period in which it would be open, and then we could open it at
least for that period. Now, what am I to do if the Sergeant at
Arms, with whom I have had the most serious discussions, says,
well, Congresswoman, we have just got enough police to cover--
it took us a long time, and only September 11th got us enough
police to cover what we need.
But I could have a camera there and the West Front could be
open the way it always was. So I put that hypothetical to you
and ask you if that is the suggestion that I am offered, should
I take it, given the outcry that one of the great vistas to the
Capitol and to our city has been closed because there is a real
danger. You really could come up these stairs and put a device
right under a major part of what the Capitol is just by walking
up the stairs.
What are you going to do with that one?
Mr. Barnes. Well, again, Congresswoman, I think that is why
it is important to really study whether or not these cameras
make a difference or do they give us a false sense of security.
I know, for example, they had for over a 22-month period
cameras were trained in Times Square, concentrated cameras. Ten
arrests for petty crimes. I know of no evidence where these
cameras have ferreted out terrorists. No evidence where those
cameras have really been effective in preventing, deterring,
helping with major crimes.
And so the question is, how do we spend our money? And I
think we can look to Detroit, for example, where after a decade
and a half decided to spend their money in other ways. We can
look to Oakland that studied at great length this issue. And
the Chief of Police finally said, it is not worth it. We can
look to Newark, White Plains, many places throughout the United
States. Even Tampa has abandoned, at least for the moment, the
facial recognition program that it had 2 years ago during the
Super Bowl.
So these adventures have been tried and abandoned, and we
need to know whether they are cost effective. And particularly
when you measure the cost, dollars and cents--not only the cost
in terms of dollars and cents, but the costs to our privacy.
The burdens far outweigh the benefits in our opinion.
Ms. Norton. I think you raise a good point. And this will
be my last statement about costs. Of course the cost of
stationing a cop is there, a very substantial cost as well, and
having him look at everybody who goes up and down is the kind
of, ``invasion that I did not have when I walked up the Capitol
steps before.''
I am going to ask the Chair, because I think Mr. Barnes has
raised an important question about effectiveness that we have
not had answered here. It is true that the Chief said that 10
percent of those arrested in Sydney, which is a very high
number, 10 percent of the arrests came from this camera. And he
mentioned things like assaults and the rest of it.
I would like to ask the Chair if we might write to Detroit,
to the locations that have been named so that we might add to
the record why they abandoned this. For all we know the
technology might not have been as effective then. But we need
to know why it was abandoned, because the whole notion of
effectiveness seems to me to be at the root of this. If we are
just putting some cameras up there to make ourselves feel good,
than it does seem to me we ought to take them down right away.
Thank you very much, Ms. Chairman.
Mrs. Morella. I think that is a good idea, Ms. Norton. We
may want to, without overtaxing the GAO, ask them to look at
how effective these surveillance devices are.
And I want to thank this panel for the expertise you have
given us. I know there are a number of other questions we would
like to get to you.
As an aside before I just conclude, Mr. Barnes, what is the
ACLU's position on the use of red light and speed cameras if
they are tied into a camera surveillance system like the
District's? Do you have a position on that?
Mr. Barnes. Well, no, we haven't taken a position. But I
will say this, Madam Chair. The difference between the red
light cameras is that they focus on a specific individual who
allegedly has run a red light in a particular circumstance.
That is very different from the general focus on all of us
that this video camera surveillance system would do.
Mrs. Morella. Very good. We will be calling on you if we do
draft any legislation to give us your expert response and
advice as we move along, if that would be acceptable with you.
We feel that we have some good minds here with adequate
background, experience, and that you could enhance what we may
want to do.
So I do want to thank you all for being here. I am going to
adjourn this subcommittee. I think it has been an excellent
hearing. I want to recommend accolades for our staffs. On the
majority side Russell Smith, the Staff Director. Robert White,
Shalley Kim, Matthew Batt, Heea Vazirani-Fales.
On the minority side, John Bouker and Earley Green. Thank
you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
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