[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW EFFECTIVELY ARE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORKING
TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-160
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
_______
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
84-698 WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DOUG OSE, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Henry Wray, Senior Counsel
Justin Paulhamus, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 22, 2002................................... 1
Statement of:
Posner, Paul, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, U.S.
General Accounting Office; Ron Castleman, Regional
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Ray P.
Churay, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix Field
Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Michael P. Austin,
Director, Arizona Division of Emergency Management; David
Englethaler, Director, Arizona Department of Health
Services and Response Office and Emergency Response
Coordinator, Arizona Department of Health Services; and Lt.
Col. Norman Beasley, Assistant Director for Criminal
Investigations, Arizona Department of Public Safety........ 18
Spencer, Robert, director of Maricopa County Department of
Emergency Management; Jack Harris, assistant chief, Phoenix
Police Department; Steve Storment, assistant chief, Phoenix
Fire Department; Tom Gallier, general manager, Water
Utilities Department, city of Tempe; and Roy Stewart,
president, Stewart Electric & Communications............... 86
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Austin, Michael P., Director, Arizona Division of Emergency
Management, prepared statement of.......................... 71
Beasley, Lt. Col. Norman, Assistant Director for Criminal
Investigations, Arizona Department of Public Safety,
prepared statement of...................................... 80
Castleman, Ron, Regional Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, prepared statement of................... 49
Churay, Ray P., Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Phoenix
Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared
statement of............................................... 58
Englethaler, David, Director, Arizona Department of Health
Services and Response Office and Emergency Response
Coordinator, Arizona Department of Health Services,
prepared statement of...................................... 75
Flake, Hon. Jeff, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Arizona, prepared statement of.......................... 13
Gallier, Tom, general manager, Water Utilities Department,
city of Tempe, prepared statement of....................... 126
Harris, Jack assistant chief, Phoenix Police Department,
prepared statement of...................................... 95
Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 2
Hull, Governor Jane D., prepared statement of................ 8
Posner, Paul, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, U.S.
General Accounting Office, prepared statement of........... 24
Spencer, Robert, director of Maricopa County Department of
Emergency Management, prepared statement of................ 90
Stewart, Roy, president, Stewart Electric & Communications,
prepared statement of...................................... 133
Storment, Steve, assistant chief, Phoenix Fire Department,
paper entitled, ``Winning Plays, Essential Guidance from
the Terrorism Line of Scrimmage''.......................... 99
HOW EFFECTIVELY ARE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORKING
TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK?
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Tempe, AZ.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1 p.m., in the
City Council Chamber, Tempe, AZ, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Horn.
Also present: Representative Flake.
Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief
counsel; Henry Wray, senior counsel; Justin Paulhamus, clerk;
Steve Voeller, chief of staff to Congressman Jeff Flake; and
Pat Curtin, office manager for Congressman John Shadegg.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.
We are delighted to have the Governor of the State of
Arizona, and we are delighted to have you, you will be
introduced to the hearing by the Councilman of this wonderful
Town of Tempe, and we look forward to it.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. So Councilman Arredondo.
Mr. Arredondo. Congressman Horn and chairman of the
committee, thank you for coming to Tempe, Arizona. It is with
great pleasure that I have the opportunity to say hello to you
and extend the invitation to come back.
And of course, Congressman Flake, thank you for always
thinking of your home town and knowing that you can always tell
it by the Butte out there. We appreciate you bringing this very
important issue to the forefront and allowing Tempe to be part
of it even though it is only hosting.
It is my pleasure today to introduce our Governor of our
great State of Arizona, the Honorable Jane D. Hull.
I wanted to make some points perfectly clear because we do
not get this honor oftentimes. It is my pleasure to introduce
this Governor because she will always be known in Tempe as the
Governor of Education where Arizona State University is very
important.
While she has inherited many difficult situations, she has
worked very diligently to keep education, our community and our
strengths together through her whole tenure as Governor. She
has strengthened our relationships with Mexico, and because of
the wonderful things she has done in Tempe, Arizona, she will
always be the Governor of Education, and that we will always
embrace her leadership and thank her for coming to Tempe,
Arizona.
The Governor of the State of Arizona, Jane D. Hull.
[Applause.]
Governor Hull. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Congressman
Flake. We are very glad to welcome you all to Arizona.
The chairman reminded me how well I know his daughter
Marsha, who lives here and does a tremendous job for those of
you who have not had the opportunity to meet her.
But, again, we are glad to have you here today and glad to
have you having an opportunity to hear what we have been doing
after September 11th.
As Congressman Flake and I both believe, the best ideas
come from the people. They come from the bottom down, and not
to disparage Washington or Phoenix, the capital, but they come
much better from the bottom up than they do from the top down.
The local citizens who live and work in the trenches are the
ones really who should be making the decisions.
I really appreciate the fact that you are here to listen to
us because it is extremely important to all of us, particularly
those of us, and the chairman is from California, that live in
the West and think that no one from east of the Rockies even
knows where the West is. So always glad to have you out here.
I am here today to testify regarding the actions that were
taken by the State of Arizona and our local governments in
coordination with the Federal Government to address the
challenges of assuring security of our State and our Nation.
Along with our fellow citizens across the country, Arizona has
watched the horror of September 11th unfold before our eyes.
In a single moment, we witnessed the worst of human
behavior, and in the next the very best of human behavior. And
even more, we witnessed the tremendous spirit of Americans.
As in other States, Arizona has demonstrated courage in the
face of adversity. Within hours of the attack, Arizona members
of FEMA's emergency response team, including several canine
units, were mobilized and were one of the first groups to be
transported by military plane to Washington. Several of them
are hear today.
Did the dog come? The dog is not here.
We had the dog on the floor of the house for opening
ceremonies. So sorry he is not here today.
They were followed by two teams of Phoenix fire fighters,
some of the same brave men and women who responded to the
bombing in Oklahoma. They are recognized as some of the finest
fire fighters in the Nation, and we are fortunate to have them
serve us daily.
Citizens of every background in Arizona stood in line in
100 degree heat to donate blood. Others organized the
collection of blankets and materials and supplies for shipment
to both New York and to Washington.
Arizona's children were especially moving. They collected,
as children did in other States, their pennies, their savings,
and donated them, as well as their own toys, to the children
who had been left homeless and in many cases parentless in New
York.
Since the tragic events, which I think have changed all of
our lives and I believe has changed all of our priorities, we
know that the threat of possible terrorist activities will go
on at any time and any place, and certainly what has just
happened in Israel is appalling to all of us.
The sense of having personal security in our lives, I
think, is probably gone forever or changed at least. The State
of Arizona has stood ready, however, to take all of the
necessary actions to protect the people of Arizona and the
United States when faced by those who would harm us and our way
of live.
We are not new to comprehensive efforts aimed at
anticipating and responding to possible terrorist attacks. The
cooperative spirit of all levels of government was evident when
the city of Tempe hosted Super Bowl XXX in 1996. It was
apparent again in our very successful efforts in preparation
for Y2K.
And in 1997, we established the Arizona Domestic
Preparedness Task Force, consisting of Federal, State, county,
and local agencies, public and private entities who develop
plans for the detection, prevention, and response of terrorist
activities.
That was done largely because of funding from Washington,
which we appreciate.
Those years of preparation by true professionals allow us
to respond quickly to the threats posed by the attacks of
September 11th. Within minutes, the Arizona Department of
Public Safety mobilized their operations center headed by a
national expert on weapons of mass destruction, whom you will
be hearing from later today.
DPS developed a unique, secure communication system to
insure that we have the best lines of communication among
Federal, State, county, and local law enforcement. Arizona is a
recognized leader in those efforts, and you will be hearing
from them in just a few minutes.
Also within the Arizona Department of Emergency Management,
known as FEMA, Arizona FEMA had its emergency operations center
open and running with Federal, State and local agencies
standing in alert.
This center has been in operation for decades dealing with
national disasters and other emergencies. It directly
communicates with State and local agencies, the FBI, FEMA, Red
Cross, and members of major utilities and other private
entities.
I was out there that day, and I had also been out there
around midnight on Y2K, and again, the setup, you have a lot of
people who come in from all over to basically work those 24-7
that everybody worked for so long.
The Domestic Preparedness Task Force reviewed and upgraded
its response plans. The State Health Lab, located within the
FBI, stayed open around the clock to insure that any reports of
suspected anthrax or other forms of bioterrorism were
immediately dealt with.
Over 900 suspected samples were tested, and I am happy to
report that all of the samples were negative.
I established a State Homeland Security Coordinating
Council consisting of 12 State agencies to oversee all State
response efforts.
We really do not have a homeland securities czar. We have
two or three czars. So let me introduce two of them that are
here today. Dr. Jim Shamadan. I do not know where he is. Back
there somewhere?
George Weiss, and Sandra Schneider has just joined us,
along with Steve Truitt, our Tucson Director who basically
handled the daily coordination of these efforts.
I activated Operation Vigilance and setup a central
telephone number at that DPS center for leads, for reports of
terrorism, for anything that needed to be in the intelligence
community, and basically all of those calls were followed up by
almost 100 DPS detectives.
Obviously, I called on the National Guard early and often.
We basically had National Guard at the President's request into
the airports within a week. Like all States, we had to wait for
the FAA training to come in.
They have stood with the Federal agents at our border with
Mexico, and again, they were put there in a civilian capacity
to facilitate the commerce. Arizona is a State that, because we
are very close to Mexico, September 11th was obviously coming
into our produce season, as with California. We were very
concerned about what was going to happen if the commerce could
not go through.
They facilitated that commerce, and it actually went very,
very smoothly, and the rest of them will be pulling out this
week.
They assisted the Bureau of Reclamation with patrols at
Hoover Dam. The bureau finally got people up there, but it was
a long time when basically our DPA and our National Guard were
up there and some of Nevada's.
They worked alongside the Deputy of Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office to provide around-the-clock security for the
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Plant, which is the Nation's
largest nuclear plant.
We worked closely with Mayor Rimsza of Phoenix, who did an
outstanding job, along with Sheriff Joe Arpaio, in coordinating
this multi-agency task force to insure the safety of the
thousands of fans who attended the World Series in Phoenix.
And, again, that was another potential terrorist threat target.
These efforts can only be successful with cooperation and
communication, and I think I used those words many, many times
during September and October. On the Federal level, my office
and the State agencies have been in regular contact with the
White House, the Office of Homeland Security, and various other
Federal agencies.
We have held frequent conference calls with cabinet
members. In fact, we love the briefings that we get about twice
a week with Tom Ridge, if he was there, with Joe Arpaio, with
all of the offices of the administration. They were extremely
helpful in keeping the Governors aware of what was going on.
I was in Washington about two or 3 weeks ago, and I had the
opportunity of meeting not only with President Bush, but with
Homeland Security Director--I still call him Governor Tom
Ridge. He says he prefers Governor--to talk more about that
relationship and certainly with Governor Ridge to talk about
the smart border concept, the fact that we have done a lot of
work in Arizona on technology on the border, and all we need
now, to mention those dirty words, is funding.
I know there are a couple of bills going through that would
help us both with creating the smart borders that we need and,
second, in rebuilding the Hoover Dam bypass, which basically
the Hoover Dam has now been closed to trucks since September
11th and will remain closed to trucks because of the condition
of the dam.
So we are hoping that we will get the funding to complete
that bypass road, which has been started, so that we do not
have that situation again. It is costing truckers and those who
are transporting goods a lot of money to have to go clear
around, as Jeff knows, but you cannot come down that road, and
we are losing some trucks periodically.
So, again, we are hopeful that can be resolved.
I was recently in Mexico with Governor Fox, and he has
insured his commitment to working with us with the border
problems. They have done a lot in Mexico to alleviate some of
the problems that we have had.
I believe that Arizona enjoys one of the finest interagency
cooperative spirits in the Nation. There is always room for
improvement. In that effort, in the next 2 months, two
conferences related to terrorism will be held in Arizona.
One is designed to educate first-responders and health care
providers on the potential threats of bioterrorism. It is co-
hosted by my office, by the Department of Health Services, the
Department of Military and Emergency Affairs, and the FBI.
A second conference will deal with communications
interoperability and is co-hosted by the Arizona Criminal
Justice Commission. As was evidenced in New York, radio and
electronic communications between first-responders is a dire
necessity. This situation, particularly in Arizona, needs vast
improvement.
I appreciate the Federal funds that are planning to come
our way to specifically address this crucial issue to all of
the States.
I would be remiss if I didn't bring just two other issues
to your attention. First, the attack and response to terrorism
both here and abroad shows how vital Arizona's military bases
are to the defense of our country. We need to do everything we
can do to protect them, to protect Luke, to protect Yuma, to
protect Fort Huachuca, and to protect Davis-Monthan, and
certainly we work with that a great deal, and I would just
remind you about the base closings.
Second, some of the Federal funds that are available for
security purposes have been designed to include a match of
various sorts from State and local governments. As you well
know from the West, and I am sure you have heard from a lot of
the Governors; you have not heard from me about, ``the
financial condition that most of the states are in.''
Yesterday I signed a bill that will remove another $230
million from the 2002 budget. We have already removed about
$675. So the 2002 budget is down $1 billion, and hopefully will
balance in July.
We now begin the job of cutting another $1 billion from the
2003 budget. That is about 17 percent of the State's budget,
and I have obviously tried very hard not to hit education.
So it is tough for all of the Governors, but again, I
believe that what is being done in Washington is extremely
important, and I would only ask that as we go for matches, that
one understands that all of the States and on behalf of
literally all of the Western States, we are all suffering, and
it will be difficult for us to make matches.
Finally, just in ending, and again, I thank you for coming,
and I thank you for listening; the State of Arizona is in the
forefront of the Nation's efforts to prepare for and, if
necessary, respond to terrorist threats whenever and however
they occur.
Our local first-responders stand shoulder to shoulder with
our Federal colleagues. We appreciate the tremendous
cooperation that we have received from all the Federal and
local agencies. We appreciate the briefings and the
conversations that we have had with the cabinet officers, with
the officials of FEMA, and certainly Governor Ridge is talking
to our people once a week, which we really appreciate.
I think we have set in place a very flexible, responsive,
domestic preparedness program that assures that Federal, State,
and local officials work together as seamlessly as possible to
meet any challenge.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to appear before
you, and thank you again for coming West, even though both of
you are from the West, and I know that you will enjoy hearing
from our agencies and from the panels that are setup.
They are the true experts, and more than that, they are the
people who have really pulled this together because they know
what they are doing.
With that, I want to thank you very much, and if you have
any questions, I would be glad to answer.
[The prepared statement of Governor Hull follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you very much for giving us the
really leadership that you have provided as Governor and the
cooperation you received from it.
And I want to now ask that Representative Flake, on behalf
of the committee here, will thank you for us.
Mr. Flake. I just want to echo those words. I know that you
have a very busy schedule. You have outlined some of the issues
that you are dealing with, and so we appreciate it a great
deal.
It speaks to the importance that you place on this issue,
and we all know that one of the hallmarks of the whole
administration has been the interagency coordination and
cooperation that exists here in Arizona. And we at the Federal
level learn a lot from that because we have our own problems
with interagency issues, and the fact that you were able to
pull together such a great team in such a short period of time
and carried out such great work speaks well for you, and we
really appreciate you carving out time in your busy schedule to
be here.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jeff Flake follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Governor Hull. Thank you very much. Have a nice weekend.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
Mr. Arredondo. Chairman Horn, hopefully you, too, as we in
Arizona and particularly Tempe have come to appreciate the
Governor, because of the wisdom and the leadership she has
provided, we congratulate her and thank her for coming to
Tempe.
Congressman Flake, prior to me introducing our next guest,
I would be remiss upon our city, our educators if I did not say
thank you to the hard work you have carried back in Washington,
DC, to provide those homeless kids a safe haven to attend
school.
I thank you for your leadership, your hands on approach to
continue the support where kids have an opportunity every day
to succeed. Thank you for representing our district very well.
With that, it is with great pleasure that I get to
introduce the Honorable Skip Rimsza. Skip was tied up in
traffic on the Phoenix side. So it took him a little longer to
get to the Tempe side. [Laughter.]
But he is here, and we congratulate Mr. Rimsza for the
things that he has stood for and has done in Phoenix.
We know for a fact that he has overseen already 16 new
additional city parks to enhance the quality of life for his
citizens. But more so and the most important thing that we
would like to recognize and thank him is for the new units in
the Phoenix Police Department dedicated to solely fighting hate
crimes.
You know, I could go on and on, but the real person is
here, and it is time for me to introduce the Honorable Skip
Rimsza, Phoenix Mayor.
[Applause.]
Mr. Rimsza. Thank you very much.
I do apologize for my late arrival.
We are very pleased to host you here in our community, and
I know the city of Tempe is delighted to have you here in our
facility.
I will just take a few short moments to chat with you about
the urban center challenges we have for homeland security, and
there are a couple of things that at least from my perspective
are important to touch upon.
First, we understand in the city of Phoenix that there is
no single agency capable of expectory planning by themselves
for the kinds of things that we are now forced to consider as
potential elements that happen in urban centers. So you being
here today and the partnership, frankly, that has developed
since September 11th between local government, State
government, Federal Government are nothing short of profound.
I would refer quite personally to the World Series game,
the very first one that was played here in Phoenix right after
the September 11th attacks as one where all levels of
government came together to provide the level of security that
was, I think, critically important for that event to be a
success.
The collaboration at that event with the Federal Government
and State and local organizations was nothing short of
profound, and I do think the September 11th events have caused
us all to set aside any parochial perspectives we might have
had and find even better ways to work together.
We think the collaboration that has resulted in the new
funding that is being discussed for us is very important to us
and you.
One of the key issues for cities, I would tell you, is
this. We would like to make sure that Congress recognizes that
cities really are the places where public safety is provided.
To give you an example, cities in Arizona have about 10,000
public safety employees. The State itself has 1,000.
So we are kind of the place we like to think, and I think
the Vice Mayor would agree with me, where the rubber meets the
road when it comes to public safety. So as you look at the
funding that might be available to protect our communities from
any kind of terrorist acts, we would like you to very carefully
consider the places where the work is being done today and make
sure the resources get to those locations.
I also have to take a short moment and speak about urban
center cities. From our perspective, and we think it is broadly
held, that locations where terrorists might focus their
activities will tend to be densely populated urban centers.
Once again, therefore, we would suggest that the allocation of
any resources or partnerships be focused on those urban centers
so that they can respond to the likely locations of attacks.
There are some exceptions to that I think we all recognize,
such as nuclear power plants or water supply sources that are
outside urban centers, but it would be something we would
really like you, too, to think about as you work through this
process.
The next one is sustaining the funding. I've had both the
joy and the pleasure and the pain of dealing with the COPS MORE
Grants over the years, and it was nice to have the Federal
Government pickup a portion of adding new police officers, and
it was helpful, and we took advantage of that.
But the reality is many urban center cities, in particular
were not able to take full advantage of it because, unlike
Phoenix, they weren't growing. Their tax bases weren't growing,
and as you may know and may recall, cities had to commit to
keep those officers on after 5 years out of their own operating
budgets.
And that is, I think, a challenge that should be considered
as you look at funding for these kinds of security investments,
not just initial funding for the capital equipment or the
additional training, but some base maintenance funding to keep
equipment and, frankly, the people sharp for, I think, decades
to come.
In fact, from our perspective, this is the new reality.
This is not something that is going to go away ever in the
future of our country. And so some baseline permanent funding
after the initial large funding I think is important to
consider.
I would suggest to you that the FEMA model for urban search
and rescue has been very successful for our communities. As you
may be aware, the city of Phoenix's fire fighters responded to
an earthquake in California, obviously a tremendous disaster.
We also were onsite in Oklahoma City and were part of the
recovery effort in New York City. The one challenge with that
for us and, I think, you is that response is 72 hours after the
incident, and I think all of us are recognizing that this
investment that we are talking about making now needs to be put
in place in a way that we can respond within minutes, if
possible hours probably at the longest.
So it is a different kind of investment than the FEMA
model, but the FEMA model is not a bad backdrop to consider for
your processes.
Just to kind of give you a quick outline for that, FEMA
funds for us the capitalization of some fairly sophisticated
equipment, some very specialized training from our fire
fighters. We take that equipment. We have it palletized and
stored in a location here in the valley, and then if called by
FEMA, we can rally our fire fighters and police officers and
that equipment in about 3 days to put them on the scene to help
with any rescue and recovery efforts.
That system works pretty well with the one enhancement we
think is necessary, which is having equipment more readily
available and having the training more active on a more day-to-
day basis.
The last thing I would mention to you, which is a critical
issue to every public safety system in the country, is the new
radio systems that we are all capitalizing today. The Phoenix
City voters just approved $120 million to replace our old,
antiquated radio system with a new 800 megahertz radio system,
and I am pleased and proud that the Phoenix voters wanted to do
that.
We are doing this so we can communicate directly with other
agencies internal to the city. That would be so that a police
officer and a fire fighter and someone from Streets and
Transportation can all communicate at the same time on the same
radio system.
At the same time, we want to be able to communicate with
other public safety agencies either in other cities, like
Tempe, or the State. One of the problems that appears to be
arising with this new, very significant investment, virtually
every city in America, is the sale of the 700 megahertz public
safety spectrum, and that's because, to put it simply, there is
a level of over-speak between the two systems that is
problematic.
You might have heard or recall that in New York some of the
challenges that they experienced when the fire fighters and
police officers entered the building is the loss of
communications. One of the reasons we are all looking to 800
megahertz is to avoid that kind of loss because it's a better
frequency for public safety officials to operate on.
One of the things we are all concerned about is if we
inadvertently sell the 700 megahertz system and then create
over-speak. All we are asking is solve that problem before we
sell those radio frequencies so that our officers do not get
blocked from critical communications when they are most
important.
If you do not mind, we have a short video I think we are
going to play for you, and then I will conclude.
[Video played.]
Mr. Rimsza. I would just conclude that this model is one
that is a good base model. The challenge for all of us is how
to make this even more efficient and more quickly able to
respond.
I can tell you from the perspective of us locals, the
enhanced training and equipment that is available here within
our community is very important to us, and we have always been
glad to partner with FEMA in this.
I would hope though, as always, that we never have to
respond ever again to one of these tragedies, but it makes me
feel good, as Mayor, that we are prepared to.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you very much, Mr. Mayor.
I was telling the staff on the way out that your fire
department has been No. 1 in the Nation and that we can be
proud of that. I assume they are still No. 1.
Mr. Rimsza. I am certain they are. If they were not, they
would be calling me for more equipment. [Laughter.]
Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you very much for that overview.
Mr. Arredondo. Chairman Horn, Congressman Flake, it is time
for you to get on to your business. We at Tempe want to thank
you for being here.
I would be remiss if I did not allude to the fact that our
two Assistant Police Chiefs are here in the back. If they would
please stand.
And our fire department is represented here, and we will
even have some of our staff members participating in your
panel. As you have requested, there will be a list given. You
do something that no other congressional hearing folks do and
that is the recognition of the people that really make this
happen.
We at Tempe extend our warmest hello to you and
congratulations in being here.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Well, that is well put because that is exactly
what we are trying to do, and as we all know, September 11,
2001 the world witnessed the most devastating attacks ever
committed on U.S. soil. And as we have looked about this, we
are going around to various cities and parts of America, and we
wanted those who live in the great State of Arizona and its
fine cities to know that they can rely on these systems should
the need arise.
We have been interested in the chemical attacks, the
biological attacks, the water supply, and as everybody knows in
this room, the West has always had problems with water supply.
I look with great interest on what is happening in Arizona,
your productivity in food and orchards and all the other
things, and we want to make sure that it's purified and not
compromised by some of the terrorists.
When I was in Europe a month ago, four terrorists tried to
poison the Rome water supply, and so this is the kind of thing
we face. We are going to ask during this and get ideas from
people that are going to be witnesses so that we can be better
prepared for that type of thing, which we have never had to
face before September 11th.
So let us bring the first panel here, which is Councilman
Arredondo and Paul Posner, who is the Managing Director. I will
announce them as they start with their presentation.
And Ron Castleman, Ray P. Churay, and Michael Austin, David
Englethaler, and Lieutenant Colonel Norman Beasley. We have
seats for Panel 1 right here, and we will start the way we
generally do.
We will swear in all of the witnesses, and if you do not
mind, just stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. We will start as we do always in Washington and
out in the field with the U.S. General Accounting Office as
headed by the Comptroller General of the United States, who has
the best job and the toughest job in Washington. He has a 15-
year term and nobody can mess with him. [Laughter.]
Including Congress and Presidents, and we have got an
excellent one in Mr. Walker right now.
The expert from the General Accounting Office now, Paul
Posner is Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues of the U.S.
General Accounting Office. GAO works for the Congress and not
the executive branch. We look to them, and I looked at the
terrorism blue books. There must be at least 50 of them
already. I mean, they are on top of this, and we appreciate
that.
So, Mr. Posner.
STATEMENTS OF PAUL POSNER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUDGET
ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; RON CASTLEMAN, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; RAY P. CHURAY,
ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, PHOENIX FIELD OFFICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; MICHAEL P. AUSTIN, DIRECTOR,
ARIZONA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT; DAVID ENGLETHALER,
DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES AND RESPONSE
OFFICE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE COORDINATOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH SERVICES; AND LT. COL. NORMAN BEASLEY, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY
Mr. Posner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is a pleasure to be here in the Phoenix area. I want
to again commend you for holding field hearings that are
particularly relevant since taking a bottomup look at our
system is so important for how we prepare to protect the Nation
from terrorism attacks.
It is somewhat novel to have a highly intergovernmental
issue be focused in the national security area. We are used to
dealing with State and local governments in document program
areas, whether it's education and healthcare and law
enforcement and a variety of other things. Well, we have
learned that nothing we do in the Nation can be done by one
government alone; that critically any national goal, whether it
is protecting public health or whether it is educating
handicapped children is critically dependent on State and local
governments and our ability to form partnerships with them over
time.
What we are learning now is protecting the Nation's
boundaries and borders itself from foreign threats is equally
dependent on harmonious and important working relationships.
What does this mean then for what we have to think about
going forward? One is that it means Federal initiatives are
really not Federal. They are national in nature, and that is
one of the reasons why meeting together at the local level is
so critical.
It means that Federal orders and policies mean very little
if they are not done in partnerships with State and local
governments and the private sector to address these challenges.
And ultimately the challenge for us at the Federal level,
we have to balance the national interests in obtaining
preparedness and mitigation with the unique needs and interests
of our local communities. One size will not nor should it fit
all.
For both sides this kind of arrangement raises
opportunities and challenges. By working collectively with
State and local governments, the Federal Government gains the
opportunity to get support and resources that we simply do not
have.
I mean, we cannot defend and protect water systems in this
country or transit systems or anything else. These are owned by
other levels of government. Fundamentally you were the first-
responders to every single serious incident, and we do not. So
we get the chance to enhance the protection of the Nation. We
risk the potential that we are going to have inconsistent
approaches and we are going to have to basically adopt the
priorities that local governments feel are important.
Some Federal officials may feel that is a risk, but
nonetheless, we have no other choice but to work through the
system.
Local governments gain support and financing, as well, for
critical local issues. But they risk being exposed to national
standards and requirements that may not particularly fit well
with particular local values and conditions.
With that as kind of the framing, I want to briefly reprise
the written statement that will be entered in the record with
your permission.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, that is automatically in the
record.
Mr. Rimsza. Thank you.
The main points are these. A national strategy at the
Federal level is critical. We at the Federal level have many
players, many agencies involved in this whole area of
counterterrorism and homeland security. At latest count, over
40 Federal agencies have a role to play.
The concern is obviously that this breeds the potential for
fragmentation, overlap, duplication, inefficiency. We think
this is a longstanding problem with Federal initiatives across
the Board, not just homeland security, particularly important
here because the States are so large.
There is also a concern that there is the potential for
this problem to get worse, not better, after crisis. Well
intentioned people across the board attempt to become relevant
in solving problems.
In the process, for example, after Oklahoma City, we noted
that a number of agencies got into the act of providing
assistance to State and local governments for training and
planning.
That may have been welcomed by some States and local
governments. Others told us that created widespread confusion
and overlap and frustration in dealing with the Federal
Government.
So the concern is the crises like we have just experienced
presents opportunities, but they also present potential
challenges, and the fragmentation could get worse before it
gets better, as a lot of agencies get in the act.
We have recommended consolidation of State and local
planning grants and training grants at the Federal level, and
we are pleased that at least the President's budget does
suggest the need to do that, and as you know, he has
recommended a block grant to get that done.
The second point going forward is the need for strong
national goals and indicators. We have something at the Federal
level called the Government Performance and Results Act, which
really was modeled after State and local governments more than
anything we have done. This sets the table that anything we do
in the budget or in management should be informed by some
expectation of what we are going to accomplish in terms of the
results.
We think the preparedness will not be sustainable. Funding,
support, programs are going to be difficult to sustain if we do
not have informed, balanced, national level kinds of measures
done in partnership with State and local governments and the
private sector.
Without it, we lack the ability to make budget decisions
based on performance. This could lead to either the abandonment
of effective programs or the endless funding of ineffective
ones.
The point is: How do we move then from an environment where
we can really start to measure what we are trying to do,
measure levels of preparedness, measure the impact of Federal
funds, particularly relevant now that we are ratcheting up that
level?
And what we mean by this is not just measuring input, not
the number of people in training, although that is part of it.
But trying as best we can, as difficult as it is, to measure
some kinds of indicators about how well prepared we are.
Obviously there are a lot of efforts already underway in
the State and local community and at the Federal community.
Exercises, the Emergency Management Assistance Accreditation
Programs that States and local governments are working among
themselves are part of the question because the idea of how you
measure performance and set goals is not one that any one level
government, again, should do, certainly not the Federal
Government.
These standards need to be national and not Federal, and
ultimately they need to be premised on hard work reaching some
agreement of what does it mean to be prepared. Is it the lack
of an event? Is it the limitation or containment of any damage
that does happen as a result of an event?
Those are some of the difficult questions we are going to
have to start thinking about.
Finally, we need to think about how we best define a
Federal role to promote State and local preparedness in ways
that really foster the kind of partnership we are talking
about. States and local governments' resources, as folks here
know, alone are not sufficient.
We can build on the all hazards approach to emergency
management. That is important. If you have experience and you
are prepared for an earthquake and other kinds of disasters,
you are well on the way to being prepared for this, but this
threat is different.
It crosses conventional boundaries and involves new actors,
different skills, new legal authorities, the private sector in
ways really that are very, very difficult to fashion as people
here know better than I.
So the challenge for the Federal Government is how can we
design tools to help harmonize the interests of all the
partners, and here we offer some suggestions and a statement
based on what we've learned elsewhere in the Federal system.
The point is our goal should be to enhance, not to preempt,
and our goal should be to protect others who may want to take
our money and supplant it and replace it for their own funds.
We want to somehow strike this balance.
In the area of grants, for example, there are three or four
challenges we think we need to kind of think about as we go
forward. One is to insure that the money is well targeted to
places that, No. 1, have the greatest threats and, No. 2, have
the least financial capability of delivering the public
services on their own, and this means devising some reasonable
indicators that can separate out these kinds of issues.
We have suggested in disaster assistance that FEMA do a
better job of articulating criteria to define when a
jurisdiction is more capable than others of handling
emergencies of certain types. We need to do a better job at the
Federal level, not just in this area, but across the board in
targeting Federal money.
The second issue that is perennial that challenges us
throughout the Federal Assistance System is fiscal
substitution. Clearly, we are trying to offer money because
there is a problem. If the money, in fact, is used by State or
local governments, as we often find it is, to replace local
money, then, in fact, we have not accomplished anything except
general fiscal relief.
In fact, we did a study that said in general across the
board about 60 cents of every Federal dollar given to State and
local governments is supplanted. There are ways to protect
this. We have maintenance of effort provisions. We find that
some areas are more vulnerable to this than others,
particularly areas where State and local governments have
longstanding involvement. The substitution is a particular
problem.
A third related issue is accountability. We know that
whenever the Federal Government grants money, the State and
local governments have their own accountability for their own
citizens, but somehow we have to develop procedures to insure
that there is some performance reporting back to the Federal
level.
One thing we have learned about block grants over the years
is if we do not have meaningful ways of telling appropriators
what we are getting for that money, notwithstanding the
discretion and flexibility we give to those communities,
congressional interest withers away and those programs tend to
wither away as well or get recategorized.
So as we think about this FEMA block grant, meaningful ways
to kind of translate local performance into results that can be
reported consistently at the national level really important.
Another important strategy, encourage partnerships below
the Federal level. Just as we are fragmented, we know that
communities in metropolitan areas, for example, face tremendous
barriers in working together across boundaries.
You have solved them much more so than we have because you
have had to, but we know that an emergency management and
otherwise economies of scale can really make a difference.
Mutual aid agreements are a testament to that.
The question is: As we design Federal programs, can we
encourage more of that to take place? Would that be useful?
The metropolitan planning model of the Department of
Transportation's ICE TEA is an example where all grants
essentially have to get screened by a regional planning agency.
Whether that works or not here remains to be seen, but some
kind of mechanism to encourage that process is important.
Ultimately what we need to think about as we design
assistance is sustainability. We want to have our initiatives
make a difference for the long and not the short-term.
The Federal Government does best at starting and building,
stimulating capacity. Ideally we would like to see these
initiatives become institutionalized and build support, get a
head of steam on their own on the local level. This might
happen if we're aiding the kind of functions that provide
multi-purpose functionality, not just terrorism preparedness,
but preparedness for other kinds of hazards.
The public health example is a good one where when fighting
bioterrorism, we're really strengthening the public health
system to protect against a variety of threats, and that kind
of thing augers well for the prospects of enhancing our long-
term preparedness.
A few other tools that we talk about in the testimony are
in the area of regulation. Crises have a way of prompting
national standards, and at times we visited some communities
where already some local governments are telling us that they
are facing challenges in coming to, dealing with large, for
example, national rail systems and rail corporations, and how
we can develop ways to better regulate if we need to and
develop standards that are really cooperative in nature. That
is a real challenge.
And finally, the concern of information sharing. How do we
insure that we share the kind of intelligence that State and
local governments need to really effectively target their own
resources in areas?
As you know, Presidential Directive 3, Mr. Ridge last week
announced a new warning system. The challenge of providing
State and local governments with access to sensitive national
security information that is nonetheless vital for their
citizens is a challenge we are going to be facing.
I know there is some legislation that has been developed
that certainly warrant some thought and consideration.
The point is that we can help them better face their
challenges in terrorism by better sharing information, but they
can also help us, and that is the last point here. This is a
two-way street. This is not just the Federal Government coming
down as a benefactor.
Basically State and local governments have vital resources.
They are essential to help us interdict and prevent terrorism
as well. With 600,00 local police officer, 200,000 sheriff
staff, you have really the resources to know better what is
going on in communities than the Federal Government does. And
how can we find ways to get that information back from you and
utilize it productively to defend against these threats? That
is an emerging challenge.
We notice the INS is starting to contract with certain
communities to have them monitor overstayed visa applicants, to
take advantage, in other words, of this great capacity that is
out there.
So ultimately, in conclusion, the three points that are
essential we think for preparing defending the Nation remain:
defining a strategy, to defining the national objectives and
the Federal role, developing reasonable and meaningful
national, not Federal performance accountability standards, and
designing tools and choosing them well and effectively to get
the job done.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Posner follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We appreciate that overall
national, State, city and regional perspective.
We now go to Mr. Ron Castleman, the Regional Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. He is based in
Dallas, and we are glad to have you here.
And I might add to all you do not have to read everything
that you have. If you could summarize that would be helpful
because we have got ten more witnesses.
Thank you.
Mr. Castleman. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee. I am Ron Castleman, Regional Director of
Region VI of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and it is
a pleasure for me to be here today to discuss the pressing
matter of how FEMA is assisting State and local governments to
prepare for a potential terrorist attack involving biological,
chemical or nuclear agents.
FEMA is the Federal agency responsible for leading the
Nation in preparing for, responding to and recovering from
disasters. Our success depends on our ability to organize and
lead a community of local, State, and Federal agencies and
volunteer organizations.
The Federal Response Plan forms the heart of our management
framework and lays out the process by which interagency groups
work together to respond as a cohesive team to all types of
disasters.
In response to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001,
the Federal Response Plan has proven to be an effective and
efficient framework for managing all phases of disasters and
emergencies. Much of our success in emergency management can be
attributed to our historically strong working relationship with
State and local partners.
Through our preparedness programs, we provide the
financial, technical, planning, training and exercise support
to give State, local, and tribal governments the capabilities
they need to protect public health, safety, and property both
before and after disaster strikes.
In meeting the challenges ahead for State and local
government, FEMA's Office of National Preparedness is becoming
more robust. The mission of the Office of National Preparedness
is to provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating all
Federal efforts to assist State and local first-responders, as
well as emergency management organizations with planning,
training, equipment, and exercises.
We continue to work with all 50 States and territories and
federally recognized Indian tribes and Alaskan native villages
to implement our current and other grant programs to assist
State, tribal, and local governments.
Our programs enhance their capabilities to respond to all
types of hazards and emergencies, such as chemical incidents,
incidents involving radiological substances, and natural
disasters.
With respect to Arizona, we continue to work very closely
with the Arizona Division of Emergency Management. Through our
terrorism consequence management preparedness assistance grant,
we support the State's activities in the readiness arena. With
FEMA financial support, Arizona has in place its domestic
preparedness task force that concentrates on such activities as
developing and testing the State's strategy for preparedness
and response; identifying necessary steps, Arizona communities
need to take to prepare for weapons of mass destruction events;
and establishing the most appropriate training curriculum to
deal with domestic terrorism.
Further, each of Arizona's counties received FEMA funds
from Arizona to participate in a statewide domestic terrorism
risk assessment.
Finally, our terrorism consequence management assistant
grant is also supporting various training workshops throughout
the Phoenix area that cover mass fatalities, anthrax response,
and other aspects of a response to a terrorist event.
We recognize that chemical, biological, and radiological
scenarios will present unique challenges to the first-responder
community. Of these types of attacks, we are in many ways
better prepared for chemical attack because such an incident is
comparable to a large scale hazardous material incident.
In such an event, EPA and the Coast Guard are well
connected to local hazardous material responders, State and
Federal agencies and the chemical industries. There are systems
and plans in place for response to hazardous material systems
that are routinely used for both small and large scale events.
EPA is also the primary agency for hazardous materials
functions of the Federal Response Plan.
Bioterrorism, on the other hand, presents a greater
immediate concern. With the covert release of a biological
agent, the first-responders will be hospital staff, medical
examiners, private physicians, and animal control workers
instead of the traditional first-responders with whom we have a
long-term relationship.
The Department of Health and Human Services leads the
efforts of the health and medical community to plan and prepare
for a national response to a public health emergency and is the
critical link between the health and medical community and the
larger Federal response.
Concerning the radiological threat, the Federal
Radiological Emergency Response Plan has 17 Federal agency
signatories, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the lead
Federal agency for coordinating the overall response, and FEMA
is responsible for coordinating nonradiological support to
that.
Finally, FEMA's Office of National Preparedness has asked
the FEMA regions to provide information on what the region has
done to review and modify State and local radiological
emergency preparedness plans for response to a sudden
catastrophic event.
It is FEMA's responsibility to insure that the national
emergency management system is adequate to respond to the
consequences of catastrophic emergencies and disasters
regardless of cause. We rely on our partners at the State and
local level, and without question, they need support to further
strengthen capabilities and operation capacity.
FEMA must insure that the national system has the tools to
gather information, set priorities, and deploy resources
effectively.
The creation of the Office of National Preparedness and our
emphasis on training, planning, equipment, and exercises will
enable us to better focus on our efforts and will help our
Nation become better prepared for the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Castleman follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. We thank you very much. That's a very thorough
statement and very helpful to us.
Our next witness is Ray P. Churay, Assistant Special Agent
in Charge, the Phoenix Field Office for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mr. Churay. Good afternoon, Chairman Horn, Congressman
Flake, members of the subcommittee, and distinguished
participants from Arizona.
Thank you for the opportunity to represent the FBI at this
hearing.
Terrorist events of recent years both in the United States
and elsewhere have driven home the importance of the absolute
necessity of the FBI to work closely with State and local law
enforcement and first-responder agencies.
The Phoenix FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI's
National Infrastructure and Computer Intrusion Program, and the
FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program are the main vehicles
facilitating that cooperation and support.
Each of these efforts address both international and
domestic terrorist threats that involve all appropriate local,
State, and Federal law enforcement, first-responder, and
infrastructure related agencies.
I have provided a more detailed statement. However, in the
limited time available, I would like to provide just a few
examples of how this program works.
Members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force have productive
liaison with the Arizona Department of Health Services and
their bioterrorism lab. The ADHS and lab are essential in
immediately addressing an overt biological threat and tracking
hospital cases to identify spiking illnesses that may be an
indication of a covert biological attack.
Other JTTF liaisons relevant to the purposes of this
hearing include the Metro Medical Response System, which
receives Federal funding; the Arizona Office of Homeland
Defense, which you have heard about earlier; and the Arizona
Department of Emergency and Military Affairs.
The Joint Terrorism Task Force has participated in numerous
joint training exercises, which included these and many other
agencies. These exercises involved simulated chemical,
biological and nuclear threats. Some of the locations included
Phoenix, Mesa, Lake Havasu City, Fort Huachuca and Sierra
Vista, Sky Harbor Airport, and the Palo Verde Nuclear Power
Plant.
Since the events of September 11th, the FBI has worked
closely with the law enforcement community to create two
satellite Joint Terrorism Task Forces, one at Tucson and one at
Flagstaff, and has attempted to increase membership in Phoenix
by six additional State and local agency members.
The FBI's National Infrastructure and Protection Center, or
NIPC, created in 1998, serves as a focal point to warn against
and respond to terrorist attacks that involve the use of the
Nation's cyber network.
The NIPC Key Asset initiative program identifies and
attempts to protect against cyber attacks on major electrical,
communications, water, and energy systems, as well as
transportation hubs.
The NIPC Infra-guard Program incorporates business,
military, and government communities into a kind of cyber
Neighborhood Watch network.
The FBI has also developed a number of warning systems that
are linked to the Arizona law enforcement and business
communities. The National Threat Warning System is a
classified, secure network that reaches 60 Federal agencies and
their subcomponents, as well as all 56 FBI field offices and 44
legal attaches overseas.
This information can then be disseminated to local and
State agency personnel with appropriate clearances. Thirty-
seven such warnings have been sent since September 11th.
Unclassified threat information is nationally disseminated
through the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
[NLETS]. The FBI has issued over 40 ``be on the lookout,'' or
BOLO, alerts on the NLET system since September 11th, and
thousands of security managers at U.S. commercial firms receive
threat information through the FBI's Awareness of National
Security Issues and Responses [ANSIR] Program.
The FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program fully
integrates the FBI into Arizona's local and State emergency
first-responder, and law enforcement community. The Phoenix FBI
Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator is Arizona's conduit to
a myriad of national nuclear, biological, and chemical
resources.
Arizona's Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator works
closely with the FBINQ and Counter Measures Unit and Hazardous
Materials Response Unit to provide immediate expertise and
links to subject experts in all related fields.
The WMD Counter Measures Unit and HMRU also serve as a
central resource point for Federal response teams in the event
of an actual attack. They also have immediate liaison with
agencies responsible for the administration of medical stores,
portable medical facilities, and supporting material resources,
such as tents, mobile labs, and storage buildings.
The WMD Coordinator's position was created specifically by
FBI Headquarters to insure that each FBI field office gave an
immediate response to local and State resource needs in a WMD
event.
Due to time constraints, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to make
this presentation, and I look forward to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Churay follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you very much. That is helpful.
We now have Michael P. Austin, the director of the Arizona
Division of Emergency Management.
Mr. Austin.
Mr. Austin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman.
It is a pleasure to be here today to offer some comments to
the committee.
Mr. Horn. Is that mic enough to hear you? Sorry to
interrupt.
The Reporter. The mics on the table will not amplify.
Mr. Horn. OK.
Mr. Austin. Mr. Chairman, I will try to speak louder.
My name is Mike Austin, and I am the Director of Emergency
Management for Arizona.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to offer
comments on your efforts to hear interoperability and
efficiency issues for the country.
Arizona, as you heard the Governor say, has begun preparing
for terrorism since 1997. Our strategy has been modeled after a
consensus process that was articulated well by Dr. Faulkner at
Harvard. He wrote a book, ``America's Achilles Heel,'' several
years ago and then presented the key issues of that book at a
conference that was held and hosted by the Department of
Justice in Williamsburg, Maryland, in 1997.
The State of Arizona attended that conference and took away
from that some key points of emphasis that we needed to develop
our Terrorism Task Force after in Arizona.
Governor Hull emphasized that the key points for our Task
Force would be to build a statewide response capacity;
construct a first-responder response preparedness curriculum;
and develop a robust health alert network.
Prior to September 11th, the Task Force was primarily
focused on administering the Department of Justice grant and
working with our Federal partners on integrating the State,
Federal, and local response capacity along those lines.
After September 11th, you heard the Governor mention that
she elevated that effort to the cabinet level and appointed
several of her key policy advisors to fostering the Task Force
through its reinvention.
The Governor's key points of emphasis since then have been
the driving force for developing a statewide capacity. Her
first key point of emphasis is to build a first-responder
capacity that is incredibly robust. Arizona's response has been
built on a pre-September 11th threat assessment. Obviously
after September 11th, our threat assessment methodology changed
dramatically.
We immediately recognized that first-responders need to
build a response capacity that clearly enhances public safety
and does not supplant current capacity.
The methodology that we are considering is focusing on a
model that you heard referenced by the city of Phoenix Mayor,
Mayor Skip Rimsza, based on the urban search and rescue model,
building a response capacity within the State of Arizona that
is equipment typed, resource typed, that can be functionally
deployed to an incident that occurs anywhere in the State.
The critical element of that is that mutual aid needs to be
thoroughly developed and thoroughly integrated throughout all
of the different levels of government within Arizona, including
the Federal level. There are Federal assets that need to be
incorporated into mutual aid as well.
Clearly, not all local governments are going to be able to
develop a capacity for weapons of mass destruction incidents.
It is probably not strategically valid to have every
jurisdiction in Arizona have the maximum response capacity for
any kind of incident.
The response capacity that they have should be measured
against the threat that they have and also measured against the
kind of assets that are readily deployable within their region.
To that end though, interstate and intrastate capacity must
be developed. Not so much of a problem in Arizona, but I
recently went to a similar hearing in Texas where it was
pointed out that the Phoenix urban search and rescue team is
much closer to El Paso than the Dallas urban search and rescue
team or even the city of Austin response capacity. So if El
Paso was to have an incident, then Phoenix is the closest big
responder that would be able to go.
The key component to mutual aid, of course, is
interoperability, and that is a tough problem to address. The
mayor spoke of the 800 megahertz issue, and in all of the
Federal dollars that Congress is appropriating to Federal
agencies to provide money to local jurisdictions to enhance
their communications capacity, that is not going to be enough.
We are still going to be short money in order to develop 800
megahertz capacity throughout the State of Arizona, especially
in the West.
The problem with 800 megahertz, it needs a robust repeater
methodology in order to be able to have the interoperability
that you would desire to have. The West, as you know, is much
different than the East Coast where political subdivisions are
small, and 800 megahertz carries easily across a county border.
There are counties in Arizona that are much larger than Eastern
States.
In all of this, the Governor's role plays an important
element. States play a key role. As you have heard, there are
over 40 Federal agencies that offer weapons of mass destruction
or terrorism assistance programs. It is essential that States
be able to have funding in order to administer and to be able
to provide the overhead integration capability so that all of
these goals can be met.
Providing money to first-responders is a great idea, and
Arizona embraces that because we readily recognize that the
first-responder capacity is essential to developing a statewide
capacity.
However, if all of that capacity is not integrated and a
strategic investment is not made, then as Mr. Posner has
pointed out, you will lose the effectiveness of all of the
investment to some degree. So States play a vital role, and
Congress needs to provide funding to States in order to
accomplish that goal.
The other issue that I want to bring forward today is the
issue of outcome-based performance indicators for the
accountability for that funding. That is a dynamic topic that
needs to be thoroughly explored.
Before strategic investment can take place, before funding
can take place beyond a first-responder capacity, we need to be
able to know what the outcome is. We kind of intuitively know
what that is being better prepared. But realistically, what
does that mean?
And if we have 30 different funding streams or several
different funding streams that have specific program indicators
or outcome indicators, output indicators, if you will, for what
that funding is being spent on, if DOJ has an accountability
process and FEMA has an accountability process, then the
administrative burden on the States would be excessive.
We need to know, the Nation needs to have an outcome
indicator or outcome based methodology that all of the Federal
agencies will accept as a performance accountable measure for
the funding that is coming through. The States can provide that
methodology and can provide that reporting, but to have
separate accountability outcomes for all of the different
funding streams may be difficult to administer.
So we do need to have outcome-based indicators, and they
may be simple to arrive at. They may be outcome indicators that
already exist: faster response times for first-responders,
better water quality, things like that currently exist that we
can report on.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity today. In the
interest of time, I will end my comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Austin follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, that is a very fine list that the Governor
is implementing, and it is a good list that I am sure other
States will try to follow.
Our next presenter is David Englethaler, director, Arizona
Department of Health Services and Response Office, emergency
response coordinator for the Arizona Department of Health
Services.
Mr. Englethaler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Flake, members of the committee.
Good afternoon. I am David Englethaler with the Arizona
Department of Health Services. I am here to represent Dr.
Catherine Eden, who is the director of the Department, who is
sorry that she is not able to appear before this subcommittee.
I act as the chief of the Department's Bioterrorism Office
and as the emergency response coordinator for the Department.
I am grateful to this subcommittee for the opportunity to
speak here today. My hope is to give you the Department of
Health Services' perspective on what we have been doing so far
to prepare for a potential bioterrorism attack, as well as what
we are currently working on.
Prior to receiving the Centers for Disease Control
bioterrorism funds, public health agencies at the State and
county levels were not primary participants in bioterrorism
discussions and really were not consulted within bioterrorism
hoax responses, which has really been the primary response to
bioterrorism prior to September 11th.
The primary responders were often the law enforcement and
HAZMAT agencies, which are not considered traditional public
health partners.
The Arizona Department of Health Services received a
bioterrorism cooperative agreement from the Centers for Disease
Control in the fall of 1999. These funds allowed the department
to establish its epidemic detection and response program. This
program was centered around four main activities, those being
emergency response planning, bioterrorism and outbreak
surveillance and investigation, biological agent detection, and
communications.
The CDC funding provided the Department the opportunity to
simultaneously begin to develop bioterrorism response
capabilities, as well as to bolster the existing infectious
disease surveillance and response infrastructure.
Over the ensuing 2 years, the department established itself
as a main component in emergency response, particularly in the
area of bioterrorism. Close partnerships were developed with
emergency management and law enforcement and other first-
responders, and these relationships were tested and proven
during the anthrax letter and hoax responses activities during
last fall.
Three Arizona cities were funded as part of the federally
coordinated Metropolitan Medical Response System Program out of
the Office of Emergency Preparedness. The Department has built
close ties with these programs and remains involved with the
development of their systems.
The Department has also developed both intra and
interdepartmental response plans for public health emergencies
and produces statewide response plans for bioterrorism,
pandemic influenza, and the national pharmaceutical stockpile,
and has participated in various tabletop exercises.
New disease and outbreak surveillance systems have either
been developed on air in the process of development. The State
Health Laboratory has increased its capacity to test for
bioterrorism agents and has begun to provide Level A laboratory
training.
The Department has also increased the emergency health
communications capacity in the State by providing county health
departments and healthcare facilities with communications
equipment, including satellite dishes and fax machines.
The department has also begun development of an Internet
based health alerting system that allows for secure high-speed
communications between all emergency responders, and this
system is being done in coordination with emergency management
and law enforcement.
All of these activities were made possible by the Centers
for Disease Control bioterrorism cooperative agreement funds,
and all were tested during September 11th and anthrax response
activities. A review of response activities last fall has shown
that the department was able to adequately respond to the
public health needs of the State, although the Department's
resources were taxed.
The county health departments and the hospitals
participated to some degree in emergency response actions, but
they had not been previously able to develop strong
bioterrorism response systems. It became obvious that an actual
large scale bioterrorism attack would quickly overwhelm
Arizona's, like most States', response capabilities.
With the advent of the CDC bioterrorism cooperative
agreement, supplemental funds and the HRSA hospital
bioterrorism preparedness funds just recently this year, the
State will be able to address the bioterrorism preparedness
needs of the county health departments and begin to address the
many needs of the hospitals in this State.
Currently the Department of Health Services is vigorously
developing work plans and applications for these grants. The
Department is also making immediate funds available to all
county health departments for each to hire a bioterrorism
coordinator, as well as a communications coordinator to insure
the development of local health emergency response plans and
the integration of department directed health communications
systems.
The department has already met with the county health
departments, and the bioterrorism and hospital advisory
committees to provide input and direction on work plan
development for both of these grants.
The department believes that these funds will allow the
State to go a long way to shoring up Arizona's public health
infrastructure, while insuring the citizens of Arizona will be
more adequately protected during catastrophic bioterrorism
attack.
An ongoing planning concern is the long-term maintenance of
this increased public health infrastructure, particularly
funding for new personnel. It is hoped that these current
funding streams are, although immediate in nature, long-term in
reality.
I thank the subcommittee for your time and your kind
invitation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Englethaler follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you. That is helpful.
I am going to take the privilege of one question and one
question only, and then we can do it generally, but it comes to
me, and I want it with this part of the record.
You have got fine laboratories in the Public Health
Department. Do you have a capacity of the nonprofits and the
profits, the universities to do some of this laboratory work of
let's say you had some kind of a plague and biological thing?
Have you thought about getting those all connected in some way?
Mr. Englethaler. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Flake,
essentially those labs that you all listed are considered Level
A labs, and those are labs that typically test for various
types of disease agents that humans may get. They are all
receiving training through our department to be able to do a
certain level of testing for the various bioterrorism agents,
at least some rule out testing, information on how to handle
this material, how to send it to the State lab.
The State lab is part of the overall laboratory response
network in the country and is coordinating all existing testing
during a bioterrorism event or hoax type situation. So we are
working with those partners and providing education and
training, too.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
And now our last speaker for Panel 1 is Lieutenant Colonel
Norman Beasley, the Assistant Director for Criminal
Investigations of the Arizona Department of Public Safety.
Colonel Beasley.
Lt. Col. Beasley. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Flake, it is,
as the rest of the panel has said, a pleasure to be here and to
have the opportunity to testify on this truly probably the most
vital topic that we are facing today in our society.
What I would like to do real briefly, and I assure you real
briefly, is talk a little bit about what the Department of
Public Safety and other law enforcement offices are doing in
Arizona, and then talk specifically about some homeland defense
recommendations as it relates to the law enforcement function.
The Department of Public Safety is designated under our
emergency response plan as the lead State agency for terrorism.
What this means is that we are responsible for coordinating all
State assets that would be deployed to assist other State and
local agencies during an act of terrorism.
To accomplish this mission, as of September 11th, we have
instituted our Domestic Preparedness Command. As part of that,
we have opened a Domestic Preparedness Operations Center that
until recently was staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week by not
only DPS investigative personnel, but personnel from other
local law enforcement agencies.
What this center handles is all requests for DPS
assistance, information, and support, and any other State
agencies' support, to include the Department of Health
Services; is routed to this center, and then it gives us a
point of central coordination.
We also, during the anthrax scare, we took over the
responsibility from the FBI to track all of our suspicious
anthrax letters. If a local jurisdiction does not have the
responses to respond to deal with a suspicious package, we will
either have other local agencies respond or our own specialized
response units will respond in conjunction with the FBI to deal
with that particular package and then transport it to the
Division of Health Services.
We also coordinate the deployment of the National Guard
Civil Support Team, which has been a very good asset for us,
and is the National Guard's version of a weapon of mass
destruction response team.
The center also developed a secure Web site that provides
real time intelligence, research and open source information to
all law enforcement agencies, not only within Arizona, but
throughout the country.
It does provide written ready access to even Federal
generated information. We have partnered with the FBI, and all
of their teletype and information bulletins are placed on this
Web site in a real time basis so that agencies in Arizona can
go to this Web site and get the most current information that's
available.
In addition, our Intelligence Bureau generates daily threat
advisories for all law enforcement agencies in Arizona. To
date, we have generated well over 250 intelligence bulletins.
We have forwarded 187 NLETS terrorist related teletypes to all
law enforcement, and basically this becomes a check and
balance.
What we found initially is not every law enforcement agency
was receiving the NLETS. So we have taken that responsibility
to make sure that every agency gets this information.
If they do not have NLETS capability, we use e-mail or the
fax.
Since September 11th, as a department we have been in a
higher state of alert, and all of our specialized response
units that would respond to a weapon of mass destruction or act
of terrorism are on immediate mobilization status.
Detectives and support personnel assigned to the division
have been redeployed to conduct counterterrorist investigations
in the area of intelligence and security operations. We work
very closely on the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and the
U.S. Attorney's Anti-terrorism Task Force. We have also
assisted the city of Phoenix with security at Sky Harbor
Airport.
In the area of personal protection equipment, we have been
very fortunate. We are in the process of finishing up the
purchase of a personal protective ensemble for every sworn
officer, almost 1,100, that will give every officer in the
field protection so that they could perform law enforcement
functions within a chemical and biological environment.
At the request of the U.S. Attorney's Office, we have
partnered with the FBI in their expanded U.S. Attorney Task
Force and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force to provide liaisons in
those areas of the State where there is not an FBI agent.
Throughout our history, Arizona has enjoyed a very strong
working relationship prior to September 11th, and this has been
a building block not only with law enforcement, but with other
public safety respond agencies. A lot of credit goes to the men
and women out there in the field in Arizona who work daily on
very hazardous things and work very well. We feel Arizona
really is a model when you look at interagency cooperation.
I want to publicly compliment the role of the U.S. Attorney
and the FBI in providing that support to us.
Now I wish to talk specifically on some homeland defense
issues, some of which Mr. Posner touched on.
In the area of intelligence sharing, there needs to be a
mechanism in place to allow for the timely sharing of
intelligence information between State, local, and Federal
agencies. Currently there does not seem to be a clear vision on
how this is going to be accomplished.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police has a Web
site on the FBI Law Enforcement Online. The U.S. Department of
Justice RISS projects are attempting to use RISSNET as an
interoperability between agencies.
The problem with both of these systems is not everybody is
on them.
The FBI uses the NLETS system to disseminate information.
Again, as we talked, not all law enforcement agencies have
this.
In addition to the vision on how are you going to get this
information from the Federal level to the State level, there
needs to be also a vision on specific tasking to State and
local agencies. What does the Federal Government expect from us
in the way of information, and a mechanism where those State
and local investigative operations can input that data directly
and receive information back.
This vision should also look at developing and supporting
systems, including software and hardware, that enhance the
overall intelligence effort and makes this a true national
intelligence program.
It appears that the State law enforcement agencies can play
a vital role, and I think Congress needs to look at funding for
the State level law enforcement agency in the area of this
intelligence dissemination system.
The development of interoperable communications systems is
a huge issue for first-responders, and that has to be a
critical thing for Congress to look at. We had experience
during the World Services. The military does have that
capability to link various radio frequencies, and if this
system could be made available to State and local agencies, as
long as it was not cost prohibitive, that might be something to
look at.
In the area of training, much of the WMD training that we
see today is not law enforcement specific. We would like to see
that the training programs develop some form of law enforcement
specific training that is geared to what the law enforcement
officer is going to do in a WMD or a terrorist environment.
That is primarily for the field officers.
In closing, I really wish to thank Congress for their
support in the Nunn-Luger initiatives and other initiatives
because, quite frankly, without your support, Arizona could not
be at the level of preparedness that we currently are.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lt. Col. Beasley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, I thank you for your fine presentation.
I want to just answer one thing that I think is what you
were talking about. We were very conscious of sharing law
enforcement information with the FBI and other intelligence
agencies to pinpoint a person in the city or the county or the
State that would be cleared by the FBI so that you did not have
a dope by mistake that was putting away marijuana or something
and taking it out the cage himself.
So I would just like to put this in the record because it
is definitely with what you are talking about, which is the
H.R. 3483, the Intergovernmental Law Enforcement Information
Sharing Act of 2001.
This is a letter signed by myself and Christopher Shays,
the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs and International Relations, and I gave this to the
chairman of Judiciary and the James Sensenbrenner, Jr. He is
very responsive to this, and we hope we can move that
legislation in the next couple of months. And we know that is
long overdue.
So you hit a right thing, and I hope that the delegation
all over the country agree with that, and I think they do.
So that is very helpful now on Panel 1, and then we will
move into Panel 2, and with the General Accounting Office
usually we have the individual from the GAO we will at the end
ask if we have missed something. That is where we are trying to
get to between people.
The Panel 2 is Robert Spencer, Jack Harris, Steve Storment,
Tom Gallier, and Roy Stewart.
OK. We do swear in our witnesses. So if you will stand and
raise your right hand, we would appreciate it.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. The Clerk will note that all five witnesses have
affirmed.
We will begin with Robert Spencer, the Director of Maricopa
County Department of Emergency Management.
STATEMENTS OF ROBERT SPENCER, DIRECTOR OF MARICOPA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT; JACK HARRIS, ASSISTANT
CHIEF, PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT; STEVE STORMENT, ASSISTANT
CHIEF, PHOENIX FIRE DEPARTMENT; TOM GALLIER, GENERAL MANAGER,
WATER UTILITIES DEPARTMENT, CITY OF TEMPE; AND ROY STEWART,
PRESIDENT, STEWART ELECTRIC & COMMUNICATIONS
Mr. Spencer. Chairman Horn, Congressman Flake, members of
the committee, thank you for this opportunity to present some
local views on how the Federal Government's efforts are working
for the response to terrorism and for searching for
recommendations to make those efforts more efficient. My
comments today will hopefully represent the local regional
perspective.
Some of the demographics of Maricopa County are included in
the written statement that I have submitted today. I will not
go into those too much right now.
Mr. Horn. I might say all of your statements automatically
go into the record when I call your name.
Mr. Spencer. OK.
Mr. Horn. We hope we can get these hearing records out in
the next few months because otherwise we are losing problems
and not taking your knowledge and spreading that around the
country.
So go ahead.
Mr. Spencer. Included in that statement are many of the
terrorism response capabilities that we have. Today I am
speaking from the Maricopa County perspective, but it is also a
partnership of 24 cities and towns and another 30 city-like,
unincorporated population centers. So it is not just Maricopa
County because we do work closely together with the cities and
towns.
In my short period of time here today for verbal testimony,
I would like to convey shortfalls that we have in the system
and some recommendations maybe on how to fix some of those
shortfalls.
The current money allocated by the U.S. Department of
Justice has begun to put a dent in the overall needs for
equipment. This money flow needs to continue.
Restrictions on this money, however, need to be relaxed. We
cannot purchase such items as bomb robots and rolling stock
with this money. So even though we are buying a lot of response
equipment, we are getting close to the dilemma as to how we
will store it and quickly get it to the scene. Trucks and
trailers must be purchased for such.
Perhaps too much emphasis is sometimes placed on these
funds for chemical and biological response, where maybe the
most likely attack will be conventional explosives perhaps
enhanced with nuclear materials.
Therefore, equipment to interrupt or disarm bombs and
equipment to rescue people in collapsed structures needs to be
considered.
When considering this and certain other sources of Federal
funding for the local emergency response, the bureaucracy needs
to lighten-up on some of the grant restrictions. Requiring
local match can be difficult when dealing with funds at these
levels. We cannot spend the money if we are required to match
it, and we cannot come up with the qualified matches.
Another shortcoming is that when moneys at these levels
come into a smaller agency, such as mine, it can be very
difficult to spend it within strict timeframes and without
additional personnel to manage the funds. We want to get this
money on the street as quickly as possible, but we also want to
manage it professionally.
Future money should allow for the hiring of a limited
number of employees to keep track of the funds and to get those
funds spent expeditiously.
Now, the hospital system has come into this game late and
is not yet able to provide the level of capability that we
need. Even during normal times, our EMS and hospital system in
the valley becomes saturated. If the large mass casualty
incident was to occur during the 8 months out of the year when
our population is at its highest, when our snowbird population
has come down for their annual migration, we might be fortunate
to find three critical care beds per hospital.
May I suggest something maybe that may help nationwide to
remedy the need for more critical care bed space? This may be
maybe my highest recommendation today, for improving the
hospital surge capacity preparedness, and that would be for the
Federal Government to develop 12 nationally committed field
hospitals which could be expeditiously shipped anywhere in the
Nation within a 12 hour maximum timeframe.
If you research some of the old civil defense things, we
used to have those, and during the early 1980's they were
dismantled, sent to South America, and so forth, and we no
longer have that capacity.
There has already been developed a similar capability in
the national pharmaceutical PUSH package, and to a lesser
degree the national DMORT system. The hospitals would be self-
contained, would provide shelter, climate control, bed space,
and medical equipment to handle up to 1,000 critical care
patients.
A trained group of professionals would accompany the
hospitals during a deployment, to set them up and to provide
additional medic support to the local effort.
The mobile hospitals would go a long way in solving the
surge capacity required in every locality in our Nation.
The next shortfall that currently is being addressed, but
needs to be expanded and implemented nationwide is the uniform
medical surveillance system, and David Englethaler addressed
that pretty well.
But if a biological attack was to occur, we all know that
recognizing the event early on is crucial preventing its
spread. Funding to install the system in every hospital and in
every emergency medical system is of paramount importance.
The ability to quickly warn and advise the public is
lacking. The old civil defense sirens are gone. The emergency
alert system has replaced the earlier and older emergency
broadcast system, somewhat debatable as to whether or not that
was an improvement.
Locally we have something called the media alert, which
will blast fax the media with emergency information. The media
alert was developed to supplement the EAS.
We currently have funding also to develop a county-wide
telephone calling system to provide emergency information to
the populous.
With all of these projects considered, I am still not
comfortable that we have what we need in the way of warning and
notification. The Federal Government has been working on
legislation that requires a special electronic chip to be
installed in all new radios and televisions. The chip would
automatically turn on a device in which it was installed and
tune it to receive emergency messages from the EAS.
This would fill a huge gap, and it would be found where
someone who is not in contact with a telephone or did not have
their radio or TV turned on. The Federal Government should
continue to look at this legislation and expedite it if it
really does seem right.
The final shortfall that can be predicted is the ability
for the local emergency response agencies to sustain their
terrorism emergency response capabilities. Most response
equipment has a 5-year shelf-life. Of course, if it actually
has to be used, it is immediately outdated.
Phoenix, which is our original Nunn-Luger-Dominici Act city
that was trained under those funds, has noted that their
originally purchased equipment is going to start getting
outdated. It has been that long.
Although they have spent much of their own local money to
sustain and build their capabilities, they cannot do so
indefinitely. The Federal Government needs to come up with a
plan and funding streams to provide the sustainability required
in the future.
Thank you, once again, for requesting our local input. I
hope my recommendations can help you plan future legislation
that will make local response to terroristic acts more
effective and more efficient.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spencer follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, that's excellent, and your point on the
hospitals and the need for tents and all of the rest of it,
like MASH, maybe we can get some of it off the MASH set in
Hollywood and solve some of these problems.
But I will ask our staff to go now and get a real look of
where are the various tents and all that could be moved rapidly
across the country. So thank you for pointing that out.
Jack Harris is the Assistant Chief of the Phoenix Police
Department.
Thank you for being here.
Mr. Harris. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before
this committee.
It is nice going in the second group because I get to just
review some of the main points that I wanted to present because
most of them have been presented by other members from the
other group. But let me say that one of the important points
that we wanted to bring forth from the local jurisdiction is
the topic of resource allocation and threat assessment.
In the earliest stages of the development of the WMD
program back in 1996, the initial grant funds that were going
to be offered to the jurisdictions were disseminated based
primarily on the 27 largest jurisdictions throughout the United
States. That short list of 27 jurisdictions included the city
of Phoenix.
As time went on, the funding was presented at the State or
the country level for disbursement, and the funds to not always
get disbursed to the areas where the risk is the highest or
where the population is the greatest. We would recommend that a
review be made and go back to the original allocation alignment
of looking at the jurisdictions that had the highest risk
assessment according to the Department of Justice study and
also where the largest masses of population were concentrated.
The second area that I would like to talk about which has
been discussed already is the policy for sustainment of funds.
We get funds which we really appreciate to start program and to
purchase equipment for programs that are essential to our
response to a WMD situation, but we desperately need to be able
to continue that funding to sustain that equipment and those
programs beyond just the initial allotment to get the
equipment.
One example would be the purchase of, say, 2,700 gas masks
to equip everyone with the Phoenix Police Department. That is
extremely beneficial to us, and we appreciate that kind of
funding.
But along with that allotment comes training needs and OSHA
standards that have to be met to continue to operate with that
equipment. OSHA standards will require physical examinations,
respiratory examinations for people who are disbursed with this
equipment and also training in how to properly utilize the
equipment.
That funding can be very detrimental to a local agency,
especially in these hard times economically. So we would, as
some of the other members have, emphasize and reiterate that we
need sustainment funds to keep those programs and equipment
going into the future.
The other topic that I wanted to discuss was the
communications situation with the 700 megahertz bands. The city
of Phoenix strongly urges continued review by the FCC and the
congressional committee for appropriate distribution and
organization of frequencies allocated for public safety uses.
As I am sure you are well aware, in any type of major response
to something like Oklahoma City, one of the first things that
can cause problems for first-responders is the lack of
communications.
So we are asking that we continue to look at how those
frequencies are allotted to both public entities and private
entities, as well as to public safety organizations so that
when we get to a scene, as the Twin Towers disaster, that we
are able to continue to communicate without overlap or the
frequencies and a problem with private industry frequencies not
be available to us to be able to maintain the communications
that are so necessary in a mass disaster like that.
And with that, I would thank you for allowing me to present
today and appreciate any consideration that you give to our
requests.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. We now have your counterpart in the Phoenix Fire
Department, Assistant Chief Steve Storment.
And welcome being here.
Mr. Storment. Thank you, Congressman Flake and Mr.
Chairman, for the opportunity to actually followup from what
Mr. Spencer and Jack said as far as sustainability.
We go back to 1997 being one of the first two dozen MMRSes
that were put together to start looking at this issue, and as
Mr. Spencer said, as we have gone along with this, we have made
the equipment go as far as we can. We are now almost 6 years
into that program, and using the FEMA USAR model that the mayor
spoke about so well and the video, we have been a decade, and
that has been my responsibility over the last actually 12
years, is that direct funding source to the local jurisdictions
that provide the direct service to the customer.
In the gap between our 22 points out of 22 points that we
scored during the assessment in this last round of money, we
got all of the points there were for the hazards and the risks
associated. One of our gap problems is the FEMA USAR assets,
some 60,000 pounds and some up to 100 people that you have got
to move on best speed is a 6-hour window and up to 2 to 3 days
to get wherever you are going.
Those same folks, if it happens here, are tied up in the
emergency response. One of the pieces for sustaining our effort
here is daily operational sustainment that takes 6 to 8
minutes, not 6 to 8 hours. For us that would be a piece of
equipment and staffing called heavy rescues that New York City
had and other cities currently have that allows you to kind of
bridge that gap between getting the rest of the stuff here and
the rest of the Federal effort here that helps not only law
enforcement, but also helps the fire department and certainly
the customers in Phoenix.
The other part of this sustainment effort is the track
record. In fact, Mr. Posner said it very well, is the success
stories. In the last 10 years, last 12 years of the FEMA USAR
program, we have survived an IG audit, and that was quite
interesting and we got through that.
So those auditing pieces for the local jurisdiction are in
place, and they work. We would like to see that directed to the
city locale that have a proven track record to continue. With
the efforts between the police department and the fire
department and MMRS, we have been ranked at least by CNN in one
article being the fifth best prepared in the Nation.
What held us back was what Mr. Spencer talked about, was
the hospital piece, which is enormously difficult and at least
in what you read in some of the congressional notes and in the
newspaper, the Health and Human Services piece with a block of
money coming through to them would certainly be helpful.
We would like to submit that our effort over the last
number of years has been well measured. We know what the work
is. Hence we know what the job needs to be done, and we know
what the outcome is.
We have deployed to five different locations. We have seen
it from the ground up.
On the frequency piece that Jack talked about, we would
like to add another piece that is not quite so special to
become routine, and that is use of satellite communication that
is not impervious, but certainly more hardened than ground-
lines and cell phone towers.
And having been one of the first ones to Oklahoma, I can
tell you it was a little unnerving to call to the National
Response Center via pay phone in the Bell South building
because there were no other lines available. So some interest
in that to make it less special and more user friendly.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to pass this along,
and as part of the record, we made copies of a group that I got
to work with back in Boston at the Kennedy School of
Government, which I have had the privilege of sitting on their
Executive Board for weapons of mass destruction issues, and
there is a paper, which I am sure you guys have it, called
``Winning Plays, Essential Guidance from the Terrorism Line of
Scrimmage,'' which is kind of a long way of saying, you know,
we know what the issues are and we have offered some solutions
to those issues, and those are kind of the solutions we share
with you today.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Well, we would certainly want to have that
document in the hearing record. If you could just read in the
matter and give it to the court reporter, and we will have it
in.
Mr. Storment. The name of the paper that some 12 of us had
put together as part of this charge over the last 3 years is
coming out of September 11th, and it was actually done for a
really good friend of ours who passed away in that, Jack Finney
of the New York City Fire Department, and it is called
``Winning Plays, Essential Guidance from the Terrorism Line of
Scrimmage,'' which basically represents the folks in the
trenches, which are all of us.
Mr. Horn. Sure.
Mr. Storment. And the contributing authors were Peter
Bearing, Paul Matascowsco, Hank Christian, myself, A.D.
Vickery, and then the staff at the school there.
And we have 100 copies back there, and I certainly have a
copy here for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you.
I am a graduate of the Kennedy school, too, so I am
interested in what they are doing. I am glad to see there is
practicality and not just theory. So thank you for changing my
view of my alma mater. [Laughter.]
So we now have Tom Gallier, the General Manager, Water
Utilities Department, city of Tempe.
Thank you.
Mr. Gallier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Flake.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to your subcommittee
today.
As I am sitting here listening to all of the previous
speakers, I realize what we have been hearing from are our
protectors and our rescuers in the event of a terrorist attack.
I guess I am here to be the target, to represent the target
community.
Mr. Horn. You are right. You are right. We have not had a
lot of testimony on the water resource situation.
Mr. Gallier. It is a significant issue, albeit quiet one,
in the background, and we appreciate that.
I think an example of the whole thing in a nutshell is all
of us have bottles of what we call ``Tempe tap'' here at our
places, and I think all of us drink this water without a
moment's hesitation or thought about its safety. And our goal
essentially in the water industry is to make sure that
continues to be the case.
With the help of the good folks up here and with our
representatives in Congress and other legislators and councils,
hopefully we can continue that.
I wanted to just briefly summarize the written comments
that I have already submitted. It is important to remember that
in the water industry, this issue did not begin for us on
September 11th. By Presidential directive in 1996, as you are
aware, there was an intergovernmental cooperative effort begun
by Executive Order 13010.
That was expanded in 1998 with the creation of the National
Infrastructure Protection Center. Eight key critical sectors
were identified in the country, water supply being one of those
key sectors, and we have been working every since to try to
develop programs that will allow us to protect our water
systems around the country, not just in any particular area.
One of the key elements of that is gradually coming to
fruition now is a joint effort between the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and one of our professional associations, the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies. They have
coordinated very closely with the FBI, with the Department of
Energy's Sandia Labs especially, CDC, and many other Federal
agencies to help fine tune our planning and preparation for
potential terrorist acts.
As you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of
the session, it is not a groundless concern, especially with
what just happened a few weeks ago. Those of us in the water
industry are very aware of that and very concerned.
Some of the key points I would like to make is that as EPA
and our own association are working together, one of their key
outcomes they are working on is a system called the Water
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or Water ISAC. Similar
to some of the agency communication systems that you have heard
spoken about earlier, but with a focus on water.
That is a very important piece of communication technology
that we need to be in place as soon as possible. Those agencies
are working very closely on it. There are a few issues that
still need to be ironed out, not the least of which, as was
mentioned earlier. We have the same issue, and that is
obtaining security clearances at the proper level for the
proper people in our associations so that they can get the
information from the FBI and other national security agencies
as soon as possible and then adequately get that information
out to the rest of us.
There are some financing questions that need to be
addressed as well. There has been funding provided to create
this system. We are now struggling to figure out how to pay for
it for ongoing O&M, as was mentioned here.
We may do that by subscription, essentially charging all of
us in the industry a certain amount to support that, and if
that is what it takes, then we will certainly do that.
Definitely more research and development is needed on the
full range of water system security threats that we face now.
EPA's ongoing efforts have been helpful. They have allocated or
potentially allocated $15 million this year in their proposed
budget or next year's budget. That is a good start. We would
like to see that continue and even be increased.
There are efforts by a number of Federal research agencies
and the American Water Works Association Research Foundation
that are using some of the funds from the past and will be
using those that are available this year.
I am participating on a Professional Advisory Oversight
Committee for an international study that is looking at one
aspect of that right now with representatives of Portland,
Oregon water authority and also the city of New York.
So we are not just looking nationally at this issue, but
outside of our boundaries as well.
Governor Whitman's announcement last Tuesday that EPA is
releasing $90 million in emergency grant funds directly to
water systems to help pay for vulnerability assessments is
greatly appreciated. I was notified by phone last week by EPA
Region IX in San Francisco, and I appreciate the direct
contact.
As was mentioned here, I appreciate the fact that funding
is coming directly to us. We do not have to go through three or
four layers of bureaucracy.
We appreciate the efforts that EPA is also making with
Sandia Labs. DOE's research arm at Sandia is doing tremendous
work for the water industry. They are beginning to plan now
some train the trainer sessions, which a number of
professionals in the industry can then use to come back and
disseminate that knowledge very rapidly.
Those sessions will begin next month. Already the city of
Phoenix and the city of Tempe have volunteered in this area to
provide space for that training process to occur when that is
complete.
Our city's planning efforts are coordinated, of course, by
our fire and police departments, as Phoenix's are. We work
closely with county, State, and Federal emergency planning and
response personnel. We have had a number of emergency drills,
just like most cities. Our latest one was last October, I
believe, and that scenario was based on a biological or
chemical terrorist attack at a sporting event, which we have
some experience with sporting events in Tempe.
Individually, our facilities are upgrading our electronic
and physical security systems. We are reassigning staff to
security planning and patrol duties. The leader in the valley,
without question, has been the city of Phoenix Water Services
Department. I believe they deserve special recognition for
their efforts in this area.
We are also, like everyone else, revisiting all of the
design, construction and operating standards, plans, and
assumptions because we realize now that this is not a short-
term issue. It is long-term. We have to rethink the way that we
not only deliver our water services to our customers, but also
how we bring the water into our facilities, how we treat the
water, and then how we distribute it and store it.
The ultimate question that we face in the water industry is
what is the appropriate level of security that is needed. How
much of our limited financial resources should we be prepared
to expend on security when we as an industry also face
significant costs to meet other, ever more stringent State and
Federal water quality requirements?
As an example, in Tempe's case, the new arsenic standards
that were recently issued have very little effect on us. Our
surface water supplies were blessed to have supplies that are
very low naturally in arsenic.
Many of the cities around us, however, rely on
substantially more groundwater than we do that does have high
arsenic levels. There is at least one city in the valley that I
know of that is facing at least $60 million in capital
construction to be able to meet those standards.
I am not saying that to question the validity or the
necessity of those standards. I think that is important for
public health, but it is important to remember that the water
industry is facing challenges on several fronts at the same
time.
So, of course, like everyone else, we are asking for more
money. That usually comes through the form of the State
revolving loan fund program, and again, to echo what Mayor
Rimsza said earlier, and so did my counterparts here in local
government, frequently portions of those funds when they are
available have set-asides for rural areas where the level of
income is much lower and the need is great.
We need to look at security issues from a different
perspective. The targets primarily for terrorist activity are
going to be the larger urban areas. I would only ask that you
remember it is not just one particular city in an urban area.
Phoenix is like other major urban areas around the country, and
within this area, we have eight cities with populations greater
than 100,000.
So we would suggest that be looked at as a metropolitan
area basis, and that a set-aside in the Federal SRF be made of
about 15 percent, if possible, for metropolitan areas around
the country
so that we have a quicker access to that money that we can use
for security improvements and other things that we will need.
With that, I will end my statement and be happy to answer
any questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallier follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you very much. That is helpful, and
we will get back to it in the question period.
I have asked Representative Flake to introduce our last
presenter.
Mr. Flake. Well, thank you, Congressman Horn and Mr.
Chairman.
I wanted to introduce Mr. Stewart. I have been familiar
with him and his company recently. Just to put it bluntly, I
have been very impressed with what they have done.
Right after September 11th, Mr. Stewart got a call saying
things were needed in New York, particularly to restore
cellular phone service there, and within hours he put together
a team of eight men and drove, I think it took 49 hours or so.
Mr. Stewart. About 48 hours, yes.
Mr. Flake. And with two trucks and all of the equipment,
eight men, driving across the country, arrived, and it was
fairly chaotic, as I understand, for quite a while there, but
within 4 days working nonstop, they were able to restore
cellular service there by putting up some microwave facilities,
and I just want to commend him publicly for that and his
company for what he did, and I look forward to his testimony.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Chairman.
I guess probably what I will do is probably create more
questions than I have answers or needs from the private sector.
We have listened all day to these fine organizations that are
established, and they do a fantastic job. We have watched them
in New York City on September 11th when we were back there.
Like the Congressman said, we got a call and asked us to go
back to New York and deliver some equipment back there and see
if we could not aid them in bringing a cellular system back up
for one of our carriers that we worked for here in the valley.
No information other than just what we could get off the
media, over telephones as we were traveling. We put a team
together pretty rapidly. What do we need when we get back
there, like our urban response teams, so organized and have
everything ready to go to deal with the actual scene itself?
But when they break it, we have got to go fix it, and as we
talked today, everybody is very concerned with this 800
megahertz, which we are working on that presently right now.
Communications play such a vital role to America. A question to
you is: What would have happened in Manhattan if Wall Street
would have opened up the next morning business as usual? The
reason why they could not, they could not communicate with the
world.
Our business today communicates globally. It is a very,
very vital role in emergency tasks, in our business, in our
commerce today around the world.
It is a very complex system, and 99 percent of it is
operated and owned by publicly held companies, and privately
held companies like myself that design it and build it and
maintain it for these companies with all of the large ones.
But like Congressman Flake said, we got a call, and we
headed for New York. We had never been asked to do this before.
We never responded to a disaster. So we got back to New Jersey.
There we found out there was no land-line base available, and
what their cell system operated on was a hard-line system.
Copper wire was the way they hauled their cell sites around.
Out here in the West we hurl microwave shots around here
because we're so sprawled across the State that we do not have
copper; we do not have hard-lines. So we use microwave.
Everywhere you look there is a microwave dish hauling our
systems around the country.
So when we got back there, all of the copper lines had been
destroyed in the neighborhood of literally millions when the
World Trade Center went down.
So we went into their command center for the customer that
we were working for, and it was somewhat chaotic, but this had
never happened in America before. So, yes, it kind of
devastated everybody.
We went to work the first day, went into the city; finally
got into the city. Access was an absolute nightmare. Here was a
bunch of guys from Arizona. Who are these folks? What are they
going to do with the microwave specialists?
Well, we did have enough thought that we said, OK, let's
take everything but the kitchen sink when we leave. We took all
of our spectrum analyzers, all of our equipment to sweep cell
sites, to install, all of the materials that we could haul in
our service trucks that we pulled the equipment back to New
York with.
Sitting in the war room, we finally started calling it, we
had a map of Manhattan, and we had an entire system that was
completely dead. There was some movement being made in it, some
additional switching facilities that had been hauled into the
area and were being tapped onto the switch, but nothing could
be brought back up because the local phone company was trying
to bring copper back up.
Well, copper was not coming up, and there is a great deal
of it that will not be up for several more months.
So then we sat down, and we sat actually on a chalkboard in
general conversation. How are we going to put this system back
together?
That is when we came up with, well, we do not know your
system, but you have got cell sites here and here and here. Do
you have access into these buildings? We can put you a
microwave shop. We can haul it back through what we call a
backbone system, a trunking system, fire these cell sites up to
these various building tops and carry it out of the city that
way and get you to a switching facility.
Sure, that will be fine.
So we went out to try to accomplish that task, and we ran
into building owners that asked why we were there, what we were
going to do, who was going to insure this installation while we
are there, what is it going to look like on our building, is it
really necessary, where are your credentials at, problem after
problem after problem.
It got to the point where we were afraid to leave what we
had called the soft-line with our trucks and our equipment
because we were afraid we would not get back in. Sometimes they
would let us in; sometimes they wouldn't. We'd have to go
around to another. Obstacle after obstacle that we ran into,
with government agencies sitting there doing their job, but not
allowing us to move freely through the city.
A job that should have taken probably 1\1/2\ to 2 days is
what we would have done here in the Phoenix metropolitan area
with our highrises. It wound up taking us about 4 days.
We commandeered a broken grocery cart, a hand-truck we
found behind a building, and that is the way we moved around
through the city, like a bunch of thieves actually.
So I guess in closing, like I said, my story is probably
going to have more questions and more problems because this is
the first time we have been involved in this.
What do we need to do to organize this? We have just a
multitude of talent across the United States that is going to
have to respond to these needs. When Phoenix goes down, they
are going to have to call us because we built it. We will play
a large role in the 800 megahertz for Phoenix fire and police
and civil defense here in Phoenix.
What are we going to do to organize that so that we know
where our resources are? We know where the fire department is.
We know where HAZMAT is at. We know where the Phoenix Police
Department is. We know where DPS and all of these agencies are.
But who knows where our talent is to bring this stuff back up
when it is actually needed?
Who knows where Roy is at? And his staff are absolutely the
best of the best when it comes to microwave people. Who knows
where they are and do we need them?
So I will close this on the last and try to wrap this thing
up, but I do appreciate you guys giving us the opportunity to
come and bring some of the problems that the private sector had
in New York City and probably some that may occur again, but
maybe with the help of this committee right here and these
hearings, we might be able to start reaching out and saying,
``Hey, maybe we do have a problem here. Let's organize this and
see if we cannot get it together.''
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stewart follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Horn. Well, we thank you.
That is a real fascinating story. Has that been picked up
by the press?
Mr. Stewart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. Do you have some questions you would like to ask
first?
Mr. Flake. Yes.
Mr. Horn. Please do.
Mr. Flake. Just a few.
Mr. Stewart, given what you encountered there and kind of
taking from the first panel, Mr. Posner talked about strategies
to coordinate, some of the problems as we have heard are
resource problems and others are communication and
coordination.
On the communication and coordination, a national strategy
as opposed to a Federal strategy is what has been posed. How do
you people who work with it on the ground, how do you see that
playing out?
The notion is that you do not rely on the Federal
Government coming in and posing a solution and saying that this
agency with this agency or you are going to be supporting it
with this agency or that. What would be the appropriate
vehicle, an association of State legislators or some
association of police forces out there?
I guess I will close it, if you could answer that briefly,
your thoughts about a national strategy as opposed to a Federal
strategy and how that might help on the ground in a situation
because we have had a real world situation that Mr. Stewart has
encountered; how that would have perhaps helped in that regard.
Mr. Posner. I have been impressed hearing just about the
vitality of our system. I mean, the Federal Government, for
example, has not recognized the security problems of the water
systems, but you have the Association of Water Resource
Managers that is really taking a proactive role in this system.
I think we are seeing a lot of that in the emergency
management community, how with some support from FEMA the State
and local managers are taking this problem on themselves and
developing professional standards, certification procedures.
I am not familiar with the communications area, but somehow
being able to--and I am reading the really wonderful report
that this plays, this effort that you worked on together, and I
am familiar with some of the other people there, and they are
all first rate people, and you have really laid out an agenda
that really does not just focus on the Federal Government.
I mean, certainly we can facilitate, but it is, I think, a
responsible strategy to say that this is really national
problems and not Federal, and part of that is getting private
sector. Part of it is getting the professional association
officials together to really do something about some of these
problems.
Mr. Flake. Specifically, Mr. Stewart, if you were to
encounter a situation like this again, say we had a similar
attack in Chicago or L.A. and you were called to go in again.
What do you think we have learned already that would make it
easier for you to get around and do in a day what you had to
spend 4 days doing?
Mr. Stewart. Well, after myself and my staff got back to
Chandler there to our office, we started having general
conversations, and it just about has not stopped to this day.
What if, what if, what if?
Because nobody knows anything about us, we started kind of
putting together our own plan. What if we had some kind of an
org. chart put together around the country that says, OK,
Stewart Electric & Communications. They live in Chandler,
Arizona, and we do happen to know for their staff. Now, I went
out and bought five cows since New York. On my own I have spent
several thousands and thousands of dollars to put together a
team of emergency what we call cows, cells on wheels, which is
what we pulled back to New York and which New York is operating
heavily on right now.
Mr. Flake. I thought you were talking about cattle.
Mr. Stewart. Yes.
Mr. Flake. What in the world?
Mr. Stewart. A cow. I used that so easy. It is a cell site
on wheels. It is a portable cell site, and we hauled those back
to New York.
And so we went to the effort or the expense now that we
have actually purchased five, and we have them sitting in our
yard right now just in the event that these things or another
situation like this was to happen again.
You talk about your water system. A lot of the water
systems and pumps, sewer treatment plants and what have you,
they are all hauled or a lot of them are hauled via some type
of broad band radio system.
You can simply take and knock one of those radios off the
ground, and until a serviceman gets out there and manually
opens or closes that pump, you have got a major problem going
on.
Our communications within our own home jurisdiction,
Phoenix, Mesa, Tempe, this entire State right here relies so
heavily. If you want terrorist activity to really become a pain
in your side, let him start working on our communication
system, and he will drive us crazy. You can already see what is
going on with our Internet with the hackers and viruses going
around there.
It is very simple to get to these systems. They are on
mountaintops. They are on rooftops. They are sitting out on a
pump station for the CAP with a little Aggie sitting out there
that controls that entire station out there.
What we need is once this happens and our terrorist
activity may become small like this to where it's just an
ongoing nagging, going on type of situation to where we know
where we can get the resources and we know where we can find
the people that can respond to that.
A pre-qualifying list. Take my key employees, the people
that would really count. The eight that I had back in New York
are the best of the best, like I said, when it comes to
telecommunications or microwave and analyzing problems with
taking data and moving it through air. I have got eight
individuals that just are second to none.
Those people to be qualified and somebody to know where
they are if they are needed. Something simple as starting at
the ground roots there and start building a private sector
because we are the one that is going to have to fight this war
when it goes on.
Mr. Flake. Just to followup on that, Mr. Spencer, we talked
about problems of communication and coordination between the
Federal Government and the State, the State and the local
agencies. Is there sufficient coordination and cooperation
right now between local agencies and the private sector, as Mr.
Stewart who actually will come in and be partners with various
governments in this?
Is there need for that?
Mr. Spencer. There is much more that could be done. We work
real closely with the utilities, but I did not know of his
existence. You know, we are aware of cell on wheels, but we
would have gone to the telephone company to find those, and
hopefully you are on their list.
Mr. Stewart. And whether that list would ever get back to
somebody like you guys, you know, it is hard to tell. That is
why I keep kind of going back to an Arizona, if you will, or
national and expanding from there. Some type of org. chart.
If we have a major disaster in telecommunications, let's go
over here in this category over here and let's start seeing who
does this and who can put response teams together on that.
Now we have got DPS and the military and everybody to
protect us and secure that area off, but we have got to get
that thing rebuilt. Well, just an awfully lot of our
communications throughout this country and the world is built
by the private sector. The systems that we have here in Arizona
we know more about than the people that have their name on them
because we build them. We maintain them and service them for
those companies.
Mr. Posner. If I could just maybe add one other point.
Mr. Flake. Go ahead.
Mr. Posner. In response, Congressman Flake, to your
concern, there is a national infrastructure protection council
that is established under Presidential directives, and they do
have subcommittees of working level groups that are supposed to
be pulling together exactly what you are saying at the national
level, recognizing like we did in Y2K that this is not a
Federal--it is a national problem, and that the private sector
really commands the key resources.
They are supposed to be pulling together strategy, No. 1,
to map out who does own this problem. Who are the key actors
and what are the strategies?
You know, that is something that, again, in the
communications area across the board there are efforts that are
underway to do that, I believe. We have not looked at that
particular sector, but you are pointing up an important----
Mr. Stewart. But I believe that is starting being built at
the State level and then growing to the national level, but in
order for it to happen, we have got disaster recovery programs
that were put out for our wireless communications field
industry several years ago, which I was very proud to work on
one with one of our carriers and played a major role in
developing and designing and being ready to respond to them.
People tend to go to sleep. People tend to forget about
this. So that if we do not go from a Federal level and maybe a
Federal mandate and then start at the State level and have it
grow and then connect to a national and then a Federal level,
as Americans we get kind of comfortable with the fact that,
well, that happened in New York and now we have got baseball
season getting ready to start. We get lax.
I do not want to see this after what we went through in
Manhattan for 4 days of hell back there. If this should happen
again, we should be a lot more prepared in the private sector
than what we are right now.
Mr. Horn. Let me pursue another question that is, I guess,
three decades ago. I was a university president, and we
participated in the emergency situations because we had our own
State police force on the campus. It was a campus the size of
Arizona State University, and you have got a very fine
university.
And we did these exercises, and the problem was nobody
could communicate with anybody because we did not have the
frequencies. At that time it was all on the East Coast, and you
had to squeeze them out in order to have our people.
Now, our first hearing was in Nashville, Tennessee a few
weeks ago, and part of the situation was in response to a
question like this, that the military helicopters, and they
have a major I think 82nd Airborne fairly near, and the
civilian helicopters had a completely different frequency. They
could not talk to each other. We went through the trauma
sections of the hospital there, and Vanderbilt, just like
Arizona State, is a very fine university.
But if you cannot get the communications out there, it is
just a blind corridor, and I wonder what it is doing at either
the national level, the State level or trying to get--what do
you need? I saw here interoperability of radio communications
and the 700 public safety spectrum.
Is that so difficult? Are we running out of some of those
frequencies and all or levels of frequency? And how do we deal
with that? What have we dealt with in the State of Arizona from
Flagstaff to there?
Mr. Harris. I do not know about communications, but locally
we are switching over to the 800 megahertz band so that we
would be able to communicate with fire. Mesa, Tempe,
Scottsville, Phoenix, all of those agencies would be on the
same frequencies, and they would be able to communicate at
least locally.
Second, 700, as I understand it, is the next group of bands
of frequencies that are becoming available. When you get into
that group of bands, it is not that there is not enough bands
for public safety and for the private sector. It is how they
are arranged.
And, again, I am not an expert in this area, but when they
are not arranged appropriately, you can get cross-talk between
the bands, and it stops the communications.
So it is more when we look at the FCC as I understand it.
It is not in how many bands there are, but in how they are
arranged that is going to be critical so that we do not have
that cross-talk with private bands.
Mr. Horn. Could it be jammed also easily or just the cross-
talk does it?
Mr. Harris. You are out of my area of expertise already.
Mr. Spencer. Just experience, it is kind of a good news/bad
news type thing. The 800 megahertz trunking looks like it has
the potential to tie a lot of us together, and on the fly we
can create talk groups almost, you know, within minutes.
The bad news is that it does not work well in buildings. I
am not sure what they were using in New York City, but I
understand within the Towers they lost communications on the
radios, and I am not sure if it was because of the frequencies,
but it is definitely a problem within our own command center.
Our EOC, we have to have an internal repeater just to be
able to make the frequency go out.
Second of all, there are certain cell phone companies that
have close frequencies that interfere with it. I know, I
believe, it was Phoenix PD was on a SWAT mission and they had
to pull back because they lost communications because they were
close to one of these cell sites and it blanked out their 800
megahertz.
Mr. Horn. Yes. We were told that there was a real problem
where cellular phones just went out. So is there in between the
fire departments, the police departments, the States, and the
FEMAs--do you know anybody who is working on this or are they
just saying, well, it is a bad problem?
Mr. Spencer. Well, on the interference side of things, they
are looking at it. I think part of the problem is that
particular cell company that is having the problems, they are
also within that close band, and that is where you are getting
some of that crossover.
In this area, it is kind of a catch as catch can. As soon
as the cities and towns switch to 800 megahertz, there is a
wireless committee that is somewhat organizing it, and again,
there is a bit of a problem. Some of them have bought the
analogue system and the newer systems coming on are digital. So
the older analogue systems are now going to have to somehow
convert or get translators that will turn that into digital so
that they will continue to talk on that and be able to talk to
each other.
It is as close, I think, as we have ever gotten to
something that will help us all talk together.
Another system that is out there that I know our local
National Guard's community support team has is a magical band
that will tie some of these frequencies together, but I think
it is limited to two or three frequencies at a time. It will
make it so that you are able to talk to each other as though
you are on the same frequency.
Expansion of that type of equipment might not hurt.
Mr. Horn. Staff tells me that the Federal Aviation
Administration has instituted a policy that would free up the
space for emergency officials, while limiting cell space for
the public.
Oh, OK. It is the Federal Communications Commission. That
is what I thought.
So that would make some sense. Do you think so?
Mr. Harris. I have been told the FCC is also conducting
hearings on the problem.
Mr. Horn. Good.
Mr. Stewart. We will make one suggestion that 800 megahertz
band be looked at very, very close.
Mr. Flake. I had one question for Mr. Gallier.
Initially right after September 11th, we were warned of
chemical and biological attacks and were told the water systems
were certainly vulnerable.
Later on there seem to be kind of a pull-back, that, no,
there's really nothing that they can do. It would be very
difficult and they would have to be very, very sophisticated at
that to use the water systems to terrorize.
What have we settled on? How big of a threat is it?
You mentioned that you have to weigh or balance your meter
resources to protect against it. How much of a threat do you
think it is in Arizona? Have we got enough water to matter
here?
Mr. Gallier. Congressman, I think it is kind of a Gordion
knot, if you will. I think the initial statements that said
there was little risk were really based on an assumption that
an attack would occur within the raw water supply itself or at
the point where the raw water supply comes into the treatment
facility.
You have facilities like mine that treat approximately 50
million gallons of water a day per facility. It would take a
lot of poison or biological toxin to have an impact, more than
most people could really do effectively.
There are other risks though. A number of groups are
beginning to raise the issue of storage, large quantity storage
of high pressurized gas cylinders filled with chlorine gas.
It's actually in a liquid form because it is under so much
pressure.
Thousands of pounds of chlorine are stored at water and
waste water facilities throughout the country, throughout the
world. All of our systems of protection are designed
essentially around protection against human error or accidental
release. They are really not adequately designed; the systems
are not adequately designed to protect against a significant
terrorist attack.
That is one issue that I think as an industry we are very
concerned about.
That does not directly affect the quality of the drinking
water. It directly affects the areas immediately around any
facility where they are stored. So there is a significant issue
there.
The other potential is the issue of, frankly, contamination
happening intentionally within the distribution system. As
Chairman Horn indicated at the beginning, that is a major
concern that we have in the industry, and I am going to be
honest. We do not have clear-cut answers to that right now. My
suggestions that significant additional research and
development are needed are really focused on that area as much
as anything else.
So when someone talks about dumping water in a canal or
poisons in a canal or into a lake or some other water source,
that is really not where the threat is. The threat is in the
distribution and, alternately, the physical threat of what
happens if the hazardous chemicals that are used in some places
in the treatment system are released.
Mr. Spencer. We actually ran an exercise where we modeled a
plume from a chlorine tanker at a water treatment plant, and it
put out a plume over ten miles long, over a mile wide, and that
was at what is known as an IDLH level, or immediately dangerous
to life and health. If you are in it a very short-time, you
have permanent damage.
So it is a huge potential that is out there for an attack.
Mr. Gallier. And I would add in most of those cases, there
are technological alternatives available, but they are not
cheap.
To give you an example, I have done some back-of-the-
envelope work with our engineering staff and others to look at
what it would take to convert our two water treatment plants.
It is just one city serving approximately 170,000 people.
We could be looking at costs as high as $30 million in
capital to do that, and then when you look at the operating
component of that, I pay for chlorine right now roughly $50,000
to $60,000 a year on average. It is not a high dollar item
within our budget.
But to replace that with some of these other alternatives,
you would easily be talking in excess of $1 million a year. You
start multiplying that through other threats that we may face,
that is an issue that we have to be concerned about.
Mr. Horn. I am told that there are some processes and
chemicals that could get the poisons out of water and get
purification is that pretty well known throughout those who
have your responsibility on the protection of the water
resources?
Mr. Gallier. Well, Congressman, that depends on what the
threat would be, what type of chemical or biological
contaminant would be in place. Some are relatively easy to deal
with. The organism itself might be very hazardous, but the
treatment necessary to render it harmless is relatively
straightforward.
Some have a minor health effect, but are very difficult to
control. There are many, many, many variables that we have to
deal with.
Mr. Horn. When you get done cleaning up Arizona, you should
probably come to Washington, DC. The Corps of Engineers puts in
absolutely wonderful purified water, and it goes through a
distribution system of the city of Washington which we all have
given up on, and we just now--well, Speaker Gingrich, when he
got into power, he said, ``You can get the bottled water for
your constituents, but you cannot really drink it.''
But we all drink it. So that is a problem, too, in terms of
distribution systems.
Mr. Gallier. Distribution system is a key part of this.
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Mr. Gallier. That is why it is very important that the
research and development that is ongoing right now continue.
I do not think there is a single problem we face that there
is not a fix for. In some cases it is going to take some time
and in other cases it is going to take time and money. But
there are fixes out there for all of these issues, and there is
no reason to believe that there is any substantial risk of that
type of attack at this time.
But it is important to recognize that the risk is there,
and we do need to recognize it, and we need to deal with it.
Mr. Posner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add.
Mr. Horn. Yes.
Mr. Posner. The discussion here is illustrative of some
broader concerns we have addressed, which is that homeland
security and the costs of paying for what we are dealing with
are substantial and really kind of bump up against other
priorities. And we have talked about the need for agencies.
The Coast Guard faces this, for example. They have had a
long established mission to trace down drug dealers and others
dealing with public safety. They are having to really rethink
because they have a totally new mission protecting the ports
now.
They have had to pull their boats back in, and they have to
face some painful tradeoffs because money is not unlimited, and
particularly in State and local budgets, or the Federal level.
How do you do that? How do you go about reassessing your
priorities?
And that may be the process that ultimately water systems
have to rethink because you have many standards that you are
trying to comply with for safe drinking water, and now you have
this new set of demands.
I know that we challenged OMB and the Federal agencies to
think more explicitly about that.
Mr. Horn. How realistic a threat would airborne toxins be
to the area?
And reports have confirmed or I do not know if they have
really confirmed, but they have been considered that the
terrorists of the September 11th situation explored that
option.
Mr. Gallier. I probably would not be the appropriate person
to try to answer that because that is a different medium
entirely.
Mr. Horn. Not just allergy off the trees, but if they are
put in dust cropping and all of that.
Mr. Gallier. Oh, you mean an airborne addition?
Mr. Horn. Yes, airborne. Sorry.
Mr. Gallier. I see. You know, we have had some concern
about that in the industry. There were reports early on of crop
dusters going in low over reservoirs, and then combined with
reports that some of the Al Qaida cell members were trying to
get information on how to operate crop dusters and all of that.
Personally I think that if the use intended would be to
contaminate a water supply, I think the risk is pretty low,
again, for that same reason.
It is the old dilution is the solution to pollution
argument. It works the same for poisons and toxins. You would
have to have a very, very high amount, a large quantity amount
relative to the amount of water that is being treated in the
system in order to have an effect.
But if the goal is to introduce fear into a population,
which is one of the major goals of terrorism, then you could
have some effectiveness in doing that. Anything you do to cause
fear in a population is going to have some benefit if that is
your goal.
As I said at the beginning, people want to be able to
depend on their water being safe when they open the tap, and
right now it is. Our goal is to make sure that it continues to
be.
Mr. Horn. Any other questions?
Well, let me just say we thank you very much for this
Friday that I am sure your families are waiting for you at
home.
I want to thank the people that helped us prepare this.
Steve Jewett, the Governor's Homeland security coordinator.
Marcus Aurelius, the emergency management coordinator for the
city of Phoenix. Shannon Wilhelmsen, director of government
relations for the city of Tempe. Amber Wakeman, the government
relations management assistant for the city of Tempe. Skip
Neeley, communications and media relations for this fine city.
Greg Wolfe, communications and media relations for the city of
Tempe. Josh Lader, the executive assistant to Office of Mayor
Neil Giuliano's office. Mark Minieri, intern, Office of the
Mayor. And the court reporter today is Allison Long, and we
thank you. It has been a long afternoon, and we are delighted
to have you here.
Our own staff, Mr. J. Russell George is staff director and
chief counsel, back of me. To my left, Henry Wray is the senior
counsel. And Justin Paulhamus is majority clerk. Other
congressional staff are Steve Voeller, chief of staff to
Congressman Jeff Flake. Pat Curtin, office manager for
Congressman John Shadegg.
We appreciate all of the help that we got. So thank you
all, especially when you have come both close and far.
So if you have any thoughts, write us a letter. We will put
it in the hearing. What we are trying to do is when we get to
about maybe 15 or 20 cities, we want to put that in a report,
and hopefully it will be useful.
It is not going to be useful unless we have your ideas
because we do not know all of this stuff, and we do not pretend
to. That is why we hold these hearings, and so we would welcome
any thought you have got.
You might say, ``Oh, well, they already know that.''
Well, often we do not know it. So we would like your help.
With that, I thank Representative Flake for being here. I
have seen him on the floor. He is a great representative for
the State of Arizona. He is an eloquent speaker, more than most
of his class certainly.
We will not tell the rest of them that. [Laughter.]
But it is true. I have watched him do these things, and so
you have got a good voice in Washington, and we are glad to
have him here.
Thank you for taking all of the time when he could be
shaking constituents' hands.
So thank you. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee meeting was
adjourned.]
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